## Reshaping Cooperative Security Among Central American States



#### Number 17, January 1995

Note:Opinions, conclusion, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, or any other government agency.



## Workshop Conclusions

#### Overcoming the Past

The United States has played a central, often
confrontational, and inevitably controversial role in
Central American security issues for over 150 years. 
This workshop took place less than three years after the
conclusion of the war in El Salvador, less than five years
after the electoral defeat of Nicaragua's Sandinistas and
the U.S. military intervention in Panama, and while an
insurgent conflict continues in Guatemala.  The bitter
struggles of the previous decade were fresh in the minds
of all participants.  Yet, despite the violent and divisive
recent history, the tone of the conference was clearly
forward-looking, with a minimum of polemics, dredging
up of past events, or placing blame for current problems
on one or another set of domestic actors or the United
States. Instead, the focus was on future solutions, on
possibilities for cooperation, and on building a tradition
of mutual regional security which would benefit all.

Defining Today's Security Challenge

With the demise of the Cold War and its well defined threats, the region has to deal with many non-
traditional problems that often cannot be anticipated. 
For collective security to work, all nations in a region
must accept that war is no longer a viable instrument of
policy to be used against their neighbors and that each
nation's security is greatly enhanced if it can count on
the support and cooperation of its neighbors.  In this
context, the United States can play a vital role,
stimulating careful national security analysis and regional
cooperation while being careful not to impose its own
security agenda on the Central American nations.  In this
regard, Latin concerns persist over the presence of U.S.
military forces in Central America--roughly 9000 in
Panama and 1000 in Honduras.  The concerns seem to
be divided between the opposition to continued forward-stationing and the apprehension of economic, political,
and security problems should U.S. forces be withdrawn.

A former senior regional official cited the issue of
corruption as a threat to national stability and emphasized
the need for solidarity among all elements of a society to
meet emerging domestic  and transnational threats. 
Civilians need to make it clear that they are ready and
able to exercise  leadership in security matters.  Like
many at the conference, this individual considered the
gravest threats to be internal, generated by poverty,
environmental degradation, drugs, common crime, and,
in particular, weak political systems.  Of secondary
concern are traditional issues such as maritime rights and
boundary disputes.

Highlighting the traditional relationship between
injustice and violence in this region, one Latin security
specialist asked, "Why do we need a military?"  He
stressed that civilian inaction in addressing this question
could undermine both security and democracy as much
as any military action could.

An American with extensive experience in Central
America warned against defining security so broadly that
it loses its meaning.  He pointed out that continuing
problems produced by the  arms trade, the persistence of
para-military forces in the region, and the mixture of
ethnic divisions, internal violence, and institutional
failure threaten stability in all seven countries.  The
military,  therefore, remains one of the region's most
viable institutions.  The United States, with its diminished presence, is losing its ability to  influence.



#### Six Common Themes From Four International Working Groups

(1)  Frustration with the United States.  Central American participants expressed serious concerns over
the past unreliability of Washington's support and the
vague nature of the unfolding United States policy.  They
repeatedly discussed the lack of continuity and coherence
of Washington's policies, the perception of bias in the
U.S. treatment of developing nations and of groups
within these nations, and the rapid decline in U.S. funding projects related to national security.

(2) Development of Stronger Democratic Institutions.  Continued growth of democratic institutions is vital to
Central American security.  Both military and civilian
participants expressed concern over the fragility of their
national systems for governing and the danger that public
disillusionment might lead to internal violence and the
possible restoration of authoritarian regimes.  While
divided as to the extent to which civilian or military
leaders and their respective institutions have been
responsible for this fragility and disillusionment, there
was general agreement that this detrimental environment
poses a potent-ial danger to both groups and to the state. 
There  was also broad consensus that civilian
understanding of and involvement in developing and
overseeing security policies are essential.

(3)  The Importance of Sound Civil-Military Relations.  There is a division between those countries
where the issue of civil-military relations is essentially
resolved (Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama) and those
where it remains a major issue (Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and El Salvador).  For the latter group,
reaching a national consensus on meeting security threats
and promoting regional cooperation continues to be
hampered because of the absence of clear lines of civilian
authority over the armed forces, the lack of popular
respect for military institutions, and the blurring of the
distinction between military and police roles in society.

