U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–126 PDF 2005

A REVIEW OF THE AIRPORT PRIVATE

SECURITY SCREENING PILOT PROGRAM

(108–61)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 22, 2004

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

JACK QUINN, New York

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana

BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MAX BURNS, Georgia

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

VACANCY

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

MIKE THOMPSON, California

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JACK QUINN, New York

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana, Vice Chairman

BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

VACANCY

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

BOB FILNER, California

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Anderson, Terry, Executive Director, Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, MS ..... 48

Berry, Gerald L., President, Covenant Aviation Security, LLC, Alexandria,

VA .......................................................................................................................... 48

Brown, Philip, Acting Director of Aviation, Kansas City International Airport,

Kansas City, MO .................................................................................................. 48

DeMell, John, President, Firstline Transportation Security, Eastlake, OH ....... 48

Ervin, Hon. Clark Kent, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland

Security ................................................................................................................. 17

Larson, George W., Airport Director, Jackson Hole Airport, Jackson, WY ........ 48

Martin, John, Airport Director, San Fransisco International Airport, San

Franisco, CA ......................................................................................................... 48

Pacious, Patrick, Evaluation Director, Bearingpoint, Inc. ................................... 40

Rabkin, Norman J., Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Division, U.S. General Accounting Office ................................................................. 40

Slaybaugh, Terrence G., Director of Aviation, Greater Rochester International

Airport, Rochester, NY ........................................................................................ 48

Stone, Hon. David M., Acting Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security .................................................... 17

Thomas, Ronald, President and Chief Operating Officer, Mc Neil Technologies, Inc., Springfield, VA ............................................................................. 48

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Anderson, Terry ....................................................................................................... 62

Berry, Gerald L ........................................................................................................ 65

Brown, Philip ........................................................................................................... 74

DeMell, John ............................................................................................................ 85

Ervin, Hon. Clark Kent ........................................................................................... 98

Larson, George W .................................................................................................... 108

Martin, John ............................................................................................................ 115

Pacious, Patrick ....................................................................................................... 124

Rabkin, Norman J. .................................................................................................. 130

Slaybaugh, Terrence G ............................................................................................ 151

Stone, Hon. David M ............................................................................................... 158

Thomas, Ronald ....................................................................................................... 166

ADDITION TO THE RECORD

Air Transport Association of America, Inc., statement ........................................ 169

(1)

A REVIEW OF THE AIRPORT PRIVATE

SECURITY SCREENING PILOT PROGRAM

Thursday, April 22, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIA- TION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRA- STRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in room

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica [chairman

of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the

Aviation Subcommittee to order.

Today our topic is a review of the airport private security screening pilot program. The order of business will be as follows. We will

have opening statements from members, and we have three panels

of witnesses. It is a rather long hearing today, so hopefully we can

keep the program moving.

We will start with opening statements, and I do have an opening

statement, and then I will yield to other members for recognition.

Ladies and gentlemen of the subcommittee, today, as you know,

we are going to take our first review of the private screening pilot

program, which has come to be known as the PP5 program. This

two-year pilot program was mandated in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and I was the primary author of the provision that put this program into place, so I am pleased that today

we can examine its progress.

The PP5 pilot program allows qualified private security companies to provide passenger and baggage screening at select airports

under Federal supervision.

The private screening companies have been required to meet the

same very rigorous security standards as our centrally employed

Federal screeners under the full Federal screening program; however, the law that we wrote is silent on what role TSA is to have

in the Pilot program, other than providing Federal oversight.

The private screening program began in November 2002, when

four qualified private security companies: FirstLine Transportation

Security, Jackson Hole Airport Board, McNeil Technologies, Inc.,

and Covenant Aviation Security took over screening at five airports: Jackson Hole, Kansas City International, Greater Rochester

International, San Francisco International, and Tupelo, Mississippi.

And what we did when we put this program in place, we selected

one in each category of size of airport to test this private approach.

Currently, however, more than 400 airports operate with central-
2

ized command and control employment and training of nearly

45,000 screening personnel.

The operational success of our highly centralized all-Federal bureaucracy has been marginal by almost any effective and objective

evaluation.

Numerous airports have been plagued with passenger screening

delays. We had many of them up here. I think we had 16 airports

up here before us just recently, talking about some of the problems.

For example, Las Vegas, Nevada reported some four-hour passenger screening delays at one point. Screener vacancies exceed 20

percent in some of our busiest airports. Los Angeles, for example,

and I visited there earlier this year, cited over 290 unfilled positions, while Jacksonville, Florida, to the north of my district, reported to our subcommittee that they had too many screening personnel. Many other airports report excess TSA airport bureaucracy.

Training and background checks, unfortunately, have lagged behind.

The TSA bureaucracies at large and small airports unfortunately

have grown unchecked. Quite frankly, it is difficult or impossible,

I believe, to micromanage the employment, the training, and the

deployment of tens of thousands of screeners from Washington,

D.C. to scores of differently configured airports with fluctuating

scheduling requirements.

While problems with the ‘‘Soviet-style’’ Federal screening operations should raise the serious concern of Congress, anyone who

has seen the classified results and detection rates of this system

and does not call for reform in the program I believe is derelict in

their responsibility.

That is why I have been a major proponent of a decentralized

screening program.

I also believe that aviation security is not best served by a ‘‘onesize fits all’’ approach. Rather, we should allow decentralized flexibility, efficiency, cost savings, and innovations. These are things

that the Pilot program was intended to highlight. All that can be

accomplished, as Europe and Israel have realized, without diluting

any standards or lowering any requirements.

As long as the highest-level security standards are met or exceeded, how that is accomplished should be determined by those

most closely involved at the airport operational level.

While I am most pleased with the results of the pilot screening

program, some will testify today that the program was overly constrained by the TSA and that it never really was allowed to be experimental. We will look at that.

However, I believe that the Pilot program has had a very positive

effect on the provision of aviation security post-September 11th.

I understand that the PP5 companies were initially given limited

flexibility in recruiting, hiring, and training, and implementing

new approaches to meet the Federal operating standards, the

SOPs.

However, recently, the TSA has given the PP5 airports more

flexibility and has asked the companies to submit proposals to conduct assessment and hiring processes locally.

In fact, the Pilot program has quietly been achieving improvements in the business of airport security.
3

Since the inception of the program, the PP5 airports have been

the source of many of the new ideas and innovative approaches to

aviation security. Let me cite some of those examples: 100 percent

cross-training of security screeners; hiring of a mix of full-time and

part-time screeners; the provision of recurrent training locally; development of a Computer Learning Lab; prescreening of all candidates to ensure they meet minimum requirements set by TSA,

and that avoids the costs being incurred for the assessment of unqualified candidates. Another idea implemented innovative approach is use of actual screeners to assist in panel interviews with

candidates so that operational experience is brought to bear in assessing potential employees. Another item is utilization of screeners’ expertise by forming focus groups to review and revise screening functions; also, developing unique training opportunities, including detecting explosives, customer service, and proper lifting

techniques. And, finally, another innovation idea is allowing employees to work part-time as security screeners and part-time in

other airport-related jobs.

Those are some of the items we have learned from this program.

While TSA was slow to recognize the benefits of the pilot program, I believe that TSA is now starting to take advantage of the

opportunities and new approaches the private sector can provide.

Some of the ideas first put in place by the private screening companies and airports are now being implemented at all Federal

screening airports. This is not a coincidence.

With the exception of TSA’s initial inflexibility and slow recognition of the pilot program advantages, the PP5 program has been,

in my opinion, an unqualified success.

Today we will hear from Admiral Stone of the TSA, the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, the GAO,

and also BearingPoint, which has recently concluded a study and

review of this and our Federal screening program.

Finally, I believe, and most importantly, we will hear from the

airports and the companies participating in the pilot program.

It is not surprising that all of the pilot airports would like to remain in the private screening program. That fact says much about

the success of the program. It also says much about the need for

reform and flexibility in aviation security programs.

Let me say also that this is clearly not a proposal to return to

pre-September 11th security. No one proposes giving screening responsibilities back to the airlines. No one proposes lowering Federal standards one iota. Rather, this is an approach that all Federal facilities across the Country employ today, where the private

sector, under Federal guidelines, provide high-quality security

functions with strong Federal oversight.

For years the public-private security model has worked successfully at nuclear power plants and military bases, and we see that

also as an evolutionary progression in the European model.

To further improve the performance of our national screening

system, we must develop and deploy new screening technologies,

and we must reform the current bureaucracy so that we are even

more responsive to local needs and aviation security requirements.

I believe the testimony this morning will confirm that with even

greater Federal standards and greater Federal oversight, we can
4

better utilize both Federal and private security personnel to channel our scarce resources and enhance our post–9/11 aviation security.

So with those lengthy comments, I am pleased to yield to Mr.

DeFazio.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for convening

this hearing on this vital topic.

Admiral, thank you for being here today.

I agree with the Chairman in that the PP5 study was instructive,

it was a good learning experience, although I draw slightly different conclusions. I don’t believe it means we should have a massive, wrenching transition back to private security at all the other

airports in America, with all the disruption that would potentially

bring about in the transition. I would also note that, despite what

I heard in the closed meeting a couple of weeks ago and in the

briefing yesterday, I found out that the same caps and limits in

terms of personnel are applied to the private screening as are to

the TSA airports. Caps which are based on arbitrary limits which

were placed on the TSA by our colleagues on the Appropriations

Committee, who chose a number out of the air and said this is how

many people you make the system work with. Even if it doesn’t

work well, even if it means long lines, even if it means you can’t

do all the baggage, that is what we are going to do.

That was certainly never the intent here, so we have a resource

problem and that comes from some of our friends on the Appropriations Committee. The Administration has not stood up to them to

demand more funding for more people, and that is, in part, contributing to the existing congestion problems.

But we also have had an overly centralized bureaucratic system

with the TSA, as the Chairman pointed out. But instead of coming

to the conclusion that that means we should change everything

over to private, what it means to me is that the flexibility that the

TSA has extended to the private contractors in a number of areas

which the contractors requested, which make a lot of sense, should

be applied to the TSA. We should decentralize the system.

The FSD should be given a lot more authority; they should be

given authority for training, for hiring, and for firing. Congress was

very specific, and I am puzzled, and the BearingPoint people

couldn’t explain, nor could the TSA representative at my briefing

explain to me how it is that the private companies say they are

much more able to get rid of nonperforming employees than is the

TSA, when we specifically gave the TSA authority to discharge for

nonperformance. There is just no question about it, Congress was

very specific on that point: there is not supposed to be any bureaucracy. And so I guess the problem is you have to call the central

headquarters, and you are in a different time zone, and they call

you back three days later, and you have got to put the person here

or there.

We have got to do away with the centralized bureaucracy and

give this decision-making to the FSDs. And if we don’t have confidence in the FSDs, we need to replace them and put people in

there who can handle that kind of authority. It should go to training; it should go to recruiting; it should go to firing; it should go

to scheduling.
5

I asked again the question yesterday how is it that the private

contractors can utilize split shifts better and more fully than the

TSA, and the TSA representative again couldn’t answer my question. Well, there is no reason, actually. Again, it is the centralized

bureaucracy hasn’t allowed that. Why not allow the local FSD to

do that?

When you do all those things, you would end up with the flexibility you need. Hopefully we can push our colleagues to provide the

additional resources.

And the one most startling thing in here, which, again, the

BearingPoint people could not explain, from their survey is that

people who did not know or who were not told, in being surveyed,

that they had gone through private security or Federal security

had less confidence in the private security at both Kansas City and

San Francisco. That is very telling. Part of this is about confidence

because I pointed to the huge loopholes in the system before, and

I will bring those up again later today. Answers I have still not gotten from TSA or GAO on how many hundred thousand people a

day pass into the airports’ secure or sterile areas without any

screening whatsoever. I have been unable to get an answer to that

question. I know it is happening at some airports and not at others.

I watched the person who sells newspapers at my local airport taking off her shoes and going through security this last week, but I

understand at many major airports thousands of people a day just

file passed, waving a vague ID at somebody, and go on in carrying

overcoats, bags, boxes, whatever. I can’t get an answer to that simple question.

We have got to admit that the inadequacies and the loopholes in

the system are phenomenal, so the confidence is very important.

The fact that Americans have more confidence in the Federal Government performing a national security function than in private

contractors is a bit telling. I am not recommending that we have

to change back at San Francisco or Kansas City because of the lack

of confidence, because the security results were quite comparable,

and they all need improvement, but we, I think, have a system in

place that can be made a lot better, and the steps we need to take

are plain.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I expect we will be able to elaborate

on this later as we go through the hearing.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. LoBiondo, I believe you were next.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Mica. And I appreciate your

holding this hearing today.

As you know, I, like several of my colleagues, are becoming increasingly frustrated with the TSA’s inability to staff a sufficient

number of screeners at our airports. We are hearing about the reports of this on a nationwide basis, and I have a specific incident

in my district. I have contacted the TSA on numerous occasions. I

wrote to them over a month ago about staffing shortages at Atlantic City International Airport, which is in my district.

The airport is currently about 14 full-time equivalents short of

their authorized level. We have been promised that the situation

would be remedied time and again. This medium-sized airport is

trying to expand. We have got opportunities that we can’t take ad-
6

vantage of because a third screener lane cannot be opened, and we

are not even able to provide enough screeners for the two lanes

that are operating, that they have right now.

Admiral Stone, I hope you will address this situation. I know

that there is a lot on your plate, and I sort of hesitated to get specific about my district, but I am feeling this frustration and don’t

know where to turn, and I think my colleagues are feeling the

same thing in an overall basis. So your help and consideration

would be appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Oberstar?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the seriousness with which you have approached this hearing, and Mr.

DeFazio as well, our ranking member. This is, right now, and for

the foreseeable future, the most significant aviation security issue,

perhaps the most important security issue, next to port security,

we face.

The focus of this hearing is the BearingPoint company evaluation

of the private screener companies, and looming ahead of us is the

opt-out opportunity this coming November, a provision that I did

not willingly embrace. But it was something we needed to do in

order to get our TSA bill passed in the immediate aftermath of

September 11. I thought, in the end, that will be a good performance indicator, it will be a yardstick of measurement of the Federal

program which I have advocated since 1987 or 1988, and private

comparative system operating pretty much on the same level.

But we need assurances and we have got to put this opt-out in

the context of the present Administration’s overall policy of privatization of Government programs. The President announced two

years ago a plan to privatize 150,000 Federal jobs. They have succeeded in doing roughly 30 or 35,000. So I want to see assurances

that the opt-out program in this context is not going to create unwarranted opportunities or incentives to airports to opt out. As Mr.

DeFazio said, the BearingPoint study shows that certain airport

passengers actually had less confidence in the security process at

those privatized facilities than at the Federalized ones.

Second point. The heart of the airline transportation security

provisions was one level of security. That wasn’t plucked out of the

air aimlessly, but it was based on one level of safety at the FAA,

something I advocated for many years. And we finally got that policy established with the cooperation of the FAA and the DOT and

Secretary Slater at the time working hard to establish that there

should not be a difference in one flight standards district office in

Miami to one in Seattle. Same with security. You shouldn’t encounter a different level of security at Minneapolis, St. Paul than you

do at Chisholm-Hibbing or than you do in Eugene, Oregon, or than

you do in Orlando, Florida. No unwarranted advantages to the privately operated security checkpoints and those that are federally

operated.

Now, part of the problem is the appropriation process that first

set an unrealistic level, lowering the numbers, and then didn’t fund

that even lower level of personnel.

Now, on March 17, Mr. DeFazio and I, and Senators Hollings

and Rockefeller, sent you some questions about the opt-out pro-
7

gram. We wanted assurances that there wouldn’t be preferential

treatment for those who opt out compared to those who choose to

stay in the program.

Some of those airports are operating in the mistaken belief that

if they opt out, they will be able to increase their screener staffing.

I have heard this from various airport operators. They think that

they are going to get better treatment if they are not in the Federal

system than if they remain. It is clear, under one level of security,

that is not the case and should not be the case.

Your response, Admiral, did not answer those questions, and I

expect a clear response today, and I am going to be pressing you

on it.

The GAO audit suggests there is widespread underutilization.

We hear it. Members of Congress generally travel extensively, they

see the security system; they know whether facilities are being well

used or underused. And then we see, as Mr. DeFazio pointed out,

various airport personnel just being waved on through.

I suggest, Admiral, that you go to Charles de Gaulle Airport in

Paris, to the new Air France terminal, concourse, and watch how

they conduct security with multilayers. I did this in February to

specifically see their security system.

They have 500 EDS deployed, Mr. Chairman, at Charles de

Gaulle Airport. Five hundred to screen checked luggage.

I walked through the security system with the chief of security

of CDG, the chief of security for what we would call the county

within which the airport is located, the head of security for Air

France. Every one of them was not only screened, their badge read

by a reader, their thumb print taken after they went through, and

then wanded, and wanded again at the checkpoint before you board

the aircraft. That multilayered security is going to make sure that

we don’t have another September 11 attack.

Now, the centralizing of the process, one of the problems we had

in the 1980’s in aviation safety was the highly super-centralized operation of FAA, and what we needed to do was maintain a single

standard, but allow local flexibility. TSA needs to move away from

the centralized hiring process, set realistic standards for how many

personnel are needed at each airport, given its passenger load and

its cargo facility, and then staff it and give them the authority to

staff those facilities. There is no excuse for the discrepancies that

we have in the failures to fill positions and the head security officers at various airports having to always get clearance from Washington. Set the standard, give them the money, give them their

head, and then hold them accountable. That is what we need to do.

I look forward to the testimony to come today, and, again, Mr.

Chairman, thank you for your vigilance on this subject, and, Mr.

DeFazio, thank you for staying so thoroughly informed and vigilant

and providing the oversight we need.

