II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4824 

To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2022 

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. HAGERTY) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘North Korea Policy 

5 Oversight Act of 2022’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT9 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com10 mittees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

2 the Senate; 

3 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of 

4 the Senate; 

5 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

6 the House of Representatives; and 

7 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of 

8 the House of Representatives. 

9 (2) NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.— 

10 The term ‘‘nuclear nonproliferation treaty’’ means 

11 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

12 Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow 

13 July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483). 

14 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

15 Congress makes the following findings: 

16 (1) The world faces a greater risk of nuclear 

17 conflict today than at any time since the height of 

18 the Cold War, due to Russia’s threatened use of nu19 clear weapons during its invasion of Ukraine, Chi20 na’s pursuing a rapid expansion of its nuclear arse21 nal, Iran’s continued efforts to pursue nuclear weap22 ons, and Kim Jong-un’s relentless pursuit of nuclear 

23 weapons and ballistic missiles in the face of global 

24 condemnation and severe economic sanctions by the 

25 international community. 


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1 (2) The North Korean nuclear program did not 

2 arise instantaneously, but is the culmination of the 

3 rogue regime’s illegal efforts over 7 decades to ac4 quire a viable deterrent that threatens both the 

5 United States and our critical allies in the Indo-Pa6 cific region. 

7 (3) North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests 

8 since 2006, with each test increasing in explosive 

9 strength and sophistication. 

10 (4) North Korea’s last nuclear test, occurring 

11 on September 3, 2017, was its largest nuclear explo12 sion to date, registering a 6.3 magnitude earthquake 

13 according to the United States Geological Survey 

14 with an estimated yield of 140 kilotons. 

15 (5) According to open source analysis, North 

16 Korea has produced enough fissile material for at 

17 least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons. 

18 (6) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic 

19 missile portfolio that includes a diverse array of de20 livery systems capable of striking targets throughout 

21 the region, including short-range Scuds, medium22 range No-Dong missiles, an increasingly capable 

23 cruise missile program, and intercontinental ballistic 

24 missiles that are potentially capable of targeting the 

25 United States homeland. 


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1 (7) The Department of Defense estimates that 

2 North Korea currently wields approximately 200 

3 launchers capable of firing short and medium range 

4 ballistic missiles. 

5 (8) Since January 2022, North Korea has con6 ducted 13 ballistic missile tests, including at least 

7 three assessed in open source analysis to be inter8 continental ballistic missiles. 

9 (9) Rigorous international economic sanctions 

10 applied since the passage of the North Korea Sanc11 tions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public 

12 Law 114–122), including by the United States and 

13 the United Nations Security Council, intensified 

14 pressure on the regime and focused international at15 tention on the urgency of the challenge posed by the 

16 Kim regime in Pyongyang. 

17 (10) The Government of the Democratic Peo18 ple’s Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the 

19 international community by illicitly developing its 

20 nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of 

21 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 

22 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 

23 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 

24 (2017), and 2397 (2017). 


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1 (11) The Government of the Democratic Peo2 ple’s Republic of Korea engages in gross human 

3 rights abuses against its own people and citizens of 

4 other countries, including the United States, the Re5 public of Korea, and Japan. 

6 (12) In 2018 and 2019, the United States and 

7 North Korea engaged in intensive diplomacy, includ8 ing three leader-level summits between Donald 

9 Trump and Kim Jong-Un, resulting in the first lead10 er-level commitment from North Korea to 

11 denuclearize, as stated in the 2018 Singapore Joint 

12 Statement. 

13 (13) The stakes for the security of the United 

14 States and United States allies are such that all 

15 credible diplomatic options must be prioritized, 

16 resourced, and fully pursued, in addition to main17 taining robust and credible deterrence. 

18 (14) Economic pressure and sanctions provide 

19 critical leverage in any such diplomatic negotiations 

20 and must be maintained and strengthened until the 

21 North Korean regime takes meaningful and 

22 verifiable actions toward denuclearization. 

