UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO. 20-21746-CIV-MORENO/GOODMAN

NATIONAL EQUESTRIAN LEAGUE, LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

KEEAN WHITE, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, National Equestrian League, LLC (“NEL”) and JumpingClash, S.I. 

(“JC”), filed an amended complaint against Defendants, alleging copyright infringement, 

breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, conspiracy, 

breach of fiduciary duty, theft of trade secrets, unjust enrichment, and FDUTPA claims 

arising from Defendants’ acting as consultants to Plaintiffs in the formation of Plaintiffs’

professional horse jumping league. [ECF No. 45]. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the following counts: Count I (copyright 

infringement), Count V (fraud), Count VI (negligent misrepresentation), Count VIII 

(conspiracy), Count XII (unjust enrichment), and Count XIII (copyright infringement). 

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[ECF No. 50].1 Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. [ECF 

Nos. 54; 57]. United States District Judge Federico A. Moreno referred to the Undersigned 

all rulings on pretrial, non-dispositive matters and a Report and Recommendations on all 

dispositive matters. [ECF No. 30].

For the reasons discussed below, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that 

the District Court deny in large part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended 

complaint. Specifically, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District 

Court deny the motion to dismiss as to: Count I (copyright infringement), Count V 

(fraud), Count VI (negligent misrepresentation), Count VIII (conspiracy), Count XII 

(unjust enrichment), and Count XIII (copyright infringement). The Undersigned 

respectfully recommends that the District Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss, as 

follows: (1) striking Plaintiffs’ requests for disgorgement of profits in their breach of 

contract claims; (2) striking Plaintiffs’ request for damages other than actual damages, 

infringer profits, and costs for copyright infringement; and (3) striking Plaintiffs’ request 

for damages other than actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and court costs for the 

FDUTPA claim. 

1 Defendants initially moved to dismiss Count IX (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) [ECF 

No. 50], but later withdrew their motion to dismiss this count in their reply. [ECF No. 57]. 

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I. Background

On April 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their eight-count complaint against Defendants. 

[ECF No. 1]. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all eight counts of the complaint, which 

was referred to the Undersigned. [ECF No. 6]. The Undersigned entered a Report and 

Recommendations recommending that Count III (Breach of Contract against MMG), 

Count V (Fraud against all Defendants), Count VI (Negligent Misrepresentation against 

MMG, Angelstone, Morrissey, and White), and Count VIII (Conspiracy against all 

Defendants) be dismissed with leave to amend; and the motion to dismiss be denied as 

to: Count I (Copyright Infringement against all Defendants), Count II (Breach of Contract 

against Angelstone), Count IV (Breach of Contract against Morrissey), and Count VII 

(Tortious Interference against all Defendants). [ECF No. 38]. 

Before Judge Moreno ruled on the parties’ objections, Plaintiffs moved to file an 

amended complaint, which was granted. [ECF Nos. 42; 44]. Plaintiffs filed an amended 

complaint including six new counts and pleading additional details relating to the 

previously pled eight counts. [ECF No. 45]. 

Plaintiffs include the following general allegations, which are incorporated to all 

the counts: 

12. For years JC has been developing a concept and plan to launch a 

professional horse jumping league called the National Equestrian League 

(the “NEL”). The plan to develop and promote the NEL shall be referred to 

herein as the “NEL Plan.” JC set out to create the “NFL of Equestrianism,”

with teams of the best horses and riders competing in America’s top venues. 

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Among other things, the NEL Plan includes sponsorships, advertising, 

television coverage and equipment sales.

13. JC owns by assignment the rights to a copyright in the Jumping Clash 

Show Jumping Competition Modality and Format (“Competition Modality 

and Format”). The Copyright registration number is TXu001789936. The 

Competition Modality and Format includes a description of the competitive 

system, innovations, betting, examples of competitions in the JC system, 

logos, and other information.

14. JC also owns the rights to a copyright in the National Equestrian League 

Presentation (“League Presentation’). The Copyright registration number is 

TXu2236041. The League Presentation includes a description of the NEL 

and its plans.

15. JC owns the rights to a copyright in the National Equestrian League 

Executive Summary (“Executive Summary”). The Copyright registration 

number is TXu2235322. Executive Summary includes a description of the 

NEL and its formats.

16. JC also owns the rights to a copyright in the National Equestrian League 

Franchise Summary (“Franchise Summary”). The Copyright registration 

number is TXu2237874. The Franchise Summary includes a description of 

the NEL and its formats.

17. JC has expended years of activity and significant sums of money to 

develop the NEL Plan. After analyzing the issues extensively and investing 

much time and money for strategic consulting, JC determined that North 

America was a viable market in which to develop and launch the new 

format for team competition.

18. JC formed National to assist in planning, developing, promoting and

operating the NEL Plan in North America.

19. In or around July 2017, JC met with MMG, Morrissey and Nicky Meyer

(“Meyer”). At the meeting, representatives for JC presented the concept of 

the NEL Plan. Morrissey and Meyer loved the project and expressed an 

interest in being part of it. They agreed that MMG would begin working for 

JC after JC obtained approval from the Federation Equestre Internationale 

(“FEI”).

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20. As part of its efforts to develop and promote the NEL Plan, in 2017, JC 

successfully secured FEI approval of the JumpingClash rules which form 

the foundation of the NEL. Obtaining FEI approval was a detailed and 

time[-]consuming process, requiring extensive work, knowhow, and 

development of the horse jumping league concept and business plans. 

. . .

25. After numerous meetings, JC and MMG entered into a contract, attached 

as Exhibit C hereto.

