Number 167, August 1999
**Partnership For Peace (PFP):*After the Washington Summit and Kosovo
by Jeffrey Simon

Conclusions- The NATO Washington Summit and the war in Kosovo    pose serious challenges for the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in implementing reforms among    its 24 partners and dealing with the expectations of the nine partners seeking NATO    membership. 
- Because the nine partners of the Membership Action    Plan (MAP) have heightened expectations of NATO membership, the continuing lack of an    invitation could lead to disillusionment. This could lead to cleavage among MAP partners. 
- Lessons learned by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech    Republic suggest that the nine MAP partners may find their human and material resources    overwhelmed in harmonizing NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGs) to their defense    establishments and in responding to the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative. The result    could develop two-tier armed forces in the MAP states, one tier designed to function    within the PFP, the second developed according to national defense, but neither able to    function well as a whole. 

 A "security earthquake" shook Europeduring the late 1980s and early 1990s. Limited crises reappeared and began to hauntEurope, making NATO look outward and take steps to project stability—its newmechanism was cooperation.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),formed in November 1991, brought former adversaries together to talk and to beginmultilateral cooperation, not partnership. The emerging political dialogue helped Centraland East European (CEE) politicians to better understand defense requirements; they slowlybegan to realize that defense encompassed more than just military issues (e.g., civilemergency planning, air space management, etc.) 
**PFP Genesis and Evolution

Partnership For Peace has undergone enormous changesince its inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Though some in CEE initially sawPFP as a palliative (no enlargement), PFP did move non-NATO members beyond dialogue andinto practical partnership. PFP developed a framework and process; it established the normthat partners should be "contributors" and marked a shift from purelymultilateral dialogue to bilateral (partner and Alliance) relationships in the form ofIndividual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and self-differentiation. It marked theestablishment of a wide environment of cooperation, to include the Planning and ReviewProcess (PARP), transparency, civil control/oversight of the military, and peace supportoperations. 

The July 1997 Madrid Summit made PFP more relevantand operational by introducing enhanced PFP and a second PARP cycle. It also marked theintroduction of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)—which replaced theNACC—and creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and NATO-UkraineCommission to keep Russia and Ukraine engaged in the partnership. It was also marked bythe invitation of three PFP states to join in membership talks with NATO.

By the April 1999 Washington Summit, Poland,Hungary, and the Czech Republic had joined NATO. The summit introduced programs to makePFP more operational and approved the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which for the firsttime mentioned PFP (para. 35) as an Alliance activity. It launched a Defense CapabilitiesInitiative to improve interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable,between Alliance and partner forces. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) and a third PARPcycle were intended to establish closer relations among partners and the Alliance forcommon operations.

NATO is developing an operational capabilitiesconcept (OCC) that should help to engage partners in future military operations byidentifying national or multinational forces that can be used in non-Article 5 activities.The OCC should be developed by autumn 1999 and will result in a pool of forces that canaugment NATO forces. 

The MAPs, a practical manifestation of the NATO(Article 10) Open Door policy, identify five partner activity areas (political andeconomic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal) that develop the capabilitiesneeded for membership. The MAP annual National Plan (ANPs) generated by each partner alloweach to set their own objectives and targets on preparations for possible futuremembership.

The PARP has been further enhanced so that it issimilar to the force planning procedures among the allies. Ministerial guidance setspartner target force goals to build capabilities and permits partner support elements tobe involved in exercise planning.

In sum, the Washington Summit poses seriouschallenges for PFP in the form of greater differentiation among the 24 partners (9 MAP and15 non-MAP). In addition, because it is implausible to admit nine new members in the nearterm, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) must successfully deal with the expectations andneeds of the MAP partners.
**External Challenges

The PFP future is challenged not only by internalfactors, such as how well partners implement reform, but also by the external environment.

Kosovo is one external factor that will affect thePFP future of some partners. For those opposed to NATO actions in Kosovo (e.g., Russia),the phrase "partnership for peace" now has a hollow ring. NATO actions reinforcetheir perception that it intends to interfere in national internal affairs. To change thisperception, NATO needs to make PFP a flexible forum to explain its policies and listen tothe views of those who may not share the same perspective. PFP is an open door to the restof the world; some partners argue that that door needs to remain two way.

Another external effect of the war in Kosovo on NATOpolitical decisions is the yet unanswered question of whether the war will become acatalyst for South East European enlargement or whether lessons learned from Kosovo by theNAC, at 19, could become an impediment to further enlargement.

