1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

305S TRUST, LLC, individually and §

on behalf of those similarly situated, § 

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

vs. § DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 §

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE §

SERVICES, LLC, §

 §

Defendant. §

 §

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff 305S TRUST, LLC (“305S Trust”) by and through its counsel, Scott Hirsch Law 

Group, PLLC, and Rodriguez Law & Advocacy, P.A., brings this class action lawsuit for violations 

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., (“FDCPA”), Section 559.72(9), 

Florida Statutes (“Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act” or “FCCPA”), and Section 

701.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes. In support Plaintiff alleges the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a putative class action brought through Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. It is brought by 

a Florida limited liability corporation on its own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly 

situated, against one of the country’s largest loan servicers, CARRINGTON MORTGAGE 

SERVICES, LLC (“Defendant” or “CARRINGTON”). CARRINGTON is employed by lenders 

to “service” mortgages on their behalf. 

2. This class action seeks to recover from CARRINGTON improper fees which are 

excessive in nature and improperly charged by CARRINGTION as being owed by the mortgagor. 

These fees, are in many instances, fraudulent in nature and are added onto the fees the owner owes 

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on the distressed property; as a means of providing fees to CARRINGTON and the lenders they 

service. Plaintiff and the Class Members are Florida homeowners whose homes have been in

foreclosure. CARRINGTON is servicer of the mortgage loans which encumber Plaintiff’s and 

Class Members’ homes. As a servicer, CARRINGTON regularly acts as a debt collector. 

PARTIES JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Plaintiff, 305S Trust is a Florida limited liability corporation with its principle place 

of business located at 7491 North Federal Highway, Boca Raton, Florida, within this judicial 

district. On May 2, 2013, it purchased a condominium located 350 South Miami Avenue, Unit 

2806, Miami Florida, via deed in lieu of foreclosure.

2. Defendant, CARRINGTON is a Delaware limited liability corporation with its

principal place of business in Anaheim, California.

3. This Court has general diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) 

because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and there is 

complete diversity between the Plaintiffs and Defendants. This Court also has jurisdiction over 

this matter pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§1332(d). 

CAFA’s requirements are satisfied in that (1) the members of the Class exceed 100; (2) the 

citizenship of at least one proposed Class member is different from that of the Defendant; and (3) 

the matter in controversy, after aggregating the claims of the proposed Class members, exceeds 

$5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this

action arises out of the FDCPA, a federal statute. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction 

over the FCCPA and Section 701.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 

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because these claims are so related to the federal FDCPA claims that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 

5. Venue is proper in the United States District Court in and for the Southern District 

of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district.

APPLICABLE LAW

FDCPA

6. The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices . . .

to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses...” 15

U.S.C. § 1692. 

7. The FDCPA generally prohibits debt collectors, including CARRINGTON, from

using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt” [§ 1692e], and the use of “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, including, but not limited to:

a. False representations or misrepresentations of “the character, amount, or legal 

status of any debt.” Id. at § 1692e(2)(A);

b. False representations or misrepresentations of any “compensation which may be 

lawfully received by [the] debt collector for the collection of a debt.” Id. at § 

1692e(2)(B);

c. “The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense 

incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized 

by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” Id. at § 1692f (1); and 

d. “The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to 

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collect” a debt. Id. at § 1692e (10). 

FCCPA

8. The purpose of the FCCPA is to “provide the consumer with the most protection 

possible.” LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing § 

559.552, Fla. Stat.).

9. Like the FDCPA, the FCCPA prohibits persons, including CARRINGTON, from 

engaging in certain abusive practices in the collection of consumer debts. See generally § 559.72, 

Fla. Stat.

10. Specifically, the FCCPA states that no person, including CARRINGTON, shall 

“claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not 

legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right

does not exist.” § 559.72(9), Fla. Stat. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. On May 2, 2013, 305S Trust purchased, at a condominium association foreclosure 

sale, a condominium located at 350 South Miami Avenue, Unit 2806, Miami, Florida 33130. The 

condominium association had foreclosed on the property because the previous owner failed to pay 

condominium association fees. Florida Statute § 718.116, permits condominium associations to 

foreclose under those circumstance to enable them to recover their unpaid fees. 

