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CBP AND ICE: DOES THE CURRENT

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BEST

SERVE U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY INTERESTS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 9, 2005

Serial No. 109–4

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Vice Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California Ex Officio 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi Ex Officio

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, 

and Oversight 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Integration, and Oversight 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands ... 55

The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Pennsylvania .......................................................................................... 50 

The Honorable Katherine Harris, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

States of New Jersey ............................................................................................ 52

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 61

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 53

WITNESSES 

Mr. T.J. Bonner, President, National Border Patrol Council 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32

Mr. Randy Allen Callahan, Executive Vice president, American Federation 

of Government Employees, AFL–CIO 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27

James Carafano, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12

Mr. Michael Cutler, Former Senior Special Agent, U.S. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37
Page

IV

Mr. Kenneth C. Klug, Former Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

Mr. David Venturella, Former Director, Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, Prepared Statement ................................................................... 86

Questiona and Responses for the Record of T.J. Bonner ...................................... 67

Questions and Responses for the Record of James Jay Carafano, PhD .............. 68

Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. Michael Cutler ......................... 72

Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. Kenneth C. Klug ...................... 81

Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. David J. Venturella ................. 84
(1)

CBP AND ICE: DOES THE CURRENT 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BEST SERVE 

U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY INTERESTS? 

Wednesday, March 9, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Shays, Harris, Reichert, 

McCaul, Dent, Cox (Ex Officio), Meek, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, 

Christensen and Thompson (Ex Officio). 

Mr. ROGERS. I want to welcome all of you to this the inaugural 

meeting of the Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on 

Management, Integration, and Oversight; And I would also like to 

welcome our Ranking Member, Kendrick Meek of Florida, and Mr. 

Thompson of Mississippi to this committee. I know we are going to 

have a lot on our plates. It is going to be an interesting committee, 

and I look forward to the challenges we face. 

It is going to be our responsibility to address the serious management challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security, and 

I must add that improving the management and operation of the 

Department is no small challenge, but we accept that challenge 

with a commitment to do what is best for our Nation. 

The purpose of today’s hearing will focus on one of the most important management challenges facing the Department and involves one of the most important functions, protecting our borders 

and enforcing our immigration and customs laws. 

The Border and Transportation Security Directorate, or BTS, of 

the Department of Homeland Security is divided into two now separate bureaus, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, 

and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE. In 

particular, we will explore whether the current Division of Border 

Security, within CBP, and Immigration and Customs investigations, within ICE, is the best way to structure these important 

functions or if the separation has caused more operational, administrative, and budgetary problems that negatively impact the 

Homeland Security missions of these agencies. 

I believe that we are best served today by attempting to gain an 

understanding of the challenges facing these agencies, whether the 
2

current organization is the best structure to face these challenges, 

and discussing possible solutions to the problems that we identify. 

Shortly before the Department of Homeland Security officially 

opened its doors, the Administration used the reorganization authority provided to the Secretary of DHS in the Homeland Security 

Act to split up the Customs Service and the Bureau of Border Security and reconfigure them into two new bureaus within the BTS directorate: Customs and Border Protection, CBP, and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, or ICE. Essentially, the reorganization 

merged Customs and Immigration enforcement at the border into 

one agency, while separating out Customs and Immigration investigations into another agency. It is important to note that this was 

not a simple border security versus interior enforcement split, since 

ICE agents often operate at or near the borders and Border Patrol 

agents are not limited geographically to the borders. 

As a result, CBP now consists of the Office of Border Patrol and 

the Office of Field Operations, the latter of which is staffed by INS 

inspectors, former Customs inspectors, and former Department of 

Agriculture inspectors. These CBP officers, as they are now called, 

are responsible for carrying out the duties and functions formerly 

carried out by these three separate agencies. 

ICE is comprised of former INS investigators and former U.S. 

Customs investigators, who are referred to as ICE agents, and are 

responsible for the enforcement of both immigration and customs 

laws. ICE also contains the Office of Detention and Removal, the 

Office of Intelligence, the Federal Protection Service, and the Federal Air Marshals. 

The issues at hand today—as with all reorganizations there will 

always be growing pains, but 2 years later the concerns with the 

current structure seem to be growing and not receding. Through 

the committee’s oversight activities we have learned of several anecdotal examples of poor operational coordination between the Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of Investigations that have or could 

have led to security or operational compromises. 

In addition, we have heard of concerns that inspectors are not receiving investigative support as readily as before the reorganization 

and that reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that 

impede effective and efficient communication and information sharing. 

We have also learned of serious budgetary problems facing in 

particular ICE and the challenges that appear to be attributable to 

the inexact division of resources within INS when INS was divided 

in three separate parts: CPB, ICE, and the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Service. ICE’s budget shortfalls have forced ICE to 

impose hiring freezes and to release aliens that otherwise should 

be detained. 

Today, we will start a dialogue on the future of CBP and ICE by 

examining the effects of the Administration’s reorganization, both 

pros and cons, 2 years after its implementation. As we undertake 

this review, we must examine this issue in the larger context of the 

BTS Directorate and its role with respect to ensuring coordination 

and achievement of the missions of ICE and CBP, and we will also 

examine how a proposed new DHS regional field structure would 

impact upon operational efficiencies and what the effect of the De-
3

partment’s new secretarial-level policy office will have upon the operations of these two bureaus. 

We hope our witnesses today can provide some insight, not only 

into the challenges and concerns that exist within the current organization of CBP and ICE, but also some potential solutions. I thank 

them all for providing us with their testimony today. 

At this time I would now recognize my friend and colleague from 

Florida, the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek, for any statements that 

he may have. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I think 

that you really framed the meaning for this meeting and also for 

the ongoing dialogue. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on our first meeting 

and also the whole committee on becoming a standing committee 

here in this Congress. As you know, many of us were on the oversight committee, the Select Committee last year, and I think this 

is a step in the right direction for the protection of the homeland. 

I also would like to thank those members of the Department of 

Homeland Security for all the hard work that they have been doing 

since the creation of the Department, and I can tell you that it was 

done in a way to get us to this point so that we can have a subcommittee like we are having now to review some of the functions 

of the Department. 

As you know, today’s subject will pretty much focus on CBP and 

ICE and seeing how we could possibly make the functions work 

better, but I am definitely looking forward to many of our witnesses that are here today and hearing their comments and also 

their findings. 

Mr. Chairman, I just would pretty much like to just share some 

of the concerns that I have and would hopefully like to see some 

of the witnesses address or hear them address. 

What do they think, as it relates to the Department as it is moving now and these two agencies and the reason why they were integrated in the first place, on the positive, the reason why it was 

done? 

And, also, I think not necessarily negative, but how can we move 

towards a more creative functional agency if it was merged together? How would we deal with some of the issues of the upper 

echelon of the agency, in military talk, brass? How would that integrate itself together? And will it jeopardize the security of the 

homeland and the function of this enforcement arm of Department 

of Homeland Security? 

We have a number of members here, Mr. Chairman, that I know 

that are going to have some insightful questions for our panel. I 

know our panel is quite large, so I will reserve the rest of my comments and enter it for the record so that we can have it on record 

for future meetings. 

But I am honored to be here and pleased to be your ranking 

member on this committee. I know that we are going to do good 

work together, and I know that we are going to get out in the field, 

and we are going to see what these gentlemen are going to share 

with us this morning firsthand. 

[The information follows:]
4

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT

Today’s hearing marks the inaugural hearing of the Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight, which I am honored to chair. I want to thank 

Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Thompson for their leadership in establishing 

this Subcommittee, which will focus on improving the management and operations 

of the Department of Homeland Security—no small challenge. And I would also like 

to take this opportunity to welcome the Subcommittee Ranking Member, Mr. Meeks 

of Florida. I look forward to working with you and the other Members of this Committee in a bipartisan fashion to address the serious management challenges facing 

of one our Nation’s most critical agencies. 

Today’s hearing will focus on one of those important management challenges—

whether the two now-separate bureaus within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) of the Department of Homeland Security—U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection or ‘‘CBP,’’ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement or 

‘‘ICE’’—should be reorganized to enhance the homeland security mission. In particular, we will explore whether the current division of border security, within CBP, 

and immigration and customs investigations within ICE, has caused operational, administrative, and budgetary problems negatively impacting upon the homeland security missions of these agencies. 

When Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and created the Department of Homeland Security, it placed the responsibility for immigration inspections, investigations, detention, removal, and border patrol functions into one new 

Bureau of Border Security, within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, or BTS. Congress also transferred the functions of the Customs Service to 

DHS intact, as a stand-alone agency, into BTS. The Act also separated the immigration and alien services functions of the former INS from immigration enforcement, 

by creating a stand-alone agency within the Department called U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS). 

Shortly before the Department officially opened its doors, however, the Administration used the reorganization authority provided to the Secretary of DHS in the 

Homeland Security Act to split up the Customs Service and the Bureau of Border 

Security, and reconfigure them into two new bureaus in the BTS Directorate: CBP 

and ICE. Essentially, the reorganization merged customs and immigration enforcement at the border into one agency, while separating out customs and immigration 

investigations into another agency. But it is not a simple border security vs. interior 

enforcement split, since ICE agents often operate at or near the borders, and Border 

Patrol agents are not limited geographically to the borders. 

As a result, CBP now consists of the Office of Border Patrol and the Office of Field 

Operations—the latter of which is staffed by former INS inspectors, former Customs 

inspectors, and former Department of Agriculture inspectors. These ‘‘CBP Officers,’’ 

as they are now all called, are responsible for carrying out the duties and functions 

formerly carried out by these three separate agencies. 

ICE is comprised of former INS investigators and former U.S. Customs investigators, who are referred to as ICE agents, and are responsible for the enforcement of 

both immigration and customs laws. ICE also contains the Office of Detention and 

Removal, the Office of Intelligence, the Federal Protective Service and the Federal 

Air Marshals. 

As with all reorganizations, there will always be growing pains. But two years 

later, the concerns with the current structure seem to be growing, not receding. 

Through this Committee’s oversight activities, we have learned of several anecdotal 

examples of poor operational coordination between the Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of Investigations that have or could have compromised important operations. We 

have heard concerns that inspectors are not receiving investigative support as readily as before the reorganization, and that the reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that impede effective and efficient communication and information 

sharing. 

We also have learned of serious budgetary problems facing ICE in particular, 

challenges that appear to be attributable to the inexact division of resources when 

INS was divided into three parts (CBP, ICE, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services). ICE’s budget shortfalls have forced ICE to impose hiring freezes and to 

release aliens that otherwise should be detained. 

In light of these reported problems, I was encouraged last week when incoming 

Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, indicated that the Department will 

begin ‘‘a comprehensive review’’ of its organization, operations, and policies, and 

that ‘‘. . . analysis of the threats and risks [posed to the United States by terrorists] 
5

will drive the structure, operations, policies and missions of the department, and not 

the other way around.’’ 

Such a review is, indeed, necessary, and this Subcommittee should not jump to 

any particular conclusion about the optimal structure for CBP and ICE. Instead, we 

will start a dialogue today on the future of CBP and ICE by examining the effects 

of the Administration’s reorganization—both the pros and cons—two years after its 

implementation. As we undertake this review, we must examine this issue in the 

larger context of the BTS Directorate, and its role with respect to ensuring the coordination and achievement of ICE and CBP’s missions. And we also must examine 

how a proposed new DHS regional field structure would impact upon operational efficiencies, and what the effect of the Department’s new, Secretarial-level policy office 

will be upon the operations of these two bureaus. 

We hope our witnesses today can provide some insight not only into the challenges and concerns that exist with the current organization of CBP and ICE, but 

also as to some potential solutions. I thank them all for providing us with their testimony today. 

At this time, I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Meeks, for any opening statement he may wish to make.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENDRICK MEEK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT

Mr. Chairman, I would like to first congratulate you on being appointed chairman 

and I look forward to working with you throughout this term. I believe that the 

Management, Integration, and Oversight Subcommittee is one of the most important in that it oversees the Department of Homeland Security. On this, the first 

meeting of the subcommittee, I am eager to begin our work on ensuring that DHS 

is functioning at a level to best protect the American people. 

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the panelists. 

Dr. Carafano—You and your colleague at the Center for Strategic & International 

Studies have written a very interesting report that helped move the current debate 

on DHS internal restructuring—specifically Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). While many frontline officers and 

investigators have expressed concern about the current structure and the operational, communication and coordination problems between ICE and CBP, your 

paper has helped focus more Members of Congress on this issue. Thank you for that. 

Mr. Klug—I really look forward to your testimony especially given your experiences in New York before and after 9/11. I would very much like an ICE agent’s 

view on how the Department is working—and where and how it can be more effective. 

Mr. Bonner—I welcome your testimony—I share a number of your concerns about 

the lack of sufficient funding for the Border Patrol. 

Mr. Venturella, Mr. Cutler, and Mr. Callahan—I look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you for taking the time to be with us today. 

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is vital—the difference between the success and failure of DHS are American lives. The reason we need DHS 

to succeed is just that simple. The mission of this particular subcommittee is to determine what problems prevent DHS from achieving its mission. 

This is why I am delighted that the first hearing before this Management and 

Oversight Subcommittee is on a topic critical to our homeland security—determining 

whether the current structure of CBP and ICE—agencies charged with key border 

security functions—facilitates coordination, communication and information sharing 

between key border agencies. 

Two years after its creation, we have an opportunity to evaluate whether the existing structure of Border and Transportation Security works. The DHS 2.0 report 

states that there may be too many layers of bureaucracy at DHS and recommends 

the merger of CBP and ICE. I am not convinced that creating an agency or moving 

boxes around on a chart alone secures America or our borders. A clear mission, the 

ability to coordinate operations and communicate effectively, sufficient staffing, access to relevant information and intelligence, access to needed technology—these 

will help our men and women secure our nation’s borders. 

Additionally, I think that it is critical that we have some coordination of the immigration function within the DHS. Who in DHS is responsible for national immigration policy? We know that every immigration benefit is connected to an enforcement action at our ports of entry or overseas, or at one of our Citizenship and Immigration Service offices within the United States. While the Homeland Security Act 

abolished the Immigration and Nationality Service and separated it into enforce-
6

ment and services bureaus, I am very concerned about the further separation of immigration enforcement into ICE and CBP. I hope that our panel will address that 

issue in their testimony. 

Additionally, as you provide testimony I hope that you’ll keep four questions in 

mind. 

(1) What do you think was the basis for the Administration decision to integrate functions of the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security 

and form CBP and ICE? 

(2) What are the problems that were created by the current structure of 

CBP and ICE? 

(3) Is it possible to resolve existing problems within the current structure 

or is it necessary to make structural changes? 

(4) If structural change is necessary then what type of restructuring do you 

recommend? 

I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. I do look forward to it, and we do intend 

to be a very active subcommittee and spend some time in the field. 

So we will be seeing a lot more of you folks in the future. 

Before I recognize our next member, I would ask everybody or remind everybody that the rules of the full committee are the rules 

here and that all cell phones should be turned off or turned to the 

vibrate position, please. 

With that, I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, the 

ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and 

Ranking Member Meek. I would like to welcome the witnesses also. 

I think it is fair to say that all the Members of this committee 

want to hear what needs to be done to make America safer by improving enforcement and customs and immigration laws. That said, 

I am interested in finding out how we improve coordination between CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and ICE special agents. 

In case anyone doubts the need for better coordination, let me 

offer a few examples of the problems that are occurring all too frequently because of conflicts and miscommunication among BTS organizations. 

ICE and the Border Patrol continue to fight over controlled deliveries. The lack of coordination has resulted in, at best, the jeopardizing of investigations and, at worst, danger to law enforcement 

personnel. At a northern point of entry, a Border Patrol agent 

stopped a vehicle, ran a computer check and discovered an active 

ICE investigation. The agent searched the vehicle, found automatic 

weapons and silencers and referred the case to DEA. The DEA, not 

the Border Patrol, subsequently notified ICE. 

I could give you some other examples of a lack of coordination, 

Mr. Chairman, but I am sure the testimony will highlight it. I 

think it is clear that this subcommittee hearing is timely. It is important for the safety of this country as well as the men and 

women in uniform, and I look forward to the testimony. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, 

our friend and colleague, Mr. Cox, from California. 

Mr. COX. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me begin 

by commending Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Meek for 

your willingness to lead this critically important subcommittee. 

Thank you also for holding today’s hearing to examine the potential merger of two operational components of the Department of 

Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, and 
7

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, known as ICE. They 

are both responsible for immigration enforcement, but today they 

are doing that job separately. 

I would also like to welcome and thank each of our distinguished 

witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee to discuss this important issue with us. 

Our responsibility as Members of this committee requires us to 

conduct vigorous oversight and to regularly assess the direction 

and management of the Department of Homeland Security. Is the 

Department making acceptable progress towards integration of its 

operations? Is the Department optimally structured to achieve its 

core missions of preventing terrorism, protecting against terrorism, 

and being prepared to respond to acts of terrorism? 

This subcommittee will take the lead in examining these issues. 

I look forward to working with Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Meek, and the other members of this subcommittee as we explore 

such questions. 

We created the Department of Homeland Security with the express purpose of enhancing the Nation’s ability to prevent and to 

deal with terrorist acts. It was that overarching purpose that drove 

our decision to consolidate existing Federal agencies into a single 

new department. The main organizational task for the Department 

now is to realign the missions of those legacy agencies to more directly support our national Homeland Security efforts. 

Today, we are investigating whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service, both of which 

were transferred to DHS, have been reorganized in a way that is 

optimal for improving our immigration security efforts. The good 

news is that these immigration control agencies are now within the 

same department, and they have a clear and critical new mission: 

to prevent foreign terrorists and their weapons from entering the 

United States and to prevent those terrorists from having free 

reign within our country. 

Abolishing the INS and moving its functions into this new department was meant to correct the fundamental problems that existed within the INS itself. The old INS had multiple and sometimes conflicting roles as provider of immigration services and enforcer of immigration laws. The Homeland Security Act abolished 

the INS and split immigration services from immigration enforcement. 

But the Congress did not have the last word on the organization 

of Customs and Immigration enforcement functions within DHS. 

Utilizing its reorganization authority under the Homeland Security 

Act, the administration acted in January, 2003, to merge the Customs and Immigration border inspection and patrol functions, 

along with Agriculture inspection functions, into what is now CBP. 

In doing so, the Administration also created a new entity called 

ICE, which contains the Customs and Immigration enforcement 

agencies whose investigative responsibilities include crimes, as opposed to, for example, the inspection of cargo and people crossing 

the border. 

Two years later, questions remain about whether DHS has organized itself and is managing its immigration enforcement and border security resources in the most efficient, sensible, and effective 
8

manner. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the division of Customs 

and Immigration inspectors from their related investigative colleagues may be building administrative walls and hampering cooperation and information sharing between ICE and CBP in critical 

mission areas. 

Some observers also have suggested that the distinction between 

the so-called interior enforcement activities of ICE and the socalled border security functions of CBP are artificial constructs that 

contribute to needless administrative overlaps, programmatic turf 

battles, mission gaps, and sometimes dangerous operational conflicts. 

In addition, it appears that at least some of ICE’s very troubling 

budget shortfalls over the last 2 fiscal years have been attributable 

to erroneous budget allocations that occurred upon division of CBP 

and ICE into two distinct components of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

In light of these concerns, we must ask ourselves whether the organizational structure currently in place is contributing to these 

problems and whether a merger or reallocation of responsibility 

may help to resolve them. 

Ultimately, our goal is to see that immigration enforcement and 

border inspection activities operate within an organizational structure that provides for strong policy guidance and coordination, fair 

and efficient allocation of funding, and clearly-defined and seamless 

operational roles. It is also critical that we fully fund the authorized levels of both Border Patrol and Immigration Enforcement 

agents. 

As the committee moves toward the development of comprehensive reauthorization legislation for the Department, I anticipate 

that our findings in this hearing, and others to follow, will play an 

important role in determining the path ahead. I look forward to an 

honest exchange of ideas on this issue as we explore the best way 

to protect our Nation from those who would do us harm.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by commending Chairman Rogers and 

Ranking Member Meek for their willingness to lead this critically important Subcommittee. Thank you also for holding today’s hearing to examine the potential 

merger of two operational components of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, known as ICE, are both responsible for immigration enforcement. But 

today, they are doing that job separately. I’d also like to welcome and thank each 

of our distinguished witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee to discuss this 

important issue with us. 

Our responsibility as Members of this Committee requires us to conduct vigorous 

oversight, and to regularly assess the direction and management of the Department 

of Homeland Security. Is the Department making acceptable progress toward integration of its operations? Is the Department optimally structured to achieve its core 

missions of preventing terrorism, protecting against terrorism, and being prepared 

to respond to acts of terrorism? This Subcommittee will take the lead in examining 

these issues. I look forward to working with Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Meek, and the other Members of this Subcommittee as we explore such questions. 

We created the Department of Homeland Security with the express purpose of enhancing the Nation’s ability to prevent and to deal with terrorist acts. It was that 

over-arching purpose that drove our decision to consolidate existing Federal agencies that drove our decisions to consolidate existing Federal agencies into a single 

new Department. The main organizational task for the Department now is to re-
9

align the missions of those legacy agencies to more directly support our national 

homeland security efforts. 

Today we’re investigating whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

and the U.S. Customs Service-both of which were transferred to DHS-have been reorganized in a way that is optimal in order to improve our immigration security efforts. The good news is that these immigration control agencies are now within the 

same Department. And they have a clear and critical new mission-to prevent foreign 

terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States and to prevent terrorists from having free reign within our country. 

Abolishing the INS and moving its functions into this new department was meant 

to correct the fundamental problems that existed within the INS itself. The old INS 

had multiple and sometimes conflicting roles—as provider of immigration services, 

and enforcer of immigration laws. The Homeland Security Act abolished the INS 

and split immigration services from immigration enforcement. 

But the Congress did not have the last word on the organization of customs and 

immigration enforcement functions within DHS. Utilizing its re-organization authority under the Homeland Security Act, the Administration acted in January 2003 to 

merge the customs and immigration border inspection and patrol functions, along 

with agricultural inspections functions, into what is now CBP. In doing so, the Administration also created a new entity called ICE, which contained the customs and 

immigration enforcement agencies-whose investigate crimes as opposed to inspecting 

cargo and people crossing the border. 

Two years later, questions remain about whether DHS has organized itself and 

is managing its immigration enforcement and border security resources in the most 

efficient, sensible, and effective manner. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the division of customs and immigration inspectors from their related investigative colleagues may be building administrative walls, and hampering cooperation and information sharing, between ICE and CBP in critical mission areas. Some observers 

also have suggested that the distinction between the ’interior enforcement’ activities 

of ICE and the ’border security’ functions of CBP are artificial constructs that contribute to needless administrative overlaps, programmatic turf battles, mission gaps, 

and sometimes dangerous operational conflicts. In addition, it appears that at least 

some of ICE’s very troubling budget shortfalls over the last two fiscal years have 

been attributable to erroneous budget allocations that occurred upon the division of 

CBP and ICE into two discrete components of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

In light of these concerns, we must ask ourselves whether the organizational 

structure currently in place is contributing to these problems, and whether a merger 

or reallocation of responsibility may help to resolve them. Ultimately, our goal is 

to see that immigration enforcement and border inspection activities operate within 

an organizational structure that provides for strong policy guidance and coordination, fair and efficient allocation of funding, and clearly defined and seamless operational roles. It also is critical that we fully fund the authorized levels of both Border Patrol and immigration enforcement agents. 

As the Committee moves toward the development of comprehensive reauthorization legislation for the Department, I anticipate that our findings in this hearing 

and others to follow, will play an important role in determining the path ahead. I 

look forward to an honest exchange of ideas on this issue, as we explore the best 

way to protect this Nation from those who would do us harm. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, and thank you for you comments. 

I would remind the other Members that they can provide opening 

statements for the record. When we have smaller panels, I will 

work with the Ranking Member to arrange for other members to 

give 1—or 2-minute opening statements, but today we have a very 

large panel, and we are going to be here for awhile just getting 

through their testimony. So we will refrain today. 

We are pleased to have with us a distinguished panel of witnesses before us on this important topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in the 

record. Therefore, we ask that, due to the number of witnesses on 

the panel, that you strive to limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. 
10

Mr. ROGERS. At this time, the Chair recognizes Dr. James 

Carafano of The Heritage Foundation to testify. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CARAFANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a New Yorker. 

We talk pretty quick. So I can get through this in 5 minutes. 

The Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic International Studies issued a report called DHS 2.0. One of the recommendations was merger of the Customs and Border Protection 

and ICE agencies. This recommendation was made by about 30 individuals from academia, think tanks, some people from the Hill 

working together. It is a collaborative recommendation. 

The inspiration behind the overall report was simply recognition 

that, in Washington, bureaucracy can be created but never destroyed. But it can be reorganized. And when you are in a longterm conflict, you need organizations that are built and structured 

to be there for the long term. 

We took an object lesson from the creation of what became the 

Department of Defense in 1947, which had fundamental flaws 

which everyone recognized when the Department was created. 

Some of those were fixed in 1949 that actually enabled a secretariat that could actually have the capability to run the services 

underneath them. Some of them didn’t get fixed until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, a mere 3 years before the end of the 

Cold War, almost 40 years. 

We think we can do a lot better. We think that the war on terrorism is going to be a long, protracted conflict; and so we need an 

organization that is structured for the long term and that fixing 

the things that will make it more efficient and effective are better 

done now regardless of the short-term pain because in the end it 

will make us all safer in the long term. 

Specifically on the CBP/ICE recommendation, the genesis of the 

recommendation was really two points. One is that, in doing the 

literature search and in interviewing individuals who had been involved in putting together the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we 

simply could find no compelling argument for splitting the organizations to begin with. 

If you look, for example, in the Hart-Rudman Commission which 

made a recommendation about creating a Department of Homeland 

Security before 9/11, there is absolutely no discussion at all about 

a necessity to split internal enforcement or investigation from border security. 

The second thing is, in looking at the operation of the Department and recognizing all the problems of the reorganization and 

getting started and everything else, we simply couldn’t determine 

any substantive benefit that had been made from splitting the Department, nor could we determine any substantive potential benefit 

of having them remain separate. 

But there is an argument that the Department has gone through 

an enormous amount of reorganization and turmoil, and there is a 

question there, is there pain in further organization. So I think it 

is worthwhile to ask the question, is the pain worth the gain and 
11

is the gain substantial enough to overcome the short-term problems 

of further disruption? 

So I would offer up three criteria that we should use to measure 

whether this is a good idea or not, and I would just like to run 

through those very briefly. 

The first one is, will it improve the overall management of the 

Department, which we think is the absolutely most crucially important thing. The only notion or the only idea worth creating this Department was that we were going to gain the benefits of integrating the activities of 22 agencies. 

One of the most compelling findings of our report is that the way 

we structured the four under secretary positions doesn’t help that. 

What we have done is created four stovepipes, rather than using 

the under secretary positions for doing the cross-cutting integration 

of Department activities. We would much prefer restructuring the 

Department to have the under secretary positions be responsible 

for activities that integrate across the Department, rather than trying to command separate agencies. So, therefore, we would argue 

that the BTS under secretary would be better served doing something else and that we had a single border services agency. 

The second criteria that we would use to measure whether this 

is a good idea or not is will this create strong operational agencies? 

We think that the right model for this Department is to split activities between operating agencies and support activities. The operational agencies are responsible for going out and catching and 

stopping terrorists and doing the other statutory requirements of 

the Department, and then there are support activities that are responsible for supporting the Department overall and integrating 

them. We think when you separate that you have stronger core 

competencies and a more focused department. 

So one of the other recommendations we made in our report was 

to create the deputy as a chief operating officer and have the agencies report directly to him and just have strong operating agencies. 

If we want to do that, we have got to reduce the number of operating agencies in the Department to something that is manageable, 

that the deputy can actually handle; and right now there are too 

many operating agencies in the Department. So consolidating CBP 

and ICE would give the deputy, I think, a reasonable span of control. 

The third and I really think the most important criteria is what 

we call ‘‘envision the future.’’ One of the problems we had in debating the CBP and ICE merger is nobody could really articulate for 

us how we want to address the problem in 5 to 10 years of—from 

the point of origin overseas of a bad thing or a bad person, through 

the border, to internal enforcement. How do you address that endto-end problem? How do you decide where you get your biggest 

bang for the buck? Where do you want to be 5 or 10 years from 

now in terms of securing the United States? And, lacking that, it 

was actually kind of difficult to answer these organizational questions. 

We said, if somebody can sit down and articulate to us, describe 

for me a vision of how you want to do border security in 5 or 10 

years, then we could articulate for you the right organization to do 

that. 
12

1The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating 

under Section 501(C)(3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any government 

at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2003, it had more 

than 200,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the 

United States. Its 2003 income came from the following sources:

Individuals—52% 

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Corporations—8% 

I think that the only solutions are comprehensive solutions that 

really provide as much as possible the integration of activities from 

the point of foreign origin through internal enforcement. So I think 

what you really want is an operational agency with as broad jurisdiction as possible. So, for example, I would argue not only for the 

integration of CBP and ICE, for also for all the visa issuance and 

monitoring activities into one single agency. Because in law enforcement, law enforcement doesn’t have separate jurisdictions because they like it, they have separate jurisdictions because they 

don’t have any other choice. In a perfect world, they would have 

as broad as jurisdictions as they possibly could to do that activity. 

Then, finally, my last point is, is where do we go from here? And 

we argued for really a three-step process. Actually, we argued for 

something different, because we didn’t have any confidence in the 

Congress in creating permanent Homeland Security committees, 

and then we were proved absolutely wrong. But now that we have 

permanent committees and we have a good partner with DHS to 

work on these problems, we would recommend a three-step process. 

Step one would be to fix management first, to key on the most 

critical management activities in DHS that can make it a more effective integrated Department. I think this primarily relates to integration at the under secretary level. And the Congress and DHS 

Secretary, fix those first, get the management issues the best. We 

think that eliminating the BTS under secretary would be part of 

that. 