23 (15) The North Korean regime has a record of 

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1 national negotiators, and leveraging talks to extract 

2 concessions such as sanctions relief. 

3 (16) In order to prevent the North Korean re4 gime from further developing, using, or dissemi5 nating nuclear or ballistic weapons, technology, and 

6 related material, the United States Government 

7 should continue a campaign of economic pressure 

8 and sanctions, counter-proliferation, containment, 

9 and deterrence until North Korea completely, 

10 verifiably, and irreversibly denuclearizes. 

11 (17) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

12 Enhancement Act of 2016 states that there can be 

13 no sanctions relief unless North Korea has ‘‘made 

14 significant progress toward completely, verifiably, 

15 and irreversibly dismantling all of its nuclear, chem16 ical, biological, and radiological weapons programs, 

17 including all programs for the development of sys18 tems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of 

19 such weapons’’. 

20 (18) The United States Government has suc21 cessfully pursued a policy of deterrence, which has 

22 kept the American people safe from a nuclear attack 

23 from the Russian Federation, China, and other 

24 states with nuclear weapons, which have a combined 

25 nuclear arsenal of more than 7,000 warheads. 


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1 (19) Over time, the United States policy of de2 terrence, containment, and diplomacy to reduce nu3 clear weapons risks protected the American people 

4 and contributed to the peaceful dissolution of the 

5 Soviet Union. 

6 (20) The United States, the Republic of Korea, 

7 and Japan are all free societies that are committed 

8 to the principles of inclusive democracy, respect for 

9 human potential and individual freedom, and the be10 lief that the peaceful spread of these principles will 

11 result in a safer and brighter future for all of man12 kind. 

13 (21) The Governments and people of the United 

14 States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan can help 

15 realize this future through further strengthening 

16 their economic, political, social, cultural, and secu17 rity relationships. 

18 (22) The Governments and people of the United 

19 States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan share a 

20 commitment to free and open markets, high stand21 ards for the free flow of commerce and trade, and 

22 the establishment of an inclusive architecture for re23 gional and global trade and development. 

24 (23) The United States-Japan and United 

25 States-Republic of Korea security alliances have 


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1 evolved considerably over many decades and will con2 tinue to share greater responsibilities and dedicate 

3 themselves to a secure and prosperous region and 

4 world. 

5 (24) Robust military posture, including regular 

6 training and exercises, by the United States, the Re7 public of Korea, and Japan, is critical to ensuring 

8 peace and stability in Northeast Asia. 

9 (25) In the absence of an imminent threat to 

10 the United States or its allies, a preventive war 

11 against North Korea would pose extraordinary risks 

12 to the United States and security in Northeast Asia 

13 and would require consent of Congress under article 

14 I of the Constitution. 

15 (26) With China engaging in a ‘‘strategic 

16 breakout’’, as noted by United States Strategic 

17 Commander Admiral Charles Richard in August 

18 2021, the United States faces an unprecedented 

19 strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region as Chi20 na’s nuclear weapons program will alter the nuclear 

21 balance in the Indo-Pacific, including Northeast 

22 Asia. 

23 (27) An effective policy of deterrence requires— 

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1 ognizes that its use of nuclear weapons would 

2 result in massive retaliation; and 

3 (B) the vigorous use of diplomatic, eco4 nomic, military, and other coercive tools to en5 sure stable deterrence and prevent an adversary 

6 from proliferating material or technology. 

