UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-61146-CIV-RUIZ

ADIDAS AG, ADIDAS INTERNATIONAL 

MARKETING B.V., and ADIDAS 

AMERICA, INC., 

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS AND 

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A,”

/

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Plaintiffs, adidas AG, adidas International Marketing B.V., and adidas America, Inc.

(“Plaintiffs”), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby move this Honorable Court for 

an entry of final default judgment against Defendants, the Individuals, Partnerships, and 

Unincorporated Associations identified on Schedule “A” hereto (collectively “Defendants”).

1 In

support thereof, Plaintiffs submit the following Memorandum of Law.

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants through the filing of their Complaint

and subsequent Amended Complaint for trademark counterfeiting and infringement, false 

designation of origin, cybersquatting, common law unfair competition, and common law 

1 Plaintiffs have resolved their claims with Defendant Numbers 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 

24, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 40, 42, 54, 95, and 114, have tentatively resolved their claims with 

Defendant Numbers 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, and 57, and are engaged in expedited settlement 

discussions to resolve this matter amicably with Defendant Number 59. (See Declaration of 

Virgilio Gigante in Support of Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against Defendants 

(“Gigante Decl. in Support of FDJ”) ¶ 1, n.1, filed herewith.) Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for 

an Extension of Time to File Motion for Default Final Judgment or Notice of Joint Liability as to 

these Defendants [ECF No. 40], which is currently pending before the Court. (Id.) Additionally,

Defendant Number 116 has been voluntarily dismissed from this action [ECF No. 29]. (Id.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion only seeks judgment against the remaining Defendants identified 

on Schedule “A” hereto. (Id.)

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trademark infringement. Defendants are in default, and the prerequisites for a default judgment 

have been met. As relief, Plaintiffs seek default judgment finding Defendants liable on all 

counts of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.2 Plaintiffs pray such judgment includes the entry of a 

permanent injunction and an award of statutory damages to Plaintiffs for Defendants’ willful 

counterfeiting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and cybersquatting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1117(d). Plaintiffs also request the Court order the listings and associated images of goods 

bearing counterfeits and/or infringements of Plaintiffs’ trademarks used by Defendants be 

permanently removed and the goods of each Defendant bearing one or more of Plaintiffs’ 

trademarks held by the marketplace platforms be surrendered to Plaintiffs to ensure the 

associated e-commerce marketplace stores, and websites may no longer be used as a means for 

selling goods bearing counterfeits and infringements of Plaintiffs’ trademarks and infringing 

upon Plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs further request the Court cancel, or at Plaintiffs’ election, 

transfer the domain names at issue to Plaintiffs to ensure the associated websites may no longer 

be used as a means for selling goods bearing counterfeits and infringements of Plaintiffs’ 

trademarks and infringing upon Plaintiffs’ rights. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs’ Rights. 

Plaintiffs own all rights in and to the federally registered trademarks listed in Paragraph 4 

and Schedule “B” (the “adidas Marks”) of the Declaration of Mia Nidia Gutierrez in Support of 

Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary 

Injunction, and Order Restraining Transfer of Assets3 (“Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO”), 

which are used in connection with the manufacture and distribution of quality goods in the 

categories identified therein. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO [ECF No. 6-2] ¶¶ 4-5.) 

The adidas Marks are symbols of Plaintiffs’ quality, reputations, and goodwill and have

never been abandoned. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 6-11.) Moreover, Plaintiffs 

2 Plaintiffs are not requesting the Court award damages against Defendants jointly and severally; 

therefore, there is no possibility of inconsistent liability.

3 Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary 

Injunction, and Order Restraining Transfer of Assets (“Application for TRO”) together with 

supporting declarations and exhibits [ECF No. 6] are incorporated herein by reference.

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have expended substantial time, money, and other resources developing, advertising, and 

otherwise promoting their trademarks. (Id. ¶ 8.) Accordingly, the adidas Marks all qualify as 

famous marks as the term is used in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have extensively used, advertised, and promoted the adidas Marks

in the United States in association with quality products, and have carefully monitored and 

policed the use of the trademarks. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 6-11.) As a result, 

members of the consuming public readily identify products bearing the adidas Marks as being 

quality merchandise sponsored and approved by Plaintiffs, and the adidas Marks have achieved 

secondary meaning as identifiers of quality products.

B. Defendants’ Infringing Acts.

As alleged by Plaintiffs, admitted by default, and established by the evidence submitted 

herewith, Defendants operate and control the Internet based e-commerce stores established via 

third-party marketplace platforms under their seller identification names and/or commercial 

Internet websites operating under the domain names set forth on Schedule “A” hereto (the 

“Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names”). As such, Defendants are the active, conscious, and 

dominant forces behind the promotion, advertisement, distribution, offering for sale or sale of 

goods bearing counterfeit and infringing trademarks which are exact copies of one or more of the 

adidas Marks (the “Counterfeit Goods”). (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-17, 27; see also Gutierrez Decl. 

in Support of TRO ¶¶ 16-17; Declaration of Kathleen Burns in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application 

for TRO (“Burns Decl. in Support of TRO”) [ECF No. 6-4] ¶ 4; Declaration of Virgilio Gigante 

in Support of Application for TRO (“Gigante Decl. in Support of TRO”) [ECF No. 6-3] ¶ 2.)

Further, as admitted by Defendants through default, at all times relevant, Defendants 

have had full knowledge of Plaintiffs’ ownership of the adidas Marks, including their exclusive 

rights to use and license such intellectual property and the goodwill associated therewith. (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 32.) Defendants do not have, nor have they ever had, the right or authority to use the 

adidas Marks for any purpose. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 13, 16.) However, 

despite their known lack of authority to do so, Defendants have engaged in the activity of 

promoting, and otherwise advertising, selling, offering for sale, and distributing their Counterfeit 

Goods via their respective Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 27; see 

also Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 13-17; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4; Gigante

Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 2; see also relevant web page captures from Defendants’ Internet 

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based e-commerce stores, and commercial Internet websites operating under the Seller IDs and 

Subject Domain Names displaying Plaintiffs’ branded items offered for sale attached as Comp. 

Ex. “1” to the Burns Decl. in Support of TRO [ECF No. Nos. 6-5 through 6-10].)

