FOREMAN FRIEDMAN, PA, 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, FL 33131 Tel: 305-358-6555 / Fax: 305-374-9077

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BROWARD DIVISION

IN ADMIRALTY

CASE NO. 20-cv-60970-SMITH/Valle 

IN RE THE COMPLAINT OF: 

LOHENGRIN, LTD., as owner of the 2006 

M/Y Lohengrin, a 2006 161-foot aluminum 

trideck motoryacht from Trinity Yachts, 

IMO Number 8735998, for Exoneration from or 

Limitation of Liability.

_____________________________________________/

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO TQY’S MOTION TO STRIKE 

Petitioner, Lohengrin, Ltd. (“Lohengrin”) hereby files its response in opposition to 

Claimants’ TQY, LLC and Tommy Le’s (“TQY”) Motion to Strike Petitioner’s Answer and 

Affirmative Defenses [DE 89].

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of a vessel fire, which occurred on or about November 16, 2019, 

while the subject-vessel, while the subject-vessel, the M/Y Lohengrin was docked in the water at 

the Universal Marine Center. [DE 1]. TQY is a yacht refinishing company, which claims it suffered 

fire damage to equipment it had in the water and around the subject-vessels which caught fire [DE 

10]. TQY has moved to strike or, in the alternative, sought a more definite statement as to six out 

of 10 of Lohengrin’s affirmative defenses as well as a portion of Lohengrin’s “prayer for relief.”

[DE 89]. As discussed more fully below, TQY’s motion to strike or for a more definite statement 

should be denied in its entirety.

TQY filed one affirmative defense to Petitioner’s limitation action, which provided: 

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The TQY Claimants affirmatively aver that the casualty complained 

of and the alleged damages resulting therefrom were caused in 

whole or in part by the negligence of Petitioner, and/or its principals, 

and that such acts of negligence were within the privity and 

knowledge of Petitioner and/or its principals.

TQY does not specify the “acts” of negligence or the “cause” of the “casualty complained of” in 

its sole affirmative defense filed in this matter. TQY now attempts to impose greater pleading 

requirements on Lohengrin than is required by the Federal Rules and attempts to impose a greater 

pleading requirement than it followed in filing its own affirmative defense in this action. Cf. 

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Top Dog Real Est. Holdings II, LLC, No. 20-CV60832, 2021 WL 736384, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021) (Mag. J. Valle) (“In the absence of 

Eleventh Circuit precedent, the undersigned is persuaded by the reasoning in the cases holding that 

affirmative defenses are not subject to the heightened pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal.”).

II. STANDARD ON MOTION TO STRIKE 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may strike “an insufficient defense 

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions 

to strike are generally disfavored and are usually denied unless the allegations have no possible 

relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties. See Pandora Jewelers 

1995, Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry, LLC., No. 09-61490-CIV, 2010 WL 5393265, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 

21, 2010) (citation omitted). To be stricken, an affirmative defense must be insufficient as a matter 

of law. Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse's Computers & Repair, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 681, 683 (M.D. Fla. 

2002). A defense is insufficient as a matter of law only if the pleading on its face is patently 

frivolous, or it is clearly invalid as a matter of law. Id. 1

1 An authority relied upon in TQY’s motion to strike notes that motions to strike have been 

characterized by several courts in Florida as “time wasters” because they are so highly disfavored

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Even deficient defenses, to the extent that they raise relevant and substantial legal and 

factual questions, may survive a motion to strike. Muschong v. Millennium Physician Group, LLC, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41005, 2014 WL 1268574, *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2014). Denials, for 

example, that do not meet the technical definition of an affirmative defense, should not be stricken, 

but treated as specific denials. Id., citing Lugo v. Cocozella, LLC, No. 12-80825-CIV, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 169456, 2012 WL 5986775, *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2012)).

Affirmative defenses are not stricken when the defense presents a bona fide issue. See 

Maglione-Chenault v. Douglas Realty & Dev., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48979, at *10 (M.D. 

