UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO.: 1:20-cv-22471-DPG 

NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR 

INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE & 

TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.; GOLDWIND 

INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS(HK) LTD.; 

DSV AIR & SEA INC.; BBC CHARTERING 

USA, LLC; and BBC CHARTERING 

SINGAPORE PTE LTD., 

Defendants. 

DEFENDANT DSV AIR & SEA, INC. MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 1 of 24
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

-iI. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 

II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 4 

A. The Parties ............................................................................................................. 4 

B. The Shipments Of Wind Farm Equipment ............................................................ 4 

1. The Jade Shipment ..................................................................................... 5 

2. The Moonstone Shipment .......................................................................... 5 

C. DSV US Did Not Engage In Any Activity In Florida Relating To The 

BBC Moonstone..................................................................................................... 6 

III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 7 

A. Legal Standard For Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(2) .............................................. 7 

B. This Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over DSV US .......................................... 8 

1. DSV US Has Established Affirmatively That It Is Not Subject to 

Specific Jurisdiction ................................................................................... 8 

a. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise From Any Business 

Activity By DSV US In Florida ..................................................... 8 

b. DSV US Did Not Engage In Tortious Activity In Florida............. 9 

(1) DSV US Did Not Engage In Tortious Activity In 

Florida Related To Plaintiff’s Title III Claim .................. 10 

(2) Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Adds Nothing To The 

Jurisdictional Analysis ..................................................... 11 

(3) Plaintiff Did Not Suffer Any Injury In Florida ................ 12 

C. Asserting Jurisdiction Over DSV Would Not Comport With Due Process ......... 13 

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise Out Of DSV US’s Contacts With 

Florida. ..................................................................................................... 13 

2. DSV US Did Not Purposefully Avail Itself Of The Privilege Of 

Conducting Business In Florida. .............................................................. 14 

D. Personal Jurisdiction Over DSV Is Not Conferred By Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(2) .................................................................................................................. 17 

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 18 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

-iiCases 

Advantus, Corp. v. Sandpiper of California, Inc.

No. 3:18-CV-1368-J-34JRK, 2019 WL 4751725 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2019) ........................11 

Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.

30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1385-86 (S.D. Fla. 2014) .........................................................................7 

Blueskygreenland Env’tl. Sols., LLC v. 21st Century Planet Fund, LLC

No. 12-cv-81234, 2014 WL 1341277 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2014) ...............................................16 

Borchers v. Amazon.com, Inc.

No. 18-cv-61537, 2019 WL 5196117 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) ................................................8 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz

471 U.S. 462 (1985) ...........................................................................................................14, 17 

Buzz Pop Cocktails Corp. v. Booze Pops, LLC

No. 8:19-CV-1840, 2020 WL 2838825 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020) .........................................14 

CCTV Outlet, Corp. v. Desert Sec. Sys. L.L.C.

No. 17-cv-60928, 2017 WL 5640717 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017) ..............................................16 

Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman

635 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ...........................................................................................8 

Daimler AG v. Bauman

571 U.S. 117 (2014) .................................................................................................................17 

Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH

No. 19-cv-22619, 2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) .............................................10 

DeRossett v. Se. Toyota Distribs.

No. 17-60415, 2017 WL 7344406 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2017) ...................................................7 

DeZinno v. McClain Printing Co.

No. 06-cv-22974, 2007 WL 9709709 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2007) ...............................................9 

Don King Prods., Inc. v. Mosley

No. 15-CV-61717, 2016 WL 3950930 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2016) ............................................15 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 3 of 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued) 

Page(s)

-iiiFR Tax Grp., LLC v. Kassover

No. 17-cv-80386, 2017 WL 6346051 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2017), aff’d, 723 F. 

App’x 977 (11th Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................................3 

Hinkle v. Cont’l Motors, Inc.

268 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2017) ...........................................................................7 

Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A.

421 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................9 

Licciardello v. Lovelady

544 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................14 

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri

736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) .........................................................................................13, 16 

Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A.

537 F. App’x 852 (11th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................7 

Navitar, Inc. v. eScholar, LLC

No. 11-CV-20266-PAS, 2011 WL 13223668 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2011) ...................................15 

Neelu Aviation, LLC v. Boca Aircraft Maint., LLC

No. 18-cv-81445, 2019 WL 3532024 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2019) ................................................8 

Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A.

558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................14 

Peruyero v. Airbus S.A.S.

83 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2014) ..............................................................................7 

PG Creative Inc. v. Affirm Agency, LLC

No. 18-CV-24299, 2019 WL 5684219 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2019) (Gayles, J.) ..................13, 17 

Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Clarke Modet & Co.

515 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ....................................................................................12 

Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd.

178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999) ...............................................................................................12 

Robey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

343 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2018) ..........................................................................17 

Estate of Scutieri v. Chambers

386 F. App’x 951 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................10, 12 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 4 of 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued) 

Page(s)

-ivSnow v. DirecTV, Inc.

