U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

39–010 

" ! SENATE 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2005

109–71 

Calendar No. 112 

HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT 

ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2005 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 21 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

TO PROVIDE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT COORDINATION 

AND SIMPLIFICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

MAY 24, 2005.—Ordered to be printed 


congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JONATHAN T. NASS, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Minority Counsel 

TRINA D. TYRER, Chief Clerk 

39–010 

Calendar No. 112 

109TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 1st Session 109–71 

HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 

2005 

MAY 24, 2005.—Ordered to be printed 

Ms. COLLINS, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 21] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 21) to provide for homeland security grant coordination and simplification, and for other purposes, 

having considered the same reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill do pass. 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (the Committee) approved S. 21, the Homeland Security 

Grant Enhancement Act of 2005 on April 13, 2005. This bill seeks 

to create a stronger, more streamlined, yet accountable program of 

federal financial assistance to State and local governments and 

first responders responsible for protecting our homeland. 

Nearly 4 years have passed since the attacks on September 11, 

2001 and over 2 years since the formation of the Department of 

Homeland Security. While the Senate spent more than three 

months debating the Homeland Security Act, the law contains virtually no guidance on how the Department is to assist those at the 

State and local level with their homeland security needs. Congress 

wrote a 187-page law creating the Department, yet included but a 

single paragraph on grant programs for first responders. As a result, the Department has been left with little guidance from Congress as to how State and local grant decisions should be made. 

As with so many other issues, much of the front-line responsibility for homeland security has fallen squarely on the shoulders of 

our State and local officials and more than 9 million first respondVerDate Aug 04 2004 16:16 May 27, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR071.XXX SR071
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ers. Communities across America have risen to this challenge and 

developed scores of innovative homeland security strategies. 

Instead of encouraging these new ideas, however, the tangled 

web of federal homeland security grant programs has the potential 

to stifle the Department’s ability to foster State and local innovation. Instead of providing a foundation on which States and localities can build homeland security strategies tailored to specific 

risks, the various federal homeland security programs present 

States and communities with a mountain of paperwork. Instead of 

giving communities the flexibility they need, State and local officials face an inflexible grant structure. The current grant system 

is slow and uncoordinated. Much of this problem stems from the 

lack of planning before funds are spent. 

In February 2005, the Government Accountability Office issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs has Improved, but Challenges Remain.’’ It 

concluded that a ‘‘major challenge in administering first responder 

grants is balancing two goals: minimizing the time it takes to distribute grant funds to state and local first responders, and ensuring appropriate planning and accountability for the effective use of 

grant funds.’’ GAO further opined that ‘‘[e]ffective collaboration 

among ODP, states, and others in developing appropriate preparedness performance goals and measures will be essential to ensuring 

that the nation’s emergency response capabilities are appropriately 

identified, assessed, and strengthened.’’ Other observers also have found that while DHS grant management has improved in recent years, much more needs to be done. 

For example, the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security issued a report in December 2004 entitled ‘‘Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security.’’ Among departmental challenges described in 

the report were the management of homeland security grants. S. 

21 takes a balanced approach to restructuring the homeland security grant system to fix systemic flaws and require resource allocation decisions to be based on risk, while ensuring predictable funding to address the most pressing homeland security needs. 

The homeland security grant system is fundamentally flawed because it operates backwards. For example, under the Urban Area 

Security Initiative (UASI), DHS issues funds to a limited number 

of cities, which then apply to DHS for approval to ‘‘drawdown’’

funds for each purchase. The result is cities get funds before they 

know what they will spend them on. This is a backwards approach, 

forcing cities only after the fact to make decisions and draw-up 

plans on how to draw-down funds. This legislation would reverse 

that order and require planning first, and spending second. The result will be quicker and smarter expenditures of funds combined 

with better long-term thinking. The legislation will also require 

that national benchmarks be adopted to measure the nation’s 

progress toward better terrorism preparedness and ensure that resources are spent wisely. 

The current system also often fails to think regionally. The lack 

of regional thinking was highlighted by a recent DHS decision to 

eliminate several cities from the UASI program. The list retained 

Minneapolis, Minnesota as eligible for urban area funding, but 

eliminated St. Paul, Minnesota from the list. The absurd result was 

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half of the ‘‘Twin Cities’’ designated as at risk of terrorist attack 

such that UASI funding was appropriate, and the other half designated as not at risk and not eligible for funding. S. 21 will encourage more resource allocation decisions to be made on a regional 

basis resulting in better national preparedness coverage at a lower 

aggregate cost. 

This legislation would provide State and local governments and 

communities with the resources they need to protect their communities by establishing a predictable stream of funding to each and 

every State while at the same time directing more resources to the 

areas most at risk of a terrorist attack; making it easier to apply 

for grants; promoting flexibility in the use of homeland security 

funding; and resulting in smarter, more effective spending of funds. 

Departmental organization 

S. 21 would reorganize the administrative process for obtaining 

selected first responder grant programs within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). The legislation would codify action the 

Secretary took in March 2004 to consolidate the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination (SLGC). 

Streamlining homeland security grant programs 

S. 21 also creates an Interagency Committee to Coordinate and 

Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs (Interagency Committee) to be led by the Secretary of DHS. Among its duties, the 

Interagency Committee would identify all duplicative application, 

planning, and reporting requirements among Federal homeland security assistance programs; assess State and local needs and capabilities; and advise the DHS Secretary on implementing appropriate performance measures for grant recipients. In addition, the 

Interagency Committee would provide recommendations to Federal 

agencies on the coordination of homeland security grant programs; 

specifically, recommendations on streamlining and standardizing 

application, reporting, and planning requirements. 

Information clearinghouse 

In addition, S. 21 establishes a Homeland Security Information 

Clearinghouse within the OSLGC, which would be maintained by 

the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The clearinghouse would be 

charged with providing States and localities with information on 

grant programs and the use of Federal funds. The clearinghouse 

would gather and publish information on best practices in homeland security and voluntary standards for training programs, 

equipment, and exercises. The Committee finds that the Lessons 

Learned Information Sharing network (LLIS.gov) is one effective 

way to meet this need. The Committee strongly encourages the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 

Preparedness’s continued use of LLIS.gov, in conjunction with the 

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, as the nationwide lessons learned and information-sharing network for emergency response providers and homeland security officials. The Committee also encourages SLGCP to expand the LLIS.gov model to 

address lessons learned, best practices, and information-sharing 

imperatives for both the Private Sector as well as the American 

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Public. Further, the committee expects the Department to incorporate LLIS.gov into its annual budget to ensure consistent 

resourcing of this vital program. 

Voluntary consensus standards 

S. 21 requires that the Secretary support the development of national voluntary consensus standards for first responder equipment 

and training. Applicants for grant funds who want to use those 

funds to purchase or upgrade equipment that did not meet these 

standards would have the burden of explaining why such equipment would better serve their needs than equipment that did meet 

the standards. 

The Committee supports the efforts of the System Assessment 

and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) program. Operated by the Office for Domestic Preparedness System Support Division, the SAVER program provides independent equipment assessment and validation of commercially-available off-the-shelf emergency responder products. The Committee supports the expansion 

of this service for first responders to cover a broad spectrum of first 

responder products and urges vigorous dissemination of this valuable information. 

National voluntary consensus standards would compliment 

DHS’s current system for disseminating equipment and vendor information to grantees, while helping to ensure that first responders 

receive the quality equipment that they need and deserve. There 

is no complete list of recommended or approved products that DHS 

provides to grantees. However, venders are encouraged to register 

with a site affiliated with the LLIS (Lessons Learned Information 

Sharing)—the Responder Knowledge Base (http:// 

www2.rkb.mipt.org/). By establishing national voluntary consensus 

standards, S. 21 assists DHS in providing all information that 

grantees need to spend homeland security dollars wisely. 

Essential capabilities 

Building on the National Preparedness Goal recently issued by 

DHS, S. 21 requires that the Secretary establish ‘‘essential capabilities’’ for state and local governments. Essential capabilities are 

the levels and competence of emergency personnel, planning and 

equipment that are needed to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 

acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events. Different types of 

communities will have different essential capabilities. The bill also 

provides for the creation of a First Responder Task Force, made up 

of state and local first responders and other state and local officials, to advise the Secretary on the establishment and periodic updating of these essential capabilities. 

