UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

UNIR, LLC, a Florida limited liability

company, and MARCONI 

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC., Case No.: 1:20-cv-22508-JEM

a Florida corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LAURA RICCI, a foreign national,

MIA GLOBAL BUSINESS SCHOOL,

S.L. d/b/a MIA DIGITAL UNIVERSITY,

a foreign entity, and RENATO

BEVILACQUA, a foreign national,

Defendants

_____________________________________

PLAINTIFFS’ CORRECTED1 EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING

SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA E-MAIL ON DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL 

RULE OF PROCEDURE 4(f)(3) AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), move for entry of an order 

authorizing service of process via e-mail on foreign defendants, Laura Ricci (“Ricci”), Renato 

Bevilacqua (“Bevilacqua”), and MIA Global Business School, S.L. d/b/a MIA Digital University 

(“MIA”), and in support thereof state:

INTRODUCTION

All three of the Defendants are located abroad in Spain and Italy. Although Plaintiffs have 

attempted to serve Defendant Ricci via international courier and through her Miami-based counsel, 

all efforts have proven fruitless. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not even possess an address for Defendant 

1 Plaintiffs’ only correction to the original Motion (ECF No. 10) is the attachment of a 

proposed order. See (ECF No. 11).

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Bevilacqua, who is also the President and Chief Executive Officer of Defendant MIA. 

Nevertheless, Ricci and Bevilacqua have used particular email addresses to communicate with one 

of the Plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, courts have long found that service of process via 

email is appropriate and reasonably calculated to provide the due process required. Such service 

would also not violate any international agreement. Accordingly, this Court should grant leave for 

Plaintiffs to effect service of process on Defendants via email under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(f)(3).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Defendant MIA is a Spanish limited liability company located outside this 

jurisdiction in Barcelona, Spain. See website at https://www.miauniversity.es/en/. 

2. Defendant Ricci is a foreign citizen residing in Italy. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6); see also 

(ECF No. 1-1 at § 4.2) (listing Ricci’s address in Rome, Italy); (ECF No. 1-2 at § 5.5) (same).

3. Defendant Bevilacqua is a foreign citizen residing in Spain with an unknown 

personal address. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8). 

4. Bevilacqua is Defendant MIA’s President and Chief Executive Officer. See

printout of Bevilacqua’s LinkedIn professional profile, attached as Exhibit “A”.

5. Plaintiff Marconi and Ricci have exchanged email communications whereby Ricci 

has communicated from the following email: laura.ricci2303@gmail.com. Decl. of Laura Arrufat 

Farell, attached as Exhibit “B”, at ¶¶ 4-8.

6. Plaintiff Marconi and Bevilacqua have exchanged email communications whereby 

Bevilacqua has communicated from the following email: italiaequa@gmail.com. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5, 8.

By way of reference, Bevilacqua lists himself as the Associate Founder of the entity “Italiaequa” 

on his LinkedIn professional profile. See Ex. A.

7. None of the emails Marconi sent to Ricci and Bevilacqua have ever been returned 

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as undeliverable. Id. at ¶ 10.

8. In a Consultancy Agreement that Ricci entered into with Proeduca Altus, S.A., an 

entity related to Plaintiffs, Ricci agreed to receive notice via email. Id. at ¶ 11.

9. In a Consultancy Agreement that Bevilacqua entered into with Proeduca Altus, S.A, 

Bevilacqua also agreed to receive notice via email. Id. at ¶ 12.

10. On June 18, 2020, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Lauren Luck, Miami-based counsel for 

Defendant Ricci, whether she would accept service of process on Ricci’s behalf. Email exchange 

between F. Sanchez and L. Luck, attached as Exhibit “C’.

11. The next day, Ms. Luck stated that she was not authorized to accept service on 

Ricci’s behalf. Id.

12. Thus, on June 19, 2020, Plaintiffs attempted to serve Defendant Ricci with process

through Federal Express International Priority mail at her last known address in Rome, Italy. See

Ricci service attempt documents, attached as Composite Exhibit “D”.

13. On June 22, 2020, Plaintiffs received a tracking update from Federal Express, 

which notified Plaintiffs that the package was undeliverable upon Ricci due to the address being 

incorrect. Id.

14. Spain is a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 

Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T 361, 658 

U.N.T.S. 163 (“Hague Service Convention”). 

15. Spain does not object to Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention. See Table 

Reflecting Applicability of Article 10 of the Hague Convention, attached as Exhibit “E”.

16. Italy is a signatory of the Hague Service Convention.

17. Italy does not object to Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention. Id.

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MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. The Legal Standard for Alternative Service under Rule 4(f)(3)

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(f) provides three methods for serving an individual 

in a foreign country [such as Ricci and Bevilacqua]: (1) by internationally agreed means, such as 

those authorized by the Hague Convention; (2) by a method that is reasonably calculated to give 

notice; or (3) by other means committed to a court’s discretion that are not prohibited by 

international agreement.” Northstar Moving Holding Company, Inc. v. Northstar Movers, No. 

