Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

June 2005 MILITARY TRAINING

Actions Needed to 

Enhance DOD’s 

Program to Transform 

Joint Training 

GAO-05-548 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-548.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

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Highlights of GAO-05-548, a report to 

congressional committees 

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's 

Program to Transform Joint Training 

Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training 

Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has 

established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated 

throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and unit 

training focused on combatant commanders’ needs and linked to readiness 

assessments. Thus far, the department has established program 

accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and 

oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has also established three training 

transformation initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs 

for joint operations and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out 

missions. The initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein each 

initiative matures through the “build a little, test a little” philosophy. DOD 

plans to complete its first program assessment later this year. 

Two significant challenges that have emerged early and will require 

continued focus include: 

• (1) Establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via 

comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full 

participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD 

has taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these 

stakeholders, which include DOD’s combatant commanders, services, 

and training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal 

departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national 

security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent 

understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and 

rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the 

initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination 

efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand 

the overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in 

engaging external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training 

opportunities. However, DOD’s outreach to the senior-level leadership of 

external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their full 

commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training. 

• (2) Developing joint training requirements—and the specific training 

tasks that support the requirements—that meet combatant command 

mission needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD’s

established process called the “Joint Training System” that is used to 

translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the 

department is developing some joint tasks through a working group 

process that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant 

commands’ and services’ representatives. As a result, the department 

risks developing joint training requirements that combatant commands 

and services may not fully support. 

Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding 

support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the 

Training Transformation Program at risk. 

U.S. forces are conducting more 

complex operations, requiring 

increased interoperability between 

the military commands, services, 

and other organizations. 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

planning guidance calls for 

transforming military training by 

increasing the jointness in training. 

The overall intent of DOD’s 

Training Transformation Program 

is to assure commanders that 

forces deployed to their theater are 

not experiencing joint operations 

for the first time. Therefore, the 

program’s strategic goals focus on 

providing joint training that meets 

commanders’ needs and links to 

readiness assessments. Given the 

significant investment planned in 

the program and the impact it will 

have on the military, this report 

provides a program overview, 

including (1) DOD’s overall 

management approach and status 

of key initiatives, and (2) some 

significant management challenges 

that have emerged early in the 

program’s implementation. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD assess 

its efforts to communicate and 

coordinate with stakeholders, and 

elevate outreach efforts to include 

the senior leadership of non-DOD 

organizations. GAO also 

recommends that DOD use its 

established Joint Training System 

process to determine all joint 

training requirements. In written 

comments, DOD generally agreed 

with GAO’s recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3 

DOD’s Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program 

Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full 

Operational Capability 6 

DOD’s Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant 

Management Challenges at This Time 12 

Conclusions 20 

Recommendations for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 32 

Related GAO Products 33 

Tables 

Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training 

Transformation Initiative 12 

Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 26 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

JKDDC Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability 

JAEC Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability 

JNTC Joint National Training Capability 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

June 21, 2005 

Congressional Committees 

As recently demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces are 

conducting significantly more complex operations, requiring increased 

interoperability between and among the military services, combatant 

commands, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD 

organizations. In the past, military services experienced some joint 

operations training during joint exercises, but most service training 

focused on individual service competencies with limited joint context. To 

successfully conduct today’s joint missions, DOD’s planning guidance calls 

for transforming military training to better enable joint force operations by 

increasing the level of joint context in military training. The overall intent 

of the department’s Training Transformation Program is to assure 

combatant commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not 

experiencing joint operations for the first time. The strategic goals of 

training transformation are to provide joint training that is (1) focused on 

combatant commanders’ operational requirements, and (2) linked to 

readiness assessments through a robust network of training capabilities 

that are integrated throughout the department. 

The overall objective of this report is to provide an overview of DOD’s 

Training Transformation Program and its implementation challenges, 

especially given DOD’s plans for significant investments in the program 

and the impact that training transformation will have on the combatant 

commands and the services. Specifically, we (1) determined DOD’s 

overall management approach and status in implementing the Training 

Transformation Program, and (2) identified some significant management 

challenges that have emerged early in the program’s implementation. We 

prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General, and 

are addressing this report to you because of your committee’s oversight in 

this area. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key 

departmentwide documents—including the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense’s 2004 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan—

to identify milestones for each of three training transformation initiatives. 

Additionally, we met with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Joint Staff, as well as officials from the combatant 

commands and service organizations that are affected by the Training 

Transformation Program’s implementation. We performed our work from 

June 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

auditing standards. Further information on our scope and methodology 

appears in appendix I. 

DOD’s efforts to implement the Training Transformation Program have 

focused on establishing program plans and accountability, but much 

remains to be done to achieve full operational capability. While still in the 

program’s early implementation stages, DOD expects, by 2009, to have 

established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated 

throughout the department to provide enhanced joint training focused on 

the combatant commanders’ needs and linked to readiness assessments. 

DOD has taken steps to establish program accountability and authority by 

designating an executive agent to carry out specific responsibilities and 

functions. DOD’s approach to transforming training focuses on three 

initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for the new 

strategic environment, and to provide enabling tools and processes to 

carry out missions. These three training transformation initiatives are 

being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through 

the “build a little, test a little” philosophy. The most advanced of these 

initiatives is focused on providing enhanced collective joint training for 

units or other military and defense organizations. Of the department’s 

planned $1.76 billion investment in training transformation for fiscal years 

2003-11, $1.48 billion has been allocated to this initiative. A second 

initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember joint training 

while a third initiative, which has only recently begun, is focused on 

continually monitoring program results and identifying improvements in 

joint training. While a management structure for each training 

transformation initiative has been identified and officials have begun 

taking steps towards their respective initiative goals, a great deal remains 

to be done to achieve overall program goals. 

