In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00149-CR 

DENNIS RAY COOK, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2012-472,011, Honorable Mark Hocker, Presiding 

 

October 30, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Appellant Dennis Ray Cook, appearing pro se, appeals his conviction for the 

offense of public intoxication and the resulting fine of $50. Through one issue, he 

challenges the court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We will affirm. 

Background

Appellant was charged via information with the offense of public intoxication. He 

filed a “motion to suppress illegal arrest,” on which the court held a hearing. Officer 
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David Babcock with the Texas Tech University Police Department was the only witness 

to testify at the hearing. 

His testimony showed Babcock was on duty during a Texas Tech home football 

game in November 2011 when he received a dispatch that a Department of Public 

Safety trooper had reported a person was “passed out” on the sidewalk. Babcock and 

two other officers responded to the location, “on a sidewalk near the north end of Dan 

Law Field, near Drive of Champions and the entrance way into the parking lot of Dan 

Law Field.” When the officers arrived, they found appellant lying on the sidewalk, an 

area Babcock testified was a public place. 

Babcock approached appellant, finding him to be disoriented with a “dazed-type 

look” and slurred speech. Babcock also smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from 

appellant’s breath and body. Appellant’s eyes were red, watery, glassy, and bloodshot. 

Babcock told the court that once appellant had been helped to his feet, “he was swaying 

and appeared to be unbalanced on his feet,” and required assistance to walk.

Babcock testified he saw a cut on the bridge of appellant’s nose and a bruise on 

his cheek. He said he asked appellant “what happened,” but appellant did not want to 

answer. When Babcock attempted to question him further, appellant told him he was a 

law student, that he knew the law, and that he did not have to answer any questions. 

Appellant also told the officer that it was not any of his business and that he knew what 

he could say and what he did not have to say. Babcock testified appellant said these 

things with an “attitude.”
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Babcock placed appellant under arrest, handcuffed him, and placed him in a 

police unit to await the EMS van. The officer explained to the court that the medical 

responders would determine whether appellant should be taken to the hospital or could 

be taken to jail. Appellant was taken to jail.

During testimony regarding the circumstances that caused him to believe 

appellant was then a danger to himself or others, Babcock explained that appellant 

could have walked out into the street, walked out in front of a car exiting or entering the 

parking lot or been hit by a bus.

The trial court heard argument and denied the motion to suppress. The case was 

heard by a jury in January 2014. Officer Babcock testified as the sole State’s witness 

during the guilt-innocence phase of trial; appellant testified as the sole defense witness. 

The jury found appellant guilty of the offense of public intoxication and punishment was 

assessed as noted. This appeal followed. 

Analysis

Through his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to suppress because probable cause did not exist to 

arrest him for the offense of public intoxication. Appellant challenges only the 

reasonableness of Babcock’s conclusion he was, at the time of his arrest, a danger to 

himself or others. He does not contest the evidence he was intoxicated or that showing 

he was in a public place.
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A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is generally reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01(1)(6) (West 2012); Oles v. State, 993 

S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to 

suppress under the bifurcated standard enunciated in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 

87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier 

of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimony. Rodriguez v. State, 191 S.W.3d 428, 440 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2006, 

pet. ref’d), citing State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almost total 

deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and application-of-law-tofact questions that turn on credibility and demeanor. Perales v. State, 117 S.W.3d 434, 

437 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). We review de novo application-of-law-tofact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. In the absence of explicit 

fact findings, we assume that the trial court's ruling is based on implicit fact findings 

supported in the record. Perales, 117 S.W.3d at 437; see Carmouche v. State, 10 

S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (recognizing implicit fact findings). We then 

review de novo whether the facts, express or implied, are sufficient to provide legal 

justification for admitting the complained-of evidence. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 

530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

A person commits the offense of public intoxication if he appears in a public 

place while intoxicated to the degree that he may endanger himself or another. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.02 (West 2003). The test for whether probable cause exists for a 

public intoxication arrest is whether the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest 
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would warrant a prudent person in believing that a suspect, albeit intoxicated, was in 

any way a danger to himself or another person. Rodriguez, 191 S.W.3d at 445-46, citing 

Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Proof of 

potential danger to the defendant or others is enough to satisfy the endangerment 

requirement for the offense of public intoxication. Riggan v. State, No. 07-09-00227-CR, 

2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5497, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 19, 2011, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication), citing Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 184 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (applying former version of public intoxication 

statute).

The existence of probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances. 

Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Probable cause for a 

warrantless arrest requires that the officer have a reasonable belief that, based on facts 

and circumstances within the officer's personal knowledge, or of which the officer has 

reasonably trustworthy information, an offense has been committed. Torres v. State,

182 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When a court deals with probable cause, 

it deals with probabilities. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed 

527(1982); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. A showing of probable cause requires less 

evidence than is necessary to support a conviction. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87, 

Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 182. 

From Babcock’s testimony, the trial court could have determined that the officer 

found appellant in an intoxicated and disoriented state lying on the sidewalk, at a 
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location1and time of heavy traffic2associated with a home football game; that appellant 

then exhibited wounds to his nose and face, the cause of which were unknown; and that 

appellant, when assisted to his feet, was unsteady and swaying. Based on those facts, 

the trial court rather clearly could have agreed with Babcock’s conclusion that appellant 

was in danger of injury from the traffic.3 See Patterson v. State, No. 01-11-00054-CR, 

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1584, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 1, 2012, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting contention similar 

testimony was “too speculative” to satisfy danger requirement; collecting cases).

The suppression hearing testimony gave the trial court evidence on which to 

conclude the arresting officer had probable cause to believe appellant was intoxicated in 

a public place to the degree he posed a danger to himself or others, and thus was 

committing the offense of public intoxication. The court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying appellant’s motion to suppress. 

 

1 We take judicial notice that Dan Law Field is Texas Tech’s baseball field, located about one 

block west of its football stadium on the campus. See TEX. R. EVID. 201.

2

Babcock agreed, on cross-examination, that he considered “the amount of foot traffic and 

vehicular traffic on [the adjacent street] to be “unsafe,” and agreed he considered “a person 

demonstrating the degree of intoxication that [appellant] did at that close proximity to a street with that 

much vehicular, including busses, and pedestrian traffic in danger.”

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Indeed, we think Babcock’s testimony that appellant was in danger of being hit by a car or bus 

in the adjacent street and parking lot entrance provided only a partial list of apparent dangers to himself 

and others from appellant’s circumstances. A person lying on the sidewalk in an area of such heavy 

pedestrian traffic is at risk of being stepped on or stumbled over by passing pedestrians. 
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Conclusion

We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

James T. Campbell

 Justice

Do not publish.