UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

MIAMI DIVISION 

CASE NO.: 20-cv-22471-GAYLES/Otazo-Reyes 

NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES, 

INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE & 

TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., GOLDWIND 

INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (HK) LTD., 

DSV AIR & SEA INC., BBC CHARTERING 

USA, LLC and BBC CHARTERING 

SINGAPORE PTE LTD., 

Defendants. 

/ 

DEFENDANT XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD.’S 

RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................3 

LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................................5 

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7 

I. THE COURT LACKS SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER GOLDWIND SCIENCE 

UNDER § 48.193(1)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES ...............................................................7 

A. Goldwind Science has no business activity in Florida that is 

related to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. ......................8 

B. The alleged “trafficking” occurred in Cuba and therefore no tort 

was committed in Florida under § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. .................................9 

C. If the Court were to find that either §§ 48.193(1)(a)(1) or (2) apply, retaining 

jurisdiction over Goldwind Science would violate due process principles ...........12 

II. THIS COURT LACKS GENERAL OR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER 

GOLDWIND SCIENCE UNDER FEDERAL RULE 

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(k)(2) ......................................................................................15 

A. Goldwind Science does not have systematic and continuous contacts with 

the U.S. to invoke general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) ....................................16 

B. Plaintiff cannot establish specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) 

for the same reason it cannot do so under Florida’s long-arm statute ...................18 

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................18 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................19 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s)

Cases

Borchers v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

2019 WL 5196117 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) ............................................................................... 8

Calder v. Jones, 

465 U.S. 783 (1984) .............................................................................................................. 8, 14

Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 

216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................... 2, 5, 16, 17

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

571 U.S. 117 (2014) ................................................................................................................ 2, 6

Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, 

2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) ..................................................................... passim

Estate of Scutieri v. Chambers, 

386 F. App’x 951 (11th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................ 10

Fast SRL v. Direct Connection Travel LLC, 

2018 WL 7822711 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018) ............................................................................. 12

Fraser v. Smith, 

594 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................ passim

Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 

218 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) ......................................................................................... 2, 9, 18

Keston v. FirstCollect, Inc., 

523 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ...................................................................................... 10

Kozial v. Bombardier-Rotax GmbH, 

129 F. App'x 543 (11th Cir. 2005) when affirmed .................................................................... 15

Licciardello v. Lovelady, 

544 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 8

Madara v. Hall, 

916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) ..................................................................................... 2, 7, 8, 15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued 

Page(s)

Navitar, Inc. v. eScholar, LLC, 

No. 11-CV-20266-PAS, 2011 WL 13223668 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2011)............................14 

Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 

558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................... 6, 8, 14, 16

PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 

598 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................... 11

S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 

115 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................. 8, 14

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 

556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................... 10, 11

Vision Media TV Grp., LLC v. Forte, 

724 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2010) .......................................................................................14 

Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 6, 15 

Williams Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 

854 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................. 10, 12

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ............................................................................................................ 6

Statutes

22 U.S.C. § 6021 .................................................................................................................... passim

§ 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. ................................................................................................... passim

§ 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. ................................................................................................... passim

§ 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. ................................................................................................................. 7

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)................................................................................................................... 5

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)............................................................................................................ passim

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INTRODUCTION 

An alleged brief refueling stop in Miami during a shipping vessel’s 41-day voyage from 

China to Cuba cannot invoke this Court’s jurisdiction over a party that neither commissioned the 

vessel nor has operations in the U.S. The lack of a connection between Plaintiff’s claims and this 

forum could hardly be more stark. Indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleges that “none of the windfarm 

farm equipment [at issue] was unloaded in Miami . . . while in Miami” in relation to a renewableenergy project that is being undertaken not here but in Cuba. Compl. ¶¶ 136, 199 (emphasis 

added). 

Under these precise circumstances, however, Plaintiff North American Sugar Industries 

Inc. (“Plaintiff”) – a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New York and 

with no alleged connection to Florida or this District at all – alleges that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co. Ltd. (“Goldwind 

Science”) for claims relating to alleged “trafficking” in Puerto Carupano, a Cuban port confiscated 

by the Cuban government between 1959 and 1960. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 

(LIBERTAD) Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 et seq. (“Title III” or the “Act”). But Goldwind Science did 

not hire the vessel that briefly refueled in Miami and otherwise has no sufficient U.S. presence 

such as to allow it to be sued here. Moreover, not only do Plaintiff’s sparse allegations concerning 

personal jurisdiction over Goldwind Science lack a statutory basis, but haling Goldwind Science 

into this Court would offend due process principles and traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. 

