United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 95-10301.

Steven D. HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D. LYONS, Lt. and DeSoto Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

Feb. 7, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, BARKSDALE and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Steven D. Hamilton appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil rights suit,

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm.

I

Hamilton was arrested for multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with

a child. At the time of his arrest, Hamilton was on parole from prior convictions. Fo llowing his

arrest, Hamilton was held at the DeSoto City Jail. Hamilton alleges that Defendant Lyons, an

investigating officer in the DeSoto City Jail, told him that he would not be transferred to the Dallas

County Jail until he made a statement regarding the charges pending against him. Hamilton also

alleges that Lyons denied him visitation, telephone access, recreation, mail, legal materials, sheets,

and showers. After Hamilton gave a statement regarding the charges pending against him, he was

transferred to the Dallas County Jail. Prior to trial on the new charges, Hamilton's parole was

revoked. Hamilton is currently serving a life sentence concurrently with multiple twenty-year

sentences as an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Hamilton brought this § 1983

civilrightssuit challenging the actions of Lyons and the conditions of his confinement at the DeSoto

City Jail. The district court dismissed his claims as frivolous. Hamilton timely filed his notice of

appeal.
II

We review a district court's § 1915(d) dismissal for abuse of discretion. Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). A complaint is

"frivolous," for purposes of § 1915(d), ifit lacks an arguable basisin law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). In Heck v. Humphrey, the

Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages under § 1983 for actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid must first prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question. --- U.S. ----,

----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). A § 1983 claim which falls under the rule in

Heck is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged,

invalidated, or otherwise called into question. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir.1994).

A § 1983 claim falls under the rule in Heck only when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of a subsequent conviction or sentence. Therefore, we must first

consider whether a judgment in favor of Hamilton on any of his claims would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his convictions or sentences.

A

Hamilton alleges that Lyons violated his constitutional rights by using the conditions of

Hamilton's confinement in the DeSoto City Jail in order to coerce him to give a statement.

Statements obtained through either physical or psychological coercion of a defendant in police

custodyviolate that defendant'sFifthAmendment privilege againstself-incrimination, and thus cannot

be used against him at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16

L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If we were to find that Lyons coerced Hamilton to give a statement concerning

the charges pending against him, that judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

subsequent convictions and sentences on those charges. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875

n. 12 (5th Cir.) (noting that prosecutorial use of involuntary statements can never be treated as

harmless error), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 161, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). Thus, Heck bars

this claim unless Hamilton proves that his convictions or sentences have been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or otherwise called into question. Since Hamilton has not made such a showing, this

claim is legally frivolous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim under §

1915(d).

B

Hamilton also alleges that Lyons violated his constitutional rights by altering and destroying

evidence relevant to the charges against him. Convictions tainted by the suppression, destruction,

or alteration of material evidence violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). If we were

to find that Lyons altered and destroyed evidence relevant to the charges against Hamilton, that

judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of hissubsequent convictions and sentences on those

charges. See Heck, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2368, 2374 (holding that allegation of knowing

destruction of exculpatory evidence necessarily implied invalidity of conviction and sentence). Thus,

Heck also barsthis claimunless Hamilton provesthat his convictions orsentences have been reversed,

expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question. Since Hamilton has not made such a

showing, this claim is legally frivolous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing this

claim under § 1915(d).

C

 Hamilton also alleges that the conditions at the DeSoto City Jail violated his constitutional

rights. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of prison conditions that constitute "cruel

and unusual punishment." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 69

L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of conditions of

confinement on pretrial detainees that constitute "punishment." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535,

99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). These allegat ions, challenging the conditions of

Hamilton's confinement in and of themselves, are unrelated to the validity of Hamilton's subsequent

convictions and sentences. Thus, a judgment finding the conditions at the DeSoto City Jail

unconstitutional would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Hamilton'ssubsequent convictions and
 

1

See Heck, --- U.S. at ---- n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 n. 7 (noting that a judgment which held that

a search was unconstitutional would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a subsequent

conviction in which evidence from such a search was admitted, due to doctrines like independent

source and inevitable discovery, which under certain conditions allow the use of evidence that is

unconstitutionally obtained). 

 

2Pretrial detainees are persons who have been charged with a crime but not yet tried on the

charge. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 1865. 

sentences.1 Therefore, in order to state a cognizable claim under § 1983, Hamilton need not prove

that his convictions or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into

question. We now address the merits of this claim.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which are cruel and unusual. Prison

conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they involve the "wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain [or if they are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting

imprisonment." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding deliberate indifference to an inmate's

medical needs to be cruel and unusual); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571,

57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (finding prison conditions marked by insufficient diet, severe overcrowding,

rampant violence, vandalism, and extended punitive isolation to be cruel and unusual). However,

prison conditions are not unconstitutional simply because they are restrictive; restrictive conditions

"are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes, 452

U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399.

