IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Barbara Stone, Robert Sarhan, and Lesa 

M. Martino,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, 

LLP; James K. Lehman, William C. 

Hubbard, George B. Wolfe, Trey Gowdy, 

David Wilkins, Mark F. Raymond, Carl 

Rosen, Douglas E. Starcher, and C. David 

Brown, II, individually and in their 

capacities as shareholders and managing 

partners with Nelson Mullins Riley & 

Scarborough, LLP and Nelson Mullins 

Broad and Cassel LLP; Ronald Desantis, 

individually and in his capacity as 

Governor of the State of Florida; Ashley 

Moody, individually and in her capacity 

as Attorney General of the State of 

Florida; Alan Stone; William Elmore, 

individually and in his capacity as a 

Manager and Investment Advisor with 

Oppenheimer and Co.; Oppenheimer 

Holdings, Inc.; Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.;

Albert G. Lowenthal, individually and in 

his capacity as CEO and a Director of 

Oppenheimer Holdings, Inc.; Carol-Lisa 

Phillips, individually and in her capacity 

as a Judge in the Broward County Court; 

Milton Hirsch, individually and in his 

capacity as a Judge in the Dade County 

Court; and Jimmy Patronis, individually 

and in his capacity as Florida’s Chief 

Financial Officer,

Defendants.

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C/A No.: 3:20-1290-JMC-SVH

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

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Barbara Stone (“Stone”), Robert Sarhan (“Sarhan”), and Lesa M. 

Martino (“Martino”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, bring this 

action alleging they have suffered harm due to an “an organized racketeering

enterprise.” Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local 

Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review 

such pleadings for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the 

district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the 

district judge transfer this action because venue is not proper.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs, all Florida residents, present their case as a challenge to “an 

organized racketeering enterprise where probate court judges, attorneys and 

guardians are ruling competent senior citizens incapacitated to strip them of 

their civil and human rights.” [ECF No. 1 at 4; see also id. at 9 (“The State of 

Florida in collusion with and under the auspices of its governor and attorney 

general, Ron Desantis and Ashley Moody[,] is murdering its citizens and 

embezzling their assets.”)]. Plaintiffs allege that this matter originates from 

what they have termed the “guardian human trafficking/corruption racket,” 

wherein “the state of Florida steals the life savings and home of its 

vulnerable citizens in a manufactured, scam court proceeding” and “illegally 

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obtains federal funds to fund this criminal racket.” Id. at 11.1

Stone alleges the following four sets of defendants as participants in 

this enterprise: (1) the law firm Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

(“NMRS”) and associated Florida-based firm Nelson Mullins Broad and 

Cassel (“NMBC”), as well as various managing partners and shareholders of 

NMRS and NMBC, all located in South Carolina and Florida (“Nelson 

defendants”);2 (2) the financial services company Oppenheimer Holding, Inc.

(“Oppenheimer”), and related entities, as well as the CEO Albert G. 

Lowenthal, located in New York, and investment advisor William Elmore 

(“Elmore”), located in Florida (“Oppenheimer defendants”); (3) Florida 

officials: Governor Ronald Desantis (“Desantis”), Attorney General Ashley 

Moody (“Moody”), Chief Financial Officer Jimmy Patronis, as well as two 

Florida judges, Carol-Lisa Phillips (“Phillips”) and Milton Hirsch (“Hirsch”);

and (4) Alan Stone, Stone’s brother, located in Florida (collectively, 

“Defendants”). Sarhan and Martino bring claims solely against Desantis and 

Moody, who are termed “Florida Public State Actor Defendants” in Plaintiffs’

complaint. Id. at 3.

1 Plaintiffs allege this “guardian human trafficking/corruption racket” is not 

limited to Florida. [See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 4–9]. However, Plaintiffs 

allegations as to their and Defendants’ involvement in this enterprise solely 

concern events that occurred in Florida. See id.

2 Although Plaintiffs identify whether a given individual Nelson defendant is 

in Florida or South Carolina, all are alleged to be managing partners and/or 

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Plaintiffs’ contentions stem from legal actions and litigation that have

occurred in Florida, beginning with guardianship proceedings as to one of 

each of Plaintiffs’ parents. See id. at 16–20.