The Committee does not intend for DHS to take a ‘‘back-to-thedrawing-board’’ approach in implementing this provision. Rather, 

the Committee expects the Department to use the National Preparedness Goal as a starting point from which, working with first 

responders and other experts, it is to develop essential capabilities. 

The Committee strongly encourages the Department to broadly solicit comment from first responders and others to understand how 

the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness Guidance, and associated guidance and standards developed by the Department are working at the state and local level, so that the DeVerDate Aug 04 2004 16:16 May 27, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR071.XXX SR071
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partment may take these lessons into account in establishing essential capabilities. 

The establishment of essential capabilities will provide important 

guidance to states and localities trying to improve their terrorism 

preparedness, as well as benchmarks for measuring both state and 

national progress in achieving that preparedness. Essential capabilities, moreover, would be intimately tied to the grant decision 

making process by requiring consideration of how funding decisions 

will help accomplish key preparedness goals, and thereby providing 

a basis for prioritizing among needs. The establishment of essential 

capabilities also creates an important barrier to wasteful and inappropriate spending, as states and regions, in applying for and allocating homeland security grant funds, will have to demonstrate 

that the funds are being used to achieve specific capabilities. 

Homeland security grants 

S. 21 authorizes formula based and discretionary homeland security grants to States and regions for first responder preparation activities, such as emergency planning, risk assessments, mutual aid 

agreements, equipment, training, and exercises. Funding would be 

provided for overtime expenses incurred during periods of heightened alerts, for training activities, and for certain activities in support of federal border protection. To be eligible for a homeland security grant, States would be required to complete a State Homeland Security Plan that addresses matters including interoperable 

communications, incident command systems, regional coordination, 

response planning, and training exercises. The plan must also include a three-year strategy for allocating funding to localities based 

on risk, capability, and need, as well as an assessment of the shortfall between existing and needed response capabilities. The bill provides basic guidelines for States to use in developing their plans, 

including mandatory input from local officials, first responders, and 

the private sector. 

Accountability 

Considerable attention has been devoted to the alleged misuse of 

homeland security grant funding. S. 21 contains a variety of tools 

to preserve the integrity of these programs. S. 21 includes a number of other provisions designed to increase accountability and ensure the appropriate use of homeland security grant funds. These 

include: 

1. Independent Audit: An annual GAO audit and report on 

Homeland Security grants to states. 

2. Robust Reporting Requirements: Grant recipients will be 

required annually to report to the Secretary on how funds were 

spent and on progress toward achieving essential capabilities. 

Currently, states report spending in broad categories, which 

means that wasteful expenditures easily could be missed. 

3. Tying Spending to Standards: A requirement that states 

distribute and spend Homeland Security funding only in ways 

that measurably help state, local, or tribal jurisdictions meet 

preparedness standards and achieve essential capabilities to be 

set by the Department (i.e., funds cannot be spent on leather 

jackets or garbage trucks unless they demonstrably increase 

preparedness and essential capabilities as defined by DHS). 

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4. Providing Remedies for Non-Compliance: Authorizes the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to terminate or reduce grant 

payments if a state or locality fails to comply with the bill’s accountability requirements. 

5. Coordinating Expenditures of Federal Funds: Establishes 

an interagency committee to ensure that federal homeland security dollars from all sources are spent in a coordinated manner, avoiding purchases of duplicative equipment or services, 

or the purchase of incompatible equipment. 

State and local flexibility 

The needs of our States, localities, and first responders vary 

widely across the nation. This legislation would ensure that federal 

homeland security assistance is sufficiently flexible to meet these 

diverse needs. 

Prior to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations 

Act of 2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness allocated the 

same percentage of each State’s funds for training, equipment, exercises, and planning, thus leaving no room to accommodate different States’ priorities. In each and every State, 70 percent of the 

federal funds were required to be spent for equipment, 18 percent 

for exercises, 7 percent for planning, and 5 percent for training. In 

allocating funds this way, the federal government effectively said 

that Maine must spend exactly the same portion of its homeland 

security dollars on training as Ohio and Hawaii. Moreover, States 

could not transfer surplus funds from one category to another to 

meet their needs. 

The bill would give State and local governments greater flexibility with previously appropriated ODP grant funds by allowing 

grant recipients to request and the Secretary to approve funding 

transfers among different activities, including equipment, training, 

exercises, and planning. For new funding, State and local governments have even more flexibility in funding, provided that such 

spending is consistent with State homeland security plans. 

Smuggling weapons of mass destruction 

The bill would impede the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction into the United States using vehicles that carry municipal 

solid waste. Approximately 180 municipal trash trucks from Canada cross the U.S. border every day, for example, to deposit cargo 

in Michigan landfills. Because the dense and variable cargo in 

these vehicles, sometimes including sludge, resists analysis using 

the mechanical inspection devices typically at U.S. border crossings, and because discovery of illegal drugs on one such Canadian 

vehicle confirmed the truck’s use in smuggling, serious questions 

have arisen about the effectiveness of current border screening procedures for detecting chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological 

materials that could be concealed on these vehicles. 

The bill would bar further entry of these vehicles into the United 

States unless and until the Secretary certifies to Congress that the 

methods and technologies being used to screen these vehicles for 

such weapons are as effective as the methods and technologies 

being used to screen for such weapons in other items of commerce 

entering the United States via other commercial vehicle transport. 

This provision is intended to prompt a thorough re-evaluation of 

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the screening procedures now being used for vehicles carrying municipal solid waste, and to strengthen U.S. border protections 

against efforts to use these vehicles to secretly transport chemical, 

nuclear, biological or radiological materials into the country. 

II. BACKGROUND

At present, State and local governments receive assistance for 

homeland security activities from a range of Federal departments 

and agencies as well as DHS. Despite the diffuse origins of funding, 

these Federal programs share a similar goal: To assist State and 

local governments in their efforts to enhance the capabilities of 

first responders to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks, 

particularly attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. 

The vast majority of these activities fall into the categories of 

emergency planning, training, equipment, and exercises. Congress 

has also provided limited funding for personnel compensation and 

overtime expenses incurred during times of heightened alert 

through these entities and programs. 

Federal assistance is also available from programs that are not 

specifically oriented to first responders or terrorism preparedness. 

State and local governments may seek emergency preparedness assistance in the form of block grants and categorical grants from 

programs administered by the Departments of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), and Transportation (DOT), and the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, both Congress and 

the President have given increased attention to the role of first responders in the nation’s homeland security efforts. This attention 

is evident in the funding Congress provided in fiscal year 2004 

where $2.925 billion was appropriated for the programs authorized 

in S. 21. Additional funds were provided to first responders under 

other programs such as the FIRE Act grants and Emergency Management Performance grants. The Administration and Congress 

have made numerous proposals to restructure existing first responder assistance programs. Thus far, none has been enacted into 

law. 

A wide range of policy concerns led to the development of S. 21. 

These concerns are not limited to first responder preparedness programs. Rather, they are pertinent to the broader debate over Federal assistance for State and local homeland security efforts. A 

number of such policy concerns are discussed briefly below. 

Complexity of grant applications and planning requirements 

At present, State and local governments seeking Federal assistance for their homeland security efforts, and emergency preparedness in general, may apply to DOJ, DOT, EPA, and HHS, as well 

as to entities within DHS, such as ODP and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This multitude of programs 

presents a complex array of application requirements. Nearly all 

applications contain planning requirements that are intended to 

promote the effective use of funds, but they also create an overwhelming amount of paperwork for State and local officials. The 

various application and planning requirements are often duplicative, calling for similar assessments, analyses, and spending plans. 

State and local officials have told the Committee that each program 

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requires numerous administrative steps. For example, to receive 

funds from ODP’s State Homeland Security Grant Program, States 

must go through as many as 12 steps in order to obtain approval. 

S. 21 would address this problem in two ways. First, the bill creates an Interagency Committee to identify duplicative application 

and planning requirements in emergency preparedness programs 

and make recommendations on streamlining those requirements. 

