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Number 133, February 1998

**Where is NATO’s DefensePosture Headed?**

**by Richard Kugler and TonyVanderbeek**

**Conclusions**- NATO’s upcoming debate over how to handle new strategic challenges should address    not only policy and strategy, but also the thorny details of defense budgets and programs.    If the European allies lack the proper military forces, they will not be able to help meet    new challenges even if their political views are responsive.
- Contrary to the fears of some observers, the Europeans are not disarming. Despite recent    downsizing, they still have large forces that can defend NATO’s borders, especially    now that the threat to Europe has faded. However, their capacity to perform new,    untraditional missions is far less impressive.
- The Europeans understand this shortcoming, and some are trying to improve, but their    ability to pursue new initiatives is hamstrung by tight fiscal constraints. These arise    because their annual combined budget of $160 billion is stretched thin supporting 2.5    million troops. By contrast, the United States spends $250 billion to support only 1.4    million troops, and even it has difficulty funding both readiness and modernization.
- The Europeans face mounting troubles. The readiness of their forces is declining.    Because they lack sufficient funds for new investments, they also are making only slow    progress in modernizing and otherwise preparing for the future.
- Additional investment funds will be needed if they are to pursue such critical    initiatives as the revolution in military affairs (RMA), peace support missions, NATO    enlargement, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defense, power projection outside Europe,    and fair burden-sharing.
- To generate these funds, the Europeans will need either to increase their defense    spending moderately, or to reduce their force structures in significant but safe ways.
- Because some reductions seem necessary, the tradeoff between quantity and quality likely    will become a defining issue for NATO. Common western interests will be better served if    European forces are somewhat smaller than now, but more capable of performing new, high-    priority missions. Relevant forces and high quality are the keys to the future.

**Introduction**

How NATO will respond to changing security challenges in Europe and elsewhere isdriving a critical and growing debate over NATO’s future strategic policy.NATO’s ability to handle these challenges will be determined not only by itspolitical goals, but also by whether its military capabilities are adequate to the task.If European forces fall short, NATO could fail even if it makes sound decisions aboutpolicy and strategy.

With this focus, an examination of the military forces of NATO’s European membersmust address three issues: 1) Where do these forces stand and where are they headed? 2)How can they be improved to meet NATO’s future security needs? And, 3) What are thepossible sources of funding for needed improvements? 

**Current NATO Forces and Budgets**

NATO’s strategic concept of 1991 called for a shift away from stationary lineardefense toward a mobile doctrine—with smaller forces. Whereas NATO’s strategyfor the Cold War called for defense against a theater-wide attack on Europe, its newstrategy focused on regional contingencies with a balanced combination of Reaction Forces,Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces. At the time, the general consensus held thatdefense reductions of about 20-35 percent made sense. Since then, the Europeans have beencarrying out this guidance. Indeed, the Europeans have downsized less than the UnitedStates, as shown in Table 1.

While downsizing, the United States and the Europeans have pursued differentstrategies. The United States lowered its presence in Europe from 330,000 to 100,000troops, and reconfigured its overall defense posture primarily for swift power projectionto other endangered theaters: i.e., the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. By contrast, theEuropeans remained focused on Europe retaining enough forces for regional contingencies,and preserving a strong capacity for reconstitution should a theater threat return.

Of the resulting forces, more than 80 percent were configured for local border defensemissions. Of these, only a few were high readiness units; the rest were manned at mediumor low readiness, with a mix of active and reserve personnel. The remaining 20 percentwere high-readiness "Reaction Forces," totaling 10 divisions, 470 combataircraft, and 160 ships. But naval combatants aside, even these forces were tailoredmostly for local missions. For power projection to the northern and southern regions(e.g., Norway and Turkey), NATO mostly continued to rely on U.S. and British forces. Theother Europeans contributed only token forces to these missions.

Table 2 contrasts current European forces and budgets with those of the United States.The table shows significant European defense assets. The Europeans spend less on defense,but have larger forces. Together, the Europeans are the world’s second strongestmilitary power.