First, Plaintiff’s assertions of specific jurisdiction under the two provisions of Florida’s 

long-arm statute on which Plaintiff relies fail for several reasons. For one thing, establishing 

specific jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) (the business activity prong) requires a direct 

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connection between the underlying cause of action and the defendant’s alleged business activity 

in the forum, but here there is none. See Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 

F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). For its part, Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) (the tortious activity prong) 

similarly requires the alleged tort to have a nexus to the jurisdiction. Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, 

No. 19-22619-CIV, 2020 WL 2733729, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020). No such nexus is plausibly 

established here – nor could it be, as the alleged trafficking occurred in Cuba and the alleged injury 

was incurred in New Jersey or New York, where Plaintiff is incorporated and does business. 

Compl. ¶ 19. Moreover, Plaintiff’s common-law conspiracy claim does not alter this conclusion 

because the conspiracy claim is barred by the Act, and thus cannot support jurisdiction, and in any 

event no essential aspect of the alleged conspiracy occurred in Florida. Finally, even if either 

Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) or (2) were satisfied (which they are not), the Court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction would also need to comport with due process and “traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the facts, fail to meet this 

constitutional barrier. 

Second, Goldwind Science does not have sufficient contacts with the broader U.S. to 

support general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Because Plaintiff’s cause of action stems from 

property located (and confiscated) in Cuba, Plaintiff must establish general, not specific, 

jurisdiction over Goldwind Science under this Rule. See Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 

F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). Finding general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) is a stringent 

standard that cannot be met unless the defendant has such pervasive contacts with the U.S. that the 

defendant is essentially “at home” here. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39 (2014). 

Goldwind Science does not have sufficient contact with the U.S. to support any such finding. 

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For these reasons, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Goldwind Science 

and this Motion should be granted. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff, through a number of subsidiary companies, allegedly once owned various real 

and personal property as well as a variety of intangible assets in Cuba “relating to the production, 

refining, and transportation of raw sugar.” Compl. ¶¶ 19, 64; id. at Ex. 1, at 2. Plaintiff alleges 

that in 1960 the Castro regime confiscated these various related companies and their properties 

and assets located across the island nation (the “Confiscated Property”). Id. ¶ 3. One of the dozens 

of assets the Cuban government allegedly confiscated was Puerto Carupano (referred to in the 

Complaint as the “Confiscated Port”), a commercial shipping port located in Cuba. Id. ¶¶ 65–66.

According to the Complaint, “[a] host of Cuban state-owned entities” are currently “involved in 

the planning, construction, and implementation” of “one of Cuba’s largest ongoing public works 

projects,” known as the “Herradura Wind Farm Project.” Compl. ¶¶ 82, 86. Plaintiff alleges that 

Goldwind Science, along with others, trafficked in the Confiscated Port in violation of the Act by 

“coordinat[ing] at least two separate voyages that delivered and unloaded equipment [from China] 

. . . , by way of Florida, for use in the Herradura Wind Farm Project.” Id. ¶¶ 103, 198–203. Plaintiff 

further alleges that Goldwind Science manufactured the equipment that was shipped to Puerto 

Carupano during only one of those two voyages – that made via the BBC Moonstone. See id. ¶¶ 

116-32. 

Regarding the BBC Moonstone (and the other vessel, the BBC Jade) delivering the 

equipment to Puerto Carupano “by way of Florida,” Plaintiff alleges merely that the BBC 

Moonstone arrived at and departed from the Port of Miami on the same day. Id. ¶¶ 135, 138. Id.