7 (28) The United States requires a comprehen8 sive diplomatic strategy that outlines the funda9 mental principles, actions, and verification and com10 pliance mechanisms necessary to properly engage the 

11 Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

12 Korea on the full denuclearization of North Korea. 

13 SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

15 States— 

16 (1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to 

17 achieve the complete and verifiable dismantlement of 

18 North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic and 

19 cruise missile programs; 

20 (2) until such time as denuclearization is 

21 achieved— 

22 (A) to deter North Korea from using weap23 ons of mass destruction or leveraging those 

24 weapons to coerce United States allies; 


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1 (B) to contain attempts by North Korea to 

2 proliferate such weapons and technologies; 

3 (C) to ensure that the United States and 

4 allies maintain credible deterrence against 

5 North Korea, including the presence of United 

6 States military troops in the Korean Peninsula 

7 and Japan, as well as the development and de8 ployment of new military capabilities; and 

9 (D) to continue the maximum pressure 

10 campaign against North Korea and its enablers, 

11 in cooperation with the United Nations and the 

12 international community; 

13 (3) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to re14 sult in the complete, verifiable denuclearization of 

15 North Korea, to reserve the right to utilize all avail16 able options to protect and defend United States na17 tional security interests and meet United States 

18 treaty obligations; and 

19 (4) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

20 Treaty and not recognize North Korea as a legiti21 mate nuclear weapons state. 

22 (b) DIPLOMACY.—It is the policy of the United 

23 States— 

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1 curity interests, with the North Korean regime for 

2 the purposes of— 

3 (A) advancing meaningful negotiations re4 garding denuclearization, including the Govern5 ment of North Korea abandoning and disman6 tling its unlawful missile and nuclear weapons 

7 programs, ceasing its proliferation activities, 

8 and coming into compliance with all relevant 

9 international agreements and United Nations 

10 Security Council resolutions; 

11 (B) reducing the risks of military mis12 calculation; and 

13 (C) creating opportunities for the develop14 ment of confidence building measures as part of 

15 a broader effort to denuclearize North Korea; 

16 (2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting 

17 the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation with 

18 United States allies, particularly the Republic of 

19 Korea; 

20 (3) to encourage all nations to deny North 

21 Korea the ability to maintain diplomatic missions on 

22 foreign soil until such time as the Government of the 

23 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea takes cred24 ible and verifiable steps toward denuclearization; 


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1 (4) to encourage all nations to fully implement 

2 and enforce United Nations sanctions with respect 

3 to North Korea, including sanctions related to end4 ing the practice of hosting overseas North Korean 

5 workers; 

6 (5) to increase the effectiveness of United 

7 States sanctions by seeking to work through the 

8 United Nations and with other like-minded countries 

9 to ensure a multilateral approach to sanctions; 

10 (6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan 

11 and the Republic of Korea, including through ex12 tended deterrence commitments and the presence of 

13 forward-deployed United States military forces, that 

14 the United States is committed to fulfilling its treaty 

15 obligations if they are attacked; 

16 (7) to resist actions by the People’s Republic of 

17 China (PRC) to use North Korea issues as a way to 

18 draw the attention of the United States Government 

19 away from other important regional issues and chal20 lenges; 

21 (8) to provide support for North Korean refu22 gees and asylum seekers in accordance with United 

23 States law; 

24 (9) to promote the human rights and dignity of 

25 the North Korean people, including through the 


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1 United Nations and other multilateral institutions; 

2 and 

3 (10) to seek opportunities for humanitarian ac4 tions, such as family reunification and the return of 

5 human remains. 

6 (c) ECONOMIC PRESSURE.—It is the policy of the 

7 United States to sustain and calibrate economic pressure 

8 on North Korea until the regime undertakes meaningful 

9 and verifiable actions toward denuclearization, including 

10 by— 

11 (1) encouraging all nations to robustly imple12 ment and enforce existing United Nations sanctions; 

13 (2) leveraging the strength of the United States 

14 financial system to deny access by the Government 

15 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and 

16 those with whom such government facilitates illicit 

17 financial transactions to the United States and glob18 al markets, including through the use of secondary 

19 sanctions; 

20 (3) encouraging all nations, consistent with 

21 United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end 

22 the practice of hosting North Korean citizens as 

23 guest workers, recognizing that such workers are 

24 demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of rev25 enue for the Kim regime and its nuclear ambitions; 


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1 (4) working with the international community 

2 on rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from 

3 North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers, con4 sistent with United Nations Security Council resolu5 tions that have banned nearly every major export 

6 from North Korea; and 

7 (5) strictly implementing and enforcing United 

8 States laws with respect to sanctioning entities, in9 cluding Russian and Chinese entities, that knowingly 

10 engage with sanctioned entities from North Korea or 

11 trade in items prohibited under United Nations Se12 curity Council resolutions. 