Mr. MICA. I thank the ranking member of the full committee.

I am pleased to recognize Mr. Hayes from North Carolina.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding

this hearing today. We are all tasked with the objective of providing the most reasonable common sense security for our citizens.

And, Admiral Stone, I appreciate what you are doing. Sometimes

I feel like you are Charlie Brown and we are Lucy; we keep pulling
8

the football away when we define the goal post. There is a balance

that exists between the Government’s inherent responsibility to define the objective and to outline, using various law enforcement,

homeland security, TSA criteria, what the goal posts and the goal

line should be, and we appreciate that. But also it has been proven,

and there are many of us that felt this way before, that the private

sector has a very important and vital role to play. So if we do nothing else today, hopefully we can begin to find that balance between

using the responsibility of the Government to define what we are

doing and the flexibility of the private sector of each airport in each

State, whether it be Atlantic City or Charlotte, and find out the

best, most common sense responsible and reasonable way to do

that. I appreciate what you are trying to do. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I recognize Mr. Lipinski.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding

this hearing today on the airport screener privatization pilot program.

I also want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.

As we discuss this issue, it is important to remember why the

Transportation Security Administration was created. It was created

to improve our aviation security and restore and maintain the flying public’s confidence in our air travel for every airport. In other

words, the TSA was intended to guaranty there is a uniform level

of security for all airports. I believe that for airline passengers, this

uniformity has once again instilled a sense of confidence in aviation

security.

Mr. Pacious, I look forward to hearing your findings on the issue

of passenger confidence with the security process.

I am not claiming that there aren’t improvements to be made by

the TSA when it comes to hiring, staffing, and the training of

screeners. Understaffing at security checkpoints is noticed at many

airports, including one in my own district, at Midway. TSA has

been urged to uphold a sufficient staffing level at all airports. Unfortunately, this goal so far has not been reached.

From what I understand of the preliminary data of the GAO

audit on the private screening contractors, it states the flexibility

that TSA has given private screening contractors in implementing

airport-specific practices has enabled them to achieve some efficiencies.

I understand that the TSA is looking to granting similar freedoms and flexibilities to Federal security directors at Federal airports and, therefore, those airports could also have significant efficiency improvements.

Again, I reiterate that the congressional intent behind the TSA

was establishing a uniform level of security. Therefore, I do not believe that PP5 airports should be granted more flexibility than Federal airports.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Pearce?

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
9

I would comment to Admiral Stone that at our last closed meeting, we had the question on measurement parameters, and again

I would just remind you that a business principle is if you measure

it, you do something about it; and if you do not measure it, you do

not do anything about it.

I would encourage you. I do not know, I got the feeling from that

discussion that you do not measure passenger delays, and has been

pointed out, the purpose of TSA was to restore confidence and return people to the airports and to flying. But the one thing that

is going to drive them away is lengthy delays and unpredictable

delays.

I have heard comments from the fast food industry that as hamburgers and breakfasts are sold across the Nation, that a computer

is showing exactly how many units are sold in what area, and they

begin to dispatch their ingredients to those areas where the sales

may be running a little bit high.

I think anything short of that very, very pragmatic addressing of

the needs for screeners in some areas and the excess of screeners

in other areas is needed here. We need to approach this like a business: we need to direct the resources where they need to be without

overdirecting in other areas.

I asked the question just before we went home for Christmas

break about the bonuses. Frankly, I think that a measurement parameter of delays and security should be the basis for bonuses,

rather than it was time for bonuses. Bonuses should be for superior

performance rather than just because it is time that we gave bonuses, and would hope that you would remember that as you are

developing your business model or management model.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak and for

having this hearing.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Menendez?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When Congress created the airport screener privatization pilot

program, we placed four specific requirements on the private

screening companies so that we could avoid the disastrous results

that we had under the previous private screening companies. We

required that the private companies operating under the pilot program (1) would have Federal Government supervisors to oversee all

screening at each participating airport; that they hire only employees that met the Federal Government’s criteria; that they provide

compensation and other benefits equal to those provided by the

Federal Government; and that the company be United Statesowned and controlled.

In addition, the TSA was required to have participating airports

have screeners trained in the same manner as Federal screeners so

that the security procedures would be standardized, well coordinated, consistently implemented throughout the airports in the

Country to achieve consistent security. And this was much heralded in the debates here in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act when it was debated on the floor. Committee members on

both sides of the isle heralded the fact that this would be the first

time that we had Federal management over all airport security.

And I think those views then continue to be an important one now.
10

No one suggested that the airports opting to participate in the

pilot program would have less Federal oversight.

So I am concerned, as I get a sense of some of the clambering

for flexibility, that in the context of that flexibility it seems that

there is some weakening of these four critical requirements that

we, in a bipartisan way, established, and that is part of what I will

be looking for today.

Also, with reference to reviewing the prepared testimony from

the GAO, the IG, and the private screening companies, it seems

that everybody is unhappy with TSA’s hiring and training procedures, and that includes even Federal security directors.

As someone who represents one of the busiest airports in the Nation, Newark International Airport, I will tell you it is also the airport where one of the fatal flights on September 11th originated,

an airport that still, still has not met the 100 percent EDS baggage

screening requirement, and where travelers frequently stand in security lines that exceed 45 minutes, I share these concerns.

And, Admiral, I understand you have only been on the job a few

months, but if I didn’t know better, I would almost think that TSA

is complicity in trying to ensure that we don’t succeed so we can

go to private security screening, because the reality is that notwithstanding all the management tools we have given to TSA, the flexibility, the part-time abilities, the configurations that would maximize abilities, I see it at Newark and I see that none of those management flexibilities are in use, and it is clearly a failure in terms

of using the abilities that the Congress has given to the TSA to

meet its obligation.

We are now at nearly pre-September 11th and headed in the

right direction for the purposes of the industry and the traveling

public, we are heading in the right direction in terms of the number of passengers that are traveling in this Country. That is good

news: good news for the industry, good news for the economy; a

sense of confidence in being able to fly again. But we are going to

choke that success and that confidence by the inability of TSA to

meet the demand.

And so I certainly hope that we, as part of this, look at, and I

hope the committee looks at more intensively, how we focus on improving these procedures at all airports; how we look at getting

TSA to be responsive and use the management tools that Congress

has given it as a starter. And I understand the cap issue as well,

but when you don’t even use the management tools you have to

meet part of your challenge, the cap, in and of itself, is not a question.

And, finally, the BearingPoint study found little cost or security

benefit in having the private security companies do this specifically, and if that is the case, and if we are looking for all these

flexibilities, flexibilities that we are either not giving to TSA or

flexibilities that the TSA has and is not using, then we have a real

problem on our hands.

So I look, Admiral, for some responses to these questions generically, and I am looking forward to engaging with you specifically

at Newark, because we cannot continue on the path that we are

on. We are going to stifle the progress that we are going to make.

That has an economic effect in the Country, for our region and in
11

the Country, and God knows we need a more vibrant economy. So

it is all interrelated with the security issue, and we look forward

to your responses.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

I want to yield now to Ms. Berkley. She has a request to leave

early, so you are recognized.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just about to

walk out. I appreciate it.

First, I want to thank Admiral Stone for working with the Nevada delegation, the airport director, and the FSD at McCarran

Airport to resolve problems the airport experienced at the beginning of the year. As you are well aware, in January, departing passengers, and our Chairman mentioned this, stood in line for up to

four hours after attending one of the largest conventions in Las

Vegas. This obviously is unacceptable for a community that depends on its airport for its very livelihood. And as I have said on

many occasions, almost 50 percent of the people that come to Las

Vegas to enjoy our wholesome family entertainment come through

McCarran Airport. That is 36 million visitors. People who stand in

line for four hours are going to think twice before coming back to

our community, and that would have an economic impact that I

would hate to think about.

You have heard what we said, and I appreciate that. The TSA

has worked with the FSD at McCarran to give him more flexibility,

and that was the key word. I think every one of the members on

this Committee has mentioned the need for more flexibility to move

passengers through the security checkpoint securely and more efficiently. And, as a result, we are a success story. The length of time

travelers must stand in line has been dramatically reduced. We

just had our National Broadcasting Association big convention in

Vegas. Not as big as CES, but I can say that we did not receive

many complaints.

The airport is continuing to work with the TSA to make sure

that the screening process continues to improve. By the middle of

June, a few months from now, the airport is adding six additional

security lanes. But I must reiterate to the Admiral, just as every

one of my colleagues has stated, we need the staffing of these additional lines. If we don’t have enough staffing, it doesn’t matter how

many security lines we have; we can’t get people through. And I

think all of us share that concern, particularly at McCarran’s D

gate, although I can tell you C gates are no bargain either.

Finally, while the TSA has experienced difficulties at McCarran

and other airports, I am absolutely not convinced, as a matter of

fact, quite to the contrary, that privatizing our aviation security

system is the answer. And I can’t help but agree with my colleague,

Mr. Menendez, there almost seems to be a conspiracy to ensure

that this doesn’t work. Congress has not provided TSA adequate resources to hire the number of screeners and equipment needed to

fully carry out the mandates we put in place, and they were very

specific.

Rather than undo what progress has been made, we should be

redoubling our efforts and giving the TSA the tools that they need

for success, rather than offering those same tools to private compa-
12

nies and not providing those same tools to the TSA to actually do

their job.

Like everyone else on the committee, I am looking forward to

your testimony regarding privatization and all the other issues that

you are going to talk about.

And, Mr. Chairman, I can’t thank you enough for allowing me

this extra time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentlewoman yield?

I just simply want to supplement her observations about the

shortcomings at McCarran.

I have been through there a couple of times, attend a conference,

give a speech, try to get out of town. The lines are just untenable.

And I heard the screener saying we are short-handed, we don’t

have enough people. They were drawing people from other parts of

the airport to come and work the security lines.

Ms. BERKLEY. May I reclaim my time?

The director of the airport and his administrative personnel have

been on the lines because it has been so desperate. He pulled them

out of the executive offices and the administrative offices, and they

started doing screening themselves. That is difficult.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

Let me yield now to Mr. Pascrell has been waiting. Thank you.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I was very proud when this subcommittee led the way for the creation of the Transportation Security Administration. There are many loopholes that remain and

problems that exist. I believe that the Federalization of airport

screeners has improved our physical security, and also the public

confidence in the aviation security system. The public can be assured that if we follow the law as it is written, we will never go

back to the time of security on the cheap. We must not revisit the

days when Argenbright and its ilk were paying minimum wages,

with no benefits, to those on the front lines of our security system,

yielding disastrous results, and high turnover rates speak for themselves.

It is the Federal Government that has the duty to ensure the

American people are protected against terrorism, with one level of

security nationwide. Anything else is unacceptable. We can and

will not allow any airport screeners, either Federal or private, to

be held to lesser standards so that management can meet their bottom line. That is not acceptable either.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 plainly

states for all of us that the TSA cannot compromise staffing levels,

training standards, or wages and benefits for any private screener

workforce. Of this there can be no question, it is laid out quite

clearly.

The section 108, security screening by private companies, chapter

and verse very specifically talks about the security screening pilot

program and speaks very specifically about the opt-out program. If

I may quote from the very rules that exist that you must implement: ‘‘A private screening company is qualified to provide screening services at an airport under this section if the company will

only employ individuals to provide such services who meet all the

requirements of this chapter applicable to the Federal Government

personnel who perform screening services at airports under this
13

chapter, and will provide compensation and other benefits to such

individuals that are not less than the level of compensation and

other benefits provided to such Federal Government personnel in

accordance with this chapter.’’

It ends on the very next page. It is very specific, very defined,

and very clear for all of us to understand this.

I would like the panel to help us resolve some of the questions

that do remain. When the report cites that the private sector is

finding efficiencies and cost savings without compromising TSA

standards, can any of these practices be utilized by the TSA itself?

There is also a huge issue of liability. People entrust the Government to protect them. If we pass that responsibility to the private

sector, will they assume the liability for a terrorist attack caused

by negligence of one of their screeners? Very important issue; we

discussed it two years ago.

One final point. As we criticize policy set by TSA management

and implementation of the law, let us be careful not to demean the

tens of thousands of Americans that serve as Federal screeners.

These men and women spend their days and nights, and they literally serve on the front lines in the prevention of aviation terror

attacks, and we appreciate their service.

And I have also suggested, Admiral, time and time again, why

we expand the pool of folks that we look at for these jobs. I feel

more strongly about this now than I did two years ago, that we

turn to the law enforcement community, that we look at retired law

enforcement officials, former first responders who have been

trained in the business of looking folks in the eye. I think that this

is important, I think it is critical, and I certainly am not going to

miss this opportunity to bring it up again.

I understand that this hearing is but the first step in this process, and I look forward to finding ways to bring some private sector

utilized efficiencies to the TSA, and I am very proud of what TSA

has done so far.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mrs. Tauscher.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

DeFazio. Thank you for holding this hearing. I am going to be

brief, as there are many witnesses scheduled today. I just want to

take a minute to brag about one of them. And I hope, when I get

to know you better, Admiral, I will be bragging about you. But, instead, I am going to brag about John Martin, who is the Director

of the San Francisco International Airport, who is on the third

panel, and he just does a phenomenal job of managing the multitude of challenges facing airports today, and he should be commended.

SFO, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is the largest of the five airports participating in the two-year private pilot program known as

PP5, and all of the reports I have seen show that the pilot has been

successful at SFO. One reason for SFO’s success is the investments

that they have made in inline baggage system, in a comprehensive

security system that includes closed circuit televisions, which reduce staffing needs and moves passengers through the checkpoints

much faster.
14

I look forward to Admiral Stone’s testimony and hope to get a

chance to ask him about TSA’s commitment to provide SFO with

an additional 15 to $20 million. They need to finish their inline system so they can truly be a model of national success in this area.

Another reason for SFO’s success is their strong partnerships

with TSA through the Federal security director and their contractor on site. We should be replicating the model of success of SFO

through the best practices developed under ideal conditions like

this one, and TSA should give more flexibility for innovation to all

airports, not just those in the pilot program.

As this committee analyzes PP5 and looks forward, it is important to remember that airports nor airlines are in the business of

managing security screening. This committee did the right thing by

taking that responsibility away from the airlines after 9/11 and

making it a Federal security function. So whether an airport opts

out or in the system, it is imperative that the Federal Government

continue to set uniform security standards for that system, provide

strong Federal oversight, provide a Federal screening workforce

where needed, and provide the investment dollars needed to make

sure that they can accomplish these goals.

That said, no two airports are alike, so it is our job to replicate

best practices across this diverse system and give the Federal security directors flexibility to work with their airports to define the

best practices at each airport without diluting standards, and making sure that we have a seamless security network across our

Country.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MICA. I thank you and recognize Ms. Johnson, who has been

waiting patiently.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman Mica and

Ranking Member DeFazio for holding this hearing today.

I have listened to the opening statements, and I can say from the

Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport we have many of the same

problems. But I still believe that the airport security screening activities are inherently a Federal responsibility, and I think people

feel more secure with TSA screeners than with private screeners.

And besides encountering poor customer service in many cases, I

think the Federal screeners are doing a respectful job. We have

huge numbers of complaints in DFW about the attitudes. It is important that we keep a standard uniform security program for all

airports, but we need to improve the way TSA staffs, hires, and

trains its screeners. Specifically, we need to meet more local control

of staffing and training at our airports.

Currently, the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport is losing 60

screeners per month. This adds up to 720 screeners that DFW is

losing per year. Unfortunately, DFW’s TSA Federal security director has only replenished the screener workforce once since he has

been at the airport. With passenger volumes for fiscal year 2004

and 2005 projected to result in DFW’s second and fourth highest

years ever, it is imperative that we have enough screeners to process this increase in passengers. This is clearly a problem that can

and should be remedied by decentralizing screener hiring practices.

As I have said time and time again, and throughout the highway

bill reauthorization process, we have got to evolve authority to
15

those more directly impacted by the problem. Those closes to the

problem are best able to fix it. Local control will provide better security and customer service for our Nation’s airports.

I would like also to voice one more concern. DFW Airport is also

experiencing significant delays at four of its checkpoints, and the

time has risen long past 30 minutes at peak time, and TSA has

concluded that the checkpoints need to be reconfigured for space

and efficiency, but they have not completed this project yet. We

have seen lines curve all the way around to the counters where

people are getting serviced for tickets, where you can’t pass, and

out into the sidewalks.

I am concerned that as summer nears, passengers will experience lengthier waits and lines will still spill outside onto the curb

area. And if you have been to Texas, you know you don’t want to

be out there. In order to prevent this scenario, I am requesting that

TSA complete this checkpoint reconfiguration project very soon.

I look forward to continuing to work with this committee on

these issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Graves?

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just be very brief.

I do want to welcome Kansas City for being here. They are not

on the panel, but they are one of the five airports that are in the

pilot program. We have a very unique situation in Kansas City,

and they do a very good job of administering it, and I am very

pleased to have them here today. And I hope to get you out there

some time soon to witness that firsthand.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for the invitation. I hope to see it. I have

changed my opinion about the configuration of the airport a bit, but

we will get into that later.

Ms. Norton, you are recognized.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank

you very much for this hearing. Actually, we may be able to learn

something from this hearing, because, after all, we are dealing, Admiral Stone, with an agency, and we very much appreciate the fact

that you are building an agency from the ground up. Actually, I regard that as a great opportunity. Instead of kind of pasting over

years, some of them decades, of what somebody else has done

wrong, you can, of course, start all over again, make your own mistakes and correct your own mistakes.

I am not sure exactly what the pilot program was supposed to

be showing us. I have great respect for pilots, having run a Federal

agency myself. I always began with a pilot. But, of course, I don’t

think that there is any disposition in the American people or in the

Congress to change from the system we have just changed from to

go to this system. So I choose, therefore, to look at the pilot program for what it can teach us, since it is from the ground up, as

is the more general nationwide program.