¶¶ 170, 173. Plaintiff also alleges that several days after leaving the Port of Miami, the vessel 

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“stopped at [Puerto Carupano] in Cuba to unload the wind farm equipment” destined for the 

Herradura Wind Farm Project. Id. ¶¶ 143, 177 

Plaintiff alleges that the shipping documents presented to the U.S. authorities were central 

to routing BBC Moonstone through Miami, and that such shipping documents were allegedly false 

as to the equipment’s ultimate destination (identifying Miami and the Miami Seaport as, 

respectively, the shipment’s destination and port of unlading). See id. ¶¶ 116-122. Tellingly, none 

of these shipping documents are attached to the Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that BBC 

Chartering purportedly determined the shipping route taken by the BBC Moonstone in 

coordination with Goldwind Science, Energoimport, and other relevant shippers, carriers, and 

consignees. Id. ¶¶ 113-15. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that Goldwind Science is a foreign corporation organized under the 

laws of the People’s Republic of China and that none of the equipment at issue was unloaded in 

Miami – or even in the United States at all. See id. ¶¶ 20-21, 136, 137. In reality, Goldwind 

Science does not operate in Florida or the broader U.S. See Declaration of Z. Yeheng (“Decl.”) 

¶¶ 3, 8-11, attached as Exhibit “A.” Goldwind Science also: 

 is not a party to any contract(s) with Vessel Operating Common 

Carriers, including BBC Chartering USA, LLC or BBC Chartering 

Singapore PTE LTD, regarding the Herradura Wind Farm Project; 

 is not a party to any contract(s) with Non-Vessel Operating 

Common Carriers, including DSV Air & Sea Inc., regarding the 

Herradura Wind Farm Project; 

 is not registered to business in Florida, has no offices, warehouses, 

plants, or registered agent in Florida; 

 does not sell or manufacture any of its products in Florida; 

 has not commissioned any of its products in Florida; 

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 has no operations in the broader U.S. and is not registered to do 

business in any state in the U.S.; 

 does not maintain a phone number or mailing address in the U.S.; 

 has no bank account(s) in the U.S.; 

 does not have any direct U.S. affiliates or subsidiaries; 

 does not own or lease any real property in the United States; and 

 other than this lawsuit, has never been a party, either as a plaintiff 

or a defendant, in any lawsuit in the United States. 

See id. ¶¶ 5-15. Based on these facts, this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Goldwind 

Science.

LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant must be dismissed from an action if the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). To withstand a motion to dismiss for lack personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

must plead a prima facie case of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Sherritt, 216 F.3d 

at 1292 (holding that district court lacked personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where “the 

cause of action involve[d] properties in Cuba, which were expropriated by the Cuban 

government”). Moreover, in assessing personal jurisdiction, the Court should not accept a 

plaintiff’s allegations to the extent those allegations are controverted by the defendant’s affidavits. 

See id. If the defendant can refute personal jurisdiction through affidavits or other competent 

evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to substantiate its jurisdictional allegations through 

affidavits, testimony, or other competent evidence of its own. Id.

Personal jurisdiction is specific or general. Specific jurisdiction – or “case-linked” 

jurisdiction – “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy (i.e., 

an activity or occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s 

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regulation).” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 n.6 (2014). The minimum contacts necessary 

for specific jurisdiction are grounded in fairness and assure that “the defendant’s conduct and 

connection with the forum State [is] such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into 

court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that 

Oklahoma court did not have personal jurisdiction over automobile manufacturer in a products 

liability suit stemming from an accident in Oklahoma because the manufacturer did not carry out 

any business activity in Oklahoma and the vehicle was bought in New York by New York 

residents). An essential element of specific jurisdiction is “that plaintiff’s claim must arise out of 

or relate to at least one of defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, 

S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the lower court lacked specific jurisdiction 

over foreign defendant because the defendant’s contacts with the U.S. were not sufficiently related 

to the plaintiff’s negligence claim) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

General jurisdiction – or “all purpose” jurisdiction – “permits a court to assert jurisdiction 

over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.” Walden, 571 U.S. 

at 283 n.6. To support general jurisdiction, a defendant’s contacts must be “so continuous and 

systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in in the forum state.” Daimler, 571 

U.S. at 138 (holding that California court did not have general jurisdiction over German company 

based on cause of action stemming from the company’s subsidiaries’ conduct in Argentina because 

the company did not have sufficient contact with the forum) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 849 (11th Cir. 2010) (a court’s exercise of 

“general personal jurisdiction . . . requires a showing of continuous and systematic contacts 

between the defendant and the relevant forum”). 