Two significant challenges that have emerged early in DOD’s Training 

Transformation Program include (1) establishing effective partnerships 

with program stakeholders through comprehensive communication and 

coordination and (2) developing joint training requirements that meet 

combatant commanders’ needs. Establishing effective partnerships with 

DOD’s combatant commanders, services, and other federal organizations 

is important given their key roles in planning, funding, and participating in 

training events. Department officials have taken some positive steps to 

communicate with DOD stakeholders and address this challenge; however, 

we found an inconsistent understanding among some stakeholders of the 

strategic vision and the rationale behind the implementation and 

development pace of the initiatives. In addition, efforts to collaborate with 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

the senior leadership of non-DOD organizations and obtain their full 

commitment to training transformation have been limited to date. Without 

stakeholders’ full understanding and participation, DOD risks not being 

able to fully achieve its program goals. Furthermore, DOD is developing 

some joint training requirements—and the specific training tasks that 

support the requirements—through a working group process and not 

through the existing Joint Training System, DOD’s established, 

authoritative process that translates commanders’ needs into training 

requirements. For example, the working group identified 43 tactical 

tasks,1

 about half of which did not originate through the Joint Training 

System. Many stakeholders we spoke with expressed reservations about 

the validity of some of the tasks developed in this manner. As a result, the 

department’s approach risks developing joint training requirements that 

combatant commands and services may not fully support. 

To improve comprehensive communication and coordination, we are 

recommending that DOD assess the effectiveness of its efforts in this 

regard to facilitate stakeholders’ full understanding of the Training 

Transformation Program’s goals and initiatives. We are also 

recommending that, as DOD continues its outreach efforts to non-DOD 

organizations, it extend these efforts to include the senior leadership of 

these non-DOD organizations. To mitigate the risk of establishing joint 

training requirements that may not be fully supported by the combatant 

commands and services, we are recommending that DOD use the Joint 

Training System to establish all the training requirements at the joint 

tactical level, which would promote widespread participation and better 

opportunities for stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements. DOD 

generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations and is planning actions to 

implement our recommendations. 

Service military training has historically focused on individual service 

competencies, with less emphasis on joint operations involving joint 

commands, other services, and emerging operations with other 

governmental and nongovernmental agencies and international partners. 

While this has allowed the services to meet their core training 

responsibilities, it has also contributed to forces entering combat without 

having had previous experience or training in joint operations. For 

 1

 Tactical tasks refer to combat and combat support-level activities that are normally 

performed by DOD service components to achieve combat objectives. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, many forces had to be given some 

level of basic joint operations training after they had already entered the 

Iraqi theater of war, because they were experiencing joint operations for 

the first time. In a changing security environment, joint operations are 

becoming more important given the complex nature of military operations. 

Specifically, this importance is being driven by the combatant commands’ 

need to combine the capabilities of multiple services to address the global 

threat as well as the growing interdependence of capabilities among the 

services. 

Under Title 10, both combatant commanders and the military services are 

given the authority to determine training requirements, plan training 

exercises, and execute training activities. Specifically, combatant 

commanders oversee all aspects of military operations, joint training, and 

logistics using the forces assigned to them,2

 while the military service 

secretaries are generally responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying, 

equipping, and training their service personnel.3

 Furthermore, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are responsible for 

formulating joint training policy and doctrine.4

 The Joint Forces 

Command is DOD’s lead in providing joint warfighting capability through 

joint training. 

The idea to transform training in the department initially surfaced in 2001, 

when the department, in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,5

 recognized 

that training was a key to dealing with a continuously changing 

environment, and emphasized a need to enhance jointness and capitalize 

on technology advances. Defense guidance issued shortly thereafter 

directed the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to 

work with the services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

combatant commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop a 

plan for transforming military training that would better enable joint force 

operations. The department’s vision for the Training Transformation 

Program is to provide “dynamic, capabilities-based training for DOD in 

 2

 10 U.S.C. § 164. 

3

 10 USC §§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b). 

4

 10 U.S.C. § 153. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01B, Joint 

Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

5

 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD effort to be 

conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals. 
Page 5 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of 

service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

operations,”6

 and is built upon a foundation of three capabilities. 

According to the 2004 Training Transformation Implementation Plan, 

these three capabilities, or initiatives, are designed to prepare individuals, 

units, and staffs for the new strategic environment, and to provide 

enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. Through these three 

capabilities, combatant commanders are expected to receive betterprepared forces that align with their joint operational needs. 

• The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is expected to prepare 

forces by providing units and command staffs with an integrated live, 

virtual, and constructive training environment.7

 This capability would add 

enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes 

jointness and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of 

combatant command operations. 

• The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) is 

intended to prepare future decision makers and leaders to better 

understand joint operations and the common operational picture, as well 

as respond innovatively to adversaries. Program officials believe this 

capability will enhance existing joint individual education with newly 

developed courses and make these courses readily accessible through an 

expanded knowledge distribution network. 

• The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC) is expected to assist 

leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives on 

individuals, organizations, and processes, and link the impact of the 

Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders’ readiness 

requirements. This capability is also supposed to provide the processes 

and tools to continuously improve joint training. 

 6

 DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, March 1, 2002, p. 5. 

7

 Live training refers to live simulations involving real people operating real systems in a 

live environment. Virtual training involves virtual simulations using real people operating 

simulated systems. Constructive training refers to simulated people operating simulated 

systems, often referred to as war games. 
Page 6 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training 

Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has 

established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated 

throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and 

collective training focused on the combatant commanders’ needs and 

linked to readiness assessments. Through its 2003 Training 

Transformation Implementation Plan, the department established 

program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership 

management and oversight roles and responsibilities. While each program 

initiative has focused on developing a management structure, defining 

joint training requirements, and developing mechanisms and networks to 

deliver enhanced joint training, all three still have a great deal remaining to 

be accomplished to meet program goals. 

In early 2003, DOD issued its first Training Transformation 

Implementation Plan, which established the basic management approach 

for implementing the Training Transformation Program. As part of this 

approach, the department has taken action to establish program 

accountability and authority. 