26. The contract was “to provide consulting and management services” for 

National. Ex. C, Annex. . . 

27. MMG’s team included Defendant Morrissey, as well Michael Morrissey, 

the president of MMG, and Nicky Meyer. Ex. C, Annex.

. . .

33. MMG and Morrissey became JC’s image promotor and representative

within the North American equestrian industry. MMG’s main task was to 

contact the main stakeholders in the market and act as the intermediary 

between JC and these stakeholders.

34. By agreement of the parties, MMG continued to work pursuant to the 

contract at all relevant times.

35. Despite being experts at event promotions, MMG and Morrissey 

sabotaged the NEL Plan by failing to share necessary information about it, 

including, without limitation to the relevant potential investors, venues, 

potential sponsors, and key stakeholder groups. This led to wasted time 

and resources and required retention of an additional consultant.

36. MMG and Morrissey also sabotaged the NEL Plan by unilaterally 

canceling event dates in January 2020, at about the same time that MMG, 

Morrissey, White and Angelstone formed Major League, launching their

own league based on the NEL Plan.

37. MMG’s actions resulted in event cancellation fees and damaged NEL’s

reputation, making it more difficult in the future for the NEL to book dates 

and make deals in the horse jumping community.

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38. Under its agreement with JC, MMG was to engage with and negotiate 

with all event promotors that might be attractive for NEL. Despite many 

expressions of interest and the attractive economic proposal provided by 

JC, MMG never successfully obtained a contract with even a single

promotor. At the time, it was confusing to Plaintiffs, but given later events, 

the reason for MMG’s failure to obtain contracts for the NEL has become 

clear as Morrissey, MMG, White and Angelstone have launched their own

competing league, using as a framework the NEL Plan that JC developed at 

such great expense and personal sacrifice.

39. In order to facilitate MMG’s work, JC opened up all its research and 

analysis and shared with MMG, Morrisey, White and Angelstone its entire 

strategy, collaboration proposals, business plans, sales reports for investors, 

regulations, television format proposals, media strategy, image, team value 

proposals, business model developments, systems for licensing and

franchising, and other aspects of the NEL Plan. Plaintiffs also promoted 

MMG’s image by including MMG’s brand and professional profile on the 

NEL website.

40. MMG also worked to set event dates with the FEI, the United States 

Equestrian Federation (“USEF”), and Equestrian Canada. MMG performed 

poorly, underestimating the expense of bookings and taking much longer 

than necessary. MMG also induced JC to allow MMG to book the times in 

its own name instead of for NEL. 

41. MMG’s mishandling of the bookings created problems for the launch of 

NEL

. . .

42. At a meeting in Florida, MMG introduced JC to White as a possible 

collaborator in two areas.

43. White loved the NEL’s concept and stated it would be a great fit for his 

company and venue. 

44. White promised that he would collaborate in organizing an event in 

Canada and act as a manager for team sales.

45. White also worked to co-organize a possible event with the NEL to be 

held in Toronto, for which he charged a monthly fee to National.

46. White was provided with all the details of the NEL Plan.

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47. White worked to promote the NEL with potential teams.

48. National and White’s company, Angelstone, entered into a 

Collaboration Agreement, attached as Exhibit A hereto.

49. The purpose of the Collaboration Agreement was to retain Angelstone 

and White as consultants for the NEL project and to identify persons to 

acquire teams for the NEL. Its duration was from August 30, 2019 through 

December 31, 2020.

50. The agreement stated that National “is interested in identifying persons 

to acquire NEL Teams to be part of the Series and competing in the new 

series.”

51. Angelstone promised to “supply the NEL the Services described as set 

out in this Agreement.”

52. The Collaboration Agreement further provided the “Services that the 

Consultant shall provide in favor of NEL shall include all the reasonably 

necessary information, resources and efforts in order to help NEL to 

accomplish the Project.”

. . .

54. National and Angelstone also entered into a consultancy agreement for 

an event in Toronto (the “Toronto Consultancy Agreement”), attached as 

Exhibit D hereto.

. . .

56. Anglestone also agreed to provide services, including assistance with 

negotiations, promotions and public relations, obtaining sponsors, and 

setting up competitions.

57. In their roles as consultants, Defendants obtained various proprietary 

and secret information from Plaintiffs.

58. This included the NEL Plan, business plans, costs, regulatory knowhow, various contacts of potential investors, promoters, managers, 

sponsors, venues, potential event dates, event features and benefits,

financial projections and economic scenarios, market analyses and research,

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marketing and promotional plan, competition format, timetables, partners 

and teams, and their copyright protected materials.

59. Defendants used and disclosed this information in setting up their own 

league – called Major League Show Jumping (the “MLSJ”), organizing 

events, creating its rules, pitching teams, investors and sponsors and other 

activities.

60. MMG and Morrissey failed to provide the services they promised 

because they were not able to organize proper events in a timely fashion.

61. At relevant and important junctures in the project, White and 

Angelstone failed to present proper teams for consideration, instead trying 

to recruit individual riders into teams Defendants attempted to organize 

themselves. This also set back the project for Plaintiffs.

62. Later events would show that the Defendants were, in violation of their 

roles as paid consultants, withholding their efforts for obtaining investors, 

venues, teams, promotors and managers for NEL.

. . .

65. Morrisey and White, abusing their positions as consultants, sought to 

discourage Plaintiffs in their planning because they were secretly forming 

a competing league of their own that would include many, if not all, of the 

key components of NEL. Consequently, they did not offer alternatives that 

they believed would be successful.