The great challenge, it seems to me, for the pilot is to operate

with both oversight and flexibilities. Now, that is a problem

enough, but when you are operating within the necessary constraints that since 9/11 we are going to put on aviation, the challenge is particularly great. I mean, the fact is that the standards

have to be the same. The fact is that the staffing levels have to be

the same. The fact is that there have got to be Federal supervisors.
16

I am beginning to wonder what is different, except that there are

some private companies that are running it, and, of course, in a

real sense, that is from whence we just came.

I understand that there is some concern among these companies

that, well, they are too constrained. Yes, that is right. And that is

the challenge. You are going to be constrained. Because we are

dealing with aviation, everybody is going to make sure that we

don’t, in fact, get into the same problems we had before.

But precisely because they are operating within a constrained

model, I think the model could be useful to us in what really concerns me, and that is to say can the private model help us build

a better national system because it is operating on a smaller scale.

For example, is their staff retention any better than it is with the

TSA? One of the chronic problems, you invest a whole lot of money

in training people to do it right, and I want to know where are they

going? We are paying them enough. We made sure we were paying

them enough. I have to assume that you are paying them the very

same thing in the private sector. Can the private sector teach us

something about staff retention?

My good friend and colleague who spoke before me, Ms. Johnson,

has just mentioned these lines. Well, do they have the same lines?

If they are operating under similar constraints, albeit private parties with a little more flexibility, can they teach us something

about that?

Ultimately, I think that the value of the pilots can be, if they operate indeed as pilots, can they help us innovative, can they help

you build a new system from the ground up, even as they are? Can

they show us, because they are operating on a smaller scale, what

we can do on a greater scale? What they can do without sacrificing

Federal standards, we surely intend to do without sacrificing a

Federal system.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Porter.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing today. As you know, September 11th the date

comes up frequently on the hill and across the Country, but I think

we learned about the importance of adequate airport screening.

McCarran, with close to 30 million passengers a year, we are acutely aware, and I would like to applaud our security director, Mr. Jim

Blair, at McCarran-Las Vegas, and the folks at Laughlin/Bullhead

City Airport. But, unfortunately, as the economy is getting stronger

and more positive, and more people are enjoying the hospitality industry, we are finding that our system is continually being overtaxed because of the number of tourists that are coming through,

and we want to make sure that we can welcome those tourists and

not be a problem.

We have talked at length in this committee and with the TSA,

and I would like to reinforce, one, the positive things that you are

doing, but to encourage the continued effort of working with individual communities when it comes to being prepared for the number of visitors. In Las Vegas, every day is a Superbowl. And I know

Houston did a great job, as did TSA, of handling the Superbowl,

but we need to make sure that TSA continues to be in communica-
17

tion with the different business communities, hospitality included,

but wherever you are in the Country. We literally have thousands

of people standing around during one of our events earlier in the

year because we weren’t adequately staffed.

So I guess, in summary, I appreciate what you are doing, but

once again I call on the coordination of the TSA with the communities across the Country as they gear up for their very own

Superbowls. And the more efficient we can be in handling the visitors to our communities, the safer they will be. And, again, appreciate what you are doing. And I hope to learn from the five airports

that we are currently experimenting with with the private screening, but, again, thank you, but keep coordinating with these different communities.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Any further opening statements?

[No response.]

Mr. MICA. With no further opening statements, we will turn to

our first panel and witnesses.

Let me just make one announcement to the subcommittee. I

think Mr. DeFazio, possibly Mr. Oberstar and myself have seen the

classified results of the testing of the current system, both private

operations, the five pilot programs, and also many of the other airports. I think it would behoove every member of this panel to take

time to get with staff, we have copies of those classified reports,

and access them. I think we have a very serious situation on our

hands relating to the effectiveness of the current system, be it public or private, and I think that each of you should take time to review the problems that have been identified with the current system. And I think we need to take that under probably a closed session and discuss where we go from here, whether we have an expansion of the current private program or the public program, because we do have some serious deficiencies in the current system.

So the staff, if you will arrange with them, can give you that classified information.

Let me just say, too, that this hearing is not about opting out of

the Federal security system. I have not proposed that; no one that

I know of has proposed that. These pilot programs, too, have

worked under a Federal system and were supervised and the

standards set by Federal authority, and no one proposes any

change to that. What we are going to do is find out how the five

pilot programs operated and how TSA intends to move forward

from this point, given the provisions of the law that was enacted

November 19th, 2001.

So, with that, I am pleased to recognize our first panel, which is

Admiral David Stone, Acting Administrator of the Transportation

Security Administration, and also the Honorable Clark Kent Ervin,

Inspector General of Homeland Security.

Welcome. You are recognized first, Admiral Stone.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;

AND HON. CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Admiral STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18

Chairman Mica, Congressman DeFazio, Congressman Oberstar,

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing regarding TSA’s private screening pilot program, what we call

the PP5 program. I will refer to those airports participating in the

PP5 program as PP5 airports.

Yesterday, TSA briefed the Chairman and Ranking Member on

the findings from an independent study TSA commissioned to compare screening at the five pilot airports with screening at Federal

airports. While you will hear later from BearingPoint, the independent evaluator, I am pleased to now have the opportunity to

discuss their findings in an open hearing. This will allow me to discuss how those findings will shape our thinking as we move forward on designing the parameters of the opt-out program after the

conclusion of the pilot program.

As a threshold matter, ensuring the security of the civil aviation

system is our overriding objective. With this central mission in

mind, a fundamental goal of the independent study was to provide

an objective view of whether it would be appropriate for TSA to

proceed with the opt-out program from a security standpoint. Indeed, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act specifically

states that TSA may only enter into private screening contracts

with airports electing to opt out if TSA determines and certifies

that the level of screening services and protection provided at the

airport under the contract will be equal to or greater than the level

that would be provided at the airport by Federal Government personnel.

The results of the BearingPoint study indicate that while additional study analysis and refinement will be required as we move

forward, TSA anticipates that it will be in a position to make this

certification at the appropriate time. Specifically with respect to security effectiveness, BearingPoint concluded that the five PP5 airports performed at a comparable level to airports with TSA screeners.

BearingPoint arrived at its conclusion after conducting extensive

comparisons between Federal and private contract screening using

the following criteria: covert testing results from TSA, DHS, and

the General Accounting Office; screener response to threat image

projection system images; secondary searches conducted at boarding gates to assess the effectiveness of initial searches at some airports; and screener performance on various decertification tests.

In addition to the security analysis, BearingPoint compared the

cost of conducting operations at Federal and private airports. It

found that the cost at the five airports were not different in any

statistically significant manner from the estimated cost of federally

conducted security operations at those airports.

BearingPoint also examined customer service and stakeholder

impact, although its findings in this area were less conclusive.

Data indicated that customer satisfaction at the Category X and 1

airports was mixed, but there was not enough data to draw conclusions for the other three airports. However, a qualitative survey of

stakeholders revealed no difference in this area between airports

with private contract screening and those with Federal screeners.

While we believe that BearingPoint’s independent study has been

a highly useful exercise, it is merely a starting point, and not the
19

end. We regard the pilot program and opt-out program as an interim process where TSA continually operates, evaluates, and innovates with regard to private contract screening.

We have learned a great deal from the BearingPoint study, as

well as from our own experience, and I have no doubt that we will

glean additional useful information as we proceed with the remainder of the pilot program. We intend to use the remaining months

of the pilot program to incorporate lessons learned thus far and

apply them to the future conduct of the PP5 program. Furthermore, we will be incorporating all lessons learned in the designing

of the opt-out program and then further incorporate lessons

learned from future activities at airports utilizing private contract

screening.

We acknowledge and appreciate suggestions voiced by the PP5

contractors, airport authorities, as well as GAO and the DHS Inspector General regarding operational flexibility at the PP5 airports. Previously, in keeping with our central security mission, TSA

managed the PP5 program conservatively with regard to flexibilities. In doing so, TSA was taking the utmost care during the organization’s standup phase to ensure that security was being met at

all of the Nation’s airports, including the PP5s. TSA has provided

the PP5 contractors with significant flexibility in certain areas;

however, we are actively seeking to increase this flexibility even

further. Now that we are more confident in our ability to judge the

impact on aviation security that a proposal may have, we will move

forward aggressively in this area.

One example of flexibility is TSA’s approval of the idea conceived

by Covenant Aviation Services to implement and test the concept

of using baggage handlers to perform nonscreening functions in

lieu of baggage screeners at San Francisco International Airport.

Covenant believes that this division of responsibilities will result in

cost savings without any deterioration in security. TSA is now

monitoring the implementation of this idea. TSA welcomes all innovative ideas put forward by the contractors and will afford each

proposal careful consideration.

TSA is in the early stages of developing an efficient, understandable, and effective procedure for opt-out applications and is currently drafting the specific contents of the opt-out guidance. As we

move forward on developing the guidance, I must emphasize again

that security of the aviation system is and will always be our overriding concern.

One of the many challenges TSA faces in developing the opt-out

guidance relates to transition issues concerning the Federal screener workforce at airports that elect to opt-out and where we approve

this request. TSA has invested significant time and resources in

hiring and training Federal screeners. They function at a high level

of performance and have done a tremendous job of protecting our

civil aviation system. We certainly believe it would be wise to preserve this investment and retain the knowledge, skills and experience of this valuable, dedicated, and proven workforce.

One option that TSA is considering to address this challenge is

to provide Federal screeners at the affected airports with the right

of first refusal for screener positions at contract screening companies. We are working hard to resolve these issues, as well as oth-
20

ers, to ensure that the process will be in place to give careful consideration to applications submitted by airports that elect to opt

out after November 18th of this year. TSA is currently on schedule

to meet a self-imposed deadline for providing guidance to the airports in order to aid their decision on whether or not to opt out.

As we move forward, we will take appropriate steps to ensure

that we communicate effectively with our stakeholders, with the

current screening workforce, and with Congress on our progress.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,

this concludes my remarks. I look forward to answering your questions during this hearing.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your statement.

I will start with a couple of questions.

I am sorry, we have got the Inspector General before I start my

questions. I thought you were going to have to leave early, but you

get the privilege, Mr. Ervin, of following Mr. Stone, so welcome,

and you are recognized.

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members

of the committee.

Based on our own work on this matter, the Office of Inspector

General found that there is not a sufficient basis at this time to

determine conclusively whether the pilot airport screeners performed at a level equal to or greater than that of Federal screeners.

TSA needs to develop measurable criteria to evaluate both contractor and Federal screeners properly. Available data from limited

covert testing suggests that they performed about the same, which

is to say equally poorly. But the apparent consistency in performance was not unexpected, considering the extraordinary degree of

TSA’s involvement in screening, hiring, deploying, training, and

promoting pilot screeners.

TSA’s tight controls over the pilot program restricted flexibility

and innovation that the contractors might have implemented to

perform at a level exceeding that of the Federal workforce. For example, the inability to hire screeners independently left pilot program contractors totally dependent on TSA to obtain their initial

workforce and to fill any vacancies caused by attrition or to meet

peak period needs during the first year of the contract. As a consequence, the pilot program contractors said that they could not effectively and immediately address problems with high attrition levels, understaffing, excessive overtime, and employee morale.

The staffing shortage at the Kansas City Airport, for example,

was so severe that to meet the minimum staffing requirements and

to ensure airport screening security, TSA temporarily deployed 68

Federal screeners to two passenger checkpoints and three baggage

screening areas. The Federal screeners were deployed to the Kansas City Airport for two months, costing TSA over $1 million.

Applicant screening was also a problem. Covenant prescreened

all the applicants prior to sending them to the TSA assessment

center, to increase the likelihood that TSA would agree that the

prescreened applicants were qualified. However, only 31 percent of

the prescreened applicants passed the TSA assessment process,

and that was about the same percentage as passed the TSA assessment center who were not prescreened. The contractor had to wait

for future TSA-initiated assessment centers to be set up before it
21

could attempt to fill the remaining vacant positions, and TSA refused to share its assessment criteria with the contractors so that

future contractor prescreening could increase the likelihood of the

pass rate.

The pilot program contractors were also restricted in the overall

number of screeners that they could hire and in how screeners

were trained. For example, although the TSA pilot contract award

press release and the pilot program contract stated a requirement

for baggage screening, TSA did not include authorizations for baggage screeners in the initial hiring or staffing level. To attain staffing flexibility, pilot program contractors, with approval from local

TSA, did cross-train passenger screeners and checked baggage

screening on their own.

TSA’s management and oversight of the pilot program was generally decentralized, and program and operational issues had to be

routed through numerous divisions within TSA in order to be researched, discussed, and then finally approved. When contractors

and local TSA officials needed decisions and/or direction, they often

had difficulty getting headquarters officials to respond. Some local

TSA and contractor officials found it easier to make their own decisions rather than seeking headquarters approval or guidance, leading to inconsistencies among pilot airport program management

and thereby making comparisons between the Federal workforce

and the contractor workforce even harder to make.

In conclusion, OIG believes that, in theory, pilot programs can be

a useful tool in exploring program innovations and improvements.

But in this instance TSA must develop meaningful performance

measures and standards so that overall performance and the effects of new improvements can be measured and assessed, and contractors must be given the flexibility to determine what works best

for their own situations.

I have a longer statement, as you know, Mr. Chairman, for the

record, and, like the Admiral, I would be happy to answer questions. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And, without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record.

Now we will proceed with questions. I thank both of our witnesses for their comments.

First of all, Admiral Stone, again, I want to make it perfectly

clear that no one is opting out of a Federal program, that, in fact,

there will still continue to be all requirements, policy oversight conducted by the Federal Government and TSA. Is that correct?

Admiral STONE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Under any circumstance that is considered, they are

not opting out from Federal requirements.

I was actually quite surprised at the unanimity of the panel,

both sides of the isle, in the plea for decentralization. And God

bless you, Admiral Stone. We have had McGaw and we have had

Loy, and you are acting. You are number three, and you have inherited what has been probably one of the most formidable tasks

since World War II of putting together an aviation security system

or any kind of a system with 40,000, I think at one point we were

up to 55,000, employees to get this thing launched, and trying to

get it to work right is quite a challenge.
22

But we passed the law, we have November 19th as a deadline,

and we have many airports, some are in the audience, or their representatives, wanting to know what time frame you anticipate that

they will know how they can proceed. And again, latest indication

I have had is about 100 airports want to look at operating in a

similar fashion, with Federal supervision, with private screeners,

and also in a more decentralized fashion so that some of the hiring,

the recruitment, the training can be done on a localized basis, and

also the deployment of personnel can be done so they can address

the peaks and valleys of their passenger screening requirements.

Can you give us, today, some kind of an outline in which you anticipate this transition to take place and let us know what the

schedule is?

Admiral STONE. Yes, sir. When Admiral Loy testified last fall before this committee, he set the bar and it was his hope that TSA

would promulgate six months prior to November 19th a process by

which airports could then review and make their decisions concerning submission of paperwork requesting to opt out on November

19th. So May 19th has been the goalpost that we have set that we

would like to be able to have an opt-out process described.

The program structure would include issues such as indemnification, our position on unionization and program application such as

the contract vehicle, contract award process, application process,

and also clarifying the role of TSA, the role of the FSD, the role

of the airport, and the role of the private contractor. And so we are

busily working and crafting that plan. We plan on meeting once

again with the companies that have provided services for the PP5

airports. In fact, we recently sent them a letter because we want

to meet with them to discuss their ideas that they have provided

us on efficiencies and effectiveness, improvements so that we can

include that into our opt-out planning process.

So our goal is that, in that May time frame that I mentioned, to

be able to develop that, have that briefed up through our department and up the chain so that we can provide at the earliest opportunity to the airport directors what that process will look like so

that they can make a thoughtful decision.

Mr. MICA. OK.

And again I heard some concern about we don’t want massive

disruption in this process, so we want a smooth transition. We

don’t want any diminution or change in standards; we would actually like to see higher requirements kept. I think that is one of the

concerns of the subcommittee as we make this transition.

The liability and indemnification is an important question, because no one wants to take on this responsibility if they are liable.

Almost everything TSA is now contracted to the private sector, isn’t

that true? I have the recruitment is done by NCS-Pearson; assessment and hiring of all screeners, private and Federal, is done by

NCS, a private contractor; the recruitment assessment and hiring

of personnel is done by Cooperative Personnel Services, a private

contractor; the preemployment physical testing is done by a private

contractor; Boeing-Siemens done training for baggage screener;

Boeing-Siemens does study of passenger movement.

Are they indemnified, these folks, now?
23

Admiral STONE. I would have to find out for each individual one

and provide that back to you, sir.

Mr. MICA. OK. But, again, no one is going to take on this responsibility. And you do have a current indemnification for these five

pilot projects in some way, don’t you? Could you describe that?

Admiral STONE. We are currently working with DHS to provide

coverage to the private screening contractors under the Safety Act

enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act, and consideration is

being given to amending that Security Act regulation to designate

and certify TSA’s current standard operating procedures that are

followed by TSA screeners and contractors at the privatized airports as an approved antiterrorism technology. Doing so would provide the contractor with the judicially-created affirmative defense

known as the government contractor defense. That defense protects

the contractor from third-party liability towards suits.

Mr. MICA. One of the questions raised here was if you have

enough resources. I am told that right now, while you have a cap

of 45,000 imposed by the appropriators, you have approximately

3,000 vacancies on any given day across the Country. Is that correct?

Admiral STONE. No, sir, it is not. When you look at the airports

today, those airports have allocations based on a 49,600 FTE. We

currently are in the process of repromulgating what those allocations look like at 45,000 FTE, and so we are operating right now,

at least full-time equivalence for the FTE acronym——

Mr. MICA. But we still have——

Admiral STONE. We are operating below that number.