450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................12 

Sovereign Offshore Servs., LLC v. Shames

No. 17-CV-80172, 2017 WL 7798664 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017) ............................................15 

In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig.

396 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ..........................................................................17 

Tancogne v. Aquimpex, S.p.A.

No. 07-cv-22553, 2009 WL 10667749 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2009) ..............................................9 

Taylor v. Moskow

717 F. App’x 836 (11th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................3 

U.S. Sec. &. Exch. Comm. v. Carrillo

115 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................................16 

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer

556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................11 

Waite v. All Acquisition Corp.

901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Waite v. Union Carbide 

Corp., 139 S. Ct. 1384 (2019) ............................................................................................13, 14 

Walden v. Fiore

571 U.S. 277 (2014) ...................................................................................................................8 

Statutes 

22 U.S.C. 

§ 6021, et seq. .................................................................................................................. passim

§ 6023(13) ............................................................................................................................1, 10 

§ 6082(a) ....................................................................................................................................1 

Fla. Stat. 

§ 48.193......................................................................................................................................7 

§ 48.193(1)(a) ................................................................................................................8, 10, 12 

§ 48.193(1)(b) ..........................................................................................................................12 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(2) ..................................................................................................................................1, 17 

12(b)(2) ......................................................................................................................................7 

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1 

I. INTRODUCTION 

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff North American Sugar Industries Inc. (“Plaintiff”), a New Jersey 

corporation, sued several Defendants, including DSV Air & Sea Inc. (“DSV US”), a Delaware 

corporation, for activity relating to a port in Cuba.1 The Complaint alleges specific jurisdiction 

over DSV US based on two provisions in the Florida long-arm statute that apply to causes of action 

arising from (1) defendant’s business activity in Florida or (2) commission of tortious acts in 

Florida. 2 Requiring DSV US to defend itself in this proceeding would violate Florida’s long-arm 

statute and constitutional due process protections. 

The basis of Plaintiff’s suit is Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 

(LIBERTAD) Act. See 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq. (the “Act,” or “Title III”). Title III creates a 

statutory cause of action against entities who “traffic[] . . . knowingly and intentionally” in property 

confiscated by the Cuban Government. Id. §§ 6023(13), 6082(a). According to the Complaint, 

Plaintiff owned a port in Cuba—Puerto Carupano (the “Confiscated Port”)—that was confiscated 

by the Cuban Government in 1960 along with dozens of other assets belonging to Plaintiff 

(together with the Confiscated Port, the “Confiscated Property”). Plaintiff’s suit stems from two 

shipments of wind farm equipment from China to Cuba by sea in which the equipment was 

unloaded at the Confiscated Port: the Jade Shipment and Moonstone Shipment. Plaintiff alleges 

that DSV US was involved in only the Moonstone Shipment by acting as a carrier for the shipment. 

1 The other named Defendants are BBC Chartering USA, LLC and BBC Chartering 

Singapore PTE Ltd, Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd. (“Goldwind International”), and 

Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“Goldwind Science”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”). 

2 Plaintiff also alleges, in the alternative, personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(2), which applies only if the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of 

general jurisdiction. DSV US, however, is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Delaware 

and New Jersey. 

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According to the Complaint, DSV US trafficked in the Confiscated Port—located in Cuba—by 

allegedly providing transportation services and by causing, participating in, and commercially 

benefitting from other entities’ alleged trafficking. (Compl. ¶¶ 216–17.) 

As established by the Declaration of Ken Witkowski (“Wit. Decl.”, attached as Exhibit A), 

DSV US was not a carrier and did not provide transportation services for the Moonstone Shipment. 

In fact, DSV US was not party to any agreement to ship wind farm equipment from China to Cuba, 

nor did DSV US even communicate with any other Defendant about the Moonstone Shipment. 

Plaintiff appears to have mistakenly concluded that DSV US was a carrier for the Moonstone 

Shipment based on an electronic submission to United States Customs and Border Protection 

(“USCB”) using a code number associated with DSV US. (Compl. ¶¶ 125–126.) The shipping 

documents for the Moonstone Shipment show that DSV US was not and did not act as a carrier; 

the code number used in the submission identified in the Complaint was a clerical error. (Wit. 

Decl. ¶ 8.) More significantly for personal jurisdictional purposes, DSV US did not engage in any 

activity in Florida related to the Moonstone Shipment. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Personal jurisdiction is not conferred by Florida’s long-arm statute. First, Plaintiff’s Title 

III claim does not arise from any business activity by DSV US in Florida. DSV US has two offices 

in Florida, but neither office was involved in the Moonstone Shipment in any way. Second, the 

Title III claim does not arise from DSV US committing a tortious act in Florida. DSV US did not 

take any action in Florida related to the Moonstone Shipment, much less engage in any tortious 

activity in Florida. For these reasons, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate Florida’s 

long arm-statute.