These statistics are reasons for confidence that the Europeans can carry outtraditional border defense missions—especially since today’s threats are so low.This is clearly the case in the central and northern regions. There, European forces areintegrated under a single NATO command and are armed with modern weapons. Within a month,NATO could mobilize five multinational corps. Augmentation forces, plus U.S.reinforcements, could increase NATO’s posture to 25 divisions and 2,400 aircraft.

The situation in the southern region is less positive, but still confident. There, NATOhas larger ground forces than in the central region, but smaller air forces. Also,NATO’s forces are not as ready or as well-equipped, and they are not organized intomultinational formations. Yet the traditional threats there are not imposing. The defenseof Turkey is key, but Iraq no longer has the power to threaten Turkey alone. Iraq, Iran,and Syria could gain a numerical advantage over Turkey’s large army, but any conflictwould be fought on rugged terrain that would slow their advance. Provided U.S., British,and other reinforcements are available, NATO can defend Turkey in today’s setting.

**Few Funds for Investments**

Nonetheless, warning signs of growing trouble are evident. Fiscal constraints inhibitconstructive responses even if widespread political support for such responses exists.This is true not only for the southern Europeans, but for the central and northern statesas well, who are supporting 1.1 million troops on only $122 billion annually. In addition,today’s political atmosphere in Europe is neither pro-defense nor forward-looking.Some security experts endorse reforms, and several European military establishments grasptheir problems and their need for change. But the prevailing public mentality favors onlyslow progress. 

These constraints negatively affect the quality of Europe’s military forces, andthe situation may worsen. Some European Main Defense Forces are slowly but steadily losingtheir readiness. Shortened conscription time is one factor. Also, many ground units nowconduct training only at the company level—not the battalion level, which is key tobeing ready to fight on short notice. Average aircrew training has dropped to 160 hoursper year: below the NATO standard of 180 hours, and well below the U.S. standard of 220hours. If this downward trend continues, the consequence could be a slow, but eventuallycrippling, loss of combat readiness for these important forces.

Equally serious is the lack of sufficient money for investments, which play a largerole in determining future capabilities. Similar to the United States, the Europeansbought new weapons during the 1980s, and have been on a procurement holiday since then.But these weapons are approaching the end of their life cycles. Whether sufficient fundswill be available for new weapons is unclear.

Europe’s fiscal problems can be illustrated by comparisons to the United States,which has a larger defense budget and a smaller force posture than the Europeans.Notwithstanding its larger budget, the United States has had to struggle to free enoughfunds for investment. DOD has been compelled to pursue painful cuts in its domesticoverhead and infrastructure, and to economize in other ways. It is trimming active andreserve component forces. Despite these steps, some research and development (R&D) andprocurement programs have been slowed, and improvement goals in several areas have beenscaled back. Although the United States pays higher personnel costs per soldier (and getshigh-quality people in return), its fiscal constraints on investments pale when comparedwith those confronting the Europeans.

At the moment, the Europeans are spending only $8 billion on R&D; by contrast, theUnited States is spending $25 billion. Moreover, the European defense industry isfragmented into small national components. As a result, the Europeans are encounteringtrouble in producing the Eurofighter, a new strategic air transport, and other newweapons. At a time when military technology is changing rapidly, the Europeans face thedanger of being saddled with inadequate new weapons or a too-high price for the adequatemodels that are produced.

As important, the Europeans are spending only $30 billion on procurement. This comparesto U.S. spending of $42 billion, with plans to elevate it to $60 billion or more. TheEuropeans’ ability to buy new weapons is limited because much of their money must bespent on vehicles, spares, stocks, and materials. If the Europeans do not spend more onprocurement, the consequence will be aging weapons and less militaryeffectiveness—especially against modern threats.

The lack of investment funds virtually rules out other new initiatives. In theaftermath of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, it was clear that the Europeans needed betterpower projection capabilities, but progress has been slow. When NATO began contemplatingmilitary intervention in Bosnia, the Europeans initially were reluctant because theylacked appropriate forces and the funds to make the necessary changes quickly. For othermissions, their lack of mobility assets and expeditionary forces remains a majorconstraint on power projection.