13 (d) PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND MISSILE

14 TECHNOLOGY.—It is the policy of the United States— 

15 (1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, 

16 missile technology, or related material to or from 

17 North Korea and other states or non-state actors; 

18 (2) to support the efforts of the international 

19 community to detect, interdict, and prevent the 

20 transfers of nuclear or missile technology or related 

21 items to or from North Korea; 

22 (3) to prioritize close coordination with global 

23 partners, including through technical assistance and 

24 capacity building, to enhance the ability of the global 

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1 ties that engage in transfer of nuclear weapons, mis2 sile technology, or related material to or from North 

3 Korea; and 

4 (4) consistent with United States obligations 

5 under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to en6 courage all countries that are party to such treaty 

7 and International Atomic Energy Agency agree8 ments to abide by their obligations and commit9 ments. 

10 (e) ALLIANCES AND MILITARY POSTURE.—It is the 

11 policy of the United States— 

12 (1) to reaffirm the importance of the United 

13 States-Japan and United States-Republic of Korea 

14 alliances for maintaining peace and stability in the 

15 Indo-Pacific region and beyond; 

16 (2) to reaffirm United States extended deter17 rence commitments to Japan and the Republic of 

18 Korea, and to back up such commitments with con19 crete actions such as prioritizing nuclear moderniza20 tion to sustain credible deterrence; 

21 (3) to reaffirm the importance of the forward22 deployed presence of United States military forces in 

23 Japan and Korea, and affirm close alliance coordina24 tion on any adjustment of United States military 

25 posture in the region; 


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1 (4) to strengthen United States efforts to con2 front emerging or asymmetric challenges, including 

3 cyber and space; 

4 (5) to safeguard maritime security and ensure 

5 freedom of navigation, commerce, and overflight in 

6 the Indo-Pacific region; and 

7 (6) to cooperate with allies and partners in the 

8 provision of public goods to the region, including hu9 manitarian relief and disaster response. 

10 (f) MILITARY MEASURES.—It is the policy of the 

11 United States— 

12 (1) to keep United States security commitments 

13 to United States allies in the face of North Korea’s 

14 continuing threat, including taking necessary actions 

15 for United States self-defense and the defense of 

16 United States allies, including joint military exer17 cises, modernization of weapons systems deployed in 

18 the region, and robust counter-provocation planning 

19 by the United States and Republic of Korea Com20 bined Forces Command; 

21 (2) consistent with longstanding United States 

22 interests in maintaining stability in Asia, to develop 

23 and deploy effective and reliable anti-ballistic missile 

24 capabilities to defend the United States homeland, 


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1 United States forces in the region, and United 

2 States allies Japan and South Korea; 

3 (3) to formulate and carry out military plan4 ning and operations impacting the Korean Peninsula 

5 in close cooperation with United States allies, par6 ticularly the Republic of Korea and Japan; 

7 (4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bol8 sters the force posture and military strength of our 

9 alliance and partner networks in the broader Asia10 Pacific region; and 

11 (5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, 

12 credible and overwhelming military options against 

13 the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 

14 of Korea, consistent with efforts to deter the regime 

15 from use of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and 

16 related technology. 