Plaintiffs’ evidence, obtained as a result of their investigation of Defendants, clearly 

demonstrates Defendants are engaged in the fraudulent promotion, advertisement, distribution, 

offering for sale, and/or sale of goods bearing counterfeits of the adidas Marks. Plaintiffs’ 

counsel retained Invisible Inc, a licensed private investigation firm, to investigate the promotion 

and sale of counterfeit and infringing adidas branded products by Defendants and to obtain the 

available payment account data for receipt of funds paid to Defendants for the sale of counterfeit 

adidas branded merchandise through the Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names. (Gutierrez Decl. 

in Support of TRO ¶ 14; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 3; Gigante Decl. in Support of TRO ¶

2.) Invisible Inc accessed each of the e-commerce stores, and commercial websites operating 

under Defendants’ Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names, placed an order from each of the 

Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names for the purchase of various products – all bearing 

counterfeits of at least one of the adidas Marks4

– and requested each product to be shipped to its 

addresses in the Southern District of Florida. (See Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 and 

Comp. Ex. “1” thereto.) Each order was processed entirely online, and following the submission 

of each order, Invisible Inc finalized payment5 for the products ordered via Defendants’

4 Some Defendants blurred-out and/or physically altered images of Plaintiffs’ Marks on the 

products being offered for sale via their respective e-commerce stores. (See Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4, n.1.) Upon receipt of the items purchased from these Defendants, Invisible 

visually inspected the items and verified that each item did in fact bear one or more of the adidas 

Marks in their entirety. (See id.) Photographs showing the items Invisible received bearing the 

adidas Marks in their entirety were sent Plaintiffs’ representative for review and are included in 

Comp. Ex. “1” to the Declaration of Kathleen Burns. (See id.)

5 Invisible was instructed not to transmit the funds to finalize the sale for the orders from some 

of the Defendants so as to avoid adding money to Defendants’ coffers. (See Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4 n.2; Gaffigan Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 2, n.1.)

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respective payment accounts and/or payee,6 as identified on Schedule “A” hereto.7 (See id.) At 

the conclusion of the process, the detailed web page captures and images of products ordered via 

each Defendants’ Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names, together with photographs of some of 

the products received, were sent to Plaintiffs’ representative for inspection. (See Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4; Gigante Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 2; Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 

15.)

Plaintiffs’ representative, who is trained to identify the distinctions between genuine 

versions of Plaintiffs’ branded merchandise and counterfeit copies of the same, reviewed and 

visually inspected the adidas-branded goods purchased by Invisible Inc via each of the Seller IDs

and Subject Domain Names by reviewing the e-commerce stores, and commercial websites

operating under the Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names, or the detailed web page captures 

6 Defendant Numbers 1-4 operate via the non-party Internet marketplace platform, 

Amazon.com. Amazon.com is an e-commerce marketplace that allows Defendants to conduct 

their commercial transactions privately via Amazon’s payment processing and retention service, 

Amazon Payments, Inc. As such, Defendants’ payment information is not publicly disclosed. 

(See Gaffigan Decl. ¶ 5; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 n.3.)

Defendant Numbers 5-41 operate via the non-party Internet marketplace platform, 

DHgate.com, and have their payments processed on their behalf via DHgate.com’s third-party 

payment platform, DHpay.com. (See Gigante Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 6; Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4, n.3.) The DHgate.com and DHpay.com platforms are operated by the 

Dunhuang Group, who utilizes Camel FinTech Inc to process transactions and deal with refunds 

and chargebacks on behalf of DHgate.com to its customers. (See Gigante Decl. in Support of 

TRO ¶ 6.)

Defendant Numbers 43-60 operate via the non-party e-commerce marketplace platform 

Joom.com, which is operated by SIA Joom. “Joom USA Inc” was identified as the PayPal payee 

for the orders from Defendant Numbers 43-60, which is the aggregate PayPal account for 

purchases made via Joom.com. (See Gigante Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 7; Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4, n.3.)

Defendant Numbers 61-92 operate via the non-party e-commerce marketplace platform, 

Wish.com (“Wish”), which is operated by ContextLogic Inc. (“ContextLogic”). The payee for 

the orders placed from Defendants 61-92’s Wish.com Seller IDs identifies “PayPal *Wish,” 

which is the aggregate PayPal account for purchases made via Wish.com. (See Gigante Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 8; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 n.3.)

Defendant Numbers 93-119 use money transfer and retention services with PayPal. (See

Gaffigan Decl. ¶ 9; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 n.4.)

7

 Additional contact email addresses for Defendants are also identified on Schedule “A” hereto. 

(See Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 n.4; Gaffigan Decl. ¶ 3.)

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and images of the products bearing the adidas Marks, together with photographs of certain 

received goods, and determined the products were non-genuine, unauthorized versions of 

Plaintiffs’ goods. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 16-17.)

C. Procedural Background

On June 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and on July 7, 2020 their Amended 

Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief against Defendants. On June 12, 2020, Plaintiffs 

filed their Application for TRO [ECF No. 6]. On June 16, 2020, this Court entered a Sealed

Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF No. 9], and 

subsequently converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction on July 14, 

2020, [ECF No. 31]. The Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction required, 

inter alia, Amazon Payments, Inc. (“Amazon”), Dunhuang Group which operates the 

DHgate.com and DHPay.com platforms, Camel FinTech Inc., SIA Joom, which operates the 

Joom.com platform (“Joom”), ContextLogic, Inc., which operates the Wish.com website 

(“ContextLogic”) and PayPal, Inc. (“PayPal”), and their related companies and affiliates to 

identify and restrain all funds in Defendants’ associated payment accounts, and divert those 

funds to a holding account for the trust of the Court. Subsequently, Plaintiffs’ counsel received 

notice from the applicable financial institutions that they complied with the requirements of the 

Court’s Order and restrained Defendants’ funds. (See Gigante Decl. in Support of FDJ ¶ 2, filed 

herewith.)