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Supreme Court

evaluated the constitutionality of conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees.2 Because they have

not yet been convicted ofthe crime with which theyare charged, pretrialdetainees have a due process

right not to be punished for that crime. Id. at 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 1872 n. 16. The Supreme Court

has stated the distinction between conditions that may be constitutionally imposed on convicted

prisoners and conditions that may be imposed on pretrial detainees as follows:

[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is

concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due

process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication,

the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
 

3

"Reasonably related" means that the restriction is (1) rationally related to a legitimate

governmental purpose, and (2) not excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell, 441 U.S. at 561,

99 S.Ct. at 1886. 

 

4

In Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 106 (5th Cir.1993), we recognized that both the

Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments were implicated by constitutional claims of detained parolees. 

However, since the same standard applied to the plaintiff's claim of excessive force under both

Amendments, we did not decide the issue confronting us today. Id. 

Amendment.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412-13 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d 711

(1977). Courts deciding the constitutionality of conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees must

determine whether the conditions complained of are imposed for the purpose of punishment. Bell,

441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. Courts may find a punitive purpose upon direct proof of an

expressed intent by detention facility officers to punish the pretrial detainee for the crime with which

the detainee has been charged but not yet convicted. Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74. In addition,

courts may infer a punitive purpose ifthe challenged condition or restriction is not reasonably related

to a legitimate governmental objective.3 Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874.

Hamilton challengesthe conditions of his confinement at the DeSoto City Jail. We must first

determine whether the standard announced in Bell should be extended to the claims of a parolee

challenging conditions of confinement during his detention following an arrest for a crime committed

while on parole. This issue has not been decided by this circuit or any other circuit.4 In some

respects, a detained parolee islike the pretrial detainee envisioned by the Supreme Court in Bell. The

State does not acquire the power to punish a person for the commission of a particular crime until

after the defendant is found guilty of the commission of that crime. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671-72

n. 40, 97 S.Ct. at 1412-13 n. 40. Thus, a person on parole for one crime who is arrested for a second

crime cannot be punished for the commission of the second crime unt il he is found guilty of the

commission of the second crime. In this regard, a parolee may be deemed a "pretrial detainee" with

respect to the second crime charged. See Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (10th Cir.)

(characterizing a paro lee as "in pretrial detention" for purposes of describing his § 1983 claims

challenging conditions of his confinement), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d
 

5The Supreme Court later ruled that pretrial detention could also be justified in some cases by

a governmental interest in community safety. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748, 107 S.Ct. at 2102. 

 

6Nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest that Bell 's standard does not apply to

persons who have been previously convicted of a crime but fully served their sentences or fully

paid their fines. 

566 (1992).

However, in many respects, a parolee held in pretrial detention is unlike the pretrial detainee

envisioned by the Supreme Court in Bell. Due to weighty liberty interests, the typical pretrial

detainee is rarely detained prior to trial. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095,

2105, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or

without trial is the carefully limited exception."). The only justification for pretrial detention

specifically recognized by the Bell Court was to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial on the

crime charged. Bell, 441 U.S. at 534 n. 15, 99 S.Ct. at 1871 n. 15.5 The Bell Court's descriptions

of pretrial detainees, asthose persons who have not been found guilty of any crime, strongly suggest

that the Court spoke with the "typical" pretrial detainee in mind. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 536, 99 S.Ct.

at 1872 ("A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of any

crime."); id. at 545, 99 S.Ct. at 1877 ("[P]retrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any

crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted

prisoners.").6

In contrast, the detained parolee, arrested for a new crime while on parole, is routinely

detained prior to trial. The Supreme Court has recognized the "overwhelming" interest of states in

regulating the conditions of parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593,

2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made

with the recognition that with many prisonersthere is a risk that they will not be able to live in society

without committing additional antisocial acts."). Thus, in Texas, a parolee arrested for a crime

committed while on parole, regardless of the likelihood that he will appear at trial, "may be held in

custody pending a determination of all facts surrounding the alleged offense." TEX.CODE
 

7Recognizing the substantial governmental interest in the regulation of parole conditions, the

Seventh Circuit upheld a similar Illinois statute against a due process challenge to the statute's

failure to provide for a bail hearing for parolees arrested for a criminal offense committed while

on parole. Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 728-29 (7th Cir.1988). 

CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.18 § 13(a).7 The liberty interests of a parolee are restricted, and are subject

to the authority of the State to return the parolee to prison without a full adversary criminal trial. See

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("The State

has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That finding justifies imposing extensive

restrictions on the individual's liberty.").