The second one is we think there is a need for something equivalent to the QDR in DHS, a quadrennial security review in which 

the Department every 4 years sits down and maps out its resources, its requirements, its strategy, and provides a comprehensive assessment to the Congress of where it wants to go. Then we 

would see that QSR being done in the near term in DHS, and that 

that would then serve as a basis for further integration of the Department. 

Then the last thing we recommended was a one-time national security review, kind of an independent assessment to the Congress 

of the work of the QSR and, quite frankly, we think the work of 

the QDR as well to really say, does all this come together into one 

coherent package? And to really give the Congress something to 

chew on in looking at a way ahead in the future. 

With that, I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify before the committee today.1 Thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the proposal to merge the Department of Homeland 
13

Investment Income—18% 

Publication Sales and Other—3%

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 5 percent of its 2003 

income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national accounting firm 

of Deloitte & Touche. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon 

request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own 

independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional 

position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 2The task force co-chairmen and participants would like to acknowledge the helpful support 

provided by the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the use of its online Homeland Security Database and Information Exchange Site, which facilitated the task force’s deliberations. 

The site is located at http://www.thepresidency.org/hsdatabase.htm. 3 James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon

(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 25–31.

Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration-Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) agencies. This was one of the key recommendations of the task 

force chaired by myself, on behalf of The Heritage Foundation, and David Heyman 

of The Center for Strategic and International Studies. The task force’s report, DHS 

2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,2 evaluated the department’s 

capacity to fulfill its mandate as set out in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

In my testimony, I will address, 1) the report’s proposal for merging CBP and ICE 

and how it was developed, 2) standards that could be used to evaluate the recommendation, and 3) possible next steps for the department and Congress. 

Before I discuss the recommendation to create a single border services agency, I 

would like to share with the committee our rationale for undertaking this study and 

why the task force feels it is imperative this issue receive prompt attention from 

Congress and the department’s new leadership. 

We have learned much since 9/11. Americans have had time to dwell on the challenges of protecting the nation against foreign threats in the 21st century and to 

think about the kinds of institutions we need to address these dangers in the decades ahead. In particular, it is time to reconsider the role of the newly established 

Department of Homeland Security in this effort. Experience reminds us that it takes 

only a few years for bureaucracies to become entrenched. After that they are impossible to change. The creation of the Department of Defense is a case in point. During 

the debates over the 1947 National Security Act and again as president, Eisenhower 

lobbied for reorganizing the Pentagon to ensure the armed forces would work closely 

together. He failed to overcome the political opposition and the service parochialisms that blocked reforms. As a result, fundamental problems in joint operations 

went unaddressed until 1986 and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.3 The 

lesson is clear. Fix them at the beginning or live with the mistakes for a long time. 

The Recommendation to Merge CBP and ICE 

The proposal to consolidate CBP and ICE was developed by a task force with 

members from academia, research centers, the private sector, and Congress and 

chaired by homeland security experts at The Heritage Foundation and The Center 

for Strategic and International Studies. The task force examined the effectiveness 

of the new department in four areas: management, roles and missions, authorities, 

and resources. 

Based on analysis, conducted through seminars, an extensive literature search, 

and interviews, the task force developed 40 major recommendations for improving 

the oversight, organization, and operation of DHS. The findings and recommendations of the task force can be found on The Heritage Foundation’s web site at http:/

/www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr02.cfm. 

Specifically regarding challenges related to border security the task force observed 

that before the creation of DHS, seven agencies, among others, were involved in securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws, and protecting our transportation system. They were: (1) U.S. Customs; (2) the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS); (3) the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR); (4) the Bureau of Consular Affairs; (5) the U.S. Coast Guard; (6) the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA); and (7) the Animal, Plant, Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS). Agency missions overlapped. It was difficult to resolve operational or policy conflict without resorting to a cumbersome, inefficient, and ineffective interagency process. 

The creation of the DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with overlapping 

missions and to better integrate the national border security effort. And it has succeeded to some degree. The INS has been abolished. Immigration border inspectors 

and Border Patrol Agents have been merged with most of U.S. Customs and the border inspectors of APHIS to create CBP. Customs and Immigration Investigators and 
14

4The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, ‘‘Road Map for National 

Security: Imperative for Change,’’ (February 15, 2001), p. 12, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf. 5 James Jay Carafano and Ha Nguyen, ‘‘Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa Issuance and 

Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland Security,’’ October 27, 2003 (Backgrounder #1699), 

www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1699.cfm. 

Detention and Removal Officers were combined into a new organization, ICE, responsible for ‘‘internal enforcement.’’ The two agencies were assigned to a Border 

and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate under the Undersecretary for Border 

and Transportation Security. 

In ‘‘consolidating’’ responsibility for border, immigration, and transportation security, DHS actually increased the number of involved agencies to eight and created 

more problems that now need solving. In addition, it has failed to clearly delineate 

the agencies’ missions within DHS that also have border, immigration, or transportation security responsibilities. 

Additionally, the task force concluded that the split of responsibilities between 

CBP and ICE was done without a compelling reason. The task force was not able 

to find any convincing argument that there were unsolvable problems in the legacy 

agencies of having border agents and internal enforcement investigators working in 

the same organization. Indeed, in various interviews, not one person was able to coherently argue why CBP and ICE were created as separate operational agencies. In 

addition, the Hart-Rudman Commission, which recommended creating a national 

homeland security agency before the 9/11 attacks, saw no need to split border and 

internal enforcement authority.4 Some have analogized the separation to deciding 

to break up the New York Police Department into two separate agencies—one housing the uniformed ‘‘beat cops’’ (analogous to CBP’s uniformed officers), and the other 

housing the detectives (analogous to ICE’s plain-clothes investigators). 

The reorganization exchanged one seam in U.S. security for another. Before the 

creation of DHS, ‘‘people’’ and ‘‘things’’ entering the country were handled under 

separate systems. There were no common policies, programs, or standards. Dealing 

with dangers that involved both required coordination between two different agencies. Today, travelers and goods are handled by an integrated system, but border 

operations and interior enforcement are now bifurcated into two different organizations creating a new requirement for interagency coordination. 

Complicating the border security picture is the mission of TSA. While most Americans associate TSA with ground screeners at airports, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act creating TSA also charges TSA with responsibility ‘‘for security 

in all modes of transportation,’’ including ensuring the ‘‘adequacy of security measures for the transportation of cargo.’’ This has injected TSA into the realm of border 

security, and created friction with other DHS agencies historically in charge of securing the movement of cargo into the United States—CBP and Coast Guard. In addition, BTS has not been particularly effective in clearly delineating the relative responsibilities of CBP and TSA. 

Another complicating factor is that under the Homeland Security Act, responsibility for ensuring that terrorists do not obtain visas to enter the United States is 

shared between DHS and the State Department’s (DOS’) Bureau of Consular Affairs. Integration of their activities and supporting intelligence services represents 

a significant interagency challenge.5 For example, the process for negotiating a 

Memorandum of Understanding between DOS and DHS delineating their respective 

responsibilities took over a year. 

DHS 2.0 proposed rationalizing border security and immigration enforcement by 

merging CBP and ICE and eliminating BTS. The directorate has neither the staff 

nor infrastructure to integrate the operations of CBP and ICE on a consistent basis. 

Nor does it have a policy operation with sufficient influence with the secretariat to 

resolve interagency conflicts. Merging CBP and ICE into a single border services 

agency will bring together all of the tools of effective border and immigration enforcement—Inspectors, Border Patrol Agents, Special Agents, Detention and Removal Officers, and Intelligence Analysts—and realize the objective of creating a 

single border services agency. 

With the merger of CBP and ICE into a single agency, there is no need for the 

BTS ‘‘middle management’’ layer. All operational agencies should have a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary via the Deputy. This will allow for a better, 

DHS-wide (including the Coast Guard) policy and operational strategic approach to 

border security matters. 

Additionally, splitting responsibility for visa issuance and management between 

DHS and DOS was a mistake. Operations could be managed more efficiently under 

one department and would place responsibility and accountability in one place. The 
15

6Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security,’’ Department of Homeland Security, December 2004, p. 1. 7Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘Major Management Challenges,’’ p. 2. 

choice is difficult. Arguably DOS is better positioned to consider the diplomatic, economic, and cultural issues at stake in issuing visas. On the other hand, if DHS were 

responsible it could seamlessly integrate visa management into a merged border 

services agency, thus overseeing the movement of people and goods from the foreign 

point of origin to the interior of the United States. Any consideration of a CBP/ICE 

merger should also rethink the management of activities for visa issuance and monitoring.

All the Right Moves? 

Perhaps the most valid criticism of the DHS 2.0 proposal to create a single border 

services agency is that it would heap more turmoil on organizations that have already seen substantial disruption. In short, critics argue the pain of further change 

is not worth the gain. Three measures could serve as a guide for determining whether further reorganization is warranted. Any proposed changes should:

• Improve overall management of the department as a first priority; • Divide department activities between operational responsibilities and support functions under different chains of command. 

• Implement a future vision of the department.

The proposal to create a single border services agency should be judged against 

these standards. I would like to address each in turn.

Focusing on Management 

In a recent report the DHS Inspector General identified department-wide management as a significant issue of concern. ‘‘Integrating its many separate components 

into a single, effective, efficient, and economical department,’’ the IG wrote, ‘‘remains one of DHS’’ biggest challenges.’’ 6 The weaknesses in DHS management are 

critical because they cut against the core rationale for passing the Homeland Security Act: gaining the synergy of having most of the key federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities grouped in one department. 

The creation of a single border services agency should only be undertaken if it will 

help address the most significant management challenges of DHS. 

The task force concluded that merging CBP and ICE provides an opportunity to 

substantially strengthen the DHS secretariat. Currently, the undersecretary positions in DHS are used to command subordinate agencies, rather than contributing 

to the cross-cutting integration of department activities and strengthening coordination with other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and 

foreign governments. Merging CBP and ICE into a single agency would eliminate 

the need for a BTS Undersecretary and allow the department to use that position 

to enhance the capacity of the secretariat to provide stronger leadership for the department overall. 

DHS 2.0 proposed to have the new border services agency report directly to the 

Deputy Secretary, who would act as the department’s chief operating office (COO), 

as well assume the responsibilities of the Undersecretary for Management. This 

change would address one of the key concerns expressed in the DHS IG report on 

the major management challenges of the department—confusing and duplicative reporting chains. Currently, DHS employs a concept called ‘‘dual accountability,’’ 

where agency staff are asked to report both through their undersecretaries and chief 

officers in the secretariat.7 This dual reporting system has proven contentious and 

inefficient. Eliminating the ‘‘middle management’’ over operating agencies will create a single chain of command and allow the deputy to more effectively direct financial, information management, acquisition, and personnel initiatives that cut across 

the DHS. 

Consolidation is also important for making the deputy’s duties manageable. If the 

deputy is to serve as an effective COO, his span of control needs to be reasonable. 

This would require consolidation of existing organizations within the DHS. The 

merger of ICE and CBP help reduce the scope of COO responsibilities. 

The need for a BTS directorate over ICE and CBP, can also be eliminated by moving oversight functions, such as policy, planning, and stakeholder outreach, into the 

secretariat where they more properly belong. To address this, our report also called 

for reconfiguring two undersecretary positions. First, DHS 2.0 proposed an Undersecretary for Policy and Planning, which would include an Assistant Secretary for 

International Affairs. Second, the report recommended eliminating the Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness & Response (EP&R) and replacing this position 

with an Undersecretary for Protection and Preparedness who would oversee critical 
16

8Michael A. Wermuth, Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, January 26, 2005, p. 5, hsgac.senate.gov/—files/WermuthCT233.pdf. 9 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘The Homeland Security Authorization Bill: Streamlining the Budget 

Process’’ April 15, 2004 (Executive Memorandum #923), www.heritage.org/Research/

HomelandDefense/em923.cfm. For example, one area where consolidation may contribute to improving operational performance is in the implementation of Chimera. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 requires the integration of all data systems related 

to visa issuance and monitoring into Chimera, an interoperable, interagency computer-based 

data management system. The law assigns the DHS primary responsibility for developing an 

overarching information architecture to share immigration and intelligence data and calls for 

creating an eight-member commission to oversee Chimera. To date, little progress has been 

made in implementing the system.

infrastructure protection, preparedness, and state and local governments/private 

sector coordination efforts. This would consolidate the following agencies: the Infrastructure Protection component of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate; Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP); the non-operational transportation infrastructure protection 

mission of TSA, the ‘‘preparedness’’ piece of the EP&R Directorate; the Office of Private Sector Liaison, and; grant making authority for DHS. 

One consideration for the Congress and the department’s new leadership is the 

potential of using the creation of a single border services agency as a catalyst for 

overall reforms in the department, improvements that would enhance the capacity 

of the secretariat to integrate and coordinate activities across DHS.

Operating Responsibilities and Support Functions 

A second measure that should be used to judge the value of creating a single 

agency is whether this initiative would sharpen the operational effectiveness of the 

department. Dividing functional responsibilities in the department between ‘‘operational’’ agencies and ‘‘support’’ organizations is a sound management principle because it focuses agencies on critical missions. It also helps to develop strong institutional cultures. The Defense Department explicitly follows this model. Combatant 

commanders are charged with ‘‘running the war.’’ The services are responsible for 

‘‘raising, training, preparing, and sustaining’’ the force. It is a model that works well 

because it encourages organizations to focus on their core competencies. A DHS 

analogy would be to establish robust operational agencies that concentrate on stopping terrorists and conducting the department’s other statutory missions apart from 

the staffs and directorates responsible for conducting planning, coordination, policymaking, budgeting, and support activities for the department as a whole. 

A single border services organization responsible for visa issuance and monitoring, 

managing points of entry, patrolling the borders, and interior enforcement should 

only be established if it will create a stronger and more effective operating agency. 

In recent hearings before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

Committee, Michael Wermuth, director of Homeland Security at RAND, was skeptical of the proposal to merge CBP and ICE concluding that ‘‘a good argument can 

be made that the skills required for the performance of those separate tasks require 

different recruiting, retention, training performance evaluation, operational procedures, and other related activities.’’8 Indeed, both agencies are currently struggling 

with the challenge of cross-training skills and building a common culture among 

agency personnel. Wermuth argued for a comprehensive assessment to determine 

whether a single organization could appropriately manage the plethora of skills and 

activities involved in overseeing the movement of goods, people, and services across 

America’s borders. 

Concerns over the capacity of an integrated agency to train, manage, and retain 

personnel are worthwhile considerations. These, however, are not issues of organizational design, but challenges for human capital and information technology programs. Indeed, creating a single operating agency might enhance prospects for establishing more robust personnel programs, offering a wider range of career progression and professional development options, opportunities for both cross-training and 

specialization, and an increased capacity to shift and surge resources. In addition, 

creating a single agency may offer advantages for integrating and consolidating information technology programs. Any consideration to merge CBP and ICE must be 

made in tandem with discussions over the scope and structure of the human capital 

and information technology initiatives that will be instituted to support consolidating the agencies.9

Envisioning the Future 

A third way to evaluate the benefit of further organizational innovation is to 

measure how change will contribute to the long-term development of the department. One hotly debated issue relates to the division of roles and missions within 
17

10The purpose of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–

VISIT) program is to establish a system that can collect, maintain, and share biometric and biographic data on foreign nationals for border and immigration enforcement. The goal of the system is to screen all foreign nationals from non-visa-waiver countries entering and exiting the 

United States. See James Jay Carafano, ‘‘The Homeland Security Budget Request for FY 2005: 

Assessments and Proposals,’’ Backgrounder #1731 March 5, 2004, www.heritage.org/Research/

NationalSecurity/bg1731.cfm. 11The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the employment of technologies to 

establish ‘‘smart borders’’ that promote the efficient flow of people, goods, and conveyances while 

providing greater security. Office of the President, ‘‘The National Strategy for Homeland,’’ (July 

2002), p. 22, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat—strat—hls.pdf. In December 2001, the 

‘‘United States and Canada agreed on a Smart Border Declaration and a 30 point action plan 

to implement smart borders. Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘US-Canada Smart Border/ 30 Point 

Action Plan Update,’’ (December 6, 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-

1.html. See also, Andre Belelieu, ‘‘Canada Alert: The Smart Border Process at Two: Losing Momentum’’ Hemisphere Focus, Center for Strategic and International Studies, XI/31 (December 

10, 2003), pp. 1–8, www.csis.org/americas/pubs/hf—v11—31.pdf. 12 Carafano and Nguyen, ‘‘Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa Issuance and Monitoring: An 

Imperative for Homeland Security.’’

the department. The creation of DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with 

overlapping and complementary missions. Since its formation, DHS has made some 

positive efforts to group the right activities under the right organization. Moving the 

Office of Air and Maritime Interdiction under CBP and shifting the Federal Marshal 

Service to ICE are cases in point. However, a broader assessment needs to be made 

across the department. There is reluctance to undertake such a review based on the 

argument that the organizations have not yet absorbed all the change heaped upon 

them. Such thinking is shortsighted. The war against terrorism will be a protracted 

conflict and DHS needs to be structured and resourced for a long campaign. 

DHS needs to be organized not to accommodate the present, but to build toward 

the ideal organization of the future. Therefore, the department needs to articulate 

how it envisions conducting its missions five to ten years from now and let this vision 

drive the organizational design, particularly the structure of border security operations. 

The department’s current organization reflects an outdated vision of how to protect America’s borders. Visa issuance, border security, and internal enforcement are 

divided into three separate agencies, suggesting that threats and countermeasures 

can be neatly segmented in discrete activities. There are, however, no frontiers in 

21st century national security, nor are all border security issues best handled at the 

border. Protecting the United States against terrorist threats and significantly reducing transnational crime (e.g. drug, arms, and human trafficking) and environmental dangers (such as contagious diseases and invasive species), as well as illegal 

entry and unlawful presence in the United States requires activities that address 

these challenges from the point of foreign origin through transiting the border, and 

within U.S. territory. Distinguishing clear lines of responsibility between foreign, 

border, and domestic security is a thing of the past. Nor can responsibilities for security, promoting economic growth, and protecting the liberties of American citizens 

(as well as visitors and international business partners) be considered in isolation. 

DHS’ future vision must not only speak to how to integrate activities, but how 

to establish priorities and make trade-offs, focusing investments on where the nation can get the biggest ‘‘bang’’ for its security ‘‘buck.’’ At least three major issues 

should be addressed. 

First, the vision must make hard choices in deciding between investments in monitoring legal means of trade and travel and combating illegal entry into the United 

States. Improving the monitoring of legal means to enter the country, including improving physical infrastructure at points of entry and promoting programs like US–

VISIT10 and the Smart Borders Initiative,11 should have the highest priority. Most 

goods, services, and people enter and exit the United States through legitimate networks. These networks are the lifeline of the U.S. economy and must be appropriately managed and protected. Likewise, virtually all known terrorists who have 

entered the United States came in through legal channels.12 In addition, as the 

United States improves its capacity to reduce entry into the country at places other

than legal points of entry, illicit activities attempting to penetrate legal networks 

of trade and travel will likely increase. Effective border services must already be 

in place to meet this challenge, if the United States hopes to improve its overall security. 

Second, strategic choices need to be made on how to best affect the flow of illegal 

entry and unlawful presence in the United States, as well as transnational criminal 

activities and environmental threats. Too often the assumption is made that the 

best place to reduce illegal and illicit activity is by interdicting it at the border. In 
18

13For example, terrorist investigations involving immigration violations are an area in which 

much could be done immediately to improve the role of state and local law enforcement. Domestic counterterrorism comprises law enforcement efforts primarily by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ICE to identify, prevent, and prosecute terrorists. One improvement would be 

to form cooperative partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for 

immigration investigations related to terrorism. While using state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws has been controversial, such programs may be appropriate for some states and localities. In June 2002, the INS and the State of Florida created 

a pilot program that could serve as a model for enhanced and appropriate cooperation. The program trained selected state and local law officers to assist in domestic counterterrorism immigration investigations. The Florida officers were required to be members of the state 

counterterrorism task force and could engage in these activities only when taking part in 

counterterrorism operations supervised by the federal INS officers. When the INS became part 

of the DHS, the program’s memorandum of understanding was renewed. The Florida pilot program represents an ideal model for the limited and appropriate use of state and local support 

in expanding the DHS’ investigatory capacity. Congress should provide sufficient resources to 

allow the DHS to offer similar programs to other states and U.S. territories. See, James Jay 

Carafano, Paul Rosenzweig, and Alane Kochems, ‘‘An Agenda for Increasing State and Local 

Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism,’’ February 24, 2005 (Backgrounder #1826). 14 In March 2002, President George W. Bush proposed the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new foreign assistance program to low-income countries that demonstrate a strong commitment to ‘‘ruling justly,’’ ‘‘investing in people,’’ and ‘‘establishing economic freedom.’’ Ana I. Eiras, ‘‘Make the Rule of Law a Necessary Condition for the Millennium 

Challenge Account,’’ March 7, 2003 (Backgrounder #1634), www.heritage.org/Research/

TradeandForeignAid/BG1634.cfm. 15 Robin F. Laird, et al, ‘‘The Challenges to Developing a Effective Maritime Security Architecture,’’ in James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems, eds., Making the Seas Safer, Heritage Special 

Report No. 3, (February 17, 2005), pp. 20–27, www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/

loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=74871. 

practice, internal enforcement policies and programs, followed by working with point 

of origin and transit countries, probably offer a greater return on investment. In the 

long term, for example, initiatives such as effective workplace enforcement (which 

discourages the employment of individuals who are unlawfully present in the United 

States), domestic counterterrorism investigations (including means to track down 

criminal aliens),13 and the Millennium Challenge Account 14 (which promotes policies that advance economic growth, sound governance, and the rule of law in foreign 

countries) will have a greater impact on illegal entry and unlawful presence than 

hiring additional border guards. 

Third, addressing the challenge of illegal entry between the points of entry cannot 

be ignored, but clear priorities have to be established. Investments must be made 

in resources that create a system-of-systems approach to security. Rather than trying to control the entire border, the United States needs a system that direct the 

right capabilities to the right place at the right time to provide an appropriate response. Key investments include a combination of high speed and armed airborne 

assets and robust airborne sensor capabilities. These assets need to be linked to an 

intelligence and early warning network that provides knowledge of activities in the 

maritime domain and along the border, as well as to means to effectively analyze 

and share that knowledge. Modernizing CBP’s air and marine interdiction capabilities in concert with increasing funding for the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater 

acquisition program, for example, ought to take precedence.15

To address these three issues, DHS must conduct a national assessment to determine the system-of-systems it requires. Any system will need to include all the ‘‘layers of security’’ that impact on securing the border. Congress and the administration 

should use this analysis to determine where their efforts should be directed and 

whether creating a single border services agency with jurisdiction over all activities 

related to the transiting of U.S. borders would improve the department’s allocation 

of assets and effectiveness.

Next Steps 

DHS 2.0 called for the President and Congress to establish a non-partisan commission to review the performance of the department and assess its capacity to fulfill the missions outlined in the Homeland Security Act and report back within six 

months. Without permanent oversight committees in the Senate and House, the 

task force felt Congress would be unable to effectively address the challenge of restructuring the DHS. Things have changed. The task force applauds the action 

taken in both chambers to create permanent committees. With Congressional oversight of the department’s management now consolidated in appropriate committees, 

Congress could consider alternative paths for moving forward. One would have Congress legislate key management reforms and establish a routine authorization process. Then, Congress, jointly with the leadership of DHS, can address reorganization 

issues, such as merging CBP and ICE, in a more deliberative manner through a 
19

16 James Jay Carafano, Baker Spring, and Jack Spencer ‘‘National Security Requires a National Perspective—and Congressional Action,’’ February 17, 2005 (Executive Memorandum 

#959), www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em959.cfm.

combination of reviews conduct by DHS and an independent panel answering to the 

Congress.16 This strategy might proceed as follows. 

Step #1: Legislate Undersecretaries for Policy and Protection and Preparedness 

and abolish the Undersecretaries for Emergency Preparedness and Response and 

Management. Establish Chief Operating Officer functions under the Deputy Secretary.

Step #2: Implement an authorization process for DHS. An authorization bill for 

the DHS could serve as a critical statutory management tool providing the means 

to exercise stronger oversight of important DHS activities such as key personnel 

programs, performance of critical missions, major research programs, and information technology investments.

Step# 3: Establish a requirement for periodic reviews. Congress should establish 

a requirement that DHS conduct quadrennial reviews of the department’s strategies, force structure, resources, and appreciation of the threat. The Quadrennial 

Homeland Security-Review (QHSR) should be timed to coincide with the mid-point 

of the presidential term. The first QHSR should be specifically tasked to establish 

a future security vision. That vision will inform the decision over whether to merge 

CBP and ICE.

Step #4: Create a one-time National Security Review Panel. In parallel with the 

first QHSR, the Congress should establish a non-partisan National Security Review 

Panel (NSRP). The NSRP should be charged with providing an independent assessment of the QHSR as well as assessing the efforts of the DHS in the context of larger national security programs and strategies. 

Conclusion 

The creation of the DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with overlapping 

missions and to better integrate the national border security effort. Any proposal, 

including merging CBP and ICE should be evaluated against whether it will improve the overall management of DHS, whether it will further delineate department 

activities between operational and support functions with each under a separate 

chain of command, and whether the action implements a future strategic vision of 

the department. 

Once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and the rest of the Committee for holding 

this hearing and for inviting me to participate. I look forward to answering any 

questions you might have.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Klug, who is a 

former Special Agent in Charge of ICE. 

Mr. KLUG. Former Associate Special Agent in Charge, but I appreciate the promotion. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. KLUG. I am a New Yorker, also, so I will speak quickly. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH C. KLUG, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT 

IN CHARGE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. KLUG. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor and a privilege to appear 

before you today to present testimony in furtherance of reuniting 

the enforcement and regulatory functions of what were the U.S. 

Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

The majority of my 25-year career was spent with the United 

States Customs Service. The final 2 years was spent with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The majority of my time in the last 

4 years of my tenure was spent rebuilding the Special Agent in 

Charge New York office which had been destroyed during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
20

When the inspectors and special agents were separated into Customs and Border Protection, CBP and ICE, their collaboration, cooperation, and teamwork immediately began to diminish. Since the 

separation of the two agencies, there has been a sharp decline in 

the traditional Customs/Border-related investigations, resulting in 

a drastic reduction in narcotics, illegal merchandise, munitions, 

and currency seizures. 

The decision to split Customs and Immigration into ICE and 

CBP seriously undermined rather than strengthened the new Department’s law enforcement’s critical mission. The decision to separate the two agencies reflects an absence of understanding in the 

matter of processes, relationships, and how the border environment 

and Federal law enforcement functions most optimally. 

Inspectors are first to see passengers and merchandise at the 

border crossings. Agents investigate violations emanating from 

cross-border movements. As such, the Nation has a vested interest 

in these two law enforcement forces being united in leadership, resources, strategy, method, and communications. 

Instead of streamlining the flow of information vital to our national security, the new structure places roadblocks in the way. The 

separation of inspectors and special agents caused a gap in the flow 

of information, detracting from border enforcement and port security. The creation of ICE was tantamount to building a house without a foundation. The administration failed to conduct a comprehensive review in the beginning relative to the complexity or 

feasibility of combining these two diverse agencies. No study, cursory or in depth, was requested to be produced in anticipation of 

the proposed separation, as far as I understand. 

I am certain that if an independent group such as the Government Accountability Office had conducting a study at that time, it 

would have undoubtedly led to an understanding of the symbiotic 

relationship and intermeshed roles of the agents and inspectors. 

Consequently, the separation of CBP and ICE would have never occurred. 

Furthermore, I believe that an understanding of the current 

flawed situation inevitably will lead to the conclusion that a merger would correct this irrational design that has hampered DHS’s 

ability to progress in the arena of border enforcement. 

From the onset, we were told that ICE was created to protect the 

Nation’s border foremost against terrorism. We in the New York 

field office that had firsthand witnessed the death and destruction 

on September 11 welcomed the opportunity to contribute to this effort. We were anxious to engage in the fight and looked forward to 

our role in this important mission. We awaited direction from the 

agency in the form of a mission statement. No such statement was 

forthcoming, and inexplicably to date no succinct mission statement 

regarding our role in the war on terrorism has been issued. Additionally, no specific enforcement priorities have been identified. 

Like many of my colleagues, I left the agency rather than stay 

and watch it helplessly while it declined. My understanding is that 

ICE currently has in excess of 800 vacancies which have been 

caused by the mass exodus of disillusioned employees and a hiring 

freeze. 
21

CBP inherited Customs’ cutting edge computer technology and 

administrative systems. ICE inherited the INS computer systems 

that were archaic at best. When we advised ICE’s new management team that the systems were not adequate, they repeatedly 

told us that we didn’t understand the systems and they were in 

fact superior. Of course, the contrary was true. 

As Congress has repeatedly stated in the past, the Immigration 

systems provided the user with no ability to track the use of funds 

or live within its allotted budget. Even today, the ICE administration systems fail to track the budget, procurement, property and 

travel and fail to support the agency. This has been repeatedly evidenced by the continuing need to have independent auditors from 

the private sector review the ICE funding levels and anticipated 

expenditures. After 2 years, this agency does not have accountability over the funds provided by this committee. 

A merger of ICE and CBP would greatly reduce the duplication 

of effort and costs associated with the current separations of information technology systems. 

I have yet to hear one individual within DHS articulate a single 

sound reason for the continued separation of Customs and Border 

Protection and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One 

very vague explanation is that CBP will handle border enforcement 

and ICE will be responsible for interior enforcement. This reasoning is fatally flawed. Border enforcement and interior enforcement cannot be separated. This is the same defective logic which 

created the agency in the first place; and, once again, this reasoning displays a complete lack of understanding of the agencies’ 

roles and jurisdictional responsibilities. 

In a similar fashion to CBP, ICE’s jurisdictional responsibilities 

relate to a must-have nexus to the border. ICE’s jurisdictional responsibilities directly relate to cross-border movement of people 

and merchandise. Illegal aliens cross our borders. Those involved 

in immigration fraud cross our borders. Narcotics cross our borders. 

