[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-15803

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-21842-JLK

MARK HORNE,

an individual,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

JULIE MARTIN-HORNE,

an individual,

 Plaintiff,

 versus

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,

a foreign corporation

d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Line,

d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines,

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(June 29, 2018)

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Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Mark Horne (“Horne”) appeals the district court’s grant of Carnival’s 

motion for summary judgment on his claim for negligent failure to warn of a 

dangerous condition on a cruise ship, and for negligent maintenance. On their 

honeymoon, Horne and his wife Julie were on the cruise ship Fascination, and 

went to take pictures of the sunset on an exterior deck. It was a very windy day, 

and when they desired to leave the exterior deck the couple had to go through a 

heavy metal door. A warning sign on the door said “CAUTION—WATCH YOUR 

STEP—HIGH THRESHOLD.” There was no other warning. Julie opened the 

door, but had trouble, so Horne grabbed the door along its edge and held it open. 

Once Horne walked through the door, he began to release it. The door slammed 

shut as Horne released it, closing before he could get his hand free and chopping 

off the fifth finger of his right hand at the distal joint. 

Horne brought suit against Carnival, alleging failure to warn of a dangerous 

condition and negligent maintenance of the door. The district court granted 

summary judgment to Carnival, finding that Carnival had no duty to warn because 

there was no evidence that Carnival was on notice, actual or constructive, of the 

dangerous condition and because the danger was open and obvious. This appeal 

followed.

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We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Quigg v. Thomas 

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is 

properly granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235 

(quotations and alteration omitted).

Because the injury occurred on navigable waters, federal admiralty law 

applies to this case. Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th 

Cir. 1990). To establish his claim for negligence, Horne must show that Carnival 

had a duty of care, breached that duty, and that breach was the proximate cause of 

Horne’s injury. “[A] cruise line owes its passengers a duty to warn of known 

dangers.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012). 

However, in order to have a duty to warn of a danger, the cruiseline must have 

“actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise 

Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989). Moreover, there is no duty to 

warn of open and obvious dangers. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. 

e (Am Law Inst. 1965); Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352, 357 (5th 

Cir. 2016); Frasca v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 654 F. App’x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 

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2016) (citing Lamb by Shepard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 

(11th Cir. 1993)). Whether a danger is open and obvious “is guided by the 

‘reasonable person’ standard.” Frasca, 654 F. App’x at 951.

The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Carnival 

had no duty of care (Horne alleges there was a duty to warn and a duty to maintain) 

and so Horne’s claims fail as a matter of law. As to failure to warn, the court held 

no duty existed for two reasons: (1) Carnival did not have actual or constructive 

notice of the allegedly hazardous condition; and (2) the hazard was open and 

obvious. The court separately held that Carnival had no notice that the door was in 

a dangerous condition, so the failure to maintain claim failed as well. We will 

address each holding in turn.

First, the district court held that there was no evidence that Carnival had 

either actual or constructive notice of the allegedly hazardous condition of the 

winds causing the door to slam. In Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275 

(11th Cir. 2015), we addressed actual or constructive notice in the context of a slip 

and fall case on a cruise ship. In that case, we held that “testimony of [witnesses]—

that warning signs were sometimes posted on the pool deck after rain—viewed in 

the light most favorable to [plaintiff], is enough to withstand summary judgment as 

to notice.” Id. at 1289. Likewise, in this case, there is evidence that the cruise line 

sometimes posted signs on the deck door in the event of strong winds. These signs 

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would read “caution, strong winds.” There was no such sign on the day of the 

incident. Viewed in the light most favorable to Horne, the evidence that Carnival, 

in the past, put up signs warning of strong winds creates a genuine issue of fact as 

to whether Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition.

Second, the district court held that the danger of the door slamming shut in 

high winds was open and obvious, so Carnival had no duty to warn. A cruise line 

does not “need to warn passengers or make special arrangements for open-andobvious risks.” Deperrodil, 842 F.3d at 357 (5th Cir. 2016); Malley v. Royal 

Caribbean Cruises Ltd, 713 F. App’x 905, 908 (11th Cir. 2017). In determining 

whether a risk is open and obvious, we focus on “what an objectively reasonable 

person would observe and do[] not take into account the plaintiff’s subjective 

perceptions.” Malley, 713 F. App’x at 908. 

The district court held that the windy conditions and the heavy door were 

open and obvious to a reasonable person. Moreover, a reasonable person would 

have used the handle of the door instead of holding it by the edge, as Horne did. 

Horne argues that the relevant danger is not the wind, or the heavy door, but rather 

the risk that the wind would cause the door to slam so hard and so fast that it would 

chop off his finger. Horne contends that this risk is not open and obvious to the 

reasonable person. Horne states that although he knew that the door was heavy and 

it was windy, he had no reason to believe the door would close so hard and fast

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that it chopped off his finger. He also states that he had no way of knowing that the 

door would slam shut so fast that, despite his best efforts, he could not remove his 

hand in time. Based on this testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Horne, 

we hold that a reasonable juror could find that this hazard was not open and 

obvious. Thus, we reverse with respect to the duty to warn claim.

Third, the district court held that Horne’s failure to maintain claim fails 

because there is no evidence that Carnival had notice that the door was in a 

dangerous condition. In order for Horne to succeed on his failure to maintain 

claim, he must show that Carnival had actual or constructive notice that the door 

was in a dangerous condition. Horne’s expert’s testimony that the door was in a 

dangerous condition is only relevant if Horne can first show that Carnival had 

actual or constructive notice of this danger. The only evidence Horne presents that 

Carnival had actual or constructive notice that the door was dangerous were two 

work orders entered, and subsequently closed, for repairs on the door. Plaintiff 

presents no evidence that these work orders were not actually performed; in fact, 

Carnival’s corporate representative testified that “closing” a work order indicates 

that the requested repairs have been completed. Thus, these work orders do not 

provide evidence that Carnival had notice that the door remained in a dangerous 

condition at the time of the incident. Viewed in the light most favorable to Horne, 

the work orders alone do not create a genuine issue of fact about whether Carnival 

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had actual or constructive notice that the door was in a dangerous condition at the 

time of the incident. Thus, the district court did not err with respect to the failure to 

maintain claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court with 

respect to the failure to maintain claim, but we reverse with respect to the claim of 

duty to warn. The district court’s grant of summary judgment is 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings 

not inconsistent with this opinion.

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