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ARGUMENT 

This Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Goldwind Science because (a) Section 

48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat.,1 is not satisfied and, even if it was, asserting jurisdiction over Goldwind 

Science would violate due process principles, and (b) Rule 4(k)(2) is likewise not satisfied because 

Goldwind Science does not have sufficient contacts with the forum to invoke jurisdiction. 

I. THE COURT LACKS SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER 

GOLDWIND SCIENCE UNDER SECTION 48.193(1)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES 

Florida’s long-arm statute does not provide this Court with personal jurisdiction over 

Goldwind Science. Determining whether the court has “personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant requires a two-part analysis.” Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. The first inquiry requires the 

court to determine whether the long-arm statute is satisfied. Id. The second inquiry requires that, 

if the long-arm statute is satisfied, the court analyze “whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the 

defendant comports with the Constitution’s requirements of due process and traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.” Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. 

The second inquiry is a two-pronged test within itself, involving both “due process” as well 

as “fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 1516. Due process requires that a defendant has 

“minimum contacts” with a forum such that there is “fair warning that a particular activity may 

subject [the defendant] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Id. This is satisfied only if the 

“defendant has purposefully directed . . . activities at the forum . . . and the litigation results from 

alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Id. The three criteria of minimum 

contacts are: (1) the contacts must relate to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) the contacts must 

show the defendant’s purposeful availment to the forum; and (3) the contacts must be of such 

1 Plaintiff does not allege general jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute over 

Goldwind Science. 

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character that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled to court in the forum. See

S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, in the context of intentional torts, the “Calder” effects test provides that personal 

jurisdiction exists only if (1) the defendant committed an intentional act, (2) directly aimed at the 

forum state, and (3) that caused harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be incurred 

in the forum state. See Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1220 n.28 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-

90 (1984)); see also Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008). 

If the due process prong is met, then the fair play and substantial justice inquiry requires 

the court review factors such as “the burden on the defendant in defending the lawsuit, the forum 

state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 

effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

controversies and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social 

policies.” Madara, 916 F.2d at 1517. 

A. Goldwind Science has no business activity in Florida that 

is related to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) 

Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that Goldwind Science has 

“operat[ed], conduct[ed], engag[ed] in, or carri[ed] on a business” in the state of Florida. That 

section also requires that the defendant’s business activity be sufficiently connected to the 

plaintiff’s cause of action and confers a pecuniary benefit to the defendant. See, e.g., Borchers v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-61537, 2019 WL 5196117, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) (“For this 

provision to apply, there must be a direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection between the 

basis for the cause of action and the business activity.”). 

Here, Goldwind Science engaged in no business activity in Florida that is sufficiently 

connected to Plaintiff’s causes of action. Goldwind Science is an entity organized under the laws 

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of the People’s Republic of China. Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Goldwind Science does not have an office, bank 

account, or registered agent, and is neither licensed to do business in the State nor has any other 

connection to this forum whatsoever. In Future Technology Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare 

Systems, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over 

an Illinois-based company that managed various healthcare facilities in the Midwest in a breach of 

contract action filed by a Florida-based software company. 218 F.3d at 1249. Specifically, the 

court held that it could not “find support for plaintiff’s allegation that defendant falls within 

Florida’s long-arm jurisdiction statute under the provision dealing with the operation of a business 

in Florida” because the “[d]efendant’s business [was] running healthcare facilities in the Midwest, 

not contracting with computer companies in order to obtain remediation services for its computer 

information systems.” Id. Similarly, Goldwind Science is a windfarm technology manufacturer 

based in China that sells its equipment to end users around the world. Its primary business is not 

to contract with Vessel Operating Common Carriers, Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers, or 

port agents that ship equipment through Florida, or any other port for that matter. Indeed, 

Goldwind Science’s relationship to Florida is so lacking in that it has not sold or commissioned 

any of its windfarm equipment in Florida to date. See Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. In sum, Plaintiff has not pled 

and cannot establish a “direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection between the basis for 

[Plaintiff’s] cause of action” to any of Goldwind Science’s “business activity” in Florida. Del 

Valle, 2020 WL 2733729, at *2; see also Future Tech., 218 F.3d at 1249. 