Trademark-restricted merchandise crosses our borders. Illicit funds 

cross our borders. Munitions and high technology cross our borders. 

And terrorists cross our borders. ICE is responsible for pursuing 

criminal investigations into all of these critical areas. However, we 

have separated the agencies responsible for investigating these important violations, and that undermines our national security. 

The situation is analogous to separating the uniformed police officers from the detective force. By merging CBP and all of the entities involved in border and immigration enforcement, responsibilities would be brought together with a single mission and chain of 

command. We will not realize the objective of creating a single border enforcement agency until special agents, inspectors, border patrol agents, intelligence analysts, retention and removal officers are 

brought together under one roof. Under a unified command structure, a single border agency would be far more productive. 

There are a myriad of reasons why initial separation of these 

agencies never made sense and a number of additional justifications as to why combining CBP and ICE is best for this Nation and 

its war on terrorism. One thing is certain. Whatever the decision 

of Congress is regarding the merging of these two agencies, it 

should be done quickly. Should we continue on the current configu-
22

ration, that would mean maintaining the duplicity of tasks, wasting tax dollars, and perpetuating the downward slide of its employees and morale. Simply stated, a house divided cannot stand. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Klug. 

[The statement of Mr. Klug follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH C. KLUG

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It 

is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today to present testimony in furtherance of reuniting the enforcement and regulatory functions of what were the 

U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The majority 

of my twenty-five year law enforcement career was spent with the U.S. Customs 

Service. I held positions in several field offices on both the regulatory and enforcement sides of the Customs Service. I spent the final two years of my career with 

the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) before retiring in July 2004. Most 

of my efforts during the latter years of federal service were focused on rebuilding 

the Special Agent-in-Charge New York office, which had been destroyed as a result 

of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. 

For over two centuries, the U.S. Customs Service has facilitated the flow of our 

nation’s commerce while protecting American’s business and populous from contraband and more recently terrorist threats. U.S. Customs has always been at the forefront of protecting our nation’s borders. A notable example is when a Customs Inspector in Port Angeles, Washington intercepted terrorist Ahmed Ressam who had 

driven off the ferry from Victoria, B.C., destined for Los Angeles airport with 135 

pounds of bomb making ingredients hidden in the trunk of his car. U.S. Customs 

personnel apprehended him after a foot chase through the streets of Port Angeles 

almost certainly averting a major disaster. The U.S. Customs Service garnered 

many similar front page headlines with numerous successful investigations and its 

many innovative impact programs. 

Legacy Customs was comprised of two disciplines, the regulatory side, which included the uniformed inspectional force that the traveling public is familiar with 

and the investigative function which included the offices of Intelligence, Air and Marine units. The two sides of the agency shared a symbiotic relationship that led to 

many successful investigations in the enforcement of numerous domestic and international laws. When the Inspectors and the Special Agents were separated into Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE, their collaboration, cooperation and 

teamwork immediately began to diminish. The current ICE administration paints 

a favorable picture of the existing situation. It uses superfluous adjective and adverbs along with rhetoric to disguise its current problems. The reality is that ICE 

statistics are embarrassing compared to those numbers produced before the merger. 

Since the combining of the two new agencies there has been a sharp decline in the 

traditional ‘‘Customs’’ related investigations resulting in a drastic reduction in narcotics, illegal merchandise, munitions and currency seizures 

It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the Office of Investigations, that the 

concept of ICE and the subsequent division of the Customs Service was fatally 

flawed from its inception. Frankly, the creation of ICE was tantamount to building 

a house without a foundation. Many in the law enforcement community found it 

quizzical as to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, such as Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in the transition. 

The logic behind the concept of ICE became even more arcane when the Federal 

Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency responsible for guarding government buildings, was taken from under the General Services Administration and placed within 

ICE. To date, not a single individual I have spoken with in the federal government 

can supply any reason for incorporating F.P.S. into this border protection agency. 

Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive review or issue 

a written report relative to the complexity or feasibility of combining these diverse 

agencies. Apparently no study, cursory or in depth, was requested or produced in 

anticipation of the proposed separation. I am certain that if a study had been conducted by an independent group such as the G.A.O., the separation would have 

never been recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my coworkers believed then and continue to feel that the proposed division of Customs and 

INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on the part of those individuals 

in the administration who proposed it. They certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions of the two agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved 

to substantiate that belief. All of our trepidations over the ill conceived creation of 
23

ICE quickly began to be realized during the first few months of the new agency’s 

history. 

From the onset we were told that ICE was created to protect the nation’s borders, 

foremost against terrorism. We in the New York field office who had witnessed firsthand the death and destruction on September 11th, welcomed the opportunity to 

contribute to this effort. We were anxious to engage in the fight and looked forward 

to our role in this important mission. We anticipated ICE’s development and communication of our new mission. We awaited a statement that clearly outlined our 

long and short-term goals. We believed that organizationally, the structure of ICE 

would be changed to reflect our new mission. We looked forward to the publication 

of objectives in furtherance of achieving our mission. We believed that the new policies would be distributed to all employees. Two years after the creation of ICE, none 

of these necessary precursors have been identified let alone accomplished. The best 

ICE has been able to do thus far is produce a nebulous statement as to what the 

agency purpose has become. Inexplicably, to date no succinct mission statement has 

been issued and no specific priorities have been identified. 

Customs was always on the cutting edge of computer technology and administrative systems. ICE inherited the INS computer systems that were archaic at best. 

When we voiced our comments on the need to improve or change these systems to 

ICE’s new management team, we were repeatedly told by ICE management that we 

didn’t understand the new systems. In fact ICE management informed us that they 

were superior to the Customs systems. Of course the contrary was true, as Congress 

had repeatedly said in the past, the Immigration systems provided the user with 

no ability to track the use of funds or to live within their allotted budget. Even 

today the ICE administrative systems that track budget, procurement, property, 

travel and even time and attendance fail to support the efficiencies of the service 

or promote accountability. This has repeatedly been evidenced by the continuing 

need to have independent auditors from the private sector review the ICE funding 

levels and anticipated expenditures. After two years this agency does not have accountability over the funds provided by this Committee. To further exacerbate the 

situation the agency has failed to identify a clear mission, establish measures of effectiveness and identify the funding level required to pursue its mission. In effect, 

there is no accountability for the proper expenditure of appropriated funds. 

Instead of engaging in the war on terrorism we found ourselves fighting with ICE 

management to upgrade computer systems and update its programs. We were not 

requesting anything more than to bring us back to a level of technology that had 

successfully supported our mission in the past. It became apparent at this point in 

time that the organization was unable or unwilling to entertain suggestions to improve antiquated technology and flawed policies. Consequently I decide along with 

many of my contemporaries to retire from the agency, rather than stay and watch 

helplessly as it deteriorated. This loss of experience and talent has further undermined the agency’s ability to succeed. Every current Customs employee I speak with 

today express their desire to leave ICE, either by retiring when eligible or transferring to another agency. ICE currently has in excess of 800 vacancies which have 

been caused by the mass exodus and a hiring freeze. If CBP were successful in forming an investigative arm, all of the former Customs Criminal Investigators I have 

spoken with would readily apply for transfer. 

In the interim, morale continues to fall rapidly within ICE. Contributing to this 

downward trend is the discontinuance of some positive employee initiatives. The 

Tuition Assistance Program which helps subsidizes education costs, has been 

ceased. The small monetary recognitions which were distributed to deserving employees in the Customs Service during award ceremonies have disappeared under 

the new regime. While other divisions within DHS enjoy adequate budgets and recognize their employees for their efforts, ICE employees have difficulty securing sufficient funding to pursue operational objectives and receive no recognition for their 

often times exemplary performance. The impression, whether true or not, is that the 

ICE hierarchy has mismanaged the budget. When the ICE hierarchy was informed 

of the low morale caused by the absence of these programs, they were either non 

responsive or dismissive of our concerns. From speaking to many people who remain 

with the agency, ICE continues to flounder. 

A merger would reverse this disturbing situation and makes sense on a number 

of different planes. The over riding reason is an improvement in the efficiencies and 

effectiveness of government while eliminating duplication of effort. Considerable cost 

savings of tax dollars could also be realized. Some examples of how a merger will 

benefit productivity while reducing costs are as follows:

1. It would be beneficial to have one air and marine unit under a single command to support the Immigration/Customs enforcement function. 
24

2. Duplicated intelligence organizations would be melded into a single cohesive 

unit producing a more efficient and comprehensive intelligence product for the 

new agency. 

3. The separate Internal Affairs units would join together bolstering the efficiency and integrity of the new agency. 

4. The forfeiture fund process would be more effective under a single management and result in a more lucrative source that would augment the new agency’s budget. 

5. Human Resource functions will be integrated into one unit, unifying hiring 

and recruitment of core area positions. 

6. Training staff and regiments would be integrated, resulting in a cost savings 

and a more effective program. 

7. A single Information and Technology division would upgrade all systems 

databases and make them interoperable creating a more powerful and cost efficient tool. 

8. Foreign posts could be filled by one individual representing all Homeland Security interests instead of one for CBP and one for ICE. 

9. A single border agency would provide a central point of contact for intelligence and communication on all Immigration and Customs matters with other 

federal, state and local agencies thus eliminating the current confusion. 

10. The business and trade communities would have their issues and concerns 

better served by the unification of the regulatory and investigative functions. 

11. The merger would eliminate the cumbersome necessity of complying with 

the Third Agency Rule for the exchange of information that is critical to the 

protection of our borders. 

12. The exodus of talent from the agency would stop and the agency would be 

able to attract highly qualified candidates 

I have yet to hear from any individual within DHS articulate a single sound reason for the continued separation of Customs and Border Protection from Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One very vague explanation is that CBP will handle 

‘‘border enforcement’’ and ICE will be responsible for ‘‘interior enforcement’’. This 

reasoning is fatally flawed. ‘‘Border enforcement’’ and ‘‘interior enforcement’’ cannot 

be separated. This is the same defective logic which created the agency and once 

again this reasoning displays a complete lack of understanding of the agencies roles 

and jurisdictional responsibilities. In a similar fashion to CBP, ICE’s jurisdictional 

responsibilities relate to, or must have a nexus to, the border. 

ICE’s jurisdictional responsibilities directly relate to the cross border movement 

of people and merchandise. Illegal aliens cross our borders, those involved in immigration fraud cross our borders, narcotics cross our borders, trade mark restricted 

merchandise crosses our borders, illicit funds cross our borders, munitions and high 

technology cross our borders and terrorists cross our borders. ICE is responsible for 

pursuing criminal investigations in all of these critical areas. However, we have separated the agency responsible for investigating these important violations that undermine our national security from those actually standing on the border. This situation is analogous to separating the uniformed officers from the detectives. A recent 

decision by CBP to not allow ICE to have immediate access to passenger manifests 

on aircraft arriving from foreign countries illustrates the types of difficulties encountered as a result of the current structure. Although ICE has a critical need for information on the arrival of foreign passengers to identify criminal violators, smugglers, 

fugitives and even terrorists, ICE is treated as a ‘‘third agency’’ and must submit 

a formal written request for the information, a time consuming process that could 

cost lives 

By merging CBP and ICE all of the entities involved in border and immigration 

enforcement responsibilities will be brought together with a single mission and 

chain of command. We will not realize the objective of creating a single border enforcement agency until Special Agents, Inspectors, Border Patrol Agents, Intelligence Analyst and Detention and Removal Officers are brought together. 

There are a myriad of other reasons why the initial separation of these agencies 

never made sense and a number of additional justifications as to why combining 

CBP and ICE is best for this nation and its war on terrorism. I find it hard to believe that anyone can propose a counter argument, with as much cause, to maintain 

these agencies as separate entities. One thing is certain, whatever the decision of 

congress is regarding the merging of the two agencies, it should be done quickly. 

Should we continue with the current configuration it would mean maintaining the 

duplicity of tasks, wasting tax dollars and perpetuating the downward slide of ICE 

and its employee’s morale. Simply stated, a house divided against itself cannot 

stand.
25

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Randy Callahan, Executive Vice President of the American Federation of Government 

Employees, AFL/CIO, and a current ICE investigator. Mr. Callahan. 

STATEMENT OF RANDY ALLEN CALLAHAN 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am actually an immigration enforcement agent. It is a little bit different than a 

criminal investigator, and I can go into more detail on that if you 

need that. 

I am here today as the Executive Vice President of Council 117 

of the American Federation of Government Employees. It is also 

known as the National Homeland Security Council Number 117. 

And my background, I started in 1996 as an immigration inspector 

and a year later became a detention enforcement officer, which was 

reclassified in August of 2003 as immigration enforcement agent. 

The Council that I represent represents approximately 15,000 

employees of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

which, as we have discussed, is split into three separate bureaus: 

Customs and Border Protection, ICE, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 

In our view, there are both advantages and disadvantages with 

each proposed organizational structure, the current one and the 

proposed merger, and I will try to go into that. Those proposing to 

combine ICE and CBP argue that two-bureau structure is overly 

duplicative and bureaucratic. Proponents view ICE and CBP as 

mutually responsible for the enforcement of our Nation’s immigration and customs laws and their workforces should be combined. 

Certainly a review of the many occupational positions within the 

two bureaus assigned to enforce these laws would suggest this. 

CBP officers, formerly known as immigration customs and agriculture inspectors, are the first line of defense at all air, land and 

seaports of entry into the United States. Border Patrol agents are 

assigned to CBP and are responsible for the areas along the border 

between U.S. ports of entry. Deportation officers are assigned to 

ICE in the Detention and Removal Operations Division, and they 

are responsible for maintaining dockets of the removal cases and 

immigration proceedings. They are also responsible for fugitive operations, finding people that have been released from custody on 

the condition that they show up to their removal proceeding and 

failing to do so. 

Immigration enforcement agents are assigned to ICE in either 

the Investigations or the Office of Detention and Removal Operations Divisions. They are a combination of two positions that were 

part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, detention enforcement officer and immigration agent; and they have a wide 

range of duties that include holding people in custody until their 

removal proceedings, removing them from the country once an 

order of removal has been issued. They participate in fugitive operations, and they assist other Immigration officers. 

Why are there so many different types of positions to enforce the 

same set of laws? Wouldn’t it make more sense to have an all-encompassing position that is trained to enforce the law? In some 

ways, the answer is yes. Having one position or having one organi-
26

zational structure would allow for greater flexibility in deploying 

the force, could provide a career progression ladder and could provide pay parity or parity for pay and benefits. 

This last reason may well be the reason why the positions 

haven’t been combined as of yet. CBP officers are not provided the 

law enforcement retirement benefits or law enforcement salary 

rates. In fact, the Immigration enforcement agents are the lowest 

paid on the GS scale. Then it goes up from there. The Border Patrol agents are paid less than deportation officers, et cetera. 

Combining ICE and CBP could potentially eliminate several levels of management and combine budget control offices. Potential 

savings of salary and benefits by eliminating these management 

level positions is fairly significant. 

Combining ICE and CBP may also result in greater cooperation 

among the divisions. As it is right now, we have the problem of a 

serious lack of cooperation between legacy and components. People 

are still holding on to that: I am a Customs employee or I am an 

Immigration employee. So until that environment is changed, you 

are going to continue to have those internal struggles. 

For this reason, if it is decided to combine the two bureaus into 

one, we would recommend that whoever is picked to lead that bureau has a background in both divisions. That way they understand the importance of both ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

Now, supporting the status quo. Why was the INS split up in the 

first place? After the attacks of September 11th, the country demanded to know how the terrorists were able to enter the country. 

Investigation into the 9/11 attacks determined that there were several missteps by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that 

allowed the terrorists to plan and execute their plot. Couple that 

with the approval of student visas of the terrorists subsequent to 

the attacks and you can understand why there was a call for dismantling the INS. 

One of the reasons why the division was done the way it was 

done was because, in the old INS, there was regular shifting of 

funds between the divisions and what would happen is, as an example, it would depend on the office. 

In my office in San Diego, for example, there were a lot of times 

where detention removal resources and funds were used to support 

the inspections on border operations. Our western region director 

had a background in the Border Patrol and would use those resources to help Border Patrol operations. As a result, interior enforcement or fugitive operations were greatly diminished. We 

weren’t going out and finding fugitives to the scale that we needed 

to. For this reason, it seems that it makes sense to separate those 

chains of command and have them concentrate on specific jurisdictions. 

The problem still exists. We have mentioned or it has been mentioned before about the ICE budget problems. As I understand it, 

there is approximately $300 million of ICE funds that were used 

by both CBP and CIS. How that all happened, I don’t know. I 

haven’t seen the audit report yet. But if the organizations were 

combined, how much more of that money would have been used to 
27

support border operations or the Immigration Services Division? 

That, I don’t know, and I really would rather not think about it. 

How do employees look at the merger? It is a mixed bag. You 

have got some that are for it and some that are opposed to it. We 

definitely need to look more into it to find out what the best structure is. But the bottom line is, no matter what the organizational 

structure, we need good leaders to focus on the mission, and we 

need adequate staffing and resources to get the mission accomplished. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Callahan. 

[The statement of Mr. Callahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RANDY CALLAHAN

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Subcommittee: 

My name is Randy Callahan. I am currently an Immigration Enforcement Agent 

with the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal Operations. I began my career in 

1996, when I was hired by the Immigration & Naturalization Service as an Immigration Inspector. In 1997, I became an Immigration Detention Enforcement Officer. 

In August of 2003, the Detention Enforcement Officer was reclassified into my current position. 

I am here today as the Executive Vice—President of Council 117 of the American 

Federation of Government Employees, also known as the National Homeland Security Council. The Council represents approximately fifteen thousand employees of 

the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, which, as you know, was split 

into three separate Bureaus: Customs and Border Protection (C.B.P), Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E) and Citizenship and Immigration Services (C.I.S) 

in March of 2003. On behalf of the bargaining unit members of these Bureaus, I 

thank you for inviting me to present NHSC’s views on the current organizational 

structure of C.B.P and I.C.E and whether or not it best serves the homeland security interests of U.S. citizens. 

In our view, there are both advantages and disadvantages with each proposed organizational model. I shall attempt to present the pros and cons of each.

Arguments in Support of an I.C.E/C.B.P Merger: 

Those proposing to combine I.C.E and C.B.P argue that the two Bureau structure 

is overly duplicative and bureaucratic. Proponents view I.C.E and C.B.P as mutually 

responsible for the enforcement of our nation’s immigration and customs laws and 

their work forces should therefore be combined. Certainly, a review of the many occupational positions within the two Bureaus assigned to enforce immigration and 

customs law would suggest this. 

C.B.P Officers, formerly known as Immigration or Customs Inspectors, are the 

first line of defense at all air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States. 

They facilitate the legal entry of imported goods, as well as bona fide immigrants 

and non-immigrants, while identifying persons attempting to enter the country illegally using fraudulent methods. In addition, C.B.P Officers gather intelligence on 

smugglers, seize vehicles used by drug and alien smugglers, and prepare prosecution cases for the U.S. Attorney’s office. 

Border Patrol Agents are assigned to C.B.P and are responsible for the areas 

along the border between U.S. ports of entry. Their job is to prevent illegal border 

crossings, and to intercept drugs and people being smuggled into the country. I.C.E 

Criminal Investigators work in the Office of Investigations (OI) and are responsible 

for breaking up human and drug smuggling organizations, as well as identifying, 

locating, and arresting terrorists and terrorist organizations working within the 

country. 

Deportation Officers are assigned to I.C.E in the Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) division. They are responsible for locating and apprehending fugitive 

aliens, preparing travel documents for aliens that have been ordered removed from 

the country, and maintaining file dockets of removal proceedings. 

Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEA) are assigned to I.C.E in either the office 

of Investigations or the Office Detention and Removal Operations. They are a combination of two positions that were part of the Immigration & Naturalization Service: Detention Enforcement Officers and Immigration Agents. They are largely responsible for holding in custody people arrested by other Immigration Officers and 
28

who are facing removal proceedings. Immigration Enforcement Agents assist Deportation Officers with fugitive operations, escorting aliens ordered removed from the 

country to their country, and basically serve at the will of C.B.P. 

C.B.P uses Immigration Enforcement Agents as prisoner transport officers at both 

Border Patrol Sectors and ports of entry. Soon, the office of Detention and Removal 

will take over the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) from I.C.E’s Office 

of Investigations. ACAP is a program where Criminal Investigators or Immigration 

Enforcement Agents assigned to the Office of Investigations identify aliens in violation of immigration laws at state and local prisons, or jails. Once state or local authorities have completed their review, illegal aliens are transferred to I.C.E, where 

they are placed into removal proceedings. 

Why are there so many different types of positions to enforce the same set of 

laws? Would it not make more sense to have one ‘all-encompassing’ position that 

is trained to enforce the law? In some ways, the answer is yes. Having one position 

would allow for greater flexibility in deploying the work force, would provide a career progression ladder, and would provide parity for pay and benefits. This last 

reason may well be why the positions have not been combined to date. C.B.P Officers are not provided law enforcement retirement benefits or the law enforcement 

salary rate. In fact, Immigration Enforcement Agents are paid at the lowest full performance GS level; Border Patrol Agents are paid less than Deportation Officers, 

who are paid less than Criminal Investigators. It is likely more cost effective for the 

government to keep the positions separate, though it is not necessarily best for the 

mission of the Bureaus or the Department. 

Combining I.C.E and C.B.P could potentially eliminate several levels of management and combine budget control offices. Instead of having two Bureau heads, two 

directors of operations, two budget directors, two offices of labor relations, etc., it 

would be possible to consolidate these offices into one. The potential savings in salary and benefits by eliminating these management level positions is fairly significant. 

Combining I.C.E and C.B.P may also result in greater cooperation between divisions. Indeed, as it stands right now, there is a serious lack of cooperation between 

legacy components (INS and Customs) of the two Bureaus. The leadership of the 

former INS and Customs Service are, as we speak, locked in a heated battle for control of the purse strings. As President Bush acknowledged when discussing the position of Intelligence Czar, the larger the budget one controls in Washington, the more 

influence one has. The combined budget of I.C.E and C.B.P will give a great deal 

of additional power to the individual chosen to lead the merged Bureau. For this 

reason, I recommend that this person have a strong background in both immigration 

law enforcement and customs law enforcement. Only will such an individual have 

the ability to ensure that both sets of laws enforcement priorities.

Arguments in Support of Maintaining the Status Quo: 

I have already given you the current organizational structure and a few reasons 

why I believe that combining the two Bureaus might make sense. Now, I will offer 

you some arguments in support of the status quo, arguments that have advantages 

in terms of mission effectiveness. 

In looking at this issue, the question must be asked: Why was the INS split up 

in the first place? After the attacks of 9/11/01, the country demanded to know how 

the terrorists were able to enter the country. The investigation into the 9/11 attacks 

determined that there were several missteps by the Immigration and Nationalization Service that allowed the terrorists to plan and execute their plot. Couple that 

with the approval of student visas for a few of the terrorists subsequent to the attacks and you can understand why there was a call for dismantling the INS. 

When the Department of Homeland Security was being created, a review of the 

functions of the different agencies was conducted to determine where each one belonged in the new structure. Because of longstanding problems with INS management, it was judged that there was a need to divide the agency’s responsibilities. 

It was also determined that the INS had failed to put sufficient emphasis on the 

enforcement of immigration laws in the interior parts of the U.S. 

I know of countless situations in which the INS would shift funds and resources 

to focus on the favored projects of certain INS managers. For example, the former 

INS District Director in San Diego frequently used funds and resources from the 

Detention and Removal branch and the Investigations branch to support inspections 

operations at the San Diego Ports of Entry. In addition, the former INS Western 

Regional Director used the same resources to support Border Patrol operations in 

Arizona. These reallocations of funds meant that there was less money available for 

fugitive operations. It was In an attempt to prevent these types of problems in the 

future, that the office of Detention and Removal Operations and Investigations were 
29

separated from the Border Patrol and Inspections in the new Department. Clearly, 

the designers of the Department of Homeland Security were correct when they decided to separate these components of I.C.E and C.B.P. 

Yet the problems still exist. As things now stand, C.B.P and Citizenship and Immigration Services (C.I.S) have expropriated over $300M of I.C.E’s funds under the 

current organizational structure. How much more money would C.B.P successfully 

siphon out of Detention and Removal and Investigation Operations if I.C.E and 

C.B.P were merged is a question I and my colleagues at I.C.E feel compelled to 

raise. 

One of the main reasons it appears that I.C.E is failing is because it is being 

starved of necessary resources. It may be that this hearing would not be necessary 

if I.C.E had all of the funds appropriated by Congress. I already alluded to a $300 

million shortfall in I.C.E’s budget, because funds were transferred to C.B.P and 

C.I.S. I now hear that the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) 

took funds from all BTS components in order to support certain BTS activities. If 

that is the case, and Congress did not approve this reallocation of funds, then I hope 

you will address the issue with BTS. The problem may lie less with the organizational structure, and more with the people filling key leadership positions.

How Do Employees View the Merger: 

I’ve laid out arguments both in favor of, and against the existing organizational 

structure, and I believe that a merger can work. But what do the employees in the 

field want? Frankly, it’s a mixed bag. C.B.P managers strongly support a merger. 

They want access to the I.C.E dollars and the power that comes with them. They 

believe that in a merger of the two Bureaus, C.B.P will emerge as the lead agency. 

The primary concern of C.B.P employees is that there be someone to pick up their 

detainees and transport them to a detention facility or wherever they need to go. 

Criminal Investigators that were Customs employees prior to the creation of I.C.E 

also generally support a merger. I have heard that they believe they will have a 

larger share of the budget pie under C.B.P than they currently have with I.C.E. I 

hear also that there is an attitude among former Customs CI’s that immigration enforcement is somehow beneath them. It may be that because immigration law is so 

complex and their training in it so limited, they have no desire to conduct investigations of immigration violations. Or, it may be that they simply want nothing to do 

with immigration matters. However, since all of the terrorists on 9/11 were immigrants, this is a dangerous situation that must be rectified. 

Legacy Immigration Criminal Investigators largely want to remain in I.C.E. While 

they were recently taken out of the collective bargaining unit, and I am no longer 

able to represent them, I still field calls from Criminal Investigators who are frustrated with the way they are treated now that they can not be part of the union, 

but who feel they definitely have it better in I.C.E than they would in C.B.P. 

Deportation Officers and Immigration Enforcement Agents also want to remain in 

I.C.E. They fear that the progress they have made in security funding for fugitive 

operations will be for naught, if C.B.P is allowed to divert DRO resources to support 

C.B.P initiatives. As one of my colleagues put it, ‘‘The border is, has been, and always will be, the squeaky wheel. Businesses and illegal immigrant rights activists 

don’t cry when someone doesn’t show up for their removal hearing, but man do they 

ever scream when the border wait is longer than forty-five minutes.’’ The squeaky 

wheel will always get the grease, and the grease will be taken from Detention and 

Removal if C.B.P management can arrange it.

Conclusion: 

The employees of I.C.E and C.B.P will work within whatever organizational structure is determined by Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security. We strongly believe that, no matter what the structure, the mission of DHS is doomed to fail 

if management continues to cling to its respective legacy components (INS, Customs) and battles for overall control of the Bureaus is allowed to continue. Whatever 

is decided on this issue, it is essential that Congress also ensures that I.C.E components receive the funds appropriated for them and not allow these funds to be continually diverted for other purposes. 

Mr. Chairman, on a final, unrelated note, my ability to testify at this hearing 

stems from my right to be part of a union. It is an honor for me to be here and 

I hope to be able to speak on behalf of I.C.E employees for a long time to come. 

My colleagues in the I.C.E Office of Investigations, the Federal Air Marshal Service, 

the TSA, and other agencies that make up the Department of Homeland Security 

do not have the same right. Please correct this injustice by allowing them to join 

a union and by strengthening whistle blower protections. Employees should not 
30

have to suffer silently as they watch fraud, waste and abuse occurring in front of 

them. Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony.

Mr. ROGERS. Our next witness is Mr. T.J. Bonner, President of 

the National Border Patrol Council. Mr. Bonner. 

STATEMENT OF T.J. BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER 

PATROL COUNCIL 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Meek, other distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

I have been a Border Patrol agent for the past 27 years and am 

proud of that. The Department of Homeland Security is very fortunate to have inherited tens of thousands of dedicated, talented employees. Unfortunately, many of these people are leaving as soon 

as they are able to retire, and many of them have their resumes 

out there looking for other jobs. They are stifled by the current organizational structure which does not allow them to do their jobs. 

Organizations in and of themselves are incapable of accomplishing the mission. It is always the employees who carry out the 

mission. An organizational structure can either facilitate the accomplishment of the mission or impede the accomplishment of the 

mission. In this case, the dual enforcement structure of CBP and 

ICE has proven to be a major barrier to the accomplishment of the 

extremely vital mission of the Department of Homeland Security, 

stopping terrorists from entering our country and carrying out 

their dastardly deeds. 

A long time ago, before Homeland Security was even contemplated, before the Department of Homeland Security was contemplated, there was talk about merging or rather splitting up the 

enforcement and service functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The National Border Patrol Council supported 

that idea. It made perfect sense. That concept was carried over in 

the Homeland Security Act, and we supported it then, also. 

We did not, however, support the further administrative bifurcation of interior and border security because it simply made no 

sense. Everything is integrated. All of the crime that our agents 

deal with, whether it be Border Patrol agents, inspectors, special 

agents, it all emanates outside of this country, or if it is emanating 

within this country, it is importing people or goods illegally into the 

country. 

There needs to be coordination and cooperation between all of 

these agencies. Unfortunately, that does not exist today. It has 

worsened since the merger of the 22 agencies into the Department 

of Homeland Security, especially because of the artificial bifurcation of the two enforcement bureaus. 