The department designated the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness with overall responsibility for implementing 

the Training Transformation Program. Furthermore, the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Readiness has been given executive agent 

responsibility for training transformation planning, programming, 

budgeting, and execution progress. To carry out their responsibilities, 

these offices use three standing working groups, as follows: 

• The Executive Steering Group is made up of senior executive-level 

officials—including four star general officers/flag officers and equivalent 

senior executive service civilians —and is headed by the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In addition to high-level program 

execution oversight, this group, according to program officials, makes 

department-level policy decisions and deals with unresolved issues as it 

pertains to training transformation. 

• Subordinate to this executive group, the Senior Advisory Group is led by 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and consists of 

senior-level officials, including three star general officers/flag officers and 

equivalent senior executive service civilians. This group, according to 

program officials, has directive authority and is responsible for overseeing 

the execution and updates to the Training Transformation 

DOD’s Efforts Have 

Focused on 

Establishing Plans 

and Program 

Accountability, but 

Much Remains to be 

Done to Achieve Full 

Operational 

Capability 

DOD Has Established 

Training Transformation 

Program Accountability 

and Authorities 
Page 7 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Implementation Plan, and the timely allocation, transfer, and execution of 

the program’s resources. 

• The Joint Integrated Process Team, being subordinate to the above two 

groups, serves as the primary collaborative working forum that provides 

input to the oversight groups and responds to their guidance. Led by the 

Director of Readiness and Training Plans and Policy, this team consists of 

senior analysts, planners, and action officers from staffs, agencies, and 

commands contributing to the department’s Training Transformation 

Program. 

Each of these groups has representatives from the services, the Joint 

Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and a 

wide cross-section of department-level offices, such as the Offices of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics. 

DOD is employing an incremental approach to developing and 

implementing the Training Transformation Program, designed to reduce 

development cycle time and increase the speed at which advanced 

capabilities are delivered. According to a DOD official, DOD’s approach to 

developing and implementing the training transformation initiatives 

follows a “build a little, test a little” philosophy that is unlike a more 

traditional development approach, where initiatives within a program are 

developed sequentially with planning, development, implementation, and 

assessment phases. Under this development approach, some elements of 

the three training transformation initiatives—the JNTC, the JKDDC, and 

the JAEC—are developed concurrently, while other elements are 

sequentially developed. The department’s expectation is that the three 

initiatives will work together to successively build a training environment 

that meets combatant command needs in three phases. Phase 1 (2005) 

focuses on providing combatant commanders with a steady flow of jointtrained individuals, units, and staff. Phase 2 (2007) places an emphasis on 

supporting an innovative training environment for new joint operational 

capabilities based on combatant commanders’ demands. Phase 3 (2009) 

will transition joint training into a real-time mission planning and rehearsal 

environment. 

Reflective of the iterative implementation approach described above, 

DOD’s framework for assessing Training Transformation Program 

performance will likewise follow the three phases of the program’s 

development. Performance metrics are being continuously developed 

during each of these phases to mirror the actual development and 

evolution of each initiative’s capabilities. Similarly, formal program 
Page 8 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

assessments using these metrics to measure training transformation’s 

impact on joint force readiness and guide subsequent investments in 

training transformation capabilities will begin in 2005, at the end of Phase 

1, and occur every 2 years thereafter. 

The management of each of the three training transformation initiatives is 

carried out largely by joint management offices within each initiative’s 

sponsoring organization. For example, the JNTC joint management office 

is in the Joint Training Directorate of the Joint Forces Command. These 

offices serve as the primary focal points for planning, program 

preparation, and execution of all resources and events associated with 

their respective training transformation capability. The joint management 

office directors, having the responsibility to implement their respective 

initiative, report directly to the organization sponsoring their initiative. 

Each of the joint management offices also reports to the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Readiness through the Joint Integrated Process 

Team. The offices are organized functionally to align with their primary 

goals and objectives. 

The implementation status of each of DOD’s three initiatives—the JNTC, 

the JKDDC, and the JAEC—varies, as program managers are intentionally 

staggering the rollout of the initiatives in accordance with the incremental 

development approach aimed at reducing development cycle time and 

increasing the speed at which advanced capabilities are delivered. The 

current and planned funding of these initiatives also reflects this 

development plan. 

Overall, the three initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units, and 

staffs for a new strategic environment that requires services and 

combatant commands to work together, and to provide enabling tools and 

processes to carry out missions. These initiatives to transform military 

training are expected to result in a robust network of training capabilities 

integrated throughout DOD that provides enhanced joint individual and 

collective training focused on the combatant commanders’ needs and is 

linked to readiness assessments. Program managers designated the JNTC 

initiative as the leading effort to transform military training, and thus its 

progress is further advanced than the other two initiatives. However, 

officials responsible for both the JKDDC and JAEC have established a 

management structure and initiated a number of efforts to meet program 

goals. 

Status and Funding of 

Training Transformation 

Initiatives Vary 
Page 9 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

The JNTC initiative is focused on providing enhanced collective joint 

training for units or other military and defense organizations. During the 

2002–03 time frame, a joint management office for the JNTC initiative 

within Joint Forces Command was established and resourced. Early JNTC 

efforts have been targeted at identifying and analyzing combatant 

commanders’ joint training requirements for an enhanced joint training 

environment that will cut horizontally—to improve interoperability among 

services—and vertically—to improve joint planning and execution of 

training—across various components and command levels. This effort 

includes, but is not limited to, analyzing combatant commands’ missionessential tasks; identifying joint training requirements evolving from 

operational and prior training experiences; analyzing joint training 

required at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations; and 

setting the framework for accrediting and certifying future joint training 

programs and facilities. 