On June 12, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Ex Parte Motion for Order Authorizing Alternate 

Service of Process on Defendants, [ECF No. 7],

8 which the Court granted on June 16, 2020 [ECF 

No. 10], authorizing Plaintiffs to serve the summonses, Amended Complaint, and all subsequent 

filings in this matter upon Defendants via electronic mail (“e-mail”) or via website posting on 

Plaintiffs’ serving notice website. Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Plaintiffs served Defendants 

with their respective Summons and a copy of the Amended Complaint via e-mail and website 

posting on July 7, 2020. (See Gigante Decl. in Support of FDJ ¶ 4; Proof of Service [ECF No.

28].) The time allowed for Defendants to respond to the Amended Complaint has expired. 

(Gigante Decl. in Support of FDJ ¶ 5.) Defendants have not been granted any extension of time 

8 Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for Alternate Service, together with supporting declaration and 

exhibit, are incorporated herein by reference.

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to respond, nor have they served or filed an Answer or other formal response. (Id. at ¶ 6.) To 

Plaintiffs’ knowledge, none of the Defendants are infants or incompetent persons, and, upon 

information and belief, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

On August 5, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default [ECF No. 

32] as to certain Defendants, and the Clerk subsequently entered Default as to those Defendants 

for failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure [ECF No. 33, 37]. On September 23, 2020, the Court entered an Order directing 

the Clerk of the Court to enter Default against remaining Defendants [ECF No. 38], and the 

Clerk entered Default as to the remaining Defendants on September 24, 2020 [ECF No. 39] 

Plaintiffs now move the Court to grant Final Default Judgment against Defendants, and submits 

this Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment in compliance with the Court’s September 23, 

2020 Order requiring the same [ECF No. 38].

III. ARGUMENT

A. Default Judgment Should be Entered Against Defendants.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1338. Personal jurisdiction over Defendants and venue in this district are proper under 28 

U.S.C. § 1391 as Defendants direct business activities toward consumers within this district and 

cause harm to Plaintiffs’ businesses through the Internet based e-commerce stores, and 

commercial Internet website operating under the Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names. (See

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 10, 13, 27.)

1. Default Judgment is Proper.

A court may order a default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) following the 

entry of default by the court clerk under Rule 55(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 55. Upon entry of default 

by the clerk, the well-pled factual allegations of a plaintiff’s amended complaint, other than those 

related to damages, will be taken as true. PetMed Express, Inc. v. Medpets.com, 336 F.Supp.2d 

1213, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359 (11th Cir. 1987)). In 

this case, the Amended Complaint, pleadings, and declaration filed in support of Plaintiffs’

Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment clearly demonstrate that default judgment pursuant 

to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be entered against Defendants.

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2. Factual Allegations Establish Defendants’ Liability.

Title 15 U.S.C. § 1114 provides liability for trademark infringement if, without the 

consent of the registrant, a defendant uses “in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 

colorable imitation of a registered mark: which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 

or to deceive.” In order to prevail on their trademark infringement claim under Section 32 of the 

Lanham Act, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) they had prior rights to the mark at issue and (2) 

Defendants had adopted a mark or name that was the same, or confusingly similar to its mark, 

such that consumers were likely to confuse the two. See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, 

Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. 

Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

To prevail on a claim of false designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 

Act, Plaintiffs must prove that Defendants used in commerce, in connection with any goods or 

services, any word, term, name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 

designation of origin, which is likely to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 

Defendants with Plaintiffs, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval, of Defendants’ goods by 

Plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). As with trademark infringement claims, the test for liability 

for false designation of origin under Section 43(a) is also “whether the public is likely to be 

deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks at issue.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 

Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2763 (1992). 

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also sets forth a cause of action for cybersquatting

pursuant to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). To 

prevail under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “(1) its mark is distinctive or 

famous and entitled to protection; (2) the defendant’s domain name is identical or confusingly 

similar to the plaintiff’s mark; and (3) the defendant registered or used the domain name with a 

bad faith intent to profit.” Bavaro Palace, S.A. v. Vacation Tours, Inc., 203 Fed.Appx. 252, 256, 

2006 WL 2847233, at *3 (11th Cir. 2006). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

Whether a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s trademarks creates a likelihood of confusion 

between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s products is also the determining factor in the analysis 

of unfair competition under the common law of Florida. See Planetary Motion, 261 F.3d at 1193 

n.4 (“Courts may use an analysis of federal infringement claims as a ‘measuring stick’ in 

evaluating the merits of state law claims.’). Further, the test to determine trademark 

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infringement liability under Florida common law is the same as the likelihood of consumer 

confusion test outlined in § 32(a) of the Lanham Act. See PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1217-18.

The well-pled factual allegations of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, including 

specifically those pled in Paragraphs 10-17, 27-36, 51-54, 58-61, 64-68, 66-70, 73-75, and 78-80

[ECF No. 15], properly allege the elements for each of the above claims. Moreover, the factual 

allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, substantiated by the evidence submitted herewith, 

conclusively establish Defendants’ liability under each of the claims asserted in the Amended 

Complaint. (See Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 13-16; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 

4.) Accordingly, Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

should be entered against Defendants.

B. Plaintiffs’ Requested Relief Should be Granted.

1. Entry of a Permanent Injunction is Appropriate.

Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction 

“according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable,” to 

prevent violations of trademark law. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, “[i]njunctive relief is the 

remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy 

at law for the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. 

Agad, 911 F. Supp. 1499, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 

Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, even in a default judgment setting, 

injunctive relief is available. See e.g., PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23.

Defendants’ failure to respond or otherwise appear in this action makes it difficult for Plaintiffs

to prevent further infringement absent an injunction. See Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp. 2d 

1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“[D]efendant’s lack of participation in this litigation has given the 

court no assurance that defendant’s infringing activity will cease. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled 

to permanent injunctive relief.”) Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116, this Court should permanently 

enjoin Defendants from continuing to infringe any of Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights, 

including the adidas Marks.

Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates (1) it has 

suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship 

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favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public’s interest. eBay, 

Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006). As demonstrated herein, and based 

upon the issuance of the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction entered in this 

matter, Plaintiffs have clearly carried their burden on each of the four factors, warranting 

permanent injunctive relief, because Defendants have unlawfully used Plaintiffs’ trademarks and 

associated goodwill to make a profit. Accordingly, permanent injunctive relief is appropriate. 