Second, the bill sets up a single, clear set of goals for the ThreatBased Homeland Security Grant Program, the predecessors of 

which have, in the past, subjected State and local governments to 

annual changes in planning and application requirements. 

Coordination of information within DHS 

The Committee supports coordination of programs and information within DHS. The Committee directs the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness to work with the Science and Technology Directorate 

and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to ensure that State and local governments and first responders receive information regarding threat, vulnerability assessments, and mitigation technologies for high risk sites in their jurisdictions, such as manufacturing facilities using chemicals and hazardous shipments. 

Allocation of funds 

The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), the Law 

Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) and the 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) currently comprise the core 

terrorism-related first responder grant programs. Created in the 

wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the SHSGP 

grants (which provide funding for first responder training and 

equipment to all states) and LETPP grants (which provides funding 

for the terrorism prevention activities of state and local law enforcement) have roots in section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 

U.S.C. § 3714), which directed the Office for Domestic Preparedness 

(then in the Department of Justice) to make a grant to each state 

‘‘to enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to terrorist acts.’’ The Patriot Act provision, 

however, provides virtually no additional guidance on the structure 

or priorities for such grant programs. Funds for the UASI program, 

which provides grants to a limited number of urban areas deemed 

to be high-risk, have been provided for in homeland security appropriations acts, but UASI is otherwise unmentioned in statute. 

To date, all funds under the SHSGP and LETPP programs have 

been distributed in accordance with a funding formula. Pursuant to 

section 1014 of the Patriot Act, each state (as well as the District 

of Columbia and Puerto Rico) receives 0.75% of the total available 

funds, with four territories each receiving a 0.25% share; together, 

these allocations account for 40% of the total. In the absence of further statutory guidance and likely not yet in a position to meaningfully assess relative risks, DHS chose, in previous years, to distribute the remaining 60% of SHSGP and LETPP funds to states 

in direct proportion to the states’ population. For FY 2005, Congress effectively ratified this approach by requiring, in the DHS appropriations Act, that the Department allocate funding under these 

programs ‘‘in the same manner as fiscal year 2004.’’

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At the other end of the spectrum, the allocation of UASI grants 

has been left almost entirely to the discretion of the Secretary. 

DHS on its own determines the number of cities that are to receive 

UASI grants, the identities of those cities and the amount each is 

to receive, based on a largely nonpublic methodology that has 

changed each year. The ‘‘application’’ process consists of providing 

various pieces of information and making certifications to the Department only after the allocation decisions have been made. The 

program’s ‘‘black box’’ approach to grant distribution has the potential to create an impression of arbitrariness. While few would question DHS’s decision to award the most substantial UASI grants to 

the obviously high-threat cities of New York City and Washington, 

D.C., there is a lack of transparency about the overall process for 

allocating (and not allocating) UASI grants. 

In awarding UASI grants, moreover, DHS has focused narrowly 

on individual cities, rather than looking at the full regions that are 

likely to be seriously affected by, and required to respond to, any 

attack. Perhaps the most obvious example of this was DHS’s decision in FY2005 to award a UASI grant to Minneapolis but not to 

St. Paul, ignoring the fact that the so-called ‘‘Twin Cities’’ form a 

single, interdependent metropolitan area. This practice can also potentially lead DHS to focus on one city of a certain size while overlooking a region of an equal geographic size and with an equal 

number of people that happens to be divided into several different 

towns (a not uncommon political geography in New England, for 

example)—though both areas may be subject to similar risks. In 

FY2005, DHS for the first time also imposed a population threshold 

for UASI grants, thereby precluding cities that did not meet this 

threshold (which was measured solely within the city limits) from 

even being considered for any UASI funds, regardless of the actual 

risk the city might otherwise face. 

S. 21 would replace SHSGP, LETPP and UASI with a new homeland security grant program, the Threat-Based Homeland Security 

Grant Program, aimed at supporting the nation’s first responders 

and preventers. The new program would not affect first responder 

grant programs in existence prior to September 11, 1991, including 

Emergency Management Performance Grants and Firefighter Assistance Grants. Nor does the new program encompass targeted 

critical infrastructure grants, such as grants for port security or 

transit security, which are intended to remain separate and distinct programs. 

The grant program created by S. 21 strives to create a better and 

more effective balance between formula funding and discretionary 

grants. S. 21 allocates a substantially larger share of funds to discretionary, threat-based grants than has previously been the case, 

but at the same time provides each state with a significant level 

of baseline funding. The Committee believes that maintaining a 

meaningful level of baseline funding is necessary to ensure that, as 

a nation, we make progress toward achieving an adequate level of 

nationwide preparedness. On 9–11, terrorists attacked high-profile 

targets in two of our great cities, and no reasonable person would 

doubt that terrorists continue to be drawn to such targets. But it 

is also true that terrorists around the world have attacked ‘‘soft 

targets’’ and less prominent places: in Bali, Indonesia, terrorists 

targeted a discotheque; in Beslan, Russia, they targeted a school; 

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in Madrid, they targeted a commuter train; in Oklahoma City, a 

government building. We simply cannot know with certainty where 

terrorists will strike next, and we would be foolish to leave whole 

swaths of the country unprotected. Moreover, the effects of certain 

kinds of potential attacks, such as biological weapons attacks or attacks on the nation’s food supply, are unlikely to neatly limit themselves to a single, circumscribed geographic area. Finally, much of 

the money provided from this grant program, like its predecessors, 

will be used to help states and localities build long-term capacity 

to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, including the procurement of equipment over time, and the systematic and ongoing 

training of first responder personnel. A predictable, reasonable 

level of baseline funding facilitates state planning and encourages 

states and localities to invest in these necessary long-term efforts 

by helping ensure that funding will continue to be available to 

them each year. 

S. 21 provides a sliding-scale baseline amount of funding to each 

state. Each state would receive a minimum of 0.55% of the total 

funds appropriated under the Threat-Based Homeland Security 

Grant Program. Because states that are larger and/or more densely 

populated face greater risks and greater costs in preparing for and 

responding to a terrorist attack, such states receive higher baseline 

amounts, based on a formula that combines population and population density. 

All funds beyond those necessary to cover the baseline allocations—over 60% of the total—would be distributed based on the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences faced by the area 

from a terrorist attack. In dollar amounts, this means that S. 21 

would distribute twice the money based on risk as was the case in 

FY05. From this funding pool, the Secretary can make threat-based 

grants to both states and to metropolitan regions. Grants to regions 

can comprise up to 50% of the total threat-based grant funding. All 

funds are to be distributed to assist states or region to achieve essential capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of 

terrorism and other catastrophic events. 

Encouraging regional cooperation and a regional perspective on 

preparedness, S. 21 moves the focus of local funding from individual cities to metropolitan regions. Unlike the current ‘‘black box’’

situation under UASI, moreover, where DHS simply announces a 

list of cities it has selected to fund, S. 21 would establish an application process for metropolitan region funding. In applying for 

funding, communities are given considerable flexibility in forming 

regions that make the most sense locally: a region must simply be 

made up of two or more contiguous municipalities, counties, parishes or Indian tribes, and must include the largest city in the metropolitan area. To place some limits on the number of regional applications DHS would have to review, only regions within the 100 

largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) would be automatically eligible to apply, though other regions could apply with the 

consent of the Governor of the relevant state or states and of the 

Secretary. 

S. 21 requires that grants to regions be prioritized based on 

threat, vulnerability and consequences from a terrorist attack, with 

the Secretary directed to give consideration to such factors as population; population density; the presence of critical infrastructure 

11 

1Warren Rudman, Richard Clarke, Jaime Metzl, et al., ‘‘Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,’’ Council on Foreign Relations (2003), available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/ResponderslTF.pdf. 

and key assets in the region or in nearby jurisdictions; proximity 

to international borders and coastlines; the presence of at-risk sites 

or activities in nearby jurisdictions; whether there has been a prior 

terrorist attack in the eligible metropolitan region; whether any 

part of the eligible metropolitan region has ever had a higher 

threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than 

the threat level for the United States as a whole; and the extent 

of unmet essential capabilities in the region. The bill also directs 

the Secretary to take into account the extent to which all the jurisdictions in the metropolitan area are participating in the regional 

application; regions that include more of the jurisdictions in their 

metropolitan area are to be given priority in funding—encouraging 

and rewarding regional cooperation. The bill also prohibits DHS 

from establishing a population threshold for regions that would exclude areas from consideration that otherwise faced significant 

threats, vulnerabilities or consequences from terrorism. 