B. The alleged “trafficking” occurred in Cuba and therefore 

no tort was committed in Florida under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) 

Plaintiff’s efforts under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) fare no better. Establishing personal 

jurisdiction under that provision similarly requires the alleged tortious activity to have a nexus to 

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Florida.2 In Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, the plaintiffs filed a Helms Burton Act complaint against 

online booking companies for renting hotel rooms to tourists on plaintiffs alleged property in Cuba 

that was confiscated by the Cuban government. 2020 WL 2733729, at *2. The plaintiffs asserted 

personal jurisdiction over the online booking companies on various grounds, including Section 

48.193(1)(a)(2). See id. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument under this provision, the Court noted 

that “the [p]laintiffs bring a Helms Burton claim, alleging that the [d]efendants trafficked in their 

confiscated property, which occurred in Cuba,” meaning that the allegedly tortious activity took 

place in Cuba, not Florida. Id. at *3; see United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1282 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (declining personal jurisdiction over defendant where plaintiff “alleged nothing that 

clearly connected [defendant] to a conspiracy made or carried out in Florida.”); see also Williams 

Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that Section 

48.193(1)(a)(2) requires that the defendant must have “committed a substantial aspect of the 

alleged tort in Florida . . . [that] [is] essential to the success of the tort.”); Keston v. FirstCollect, 

Inc., 523 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (same).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim that Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) provides a basis for personal 

jurisdiction over Goldwind Science fails under the weight of Mazer and Del Valle (among 

numerous other authorities). Plaintiff’s cause of action relies almost entirely on conduct that 

pertains to Cuba. The Complaint itself recognizes how little Plaintiff’s claims have to do with 

Florida or the U.S. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that “[t]he contract with Energoimport was 

to supply wind turbines and related equipment to the Herradura Wind Farm Project,” and that 

2 Plaintiff does not allege that it suffered an injury in Florida from Goldwind Science’s (or 

any other Defendants’) out-of-state conduct. Compl. ¶ 15. Nor could Plaintiff, which is a New 

Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New York, do so. Compl. ¶ 19; see also

Estate of Scutieri v. Chambers, 386 F. App’x 951, 956 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the longarm statute was not satisfied where plaintiff did not suffer the alleged injury in Florida).

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Goldwind Science “knew or had reason to know that” of the project’s “importance in the Cuban 

economy.” Compl. ¶ 199 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 200-05. Plaintiff even asserts that 

before Puerto Carupano was expropriated, it was “critical to [Plaintiff’s] business operations in 

Cuba and abroad.” Id. ¶ 67 (emphasis added). Plaintiff also recognizes that no cargo was 

unloaded in Florida. Id. ¶ 136. Therefore, just like the plaintiffs in Del Valle, Plaintiff “bring[s] 

a Helms Burton claim, alleging that the [Goldwind Science] trafficked in [its] confiscated property, 

which occurred in Cuba.” 2020 WL 2733729, at **2-3. And, just as those circumstances were 

insufficient to establish in Del Valle that a tort had been committed in Florida sufficient to confer 

personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, so, too, are they here. 

To the extent that Plaintiff relies on the alleged conspiracy for support for jurisdiction, this 

position fails several times over. As an initial measure, Goldwind Science did not determine the 

routes for either shipment, see Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, which defeats Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary. 

See Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1277 (confirming that factual denials of complaint’s jurisdictional 

allegations shifted burden back to plaintiff). In addition, as noted in the remaining Defendants’ 

separately filed omnibus Motions to Dismiss (which Goldwind Science has joined in full), the 

Act’s election of remedies provision precludes pursuing both Title III and common law damages 

for the same alleged conduct, so the conspiracy claim is not viable to begin with and cannot support 

a finding of personal jurisdiction. See PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598 

F.3d 802, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[B]efore a court addresses . . . specific jurisdiction exists under 

the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint state a 

cause of action.”). Finally, in all events, there is no “substantial aspect” of the alleged conspiracy 

that occurred in Florida and that was “essential to the success of the tort.” Williams, 854 F.2d at 

394. In fact, Plaintiff alleged that the same “trafficking” in its Confiscated Property occurred on 

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various occasions without a stop in Miami. Compl. ¶¶ 184-88. Plaintiff thus pleads itself into a 

conclusion that the refueling stop (where allegedly inaccurate shipping documents were presented) 

was not essential to the alleged trafficking in the Confiscated Port that forms the heart of this case. 