More specifically, Stone alleges that she filed for guardianship of her 

mother to protect her from abuse and financial exploitation by her brother,

Alan Stone. Id. at 16. Stone alleges her mother was subjected to “horrific 

conditions,” resulting in her death, and, thereafter, Stone became involved in 

multiple Florida-based litigations concerning her mother’s treatment, 

allegedly resulting, in part, with Stone’s law license being taken from her and 

her repeated arrest. Id.; see also id. at 41–52. Stone alleges judges Phillips 

and Hirsch, both located in the Southern District of Florida, presided over 

these litigations, including the guardianship proceedings. Id. at 2–3, 42–43, 

51.3

Martino alleges her father was being financially exploited by her 

sibling, and she thereafter placed her father in guardianship, transferring 

him from Hillsborough County to Pinellas County, Florida, both located in 

shareholders with both NMRS and NMBC. [See ECF No. 1 at 1–2].

3 The court may take judicial notice of the locations of judicial districts. See, 

e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 444 F. App’x 708, 709 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 

United States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 1229, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2008)) (holding as 

“an appropriate subject for judicial notice” judicial notice of the fact that the 

city of Richmond is located in the Eastern District of Virginia); see also

Consol. Insured Benefits, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., C/A No. 6:03-3211-

RBG, 2006 WL 2864425, at *2 n.3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2006).

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the Middle District of Florida. [ECF No. 1 at 18; ECF No. 1-2 at 40]. Martino

alleges her father was also subject to abuse during his guardianship, she has 

been threatened with arrest, and her home has been seized due to an 

allegedly illegal judgment. [ECF No. 1 at 19; see also id. at 81].

Sarhan alleges his mother was also subject to abuse during her 

guardianship, resulting in her death and Sarhan himself losing his home “to 

a fraudulent foreclosure.” [ECF No. 1 at 20; see also id. at 84–85]. Sarhan

previously challenged his mother’s guardianship in the Circuit Court of the

Eleventh Judicial Circuit in Miami-Dade County, Florida, located in the

Southern District of Florida. [See ECF No. 1-2 at 53].

Plaintiffs assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organization (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., as well as claims for 

“discrimination and retaliation in violation of Americans with Disability Act,”

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and “deprivation of rights under color of 

law.”4 Additionally, Stone brings claims for negligence, loss of familial 

association and interference with constitutionally-protected associations, 

wrongful death, breach of fiduciary duty, ipso facto liability, legal 

malpractice, unjust enrichment, fraud in the inducement, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. 

4 Plaintiffs’ RICO and ADA claims are against all Defendants. [See, e.g., ECF 

No. 1 at 60–61, 72–73]. Plaintiffs’ claims for “deprivation of rights under color 

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[ECF No. 1 at 36–37; see also id. at 52–81 (Stone’s grounds for relief); id. at 

81–84 (Martino’s grounds for relief); id. at 85–88 (Sarhan’s grounds for 

relief)]. Plaintiffs seek damages and prospective relief, including the

investigation and arrest of Defendants. See, e.g., id. at 37, 71.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful 

review has been made of the pro se complaint. Pro se complaints are held to a 

less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and a federal district court is charged with liberally 

construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a 

potentially meritorious case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). In 

evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be 

true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555‒56 (2007)).

Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the 

court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a 

claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 

(2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 for “all civil 

of law are brought against Desantis and Moody only. Id. at 65, 82–83, 86.

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actions”). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings 

means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid 

claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district 

court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never 

presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the 

plaintiff’s legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 

1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, 

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Moreover, even when the filing fee is paid, the court possesses the 

inherent authority to ensure that a plaintiff has standing, that federal 

jurisdiction exists, and that a case is not frivolous. Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed. 

App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 

B. Analysis

Venue is improper in this district. The court has the power to consider 

sua sponte whether venue is proper at this stage of litigation. See Jensen v. 

Klayman, 115 Fed. App’x 634, 635–36 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Harmon 

v. Sussex Cnty., No. C/A 4:17-2931-RBH-TER, 2017 WL 6506396, at *2 

(D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (recommending transfer of venue at initial-review 

stage of fee-paid civil action), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 

6498165 (Dec. 19, 2017); Yates v. State Farm Cas. & Fire, C/A No. 4118-

00179-BHH-KDW, 2018 WL 6928735, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2018) (same), 

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report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Yates v. State Farm Cas., C/A 

No. 4:18-00179-DCC, 2019 WL 95170 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2019). 5

The general venue statute provides where this action may be brought 

and states as follows:

Venue in general—A civil action may be brought in—

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all 

defendants are residents of the State in which the district 

is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action 

is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise 

be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district 

in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal 

jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) (West). 