**The Coming Agenda of New Challenges**

New strategic challenges will likely increase pressures on European security. If theEuropeans do not respond to them, they arguably could condemn themselves to strategicimpotence. Moreover, they could make NATO irrelevant by leaving it able to defend bordersthat are no longer threatened, but unable to deal with growing dangers that menace thealliance’s vital interests.

Europe does not have to mimic U.S. military capabilities, but it does need to acquirecomplementary assets. The United States has already made large capital investments inexpeditionary forces and strategic mobility, and has started on RMA. Hence, the Europeansmust both make up ground and prepare for the future. Six strategic challenges illustratethe demanding nature of the defense reform agenda facing the Europeans.

**1. Participating in the RMA.** The RMA requires modernization, but not intraditional ways. It involves the use of ultra-modern information systems and othertechnologies to greatly enhance force effectiveness. Future combat units will have highertechnology, better C4 systems, different weapons and support assets, and perhaps lessmanpower. European forces will need to follow suit not only to remain capable of operatingwith U.S. forces, but also to remain stronger than potential foes, who themselves will bemodernizing in ways that checkmate current technology.

**2. Preparing for peace support operations (PSO).**Bosnia may be a forerunner of abig increase in PSO missions in response to growing ethnic separatism, failed states, andmounting violence in several regions. Bosnia shows that specific assets and trainingregimens are required. Ad hoc policies will not suffice if PSO operations become a regularfeature. The Europeans face the task of configuring a portion of their military posturesfor PSO missions, buying them the right equipment (e.g., C4ISR systems), training them,and supporting them. Building adequate PSO assets is not a crippling expense, but neitheris it trivial, and it undeniably is important.

**3. Implementing NATO enlargement.** Although NATO enlargement is not threat-based,the act of adding new members necessitates that the Europeans take responsibility forhelping ensure their security not only in crisis and war, but in peacetime as well. TheUnited States may be a principal architect of NATO enlargement, but it cannot be the onlycountry saddled with the task of fulfilling its defense requirements. New members cannotdevelop their own defense postures according to NATO’s guidelines unless they receivecredible assurances of the help that they will be receiving from NATO as a whole. 

**4. Improving power projection**. Britain, France, and Germany are already takingthis step. Each country is creating a modest but useful pool of 50,000 troops that can bedrawn upon to mount projection missions. Nonetheless, NATO’s integrated command hasno charter to develop multinational plans and programs for operations outside thealliance’s borders. Missions are launched on an ad hoc basis, with no commitmentsmade in enduring ways. Across Europe, moreover, the dominant emphasis is on becomingprepared to project small forces in a slow manner for low-intensity operations alongEurope’s periphery. By contrast, the future seems destined also to require a capacityto project large forces quickly for a wide spectrum of high intensity operations indistant areas, including the greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Currently theEuropeans lack the necessary mobility assets (e.g., fast sealift), logistic support,C4ISR, and expeditionary forces. They are slowly making progress, but the future likelywill require better projection forces than now planned—by a factor of three or four.

**5. Meeting WMD threats with better counterproliferationassets.**This will require better European active defenses, passive defenses, andlong-range strike assets. Whether a full ballistic missile defense system will be neededis to be seen. The key point is that the future WMD threats may arrive faster than onceexpected. WMD systems in the hands of rogue states could pose a threat not only to westerninterests outside Europe, but also to NATO’s forces and even to European cities. 

**6. Distributing the burden.** Allocating new roles,missions, and responsibilities in ways that ensure military effectiveness, advance theinterests of all members, and distribute burdens fairly is an internal challenge. Aboveall, NATO cannot expect the United States to handle every new challenge largely by itself,with only token allied contributions. U.S. forces are already stretched thin by demandingglobal missions. Strong contributions from all European member states will be needed, notonly to keep NATO effective, but also to keep NATO’s cohesion and the transatlanticbond intact. Moreover, capable European forces are key to resolving command structureissues in a manner that leaves both sides of the Atlantic happy.

These new challenges do not call for perpetuation of a hugeEuropean force posture maintained at medium readiness and armed with aging weapons. Whatthey mandate are smaller armed forces, guided by modern operational concepts, ready toperform security and defense missions not only in Europe, but beyond.