Even if the Florida long-arm statute provided a basis for personal jurisdiction over DSV 

US, exercising jurisdiction over DSV US would be contrary to constitutional due process. Plaintiff 

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3 

has failed to demonstrate that its Title III claim arises out of or relates to DSV US’s contacts with 

the forum and that DSV US purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within Florida. The relatedness requirement fails because DSV US’s contacts with the forum state 

were not a “but-for” cause of the Title III claim. As to the purposeful availment requirement, DSV 

US did not engage in intentional conduct aimed at Florida that caused harm in Florida. In fact, 

DSV US could not have harmed Plaintiff in Florida because it is a non-resident and does not allege 

to have any connection to Florida. 

Plaintiff apparently wants to establish personal jurisdiction by asserting a civil conspiracy 

claim, alleging that Defendants engaged in a scheme by which the BBC Moonstone vessel (the 

“BBC Moonstone”) stopped in Miami, Florida and documents were presented indicating 

incorrectly that the wind farm equipment would be unloaded in Miami rather than Cuba. The 

conspiracy claim, however, does not establish personal jurisdiction because DSV US was not part 

of any agreement to ship wind farm equipment from China to Cuba. In fact, DSV US did not have 

any communications with any alleged co-conspirator. As such, there is no personal jurisdiction 

over DSV US based on the alleged civil conspiracy claim. 

The Complaint must be dismissed because DSV US has affirmatively established that it is 

not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Florida.3

3 Defendants are filing contemporaneously with this motion a Joint Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims. Because, as explained in the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, this court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, there is no 

basis to assert personal jurisdiction over DSV US. FR Tax Grp., LLC v. Kassover, No. 17-cv80386, 2017 WL 6346051, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2017), aff’d, 723 F. App'x 977 (11th Cir. 

2018); see also Taylor v. Moskow, 717 F. App’x 836, 839–40 (11th Cir. 2017) (“In Florida, 

before a court addresses the question of whether specific jurisdiction exists under the long-arm 

statute, the court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint state a cause of 

action.”) (citation omitted).

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. The Parties 

Plaintiff is a New Jersey corporation that, prior to 1960, owned several Cuban subsidiaries 

in the sugar production industry. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 63.) Plaintiff owns a certified claim to numerous 

properties and assets confiscated by the Cuban Government in 1960, including the Confiscated 

Port. (Id. ¶¶ 64–65, 69.) American Sugar does not allege that it conducted business in Florida, or 

that it has any connection to the State of Florida. 

DSV US is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Clark, New 

Jersey. (Id. ¶ 22; Wit. Decl. ¶¶ 4–5.) DSV US provides freight forwarding services, both by air 

and sea, for international shipments. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 3.) DSV US is an affiliate of non-party DSV 

Ocean Transport A/S, a Danish corporation (“DSV Denmark”).4 (Id. ¶ 5) In December 2018, 

DSV US had 35 offices in the United States, including a Miami and Orlando office. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Defendant Goldwind Science is a Chinese Corporation. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Its parent 

company—Defendant Goldwind International—is a Hong Kong corporation. (Id. ¶ 21.) Both 

companies manufacture wind farm equipment. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21.) 

Defendant BBC Chartering USA, LLC is a Texas corporation. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendant BBC 

Singapore PTE Ltd. is a Singapore corporation. (Id. ¶ 24.) 5 The BBC Carriers provide 

transportation services, specializing in the provision of ocean cargo transportation. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) 

B. The Shipments Of Wind Farm Equipment 

According to the Complaint, Goldwind International entered into an agreement with third 

parties to supply wind turbines for a wind farm project in Cuba. (Id ¶¶ 88–89.) Goldwind 

4 The Complaint makes allegations about DSV Denmark, but it was not named as a 

Defendant. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 156, 159.) 

5 BBC Charting USA, LLC, BBC Singapore PTE Ltd., and non-party BBC Chartering 

Carriers GmbhH are referred to collectively as the “BBC Carriers.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) 

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5 

International arranged for the transport of that equipment from China to Cuba. (Id. ¶ 93.) The 

wind farm equipment was shipped in at least two voyages; however, the Complaint focuses on two 

deliveries that occurred on separate vessels: the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone. (Id. ¶¶ 104–

83.)6

1. The Jade Shipment 

The BBC Jade left China on November 15, 2018 and arrived at Puerto Carupano on January 

6, 2019. (Compl. p. 45.) American Sugar, however, does not allege that DSV US was involved 

in the BBC Jade shipment. (Id. ¶¶ 154–83.) 