Fla. April 9, 2014); Fifth Third Bank v. Alaedin & Majdi Investments, Inc., No. 8:11-CV-2206-T17TBM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48002, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2012) (explaining that 

a motion to strike an affirmative defense is usually denied unless the allegations have no possible 

relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties); Story v. Sunshine

Foliage World, Inc., 120 F. Supp.2d 1027, 1030 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Seibel v. Society Lease, Inc., 

969 F. Supp. 713, 715 (M.D. Fla. 1997). See also Malibu Media, LLC v. Zumbo, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 82272, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2014) (holding that “to the extent that a defense puts into 

issue relevant and substantial legal and factual questions, it is sufficient and may survive 

a motion to strike, particularity when there is no showing of prejudice to the movant.”)

Accordingly, “[a] court will only strike a defense as insufficient if: (1) it is patently 

frivolous on its face; or (2) it is clearly invalid as a matter of law.” Seybold v. Clapis, 966 F. Supp. 

2d 1312, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Guididas v. Cmty. Nat'lBank Corp., No. 8:11-cv-2545, 

2013 WL 230243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2013)). In other words, “[a]n affirmative defense will 

and considered an “extreme measure.” See Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551, 2008 

WL 2225668, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2008).

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be held insufficient as a matter of law only if it appears that the defendant cannot succeed under 

any set of facts which it could prove,” and “[t]o the extent that a defense puts into issue relevant 

and substantial legal and factual questions, it is ‘sufficient’ and may survive a motion to strike, 

particularly when there is no showing of prejudice to the movant.” See Reyher v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 574, 576 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Nobles v.

Convergent Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-1745, 2015 WL 5098877, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 

Aug. 31, 2015) (explaining that “[e]ven deficient defenses, to the extent that they raise relevant 

and substantial legal and factual questions, may survive a motion to strike.” (citing Muschong v.

Millennium Physician Grp., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-705, 2014 WL 1268574 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 

2014))). In deciding a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), “the movant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the challenged matter should be stricken.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Quorum

Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:12-cv-406, 2014 WL 585426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2014) (citation 

omitted).

III. LOHENGRIN’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ARE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT AND 

SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN

A. The Court should not strike Lohengrin’s second affirmative defense 

TQY argues in its Motion that the Court should strike Lohengrin’s second affirmative 

defense, which provides that Claimant’s Claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the Court denied Lohengrin’s motion to dismiss 

Claimant’s Claim already and because it is allegedly not a valid affirmative defense. TQY’s 

arguments, however, miss the mark and do not even meet Claimants’ threshold burden to show 

how it would be prejudiced were the defense not stricken. Cf. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Burd, No. 

6:09-cv-231-Orl-31KRS, 2009 WL 1537899, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2009) (“To the extent that a 

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defense puts into issue relevant and substantial legal and factual questions, it is ‘sufficient’ and 

may survive a motion to strike, particularly when there is no showing of prejudice to the 

defendant.”) (internal citations omitted). On this basis alone, TQY’s motion to strike Lohengrin’s 

second affirmative defense should be denied.2

In addition to TQY’s failure to identify how it would be prejudiced at all by Lohengrin’s 

Second Affirmative Defense remaining, TQY’s Motion should be denied because under Rule 12, 

“the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” represents a defense that may be 

asserted in a responsive pleading or a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(h)(2); see also Moore, 2014 WL 2527162, at *2 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) 

allows a party to raise the failure-to-state-a-claim defense in any pleading that Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 7(a) allows, which includes an answer to a complaint.”). Thus, even where courts 

have found that this defense is not an “affirmative defense,” rather than strike the defense, they 

have held that the “proper remedy” is to view it “as a specific denial” or as 

“harmless[].” See Ahamad v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 5781245, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 

Oct. 25, 2013) (declining to strike defense that “Plaintiff has ‘failed to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted,”’ because where “disputed defenses amount to denials of Plaintiff's claim ... 

[t]he proper remedy is not to strike these defenses, but to treat them as denials”); see also Moore, 

2014 WL 2527162 (“Given [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) and 7(a)] and the harmlessness of any 

mistaken designation of the defense as an affirmative one, the Court declines to strike those 

paragraphs.”).