12. By purchasing the home at the condominium association’s foreclosure action, 305S

Trust acquired title to the property subject to the previous owner’s mortgage. This mortgage was 

also the subject of a foreclosure action. CARRINGTON was the servicer of this first mortgage. 

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13. On March 29, 2019, 305S Trust, through its owners, contacted CARRINGTON to 

determine what amounts were left unpaid on the mortgage so that 305S Trust could purchase the 

property outright, with a clear title. 

14. This process – the determination of amounts unpaid on the mortgage so that the 

property can be purchased with clear title – is conducted through the transmittal of an “estoppel 

letter” and is recognized under Fla. Stat. § 701.04.

15. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 701.04(1)(a), it is a violation of the statute, for the lender or 

its agents to deliberately inflate amounts properly due under or secured by a mortgage. 

Laptopplaza, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 276 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). 

16. The “Payoff Statement” and list of fees due sent to Plaintiff pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 

701.04, did not contain an accurate payoff balance. Indeed, there existed fees that were overstated, 

excessive, and non-existent. Specifically, and by way of example, the list of fees contained a line 

item for a “PROP PRES-POOL SERVICE” in the amount of $1,200.00. This fee is completely 

fraudulent as the property being a condominium does not have a separate pool for which the 

maintenance is the responsibility of the property owner. The condominium community pool 

service is paid for by the condominium association and not authorized by any debt instrument

CARRINGTON can charge to Plaintiff. This $1,200 fee, and others similar, is nothing more pure 

profit for CARRINGTON in violation of the FDCPA, FCCPA, and Fla. Stat. § 701.04. A copy of 

the Payoff Statement and list of fees owed is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

17. Additionally, the Payoff Statement contained a line item of “Other Unpaid 

Expenses” which totaled $21,674.36. CARRINTON did not state how these “other” expenses 

were calculated, whether they may be disputed, or what provision of the mortgage instrument gave 

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rise to them. Indeed, the “total fees due” which makeup the list of fees totals $17,926.86 (a 

$3,747.50 difference). 

18. Moreover, nowhere contained within the March 29, 2019 letter to Plaintiff are the 

required statements that the letter is an attempt to collect a debt, from a debt collector, or that 

Plaintiff could dispute the amount of the debt. The FDCPA requires these “validation notices” to 

be sent to consumers, such as Plaintiff and the Class Members, containing certain information 

about their alleged debt and their rights with respect to those debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

19. Pursuant to § 1692g(a) of the FDCPA, a debt collector must send this notice 

“[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the 

collection of any debt,” unless the required information was “contained in the initial 

communication or the consumer has paid the debt.” Id., § 1692g(a). The validation notice must 

advise the consumer of “the amount of the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). And the validation 

notice must advise the consumer of their rights to dispute the debt in writing, and to request, in 

writing, that the debt collector “obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the 

consumer” and mail “a copy of such verification or judgment” to the consumer. Id., § 1692g(a)(4). 

20. CARRINGTON failed to comply with § 1692g(a)(1) by not specifying in a clear, 

intelligible manner the amount of the debt allegedly owed, and CARRINGTON failed to comply 

with §§ 1692g(a)(4)-(5) by neither providing the consumer (Plaintiff) with a statement that if it

notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion 

thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 

against the consumer and mail a copy of such verification or judgment to the consumer, nor 

providing the consumer a statement that upon Plaintiff’s written request within the thirty-day 

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period, the debt collector will provide Plaintiff with the name and address of the original creditor, 

if different from the current creditor. 

21. Plaintiff attempted numerous times to intervein in the underlying mortgage 

foreclosure action to dispute the debt and amounts owed. Plaintiff’s intervention was opposed by 

the mortgagee and denied in July of 2019. Ultimately, Plaintiff lost title and possession of the 

property. 

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

22. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all individuals similarly 

situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following 

class:

All persons with a Florida address, to whom CARRINGTON mailed a debt collection 

communication not returned as undeliverable to CARRINGTON, in connection with the collection 

of a consumer debt, within the applicable statues of limitations, that failed to state (1) the 

communication was “an attempt to collect a debt;” or (2) “[i]f the debtor notifies CARRINGTON

within 30 days after receipt of this letter that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed, 

CARRINGTON will obtain verification of the judgment will be mailed to the debtor by the firm;” 

or (3) “[u]pon the debtor’s request within 30 days after receipt of this letter, CARRIGTON will 

provide the debtor with the name and address of the original creditor if different from the current 

creditor;” and/or (4) collected or attempted to collect, using Payoff Statements that contained (a)

overstated fees; or (b) fees that were not allowed under the law or mortgage agreement; (c) or fees 

that were fraudulent in nature, such as a pool service fee. 