2. The Moonstone Shipment 

The BBC Moonstone departed China on December 25, 2018 with the wind farm 

equipment. (Id. ¶ 133.) On January 30, 2019, the BBC Moonstone stopped at the Miami Seaport 

to refuel and resupply. (Id. ¶¶ 135, 137.) The BBC Moonstone arrived at Puerto Carupano on 

February 4, 2019, where the wind farm equipment was unloaded. (Id. ¶ 139.) 

According to the Complaint, Goldwind Science hired and paid DSV US to deliver the wind 

farm equipment to Puerto Carupano (id. ¶ 109), and DSV US then hired and paid BBC Carriers to 

carry out the delivery, (id. ¶ 110.) Plaintiff alleges that DSV US acted as the carrier that did not 

operate the vessel (a “NVOCC”) (id. ¶¶ 95, 108, 117–118) and that BBC Carriers acted as the 

carrier that operated and chartered the vessel (a “VOCC”) (Id. ¶¶ 95, 108). 

These allegations regarding DSV US’s involvement in the Moonstone Shipment are false. 

(See Wit. Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, 12.) In fact, DSV US was not hired to act as a carrier or to engage in any 

other activity related to the Moonstone Shipment. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 9.) And DSV US did not act as a 

6 American Sugar alleges that “multiple other shipments” arrived at Puerto Carupano, in 

which DSV US was not involved. (Compl. ¶¶ 184–88.) 

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carrier for the Moonstone Shipment. (Id. ¶ 8.) Nor did DSV US hire or pay anyone, including 

BBC Carriers to carry out the Moonstone Shipment. (Id. ¶ 12.) DSV US was not involved in 

planning the route for the Moonstone Shipment, deciding that the ship stop in Miami, or selecting 

the destination port in Cuba. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) 

DSV US engaged in only limited activities that had any relation to the Moonstone 

Shipment: DSV US conferred, outside of Florida, about a compliance issue, DSV US made a call 

from outside of Florida to the U.S. Department of Commerce (also located outside of Florida) to 

discuss the export license authorizing the Moonstone Shipment, and DSV US transmitted forms 

for DSV Denmark pertaining to the Moonstone Shipment from outside of Florida to USCB. (Id.

¶ 16.) 

According to the Complaint, several documents relating to the Moonstone Shipment 

incorrectly list “Miami, Florida” and “Miami Seaport” as the shipment destination and port of 

unlading, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 116, 120–23, 125, 128–31.) Specifically, American Sugar 

points to cargo declarations submitted to USCB (id. ¶¶ 116, 120, 125, 128), two house bills of 

lading (id. ¶¶ 121, 129), and two master bills of lading (id. ¶¶ 122–23, 130–31.) None of those 

documents are attached to the Complaint. In fact, DSV US did not review, issue, sign, present, or 

submit to USCB any cargo declaration, bill of lading, or any other document stating that Miami or 

the Miami Seaport was the ultimate destination of the BBC Moonstone, rather than Cuba, or that 

the wind farm equipment would be unloaded in Miami. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 23.) Nor did DSV US direct 

any other entity to do the same. (Id.) 

C. DSV US Did Not Engage In Any Activity In Florida Relating To The BBC 

Moonstone 

As to DSV US’s Florida activity in relation to the alleged causes of action, American Sugar 

only alleges “[o]n information and belief” that “DSV [US]’s Miami office was involved, at least 

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7 

in part, in providing” various logistical services related to the Moonstone Shipment. (Compl. ¶ 

113 (emphasis added).) In fact, DSV US’s Miami office (and Orlando office) had no involvement 

in the Moonstone Shipment. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 18.) No DSV US employee, agent, or representative 

took any action in Florida related to the Moonstone Shipment. (Id.) 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. Legal Standard For Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(2) 

“A court must dismiss an action against a defendant over which it has no personal 

jurisdiction.” Peruyero v. Airbus S.A.S., 83 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citation 

omitted). A plaintiff first must plead sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for the exercise 

of specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 30 

F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1385-86 (S.D. Fla. 2014); see also DeRossett v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 

17-60415, 2017 WL 7344406, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2017). Even if a plaintiff meets its initial 

burden, if the defendant submits an affidavit challenging jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff “to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Aronson, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 1385. 

To meet its burden, the complaint must plead sufficient facts that establish both that the 

defendant is subject to the forum state’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, and that “the exercise 

of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution.” Hinkle v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2017). 

The “Due Process” question is a separate inquiry that “imposes a more restrictive requirement” 

than Florida’s Long-Arm Statute. Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A., 537 F. App’x 852, 859-60 

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2010)). 

Here, the Complaint does not allege that the Court has general jurisdiction under the Florida 

long-arm statute over DSV US. Thus, the issue is whether the Court can exercise specific 

jurisdiction over DSV US—which is entirely dependent upon whether DSV US’s “suit-related 

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8 

conduct [created] a substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 

284 (2014). 

