NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EDDIE SLAUGHTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2018-1129

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00403-RHH, Senior Judge Robert 

H. Hodges, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: May 7, 2018

______________________ 

 EDDIE SLAUGHTER, Buena Vista, GA, pro se.

 DAVID MICHAEL KERR, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2 SLAUGHTER v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. 

Eddie Slaughter appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims 

Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. Slaughter v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 

712, 715 (2017). Because the Claims Court did not err in 

its dismissal, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Eddie Slaughter is an African-American farmer who 

has raised crops and livestock in Buena Vista, Georgia 

since the 1980s. Slaughter was a prevailing claimant in a 

class action lawsuit brought by a class of AfricanAmerican farmers against the United States Department 

of Agriculture (“USDA”) for discrimination in connection 

with “farm loans and other credit and benefit programs.” 

See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1999). 

The parties agreed to a consent decree entered by the 

District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. district 

court”), which established a two-track dispute resolution 

mechanism. See id. at 95–98. 

Slaughter filed a claim pursuant to one of those 

mechanisms, known as Track A, which provided those 

class members with little or no documentary evidence, but 

who were determined by an adjudicator to have been a 

victim of race discrimination, with “a virtually automatic 

cash payment of $50,000, and forgiveness of debt owed to 

the USDA.” Id. at 95; see also Slaughter, 133 Fed. Cl. at 

713. In exchange, the consent decree required the class 

members to dismiss their claims with prejudice and waive 

any right to contest the decisions of the adjudicator, 

except that the monitor could require reexamination if he 

determined that “a clear and manifest error has occurred 

that is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 107–08 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
SLAUGHTER v. UNITED STATES 3

In 2001, the adjudicator assigned to Slaughter’s claim

found discrimination in connection with his ownership

loans, but not his operating or emergency loans. Slaughter, 133 Fed. Cl. at 713. He was awarded “a $50,000 cash 

payment, tax credits amounting to 25% of the cash payment, and injunctive relief” pursuant to the consent 

decree. Suppl. App. 7. He was “not awarded any debt 

relief.” Id. However, the USDA mistakenly sent Slaughter 1099-C tax forms, which indicated that Slaughter’s 

government loans had been forgiven. Slaughter, 133 Fed. 

Cl. at 713. The Internal Revenue Service considers loan 

forgiveness to be taxable income to debtors, which is 

reported on form 1099-C. Id. In 2002, the USDA sent a 

letter to Slaughter notifying him of the erroneous 1099-C 

tax forms, and further clarifying that while his ownership 

loans had been cancelled, his other loans had not been. 

Slaughter sought reexamination of the 2001 adjudication, and the monitor directed the adjudicator to reexamine his claim. Upon reexamination, the adjudicator 

awarded Slaughter debt relief for his ownership loans. 

He did not receive any debt relief for his operating or 

emergency loans as the adjudicator made no specific 

findings of discrimination with respect to those loans. 

The reexamination decision, which issued in 2005, was 

final and gave Slaughter “no further rights to petition the 

Monitor” regarding the decision or to “seek review in any 

court or before any tribunal.” Suppl. App. 9; see also 

Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 107–08.

In April 2015, Slaughter sued the USDA in the 

Claims Court for “breach” of the consent decree, and filed 

an amended complaint in November 2016. He alleged 

that he was entitled to full debt relief and that failure to

provide this relief constituted a “breach” of the consent 

decree. See Slaughter, 133 Fed. Cl. at 712–13.

The government filed a motion to dismiss under the 

Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“Rules”) 12(b)(1) for 
4 SLAUGHTER v. UNITED STATES

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and

the Claims Court granted the motion. The court concluded that the consent decree failed to invoke proper Tucker 

Act jurisdiction, and thus there was “no basis for accepting jurisdiction of this case” under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. at 

715. Moreover, the court concluded that even if it had 

jurisdiction, it “could not proceed beyond the pleadings 

because [Slaughter’s] complaint does not show a plausible 

entitlement to relief” under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. Accordingly, the Claims Court dismissed the complaint. Id.

Slaughter timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo dismissals by the Claims Court for 

lack of jurisdiction. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 

1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Tucker Act grants the 

Claims Court jurisdiction of claims against the United 

States “upon any express or implied contract with the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). “Every claim of 

which the United States Court of Federal Claims has 

jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is 

filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2501. “Generally, in the case of a breach of a 

contract, a cause of action accrues when the breach occurs.” Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). “Compliance with the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional requirement.” Holmes v. United 

States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing John 

R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–

34 (2008)). 

Slaughter argues that the consent decree constitutes 

a contract with the government, and therefore that the 

Claims Court had jurisdiction over his complaint. He also 

contends that he was denied the opportunity to have “a 
SLAUGHTER v. UNITED STATES 5

formal hearing on the merits before the USDA’s Administrative Law Judge.” Appellant’s Br. 5.

The government responds that no contract existed between Slaughter and the government upon which his 

breach of contract claim could be based. First, because 

Slaughter did not receive full debt relief as a result of the 

Pigford adjudication, the government asserts that 

Slaughter’s only basis on which he was entitled to full 

debt relief was based on the incorrect 1099-C tax forms 

from 2001. The government argues, however, that the 

1099-C tax forms are not contracts. Even if they were, 

the government contends that any breach of contract 

claim based on the 1099-C tax forms would have been 

time-barred, because the six-year statute of limitations 

started running in 2002 when the USDA notified Slaughter of its error. 

Second, the government argues that the consent decree did not promise the payment of money or any debt 

relief to Slaughter. Rather, it established a two-track 

procedural mechanism for resolving the class members’ 

claims. Pursuant to Track A, the government promised 

debt relief only if the adjudicator decided that the loans 

were tainted with discrimination. The government additionally observes, however, that Slaughter has not challenged the 2005 decision itself, nor could he, because it 

was final and unreviewable. Finally, the consent decree, 

as the government contends, did not provide for a formal 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. 

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

properly dismissed Slaughter’s complaint under Rules 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). First, to the extent that Slaughter’s 

claim for entitlement to full debt relief was based on the 

1099-C tax forms, his claim was time-barred. The USDA 

notified Slaughter of the erroneous 1099-C tax forms in 

2002. Assuming arguendo that the 1099-C tax forms 

could create a contract between Slaughter and the gov-
6 SLAUGHTER v. UNITED STATES

ernment, Slaughter would have had to have filed the

complaint in this case within six years from the date the 

USDA notified him of the error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

The original complaint was not filed in the Claims Court 

until 2015. The court therefore properly dismissed the 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Second, Slaughter’s claim that he was entitled to full 

debt relief was not a remedy provided for by the consent 

decree. See Slaughter, 133 Fed. Cl. at 715. The consent 

decree only established the procedures by which the 

Pigford class members could petition for debt relief. See 

id. In fact, Slaughter followed these very procedures, 

which resulted in a 2005 decision that granted him partial debt relief. See Suppl. App. 6–9. If Slaughter had 

wanted to challenge the 2005 decision, he could not, 

because the 2005 decision was unreviewable. See id. at 9. 

He also did not raise it in his complaint. The Claims 

Court therefore correctly dismissed the complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

We have considered Slaughter’s remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Claims 

Court’s dismissal of this case.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.