23. Plaintiff and Class Members reserve the right to amend the Class definitions as 

discovery proceeds and to conform to the evidence. Excluded from the Class are persons whose 

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Payoff Statements according to CARRINGTON records were returned as undeliverable, persons 

whose mortgages were for commercial purposes, not for personal, family, or household purposes, 

and Defendant, and any subsidiary or affiliate of Defendant, and the directors, officers and 

employees of Defendant or its subsidiaries or affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary. 

24. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), the proposed class is made up of at least 40 persons, 

the joinder of whom are impracticable except by means of a class action. The disposition of the 

claims in a class action will benefit both the parties and the Court. The exact number of class 

members can be determined through discovery and review of CARRINGTON’s business records. 

25. The proposed class is ascertainable because it is defined by reference to objective

criteria. In addition, and upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of 

the proposed class can be identified in business records maintained by CARRINGTON. 

26. In conformance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), all Class Members’ claims (including 

305S Trust’s) are unified in that they arise from the same improper charging and collection 

practices arising out of materially identical circumstances. 305S Trust’s interests are coincident 

with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the proposed class.

27. Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), 305S Trust is a member of the class. Its 

claims are typical of all other Class Members. All Class Members’ claims are unified, as all were 

victims of the same collection and charging practices.

28. Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), 305S Trust will adequately represent the 

class because it has interests in common with the proposed Class Members and it has retained 

attorneys who are experienced in class action litigation.

29. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), there is a well-defined community of interest 

in the questions of law and fact involving and affecting the class to be represented by 305S Trust. 

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Common questions of law and/or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members of the class. Common questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Whether CARRINGTON’s impositions of “pool service” and “Other” fees that 

are not traceable back to actual allowed services provided violate the FDCPA;

b. Whether CARRINGTON’s impositions of “pool service” and “Other” fees that 

are not traceable back to actual allowed services provided violate the FCCPA;

c. Whether CARRINGTON’s impositions of “pool service” and “Other” fees that 

are not traceable back to actual allowed services provided violate Fla. Stat. § 

701.04.

d. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory damages under the 

FDCPA and the amounts thereof;

e. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory damages under the 

FCCPA and the amounts thereof; and 

f. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory damages under 

Fla. Stat. § 701.04 and the amounts thereof. 

30. Further, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 

would create a risk of:

a. Inconsistent or varying adjudications concerning individual members of the class 

that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant opposing 

the class; and

b. Adjudication with respect to individual members of the class that would, as a 

practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to such 

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adjudications, and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of other non-party 

class members to protect such individual interests.

31. The class action method is appropriate for the fair and efficient prosecution of this 

action. 

32. Individual litigation of all claims that might be asserted by all class members would 

produce such a multiplicity of cases that the judicial system, having jurisdiction of the claims, 

would remain congested for years. Class treatment, by contrast, provides manageable judicial 

treatment calculated to bring a rapid conclusion to all litigation of all claims arising out of the 

conduct of the defendant.

33. The certification of the class would allow litigation of claims that, in view of the 

expense of the litigation, may be an insufficient amount to support separate actions.

COUNT I

(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 USC §§ 1692e, 1692f)

34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein.

35. Plaintiff and each Class Member was a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(3).

36. The mortgage loans encumbering the property of Plaintiff and Class Members, 

which CARRINGTON service, are debts under the FDCPA because each is “an[] obligation or 

alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction . . . [that is]...primarily 

for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)

37. CARRINGTON is a “debt collector” of those mortgage loans as defined by 15 

U.S.C. § 1692a(6) because it regularly attempts to collect, and collects, amounts owed or asserted 

to be owed or due another, including the mortgage debts from Plaintiff and Class Members via

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Payoff Statements. The Payoff Statements and servicing letter described above indeed uniformly 

confirmed this by identifying CARRINGTON as a debt collector. And CARRINGTON acquired 

the servicing rights of Plaintiff and each Class Member’s mortgage after it was in default.