B. This Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over DSV US 

1. DSV US Has Established Affirmatively That It Is Not Subject to 

Specific Jurisdiction 

Plaintiff relies on the provisions in Florida’s long-arm statute that provide for personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation “for any cause of action arising from” (1) “[o]perating, 

conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business venture in [Florida] or having an office or 

agency in [Florida],” and (2) “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” Fla. Stat. §§ 

48.193(1)(a)(1) and (a)(2) (emphasis added). Neither provision subjects DSV US to this Court’s 

jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise from DSV US’s business activity or “tortious” 

actions in Florida. 

a. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise From Any Business Activity By 

DSV US In Florida 

To establish specific jurisdiction based on allegations of business activity in Florida, “[t]he 

business activity must demonstrate a general course of business for pecuniary benefit connected 

with the alleged tort.” Neelu Aviation, LLC v. Boca Aircraft Maint., LLC, No. 18-cv-81445, 2019 

WL 3532024, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2019) (emphasis added). “For this provision to apply, 

there must be a direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection between the basis for the cause 

of action and the business activity.” Borchers v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-cv-61537, 2019 WL 

5196117, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) (citing Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman, 

635 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)). 

DSV US’s business activity in Florida had no connection to the Moonstone Shipment. 

(Wit. Decl. ¶ 18.) Neither the two DSV US offices located in Florida nor any of DSV US’s 

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9 

employees in Florida played any part in any activity that was in any way related to the Moonstone 

Shipment. (Id.) Because there is no “nexus or connection between the business carried on” by 

DSV US in Florida and Plaintiff’s alleged claims the Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction. 

Tancogne v. Aquimpex, S.p.A., No. 07-cv-22553, 2009 WL 10667749, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 

2009) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to establish defendant’s 

business activities in Florida were tied to plaintiff’s claims). 

The only activity by DSV US even tangentially related to the Moonstone Shipment 

occurred entirely outside of Florida and did not involve DSV US’s Florida offices or employees. 

(Wit. Decl. ¶ 16 (DSV US’s compliance personnel had discussions outside of Florida concerning 

the Moonstone Shipment, DSV US had one phone conversation with the U.S. Department of 

Commerce to discuss the export license for the Moonstone Shipment where the participants on the 

call were outside of Florida, and DSV US electronically transmitted forms from outside of Florida 

to USCB).) Even if the electronic transmissions or communications had been directed at Florida 

(and they were not), they would not rise to the level of “doing business” in Florida. See Horizon 

Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005) (“While 

[defendant] made telephonic and electronic communications from its California offices into 

Florida, these communications cannot constitute ‘conducting business’ in Florida.”). DSV US has 

established that it did not engage in any business activity in Florida connected to Plaintiff’s claims. 

b. DSV US Did Not Engage In Tortious Activity In Florida 

For personal jurisdiction to attach under the tortious activity provision of the Florida longarm statute Plaintiff must demonstrate that DSV US “committed a substantial aspect of the alleged 

tort in Florida by establishing that the activities in Florida were essential to the success of the tort.” 

DeZinno v. McClain Printing Co., No. 06-cv-22974, 2007 WL 9709709, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 14 of 24
10 

2007) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis added). In addition, out-of-state conduct that causes 

injury within Florida can serve as a basis for jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)(2). See Estate of 

Scutieri v. Chambers, 386 F. App’x 951, 956 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, DSV US did not commit any 

aspect of the alleged trafficking in Florida or cause any injury in Florida. 

(1) DSV US Did Not Engage In Tortious Activity In Florida 

Related To Plaintiff’s Title III Claim 

DSV US did not engage in any activity in Florida related to the Moonstone Shipment, much 

less commit a substantial aspect of the alleged trafficking activity in Florida. Tracking the 

language of 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13), the Complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that DSV US 

knowingly and intentionally (1) used the Confiscated Property; (2) engaged in commercial activity 

using or otherwise benefiting from the Confiscated Property; and/or (3) caused, directed, 

participated, or profited from the trafficking by another person. (Compl. ¶ 215.) But DSV US did 

not engage in any such activity, and certainly did not do so in Florida. (See Wit. Decl. ¶ 22.) 

The Confiscated Port is located in Cuba, not Florida. As such, DSV US did not “use” the 

Confiscated Port in Florida (nor could any other defendant have done so). See Del Valle v. Trivago 

GmbH, No. 19-cv-22619, 2020 WL 2733729, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) (dismissing HelmsBurton claim for lack of personal jurisdiction where “Defendants [allegedly] trafficked in . . . 

confiscated property, which occurred in Cuba.”) In fact, DSV US did not “use” the Confiscated 

Port at all. (See Wit. Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16, 24.) Likewise, DSV US did not engage in any commercial 

activity using or benefitting from the Confiscated Port, and certainly did not do so in Florida. (Id. 

