Number 149, October 1998**NATO After the FirstTranche*A Strategic Rationale for Enlargement
by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Conclusions- The first tranche of NATO    enlargement—adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic next year—will help    stabilize an historically unstable region and bring security benefits to all of Europe.  
- Enlargement raises a number of difficult    questions. How should enlargement unfold in the future? What should be the standards for    selecting new members? Above all, what is NATO trying to achieve by enlarging further? 
- It is time to take a hard look at the    process of future enlargements. Enlargement needs to serve the Alliance’s vital    interests and Europe’s security as a whole.  
- A NATO open-door policy, driven by only    a loose set of political standards for enlargement, could have a detrimental effect on    both NATO and Europe. 
- Enlargement needs to be guided by an    explicit strategic rationale. Membership should not be granted simply for democratic    conduct. Enlargement should occur only when it enhances NATO as a credible military    alliance and produces compelling security benefits. 
**Giving Enlargement A Strategic Rationale

A strategic rationale for enlargementwould help ensure that further NATO enlargements are carried out wisely, with positiveeffects. For the United States, enlargement should be one part of a strategic policy aimedat stabilizing Europe and adapting NATO to deal with new threats on Europe’speriphery and beyond its borders. Admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic servesthis agenda and is accomplishing its strategic purpose of making Central Europeincreasingly stable and secure. The countries of the region are developing democraticgovernments and free market economies, establishing civilian control over theirmilitaries, and downsizing their force postures while upgrading their military quality toNATO standards. The three prospective members are contributing to military misssions onNATO’s periphery. In short, they are producing more security than they consume. NATOnow needs to decide whether offering accession to other aspirant states will accomplishsimilarly worthy goals.

In September 1995, NATO proclaimed thatenlargement must serve the Alliance’s security interests. But the momentum of thefirst enlargement created a dynamic that discounts strategic purposes and increasinglyemphasizes looser, less discriminating political standards. These standards imply that aEuropean state can qualify for admission if it presents credentials as a buddingdemocracy, with a market economy, civilian control of the military, a responsible foreignpolicy toward its neighbors, a credible Partnership for Peace (PFP) track record,NATO-compatible military forces, and a willingness to participate in NATO activities. 

These standards deny NATO a strong andconsistent rationale for saying "no" when its security interests and strategicpurposes are not served by enlargement. In response to the NATO open-door policy and arecently acquired freedom to choose, 12 states sought membership. Moreover, the list ofpotential candidates does not necessarily end there. Austria, Sweden, and Finland have notyet applied but they might, at some point; and they already meet most NATO politicalstandards.

Most aspiring states view membership as astep to advance their own security interests. Planning their military postures for thenext decade or two, most of the nine aspirant states are concerned about defendingthemselves if the security environment deteriorates. Yet, they do not want to commit largedefense budgets that would slow their economic recoveries. Membership in NATO providesstrong protection and a means to minimize defense expenditures.

This self-focused stance isunderstandable, but it could diminish the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO. The NATOapproach to enlargement needs a stronger strategic focus. Deliberations tend to focus toomuch on the political merits of each aspiring state, rather than on Alliance goals andstrategy, or the regional and theater-wide implications of admitting new members.
**Toward a Larger but Less Effective NATO?

Swift movement to a larger alliance couldalter the political and military character of NATO. Populating the North Atlantic Council(NAC) with a large bloc of new members could make consensus-building and decisionmakingsignificantly harder. NATO might still be able to perform some missions, such aspeacekeeping in cases where a widespread political consensus exists. But its effectivenessas a military alliance to perform other critical functions could be eroded.

A significantly larger alliance might notproduce a more stable Europe or even render new members secure. If enlargement weakensNATO, new members could find themselves deprived of the credible security guarantees thatled them to seek NATO membership. This could leave them still searching for security inother ways—a destabilizing trend that enlargement originally was intended to avoid.Moreover, potential rogues would be unimpressed by a larger NATO if its political will andmilitary power to contest aggression are diminished.

The same reasoning applies to the dauntingtask of forging a new NATO southern strategy and preparing for new security missions bothinside Europe and beyond its borders. Growing threats from the South mean that NATO mayneed to prepare WMD defenses and defend its interests better than now, not only in Europebut outside Europe as well. If NATO enlarges too quickly, it may be unable to carry outthis important strategic shift. 
**Establishing a Strategic Purpose

NATO might avoid the dangers ofenlargement if it is guided by a clear strategic purpose. A clearer strategic purposewould supplement NATO’s existing political standards for admitting new members withfirm strategic standards that enhance, not undermine, NATO security.