66. In or around early December 2019, Defendants, acting by and through 

White and Morrisey, agreed to misappropriate, highjack and leverage the 

existing infrastructure of Plaintiffs and form their own competing horse 

jumping league, while keeping it secret and seeking to sabotage Plaintiffs’ 

plans.

67. Morrissey and White falsely stated that they would continue working 

with Plaintiffs. Defendants did not indicate that they would misappropriate 

Plaintiffs’ plans that Plaintiffs had labored so hard and invested so much to 

develop and set up their own league based on those misappropriations.

68. The NEL provides a novel means of competition, which is highly 

attractive to the world of horse jumping. Leveraging Plaintiffs’ competition 

format and concepts, infrastructure, confidential information, ideas and 

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plans, as well as Plaintiffs’ contacts, Defendants formulated an illicit plan 

to gain entr[y] into the horse jumping world.

69. On or around December 13, 2019, Plaintiffs and Morrisey and White 

again discussed future plans, and Defendants falsely agreed to continue 

working with Plaintiffs.

70. On or about December 16, 2019, White and Angelstone falsely stated in 

an email he would “absolutely” keep working with Defendants and not 

cancel their agreement. He punctuated his agreement by expressing his 

“sincerest gratitude and very best regards,” although Defendants’ secret 

plans were based on anything but gratitude and fond well wishes.

71. On December 21, 2019, White contacted Alfonso Romo, who had been 

identified as a potential investor and promotor for Plaintiffs. Defendants 

began negotiations with him over investing in a new league started by 

White and Morrissey, as well as event promotions for the new league. 

Romo eventually purchased an ownership interest in the MLSJ and helped 

promote an event to be held [in] San Miguel de Allende, Mexico as part of 

the MLSJ series.

. . . 

73. By late December 2019, Defendants were already working on business 

plans for a new league.

74. Seeking to keep tabs on Plaintiffs’ activities, Defendants began 

communicating directly and clandestinely with James Whisenand, a

consultant and attorney for Plaintiffs, and the principal of a minor interest 

holder in National.

. . .

77. On December 29, 2019, at the same time Defendants were already 

working to form their own league and had already misappropriated

Plaintiffs’ trade secrets and prospects, Defendants contacted James 

Whisenand, and asked him for updates on Plaintiffs’ plans. Morrissey and

White agreed to keep what they were doing away from Whisenand. 

78. In January 2020, Plaintiffs’ representatives again met with Morrissey 

and agreed to the next steps regarding the relationship with Morrissey and 

MMG vis a vis the promotion and launch of NEL. 

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79. Plaintiffs’ plans included a critical role for MMG and Morrissey.

80. Notwithstanding the ongoing efforts to execute the NEL Plan and 

discussions with Plaintiffs, Morrissey and MMG unilaterally cancelled 

event dates in January 2020 and did not notify Plaintiffs of such 

cancellations until almost three months after such cancellations were made. 

81. While signaling further cooperation with Plaintiffs, Defendants worked 

to steal the NEL Plan, use Defendants’ confidential information, regulatory 

knowhow, and business plans, infringe JC’s copyrights, and set up their 

own league.

82.The MLSJ copies the main elements of NEL, including but not limited to

three rounds taking place in one day, elimination of teams per round, 

inclusion of a jump off as final round, three riders per team in first round, 

two riders per team in second round, one rider per team in the jump off 

round, and a team manager. 

. . .

88. Later in January 2020, again without informing Plaintiffs, Defendants 

contacted the USEF and requested that the licensee be changed from 

National to MMG. Defendants also requested that the organizer be changed 

from National to MMG and to not mention National.

89. Meanwhile, Defendants continued to contact Plaintiffs from January 

through March 2020 and discuss ongoing planning for the NEL with the 

Plaintiffs, and they did not mention that they were cancelling National’s 

competition dates or setting up a new league.

. . .

96. On January 23, 2020, Defendants signed a venue agreement with 

Bromont, a venue in Quebec, Canada, which had been one of NEL’s 

proposed venues.

. . .

101. Defendants falsely told the FEI in January or February 2020 that 

Plaintiffs were not going forward with their own plan.

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102. By early February 2020, Defendants purported to have drafted rules 

for MLSJ and had signed 8 teams and were attempting to get approved by 

the FEI.

. . .

110. On March 13, 2020, when Plaintiffs sought to contact Morrisey to 

discuss launching NEL, they were informed by Morrisey that “when I did 

not hear from you back in February I assumed the project was given up.” 

Defendants were still concealing from Plaintiffs that they had already 

cancelled the dates in early January 2020. 

111. On or about March 13, 2020, Morrissey attempted to conceal his moves 

by claiming that he had not heard from Plaintiffs and had assumed that the 

NEL Plan was not going forward. Morrissey did not disclose that he had 

formed Major League and intended to use the NEL Plan to form his own

league.

112. Defendants drafted a false letter to the USEF, but Plaintiffs did not 

approve the letter, and did not understand what the Defendants were 

attempting to do.

113. Finally, on March 26, 2020, apparently unable to hide the cancellations

any longer, MMG informed Plaintiffs that it had cancelled the dates 

already.

114. The reason for Defendants’ failures to execute on their agreements with 

Plaintiffs became clear in 2020 when Defendants went public with their 

intention to launch their own league modeled on the NEL Plan they had 

misappropriated.

. . .