¶¶ 16, 18.) DSV US did not benefit from the Confiscated Port because it was not a carrier for the 

Moonstone Shipment or a party to the Moonstone Shipment. (Id. ¶¶ 8–12.) And DSV US certainly 

did not benefit from the Confiscated Port in Florida. (Id. ¶ 18.) Simply put, because DSV US did 

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not engage in any activity related to the Moonstone Shipment in Florida it necessarily did not 

engage in any activity in Florida that was essential to the alleged trafficking. 

(2) Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Adds Nothing To The 

Jurisdictional Analysis

Lacking any facts that DSV US engaged in any activity in Florida related to the Title III 

claim, Plaintiff apparently attempts to impute acts of the alleged co-conspirators to DSV US. 

Plaintiff alleges that “[e]ach of the Defendants agreed to transport the Goldwind Equipment from 

China to . . . Cuba via the Confiscated Port.” (Compl. ¶ 238.) In furtherance of the supposed 

conspiracy, Defendants allegedly implemented a scheme for the BBC Moonstone to stop in Miami 

to refuel and resupply and to present false documentation representing that equipment would be 

unloaded in Miami. (Id. ¶ 241.) 

Acts of alleged co-conspirators may be imputed to a defendant only where it “was part of 

a conspiracy either engineered in Florida or pursuant to which a tortious act in furtherance was 

committed in Florida.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009). As 

such, the conspiracy allegations cannot support personal jurisdiction over DSV US unless it “was 

involved in a Florida-based agreement to [traffic in the confiscated port]—i.e., involved in a 

meeting of the minds with at least one other [alleged] co-conspirator—before the time of the 

[alleged trafficking].” Id. at 1282 (emphasis in original). DSV US, however, was party to no 

agreement related to the Moonstone Shipment. (Wit. Decl. ¶¶ 8–13, 24); see Mazer, 556 F.3d 

1260, 1277 (finding factual denials of jurisdictional allegations sufficient to shift burden to 

plaintiff); Advantus, Corp. v. Sandpiper of California, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-1368-J-34JRK, 2019 WL 

4751725, at *28 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2019) (holding plaintiff “failed to carry its burden of 

establishing . . . personal jurisdiction over [defendant] as to the alleged conspiracy claim” where 

defendant “has come forward with evidence rebutting” allegations of conspiracy”). Indeed, DSV 

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US had no communications with any alleged co-conspirator related to the Moonstone Shipment. 

(Wit. Decl. ¶ 10.) Because DSV US was not part of an agreement to engage in the alleged 

trafficking activity, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim cannot serve as a basis for asserting personal 

jurisdiction over DSV US. See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Clarke Modet & Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 

1296 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding evidence of defendant’s involvement in conspiracy insufficient to 

establish personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b)); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 

(11th Cir. 2006) (same).7

(3) Plaintiff Did Not Suffer Any Injury In Florida 

While out-of-state conduct can satisfy § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Plaintiff “must still plead facts 

demonstrating a cognizable injury in Florida.” Estate of Scutieri, 386 F. App’x at 956. Plaintiff 

is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and does not allege 

that it has any connection to Florida. (Compl. ¶ 19.) While DSV US disputes that Plaintiff has 

alleged any injury traceable to any activity by DSV US, (see Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss at Section 

I ), Plaintiff certainly has not suffered any injury in Florida. See Estate of Scutieri, 386 Fed. Appx. 

at 956 (holding that long-arm statute was not satisfied where plaintiff did not suffer injury in 

Florida); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) (the statute does not 

provide jurisdiction over claims arising from “an allegation of injury to the business interest of 

7 Even if DSV US had been party to an agreement to ship wind farm equipment from China 

to Cuba (and it was not), the conspiracy claim still would not provide a basis for exercising 

personal jurisdiction over DSV US. Because “Florida courts do not recognize civil conspiracy 

as an independent tort,” the court must determine whether the alleged underlying tort “arises 

from” acts in Florida. Estate of Scutieri, 386 F. App’x at 955. Plaintiff alleges in conclusory 

fashion that “[t]he stopover . . . in Miami [including presenting false documents representing that 

the wind farm equipment would be unloaded in Miami] was an essential aspect of Defendants’ use 

of the Confiscated Port . . . .” (Compl . ¶¶ 241–42.) The Complaint is devoid of any allegations 

to show that the stop to refuel in Miami (id. ¶ 104) was essential to the alleged trafficking activity 

in Cuba. 

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[even] a Florida plaintiff where that interest is located entirely outside of Florida.”). DSV US’s 

out-of-state conduct does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute. 

C. Asserting Jurisdiction Over DSV Would Not Comport With Due Process 

Even if Plaintiff had satisfied the Florida long-arm statue, it fails the second step of the 

jurisdictional analysis—determining whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction comports with 

the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution. Due 

process requires courts to consider, first, “whether the plaintiffs have established that their claims 

arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum” and second, 

“whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.” Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 

1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Waite v. 

