UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Miami Division

Case Number: 20-22240-CIV-MORENO

STEVEN GAMMONS, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., COX 

& COMPANY, LTD., and SOUFRIERE 

HOTWIRE RIDES, INC.,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

Plaintiff, Stephen Gammons, a cruise passenger suffered a leg injury while ziplining in 

St. Lucia. Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. sold Plaintiff the shore excursion, which was 

owned and operated by the co-defendants, Cox & Co., Ltd. and Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc. –

both based in St. Lucia. Defendants separately moved to dismiss on various grounds. The Court 

finds the Plaintiff fails to properly plead Royal Caribbean had notice or constructive notice of the 

unreasonably dangerous zipline. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim based on the existence of a 

joint venture since the agreement between Royal Caribbean and Cox & Co., Ltd. expressly 

disclaims that relationship. Finally, personal jurisdiction is lacking as to the St. Lucian 

Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.'s 

Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 21), Defendant Cox & Company, Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 22), 

and Defendant Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 32). 

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THE COURT has considered the motions, the responses, pertinent portions of the record, 

and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is

ADJUDGED that the Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended Complaint consistent with this order 

by September 16, 2021. It is also

ADJUDGED that Defendants, Cox & Company, Ltd. and Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc., 

are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

I. Background

Plaintiff suffered an orthopedic accident to his leg while on a zipline excursion during a 

cruise, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.’s Freedom of the Seas. The excursion was called the 

“Hotwire Pitons Zipline by the Sea” and Plaintiff booked it after receiving promotional material 

describing the activity from Defendant Royal Caribbean. Defendants Cox & Company, Ltd. and 

Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc., companies based in St. Lucia, own and operate the excursion 

pursuant to contracts with the cruise line (“Excursion Entities”). Defendant Royal Caribbean also 

sold tickets for the zipline excursion aboard the cruise ship. 

On May 30, 2019, Plaintiff and 56 other passengers from the Freedom of the Seas 

attended the zipline excursion. Plaintiff alleges that he was not assisted by guides or provided 

with a safety briefing prior to participating in the zipline, which is contrary to Royal Caribbean’s 

representations to him. While on the zipline, Plaintiff’s foot was caught below the platform from 

which he departed, causing him to sustain injuries to his tibia and fibula. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Royal Caribbean knew or should have known of the risk 

of harm because it engaged in an approval process, where Royal Caribbean ascertains that the 

operator is qualified. The excursion operators also provide the cruise line with details pertaining 

to the excursion, including the location, description, restrictions, and participation levels for the 

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excursion. The Defendant Royal Caribbean also inspected the excursion. After it approved the 

excursion, Royal Caribbean sent the excursion operators its standards, policies, and procedures 

that operators must follow while offering excursions to cruise passengers. Plaintiff alleges that 

Royal Caribbean conducts yearly site inspections of the excursion and requires the excursion 

operators to submit yearly reports to Royal Caribbean disclosing details of incidents that 

occurred involving cruise line passengers. 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserts three counts. The first count is a negligent 

failure to warn claim against Defendant Royal Caribbean. The second count is a negligence 

claim against the excursion entities. The third claim is a negligence claim against the three 

Defendants based on their joint venture. 

Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss argues that certain allegations regarding agency 

should be stricken, that the negligent failure to warn claim should be dismissed because the 

allegations do not suffice to establish that it was on notice of a dangerous condition, and that the 

joint venture claim fails based on the Tour Operator Agreement. 

The excursion entities filed motions to dismiss asserting the Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction as to them. Plaintiff agrees there is no general jurisdiction; the question at issue is 

whether the Court can exercise specific jurisdiction. 

II. Legal Standard

To state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While the Court must consider 

the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint as true, this rule “is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In 

addition, the complaint's allegations must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 

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127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). 

In practice, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief. Id. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific 

undertaking that requires the court to draw upon its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 

679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court may dismiss a case with prejudice if the allegations of a complaint, 

even when taken as true, afford no basis for relief or when amendment would be futile. E.g., Burger 

King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999); Chiron Recovery Ctr., LLC v. United 

Healthcare Servs., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2020).

III. Legal Analysis

A. Royal Caribbean’s Motion to Dismiss

1. Count 1: Negligent Failure to Warn

Under federal maritime law, the duty of care that cruise operators owe passengers is 

ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, “which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing 

liability, that the carrier have actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.” See 

Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989). A facet of the duty of 

care is the cruise operator’s “duty to warn of known dangers beyond the point of debarkation in 

places where passengers are invited or reasonably expected to visit.” Chaporro v. Carnival 

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Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012). The duty to warn only extends to dangers “which 

the carrier knows, or reasonably should have known” to exist. Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 

683 F. App’x 786, 794 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A]s a prerequisite to imposing liability, a carrier must 

have had ‘actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.’” (quoting Keefe, 867 F.2d 

at 1322); Serra-Cruz v. Carnival Corp., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (finding 

cruise line knew or should have known that ATV excursion was unreasonably dangerous based 

on prior similar incidents). 

To be held accountable on the direct negligence claim for failure to warn, the Plaintiff 

must plead that Royal Caribbean knew or should have known about the unreasonably dangerous 

condition. The parties dispute the sufficiency of the allegations in this regard. Unlike Serra-Cruz, 

where the plaintiff pled prior similar accidents on the ATV excursion, the Second Amended 

Complaint does not allege any prior accidents. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint asserts 

that Royal Caribbean’s initial approval process and yearly inspections put it on notice that the 

zipline excursion was unreasonably dangerous. Plaintiff complains that he was not assisted by 

guides or provided a safety briefing, but there are no allegations to show how Royal Caribbean 

knew or should have known that. For example, in Bailey v. Carnival Corp., 369 F. Supp. 3d 

1302, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2019), the court found the allegations of notice sufficient where the 

conditions causing the plaintiff’s accident were noted by prior adverse comment cards submitted 

by passengers who participated in the zipline tour. The Second Amended Complaint does not 

allege there are prior adverse comment cards.

What is left to establish notice is the cruise line’s initial approval process, its yearly 

inspection, and the operator’s status reports. In Mellnitz v. Carnival Corp., No. 18-24933-CIV, 

(S.D. Fla. April 15, 2019). the court addressed whether yearly inspections suffice to establish 

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notice. It said that a complaint must allege that “when [the cruise line] tested this excursion with 

its operator, it knew and experienced [the same dangerous condition] and so could have known 

that, going forward, passengers would be subjected to the same.” Id. at Motion to Dismiss Hr’g. 

Transcript at 14-15 (“[T]ell us how you know what Carnival knew. And it’s not just because they 

cleared the operator and picked them, that doesn’t mean that they knew all of the dangers that 

your client experienced.”). In Sanlu Zhang v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 19-20773-

CIV, 2019 WL 8895223, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2019), the court also recognized that 

generalized allegations regarding cruise line “inspections” of shore excursions are insufficient to 

establish notice. It states “[plaintiff] does not explain how any of Royal Caribbean’s alleged 

inspections of the Excursion Operators could have possibly alerted it to the dangerous condition 

that ultimately resulted in [plaintiff’s] injuries.”

In Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 2012 WL 2049431, *5 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012), 

the court dismissed the complaint where the plaintiff failed to allege facts from which it may be 

inferred that the cruise line either knew or should have known of any dangerous or unsafe 

condition associated with the zipline excursion. It is not enough to say that Royal Caribbean 

approved the excursion, inspected the excursion yearly, and received reports from the excursion 

entities yearly. Unless Plaintiff can allege that Royal Caribbean saw that there was no assistance 

provided, no safety briefing, or other unreasonably dangerous circumstances were present when 

it did the approval or the inspection, the allegations are insufficient to provide notice. Likewise, 

there are no facts alleged to show how Royal Caribbean knew or could have known that there 

was an unsafe distance between the platforms from which guests took off, or the unsafe manner 

in which the lines were secured, which caused Plaintiff’s foot to get stuck. Plaintiff relies on 

Adams v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-24578-CIV (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2020) to argue that the 

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allegations are sufficient to establish constructive notice. In Adams, however, the court found 

that the cruise lines initial and annual inspections, coupled with allegations of co-ownership and 

co-control of the excursion enterprise were sufficient at the pleading stage to establish notice. 

Here, there are no allegations of co-ownership of the ziplining excursion. Accordingly, the Court 

dismisses this claim without prejudice to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to properly plead notice. 

b. Count 3: Negligence based on Joint Venture

Plaintiff’s theory of Royal Caribbean’s vicarious liability is based on his assertion that 

Royal Caribbean and the excursion entities were engaged in a joint venture. The Eleventh 

Circuit recognizes several “signposts” or “likely indicia” that suggest the existence of a joint 

venture such that one defendant may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a joint 

venture partner. Ceithaml v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 

(citing Fulcher’s Point Pride Seafood, Inc. v. MN Theodora Maria, 935 F.2d 208, 211 (11th Cir. 

1991)). These include the (1) the intention of the parties to create a joint venture; (2) joint 

control or right of control; (3) joint proprietary interest in the subject matter of the joint venture;

(4) the right of all venturers to share in the profits; and (5) the duty of both to share in the losses.

Id. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the parties’ intentions are paramount to determine the 

existence of a joint venture. 

Although Plaintiff asserts that Royal Caribbean and the excursion entities entered a joint 

venture, Royal Caribbean rejects the premise citing to a provision in its Tour Operator 

Agreement. The Tour Operator Agreement was entered between Royal Caribbean and Cox & 

Co. It reads: 

Operator’s relationship with Cruise Line during the Term of this Agreement shall 

be that of an independent contractor . . . Nothing related in this Agreement shall 

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be construed as constituting Operator and Cruise Line as partners, or as treating 

the relationships of employer and employee, franchisor and franchisee, master and 

servant or principal and agent or joint venture between the parties hereto.

The agreement unequivocally establishes the parties’ intent in forming their relationship. 

Plaintiff argues that the agreement falls outside of the four corners of the complaint and the 

Court cannot consider it in ruling on a motion to dismiss. Courts in this district have dismissed 

joint venture claims with prejudice based on the same or nearly identical language to the one in 

this case. Zapata v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 12-21897-CIV, 2013 WL 1296298, at *6 

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) (“[T]he unambiguous language of the [Tour Operator Agreement] 

directly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations and warrants dismissal of Plaintiff’s joint venture 

claim.”); Doria v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 19-20179-CIV (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2019) 

(dismissing joint venture claim with prejudice because the contract “unambiguously showed no 

intention on the part of Carnival to enter into a joint venture with excursion companies.”). 

To address the Plaintiff’s contention that the agreement falls outside the Complaint’s four 

corners, both Zapata and Doria state that the plaintiffs put the agreement at the center of the joint 

venture claim. Likewise, in this complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean and the 

Excursion Entities entered into an agreement where Royal Caribbean would sell the excursions, 

and the Excursion Entities would run the operation. Plaintiff describes the relationship as a joint 

venture. In both Zapata and Doria, the courts found that they could consider the undisputed 

agreement, central to the joint venture claim and referenced in the complaint, without converting 

the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Because the Tour Operator 

Agreement expressly contradicts the Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds it appropriate to 

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dismiss the Plaintiff’s joint venture claim with prejudice. See also Barham v. Royal Caribbean 

Cruises, Ltd., No. 20-22627 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2021).1 

c. Request to Strike Language

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Defendant requests the Court strike 

language in the Second Amended Complaint regarding an alleged agency relationship because 

the complaint lacks any agency theory of negligence. “A ‘court may strike from any pleading 

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material.” 

Williams v. Delray Auto Mall, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2013). “A motion to strike is 

intended to clean up the pleadings, removing irrelevant or otherwise confusing materials.” Id.

There is no cause of action alleging that the excursion entities were Royal Caribbean’s agents, 

such that Royal Caribbean would be vicariously liable for the actions of its agents. Therefore, the 

Court finds the allegations immaterial and strikes the language of paragraphs 36 and 38. 

B. Motions to Dismiss by the Excursion Entities

The Excursion Entities, Cox & Company Limited and Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc., are 

St. Lucian corporations that do not have offices in Florida. Plaintiff’s allegations are identical as 

to each Excursion Entity, so the Court treats them together even though they move separately to 

dismiss. Plaintiff’s responses to each of the motions to dismiss abandons any claim for general 

and/or Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction. The issue before the Court is whether it can exercise specific 

personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193(1)(a). 

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient facts to establish specific personal 

jurisdiction over the Excursion Entities, both nonresident defendants. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 

1 Although Defendant Soufriere was not a party to the Tour Operator Agreement, the agreement shows Royal 

Caribbean’s intent not to enter a joint venture. Because the Court finds that there is no personal jurisdiction as to 

Soufriere Hotwire Rides, in any event, there are alternative grounds to dismiss this Defendant. 

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S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013). When the defendant “submits affidavits 

contrary to the allegations in the complaint, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce 

evidence supporting personal jurisdiction, unless the defendant’s affidavits contain only 

conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction. Stubbs v. Wyndham 

Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). But when the 

plaintiff offers no competent evidence to the contrary, “a district court may find that the 

defendant’s unrebutted denials [are] sufficient to negate plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations.” 

Chimene v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 16-23775-CIV, 2017 WL 1536055, at *1 (S.D. 

Fla. April 5, 2017). 

The Second Amended Complaint, at paragraphs 10 and 11, sets forth the jurisdictional 

allegations. Plaintiff alleges that specific jurisdiction is satisfied by the following activities of 

the Excursion Entities: “(a) reaching out to Florida-based cruise lines, insurers, cruise industry 

associates, and/or premium financing companies for purposes of operating, conducting, engaging 

in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state; and/or (b) contractually agreeing to 

indemnify Florida based cruise lines (entities mostly located in Miami and Fort Lauderdale) for 

any harm resulting to cruise passengers, thereby insuring a “person, property, or risk located 

within this state.” Plaintiff also relies on the agreement entered by the Defendant Cox & Co. and 

Royal Caribbean, which contains a choice-of-law clause designating Florida law as the 

governing law and contains a provision where the Excursion Entities agree to jurisdiction in 

Florida.

“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over causes of action arising from 

or related to the defendant’s actions within Florida and concerns a nonresident defendant’s 

contacts with Florida only as those contacts related to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Wolf, 683 

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F. App’x at 793. To exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the cause of 

action sued upon must “arise from” certain enumerated acts occurring within Florida. The “arise 

from” language contained in § 48.193(1)(a) is referred to as the “connexity” requirement. 

Zapata, 2013 WL 1100028, at *2. Plaintiff’s allegations that the Excursion Entities had contacts 

in this state do not relate to specific personal jurisdiction. The Second Amended Complaint 

alleges the Excursion Entities’ negligence occurred in St. Lucia, where the Excursion Entities are 

incorporated and maintain their principal place of business. Plaintiff cannot allege how the 

Excursion Entities committed a tort in Florida and fails to establish specific jurisdiction based on 

any tort claims related to his accident in St. Lucia. In Wolf, the cruise passenger alleged injuries 

during a shore excursion, and the Eleventh Circuit found that specific jurisdiction could not be 

exercised for this exact reason. Id., 683 F. App’x at 793 (“Mr. Wolf does not allege that OCT 

committed a tortious act in Florida and cannot assert specific jurisdiction based on any tort 

claims related to the incident that occurred in Costa Rica.”); Chimene, 2017 WL 1536055, at *3 

(finding no specific jurisdiction over MC Tours, “which requires a nexus between the alleged 

tort and MC Tours’ activities in Florida.”). 

Next, the Second Amended Complaint cites to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(9) to allege 

that Cox & Co. consented to jurisdiction in Florida when it executed the Tour Operator 

Agreement with Royal Caribbean. Defendant Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc. is not a party to the 

Tour Operator Agreement, but Plaintiff contends that Soufriere benefits from the Tour Operator 

Agreement between Cox & Co. and Royal Caribbean. Because Soufriere’s business comes from 

the cruise ship passengers and Cox pays Soufriere a “flat fee” for each passenger. 

Section 48.193(1)(a)(9), Florida Statutes, grants parties the right to confer personal 

jurisdiction by contract, but the contract must comply with sections 685.101 and 685.102 of the 

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Florida Statutes. See Fla. Stat., § 48.193(1)(a)(9); see also Corp. Creations Enters. LLC v. Brian 

R. Fons Attorney at Law, P.C., 225 So. 3d 296, 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[S]ections 685.101 

and 685.102 allow parties to confer jurisdiction on the courts of Florida by contract alone if 

certain requirements are met.”) (alteration added). “[T]o satisfy Florida’s statutory requirements, 

a contract must: (1) include a choice of law provision designating Florida law as the governing 

law; (2) include a provision whereby the non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the 

courts of Florida; (3) involve consideration of not less than $250,000; (4) not violate the United 

States Constitution; and (5) either bear a substantial or reasonable relation to Florida or have at 

least one of the parties be a resident of Florida or incorporated under its laws.” Johnson v. Royal 

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (internal quotations 

omitted).