Finally, another external factor is the so-called"new member" effect. For example, if new members fail to meet NATO force goalsand create the impression that enlargement has contributed to more "consumers"and not "producers" of security, NATO might well be hesitant to further enlargeanytime soon.
**Lessons Learned by the New NATO Members

Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic arethe only NATO members who have been PFP partners, their experience is particularly usefulin helping the Alliance deal with the partnership’s new challenges. One fundamentaldifference between the three new allies and current PFP partners is that each new membersignificantly downsized its armed forces *before* accession; experiencing many of theresulting social pains and political consequences prior to accession. Nevertheless, thesenew members have many of the same military challenges as the partners, such as dealingwith top-heavy officer corps, reducing conscription service, building noncommissionedofficer corps, and modernizing armed forces with scarce resources. Their experience canhelp the Alliance to more effectively implement PFP after the Washington Summit.

The experiences of the new members highlight threemajor gaps that could affect the PFP.

1. Political ambition drove the three new members;as a result, practical cooperation was merely a derivative of the process. The disparitybetween partner expectations and reality was large, even at accession on March 12, 1999.Their general staffs stressed military modernization; the defense ministries, thepolitical imperatives. Funds were scarce and bureaucratic hurdles immense. The entirepolitical system was not ready for NATO membership. But Poland, Hungary, and the CzechRepublic differed from the nine MAP partners in that they held an invitation since July1997, so their governments had political reason to justify devoting scarce resources tothe armed forces. 

2. Resource scarcity (in terms of trained personneland money) is similar. For the three new members, the PARP prepared roughly 15 percent ofthe armed forces to NATO standards, creating dislocations among the remaining forces andresulting in two-tier military structures. The enhanced (third cycle) PFP and DefenseCapabilities Initiative applies PARP procedures to all the MAP partners’ armedforces. This is not only a great burden to the MAP partners' nascent militaries anddefense ministries; it also creates an implicit NATO obligation toward partners who do notyet enjoy Article 5 protection.

3. The application and incorporation of NATO STANAGswere huge hurdles and overburdened the physical capacity of the new members. For example,it was an enormous effort for Hungary just to translate 621 STANAGs into Hungarian andbegin military harmonization. Poland was overwhelmed. Initially it needed to build fromjust three people to roughly 600 to harmonize the 50 initial NATO STANAGs, to roughly 700STANAGs by the Madrid Summit, to 1,500 by the time of accession. The 1,169 STANAGs nowmade available to MAP partners could likely overwhelm their limited physical capacities.
**MAP Partner Expectations and NATO Challenges

Compared to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,which downsized their armed forces before their entrance into NATO, the MAP partnerseither must still downsize (Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) or build new armed forces(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia). Albania and Macedonia fall into yet a thirdMAP subgroup. As reduced partner armed forces result in social dislocation, NATO maybecome the object of blame. 

NATO also needs to prevent two-tier armed forcesfrom developing among MAP partners. In their effort to achieve membership, the danger isthat MAP partner force distortions will result. For example, Slovakia is committing 5percent of its defense budget just to PFP. If NATO ultimately does not reciprocate with aninvitation, some MAP partners may end up with two-tier forces that will have littleutility in helping the partner deal with its own security.

Though NATO has stated that the MAP is a"practical manifestation of the Open Door," and that the MAP "does notimply any timeframe for any accession decision nor any guarantee of eventualmembership," each MAP partner wants to (or actually does) believe an invitation is inthe offing. Each to varying degrees believes that its commitment of scarce resources toaugment NATO will result in a reciprocal obligation. 

Hence, NATO needs to seriously consider just how farthe NAC at 19 can enlarge to accommodate the 7 to 9 MAP aspirants (to 26+?). If any or allof the MAP aspirants fail to receive membership invitations, they will likely bedisillusioned, resulting in a cleavage of the MAP partners from the Alliance. Some MAPpartners have expressed skepticism about NATO efforts to develop regional cooperation inthe Baltic region and South Eastern Europe and fear that efforts to regionalize willundermine the fulfillment of their enlargement objective. Hence, NATO needs to examineseriously how far it is willing to enlarge and to stress that MAP participation preparesthe political conditions for compatibility but does not guarantee enlargement.