Williams, 854 F.2d at 394.3 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first jurisdictional inquiry 

and the Court should “decline[] to find that the it has jurisdiction under this subsection.” Del Valle, 

2020 WL 2733729, at *3. 

C. If the Court were to find that either Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) or (2) apply, 

finding jurisdiction over Goldwind Science would violate due process principles. 

Even if the Court found that the first inquiry under specific jurisdiction were met, which it 

should not, the second inquiry would still fail because retaining jurisdiction over Goldwind 

Science would violate its due process rights. Plaintiff alleges that Goldwind Science was aware 

that BBC Moonstone would make a refueling stop in Miami on its way to Cuba. See Compl. ¶¶ 

198-203. Plaintiff then alleges that DSV or BBC, not Goldwind Science, submitted the cargo 

declaration to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. See id. ¶¶ 96-98, 109, 116-32. 

None of the activity allegedly occurring in this forum, however, is related to Plaintiff’s 

cause of action. Goldwind Science should not be forced to litigate further in this forum based on 

Plaintiff’s allegations because the minimum contacts requirement “assures that a defendant will 

not be haled into a jurisdiction as a result of . . . random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts . . . or 

because of the unilateral activity of a third person.” Id. The refueling stop in Miami is too 

attenuated to the alleged trafficking, and DSV’s or BBC’s alleged submission to U.S. Customs 

3

In all events, a single instance of alleged conspiratorial conduct would still be insufficient 

to establish jurisdiction. Fast SRL v. Direct Connection Travel LLC, No. 17-20900-CIV, 2018 

WL 7822711 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

when defendant’s activity was limited to a single transaction arranged through Florida-based 

intermediary). 

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was a unilateral act by a party other than Goldwind Science. Plaintiff’s own illustration highlights 

how attenuated the fueling stop was to the voyage: of the 41 days that BBC Moonstone traveled 

from Tianjin, China to Puerto Carupano, Cuba, it stopped in Miami, Florida for only one day4 and 

did not unload any cargo while here: 

As the U.S. Supreme Court established decades ago, Plaintiff cannot “seek to base jurisdiction on 

one, isolated occurrence” stemming from “the . . . circumstance that a single [voyage]” allegedly 

caused the harm “[Plaintiff] happened to suffer while [BBC Moonstone was] passing through” 

Miami. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295. Moreover, the attenuated nature of the alleged refueling stop 

in Miami is even more apparent based on Plaintiff’s allegations that Goldwind Science purportedly 

caused the same injury related to the same windfarm project without passing through Miami. See

Compl. ¶¶ 184-88. Therefore, none of three prongs of the minimum contacts inquiry can be met. 

Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1542.

The same holds true under the Calder “effects” test for intentional torts. Here, Plaintiff 

alleges an intentionally tortious act, not “untargeted negligence.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. But 

4 The stop indeed was shorter than a full day as Plaintiff even recognizes that the BBC 

Moonstone refueled and then immediately proceeded to Cuba. Compl. ¶ 137.

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no conduct was directly aimed at Florida – the Herradura Windfarm Project, like the Confiscated 

Port in which Goldwind Science allegedly trafficked, is in Cuba, and no equipment was unloaded 

here. See Vision Media TV Grp., LLC v. Forte, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 

2010) (applying the effects test in holding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over 

defendants because there was no evidence that their conduct targeted or was otherwise aimed at 

Florida). In fact, Plaintiff is not even a resident of Florida – it is instead a resident of New Jersey 

and New York and does not allege to conduct business here. Navitar, Inc. v. eScholar, LLC, No. 

11-CV-20266-PAS, 2011 WL 13223668, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction because “[p]laintiff . . . [was] a New York corporation . . . and it[s] 

. . . damages, if any, were suffered anywhere it conducts business.”). Accordingly, there are no 

allegations or evidence that “Plaintiff will be damaged anymore in Florida than in New York [or 

New Jersey] . . . Thus, there is no evidence that [Goldwind Science] . . . should have anticipated 

that it would cause harm in Florida.” Id.

