alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### [§4283. Repealed. Pub. L. 101–508, title XI, §11213(e)(1), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–436]

Section, added Pub. L. 100–223, title IV, §405(a), Dec. 30, 1987, 101 Stat. 1533; amended Pub. L. 101–239, title VII, §7501(a)–(b)(2), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2361, provided for reduction in aviation-related taxes in certain cases.
(No. 967

Claimant awarded $350.00.)

#### Clifford C. Hood, Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed January 19,*1927.

Non-liability of *state*— not *liable for acts of its militiaman.*The State is not liable for the torts of a State militiaman while engaged in military movements.

Social justice and *equity*— award *may*Be *made.*Although the State is not liable for property damage caused by the act or tort of its militiaman, while in military movement, an award may be made to reimburse claimant for the damage sustained.

E. P. Field, for claimant.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 29, 1925, a tractor belonging to Battery B, 123rd Field Artillery, while being driven along a street in Monmouth, Illinois, by a private of the organization, in military movement, under command of a superior officer, crashed » into the automobile of claimant and badly damaged it. .

On September 3, 1925, the board of officers of the 123rd Field Artillery met and heard evidence as to the cause of the accident and the amount of the damages. The board found that the accident was unavoidable and was caused by a defective .steering apparatus on the tractor, and that neither the driver of the tractor, the owner of the automobile nor the officer in command was to blame. They further found the amount of damages to the automobile to be approximately $350.

The Attorney General has filed a statement, attaching thereto and making a part thereof a letter from the Adjutant General. In the Adjutant General’s letter he states that the claim is a just, one against the State, and that he does not wish to contest it.

*257The State is not legally liable for an act of a State militiaman while in military movement. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

However, as it appears there is merit in this claim, as an act of social justice the court recommends to the General Assembly that it appropriate-to the claimant the sum of $350.00 to reimburse him for the damage sustained.
### §859. Adoption of annual accounting period

#### (a) General rule

For purposes of this subtitle—

(1) a real estate investment trust shall not change to any accounting period other than the calendar year, and

(2) a corporation, trust, or association may not elect to be a real estate investment trust for any taxable year beginning after October 4, 1976, unless its accounting period is the calendar year.

Paragraph (2) shall not apply to a corporation, trust, or association which was considered to be a real estate investment trust for any taxable year beginning on or before October 4, 1976.

#### (b) Change of accounting period without approval

Notwithstanding section 442, an entity which has not engaged in any active trade or business may change its accounting period to a calendar year without the approval of the Secretary if such change is in connection with an election under section 856(c).

(Added Pub. L. 94–455, title XVI, §1604(i)(1), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1752, §860; renumbered §859 and amended Pub. L. 95–600, title III, §362(d)(6), title VII, §701(t)(1), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2852, 2911; Pub. L. 99–514, title VI, §661(c), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2300.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 859, added Pub. L. 94–455, title XVI, §1601(a)(1), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1742; amended Pub. L. 95–600, title VII, §701(t)(4), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2912, related to a deduction for deficiency dividends, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 95–600, title III, §362(d)(6), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2852. See section 860 of this title.

#### Amendments

1986—Pub. L. 99–514 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

1978—Pub. L. 95–600, §701(t)(1), designated existing provisions as par. (1), substituted "change to any accounting period" for "change to or adopt any annual accounting period", and added par. (2) and provision for nonapplicability of par. (2) to a real estate investment trust for any taxable year beginning on or before Oct. 4, 1976.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1986 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 99–514 applicable to taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986, see section 669 of Pub. L. 99–514, set out as a note under section 856 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1978 Amendment

Repeal of prior section 859 of this title and redesignation of section 860 of this title as this section by section 362(d)(6) of Pub. L. 95–600 applicable with respect to determinations (as defined in section 860(e) of this title) after Nov. 6, 1978, see section 362(e) of Pub. L. 95–600, set out as an Effective Date note under section 860 of this title.