The ANP assessment is important to NATO credibility.NATO feedback from the assessment to the MAPs needs to be rigorous and precise toencourage real military reform, to temper potentially false expectations, and to stressthat the MAP is a route to compatibility, not necessarily a route to membership. This maybe difficult, because existing NATO staff, already burdened by 19 (rather than 16) DefensePlanning Questionaire assessments, would be further burdened by providing nine additionalANP assessments. However, if NATO succeeds in providing rigorous appraisals that result inpartner reforms, it would imply a reciprocal NATO political commitment.

Another important NATO tool is the DefenseCapabilities Initiative. NATO has thus moved away from the merely diplomatic to being moreinvolved with the MAP partners’ force planning process. Some MAP partners actuallysee the DCI as leading to a de facto (vice de jure) operational Article 5. The multi-yearplanning guidelines help MAP partners sell their defense programs to their parliaments,but, to the degree to which each MAP partner succeeds, the partner perceives a reciprocalNATO obligation.
**Fifteen non-MAP Partners

The 15 non-MAP partners include Russia, Ukraine,Belarus, and Moldova; the neutrals—Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland; theCaucasus—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and Central Asia—Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

Russia at first did not want to participate in PFP,but as other countries joined they reluctantly approached the Alliance. Russia initiallyrefused to submit an IPP, then after six months submitted one they did not implement.Later, Russia negotiated a second IPP they have not implemented. So, relations exist onlyon an ad hoc basis working on specific activities. Russia has participated in IFOR/ SFORand participates on the EAPC and Political-Military Steering Group and other fora, butmostly as a silent partner. They have essentially withdrawn from PFP and the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council pending the outcome of the Kosovo conflict. It remains unclearwhat relations will be after they return.

Ukraine’s participation in PFP is the linkdrawing Ukraine to the West. Since 1994, 5,000 military officers have participated in PFPactivities (3,800 in PFP military exercises). During the second PARP cycle, Ukrainefulfilled 11 Interoperability Objectives thanks to NATO financial assistance.Participation in IFOR/ SFOR has been important; in March 1999, NATO established a trainingcenter and, in May, a liaison office in Kiev, which should give impetus to cooperation. Insum, PFP remains Ukraine’s main path to advance military training and to work withthe West.

Moldova, though a member of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, does not participate in any of its military or political-militarybodies. It pursues neutrality and does not see NATO enlargement as a threat to security.Moldova sees active participation in PFP as an important avenue for its future integrationin European security structures. Not surprisingly, scarcity of economic resources,language problems, and lack of experience constrain its participation in PFP activities.

Austria has been a member of the European Union (EU)since January 1995, after which it joined the PFP (February 1995). PFP plays an importantpolitical unifying function by allowing Austria to maintain neutrality while meeting itsEU peace support operations requirement. After the July 1997 Madrid Summit, Austria joinedthe EAPC, but delayed participating in enhanced PFP until November 1998. Austria now hasdiplomatic representation and staff elements at NATO headquarters. PFP is important inthat it is the only dimension in Austria’s security policy (aside from EU and CommonForeign and Security Policy) that has a consensus among all the political partiesrepresented in its Parliament.

Croatia is not yet a member of PFP because ofincomplete implementation of Dayton, return of refugees, and democratization. It has madeprogress in all three deficiencies and views the partnership as a path toward full NATOmembership. In sum, it plans to join the MAP.

Initial concerns about differentiated (MAP andnon-MAP) partnerships resulting from the Washington Summit may have been overdrawn. Manynon-MAP partner subgroups appear to exist. As a result, participation in the Partnershipmay atrophy for some (Russia, Belarus), but become more significant among others(Austria), particularly among partners with greater proclivity toward liberal democraticinstitutions.
**Recommendations- U.S. bilateral efforts will most likely be needed    in aiding partners' nascent defense ministries by training civilian and military personnel    to fulfill MAP and STANAG requirements. 
- U.S. defense assessments that have been conducted    for some MAP partners—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Romania—also    need to be provided to Slovakia and Slovenia.  
- NATO credibility on further enlargement and its    capability to encourage partner military reforms will hinge, in large measure, on how    thorough and critical its annual National Program Assessments are conducted. Hence, NATO    needs to ensure that adequate staff elements are available to meet the task. 

This paper is the result of a conference hosted by INSS and theSlovenian Defense Ministry Center for Strategic Studies held in Bled, Slovenia, on June4-5, 1999. Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow at INSS. He can be reached at (202)685-2367, by fax at (202) 685-2972, or by e-mail at [email protected]. Opinions, conclusions,and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author anddo not necessarily represent the views of National Defense University, the Department ofDefense, or any other government agency.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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