We support merging Customs and ICE—I am sorry, CBP and 

ICE and believe that this can be done in a manner that would benefit the country. It has to be done, however, thoughtfully and carefully. It has to be done in such a manner that it encourages people 

to cooperate and that it is structured in such a manner that that 

happens as a natural consequence, not because of the will of some 

managers or employees fighting against the current of the river, 

swimming upstream as it were. It has to be something that naturally flows from that. 
31

For example, right now there are no defined career paths within 

either of the bureaus that leads to an intermingling of the various 

occupations. Amazingly, the criminal investigators in ICE are selected, by and large, from people straight out of college or right off 

the street. They are not drawn from the ranks of Border Patrol 

agents, CBP inspectors or Immigration enforcement agencies. That 

would make perfect sense, but it doesn’t happen. 

I can’t think of a single major metropolitan police department 

where this happens, where they don’t go to the ranks of their uniformed officers looking for their detectives. This would yield a better product because you would have knowledgeable, skilled employees filling these ranks. Also, it would cut down on the attrition 

problems that we have within these ranks, Border Patrol agents, 

CBP inspectors. Because, right now, your reward for putting in 10, 

15 years on the border is to watch someone straight out of college 

get a higher paying, more challenging job than your job. So what 

is the incentive for these people to stick around? 

I would also like to touch on the need for specialization. One face 

at the border, while it sounds—it has a lot of facial appeal, the concept has simply not worked. Expecting one class of employees to be 

knowledgeable in immigration, customs, and agricultural law is 

asking too much of a single human being. So what we have ended 

up with is a generation of generalists rather than specialists. This 

is going to be disastrous a few years down the road. 

Right now, we still have people who were trained very well in 

these specialized disciplines, so we haven’t seen the full effects of 

one face at the border. But when we end up with a bunch of generalists, we are going to see a lot of things slipping by these inspectors at the border that should not be slipping by them; and having 

specialists in the secondary areas will not cure that defect because 

the people on the primary inspection lines are the ones who have 

to be able to recognize that something is wrong in order to send 

it over to the secondary inspection line. 

Finally, no discussion of this problem would be complete without 

at least touching upon the fact that the new personnel regulations 

that have been forced upon these employees will have the effect of 

driving away the best and the brightest. As I mentioned earlier, it 

is the employees who will make or break this agency. To the extent 

that these personnel regulations push people away from this agency and make service in the Federal Government less attractive, the 

Department will not be able to meet its mandate to protect this 

country. 

In summary, the National Border Patrol Council fully supports 

the idea of merging ICE and CBP but urges that it be done carefully, listening very carefully to the people at all levels of the organization, those on the front lines, those mid-level managers and 

upper-level managers, figuring out what makes sense and proceeding along those lines but ensuring that the structure facilitates 

cooperation and coordination and that it allows for specialization 

within the various occupations. Because, bear in mind, we still 

have to enforce all of the laws that are out there on the books: the 

immigration laws, the custom laws, the agricultural laws, the maritime laws. All of the laws of those 22 agencies that were merged 
32

into the Department of Homeland Security still need to be enforced 

by someone. 

Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Bonner. 

[The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL OF THE AMER- ICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AFL–CIO, PRESENTED BY T.J. 

BONNER, NATIONAL PRESIDENT

The National Border Patrol Council, which represents approximately 10,000 frontline Border Patrol employees, appreciates the opportunity to share its views and 

concerns regarding the organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 merged 22 diverse agencies within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government with the goal of fostering better coordination 

and cooperation among them in order to better protect the United States against 

the threat of terrorism. Three years later, it is appropriate to evaluate the effectiveness of one the more controversial after-the-fact organizational changes—the creation of two separate enforcement bureaus within the Directorate of Border and 

Transportation Security instead of a single bureau as originally called for in Section 

442 of the Act. As contemplated therein, the Bureau of Border Security would have 

been responsible for coordinating and carrying out all of the functions of the Customs Service and the Transportation Security Administration, the law enforcement 

functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the General Services 

Administration, and certain agricultural inspection functions of the Department of 

Agriculture. For reasons that were more political than practical, two bureaus were 

created in its place: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The legacy Customs Service management structure took control of CBP, and the legacy Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (I&NS) management structure took control of ICE. Although 

the stated rationale for the bifurcation of the enforcement functions was to allow 

CBP to primarily focus on enforcement at the borders and ICE to primarily focus 

on enforcement in the interior, it is obvious to even the most casual observer that 

this distinction is almost completely artificial. In order to effectively carry out their 

statutory missions, both of these bureaus need to be able to seamlessly operate 

without regard to artificially-imposed boundaries. It is now apparent that the dual 

structure was mainly created to allow the existing Customs and I&NS bureaucracies 

to survive largely intact. The survival of an existing bureaucracy in a consolidation 

can be either productive or counter-productive, depending upon whether or not it 

is compatible with the new mission and contributes to its accomplishment. In the 

current structure, unfortunately, the new bureaucracies have impeded the accomplishment of the Department’s anti- terrorism and other law enforcement missions. 

These important objectives require a high level of coordination and cooperation 

among all of the Department’s employees. The current bifurcated structure places 

needless barriers between these employees and provides major disincentives for 

them to coordinate their efforts and cooperate with each other. In fact, the level of 

coordination and cooperation has decreased significantly since the consolidation. 

Long before the Department of Homeland Security was even contemplated, there 

was a great deal of concern in Congress about the ability of the I&NS to effectively 

discharge its dual enforcement and service missions under a unified structure with 

a single chain of command. The National Border Patrol Council supported splitting 

the service and enforcement programs in order to enable both of them to operate 

at peak efficiency while at the same time facilitating coordination and cooperation 

between the two branches. The Council also supported the same goal under the 

Homeland Security Act, but did not endorse the dual split of the enforcement bureaus. It maintains that such a move was a mistake from the beginning, and should 

be rectified as soon as possible. Of course, merely merging these two bureaus will 

not cure the ills that plague them. A fundamental restructuring of every key aspect 

of the organization must also occur if meaningful improvements are expected. 

The new consolidated structure must be fully integrated at all levels of the organization. It must not only eliminate impediments to coordination and cooperation, but 

must also facilitate the achievement of these goals. Such critical matters should not 

be dependent on the will and strength of a few high-level leaders, but must be the 

natural result of a well-planned organizational structure. In order to ensure the success of the new structure, it must be carefully constructed, paying close attention 
33

to the input of employees at all levels and components of the existing bureaus. To 

be successful, this new structure and culture must first be embraced by the leaders 

at the top of all of the integrated programs, and then be filtered down to employees 

at all levels of the organization. The only way that this will happen is if the changes 

make sense to all employees and truly represent a significant improvement. 

Weak links in the organizational chain should not be allowed to frustrate the accomplishment of the overall mission. For example, the current structure places all 

of the funding and responsibility for the detention of illegal aliens into a single bureau, even though all of the programs in both bureaus are dependent upon this resource. Allowing mismanagement and under-funding in one program to disrupt the 

entire operation is untenable. A proper organizational structure would ensure that 

all aspects of the operation are carefully planned and integrated, and that all of the 

resources are properly distributed to ensure that such disparities rarely, if ever, 

occur. Unanticipated shortfalls in one or more key areas would be compensated for 

by shifting funds and resources from other areas. 

The chains of command and lines of authority in the new organization must be 

structured horizontally as well as vertically in order to ensure that all of the components seamlessly interface with each other as well as to facilitate cooperation. Currently, all of the Department’s criminal investigators belong to one bureau, while 

all of the front-line personnel who enforce the laws pertaining to the legal and illegal entry of people and goods entering the United States belong to a different one. 

Under this system, there is absolutely no incentive for these employees to coordinate 

their investigations or to cooperate with each other. To the contrary, it actually encourages competition and isolationism. 

Another factor that discourages coordination and cooperation among the Department’s employees is the absence of defined career paths within the various organizational components that would allow for the easy interchange of experience and skills 

between them. For example, in a properly-constructed organization, criminal investigator positions and other higher-graded occupations should be selected from the 

ranks of entry-level occupations such as Border Patrol agents, CBP inspectors, and 

Immigration Enforcement agents. This would not only provide the Bureau with experienced employees who would require minimal training to perform well in these 

complex assignments, but would also boost morale and slow attrition among the 

ranks of the other occupations. Amazingly, the Department hires almost all of its 

criminal investigators straight out of college. This has no parallel in any other law 

enforcement agency in the country. Every single major police department hires its 

detectives from the ranks of its uniformed officers. 

It would be a serious mistake to assume that the employees in the various occupations within the consolidated bureau are interchangeable and that some of these occupations should therefore be merged. Occupational distinctions should be based 

upon operational requirements and realistic employee expectations, not on uniformity for uniformity’s sake. In addition to its over-arching mission of anti-terrorism, the Department continues to be responsible for enforcing immigration, customs, maritime, and agricultural laws. All of these laws are complicated and arcane, 

and it is unrealistic to expect one employee to be an expert in more than one discipline. While it is helpful for all employees to be familiar with those laws that they 

might encounter during the normal course of their duties, it is unwise to attempt 

to create a workforce of generalists rather than specialists. 

The best example of this theory going awry is the ‘‘One Face at the Border’’ initiative undertaken by CBP shortly after its creation. While the phrase has a certain 

facial appeal, its underlying premise is fundamentally flawed. The complexities of 

the three major types flaws and regulations that are enforced at the border virtually 

guarantee that no individual can become an expert in all of these areas. Efforts to 

homogenize the inspectors at our Nation’s ports of entry will ultimately result in 

a workforce composed of ‘‘jacks of all trades, but masters of none.’’ The plan to place 

specialists in the secondary referral areas as an adjunct to these generalists in the 

primary inspection areas will also prove ineffective. If the primary inspectors have 

insufficient knowledge of the applicable laws, they will be incapable of identifying 

suspicious people and cargo for referral to the secondary areas. For similar reasons, 

the current attempt to force all criminal investigators to handle cases involving all 

of the various laws within the Department’s jurisdiction is also doomed to failure. 

Specialization must be embraced and encouraged at all levels of the organization. 

Finally, it must be recognized that organizational structures in and of themselves 

are wholly incapable of carrying out an agency’s mission - they merely facilitate the 

accomplishment of the mission by the agency’s employees. The more skilled and 

dedicated the employees are, the more effectively the mission will be accomplished. 

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security is in the process of implementing a new personnel system that will make it very difficult to recruit and re-
34

tain the best and the brightest employees. Although the new rules purport to be progressive measures that will reward and encourage superior performance and hold 

all employees accountable, they are in fact throwbacks to the corrupt, cronyismbased nineteenth century civil service system that nearly ruined public service in 

this country. All employees want to be paid and treated fairly, and to have a say 

in the decisions that affect their working conditions. Because this new personnel 

system does not meet those basic needs, it will discourage highly-skilled and dedicated employees from serving their country in this vital agency. 

In summary, the National Border Patrol Council strongly supports the merger of 

the Department of Homeland Security’s two enforcement bureaus, but cautions that 

such a consolidation must be undertaken thoughtfully. Otherwise, it will not correct 

the problems that exist in the current bifurcated structure, and could actually worsen the situation. In order to be effective, the new structure must foster the coordination and cooperation that are so essential to the accomplishment of the Department’s anti-terrorism and other law enforcement missions. It must also facilitate 

specialization in the various laws that the Department is charged with enforcing in 

order to maximize the odds that terrorists and weapons of mass destruction will be 

intercepted. Finally, it must ensure that employees are treated fairly and that their 

input is heeded so that the Department is able to continue its tradition of attracting 

the best and brightest to protect America against the threat of terrorism.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Michael Cutler, 

former Senior Special Agent, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 

Service. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CUTLER 

Mr. CUTLER. Thank you for having me. Good morning. As a New 

Yorker, I will also try to speak quickly for you. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are going to have to get some southerners on 

this panel. 

Mr. CUTLER. I think so. We are kind of taking over today. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, distinguished members of the Congress, members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, 

I welcome this opportunity to provide testimony today on the critical issue of determining if the current organizational structure of 

ICE and CBP best serves U.S. Homeland Security interests. 

This issue is of great concern to me on two levels. First of all, 

I am an American; and, second of all, I am a former INS Senior 

Special Agent, having worked for the agency in New York for some 

30 years. 

We all know the significance of September 11, 2001, but how 

many Americans remember February 26, 1993? I believe that few 

Americans would readily remember that second date perhaps because we have a short memory as a Nation, perhaps because the 

events of that date were so drastically and horrifically eclipsed by 

September 11, 2001. We recently marked the 12th anniversary of 

the first attack on the World Trade Center, which in fact occurred 

on February 26, 1993. Six people lost their lives on that day simply 

by going to work. At least a thousand people were injured, and it 

has been estimated that the damage to the World Trade Center 

complex was an estimated half billion dollars. Our Nation did little 

to protect itself after that attack, and the terrorists essentially of 

their own volition waited more than 8 years before they attacked 

this country again at that very same location. Therefore, we should 

take very little comfort that there have been no attacks committed 

within our country’s borders since September 11, 2001. Indeed, we 

are continually warned about the potential for future attacks on 

our Nation that might involve weapons of mass destruction. I fear 

a future attack might serve to eclipse the attacks of 9/11. 
35

The fact that the issue of reorganizing the agencies which bear 

the responsibility of securing our Nation’s borders is the focus of 

this hearing encourages me that this subcommittee is intent on 

making the protection of our borders and the enforcement of the 

immigration laws the priorities, as well they should be. But I 

would implore you and your colleagues who represent us in both 

Houses of Congress to act swiftly and resolutely to secure our Nation’s borders which at present are anything but secure. The clock 

is ticking, and the time is on the side of our Nation’s enemies. 

To quote the first two sentences of the preface of a report entitled, ‘‘9/11 Terrorist Travel, a staff report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,’’ and I quote: ‘‘‘It 

is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry 

out attacks on the United States if they are unable to enter our 

country. Yet, prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought 

of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. 

The failure of our Nation to impose even a modicum of control 

over who is able to enter our Nation even now is a clear indication 

of the inability of the United States to protect its citizens from the 

potential of another terrorist attack. 

And it is not only terrorists who threaten our well-being. It is estimated that some 30 percent of the Federal inmate population is 

comprised of aliens. 

When I worked at the former INS, I became an advocate for the 

concept of what I have come to refer to as the ‘‘immigration law 

enforcement tripod.’’ Under this concept, the Border Patrol enforces 

the law between ports of entry, the inspectors enforce the laws at 

ports of entry, and the special agents comprising the interior enforcement component of immigration law enforcement, along with 

deportation officers, back up the other two divisions of what was 

the Immigration Service. I had recommended that the service side 

of the INS should be spun off as a separate entity that would rely 

on special agents to conduct field investigations when appropriate, 

to seek to uncover immigration benefit fraud, a critical issue that 

has all been ignored and neglected. 

As we know, since the formation of DHS, the immigration benefits program has been indeed placed under a separate bureau; and, 

in addition, enforcement elements of the former INS have been 

merged with U.S. Customs Service to form the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Additionally, other agencies have 

been added to the DHS, among them the Secret Service, the Transportation Service Safety Administration, and the GSA Police. 

To further complicate matters, the current structure divides interior enforcement of the immigration laws from the enforcement of 

the immigration laws along the border and at ports of entry. The 

inspectors and Border Patrol agents are now part of CBP, and we 

need to fortify our Nation’s exterior borders but not create bureaucratic borders between these two law enforcement agencies that 

share responsibilities for a common mission. 

It is my opinion and the opinion of many of my former colleagues 

at the former INS that this management structure is unwieldy and 

ineffective. The enforcement of the immigration laws is critical and 

shares little with the other agencies which have been combined 
36

with the former INS. The mission of each of these agencies is critical but unique. 

The mission of the former U.S. Customs Service bears little in 

common with the work and priorities and orientation of the former 

INS. In fact, prior to the merger, Customs was a division of the 

Treasury Department and the INS was a division of the Department of Justice. Its primary responsibility was to prevent contraband from entering the United States and to collect tariffs and duties. Customs is responsible for the movement of goods and currency across our Nation’s borders. The INS was concerned with the 

movement of people across our Nation’s borders and has been involved with issues that more closely paralleled what the employees 

of State Department, the Labor Department, and the FBI are involved with. 

To reinforce this point, I would point out that, while it was relatively rare for INS agents, at least in New York, to work with 

their Customs counterparts, it was relatively common for us to 

work with agents of the other agencies that I just mentioned. The 

primary similarity between Customs and the INS was the border, 

and once you remove the border from the equation, the differences 

became obvious and profound. 

Since the merger of INS into ICE, the new special agents who 

are now being trained are no longer even receiving Spanish language training. It is estimated that some 80 percent of the illegal 

alien population of the United States is Spanish speaking. This 

language training was an integral part of the curriculum for all 

new law enforcement officers at the old INS. 

Mr. CUTLER. You cannot investigate people that you cannot communicate with. It is worth noting that most of the special agents 

in charge of ICE offices came from the U.S. Customs Service, further eroding the immigration mission. I have come to think of the 

current situation, quite frankly, as the Customization of immigration and law enforcement. I have been told that few employers of 

illegal aliens are found under the auspices of the Employer Sanctions Program in the United States last year. 

Additionally, the investigation of immigration benefit fraud has 

been relegated, from what I have been told, to being pursued by 

very few field agents and some computer systems. We are currently 

engaged in a war on terror where control of our Nation’s borders 

is critical to the outcome of this battle where the stakes are so 

high. 

In order for the borders to be secured, we need to have a coordinated enforcement program that creates a seamless effort from the 

borders to the interior. This can best be done, in my estimation, by 

putting the CBP and ICE under one roof. It is also essential that 

separate chains of command be established with the Immigration 

and Enforcement Program with specific training and funding and 

accountability. This is the era of the specialist; one size does not 

fit all. 

It is critical that our Nation gains control of its borders and the 

entire immigration bureaucracy if we are to protect our Nation 

from illegal immigration. Illegal immigration has a profound impact on more aspects of this Nation has does any other issue. It impacts on everything from education, the environment, health care, 
37

and it also involves criminal justice and national security. It is 

vital, in my view, that this mission be effectively dealt with. The 

current structure does not provide the framework or leadership to 

enable this to happen. 

Morale among the former INS personnel is at an all-time low. 

Clearly this situation needs to be remedied, and a reorganization 

such as I have outlined, I believe, would represent a major step in 

the right direction. 

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for your comments, 

Mr.Cutler. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. CUTLER

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, distinguished members of Congress, 

members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen. I welcome this opportunity to provide 

testimony today on the critical issue of determining if the current organizational 

structure of ICE and CBP best serves U.S. homeland security interests. 

This issue is of great concern to me on two levels. First of all I am a citizen of 

the United States. Secondly, I am a former INS senior special agent, having worked 

for that agency for some 30 years. 

We all know the significance of September 11, 2001, but how many Americans remember February 26, 1993? I believe that few Americans would readily remember 

that second date. Perhaps it is because we have a short memory as a nation. Perhaps it is because the events of that date were so drastically and horrifically 

eclipsed by September 11, 2001. We recently marked the 12th anniversary of the 

first attack on the World Trade Center which occurred on February 26, 1993. Six 

people lost their lives on that date by simply going to work. At least a thousand 

other people were injured and some estimates pegged the damage to the World 

Trade Center complex at being in excess of one half of a billion dollars. Our nation 

did little to defend itself after that attack and the terrorists, essentially of their own 

volition, waited for more than 8 years before attacking our nation at that location 

again. Therefore we should take little comfort that there have been no attacks committed within our country’s borders since September 11, 2001. Indeed, we are continually warned about the potential for future attacks on our nation that may make 

use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. I fear a future attack might serve to eclipse 

the horrific attacks of 9/11. 

The fact that the issue of re-organizing the agencies which bear the responsibility 

of securing our nation’s borders is the focus of this hearing encourages me that this 

subcommittee is intent on making the protection of our borders and the enforcement 

of the immigration laws the priorities as well they should be. But I would implore 

you and your colleagues who represent us in both houses of congress to act swiftly 

and resolutely to secure our nation’s borders which at present are anything but secure. The clock is ticking and time is on the side of our nation’s enemies. To quote 

the first two sentences of the preface of a report entitled, ‘‘9/11 and Terrorist Travel, A Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States,’’

‘‘It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks 

in the United States if they are unable to enter the country. Yet prior to September 

11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.’’

The failure of our nation to impose even a modicum of control over who is able 

to enter our nation, even now, is a clear indication of the inability of the United 

States to protect its citizens from the potential of another terrorist attack. And it 

is not only terrorists who threaten our well-being. It has been estimated that 30% 

of the federal inmate population is comprised of aliens. 

When I worked at the former INS, I became an advocate for the concept of what 

I have come to refer to as the ‘‘Immigration Law Enforcement Tripod. Under this 

concept the Border Patrol enforces the laws between ports of entry, the inspectors 

enforce the laws at ports of entry and the special agents, comprising the interior 

enforcement component of immigration law enforcement along with the deportation 

officers back up the inspectors and Border Patrol agents. I had recommended that 

the service side of the INS should be spun off as a separate entity that would rely 

on the special agents to conduct field investigations, when appropriate, to seek to 
38

uncover immigration benefit fraud, a critical issue that is all but ignored and neglected. 

As we know, since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security the immigration benefits program has, indeed, been placed in a separate bureau and in 

addition, enforcement elements of the former INS have been merged with the U.S. 

Customs Service to form the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Additionally, other agencies have been added to the DHS; the Secret Service, the 

Transportation Safety Administration and the GSA Police. To further complicate 

matters, the current structure divides interior enforcement of the immigration laws, 

from the enforcement of the immigration laws along the border and at ports of 

entry. The inspectors and Border Patrol agents are now part of CBP or Customs 

and Border Protection. We need to fortify our nation’s exterior borders but not create bureaucratic borders between these two law enforcement agencies that share responsibilities for a common mission. 

It is my opinion, and the opinion of many of my former colleagues at the former 

INS, that this management structure is unwieldy and ineffective. The enforcement 

of the immigration laws is critical and shares little with the other agencies which 

have been combined with the former INS. The mission of each of these agencies is 

critical, but also unique. The mission of the former U.S. Customs Service bears little 

in common with the work and priorities and orientation of the former INS. In fact, 

prior to the merger, Customs was a division of the Treasury Department and the 

INS was a division of the Department of Justice. Its primary responsibility was to 

prevent contraband from entering the United States and to collect tariffs and duties. 

Customs is responsible for the movement of goods and currency across our nation’s 

borders. 

The INS was concerned with the movement of people across our nation’s borders 

and has been involved with issues that more closely paralleled what the employees 

of State Department, the Labor Department, and the FBI are involved with. To reenforce this point, I would point out that while it was relatively rare for INS agents 

to work with their Customs counterparts it was relatively common for us to work 

with agents of the other agencies I have just mentioned. The primary similarity between Customs and the INS was the border. Once you remove the border from the 

equation the differences become obvious and profound. 

Since the merger of INS into ICE the new special agents who are now being 

trained are no longer even receiving Spanish language training. It is estimated that 

some 80% of the illegal alien population is Spanish speaking. This language training 

was an integral part of the curriculum for all new enforcement officers at the old 

INS. You cannot investigate people you cannot communicate with. It is worth noting 

that most of the Special Agents-in-Charge of the ICE offices came from the U.S. 

Customs Service further eroding the immigration mission. I have come to think of 

the current situation as the ‘‘Customization of immigration law enforcement.’’ I have 

been told that few, if any employers of illegal aliens were fined under the auspices 

of the employer sanctions program in the United States last year. Additionally, the 

investigation of immigration benefit fraud has been relegated, from what I have 

been told, to being pursued by very few field agents and computer systems. 

We are currently engaged in a war on terror where control of our nation’s borders 

is critical to the outcome of this battle where the stakes are so high. In order for 

the borders to be secured we need to have a coordinated enforcement program that 

creates a seamless effort from the borders to the interior. This can best be done, 

in my estimation, by putting the CBP and ICE under one roof. It is also essential 

that separate chains of command be established for the immigration enforcement 

program with specific training and funding and accountability. This is the era of the 

specialist. One size does not fit all. It is critical that our nation gains control of its 

borders and the entire immigration bureaucracy if we are to protect our nation from 

illegal immigration. Illegal immigration has a profound impact on more other aspects of this nation than does any other issue. It impacts on everything from education, the environment, health-care and the economy to criminal justice and national security. It is vital, in my view, that this mission be effectively dealt with. 

The current structure does not provide the framework or leadership to enable this 

to happen. Morale among the former INS personnel is at an all-time low. Clearly 

this situation needs to be remedied. A reorganization such as I outlined would represent a major step in the right direction. 

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. ROGERS. Our next witness is Mr. David Venturella, former 

Director of the Office of Retention and Removal Operations, and we 

look forward to your comments. 
39

STATEMENT OF DAVID VENTURELLA 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Thank you. For the record, I am from Chicago, 

so I may need an extra 30 seconds. 

Mr. ROGERS. We will work with you. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Mr. Chairman and honorable committee members, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today, 

an honor to appear before you to discuss the matter at hand. 

In an 18-year career in law enforcement, I have worked as an 

entry-level deportation officer with the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service to overseeing the detention and removal operations of criminal and illegal aliens as the Acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

The creation of Homeland Security was one of the greatest and 

most significant realignment efforts in the Federal Government in 

over 40 years. The goal of the established Department to break 

through the layers of bureaucratic red tape and turf wars that existed between various law enforcement agencies and focus the mission of government on protecting our Nation and its people will be 

achieved by asking the questions such as the ones presented here 

today. The question of this hearing should be should we possibly 

merge ICE and CBP, and is there a benefit to doing so? 

While I applaud this committee and others for recognizing that 

ICE and CBP are not functioning at their optimum level and looking at options to fix that situation, it is my humble opinion that 

an option to merge the two organizations is not necessary at this 

time and may well cause the Department to move backwards. 

The creation of DHS provided an opportunity to take a fresh look 

at how the former Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service could maximize their effectiveness by aligning all 

of the right pieces to carry out its important missions. Unfortunately, that has not occurred. In particular, the potential envisioned by the creation of an enforcement agency has not been fully 

realized. Instead, I would recommend a thorough examination of 

the components of each bureau and redistributing programs to provide a logical alignment of operations, assets, as well as the integration of appropriate resources. 

In that vein, I would suggest strongly placing customs and agriculture and port assets under our Customs Bureau, and immigration and enforcement assets under an immigration bureau. The 

Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshals should be 

moved elsewhere in the Department. They don’t fit. It doesn’t make 

sense. The experiment of forcing square pegs into round holes and 

joining numerous programs under one roof has served merely to diminish the Department’s focus on enforcement. 

While the leadership at ICE had the most difficult job in the 

three immigration bureaus in addressing the critical infrastructure 

issues, which are hampering its ability to execute just basic functions, the fact remains that neither ICE nor CBP have plans to 

complement one another, nor are they capable of successfully moving forward. It is vital to recognize that the two bureaus barely 

interact. When they do, they argue over budget, operation and jurisdiction. 
40

This is not to say that there have not been successes at integration. The Arizona Border Control Initiative, the expansion of expedited removal between ports of entry, and the publication of joint 

detention priorities are a few of the areas where the two bureaus 

working with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate 

have been able to work together to increase the effectiveness and 

inefficiency of operations. However, all too often BTS, which has insufficient resources to properly integrate the agencies, has been 

forced to waste their scarce resources and staff mediating disputes 

between these agencies instead of developing strategy and integrating operations to fulfill the Department’s mission. 

Whether the decision is ultimately made to merge ICE and CBP 

or not, real issues will remain unless the underlying vision and 

mission occur in a unifying manner. If ICE and other Homeland 

Security agencies do not have the proper strategic planning, mission focus and strong leadership, their goals will remain 

unreachable, and our country will remain vulnerable. 

Aside from the organizational issues that are being contemplated 

today, this committee must look at major policy issues. Throughout 

my 18 years of service in the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau, 

this country has lacked a clear policy in immigration matters. 

Congress and the administration must send DHS a clear signal 

on immigration policy. This lack of direction has made the missions 

of the current agencies responsible for enforcing these statutes 

more confusing and complicated. Unfortunately for the Department, there are many dedicated individuals who often, without the 

appropriate resources, clear mission and strategy, continue to perform the impossible day in and day out. Within that same breadth, 

the Department, and in particular ICE, has lost many talented individuals who can no longer wake up each day to face those trying 

circumstances. 

Now it is time to reexamine not just organizational issues, but 

again the larger issues, policy, strategy and mission. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you for that statement. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID VENTURELLA, FORMER ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE

OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman and honorable Congressional Members, I would like to thank you 

for the opportunity to testify today and I am honored to appear before you to discuss 

the matter at hand. 

In an eighteen year career in law enforcement, I have worked as an entry-level 

deportation officer with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, to overseeing the detention and removal efforts of criminal and illegal aliens in the United 

States as the acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security was one of the greatest and 

most significant re-alignment efforts in the federal government in over 40 years. 

The goal of the established Department to break through the layers of bureaucratic 

red tape, end the turf wars that existed between various law enforcement agencies 

and focus the mission of government on protecting our nation and its people will 

be achieved by asking questions such as the one presented here today. 

The question of this hearing is. . .should we possibly merge ICE and CBP and 

is there a benefit to doing so? While I applaud this committee and others for recognizing that ICE and CBP are not functioning at their optimum level and are looking 
41

at options to fix that situation, it is my humble opinion that an option to merge the 

two organizations is not necessary at this time and may well cause the department 

to move backwards. The creation of DHS provided an opportunity to take a fresh 

look at how the former Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service could maximize their effectiveness by aligning all of the right pieces to carry out 

its important missions; unfortunately that has not occurred. In particular, the potential envisioned by the creation of an enforcement agency has not been fully realized. Instead, I would recommend a thorough examination of the components of each 

bureau and redistributing programs to provide a logical alignment of operations, assets as well as the integration of appropriate resources. In that vein, I would suggest that you strongly consider placing customs and agriculture assets under CBP 

and immigration enforcement assets under ICE. The Federal Protective Service and 

the Federal Air Marshals Service should be moved elsewhere in the department. 

The experiment of forcing square pegs into round holes and jumbling numerous programs under one roof has served merely to diminish ICE’s focus on enforcement. 

The leadership at ICE had the most difficult job of the three immigration bureaus 

in addressing the critical infrastructure issues which are hampering the ability to 

execute basic functions. The fact remains that neither ICE nor CBP do not have 

plans that compliment one another nor are they capable of successfully moving forward. It is vital to recognize that the two bureaus barely interact and when they 

do, they argue over budget, operations and jurisdiction. 