2 See also Int'l Metalizing & Coatings, 2012 WL 2889687 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 19, 2010) 

(“A motion to strike will usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the 

controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 

added).

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Finally, the Court expressly ruled in denying Lohengrin’s motion to dismiss that “the Court 

is not inclined to dismiss the Complaint because although there is a single cause of action, 

Respondents admit that their claim is sounding in maritime negligence.” [DE 72 at p. 3]. Therefore, 

the Court did not pass on all the potential bases for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based 

on TQY’s representations in its response to the motion to dismiss that it was only bringing one 

cause of action. TQY’s pleading itself, however, never identifies the single cause of action. Thus, 

there may still be a valid basis for the 12(b)(6) defense should TQY attempt to make out a claim 

different than maritime negligence based on its initial pleading. For these reasons, the Court should 

not strike Lohengrin’s second affirmative defense.

B. Lohengrin’s fourth affirmative defense is valid as pled related to superseding causes

TQY argues that a “more definite statement” (though it only cites Rule 12(f) in its motion) 

is warranted related to Lohengrin’s fourth affirmative defense because it is purportedly “too vague 

and opaque for the TQY Claimants to properly deal with the defense.” [DE 89 at ¶ 12]. TQY, 

however, is wrong as a matter of law. First, TQY attempts to impose a heightened pleading burden 

on Lohengrin, which this Court does not follow. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Top 

Dog Real Est. Holdings II, LLC, No. 20-CV-60832, 2021 WL 736384, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 

2021) (Mag. J. Valle) (“In the absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent, the undersigned is persuaded 

by the reasoning in the cases holding that affirmative defenses are not subject to the heightened 

pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal.”). Second, other judges in this district, including Judge 

Beth Bloom, have rejected a similar argument attempting to strike finding:

“[T]his defense provides adequate notice by alleging the existence 

of a superseding cause that “cut off any causal connection between 

[Defendant's] alleged negligence and [Plaintiffs'] injuries” Wiegand 

v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 19-cv-25100, 473 F.Supp.3d 

1348, 1352 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2020). “Under general federal 

maritime law, a superseding cause defense, if successful, completely 

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exculpates the defendant of any liability in the 

matter.” Id. (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 

837-838, 116 S.Ct. 1813, 135 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996)). The Eleventh 

Circuit has explained that “[r]equiring a defendant to plead certain 

defenses affirmatively serves the important purpose of providing 

notice to the plaintiff and the court.”...The defendant is not required 

to “set out in detail the facts” upon which his affirmative defense is 

based; rather, he need only set forth a “short and plain statement” 

that will give “fair notice” of the defense and the “grounds upon 

which it rests.” T.G. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 06-61228-CIV, 

2006 WL 8432512, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006). Further, “[a]s 

to the lack of factual support, the Court will not strike 

this affirmative defense where the parties have not conducted 

discovery and only Plaintiff was present...at the time of the alleged 

injury. This affirmative defense is better challenged at summary 

judgment.” Iskandar, 2018 WL 7463362, at *2. As such, Plaintiffs' 

Motion is denied as to Defendant's Eleventh Affirmative Defense.

Birren v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 336 F.R.D. 688, 696–97 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (Bloom, J.).

Here, as in Birren, Lohengrin’s Fourth Affirmative Defense provides adequate notice to TQY as 

a matter of law – especially in the context where Lohengrin was not present at the time of the fire. 

See, e.g., Ellison v. Nw. Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (King, J.) (“The 

defendant further asserts that the injury was caused by a third party over whom the defendant had 

no control, or by an intervening and unforeseeable cause. This Court, finding no legal bar to these 

defenses, holds that they should not be stricken at the pleading stage. The plaintiffs’ motion 

to strike them is hereby denied.”).