All funds beyond the baseline allocations that are not given out 

in grants to regions would be distributed to states, based on the 

threat, vulnerability and consequence faced by the state from a terrorist attack. As with regional grants, there would be a competitive 

application process, and the Secretary is to consider similar factors 

in allocating state threat-based grants: population density; coastline; international borders; the presence of critical infrastructure 

and key assets; threats and vulnerabilities related to at-risk sites 

or activities in adjacent jurisdictions; having had a prior terrorist 

attack in the State or in a metropolitan region that is wholly or 

partly in the state; any part of the state having ever had a higher 

threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than 

the threat level for the nation as a whole; and the extent to which 

the state has unmet essential capabilities. Eighty percent of all 

state grant funds would have to be passed through to local governments within 60 days. S. 21 authorizes $2.925 billion for grants in FY06 and FY07 and 

such sums as are necessary thereafter. This is the same level of 

funding appropriated for SHSGP, LETPP and UASI grants in 

FY04. In FY05, funds for these grant programs were reduced to 

$2.385 billion and the President’s FY06 budget has proposed that 

the programs be reduced further to $2.04 billion. The Committee 

does not believe that such decreases in first responder funding are 

justified. Indeed, evaluations such as that conducted by a task force 

of the Council on Foreign Relations have found that significantly 

more rather than less funding is necessary to ensure adequate levels of first responder preparedness.1

Additional allocation considerations 

The bill recognizes the importance of continued support for terrorism prevention efforts at the state and local level by providing 

for up to 25% of the total funding under the bill to be used for Law 

Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program purposes. These purposes include information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks; target hardening; threat recognition; interoperable communications 

12 

systems; and overtime expenses associated with providing enhanced law enforcement operations in support of Federal Agencies 

for increased border security and border crossing enforcement. The 

Committee approves of the activities conducted under Operation 

Stonegarden as an important method to buttress federal border 

protection activities using state and local law enforcement personnel. 

The Committee recognizes that threat, risk, and vulnerability related to critical infrastructure or key national assets, as identified 

in the State Homeland Security Plan or as identified by the Secretary can take many different forms. Key national assets include 

national nuclear weapons laboratories; nuclear power plants; land 

and sea ports of entry; US military bases, service academies and 

other defense assets; homeland security training centers; chemical 

industries; and maritime centers. The Committee particularly notes 

the national interest in the securing of the national food systems 

from threats of terrorist attack. The Committee commends the 

work conducted by 11 mid-western states to collaborate on efforts 

to prevent agroterrorism in the Multistate Partnership for Security 

in Agriculture. The Committee feels that this is the type of collaborative state initiative and participation that S. 21 seeks to foster 

and encourage elsewhere in the country. 

In allocating discretionary grants to states and metropolitan regions, the Committee also strongly urges the Secretary to consider 

military, tourist, and commuter populations that may be present in 

an area at any given time. Although generally not included in the 

official population figures for a state or metropolitan area, these 

transient populations can be substantial—Las Vegas, NV, for example, hosts an average of nearly 300,000 short-term residents on 

any given day—and require similar protection to other residents in 

the event of a terrorist attack or other catastrophic event. In the 

past, DHS has considered some locations at risk of a potential terrorist attack because of their increased short-term populations; at 

a minimum, these additional populations place increased burdens 

on state and local first responders and preventers. It is important 

that regions and states with substantial short-term populations 

have sufficient resources to ensure the safety of these visitors. 

Funding applications and distribution 

Under S. 21, discretionary, threat-based grants to both metropolitan regions and states would be given out in a competitive, application-based process. This reverses the current process and 

would, sensibly, require applications and planning before homeland 

security grant funds are awarded. 

States are required to submit to the Secretary applications for 

grants that detail how the requested funds will be used to achieve 

essential capabilities. In order to receive grants, states must also 

have an approved state homeland security plan, developed with the 

input of local officials and first responders, that addresses how the 

state will respond to terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events 

and includes priorities for the allocation of funding to local governments, based on the localities’ risks, capabilities and needs. By requiring states to plan how they will distribute money before they 

receive grants, the Committee hopes to speed up the actual obligation and disbursement of funds to localities once the grants are 

13 

awarded, and so help address an issue that has been a continuing 

source of frustration for some local governments. 

In order to ensure statewide coordination and consistency with 

state plans, eligible metropolitan regions intending to apply for 

threat-based grants must submit their application to DHS through 

the Governor of each state within which the metropolitan region is 

a part. The Governor is given the opportunity to notify the Secretary if the Governor believes that the application is inconsistent 

with the state plan or if the Governor otherwise does not support 

the application, but the Governor may not prevent the application 

from being considered by DHS and must transmit the application 

to the Secretary within 30 days of receipt. 

A number of State and local organizations, including the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors Association, the National Association of Counties, the Council of State 

Governments, and the International City/County Management Association support State coordination of the first responder grant 

program, with 80 percent of the resources being distributed by the 

States to units of local government. The Advisory Panel to Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons 

of Mass Destruction, established in accordance with Section 1405 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 

Public Law 105–261, agreed with this approach. In its fourth annual report to Congress, the Advisory Panel, also known as the Gilmore Commission, concluded that States must have discretion over 

the use of grant funds to ensure the allocation of resources on the 

basis of assessed needs. 

The Committee agrees that state-wide coordination in homeland 

security planning is needed, but also cautions that funding must 

reach the local level in a timely manner. S. 21 would require 

States, consistent with their state homeland security plans, to provide 80 percent of all grant funds to local governments. This approach would allow states to coordinate their homeland security 

plans with local entities and to retain funds for initiatives and 

planning that is more effectively accomplished on a state-wide 

basis, while ensuring that the large majority of homeland security 

funding is provided to localities. For grants received pursuant to an 

award to an eligible metropolitan region wholly or partly within 

the state, the state must use any of the money it retains on items 

or services that benefit the eligible metropolitan region. Furthermore, States would be required to distribute all funds to localities 

within 60 days of receipt. 

S. 21 requires funds to be allocated based on the State Homeland 

Security Plan approved by the Secretary. The Committee understands, however, that in certain cases state and local officials and 

first responders should be authorized to address security needs, 

such as those required to protect large public events, not foreseen 

during the development of the homeland security plan. The Secretary should ensure that state and local governments and first responders have sufficient flexibility to meet these immediate security needs, should they arise. 

Existing regional mechanism 

The Committee recognizes that there is a long-standing, well established network of councils of governments, regional planning 

14 

commissions, regional planning organizations, development districts and other multi-purpose associations of local governments 

that have the capability and expertise necessary to coordinate regional emergency response plans. The composition of these entities 

varies widely. These organizations, collectively known as Regional 

Councils, are multi-purpose, multi-jurisdictional public organizations created by local governments to respond to Federal and State 

programs. Many of them are bi-state or even tri-state and are officially recognized in the states and localities they serve. Regional 

Councils have a long history of working with each other on projects 

that cross regions and cross state lines. Having more than 40 years 

of experience in planning economic development, disaster recovery, 

and transportation and infrastructure analysis, they serve as conveners that bring together the public, private, and civic sectors. 

These Regional Councils may already be in a unique position to fill 

a void in planning and coordinating homeland security plans across 

jurisdictional boundaries while providing an unbiased and apolitical environment capable of analyzing needs based on merit alone 

without creating another layer of government bureaucracy. The 

Committee urges the Department to fully utilize Regional Councils 

in the grant-making process. 

Distribution of funds to tribes 

The Committee recognizes that Indian tribes, authorized tribal 

organizations, and Alaska Native villages play an important role in 

protecting our communities from terrorist incidents. The Committee is concerned by reports that sufficient homeland security 

funding is not being allocated to the tribal governments by the 

states. 