That is not to say that there have not been successes in integration. The Arizona 

Border Control Initiative, the expansion of expedited removal between ports of 

entry, and the publication of joint detention priorities are a few of the areas where 

the two bureaus, working with the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate have been able to work together to increase the effectiveness and efficiency 

of operations. However, all to often, BTS, which has had insufficient resources to 

properly integrate the agencies has been forced to waste its scarce staff and resources mediating disputes between the bureaus instead of developing strategy and 

integrating operations to fulfill the Department’s mission. Whether the decision is 

ultimately made to merge ICE and CBP or not- the real issues will remain unless 

the underlying mission, vision and planning occur in a unified manner. 

If ICE, CBP and other Homeland agencies do not have the proper strategic planning, mission focus and strong leadership, their goals will remain unreachable and 

our country will remain vulnerable. 

Fortunately for the Department, there are many dedicated individuals, who, often 

without the appropriate resources, clear mission and strategy, continue to perform 

the impossible. Within that same breath, the Department, and in particular, ICE 

has lost many talented individuals who could no longer wake up each day to face 

those same trying circumstances. 

It is time to re-examine not just organizational issues, but the larger issues of policy, strategy and mission. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding this important issue. I 

welcome the opportunity to answer any questions that you may have.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank all of you for what I think are very thoughtful statements and helpful, very diverse. 

I would like to start off the questioning and would remind everybody that we are going to try to stick to the 5-minute rule on the 

committee with our questions as well, and I will try to set the pace 

for that. 

In listening to the statement, I thought about an article that I 

read recently by Asa Hutchinson just as he was about to leave his 

post. The Under secretary was urging that we not undo 2 years of 

productive growth and development. He considered this period, 

while painful and flawed, part of a developmental process that we 

needed to stick—to adhere to. 

I would like to know from you, Mr. Venturella, would you agree 

with that? Are we in the right path? Is this just growing pains that 

we are experiencing? 

Mr. VENTURELLA. We are certainly feeling growing pains, sir. 

When I was in the Department, we were feeling growing pains. Are 

we on the right path? I just don’t know what that path is, and I 
42

think that is the problem, where are we going and how are we getting there. Spell it out to us. 

Again, there are great individuals working in all of these bureaus 

who, if they had the proper direction, the proper focus, would carry 

out and execute perfectly. But that doesn’t exist. You know, I don’t 

want to blame any individuals, it is just, again, some of these—the 

misalignment of bureaus and operations and functions has taken 

the focus away from the Department on what is our strategy, what 

are we going to do the next 3 to 5 year out, and focus on these 

start-up issues. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. Carafano, in your remarks, I think it 

would be fair to say you disagree with former Secretary Hutchinson. Would you tell us why he is wrong, and those just aren’t 

growing pains that we are living with? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes. I have great respect for what Under Secretary Hutchinson did as the Under Secretary for DHS. But he was 

very much focusing on standing up the organization that he was 

handed. I mean, he didn’t get a vote on what it should look like. 

I think the most salient comment was made by David. I mean, 

we don’t—there is no vision of where we are going. Therefore, it is 

kind of a circular debate as is this growing pains or not because 

we really don’t know where we are going. 

In my statement I tried to articulate four or five pieces of what 

I thought envisioning the future ought to look like and that would 

serve the basis for reorganization. The top three is—one is first you 

have to focus on the legal means of entry in the United States. 

Those are our vital lifelines. They have to be protected. Virtually 

every known terrorist that entered the United States has come in 

through a legal means, so those legal means and infrastructure 

that support them at the border, I think, ought to be our number 

one priority. 

Internal enforcement and point of origin and point of transit, because the worst place to stop this is at the border. It is better to 

keep the flow from the border to begin with, and internal enforcement and external pressure, I think, will provide much more bang 

for the buck. 

The third point I try to make is on the border, I think, where 

we really need to put our priority is between the points of entry. 

Therefore, I think what is really required is a systems-to-systems 

approach is what gets the right assets to the right place at the 

right time to interdict threats. And what I argued before, there is, 

I think, a lot of that going to be airborne, whether it is the air and 

maritime interdiction capabilities, which is now in CBP, or in 

pumping up the Coast Guard’s domain, awareness and capabilities 

to react. 

But I think we need that kind of document on the table from the 

Department, because otherwise we are really just—everybody can 

make a great compelling case based on what they are particularly 

concerned about, but what is most important is how do we reduce 

illegal entry and unlawful presence overall, and how do we keep 

terrorists and other bad things out of the country. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

Finally, I would like a quick answer of Mr. Klug. You talked 

about how we needed to merge in order to enhance our border secu-
43

rity specifically. What is our biggest vulnerability, in your opinion, 

without the merger? 

Mr. KLUG. I believe it is the flow of intelligence that surrounds 

port security that is our greatest vulnerability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. 

I now would like to recognize my Ranking Member, my friend 

Mr. Meek from Florida, for questions. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the Members for speaking from their heart today about the direction that 

we are going in, direction that we may take in the future. I can 

tell you that I was sitting here and I was waiting for the real what 

we should do. I am hearing both sides. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we put together a very good panel here, 

because we are going to have some insightful questions from members of this committee that will hopefully get us to some sort of 

conclusion, and that conclusion doesn’t have to be today. I think it 

is an ongoing discussion and action. 

But I can tell you what I do fear. It is a very difficult task that 

we are talking about here, the enforcement of protecting the homeland and also at our airports and seaports. I mean, this is a big 

job. This is not small. So if anyone may hear your statements and 

say, why aren’t they coming to hard conclusions, I think you have 

said it best if we are heading in the direction that we are heading. 

I don’t know quite what direction we should go into now, but I 

can tell you there are two reasons why we are here today. One is 

the GAO report that was produced, and also the Department of 

Homeland Security 2.0, and looking at the conclusions of both of 

those reports, I can tell you that it is not something that the Department, from what I can see, 

Mr. Chairman, has embraced, or even having a serious discussion about looking at how we can deliver. 

But, Doctor, I want to just ask you a quick question, and I know 

that you have had a lot to say here today, and I can see that you 

spent quite a bit of time on it. 

Originally we started out looking at this with four principles, 

four guiding principles, of putting these—in having these two agencies separate, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. One was delivery, control of delivery; and also prevention of 

alien smuggling; and, three, detention and removal; and guidance 

of communications. I want to just—I want you to elaborate, and 

anyone else can elaborate with the time that is left, on the end of 

the fourth point, not necessarily in that order, the guidance of communications. 

I think being a past creature of law enforcement myself, I know, 

when we talk about those stovepipes, is very hard, they are steel, 

they are galvanized, they are tribunal, almost. You have to either 

be a part of that agency to receive information. As we talk about 

protecting the homeland, communication and information is important. 

So, in your report, in your 2.0 report, did you have any findings, 

or did you come about to any conclusions on how communications 

will be improved if we were to change our present structure right 

now? 
44

Mr. CARAFANO. Most of the input was anecdotal, but basically it 

was a lot of stories of coordination that simply wasn’t required before, because now people are in separate buildings. People don’t 

have TDY to go and talk to other people. People have to talk to a 

boss to coordinate, when they didn’t have to before. 

The other common thing that we heard a lot of was that in the 

old CBP, it was often the investigators that really had the big picture and really could work with the border people in terms of providing them the context of how what they are doing fit in the overall picture, and that made much more better internal enforcement 

investigations. 

Mr. MEEK. Anyone else care to elaborate on that? 

Mr. KLUG. I would like to echo what the Doctor said, quite true, 

that intelligence and that expertise that was inherent in the Customs Service relative to port security, much of that expertise was 

lost when the two agencies were split. And that symbiotic relationship I spoke about in my testimony weren’t flowery words, it was 

the passionate truth. 

We are collocated. On a formal and informal basis we exchange 

intelligence information, and that led to many successful seizures 

of narcotics. We could have continued to take that expertise if we 

are combined or continue to be combined and focused on the war 

on terrorism. We lost that when the two agencies were split, and 

we are continuing to increase that schism as the days go on. 

Mr. MEEK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUTLER. Well, before I became a special agent, I was an inspector at Kennedy Airport. The nice thing was that I maintained 

that special relationship with the inspectors. They were a great resource for me as an agent, when I made the transition to becoming 

a special agent. 

But I speak to my colleagues today who are agents assigned to 

ICE. There has been literally a barrier that has now gone up. They 

will tell me of instances of law violations are being discovered by 

inspectors who are calling the FBI before they are calling ICE. 

They are saying, why aren’t we notified if we are supposed to be 

part of the same organization? There is a sense of organization, 

there is a sense of we are us, and you are you, and this didn’t happen before. That is why I was saying before that we need to build 

up the exterior borders of the United States to protect ourselves 

from those who would come here and harm us. But on the other 

hand, we need to remove all of these barriers that we have erected 

within the Immigration and Customs law enforcement community, 

because it is a community, and we do have to rely on each other. 

But I think the other part of the problem is, though, that we just 

don’t have the resources to do an effective job. I just want to make 

one fast point about that. Once again, I have to tell you that I am 

a New Yorker for a reason. New York has claimed to be the safest 

big city in the United States. We have 8 million people confined to 

a small area, but we have a police force of nearly 40,000 police officers. We have about 2,000 agents dedicated to enforcing the immigration laws for the entire country, where we have an illegal alien 

population that might be twice as great as the number of people 

who live in the city of New York. 
45

Without the resources, without the detention space, without a 

clear mission, without the political will—and this has been a problem from before the merger, we got into this mess—the folks who 

are here illegally in the United States didn’t come here last Thursday. This problem was building for a very long time, so that what 

we need to understand is historically no one has wanted to deal 

with immigration. People called Social Security the third rail. I 

think if there is a third rail, it has been immigration. So I think 

we really need to come to grips with resources as well as management and structure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. I do have one final point. 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Those barriers have been created, but once 

again it is because of the leadership that has allowed those barriers 

to be created. They have forced a schism between the bureaus. On 

paper, yes, these are our bureaus, but it takes leadership to break 

those down. That hasn’t occurred. Again, we have lost focus on 

what the goal and the mission is for the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

compliment the witnesses on their testimony and let me make 

some suggestions for you, Mr. Chairman. It just appears at some 

point we ought to bring some people from the administration— 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. 

Mr. THOMPSON.—in and let hear see the other side. 

Mr. ROGERS. Exactly. It was on purpose that we brought folks 

from the outside first to get their perspective before we had the 

folks from the inside. But we do intend to do just that. I agree with 

you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Because there are some things that are very 

troubling for me. What I hear from people in the field is that they 

want it to work, but the mechanics for that to happen just don’t 

happen to exist at this point. 

One of the things I would like to assure Mr. Klug is that we need 

to see the audit of ICE, and we hope to get that audit report at 

some point and review it, because those things help us. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we also need to get someone in here from 

ICE to explain that audit to the committee, since we are an oversight committee, and we should examine some very glaring issues 

raised in this audit from an oversight and management standpoint. 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I guess the last thing is what I got from everyone at the table is that you think, given the right direction, the 

merger is good. But unless you get it right, it is suspect. Why don’t 

we start with the good doctor and give me a personal observation 

on that. 

Mr. CARAFANO. I think that is correct. I mean, I think a reorganization without a comprehensive vision that tackles tough political 

issues like illegal entry and unlawful presence in the United States 

is not helpful. 
46

I would certainly agree with the argument that it is a resourcing 

question as well as an organizational question, and I think that is 

part of the study is you never are going to have all the money you 

want. The question is do you have an organization that is designed 

to put the resources where you are going to get the biggest bang 

for the buck to address the problem? Any time you ask that decision among multiple agencies and the Department, it is just more 

complex, because you are worried about making your agency 

healthy as well as getting the mission done. 

So when you create an operational agency, which has a core competency of addressing the problems from end to end—and I actually 

include visa issuance in this—from visa issuance to internal enforcement, then hopefully you have somebody at the top who can 

look at the problem strategically and not only say, how can I best 

put my organizational piece to do that, but how can I best apply 

the resources to do that. 

I don’t think ICE is ever going to, ever, ever going to have the 

capacity to do internal enforcement, so I truly believe it is the one 

thing we really, really have to do if the Federal Government wants 

to make a substantive contribution to this problem. It is never 

going to happen as an independent, tiny little agency sitting by 

itself, hanging out at the end of DHS. It is never going to have the 

pull, the politics, the cover that it needs to do its job. 

Mr. KLUG. I am here today at my own expense. I came in from 

New York. I don’t represent a foundation, I don’t represent a union. 

I come here, I am no longer an employee, so unlike the committee, 

I cannot be promoted to another position. 

I am here out of concern for what I thought was a very broken 

agency, or had become a broken agency. I am here for concern of 

the general American public. I have no other agenda other than to 

speak to the distinguished members of this committee to say that 

what has occurred would have separated these two agencies was a 

flawed idea, and that I am hoping that the agency and I am hoping—and I am not so presumptuous enough to think that I have 

the whole picture. I realize that I have an opinion predicated upon 

a relatively short career of 25 years, but that opinion I am passionate about. 

That is why I am here today, and I think that the best thing for 

the American public is to merge these two agencies back together, 

because that merger would be much more conducive to what I 

think the intent of Congress was when it formed the Department 

of Homeland Security, and that was to protect our borders. 

Mr. ROGERS. Time has expired on this line of questioning. I 

would like to recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox 

of California, 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again thank you 

to each of our witnesses. Like the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, I look forward to hearing 

from the Department of Homeland Security and administration 

witnesses on this topic. 

But I want to thank each of you, because what we have found 

both in this committee, and in our other work in the Congress, is 

that when people leave their service and the Administration, when 

they leave the government and get a chance to reflect on their du-
47

ties, they are oftentimes more candid with us, and we are trying 

to solicit views both from within the government and out of the 

government. We put a lot of weight on not only what the government says in defense of its own structures, but also what others 

who spend full time examining these issue think and what they 

have concluded. Therefore, the views of academics, of think tanks, 

of professional associations and so forth are of very significant importance to this committee. ? 

And as has been just pointed out, some of you are traveling here 

at your own expense, and we very much appreciate this. Make no 

mistake, we will be hearing from and having very serious discussions with, in formal hearings and other fora, the Administration 

on these topics. 

What got us here, of course, is that after Congress passed the 

Homeland Security Act, there was a DHS-initiated reorganization 

plan. So the Homeland Security Act didn’t lay it out this way. This 

is not what Congress did, but there was a subsequent decision after 

2002 the Homeland Security Act passed. 2003 was the date of the 

reorganization plan. There was a subsequent decision to do something that may have very profound long-term consequences, and 

that is to separate before what had not been separated, immigration enforcement at the border from immigration enforcement 

throughout the rest of the country. 

Now, we are all familiar with the problem that we have in our 

Federal system of the bank robber who flees the jurisdiction, runs 

across county lines, and, you know, different county sheriffs to go 

after them across the State lines, and different State jurisdictions 

have to go after them; and some of those different turf rivalries in 

different situations of the State, and not too dissimilar with experiences we have had between the Federal Government and State and 

local authorities. Some of those things can get in the way of doing 

the job. 

What we found post-9/11 in the 9/11 Commission report, and 

with everything else that has been brought to the table to analyze 

these questions, is that information-sharing and accountability and 

responsibility at the highest levels are vitally important if we are 

going to stop the terrorists from exploiting these holes in our system. 

What we are here today to find out is whether or not we have 

such holes in our system; whether or not, as someone flees across 

the border and gets beyond a certain distance so that they are no 

longer within the purview of what we have artificially called the 

border piece, they fall into another’s jurisdiction. Even though it is 

all the same Department, the hand-off isn’t working. 

So I want to put the question to you in that very stark way. Are 

we missing people who could be picked up because of the lack of 

hand-off between CBP and ICE? I will put that question to anybody who wants to leap at it. 

Mr. Cutler. 

Mr. CUTLER. Yes, I think we are. We have to look at the fact that 

there are so many competing interests, because things are driven 

by interests, as we all know. 

There is a Visa Waiver Program in effect right now, just to give 

you an idea, where people from 27 countries plus Canada don’t 
48

even need to get visas in order to enter the United States. It is bad 

for two reasons. Number one, we don’t get the right opportunity to 

make use of biometrics and other methods to properly vet people 

applying for entry in the U.S., notwithstanding US–VISIT and so 

forth. The other thing is Congress passed legislation a few years 

ago that made a crime of visa fraud punishable, if it is involving 

narcotics trafficking, by 20 years in jail; 25 years in jail for visa 

fraud if someone is a terrorist. But if you have a visa waiver program, those folks are able to come to our country—a guy like Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, would have been eligible to enter this 

country without a visa. So if you look at the way the various agencies work in fragmented ways that are often contradictory, and 

competing methods, that is one problem. 

The other problem that we deal with is immigration benefits 

fraud. What we saw the terrorists do—and they are very sophisticated and very adept at this—is they want to come to our country 

and hide in plain sight. The easiest way to hide in plain sight is 

to get lawful status in the United States. If you can get a green 

card, or especially if you can get a U.S. passport, that gives you 

free access not only to our borders, but to virtually all the borders 

of the countries throughout the world. 

The 9/11 Commission found that the ability to travel freely and 

frequently was vital for those characters to prepare to attack us. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Bonner, do you remember not too long ago that in 

the San Diego sector there was an edict issued that the Border Patrol officers would go so far and no further and it was then publicly 

reversed? What is the situation now in California, and is there an 

informal point beyond which the Border Patrol can’t go? 

Mr. BONNER. Yes, there is. And that remains in effect, and basically that point is the immediate border vicinity places—

Mr. COX. Defined as what? 

Mr. BONNER. It is not strictly defined, but probably 25 to 50 

miles is about the strength of our jurisdiction. 

Mr. COX. Well, that is a big fudge factor, 25 miles. Now, what 

happens, let us say we are out 25 miles, and then we have got the 

next band of 25 to 50. What is going on in there? Who is working 

that area? Is that ICE, is that CBP, is it both; and, if so, are they 

seamlessly working together? 

Mr. BONNER. No, they are not seamlessly working together. 

There is very little cooperation between the two agencies. The current detention fiasco where we have a policy when we catch Central Americans, people from countries other than Mexico, we do not 

have bed space to hold those people, so we release them into the 

United States. Then CBP points the finger at ICE and says, your 

end of the boat is sinking. 

This is everybody’s problem, yet this bifurcated structure pretends that it is just isolated to that one area, when, in fact, we all 

depend on those resources in order to accomplish the mission of the 

agency. 

Similarly, on the interior enforcement, we are told as Border Patrol agents, the ICE agents will handle this. Well, we know that 

there are less than 2,000 ICE agents to cover the entire country, 

and we know they are not handling that problem. We say, we have 

the resources, why can’t we go there and work citizen capabilities 
49

and the intelligence that we have? And we are told that it is not 

your job. Well, whose job is it? There is just no coordination, no 

hand-off here. 

Mr. COX. Apparently no one. 

Yes, Mr. Carafano. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Just a very quick example, because it is also an 

example of efficiencies. Sea Hawk, which is the operation in 

Charleston, South Carolina, single best port security operation I 

have ever seen. Everybody comes to the table; Federal, State and 

local share assets, share information, absolutely fabulous. 

At the meeting every morning there is a CBP agent, there is a 

ICE agent there. Why? Because there are two separate agencies, 

because—one guy actually in terms of allocating resources for what 

needs to be done and allocating and sharing tasks and intelligence 

can do that very well. 

So we have doubled the force requirement at this center simply 

because we have two agencies there. There is a lot of that, I think, 

inefficiency at many administrative levels when you only need one 

representative to handle this array of tasks. 

Chairman COX. Mr. Carafano, could you help us understand 

what precisely is the counterterrorism aspect of this problem? 

What is the cost? What are the consequences of this cumbersome 

hand-off right now between what we are artificially calling border 

and interior? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, I think the single greatest one is the vast 

majority of bad things and bad people come in through illegal 

points of entry. What you want to do—those have got to be as robust as possible. What you want to do is you want to take as many 

people who are not coming through the legal ports and convince 

them—them that they need to come through the legal—so you 

want to get as many people going through the legitimate gates as 

possible. That is where we are really simply failing. 

We are doing a fair job, there is a lot better we can do, about 

increasing the infrastructure at the ports of entry, increasing the 

procedures, making things flow, but still—surveying things; but we 

are doing a very, very awful job about convincing people that they 

need to go that route rather than the black route. Because we get 

the people—we get the majority of people going through the legal 

ports of entry. The few bits and services that are not coming 

through are the really bad people we want to go after, and then 

we can use our targeted assets to go after them much more efficiently. 

But we have got to do a better job of not just strengthening the 

legal points, but getting the illegal flow down, diverting it through 

the legal mechanism. We are never going to do that unless we increase internal enforcement. And the lack of cooperation between 

the border and internal enforcement is part of the problem, and the 

lack of resources for internal enforcement is a big part of the problem. 

Mr. COX. Would any other part of the panel wish to comment on 

that question on the counterterrorism aspect of this discussion? 

Mr. VENTURELLA. We miss opportunities every day in the area of 

counterterrorism, because of the lack of intelligence that we gather 

from these activities, the lack of intelligence that is passed on to 
50

the appropriate agencies. We are missing that opportunity to gather that intelligence and determine the right strategies and right 

initiatives to tackle these problems. 

We miss that opportunity every day, from the Border Patrol who 

arrests an individual, finds out there is no detention space, and lets 

that person go. We have lost that individual. We have lost that opportunity to gain whatever intelligence we could on this on the 

way, the manner these individuals came to the United States to 

help law enforcement and to secure that border. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. 

Is the green light stuck on? 

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I was going to tell you, the lights 

aren’t working out here. 

Mr. COX. I yield back, in that case, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will at the 5-minute point tap the gavel so you 

know time is up, and if you will wrap up your point so we can 

move back to the next Member. 

I guess we are back in order. I recognize the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of you 

for your very thoughtful testimony here today. I am tempted to ask 

you who is enforcing the border between ICE and CBP, but I won’t 

do that. My question though deals with this. 

Mr. Cutler, when you were talking about these bureaucratic borders that you have experienced, and you have cited one example a 

few moments ago with the FBI and I guess it was ICE, would you 

give us some more specific examples of these bureaucratic examples that you have been experiencing as a professional all these 

years? 

Mr. CUTLER. Well, I left the agency before the merger, so I am 

relying on folks that are there. But basically the way it stands is 

that a wall has truly been erected between the people at CBP and 

the people at ICE. It used to be that as an immigration agent we 

were part of INS, and it included the inspectors, it included the 

special agents. We all worked for the same district Director, so we 

were all part of the same office. 

They have separate chains of command at this point, so everyone 

now has a sense of competition, this is my territory, you are in my 

domain, and I control this; and people tend to be very territorial. 

The result of that is it that becomes that kind of a competition for 

resources, for intelligence, to take the credit for having made the 

accomplishments, and we can’t afford that if we are fighting a war 

on terror or if we are fighting a war on drugs. 

People have to cross our borders to get to the interior. It is a continuing flow. They don’t materialize in the middle of the United 

States. If they land at an airport, they are going to see an inspector. If they run the border, then they have managed to evade the 

Border Patrol, or because of a lack of resources, the Border Patrol 

did what T.J. referred to, this catch and release program where 

they are so overwhelmed by the numbers of illegal aliens that they 

have to permit them to travel onward with the orders that they are 

to appear for a hearing. What is the rate that shows up, 10, 12 percent, if that many? So what we wind up doing is overburdening the 

interior because we can’t deal with it at the border. 
51

We need to understand that this is a whole system. You can’t address it piecemeal. It is kind of putting a watch together. It is great 

if you have all of these great components, but if you don’t fit them 

into that watch case and screw them together so that everything 

measures, that watch isn’t going to run. We have never put all of 

these components together in a unified program to make certain 

that the program works either. 

Mr. DENT. Mr. Bonner or Mr. Callahan, do either of you have 

specific examples you might like to share with us in this committee? 

Mr. BONNER. Sure. The Border Patrol used to have criminal investigators within its ranks that reported up through its chain of 

command. We would work very closely with these criminal investigators to take down smuggling operations at the highest levels, 

and there was a tremendous amount of cooperation. The agents at 

the field level knew what was going on in these investigations and 

very highly coordinated. 

After the merger those agents were taken and put into ICE, and 

the cooperation—it was as if a wall was erected from that point forward; unless you knew people in the organization and would go 

around the walls and make clandestine phone calls to try and 

share information, there was simply no information being shared. 

Now we are not cooperating and coordinating our operations, and 

it is a shame, because a lot is still going on at the border in the 

way of smuggling, but we are not being nearly as effective as we 

used to be in stopping that. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Callahan. 

Mr. CALLAHAN. While there are territorial aspects of it, while it 

is not just within the bureau, you have a fight for control within 

each bureau between the legacy components, the INS components 

and the Customs components. They are fighting for control of the 

budget, they are fighting for control of the bureau, and, depending 

on which office you go to, the focus is primarily what that person’s 

background is. In some offices it is Immigration, but in a majority 

it is Customs, and the immigration falls to the wayside. You really 

need to look at the leadership and bring in leaders that are going 

to focus equally on both aspects and on the antiterrorism aspects 

of the enforcement. 

Mr. DENT. My final question deals with the Canadian situation, 

Canadian border. Mr. Cutler, you pointed out the 2,000 Border Patrol for the whole Nation. 

Mr. BONNER. Two thousand special agents. 

Mr. DENT. Two thousand special agents, I am sorry, on the border of Canada, more than 2,000 miles long. I guess the question I 

have, it is probably directed more to Mr. Bonner and Mr. Callahan, 

do you believe the consolidation of ICE and CBP would enhance 

the resources along the northern border, especially given the—well, 

specifically given known terrorist cells up there. Do you think this 

merger would help us in the northern border? 

I need you to give a quick answer because time has expired. 

Mr. BONNER. Sure, it certainly would help. I would point out that 

the northern border is 4,000 miles long between the continental 

U.S. and Canada. Currently we have currently fewer than one—

well, we have approximately 1,000 Border Patrol agents to patrol 
52

that entire area 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We need more resources. I believe that a more cohesive structure would allow the 

Bureau to focus its resources where they are needed. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, 

Mr. Chairman, what I have heard this morning is not very comforting. 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Number two, the 9/11 Commission called for an 

addition of 2,000 Border Patrol agents. The President’s budget 

called for an addition of 200. So we keep on sliding back here and 

failing to come to grips with the major issue of personnel. 

I want to ask two questions, if I may, Mr. Chairman, two areas. 

Number one, what is the relationship, if any, between—and I know 

we are dealing with enforcement agencies—between Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, and what we are talking about today, 

ICE and the Customs and Border Protection? Are there any discussions between the two groups? Because if you are trying to get people into the legal process of becoming citizens, you are doing a lot—

not you, personally—you are doing a lousy job, and it would seem 

to me that we would want to strengthen that relationship between 

enforcement and those folks who have had the responsibility all the 

time of trying to get people into the legal process, which we want, 

which makes jobs easier for enforcement. 

What am I missing? Mr. Callahan? 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Actually CIS is a missing cog in this whole equation. The adjudicators, asylum officers and information officers 

identify criminal aliens and that quite frequently, and they actually issue out notices to appear in removal proceedings, and what 

is supposed to happen is they are supposed to call up the enforcement branch, usually investigations—it could be the detention removal office—to have that person come down and actually take 

them into custody. How frequently does that happen? I can’t really 

say. I don’t think it is happening as often as it needs to. But the 

short answer, we could do a better job at it. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes. 

Mr. CUTLER. Well, you know, there was a program called Citizenship USA under the prior administration that wound up where 

tens of thousands of criminals got to be U.S. citizens. 

The reality is we need integrity to the benefits program. The 

GAO did a study 3 years ago that found fraud to be rampant and 

pervasive. Without resources, without people knocking on doors to 

make certain that there is any kind of validity to an application, 

whether it is residency based on a marriage, residency based on a 

job, or application for citizenship where the person uses multiple 

identities, you have people involved making claims of political asylum who aren’t entitled, who make false statements. The only way 

you are able to determine the validity of statements made or the 

validity of an application is to have enough people to knock on the 

doors and burn shoe leather and make field investigations. 

Most people think of interior enforcement to be purely reactive, 

to go out and arrest people who shouldn’t be here legally. The 
53

fraud component is huge. And to go back to what I said originally, 

the ideal situation for a U.S. terrorist is to be a U.S. citizen. Someone said that a spy is someone who couldn’t attract the attention 

of a waitress in a greasy spoon diner. The same thing is true as 

of a terrorist. They want to be able to hide in plain sight. The easiest way to do it is to get U.S. citizenship or residency, and if that 

program lacks integrity—and right now I understand there are 6 

million applications for benefits pending at CIS. How could you 

possibly have integrity? These folks are adept at using the system 

to accomplish their goals. That is why you need the resources, and 

you need a coordinated effort. 

One last thing about the coordination between CIS and investigations, I have been told that when they need their help to provide 

them with documents for an undercover operation or whatever, 

they are not getting CIS to cooperate with ICE either. So that is 

another area of vulnerability that hurts the operational end of 

things and makes us again vulnerable to terrorists. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope we will heed 

what is being said here. 

I just have one other question, if I may. The Federal Protection 

Services, the primary mission is one of protection, community policing, crime prevention, as I understand it, much like a traditional 

uniformed police department. ICE, on the other hand, is charged 

primarily with investigations and prosecutions and alien removal. 

Now, I would like to hear your thoughts on whether there is 

more efficient placement of the Federal Protection Services within 

the Department that exist now, and, for example, given that the 

FPS protects infrastructure and doesn’t assist State and local police 

with information-sharing, wouldn’t placement within—on this interesting chart—with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Directorate seem more logical? Would anyone care to respond to that? 

Mr. ROGERS. A quick answer, time has expired. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Very quickly. In my statement, I propose that 

FPS should be moved out of ICE. I think there needs to be serious 

consideration whether it actually fits into the Department. It is a 

very hard placement in looking at the various functions of responsibilities in Homeland Security. So I would raise the question, 

maybe it should be moved out of the Department. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Altogether. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Altogether. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Wow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Shays is recognized. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. 