Union Carbide Corp., 139 S. Ct. 1384 (2019). Plaintiff cannot meet its burden to establish either 

prong. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs.”) 

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise Out Of DSV US’s Contacts With 

Florida 

“To establish relatedness, plaintiffs must at a minimum demonstrate the defendant had 

some contact with the forum state and that the contact was a but-for cause of the alleged tort. That 

is, the alleged tort must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum.” 

PG Creative Inc. v. Affirm Agency, LLC, No. 18-CV-24299, 2019 WL 5684219, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 

Oct. 31, 2019) (Gayles, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition, “the causal 

nexus between the tortious conduct and the purposeful contact must be such that the out-of-state 

resident will have ‘fair warning that a particular activity will subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a 

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foreign sovereign.’” Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (alteration in original)). 

Here, the activity by DSV US in Florida does not meet the “but-for” test. The only activity 

by DSV US in Florida is that it has branch offices in Miami and Orlando and that DSV US is the 

shipper for a certain number of unrelated shipments each year that are unloaded at Florida ports. 

(Compl. ¶ 22.) The Moonstone Shipment would have occurred regardless of whether DSV US 

had Florida offices. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 18.) Because DSV US’s contacts with Florida “have nothing to 

do with the torts [DSV US] allegedly committed” Plaintiff cannot “establish[] that [DSV US’s] 

contacts were the but-for cause of the torts [Plaintiff] allege[s].” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1315. 

2. DSV US Did Not Purposefully Avail Itself Of The Privilege Of 

Conducting Business In Florida 

As for the second prong of the due process inquiry—i.e., purposeful availment—in cases 

involving intentional torts courts apply the Calder “effects test,” which requires that a defendant 

has (1) committed an intentional act, (2) aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the 

defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state. Licciardello v. Lovelady, 

544 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008). DSV US is alleged to have committed an intentional act of 

“trafficking” in the confiscated port, but Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second and third prongs of the 

effects test. 

To satisfy the second prong, a defendant must have intentionally and purposefully directed 

“tortious conduct” at a resident of the forum. Buzz Pop Cocktails Corp. v. Booze Pops, LLC, No. 

8:19-CV-1840, 2020 WL 2838825, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020). DSV US did not engage in 

any conduct relating to the Moonstone Shipment that was aimed at Florida, whether intentional or 

otherwise. The only conduct by DSV US related in any way to the Moonstone Shipment occurred 

outside of Florida and was not directed into Florida. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 18.) This is not sufficient. See 

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Navitar, Inc. v. eScholar, LLC, No. 11-CV-20266-PAS, 2011 WL 13223668, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 

7, 2011) (holding defendant’s contact with Florida were not sufficient to satisfy due process where 

provided “[a]ffidavit makes it clear that Defendant’s business activities relating to [plaintiff’s 

claim] are not directed at Florida.”); see also Sovereign Offshore Servs., LLC v. Shames, No. 17-

CV-80172, 2017 WL 7798664, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017) (holding that even “Defendant’s 

awareness that his blog posts would be accessible in Florida, by virtue of the nature of the worldwide web, and [plaintiff’s] physical location in Florida are insufficient to establish that Defendant 

has minimum contacts with Florida.”) 

Moreover, DSV US’s limited acts related to the Moonstone Shipment were not tortious. 

DSV US transmitted forms to USCB relating to the Moonstone Shipment, and those forms did not 

misidentify the ultimate destination as Miami or state that the wind farm equipment would be 

unloaded in Miami. (Wit Decl. ¶¶ 16, 23.) There is no tortious conduct or wrongdoing by 

submitting forms to USCB. And of course, there is no wrongful or tortious conduct in conferring 

on a compliance issue relating to the shipment or discussing with the U.S. Department of 

Commerce the license it issued for the BBC Moonstone Shipment. Absent any tortious conduct 

directed at Florida, DSV US did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business 

in Florida. See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Mosley, No. 15-CV-61717, 2016 WL 3950930, at *5 

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2016) (holding plaintiff failed to satisfy “effects test” defendant’s national 

advertising campaign was “not inherently tortious . . . and there is no evidence that the promotional 

materials were purposefully directed at Florida or its citizens.”) 