Additionally, a considerable portion of the JNTC organization has been 

focused on identifying, defining, and developing the facilities and 

technologies necessary to develop a global joint training network that can 

deliver live, virtual, and constructive joint training capabilities to the 

services, combatant commanders, and interagency and multinational 

partners. In keeping with training transformation’s approach to introduce 

capabilities more rapidly, JNTC managers working with the services 

during 2004 provided an early demonstration of the ability to enhance four 

existing exercises with live, virtual, and constructive capabilities by 

integrating these capabilities to improve joint horizontal and vertical 

training. In October 2004, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Readiness, who has been given executive oversight responsibility for the 

Training Transformation Program, deemed the JNTC initiative to be 

operationally capable—indicating that the initial infrastructure of 

networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint context of 

training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, JNTC managers 

plan to incorporate this demonstrated capability in 14 additional service or 

combatant command exercises. 

Additionally, JNTC managers expect to continue their efforts to enhance 

DOD’s capability, increasing the level of jointness in military training by 

involving joint commands, other services, and federal agencies involved in 

current military operations. Among these efforts, JNTC managers would 

like to complete development of a permanent network of communications, 

instrumentation, and supporting infrastructure to support joint military 

training. JNTC managers plan to create a Web-based capability to deliver 

joint operational planning and mission rehearsal training. They also plan 

The Joint National Training 

Capability 
Page 10 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

to have the capability to conduct overseas/multinational training events by 

fiscal year 2007. Additionally, they plan to continue developing training 

requirements that support joint training at all levels, and accrediting joint 

training programs and certifying training facilities. The certification of 

DOD’s training facilities relies on their ability to meet joint training needs. 

Although DOD’s JNTC initiative is designed to enhance communication 

and infrastructure to better simulate a joint environment, the services 

continue to face challenges in maintaining training facilities to meet their 

own service-specific training requirements. GAO has just recently 

completed a review looking at the current condition of DOD’s military 

training facilities.8

 The report concluded that current training range 

facilities are deteriorating and compromise the realism essential to 

effective training. 

The JKDDC initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember 

joint training. Efforts under the JKDDC initiative have been focused on 

organizing a management structure, initiating a process for identifying 

joint individual training requirements, and establishing an organizational 

and technical framework for developing and distributing courses to 

address these requirements. In late 2003, a joint management office within 

the Joint Staff’s Office of the Director for Operational Plans and Joint 

Force Development was established to manage the JKDDC initiative and 

oversee the development of joint individual education and training. Also, 

in October 2003, the JKDDC Working Group was established to begin 

identifying and prioritizing joint individual education and training 

requirements. During fiscal year 2004, the JKDDC Working Group 

identified 38 combatant command requirements for joint individual 

courseware. A key milestone for the JKDDC initiative—identifying the 

technologies and infrastructure needed to achieve an interim course 

materials distribution capability—was reached in January 2005. As of 

January 2005, the JKDDC initiative has developed and distributed two joint 

individual courses to satisfy some of the combatant commanders’ initial 

requirements. Another 17 courses are under development. 

JKDDC managers plan to continue identifying and developing joint 

individual education requirements and associated courseware. They also 

plan to develop a long-term joint individual training continuum and a 

global distribution capability for joint education and training that include 

 8

 GAO, Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve 

Conditions of Military Training Ranges, GAO-05-534 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005). 

The Joint Knowledge 

Development and Distribution 

Capability 
Page 11 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

multinational and international partners. A pilot global distribution 

capability demonstration is planned for fiscal year 2006, with a mature 

joint individual training continuum expected in late 2009. 

The JAEC initiative is focused on continually monitoring program results 

and identifying improvements in joint training. The JAEC joint 

management office was established during fiscal year 2004 under the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. Most of the early 

efforts conducted under this initiative have been focused on planning, 

assessing, and developing tools and techniques that can be embedded in 

the other training transformation initiatives in order to provide a robust 

joint assessment and enabling capability. This effort has resulted in the 

establishment of preliminary training transformation performance 

assessment metrics in early 2005. The first of three formal periodic 

program assessments will occur from April to October 2005 and 

refinements to the metrics will continue to be made as this process 

progresses. Additionally, the JAEC joint management office is developing 

a process that would uniformly track joint training, education, and 

experience, and ensure this information can be linked to readiness 

assessments by 2006. Within this initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 

the lead for evaluating enhancements to DOD’s Joint Training System9

 to 

make it more user friendly and adaptable to evolving operational concepts 

and to complete these enhancements by 2009. 

Current and future funding also reflect the incremental development 

approach DOD is using to implement the program. The JNTC initiative, 

the leading effort for transforming military training, accounts for $1.48 

billion, or 84 percent, of the total $1.76 billion budgeted for fiscal years 

2003 through 2011. Efforts related to the JKDDC and JAEC (the trailing 

initiatives) are collectively budgeted for $284.9 million. For the first time, 

in fiscal year 2005, all three training transformation initiatives prepared 

program execution plans reflecting what they expected to spend during 

that fiscal year, as shown in table 1. 

 9

 Joint Training System is a framework used by the department’s joint community to 

identify training requirements; develop training plans; and execute, evaluate, and assess 

joint training. 

The Joint Assessment and 

Enabling Capability 

Funding of Initiatives Reflects 

Incremental Rollout Plans 
Page 12 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training Transformation 

Initiative 

Dollars in millions 

Initiative Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures

JNTC $188.0

JKDDC 13.1

JAEC 12.3

Total $213.4

Source: DOD. 

Resources to manage the Training Transformation Program come from 

three primary sources: (1) funding provided directly to and controlled by 

the services for service-specific program activities related to the JNTC 

initiative; (2) funding provided directly to the Joint Forces Command, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff for their own 

training transformation activities; and (3) funding provided directly to the 

Joint Forces Command for distribution to the services for service-specific 

JNTC program activities. By providing the Joint Forces Command with 

this funding, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has given the command 

the flexibility to annually fund service activities deemed critical to the 

Training Transformation Program, because they contribute to meeting the 

goals and objectives identified in the Training Transformation 

Implementation Plan. 