At least twenty-eight Indian tribes inhabit land on or easily accessible to the Mexican and Canadian borders. In some areas, the 

international border is guarded by wooden or barbed-wire fences or 

has no barrier. Numerous pieces of critical infrastructure, including 

energy resources that serve county and state governments, are located in Indian Country. The Committee is concerned that, even 

though the critical infrastructure, international borders, and populations that reside on tribal land are incorporated in state homeland security plans and grant applications, most states do not allocate a corresponding level of funding to the tribes. 

Many Indian tribal governments have entered into Memoranda 

of Understanding or inter-governmental agreements with county, 

state, and local law enforcement to address criminal activity and 

civil disorder on Indian lands. However, numerous counties and 

states have historic disputes with tribes on law enforcement and 

jurisdictional issues that hamper the ability to enter into such 

agreements. Consequently, some Indian tribes are not included in 

state homeland security planning and do not receive resources to 

enhance their ability to respond immediately to terrorist threats 

that may affect infrastructure and resources located on or adjacent 

to Indian lands. 

The Committee intends for states to provide homeland security 

funding allocations to tribes in the same manner local governments 

are provided funding. S. 21 holds States accountable for providing 

the necessary resources to help tribal communities achieve essential capabilities. The bill further directs that tribes do not have to 

15 

go through a local government to receive funding, but rather 

should receive funding directly from the State. 

The Committee is troubled by reports that some States are using 

tribal sovereignty as a reason to refuse to allocate funds to tribes. 

For the purposes of homeland security planning and funding, the 

Committee directs State governments to respect tribal sovereignty 

by providing funding to tribes so that tribes may exercise their responsibility for tribal lands located within State borders. However, 

the Committee respects the separate sovereign status and jurisdictional authority of tribes and is not implying that tribes are local 

governments for purposes of homeland security. 

Flexibility of Homeland Security grant funds 

At present, terrorism preparedness programs generally fund four 

broad categories of assistance: planning, training, equipment, and 

exercises. In some instances, funding may also be used for personnel compensation, overtime, and construction. Prior to the 

Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, 

ODP’s formula program, which is the largest grant for terrorism 

preparedness, gave recipients separate allocations for planning, 

training, equipment, and exercises, but did not give them discretion 

to transfer funds among these activities. 

Many State and local officials have told the Committee that the 

range of eligible activities should be expanded to give State and 

local recipients broad discretion in the use of funds. Specifically, 

they have asked for the flexibility to transfer past funds among different activities (i.e., planning, training, equipment, and exercises) 

and for overtime expenses incurred during times of heightened 

alert. 

S. 21 would give State and local governments greater discretion 

over the use of terrorism preparedness grant funds. Section 4 

would allow grants to be used to fund overtime expenses relating 

to training activities and increased security during times of heightened alert status, as determined by the Secretary. 

The Committee is concerned by testimony that local jurisdictions 

have been unable to take advantage of WMD training for first responders due to the cost of ‘backfilling’ positions of employees assigned to training. The Committee directs ODP to allow the use of 

formula grant funds for overtime costs that are directly attributable to participation in ODP-funded first responder training. 

Communications system grants 

S. 21, as amended, includes International Border Community 

Interoperable Communications Demonstration Project, a program 

to examine solutions to the daunting problem of cross border interoperability. In selecting communities for participation, the Committee strongly urges the Secretary to select sites along the borders 

that reflect a variety of conditions, including at least one site with 

significant border crossings (at least 8,000,000 crossings per year), 

commerce activity (at least $50,000,000,000 in commerce per year 

and other economic activities), and critical infrastructure, such as 

bridges, railways, pipelines and water resources. 

16 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

S. 21 builds upon a bill first introduced in the last Congress, S. 

1245, the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2003 

which was introduced on June 12, 2003 by Senator Susan M. Collins of Maine. S. 1245 was offered as an amendment to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 in October of 

2004. It passed the Senate by voice vote, but ultimately, it was not 

included in the enacted legislation. 

S. 21, the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2005 

was introduced on January 21, 2005. Senators Lieberman, Carper, 

Akaka, Feingold, and Voinovich joined as original cosponsors. Senators Chafee and Coburn followed as cosponsors thereafter. 

On April 13, 2005, the Committee met in a business session to 

consider S. 21. An amendment in the nature of a substitute was 

offered by Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman. The 

substitute was adopted by voice vote. 

The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 

Senator Levin and co-sponsored by Senators Collins and Lieberman 

to authorize a demonstration project for cross border interoperable 

communications. 

The Committee opposed, in a 15–1 roll call vote, an amendment 

sponsored by Senator Lautenberg to add as a finding to the bill selected portions of a 9/11 Commission recommendation. 

The Committee adopted by voice vote an Amendment sponsored 

by Senators Lautenberg and Warner to add to the list of criteria 

to be considered in allocating threat-based funds to states and eligible metropolitan regions two additional factors: first, whether an 

area has been previously attacked by terrorists; and second, whether an area has been issued a DHS alert level that is higher than 

the rest of the country. 

S. 21 was then reported out of Committee by voice vote. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION

Section 1. Short Title 

Section 1 sets the short title of S. 21 as the ‘‘Homeland Security 

Grant Enhancement Act of 2005.’’

Section 2. Interagency Committee To Streamline Grant Programs 

Subsection (a) would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

by inserting section 802. 

HSA section 802—Interagency committee to coordinate and streamline homeland security grant programs 

Establishment 

Establishes the Interagency Committee to Coordinate and 

Streamline Homeland Grant Programs to ensure coordination of 

separate federal department or agency grant programs. The Interagency Committee would also ensure coordination among DHS 

grant programs for State and local preparedness. 

Composition 

The Committee shall include representatives of the Department 

of Homeland Security (including the U.S. Fire Administration), the 

17 

Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 

Transportation, the Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal government representatives determined to be necessary by the President. 

Responsibilities 

Provides that the Interagency Committee shall consult with 

State and local governments and emergency response providers regarding their homeland security needs and capabilities. This Interagency Committee would also advise the Secretary on the development of performance measures for homeland security grant programs. The Interagency Committee would report any findings to 

the information clearinghouse established under section 801(c). 

No later than 1 year after enactment, the Interagency Committee 

must develop a proposal to streamline and standardize planning requirements to eliminate duplication, ensure accountability, and 

promote coordination in homeland security assistance programs. 

The section also requires the Interagency Committee to report to 

Congress and the President on these studies. 

Section 3. Streamlining Federal Homeland Security Grants Administration 

Section 3 codifies existing practice by establishing the Office for 

State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 

(OSLGCP) within the Office of the Secretary. It creates a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed position of Executive Director of this office. It also moves the Office for Domestic Preparedness from the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security 

into OSLGCP, provides that the Director of the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness report to the Executive Director of OSLGCP and 

eliminates the requirement that the Director be Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed. 

Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse 

Subsection (d) of section 3 would amend section 801 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) by establishing a 

Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse, within the Office of 

State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. It 

would have the Clearinghouse assist State and local governments, 

and first responders by creating or enhancing a web site, a toll-free 

number, and a single publication containing information on homeland security grant programs. 

Under this section, the Clearinghouse, in consultation with the 

Interagency Committee, would coordinate any Federal agency’s 

technical assistance to State and local governments to conduct 

threat and vulnerability assessments. The Clearinghouse would 

also establish templates for conducting threat analyses and vulnerability assessments. 

This section instructs the Clearinghouse to work with State and 

local governments, first responders, the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, the National Memorial Institute for the 

Prevention of Terrorism, and private organizations to gather and 

validate best practices in State and local homeland security programs and practices. Information on equipment, training, and other 

services acquired with Federal funds under the homeland security 

18 

grant programs would be gathered by the Clearinghouse and made 

available to State and local governments and first responders. Information regarding voluntary standards of training, equipment, 

and exercises would also be provided to State and local governments and first responders. The section further instructs the Clearinghouse to provide States, localities, and first responders with any 

other information the Secretary determines necessary. 