17 (g) HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the policy of the United 

18 States— 

19 (1) to continue to make it a priority to improve 

20 information access in North Korea by exploring the 

21 use of new and emerging technologies and expanding 

22 nongovernmental radio broadcasting to North Korea, 

23 including news and information, to increase informa24 tion dissemination in the Democratic People’s Re25 public of Korea (‘‘DPRK’’); 


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1 (2) to commit to exploring appropriate opportu2 nities for coordinating efforts to plan for humani3 tarian needs in the DPRK; 

4 (3) to press for non-choreographed access for 

5 the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 

6 rights in the DPRK and the United Nations High 

7 Commissioner for Human Rights; 

8 (4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign 

9 governments to allow the United States to process 

10 North Korean refugees overseas for United States 

11 resettlement; 

12 (5) to urge the Government of the People’s Re13 public of China to halt forcible repatriation of North 

14 Koreans; 

15 (6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a 

16 market economy in North Korea; 

17 (7) to increase the availability of nongovern18 mental controlled information inside North Korea; 

19 and 

20 (8) to uphold the North Korean regime to re21 solve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the 

22 North Korean regime and to emphasize the need for 

23 their safe return. 

24 (h) INFORMATION DISSEMINATION EFFORTS.—It is 

25 the policy of the United States— 


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1 (1) to increase the flow of information, news, 

2 and cultural programming into North Korea, includ3 ing through radio and television broadcasts, digital 

4 media, and other means; 

5 (2) to increase the flow of information to North 

6 Korean citizens, including through radio and tele7 vision broadcasts, digital media, and other means; 

8 and 

9 (3) to fulfill all requirements under United 

10 States law, including the North Korea Sanctions and 

11 Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, with regard to 

12 providing resources for freedom of information ef13 forts into North Korea, and to regularly consult with 

14 Congress regarding such efforts. 

15 (i) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit 

17 to the national security committees a detailed strat18 egy, which may include a classified annex, for the 

19 implementation of policies outlined in subsections (b) 

20 through (h), augmented by briefings to the national 

21 security committees on a quarterly basis or as re22 quested. 

23 (2) NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES DE24 FINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘national secu25 rity committees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

2 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com3 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 

4 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

5 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 

6 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

7 House of Representatives. 

8 SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. 

9 (a) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY REPORT.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

12 every 180 days thereafter for a period of two years, 

13 the President shall submit to the appropriate con14 gressional committees a report that describes— 

15 (A) how the diplomatic negotiations with 

16 the Government of the Democratic People’s Re17 public of Korea are expected to proceed; and 

18 (B) actions taken by the United States 

19 Government to address the threats posed by, 

20 and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s 

21 Republic of Korea. 

22 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

23 paragraph (1) shall include— 

24 (A) an overview of ongoing efforts by the 

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1 matic strategies to ensure that North Korea re2 turns to negotiations with the United States, as 

3 well as a negotiation strategy for the United 

4 States Government in the event that North 

5 Korea returns to negotiations with the United 

6 States, including an assessment of strategies— 

7 (i) to achieve peaceful 

8 denuclearization of North Korea; 

9 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by 

10 the ballistic and cruise missile programs of 

11 the Democratic People’s Republic of 

12 Korea; and 

13 (iii) to continue the maximum pres14 sure campaign, in coordination with United 

15 States allies; 

16 (B) an assessment of— 

17 (i) the roadmap toward peaceful 

18 denuclearization of North Korea and the 

19 elimination of the nuclear, ballistic, and 

20 cruise missile threats posed by the Demo21 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

22 (ii) specific actions that the Govern23 ment of the Democratic People’s Republic 

24 of Korea would need to take for such road25 map to become viable; 


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1 (iii) specific actions that the United 

2 States Government could possibly take for 

3 such roadmap to become viable; 

4 (iv) specific actions that other coun5 tries in the Indo-Pacific, including the Re6 public of Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, 

7 could possibly take for such roadmap to 

8 become viable; and 

9 (v) specific actions that international 

10 and regional institutions could possibly 

11 take for such roadmap to become viable; 

12 and 

13 (C) a summary of the United States strat14 egy to increase international coordination and 

15 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

16 multilaterally, including sanctions implementa17 tion, enforcement, and interdiction— 

18 (i) to encourage credible diplomatic 

19 engagement by the DPRK; and 

20 (ii) to address any threat posed by the 

21 nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missile pro22 grams of the Democratic People’s Republic 

23 of Korea. 