DOD’s Training Transformation Program will likely face some significant 

management challenges throughout its implementation. Two significant 

challenges that have emerged early and will require continued focus are 

 (1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such as 

the services and combatant commands, through comprehensive 

communication and coordination; and (2) developing joint training 

requirements that meet combatant commands’ mission needs. Both these 

challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support 

among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the 

Training Transformation Program at risk. 

DOD’s Training 

Transformation 

Program Faces Two 

Significant 

Management 

Challenges at This 

Time 
Page 13 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Establishing effective partnerships through comprehensive 

communication and coordination is a significant management challenge 

and is a key to obtaining full buy-in and commitment of internal and 

external program stakeholders. These include DOD’s combatant 

commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives 

from the federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise 

the national security interagency community. Commitment from the 

combatant commands and services is critical in achieving the training 

transformation goals because they play a key role in planning and funding 

training events. The same commitment is necessary from non-DOD 

stakeholders given the changing nature of our military operations, which 

require more intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners 

than ever before. 

Attributes inherent to transformational programs—such as program 

complexity and the need for stakeholders to make cultural adaptations—

along with DOD’s limited authority to influence external stakeholders, 

make communication and coordination especially difficult. Recognizing 

the challenge these elements pose, DOD has taken some positive steps to 

communicate and coordinate with training transformation internal and 

external stakeholders. However, we found that an inconsistent 

understanding of the Training Transformation Program remains among 

some internal stakeholders. Additionally, the department’s efforts to 

engage senior leaders in non-DOD organizations to establish joint training 

requirements to collectively respond to the nation’s security challenges 

across the full spectrum of interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational operations have been limited. These operations may 

include, but are not limited to, global war, humanitarian assistance, and 

disaster relief. 

DOD officials agree that there are several attributes in managing the 

Training Transformation Program that make communication and 

coordination with stakeholders a challenge. Officials acknowledge that 

their use of a rapid, incremental approach to developing and implementing 

the program adds a degree of complexity over traditional approaches. 

Moreover, DOD’s decentralized management of the three program 

initiatives and dependencies on integration of separately led combatant 

command and service training initiatives introduce additional complexity. 

Further, encouraging stakeholders to make the cultural changes inherent 

to the successful implementation of governmental and defense 

transformational programs, such as the Training Transformation Program, 

generally also requires focused management attention to communication 

and coordination. The Training Transformation Program’s call for 

Establishing Effective 

Partnerships with 

Stakeholders Is a 

Significant Management 

Challenge 

Program Attributes Make 

Communication and 

Coordination Challenging 
Page 14 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

communication and coordination beyond DOD entities may pose an 

additional challenge, because of DOD’s lack of direct authority over nonDOD partner organizations. 

The complexity of the Training Transformation Program heightens the 

communication and coordination challenge. The department’s choice to 

employ a rapid, incremental development approach provides management 

with a process to review, assess, adjust, and redirect actions that 

collectively transform training, and, according to DOD officials, is a 

contributing factor to the complexity of the program. Some DOD officials 

we spoke with referred to the development approach as a “state of 

constant change.” Furthermore, in an effort to meet the Training 

Transformation Program’s goals, DOD has assigned separate 

organizations—the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Readiness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces Command—to 

oversee development of each initiative. In addition, the ability to leverage 

evolving and developing technologies to deliver an integrated live, virtual, 

and constructive joint training environment requires the successful 

integration of separately led combatant command and service training 

initiatives. For example, the Pacific Command and its Navy component, 

according to command officials, are developing their own discrete training 

capabilities that are expected to eventually link to and enhance the JNTC. 

Achieving JNTC goals relies upon existing training events, led and funded 

by combatant commands and services. The successful linkage of these 

efforts will depend on continued comprehensive communication and 

coordination. 

We have previously reported that transformational programs across 

government require particular attention to managing cultural change.10

Within the Training Transformation Program, we believe there are two 

areas where communication and coordination will play an important role 

towards achieving cultural adaptation. First, the training developed under 

the program is expected to respond to combatant commanders’ 

capabilities-based requirements, moving away from mission-based 

requirements that are based on specific threats. A capabilities-based 

approach focuses on identifying the capabilities that U.S. forces will need 

 10 See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003); and 

Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are 

Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 
Page 15 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

to deter and defeat any potential adversaries, being able to respond 

decisively anywhere and anytime to any type of challenge. Second, 

training developed under the program will be “joint” in nature and will 

reflect the growing need for different services and commands to work 

together to achieve common goals. DOD acknowledges, in its Training 

Transformation Implementation Plan, that it has to balance the priority 

to provide the services with more joint training at the individual and 

service levels against the services’ priorities to train to their servicespecific core competencies. The program also emphasizes training across 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, which 

creates additional cultural challenges for program stakeholders. 

DOD recognizes that program complexity and adaptation to cultural 

change are inherent to training transformation, and DOD has taken some 

positive steps to communicate and coordinate with internal stakeholders, 

as illustrated by the following actions: 

• According to DOD officials, at program inception, DOD designated a single 

integrating authority under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness with oversight responsibility to coordinate 

strategy within and among the training transformation initiatives, as well 

as into other DOD transformational efforts to achieve the desired 

integration. 

• DOD prepares and presents the Training Transformation Program 

strategic plan, implementation plan, and road map at regularly scheduled 

working-level meetings, with the intent to update stakeholders and 

generate discussion. In addition, the department created an interactive 

program Web site containing a repository of these documents, which 

allows stakeholders to comment on materials directly. 

• Under the leadership of the Joint Staff, the Joint Lessons Learned Program 

expanded the existing lessons learned concept by establishing joint 

lessons-learned specialists’ positions at all combatant commands and 

services.11 The physical presence of these program specialists serves to 

increase the understanding of the Training Transformation Program, as 

well as improve the collection, analysis, and feedback processes for 

lessons learned. 

• DOD has begun an outreach campaign with the aim of better facilitating 

the collection of training requirements from combatant commands and 

services. A Joint Forces Command official, acknowledging a need for 

 11 The U.S. Coast Guard does not have a Joint Lessons Learned Specialist but works closely 

with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned to further their ability 

to share joint lessons. 