Section 4. Essential Capabilities for First Responders and the 

Threat-based Homeland Security Grant Program 

Section 4 would amend Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding 

sections 1801–1808. 

HSA section 1801—Definitions 

‘‘Metropolitan regions’’ are defined as the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the country, or combined statistical 

areas that include those MSAs. Both MSAs and combined statistical areas are as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. ‘‘Eligible metropolitan regions’’ are defined as a combination of 

two or more municipalities, counties, parishes or Indian tribes 

within a metropolitan region that includes the largest city in the 

metropolitan region, or, alternatively, any other combination of 

contiguous local governments that is formally certified by the Secretary and has the consent of the state(s) in which the local governments are located. ‘‘Essential Capabilities’’ are defined as the levels, availability, 

and competence of personnel, planning, training and equipment 

needed to effectively and efficiently prevent, prepare for and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks and other 

catastrophic events. ‘‘Sliding-scale baseline allocation’’ is an index used to calculate a 

state’s allocation under the sliding scale baseline distribution in 

HSA section 1804(f)(1) and is defined as 0.001 multiplied by the 

sum of (a) the value of a State’s population relative to that of the 

most populous of the 50 States, where the population of such 

States has been normalized to a maximum value of 100 and (b) 1⁄4

of the value of a State’s population density relative to that of the 

most densely populated of the 50 States, where the population density of such States has been normalized to a maximum value of 

100. Normalizing population and population density means that 

both values are put on a scale of 0–to–100, so that the most populous state (or in the case of population density, the most densely 

populated state) has a value of 100, a state with half the population of the most populous state has a value of 50, a state with 

a quarter of the population of the most populous state has a value 

of 25, and so on. 

This section also defines the terms ‘‘Indian Tribe’’, ‘‘Population’’, 

‘‘Population Density’’, and ‘‘Threat-based Homeland Security Grant 

program’’. 

HSA section 1802—Preservation of pre–9/11 grant programs for 

traditional first responder missions. 

This section excludes the programs that follow from amendment 

under this Act: the Firefighter Assistance Program (including 

grants awarded under the SAFER Act); the Emergency ManageVerDate Aug 04 2004 16:16 May 27, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR071.XXX SR071
19 

ment Performance Grant Program, the Urban Search and Rescue 

Grant Program, the Justice Assistance Grants, the Public Safety 

and Community Policing Grant Program, grant programs under 

the Public Health Service Act, and the Emergency Response Assistance Program. 

HSA section 1803—Essential capabilities for first responders 

Establishment 

This section would require the Secretary to establish clearly defined essential capabilities for State and local government preparedness needs. The Secretary would be required to build upon 

the National Preparedness Goal and must consult with the Task 

Force on Essential Capabilities, appropriate federal agencies, State 

and local emergency response providers, State and local officials, 

and relevant consensus-based standards making organizations. The 

Secretary must ensure descriptions of the essential capabilities are 

provided to the States and Congress. The States must make them 

available to local governments. 

Objectives 

This section provides that the essential capabilities must meet 

the objectives that follow: 

Specificity—The essential capabilities must specifically describe the training, planning, personnel, and equipment that 

different types of communities should possess or have access to 

in order to meet the Department’s goals for preparedness. Essential capabilities are to be tailored to address the different 

requirements of different types of communities. 

Flexibility—The essential capabilities must be sufficiently 

flexible to allow State and local government officials to set priorities based on local or regional needs. 

Measurability—The essential capabilities must be designed 

to enable measurement of progress toward specific terrorism 

preparedness goals. 

Comprehensiveness—The essential capabilities must be 

made within the context of a comprehensive State emergency 

management system. 

Factors to be considered 

Essential capabilities will be different for different types of communities. A very large and densely populated high-risk city like 

New York will have a different level of essential capabilities that 

it needs to attain than will a small, remotely located town. Similarly, a community with a nuclear power plant or with a port will 

need to have capabilities to deal with the particular consequences 

of potential attacks on those types of facilities that a community 

without such facilities will not need to have. This section requires 

that in establishing essential capabilities for different types of communities, the Secretary must specifically consider variables of 

threat, vulnerability, and consequences with respect to population 

(including transient commuting and tourist populations), population density, critical infrastructure, coastline, and international 

borders, as well as other factors the Secretary deems important. 

20 

Task force on essential capabilities for first responders 

This section would establish an advisory body to assist the Secretary in formulating the essential capabilities. It would ensure 

that the Task Force does not terminate within two years as generally required under the HSA, and instead requires the Task 

Force to terminate in 5 years unless the Secretary extends it. Within 9 months of enactment, and every three years thereafter, the 

Task Force must submit a report to the Secretary on its recommendations for essential capabilities for preparedness related to 

acts of terrorism. This section provides that the membership of the 

Task Force shall consist of 25 members appointed by the Secretary 

and include members from emergency response field, health professionals, experts from Federal, State and local governments and the 

private sector, and State and local officials with expertise in terrorism preparedness. Finally, this section mandates compliance 

with the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 

HSA section 1804—Threat-based Homeland Security grant program 

Establishment 

Establishes a new grant program, the Threat-Based Homeland 

Security Grant Program, which replaces the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 

Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative. Authorizes the 

Secretary to make grants to States and eligible metropolitan regions under this program to enhance homeland security. Provides 

that the grants made under this section are to be governed by the 

terms of this section and not by any other provision of law, and 

that any requirement of section 1014 of the USA Patriot Act shall 

be deemed to be satisfied by this grant program. 

Use of funds 

Provides that grants are to be used to address homeland security 

matters related to acts of terrorism or catastrophic events or to address shortfalls in essential capabilities. Sets forth permissible uses 

for grant funds, including planning; purchasing and upgrading 

equipment; conducting emergency preparedness exercises; training; 

the payment of overtime expenses related to training or an increase 

in the threat level; terrorism prevention activities traditionally permitted under the LETPP program; and other approved activities 

related to achieving essential capabilities. 

Subsection (b)(3) prohibits the use of grant funds to acquire land 

or construct buildings or other physical facilities, except for those 

described in section 611 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (42 

U.S.C. 5196). The Committee understands that section 611 would 

cover construction to alter or remodel existing buildings for the 

purpose of making them secure against terrorist attack or able to 

withstand or protect against chemical, radiological or biological attack, such as by altering HVAC systems or providing secure testing 

and treatment facilities in public health laboratories or in hospitals; and that grants under this bill could therefore be used for 

such construction. To the extent that grants under this bill are 

used to construct buildings or facilities as described in section 611, 

all of the terms of section 611 will be applicable and the Committee 

expects them to be fully complied with. 

21 

Equipment standards 

Provides that grant applicants who propose to use grant funds to 

purchase equipment that does not meet applicable national voluntary consensus standards must include in their application an 

explanation of why such equipment will better serve their needs 

than equipment that does meet the standards. 

Application 

Provides for grant application procedures for States and metropolitan regions. State applicants must explain how the requested 

funds would be used to achieve essential capabilities; must have an 

approved homeland security plan; and must demonstrate satisfactory progress toward achieving essential capabilities. Eligible metropolitan regions (defined in HSA Section 1801) must include in 

their applications an explanation of how the requested funds would 

be used to achieve essential capabilities; and how the use of the 

funds would be consistent with relevant state homeland security 

plans. Where not all the local jurisdictions in a metropolitan region 

are participating in the application, the applicants must explain 

why the eligible metropolitan region, as constituted, is an appropriate unit to receive grants to prevent, prepare for, and respond 

to terrorism. Requires that eligible metropolitan regions submit 

their applications to the relevant governor(s) for the governor’s review. If the governor does not support the regional application or 

finds it inconsistent with the state plan, the governor is to notify 

the Secretary of that fact. 

Homeland Security plan 

States applying for grants are required to have a 3-year state 

homeland security plan. This section requires that the plan include 

a 3-year strategy for achieving various goals; measures to assess 

the extent to which those goals have been achieved; and priorities 

for allocating grant funds to local governments based on risk, capabilities and needs. It also provides that states are to complete a 

comprehensive risk assessment and an assessment of capabilities 

and needs. The section provides further that states are to coordinate state planning activities with the activities of local governments and are to seek input from local stakeholders through the 

establishment of an advisory committee made up of local officials 

and emergency response providers. 