Here, review of Plaintiffs’ allegations reveals that none of the venue 

requisites in § 1391 has been met. The majority of defendants named in this 

5 Plaintiffs have stated in their complaint that they “do not recognize the 

jurisdiction of any magistrate judge and object and do not consent to a 

magistrate judge nor any involvement by a magistrate whatsoever in this 

matter.” [ECF No. 1 at 93; see also ECF No. 4]. However, as stated above,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Civ. Rule 

73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), established procedures of this court, and the case law 

cited above, the undersigned is authorized to review Plaintiffs’ pleadings for 

relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For 

these same reasons and pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)

and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned has denied

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action reside in Florida, and there is no connection between this district and 

the allegations found in Plaintiffs’ complaint. None of the events giving rise 

to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district. All of Plaintiffs’ claims relate to 

events, mostly of a legal nature, that happened in Florida, primarily the 

Southern District of Florida.6

Here, venue and jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida are 

proper as to Defendants. First, as stated above, the Southern District of 

Florida is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(2) (West). 

Additionally, the Southern District of Florida would have personal 

jurisdiction over all in-state residents and, also, out-of-state residents 

pursuant to the RICO venue provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965, and pendent 

personal jurisdiction.7 See, e.g., Koch v. Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 847 F. 

Plaintiffs’ “motion not to assign a magistrate judge.” [ECF No. 4].

6 Although Stone names as individual Nelson defendants five managing 

partners and shareholders, all stated to be located in South Carolina, and one 

individual Oppenheimer defendant, stated to be located in New York, [ECF 

No. 1 at 1–3], no mention of these defendants is made in Plaintiffs’ 96-page 

complaint. Likewise, although Stone names NMRS and various Oppenheimer 

entities as defendants, also located in South Carolina and New York, 

respectively, all references made to actions taken by these entities are 

through what appear to be their associated Florida entities, and through, 

specifically, defendants Mark F. Raymond, Carl Rosen, and Elmore, all of 

whom are located in Florida. See id. In short, Plaintiffs fail to allege any 

action or inaction specific to these non-Florida defendants. 7 The RICO venue provision provides as follows:

(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any 

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Supp. 2d 1370, 1374–75 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“The [Eleventh Circuit] held that a 

federal district court in Florida, presented with a RICO claim, had personal 

jurisdiction over non-Florida entities under RICO’s nationwide service of 

process provision.”); In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 

1101, 1168 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Prou v. Giarla, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1374 

(S.D. Fla. 2014)) (“Had Plaintiff properly pled his Federal RICO claims, the 

Court would have been able to exercise personal jurisdiction over his 

remaining state law claims . . . under the doctrine of pendent personal 

jurisdiction.”); see also LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 830 

F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the law of state of transferee 

person may be instituted in the district court of the United States 

for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an 

agent, or transacts his affairs.

(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district 

court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of 

justice require that other parties residing in any other district be 

brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be 

summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any 

judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West). To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the “ends of 

justice” provides for proper venue in this district, [see ECF No. 1 at 34 n.53], 

the court rejects this argument. The ends of justice require that the instant 

action be brought in the Southern District of Florida, where the majority of

Defendants are located as well as all evidence and witnesses, instead of this 

district, where a limited number of Defendants are located and who are only 

named in the caption of Plaintiffs’ complaint and not referenced thereafter.

See Sadighi v. Daghighfekr, 36 F. Supp. 2d 267, 277 (D.S.C. 1999) (citing 

Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distribs., Inc., 784 F.Supp. 306, 312 

(D.S.C. 1992)) (“venue appears to be proper in Florida against both sets of 

Defendants because a substantial part of the events underlying the RICO 

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district court, rather than law of state of transferor district court, governed 

action in which transfer of venue was required).8

claim against each allegedly took place in that state”). 8 “Traditionally, venue must be appropriate for each claim,” Sadighi, 36 F. 

Supp. 2d at 275, and Stone additionally brings ADA claims against all 

Defendants, claims not addressed above. [ECF No. 1 at 72]. It is unclear if 

the Southern District of Florida would have personal jurisdiction over the 

non-Florida Defendants regarding this claim. However, for multiple reasons, 

transfer of this case is still warranted. First, as noted, Plaintiffs include nonFlorida Defendants in the caption of their complaint only and do not 

specifically reference them again, including in connection with this claim.