Mr. MICA.—literally thousands of vacancies of unfilled positions.

Admiral STONE. We have about 700 based on a 45,000 full-time

equivalent metric, or we have got 44,300 FTE right now

operating——

Mr. MICA. That is not the information that I have been given by

staff. Again, I wish you would check that and give it to the subcommittee. I can recite more than 700 vacancies right now across

the Country.

Admiral STONE. Yes, sir, and that is based on the old allocation

figure.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, again, we have places where we don’t have

the personnel deployed, and I am getting complaints from local

Federal security directors that they can’t get people deployed, either recruited, trained, a background check completed from Washington, and then deployed to where they need them, and that is

part of the problem.

I think you heard the plea here. No one wants to change the

standards, but we want to decentralize the process and make it

more flexible.

Well, I have a number of questions, but I have to let everybody

have a fair shot here today. But the last thing is the most disturbing thing we heard from the Inspector General was that both the

Federal and the private screeners performed equally poorly.

Isn’t that what you said?

Mr. ERVIN. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. And when I asked the members of the subcommittee

to review the classified information beforehand, this is what I was
24

referring to. We have a system that isn’t working. I think it is incumbent, and I am going to ask Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Oberstar, and

others on the committee that are interested. I think we need an

emergency meeting with Admiral Ridge, Admiral Loy, Hutchinson,

you, and others to sit down and look at the results we have seen

in testing the system. It is not working, whether it is private or

Federal, to the degree it should. And that is just for finding certain

types of threats.

What concerns me even more is the type of threat that we may

see with an explosive device we are even less likely to be able to

deal with with the current training, with the current equipment

and technology, and the current deployment of resources. And I

think we need to have a serious meeting within the next 10 days,

and I am going to ask the ranking member to join me, the full committee, whatever it takes. We need to sit down and see how we can

develop a more effective system to address the gaps in the current

system that we have, whether it is public or private.

So I put you on notice I am asking the staff to ask Secretary

Ridge and the others, and that meeting will take place one way or

the other. If necessary, I will request a subpoena and will have

folks come in here if they will not voluntarily. This is a very serious situation and it needs our immediate attention.

Admiral STONE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I had a talk with the Inspector General yesterday on this subject, related to the covert testing program, and in this unclassified forum I wanted to make the

point that we do indeed agree that there is a need for a closed session here to discuss both the technologies that are involved in this,

as well as the issue related to the investment that we have made

in this over the last 18 months, since we stood up and Federalized

the screening force and we have tracked this very closely. That is

70 percent improvement on where we are headed. I have also met

with my Israeli counterparts to talk to them about the concept of

covert testing and the need that when you have a testing program,

you need to break the system. We do not want to produce results

that have 99 percent completions by having testing conducted that

is simple and pumps up our numbers. So that system is designed

to break it and is in concert with whether you deal with the

Israelis or any other experts in this field to make sure that we

know where our vulnerabilities are so we can remedy them. So, sir,

I look forward to that opportunity to brief that.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. DeFazio?

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I share

your sense of urgency about this issue. You and I have both been

critical of the lack of new equipment available for screening passengers so that TSA employees or the private contract employees

don’t have the tools they need, particularly for the detection of

carry-on explosives. It is just not conscionable that we haven’t acquired and deployed that technology. Technology exists. Technology

is used here at the Capitol, it is used at the White House, but it

is not used in our airports. We just can’t abide by that situation,

and we have got to move forward with rapid deployment, because

I believe that that is one of the greatest risks that confront us. I

welcome the opportunity to participate with the Chairman in an
25

urgent emergency hearing or briefing and conversation with the

highest ranking people in the Administration on this issue.

And I just reflect further, when Inspector General Ervin said

equally poorly, that was an attention-getter. He didn’t say comparably; equally poorly. We are not violating any confidences here.

That is a condemnation. And what I hark back to is when I introduced my first bill on enhancing passenger screening and checkpoint screening in 1987, after a briefing by the FAA on the failure

rate of the existing system then run by the airlines. I was shocked.

I was absolutely shocked. And at that point we didn’t exactly confront the threats we confront today, but I was still very concerned.

So I introduced my first bill back then. And the interesting thing

is that the failure rates are comparable between 1987 and today,

and part of that has to go to the technology the people are working

with. Many of them are working with essentially the same technology they were working with in 1987. Granted, the tests are

more sophisticated, they are more difficult targets in terms of concealment, but that is just not acceptable.

Now to go on to a few of the other points here. Admiral, you

talked about the amount of effort that is going into laying out the

process to convert to private contracting. There is quite a considerable effort going on in your staff, but I would just hope there is at

least as comparable or even a more urgent effort going on to give

the existing FSDs the flexibility that the private contractors have

today and the things that are identified in this report about how

they can do things better with split shifts, how they can dismiss

people.

As the Chairman brought up, for instance, there was a concern

here about the prescreening. Covenant prescreened people and 31

percent got through the final screening. Well, of course, the assessment and hiring was set up by NCS-Pearson, but it is overseen by

the TSA.

Could you tell me, Inspector General Ervin, do you have any idea

where that problem is? You said they wouldn’t communicate back

to Covenant about the criteria that were used. Is that a TSA policy? Is that a policy with the contractor? Were the failure rates due

to criteria set by the contractor or some sort of overlay of bureaucracy and policy by the TSA?

Mr. ERVIN. Well, what we are told is that TSA would not share

with Covenant, or the other contractor that tried to prescreen, the

criteria that TSA assessment center used, and so we really don’t

know.

Mr. DEFAZIO. But NCS-Pearson administers those tests, so did

NCS-Pearson come up with the criteria or did TSA come up with

the criteria?

Mr. ERVIN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Because we have got this confusing situation.

You have on one end a private contractor who wants better information, you have got the TSA in the middle, and then you have

another private contractor who is the one who failed them. There

is some problem here, and I can’t quite get to it.

Admiral, do you have any insight into that problem?

Admiral STONE. Yes. That is an issue of communication between

TSA providing the visibility it needs to provide so that we can get
26

that hiring process more efficiently done. So the effort of the organization has been local testing, not just covert testing from headquarters, but local testing, so those kits are now out there in the

field so our FSDs can conduct their own daily testing; local training

rather than being dependent on contract companies to come and

train you, you have your own master training and have that FSD

be empowered to train and evaluate his or her own personnel; to

have the threat information projection system at all of our airports,

which it now is, so that each screener can punch in their code at

the x-ray machine and then have the FSD be able to score and see

how that individual screener is performing; and then local hiring.

If you go to Boston Airport today, with the great Federal security

director that we have there, George Nicara, you will find that that

airport is our model airport for moving down the road for local hiring.

We could not agree more that the secret to success for TSA is

local testing, training, hiring, and empowerment of the FSD at the

local level.

Mr. DEFAZIO. How soon can we spread that from Boston to other

airports?

Admiral STONE. Right now we are looking at that because we are

keen to set up other hubs throughout the Country where we can

make that hiring process much quicker than it is today.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. DeFazio, if I could just add something. On the

discrete issue of prescreening, whether it is TSA that sets the criteria or whether it is the contractor that does so, it seems to us

that those criteria ought to be shared with the contractor so that

they know in advance what the criteria are to increase the likelihood of the pass rate of those whom they prescreen. Prescreening

is a good idea, provided the criteria are shared with the contractors.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. We are certainly entrusting that contractor

with a whole host of other classified but nonclassified burdens and

duties and information to run these services at the airport, so I

don’t understand why we would have a problem sharing that.

Mr. ERVIN. Exactly.

Admiral STONE. I couldn’t agree more. That partnership is key,

and that is why we are meeting with the private company leadership to make sure that we are doing just that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. One other issue. I realize my time has expired and

I may have a second round. When the Chairman raised the issue,

I think there is some confusion again, and I am really bent out of

shape by this arbitrary mandate by the Appropriations Committee

that you are reduced to 45,000. Even though we have Mr. Menendez, Ms. Berkley and others coming in here and telling us about

unacceptable waits in lines, you are in the process of reducing the

number of allowed personnel screeners under the TSA, is that correct?

Admiral STONE. We are already there. We are below the 45,000

cap and we are hiring up to it at those airports that need to ensure

that they have the screeners to do 100 percent electronic. That is

our number one priority and we are going to do that, and that will

bring us roughly up to the 45,000 cap number. So what you see

today at our Nation’s airports is 45,000 screeners, roughly, and
27

now we need to do the shaping. We have got some airports that

have too many screeners and others too few, and so we are in that

process of readjusting that and then putting out the new allocation

of here is what your airport looks like at 45,000 cap. Right now

those airports have the numbers that are the 49,600 allocation, and

so when you see news articles or things related to why they are

short, they are comparing it to the old 49,600 structure that we

had.

Mr. DEFAZIO. And this was not recommended by TSA; this was

not recommended by the Administration. The 45,000 cap was an

arbitrary number? I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but

was a number chosen by Congress?

Admiral STONE. It was my understanding that due to the demonstrated inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, that TSA was given a

number so that we could demonstrate that we could be efficient

and effective, and so at 45,000 we are required then to report how

that is working for us at our Nation’s airports. So I owe a report

to Chairman Rogers and to my leadership at DHS.

Mr. DEFAZIO. And will you have that report of the feasibility of

meeting the needs, mitigating the lines and the waits and the other

concerns to the Chairman before we go through this year’s appropriation cycle?

Admiral STONE. I am working right now so that I get the right

numbers on what those allocations should be with the airport

groups, the AAAE, the ACI, the Airline Association, the experts

that know the particular airports to work with them to detail for

each airport what should be the appropriate level, and also to get

a vision of what is the capacity. When you look at an airport, for

instance, like Dulles, just last week I had the leadership come in

from Dulles and brief me that as a result of the increased growth

at that airport, Dulles today would be akin in the summer to New

Orleans International Airport being put on top of Dulles. That is

the kind of growth as a result of the low fare carrier at Dulles. So

those capacity issues I need to understand. I am asking for that

partnership from the airlines and the airports to understand that

capacity and growth so that we can then provide that number.

Mr. DEFAZIO. But we started out at 55.6, and then that was reduced to 49.6. But the number 45, to the best of my knowledge,

and I will characterize it from my side, was chosen out of thin air

by the Appropriations Committee and they just said this is your

number, you go to this number. There wasn’t a recommendation by

the Administration that we go to 45, is that correct, it did not recommend that number?

Admiral STONE. It was my understanding that the number was

determined based on giving TSA a reasonable target to demonstrate efficiency.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But that is reasonable or arbitrary, however

you want to look at it. It wasn’t based on any request of the Administration, on demonstrated needs, any statistical quantification

of wait times. In fact, as I understand, the secretary has discarded

the wait time criteria of 10 minutes, isn’t that correct? We no

longer have that.

Admiral STONE. No. In fact, Representative Pearce asked about

that. We currently have, for March and April, the national average
28

peak wait times: for the month of March, 12 minutes; for the

month of April, 11.8 minutes. And then we have airports that are

listed that drive that average up, for instances, airports such as

Honolulu, Miami, Atlanta, Las Vegas.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Washington National.

Admiral STONE. Yes. And so we have that. We are tracking that

carefully. We will note that we have not discarded that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, averages are sometimes deceptive, and I

would be interested in how the averages are reached.

Mr. MICA. Will the gentleman yield?

Seventy percent of the air traffic goes through 30 airports in the

United States each day.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. So the question is——

Mr. MICA. If you spread that over——

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. Is that the average wait time per passenger

or per airport. And I would be interested. I won’t get into that now,

but I travel a lot, a couple hundred thousand miles a year. I would

say rarely, if ever, do I encounter as little as a 12 minute wait

time. But that is only flying 60, 70 times a year in various places

around the Country. Maybe there is something going on in some

other places I don’t know about.

But my concern and my point is the number 45,000 was not built

on, it wasn’t looking at the needs, the increase in air traffic and

all that, and setting a firm wait time criteria for all airports individually, as opposed to some sort of aggregate average, it was dictated, and you are doing your best to get there.

Admiral STONE. Right. It was my understanding it was a number

that was determined as a result of let us make sure we are making

efficient, effective use of the taxpayers money.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Now, I know you don’t want to upset our friends

on the Appropriations Committee. Neither do I. But I just want to

make the point that when we see lines getting longer and longer,

and you are at your cap, there is not a lot of alternatives out there.

Maybe you can shuffle some people around and drive up the wait

times at other smaller airports or at different airports, and mitigate them a little bit at the bigger airports, but it is hard. You

can’t have a team of people you move around the Country on a seasonal basis like to Florida in the wintertime and to somewhere else

in the summertime, unless you are going to provide some sort of

extraordinary housing benefits or something else for these people.

I don’t know.

Admiral STONE. And that is why this partnership with the civil

aviation partnership with those organizations is key. We need to

get the number by the people that know what it should be and

what the growth is, and we are doing just that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you have been very

generous. I am well over my time.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Baker, I know you have to leave. Go ahead.

Mr. BAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

your courtesy.

Admiral, I just want to get a clear understanding as to checking

efficiencies, protecting concerns of security, making modifications to

organizational structure. Is there a sufficiently broad grant of au-
29

thority to you and the agency to engage in any policy changes you

feel would be advisable or are there statutory constraints which

would constrain your ability to make the organizational changes

you feel appropriate?

Admiral STONE. I think there is the flexibility within the current

parameters to allow TSA to be creative, innovative, remove the layers between headquarters and the field, and empower the Federal

security directors and have them partner effectively with local leadership to get the right answer for each tailored airport.

Mr. BAKER. Then in that regard, I suggested at an earlier hearing on this subject, given the constraints with which the field personnel have to operate, and I will not enumerate the examples previously granted, but there were clearly times when movement of

passengers could have been facilitated, but because of the line-byline requirements that the individual inspector must abide by or

resultingly get written up, needless processes and, therefore, travelers’ time was consumed while lines were growing. I have made

the observation if it is a matter of trying to have a uniform protocol, where everybody knows what to do in every situation, understandable. But it would seem that there would be a sufficient reason, given all the variables that these screeners must come in contact with, that at least the supervisor, or some person on duty in

charge, could be consulted with or asked is it appropriate to do X

or Y in this case, and a grant of authority given by that person so

that the routine security personnel would not feel they were at personal professional risk by allowing something that was obviously

not a threat to proceed through the check-in.

So, one, a grant of authority to some field personnel to be, in effect, an appellate resource or a place where a traveler could go to

get relief from a particular problem would be a great advantage.

And I fly in and out of Baton Rouge, and it is a very small airport.

We certainly don’t have the problems the Chairman or other members have with high volume, but I can tell you on a given morning

we never know what the wait line will look like when we get to

that airport; it can be a matter of a couple of minutes, it can be

30 minutes, and all too often it is some little abhorrent thing that

has occurred that has caused things to back up. And if there was

someone given managerial authority at that location to make judgments, I think it would greatly enhance the ability to flow.

Secondly, as to the international consolidation of security corporations, there are sufficient number of nondomestic providers

who now are on contract, for example, with the Department of Defense to provide security services to extremely sensitive areas of

our Government. As I now understand it, the TSA has a prohibition on a nondomestic owner being allowed to contract for security

services for fear of who those non-U.S. owners may represent.

It seems to me that if you have a very large domestically owned

security company, they can employ whoever they want. So the

threat of risk from a terrorist-driven enterprise or person exists

even within the domestically-owned corporation. It would seem a

competitive advantage for us to open the process up as broadly as

possible to have, subject to TSA screening and background checks,

as many people providing services as are possible to get the best

qualified people at the lowest price to do the job.
30

Hence, the reason for my initial question. If you have the authority and feel not inappropriately fettered by congressional statute,

these are changes I think which could be implemented to provide

higher levels of service at a quicker time at lower cost and greatly

enhance the movement of passengers and services through the system.

And I don’t expect a lengthy answer. I appreciate the Chairman’s

courtesy in allowing me to perhaps speak out of order, but time

constraints are what they are, and I appreciate your difficult task,

Admiral.

Admiral STONE. Yes, sir. And I will look into making sure that

we comply with the law related to that. And as we review the optout process and how we might best also organize our Federal airports in the future, the comments that you made will be part of

this dialogue that we have in the coming weeks on that.

With regard to empowerment of the local FSD and having people

make decisions locally, having been a Federal security director

under the old private contract screeners, and then also been one

with the new Federalized screeners, the difference is night and

day. I have been there on the line; I have seen the checks; I have

been part of the covert testing for both. There is no comparison between what we had in the past at LAX, for instance, and what we

have today. And a lot of that is due to the unity of command of

having a Federal security director there to lead people, the clarity

of the mission that is provided by that Federal entity, the standard

operating procedures that we have, but also under that system the

ability of leaders to be out, like Ken Cusprison at Minneapolis, St.

Paul or Ed Gomez at San Francisco, to lead people, to make judgment calls, to make sure we do the right thing. And so we are totally committed to making sure that local empowerment to these

leaders that we have entrusted for the security of these airports is

a major theme and emphasis point for TSA.

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Johnson?

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stone, the BearingPoint study points to the fact that

private screening companies are not required to staff with a specified number of full-time or part-time employees, and can use various staffing models such as split shifts and management of downtime. Is TSA planning to grant similar authority to Federal model

airports? And if not, why not?

Admiral STONE. Thank you for that question. We are going to be

capitalizing on these best practices that we have seen to ensure

that our Federal security directors, whether they are at a

privatized airport or a Federalized airport, are able to benefit from

this. So that that flexibility in scheduling their workforce, their

ability to manage a pot of money and then use those resources as

they see fit to tailor their airport I think is a critical way for us

to approach this both at the Federalized and the privatized airports.