119. Defendants contacted and have received commitments and/or 

contracts with teams, promotors, investors, sponsors, managers, potential 

partners, and venues, which Defendants learned about and/or promoted

through working on the NEL Plan, and which they were contractually 

obligated to obtain for Plaintiffs. [Plaintiffs list the prospective partners and 

venues in paragraphs 121 and 122]. 

. . .

123. The impact of contacting these prospects for Defendants’ new league 

caused the prospects not to do business with Plaintiffs.

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124. Defendants likewise made additional breaches of their respective 

contracts by obtaining such teams, sponsors, investors, events and venues 

for MLSJ, not Plaintiffs.

[ECF No. 45, pp. 2-8]. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the following counts: (1) Count I for 

copyright infringement of the “Competition Modality and Format” against all 

Defendants; (2) Count V for fraud against MMG, Angelstone, Morrissey, and White; (3) 

Count VI for negligent misrepresentation against MMG, Angelstone, Morrissey, and 

White; (4) Count VIII for conspiracy against all Defendants; (5) Count XII for unjust 

enrichment against all Defendants; and (6) Count XIII for copyright infringement of the 

“Executive Summary,” “League Presentation,” and “Franchise Summary” against all 

Defendants. [ECF No. 50].2 The specific allegations for each count are discussed below in 

the analysis of each count. 

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a 

complaint that fails to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations 

2 Although Plaintiffs filed a fourteen-count complaint and defendants move to 

dismiss only six counts, Defendants did not file a partial answer for the eight counts not 

subject to the dismissal motion, and Defendants did not file a motion to postpone the 

filing of their answer to the remaining counts. Plaintiffs, however, have not sought any 

relief flowing from this scenario.

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as true and construe them broadly in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Watts v. 

Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). When conducting this analysis, the 

Court may typically examine only the four corners of the complaint. St. George v. Pinellas 

Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). There are some exceptions to the “four corners” 

rule, but they are inapplicable here, with one exception: taking judicial notice of publicly 

filed copyright registration documents submitted as exhibits.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a Complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Generally, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must do more than merely label his or her 

claims.” Afkhami v. Carnival Corp., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Blumel 

v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 425 (M.D. Fla. 1996)). 

Additionally, a cause of action for fraud must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 9(b), which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” A plaintiff must allege “(1) the precise statements, 

documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for 

the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the Plaintiffs; 

and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Cardenas v. Toyota Motor Corp., 

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418 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1098 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., 

Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

“In other words, a plaintiff is required to plead the ‘who, what, when, where, and 

how’ pertaining to the underlying fraud.” Cardenas, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1098 (citing Garfield 

v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006)). 

III. Analysis 

a. Counts I and XIII – Copyright Infringement Against All Defendants 

In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants infringed their “Competition Modality 

and Format.” [ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 127-40]. “The Competition Modality and Format includes 

a description of the competitive system, innovations, betting, examples of competitions 

in the JC system, logos, and other information.” Id. at p. 3. According to Plaintiffs, the 

infringing work is substantially similar, if not identical, to the Competition Modality and 

Format and “Defendants copied the Format and Modality by copying the elements, 

including but not limited to the team format, team manager, number of rounds, and 

height of obstacles (1.45-1.50m).” Id. at ¶ 131.

In Count XIII, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants infringed the “Executive 

Summary,” “League Presentation,” and “Franchise Summary.” Id. at ¶¶ 267-82.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “copied the Executive Summary by copying 

the elements, including but not limited to the competition format, teams are made up of 

a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 6 riders, three days of events, mandatory 

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participation requirement, and ten events across North America.” Id. at ¶ 271. Plaintiffs 

also allege that “Defendants copied the League Presentation by copying the elements, 

including but not limited to using the franchise model, presenting MLSJ as a new league 

to promote horse jumping in ‘iconic’ locations throughout North America, made for TV, 

with the best riders on eight teams.” Id. at ¶ 272. And they say that “Defendants copied 

the Franchise Summary by copying the visual presentation, graphics, and elements of 

NEL in their own MLSJ franchise presentation.” Id. at ¶ 273.

To establish infringement, a copyright owner must prove “(1) ownership of a valid

copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” BUC 

Intern. Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1142 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation 

omitted). “[C]opyright normally protects the expression of ideas, but not the ideas 

themselves.” Id. Copyright protection also extends to factual compilations. Id. at 1141. 

“Even if all divisible elements of a work are filtered out as unprotected, the copyrighter’s 

selection and arrangement of otherwise unprotected elements can be protectable, if 

original.” Parker v. Outdoor Channel Holdings, No. 2-11-CV-00159-J, 2012 WL 6200177, at 

*4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2012) (internal citation omitted). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are seeking protection for a game concept or 

athletic event that is not subject to copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case

does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 

procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 

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regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such 

work.”); see also Somerson v. McMahon, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353-54 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“The 

Second Circuit has examined the issue of whether an athletic event is copyrightable and 

concluded that it is not. . . . The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s reasoning.”).

But Defendants concede that the Franchise Summary containing visual 

presentation and graphics is protected by the Copyright Act.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ merit-based arguments are not appropriate at the 

motion to dismiss stage and that deciding these arguments would require the Court to 

conduct a fact-intensive comparison of each of Plaintiffs’ works and compare it to 

Defendants’ materials. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the constituent elements (“such as 

the one-on-one rider format, specific team composition, unique graphics and 

compilations, and presenting it as a franchise model in iconic locations throughout North 

America”) are protected under the Copyright Act. [ECF No. 54, p. 16]. 

The Undersigned agrees with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have alleged infringement of 

their registered copyrights. Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to support the claim that 

Defendants have infringed on (at least some) of the constituent elements contained in the 

“Competition Modality and Format,” “Executive Summary,” “League Presentation,” and 

“Franchise Summary.”

