### Koreapolitik

Authors: James Goodby, Senior
Fellow

Colonel William Drennan,
USAF

Note:

Conclusions

A Peace System in the Korean Peninsula

Security agreements between North and
South Korea have had a disconcerting
tendency to break down within a short
time, and the confidence-building that
should result from implementation of
these agreements has never been
achieved.  The Basic Agreement between
North and South Korea, which took effect in
1992, provided a partial blueprint for
achieving broad restructuring of
security relations and a more stable
order in Northeast Asia.  The ROK
Government has repeatedly declared its
readiness to resume discussions with
North Korea to advance the unfinished
agenda defined in the Basic Agreement and
the Denuclearization Agreement, each of
which provides much that could
contribute to a peace system in the
Korean peninsula.  One obstacle to
progress has been North Korea's
insistence that a peace treaty to
replace the 1953 armistice agreement
should be negotiated between North Korea
and the United States. The South Korean and
U.S. governments have insisted that a
peace treaty should be negotiated
between North and South Korea.

A peace system based on agreements
codifying certain security arrangements
would be the most feasible next step
toward lasting peace in the  Korean
peninsula.  Peace and stability could be
promoted through a series of
interrelated measures that would be the
functional equivalent of a peace treaty. 
Both North and South Koreans have spoken of
a "peace system" and both sides share
some similar ideas about the contents
of such a system.  The United States also
would be very much engaged in one
aspect the regulation of arms and armed
forces in the Korean peninsula. 
Furthermore, a commission similar to
the South-North Joint Military Commission
established in the Basic Agreement would
be authorized to deal with compliance
questions.  This would require
examination of the continued relevance
of the Military Armistice Commission
and the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, as well as other
arrangements established by the 1953
armistice agreement.

Clearly, North Korea hopes to
liquidate key elements of the armistice
agreement and, hence, the agreement
itself.  Refusing to acquiesce to the
liquidation of the 1953 agreement is the
only principled position open to the ROK
and the United States  But this position
would not be inconsistent with a South
Korean effort to test North Korea's
sincerity by proposing to define together
a more peaceful and stable security
situation.

The Conventional Force Balance 
on the Korean Peninsula

Numbers alone do not tell the whole
story about the military balance in the
Korean peninsula. Capabilities are
based on quality as well as quantity. 
Qualitatively, South Korean equipment is
superior to that of the North.  That said,
statistics and geography give North
Korea a marked advantage in ground
forces.1 The North maintains almost twice
as many troops on active duty as does the
South.  Its armored forces include nearly
twice as many main battle tanks (3700 to
1900) plus 500 light tanks.  It has 2500 armored
personnel carriers to the South's 2000. 
While the South is ahead in towed
artillery (3,500 to 2,300), the North has a 4,500 to
900 advantage in self-propelled artillery.
The DPRK has deployed a considerable part
of its army perhaps as much as 2/3 just
north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 
posing  a major threat  to Seoul,  only 35  
miles to the south.  This is the most
destabilizing  factor in the military
equation.

The North is superior to the South in
air force manpower with 82,000 personnel
opposed to the South's 53,000.  The North also
has more aircraft, 770 to 447, but
qualitative superiority belongs to the
ROK with its 48 modern F-16s plus F-4s and 
F-5s.  The DPRK has 14 Russian MIG-29s but the
majority of its forces are older MIG-17s,
19s, 21s, and 23s.  Better trained air crews
also give the ROK air force a marked
qualitative edge.

South Korea's navy is larger than the
North's in manpower terms, 60,000 to 46,000.  The
South has a larger surface force than the
North (8 destroyers and 32 frigates to the
North's 3 frigates), while North Korea has
a 25 to 2 advantage in submarines. Both
also have acquired mini-submarines. The
North has a larger inven-tory of patrol and
coastal combatants, 390 to the South's 122.

The United States has about 37,000 armed
forces personnel stationed in Korea.  The
U.S. Army deploys one army headquarters and
one infantry division.  The U.S. Air Force
deploys one air force headquarters and
two air wings with 84 combat aircraft, of
which 72 are F-16s.  The Air Force also has
96 combat aircraft in Japan while the U.S.
Navy has homeported several ships there,
including an aircraft carrier.
     With or without United States help, the
ROK would defeat a North Korean attack,
according to most analysts, but damage
to Seoul, home to a quarter of the South
Korean people, would be substantial in
any major conflict.  General Luck, U.S.
commander in Korea, has estimated that a
major war in Korea could cost over a
million lives and a trillion dollars. 
While limited conflict scenarios are
conceivable, even a limited attack
risks retaliation that would likely
escalate the conflict to all-out war.  In
the end, the ROK almost certainly would
prevail in a war of escalation, as in a
sudden massive attack.

Negotiated Measures to Avoid
Miscalculation

Wars sometimes occur because a
government miscalculates its chances
for victory. This happened in 1950, prompting
the beginning of the Korean War.
Miscalculations of an adversary's
intentions and capabilities still are
possible, especially if the assessments
are driven by fear and distrust, made under
pressure of time, and flawed by ignorance
or faulty assumptions. Arguably, some
advantages can be gained through
secrecy, but secrecy usually promotes
military  overcompensation, further
contributing to suspi-cions and fears.
Transparency, in contrast, typically has
not invited an attack but has encouraged
a more realistic appreciation of a
threat and a more carefully calibrated
response.