Defendants’ actions merit permanent injunctive relief, not only to protect Plaintiffs’

reputations, but also to protect consumers from being deceived as to the quality and source of 

products bearing Plaintiffs’ trademarks. The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, 

substantiated by the evidence submitted herewith, shows Defendants are “continuously 

infringing and inducing others to infringe” the adidas Marks by using them to advertise, promote,

and sell goods bearing marks which are identical or altered to be identical to the adidas Marks. 

(See Am. Compl. ¶ 52; see also Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 13-16; Burns Decl. in 

Support of TRO ¶ 4; see generally Defendants’ Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names attached 

as Comp. Ex. 1 to the Burns Decl. in support of TRO.)

Plaintiffs are clearly suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury if 

Defendants’ infringing activities are not permanently enjoined. (Gutierrez Decl. in Support of 

TRO ¶ 21.) In trademark cases, “a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion . . . 

may by itself constitute a showing of a substantial threat of irreparable harm.” McDonald’s Corp. 

v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l 

Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 986 (11th Cir.1995) (“There is no doubt that the continued sale of 

thousands of pairs of counterfeit jeans would damage LS & Co.’s business reputation and might 

decrease its legitimate sales.”). In any event, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges that 

Defendants’ unlawful actions have caused Plaintiffs irreparable injury, and will continue to do so 

if Defendants are not permanently enjoined. (Am. Compl. ¶ 48.) Defendants have defaulted 

upon Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in that respect. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law so long as Defendants continue

to use the adidas Marks in connection with the operation of the Internet based e-commerce 

stores, and websites under the Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names because Plaintiffs will have 

no control of the quality of what appear to be their products in the marketplace. An award of 

money damages alone will not cure the injury to Plaintiffs’ reputations and goodwill which will 

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result if Defendants’ infringing and counterfeiting actions are allowed to continue. Moreover, it 

can hardly be said that Defendants face hardship in refraining from their willful infringement of 

Plaintiffs’ trademarks, whereas Plaintiffs face hardship from loss of sales and their inability to 

control their reputations. In reality, Defendants have no cognizable hardship, as they will be 

prohibited from selling counterfeit goods, which is an illegal act to begin with. Finally, the public 

has an interest in the issuance of a permanent injunction against Defendants in order to prevent 

consumers from being misled by Defendants’ products. See Chanel, Inc. v. besumart.com, 240 

F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ("[A]n injunction to enjoin infringing behavior serves 

the public interest in protecting consumers from such behavior." (alteration added) (citation 

omitted)); BellSouth Adver. & and Publ’g. Corp. v. Real Color Pages, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 775, 

785 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding “[i]n a trademark infringement or unfair competition case, a third 

party, the consuming public is present and its interests are paramount.”) Ultimately, the 

permanent injunction will prevent consumer confusion and deception in the marketplace, and 

will protect Plaintiffs’ property interest in the adidas Marks, which are the touchstones of 

trademark law.

Furthermore, as admitted by Defendants through default, (i) the Seller IDs and Subject 

Domain Names, and associated payment accounts are essential components of Defendants’ 

online activities, and (ii) the Seller IDs and Subject Domain Names themselves are one of the 

means by which Defendants further their counterfeiting and infringement scheme and cause 

harm to Plaintiffs. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Therefore, in order to effectuate the injunction as a 

practical matter, the Subject Domain Names should be ordered transferred by Defendants, their 

registrar, and/or registry, to Plaintiffs’ control where they may be disabled from further use as a 

platform for the sale of counterfeit goods. Additionally, all listings and associated images of 

goods bearing counterfeits and/or infringements of the adidas Marks via the e-commerce 

marketplace stores operating under the Seller IDs, including but not limited to the listings and 

associated images corresponding to the Amazon Standard Identification Numbers (“ASINs”)9 

9 An ASIN is a unique 10-digit alphanumeric identifier Amazon assigns to each product. The 

ASIN for the Plaintiffs’ branded product at issue was obtained either from the Product 

Information / Description segments or the URLs of the infringing items, all of which are 

identified on Schedule “A” hereto. (See Burns Decl. in Support of TRO in Support of TRO at n.6

and Schedule “A” thereto.) Sellers can create a variational relationship between products in 

regards to name, size/count, color, style, scent, etc. When doing so, the ASIN identified in the 

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identified on Schedule “A” hereto, and any other alias seller identification names being used 

and/or controlled by Defendants to promote, offer for sale, and/or sell goods bearing and/or using 

counterfeits and/or infringements of the adidas Marks, should be permanently removed by the 

Internet marketplace website and operator and/or administrator. Moreover, the goods of each 

Defendant bearing one or more of the adidas Marks that are in the inventory, possession, custody 

or control of the Internet marketplace website operators and/or administrators, should be 

surrendered to Plaintiffs. Absent the transfer of the Subject Domain Names and the removal of 

the listings and images of goods bearing counterfeits and/or infringements of the adidas Marks, 

Defendants will remain free to continue infringing Plaintiffs’ trademarks with impunity, will 

continue to benefit from the Internet traffic to those websites, and e-commerce stores built 

through the unlawful use of Plaintiffs’ trademarks, and will continue to defraud the public by 

their illegal activities. Further, the surrender of the counterfeit merchandise bearing the adidas 

Marks from Internet marketplace websites would permanently remove these counterfeit goods 

from the stream of commerce to further protect the public from being defrauded by Defendants’ 

worthless items.

The Court’s powers of equity are sufficiently broad to compel measures necessary to 

enforce an injunction against infringement. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 

Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1276 (1971) (“Once a right and a violation have been 

shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for. . . the 

essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould 

each decree to the necessities of the particular case.”); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical 

Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944) (“Equity has power to eradicate the evils of a condemned scheme 

by prohibition of the use of admittedly valid parts of an invalid whole.”). District courts are 

expressly authorized to order the transfer or surrender of domain names in an in rem action 

against a domain name. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(C), (d)(2). However, the remedy is by no 

means limited to that context. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Otamedia, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 2d 

228, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Yesmoke.com domain name transferred to plaintiff despite the 

fact that plaintiff did not own a trademark in the term “Yesmoke” and noting that 15 U.S.C. § 

1125 “neither states nor implies that an in rem action against the domain name constitutes the

Product Information / Description segments represents the core product and a different ASIN 

may be assigned based on variations thereof, as identified in the URLs. (See id.)