0:19-cv-62176, 2019 WL 9093463, at *1 (S.D. Fla. December 17, 2019). Rule 4(f)(3) is not 

subsumed within or in any way dominated by Rule 4(f)’s other subsections; it stands 

independently, on equal footing.’ . . . The invocation of Rule 4(f)(3), therefore, is neither a last 

resort nor extraordinary relief.” Brookshire Bros, Ltd. v. Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc., No. 05-

CIV-21962, 2007 WL 1577771, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2007) (quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio 

Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Seaboard Marine Ltd., Inc. v. 

Magnum Freight Corp., No. 17-21815, 2017 WL 7796153, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) 

(“Despite coming last in the list of available methods of service in Rule 4(f), there is no indication 

from the plain language of the Rule that the three subsections, separated by the disjunctive ‘or,’

are meant to be read as a hierarchy.”). 

Under Rule 4(h), a foreign corporation may be served “at a place not within any judicial 

district of the United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual, except 

personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i).” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h). Thus, Plaintiffs may serve Defendant 

MIA under Rule 4(f)(3) just as they would an individual – that is, “by other means not prohibited 

by international agreement, as the court orders.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).

The decision to “issue an order allowing service by alternate means lies solely within the 

discretion of the district court.” Chanel, Inc. v. Lin, No. 08-23490-CIV, 2009 WL 1034627, at *1 

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(S.D. Fla. April 16, 2009) (citing Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 

353 F.3d 916, 921 (11th Cir. 2003)) (holding that a “district court ‘may’ direct alternate means of 

service of process [under Rule 4(f)(3)].”)). Rule 4(f)(3) merely “requires that service be (1) 

directed by the court; and (2) not prohibited by international agreement.” adidas AG v. Individuals, 

Partnerships and Unincorporated Assns., No. 19-cv-61264-UU, 2019 WL 7841807, *1 (S.D. Fla. 

May 23, 2019); see also Stat. Med. Dev., Inc. v. HTL-Strefa, Inc., No. 15-20590-CIV, 2015 WL 

5320947, *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2015) (same). “The Court can order alternative methods of 

service under Rule 4(f)(3) as long as such methods comport with due process.” adidas AG, 2019 

WL 7841807 at *1. Given the posture of the case in such instances, courts often grant such motions 

ex parte. See, e.g., id.; Cartier Int’l A.G. v. Beniashvili, No. 18-60060-CIV-ZLOCH, 2018 WL 

7283265 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2018); Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. Bijouxtiffany.cn, No. 18-61605-CIV, 2018 

WL 9848263 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2018). 

This Court should exercise its discretion and permit Plaintiffs to serve Defendants via 

email.

II. Service of Process on Defendants Does Not Violate an International Agreement

As a threshold matter, Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention provides that it “shall 

not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” Hague 

Convention at art. 1. As explained above, the sole address which Plaintiffs possess for Defendant 

Ricci is incorrect. Plaintiffs do not even a possess a personal address for Bevilacqua. Thus, their 

addresses are unknown and no international agreement even applies. See Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian, 

No. 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, *2 (S.D. Fla. April 29, 2010) (“the Hague Service 

Convention does not apply” where the addresses are “false, incomplete, or invalid”); see also BP 

Prods N. Am., Inc. v. Dagra, 236 F.R.D. 270, 271 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[T]he Hague Convention does

not apply when a defendant’s address is unknown.”). In such a case, “[i]nternational law . . . does 

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not prohibit Plaintiff[s] from serving [Ricci and Bevilacqua] via email.” Zhixian, 2010 WL 

1740695 at *2.

Assuming the Hague Service Convention even applies (which it does not for the two 

individual Defendants), “[t]o determine whether an international agreement prohibits service via 

e-mail . . . against a defendant in . . . Italy . . .and Spain, the Court [should] examine the Hague 

[Service] Convention” itself. adidas AG, 2019 WL 7841807 at *2. “The Court need not address 

whether the proposed method of service violates the laws of [Spain or Italy] because as long as 

court-directed service is ‘not prohibited by an international agreement,’ such service may be 

accomplished ‘in contravention of the laws of the foreign country.’” Id. at *4 n. 2 (S.D. Fla. May 

23, 2019) (quoting Zhixian, 2010 WL 1740695 at *2). 

Neither Spain nor Italy has “objected to the alternative means of service provided by 

[Article 10 of] the Hague Convention.” adidas AG, 2019 WL 7841807 at *2; see also SoF at ¶ 

[cites].