For these reasons, a limited degree
of openness about military dispositions
in North and South Korea could help to
prevent miscalculation and promote
stability.2  The principles involved are
quite simple and straightforward. The
Basic Agreement has identified several
potential areas for South-North
cooperation.  The complicated part is to
define precisely what information is to
be exchanged and how exactly the sides go
about confirming the validity of the
information.

Negotiated Measures to
Enhance Warning Time

An important subset of the problems
generated by miscalculation is the
perception that an attack with little or
no warning would produce decisive
advantages for the attacker. Greater
openness  about military capabilities
should indicate that a surprise attack
ultimately would fail to change the
outcome of a war on the Korean peninsula. 
This, in itself, should help prevent a
miscalculation.  But other measures,
particularly constraints on deployments
near the DMZ, also could help.  Thinning out
North Korean forces near the DMZ would help
stabilize the military situation. Other
ideas might be based on the principles of
"nonoffensive defense," a concept in which
both sides relinquish the capability to
conduct deep-penetration attacks into the
opponent's territory.

Other measures that would complicate
the planning of a surprise attack would
include assigning liaison officers to
the headquarters of field commands,
requiring observers at all military
exercises, and limiting the size of
exercises.  The Open Skies Treaty, which defines
methods for monitoring military
activities, might be applicable as well.

Negotiated Measures to Enhance Crisis
Management Capabilities

Aside from miscalculations and
expectations about the value of surprise
attack, conflict on the Korean peninsula
could result from a failure to
effectively manage an emerging crisis. 
Some steps already have been agreed
between North and South Korea that would be
useful in such situations. These include
a direct communications line between
ministers of national defense and a Joint
Military Commission; however, there has
been an unfortunate tendency in Pyongyang
to view these assets as hostages to
good relations.

An agreement between the North and South
on the prevention of dangerous military
activity, similar to the 1990 U.S.-USSR
agreement could be an effective crisis
management tool.  Special monitoring
missions could also be dispatched to
prevent misunderstandings from
escalating to crises.

Characteristics of a Stable Balance 
of Military Forces

Even without overall reductions in
levels of manpower or equipment,
reductions in North Korean troops and
equipment deployed near the DMZ could
produce greater stability.  In addition,
reductions in North and South Korean
manpower, reductions in the levels and
types of equipment, and changes in
deployment patterns could yield a more
stable peninsula.  Such changes could be
effected reciprocally a step at a time or
could be negotiated as part of a
comprehensive, phased package.  The
ultimate objective would be to reach
parity in equipment levels, but there
would be an obligation to reduce first
those deployments most threatening to the
other side.  This basic notion could be
developed further utilizing the principle
of "nonoffensive defense" discussed
above.

Application of ROK-DPRK Arms Control
Agreements to U.S. Forces

If the North and South can agree on
reductions of equipment and manpower
levels, it is very likely that U.S. forces
and equipment also would be subject to
reductions.  Certain principles may
already have been established regarding
the application of North-South agreements
to U.S. forces.  For example, in connection
with the North-South denuclearization
agreement it was agreed that in a
reciprocal arrangement North Koreans
could visit U.S. military facilities. 
United States-South Korean exercises such
as TEAM SPIRIT already have played a part in
North-South agreements.  In addition, the
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework states that "the
United States will provide formal
assurances to the DPRK against the threat
or use of nuclear weapons by the United
States."

United States decisions about
supplying equipment to ROK forces or to
its own forces could be affected by
provisions concerning treaty-limited
items.  An agreement on preventing
dangerous military activities might
affect U.S. air and naval forces operating
in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula.

The United States likely will find
itself acting as guarantor for some
aspects of a North-South arms control
agreement.  The ROK, and perhaps the DPRK,
might wish the United States to pro-vide
verification assistance.  Noncircumvention of  agreements through
third-party actions has frequently been a
concern in security negotiations  and it
is likely to be in the Korean context as
well.

Assessment of the Chances of Success

Would North Korea have any serious
interest in such arrangements?  Possibly
not, even though  Pyongyang has itself
proposed confidence-building measures
and reductions to parity.  North Korea
probably believes that it holds important
military advantages in its concentration
of forces near the DMZ and in the secrecy
with which it conducts its military
affairs.  But opportunities may now exist
that were not present when North Korea's
economic outlook was rather brighter and
it had powerful support from the Soviet
Union and China.  North Korea may be
interested in arrangements short of a
peace treaty to replace the 1953
armistice agreement, it may want to
reduce the heavy economic burden of its
huge military establishment, and it
clearly needs to open up economic and
political relations with economically
advanced nations.  A more stable military
situation could help prevent incidents
from escalating out of control and relax
tensions at the DMZ. North Korea should
see this as a positive factor,
particularly given the recent helicopter
incident.  Finally, it should be a matter
of considerable interest to Pyongyang if
it found that in the course of putting
some arms control arrangements in place,
it could obtain assurances from the
United States and China that its equities
in a peace system would be a matter of
direct concern to these two great powers.

Perhaps these considerations, even as
part of a comprehensive package of
political and economic measures, would
prove insufficient to overcome distrust
in Pyongyang.  But they could be one
component in a coordinated ROK-U.S.
campaign of quiet diplomacy designed to
probe Pyongyang's willingness to join
with Seoul and Washington in reducing
tensions in the Korean peninsula.