Notwithstanding TQY’s assertions that Lohengrin is being intentionally evasive as to the 

cause of the fire (it is not), Lohengrin does not know the cause of the fire and has sought more 

specificity from each Claimant as to their theory of the cause of fire. Lohengrin has also 

propounded paper discovery on the other claimants as to their evidence relating to the supposed 

cause of the fire and has not received any discovery back yet as of the filing of this response. See 

Birren, at 696-97 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (denying motion to strike superseding cause defense because it 

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provided adequate notice of the defense); See Miller v. Se. Supply Header, LLC, No. CA 09-0067-

KD-C, 2010 WL 55637, at *9 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2010) (finding that it is “much too early in the 

litigation” to strike claim because plaintiffs “should be extended the opportunity, through the 

discovery process, to flesh out” claim); Martinez v. FMS, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-1157-J-33MCR, 2008 

WL 410101, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2008) (refusing to strike claim “at this early stage in the 

litigation”).

C. Lohengrin’s fifth affirmative defense should not be stricken

TQY asserts that a more definite statement is needed as to Lohengrin’s fifth affirmative 

defense because the affirmative defense is “fundamentally evasive” and seeks to strike the 

affirmative defense because “seaworthiness has no bearing on TQY Claimants’ claim for 

negligence.” [DE 89 at ¶¶ 17 – 18]. TQY arguments fail on both bases seeking a more definite 

statement and to strike the defense. 

With regard to the motion to strike the defense as irrelevant, TQY would have the Court 

ignore its own allegations in its pleading where it directly discussed that Lohengrin purportedly 

“had a duty to maintain its vessel in a seaworthy condition” and allegedly “fail[ed] to maintain the 

vessel in a seaworthy condition[.]” Id at ¶¶ 11-12. That Lohengrin alleges in its fifth affirmative 

defense that the was in all respects reasonably safe and seaworthy, that Petitioner hired skilled 

professionals to work on the boat, including TQY themselves, and that Petitioner exercised due 

diligence to make the vessel reasonably safe and seaworthy for refitting is wholly relevant to this 

action. As noted above, TQY also failed to allege how it would be prejudiced at all by this 

affirmative defense not being struck. See Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 617 F. Supp. 

2d 1177, 1187 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (rejecting request to strike where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate 

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prejudice, the answer provided notice that defense at issue might be raised, and the plaintiff had 

opportunity to pursue discovery to ascertain details of defense).

With regard to TQY’s claim that a more definite statement is warranted, TQY again 

attempts to impose a heightened pleading burden on Lohengrin in its affirmative defenses than it 

practiced in its own affirmative defense and than is required under well-settled law. The Eleventh 

Circuit has explained that “[r]equiring a defendant to plead certain defenses affirmatively serves 

the important purpose of providing notice to the plaintiff and the court.”...The defendant is not 

required to “set out in detail the facts” upon which his affirmative defense is based; rather, he need 

only set forth a “short and plain statement” that will give “fair notice” of the defense and the 

“grounds upon which it rests.” T.G. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 06-61228-CIV, 2006 WL 

8432512, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006). Contrary to TQY’s assertions, Lohengrin has provided 

fair notice in its fifth affirmative defense to the Court and to the Claimant. Accordingly, TQY’s 

motion should be denied on this basis as well.

D. Lohengrin’s sixth affirmative defense is legally sufficient

TQY argues that Lohengrin’s sixth affirmative defense related to TQY’s failure to mitigate

its damages “is also too vague and opaque for the TQY Claimants to deal with the defense.” [DE 

89 at 22]. TQY, again, is simply wrong and attempts to impose a heightened pleading standard 

on Lohengrin than it followed in formulating its own affirmative defense and pleading and as 

required under well-settled law in this district. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Top 

Dog Real Est. Holdings II, LLC, No. 20-CV-60832, 2021 WL 736384, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 

2021) (Mag. J. Valle) (“In the absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent, the undersigned is persuaded 

by the reasoning in the cases holding that affirmative defenses are not subject to the heightened 

pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal.”).

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In addition, the defense provides adequate notice by alleging TQY failed to mitigate 

damages. This defense has been upheld in other courts. See, e.g., Sembler Family P'ship No. 41, 

Ltd. v. Brinker Fla., Inc., No. 8:08-cv-1212-T-24MAP, 2008 WL 5341175, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 

19, 2008) (defense stating that plaintiff's claim for damages is barred because plaintiff failed to 

undertake appropriate steps to mitigate damages is sufficient to put plaintiff on notice).