2

 In such instances, courts across the country have held that the Hague Service Convention 

does not prohibit service by email. See, e.g., North Face Apparel Corp. v. Aothenorthface.com, 

No. 19-cv-60952, 2019 WL 7708496, at *3 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2019) (“service by e-mail or 

internet communication does not, therefore violate an international agreement.”); Lexmark Intern., 

Inc. v. Ink Tech. Printer Supplies, LLC, 295 F.R.D. 259, 261 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“Various courts 

have agreed that service by email is not prohibited by the Hague Convention.”); Williams-Sonoma, 

2 Regardless, even if they had, “that objection is expressly limited to those means and does 

not represent an objection to other forms of service, such as e-mail. . . .” Id; see also Stat. Med. 

Dev., 2015 WL 5320947 at *3 (“This Court and many other federal courts have permitted service 

by electronic mail and determined that an objection to Article 10 of the Hague Convention, i.e., an 

objection to service through ‘postal channels’ does not equate to an express objection to service 

via electronic mail.”); F.T.C. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, *3 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (“where a signatory nation has objected to only those means of service 

listed in Article 10, a court acting under Rule 4(f)(3) remains free to order alternative means of 

service that are not specifically referenced in Article 10.”). 

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Inc. v. Friendfinder, Inc., No. C 06-06572, 2007 WL 1140639, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007) 

(“service by email is not prohibited by an international agreement.”).

III. Service Via E-Mail Will Comport with the Requirements of Due Process

Thus, the sole remaining question is whether service on Defendants via e-mail will “fulfill 

the requirements of due process under the United States Constitution.” adidas AG, 2019 WL 

7841807 at *3. “Constitutional due process requires only that service of process provide notice 

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Zhixian, 2010 WL 1740695

at *3. 

Here, Plaintiff Marconi and Ricci have exchanged email communications whereby Ricci 

has communicated from laura.ricci2303@gmail.com. SoF at ¶ 5. UNIR and Bevilacqua have 

likewise exchanged email communications whereby Bevilacqua has communicated from 

Italiaequa@gmail.com. Id. at ¶ 6. None of the emails Marconi sent to Ricci and Bevilacqua have 

ever been returned as undeliverable. Id. at ¶ 7. Moreover, Ricci and Bevilacqua have expressed 

a willingness to be notified of legal matters via email in written agreements between them and a 

company related to Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9. 

Under such circumstances, courts have long held that service by email is reasonably 

calculated to apprise Defendants of the action against them. See, e.g. North Face Apparel Corp. 

v. Aothenorthface.com, No. 19-cv-60952, 2019 WL 7708496, at *3 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2019) 

(plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that emails that were not returned as undeliverable were likely 

to reach defendants via email); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Bitton, 278 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 

(where plaintiff’s attorney had several email communications with defendant via email, “the Court 

is satisfied that service upon Truc via email is reasonably calculated to apprise Truc of the 

pendency of this action and afford an opportunity to present objections, satisfying due process.”); 

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Zhixian, 2020 WL 1740695 at *3 (due process satisfied where emails did not bounce back); U.S. 

Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Aliaga, 272 F.R.D. 617, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (due process 

satisfied by email addresses recently used to send messages to customers); Rio Properties, 284 

F.3d at 1017 (finding email service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) permissible and meeting due process 

standards where defendant indicated preference for email communication and where email was 

determined to be the method most likely to reach the defendant); Lexmark, 295 F.R.D. at 262

(finding email service satisfied due process where defendants hold themselves out as using those 

email addresses and plaintiff has communicated with the defendant through those email 

addresses).

3

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing points and authorities, Plaintiffs UNIR, LLC and Marconi 

International University, Inc. request that the Court enter an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(f)(3) authorizing them to serve Defendants with process by sending copies of the 

Summonses and Complaint via email to the following email addresses:

For Defendant Laura Ricci: laura.ricci2303@gmail.com

For Defendant Renato Bevilacqua: italiaequa@gmail.com

For Defendant MIA Global Business School, S.L. d/b/a MIA Digital University (upon its 

President and CEO, Renato Bevilacqua): italiaequa@gmail.com

Dated: July 29, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

SANCHEZ FISCHER LEVINE, LLP

1200 Brickell Avenue, Ste. 750

Miami, Florida 33131

Tel.: (305) 925-9947

3 Although it is not necessary to exhaust other methods first, Plaintiffs’ prior failed attempts 

to use other means of service on Ricci further favors granting leave to effect alternate service under 

Rule 4(f)(3). SoF at ¶¶ 10-13.

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By: /s/ Fausto Sanchez

Fausto Sanchez, Esq.

Florida Bar No.: 86229

Email: fsanchez@sfl-law.com

Chad S. Purdie, Esq.

Florida Bar No.: 41965

Email: cpurdie@sfl-law.com

David M. Levine, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 84431

Email: dlevine@sfl-law.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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