When we passed the Department of Homeland Security, it just 

seemed illogical to us on the face of it to separate Customs and 

INS, just to address that issue, I mean, because then other things 

happened afterwards. Was there logic in bringing them both together? Shaking the head without speaking is not helpful. 

Mr. CUTLER. No. As I said during my testimony, Congressman, 

I think it was a mistake. 

Mr. SHAYS. Okay. I want to know—I am trying to sort out who 

thinks what. Do others disagree with that view? 
54

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes. Yes, I disagree. You can—there are many, 

many skill sets and activities within the whole border services activity. If you parse them all out into their own little tidy area, you 

would have an infinite number of agencies. 

I think, again, it goes back to envisioning the future. If the future, again, is to have as broad jurisdiction as possible, to have as 

many integrated activities as possible, then that argues for a larger 

thing. I actually disagree—I agree with one criticism at the border. 

I think one face at the border is not what we are looking for in 

terms of one superman who can do everything. What we want, 

however, I do think, is an integrated and coordinated handling of 

people and things with standards in the program. 

Mr. SHAYS. That is what I want. That is what I want. Tell me 

again why that just doesn’t happen. Is it a cultural problem? 

Mr. CUTLER. I think it is a cultural problem. It is also a very different type of investigation. If you are worried about people coming 

across the border, and you are worried about processing applications and dealing with visas and that whole complex area, that is 

very different from the movement of goods and currency. 

Yes, there is going to be overlap. I mean, goodness, everything 

overlaps into something else eventually, but that is why, again, 

going back to what I said is that Treasury used to be the parent 

organization of Customs, and INS had been under DOJ. It is a very 

different perspective. 

Mr. SHAYS. I will just say to you on the surface, and we will get 

into this, and hopefully will resolve it, thank God we now have a 

committee that can do it, can resolve it. 

Mr. CUTLER. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. It does seem to me this is more of a cultural battle, 

and it does seem to me it is a budgetary issue. I mean, we screwed 

up in who got money and who didn’t get money, and that is part 

of the challenge as well. I am struck by the fact that investigations 

just in one group, both enforce—correct? ICE and both enforce—not 

a nod of your head. 

Mr. CUTLER. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. But we have put the investigation on one side. 

Should investigation again be on both sides—nodding the heads. 

Anybody disagree with that? 

Mr. KLUG. No. Look, again, I am a proponent of the merger of 

CBP and ICE, so I am looking at one investigative unit of the two 

agencies combined. 

Mr. SHAYS. You would put them all together, wouldn’t you? 

Mr. KLUG. Yes, I would. 

Mr. SHAYS. How many of you would put them all together? I 

mean, who wouldn’t again? Who would not put—okay, you are the 

lone wolf here. Is this an employee issue? 

Mr. CUTLER. I am no longer an employee, as is the case of Mr. 

Klug. I am a former agent here on my own expense. I am here because I want to see the mission accomplished, and I don’t see it 

being accomplished under the same situation. Now, perhaps they 

could be under the same umbrella, but I really believe you need 

separate chains of command with budget and accountability and 

training that is specific to each of the two tasks. 
55

Mr. SHAYS. In my world I would like people to have skills that 

could do both sides of it. I would like it to not be just, you know—

yes, sir. 

Mr. COX. I am sorry, would you yield for a second? 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. 

Mr. COX. I want to understand the witness’s answer. What you 

want to keep separate with separate chains of command is Customs on one hand—

Mr. CUTLER. That is immigration. 

Mr. COX.—and Immigration Enforcement on the other hand. But 

what you are not saying is you want to keep the border interior 

separated. 

Mr. CUTLER. No, no, no. I want those integrated, absolutely. We 

should not be drawing that distinction, absolutely not. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Chris. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Just very quickly, I just want to point to something that is in my prepared testimony. I think this is an issue not 

of organizational design, but an issue of human capital development. I think that we have to separate those out, because I think 

a lot of the points that he has raised, and a lot of the points that 

you have raised, can be addressed through career patterns, the career progressions and the operational assignments that you can 

give somebody. But that can all take place within the rubric of one 

unified agency. 

What I would hate to see is—which is the point the Department 

tried to argue—this is too complicated to fit in. Well, that is like 

saying the Army couldn’t fit everything in. It is not true. 

Mr. SHAYS. I hear you. I am sorry, I missed your opening statement, so I didn’t hear that. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Yes, sir. The investigations and the inspections 

program both, what they have done is created a jack-of-all-trades 

and a master of none. You need to have some specialization. I 

think breaking off or splitting up—at least the management levels 

of it, I am sorry, splitting off the line employee part of it, where 

you have line employees that are working on investigations that 

Customs traditionally handled and investigations that Immigration 

traditionally did, is a good idea and integrating the management 

aspects of it. The same with inspections. 

Mr. SHAYS. Just very quickly, does anyone here believe that establishing the Department of Homeland Security was a mistake? 

Mr. VENTURELLA. No. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to assume that all of you think it made 

sense, so now we have to make it work. I am seeing nodding of the 

heads. 

With that, I would yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Mrs. Christensen is recognized. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I can see that this subcommittee is going to be very busy, because the issue we are discussing today goes beyond CBP and ICE. 

It is an issue of whether what we did in the legislation or the Department as implemented is effective or not, and it goes to the 

heart of the matter. 
56

I am going to try to get through three questions real quickly. I 

would appreciate as abbreviated answers as possible. I hope we 

have more than one round. 

Dr. Carafano, in reading—I am going to ask you about someone 

else’s testimony. Mr. Venturella said merging now, if I understand 

you correctly, would set us back instead of moving us forward; it 

would lose valuable time. 

Recognizing the need for effective border and INS control now, 

does the need to fix it quickly override the recommendation to 

merge, or do you disagree that merging now would impede improving the operations that we need today? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes. I would go back to my testimony. I think we 

have got to answer the three basic questions, will it help improve 

the overall management of the Department, will it create a strong 

operating agency, will it take us towards the ultimate organization 

that we want to do this in the future. If the answer is yes, then 

I would say do that as quickly as possible. 

I do think the pain is worth the gain, because this is a long-term 

problem. The pain we feel—you know, took 5 years to plan 9/11, 

3 years to plan Madrid. The next problem may not happen. If this 

was a 1-year problem, I would say let us live with it, but this is 

a generational issue. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I am clear where you are in the merger. I 

wanted to ask Mr. Klug and maybe Callahan and Bonner if they 

could answer quickly. As I read your testimony, it causes me to 

wonder whether the issue is whether there are two separate agencies operating without coordinating, or is the main issue the structuring within each agency, having—having this FPS and ICE, unequal infrastructure, unequal funding, unequal pay? What is the 

core of the issue for you? I will ask Klug first then. 

Mr. KLUG. I believe that you created two new agencies. I believe 

those agencies—an actual byproduct of the agency is parochialism. 

That is predicated upon two agencies now fighting for resources 

and budget resources. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So could it be fixed by just evening out the 

resources, lowering salaries? That was—

Mr. KLUG. They will always be competitive, they will always believe that the measurement of success will predicate the amount of 

money and resources they will get. That is where the parochial 

comes in. If we supply this information and the other agency gets 

the headlines, they are going to be seen by Congress as more 

prominent and more noteworthy, and they will get the resources in 

budget. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So the problem is that it needs to be merged, 

not that there is an inequality. Does anybody disagree? Mr. 

Venturella. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Again, I disagree with the notion that the 

merger is the cure-all for all of this. Again, I look at leadership of 

those two bureaus and within the Department. Why is this pettiness allowed to occur? Why has it festered for 2 years, and why 

haven’t you done something about it? We can better organize the 

Department. There is no question about that; make it more efficient, accomplish the mission. 
57

But, again, it is going to take strong leadership to make that 

happen, and I don’t see that. And it is a shame, because there are 

individuals here that currently work for those bureaus who day in 

and day out struggle with the pettiness with the division that has 

been created. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Well, won’t the merger fix that? 

Mr. VENTURELLA. I don’t think so. Again, I think you need strong 

leadership, you need somebody who is visionary, and you need to 

have a plan. If you ask any of these individuals what is the mission, what is the plan, you will get different answers. There should 

be one statement coming from these individuals. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Let me try to get to my third question. When 

we are concerned—this is to Mr. Klug. We are concerned that ICE 

and CBP were created from Customs and legacy and INS components of Customs, and ICE inspectors lost their best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of cargo containers 

and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I worry 

that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because of 

the disconnect between ICE and their inspectors. 

So what was the relationship before, between inspectors and investigators, and what is it now? Are there any benefits to the current structure, and what has the impact been on the cargo security 

mission of CBP? 

Mr. KLUG. I believe I mentioned in my testimony earlier that the 

symbioism that existed between the two agencies, there is a rift occurring, and that is basically that—and some of the gentlemen alluded to it before—that when there is a discovery, when there is 

intelligence and there is some information, it is passed to other 

agencies as opposed to ICE. For example, narcotics issues, we have 

heard instance of where the Drug Enforcement Administration was 

called rather than ICE. We have heard the FBI being called with 

information. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Specifically I asked about the cargo security. 

Mr. KLUG. The cargo security. Again, the intelligence and information that is guarded on both sides of the house remains separated, rather than combined, so the intelligence that is gathered by 

the ICE agents, by the ICE intelligence analysts, is separate, in a 

separate component, in a separate database. That is the intelligence gathered by CBP and their intelligence analysts. So two 

separate analytical groups, both gathering intelligence, and then 

exchanging it freely, or certainly as freely as it was when it was 

one intelligence unit. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida. 

Ms. Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to ask Mr. Klug, with reference to your last question, 

you said it has to do more with leadership or vision problem between the two agencies. Could that be fixed if questions of leadership and vision were clarified? 

Mr. KLUG. I believe that a stronger mission statement would be 

helpful. In ICE currently, I believe, it is a very vague mission 
58

statement that we had. Leadership comes and goes; institutions remain. 

Ms. HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. KLUG. So trying to find strong leaders and predicate your 

hopes of the success of an agency on the next successor. 

Ms. HARRIS. Do you think the old INS and Customs worked more 

efficiently than this does today? 

Mr. KLUG. Yes, absolutely. 

Ms. HARRIS. Do you basically think that it was just ill conceived, 

and how it was set up that they are trying to do their missions, 

but it was both ill conceived? 

Mr. KLUG. Which I believe it was ill conceived, yes. 

Ms. HARRIS. Let me go to Mr. Cutler, back to some of your questions, some of your statements. Do you think we could better reconcile the policies and practices of these two agencies so they were 

cooperating instead of competing? Or, again, do you think it is just 

ill-conceived from the outset? 

Mr. CUTLER. Are you referring to the CBP and ICE? 

Ms. HARRIS. Yes. 

Mr. CUTLER. Yeah, I think that you could put ICE and CBP together because it is a continuum. People are trying to move from 

the border to the interior. I mean, that is the goal. Which is, by 

the way, why when Border Patrol is forced to do catch and release, 

that is so troubling; because the goal that the aliens had in the 

first place when they ran the border was to get to the interior. 

Ms. HARRIS. Given more time, do you think these two could work 

these issues out to be able to have a continuum, or do you think 

on the face of it it just isn’t going to work that way? 

Mr. CUTLER. No. I think by compartmentalizing the way they 

have, it is not working. And I don’t think that the passage of time 

is the issue. I think it is a matter of recognizing that everyone has 

to feel that they are on the same team. The only reason I wanted 

to divide the immigration chain off is to make sure that people get 

the specific training, because it is a very arcane set of laws. It is 

a big body of law, and it is on both sides. But as far as the border 

and interior, we should not be drawing that distinction because it 

is a continuous process. 

Ms. HARRIS. This may be a question better asked of the administration. But in your time there right now, presently I understand 

there is a 300 million shortfall in ICE, and there is that same 

amount of surplus over at CBP. Is there anything you can tell me 

about that, or anything anyone else can? 

Mr. CUTLER. All I can say is this goes back to the idea that if 

they were able to have the funding available, with the understanding that it is a continuous process from the border to the interior, I think you would eliminate some of those problems. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Cutler. 

Mr. CARAFANO. I just—there is a resource issue, and I do think 

combining the organizations will help solve that. And I will give 

you one very small example. The 287(g) program is a provision of 

the INA code which allows for State and local enforcement agents 

to work under an ICE investigator. It is a terrific problem. Florida 

has one of the two pilot programs. It has been great. It is dying 

on the vine because ICE simply doesn’t have money to train a new 
59

set of investigators because they have moved on. I mean, so those 

things are just dying because you have an agency which is fighting 

for its little piece of the pie rather than being considered as part 

of this comprehensive problem of an end-to-end thing, and then 

somebody at the top saying, you know, where can we put the investment to get the biggest bang for the buck. 

Ms. HARRIS. Let me ask you, we have spent millions of dollars 

branding, promoting, marking, just making the delineations and 

the communications and the IT. Obviously, you feel it is worth the 

millions to go back or to reorganize again. And do you think that 

the short term and the time that we won’t be as effective is worth 

the long-term gains? Do you think there are savings in management? 

Mr. CARAFANO. I think there is definitely savings in management. But I think the difficult real political things will never get 

done in the current organization. I will give you another example, 

which is Shamira, requiring the Homeland Security Act of 2002, a 

single integrated IT system that would start from visa issuance all 

the way through internal enforcement. Zero progress has been 

made to doing this, and zero progress will be made because it is 

too complex a program coming across too many different departments and agencies to ever get anywhere. If you had one guy or 

one woman who was responsible for—if you had emergency BP in 

ICE, and if you had emergency BP in ICE with visa enforcement 

in it, and you had one person who had 85 percent of that responsibility for that program, then you might actually see something happen. 

Ms. HARRIS. One last question. Mr. Venturella, you said that the 

staff had never been kind of more discouraged. And I am really 

concerned about that, particularly when we read that we are having record seizures of drugs and interception of smugglers and 

money. What is it; what is not working? I mean, I know the accomplishments are there. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. To answer very simply, again, the creation of 

Homeland Security was an opportunity to do things better, to accomplish a unified mission, protecting this homeland. Everything 

that—and any one of us can stand up and say, day in and day out 

this is why I get up and go to work, because I have a mission I 

can stand behind. And I just don’t see that coming to fruition. 

Again, 2 years have been wasted for an opportunity that we had 

to make things better. 

Ms. HARRIS. Do you have FBI or State Department interference? 

Do you think there is a better continuum? 

Mr. VENTURELLA. I don’t look at that as interference. I look at 

that as an opportunity to work with law enforcement and to work 

with the diplomatic community to accomplish the mission. And—

I would leave it at that. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, distinguished panelists, for being here today. It 

has been insightful. And I can’t say it is the first time I have heard 

these responses. 
60

When I go back to my district, and I am in a border State, the 

number one issue is border security. I believe the Federal Government has failed us in this mission. And it is no longer just a question of immigration; it has become a question of national security 

in the post-9/11 world. 

Oftentimes in my prior job I worked with Federal law enforcement on the border, and I heard two things that I heard from the 

panelists today; and that is, not enough agents, not enough space 

to lock out the people that we apprehend on the border. 

It is astonishing to think there are 40,000 New York police officers, and yet we only have 2,000 Border Patrol special agents on 

the border. The catch and release program, Mr. Cutler, that you referred to, which, as you know, when you are at Kennedy Airport, 

Ramzi Yousef slipped through our system with that catch and release program. 

These are issues that I am concerned about. I know the intel bill 

authorized these additional agents and bed space. I have sent a letter to appropriations for the funding for these issues. I see these 

two issues as probably the most two important to facing border security. 

But what I would like to hear, because we are here on the topic 

of merger, is whether this merger would in fact expedite the processing and deportation of illegal aliens. Would it essentially tear 

down the stovepipes and the walls, or are we just moving boxes 

around? 

Mr. CUTLER. Well, I believe it would help. And there are two reasons why it would help. Number one, again, I don’t think that 

these folks should be thinking, well, I work for this little group and 

he works for that group over there. We need to understand we are 

under the same roof, doing the same job. 

But also please understand, you can’t control the border purely 

at the border. Nobody would break into an amusement park if they 

couldn’t go on the rides. Once people get past the Border Patrol or 

they get past that inspector at the airport, they know that there 

is virtually no chance that anyone is going to look to stop them 

from doing whatever they want to do in the United States. There 

are no employer sanctions, there are no real fraud investigations 

being conducted. So if you can get into the interior, you get involved in a marriage fraud, you get whatever you want to do, and 

you are here. And under those situations, the pressure on the border is tremendous. 

I know that Mr. Bonner testified last week about the lack of Border Patrol agents, that 2,000 were authorized, 210 are going to be 

hired, according to what the President wants. Tomorrow I will be 

testifying before that same subcommittee, the Immigration Subcommittee, about 143 new special agents to be hired versus the 

800. I thought the 800 was anemic; 143, I don’t want to tell you 

what I think that constitutes. It won’t even cover attrition. 

So we need the resources, but we need to coordinate the resources to take the pressure off the border also. This is a closed 

system, Okay? If you tighten the border to the point where nobody 

can get across the border, the people that want to come here aren’t 

going to throw their hands up and say, let us go to New Zealand. 

They will land at an airport, they will sky-dive. They are going to 
61

do whatever it takes to get them here. And we similarly have to 

look at this as an overall system and have a systemic approach to 

solving the problem. And we can’t do it by fractionalizing components that are responsible for the same mission. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Bonner, do you have any comments on that? 

Mr. BONNER. I agree wholeheartedly. I think that if you are looking for a solution to these problems, you have to look at it globally. 

You can’t just focus all of the resources on the border. You have 

to understand why people are coming here. Ninety-eight percent of 

the people coming to this country do so because they are looking 

to improve their economic life. As long as we allow employers to 

continue to hire people, they will continue to come, and we are just 

shoveling sand against the tide. That law has to be toughened up. 

Make it simple for an employer to figure out who has a right to 

work in this country. And if they choose to hire people who have 

no right to work in this country, take out a big hammer and smack 

them real hard with it, and then everyone else will sit up and take 

notice, and a lot of the problems that we have on our borders, people coming across illegally, will be solved. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree. And I think there has been a lack of will 

to enforce or support these laws. We have an estimated 10 to 15 

million illegal aliens in this country in the interior, and I see little 

movement in the area. 

Mr. CALLAHAN. If I can add, moving the boxes around isn’t 

enough. You have to ensure that the budgets or the appropriations 

language that comes out specifically goes into more detail on how 

much is going to be spent, and where; and don’t allow them to 

move funds from interior enforcement, detention removal program, 

and investigations over to the border just because, as we know, the 

squeaky wheel gets the grease. And the border is the squeaky 

wheel. And that is what happens more often than not. So merging 

and merging these people together or these organizations together 

will give whoever leads it the chance to move funds over to that 

squeaky wheel. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And would it enhance communication as well? 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Possibly. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Reichert. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think everyone in this room and on the panel and on the committee recognizes we have got to get this right. We absolutely have 

to get this right. And I want to thank all of you for being here 

today, and I especially want to thank all the men and women who 

serve out there today protecting our country. 

I want to let you know that I have had the opportunity of working with all the agencies that we have talked about today on a professional level, along with the FBI and Secret Service and ATF and 

DEA and all those others. And it seems to me that on the street 

level the work usually gets done. I mean, the people on the street 

get it done. They are working together usually, and they are cooperating. 
62

But what I hear today is that in fact what has really happened 

is it has even collapsed in that arena; that the people who are 

working—and correct me if I am wrong—but the people who are 

working day to day even are having difficulty communicating, sharing information, and deciding whose job is whose. And when that 

happens, we have got a serious, serious problem. 

You have laid out the problem very, very clearly. And just let me 

go over just some of the things that I heard today. 

Number one, there is no vision. There is no mission. There is no 

goals. There is no resources. There is no plan. And I would imagine 

I didn’t hear this mentioned today, but I would bet you there is low 

morale. That was a good guess on my part. 

So my question is—and really today the purpose that we are 

here, and I was just looking at, does the current organizational 

structure best serve the U.S. homeland security interests? And 

what I am hearing today is no. And then we also—then adding 

onto that a second question. We are considering an additional reorganization. 

My question to you is, shouldn’t we fix the current structure the 

way it exists today and then move on to a reorganization? Because 

I think that eventually we have to come—the cultural mindset 

from pre-9/11 has to change. We are in a different world today, and 

there has to be a cultural change in every agency that serves this 

country. 

So the first question is, reorganization now, an additional reorg, 

will it make it worse? And the second question is, I just want to 

hear maybe a one—or two-word or one- or two-sentence comment 

on what you think, very briefly, your solution would be to making 

this system work. 

Two tough questions in a very short amount of time. 

Mr. CARAFANO. I will just address the second. I really think that 

the biggest problem is you have 400 secretaries who are responsible for kingdoms as opposed to 400 secretaries who should be 

used to provide integrative functions to make all 22 agencies operate together. So, in my mind, that is the single thing that has got 

to be fixed first. 

Mr. KLUG. I do believe that the agencies, the reorganization 

should happen now. I do believe that, in its current configuration, 

it cannot be fixed. I think it is on a downward slide. I think morale 

is on a downward slide. And, again, I ask Congress to act quickly 

in merging the two agencies. 

Mr. CALLAHAN. Well, I think that the reorganization itself isn’t 

enough. You have to have leadership in place that are going to 

focus on every aspect of the mission and not concentrate just on 

one area or another area. 

Mr. BONNER. I think that you are just rearranging the deck 

chairs on the Titanic if you try and work within the current system. You have to break down those barriers. Right now the successes we have are in spite of the system, not because of the system. And it has to be changed. 

Mr. CUTLER. I think we need to have the political will to bring 

about the changes. I think that there has been a lack of political 

will to enforce the laws the way they need, and I think we have 

a lack of resources, and that is why you have no goal. I think we 
63

have to address all of it, but I don’t think the current structure 

meets the needs. So you have to do all of those things and understand that our survival really is at stake. 

Mr. VENTURELLA. Again, I think there needs to be reorganization, but not just ICE and CBP. Departmentwide, you need to take 

a fresh look. In the automobile industry, you would be in the process of a recall: You have a design flaw, you need to fix it because 

people could lose their lives. You need to fix it. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. Just let me make one comment. It 

takes a lot of courage, I know, for you to come and explain this so 

clearly and honestly as you did. And we appreciate it. That is the 

only way that we are going to be able to help. I agree with the committee chair, Chairman Cox’s comments, that now you have a committee that is here to help you, and hopefully we can get this thing 

fixed. So thank you all for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

We had a great morning, very productive. And you all have been 

very helpful, and the members clearly are interested and have a lot 

more questions than they have time. Even though we are running 

long, I would like, though, for the members who do have an additional question to have a brief opportunity to ask it, so we are 

going to go around one more time with members being given 2 minutes to ask any follow-up questions. And I would yield the first 

question to the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek from Florida. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Hearing a lot about leadership, and I can tell you right now as 

it relates to this full committee—and I don’t want to speak for the 

Chairman or the Ranking, but definitely for this subcommittee—we 

definitely have our work cut out. Leadership starts here in the 

Congress. And we have to 9 times out of 10 do some very unpopular things as it relates to bureaucracies and what people are used 

to. But I can tell you the latter is another commission being pulled 

together like the 9/11 Commission looking at the failures of which 

you shared with us today. Some of the information that you shared 

with us today is very alarming and disturbing. And I am glad that 

all of you are free to speak to that, and I want to commend all of 

you as Americans, and especially those of you that are either in a 

foundation or not in a foundation or pay for your own ticket, appreciate you coming here. It is going to make a better security situation for us. 

Mr. Chairman, I can tell you when we do have the Department 

come, I would definitely like to see attrition numbers of frontline 

men and women that are out there doing the hard work, what has 

actually happened prior to the transition and after. I think that 

will be revealing from what I am hearing here at this table. And 

I can tell you right now, in the future I can see more officers being 

this Congress pushing for more officers out there doing good work. 

But if we don’t have the leadership on the management level and 

the leadership here in the Congress to set an environment that 

they want to serve their country in that capacity, then it will be 

for naught. 

So I just wanted to make a statement. I know some other members are going to ask a question. I know that the time is running 
64

out, and I want to stick to it. I know you have a burning question, 

but if you could probably answer it in one of the future questions, 

I would appreciate it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. And the Chair recognizes Chairman 

Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much. I just want to take the opportunity once again to thank our panel. And as I was going over your 

testimony, in addition to the oral testimony that you provided, the 

written testimony as well, I was struck by Mr. Callahan’s very 

clear statement of the way things stand right now. And you are in 

a good position, Mr. Callahan, to comment on this, since you are 

in the midst of all of it. I just want to ask you all to comment on 

what he has described to us. 

As it stands right now—I am reading from Mr. Callahan’s testimony—there is a serious lack of cooperation between legacy components, INS and Customs, of the two bureaus. That, of course, is 

what we have got to eliminate. We can’t have turf jealousy, competition, even the old structures, as a result of this merger of 22 

legacy agencies into the new DHS. 

He goes on to say: The leadership of the former INS and Customs Service are, as we speak, locked in a heated battle for control 

of the purse strings. So at least in this description, we are being 

told that the competition exists even at the top. And, of course, the 

leadership of the former INS and Customs Service is literally that: 

people from those two former parts of government. So I would like 

to hear from each of you whether or not you see this as a current 

ongoing problem for the management of DHS. 

Mr. CARAFANO. If I could, just for an example. There was an 

enormous debate over whether to move air and marine interdiction 

from ICE to CBP, a debate which made actually no sense if you 

just looked at the operational needs and where the most efficiencies 

were. But yet they were debating over it because it was bodies and 

spaces and airplanes, and they both wanted them, because that is 

what bureaucracies do. But if somebody had looked at it holistically, you would have just said, well, this just makes perfect 

sense. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 

Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It appears that our 

retreat on Monday and Tuesday is paying off. I see very little disagreement, and I want to compliment the Chairman for providing 

leadership. 

A couple issues. Number one is I understand that OIG is looking 

into the problems between ICE and CBP, Mr. Chairman, at the request of Senator Collins. I need to get some agreement with you—

I am told that some employees are reluctant to come before the 

committee because of potential retribution from the administration. 

And I would not want any citizen of this country to feel like they 

can’t come before this committee and tell the truth. And however 

we need to communicate that, through the Secretary or whomever, 

I think we really need to do it. I am told that some individuals who 

are not in the union are reluctant to say things. And I just think 

we need to get to the bottom of it. 
65

The other thing I want to do—is, one, when the Secretary comes, 

I think he needs to explain to us from a budgetary standpoint why 

the administration didn’t request full funding of the 9/11 bill. There 

are just too many things left out here that we all agree on, from 

Border Patrol agents to beds for detainees and other things, that 

we absolutely ought to be funding. 

Lastly if I could get someone to brief me on this notion, maybe 

after the hearing, on detainees who are released and turned loose 

never to be seen again. I am told there are several hundred thousand of these individuals walking around the country. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays. 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to ask if anyone on the witness table believes this is not a solvable problem. So all of you concur that it 

is a solvable problem? That is the sense 

Mr. CUTLER. It has to be. 

Mr. SHAYS. It does have to be. And it is so. I mean, this is not 

something—but I will take a little bit of time. You know, there will 

be a—I think, Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing 

and thank you for the witnesses. I appreciate each and every one 

of your insights. I found in my National Security Subcommittee I 

learn the most, frankly, from those who aren’t directly in government, because there is a candidness that I don’t see elsewhere. I 

want to thank you, Mr. Venturella, for your candidness as well. All 

of you have been very helpful. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, 

Mrs. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do think this is 

an important hearing as well. And just like my other colleagues, 

I feel that my district could be the poster child for the insecurities 

that exist at our border, and we need to fix the system. 

And I would also add that, taking away from some of the discussions I have had at home with my local and Federal law enforcement, it is clear that they would definitely welcome and support 

any fix, whether it is a merger or any other way of fixing it. And 

I find—I want to thank everyone for your testimony. It has been 

very, very helpful as we move forward. 

I probably would ask one question. Mr. Bonner, you and several 

others spoke about—to me—against the trend, when you spoke 

about the need for specialization in this one face at the border environment that they are in. Can’t this be overcome? Can’t we continue the one face at the border and overcome this need by just increased training? 

Mr. BONNER. I think you are asking an awful lot for one human 

being to be expert in all of these three very complex and arcane 

areas. I mean, if you stack the laws and the regulations and all of 

the other information up, each of them is over 6 inches tall, and 

we are talking a lot of on-the-job training that is necessary to get 

to the level where I would feel comfortable that those inspectors on 

the front line are doing their job as it should be done, picking off 

those people who should not be entering our country. 

Mr. CARAFANO. It really depends. I mean, a small post at the Canadian border, which has very few people that cross every day, 
66

doesn’t need the same kind of staffing and resources as LaGuardia 

and New York City. So one of the arguments I would make as well 

as you want a large robust agency, is you want to have the capability in your workforce to tailor it to meet the different needs in 

the different parts, both on the border and internally. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, just before we adjourn. 

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly. 

Mr. MEEK. Ms. Jackson-Lee had to leave, but she wants to enter 

her statements and concerns for the record, if there is no objection. 

Mr. ROGERS. There will be no objection. 

[The information follows:] 

Mr. ROGERS. I do want to thank you all for your testimony, it has 

been very helpful, and thank the members for their questions. And 

if any members do have any additional statements or questions, 

they can submit them. And I would ask if there is a question, if 

you would submit a written response within 10 days. We are going 

to keep our committee record open for 10 days to accept those. 

And with that, I thank the panelists and committee members, 

and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(67)

A P P E N D I X 

——————

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES OF T.J. BONNER SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE BENNIE

THOMPSON

Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and CBP 

to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part of 

DHS’s genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been paid to 

inter-bureau coordination? No response has been received.

Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely 

anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations over 

the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE coordination was 

heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors had a good personal 

relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be worthwhile wouldn’t 

it have to affect more than just the headquarters components? No response 

has been received.

Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may not 

have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management had 

taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components? No 

response has been received.

Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns which 

lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is involved, the 

Deputy Secretary level? No response has been received.

Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn’t the key issue making sure that 

policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol agents, 

CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate operations 

and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible level? No response has been received.

Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the Arizona 

desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command structure 

of the ABC initiative—a task force of CBP and ICE personnel headed by the 

Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating additional task 

forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an ICE agent-in-charge or 

a Border patrol chief) is a viable way to ensure that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? No response has been received.

Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control, wouldn’t it also 

make sense to extend this model to other missions such as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? No response has been 

received.

Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be lessened 

if the Administration decided to fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? No response has been received.

Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration policy 

within DHS? Is it one person? Would the Department be better off if one 

individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall immigration 

policy? No response has been received.
68

Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security into CBP and ICE? No response has been received.

Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border initiative? 

Do you think this program is this program working? Do you have concerns 

about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration law? Can 

you please discuss your concerns in primary inspections and secondary inspections? No response has been received.

12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from Customs and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their best source of intelligence 

and law enforcement information. Given that Customs inspectors are charged with 

assessing the risk of inbound cargo containers, and working with industry to secure 

these supply chains, I worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential 

because of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.

Questions: 

a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and investigators 

before the creation of DHS? No response has been received. 

b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how has 

CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? No response has 

been received. 

c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? No response has been 

received. 

d. What is the impact on CBP’s cargo security mission? No response has 

been received. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE KENDRICK B. MEEK

FOR T.J. BONNER

Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational agencies? No response has been received.

Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DDS ultimately decides not to merge 

ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be taken 

to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? No response has been received.

Question: 3. For a merger between COP and ICE to address the concerns 

you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the headquarters 

operations would have to be part of the merger? No response has been received. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY JAMES JAY CARAFANO, PH.D. SUBMITTED BY THE

HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON

Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and CBP 

to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part of 

DHS’ genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been paid to 

inter-bureau coordination?

Response: 1. Absolutely. There have been some instance of good coordination between CBP and ICE, particularly with regard to the Arizona Border Initiative, but 

in general it’s a problem. In part, because there are new coordination requirements 

that did not exist before the creation of the department when border inspectors and 

investigators were in the same agency, and in part because ICE lacks resources. 

Freezing credit cards and eliminating TDY funds, for example, prevented agents 

from undertaking the travel needed to effect coordination. 

More fundamental to the coordination challenges is that the existing artificial 

seam between border and internal enforcement makes no sense. Distinguishing 

clear lines of responsibility between foreign, border, and internal enforcement security is a thing of the past. National security, economic growth, and the liberties of 

American citizens (as well as visitors and international business partners) can no 

longer be considered in isolation. The visa-issuing activities of the Department of 

State and the Customs and Border protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should be 

merged into a single border services agency under the DHS.

Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely 

anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations over 
69

the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE coordination was 

heavily dependent on whether the supervisors had a good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be worthwhile wouldn’t it 

have to affect more than just the headquarters components? 

Response: 2. Merging CBP and ICE, even just at the headquarters’ level, sends an 

important message that the Secretary expects these groups to work together and 

emphasizes as desired a cooperative culture. The merger ideally should be part of 

a much larger reorganization of DHS that would eliminate extraneous bureaucracy 

and consolidate policy and planning into a single office. 

I do, however, agree with, your point. DHS requires a sophisticated professional 

development program. We made an argument for such a program in The Heritage/

CSIS report DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security.

Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may not 

have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management had 

taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components? 

Response: 3. BTS does lack the staff to properly integrate the activities of the 

agencies, but that misses the point. If we had the right organization to begin with 

we would not have to create a bureaucracy to manage a problem that doesn’t need 

to exist.

Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns which 

lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is involved, the 

Deputy Secretary level? 

Response: 4. Again, I think problems and concerns arise from an artificial layer 

of coordination between inspectors and investigators that is unnecessary.

Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn’t the key issue making sure that 

policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol agents, 

CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate operations 

and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible level? 

Response: 5. Absolutely, the key to addressing border security is to deal with international, border, and internal enforcement as a single integrated mission. Addressing the challenge of illegal entry between the points of entry cannot be ignored, but 

Congress needs to establish clear priorities and invest in resources that create a system-of-systems approach to security. Rather than trying to control the entire border, 

the United States requires a network of assets that direct the right capabilities to 

the right places at the right times to provide appropriate responses. This will require a combination of investments in high-speed and armed-airborne assets and in 

robust airborne sensor capabilities linked to an intelligence and early warning network. The network would provide knowledge of activities at sea and along the border, as well as the means to analyze and share that knowledge effectively. Modernizing the CBP’s air and marine interdiction capabilities in concert with increasing 

funding for the Coast Guard’s Deepwater acquisition program ought to take precedence.

Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the Arizona 

desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command structure 

of the ABC initiative—a task force of CBP and ICE personnel headed by the 

Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating additional task 

forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an ICE agent-in-charge or 

a Border patrol chief) is a viable way to ensure that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? . 

Response: 6. ABCI task forces would be much easier to initiate if it were done 

within a single agency. Even then, while the task forces make an important contribution, they are not the answer. They are an effective tactic, but not an adequate 

strategy. We need full integration of all ICE/CBP activities, not just cooperation in 

special task forces.

Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control, wouldn’t it also 

make sense to extend this model to other missions such as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? 

Response: 7. Yes, but again this could be mores effectively done under the leadership of a single agency.

Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be lessened 

if the Administration decided to fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? 
70

Response: 8. No. Just hiring border guards is not the answer. A much more comprehensive solution is required. 

The Administration and Congress need to agree on a bipartisan approach to border security that gives precedence to the efforts that will make the nation significantly safer and more prosperous while protecting individual freedoms. Five steps 

should top the ‘‘to do’’ list. 

Step #1: The U.S. needs a single border services agency. The government’s current organization reflects an outdated vision of how to protect America’s borders. 

Responsibilities for visa issuance and monitoring, border security, and internal enforcement of customs and immigration are divided among three separate agencies 

in two departments on the erroneous assumption that threats and countermeasures 

can be neatly segmented in discrete activities. However, there are no frontiers in 

21st century national security, nor are all border security issues best handled at the 

border. 

Protecting the United States against terrorist threats and significantly reducing 

transnational crime (e.g., drug, arms, and human trafficking); environmental dangers (e.g., contagious diseases and invasive species); and illegal entry and unlawful 

presence in the United States requires addressing these threats from their points 

of foreign origin through transiting the border to their U.S. destinations. Distinguishing clear lines of responsibility between foreign, border, and domestic security 

is a thing of the past. National security, economic growth, and the liberties of American citizens (as well as visitors and international business partners) can no longer 

be considered in isolation. The visa-issuing activities of the Department of State and 

the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should be merged 

into a single border services agency under the DHS. 

Step #2: Monitoring and servicing legal entry into the United States should be 

the highest priority. Improving the infrastructure and programs that oversee and 

support lawful means of trade and travel should be funded first. This includes upgrading immigration services and physical infrastructure at the busiest points of 

entry and fully funding programs like US-VISIT (tracking the entry and exit of visa 

holders); Smart Borders Initiatives (employing technology to speed the flow of people and goods); and Secure Flight (checking airline passengers against terrorist 

watch lists). 

Most goods, services, and people enter and exit the United States through legitimate means. These networks are the lifeblood of the U.S. economy and must be appropriately managed and protected. Likewise, virtually all known terrorists who 

have entered the United States came in through legal channels. In addition, as the 

United States improves its capacity to reduce illegal entry, illicit attempts to penetrate legal networks of trade and travel will likely increase. Effective border services 

must already be in place to meet this challenge if the United States hopes to improve its overall security. 

Step #3: Internal enforcement and international initiatives should take precedence over interdiction at the border. Too often, policymakers have assumed that 

the best place to reduce illegal and illicit activity is at the border. In practice, internal enforcement policies and programs, followed by working with point-of-origin and 

transit countries, probably offer a greater return on investment. For example, approximately 85 percent of illegal immigrants who receive final removal orders abscond. 

Focusing on deporting people already ordered removed from the country is a good 

starting point. In the long term, initiatives such as effective workplace enforcement 

to discourage employment of individuals unlawfully present in the United States, 

domestic counterterrorism investigations including means to track down criminal 

aliens, and the Millennium Challenge Account (foreign aid that encourages countries to adopt polices that promote economic growth, sound governance, and the rule 

of law) will have a greater impact on illegal entry and unlawful presence than will 

simply hiring additional border guards. 

Step #4: Border security must become a system of systems. Addressing the challenge of illegal entry between the points of entry cannot be ignored, but Congress 

needs to establish clear priorities and invest in resources that create a system-ofsystems approach to security. Rather than trying to control the entire border, the 

United States requires a network of assets that direct the right capabilities to the 

right places at the right times to provide appropriate responses. This will require 

a combination of investments in high-speed and armed-airborne assets and in robust 

airborne sensor capabilities linked to an intelligence and early warning network. 

The network would provide knowledge of activities at sea and along the border, as 

well as the means to analyze and share that knowledge effectively. Modernizing the 
71

CBP’s air and marine interdiction capabilities in concert with increasing funding for 

the Coast Guard’s Deepwater acquisition program ought to take precedence. 

Step #5: The federal government should engage state and local governments and 

the private sector while respecting the principles of federalism and a free-market 

economy. Very little of this effort should rely on throwing money at the problem 

through federal grants or establishing unfunded Washington mandates. Rather, the 

federal government should take measured steps to strengthen the means of state 

and local law enforcement to conduct security and criminal-related immigration investigations, to maintain strong legal authorities for sharing law enforcement information, and to promote the development of effective national intelligence and early 

warning systems. Cooperative efforts with the private sector should focus on removing the barriers to effective information sharing between the government and nongovernment entities--information that is essential for conducting risk assessments 

and implementing effective vulnerability reduction measures that promote economic 

growth and protect the privacy of citizens and proprietary information of companies.

Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration policy 

within DHS? Is it one person? Would the Department be better off if one 

individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall immigration 

policy? 

Response 9. The answer is simple. No one is in charge. Yes, I think it should be 

one person. That person should be within an Undersecretary for Policy and Planning. We discussed the scope of this position in The Heritage/CSIS report DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security.

Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security into CBP and ICE? 

(1) The intent to abolish legacy INS. (2) The notion that internal enforcement would 

be improved by integrating immigration and customs investigators into a single 

agency.

Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border Initiative? 

Do you think this program is working? Do you have concerns about the 

ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration law? Can you please 

discuss your concerns in primary inspections and secondary inspections? 

Response: 11. I think ‘‘one face at the border’’ should not mean that one agent is 

required to do everything, in all circumstances. I think it should reflect the intent 

to establish common practices, policies, and guidelines for handling people and 

things, simplifying charges and taxes into a single system, and eliminating unnecessary duplication of support assets. I think having inspectors cross-trained is good 

professional developments and there are some situations (such as a small crossing 

point) where a single inspector might make sense or for some primary inspection 

functions, but in general I would want secondary screening and major threat areas 

to be staffed by professionals trained with expertise in particular areas.

Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from 

Customs and legacy INS components that Custom inspectors lost their best 

source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I worry 

that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.

a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and investigators before the creation of DHS? 

It is my understanding that there was a great deal of cooperation. Furthermore, 

there were more career development opportunities. It was not unusual for border inspector or border patrol agent to become a customs investigator. Now, 

many of the ICE investigators are hired straight out of college and lack useful 

field experience. 

b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how 

has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? 

CBP and ICE try to compensate by creating task forces. 

c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? 

The research and interviews conducted in support of the Heritage/CSIS report 

DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security did not find 

any compelling advantages to the current structure. 

d. What is the impact on CBP’s cargo security mission? 
72

CBP’s cargo security mission has led to an inability to really maximize the information that might be available from ICE that might help with local targeting 

assessments. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY JAMES JAY CARAFANO, PH.D. SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY THE HONORABLE KENDRICK MEEK

Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis for the decision by the Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational agencies? 

Response: 1. The intent to abolish legacy INS. (2) The notion that internal enforcement would be improved by integrating immigration and customs investigators into 

a single agency.

Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to merge 

ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be taken 

to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? 

Response: 2. The next most important action would be to fix ICE’s financial problems and ensure that the agency has adequate staff, resources and the authority 

to implement aggressive internal enforcement operations.

Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns 

you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the headquarters 

operations would have to be part of the merger?

Response: 3. Additions steps should include: 

1. A robust professional development and executive education program. 

2. A long term investment strategy to give the agency adequate resources and 

capabilities to perform its mission and invests in critical infrastructure at major 

border crossings and points of entry. 

3. An integrated border security strategy that addresses the international dimension, the border, and internal enforcement. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES OF MICHAEL CUTLER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON

Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and CBP 

to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part of 

DUS’s genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been paid to 

inter-bureau coordination? 

Response: 1. It is my belief that when you look at numerous issues concerning, the 

merging of the former Customs Service and the former INS into these two agencies, 

it becomes readily apparent that the result has left many employees from both 

former agencies frustrated and disappointed, although I believe that the former INS 

employees are in a worse position than are their counterparts from Customs. At 

present, most of the ICE field offices are headed by former Customs officials who 

lack a true understanding and appreciation, for the nature of the work that the 

former INS was responsible for. The immigration laws, both administrative as well 

as criminal, can be of great value in prosecuting the ‘‘War on terror’’ as well as the 

‘‘War on drugs.’’ Moreover, these statutes provide real leverage in combating a wide 

variety of criminal activities and can also be instrumental in cultivating informants 

who can act as the eyes and ears of law enforcement agencies when used to best 

advantage. Because of the problems that are currently being faced in integrating 

these two very different agencies into both ICE and CBP many opportunities are 

being lost to maximize the potential that could otherwise be realized to great advantage.

Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely 

anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations over 

the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE coordination was 

heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors had a good personal 

relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be worthwhile wouldn’t 

it have to affect more than just the headquarters components? 

Response: 2. I certainly believe that headquarters is essential for providing leadership and clearly defined goals, however, a head without a body won’t go anywhere 

on its own. In order for any organization to be effective, leadership is essential at 

all level of the hierarchy to establish goals and to make certain that all members 

of the organization are contributing to the overall mission. The vast majority of field 

offices are headed by Special Agents-in-Charge who came from the former u.S. Customs Service. Perhaps, in part because of this, the immigration laws are being, in 

many instances, being neglected in the overall mission. Part of this problem stems 
73

from a lack of resources, both monetary as well as manpower, however, the fact foreign language training is no longer a part of the curriculum for new agents is a very 

telling omission as is the fact that to my understanding, there is no effort being 

made to provide in-service document training for special agents. These decisions 

were presumably made at the headquarters level. Until the merger of INS and Customs, all INS enforcement officers were mandated to successfully complete a Spanish language-training program because it is estimated that some 80% of the illegal 

alien population are individuals who are Spanish speaking. It is interesting to note 

that the United States military is now actively attempting to recruit both uniformed 

as well as civilian personnel who have foreign language skills or to train personnel 

in foreign languages including so-called strategic languages. It is hard for me to understand why special agents of ICE, the agency that is most likely to encounter individuals who do not speak English within our borders, are not being given appropriate language training. Additionally, for law enforcement officers in general and 

for immigration enforcement officers in particular, document training is vital because identity documents serve as the ‘‘lynchpin’’ that holds any immigration law 

enforcement program together. It is especially important for those who are charged 

with enforcing the immigration laws to know precisely who they are dealing with 

to determine alienage and deportability of criminals and other individuals they come 

into contact with. 

These issues represent only a ‘‘tip’’ of the proverbial iceberg in illustrating how 

at present, the bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the headquarters level is failing to provide absolutely vital training to its law enforcement 

officers at a time when our nation’s security hangs in the balance. On the local 

level, as I pointed out in response to the first question, the great majority of the 

field offices are being lead by former Customs officials. I have also been told that 

at some offices, there are problems in coordinating the activities of special agents 

of ICE and the CBP managers within whom they interact on a routine basis. Among 

these issues are the facts that ICE agents have been told to make prior notification 

before going to an airport on matters of official business and CBP inspectors have 

on various instances at various locations, notified agencies other than ICE about 

violations of laws that they encountered that are clearly within the purview of ICE. 

It is inefficient for CBP inspectors to call the FBI or DEA when the first call should 

have been to ICE. These failures in coordination and cooperation are demoralizing 

and counterproductive and are symptomatic of a breakdown in the professional relationship that these two agencies must have if they are to succeed in securing our 

nation’s porous borders.

Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may not 

have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management had 

taken action to ensure proper coordination between components? 

Response: 3. I believe that creating two agencies that have a common goal was 

flawed from the outset. Humans, like most creatures, are territorial and turf battles 

among agencies has historically plagued various efforts in our government. Additionally, I have often stated that immigration law enforcement needs to be thought 

of as an ‘‘Enforcement Tripod.’’ Under this concept, the inspectors at ports of entry 

enforce the immigration laws at ports of entry, the Border Patrol enforces these 

laws between ports of entry and the special agents and deportation employees enforce the laws from within the United States and back up the other two components 

and constitute the third leg of the tripod. The interior enforcement component has 

always been the least funded and the one that has been nearly ignored for the past 

several decades, resulting in the collapse of the entire immigration effort that we 

are all too aware of today. In order for enforcement and administration of immigration laws to be effective, the three legs need to be of equal length and they also need 

to work in a coordinated fashion creating a virtually seamless operation. Creating 

a bureaucratic barrier between the components of what should be a single, coordinated agency hampers the essential mission of securing our nation’s borders and endangers our security.

Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns which 

lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is involved, the 

Deputy Secretary level? 

Response: 4. Certainly this is a problem, but I think that this problem needs more 

than a change in the way that the components are supervised. I believe that the 

structure of the agency is at the root of many ofthe problems. I also believe that 

while I would like to see ICE and CBP merged into one agency, I would like to see 

separate chains of command and separate funding and separate accountability for 

the immigration program. As I pointed out during the hearing, I believe that the 
74

merger of Customs and Immigration into one agency has created an unwieldy bureaucracy. The cultures and objectives of the former Customs and the former INS 

are very different from on another. Once you get past the point that they have both 

been traditionally involved with enforcing laws at the border, you find that they 

share little else in common. I believe that these two entities should coordinate their 

efforts to secure our border, but I am greatly concerned that the way that these efforts are currently being made, that too many gaps in the system threaten our security just as holes in a fence would fail to establish a secure perimeter around a parcel of land. 

I would not object to having the enforcement personnel who are primarily concerned with the enforcement of immigration laws from working side by side with 

those who are charged with enforcing the customs laws in one agency, I just want 

to make certain that neither side of the operation suffers because of the experience 

and orientation of the management at a particular office. Perhaps this would not 

be as critical had the attacks of September 11 not taken place, but inasmuch as we 

needed to be up to speed yesterday, we cannot afford a lengthy gestation period for 

this offspring to come into the world. I believe that what I am recommending would 

facilitate the effective enforcement of all of these critical laws in a much quicker 

pace, provided that the resources that are currently lacking are provided to accomplish these vital missions.

Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn’t the key issue making sure that 

the policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol 

agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible level? 

Response: 5. I absolutely agree that this is the destination that this process needs 

to take us, I just do not believe that the current structure of separate agencies (ICE 

and CBP) is the vehicle that will get us there. I believe that we need to rethink 

the structure of the agency that is charged with this most vital mission, securing 

our nation’s borders and effectively enforcing the immigration laws that are supposed to protect our citizens from aliens who threaten our nation’s security and our 

citizens’ lives.

Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the Arizona 

desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command structure 

of the ABC initiative—a task force of CBP and ICE personnel headed by the 

Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating additional task 

forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an ICE agent-in-charge or 

a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? 

Response: 6. I believe in the effectiveness of task forces having worked on various 

task forces for a significant portion of my career. However, I also think that a single 

agency will do a better job of accomplishing a goal than by creating a task force. 

When I was assigned to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, I was 

supposed to provide my insight, expertise, law enforcement authority and access to 

immigration resources to aid in the investigation of aliens who were involved in 

major drug trafficking organizations with the ultimate goal being the arrest, successful prosecution of the individuals involved in drug trafficking and related 

crimes.Additionally, I was also involved in the forfeiture of their assets, the deportation of aliens involved in drug trafficking after they served out their sentences, if 

applicable and the dismantling of drug trafficking organizations. There were, however, instances when the goals of my agency, the INS were not the same as the 

goals of the other agencies such as the DEA, the FBI the A TF or local or state 

police. In these instances I was often caught in the middle between the goals of the 

INS and the goals of the other agencies. However, task forces certainly operate more 

effectively than do individual agencies that are not participating in a task force that 

can help to facilitate the coordination of their operations.

Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control, wouldn’t it also 

make sense to extend this model to other missions such as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? 

Response: 7. I certainly think that such task forces would be a beneficial development, but I also think that where such crimes as alien smuggling is concerned, it 

would be easier to create a seamless effort ifCBP and ICE were merged to track 

the movement of the aliens and the smugglers from outside the United States, to 

our border or port of entry all the way to the ultimate destination within the United 

States, whether it be a safe house or the destination to which the smuggled alien 

was ultimately destined to enable the enforcement program to track down and ar-
75

rest and prosecute all of the defendants involved in the case. There would be fewer 

problems and a greatly reduced likelihood that the two agencies would ‘‘trip’’ over 

each other. If task forces are good, a single agency would be better.

Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be lessened 

if the Administration decided to fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? 

Response: 8. Certainly I was outraged that the Administration did not fully fund 

the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill. In fact, on March 10, 

the day after the hearing that I testified before the Committee on Homeland Security, I testified before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and 

Claims about a component of this very issue, the fact that the Administration only 

requested funding to hire some 143 special agents for ICE as compared with the 

800 that was authorized by Congress. Having said this, I nevertheless have to respond to this question by saying, ‘‘No.’’ I am certain that this answer will surprise 

you but I think you will quickly understand my reasoning. 

I think that we need to be mindful of the sound of the ticking clock. Weare well 

into the fourth year on this ‘‘War on terror’’ and our borders are, to my thinking, 

nearly as porous as they were on September 10, 2001. That our nation has not suffered an attack on our soil in the time since September 11,2001 gives me little comfort inasmuch as the terrorists who set off the bomb at the World Trade Center on 

February 26. 1993 waited more than 8 years to attack that facility again without 

significant interference from our government. Vice President Cheney compared the 

attacks of September 11, 2001 with the attack on Pearl Harbor committed on December 7, 1941. While the comparison was apt, our reaction to these two attacks 

could not have been more different. In short order, after December 7, our nation created fleets of cutting edge aircraft, battleships, submarines and aircraft carriers. We 

even created and successfully deployed nuclear weapons with brand new technology 

and less than four years after that day that, as President Roosevelt declared, would 

live in infamy, our nation, with the backing of our allies ended that war. 

Today we still have virtually no control over our borders. We still have a visa 

waiver program. We are still not requiring biometric passports from countries that 

participate in this program. We still have only 2,000 special agents to enforce the 

immigration laws from within the interior of the United States. Recently, I saw a 

video clip in which Vice President Cheney publicly declared that our nation has millions of illegal aliens. He went on to say that we didn’t know who they are, that 

we didn’t know where they are and they we didn’t know what they are up to. The 

enforcement of the immigration laws is the solution to that problem. Not the continuing debate about amnesty for illegal aliens or the sanctuary policy of many cities and local communities. I know that I am going a bit off the question, but I believe it is essential to make the point that indeed we need to have much better coordination among all components of the elements of the agencies and bureaucracies 

that are charged with securing our nation’s borders, however all of the coordination 

in the world will not secure the borders when you simply do not provide the funding 

or the resources and leadership to make certain that the job get done. To think that 

2,000 special agents who work in proper coordination with the Border Patrol can 

get the job done is absolutely outrageous! 

New York City has been found to be the safest big city in the United States based 

on the crime statistics compiled by the FBI. New York has approximately 8 million 

residents who all are confined to the relatively small space that makes up the 5 boroughs of the city of New York.The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has 

nearly 40,000 police officers. It has been estimated that there may well be more 

than twice as many illegal aliens in the United States than there are residents in 

New York City. These aliens are scattered across a third of the North American 

Continent that comprises the United States. They are policed by some 2,000 special 

agents. What would happen to New York’s crime rate if the number of police officers 

of the NYPD was reduced to 2,000? 

Three years ago the GAO issued a report on the issue of immigration fraud. The 

report made it clear that fraud was a pervasive problem. In short, our nation has 

given many thousands of aliens resident alien status and even United States citizenship to which they would not have been entitled had all of the relevant facts 

been known. The way to combat such fraud is to have sufficient numbers of special 

agents who can do the appropriate field investigations to determine the bona fides 

of applications for immigration benefits. Such investigations are rarely if ever done 

today. Simply put, there are not enough agents to do this most basic job. Because 

of this, many more aliens are emboldened to file fraudulent applications, confident 

that their application will most likely not be investigated or even given the sort of 

scrutiny that is critical. Additionally, even if by some quirk, it is determined that 
76

their application is fraudulent, the lack of special agents, coupled with the lack of 

jail space will mean that even if the application is denied, there is almost no chance 

that an agent will be assigned to track that alien down to either seek his prosecution or his removal from the United States. Consequently, we have a vicious cycle 

where more aliens file more applications further exacerbating the problem. 

With an estimated illegal alien population that may well exceed 15 million, with 

30% of the federal inmate population in federal penitentiaries being identified as 

being foreign born, with a backlog of millions of applications for immigration benefits now pending adjudication, how does anyone even suggest that 2,000 special 

agents or even 10,000 special agents can even begin to make a dent in this critical 

situation? I haven’t even mentioned the involvement of aliens in crime that is dealt 

with on the local level. Nor does this include the crisis in health care and education. 

It also does not include the fact that it has been estimated that last year more than 

16 billion dollars was electronically transferred from the United States to Mexico 

by illegal aliens working in our country and sending money to their home country. 

Finally, I have read that illegal aliens from Mexico represents less than one third 

of the illegal alien population in the United States. Consequently, even more money 

is being sent from the United States to the respective nations from which these 

other aliens come, further draining money from our economy. 

It may be costly to hire an adequate number of special agents to constitute a deterrent to aliens who would come to this country in violation of our immigration 

laws, or who legally enter our country with the intention of ultimately violating our 

laws, either by accepting unlawful employment or by engaging in criminal activities 

such as membership in violent gangs, drug trafficking or terrorism. It is, however, 

far costlier for our nation to not address this problem which has been growing exponentially, spurred on by the knowledge that aliens who are present in our country 

in violation of our laws have little, if anything to fear. 

I would like to insert a quote that I referred to when I testified before the House 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims on March 10,2005. This 

quote is from page 49 of a report entitled, ‘‘9/11 and Terrorist Travel, A Staff Report 

of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’’. 

‘‘Thus abuse of the immigration system and a lack of interior immigration enforcement were unwittingly working together to support terrorist 

activity.’’

I am therefore compelled to ask what it will take to change the way that we deal 

with this issue that has a direct bearing on the future of our nation? Can we afford 

to not secure our nation’s borders especially as our government focuses on securing 

the borders of Iraq as we attempt to secure that nation against terrorists and insurgents? Should the American people expect a smaller effort from the government of 

the United States to secure their borders than the citizens of Iraq are currently enjoying where their borders are concerned? 

I recall that when I testified at a hearing before the House Immigration Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security that focused on the Administration’s 

proposed budget for immigration enforcement, on February 25 of last year, that 

Representative Lamar Smith, the former chairman of the House Subcommittee on 

Immigration and Claims and currently a member of that subcommittee, stated, 

‘‘And while it’s a step in the right direction that we’re increasing the amount of 

money—as I recall, it was something like from $20 million to $40 million, roughly—

for worksite inspections, that’s a little bit like having two candles instead of one 

candle in a blackout. It’s a step in the right direction, but it’s not doing near what 

we should.’’

I would make the same point about the staffing levels authorized by Congress for 

this fiscal year. I am afraid we don’t need a couple of more candles, given the seriousness of the situation; we need to break out the floodlights!

Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for the overall immigration policy within DDS? Is it one person? Would the Department be better off if one 

individual reporting to the Secretary could coordinate overall immigration 

policy? 

Response: 9. I believe that this is a difficult question to answer. Immigration policy 

needs to be fair, consistent and ultimately, effective. Immigration policy is one of 

the most critical issues that the federal government needs to address. It has been 

said that you only get one opportunity to make a first impression. The way our nation enforces and administers the immigration laws serves as that critical first impression for people throughout the world. We need to balance fairness and compassion with justice and integrity. America is and hopefully will always be seen as the 

‘‘Land of opportunity.’’ We must, however, not permit it to become the land of opportunity to those who would harm us. We must deprive the criminals and the terror-
77

ists the opportunity to victimize our citizens and attack our nation. At present several individuals head up components of the immigration mission. Eduardo Aguirre 

is the head of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Mike Garcia headed ICE and 

Robert Bonner has headed CPB. I do not believe that a triumvirate is the best way 

to go. The concern I do have is that if the person who is ultimately responsible for 

the immigration system is a person who favors the service side, as was clearly the 

case with former INS Commissioner Meisner, that the enforcement program will 

suffer. It might make sense to have two distinct chains of command, one reporting 

to the person in charge of CIS and the other to what I hope will become a combination of ICE and CBP. The person charged with running the enforcement mission 

should be someone with extensive law enforcement experience, who thoroughly understands law enforcement. I would further suggest that they would then report to 

a person who would be in the position of balancing and coordinating both missions. 

The critical issue here is that we need to make certain that CIS be given clear 

marching orders that while the efficient processing of applications is important the 

backlog of applications should never get more attention than the integrity of the 

process. National security has to be the primary consideration for both sides of the 

operation. Having stated my misgivings about the situation that existed under the 

former INS, I also think that by putting a single person in charge of both sides of 

the operation, that individual will feel truly accountable. Sometimes people feel that 

there is safety in numbers. When a person can hide in a committee or a bureaucracy, it may become easier to not feel quite as accountable as a person who is ultimately the one person who bears ultimate responsibility. I recall that President Truman had a sign on his desk that said, ‘‘The buck stops here.’’ Perhaps that sense 

of accountability should exist for the person who will take charge of the immigration 

system. (Indeed immigration needs to be thought of as a system and not as a collection of loosely assembled components if it is to be successfully managed and lead.)

Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security into CBP and ICE? 

Response: 10. I have no idea and, in fact, I have often asked myself that very same 

question.

Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border initiative? 

Do you think this program is working? Do you have concerns about the 

ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration laws? Can you 

please discuss your concerns in primary and secondary inspections? 

Response: 11. I do not have an extensive background in customs law, however, I 

do have an extensive background in immigration law enforcement. Immigration 

laws are complex and are constantly evolving. The decisions that the inspectors at 

airports and other ports of entry have to make, especially in secondary where arriving aliens may make claims concerning political asylum and credible fear are conceivably life and death decisions. On the other hand, we have also seen that mistakes that err on the side of permitting aliens into the United States who are involved with crime and terrorism. Several times these sorts of decisions inadvertently 

facilitated the actions of the terrorists of September 11. It is absolutely critical that 

the inspectors who stand watch on our nation’s borders have extensive and effective 

training in laws, in procedures and in terms of intelligence including developments 

in document fraud. I am most concerned with the training given to inspectors who 

handle secondary inspections, since the primary inspector does not need quite as 

much background as does the secondary inspector. 

I have also been told that the senior immigration inspectors at many ports of 

entry are no longer as involved as they had been in seeking criminal prosecutions 

against aliens who seek to enter the United States in violation of law. This issue 

has been a development since the implementation of ‘‘One Face on the Border.’’

As I stated during the hearing, this is the age of the specialist. I believe that our 

security would be enhanced by making certain that the inspectors, especially in secondary, have the specialized training that they need. In view of these extremely critical and sensitive issues our nation would be better served by having separate customs and immigration inspectors handle secondary inspections.

Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from 

Customs and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their 

best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that 

Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo 

containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I 

worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because of 

the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors. 
78

a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and investigators before the creation ofDHS? 

b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of wall exist and how 

has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? 

c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? 

d. What is the impact on CBP’s cargo security mission? 

Response: 12. As I have stated previously, my knowledge about customs is extremely limited. I have heard anecdotal instances where CBP inspectors called other 

agencies when they encountered law violations that were under the purview of ICE 

such as drug seizes and the like. Clearly this is not helpful or in anyone’s best interests. I regret I cannot provide answers or insight on the other issues that relate to 

customs enforcement issues you raise in this question. 

Please note: 

If I can be of further assistance to you or other members of the Committee or members of your respective staffs, please do not hesitate to contact me. I welcome the 

opportunity to contribute to efforts intended to enhance the security of our nation. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY MICHAEL CUTLER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE KENDRICK B. MEEK

Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational agencies? 

Response: 1. I can only speculate on the motivation to go in this direction inasmuch as I was not contacted when this decision was made, nor have I spoken with 

anyone who may have been involved in that decision making process. It may be that 

the thought was that the border was seen as an entity apart from the interior of 

the United States. If indeed that was the reason, it was, in my estimation, flawed 

because the two are truly an extension of each other. In fact, what is often is overlooked is the fact that an airport located in the heart of the United States is as 

much a part of the border as would be a land border port. Airports provide direct 

access into the United States which is why the enforcement of the immigration laws 

from within the interior of the United States is as critical to the success of the immigration enforcement mission as are enforcement efforts conducted by the Border 

Patrol operating in proximity to our nation’s land borders.

Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DDS ultimately decides not to merge 

ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be taken 

to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? 

Response: 2. It is my belief that we need to place as much emphasis on the enforcement of the immigration and customs laws from within the interior of the United 

States as we do on the border. (I will focus on the issue of immigration law enforcement rather than customs law enforcement only because of my own background as 

a former INS law enforcement officer.) 

Interior enforcement efforts need to be greatly ramped up because we need to 

think of immigration law enforcement as a system rather than as a collection of separate and unrelated parts. You cannot control the flow of illegal aliens into the 

United States purely at the border for a host of reasons. First of all, nearly 50% 

of the illegal aliens currently in the United States did not evade the inspections 

process but did, in fact, enter the United States through a port of entry and then, 

in one way or another went on to violate the terms of their admission into our country.They may have simply stayed in the United States for a longer period oftime 

than they were given when they were admitted, they may have accepted unauthorized employment, or they may have committed felonies. In any event, these aliens 

fall squarely within the scope of the interior enforcement program that has been 

historically ignored, under-funded and understaffed. 

It is also worth remembering the controversial ‘‘Catch and Release’’ program of 

the Border Patrol where illegal aliens arrested by Border Patrol agents are permitted to head for the interior of he United States supposedly to turn themselves 

over to the immigration authorities for removal hearings. Not surprisingly, only a 

very small percentage of these illegal aliens do this. They simply head to their intended destinations and blend into the huge alien communities throughout our nation. They are welcomed by communities that have implemented ‘‘sanctuary policies’’ they are even able to apply for loans to conduct business as usual as our country ever increases efforts to blur the distinction between resident alien and illegal 

alien. Securing work is not difficult. Last year no company paid a single fine for 

knowingly employing illegal aliens, although the law clearly states that such companies are supposed to be fined under the auspices of the Employer Sanctions Program. An effective interior enforcement program would deter many would be illegal 
79

aliens from coming to our country. Conversely, the lack of meaningful interior enforcement encourages many aliens to come to this country in violation of law and 

when members of the political establishment publicly speculate about a guest worker program or other such amnesty program for illegal aliens, still more aliens are 

emboldened to run our borders and otherwise violate the immigration laws of this 

country. 

To quote John F. Shaw, the former Assistant Commissioner for Investigations of 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service when he testified before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims on March 4, 1999: 

‘‘In its determined efforts to establish control of the border by tightening security 

on the perimeter, Congress has seemingly ignored the critical, complementary roles 

and responsibilities of Interior Enforcement. . . and these fall mainly on the shoulders of Investigations. I believe that the concept of Interior Enforcement, supported 

by a well articulated strategy document, ought to be as familiar in the nomenclature 

of immigration enforcement as the concept, or term, Border Control. Although, I 

must admit that even in-house at INS, the Commissioner has said that Interior Enforcement is a term of usage invented by Investigations and devoid of meaning.’’

That, according to the former head of the investigations program for the former 

INS would state that his boss, Commissioner Doris Meisner would indicate her disdain for the interior enforcement program of the INS after the first attack on the 

World Trade Center on February 26, 1993 shows how great the problem is where 

dedicating adequate resources to this critical mission is concerned. 

If we do nothing else, I would urge that the interior enforcement of the immigration laws be given at least as much emphasis as we are giving the Border Patrol. 

When FBI Director Robert Mueller testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February of this year, he spoke of his concerns about possible terrorist 

sleeper cells operating within our nation. As I stated during the testimony that I 

provided when I testified before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 

Security and Claims on March 10, 2005: 

‘‘Sleeper agents are not like cicadas; they do not simply slip into our country and 

then burrow into a hole for months or years awaiting their instructions to emerge 

to carry out a deadly terrorist attack. Sleepers are, in fact, aliens who, upon entering our country, manage to hide in plain sight by finding a job, attending a school 

or doing other such ‘‘ordinary things’’ that do not call attention to them. Someone 

once said that an effective spy is someone who could not attract the attention of 

a waitress at a greasy spoon diner. The same can be said of an effective terrorist. 

It is vital that we regain control of our borders and the entire immigration bureaucracy and enforcement program if we are to protect our nation against terrorists and 

criminals. This requires that we have an adequate number of law enforcement officers who are dedicated to this critical mission.’’

I believe it absolutely imperative that we do not seek a false economy of not fully 

funding a robust interior enforcement program if we are to secure our borders 

against terrorists, drug traffickers, members of violent gangs and others who would 

threaten our nation and our citizens. I also want you to know that my concept of 

fully funding this program does not coincide with what has been authorized by Congress. Our nation needs many for special agents, they need adequate resources including jail space and operating funds and need effective training including foreign 

language training, intelligence training, document training and true leadership to 

operate effectively. Our agents who enforce the immigration laws are in the best position to defend our nation from terrorists and other criminals by cultivating informants and by being the people who are most likely to spot trends as they develop. 

Admittedly this is not a cheap proposition, but when you consider the costs that accrued since 9/11, without even getting into the massive, horrific loss of human life 

on that horrendous day, our nation would be wise to find the money and protect 

our citizens. When I spoke with the investigators who were involved in the investigation conducted in the aftermath of the first attack on the World Trade Center, 

some of them told me that they were actually surprised that the bomb did not bring 

down the tower that was struck, sideways. There would have been no escape from 

that tower had that occurred. Other building would have undoubtedly been hit. It 

is virtually impossible to know what that carnage would have been, however, it 

would have been many, many times greater than the level of loss of life that we 

experienced on September 11. We have been hearing constant warning about terrorists seeking to obtain and deploy weapons of mass destruction. The cost in terms 

of dollar amounts and more importantly, human lives, has the potential to eclipse 

the horror this nation experienced on 9/11. 

I would also remind you that 30% of the federal inmate population incarcerated 

in federal correctional facilities are identified as being foreign born. It is therefore 

safe to say that many more people die in our country each and every year because 
80

of crimes committed by alien criminals than were killed as a result of the terror 

attacks of September 11. Alien criminals are involved in everything from drug trafficking (an activity that has, in many instances, been linked to terrorist organizations) ethnic organized crime groups, including violent gangs and whitecollar criminal activities which again, have been shown, in some instances, to have links to terrorist organizations. 

I know that you have asked me a relatively short question, and that I have responded with a rather lengthy response. I have done this because of how certain 

I am as to the rightness of my response and I want to make it abundantly clear 

that there are definite reasons that I hold these beliefs.

Question: 3. For a merger between COP and ICE to address the concerns 

you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the headquarters 

operations would have to be part of the merger? 

Response: 3. I believe that beyond adequate funding for both the enforcement of 

the border components of the program and the interior enforcement efforts, we need 

to have coordination of both elements at the field office level and also need to coordinate these efforts with the benefits program to address the concerns of the GAO 

when that agency prepared a report on a study on the issue of immigration benefit 

fraud in February 2002, that stated that fraud was a pervasive problem throughout 

the immigration benefit program. The 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel made 

it clear that in preparing to attack our nation, these enemies of our nation traveled 

frequently and extensively and probably could not have attacked us had they been 

unable to travel in that fashion. A United States passport would go a long way to 

facilitate the travel of a terrorist not only to easily cross our nation’s borders, but 

to enter into many other countries inasmuch as the United States passport is considered the ‘‘gold standard’’ of passports throughout much of the world. Immigration 

benefit fraud can put an alien on the road to that highly coveted United States passport. While we are on the topic of the United States passport, we also need to seek 

simple solutions to problems as well. When an alien naturalizes, the law states that 

the new citizen may take any name that he or she desires at the time of naturalization. When a naturalized citizen applies for a United States passport, the only name 

that the passport generally reflects is the name that is on the naturalization certificate. I believe that it would make sense to make certain that the United States 

passport should also contain the name that the alien used prior to being naturalized 

so that if such a person was wanted in a foreign country under his/her original 

name, they wouldn’t be able to circumvent a name-based watch list in another country. This would enhance the security of that other country and may also help our 

nation keep better track of those who may pose a threat. This would not cost anything and may make us a bit safer. There are other such things that can be done 

at little or no cost to improve security. 

The 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel noted the many identity documents that 

the terrorists used. I believe that the issuance of driver’s licenses to illegal aliens 

must stop immediately. I have heard many people who favor open borders voice concerns about the use of driver’s licenses as national identity documents. Frankly, 

they are too late. We have been using these documents in that fashion for quite 

some time. Any significant purchase in a store will most times trigger a request to 

see a driver’s license whether you pay by check or credit card. Entry into sensitive 

buildings in the private sector as well as government often requires the display of 

a driver’s license. Boarding an airplane or train also triggers that request. The only 

problem is, driver’s licenses are not secure identity documents, we only pretend that 

they are. I have often said that the only thing worse than no security is false security. The demand of a driver’s license at present is the equivalent of whistling past 

a graveyard. It may give us comfort, but it changes nothing. Only criminals and undercover agents would lie about their true identities. Undercover agents who work 

for our government are no threat to our well-being. Criminals and terrorists are. 

The argument that illegal aliens will drive with or without driver’s licenses shows 

the level of contempt that currently exists for our laws. We currently take away 

driving privileges from motorists who are arrested for drunk driving to protect the 

rest of the population. We often hear about a drunk driver who drives a car without 

a license, gets into an accident and kills someone. I wonder if those who argue that 

illegal aliens will drive whether or not they have a license would argue against taking licenses from convicted drunk drivers on the same grounds—‘‘That they will 

drive anyway.’’

It is crucial that we deter illegal immigration and not by simply posting more Border Patrol agents along our nation’s borders. We need to create an effective immigration system that is fair, consistent, and effective and prevents illegal aliens who 

get past the Border Patrol or the inspector at the port of entry from conducting busi-
81

ness as usual. This would deprive an alien who has no lawful right to be in the 

United States the reasons to come here in the first place. A prudent homeowner 

would not allow a stranger in without looking though the peephole to make certain 

that the person knocking on the door is of no danger should he be allowed in. This 

country should do no less. Our nation’s military is currently attempting to secure 

the borders of Iraq to stop terrorists and insurgents. It appears to be working. We 

should do no less for our nation and our citizens. An effective, coordinated effort, 

aimed at the enforcement and administration of the immigration laws would go a 

long way to protect our homeland. 

Please note: 

If I can be of further assistance to you or other members of the Subcommittee 

or members of your respective staffs, please do not hesitate to contact me. I welcome 

the opportunity to contribute to efforts intended to enhance the security of our nation. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY KENNETH C. KLUG SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON

Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and CBP 

to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part of 

DHS’s genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been paid to 

inter-bureau coordination? 

Response: 1. It is clear that much could be done in the area of inter-agency coordination. First and foremost the agency heads should be held accountable for maintaining effective working relationships. By all accounts there is a rift between CBP 

and ICE at the highest levels.

Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely 

anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations over 

the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE coordination was 

heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors had a good personal 

relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be worthwhile wouldn’t 

it have to affect more than just the headquarters components? 

Response: 2. Absolutely, the entire organization needs to report through their respective chains of command to Headquarters and Headquarters needs to hold principal field officers accountable for maintaining effective and complimentary working 

relationships. This is analogous to nothing more than establishing a detective division within the existing CBP structure.

Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may not 

have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management had 

taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components? 

Response: 3. Perhaps, but it’s difficult to speculate. Clear leadership would have 

offset some if not many of the difficulties encountered. BTS could have required the 

components to establish clear cut mission statements, communicate expectations, 

provided resources, and held agency heads accountable for maintaining effective 

working relationships. BTS has also treated ICE in a disparate fashion with regard 

to resources. TSA held a widely publicized award ceremony and the Under Secretary 

for BTS participated in the CBP awards ceremony. Conversely ICE inadequate 

funding levels resulted in no awards for personnel. This added to the already debilitated morale of employees.

Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns which 

lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is involved, the 

Deputy Secretary level? 

Response: 4. I would agree. Furthermore, due to the size of the organization and 

their responsibilities the Undersecretary and/or Deputy Secretary are too far removed from the day-to-day operations of the respective organizations.

Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn’t the key issue making sure that 

policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol agents, 

CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate operations 

and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible level? 

Response: 5. These are important issues but the separation has also caused duplication of effort, duplicative administrative processes and the inefficient utilization 

of resources.

Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the Arizona 

desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command structure 
82

of the ABC initiative—a task force of CBP and ICE personnel headed by the 

Border Patrol sector chief Do you believe that creating additional task 

forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an ICE agent-in-charge or 

a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? 

Response: 6. Many question the success of the ABC. Personally I feel that the flood 

of migrants should have been monitored more closely from the onset. Had enough 

attention been paid to the slowly rising pattern more effected action could have been 

taken earlier, negating the need for the task force and consequently the tax dollars 

spent on it. Although task force initiatives may be worthwhile in some instances, 

agencies should not be relying solely on the efforts of principal field officers. Direction and leadership need to come from Washington and not negotiated in the field.

Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control, wouldn’t it also 

make sense to extend this model to other missions such as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? 

Response: 7. Again this is the underpinning of the fallacy. There is no ‘‘interior 

enforcement strategy’’ and you cannot separate the functions. They are both border 

related. If carried to the logical conclusion under the ‘‘interior enforcement strategy’’, are the functions at inland international airports and seaports interior enforcement? Certainly not, their duties are border related. ICE does not have jurisdiction 

unless people or merchandise cross a b–o–r–d–e–r.

Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be lessened 

if the Administration decided to fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? 

Response: 8. I am not well versed enough in this arena to answer this question 

but will restate that ICE has experienced significant financial hardship and operations have been adversely impacted.

Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration policy 

within DHS? IS it one person? Would the Department be better off if one 

individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall immigration 

policy? 

Response: 9. I would suggest along with many others, that a comprehensive review 

of the nations immigration policy is in order. A bipartisan approach similar the 9-

11 Commission should be taken. To illustrate the problem of dealing with the problem without a comprehensive plan, many suggest that we continue to hire additional BP officers in order to control the border. This approach has not and will not 

work. This will do little good if we do not have the funding or the facilities to house 

apprehended aliens. They are literally ‘‘caught and released’’. It does little good to 

issue appearance notices when the vast majority fail to appear.

Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security into CBP and ICE? 

Response: 10. As I stated in my March 9th, 2005 written testimony to the subcommittee ‘‘It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the Office of Investigations, 

that the concept of ICE and the subsequent division of the Customs Service was fatally flawed from its inception. Frankly, the creation of ICE was tantamount to 

building a house without a foundation.Many in the law enforcement community 

found it quizzical as to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, 

such as Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in the 

transition. The logic behind the concept of ice became even more arcane when the 

Federal Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency responsible for guarding government 

buildings, was taken from under the General Services Administration and placed 

within ICE. To date, not a single individual I have spoken with in the federal government can supply any reason for incorporating F.P.S. into this border protection 

agency. Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive review or 

issue a written report relative to the complexity or feasibility of combining these diverse agencies. Apparently no study, cursory or in depth, was requested or produced 

in anticipation of the proposed separation. I am certain that if an independent group 

such as the G.A.O. had conducted a study, the separation would have never been 

recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my coworkers believed 

then and continue to feel that the proposed division of Customs and INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on the part of those individuals in the administration who proposed it. They certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions 

of the two agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved to substantiate 

that belief.’’
83

Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border initiative? 

Do you think this program is this program working? Do you have concerns 

about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration law? Can 

you please discuss your concerns in primary inspections and secondary inspections? 

Response: 11. Inspectional (CBP) personnel would best address this question.

Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from 

Customs and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their 

best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that 

Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo 

containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I 

worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because of 

the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors. 

a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and investigators before the creation of DHS? 

Customs Agents and Inspectors were closely aligned, roles clearly established and programs were integrated. That does not appear to be 

the case with INS Inspectors and Agents. 

b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how 

has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? 

The relationships vary by location. In many instances legacy relationships 

exist and are working. Unfortunately, these will deteriorate over time due 

to attrition. In other location the entities do not interact. 

Many walls have surfaced. As an example CBP has decided that the release 

of a passenger baggage declaration or a customs entry for imported merchandise is subject to the ‘‘third agency rule’’. In some instances agents 

have been escorted from Inspectional areas and CBP has pulled back from 

joint intelligence operations such as ICAT and the EXODUS command center. 

CBP has compensated for the loss of the agents by establishing their own 

intelligence division, foreign offices and investigators referred to as 1895–

Es. 

There is much duplication of effort. 

c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? 

Any perceived benefit is clearly outweighed by the negatives. 

d. What is the impact on CBP’s cargo security mission? 

Inspectional personnel would best address this question, however, many of 

the functions that were performed by the agents are now being performed 

by the inspectors. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY KENNETH C. KLUG SUBMITTE FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE KENDRICK B. MEEK

Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to have CPB and ICE created as separate operational agencies? 

Response: 1. As I stated in my March 9th, 2005 written testimony to the subcommittee ‘‘It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the Office of Investigations, 

that the concept of ICE and the subsequent division of the Customs Service was fatally flawed from its inception. Frankly, the creation of ICE was tantamount to 

building a house without a foundation. Many in the law enforcement community 

found it quizzical as to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, 

such as Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in the 

transition. The logic behind the concept of ICE became even more arcane when the 

Federal Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency responsible for guarding government 

buildings, was taken from under the General Services Administration and placed 

within ICE. To date, not a single individual I have spoken with in the federal government can supply any reason for incorporating F.P .S. into this border protection 

agency. Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive review or 

issue a written report relative to the complexity or feasibility of combining these diverse agencies. Apparently no study, cursory or in depth, was requested or produced 

in anticipation of the proposed separation. I am certain that if an independent group 

such as the G.A.O. had conducted a study, the separation would have never been 

recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my coworkers believed 

then and continue to feel that the proposed division of Customs and INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on the part of those individuals in the administration who proposed it. They certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions 

of the two agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved to substantiate 

that belief.’’
84

Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to merge 

ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be taken 

to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? 

Response: 2. Not to merge the agencies would be a grave mistake. What has been 

need and should be instituted immediately is to identify clear mission statements, 

priorities and roles and responsibilities for the respective entities. Currently the impacted elements have been required to negotiate Memorandums of Agreement. This 

is no substitute for leadership. There are redundant systems and the entities are 

‘‘mission creeping’’. The Border Patrol has reestablished it’s prosecutions units that 

conduct investigations and OFO is contemplating expanding their investigative 

functions as well. Should the current organizational structure continue the Department and BTS needs to clarify missions and expectations.

Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns 

you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the headquarters 

operations would have to be part of the merger? 

Response: 3. We will not realize the goals of ‘‘one face at the border’’ until all entities with a responsibility for border enforcement are under one roof, pursuing the 

same priorities and reporting to one management structure. Although there may be 

separate functions within the component parts the efficiencies of Government will 

not be addressed unless they are marching in the same direction. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY DAVID J. VENTURALLA SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON

Question 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and CBP 

to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part of 

DHS’s genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been paid to 

inter-bureau coordination? 

Response: 1. It is my opinion that very little has been done to coordinate the 

strengths and capabilities of ICE and CBP in an effort to protect our homeland. 

With the lone exception of the ABC initiative, DHS, in particular has not provided 

the direction and leadership necessary to capitalize on this opportunity.

Question 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely 

anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations over 

the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE coordination was 

heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors had a good personal 

relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be worthwhile wouldn’t 

it have to affect more than just the headquarters components? 

Response: 2. Coordination must start at the top. DHS and the headquarter components of ICE and CBP must develop the culture and structure that will facilitate 

coordination and communication at all levels. ICE has done little to foster communication and coordination within its own organization and even less with CBP. The 

leadership at ICE has failed to recognize the important elements that make an organization successful.

Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may not 

have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management had 

taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components? 

Response: 3. I agree with your assessment. BTS and the Department should have 

taken a more active role.

Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns which 

lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is involved, the 

Deputy Secretary level? 

Response: 4. I do not agree with that assessment. The problems that exist today 

are the result of weak leadership, poor planning and poor organizational decisions 

made early on by the Department. For example, the ‘‘shared service’’ concept was 

well intended but the lack of oversight by the Department has only served to widen 

the rift between ICE, CBP and CIS.

Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn’t the key issue making sure that 

policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol agents, 

CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate operations 

and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible level? 

Response: 5.

Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border Control 

(ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the Arizona 
85

desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command structure 

of the ABC initiative—a task force of CBP and ICE personnel headed by the 

Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating additional task 

forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an ICE agent-in-charge or 

a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts?

Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control, wouldn’t it also 

make sense to extend this model to other missions such as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? 

DHS and BTS operational policy and procedural guidance on many important issues 

have not been forthcoming. In the two years the Department has been in existence, 

only a handful of instructions have been generated. As a result, ICE and CBP are 

allowed to act independent of one another thereby creating redundant operations 

and processes. This lack of direction only exacerbates the problems that exist between ICE and CBP. 

Response: 6 and 7. Task forces are one way of executing an operation; however, 

the impact of task force operations is very short in duration and does little to sustain the positive results achieved when the task force is dissolved. 

What is lacking in the Department is a long-range strategy that is supported by 

initiatives which compliment on another. Without a comprehensive border and interior enforcement strategy, initiatives such as ABC are only marginally successful as 

it relates to securing the border.

Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be lessened 

if the Administration decided to fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? 

Response: 8. With or without the enhancements, the vulnerabilities we have in 

border security and interior enforcement would still occur because there is a lack 

of a common mission and strategic focus. Throwing money at the problem will not 

solve the problem.

Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration policy 

within DHS? IS it one person? Would the Department be better off if one 

individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall immigration 

policy? 

Response: 9. Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the responsibility of immigration policy was located under one person and one organization. As we all recall, this didn’t work well either. The structure of the organization 

did not contribute to this failure; rather, it was the lack of leadership and vision 

that failed this country. I do support the creation of a directorate for policy and 

planning that would report to the Secretary with the Deputy Secretary having responsibility for policy implementation and operational execution.

Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border Security into CBP and ICE? 

Response: 10. I believe the Administration saw a logical break—border (CBP) 

versus interior (ICE) when it started to realign and distribute functions. I also believe they envisioned a new tool to secure the borders and improve overall enforcement that could potentially occur as a result of the merger of custom statutory authorities and assets with immigration authorities and assets. Because of the lack 

of leadership and vision, the development of these powerful tools has not come to 

fruition. 

Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border initiative? 

Do you think this program is this program working? Do you have concerns 

about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration law? Can 

you please discuss your concerns in primary inspections and secondary inspections? 

Response: 11. It is my opinion that ‘‘The One Face at the Border’’ initiative only 

addresses operational efficiencies and morale issues. It is not a strategy to improve 

security at our ports of entry and at our borders. In fact, without the inclusion of 

the U.S. Coast Guard, this initiative is incomplete. 

I do not have any concerns about the ability of inspectors to learn both customs 

and immigration law. When I was attending my basic training at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Academy as a deportation officer, I had to learn basic customs law. I believe inspectors from the former Customs Service and Immigration 

and Naturalization Service have been provided a basic foundation in both sets of 

statutes and learning the nuance of the laws would not pose a concern. 
86

I have no specific concerns regarding inspectors performing their duties during 

the primary and secondary process. I remain concerned about the information an 

inspector, in particular at a land border port of entry, has available to make their 

decisions.

12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from Customs 

and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their best source 

of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo containers, 

and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I worry that CBP 

programs will not achieve their full potential because of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.

Questions: 

a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and investigators 

before the creation of DHS? 

b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how has 

CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? 

c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? 

d. What is the impact on CBP’s cargo security mission? 

Response: 12. I cannot to respond to these specific questions regarding the relationship of Customs Inspectors and former Custom Agents. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES BY DAVID J. VENTURELLA SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY THE HONORABLE KENDRICK B. MEEK

Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the Administration to have CPB and ICE created as separate operational agencies? 

Response: 1. I believe the Administration saw a logical break—border (CBP) versus 

interior (ICE) when it started to realign and distribute functions. I also believe they 

envisioned a new tool to secure the borders and improve overall enforcement that 

could potentially occur as a result of the merger of custom statutory authorities and 

assets with immigration authorities and assets. Because of the lack of leadership 

and vision, the development of these powerful tools has not come to fruition.

Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to merge 

ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be taken 

to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? 

Response: 2. As I stated in my testimony, I would recommend a thorough examination of the components of each bureau and redistributing programs to provide a logical alignment of operations, assets as well as the integration of appropriate resources. In that vein, I would recommend placing customs, immigration and agriculture port assets under CBP and immigration enforcement assets under ICE. The 

Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshals Service should be moved 

elsewhere in the department. The mismatch of functions and overlapping areas of 

responsibilities has served merely to diminish DHS’s focus on enforcement.

Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns 

you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the headquarters 

operations would have to be part of the merger? 

Response: 3. While I do not support the merger of the two bureaus, for this organization to be successful, someone with a sense of vision needs to lead the new bureau. This leader must be able to see down the road, examine the threats to our 

country and develop a plan on how take the current organization beyond in current 

capabilities to an organization that can overcome the threats of the future.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Meek, I appreciate your effort in holding 

this very important hearing to analyze the proposed efficiencies of the new consolidated bureaus of the Border and Transportation Security. The purpose of establishing the Department of Homeland Security was to facilitate greater communication and coordination. According to a report from the General Accounting Office 

(GAO), DHS has had mixed results in this regard. While many of the field officials 

with whom GAO spoke were pleased with the communication and coordination they 

had with other DHS immigration programs, problems still exist. The purpose of the 

hearing today is to learn about the communication problems within DHS between 

the bureaus of Customs and Boarder Patrol (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE). 
87

I am particularly interested in the way the cooperation between CBP and ICE has 

affected the government’s efforts to deal with commercial alien smuggling operations. CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on each bureau’s roles and responsibilities regarding how they would transfer the assets of anti-smuggling investigators from the Border Patrol to ICE, and how they would handle anti-smuggling investigations after the transfer of these investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly 

issued by CBP and ICE in April 2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector chiefs in 

field locations outlined each program’s basic responsibilities. ICE would assume responsibility for administrative support; funding of the anti-smuggling investigators; 

and all investigations and complex cases such as international in nature or related 

to organizations or national security. The Border Patrol would have lead responsibility for cross-border and border related interdiction activities, such as surveillance 

to interdict illegal border crossings. 

According to the GAO report, these efforts have not been fully successful. Visits 

to the field and conversations with DHS employees suggest the reason for this is 

that alien smuggling cases traditionally arose from inspectors, border patrol agents 

or adjudicators noticing patterns or trends. The dissolution of INS has cut the connections between the agents who investigate alien smuggling and frontline personnel. In the same vein, fewer Customs investigations were generated based on 

leads from inspectors. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I would hope that the questions that this 

body will pose to the witnesses will bring us closer to initiating action to address 

the problems and areas of vulnerability that exist in our border security program.

Æ