A strategic purpose would focus onenhancing the capacity of NATO to handle future security challenges. It would aspire tocreate an improved alliance for the 21st century that still provides collective defense,but can also perform new European missions, project power outside Europe, and defendcommon interests in distant regions.

NATO must preserve its character as aneffective military alliance for two reasons: (1) The Alliance’s borders must alwaysbe safeguarded against unexpected surprises; (2) new NATO functions of projecting powerand stability can be performed only if the Alliance maintains the ability to provide forcollective defense.

A strategic purpose would also support aconscious external security strategy, and would use further enlargement to help carry itout. A strategic purpose would be anchored not in containment and deterrence, but in anew, forward-looking NATO strategy that shapes the peacetime environment, responds to awide spectrum of contingencies, and prepares for an uncertain future. It would pursue twofundamental goals: first, to consolidate NATO’s Eastern enlargement by promotingintegration and stability, and preventing competition and conflict in Central Europe;second, to configure NATO for pursuing a robust Southern strategy within Europe andbeyond. 

Accordingly, a strategic purpose wouldestablish firm standards for guiding further enlargement, so that the door is kept openbut new members are admitted only when this step makes strategic sense and furthers NATOsecurity interests. These standards would permit admission of new members when:
- Admitting them directly supports NATO    interests, strategy, and security goals. 
- NATO can effectively absorb and    integrate new members, and truly provide them collective defense protection. 
- Candidates are willing and able to    significantly contribute to the old and new Alliance security missions. That is, they must    be able to produce security for NATO, not just consume it. 
- NATO cohesion, decisionmaking, and    military effectiveness at carrying out old and new missions are enhanced, not diminished. 
- Admission will meaningfully enhance    Europe’s stability as a whole, rather than trigger instability, and other measures    will not produce similar effects at less risk of overextending NATO. 

These standards are meant to createflexible guidelines. The standards would bring discipline to what otherwise could becomean unruly "logrolling" process that ultimately damages NATO and Europeansecurity by admitting too many or perhaps the wrong countries.
**Enlarging in Slow, Limited Ways

Slow, selective, discriminatingenlargement should give NATO time to integrate its first tranche members, to surveyEurope’s situation, and to make judgments judiciously. A deliberate process mayfrustrate some prospective candidates, but over the long haul, they will be better servedby a NATO that enlarges one step at a time, ensuring that each phase is handled well.

Effectively integrating the first tranchemembers into NATO is critical to making enlargement a success. It will require a concertedeffort to carry out the military dimensions of enlargement. The new members must bebrought into the integrated command. Their forces must be downsized and endowed withhigher quality in readiness and modernization to meet NATO standards for compatibility andinteroperability. And, current NATO forces must be strengthened so that they can carry outnew NATO commitments in Eastern Europe.

Some may argue that because the firsttranche will fulfill NATO’s top strategic priorities, there is no compelling need toenlarge further. Even though further enlargement may not be as compelling, this does notmean enlargement fails to make strategic sense. The key point is that NATO enjoys theluxury of flexibility. A strategic purpose argues that when the political, military, andeconomic costs of enlargement outweigh the benefits, NATO should refrain. But when thebenefits exceed the costs, NATO should admit new members, on a schedule ensuring they canbe absorbed effectively.
**Appraising the Candidates

One of the main problems regarding furtherenlargement is that there are no clear and obvious candidates for inclusion in a secondround. Most lack either the will or the ability to fulfill NATO strategic purposes.Sweden, Finland, and Austria all qualify on democratic and economic grounds. They alsohave established strong civilian control over their militaries. But neither **Finland**nor **Sweden** feels a strong urge to join NATO and carry out its policies.

In **Austria** the ruling coalition issplit, with the Peoples’ Party supporting NATO membership and the Social Democratsopposed. But Hungary’s inclusion in NATO may accelerate Austria’s securitydebate and intensify pressures to join the Alliance. Indeed, NATO could expect anapplication from Austria within the next three to five years. Austrian membership wouldhave some important strategic advantages for NATO. It would provide access to Hungary in acrisis. It would also make rapid deployment of NATO troops to the Balkans easier. Butfavorable geography alone is not enough. Austria spends less than one percent of its GDPon defense—well below the NATO average. Given our strategic standards, Austria wouldhave to demonstrate a greater willingness to produce security before it is accepted forNATO membership.