Pub. L. 95–600, title VII, §701(t)(5), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2912, provided that: "The amendments made by this subsection [amending this section and sections 275, 856, 6212, and 6501 of this title] shall take effect on October 4, 1976."
ex467





 
EXHIBIT 4.67






	


Extension of Debenture Maturity Date


 


	

TO


 

	

Intellipharmaceutics
International Inc. (the “Company”)


 


	

RE:


 

	

Debenture
dated November 15, 2019, with an original face amount of US$250,000
issued by the Company to Dr. Isa Odidi and Dr. Amina Odidi (the
“Debenture”) and
the Maturity Date (as defined in the Debenture) of such
Debenture


 







 

 


The
undersigned hereby agree that the Maturity Date of the Debenture
(currently July 15, 2020) is extended to December 31,
2020.

 


DATED
as of July 15, 2020.

 




 


	
/s/ Isa
Odidi


	
 /s/ Amina
Odidi



	
Isa Odidi


	
 Amina Odidi
###### Editorial Note on Part 120

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 120 appear at 72 FR 50039, Aug. 30, 2007.

#### § 120.711 What rules govern Intermediaries?

Intermediaries must operate in accordance with applicable statutes, regulations, policy notices, SBA's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and the information in the application.
§ 112.2 Application of this part. ( a ) This part applies to all recipients of Federal financial assistance administered by the Small Business Administration. (See appendix A)
( b ) The term *Federal financial assistance* includes: ( 1 ) Grants and loans of Federal funds;
( 2 ) the grant or donation of Federal property and interests in property;
( 3 ) the detail of Federal personnel;
( 4 ) the sale and lease of, and the permission to use (on other than a casual or transient basis), Federal property or any interest in such property without consideration, or at a nominal consideration, or at a consideration which is reduced for the purpose of assisting the recipient, or in recognition of the public interest to be served by such sale or lease to the recipient; and
( 5 ) any Federal agreement, arrangement, or other contract which has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance.
( c ) This part does not apply to financial assistance extended by way of insurance or guarantee.
( d ) The terms *applicant* and *recipient* mean, respectively, one who applies for and one who receives any of the financial assistance under any of the statutes referred to in paragraph (a) of this section. The term *recipient* also shall be deemed to include *subrecipients* of SBA financial assistance, i.e., concerns which secondarily receive financial assistance from the primary recipients of such financial assistance.
( e ) The terms *program or activity* and *program* mean all of the operations of any entity described in paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this section, any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance: ( 1 ) ( i ) A department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or
( ii ) The entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
( 2 ) ( i ) A college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or
( ii ) A local educational agency (as defined in 20 U.S.C. 7801), system of vocational education, or other school system;
( 3 ) ( i ) An entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship— ( A ) If assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
( B ) Which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
( ii ) The entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or
( 4 ) Any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (e)(1),(2), or (3) of this section.
[30 FR 298, Jan. 9, 1965, as amended at 38 FR 17934, July 5, 1973; 50 FR 1441 Jan. 11, 1985; 68 FR 51348, 51349, Aug. 26, 2003]
EXHIBIT 99.2





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with the Quarterly Report of
Wells Real Estate Fund VI, L.P. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Douglas P.
Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) that:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.





/s/     Douglas P. WilliamsDouglas P. Williams Chief Financial Officer August 12, 2002
#### § 9239.2-4 Filing of charges or complaints.

All charges or complaints against unlawful enclosures or obstructions upon the public lands should be filed with the proper State Director. Such charges or complaints, when possible, should give the name and address of the party or parties making or maintaining such enclosure or obstruction and should describe the land enclosed in such a way that it may be readily identified. The section, township, and range numbers should be given, if possible.
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Jack Ruderman et al., as Executors of Morris Ruderman, Deceased, Respondents. State of New York, Department of Mental Hygiene, Appellant.