Ms. JOHNSON. One further question. Due to the lack of TSA-authorized administrative support personnel, Federal airports often

use screener personnel to perform administrative tasks such as HR
31

and payroll support, and that private contractors use less expensive administrative staff to perform these functions, is TSA planning to allow Federal model airports to hire less expensive administrative personnel to perform nonscreening functions?

Admiral STONE. That issue that you have addressed is indeed an

important one for us. We currently have today at our Nation’s airports a number of our screeners that take part and serve duties as

training assistants and then go back on line, and so they are used

sort of with two hats to provide assistance for human resources.

You can go to an airport like LAX, where you have roughly 2,000

screeners, you have two human resources staff assigned to it.

We believe we have, for the most part, across the Nation a very

lean and mean oversight staff, as I just indicated by the example

there at LAX; you have two management personnel on staff doing

training, two doing human resources. And so we found the need to

go out into the workforce and find the best and brightest people

that are doing screening who also are willing to use those talents

to help us, whether it be in human resources or training or just

overall security management. And so as we look at how that is affecting our screening force with a cap of 45,000, it will be part of

our recommendation process for what is the right model for an airport for both staff and screener numbers, since in fact that is how

we are routinely doing business today.

Ms. JOHNSON. Just a final question. Do you plan to change any

of the hiring practices, decentralizing? Have you thought about

that?

Admiral STONE. Yes. We think it is critical that we decentralize

the training, testing, and hiring, and empower the Federal security

directors so that they are not micromanaged from Washington,

D.C., and that we allow them to have funds that they can then control locally to make sure their airports are tailored to their specific

needs.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Oberstar?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think one of the most important parts of your testimony, Admiral Stone and Inspector General Ervin, is the observation that the

TSA needs to establish performance standards, program standards

by which to measure achievement that will be applied both to the

privately operated and to the Federalized facilities. Without those

performance standards, we are not going to be able to evaluate adequately. And in setting the performance standards, you need, as

the FAA has been directed to do with the new structure of an operating officer, to evaluate each airport at its peak load times, its

down times, and how many personnel you need at those times, and

then the rotation of personnel from online screening to training to

provide some diversion from the routineness of day-to-day operations.

One of the lessons of European airport security screening in the

1990’s was this rotation of personnel for a week or two weeks or

a few months to another task within the airport, and then bringing

them back after retraining and reevaluating their skills and put-
32

ting them back at the screener positions. I think that is something

you need to establish.

What I have been concerned about, though, is that there might

be a bias, and I am very encouraged by Chairman Mica’s statement

there is no thought, no purpose of pushing this screener program

in the direction of total privatization. But I just also want to hear

your assurance that TSA will not give preferential treatment to

those airports who choose to opt out over those that choose to stay

in.

Admiral STONE. Yes, sir, you have my assurance we will not give

that preferential treatment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Especially when it comes to levels of staffing and

standards?

Admiral STONE. Our intent on that, definitely not on standards.

In terms of staffing, what we would like to see, if we could craft,

is a process by which our Federalized airports, as well as our

privatized airports, are able to adjust their hiring locally so the

FSD can make that choice on efficient use of resources and adjusting their screener numbers, and whether or not they would like to

hire nonscreener baggage handlers. So we see an opportunity here

to have both the Federal and the privatized leadership be able to

make those adjustments. But I am totally committed to the nonpreferential treatment, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Inspector General Ervin, does that satisfy you?

Mr. ERVIN. I am pleased to hear that, Congressman, and certainly that is something that we will monitor.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Now, the covert testing I have some concerns, and there may be

some things you may not want to answer in an open hearing, and

that is pre-September 11 civil penalties program of FAA resulted

in 94 percent of the civil penalties assessed against airlines being

assessed for security failures by their privately engaged security

companies. There was a covert testing program conducted regularly

by FAA. Now the question: Is the covert testing program TSA is

operating a step above substantial levels of rigor above that of FAA

pre-September 11? And if so, have you measured what TSA is

doing against how FAA conducted that security program?

Admiral STONE. It is our position at TSA that the program of

testing that was being conducted in the 1990’s that you refer to

was in no way even comparable to the testing that we are doing

today, it is an apple and an orange. We are building our program

to be a state-of-the-art, what is our weakness, let us break it, let

us break the system. Every opportunity we get and expose to ourselves in our covert testing program where are our weaknesses. We

are not looking to have numbers that justify our existence. Instead,

we are looking to find out, so as operators and warriors in this war

on terror, where are we weak; what kind of technologies do we

need, what type of remedial training. And then we plot how are we

doing, even with this tough testing, and we have had a 70 percent

increase, in the 18 months since we Federalized those checkpoints,

on overall performance.

However, in a classified setting, I would like the opportunity to

provide where is it that we still find that as a result of this very

demanding testing that we are doing, that there are areas where
33

we need some additional help with regard to either training and

focus or on technology. But our view, the TSA view of the previous

testing was large guns, not very creative, tests that today would be

rudimentary for our screening force. So what we have today, in the

TSA view, is a high-tech organization where, when we did our recertification training, 99 percent recertification of our screeners

was just completed. Tip, we are finding that our tip scores, which

now we can monitor, allow us to get the insight into the daily performance of our screeners. There are a number of metrics.

We just had a survey done by BearingPoint that I would like to

provide the Chairman that was conducted in the area of what is

the confidence of the American people in your level of security at

your checkpoints? Do they think it is acceptable, meets expectations? Ninety-two percent of the traveling public surveyed by an

independent industry says that TSA meets or exceeds their expectations. And we take those data points. I think the customer service satisfaction from those sampled was 86 percent. Now, we realize

we want 100 percent, and we are going to work on that other metric, but these indicators, these metrics that we are measuring are

very important to us so that we can then go back and train our

screening force to ensure that it continues to improve, whether it

be security or customer service. And, in fact, the rise in aviation

industry and volume of flights, we believe, is in direct correlation

to the enhanced security we are providing and the consumers’ trust

and confidence in our security, and that is why we are seeing some

of these increases this summer. And that is our position.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Mr. ERVIN. Sir, may I interject on that?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Inspector General.

Mr. ERVIN. As you know, TSA does its own testing, and then the

Office of Inspector General does our own testing. I will let Admiral

Stone talk about TSA’s testing vis-a-vis the FAA testing, but with

regard to our penetration testing, we purposely designed our methodology in a way that was, for all practical purposes, comparable

to, equal to the testing methodology of DOT-OIG when TSA was

the responsibility of the Department of Transportation. And, as I

said, the results were essentially the same.

The 70 percent overall increased performance level that the Admiral has twice now mentioned is the first time I have ever heard

of it, and I don’t know what that is based on. But with regard to

our testing, it is comparable to DOT-OIG, and the difference is infinitesimal.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I find it very encouraging that you, General

Ervin, have patterned your testing program after that of the DOTOIG, because I know that program was very rigorous and very effective.

Now, how does all of this square with Admiral Loy’s testimony?

From my handwritten notes of last time he appeared before the

committee, we picked up a million illegal items, or seized a million

illegal items at airports from the time that TSA began operating,

54,000 box cutters, and made 1700 arrests. If the operation of

screeners is unsatisfactory, then there must be an awful lot more

stuff going through, or maybe that among those million items

seized are lots of fingernail clippers with little fingernail files at-
34

tached to them that were considered to be a threat in the early

days. I remember so well; I had several of them confiscated. I carry

them along just to see what someone would do, and they routinely

seized my little fingernail clipper with that little file this long,

while box cutters were getting through. Why?

Admiral STONE. I think this is in sync with Admiral Loy’s testimony that we realized that that checkpoint that that is a filter, it

is not foolproof. We think it has had a quantum leap and continues

to grow in terms of the performance at that checkpoint, but it also

reflects why we have the layers of Federal air marshals, Federal

flight deck officers, hardened cockpit doors, all of those layers of security to ensure that we mitigate the risk should anything get

through that checkpoint. So it is just one piece of that filter.

And I would be glad to provide the IG the metrics of that 70 percent improvement that is very clearly delineated in our testing

trends.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Now, I cited earlier the experience I had at

Charles de Gaulle when I requested a review of their security system, and in discussion with Chairman Mica, he said, well, they do

use private contractor firms. My point was to show the level of intensity and the multilayered security that is used at Charles de

Gaulle that should be our model for effectiveness of security at airport checkpoints, in addition to which they are screening the daylights out of checked luggage on board aircraft and packages, which

we are not doing.

But in the Charles de Gaulle model, while those employees are

contractors or with a contractor company, they are rigorously overseen by the equivalent of our county sheriff, who was there and

went through the screening system himself, and had not only his

ID run through the reader and show up on a big screen so that his

face on the screen matched his face in person, but also stepped

through and then put his thumb down to get a thumb print read

to match with that on record, and then to be full-body screened, as

all of us were. That is a great standard to have. And then also a

very highly effective x-ray screening of carry-on baggage at the security checkpoint and then again as you board the aircraft.

Admiral STONE. The check baggage piece, as well, we meet regularly, we are meeting with the French and the UK and partnering

on building on each other’s best practices. Our checked baggage

there is great interest in as well from their perspective because of

the number of CTX machines and the granularity of our check, as

opposed to the filtering that takes place through x-ray machines

vice the CTX machines that we use here that believe provide us a

higher level of security. And so that exchange is ongoing to capitalize on each other’s best practices.

Mr. OBERSTAR. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for

the time.

General Ervin, can you rate the difficulty of establishing performance standards and discuss how that might be done and how

long a period of time might take to achieve that goal?

Mr. ERVIN. Well, sir, I think that, first of all, a baseline needs

to be established; this is where we are at this point. And I think

we have the data with which to do that. And then to determine
35

what could reasonably be done within six months, within a year or

so; and then to manage towards that standard.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Can we get to a point, Admiral Stone, where we

are not taking two million pairs of shoes off every day at the airports?

Admiral STONE. I think part of this has——

Mr. OBERSTAR. People are going to wind up with foot disease

here. You are going to have a real case of——

Admiral STONE. Sir, when we go to Atlanta at our research lab

up there, we have some devices that we are concerned about shoes,

and we would like, in the covert testing program, to brief that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would think you would have found out now

which shoes are likely to harbor an unknown bomb and which

aren’t, and you could have machines that could tell that, rather

than—we are going to have people stripping down to their skivvies

pretty soon, if you continue on this standard. I think we need performance standards, as General Ervin is suggesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stone, I hope you have anticipated the question I am

about to ask, because the last time we met was at a hearing that

Chairman Mica called, and he indicated that this was an issue he

was not going to let go. Our own subcommittee chair was equally

persistent on this issue, and, of course, it concerns general aviation

at Ronald Reagan Airport. You will recall that hearing was March

16th of this year, and in response to our concern that already general aviation had been closed since 9/11, a kind of embarrassment

to our national government that it is the only general aviation still

closed in the entire Country, sending the message that we cannot

protect general aviation charter service in the Nation’s capitol, the

only capitol in the world that appears to have that problem, not to

mention the inconvenience to one of the most important regions in

the Country, not only because of the Federal Government, but because it is one of the economic engines to our Country in the private sector. So there was equal concern, I think it is fair to say,

on both sides of the table on March 16th.

My staff has written down what your response was, that you

would be meeting with various contingents within the Department

of Homeland Security. We were astonished with how many contingents there were, but we had every faith in your ability to meet

with them all and get this underway. You said it would happen

within a couple of weeks. Since it has now been over a month, I

think we are within our rights to ask. One of the reasons, of course,

for the concern of the committee is not simply the underlying issue,

but, of course, this committee has taken action, and this action has

been signed into law. And I ask you to remember that this law

says, and I am just going to quote you the relevant parts of the

statute. Notice that we put this right in the secretary’s lap because

we had not been able to get answers from other parts of the bureaucracy. ‘‘Shall develop and implement a security plan to permit

general aviation aircraft to land and take off at Ronald ReaganWashington National Airport.’’
36

So I ask you this afternoon what progress have you made to comply with the law.

Admiral STONE. Thank you, ma’am, for asking that question. Approximately 15 days after that hearing I went up and briefed the

Department on a risk mitigation plan for the reopening of general

aviation at Reagan Airport. It encompassed the three areas that I

said it would. It addressed the criticality of the assets in the area

of Reagan, which is basically within seconds of our national command authority, our political leadership in this Country, and so

those criticality of assets, the White House, the Congress, the Pentagon were all included in that brief.

Additionally, a threat brief was given as part of that, a companion threat brief that I would like the opportunity, and I mentioned

to Representative Hayes earlier today, to provide you that updated

threat briefing that takes into consideration events that have taken

place in Madrid, and also with regard to our overview of the threat

situation here in our Nation’s Capitol, as we lead up to our own

national elections. So I would like the opportunity to provide that

threat briefing, which is a key component of the risk-based decision

of reopening at Reagan.

And then the other piece has to do with the vulnerability assessment as a result of our risk mitigation plan. Yesterday I provided

an updated brief to Under Secretary Hutchinson. He asked me to

put in some additional costing figures and also to run that by a

couple of the other entities, Secret Service and others, who had

been at the previous meeting to ensure that that risk mitigation

plan in fact had been reviewed, and then at that point the Under

Secretary will have that. And I will keep you closely informed on

how that is progressing. I would very much like to provide the——

Ms. NORTON. So in response to my question, you are saying to

us that a risk mitigation plan for reopening general aviation at

Ronald Reagan National Airport is now being developed?

Admiral STONE. It has been briefed, and the context of it is

threat, vulnerability, and criticality of assets. And the Under Secretary has taken that briefing from me and asked me to add a couple additional items in there, and so that has been moving along

as I promised it would be.

Ms. NORTON. All I am trying to ascertain, the threats are, of

course, what one has to take into account. What we are particularly interested in is that the security plan have in it what it is

that the industry is supposed to do in order to be able to land and

take off there. And so when you keep talking about threats, that

is all we heard before was threats, and nobody was indeed dealing

with a plan that would handle the threats so that we could open

general aviation. And what I am saying is how far are we to opening general aviation? That was my question. How close are we to

opening general aviation at Ronald Reagan Airport?

Admiral STONE. The TSA position is the one of the key three

components on the timeline for doing that, and I would like the opportunity to provide you with an updated threat brief since that affects that timeline. The risk mitigation plan, however, is built and

has been provided to the Department.
37

Ms. NORTON. You do have a time line, however. You have a

timeline, it is just that you want to make sure we understand the

threats?

Admiral STONE. It is within that briefing, and I would like to

make sure that, in that context, that we update you on that.

Ms. NORTON. And that is going to be part of the overall briefing,

the classified briefing, the security briefing that you intend to give?

Admiral STONE. We would like to incorporate in the threat briefing with you some additional comments in that closed session, yes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that that session

can be held forthwith.

Mr. MICA. Mr. DeFazio?

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, there was a recent article in The Washington Post

about the desires of Pittsburgh Airport to allow people into the concourse to go shopping. I have a few concerns about this. Obviously,

first and foremost is security concern; secondly is the fact that we

have had a lot of discussion here about lines and inconvenience,

and people are going shopping. They may be in a hurry, but they

don’t quite have the strictures of someone who has to get on an airplane. So I want to sort of assess your intentions here.

My position would be if an airport wants to open up its concourse

for shopping, shoppers who are not getting on airplanes, then, first

off, we have to be sure it is not a security problem; secondly, I

would suggest that in all probability they should provide a duplicate set of equipment at their own expense to give the identical

screening; they should pay for the cost of that screening, because

this does not provide a public benefit in terms of air safety, air

travel. What is your position on that?

Admiral STONE. Our position is that we were approached on this

by Pittsburgh Airport. We looked at it from the standpoint of 20

years from now what do we expect our Nation’s airports to look

like; will there be technologies available for us to be able to have

commercial venues within the confines of the sterile area? We

agreed with Pittsburgh that as long as there was no security impact, that we would like to think out of the box and try to craft

with them a pilot, perhaps include biometric, perhaps not; perhaps

the airport will provide, as you indicated, metal detectors. But

what we did not want to say is no, we want to have blinders on,

or not talk about what can be done to ensure security is fully maintained while at the same time looking at what technologies and

what ideas may be available for us to glean from this pilot.

And so I am in full agreement with you, sir, there will be no impact on the security posture at that airport. We are going to closely

review whatever is proposed. But we wanted to make sure——

Mr. DEFAZIO. And no impact on the traveling public in terms of

them being further delayed because 10 people in front of them in

line want to go shopping.

Admiral STONE. I firmly believe that that is both TSA’s and the

airport’s intent, that is there something with use of technologies,

new approaches, fresh thinking so that you can look at this with

an eye towards what is the art of the possible, what technologies

exist. And so we wanted to be innovative and creative, and not just

say no, and have that dialogue with them to look at what could be
38

done for a pilot, and we are committed to meeting with them next

week to talk about that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. That brings up the other issue again I have asked

you before, I have asked your predecessor, I have asked the GAO,

I ask everybody. I would like a list of the airports in the United

States of America that allow free access with only an identification

badge to vendors and other employees into the secure area. I believe this is an extraordinary threat. Now, it is not just me. We

have First Choice Airways, a British-based airways, who says it is

therefore unacceptable to permit employees to have access to

screened passengers and secure aircraft without having undergone

the same level of personal screening and scanning as the passengers and crew. I pointed out before the irony of this. We know

who the pilot is. We know who the flight attendants are. They have

to, at most airports, although apparently not at some others, but

at most airports they have got to go through screening. We are perhaps making some absolutely minimal progress towards a pilot program for frequent traveler cards, which the Chairman and I have

both been advocating for three or four years now.