**Funding New Initiatives**

The Europeans will not be able to respond unless their governments and societies acceptthe importance of pursuing new strategic directions. They face a clear choice. Either theycan attempt to wall themselves off from new challenges (and draw apart from the UnitedStates), or they can look to the future, and join the United States in developing theweapons and forces that will be required to defend common western interests in Europe andelsewhere.

Today’s political atmosphere is not encouraging, but neither does it make newthinking impossible. The majority may favor the status quo, but some are calling forchange, and modest reform policies are starting to be adopted. In the past, the Europeansoften have shown a capacity to rise to the occasion when their own interests were atstake. The issue is not whether progress will occur, but whether it will be big enough andfast enough.

The stance of Germany will be especially important. Britain and France are alreadyforward leaning in many respects, but Germany is hesitant and has only recently begunaddressing the new challenges. If they all become committed to defense reforms and exertleadership, NATO’s northern region can be innovative in preparing for future securityneeds. The less wealthy southern countries can contribute to the extent that theirresources permit. 

More will be required, however, than paper studies and official communiques. Tangibleprogress on concrete programs aimed at building real forces for new missions will beessential, but it will require a sustained budget for 10 years or more. If tangibleprogress is to be made on reforming European forces, in the ways needed to bring a newNATO policy and strategy to life, more money will have to be made available forprocurement and other forms of investment. How much money is uncertain. What can be saidis that when the United States pursued its defense improvements in the 1980s, it wascompelled to spend about 30 percent of its defense budgets on procurement. This suggeststhat the Europeans may need to commit an additional $10-20 billion per year forprocurement and other investments. It is affordable because expenses of this magnitude arewithin the reach of Europe’s economies and of sound management practices.

The Europeans have two options. One is to increase their defense spending. The fullannual amount could be raised in a single step by elevating defense spending from 2percent of GDP today to about 2.2 percent: hardly a staggering increase. Or, they couldincrease their real spending each year in a manner that reflects their economic growth,which is about 2.5 percent annually. Within five years or so, they could reach the desiredlevel. 

The second option is to trim most European force structures in order to generate thenecessary funds. If this is the only option pursued, the Europeans likely would have toreduce their manpower and forces by 15-25 percent or more, while not cutting theirbudgets. Are force reductions of this magnitude militarily safe? The answer can bedetermined only by a detailed analysis of future contingencies and requirements.Europe’s existing posture of 2.5 million active troops, and nearly 58division-equivalents, 3,500 combat aircraft, and 350 naval combatants dwarfs foreseeablecontingencies in Europe, as well as projection missions outside Europe. Moreover, NATOenlargement will add additional forces to the ledger even as it moves the alliance’sborders eastward.

Most probably, both options will be needed in some combination. A moderate approachtoward one will make moderation possible in the other. Regardless, the trade-off betweenquantity and quality seems likely to be a defining issue in NATO’s future defenseplanning. On balance, common western interests will be better served if future Europeanforces are somewhat smaller than now, but more capable of performing new missionseffectively.

**Implications for U.S. Policy**

The United States has huge stakes in the emerging debate over how European defensepolicies should unfold. It needs greater European military help in order to meet the newchallenges ahead. One reason is fair burden-sharing, but another is to prevent U.S. forcesfrom becoming so overloaded with global requirements that they cannot handle any of themeffectively. Also, the ability of the United States to sustain a large military presencein Europe is at stake. The United States may not be able to keep current forcesthere—at a cost of $3 billion per year or more—if this investment does not yieldtangible security benefits, in the form of capable allies that can help protect commoninterests and perform future missions. A major U.S. withdrawal from Europe would weakenNATO, and Europe would become less stable. 

The United States should encourage the Europeans to reassess and reform their defensepolicies, which have become a barrier to strategic progress and a potential excuse for nothaving a credible alliance. The United States should also urge NATO to accelerate the paceof change and innovation so that future security missions can be performed.

NATO’s upcoming debate thus must address goals, policy, and strategy in the hopeof forging a new political consensus in Europe and in transatlantic cooperation. But itmust also address the thorny military issues of budgets, programs, and tradeoffs.Resolving these issues is the key to real progress.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These includereports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results ofunclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. Pierce

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