In addition to violating due process principles, exercising jurisdiction over Goldwind 

Science would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. A “primary concern 

of the fairness test is the burden placed on . . . international defendants[.] [C]ourts should consider 

the unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system.” Oldfield, 

558 F.3d at 1221 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Goldwind Science is not 

registered to do business in Florida and has no offices or registered agents in the State. Decl. ¶ 10. 

It would be unreasonably burdensome for Goldwind Science, an entity based in the People’s 

Republic of China, to litigate an action in Florida. Moreover, this Court hardly has any interest in 

adjudicating this dispute as to Goldwind Science because it is not registered to do, and does not 

conduct, business in this State. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1517. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit addressed 

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this issue in Kozial v. Bombardier-Rotax GmbH, 129 F. App’x 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2005), when it 

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of action against a foreign defendant for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. The same reasoning in Kozial applies here: 

Florida has little interest in providing a forum simply because the 

product passed through Florida on its way to [Cuba]. The only 

contact the subject [equipment] had with Florida is that a Florida 

corporation [refueled the] shipment in Florida [before] delivery to . 

. . a [Cuban] purchaser. 

Id. at 547. Moreover, the windfarm project at issue pertains to the Cuban, not Florida’s, economy. 

See supra at 15; id. ¶ 112 (recognizing that shipment of equipment “originated from the Far East . 

. . destined for a location in the Caribbean.”). Thus, there is no “case-linked” jurisdiction over 

Goldwind Science in this action, and it would offend notions of fairness and due process to hale 

Goldwind Science into this Court. Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n.6. 

II. THIS COURT LACKS GENERAL OR SPECIFIC 

JURISDICTION OVER GOLDWIND SCIENCE 

UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(k)(2) 

Plaintiff alternatively alleges that Goldwind Science is subject to personal jurisdiction 

under Rule 4(k)(2). That rule provides that “[f]or a claim that arises under federal law, serving a 

summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if . . . the 

defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and . . . 

exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.” Id. This 

analysis is broken down into two conditions that must be met: (1) plaintiff’s claims must arise 

under federal law; and, (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with the Constitution and 

laws of the United States. Fraser, 594 F.3d at 848. 

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A. Goldwind Science does not have systematic and continuous contacts 

with the U.S. to invoke general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) 

A plaintiff must satisfy Rule 4(k)(2)’s test for general jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s claim 

pertains to property that is outside the U.S. In Consolidated Development Corporation v. Sherritt, 

Inc., a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation which held oil concessions and leases that were 

expropriated by the Cuban government sued two Canadian corporations and their affiliates for 

damages under the Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 216 F.3d 1286. Holding that the lower 

court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Canadian corporation, the Eleventh Circuit recognized 

that 

[a]lthough Appellants strenuously argue that we need only find the 

minimum contacts required for specific jurisdiction, . . . [t]he 

allegations in this complaint do not arise out of any contacts the 

Canadian defendants have with the United States. Rather, the 

cause of action involves properties in Cuba, which were 

expropriated by the Cuban government . . . Thus, we must find the 

basis of the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, if any, 

under the stricter standard of general jurisdiction . . . .”

Id. at 1292 (emphasis added). All in all, under Rule 4(k)(2) “[t]he due process requirements for 

general personal jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction, and require 

a showing of continuous and systematic general business contacts between the defendant and the 

forum state.” Sherritt, 216 F.3d at 1292. In other words, “[a] party’s contacts with the forum that 

are unrelated to the litigation must be pervasive in order to support the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2),” Fraser, 594 F.3d at 850 (emphasis added; internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted), and even under this analysis, even those “contacts with the forum 

must relate to the plaintiff’s cause of action or have given rise to it.” Oldfield, 558 F.3d 1220. 

Here, Plaintiff does not (and cannot) satisfy the high burden of establishing general 

jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) because asserting personal jurisdiction over Goldwind Science does 

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not comport with constitutional due process principles. See Sherritt, 216 F.3d at 1292. Goldwind 

Science does not have pervasive contacts in the U.S. – either unrelated or related to this litigation. 