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1 (3) FORM.—Each report required under this 

2 subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

3 but may include a classified annex. 

4 (4) UPDATES.—Should the United States and 

5 North Korea engage in bilateral or multilateral di6 plomacy to achieve, implement, or verify that North 

7 Korea’s denuclearization is ongoing, the President 

8 shall augment the first strategy report submitted 

9 with written updates on the negotiation process, to 

10 be submitted to the appropriate congressional com11 mittees every 45 days thereafter. 

12 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

13 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE14 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—Not later than 30 days after termi15 nating any sanction with respect to the activities of the 

16 Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

17 Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of that govern18 ment, or any other person as provided for in Executive 

19 Order 13687 or Executive Order 13722, to the extent rel20 evant, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro21 priate congressional committees a report regarding the 

22 cessation of any illicit activity, including any implicated 

23 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 

24 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 


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1 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017), by 

2 that government or person. 

3 (c) ALLIANCES AND MILITARY POSTURE AND EX4 TENDED DETERRENCE.— 

5 (1) REPORT ON UNITED STATES FORCE POS6 TURE IN THE UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COM7 MAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.— 

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

10 annually thereafter for a period of two years, 

11 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the ap12 propriate congressional committees a report 

13 providing an assessment of the effect of any ne14 gotiations or agreements with the DPRK on 

15 United States security interests and United 

16 States military presence and alliance implica17 tions in the United States Indo-Pacific Com18 mand area of responsibility. 

19 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required 

20 under subparagraph (A) shall include— 

21 (i) a review of current and emerging 

22 United States national security interests in 

23 the United States Indo-Pacific Command 

24 area of responsibility; 


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1 (ii) a review of current United States 

2 military force posture and deployment 

3 plans of the United States Indo-Pacific 

4 Command; and 

5 (iii) the views of counterpart govern6 ments, including military commanders in 

7 the region, of the impact of negotiations or 

8 agreements with the DPRK on United 

9 States extended deterrence commitments 

10 to the Republic of Korea. 

11 (2) REPORT ON UNITED STATES FORCE POS12 TURE IN THE UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA AREA

13 OF RESPONSIBILITY.— 

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

16 every year thereafter for a period of two years, 

17 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the ap18 propriate congressional committees a report 

19 providing an assessment of the effect of any ne20 gotiations or agreements with the DPRK on 

21 United States security interests and United 

22 States military presence and alliance implica23 tions in the United States Forces Korea area of 

24 responsibility. 


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1 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required 

2 under subparagraph (A) shall include— 

3 (i) a review of current and emerging 

4 United States national security interests in 

5 the United States Forces Korea area of re6 sponsibility; 

7 (ii) a review of current United States 

8 military force posture and deployment 

9 plans of the United States Forces Korea; 

10 and 

11 (iii) the views of counterpart govern12 ments, including military commanders in 

13 the region, of the impact of negotiations or 

14 agreements with the DPRK on United 

15 States extended deterrence commitments 

16 to the Republic of Korea. 

17 (3) REPORT ON UNITED STATES FORCE POS18 TURE IN THE UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN AREA

19 OF RESPONSIBILITY.— 

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

21 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

22 annually thereafter for a period of two years, 

23 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the ap24 propriate congressional committees a report 

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1 gotiations or agreements with the DPRK on 

2 United States security interests and United 

3 States military presence and alliance implica4 tions in the United States Forces Japan area of 

5 responsibility. 