DOD Proactive in Efforts to 

Communicate and Coordinate 

with Internal Stakeholders, but 

Inconsistent Understanding 

Continues 
Page 16 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

better marketing of the JNTC, has visited with some stakeholders such as 

the European and Pacific combatant commands. Representatives under 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

with the intent of outreach and communicating joint integration and 

development issues, also visited every combatant command this past year, 

and intend to continue this practice on a periodic basis. 

Despite DOD’s efforts to communicate and coordinate with training 

transformation internal stakeholders, during our interviews with services 

headquarters and command staffs we found an inconsistent understanding 

among some program stakeholders regarding the strategic vision and the 

rationale behind the implementation and development timing of different 

components of the program. For example, representatives from three of 

the command staffs we visited viewed the JNTC as Joint Forces 

Command’s attempt to impose additional requirements on existing service 

and combatant command exercises rather than providing enabling 

capabilities to enhance existing training exercises. Also, general 

consensus among all stakeholders attending the Joint Integrated Process 

Team meeting in December of 2004 was that they did not fully understand 

the Training Transformation Program’s accreditation and certification 

processes—which are designed to ensure the joint content of military 

training programs and the adequacy of supporting facilities—because of 

the complexity of the processes as well as the lack of clear definitions 

during its initial implementation. In addition, stakeholders from a service 

headquarters and a command staff that we spoke with described the 

JKDDC as an initiative limited to the development of joint training courses. 

It appears that these stakeholders did not have a full understanding of the 

larger strategic vision of the initiative to leverage evolving technologies 

that will provide or distribute education and training needed anytime and 

anywhere, across the full spectrum of forces. Also, some stakeholders 

from two service headquarters and a command staff expressed a lack of 

understanding of the program managers’ decision to iteratively develop 

the JAEC, as they develop metrics and perform assessments of the JNTC 

and JKDDC. In particular, some of the stakeholders associated with the 

JNTC and JKDDC initiatives expressed discomfort about being measured 

against specified outcomes when they were not initially provided with 

standards to measure results. We found this overall lack of understanding 

evident mostly at the service level, among representatives of headquarters 

and command staffs. 

Our discussion with training transformation officials indicated that they 

were not specifically aware of this level of inconsistent understanding of 

training transformation’s concepts and initiatives. However, they did 
Page 17 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

indicate that the program’s complexity and development approach could 

easily lead to inconsistent understanding among stakeholders. We found 

that they had not assessed the extent to which their communication and 

coordination efforts have impacted stakeholders’ comprehension of the 

overall concept and vision of the Training Transformation Program. This 

lack of understanding risks not obtaining stakeholders’ buy-in and 

commitment needed to fully implement the goals of the program. 

While DOD has been proactive in engaging interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational partners in identifying common 

areas for potential joint training opportunities, their outreach has not yet 

been elevated to senior-level leadership to ensure their full cooperation. 

Some DOD missions—strategic defense, homeland defense, and civil 

support—have already been identified as potential areas where DOD could 

consider future training opportunities with the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy. Within 

the Training Transformation Program, the Training Transformation 

Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Essential Tasks 

effort was launched to develop capabilities and tasks for conducting 

broader, more inclusive joint operations, such as reestablishing order and 

promoting stability in other nations with multinational partners.Starting in 

early 2005, the department began engaging members of the external 

stakeholder community in collaboratively identifying tasks for conducting 

broader, more inclusive joint operations with interagency community 

partners. These efforts are mostly focused on building a task force and 

determining what is required for communication, cooperation, 

coordination, collaboration, and interoperability among the interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational partners at this time. 

The most recent Training Transformation Interagency Intergovernmental 

Multinational Mission Essential Tasks conference, in February 2005, 

consisted of more than 150 operators, planners, strategists, and policy 

developers from 40 organizations, including different non-DOD agencies 

and departments across the U.S. government, as well as from the United 

Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International 

Committee of the Red Cross. While the effort has significant upper-level 

support within DOD, the level of effort to gain support and participation 

among the external stakeholders’ senior-level management has been 

limited. Some DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that, as the 

effort moves forward into planning and implementation, it will require 

increasing levels of participation from non-DOD stakeholders. They also 

believe that, without equally significant support from upper-level 

leadership among those agencies and organizations that DOD has no direct 

DOD Is Communicating and 

Coordinating with External 

Stakeholders, but Efforts to 

Engage Senior Non-DOD 

Leaders Have Been Limited to 

Date 
Page 18 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

authority over, DOD may face challenges in maintaining a collaborative 

environment and successfully achieving future planning and 

implementation outcomes for training with those partners. The extent to 

which the leadership at non-DOD partner organizations is committed to 

defense training transformation is unknown, because of DOD’s limited 

efforts to engage these individuals to date. DOD officials acknowledge the 

importance of reaching out to the leadership of external organizations and 

recognize that their efforts in this regard have been very limited to date. 

Joint Forces Command’s new process for developing tactical-level joint 

training requirements—and the specific training tasks that support the 

requirements—does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect 

combatant command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal 

stakeholders—combatant commanders, services, and training commands. 

In the past, joint training tasks were primarily focused at the command 

level12 and were identified through DOD’s authoritative process that built 

requirements by translating combatant commander inputs into training 

requirements. Training transformation has expanded joint training 

requirements to include those at the tactical level in addition to joint 

command-level training. The current process Joint Forces Command is 

using to develop these joint tactical-level tasks does not build these 

requirements starting with the combatant commands’ analysis of training 

needs. Rather, the requirements are based on Joint Forces Command’s 

analysis of perceived training deficiencies. In addition, Joint Forces 

Command’s process for identifying and validating these tasks does not 

ensure widespread participation among the combatant commands and 

service representatives. Some internal stakeholders have expressed 

reservations about the validity of some recently developed joint tasks, 

because the tasks did not evolve through the established Joint Training 

System process in which they originated as combatant command 

requirements. Thus, DOD risks developing training requirements that may 

not be accepted as valid or necessary to meet combatant command 

training needs. 