In Central and Eastern Europe, **Slovakia**provides a land corridor to Hungary, and the results of the September 1998 election are afirst step on the road to political rehabilitation. **Slovenia** meets the economic andpolitical criteria. It also provides a land corridor to Hungary. But neither country has amilitary force which would contribute significantly to meeting NATO’s new militarychallenges.

A strong case can be made for **Romania**on strategic grounds. Romania occupies a strategic position in the Balkans and Black Searegion. It could serve as a staging area for peace support operations in the Balkans. Butit needs to make more progress in building democracy, and in economic and military reform,before it could be considered for membership.

**Bulgaria** also occupies a strategicposition in the Balkans. It has moved toward creating a viable democratic system andmarket economy since the May 1997 elections. But it has only begun restructuring itsmilitary, so it will be some time before it is ready to be considered for NATO membership.

**Albania and Macedonia**, two otherBalkan candidates, do not qualify on economic, political, or military grounds. They aremajor consumers of security, not producers of it. Moreover, the security problems faced bythese countries are largely ethnic and internal in nature, and thus would not be resolvedby NATO membership. NATO should not strengthen ties to these countries—but membershipis not the best way of addressing their security problems.

The three Baltic states—**Lithuania,Latvia, and Estonia**—pose perhaps the most difficult dilemma. The Westerncommunity faces a moral imperative to ensure that these democratic countries are madesecure. Militarily, they are too poorly prepared to defend themselves, much less performother NATO missions. Their forces may improve, but even so, NATO would be hard-pressed torush reinforcements to them in time to ward off major aggression. NATO needs to avoidmaking hollow Article 5 commitments that cannot be carried out when needed.

Admitting the Baltic states is not out ofthe question, but NATO should do so only if its strategic purposes are served by such amove. NATO can, however, enhance their security by helping them build strong governments,viable economies, and better military forces. Encouraging them to develop security tieswith their Nordic neighbors, the United States, and other European powers is another soundstep. Bringing them into the European Union (EU) would also give them enhanced economicprosperity, closer ties to European democracies, and a greater sense of security. If thesemeasures are fully pursued, NATO membership may become less important because thesecountries will be secure even without it.
**Managing Relations with Russia and Ukraine

NATO also needs to consider how Russia,Ukraine, and other CIS states fit into the enlargement calculus. Russia grudginglyaccepted the first tranche, but it is worried about further enlargement. A deliberateenlargement policy would defuse these concerns and give time for both sides to develop thePermanent Joint Council (PJC), established when NATO and Russia, in May 1997, signed the *FoundingAct on Mutual Relations* as a mechanism for deepening cooperation. Some commentatorsworry that the PJC will give Russia a veto over NATO decisionmaking. The real danger,however, is the opposite: that the two sides will fail to exploit its potential.

Western states want a good partnershipwith Russia, but this does not translate into the conclusion that Russia should join NATOin the foreseeable future. Because Russia can defend itself, it does not need NATOmilitary protection. Moreover, NATO will be reluctant to guarantee defense ofRussia’s borders, and Russia will be equally reluctant to defend NATO’s borders.If Russia makes the successful transition to democracy, it should be welcomed as a memberof the Western community and its other institutions, but NATO membership would createdifficult problems. 

Ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty andindependence calls for a NATO/Ukrainian partnership short of membership. NATO could notreadily carry out Article 5 guarantees to Ukraine against a major military threat withoutbuilding a large military infrastructure in Eastern Europe. This would probably trigger amilitarization of Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine. And, Ukraine has notyet demonstrated a convincing commitment to political and economic reform nor establishedstrong civilian control over its military. Without reform, Ukraine’s chances of beingintegrated into broader Euro-Atlantic structures remain poor.

Hans Binnendijk is the Director of theInstitute for National Strategic Studies. Richard L. Kugler is a Distinguished ResearchProfessor at INSS. A longer version of this paper will appear in a forthcoming issue ofThe Washington Quarterly.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

**| Return   to Top | Return to Strategic Forum Index |  Return to Publications |
*Return to NDU Homepage**INSS Homepage******************