Defendants are attempting to parse out portions of the “Competition Modality and 

Format,” “Executive Summary,” “League Presentation,” and “Franchise Summary” as 

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not being protected constituent elements. While Defendants may be correct that some 

elements may not be protected (like the broad idea of a horse jumping competition), this 

Court should not undertake the fact-focused process of determining the merits of 

Plaintiffs’ copyright claims on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. 

FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“However, this 

determination of whether plaintiff’s images are sufficiently original to be copyrighted is 

a factual issue that is inappropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss given the 

allegations in this case.”); Kumar v. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Engineers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-6870 

KSH, 2013 WL 5467090, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (rejecting defendant’s merits-based 

arguments on motion to dismiss and noting that “the Court's task at this point is not to 

determine on the merits whether the Thesis contains only ideas and no expression. Rather 

the Court must assess whether Kumar’s complaint provides sufficient factual information 

from which it may be reasonably inferred that the Institute trod on protectable grounds 

in publishing the Article.”). 

Defendants point to cases deciding the merits of copyright claims at the motion to 

dismiss stage that are relatively straightforward, unlike the merits determination that 

would be required here. See Brandon v. New Power Generation, No. 15-22738-CIV, 2017 WL 

1437560, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2017) (finding that lyric “phone sex” is not copyrightable 

phrase on a motion to dismiss); Total Mktg. Techs., Inc. v. Angel Medflight Worldwide Air 

Ambulance Servs., LLC, No. 8:10-CV-2680-T-33TBM, 2012 WL 33150, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 

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6, 2012) (dismissing copyright claim because counter-plaintiff failed to allege all elements 

of statutory copyright infringement and counter-plaintiff sought protection for blank 

form, which is not entitled to copyright protection); Taylor v. IBM, 54 F. App’x 794, 794

(5th Cir. 2002) (deciding on motion to dismiss that there was no copyright protection for

phrase “pre paid cash cards”).3

Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I 

and XIII should be denied. 

b. Count V – Fraud Against MMG, Angelstone, Morrissey, and White

Plaintiffs allege the following in support of their fraud count against MMG, 

Angelstone, Morrissey, and White: 

167. As set forth in the General Allegations, MMG (through Morrisey and 

others), Angelstone (through White and others), Morrissey and White 

knowingly and intentionally made various false and fraudulent statements 

of material facts and omitted to state material facts to Plaintiffs.

168. While setting up and planning the MLSJ, as alleged above, Defendants 

made false statements in December 2019 through March 2020 that 

Defendants would continue working on the NEL Plan and toward the 

launch of the NEL, as well as seeking updates on Plaintiffs’ work for the 

league.

3 Further, in support of their merit-based argument, Defendants cite to Hoopla Sports 

and Entm’t, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1996) and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. 

Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). In these cases, the plaintiffs sought copyright 

protection of live basketball games. Here, Plaintiffs argue that the constituent elements 

(“such as the one-on-one rider format, specific team composition, unique graphics and 

compilations, and presenting it as a franchise model in iconic locations throughout North 

America”) are protected under the Copyright Act, not the sport of horse jumping itself. 

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169. As alleged above, Defendants also failed to disclose their plans for the 

MLSJ, their intention of ceasing to act as consultants for Plaintiffs, and that 

they had cancelled Plaintiffs’ dates while under a duty to protect Plaintiffs’ 

confidential information and business plans and to work on behalf of 

Plaintiffs.

170. Defendants intentionally made these false statements and failed to 

make disclosures to Plaintiffs to induce them to continue to work with 

Defendants under the agreements, to continue making payments, and to 

continue to disclose confidential information, knowhow, intellectual 

property, business plans and the NEL Plan to Defendants, as well as to 

forbear checking into Defendants’ activities and to take counter-measures 

to prevent their contacts being signed up by Defendants.

171. In reliance on their false statements and omission, Plaintiffs continued 

to make such payments and disclosures and forbearances. Consequently, 

their reliance on these false statements and omissions have resulted in 

Plaintiffs’ injury.

172. Defendants’ fraud has actually and proximately caused substantial 

harm and damages to Plaintiffs.

[ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 167-172]. 

In evaluating Plaintiffs’ first complaint, the Undersigned found that Plaintiffs 

failed to plead the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraudulent conduct that 

supported their claim. See ECF No. 38, p. 17 (citing Cardenas, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1098). The 

Undersigned also found that Plaintiffs improperly comingled several defendants without 

providing specific facts supporting fraud as to each defendant. See Rubinstein v. Keshet 

Inter Vivos Tr., No. 17-61019-CIV, 2018 WL 8899231, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2018), report 

and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 8899306 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2018) (“Plaintiffs’

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Florida RICO claim improperly commingles several defendants without providing any 

specific facts and therefore fails to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.”). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs still do not allege fraud with the necessary 

particularity that is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Defendants state that the problems

are “now compounded where there are twice as many paragraphs comprising the 

General Allegations of the Amended Complaint.” [ECF No. 50, p. 7]. The Undersigned 

agrees that in some instances in the complaint, Plaintiffs still refer to the Defendants 

collectively and make vague references to false statements. However, Plaintiffs have 

amended the complaint to also provide the requisite who, what, when, where, and how

of Defendants’ alleged fraud, i.e., pretending to work as consultants for Plaintiffs while 

using that information to copy Plaintiffs’ league and create their own league, and 

sabotaging Plaintiffs’ league in the process. 