38. CARRINGTON engaged in direct “communications” with Plaintiff and Class 

Members as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) when it sent them or their representatives Payoff 

Statements, purportedly demanding money due for reinstatement or payoff of their mortgage loans.

39. The FDCPA creates a private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

40. Congress created shared, substantive statutory rights of Plaintiff and the Class 

Members to be privately enforced and protected under the FDCPA, which CARRINGTON has 

violated. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692e, 1692f.

41. 15 U.S.C. §1692e states, in relevant part,

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 

Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the 

following conduct is a violation of this section:

......

(2) The false representation of—

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully 

received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

.........

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or

attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a 

consumer. 

42. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f states, in relevant part,

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect 

or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application 

of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, 

or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is 

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expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted 

by law. 

43. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON used deceptive means of 

collecting debts––the “Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid Expenses” fees and the “Total Amount

to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them––in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), because it 

represented them in Payoff Statements in a confusing, inaccurate manner, or in a manner that 

would likely mislead a consumer.

44. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON violated 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(2)(A) because through its Payoff Statements imposing “Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid 

Expenses” fees and the “Total Amount to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them, it falsely or in a 

misleading manner stated, or mispresented, the amount, character, or status of the amounts needed 

to payoff Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ mortgage debts.

45. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON violated 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(2)(B) when through its Payoff Statements imposing “Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid 

Expenses” fees and the “Total Amount to Pay Loan in Full” fees, it falsely or in a misleading 

manner stated, or mispresented, the compensation that it might lawfully receive from Plaintiff and 

Class Members.

46. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON used unfair means of 

collecting amounts for “Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid Expenses” fees and the “Total Amount

to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, because the amounts 

were not expressly authorized by Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ mortgage instruments creating 

their debts as they must be under those instruments, or they were not permitted by law.

47. These violations of FDCPA caused injury to Plaintiff and Class Members by 

violating the foregoing substantive FDCPA rights.

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48. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory 

damages together with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). 

COUNT II

(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 USC § 1692g(a)(4))

49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein. 

50. The FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) provides:

(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in 

connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the 

following information is contained in the initial communication or the 

consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing

–

*****

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 

within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, 

the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 

against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be 

mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

51. CARRINGTON’s March 29, 2019 communication did not contain the proper 

disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), nor did CARRINGTON provide such disclosures 

within five days thereafter.

52. Specifically, the March 29, 2019 communication violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) 

by failing to inform Plaintiff that CARRINGTON need only mail verification of the Debt to 

Plaintiff, or a copy of any judgment, if Plaintiff notified CARRINGTON that Plaintiff disputed the 

Debt, or any portion thereof, in writing.

53. As a result, CARRINGTON violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).

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54. The harm suffered by Plaintiff is particularized in that the violative initial debt 

collection letter failed to give Plaintiff statutorily-mandated disclosures to which Plaintiff was

entitled.

55. CARRINGTON’s actions invaded a specific private right created by Congress, and 

the invasion of said right creates the risk of real harm. See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 

F. App’x 990, 995 (11th Cir. 2016); Macy v. GC Servs. L.P., 897 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(“In sum, Plaintiffs have satisfied the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement of 

Article III standing by alleging that GC’s purported FDCPA violations created a material risk of 

harm to the interests recognized by Congress in enacting the FDCPA.”).

COUNT III

(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 USC § 1692g(a)(5))

56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein.

57. The FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) provides:

(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in 

connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the 

following information is contained in the initial communication or the 

consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing

–

*****

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirtyday period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and 

address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

58. CARRINGTON’s March 29, 2019 communication did not contain the proper 

disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), nor did CARRINGTON provide such disclosures 

within five days thereafter.

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59. Specifically, the March 29, 2019 communication violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) 

by failing to inform Plaintiff that CARRINGTON need only provide Plaintiff the name and address 

of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, if Plaintiff notified CARRINGTON

of Plaintiff request for that information in writing.

60. As a result, CARRINGTON violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5).

61. The harm suffered by Plaintiff is particularized in that the violative initial debt 

collection letter failed to give Plaintiff statutorily-mandated disclosures to which Plaintiff was

entitled.