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 12 of 24
13

exclusive remedy for a plaintiff aggrieved by trademark violations in cyberspace.”); Ford Motor 

Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 853 (E.D. Mich 2006) (defendants ordered to disclose all 

other domain registrations held by them and to transfer registration of a particular domain name 

to Plaintiffs in part under authority of 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)). This Court, and others, have not 

hesitated to order the transfer of domain names when faced with factual scenarios similar to the 

one herein.10

Defendants have created an Internet-based counterfeiting and infringement scheme and 

are profiting from the deliberate misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ rights. Accordingly, the Court 

should permanently prohibit Defendants from conducting their unlawful activities and eliminate 

the means by which Defendants conduct their unlawful activities by transferring the subject 

domain names and by requiring their listings and associated images be removed to further 

prevent them from being used for the sale of counterfeit goods.

11

10 See e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. 7creplicachanel.com, Case No. 20-cv-60309-RAR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 

2020) (awarding transfer of domain names at issue as part of grant of permanent injunction);

Goyard St-Honore v. goyard.org.uk, Case No. 19-cv-62926-RAR (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020) (same); 

Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns, Case No. 19-cv61015-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019) (same); adidas AG v. The Individuals, P’ships, and 

Unincorporated Ass’ns, Case No. 19-cv-61180-RAR (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2019) (same); adidas 

AG v. adidascitycup.com, Case No. 19-cv-61353-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2019) (same);

Chanel, Inc. v. fashionbestchanel.com, Case No. 19-cv-60991-RAR (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2019) 

(same). See also Richemont Int’l SA v. swisscartier.cn, No. 18-60662-Civ, 2018 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 221656 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2018) (Scola, R.) (same); adidas AG v. 2017nmdshoes.us, 

No. 18-cv-61176, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216790 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2018) (Bloom, B.) (same); 

Cartier Int’l A.G. v. replicapaneraiwatches.cn, No. 17-cv-62401, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188943 

(S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018) (Moore, K.) (same); Under Armour, Inc. v. 51nfljersey.com, No. 13–

62809–CIV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56475 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2014) (Rosenbaum, J.) (same). 

Accord Gucci Am., Inc. v. The Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on 

Schedule “A”, Case No. 20-cv-60397-WPD (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2020) (same); adidas AG v. The 

Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns, 19-cv-63109-RKA (Mar. 31, 2020) (same);

Chanel, Inc. v. aozhu9284, Case No. 19-cv-63068-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020) (same).

11 See e.g., Fendi S.R.L. v. Joe Bag, No. 19-cv-61356-RAR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169132 

(S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2019) (order requiring, inter alia, Internet marketplace website operators 

permanently remove all listings and associated images of the products bearing counterfeits 

and/or infringements of plaintiff’s trademarks and cease fulfillment of and sequester all goods in 

its inventory, possession, custody, or control that bear one or more of the plaintiff’s trademarks 

at issue and surrender the same to plaintiff); adidas AG v. The Individuals, P’ships, and 

Unincorporated Ass’ns, Case No. 19-cv-61180-RAR (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2019) (Order requiring, 

inter alia, Internet marketplace website operators permanently remove all listings and associated 

images of goods bearing counterfeits and/or infringements of plaintiff’s trademarks via 

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 13 of 24
14

2. Damages as to Count I for Trademark Counterfeiting and 

Infringement.

In a case involving the use of counterfeit marks in connection with a sale, offering for 

sale, or distribution of goods, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) provides that a plaintiff may elect an award of 

statutory damages at any time before final judgment is rendered in the sum of not less than 

$1,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00 per counterfeit mark per type of good. 15 U.S.C. § 

1117(c)(1). In addition, if the Court finds that Defendants’ counterfeiting actions were willful, it 

may impose damages above the maximum limit up to $2,000,000.00 per counterfeit mark per 

type of good. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), Plaintiffs elect to recover 

an award of statutory damages as to Count I of the Amended Complaint.

The Court has wide discretion to set an amount of statutory damages. PetMed Express, 

Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (citing Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 

F.2d 829, 852 (11th Cir. 1990). Indeed, an award of statutory damages is an appropriate remedy, 

despite a plaintiff’s inability to provide actual damages caused by a defendant’s infringement. 

Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[A] successful plaintiff 

in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory damages even where 

its actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”). Congress enacted a statutory damages remedy 

in trademark counterfeiting cases because evidence of a defendant’s profits in such cases is 

almost impossible to ascertain. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-177, pt. V(7) (1995) (discussing 

purposes of Lanham Act statutory damages.) See also PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 

defendants’ e-commerce stores); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Individuals, P’ships, and 

Unincorporated Ass’ns, Case No 19-cv-61015-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019) (same); 

Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., v. artemis gesdy, Case No. 19-cv-60287-RAR (S.D. Fla. July, 

9, 2019) (same); Fendi, S.r.l. v. socjmkfn, Case No. 18-cv-63101-RAR (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2019) 

(order requiring, inter alia, Internet marketplace website operators permanently remove all 

listings and associated images of the products bearing counterfeits and/or infringements of 

plaintiff’s trademarks and cease fulfillment of and sequester all goods in its inventory, 

possession, custody, or control that bear one or more of the plaintiff’s trademarks at issue and 

surrender the same to plaintiff). See also Malletier v. Individuals, P’ship, No. 19-cv-61021-

MGC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225874 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2019) (same). Accord Gucci Am., Inc. 

v. The Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, Case No. 

20-cv-60397-WPD (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2020) (same); adidas AG v. The Individuals, P’ships, and 

Unincorporated Ass’ns, 19-cv-63109-RKA (Mar. 31, 2020) (same); Chanel, Inc. v. aozhu9284, 

Case No. 19-cv-63068-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020) (same); MPL Communications Limited 

v. 1230h0h Store, Case No. 19-cv-62891-BB (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2020) (same).

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 14 of 24
15

1220 (statutory damages are “especially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer 

nondisclosure”). This case is no exception. 