(4)  Agreement on Threats to Security.  Before Central
American governments can develop effective regional
strategies for promoting security, they must realize the
domestic consensus which defines the principal threats to
their states.  The dominant internal problems today were
considered to be crime, corruption, and the influence of
international smuggling of narcotics, weapons and
people.  Several traditional security concerns in the
region, such as the insurgency in Guatemala, the
possibility of fighting again within Nicaragua, and the
spillover influence of conflicts in Mexico (Chiapas) and
the violence in Colombia, were still considered
threatening to some states.  Efforts to establish a role for
national military institutions and regional security organizations to counter such security challenges, however, proved to be
very difficult.

(5) Roles for Security Forces.  In responding to an
increase in crime and its associated violence, including
narcotics trafficking, military and civilian participants
showed little enthusiasm for increased military
involvement. There was, however, wide recognition that
the severity of this threat, combined with the paucity of
available resources, will require some level of military
involvement for years to come.  In principle, there was
broad acceptance of the need to separate military and
police functions and to modernize and enhance the
administration of justice in all its aspects.  The role of
security forces in response to such actual or potential
security challenges as environmental destruction,
corruption, poverty, ethnic divisions, and lack of respect
for human rights proved harder to address.

(6)  The Future of Military Institutions. Little consensus was found in discussions about the future role
of national and regional security institutions.  The
military side was afraid of a reduction in size and role to
that of a "bonsai army," a tiny, largely ornamental
structure bereft of the capability to effectively carry out
its constitutional missions.  Civilians were concerned
about continued military autonomy and immunities, the
need to develop more effective controls over the security
system, and the impact of reduced budgets for all
agencies of the national government.  While all agreed
on the need for expanded dialogue on these issues, it was
clear that the wounds of previous decades would take
some time to heal.

In summary, discussion groups were neither
optimistic nor pessimistic, but determinedly pragmatic. 
There was no underestimation of the seriousness of
regional security challenges nor the dependency on extra-regional powers for solutions to them.  Regional
cooperation was seen as important, but greater emphasis
was placed on national efforts.  Government programs to
jointly educate civilian and military officials on security-related subjects were seen as having great potential.
Above all, participants recognized that regional security, 
development, and peace can be achieved only by
involving all elements in the common effort.



### Policy Implications

While recognizing that future solutions neither should nor would come from Washington, participants made several suggestions for ways in which the United States could play a more constructive role in Central America. Among the most strongly emphasized were the following:



- Washington must remain engaged and foster an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding.  Its goals should include encouraging the completion of the peace process, providing expanded assistance in the administration of justice, promoting civil-military dialogue, and creating civilian institutions able to assume responsibility for security affairs.
- External assistance is needed in developing regional capabilities for peacekeeping operations and in dealing with transnational problems of the environment and migration.
- The coming departure from Panama (and probably Honduras) raised concerns about a perceived loss of interest in the region.  The United States needs to place such withdrawals in context, insuring that they are not seen as abandonment or lack of concern with regional security issues.  The U.S.-Central American relationship is based on perceptions as well as 
actions, and these must be understood and taken into account.
- International criminal activity demands greater cooperation within the region and from external sources.  A better understanding of linkage between narcotics traficking and other illegal activities is needed in order to avoid placing prime responsibility for dealing with crime in the hands of the military.
- United States support for the democratic process and for improved civil-military relations must be more than verbal.  Expanded International Military Education and Training (EIMET) and programs designed to develop government institutions and civil society are still inadequate.  These programs need to be strengthened if the fragile, emerging democratic structures are to grow and flourish.

About the Workshop:  "Cooperative Security Among Central American States" 
At a two-day workshop jointly sponsored by the Institute for
National Strategic Studies and the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs in August,
1994, eminent scholars and civilian, military and law enforcement
practitioners from the seven Central American countries
examined the significance of strategic developments in the
Americas which are reshaping domestic and international relationships
across this region.

This workshop is the second in a five-part
series looking at the possibilities for cooperative security in the
Western Hemisphere.  The author of this report is Richard L.
Millett, North-South Center, University of Miami.  For more information
about the workshop contact: Col. John A. Cope, USA (Ret.), Senior Fellow, INSS. (202) 287-9210 x 530; Internet: [email protected].