Accordingly, TQY’s motion for a more definite statement as to Lohengrin’s sixth affirmative 

defense should also be denied in its entirety.

E. Lohengrin’s seventh affirmative defense should not be stricken

TQY again attempts to impose a heightened pleading standard upon Lohengrin in seeking 

a more definite statement as to Lohengrin’s seventh affirmative defense for comparative 

negligence. TQY’s motion for a more definite statement should be denied, however, because the 

defense places TQY on notice of the defense. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Top Dog

Real Est. Holdings II, LLC, No. 20-CV-60832, 2021 WL 736384, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021) 

(J. Valle). It is sufficiently descriptive to provide TQY with “fair notice” of Lohengrin’s intent to 

raise the issue of TQY’s comparative negligence. See Birren v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,

336 F.R.D. 688, 693 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (denying plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s comparative 

negligence affirmative defense because it “sufficiently apprises Plaintiffs of its intent to raise the

issue of Plaintiffs' comparative fault and thus should not be stricken.”). Moreover, as noted above,

a motion to strike is “a drastic remedy that is generally disfavored and motions to strike affirmative

defenses should be denied unless it is clear that the defenses could not succeed under any 

circumstances.” Niagara Distributors, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co. of New York, No. 10-61113-CIV, 2011 

WL 13096637, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2011). This court should deny the motion to strike or 

motion for more definite statement as to Lohengrin’s seventh affirmative defense because it meets 

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the less stringent pleading standard and TQY has not demonstrated that this defense “could not 

succeed under any circumstances.” Id.

F. Lohengrin’s tenth affirmative defense should not be stricken

Lohengrin’s tenth affirmative defense, which invokes the Limitation of Liability Act, meets 

the less stringent pleading standard required under Rules 8(b) and 8(c). Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd's, London v. Top Dog Real Est. Holdings II, LLC, No. 20-CV-60832, 2021 WL 736384, at 

*3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021) (J. Valle). It provides TQY with “fair notice” of the nature of the 

defense and Lohengrin’s intent to raise it. See Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar. LLC, No. CIV. 08-

00482 JMS, 2012 WL 3113168, at *10 (D. Haw. July 31, 2012) (denying motion to strike 

Limitation Act defense because it “gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense.”). 

TQY’s argument that its “many items and equipment” does not constitute “merchandise” 

under 46 U.S.C. §30504 is based on case not dealing with the statute or maritime law from 1886

and does not change the fact that this affirmative defense meets the relaxed pleading standard set 

out by Rule 8. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Zumbo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82272, at *2 (M.D. 

Fla. June 17, 2014) (holding that “to the extent that a defense puts into issue relevant and 

substantial legal and factual questions, it is sufficient and may survive a motion to strike, 

particularity when there is no showing of prejudice to the movant.”). 

Furthermore, whether TQY’s “many items and equipment” constitute merchandise under 

the statute is a question of fact or law, which is improper to be addressed in a motion to strike that 

only goes to the legal sufficiency of the defense. Lawrence v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps.

Pension Plan, No. 5:07-CV-408-OC-10GRJ, 2008 WL 11336675, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008) 

(“When the sufficiency of the defense depends upon disputed issues of fact or questions of law, a 

motion to strike an affirmative defense should not be granted.”). TQY’s assertion that its 

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equipment does not constitute merchandise is insufficient to demonstrate that this defense “could 

not succeed under any circumstances.” Niagara Distributors, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co. of New York, No. 

10-61113-CIV, 2011 WL 13096637, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2011). This court should deny the 

motion to strike Lohengrin’s tenth affirmative defense.

G. Prayer for relief is legally sufficient

Lohengrin’s prayer for relief seeking dismissal with prejudice should not be stricken. As 

an initial matter, the prayer for relief “is not couched in terms of a defense, nor is a prayer for 

dismissal...an ‘immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter’ under Rule 12(f).” Cox v. Stone

Ridge at Vinings, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-02633-AT, 2012 WL 12931994, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 

2012) (denying motion to strike prayer for relief that sought dismissal with prejudice). Further,

TQY’s argument that the prayer for relief seeks the same relief that this Court already denied is 

misplaced. There are other bases to dismiss an action besides 12(b)(6) that this court might find 

applicable. See Reyher v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 574, 576 (M.D. Fla. 