A defendant’s intent can be of probative value for establishing willfulness, triggering an 

enhanced statutory award. PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. A defendant is 

deemed to have acted willfully where “the infringer acted with actual knowledge or reckless 

disregard” to a plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. See Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enter., 

Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Willfulness may also be inferred from the 

defendant’s default. See PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (upon default, well 

plead allegations taken as true). In either case, a defendant is deemed to have the requisite 

knowledge that its acts constitute an infringement.

The adidas Marks are renowned worldwide as identifiers of quality merchandise, and the 

fact that Defendants offered for sale and sold goods using marks which are identical or altered to 

be identical to such strong marks shows their desire and purpose to trade upon Plaintiffs’

goodwill. Indeed, in a case of clear-cut copying such as this, it is appropriate to infer that 

Defendants intended to cause confusion and benefit from Plaintiffs’ reputations, to Plaintiffs’

detriment. See PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (court infers intent to confuse 

consumers into believing affiliation from Defendants’ use of such a mark that was confusingly 

similar). Moreover, in this district, it has been held that when an alleged infringer adopts a mark 

“with the intent of obtaining benefit from the plaintiff’s business reputation, ‘this fact alone may 

be sufficient to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.’” Turner Greenberg 

Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Carnival Corp. v. Seaescape Casino 

Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 1999)).

Here, the evidence clearly establishes Defendants intentionally copied one or more of the 

adidas Marks for the purpose of deriving the benefit of Plaintiffs’ world-famous reputations. In 

addition, Defendants defaulted on Plaintiffs’ allegations of willfulness. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) See

Arista Records, Inc. 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (finding a Court may infer willfulness from the 

defendants' default.) As such, this Court should award a significant amount of statutory damages 

under the Lanham Act to ensure Defendants do not continue their intentional and willful 

counterfeiting activities. 

The evidence in this case demonstrates that each Defendant promoted, distributed, 

advertised, offered for sale, and/or sold at least one type of good bearing marks which were in 

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 15 of 24
16

fact counterfeits of at least one of the adidas Marks. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 52; see also

Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 17; Burns Decl. in Support of TRO ¶ 4 and Comp. Ex. 1.) 

And, as noted above, based upon the evidence Plaintiffs have presented, it is reasonable to infer 

Defendant’s infringement was willful. Based on the above considerations, Plaintiffs respectfully 

suggest the Court award statutory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00 against each 

Defendant.

Plaintiffs’ requested damage amount is well within the permissible range prescribed 

under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) and should be sufficient to deter Defendants and others from 

continuing to counterfeit or otherwise infringe Plaintiffs’ trademarks, compensate Plaintiffs, and 

punish Defendants, all stated goals of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Joint Statement of Trademark 

Counterfeiting Legislation, H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 Cong.Rec. H12076, 

H12083; PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (“statutory damages under § 1117(c) are 

intended not just for compensation for losses, but also to punish and deter wrongful conduct.”). 

This Court and others have granted statutory damages under the Lanham Act similar to

Plaintiffs’ request herein.12

3. Damages as to Count II for False Designation of Origin.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also sets for a cause of action for false designation of 

origin pursuant to § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) (Count II). As to Count II, 

12 See, e.g., Fendi S.R.L. v. Joe Bag, No. 19-cv-61356-RAR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169132 (S.D. 

Fla. Aug. 28, 2019) (awarding Plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each Defendant); Chanel, Inc. v. 

7creplicachanel.com, Case No. 20-cv-60309-RAR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) (same); Goyard StHonore v. goyard.org.uk, Case No. 19-cv-62926-RAR (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020) (same); Louis 

Vuitton Malletier v. The Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified, Case No 19-

cv-61015-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019) (same); adidas AG v. adidascitycup.com, Case No. 19-

cv-61353-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2019) (same); Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., v. artemis 

gesdy, Case No. 19-cv-60287-RAR (S.D. Fla. July, 9, 2019) (same); Chanel, Inc. v. 

fashionbestchanel.com, Case No. 19-cv-60991-RAR (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2019) (same); Fendi, S.r.l. 

v. socjmkfn, Case No. 18-cv-63101-RAR (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2019) (same). See also Malletier v. 

Individuals, P’ship, No. 19-cv-61021-MGC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225874 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 

2019) (same). Accord Gucci Am., Inc. v. The Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns 

Identified on Schedule “A”, Case No. 20-cv-60397-WPD (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2020) (same); adidas 

AG v. The Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns, 19-cv-63109-RKA (Mar. 31, 2020) 

(same); Chanel, Inc. v. aozhu9284, Case No. 19-cv-63068-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020) (same); 

MPL Communications Limited v. 1230h0h Store, Case No. 19-cv-62891-BB (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 

2020) (same).

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 16 of 24
17

the allowed scope of monetary damages is also encompassed in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). 

Accordingly, judgment on Count II should be limited to the amount awarded pursuant to Count I 

and entry of the requested equitable relief. 

4. Damages as to Count III for Cybersquatting.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint further sets forth a cause of action for 

cybersquatting pursuant to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 

U.S.C. §1125(d). As admitted by default, and established by the evidence submitted herewith, 

Defendant adidasschweiz.us (“Defendant Number 102”) has acted with the bad faith intent to 

profit from Plaintiffs’ Marks and the goodwill associated with those trademarks by registering its

corresponding Subject Domain Name, (the “Cybersquatted Subject Domain Name”) which is

identical, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of at least one of Plaintiffs’ Marks. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-

42, 66-69.) The Cybersquatted Subject Domain Name incorporates one or more of Plaintiffs’

trademarks in its entirety surrounded by descriptive or generic terms, rendering the domain name 

nearly identical to at least one of Plaintiffs’ trademarks. Even minor variations to a plaintiff’s 

mark in a domain name can be confusingly similar. See Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v. V 

Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“taking of an identical copy 

of another’s famous and distinctive trademark for use as a domain name creates a presumption of 

confusion among Internet users as a matter of law.”); DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 

201, 205-06 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts generally have held that a domain name that incorporates a 

trademark is ‘confusingly similar to’ that mark if ‘consumers might think that [the domain name] 

is used, approved, or permitted’ by the mark holder.”). Furthermore, it is indisputable that 

Plaintiffs’ Marks are famous and distinctive. Plaintiffs’ genuine goods are among the best-selling 

sportswear products in the world, and Plaintiffs’ Marks enjoy widespread recognition and are 

prominent in the minds of the consuming public. (Gutierrez Decl. in Support of TRO ¶¶ 6-9.)