 Against this background, we return to the standard announced in Bell. Bell provides:

[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary

or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action

is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.

Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874. Such an inference is warranted in the case of the typical

pretrial detainee, in which the justification for detention arises only from a crime with which the

person has been charged but not convicted. For such a person, the due process right to be free from

punishment for a pending charge is equivalent to the right to be free from punishment altogether. In

such cases, a finding that the government intended to punish the detainee is equivalent to a finding

that the government intended to punish the detainee for the pending charge. Thus, an inference that

governmental intent was punitive is equivalent to an inference that the challenged condition is

unconstitutional.

However, such an inference is not warranted in the case of the detained parolee. Unlike the

typical pretrial detainee, the justification for the detention of a detained parolee is dual. As noted by

the Seventh Circuit, the detention and subsequent reincarceration of a parolee are only triggered by

the new arrest; detention and reincarceration are justified by the prior conviction. Faheem-El v.

Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir.1988). For detained parolees, the due process right to be free

from punishment for a pending charge is not equivalent to the right to be free from punishment

altogether. In such cases, a finding that the government intended to punish a detained parolee is not

equivalent to a finding that the government intended to punish the detained parolee for a pending
 

8Detained parolees who cannot support a claim of unconstitutional conditions under the

Fourteenth Amendment standard we announce today may of course still seek relief under the

Eighth Amendment. The constitutional rights of parolees are at least as extensive as those of

convicted prisoners. Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ---

U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 342, 126 L.Ed.2d 307 (1993). Hamilton challenges the denial of visitation,

telephone, recreation, mail, legal materials, sheets, and showers for a three-day period. We find

that these conditions do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, so as to warrant Eighth

Amendment relief. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400-01, 69

L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (holding that double-celling does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L.Ed.2d 522

(1978) (noting the importance of the length of challenged confinement, "A filthy, overcrowded

cell and diet of "grue[l]' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or

months."). 

charge. Thus, an inference that government intent was punitive is not equivalent to a finding that the

challenged condition is unconstitutional.

We thus apply Bell 'sstandard to detained parolees only to the extent that we recognize that

a parolee arrested for a subsequent crime has a due process right to be free from punishment for the

subsequent crime until convicted of the subsequent crime. Like the pretrial detainee in Bell, the

detained parolee may establish a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement through direct

evidence of an expressed intent by detention facility officers to punish him for the crime for which he

has been charged but not yet convicted. However, a court may not permissibly infer that a condition

of confinement challenged by a detained parolee is unconstitutional merely because the government

failsto come forward with evidence that the challenged condition isreasonably related to a legitimate

governmental interest. Bell tells us nothing about whether conditions of confinement that may not

be constitutionally imposed upon "detainees qua detainees," Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874,

may constitutionally be imposed upon detained parolees.8

 Hamilton presents no direct evidence that Lyons or any member of the DeSoto City Police

Department subjected him to any condition of confinement for the purpose of punishing him for the

charges pending against him. Normally, we would remand such a case to allow the development of

any such evidence under the legalstandard we announce today. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10

(5th Cir.1994) (holding dismissal inappropriate if "[w]ith further factual development and specificity

these allegations may pass section 1915(d) muster"). However, in this case, remand is unnecessary.

Even if Hamilton could show direct evidence that detention facility officials intended to punish him
 

9Hamilton asserts two other causes of action. In his fourth cause of action, Hamilton alleges

that the "actions and inactions of the DeSoto Police Department to properly investigate the

complaint filed by plaintiff denied due process and equal protection." His fifth cause of action

alleges that the "actions and inactions of all parties involved ... violated the constitutionally

protected rights of plaintiff." These allegations merely repeat the substance of the allegations

made in Hamilton's first three causes of action. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing

these claims as frivolous under § 1915(d). 

for crimesfor which he had not yet been convicted, relief under § 1983 would not be warranted. Bell

tells us that, for all pretrial detainees, " "[t]here is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with

which the Constitution is not concerned.' " Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 21, 99 S.Ct. at 1874 n. 21

(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 674, 97 S.Ct. at 1414). Hamilton alleges that he was

denied visitation, telephone access, recreation, mail, legal materials, sheets, and showers for a

three-day period. We find that none of these allegations give rise to a constitutional claim. See Mann

v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85-86 (5th Cir.1986) (finding that pretrial detainee had no right to an elevated

bed and no right to hot water); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 333 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that

prisoners not confined at a facility for long enough time to petition the courts had no right of access

to legal materials), cert. denied, Andrade v. Hauck, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1118, 47 L.Ed.2d 322

(1976). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Hamilton's challenge to the

conditions of his confinement as frivolous under § 1915(d).9

III

Accordingly, the district court's order dismissing Hamilton's § 1983 civil rights suit as

frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), is AFFIRMED.