Allocation 

Provides for an initial baseline distribution of grant funds to 

states. Each state would receive the greater of either (1) 0.55% of 

all appropriated funds or (2) the state’s sliding scale baseline allocation (defined in Section 1801) multiplied by 28.62% of the total 

amount appropriated for the Threat-Based Homeland Security 

Grant Program. The District of Columbia would receive a fixed 

0.55% share, Puerto Rico 0.35%, and the remaining territories, 

0.055% each. The sliding-scale figure in option 2), above, represents 

each state’s weighted share (where weighting is done based on a 

combination of population and population density) of the pot of 

money (28.62%) that results from adding together the 0.55% minimum distribution to each state, plus the amounts allocated for the 

District of Columbia and the remaining territories. 

22 

After the initial baseline distribution, the section provides for up 

to 50% of the remaining funds to be used to provide grants to eligible metropolitan regions to assist in achieving essential capabilities. In making such grants, the Secretary is to prioritize among regional applications by considering the relative threat, vulnerability, 

and consequences faced by the eligible metropolitan region from a 

terrorist attack, including consideration of whether there has been 

a prior terrorist attack in the eligible metropolitan region; whether 

any part of the eligible metropolitan region has ever had a higher 

threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than 

the threat level for the nation as a whole; the eligible metropolitan 

region’s population; its population density; the degree of threat, 

vulnerability and consequence related to the presence of critical infrastructure in the region or in nearby jurisdictions; whether the 

eligible metropolitan region has a coastline bordering ocean or 

international waters; whether it is at or near an international border; the extent to which the eligible metropolitan region includes 

all municipalities, counties, parishes and Indian tribes within the 

region; and the extent to which the eligible region has unmet essential capabilities. Grants to eligible metropolitan regions are to 

be distributed through the state or states in which the region is located. The state or states provide not less than 80% of the funds 

to the eligible metropolitan region, and any funds retained by the 

state must be expended on items or services that benefit the eligible metropolitan region. 

The section provides that all remaining funds are to be used to 

provide grants to each state to assist in achieving essential capabilities. It requires the Secretary to prioritize among state applications by considering the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences faced by the state from a terrorist attack, including consideration of whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in the 

State or in a metropolitan region that is wholly or partly in the 

State; whether any part of the State has ever had a higher threat 

level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than the 

threat level for the nation as a whole; the percent of a State’s population residing in MSAs; threat, vulnerability and consequence related to the presence of critical infrastructure; whether the state 

has an international border; whether the state has a coastline bordering ocean or international waters; threats, vulnerabilities and 

consequences related to at-risk sites or activities in adjacent states; 

and the extent to which the state has unmet essential capabilities. 

It further requires that, in prioritizing among states applications 

that the Secretary balance the competing goals of ensuring that the 

essential capabilities of the highest-risk areas are achieved quickly 

and that basic levels of preparedness are achieved nationwide. 

This section provides that the State must make available to local 

governments not less than 80% of the grant funds the state receives and must do so within 60 days. It requires that grant funds 

supplement and not supplant other state and local government 

funds. 

This section provides that the Secretary may designate not more 

than 25% of the total amounts appropriated to be used for the 

LETPP program, to provide grants to law enforcement to enhance 

capabilities for terrorism prevention. 

23 

Report on Homeland Security spending 

Requires that all grant recipients annually submit a report to the 

Secretary of DHS that contains an accounting of how grants funds 

were spent and the progress the recipient is making in achieving 

essential capabilities. 

Accountability 

Provides that any grant recipient that expends $500,000 or more 

in a fiscal year is to submit to the Secretary an organization-wide 

financial and compliance audit report. 

Remedies for non-compliance 

Provides that, where the Secretary finds that a grant recipient 

has failed to substantially comply with any provision in the section, 

the Secretary shall terminate or reduce payments or limit the use 

of funds to activities not affected by the failure to comply. This section also provides that, where a state fails to comply, including failing to provide grants funds to local governments in a timely fashion, local governments may petition for funds to be provided directly to the local government. 

Reports to Congress 

Requires that the Secretary submit an annual report to Congress 

that provides an accounting on how resources provided to state and 

local governments were expended and evaluating the progress of 

States and local governments in achieving essential capabilities. 

Authorization of appropriations 

Authorizes $2.925 billion for fiscal years 2006 and fiscal year 

2007 and such sums as are necessary for each fiscal year thereafter. 

HSA section 1805—Eliminating Homeland Security fraud, waste 

and abuse 

Section (a) requires an annual Government Accountability Office 

audit of the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program and 

a report to Congress of the results. Section (b) requires the Secretary to conduct reviews of grants authorized under this Act to ensure that recipients allocate funds consistent with the guidelines 

established by the Department. 

HSA section 1806—Flexibility in unspent Homeland Security funds 

This section would allow for reallocation of funds among different 

categories of uses, upon request of a State and with the approval 

of the Director of the Office of Domestic Preparedness. 

HSA section 1807—National standards for first responder equipment and training 

The section requires that the Secretary support the development 

of national voluntary consensus standards for first responder 

equipment and training. Applicants for grant funds who want to 

use those funds to purchase or upgrade equipment that did not 

meet these standards would have the burden of explaining why 

such equipment would better serve their needs than equipment 

that meets the standards. 

24 

HSA section 1808—Certification relative to the screening of municipal solid waste 

This section requires the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to submit a report to Congress examining the methodologies 

and technologies used to screen municipal solid waste entering the 

United States for chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological weapons. If those methods and technologies are less effective than those 

used to screen other commercial commerce, the report must detail 

what actions the Bureau will take to achieve the same level of effectiveness in the screening of solid waste. If the Bureau fails to 

implement the additional actions, if required, the Secretary must 

deny entry into the U.S., vehicles carrying solid waste until it can 

be reported to Congress that the screening technologies for solid 

waste are as effective as those used to screen other types of commercial cargo. 

Section 5. Communication System Grants 

This section establishes the International Border Community 

Interoperable Communications Demonstrations Project. The Demonstration Project would involve at least six communities, three on 

each border, to foster interoperable communications among Federal, State, local, and tribal government agencies in the United 

States with similar agencies in Canada or Mexico. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 

Senate requires that each report accompanying a bill evaluate the 

‘‘regulatory impact which would be incurred in carrying out this 

bill.’’ Carrying out S. 21 would have no regulatory impact. 

VI. CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to Paragraph 12, Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 

the Senate, this section describes changes to existing law. 

Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 361 et 

seq.) is amended by inserting Section 802 to establish an Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs. 

Section 801(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 

361 (a)) is amended to rename ‘‘the Office for State and Local Government Coordination’’ ‘‘the Office for State and Local Governmental Coordination and Preparedness.’’ Subsection (a) is further 

amended by inserting paragraph (2) providing for this Office to be 

headed by the Executive Director of State and Local Government 

Coordination Preparedness, who is to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

Section 430 (a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 

430) is amended by striking the provisions locating the Office for 

Domestic Preparedness within the Directorate of Border and 

Transportation Security. The remaining provisions of this section 

are moved to the newly designated Section 803. Subsection (b) of 

Section 803 is further amended by striking ‘‘who shall be appointed 

by the President’’ and inserting ‘‘who shall report directly to the 

Executive Director of State and Local Government Coordination 

and Preparedness.’’ Technical amendments are made to clarify that 

25 

the transferred office would no longer be located within a specific 

Directorate and to assign the management of the Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse to the Office for Domestic Preparedness. 

Section 801 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 361) 

is amended by adding section (c) at the end to establish a Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is 

amended by inserting Title XVIII Essential Capabilities for First 

Responders and Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program 

at the end of the Act. 

Section 2(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 

101(6)) is amended by inserting ‘‘(including fire services)’’ after 

‘‘local emergency public safety’’. 

VII. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

S. 21—Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2005 

Summary: S. 21 would authorize the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to change the criteria used to 

distribute funding for three existing first-responder grant programs 

established after September 11, 2001—the State Homeland Security, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention, and the Urban 

Area Security Initiative grant programs. Under the bill, these three 

grant programs would be governed by the provisions of a new initiative known as the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program. In addition, this bill would authorize the appropriation of 

$2.9 billion for first-responder grants for both 2006 and 2007, and 

such sums as are necessary for each subsequent year for first responder grants. 