Second, “courts may, in their discretion, transfer a case and ‘leav[e] a 

complicated jurisdictional dispute [for] the transferee court, which is in the 

best position to apply its forum state’s long-arm statute.’” Fredriksson v. 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 07 CV 0214 (ILG), 2008 WL 752469, at *4 

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2008) (citing Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. Van 

Eeghen Int’l B.V., 06 Civ. 490 (JFK), 2006 WL 1876671, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 

6, 2006) (collecting cases); Jennings v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 660 F. 

Supp. 712, 716 (D. Me. 1987) (“This Court will thus assume, without 

deciding, that this entire action could have been brought in the Virginia court 

and will order the action transferred there under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). That 

court may then determine the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction 

over Company, Century, and Idanta.”). Third, both this court and the 

Southern District of Florida have wide discretion to sever and transfer or 

sever and dismiss as the need arises or based on additional evidence. See, 

e.g., 14D Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3827 (2020) (“If 

venue is proper for some defendants but improper for others, the district 

court has wide discretion,” including “retain[ing] the case as to those 

defendants who have been properly sued there and sever and transfer the 

portion of the case for those defendants for whom venue is improper or 

dismiss the action as to those defendants”); Leskinen v. Halsey, No. 2:10-CV03363 MCE, 2011 WL 4056121, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (citing Wild v. 

Subscription Plus, Inc., 292 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir.2002)) (“If this case is 

transferred and the assigned judges of the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York disagree with this court’s assessment of the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . they may sever the Whitman defendants 

from the action and dismiss those defendants or transfer those defendants to 

a court or courts that may exercise personal jurisdiction over those 

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When a matter is filed in the wrong district, the court “shall dismiss, 

or, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or 

division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Here, in 

the interest of justice, this matter should be transferred to the Southern 

District of Florida.9 Transfer, rather than dismissal, is more appropriate in 

this case, particularly given Plaintiffs’ pro se status. Furthermore, 

transferring the case is in keeping with the ultimate goal of allowing cases to 

be decided on their substantive merits, as opposed to being decided on 

procedural grounds. See Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962); 

Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988).10

defendants.”). As stated by the Second Circuit, without such discretion, “a 

plaintiff could preclude the court from considering whether transfer would 

serve the interest of justice by including a defendant, not subject to suit in 

the more convenient district, who was in some manner peripherally involved 

in the alleged wrongdoing.” Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 619 

(2d Cir. 1968); see also City of Virginia Beach, Va. v. Roanoke River Basin 

Ass’n, 776 F.2d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 1985). As discussed more below, Plaintiffs 

will receive an opportunity to object to this report and recommendation, and 

the district judge will render a final decision on transfer thereafter.

9 Because venue is improper by statute, Plaintiffs’ choice of venue is almost 

immaterial to the analysis, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), if Plaintiffs desire

to maintain their action, transfer is virtually mandated. See Blevins v. 

Pension Plan, C/A No. 6:10-03261-JMC, 2011 WL 2670590, at *7 (D.S.C. July 

8, 2011).

10 Although Plaintiffs repeatedly state that they are unable to receive a ”fair, 

unbiased and prejudice-free process” in Florida [see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 68, 77, 

84, 88], these assertions are irrelevant to the court’s decisions related to 

venue and transfer. Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions do not make this 

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III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be 

transferred because venue is not proper. Because the court raised the issue of 

transfer of venue sua sponte, pursuant to Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 729 

n.7 (4th Cir. 1986), Plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to be heard before 

a final decision on transfer is rendered. See also Magic Toyota, Inc., 784 F. 

Supp. at 321; Sadighi, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 278. Plaintiffs’ opportunity to file 

timely objections to this Report and Recommendation is considered to be the 

required opportunity to be heard under Feller before a final decision on 

transfer is rendered by the district judge. See, e.g., Harmon, 2017 WL 

6506396, at *2 n.1.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

April 17, 2020 Shiva V. Hodges

Columbia, South Carolina United States Magistrate Judge

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached 

“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

district the proper venue for this case.

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Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to 

this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must 

specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which 

objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a 

timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but 

instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & 

Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory 

committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the 

date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections 

to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

901 Richland Street

Columbia, South Carolina 29201

 Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and 

Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment 

of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 

1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

 

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