 12 Command-level training includes the operational and strategic theater levels of training 

which are designed to provide training to unified command and joint task force 

headquarters staff. 

Developing Joint Training 

Requirements That Meet 

Combatant Commands’ 

Needs Is a Significant 

Challenge 
Page 19 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Since fiscal year 1994, the Joint Training System has been DOD’s 

authoritative process for collaboratively gathering each combatant 

command’s mission analysis and translating it into command-level training 

requirements that the services must include in their training events. 

Historically, joint training requirements have only been targeted to 

command-level training. 

The command-level joint training tasks developed by the Joint Training 

System are referred to as joint mission essential tasks, and are derived 

from a common, universal joint task list that has been used or suggested 

by the combatant commands and approved by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Training System is further supported by the 

annual worldwide joint training conference, where combatant command 

and service representatives discuss the list of joint mission-essential tasks 

to which the services must train. This collaboration ensures that the 

services understand what they must include in their training to meet 

combatant command joint training requirements. 

The Training Transformation Program has brought an emphasis on joint 

training at the tactical level in addition to the command-level tasks 

discussed above. Training at the tactical level was typically a service 

responsibility prior to training transformation. Today, however, Joint 

Forces Command, as directed in the Training Transformation 

Implementation Plan, develops joint tasks, which include joint tasks at 

the tactical level in addition to command-level tasks. 

Rather than identifying joint tactical tasks directly through the established 

Joint Training System, whose outputs are approved by the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forces Command relies on a working group 

process to identify and validate these tasks.13 The identification of these 

joint training tasks is based primarily on the working group’s analysis of 

perceived training deficiencies in combatant command and service 

training, rather than being based on the combatant commands’ analyses of 

training needs. Any working group participant may submit a joint task to 

be considered for inclusion in future joint training, but the submission 

 13 The working group is chaired by Joint Forces Command and is composed of service, 

combatant command, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Joint 

Staff, and Joint Forces Command representatives, each of whom are invited to attend 

meetings and vote on the inclusion of specific joint training tasks into training events that 

meet mission requirements. Service component representatives are encouraged to 

participate, but are not voting members. 

Command-Level Joint Training 

Requirements Rely on the Joint 

Training System 

Combatant Command and 

Service Representatives Have 

Expressed Reservations about 

the Validity of Some Joint 

Tasks 
Page 20 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

must be sponsored by a voting member. After a task is approved by the 

working group, it is validated by performing the task at one or two training 

events and then resubmitted to the working group for approval as a new or 

revised task. Throughout the working group process, service and 

combatant command representatives who participate have the opportunity 

to voice concerns regarding any of the candidate joint tasks. For example, 

the Joint Forces Command working group approved 43 joint tasks in 

October 2004 that they believe the services should include in their training 

to meet combatant command training requirements. Of these joint tasks, 

21 of them (49 percent), as identified by one service command, were new 

tactical-level tasks that had not been previously identified through the 

existing Joint Training System, and as such have not been derived from a 

combatant command’s mission analysis. 

Although combatant command representatives are invited to attend 

working group meetings, the working group process does not ensure the 

same level of widespread participation that the established Joint Training 

System achieves, and Joint Forces Command risks developing training 

requirements that lack widespread combatant command and service 

support. Representatives from service commands and combatant 

commands staff with whom we spoke expressed reservations about the 

validity of tasks developed in this manner, because they did not come from 

the Joint Training System, which systematically builds requirements based 

on combatant commanders’ needs, nor were they vetted through the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the combatant 

commands. Combatant commands’ representatives said that they have 

provided little input into the original development of the tasks identified 

by the Joint Forces Command’s working group to date. Because of the 

process used, they questioned how many of these joint tasks actually 

reflect the combatant commands’ training needs. 

The Training Transformation Program is a multifaceted effort that touches 

nearly everyone associated with the joint training community. With 

complex initiatives being developed and employed at various stages of 

maturity, comprehensive communication and coordination are critical to 

establish effective partnerships. Until DOD assesses its approach to 

communicating and coordinating training transformation initiatives and 

takes additional steps to ensure full understanding among joint training 

stakeholders at all levels—from combatant commands to services, and 

from headquarters to training commands—DOD risks not building the 

effective partnerships necessary to gain stakeholders’ buy-in and 

commitment to fully implement training transformation. This lack of 

Conclusions 
Page 21 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

understanding of the complexities and potential benefits associated with 

the training transformation initiatives would likely impair DOD’s efforts to 

enhance joint training that will enable troops to better carry out 

combatant commanders’ missions. 

The department’s transformation effort also encompasses the way training 

can be integrated with all levels of government as well as with allies and 

coalition partners. Enhanced coordination at interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational levels will promote increased 

cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct seamless 

operations. Although senior leadership support for this effort exists 

within DOD, in the absence of a targeted effort to ensure equally 

significant senior leadership support from non-DOD agency and 

organization partners, DOD is at risk of not being able to maintain a 

collaborative environment with its external stakeholders and to implement 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational training outcomes 

successfully. 

The department has an established, authoritative process to develop joint 

training requirements in the Joint Training System, which relies on the 

combatant commands to align training requirements with their assigned 

missions. By not fully utilizing this system to develop the training 

requirements to support the JNTC component-based, tactical-level joint 

training, DOD may risk the services and combatant commands not fully 

accepting these training requirements as valid. If such requirements are 

not embraced as combatant command-generated training requirements, 

the services and combatant commands may not completely support the 

need to enhance joint training at the tactical level, thus potentially 

underutilizing the capability being developed by the JNTC. 