*936All concur.
#### § 129.101 What contracting preferences are available for small business concerns located in disaster areas?

Contracting officers may set aside solicitations for emergency response contracts to allow only small businesses located in the disaster area to compete.

[84 FR 65665, Nov. 29, 2019. Redesignated at 85 FR 69125, Nov. 2, 2020]
Editorial Note on Part 117
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 117 appear at 68 FR 51349, Aug. 26, 2003.

§ 117.6 Remedial and affirmative action by recipients. ( a ) Where a recipient is found to have discriminated on the basis of age, the recipient shall take any remedial action which the Agency may require to overcome the effects of the discrimination. If another recipient exercises control over the recipient that has discriminated, both recipients may be required to take remedial action.
( b ) Even in the absence of a finding of discrimination, a recipient may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions that resulted in limited participation in the recipient's program or activity on the basis of age.
( c ) If a recipient operating a program or activity which serves the elderly or children in addition to persons of other ages, provides special benefits to the elderly or to children, the provision of those benefits shall be presumed to be voluntary affirmative action provided that it does not have the effect of excluding otherwise eligible persons from participation in the program or activity.
§ 127.200 What are the requirements a concern must meet to qualify as an EDWOSB or WOSB? ( a ) *Qualification as an EDWOSB.* To qualify as an EDWOSB, a concern must be: ( 1 ) A small business concern as defined in part 121 of this chapter under the size standard corresponding to any NAICS code listed in its SAM profile; and
( 2 ) Not less than 51 percent unconditionally and directly owned and controlled by one or more women who are United States citizens and are economically disadvantaged.
( b ) *Qualification as a WOSB.* To qualify as a WOSB, a concern must be: ( 1 ) A small business as defined in part 121 of this chapter for the size standard corresponding to any NAICS code listed in its SAM profile; and
( 2 ) Not less than 51 percent unconditionally and directly owned and controlled by one or more women who are United States citizens.
( c ) *WOSB and EDWOSB certifications.* ( 1 ) A concern must be certified as a WOSB or EDWOSB pursuant to § 127.300 in order to be awarded a WOSB or EDWOSB set-aside or sole-source contract.
( 2 ) Other women-owned small business concerns that do not seek WOSB or EDWOSB set-aside or sole-source contracts may continue to self-certify their status, receive contract awards outside the Program, and count toward an agency's goal for awards to WOSBs.
( d ) *Suspension and debarment.* In order to be eligible for WOSB and EDWOSB certification and to remain certified, the concern and any of its owners must not have an active exclusion in the System for Award Management at the time of application or recertification.
[75 FR 62282, Oct. 7, 2010, as amended at 85 FR 27660, May 11, 2020; 88 FR 26214, Apr. 27, 2023]
## SUPREME COURT OF THE S TATE OF NEW YORK



## Ap p e lla te Div isio n , Fo urth J ud i c i a l De p a rtm e n t

142 CA 13-01350 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

MERLE A. HARVEY AND DIANE F. HARVEY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RANDY AGLE AND AMY AGLE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN LLP, BUFFALO (ADAM P. HANEY OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.