But the airport employees, people who have a high turnover rate

working at the fast food places and other places, the fact that I witness them wearing winter coats, filing through without any sort of

scrutiny whatsoever, except flashing a picture ID at someone who

doesn’t know them I just think it is an extraordinary problem, and

I would at least like to know how big the problem is. I have sat

down with the airports who have concerns about lengthening the

lines and/or people that work at the airport who have to have frequent access, they have to go back and forth between, and I think

there are ways to work with that. But it is ironic that now we are

considering ways to get shoppers in, but we are going to scrutinize

the shoppers, but you still would have the people who are serving

the shoppers filing in and out of the airport without any scrutiny

whatsoever.

And now First Choice Airways sent this letter to Asa Hutchinson

the 4th of March. It apparently has not yet had a response, but

they are expressing the concern I have expressed, and they say

they may have to demand or implement gate screening because

they are concerned about people bringing weapons or explosives

who are employees, either through coercion, through bribery, or because they are a bad person; otherwise, who got through the minimal security background checks we give these people, and provide

them to passengers who have been screened. Or maybe they carried an e-ticket with them and they are going to get on the plane

themselves; we don’t know.

Admiral STONE. In response to your previous questions, what we

have done on that is the airport security plans, the ASPAs for

those airports, we have gone back to the Federal security directors

to ensure that they report back to us the big burger folks that you

had mentioned is the term from the last hearing, that in fact that

we have consistency at these airports of those individuals going

through the checkpoints and being screened much like they are at

Phoenix and LAX. What we have got now is also the regulatory

agents at our airports going out to verify the airport security plans,

what doors are opened, what is the individual procedures at that
39

airport for access into the sterile areas so that we can build the

comprehensive list of where do we see some deviations here with

regard to the process. I owe you that list of those airports. I am

also working with the airport associations themselves to help me

get that list, since it is complex, with regard to which doors open

and who has access to it.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, Detroit, they have a special little hallway

people file through; I have seen that. I have heard testimony about

other airports. At my own airport I see the person who sells newspapers taking her shoes off and stand in front of me in the security

line. So it shouldn’t be too hard for the FSDs to say, no, at our airport none of them go through security, some of them go through

security, or all of them go through security. But I appreciate your

working on it.

Inspector General?

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. DeFazio, I would just like to add that we too are

concerned about the huge potential vulnerability here, and so we

are going to be starting a job on the degree to which vendors and

other airport personnel have access to secure areas without being

screened shortly, and we would be happy to brief the subcommittee

on the results of our work once we are done. But we certainly share

the concern.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Great. Thank you. Thank you for undertaking that

task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Just in closing, one of the things that I got to do was visit the

Atlantic City Center, and the Inspector General testified that we

have equally poorly performing screening systems, and part of that,

of course, I think the resolution that Mr. DeFazio has talked about

is trying since 1987 to get better technology in place. We are dealing with 1960 and 1970 technology. When I visited Atlantic City,

I asked also for six or eight major vendors that are currently having equipment testing to meet with me and find out what is going

on from their standpoint, of part of their R&D money was getting

to them and how the programs were progressing.

Some of my observations were interesting. And, first of all, the

problem that the development programs have been delayed is not

all TSA’s fault, it is mostly Congress’ fault. Some of the money that

I put in the first TSA bill or authorized in the first TSA bill was

diverted, and the second time money was taken and also diverted

for salaries, and you were shortchanged. Now we have a significant

amount of money available for R&D.

But the problem that I am told from the private sector is that

there are technologies available that will do a much better job in

detecting threats, weapons and explosives. It has been tested, but

you aren’t buying it. And there is no long-term strategic plan for

changing out the old equipment. So why would the private sector

continue to participate or develop something that isn’t going to be

purchased? So I know some of this is more expensive, but it can

be deployed and provide, where we have risks, a much better detection rate. And some of the problems relating to civil liberties and

privacy can be addressed. But there is no long-term strategic plan

for acquiring that.
40

You have not purchased any equipment, really, to date, or at

least when I was there, as of that date, new generation equipment

or equipment that has been tested to work. So we have got to have

a long-term strategic plan in order to get the private sector to

produce this equipment and we have got to deploy it, or we will

continue to have equally poor results because we are using decades-old equipment and technology.

So I leave you with that thought. I don’t have time even for a

response since we have got votes.

I am going to recess this hearing until five after one, and I will

excuse the panelists. I thank you for your participation, and we

may have additional questions to submit to you.

Until five after one, the Subcommittee on Aviation stands in recess. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. Call the subcommittee back to order.

We have before us our second panel of witnesses today: Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice

Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office; and Mr. Patrick

Pacious, Evaluation Director of BearingPoint, Inc.

I welcome both of you, and first I will recognize Mr.—why don’t

we have Patrick Pacious make your presentation first on the report, and then we will hear from GAO?

Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

TESTIMONY OF NORMAN J. RABKIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR,

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND PATRICK PACIOUS, EVALUATION DIRECTOR, BEARINGPOINT, INC.

Mr. PACIOUS. Thank you, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member

DeFazio. Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss

BearingPoint’s evaluation of TSA’s private screening pilot program.

TSA selected BearingPoint in October 2003 as an independent

evaluator to conduct a scientifically sound assessment of Federal

and private contractor screening performance. BearingPoint, working with Abt Associates, developed three criteria to measure performance: security effectiveness, cost, and customer and stakeholder impact.

During the planning and evaluation period, our team made 29

airport visits, conducted over 240 interviews with Federal and private sector personnel, held forums with external stakeholders, collected data, conducted statistical analysis, and developed our findings. The findings of this study must be viewed in the light of five

key factors.

First, this study is best understood as a comparison of Government delivery of screening services to delivery by a public-private

hybrid. In the private screening operations, each of the three evaluation criteria is influenced by Federal oversight and management.

Second, the design of the private screening program severely limits the opportunity for differences between the two models.

Third, the period in which the study was conducted as not a

steady state environment. TSA and the contractors were in startup phase.
41

Fourth, the airports selected for the program are small in number, five, and were chosen to provide variation in size, passenger

type, and other characteristics. This small, nonrandom sample limits the ability of these findings to be generalized and extrapolated

to other airports.

Finally, the data available for review and analysis is limited. No

historical baseline data exists for the comparison, and many of the

data collection systems were still evolving during the period study.

While sufficient data was available to draw conclusions regarding

the PP5 airports, the factors above limit the ability to generalize

these conclusions to other airports.

Regarding the quantitative findings of our study, in general, our

team found that privately screened airports met the ATSA standard to perform at the same level or better than federally screened

airports. The statistical analysis provided no evidence that they are

not meeting this standard.

Findings in each of the three criteria areas are as follows:

In the area of security effectiveness, there is no evidence that the

five privately screened airports performed below the Federal airports average. However, there is credible evidence that Kansas City

is outperforming the average level of its Federal counterparts.

In the area of cost to the Government, cost for the five privately

screened airports were not significantly different from the estimated cost of a Federal screening operation at that same airport.

In the area of customer satisfaction, performance of the five privately screened airports compared to the federally screened airports was mixed in the larger airports and inconclusive in the

smaller airports.

In addition, a qualitative satisfaction survey of airport managers

and air carriers revealed no difference between the two models.

As a result of our field interviews, we also developed a number

of qualitative observations. We identified the current strengths of

each model. Some of the strengths of the Federal screening model

include: fewer layers of management, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and the ability to efficiently shift resources between

Federal airports.

The strengths of the private screening model include increased

flexibility in the scheduling of screeners, more efficient use of personnel to perform nonscreening functions such as baggage handling

and administrative support, and a contract vehicle that provides

greater visibility into operational performance.

We also identified a number of program improvement initiatives

for both private and Federal models in a companion report. Specifically, these initiatives include transitioning from a centralized

structure to one of more field control and authority over staffing,

assessment, training, and workforce management; and improving

headquarters-to-field communications.

In conclusion, if TSA desires a more robust comparison of private

screening operations to Federal screening in the future, it should

consider three steps: first, allow more flexibility at the private

screening operations in a controlled manner; second, provide a larger, well-designed sample of airports; and, third improve its data

collection systems.
42

Chairman Mica, Congressman DeFazio, members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would like to

have my written statement submitted for the record. And I look

forward to answering any questions you may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record.

We will now turn to Norman Rabkin, Managing Director of

Homeland Security and Justice Division of USGA.

Welcome, sir. You are recognized.

Mr. RABKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. DeFazio. Thanks for

inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss TSA’s contractor-run screening program. The program was to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility the contractors may

provide.

My statement addresses TSA’s implementation and evaluation of

the contract screening pilot program. It is based on preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA’s passenger screening

program. Here are the three main points from my statement.

First, a key limitation of the contractor screening program is that

it wasn’t established to enable TSA to effectively evaluate the differences in the performance of the Federal and contractor screeners, and the reasons for those differences. TSA provided the contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve

efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the requirements of ATSA.

Because TSA requires the contractors and FSDs at airports with

Federal screeners to operate under the same procedures, they all

faced many of the same challenges. For example, the contractors

and FSDs had to rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners

and to establish the assessment centers where TSA interviews and

tests the applicants. The inability to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis has limited contractors’ ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages.

TSA officials told us that they had not granted contractor officials with more flexibility because TSA wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented in order to achieve a consistent level of security across

all airports. On the other hand, TSA recently requested input from

the contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to

implement, which suggests that TSA has reconsidered its earlier

position.

My second point is that despite these overall limitations, contractors have implemented some airport-specific practices. For example, they have screened candidates before TSA has hired them at

the assessment centers; they have selected screener supervisors

from within their own workforce rather than relying on the decisions of TSA; and they have hired baggage handlers, as you have

heard, in order to use baggage screeners more efficiently. Some of

these practices have enabled the contractors to achieve efficiencies

that are not currently available to FSDs at the airports with Federal screeners.

And the third point is that TSA has not yet gathered enough performance data to compare the performance of contractors and Fed-
43

eral screeners in detecting threat objects. The primary source of

performance data are the results of the covert tests performed by

TSA’s office of internal affairs and program review, in which TSA

undercover agents attempted to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage. As you have heard earlier

this morning, the IG also conducted those kinds of covert tests.

TSA is starting to routinely gather other data on screener performance such as data on how often screeners detect threat objects

then they appear on x-ray screens and the results of screener recertification tests. Although results of covert tests conducted so far

cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the tests have

been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator

of screener performance in detecting threat objects. In general, they

indicate that contractor and Federal screeners perform similarly,

and that neither did a very good job in detecting threat objects.

Although TSA has recognized the need to improve the performance of both contractor and Federal screeners, and has taken steps

in this direction, it hasn’t yet set a target for how well screeners

are to perform.

It is not surprising that TSA’s performance data indicate little

difference between Federal and contract screeners in detecting

threat objects. It would have been informative to have an evaluation of a true pilot program where private screening contractors

were provided with greater operational flexibility from the start.

That could have assisted in identifying practices that lead to improved screener performance and hire security at the most efficient

cost to the taxpayer.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased

to answer questions.

Mr. MICA. I am going to yield immediately to the ranking member, Mr. DeFazio.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since you really, Mr. Pacious, didn’t go into sort of a summary

of the report, I just want to revisit a couple of the issues we raised

with the earlier panel; things that you observed, particularly when

you talk about the advantages of the constraints of the private

screening models. Employee discipline and termination, we talked

about this a little bit yesterday, and there is really no explanation

why there is a barrier toward doing that more expeditiously in the

Federal system that you could discern.

Mr. PACIOUS. That is correct, Congressman. That came from

interviews with Federal FSDs who were overseeing both private

and Federal models, and they described the ability to terminate

employees for poor performance as being a more rapid process in

the private side.

Mr. DEFAZIO. And then we had, again, another sort of puzzling

question in our conversation yesterday, the flexibility in scheduling

screeners. As I understand it, it is the issue of split shifts that is

the major difference between how the privates can schedule and

how the Feds are scheduling, and that is just basically because of

some sort of regulation or rule or whatever personnel policy they

have adopted on a discretionary basis?

Mr. PACIOUS. That is correct. We heard from the Federal FSDs

that the policy prevents multiple split shifts in a single day. The
44

other important point to note is that during the course of the

study, in the early part of the study TSA was not taking advantage

of part-time workers as the private contractors were doing. That

has been something that they have increased as the study period

progressed, but that is another factor that may be contributing to

that.

Mr. DEFAZIO. And then the point of personnel nonscreening functions. We had a little discussion earlier of baggage handlers, but

you brought up different issues of administrative support personnel, where FSDs have had to use screener personnel to perform administrative tasks.

Now, if we have this problem where we have got these things

going on with the centralized bureaucracy, why would they need to

do that locally too?

Mr. PACIOUS. I think a lot of the requirements put on the Federal FSDs to document training, to support payroll, to administer

human resource issues requires them to have personnel available

to do that. And really when this issue was raised was when we

looked at the cost model. We said if you were to Federalize this airport, could you do it with the same number of screeners? And the

Federal FSDs said, well, if I had to have a Federal model in here,

I wouldn’t have the private contractor doing HR and payroll support, training documentation that they are doing today, and I

would need additional resources to do that. And their Federal counterparts said they are using screeners to do that, and, in fact, we

did observe that when we went to the Federal airports.

Mr. DEFAZIO. So they are actually diverting trained screeners to

do these other functions, absorbing some substantial portion of

their time that could be used on line, screening.

Mr. PACIOUS. That is correct. And as we stated in our report, in

many cases they are using screeners who were on light duty to do

this function, but in other cases we did observe screeners who were

capable of being on the checkpoint actually doing some of these administrative functions.

Mr. DEFAZIO. The Chairman and I were talking earlier, when

you raised the issue of light duty, and it is not mentioned in your

report, but a fairly high rate of accident or injury due to the movement of sometimes rather large or heavy bags or boxes or things

that are going onto planes. Did you come across any of them? And

apparently now some of the five private screeners are beginning to

use a somewhat separate category of baggage handler who is not

a trained screener. Did you come across that?

Mr. PACIOUS. We did try to obtain from TSA information with regard to workforce-related injuries, but we were unable to get that

information.

Mr. DEFAZIO. They just couldn’t come up with it?

Mr. PACIOUS. Well, in many cases TSA is tracking this at an aggregate level and can’t get it at the airport level, and for our study,

what we were trying to achieve was an airport-to-airport comparison, which was really the primary goal, and in many cases the data

is not available at the airport level.

Mr. DEFAZIO. So if the FSDs who were expressing frustration to

you and in the GAO survey were given the same latitude or flexibility in terms of scheduling, dismissal, some sort of relief on the
45

issue of paperwork, do you see any inherent differences then between the contract model or the Federal model, if we could solve

those problems?

Mr. PACIOUS. Many of those problems could be solved by policy

changes. I think the areas where you are not going to be able to

solve those problems is where you have the contract vehicle, where

that is a strength in the private side because you are actually

using performance-based contracts in the future. That would be a

strength that would be in a private model. The other difference is

the contractors are running one airport, one contractor is running

two, so they are able to focus on a much smaller problem than

TSA, which is trying to manage over 400 airports. So those differences, a local versus a more centralized structure, if policy

changes and resource changes are made to push some of that authority out to the field, I think you could overcome some of those

weaknesses.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Rabkin, do you have any comments on any of

the points I raised there?

Mr. RABKIN. Well I agree that the FSDs at the Federalized airports have authority, and it is a question of whether TSA is going

to allow them to use that authority to achieve a lot of the efficiencies that were talked about. Also, Admiral Stone talked about

security being the main focus and factor that they want to consider

before they grant any of these flexibilities, and it seems to us that

there are flexibilities that can be granted that will not impact on

the ability to provide the level of security that they are trying to

provide. It is just a question of learning the lessons of allowing

more innovation, overseeing it, and finding a way to evaluate the

results of the innovations, reach a decision that it can be done elsewhere, and then enable other FSDs to adopt those practices.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Just in particular you talked about the hiring process for both the private and the Federal, and we had a little discussion, I don’t know if you were here during the earlier panel, about

this sort of prescreening that was done by Concept, and the fact

that even when they prescreened, they had the same failure rate

as the other nonprescreened, and sort of the lack of—it is an

opaque process, apparently, and so their prescreening doesn’t address whatever those concerns are. Is that all necessary or do you

think that process could be made to work and we would still get

qualified people who met the criteria?

Mr. RABKIN. Well, I haven’t seen the criteria that TSA is using,

but I can’t imagine that it would be classified or that there is any

reason why they shouldn’t share it with the contractors or others

that are doing the hiring. It would just seem to be a sensible business practice to do that to avoid putting people through process if

you could screen them out ahead of time.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. So basically as, say as Congress did, we set

some very basic criteria, which apparently have been expanded, as

they always do when they write an administrative role, by either

the contractor or under direction from TSA or TSA itself, and there

is some list of criteria. And you are saying you don’t see any reason

why we couldn’t make that available to contractors and/or, if we

decentralize the Federal hiring process, to the local FSDs so that

they could apply those criteria.
46

Mr. RABKIN. That is correct.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Pacious, did you come across that issue?

Mr. PACIOUS. We did come across it, and we heard from both the

contractor, the FSD, and TSA that prescreening was not—basically

they didn’t improve the failure rate that they had when they went

through the assessment process.

I will note that after our study was done, TSA did inform us that

they have solicited input from the contractors on how they would

do an assessment center themselves. I didn’t see that solicitation,

but I am assuming if I was asked to bid on that process or looked

at doing it myself, you would have to tell me what the criteria are.

So that would be something you might want to ask TSA or the contractors about, whether or not that information has been shared

today.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. OK, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Pacious, you have prepared a supplemental report, screening

operations program improvements report., and that will follow

your—well, this is all, I guess, closely held. This is your evaluation

report.

Now, I have the supplemental report that I didn’t have yesterday. What is going to happen with your recommendations to your

understanding, and what do you think are the most significant recommendations for improving performance, again, based on this document that you can reveal to us in public?