As to the issue of bad faith, the ACPA lists nine factors for courts to consider in 

determining whether a domain name has been registered or used in “bad faith” with an intent to 

profit from a mark in registering or using the mark in a domain name. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(d)(1)(B)(i); Taverna Opa Trademark Corp., 2010 WL 1838384, at *2. The nine factors are 

not meant to be exclusive and the Court may consider the context of the matter in making a

determination of bad faith. See Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. An 

examination of the relevant bad faith factors compels the conclusion that Defendant Number 

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 17 of 24
18

102’s registration and use of the Cybersquatted Subject Domain Name violates 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(d). 

The first and third factors, § 1125(d)(1)(B)(I) and (III), are clearly present inasmuch as 

Defendant Number 102 has no rights in Plaintiffs’ Marks, and Defendant Number 102 has never 

used Plaintiffs’ Marks in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. 

Additionally, the fourth, fifth, and ninth factors, § 1125(d)(1)(B)(IV), (V) and (IX), weigh in 

Plaintiffs’ favor. As discussed above, Defendant Number 102 has clearly intentionally 

incorporated at least one of Plaintiffs’ Marks in its domain name to divert consumers looking for 

Plaintiffs’ Internet websites to its own Internet website for commercial gain. Such consumers are 

likely to be confused as to the source and sponsorship of Defendant Number 102’s Internet 

website and mistakenly believe the website is endorsed by and/or affiliated with Plaintiffs. 

Clearly, Defendant Number 102’s registration of the Cybersquatted Subject Domain Name, in 

order to promote and/or offer for sale counterfeit and infringing versions of Plaintiffs’ branded 

goods, knowing the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Plaintiffs’ indisputably 

famous and distinctive marks ensures a likelihood of confusion among consumers. See House 

Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 3028, H.R. Rep. No. 106-412 p. 13 (October 25, 1999) 

(“The more distinctive or famous a mark has become, the more likely the owner of that mark is 

deserving of the relief available under this act.”).

Upon a finding of liability, the ACPA expressly empowers the Court to “order the 

forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of 

the mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(c); Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 

1356. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to the transfer and ownership of the Cybersquatted 

Subject Domain Name because it is confusingly similar to their trademarks. See id. at 663. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs may elect at any time before final judgment to recover actual damages or 

statutory damages of not less than $1,000.00 and not more than $100,000.00 per domain name, 

as the court considers just. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). Plaintiffs elect statutory damages and submit 

that in view of Defendant Number 102’s intentional, wrongful behavior, an award in the amount 

of $10,000.00 against Defendant Number 102 for its Cybersquatted Subject Domain Name, 

adidasschweiz.us, would be just. See Taverna Opa Trademark Corp., 2010 WL 1838384, at *3 

(awarding $10,000.00 in statutory damages for the infringing domain name at issue); Chanel v. 

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 18 of 24
19

7creplicachanel.com, Case No. 20-cv-60309-RAR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) (awarding $10,000.00 

in statutory damages for each infringing domain name at issue).

5. Damages as to Count IV for Common Law Unfair Competition and 

Count V for Common Law Trademark Infringement.

 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also sets forth a cause of action under Florida’s common law 

of unfair competition (Count IV) and Florida’s common law trademark infringement (Count V). 

Plaintiffs submit that judgment on Count IV and Count V should also be limited to the amount 

awarded pursuant to Count I and entry of the requested equitable relief. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court enter final default 

judgment and a permanent injunction against Defendants in the form of the proposed Final 

Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction filed herewith.

Dated: October 5, 2020. Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN M. GAFFIGAN, P.A.

By: Virgilio Gigante___________

Stephen M. Gaffigan (Fla. Bar No. 025844)

Virgilio Gigante (Fla. Bar No. 082635)

T. Raquel Wiborg-Rodriguez (Fla. Bar. No. 103372)

401 East Las Olas Blvd., #130-453

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Telephone: (954) 767-4819

E-mail: Stephen@smgpa.net

E-mail: Leo@smgpa.net

E-mail: Raquel@smgpa.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 19 of 24
20

SCHEDULE “A”