Plaintiffs provide specific dates, refer to meetings and e-mail communications, and 

provide a detailed timeline of the alleged fraud. For example, Plaintiffs allege: 

• On or about December 13, 2019, Morrisey and White “falsely agreed to continue

working with Plaintiffs.” [ECF No. 45, ¶ 69]. 

• “Morrissey and White falsely stated that they would continue working with 

Plaintiffs” when, in actuality, they planned to “misappropriate Plaintiffs’ plans[.]”

Id. at ¶ 67. 

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• “On January 19, 2020, White wrote to Plaintiffs and falsely encouraged Plaintiffs 

to launch the league as quickly as possible, notwithstanding Defendants’ 

surreptitious cancellation of NEL’s event dates.” Id. at ¶ 92. 

• Defendant MMG unilaterally cancelled events dates in January 2020 and did not 

notify Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 80.

• In January 2020, Defendants contacted USEF and requested that the NEL license

be changed from National to MMG. Id. at ¶ 88. 

• “By January 26, 2020, White and Morrissey were circulating a draft operating 

agreement for MLSJ” while fraudulently representing to Plaintiffs that they should 

continue working together on NEL. Id. at ¶¶ 98-100; see also ¶¶ 95, 99, 100, 105, 

106, 108, 110, 111.

The Undersigned finds that Defendants have notice of the conduct complained of,

and thus, they have sufficient information to formulate a defense. See Trinity Graphic, 

USA, Inc. v. Tervis Tumbler Co., 320 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Wagner 

v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006)) (“The purpose of Rule 

9(b) is to ensure defendants have ‘notice of the conduct complained of,’ so they have 

‘sufficient information to formulate a defense.’”). Accordingly, the Undersigned finds 

that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V should be denied.

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c. Count VI – Negligent Misrepresentation Against MMG, Angelstone, 

Morrissey, and White

In Count VI, Plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their negligent misrepresentation 

claim are almost identical to the allegations included in Plaintiffs’ fraud count, except 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “intentionally, recklessly or negligently” made false 

statements. [ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 175-83]. 

The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) also applies to negligent 

misrepresentation claims. See Douse v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1264 (M.D. Fla. 

2018) (relying on Lamm v. State St. Bank & Tr., 749 F.3d 938, 951 (11th Cir. 2014))

(“Negligent misrepresentation allegations are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened 

particularity standard.”).

Defendant makes the same argument as it relates to Count V for Fraud -- that 

Plaintiffs do not meet the standard for Rule 9(b). 

Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above in Count V, the Undersigned 

finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI should be denied.

d. Count VIII – Conspiracy Against All Defendants 

Plaintiffs allege in Count VIII that: 

195. In or around December 2019, Defendants, by and through White and 

Morrisey, entered into an agreement to embark on an unlawful course of 

conduct to defraud Plaintiffs, commit tortious interference, misappropriate 

trade secrets, commit unfair business practices and to infringe copyrights 

by setting up the MLSJ. 

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196. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Morrisey and White, acting for 

themselves and on behalf of MMG, Angelstone and MLSJ committed overt 

acts, including, but not limited to cancelling dates for the NEL, contacting 

Plaintiffs for information, contacting, negotiating with and signing 

Plaintiffs’ contacts and prospective business associates, using Plaintiffs’ 

proprietary information, and by inducing Plaintiffs to rely on their 

fraudulent and false representations omissions, continue to share 

confidential information and business plans, and to erroneously rely on 

Morrissey, White, MMG and Angelstone to promote Plaintiffs’ business 

interests.

197. Defendants have aided and abetted each other in these tortious acts. 

As a result of their conduct, conspiracy, and scheme, Defendants are jointly 

and severally liable for the damages sustained by Plaintiffs.

198. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs have 

suffered and will continue to suffer damages. 

199. The conspiracy was formed intentionally, willfully, and with the 

purpose of harming Plaintiffs and benefitting Defendants. Consequently, 

Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek an award of punitive damages sufficient 

to punish Defendants and serve as a deterrent against such tortious and 

unlawful conduct at the appropriate time.

[ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 195-99]. 

“To state a claim for civil conspiracy under Florida law, a plaintiff must allege: ‘(a) 

an agreement between two or more parties, (b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act 

by unlawful means, (c) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and 

(d) damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts done under the conspiracy.’” Corbett v. 

Transp. Sec. Admin., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1190 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 690 

(11th Cir. 2014) (citing United Tech. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009)). 

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Further, a claim for civil conspiracy must “set forth clear, positive, and specific 

allegations of civil conspiracy.” Corbett, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (internal citation omitted); 

see also Alhassid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing 

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556 (11th Cir. 1984)) (“In . . . conspiracy actions, courts 

have recognized that more than mere conclusory notice pleading is required. . . In 

conspiracy cases, a defendant must be informed of the nature of the conspiracy which is 

alleged. It is not enough to simply aver in the complaint that a conspiracy existed.”). 

And here, where Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have entered into an agreement 

to defraud Plaintiffs, “an underlying cause of action for fraud is a necessary predicate to 

a cause of action for conspiracy to defraud.” Alhassid., 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1316 (internal 

citation omitted). 

Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is based on fraud, 

it should be dismissed for failure to comply with the particularity requirements of Rule 

9(b). As discussed above, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiffs’ fraud count is adequately 

pled. 

Further, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy count provides the who, what, when, where, and 

how of Defendants’ alleged agreement. Plaintiffs allege that:

• In “December 2019, Morrissey and White began to plan to cut Plaintiffs out of the 

business and create their own league based on Plaintiffs’ plans.” [ECF No. 45, ¶ 

83]. 

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• White and Morrisey hid their plans and “agreed with each other to keep their own 

plans secret from Plaintiffs.” Id. at ¶ 85. 

• “On or about January 2, 2020, while keeping it secret from Plaintiffs, and claiming 

to represent Plaintiffs as their consultants and agents, Defendants caused the USEF 

to cancel event dates held by National.” Id. at ¶ 87. 

• In January 2020, they continued to develop MLSJ while agreeing to misrepresent 

to Plaintiffs [that] they were working together. Id. at ¶¶ 89-97.

Thus, the Undersigned finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VIII

should be denied.

e. Count XII – Unjust Enrichment Against All Defendants 

Plaintiffs allege in Count XII that: 

261. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on Defendants in the form of 

payments and their property, including the NEL plan, business plans, 

know how, their contacts, potential investors, managers, promoters, event 

dates and teams.

262. Defendants have knowingly and voluntarily received the benefits and 

value conferred by Plaintiffs and have voluntarily accepted and retained 

the benefits conferred.

263. It would be inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefits conferred 

by Plaintiffs.

264. Defendants would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit.

265. Plaintiffs have exhausted all direct remedies against any Defendants 

for which they are in privity of contract.

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[ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 261-65]. 

The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are “a benefit conferred upon a 

defendant by the plaintiff, the defendant’s appreciation of the benefit, and the 

defendant’s acceptance and retention of the benefit under circumstances that make it 

inequitable for him to retain it without paying the value thereof.” Alvarez v. Royal 

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (internal citation 

omitted). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment should be dismissed 

because Plaintiffs have not alleged a distinct equitable claim. Defendants state that 

Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim arises out of the relationship governed by the express 

agreements and concerns the same subject matter, and thus it must be dismissed. See

Alhassid v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 771 F. App’x 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal citation 

omitted) (“Florida courts have held that a plaintiff cannot pursue a quasi-contract claim 

for unjust enrichment if an express contract exists concerning the same subject matter.”). 

Plaintiffs point out that one of the Defendants, White, did not sign a contract. And 

additionally, Plaintiffs argue that they can plead their unjust enrichment claim in the 

alternative to their breach of contract claims, and it would therefore be premature to 

dismiss the unjust enrichment count now. See Abels v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 678 F. 

Supp. 2d 1273, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“However, Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees, 

that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) allows pleading in the alternative, even if the 

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theories are inconsistent.”). Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the contracts do not cover 

the scope of the unjust enrichment claim. 

The Undersigned agrees with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are permitted to plead unjust 

enrichment in the alternative. See id. And further, it appears that Plaintiffs’ unjust 

enrichment claim derives from different facts than the unjust enrichment claim. See 

Quantum Supply B.V. v. Mercury Air Cargo Inc., No. 20-CV-25223, 2021 WL 1125017, at *2 

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2021) (internal citation omitted) (“One instance where a party may 

properly assert an alternative claim for unjust enrichment where a valid contract 

otherwise exists is when the quasi-contractual claims concern matters which are outside 

the scope of the contract.”).

Here, while the contracts between Plaintiffs and MMG, Angelstone, and Morrissey 

may cover the fees they were paid as consultants, damages for the breach of those 

contracts may not fully compensate Plaintiffs for the loss of their entire business model 

and plan to create a novel equestrian event.

The Collaboration Agreement provides that Angelstone will act as a consultant to 

introduce Plaintiff NEL to qualified persons and that he would receive a percentage of 

the amount paid by the qualified person to NEL. The term sheet between MMG and JCC 

provides that MMG would provide specific services to JCC in connection with the NEL, 

including assisting with the business model and developing a strategic sponsorship plan.

These contracts do not discuss what would happen if Defendants took the information 

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gained during the time they were acting as consultants and created their own league with 

it (and allegedly sabotaged Plaintiffs’ league in the process). 

Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 

XII should be denied.

f. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Damages Claims 

i. Plaintiffs’ Requests for Disgorgement of Profits in Breach of Contract 

Counts

Plaintiffs previously stated, in their response to Defendants’ initial motion to 

dismiss, that they would not seek disgorgement of profits in connection with their breach 

of contract counts at trial. [ECF No. 7, p. 18 (citing Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 

F.3d 1223, 1245 n.26 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have found no Florida authority suggesting 

that this principle permits disgorgement of profits in an ordinary breach of contract 

action.”)]. Thus, Defendants have requested that this request be stricken from the ad 

damnum clauses of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract counts. 

Because this request for damages is legally unavailable (and Plaintiffs already 

conceded4 that this type of damages is unavailable here), the Undersigned agrees with 

Defendants that it should be stricken. See Church Girls, LLC v. Rodgers, No. 2:18-CV-14232, 

2018 WL 5923436, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2018) (internal citation omitted) (“While 

4 Specifically, Plaintiffs explained that “it appears that disgorgement is not an 

available remedy for a non-real property breach of contract action” and represented that 

“absent further clarification of the law, Plaintiffs will not seek that requested relief for 

Counts II, III, and IV at trial.” [ECF No. 7, p. 18].