Goldwind Science is not registered to do business in any state in the broader U.S. and has no 

operations that are linked to the cause of action at hand. See Decl. ¶ 11. This is evidenced by the 

fact that it has no bank accounts, phone numbers, or mailing addresses in the U.S. Id. ¶¶ 12 and 

13.5 Plaintiff’s allegation that “Goldwind Science . . . is reported as the shipper for about six 

shipments, and the consignee (i.e., recipient) for one shipment, for goods unloaded at U.S. ports 

within the last three years,” Compl. ¶ 20, does not impact this analysis. Plaintiff does not account 

for who paid Goldwind Science for its services, where in the U.S. the shipments were delivered, 

or when any of the shipments were made. Six shipments over a span of three years (roughly two 

shipments a year) is at best “intermittent,” and is not nearly pervasive enough to support a finding 

for all purpose jurisdiction. See Fraser, 594 F.3d at 850 (“When a defendant’s contacts with the 

United States are . . . intermittent . . . , the exercise of nationwide general jurisdiction over that 

defendant would ‘offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”). 

Therefore, concluding that Goldwind Science is “amenable to suit everywhere in the United 

States on any claim arising under federal law” would violate due process principles because 

Goldwind Science does not continuous and systematic with the forum. Fraser, 594 F.3d at 850 

(emphasis added). 

5 Plaintiff also cannot argue that Goldwind Science’s personnel’s travel to the U.S. supports 

personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). The Fraser court rejected this argument, despite the 

owners of a foreign entity frequently traveling to the U.S. for business and pleasure, in addition to 

one of its owners having a U.S. passport. See id., 594 F.3d at 845. 

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B. Plaintiff cannot establish specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) 

for the same reason it cannot do so under Florida’s long-arm statute 

Finally, even if Plaintiff were required only to establish specific as opposed to general 

jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), Plaintiff still would fail. Although specific jurisdiction under Rule 

4(k)(2) is less stringent, it still requires activity that is related to a plaintiff’s underlying cause of 

action. Due process under Rule 4(k)(2) for specific jurisdiction requires that (1) “the defendant 

must have contacts related to or giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action,” (2) “the defendant 

must, through those contacts, have purposefully availed itself of forum benefits,” and (3) “the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum must be such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled 

into court there.” Fraser, 594 F.3d at 850. 

If the Court entertains a specific jurisdiction argument under Rule 4(k)(2), the argument 

should be rejected for the same reasons that jurisdiction fails under Florida’s long-arm statute. See 

supra at I. This is because “to the extent the [Plaintiff] rel[ies] on the same Florida contacts [it] 

alleged to support . . . jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute, [the] analysis is the same 

[under Rule 4(k)(2).” Fraser, 594 F.3d at 849. And to the extent Plaintiff relies on Goldwind 

Science’s alleged broader contacts with the U.S., Plaintiff again strikes out at the first of the three 

factors of specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2): Goldwind Science has no contacts with the 

U.S. that are related to Plaintiff’s cause of action, and Plaintiff’s claims stem from property that 

was allegedly trafficked not here but in Cuba. See Future Tech., 218 F.3d at 1249; Del Valle, 2020 

WL 2733729, at *3. Goldwind Science would have no reason to anticipate being brought into 

this Court under these circumstances. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an Order granting this Motion and 

dismissing the Complaint as to Goldwind Science for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/04/2021 Page 22 of 23
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Dated: June 4, 2021 

Respectfully submitted, 

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 

600 Brickell Avenue 

Suite 2700 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: (305) 459-6500 

Facsimile: (305) 459-6550 

By: /s/ Allen P. Pegg

Allen P. Pegg 

Fla. Bar No. 597821 

Allen.pegg@hoganlovells.com 

Richard C. Lorenzo 

Fla. Bar No. 071412 

richard.lorenzo@hoganlovells.com

Reginald Cuyler Jr. 

Fla. Bar No. 114062 

reginald.cuyler@hoganlovells.com 

Counsel for Xinjiang Goldwind Science & 

Technology Co. Ltd. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERIVCE 

I hereby certify that on June 4, 2021, the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of Court using 

CM/ECF, which will serve a Notice of Electronic Filing on all counsel of record.

By: /s/ Allen P. Pegg

Allen P. Pegg 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/04/2021 Page 23 of 23