1995) (explaining that “[t]o the extent that a defense puts into issue relevant and substantial legal 

and factual questions, it is ‘sufficient’ and may survive a motion to strike, particularly when there 

is no showing of prejudice to the movant”) (citations omitted); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. 

Quorum Mgmt. Corp, No. 5:12-cv-406, 2014 WL 585426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 

2014) (clarifying that in deciding a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), “the movant bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the challenged matter should be stricken”) (citation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

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FOREMAN FRIEDMAN, PA, 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, FL 33131 Tel: 305-358-6555 / Fax: 305-374-9077

In closing, Lohengrin respectfully requests the Court deny TQY’s motion to strike in its 

entirety and for any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: April 8, 2021

 Miami, FL 

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ _Paul Bagley__________________

Jeffrey E. Foreman, Esq. (FBN 240310)

jforeman@fflegal.com

Darren W. Friedman, Esq. (FBN 146765)

dfriedman@fflegal.com

Paul Bagley, Esq. (FBN 94211)

pbagley@fflegal.com

FOREMAN FRIEDMAN, PA 

One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2300 

2 South Biscayne Boulevard 

Miami, FL 33131 

Tel: 305-358-6555

Counsel for Petitioner 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the 

Court via CM/ECF on April 8, 2021. We also certify that the foregoing was served on all counsel 

or parties of record on the attached Service List either via transmission of Notices of Electronic 

Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who 

are not authorized to receive electronic Notices of Filing.

 

By: /s/____Paul Bagley__________________

 

SERVICE LIST

CASE NO: 20-cv-60970-SMITH/Valle 

Cullin A. O’brien, Esq.

cullin@cullinobrienlaw.com

CULLIN O’BRIEN LAW, P.A. 

6541 NE 21st Way 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 

Tel 561-676-6370/Fax: 561-320-0285 

Counsel for Claimants, Tommy Le and 

Jeffrey E. Foreman, Esq.

jforeman@fflegal.com

Darren W. Friedman

dfriedman@fflegal.com

sargy@fflegal.com

Paul Bagley, Esq. 

pbagley@fflegal.com

Case 0:20-cv-60970-RS Document 97 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/09/2021 Page 13 of 14
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FOREMAN FRIEDMAN, PA, 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, FL 33131 Tel: 305-358-6555 / Fax: 305-374-9077

TQY LLC

Craig M. Greene, Esq.

cgreene@kramergreen.com, dbirchall@kramergreen.com, 

gproctor@kramergreen.com, 

jbellon@kramergreen.com,

jnapoli@kramergreen.com

KRAMER, GREEN, ZUCKERMAN, GREENE & 

BUCHSBAUM, P.A. 

4000 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 485-S 

Hollywood, FL 33021 

Tel: 954-966-2112/ Fax: 954-981-1605

Counsel for Claimants: Travelers Property Casualty Company 

of America as subrogee of (A/S/O) Buckner Bay Marine, LLC, 

and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America as 

subrogee of (A/S/O) Tin Man’s Pride, LLC 

Andrew N. Mescolotto, Esq.

anm@fertig.com

FERTIG AND GRAMLING 

200 Southeast 13th Street 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 

Tel: 954-763-5020/ Fax: 954-763-5412 

Counsel for Universal Marine Center

John D. Kallen, Esq. 

Jdklaw1@aol.com

julie@jdk-law.com

John D. Kallen, P.A. 

17071 West Dixie Highway 

North Miami Beach, FL 33160

Tel: 305-956-5775

Counsel for 3rd Party Defendant, Atlantic Refinishing Crew 

lschrader@fflegal.com

FOREMAN FRIEDMAN, PA 

One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2300 

2 South Biscayne Boulevard 

Miami, FL 33131 

Tel: 305-358-6555

Counsel for Plaintiff/Petitioner 

Case 0:20-cv-60970-RS Document 97 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/09/2021 Page 14 of 14