DEFENDANTS BY NUMBER, SELLER ID, SUBJECT DOMAIN NAME, STORE 

NUMBER, PAYMENT ACCOUNT, ASIN, AND ADDITIONAL EMAIL ADDRESS

Defendant 

Number

Defendant / Seller ID / Subject 

Domain Name

Store Number / Merchant ID / 

Payment Account

adidas Branded Item ASIN 

/ Additional Email Address

1 Customotop A1NFYNHXNJDB1K

B082XYFF3Z

B084X3YZNT

B084G51JWF

2 qin shao A3EY2DO7P5OTB3 B081SMDVVS

3 sa xi A3B3KLB8YMURJB B081FCJP5Y

4 shiguoming A1N0LINGKCUXLQ B07V4CSYDZ

6 all_star_jerseys 21215565

8 Best2018jersey 21056969

9 buling_buling_store 21025719

11 Cn-sell a/k/a Splendid Jerseys 

Factory 14498598

13 Ericshu620 21454341

14 Fan_sport 20827203

16 Hdkoco a/k/a Hdkoco Hockey 20655613

17 Hedman 21383114

18 isport_jersey 21043057

22 Jerseydhgatecom 21129766

26 Laine 21130460

27 Linshuai a/k/a Binnington 21182988

28 michaelwen2008 13687858

31 outdoorai 21254813

32 Pigchen 21178115

35 Subban 21378247

36 Superjerseyfactory a/k/a 

Superjersey Factory 20822486

38 Tukameng2016 20305377

39 Waller 20917114

41 yaxing68 21462065

43 BAODAN01 5ba9ca6f8b2c370351d94b45

45 Chinese aloe 5dee118028fc7103012c5188

46 CL store 1 5cfdad3228fc710301fb6c3e

47 CONGYOUHUAGE 5b2a1bf18b4513036c1183a4

50 LL STORE 5cfdad6636b54d03019cb8db

53 Offline Store 5cc812501436d403016c675e

58 threethreeL 5da328538b2c37030168cb30

60 YIGE 5b2a1db08b4513036c11b162

61 beautylish 584a44eb15914566e93af27d

62 bin33asdf 5e674283813c3f10a1b9f654

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 20 of 24
21

63 buxinqiuhai 5dfb429b6d5d4a07e8cbc915

64 buybuyingoodday 58294f5f9bef6e6b82e9330a

65 bybygotheway 582518e86a4a7b1cd483cda6

66 DC Supermarket 58c943acd5dbcd51146d183a

67 dinggev62v 5e0c78956a4343fd163c6f35

68 dingxuefei 58ca683c58cdc76f6ef34c48

69 fuyuangyingli 5d9559787137800bc6bf2a99

70 gryuowe526e 5d9948fb0aed7f48478a714d

71 guidaohaopeng 5e3a4f3ff8c5fd38b64a9985

72 hongyundastore 58466d7dc0874068ce1eb21a

73 Huaxieyoukai 5e44cf1b29e78671a9d3fff0

74 Jason Bald 58b4176f2a5b2e51ba93cab3

75 linduifenqin 5d95505c48ea3c2fdf953e70

76 Meiteyfull Bags 5e05ea4da3e1180b6c8ae828

77 nmbisi 5d3a6301cf861a4b1b1e7b47

78 ponuyujh 5e1d3c50ab95e80668b0c26b

79 shinereiovnf 5e06e9a7a577532fb2033039

80 Spriny Muzi 5e64ad322724a8382cdc4a03

81 studentsen 5de8cc4a71a1943c42ee30e0

82 usaexpresss 58144b3829b5f31953f36616

83 wankaifiyang 5d9560b6c095e14e6a49015b

84 weuquantuiqi 5e06f7a529e786558aa26cc5

85 whatsyourdream 589400bc879ae5526abb2bba

86 whqlytlyx 5b83ff986cff994088ffec64

87 xdyo60 5d5bf44f560eca392e849fd1

88 Xiaodouzai Zaibao 5e364756e489d51000966726

89 Yogo 's Chinese style grocery store 59646d3537635d6dc5cd6e35

90 zhangzhongliang 5e06f55c310ce93044889c60

91 zuixiangqiqing 5e082159a577535c470330d4

92 zvq4l98f 5d4ecaa18388976300e72e39

93 babyyu29 babyyu2018@outlook.com

94 dhp_59 pvdfl1@163.com

96 kauee01 Transaction ID: 

90909024GE319862A

97 romeholiday2005 jiandong20170821@outlook.com

98 sambede-brand sweetpetloveyou@outlook.com

99 storefor.you elhachimisoukaina20@gmail.com

100 swexb778 a/k/a masked778 swexbaa@163.com

101 2019sneakersrelease.com rompcont1592@mail.com Customerservice@onlinecust

omerservice.xyz

102 adidasschweiz.us junfengchen66@126.com onlinetopcustomerservice@g

mail.com

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 21 of 24
22

103 artemisoutlet.cn

mariadelaa@163.com

ximandylly@outlook.com

bailanlike@sina.com

artemisoutletsneaker@gmail.

com 

104 buyitoutlet.com boosticboostic@gmail.com info@buyitoutlet.com

khnpnd@gmail.com

104 yeezybreezy.com katemeadow420@gmail.com

info@yeezybreezy.com

yeezy.su@gmail.com

podopozhko@gmail.com

104 sneakerhead.su boosticboostic@gmail.com info@sneakerhead.su

104 xstock.shop boosticboostic@gmail.com

katemeadow420@gmail.com

yeezy.su@gmail.com

info@yeezy.direct

105 elitejerseydeals.com lowe7bm4kl4@mail.com

elitejerseydeals@umailservic

e.com

musosnot@mail.ru

105 elitejerseysvipwholesale.com lowe7bm4kl4@mail.com

service@onlinesservice.com

elitejerseysvipwholesale@u

mailservice.com

pxljd1@sina.com

105 elitefanaticshop.com lowe7bm4kl4@mail.com

jerseysnewstyle@gmail.com

elitefanaticshop@umailservi

ce.com

service@onlinesservice.com

106 vipjerseydeals.com sophroniaje7g6z@mail.com

service@onlinesservice.com

vipjerseydeals@umailservice

.com

melsidagon@mail.ru

106 elitejerseyvip.com sophroniaje7g6z@mail.com service@onlinesservice.com

106 officialonlineshop.co sophroniaje7g6z@mail.com

officialonlineshop@umailser

vice.com

service@onlinesservice.com

107 elitejerseywholesale.com ottorayloq@mail.com

blackkjslaser@hotmail.com

elitejerseywholesale@umails

ervice.com

service@onlinesservice.com

bnztn9@sina.com

108 hotjerseysale.com elaaltmanqf6@mail.com

109 jerseyspromart.com CianaouEdisonez@yahoo.com

jerseyspromart@umailservic

e.com

elitejerseysboutique@gmail.

com

110 kicknove.com 1054903493@qq.com

chenxiaoqing0410@163.com helloshoes88@gmail.com

111 kicksvogue.me 1500307688@qq.com kicksvogue88@gmail.com

112 rabonajersey.com rbnpayment1234@gmail.com rabonajersey@gmail.com 

113 Sneakerpop.org 3447739653@qq.com buypopsneakers@gmail.com

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 22 of 24
23

115 umass1968.com MichaelClarkdrL@yahoo.com Customerservice@aftersaleservice.com

117 yecheil.com xileiwanxing@outlook.com yecheilsale@gmail.com

118 yesyeezy.cn

lixia8410@hotmail.com

jakejay23@163.com

chenyong652a@sina.com

worldsneaker1@gmail.com

slowdown88@163.com

119 yzystatic.org 330390183@qq.com yezzystatic@gmail.com

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 23 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on October 5, 2020, a true copy of the foregoing was served 

upon Defendants via the e-mail addresses at which Defendants were served, and by posting 

copies of the same on Plaintiffs’ designated service notice website appearing at the URL

http://servingnotice.com/Dp23j11/index.html.

Virgilio Gigante_______________

Virgilio Gigante

Case 0:20-cv-61146-RAR Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 24 of 24