62. CARRINGTON’s actions invaded a specific private right created by Congress, and 

the invasion of said right creates the risk of real harm. See Church, 654 F. App’x at 995; Macy, 

897 F.3d at 761. 

COUNT IV

(Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act § 559.72(9), Fla. Stat)

63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein. 

64. Section 559.72, Florida Statutes, of the FCCPA mandates that “no person” shall 

engage in certain practices in collecting consumer debts. 

65. CARRINGTON is a “person” within the meaning of the FCCPA. 

66. The mortgage loans encumbering the properties of Plaintiff and Class Members, 

and being serviced by CARRINGTON, are each a “debt” under the FCCPA because each one is 

“an[] obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in 

which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are 

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been 

reduced to judgment.” § 559.55(6), Fla. Stat.

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67. The FCCPA creates a private right of action. See § 559.77, Fla. Stat.

68. The Florida Legislature created shared, substantive statutory rights of Plaintiff and 

Class Members to be enforced and protected privately under the FCCPA, which CARRINGTON

violated. §§ 559.72, 559.72(9), 559.77, Fla. Stat.

69. Under Section 559.72, Florida Statutes, 

In collecting consumer debts, no person shall:

......

(9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows 

that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal 

right when such person knows that the right does not exist.

70. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON violated Section 559.72(9), 

Florida Statutes, by attempting to collect "Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid Expenses” fees and 

the “Total Amount to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them, when, as stated above, it knew that 

the fees, and as a corollary, the total amounts incorporating them, were not legitimate debts.

71. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON violated Section 559.72(9), 

Florida Statutes, by attempting to collect “Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid Expenses” fees and 

the “Total Amount to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them, when, as stated above, it knew it had 

no legal right to collect the fees, and as a corollary, no legal right to collect the total amounts 

incorporating them.

72. These violations of FCCPA caused injury to Plaintiff and Class Members by 

violating the foregoing substantive FCCPA rights.

73. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory 

damages together with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Section 559.77, Florida Statutes. 

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COUNT V

(Violation Florida Statute § 701.04)

74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein. 

75. Section 701.04, Florida Statutes, provides for a statutory cause of action for the 

deliberate inflation of amounts properly due and secured by a mortgage. 

76. Based on the foregoing allegations, CARRINGTON violated Section 701.04, 

Florida Statutes, by attempting to collect "Pool Service” and “Other Unpaid Expenses” fees and 

the “Total Amount to Pay Loan in Full” incorporating them, when, as stated above, it knew that 

the fees, and as a corollary, the total amounts incorporating them, were not legitimate debts and in 

fact deliberately inflated. 

77. These violations of Section 701.04 caused injury to Plaintiff and Class Members 

by violating the foregoing statutory rights.

78. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory 

damages together with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Section 701.04, Florida Statutes. 

JURY DEMAND 

79. Plaintiff respectfully requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, respectfully requests this Court to award 

against CARRINGTON in favor of Plaintiff and the Class all of the following:

a. Certifying Plaintiff’s claims for class treatment under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative, and 

appointing Plaintiff’s attorneys as counsel for the Class;

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b. A judgment for statutory damages under the FDCPA and/or the FCCPA and/or Fla. 

Stat. § 701.04;

c. A judgment for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees under the FDCPA and/or the 

FCCPA and/or Fla. Stat. § 701.04; and,

d. Any other relief for Plaintiff and the Class the Court deems just and proper. 

Dated: June 8, 2020.

By: Scott D. Hirsch

Scott David Hirsch

SCOTT HIRSCH LAW GROUP

Fla. Bar No. 50833

7301 W Palmetto Park Road

Suite 207A

Boca Raton, FL 33433

Tel: (561) 569-7062

Email: scott@scotthirschlawgroup.com

Erika Denise Rodriguez

RODRIGUEZ LAW & ADVOCACY, P.A.

7301 W Palmetto Park Road

Suite 207A

Boca Raton, FL 33433

Tel: (561) 800-4177

Email: Erika@rodriguezlawpa.com

Jessica L. Kerr

THE ADVOCACY GROUP

200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Tel: (954) 282-1858

Email: service@advocacypa.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 0:20-cv-61129-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2020 Page 18 of 18