The glaring problem with Plaintiff’s argument is that he is not a party to the Tour 

Operator Agreement between Royal Caribbean and Cox & Co. Carmouche v. Carnival Corp., 36 

F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“Plaintiff is not a party to the shore excursion contract, 

and, therefore, may not be able to enforce the conferral of jurisdiction clause.”), aff’d at 789 F.3d 

1201 (11th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that even as a non-signatory passenger he 

can sue Excursion Entities in Florida courts. The Second Amended Complaint does not, 

however, claim any third-party beneficiary status, which is ultimately without a difference. In 

making his argument, Plaintiff relies on several provisions of the Tour Operator Agreement: 

It is anticipated that all Tours under this Agreement shall be arranged, booked and 

facilitated solely through Cruise Line on its Passengers’ behalf with the Operator.

Operator acknowledges that pursuant to its agreement with the Passengers, all 

disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to 

the cruise ticket agreement between Passenger and Cruise Line shall be litigated, if 

at all, in and before a court located in Miami, Florida U.S.A. (or such other 

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jurisdiction as may be specified in the agreement with the Passenger) to the 

exclusion of the courts of any other state, territory or country. Operator shall take 

no steps that contradict these arrangements. 

The Tour Operator Agreement contains an agreement by Cox & Co. to indemnify Royal 

Caribbean from any claims arising from the “business or operations of the Operator,” such as the 

negligent operation of the zipline excursion alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. The 

Agreement contains a provision applying Florida law to any dispute and a forum-selection clause 

selecting Florida as the venue for litigation. 

The Excursion Entities argue the Court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over them 

because Plaintiffs are not parties nor third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement. Notably, this 

Tour Operator Agreement contains a third-party beneficiary disclaimer. It states that “[o]ther 

than as expressly set forth herein, this Agreement shall not be deemed to provide third parties 

with any remedy, claim, right or action or other right.”). Courts in this district have routinely 

agreed with the Defendants’ position finding the Agreement “simply defines the relationship 

between the operator and the cruise line, concluding the conferral-of-jurisdiction clause did not 

constitute a blanket personal jurisdictional waiver.” Serra-Cruz, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1361; 

Barham, No. 20-22627 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2021); Johnson, 474 F. Supp. 3d at 1268 (“Courts in 

this Circuit have addressed largely identical allegations and rejected Plaintiffs’ third-party 

beneficiary claims, especially where, as here, the Agreement includes an express disclaimer of 

third-party benefits); Wolf, 683 F. App’x 786,798-99 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s 

grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s third-party beneficiary contract claim because the 

tour operating agreement expressly disclaimed any intent to benefit third parties); Sanlu Zhang, 

2019 WL 8895223, at *6-7 (dismissing the plaintiff’s third-party beneficiary claim because 

cruise passengers received merely incidental benefits of the contract between Royal Caribbean 

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and the excursion operator); Zapata v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 12-21897-CIV, 2013 

WL 1296298, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiff’s third-party beneficiary 

claim where the tour operating agreement expressly disclaimed any intent to benefit the 

plaintiff.). The clause that Plaintiff relies on to argue that the Tour Operator Agreement provides 

consent to jurisdiction to suits by Passengers merely defines the relationship between the cruise 

line and the operator. It does not, as Plaintiff suggests, allow him to hail non-resident defendants 

into this Court. 

In sum, Plaintiff is neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the Tour Operator 

Agreement. Indeed, Defendant Soufriere Hotwire Rides, Inc. is also not a party to the agreement. 

Plaintiff cannot avail himself of the Agreement’s consent-to-jurisdiction provision to sue the 

Excursion Entities. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims as to the Excursion Entities are dismissed 

without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 7th of September 2021.

______________________________________

FEDERICO A. MORENO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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