Mr. PACIOUS. We did submit that report to TSA, and they made

comment on it and provided that back to us before we submitted

the final version to them. It is my understanding that TSA is going

to investigate many of these initiatives. It is important to note that

these are not necessarily recommendations. In many cases this is

an idea that we, in our study, deemed to be a good idea that TSA

ought to investigate. And we do explain some of the pros and cons

of moving some of the authority out to the field that TSA should

look at before making these——

Mr. MICA. So decentralization is one of the prime recommendations?

Mr. PACIOUS. That is true.

Mr. MICA. And I think actually it was pretty unanimous. I was

surprised, we rarely have unanimity on such a diverse panel, but

everybody seems to believe that that is part of the solution.

Anything else?

Mr. PACIOUS. That is correct. We broke the document up into improvements that apply just to the PP5s and then improvements

that apply to all airports. Both Federal and private would like to

see local assessment. And when you talk to the contractors about

it, some of them want to do it themselves, others want the local

FSD involved. So there isn’t unanimity as to exactly how to do it,

and those are the things we recommend TSA look into, the different types of models they might use when they decentralize a

function.

Mr. MICA. And I think you have also talked about maybe—I don’t

know if it is in this part of the report, but I think something you
47

might have mentioned, about having some incentives for the private sector and some rewards for good performance. Is that correct?

Mr. PACIOUS. That is correct. The private contractors do have an

award fee pool that they are eligible for if they achieve certain objectives. What we recommend going forward is incentive-based contracts that link those objectives to specific monetary awards. As

you heard a great deal of discussion this morning, and we would

agree, there are not established baseline performance measures

when you talk about operating an airport for overtime or other

workforce management issues. Those are some of the measures

that might be linked to an incentive-based award fee contract in

the future.

Mr. MICA. Then I noticed from, again, this evaluation, I think it

was mentioned by you all, too, that Kansas City had performed

above average, and fortunately we heard from our previous witnesses that performance is lacking in detection capability. Is there

anything unique? Now, I know Kansas City has a unique structure

of the airport layout, but was there anything unique that you identified with that operation that might be part of a recommendation

to look at that we could improve performance at other airports?

Mr. PACIOUS. We were unable to find a quantitative reason for

why Kansas City outperformed, so we were left with looking at

qualitative observations that may be involved. Obviously, the

unique configuration of the airport may be a factor. It is also interesting to note that ITS, now FirstLine, was an incumbent, so they

were doing screening prior to the creation of TSA. That may be a

factor as well.

As I said, we didn’t go and look at the screener level performance

to understand has that particular screener been doing the job for

two or three years and may have advanced further down on the

learning effect that might have impacted that, but we are basically

left with looking at qualitative reasons as to why that might be.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, I appreciate both of you gentlemen, unless

Mr. DeFazio had additional comments. We may have some additional questions that we may not be able to ask in this open session, but we appreciate your cooperation, and if there are no further questions, we will excuse you at this time and call our last

panel of witnesses.

The last panel of witnesses, panel three, consists of Mr. Terrence

Slaybaugh, Director of Aviation of Greater Rochester International

Airport, Rochester, New York; Mr. Ronald Thomas, President and

Chief Operating Officer at McNeil Technologies, with that firm located in Springfield, Virginia; Mr. George W. Larson, Airport Director of Jackson Hole Airport, Jackson, Wyoming; Mr. Philip Brown,

Acting Director of Aviation at Kansas City International Airport,

Kansas City, Missouri; Mr. John DeMell, President of FirstLine

Transportation Security, Eastlake, Ohio; Mr. John Martin, Airport

Director of San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco,

California; Mr. Terry Anderson, Executive Director of Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, Mississippi; and Mr. Gerald L. Berry, President of Covenant Aviation Security, Alexandria, Virginia.

I welcome all of our panelists. I thank you for your patience. This

is a long hearing about a very important topic. Also, I don’t think

a whole lot of you have testified before us before. If you have a
48

lengthy statement, we will submit that by request in the record,

the entire statement will be made part of the record, just a request

through the Chair. And we ask you to condense your comments to

the most salient points, again, given the long day and the large

number of remaining witnesses.

So with that, we will recognize first Mr. Terrence Slaybaugh, Director of Aviation for Greater Rochester International Airport,

Rochester, New York.

Welcome, and you are recognized.

TESTIMONY OF TERRENCE G. SLAYBAUGH, DIRECTOR OF

AVIATION, GREATER ROCHESTER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ROCHESTER, NY; RONALD THOMAS, PRESIDENT AND

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, MC NEIL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

SPRINGFIELD, VA; GEORGE W. LARSON, AIRPORT DIRECTOR,

JACKSON HOLE AIRPORT, JACKSON, WY; PHILIP BROWN,

ACTING DIRECTOR OF AVIATION, KANSAS CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, KANSAS CITY, MO; JOHN DEMELL,

PRESIDENT, FIRSTLINE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, EASTLAKE, OH; JOHN MARTIN, AIRPORT DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SAN FRANCISCO, CA;

TERRY ANDERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TUPELO REGIONAL AIRPORT, TUPELO, MS; AND GERALD L. BERRY,

PRESIDENT, COVENANT AVIATION SECURITY, LLC, ALEXANDRIA, VA

Mr. SLAYBAUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you

for inviting Rochester to share experiences for the past few years

with the private screening program and the TSA.

Based upon Rochester’s experience, we are convinced and continue to be convinced that private screening is a more efficient and

effective way to protect the air traveling public, and to do so at a

cost that is affordable to the industry.

While we are convinced that private screening is effective and efficient, we have not been able to say that conclusively because basically, as we have discussed today, the Federal workforce and the

private workforce have both been managed in the same way by the

TSA.

As a little bit of a background, Rochester has spent a lot of time

studying the whole issue of private versus Federal screening. We

did a report in March of 2003 analyzing the screening cost at Rochester. At that time, it showed that screening personnel cost was

$17 million, exceeding the airport budget by about $4 million.

We have submitted a number of recommendations to the TSA

and how that can be reduced. We have had no fewer than a dozen

meetings and correspondence to the TSA regarding this, and have

not seen any of the recommendations accepted or implemented.

The current pilot program, which we were very anxious to get involved in when it became official in the Act, has really been a pilot

in name only. The TSA, at our airport, at least, makes all the decisions and the private screening company implements them. The

airport staff, as well as the airlines, are pretty much excluded and

have effectively been excluded from the process at our airport. The

TSA often implements changes to the workforce at Rochester without informing the airport administration or the air carriers, and
49

often I have to initiate meetings with the TSA once they have

made changes so that we can get an explanation as to how they

have been made. And what we have seen through this process is

that some of the best experience and knowledge that we have at

our airport has been excluded from the pilot program and has not

been involved in most of the major decisions with the program.

At Rochester, the TSA, as I have mentioned, has not embraced

the staff and the airlines. If you look at the reading of a GAO report, 03–190, it appears to be the TSA operating philosophy and

process, there is no mention of a role for airport directors and staff

in the operations of the TSA. And I might want to note today, as

I sit and listened to a lot of the testimony that was given here

today, there was very little mentioned of the airport administrations or any interaction with the airport administrations in looking

at the pilot program.

To give you an example, the TSA has held meetings with the

FSDs of the PP5 program over the last year. They have held a

number of these meetings. I had an opportunity to run into the coordinator of the program in Rochester and asked that similar meetings be held with airport directors. I never got a follow-up to that

request, even though I did pursue it at least once to try to facilitate

those type of meetings.

The management infrastructure for the private screening program, since it is the same as the Federal workforce that has this

one size fits all implementation and has resulted in an overstaffing

of TSA managers. In our recommendations, we have recommended

that the number of TSA direct people in Rochester could be reduced from the 20 authorized positions under the FSD to five, saving at least $1.5 million per year in direct TSA personnel cost. And

I might add that that $1.5 million could fund 30 additional screeners in Rochester.

While the law does require TSA supervision of the private

screening activities, the level of supervision responsibility is duplicated under the private screening company contract. This implementation has obviously created duplication of responsibilities, creating redundancy and waste.

What we have continued to advocate, and have advocated in over

14 communications to the TSA over the last two years, is to form

a true pilot program that would foster innovation, reduce cost, and

optimize effectiveness. We have strongly recommended that a plan

be formulated and defined in an MOU or some type of other agreement with the airport that identifies the roles of the TSA, the

screening company, the airport staff, and the air carriers. At a minimum, we think a program should have that document that sets

forth the goals and objectives of a pilot program and identifies

areas where the TSA, the companies, the airport, and our airline

partners can improve security, create efficiencies, reduce cost, and,

most importantly, I think, be able to introduce new technologies

into the process.

I won’t bother to go through; we did have four or five specific

points. I think most noticeable is we are recommending the TSA

should be responsible for standards, regulations, oversight, and

compliance of the program. We strongly believe the airport should
50

be tasked with the responsibility of leading the program and making sure that it is a true pilot or private program at the airport.

I will just end by saying that we strongly believe in Rochester

that a true team approach, which really has not existed for the

past two years, could leverage in the knowledge and experience of

both the airport, as well as the airlines, could reduce the need for

unnecessary TSA administration and consultants, reducing costs,

but more importantly, I believe, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of security at our airport.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

I believe we have these witnesses paired, so Mr. Ronald Thomas

is President and Chief Operating Officer of McNeil Technologies,

operates the Rochester PP5.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MICA. OK. So you are recognized and we will hear your follow-up comments.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the

committee.

McNeil Security provides security screening services at Greater

Rochester International Airport, which is a large category 2 airport. All of the screeners employed at Rochester were selected

using processes identical to that given to Federal screeners. The

same on-the-job training requirements and testing processes leading to certification were also used.

One of the differences, however, was our ability to choose our supervisors based upon interviews, past experience, and other test-related factors. We have expanded on that by instituting an overall

promotional process that provides our employees with a career

path.

McNeil Security began operations in November 2002 with a mix

of full-time and part-time personnel. This has allowed us to deploy

staff in an efficient manner by synchronizing staffing levels with

airline scheduling.

McNeil Security supervisors and lead screeners are assigned duties in addition to their TSA-mandated functions. For example,

training, supply procurement, scheduling, and information management. We have also implemented focus groups comprising screeners. One of the focus groups presented a plan for the selectee

screening process that was accepted and implemented by TSA. Another focus group is currently working with the airport administration and TSA in their design of the new check baggage screening

area.

We have been able to implement training programs in addition

to those provided by TSA. These programs, approved by TSA, have

included a nationally recognized customer service program and

demonstrations by a local law enforcement bomb squad. One of our

supervisor training facilitators developed a series of crossword puzzles as a training tool.

McNeil Security has recognized that formal training is not

enough. Physical search techniques, x-ray image analysis, and

other procedures demand frequent practice to maintain proficiency

and efficiency. More than 90 percent of our screeners are dual-certified in passenger and check baggage screening. The Rochester

team developed a unique scheduling system that rotates dual-cer-
51

tified screeners on a regular basis. This helps to ensure that

screeners maintain peak skills in all areas.

Screener retention is a critical issue. A stable workforce is a real

cost savings. There is no question the screener experience and frequent exercise of the skills required lead to reduced wait times,

more efficient and more effective screening. Screeners who are satisfied and can visualize a positive future are more efficient, dedicated, and motivated. Or attrition rate is approximately 10 percent.

This is far below the national average.

McNeil Security developed and implemented a passenger comment form shortly after we began operation. The form provides for

both positive and negative feedback. We also instituted a complaint

investigation process for the purpose of identifying issues and solving them. We typically will contact a complainant to advise them

of the outcome of an investigation of their complaint usually within

a 48-hour time period.

McNeil Security, with the support of TSA, the Rochester Airport

Administration, and the airlines, has developed a responsive, effective, and efficient security operation. This program is a success

story that should be strongly supported as a win-win solution for

airport security. The regulatory responsibility of the local TSA staff

working in partnership with the private security contractor is a

model that works to keep our Nation’s airports safe, secure, and efficient.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And we will recognize next Mr. George

Larson, Airport Director of Jackson Hole Airport, Jackson, Wyoming.

I understand your local authority has undertaken the screening

responsibility, rather than the company, is that correct?

Mr. LARSON. That is correct, Mr .Chairman.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, you are a little bit different breed of cat, but

welcome. We are pleased to hear your testimony at this time.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you. Chairman Mica, Congressman DeFazio,

thank you for the invitation to discuss the results of the airport

screening privatization pilot program before the committee.

The Jackson Hole Airport is a category 3 airport within the program. We are an origin and destination airport. All of our 217,000

enplanements last year went through security screening. We don’t

have any connecting flights.

We also are a resort destination with very large seasonal swings.

In our shoulder seasons we will board 5,000 passengers a month,

and in the summer or winter seasons we will jump up to 30,000

passengers a month. So there is a great variation there.

We are located in a very affluent part of the Country, with very

little housing, so that poses some interesting challenges for workforce economic survival for us.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Jackson Hole Airport

Board is the private screening authority. That is different within

the PP5 program. We have been doing screening for over the last

20 years, which is one of the reasons we sought to continue screening under the PP5 program.

In the Board’s experience, we believe that we have been a success, although not perfect. We have also taken independent surveys
52

to indicate that the passengers believe we are delivering good

screening and security performance.

Also, our experience has revealed that there are advantages to

our model, having the airport authority as the screening contractor.

When you do that, you really have one less player; you don’t have

the third screening contractor as an independent, it is just the airport and the TSA. We believe that leads to more streamlined management and allows us a little more direct accommodation and

shorter response time in answering some of the issues and the

challenges that we have faced.

We also believe that we have an advantage in that all airports

have in place an administrative function. We have used that function to lower the overhead and personnel costs required perhaps by

a private contractor, and I think therefore perform more economically.

Instrumental to our success, I will have to say, though, has been

the team approach provided by our Federal security director, Jim

Spinden, and our Resident Deputy Federal Director, Mr. Joseph Sebastian. Their oversight, cooperation, and dedication have been instrumental in yielding us a productive and rewarding experience to

date.

We do believe that hiring and training processes need improvement. As you heard today, the assessment process is cumbersome,

it is costly, and it can lead to unacceptable delays.

The setup of a large costly center for a large group of candidates

doesn’t match the needs of a small group or a small airport, and

centers are not located typically by small airports, so we incur the

additional cost of travel per diem and lodging. We recommend that

the assessment process be delegated to the Federal security director; we think that would be a more responsive process at a lower

cost.

The initial contractor training is excellent, but it is not always

in synchronization with the assessment process. For instance, we

wait as much as two months between assessment and initial training What this causes is the loss of our assessed and credentialed

employees because they need a job, they can’t wait any longer. This

results in the airport being left with insufficient staffing or no

ready pool. Again, we recommend that this initial training fall

under the responsibility of the Federal security director. We think,

again, this will be lower cost and less delays.

Regarding recurrent and continuous training, we think it is lacking, at least for our PP5 airport. We, to date have no online learning center, where other TSA airports do, and perhaps some of the

private PP5 airports do as well, but we do not.

We also think that he private contractor needs a training coordinator authorized under the contract.

Our experience has shown that contract flexibility is essential.

We believe that within a contract cost ceiling, the contractor should

have the determination of the number and also the promotion selection of his employees. He should be able to manage the hiring

and training processes without excessive delays, and he should be

able to select the best management approaches and practices.

Because we have had a great deal of that flexibility during our

first year, we were able to come in at 15 percent under the cost
53

ceiling of our contract. However, I must hasten to say that this

week a great deal of the flexibility was eroded when TSA denied

us the capability of now using assessment centers. That means we

won’t be able to hire new employees to replace our attrition as we

go into our busiest season, the summer tourist season.

Our performance is at least equal to similar TSA airports, and

we, I think, have proven that airports can perform at competitive

costs with comparable compensation.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee

today, and I will wait for the appropriate time to answer your questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And we will now hear from Philip Brown, Acting Director of

Aviation from Kansas City International Airport, which has gotten

some very strong praise as far as your performance, so we are anxious to hear your testimony today. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. DeFazio. Thank you

for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the airports

screener pilot program. I would request that my written testimony

be accepted for the record.

Mr. MICA. No objection to the entire statement.

Mr. BROWN. I would like to briefly summarize Kansas City’s

views on the PP5 program.

Kansas City was selected by TSA on June 10th, 2002, to be one

of five airports to participate in the private screening pilot program, along with San Francisco, Rochester, Tupelo, and Jackson

Hole. These airports represented a balanced cross-section of the different airport security risk categories.

Kansas City International Airport is one of the Country’s major

medium hub airports. We receive service from 24 passenger and

cargo airlines, with over 230 daily departing flights, serving approximately 10 million total passengers, 5.1 million enplanements,

checking almost 8 million bags.

We believe that the private screening program at Kansas City

International has been successful, and we want to continue using

it. To call it private screening is really a misnomer. It is a publicprivate screening program which allows airports and the TSA to

work together utilizing private screening companies to enhance security and customer service under strict TSA oversight.

The screening program provides the following advantages: enhanced flexibility and efficiencies in personnel use and deployment,

greater flexibility to respond to increased or decreased service requirements, and greater flexibility to cross-train and cross-utilize

personnel.

Kansas City is particularly conducive to private screening because of the need for flexibility to redeploy screeners on short notice, to reschedule screener shifts to and from off hours, and to add

or delete screening checkpoints on short notice, as airlines increase

or decrease services.

At the outset of our participation in the program, we provided

input to the TSA Federal security director on Kansas City’s critical

goals and objectives of the private screening program. In addition

to security, our goals focused on the external customer service
54

issues such as short lines, courteous behavior, professionalism, efficiency coupled with thorough quality screening of our customers.

Based upon our experience to date, the quality of performance of

the private screeners has been very good. Staffing, in general, has

also been satisfactory.