To promote effective partnerships and mitigate the risk of implementing 

Training Transformation Program components that are not fully supported 

by the combatant commands, services, and other federal agencies, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three 

actions: 

• direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and 

coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take 

additional steps to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s 

goals and initiatives; 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 22 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

• direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DOD 

agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders’ full 

understanding, buy-in, and commitment; and 

• direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to 

establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to 

promote widespread participation and better opportunities for 

stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third. DOD 

concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

to assess the effectiveness of their communication and coordination 

efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take additional steps 

to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s goals and 

initiatives. DOD stated that in addition to its continued effort to 

communicate and coordinate through Training Transformation Joint 

Integrated Process Team, the Senior Advisory Group and Executive 

Steering Group, it will be placing Joint Forces Command personnel within 

key Service and Combatant Command training organizations to improve 

understanding of training transformation. Additionally, DOD stated it 

would evaluate the effectiveness of the program’s overall communication 

and coordination in its first and subsequent assessments of the training 

transformation program. 

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within nonDOD agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders’ full 

understanding, buy-in, and commitment. In its response, DOD stated that 

an initiative led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) will 

address this recommendation by the end of fiscal year 2006. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System 

to establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to 

promote widespread participation and better opportunities for 

stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements. DOD stated that the Joint 

Forces Command uses the Joint Training System to develop its Joint 

Training Plan as required by DOD directive. Nevertheless, DOD also 

acknowledged that GAO is correct in its assessment that some joint 

training requirements may not be documented in the Joint Training System 

or recognized by some users of the Joint Training System. In this regard, 

they further stated that USJFCOM has been directed to submit these 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 23 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

training requirements that are derived from joint tactical tasks for 

inclusion in the Joint Training System and that the Joint Staff consider 

them in future updates. 

We agree with DOD’s comments concerning Joint Forces Command’s role 

and responsibilities in developing training requirements. However, we 

continue to believe that the services’ and combatant commands’ 

commitment and ownership of these tactical training tasks would be 

enhanced if they originated from the combatant commands’ annual 

training needs analysis, which is an integral part of the Joint Training 

System, and not just included in the system after the fact. As stated in our 

report, if such requirements are not embraced as combatant commandgenerated training requirements, the services and combatant commands 

may not completely support the need to enhance joint training at the 

tactical level, thus potentially underutilizing the capability being developed 

by the joint national training capability. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander, 

U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4402. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III. 

Janet St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 24 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

To determine DOD’s overall management approach and status in 

implementing the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed relevant 

DOD plans, policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training 

transformation. We discussed training transformation issues with a 

variety of officials at DOD, service headquarters offices, several combatant 

commands, and other stakeholders that are involved with the Training 

Transformation Program (see table 2). Specifically, we did the following: 

• To determine the DOD’s overall management approach in implementing 

the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed key documentation 

related to the management responsibilities, development approach, status 

of each initiative, and resource allocation among the three initiatives. 

• To determine the DOD’s overall status in implementing the Training 

Transformation Program, we conducted interviews with key officials 

supporting each initiative. 

• To better understand the roles, responsibilities, and funding profiles 

within the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed and analyzed 

key documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2004 

revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2003 JNTC 

Implementation Plan, the September 2004 DOD directive on military 

training, and available program execution plans prepared by the joint 

management offices from fiscal years 2002 through 2005. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 

Organization Locations 

Army Headquarters, Army Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C. 

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va. 

Headquarters, Air Force Operational Training Division, Washington, D.C. 

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. 

Air Force 

Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Tx. 

Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of Workforce Performance, Training and Development, Washington, D.C. 

Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Va. 

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training Branch, Washington, D.C. 

Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Education Training (N00T), Human Performance and 

Acquisition Assessment Division, Arlington, VA 

Navy 

Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. 

Special Operations U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force Transformation, Washington, D.C. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training Policy and Programs, Washington, 

D.C. 

 - Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint 

 Management Office, Alexandria, Va. 

 - Readiness Programming and Assessment, Washington, 

 D.C. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

 - Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 

 Directorate, Washington, D.C. 

 - Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability 

 Joint Management Office, Alexandria, Va. 

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. 

 - Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, 

 Suffolk, Va. 

 - Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, 

 Suffolk, Va. 

Joint Organizations 

U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii 

 - U.S. Army Pacific, Hawaii 

 - U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Hawaii 

 - U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Hawaii 

 - U.S. Pacific Fleet, Hawaii 

 - U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, Hawaii 

Source: GAO. 

To identify significant management challenges that have emerged early in 

the program’s implementation, we again reviewed relevant DOD plans, 

policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training 

transformation and interviewed many of the same officials indicated in 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 27 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

table 2. We reviewed and analyzed some additional key documents, 

including DOD’s 2003 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

the 2002 Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, the 2003 

Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2004 Training Capabilities 

Analysis of Alternatives Final Report, various Joint Integrated Process 

Team briefs, and prior GAO reports. To better understand some of the 

management challenges, we attended meetings of the JKDDC working 

group, the Joint Integrated Process Team, and the Training 

Transformation Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Mission 

Essential Tasks Task Force. We also obtained and reviewed all the 

minutes from the working groups and task force meetings that we 

attended. Additionally, to assess the challenge in developing joint training 

requirements that met combatant commands’ mission needs, we obtained 

a list of approved joint tasks developed by the Joint Forces Command 

working group and solicited feedback from combatant command and 

service representatives. 

We performed our review from June 2004 through May 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 28 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 32 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 

In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Fred Harrison, 

Marie Mak, Todd Dice, Gwyneth Blevins, Jonathan Clark, and R.K. Wild 

also made major contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 33 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to 

Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat 

Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. 

Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully 

Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 

Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform 

Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004. 

Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could 

Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program. GAO03-1026. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003. 

Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase 

Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training 

Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003. 

Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper 

Air Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 

2003. 

Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on 

Training Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 

2003. 

Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced 

Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2003. 

Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage 

Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: 

June 11, 2002. 

Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage 

Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 16, 2002. 

Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in 

Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 34 GAO-05-548 DOD Joint Training 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training 

and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington, 

D.C.: November 14, 2000. 

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