Assuming appropriation of the authorized and estimated 

amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost 

about $9.9 billion over the 2006–2010 period. Enacting S. 21 would 

not affect direct spending or revenues. 

S. 21 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates 

as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). The bill 

would provide several benefits to state, local, and tribal governments. Assuming the authorized amounts are fully appropriated, 

the bill would increase funding for existing aid programs while 

changing conditions for receiving those funds; any costs to state, 

local, or tribal governments would be incurred voluntarily. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of S. 21 is shown in the following table. The costs of 

this legislation fall within budget function 450 (community and regional development). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

First-responder grant program: a

Estimated authorization level ........................................................................ 2,925 2,925 2,989 3,054 3,123 

Estimated outlays .......................................................................................... 293 1,375 2,282 2,931 2,962 

Border interoperability demonstration project: 

Estimated authorization level ........................................................................ 5 5 5 0 0 

Estimated outlays .......................................................................................... 1 3 5 4 2 

26 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

Total changes: 

Estimated authorization level ........................................................................ 2,930 2,930 2,994 3,054 3,123 

Estimated outlays .......................................................................................... 294 1,378 2,287 2,935 2,964 

a Under current law, such sums as necessary are authorized to be appropriated for 2006 and 2007 for first-responder grants. 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that S. 21 will 

be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2006 and that the specified 

and estimated amounts will be appropriated for each year. CBO estimates that implementing S. 21 would cost about $9.9 billion over 

the 2006–2010 period. 

Threat-based Homeland Security grant program 

The Office of Domestic Preparedness (within DHS) derives its 

primary authority to distribute grants to states and localities to 

prepare and respond to terrorism from the USA PATRIOT Act 

(Public Law 107–56). Almost $9 billion has been appropriated for 

these first-responder grants since fiscal year 2003, including about 

$2.7 billion in fiscal year 2005. That law authorizes the appropriation of such sums as necessary for first-responder grants through 

fiscal year 2007. S. 21 would replace this authorization of appropriations with a specific authorization level of just over $2.9 billion 

annually in 2006 and 2007. The bill also would extend the authority for such grants after 2007 at whatever level is necessary. For 

this estimate, CBO assumes that the authorized amount will be appropriated for 2006 and 2007 and that the program will continue 

at that level with adjustments for anticipated inflation. 

For this estimate, CBO assumes that states would need to update their State Homeland Security Plans for approval by DHS to 

reflect new grant requirements. After that update, we expect that 

spending under the bill would follow historical spending patterns 

for existing state and local grant programs for emergency management activities. CBO estimates that implementing the ThreatBased Homeland Security grant program would cost about $9.9 billion over the 2006–2010 period. 

Demonstration program 

S. 21 would authorize the appropriation of such sums as are necessary over the 2006–2008 period for an International Border Community Interoperable Communications Demonstration Project. 

Under this provision, DHS would select six communities, at least 

three on the southern border and three on the northern border, to 

serve as demonstration projects to address issues concerning communications across the nation’s borders. The Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458) established the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility within 

DHS’s Directorate of Science and Technology. For this estimate, we 

assume that this new office would manage the international demonstration project as well as a domestic interoperability program. 

Based on information from DHS, CBO estimates that $5 million 

would be needed each year over the 2006–2008 period. Assuming 

appropriation of the necessary funds, CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost $15 million over the 2006–2010 

period. 

27 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 21 contains no 

intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. 

Section 4 of the bill would deny entry of commercial motor vehicles 

carrying municipal solid waste into the United States unless the 

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection certifies to the Congress 

that the methodologies and technologies used to screen such vehicles for weapons are as effective as the screening of other commercial materials entering the United States. The Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection indicates that such certification would be 

provided before the deadline specified in the bill. CBO believes, 

therefore, there would be no interruption of service, and thus no 

mandate. 

The bill would make several changes to existing grant programs 

for state, local, and tribal governments. First, it would consolidate 

at least three current programs—the State Homeland Security 

Grant, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and 

the Urban Area Security Initiative—and authorize the appropria- tion of almost $15 billion over the 2006–2010 period. Second, it 

would change how those funds are allocated. While some states 

would receive less funding than in previous years and others would 

receive more, assuming authorized funds are fully appropriated, 

there would be a small increase in total funding, and each state 

would receive a minimum of 0.55 percent of available funds. This 

bill would allow certain metropolitan areas to apply for funds directly and would expand eligible activities to include covering the 

costs of some overtime activities during heightened threat alerts 

and training activities. 

The bill also would authorize DHS to transfer funds directly to 

the local recipients, reduce the portion of grants retained by the 

state, or impose additional restrictions if states fail to provide 

funds to local first responders in a timely manner. States would be 

required to provide 80 percent of the funds or resources to local recipients within 60 days of receipt. If states fail to comply with that 

requirement, funds would be allocated directly to local jurisdictions. Any costs to state, local, or tribal governments as a result of 

these changes to the grant programs would be incurred voluntarily. 

State, local, and tribal governments would benefit from several 

other provisions of the bill that require DHS to create, with input 

from local first responders and trade representatives, essential capabilities and voluntary standards for equipment and training for 

first responders; a demonstration project for interoperable communication systems; and a Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Julie Middleton; Impact on 

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell; Impact on 

the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

(28) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN 

This legislation includes language that I offered that will assist 

our first responders by creating demonstration projects at our 

northern and southern borders. The amendment provides that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish at least six International Border Community Interoperable Communications Demonstration Projects—no fewer than three of these demonstration 

projects shall be on the northern border, and no fewer than three 

of these demonstration projects shall be on the southern border. 

These Interoperable Communications Demonstrations will address 

the interoperable communications needs of police officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, National Guard, and other 

emergency response providers at our borders. 

Further, this bill contains language I proposed that requires the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to deny entry of any commercial 

motor vehicle carrying municipal solid waste from Canada until the 

Secretary certifies that the methods and technology used to inspect 

the vehicles for potential weapons of mass destruction as well as 

biological, chemical and nuclear materials, are as efficient as the 

methods and technology used to inspect other commercial vehicles. 

Each month, thousands of trucks of solid municipal waste are 

being brought into the United States for disposal in U.S. landfills. 

The large size and dense character of these shipments provide opportunities for malicious individuals or groups who may wish to 

evade detection as they attempt to smuggle dangerous contraband 

into our country. This language will help to ensure the effective 

screening for weapons of mass destruction in shipments of solid 

municipal waste. 

CARL LEVIN. 

(29) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA 

The Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act provides for a 

fair and equitable distribution of funds between the States. However, I am concerned about the lack of access tribal governments 

have to this funding. In the current funding mechanism, federal 

homeland security grants are allocated to States, which in turn are 

supposed to direct at least 80 percent of the funding to local and 

tribal governments. However, more often than not, Indian tribes 

are being passed over by the States. 

Even though the population, critical infrastructure, and international borders that lie on tribal land are incorporated in State 

homeland security plans and grant applications, most States do not 

allocate a corresponding level of funding to the tribes. For example, 

the Tohono O’odham Nation has received less than $100,000 from 

the State of Arizona over the past three years, yet the Nation is 

responsible for securing 75 miles of border between the United 

States and Mexico. As security tightens up along the rest of the Arizona border, more and more illegal immigrants are choosing to 

cross through Indian country because of the lack of border enforcement. 

I do not believe this problem will be solved simply by directing 

States to include tribal governments in the funding allocation process since States know there will be no significant consequences if 

they ignore such a direction. Numerous counties and States have 

historic disputes with Indian tribes over jurisdictional and funding 

issues which can impede the funding pass-through process. In addition, there are reports that States are using tribal sovereignty as 

a reason to refuse allocation of funds to tribes. In order for the 

international borders and critical infrastructure that lie on tribal 

land to be adequately protected, tribes must be allowed to bypass 

State governments and apply directly to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for funding. 

DANIEL K. AKAKA

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