The start-up of the PP5 program was particularly successful in

that the screening contract was awarded to ITS, now FirstLine

Transportation Security, on October 10, 2002. On November 19,

2002, Kansas City International Airport met the mandated checkpoint security deadline. In 40 days, the private screening company

staffed up and trained its personnel to meet the deadline. Kansas

City International Airport also met the 100 percent baggage

screening deadline of December 31st, 2003.

The first 18 months have not been without their challenges, however. During the first year, there were not enough screeners to

serve the required number of screening checkpoints because TSA in

Washington did not take into account the shortages that turnover

created. It is our understanding that this phenomena occurred at

federally staffed airports also. TSA temporarily brought in a mobile

screening force of Federal employees to compensate for the shortfall.

Kansas City already opted out and wants to stay opted out under

the opt-out program. Under the statute, the pilot program will expire after three years. However, the law allows participants in the

pilot program to elect to continue to have such screening carried

out by the screening personnel of a private screening company

under the opt-out provision.

In conclusion, the pilot private screening program has worked

well at Kansas City International Airport, and has demonstrated

that under appropriate circumstances, private screeners, under the

direct control and supervision of the TSA, will perform excellent security and customer service.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I would

be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And we will hear next from John DeMell, President of FirstLine

Transportation Security. And you provide the service for Kansas

City, correct?

Mr. DEMELL. Correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. You are recognized.

Mr. DEMELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Graves.

As a PP5 contractor operating under TSA direction at Kansas

City International Airport, FirstLine meets or exceeds the same

overall hiring, training, and security requirements as federally

staffed airports. However, at KCI we remove the TSA’s burden of

day-to-day workforce management. This allows the Federal Government to focus on security, safety, and technology priorities. As a result, FirstLine and the TSA have worked diligently to form a seamless partnership. We have developed a close working relationship

with Richard Karasi, KCI’s Federal security director, whose central

focus rests on our shared security mission.

Allow me to be perfectly clear. As we move toward opt-out, we

strongly believe that TSA must continue to provide supervision and

accountability for overall security standards and hiring practices.
55

We have come a long way from the pre–9/11 screening process,

where security was treated just like any other commodity by the

airlines, creating a minimum wage work environment. All of this

changed after 9/11 with the creation of the TSA. We are particularly proud of our screener workforce. One hundred percent of our

screeners have been cross-trained to provide both passenger and

baggage screening. This enables us to be more efficient in our

scheduling process and to react faster to customer needs.

Our employees also receive ongoing training that exceeds TSA’s

directives. This results in a screener workforce that excels in performance, even with the unique airport configuration that demands

11 separate passenger screening checkpoints and requires us to

double screen many travelers who must leave the secure area for

creature comforts. By comparison, Atlanta Hartsfield has only four

checkpoints. Our ability to bring private sector business practices

and human services management enhances the screening product

we deliver.

FirstLine provides enhanced pay scales, training and rewards for

exceptional performance and attendance. We have installed valuable communications tools and opportunities for employee participation, including our employees’ advisory committee, which facilitates management responsiveness to employee concerns. We are

also able to discipline or offer corrective guidance in a timely manner.

We believe that our success in charting new waters with TSA

through private sector leadership can serve as a model for future

screening partnerships. We are extremely proud that BearingPoint

found credible evidence that Kansas City is outperforming the average level its Federal counterpart in the area of security effectiveness. In going forward, we recommend several enhancements that

would make the program even more effective. These include, first,

increased local decision-making ability both at the FSD and contractor level regarding such items as local control and implementation of assessment and training, critical to maintaining staff levels

and controlling overtime. FirstLine recently invested significant resources to respond to a TSA request to provide a local assessment

process for screener applicants. Our response builds on our extensive experience and knowledge. We feel strongly that our approach

will result in better applicants, lower attrition, and reduced costs.

Second, adoption of a process for peer-to-peer discussion of security challenges. This should include not only the private sector contractor and FSDs, but also TSA headquarters leadership and program management.

Third, development of a permanent, objective benchmark to carry

the PP5 approach in meeting required mission standards to the

overall Federal screening program. The BearingPoint study could

provide a basis on which to build for this process.

Lastly, a broader commitment to the public-private partnership

in order to inculcate best practices and enhance cost efficiency

without compromising the mission at hand. Contractors should be

allowed to more appropriately leverage private sector strengths

while government regulates and enforces safety standards and

quality.
56

Mr. Chairman, the private sector has much to offer TSA and the

Nation in our post–9/11 screening approach. FirstLine is committed

to ensuring that the PP5 and our work for the traveling public at

KCI continues to enhance the security of our airline passenger system.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

We will hear now from Mr. John Martin, Airport Director of San

Francisco International Airport. Welcome, and you are recognized,

sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting

me to participate in today’s hearing. And I would like to thank you,

Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee and staff who

have visited San Francisco International to view our technologybased systems first-hand. The rapid national deployment of available technology, I believe, offers the best path to improving security

and improving customer service.

Prior to the Federalization of the Nation’s airport screeners

under the TSA, SFO asked to be a participant in PP5. The request

was made because we had serious concerns about a new Federal

agency’s ability to support the difficult and challenging process of

recruiting, hiring, and managing virtually the largest workforce at

our airport. Significant staff shortfalls over a long period of time

with other Federal agencies at SFO have been commonplace in the

past.

SFO is the largest airport participating in the PP5 program, with

just over 1200 screeners. Screening today is clearly more effective

than it was under the previously airline-managed system. The collaboration we put together, what we call Team SFO, between airport management, the FSD management team, and the contractor

have been able to coordinate and deploy state-of-the-art screening

systems, which, combined with a well-trained workforce, provide a

high level of security and customer service.

Some examples of Team SFO initiatives that have resulted in

higher efficiency include the development of a screener control center, SCC, that in conjunction with the comprehensive deployment

of closed circuit television is able to simultaneously monitor the operation of our 39 checkpoint lanes and the queuing of passengers

at those checkpoints, all done from a central location. That SCC

has substantially increased the screening contractor’s ability to adjust staffing levels to support passenger volume changes at the

checkpoints, and I believe that provides a useful model for the Nation.

The FSD’s management team has very effectively coordinated the

contractor to ensure the lowest levels of staff attrition and the

highest level of security and customer service. They have instituted

a weekly detailed performance review with the contractor. Overall,

the PP5 program has allowed the FSD to spend his time on security issues, not managing the human resources function of over

1200 screeners.

The airport management has enhanced the screening system by

adding sufficient checkpoints to ensure adequate passenger processing capabilities and installed EDS in most of our facilities.
57

All being said, SFO supports airport screener privatization only

under the following circumstances: (1) that TSA retains control, responsibility, and liability for the conduct and operation of the private screening contract operations; (2) privatization is not for everyone. The program works very well in San Francisco because the

airport and the TSA have worked well together. None of the participants can afford to stand back and take the attitude this is not

my problem. The full potential of privatization can only be realized

if certain constraints presently placed on contractors are removed.

National assessment, recruiting, and training programs must be

more flexible.

In conclusion, given the funding constraints on aviation security,

TSA needs to rapidly develop more cost-effective practices to get

the job done. Arbitrary mandated staffing ceilings must be replaced

with comprehensive staffing analysis and allocation based upon

specific operational requirements at individual airports. Automation of baggage screening can significantly reduce the recurring

labor costs. A coordinated and comprehensive plan is needed for

EDS deployment that uses best practices and rewards those airports with cost-effective and timely solutions.

Flexibility and creative decision-making must be encouraged.

This does not mean that corners should be cut, but simply that airports and FSDs can be great sources for research and innovation.

This is why we believe SFO’s opt-out program has indeed been a

success.

This concludes my comments, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

We will turn now to Mr. Terry Anderson, Executive Director of

the Tupelo Regional Airport, Mississippi. Welcome, sir. You are recognized.

Mr. ANDERSON. Chairman Mica and Mr. Graves, thank you for

the privilege and opportunity to express my thoughts and perspectives on airport security, in particularly, the passage and luggage

screening activities.

As you well know, with over 489 commercial airports, there is a

vast range of sizes, shapes, and operations that have a huge influence on passenger security. The diversity includes numbers and nationality of passengers, size of terminals, security equipment,

screening areas, employment pools for potential screening hires,

airport budgets, leadership, and many more.

Political and TSA leadership seem to have limited our choices of

the security workforce to two: a Federal workforce with TSA oversight and a private workforce with TSA oversight. Two sizes won’t

fit all airports. There is a continuum of options between those two.

For smaller regional airports, a third option should and must be

considered: an airport authority workforce with TSA oversight.

This choice offers the greatest degree of control, the most flexibility, the most collateral benefits, and the most cost savings. Jackson

Hole Wyoming, a PP5 airport, has successfully demonstrated this

model for security for more than two decades. We should not ignore

this option.

Let me offer some cogent points for consideration of this airport

authority TSA plan.
58

Front-line command and control would be with the organization

that has the greatest responsibility and accountability for airport

security, that being the airport authority. The authority writes the

airport security plan, the airport emergency plan, the airport certification manual, letters of agreement with FAA, TSA leases, and

in the case of Tupelo Regional Airport, the reimbursable agreement

for law enforcement officers and the security function of the sterile

area. Absolute oversight for policy, training, and performance

would remain, of course, with TSA.

Span of control would be reduced. Instead of adding another level

of administration and bureaucracy, with a private contractor, another decision chain, additional distribution requirements for information and data, responsibility and accountability would be limited

to a single unencumbered chain of command. There would be no

doubt where security issues, human resource issues, equipment

issues, lease issues, maintenance issues, administrative issues, and

operational issues would be resolved.

Total airport security must at some point be addressed to include

general aviation at airports. Do we defer this element of security

to another set of private companies? And tactical security issues

like ManPAD. Do we address those and resulting countermeasures

to yet a third set of private contractors? I contend all elements of

security are best handled by the organization that has the greatest

degree of ownership for security at their airport: the airport authority.

Cost would be minimized. Who better can control all the budgetary elements of airport security expenses? Who best can optimize

the distribution of part-time, full-time personnel, the economy of

scale and operations, the impact of administrative overhead and

the needs of the workforce, a corporate headquarters in some large

far away city or a headquarters on site at the airfield? And what

about those large company costs plus contracts with hidden expenses and bonuses? Where does all that revenue go? It is not to

the local or regional economies that the airports serve. Instead,

these profits go to where the corporate headquarters is located.

However, if memorandums of agreement were crafted so that

reasonable administrative costs and bonuses were retained by the

airport authority, then that revenue stream would benefit that airport’s security infrastructure development and that region’s economy. Let us not ignore this option that best fits the force and strategy to the objective and offers all the complimentary benefits of

control, flexibility, accountability, ownership, lowest cost, and future adaptability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And last but not least, we have Gerald Berry, who is President

of Covenant Aviation Security.

Now, Covenant has both Tupelo and also San Francisco as their

operations. We are pleased to hear your testimony, and I appreciate your patience. You are recognized.

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Chairman Mica. I do appreciate the opportunity to have a speaking part in this PP5 program.

On October 10th, of course, of 2002, we were awarded the contract with TSA, and we do have the Category X in San Francisco
59

and the Category 4 in Tupelo. Now, we haven’t talked about it

much, but we are on a cost-plus award fee contracts. I believe we

all are. We invoice TSA on a monthly basis and they generally pay

every 30 days. On the award fee side, we are graded on very interesting criteria, and we are monitored very closely by the TSA to

make sure we are performing that criteria. First of all, it is management, operations, cost, and HR.

Covenant did meet all of its deadlines, and we had to roll out

somewhere around 1459 people to meet Tupelo and San Francisco’s

needs between 10 October and 31 December, which I thought was

a pretty admiral feat. And we had a lot of cooperation from the

TSA.

One thing that really, I think, makes us work, and I appreciate

Mr. Martin saying, is we have tremendous cooperation at San

Francisco. We get great guidance and great cooperation from John

Martin, and, of course, San Francisco has been very innovative

over the years, which helps us. And also Mr. Ed Gomez, the FSD,

gives us a lot of guidance and a lot of leadership that helps us

through some of these rickets that I will cover a little later.

Let us take San Francisco first. We presently have 1,085 screeners. TSA has authorized 1229. We are operating well below what

they have authorized. And Congresswoman Norton asked us about

how we would do—we don’t have wait times out there. I think over

the holidays our max was about eight minutes, so we are very

pleased with that. Also, inside of this, one of the reasons we are

able to bring those things down is we have 143 part-time screeners.

I didn’t know that anybody else had part-time screeners, but we

have had them since July, and it has worked exceedingly well for

us and, obviously, that allows you to bring the numbers down.

I appreciate Mr. Martin mentioning it, but the SCC is what allows this, the screening control center. And SFO has got the big

screens in there. We watch all 39 lanes, 11 checkpoints, and we

move people as necessary to make sure we keep the cost down and

maximize our efficiencies there. We are right-sizing all the time.

Along with the screening control center, we have wireless communications. We have a laptop at every lane, every checkpoint, so

that when we need to communicate something, whether it is some

kind of a change in the code yellow, code red, whatever it happens

to be, or a VIC coming through, or the need for more screeners or

lack of screeners, that can be done immediately and instantaneously, and also has the ability to take down video if something

happens to that checkpoint.

One of my favorite issues here, because it involves all of us and

I read about it constantly, is workmen’s comp. Now, the reason we

went initially to baggage handlers, which I believe we are the only

ones that have actual baggage handlers, they didn’t go through any

training process, they went through background screens and the

necessary elements for that, and the physicals, was to alleviate and

take away some of our workmen’s comp, and, honestly, it has

brought it way down. And the other thing we found out with these

people who are hired just to be baggage handlers, they don’t get

hurt. They are not on injury lists at all. So that has been a good

thing for us.
60

One thing I want to mention here that we haven’t talked about

before, and thanks again to Mr. Martin for letting us make sure

we have the space, and it is a coordination issue, we have a uniform control center, and that uniform control center is in the airport, and every screener can take his uniform there, get it pressed,

get it cleaned, get it tailored right there in the airport, which

makes a tremendous difference. And we are very proud of the way

our screeners look in San Francisco. And I think it helps their morale to have probably some of the better looking uniforms in the

Country.

Let me talk a little bit about assessment. One of the reasons we

talked earlier about this 31 percent thing, we got involved in the

recruitment and prescreening. One of the reasons we did this, we

thought the percentage would go way up in the passing. It didn’t,

but it is getting better all the time. But you then have a pick of

the people you want. You do the first cut on that, so those are people that you know that you want. The present system at most of

the other airports, and I think it understand it pretty well, where

CPS comes in, the FSD doesn’t really have a pick in there. We

wanted to make sure we do. That is one of the reasons for that.

Training. I want to again thank Mr. Martin. He has provided us

a magnificent learning center. It is 55 standup PCs that we use

constantly. We train on every capacity, whether it be harassmentfree workplace or all the image recognition that you need when we

go through this. Thank you very much. It is a good system.

We also, like the rest of them, try to make sure that our HR is

on top of everything, it is working, it is doing well.

Tupelo trades well off San Francisco. We have no attrition there,

and I think, if you look at this, we passed the test better than just

about anybody in the Country, the recertification test in Tupelo.

Let me make a couple conclusions. I think that we have all

talked about this, but what needs to happen is it has to have local

assessment. You also need to have local training. And I would recommend, as you go forward, if you are going to have a PP5 program or something similar to that, that you have a cost-plus award

fee. In other words, if we don’t perform, you don’t award. And let

me just cover that a little bit.

I know that there are several mechanisms that we use, and the

FSD drills down every week on us. One is attrition. I heard 10 percent, but we are much larger than that in San Francisco. We have

13.5 now, which I think is well below the national average. Our attendance, we are about a 97 percent level, and that is very measurable. Overtime is at 3 percent. And I know what some of the other

airports are, especially in the western area. And our workmen’s

comp is down to 3 percent. I was allowed to see the figures on

these from the other Category X airports in the western area, and

we far surpass those on those measurable statistics.

Thank you very much for your time. You can submit this into the

record. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will submit everyone’s complete statement or any additional information.

Mr. DeFazio and I have agreed to keep the record of this hearing

open for an additional two weeks, so without objection that is ordered.
61

I want to thank each of you for your patience. This has been a

very long hearing. We wanted everyone to have a say in this who

has participated in the program and keep the process open, and

also fair. We have heard both from the airport directors and also

from those who—I guess we have four vendors participating plus

the one airport in Wyoming, Jackson, Wyoming, which is acting,

actually, as the vendor.

This has been, I think, a very productive hearing. It has also

been a learning experience I think for all of us as we develop a new

system and a totally new approach. Some of you have put together

some great innovations. I think we have already heard your models

for the complete Federal system, and you all will serve as models

as we make this transition to not a total private screening process,

but a Federal-private partnership with very close Federal oversight

and setting of future policy.

I am going to probably spare you of questions, but is there any

airport director that doesn’t plan to continue in the program?

[No response.]

Mr. MICA. You all plan to continue in the program.

And I think again, Mr. Martin, you point out that we do want

to keep this in Federal responsibility, and I think all of you are

committed to that, but develop a means by which we can improve

the system, make it operate better.

I think you also pointed out, Mr. Berry, rewarding good performance. We are very concerned about the performance, although I

was very pleased with the results of both Kansas City and I think

San Francisco had some pretty high performance evaluation.

The rest of you were as good, if not no worse than your total Federal counterparts. But, again, I think you all work under the same

level of handicaps, and some of that is technology limits, limits on

innovation, and also looking at other approaches that can do a better job in determining threats and dangers to the flying public.

So with those comments, I don’t have any direct questions. We

will, again, leave the record open. We may have additional comments, in fact, I think we do, that we will submit to you for the

record.

I want to thank, again, each of you for your participation in the

PP5 program for your testimony and participation in this hearing

today.

There being no further business to be conducted before the Aviation Subcommittee, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to

reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Æ