Plaintiff also cannot satisfy the third prong of the effects test—that DSV US should have 

anticipated that it would cause harm to Plaintiff in Florida. To satisfy this requirement the 

defendant must have known “that it was likely committing [a tort] specifically against the plaintiff 

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in the forum state and continued to do so anyway.” CCTV Outlet, Corp. v. Desert Sec. Sys. L.L.C., 

No. 17-cv-60928, 2017 WL 5640717, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017). As discussed in Section 

III.B.1.b.(3) above, if any harm occurred to Plaintiff, it was not suffered in Florida. And the 

Complaint does not allege that DSV US was aware of the existence of American Sugar, much less 

that DSV US took any action that it should have known would harm American Sugar in Florida.8

Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations do not change the analysis. Minimum contacts can be 

based on a coconspirator’s presence in Florida “only if the conspiracy is directed towards the 

forum, or substantial steps in furtherance of the conspiracy are taken in the forum” and there is 

evidence “of injury related to the conspiracy that occurred in the State of Florida.” 

Blueskygreenland Env’tl. Sols., LLC v. 21st Century Planet Fund, LLC, No. 12-cv-81234, 2014 

WL 1341277, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2014) (finding elements lacking because, inter alia, plaintiff 

“is a Texas corporation complaining of lost revenues from sales in the territory of India”). As 

discussed in Section III.B.1.b.(2), DSV US was not party to “a ‘meeting of the minds’ between the 

[alleged] co-conspirators.” Id. 

Even if DSV US had been involved in an agreement to have the BBC Moonstone stop in 

Miami, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the supposed conspiracy was directed at Florida or 

substantial steps in furtherance of the conspiracy were taken in Florida. Plaintiff’s conclusory 

8 Plaintiff also could not satisfy the traditional minimum contacts test for purposeful 

availment. Under the traditional purposeful availment analysis, the court assesses the 

nonresident’s contacts with the forum state and asks whether those contacts “(1) are related to the 

plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) involve some act by which the defendant purposefully availed 

himself of the privileges of doing business within the forum; and (3) are such that the defendant 

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357 

(citing U.S. Sec. &. Exch. Comm. v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff 

cannot satisfy the first prong because DSV US’s contacts with Florida are not related to the alleged 

trafficking activity. (Wit. Decl. ¶ 18.) 

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allegation that “[t]he stopover of the BBC Moonstone in Miami was an essential aspect of the 

Defendants’ use of the Confiscated Port” (Compl. ¶ 242.), is “not entitled to [an] assumption of 

truth[].” PG Creative, 2019 WL 5684219, at *6 (Gayles, J.) (rejecting conclusory allegations in 

applying the effects test). Moreover, allegedly presenting false documentation that wind farm 

equipment would be unloaded in Miami (which DSV US did not do) would have served no purpose 

because the wind farm equipment was shipped from China to Cuba pursuant to a license issued by 

the U.S. Department of Commerce. (Wit. Decl. ¶¶ 16, 23.) As such, the stop in Miami was nothing 

more than a “fortuitous[] or attenuated contact[],” which cannot support specific jurisdiction. 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Robey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 343 F. Supp. 3d 

1304, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (applying rule).9

D. Personal Jurisdiction Over DSV Is Not Conferred By Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) 

Plaintiff alleges, in the alternative, that personal jurisdiction is conferred on DSV US under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which provides that serving a summons or filing a waiver of service 

establishes personal jurisdiction for federal claims under certain circumstances. (Compl. ¶ 15.) 

However, “Rule 4(k)(2) is applicable only if ‘the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any 

state’s courts of general jurisdiction.’” In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 

1101, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)). DSV US is a Delaware corporation 

with its principal place of business in New Jersey (Compl. ¶ 22), and is therefore subject to general 

personal jurisdiction in Delaware and New Jersey. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 118 

9 Because Plaintiff cannot meet its burden to satisfy either the relatedness or purposeful 

availment prongs of the due process analysis, “it would offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice to subject [DSV US] to personal jurisdiction in Florida.” PG Creative, 2019 

WL 5684219, at *7 (Gayles, J.). 

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(2014) (“The paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation's place of 

incorporation and principal place of business.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons state above, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Dated: August 31, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Robert M. Brochin

Robert M. Brochin 

Florida Bar No. 319661 

bobby.brochin@morganlewis.com 

Matthew M. Papkin 

Florida Bar No. 106565 

matthew.papkin@morganlewis.com 

Sarah J. Cohen 

Florida Bar No. 1010683 

sarah.cohen@morganlewis.com 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 5300 

Miami, FL 33131-2339 

Telephone: 305.415.3000 

Facsimile: 305.415.3001 

Carl A. Valenstein (admitted pro hac vice) 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

One Federal Street 

Boston, MA 02110-1726 

Telephone: 617.341.7700 

Facsimile: 617.341.7701 

John Vassos (admitted pro hac vice) 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

101 Park Ave. 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Telephone: 212.309.6000 

Facsimile: 212.309.6001 

Counsel for Defendant DSV AIR & SEA, INC. 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 23 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on August 31, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court through the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to 

counsel for all parties of record. 

/s/Robert M. Brochin 

Robert M. Brochin 

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020 Page 24 of 24