TREVETT CRISTO SALZER & ANDOLINA P.C., ROCHESTER (MICHAEL F. GERACI OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.), entered January 3, 2013. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by granting plaintiffs’ motion insofar as it sought summary judgment on the promissory note in the amount of $75,000 and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs, as limited by their brief, contend on appeal that Supreme Court erred in denying in its entirety their motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213 with respect to two promissory notes, and instead should have granted the motion insofar as it sought summary judgment on one of the promissory notes, in the amount of $75,000. We agree, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Plaintiffs met their initial burden by submitting the subject note, which contained a clause that accelerated the balance in the event that defendants defaulted, and by submitting evidence that defendants failed to make a required, biannual interest payment by the June 21, 2012 deadline ( see Sandu v Sandu , 94 AD3d 1545, 1546; Kehoe v Abate , 62 AD3d 1178, 1180). In opposition thereto, defendants failed to “come forward with evidentiary proof showing the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to a bona fide defense of the note” ( Judarl v Cycletech, Inc. , 246 AD2d 736, 737; see Ring v Jones , 13 AD3d 1078, 1078). Although “knowledgeable acceptance of late payments over an extended period of time . . . establishes the necessary elements to constitute a waiver of the right to insist upon timely payments” ( Snide v Larrow , 93 AD2d 959, 959, affd 62 NY2d 633; see Madison Ave. Leasehold, LLC v Madison Bentley Assoc. LLC , 30 AD3d 1, 6, affd 8 NY3d 59, r earg denied 8 NY3d 867), defendants established, at most, that they had made only-2- 142 CA 13-01350

two prior untimely payments on the subject note. Evidence that plaintiffs had routinely accepted untimely monthly payments on a second promissory note representing a separate obligation between the parties does not compel a different result.

F rances E. Cafarell

Entered: March 21, 2014 C lerk of the Court
(No. 746

Claimant awarded $3,993.34.)

#### Balaban & Katz Inc., Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed May 1, 1925.*

Franchise *tax*— when *refund may be made.*This case is similar to that of *Herenden Milling Co.*v. *State, supra,*and the decision of the court in that case governs this claim.

Moran, Paltzer & O’Donnell, for claimant.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for the refund of franchise taxes erroneously paid to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, by the above named claimant, in the years 1920 and 1921, amounting in all to $3993.34.

The demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, is, as a matter of law, sustained.

On the grounds of equity and social justice, we award claimant the sum of $3993.34.
###### Editorial Note on Part 134

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 134 appear at 72 FR 50042, Aug. 30, 2007.

#### § 134.1308 What is the standard of review?

The standard of review for an appeal of a HUBZone status protest determination is whether the D/HUB's determination was based on clear error of fact or law. The appellant has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence.
EXHIBIT
      32





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Chancellor Group, Inc. (the "Company")
      on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas
      Grantham, President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report
      fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
      operations of the Company.





/s/
                Thomas GranthamThomas
                GranthamPresident
                (Principal Executive Officer)and
                Chief Financial OfficerNovember
                14, 2008
HomeAbout NRCEEO/Civil Rights ProgramEqual Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights ProgramInternal Civil Rights Program

# How to File an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Complaint

To file an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), you must contact an EEO Counselor within 45 calendar days of the date of the alleged discriminatory event or, within 45 calendar days of the effective date of a personnel action. The EEO Counselor has 30 calendar days from the date you report your issue to attempt an informal resolution of the matter. Instead of EEO counseling, you may elect to participate in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). If you elect to participate in the ADR process, the pre-complaint processing period will be extended to 90 calendar days. If, at the end of the pre-complaint process, the matter is not resolved, the final interview will be conducted, and you will receive written notice of your right to file a formal complaint. The NRC's EEO complaint process (including the ADR Program) is administered by the Office of Small Business and Civil Rights (SBCR), in accordance with the regulations of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), set forth in Title 29, Part 1614, of the *Code of Federal Regulations*(29 CFR Part 1614). For a summary of the process, see the EEO Discrimination Complaint Process Flowchart. For additional information, see the following pages:
        - Pre-Complaint Process
        - Formal Complaint Process

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, February 15, 2023

Section Navigation

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, February 15, 2023
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7601

FLOYD WEAKS, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JOEL THREATT; TONY CLINE; MICHAEL YORK; D.

SOUTHERN; HARRY POLKTON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Salisbury. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CA-96-721-4)

Submitted: July 22, 1998 Decided: August 4, 1998

Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Floyd Weaks, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,

Neil Clark Dalton, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Floyd Weaks, Jr. appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint. We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting

the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Weaks v. Threatt, No. CA-96-721-4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 1997). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED