Number 160, April 1999
**The New NATO Members: *Will They Contribute?
by Jeffrey Simon
Conclusions
In assessing the reasons NATO often citesfor enlarging the Alliance, one might conclude that the three new allies will promotestability through institutionalizing common values and processes. Each case is, in fact,different:

Hungary already may have crossed thethreshold. While it has provided lines of communication, as well as a non-combatengineering battalion in Bosnia, the long-term effect of low defense budgets andnine-month conscription is undermining its military capacity. If it does not increasedefense expenditures, or if it reduces conscription to six months, Hungary will find itdifficult to meet NATO target force goals or its military commitments with Slovenia andRomania, or be anything more than a security free rider. Hungary’s choice couldsignificantly affect the future of NATO enlargement, as well as regional security.

The Czech Republic stands at a crossroad.If it maintains 12-month conscription, it has the capacity to strengthen territorialdefense, contribute a brigade to NATO rapid reaction forces and a battalion forout-of-area operations, and provide lines of communication. If, however, Prague adopts anopposition policy of eliminating conscription to use an all-volunteer force, the militarycould evaporate because of low social support. If this were to occur, the Czechs wouldbecome merely free riders of security.

Poland's social support for the military,robust economy, and demographics should provide its armed forces with the capacity tostrengthen territorial defense, add two brigades to NATO rapid reaction forces, andenhance the Alliance's capacity to operate out of area by providing lines of communicationand peace support forces. 
**Introduction

The three new NATO members must determinewhat military role each will play in European security. Their choices are important inlight of NATO arguments justifying enlargement. These reasons included:
- promoting stability through    institutionalizing common values and processes; 
- enhancing NATO's Article 5 core defense    tasks by strengthening territorial defense and contributing to rapid reaction forces; and 
- enhancing capacity of NATO to operate    militarily out of area by providing lines of communica-tion and peace support operations. 

The degree to which new NATO membersrealize their potential will influence, if not determine, the future of the Alliance. 
**NATO-Member Challenges

The new members face the challenge ofmilitarily integrating into NATO. If they succeed, the Alliance will be strengthened andpoised for further enlargement. If they fall short of expectations, and if NATO concludesthat the first tranche has added free riders rather than military contributors ofsecurity, NATO's Article 10 commitment to further enlarge will become less credible, andregional security will be compromised. 

The challenge of NATO integration is notso much a question of military equipment modernization—which is not addressed in thispaper—but of building a capable military institution that is supported by society andgovernment.

Partnership For Peace (PFP) has created asense of regional security and stability. NATO needs to be careful not to permit attentionand resources to be deflected from the PFP to its new members, as this might erode apartnership that could experience a "mid-life crisis" after the April 1999Washington Summit. NATO's new members—in addition to meeting their target force goalsand providing rhetorical support for neighboring partners' membership—need also todevote their energy and resources into the partnership.
**New NATO-Member Military Contributions

Military contributions by Hungary and theCzech Republic—with populations of roughly 10 million—might be compared toBelgium, Portugal, and Greece, whose respective forces (and defense expenditures aspercent of GDP) number 43,000 (1.6 percent), 55,000 (2.6 percent), and 162,000 (4.6percent). Poland—with a population of 38 million—is comparable to Spain, whoseforces and defense expenditures are respectively, 197,000 and 1.4 percent of GDP. 

**Hungary.** In 1999, Hungary's 52,200troops constituted roughly 42 percent of its 122,400 in 1989, when the majority (75percent) of the armed forces were 18-month conscripts. In 1994, Hungary reduced conscripttime to 12 months, and again in 1997 to nine months. A new government program seeks to *furtherreduce* conscription to six months.

Reducing conscript training time increasestraining costs and produces inadequately trained conscripts. It also requires moreconscripts to maintain existing force levels. Accelerated intake is a particularly seriousproblem for Hungary because its population is declining! In 1998 its pool of possibleconscripts numbered 90,000, which barely produced the 33,000 conscripts needed for thearmed forces. Budapest's demographics are such that between 2003 and 2005 the availablepool will decline to roughly 50,000 (or 55 percent of present levels). Assuming thatdeferments, health standards, and professional forces remain unchanged, the pool willproduce only 18,150 conscripts (resulting in an overall force of 37,950). If theGovernment implements its six-month conscription program, available manpower will declineto 12,100 (to produce an overall force of only 31,900).

Because many senior military officialsnoted publicly that the existing nine-month conscription produces troops of limitedutility, Hungary initiated a program to attract contract (extended-service) soldiers whocould perform tasks that conscripts are unable to perform (e.g., drive tanks and fireartillery). The plan was to hire 2,000 each in 1996 and 1997; and an additional 500 peryear thereafter. By NATO accession in March 1999, only 4,300 extended service troops (ofHungary's goal of 5,500) were serving, constituting a shortfall of 1,200. 

Defense Minister Janos Szabo has notedthat he will carefully survey the defense budget and find every available *forint* tofill out the extended service shortfall. This may prove difficult, because Hungary'sprofessional forces are also competing for resources in Hungary's bare bones defensebudget. Hungary’s professionals are losing ground to inflation. Last year they soughta 41 percent salary increase to simply break even with several years of inflation and wereunhappy when they received only a 23.5 percent raise. Coupled with Hungary’s lowpopular support for the military (it ranks 23 out of 25 occupations), plans to expand its19,800 professional force (which has declined 35 percent since 1989) are at risk. 

The defense budget declined from 2.8percent of GDP in 1989 to roughly 1.4 percent in 1997. In response to concerns andpressures from some NATO allies, Hungary agreed to increase its defense budget by 0.1percent per year until the year 2001 to reach 1.8 percent of GDP, which still falls belowthe European NATO-wide average of 2.1 percent of GDP.

This means that Hungary's role as acontributor of military security in NATO is in jeopardy. Legitimate questions need to beraised about the limited utility of nine-month conscripts, even for territorial defense.This problem will be magnified if conscript time is reduced to six months. Hungary'sforces would decline substantially to an overall force of 31,900. Hungary’s forcecontribution would be equivalent to Denmark and Norway; two NATO allies roughly one-halfthe size of Hungary with populations at 5.2 million and 4.3 million respectively.

Hungary needsto review the role it wants to play in the Alliance and realistically assess whether itsmilitary force is consistent with that role. Will it be able to provide for territorialdefense and meet its commitment to provide an additional battalion for NATO rapid reactionforces by 2003, let alone maintain its Bosnian 300-troop noncombat battalion? CanBuda-pest provide the resources necessary to develop its planned military units withRomania on the one hand, and with Slovenia and Italy on the other? Its answers will have asignificant impact on regional security and will determine whether it becomes a free rideror NATO contributor.

**Czech Republic.** In 1999, the CzechRepublic's 60,880 troops constituted roughly 57 percent of its 106,679 in 1993, when themajority (57 percent) were 12-month conscripts (down from 18 months in the Czech andSlovak Federated Republic). 

The new Milos Zeman government maintains12-month conscription, but some members of Vaclav Klaus's opposition are calling for anall-volunteer force. Assuming that 12-month conscription is maintained, the Czechs face ademographic problem that is not as severe as Hungary’s. Its pool of roughly 90,000 in1997 and 1998 will decline to 70,719 by 2002. This represents a decline of roughly 22percent, compared to Hungary's precipitous 45 percent decline. This means that the CzechRepublic ought to be able to meet its planned manning levels of roughly 23,000-to-25,000conscripts, if it maintains 12-month conscription. 

Recognizing the resulting effects offurther reducing conscription time, coupled with the shortage of NCOs and junior officers,the military argued that it was necessary to cultivate 14,000 junior officers beforereducing conscript time. They continue to encourage the government to maintain the12-month term.

The CzechRepublic’s 1999 professional corps of 26,163 is larger than Hungary's by 30 percent,which perhaps helps to explain why it has been able to maintain an 800-troop battalionwith vertical lift capability in Bosnia (more than twice Hungary's capacity). The largerCzech corps also makes credible its goal to provide a brigade to NATO rapid reactionforces. Many of the Czech professional corps' problems are the same as Hungary’s: ashortage of housing, inadequate pilot training, and low occupational prestige for themilitary. However, Czech Republic budgetary support for defense has been consistentlystronger than Hungary’s. 

The 1993-1994 defense budget of 2.6percent of GDP declined to 1.7 percent in 1997. In response to NATO pressure, Pragueagreed to increase defense expenditures by 0.1 percent per year to reach 2.0 percent ofGDP by 2000. And, like Hungary’s, the budget has increased each year; unlikeHungary’s, the Czech economy has been in decline. This means that the additionalresources which the Czechs assumed would accrue from increased growth are not onlyunlikely to materialize, but, with economic contraction, could result in reduced resourcesfor defense, even if Prague meets its commitment to increase by 0.1 percent per year. Inother words, economic constraints are more likely to be prominent in the Czech Republicthan in Hungary. 

If Prague maintains 12-month conscriptionand its commitment to increase defense expenditures 0.1 percent per year, and if theeconomy improves, the Czechs have the capacity to produce a military force comparable insize to those of Belgium and Portugal. However, Prague is just as likely to take a freeride.

**Poland.** In 1999, Poland's 205,000troops constituted roughly 50 percent of its 412,000 in 1988, when the majority of thearmed forces were 24-month conscripts. In 1990, Warsaw reduced conscription to 18 months,and again in 1998 to 12 months. At present, it has no intention of further reducing theconscription term.

Twelve-monthconscription should be adequate to train troops for territorial defense functions andshould not unduly stress Poland's demographic situation, which in 1998 provided a 317,000pool of manpower. While the pool will decline gradually through 2003, it is adequate toproduce the roughly 90,000 needed conscripts.

In other words, in contrast to Hungary,demographics are unlikely to impact Polish force structure. As in the Czech Republic,economics are likely to affect Polish forces—but in significantly different ways.Poland's strong economy will make it increasingly difficult for the Polish military toattract soldiers. 

Polish planners recognize that 12-monthtraining is inadequate to provide troops with many of the skills necessary to a modernmilitary. Hence, like Hungary, in 1994 Poland introduced extended-service (a minimum of anextra 15 months) contract troops, which numbered 13,500 in 1998 and are to expand to20,000 by the end of 1999. When the program was introduced in 1994 the 600 *zloty*salary was 130 percent of Poland’s average monthly salary (AMS); hence there werethree applicants per slot. In 1998 the 800 *zloty* salary was roughly 80 percent ofthe AMS; hence there was only one applicant per position. Filling the expanded,extended-service slots may be difficult, but is probably manageable, because Poland’smilitary, in marked contrast to Hungary’s and the Czech Republic’s, is a popularinstitution. 

This support has been manifest in Polishdefense budgets, which have been consistently higher than those of other new (and manyold) NATO members. Since 1989, when the Polish defense budget was 2.5 percent of GDP, ithas—with one exception in 1989—remained at roughly 2.3 percent of GDP, slightlyhigher than European NATO's 2.1 average.

The Polish professional officer corpsdropped roughly 25 percent from 112,656 in 1988 to 83,800 in 1997 (compared to 35 percentin Hungary and the Czech Republic). The professional corps has since begun to rebound to85,500 in 1998, with plans to increase to 94,900 in 1999. Poland has maintained an800-troop battalion in Bosnia and offered a second battalion, contingent upon outsidefunding. Their IFOR/SFOR force participation and professional force size make credibletheir future commitment to provide two brigades to NATO's rapid reaction force and buildcombined military units with Lithuania and Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Poland shares with other newmembers many problems that impact on morale. There is a need to improve social conditionsand housing, and many professionals are concerned about their pensions. Anothercompetitive attraction is the robust economy which is drawing talent away from theprofessional forces. In the Polish air force, pilots have been departing in droves. Forexample, a pilot with 15 years of experience earns roughly 3,000 *zlotys* per month,while he can command 8,000 *zlotys* on the open economy. Hence, as with theextended-service contract forces, the vibrant economy will make the task of building andmaintaining Poland's professional forces difficult, particularly for the air force.

In sum, while Poland's strong economycomplicates the task of building its armed forces, demographics will not be a seriousproblem, and strong social support will help Warsaw achieve its target force goals. It isconceivable that Poland will more than match Spain and will become a serious NATO militarycontributor of security, enhancing the Alliance's military capabilities.

Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow atINSS. He can be reached at (202) 685-2367, by fax at (202) 685-3972, or by e-mail at [email protected]. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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