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granting a motion to strike is disfavored by courts, the purpose of a motion to strike is to 

clean up the pleadings, remove irrelevant or otherwise confusing materials, and avoid 

unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.”); see also Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, No. 18-

14155-CIV, 2018 WL 6182590, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2018), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2018 WL 6179482 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2018) (internal citation omitted) (“A motion 

to strike is the appropriate mechanism to pursue removal of the prayer for damages in 

the Complaint.”).

ii. Request in Count XIII (Copyright Infringement) for Damages Other 

Than Actual Damages, Infringer Profits, and Costs

In Count XIII, Plaintiffs request actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney’s 

fees for Defendants’ alleged copyright infringement of the Executive Summary, League 

Presentation, and Franchise Summary. Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ request for 

statutory damages and attorney’s fees because the alleged infringement of the Executive 

Summary, League Presentation, and Franchise Summary began before these copyrights 

were registered. See 17 U.S.C. § 412; see also Rug Art Int'l, Inc. v. Galaxy Mktg., Inc., No. 11-

60178-CIV, 2011 WL 13217291, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2011) (“Accordingly, § 412 operates 

to foreclose Plaintiff’s pursuit of either statutory damages or attorney’s fees with respect 

to the “Calabasas” and “Tassels” designs, because they were registered after the alleged 

infringement.”).

Defendants attach to their motion to dismiss a copy of the U.S. Copyright Office 

Registration Records reflecting that Plaintiffs obtained copyright registration of the 

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“League Presentation” and the “Executive Summary” on January 19, 2021, and on 

February 5, 2021 for the “Franchise Summary.” [ECF No. 50-1]. Defendants’ alleged 

infringements began at least thirteen months before a copyright was ever registered.

Thus, Defendants can recover only actual damages, infringer profits, and costs related to 

the infringement. See Rug Art Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 13217291, at *2 (striking requests for 

statutory damages and attorney’s fees when infringement occurred prior to date of 

registration).

Plaintiffs do not dispute this. They simply state that making this determination 

would require the Court to make factual findings as to the date of the infringement, which 

is not appropriate on a motion to strike. See Miranda v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 11-cv-20885-

KMM, 2011 WL 13223667, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“It is 

inappropriate to resolve disputed factual issues on a motion to strike.”). 

The Undersigned agrees with Defendants that no factual determination is

necessary to strike the demands for statutory damages and fees because Plaintiffs allege

the dates of infringement (beginning in late 2019 and early 2020) in the Amended 

Complaint. See ECF No. 45, pp. 11-12. And the Court may take judicial notice of the 

copyright records reflecting the date of registration. See Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. 

S.E.C., 177 F. App’x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (“The district court 

may take judicial notice of public records and may thus consider them on a motion to 

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dismiss.”); see also Pro. LED Lighting, Ltd. v. AAdyn Tech., LLC, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1371

n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (taking judicial notice of copyright registrations). 

Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that the Court may properly take judicial 

notice of the copyright registration documents [ECF No. 50-1] and grant Defendants’ 

motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request in Count XIII (Copyright Infringement) for damages 

other than actual damages, infringer profits, and costs. 

iii. Plaintiffs’ Request for Damages Other Than Actual Damages, Plus 

Attorney’s Fees and Court Costs in Count XIV (FDUTPA)

Defendants move to strike the ad damnum clause of Count XIV to the extent 

Plaintiffs seek damages beyond those recoverable under FDUTPA. The Florida Deceptive 

and Unfair Trade Practices Act limits recovery to “actual damages, plus attorney’s fees 

and court costs.” § 501.211(2), Fla. Stat. “Actual damages” under FDUTPA “is a term of 

art, defined by Florida courts as the difference in market value of the product or service 

in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which 

it should have been delivered.” Eclipse Med., Inc. v. Am. Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc., 

262 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, regarding Count XIV (FDUTPA): 

Plaintiffs seek judgment for compensatory, consequential, and general 

damages in an amount to be determined at trial; disgorgement and 

restitutions of all earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits received by 

Defendants as a result of their unlawful acts and practices; punitive 

damages, declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees; costs and disbursements of the 

action; pre-and post-judgment interest; preliminary and permanent 

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injunctive relief, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem 

just and proper.

[ECF No. 45, p. 44]. 

Thus, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiffs’ request for any damages other than 

“actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and courts costs” should be stricken from the ad 

damnum clause of Count XIV. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that 

the District Court deny in large part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended 

complaint. Specifically, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District 

Court deny the motion to dismiss as to: Count I (copyright infringement), Count V 

(fraud), Count VI (negligent misrepresentation), Count VIII (conspiracy), Count XII 

(unjust enrichment), and Count XIII (copyright infringement). The Undersigned 

respectfully recommends that the District Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss, as 

follows: (1) striking Plaintiffs’ requests for disgorgement of profits in their breach of 

contract claims; (2) striking Plaintiffs’ request for damages other than actual damages, 

infringer profits, and costs for copyright infringement in Count XIII; and (3) striking 

Plaintiffs’ request for damages other than actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and court 

costs for the FDUTPA claim. 

Finally, in order to ensure that the parties will be proceeding on an easilyunderstood complaint, rather than one with sentences, clauses, and prayers for relief 

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stricken, the Undersigned further recommends (if these recommendations are adopted) 

that Plaintiffs file a cleaned-up Second Amended Complaint within seven days after an 

order adopting these recommendations is entered, and Defendants shall substantively 

answer all counts within seven days after service of the Second Amended Complaint.

V. Objections

The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy 

of this Report and Recommendations within which to file written objections, if any, with 

United States District Judge Federico A. Moreno. Each party may file a response to the 

other party’s objection within fourteen (14) days of the objection. Failure to file objections 

timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue 

covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to 

factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error 

if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).

RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED, in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on May 26, 

2021. 

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Copies furnished to:

The Honorable Federico A. Moreno

All counsel of record

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