6 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required 

7 under subparagraph (A) shall include— 

8 (i) a review of current and emerging 

9 United States national security interests in 

10 the United States Forces Japan area of re11 sponsibility; 

12 (ii) a review of current United States 

13 military force posture and deployment 

14 plans of the United States Forces Japan; 

15 and 

16 (iii) the views of counterpart govern17 ments, including military commanders in 

18 the region, of the impact of negotiations or 

19 agreements with the DPRK on United 

20 States extended deterrence commitments 

21 to Japan. 

22 (4) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.— 

23 Any reports required to be submitted under this sub24 section to the appropriate congressional committees 

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1 sisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated 

2 into a single report. The consolidated report shall 

3 contain all information required under this Act with 

4 respect to the reports comprising such consolidated 

5 report. 

6 SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS. 

7 (a) MEMBER BRIEFINGS.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Following each round of dip9 lomatic talks between the United States and North 

10 Korea, the Secretary of State and the Director of 

11 National Intelligence shall hold, for the appropriate 

12 congressional committees and congressional leaders, 

13 briefings on the negotiations. 

14 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The briefings required 

15 under paragraph shall be held in a classified format. 

16 (b) STAFF BRIEFINGS.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

19 of State, with the concurrence of the Director of Na20 tional Intelligence, shall hold monthly briefings for 

21 cleared national security staff members of the appro22 priate congressional committees. 

23 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The briefings required 

24 under paragraph (1) shall be held in a classified for25 mat. 


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1 SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS. 

2 During each quarterly period that diplomatic talks 

3 undertaken between the United States and North Korea 

4 continue, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen5 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

6 of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and 

7 otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the 

8 negotiations. 

9 SEC. 8. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA. 

10 (a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR

11 AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA AND VERIFICATION

12 ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.— 

13 (1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not 

14 later than 5 days after reaching an agreement with 

15 North Korea relating to the nuclear and missile pro16 gram of North Korea, the President shall transmit 

17 to the appropriate congressional committees, the ma18 jority and minority leader of the Senate and the 

19 Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of the 

20 House of Representatives— 

21 (A) the agreement, including all related 

22 materials and annexes; and 

23 (B) a verification assessment report pre24 pared by the Secretary of State in accordance 

25 with paragraph (2). 

26 (2) VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT REPORT.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

2 shall prepare, with respect to an agreement de3 scribed in paragraph (1), a report assessing— 

4 (i) the extent to which the United 

5 States Government will be able to verify 

6 that North Korea is complying with its ob7 ligations and commitments under the 

8 agreement, including how North Korea 

9 might attempt to conceal its program; 

10 (ii) the adequacy of the safeguards 

11 and other control mechanisms and other 

12 assurances contained in the agreement 

13 with respect to North Korean nuclear and 

14 missile programs to ensure North Korea 

15 activities are limited to the subset of activi16 ties permitted under the agreement; and 

17 (iii) the capacity and capability of the 

18 United States and international organiza19 tions, such as the International Atomic 

20 Energy Agency, to effectively implement 

21 the verification regime required by or re22 lated to the agreement, including whether 

23 the United States or international organi24 zations will have— 

25 (I) sufficient access to— 


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1 (aa) all nuclear facilities 

2 that span the entire nuclear fuel 

3 cycle; 

4 (bb) facilities associated 

5 with the nuclear weaponization 

6 program; 

7 (cc) facilities associated with 

8 its missile program; and 

9 (dd) declared and 

10 undeclared sites; and 

11 (II) the ability to investigate sus12 picious sites or allegations of covert 

13 nuclear-related activities. 

14 (B) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The report re15 quired under subparagraph (A) shall be trans16 mitted in unclassified form, but shall include a 

17 classified annex prepared in consultation with 

18 the Director of National Intelligence, summa19 rizing relevant classified information. 

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NORTH KOREA FINAL

21 AGREEMENT.—It is the sense of Congress that any bind22 ing agreement between the United States and the Demo23 cratic People’s Republic of Korea should be submitted to 

24 the United States as a treaty and subject to the advice 

25 and consent of the Senate in accordance with article II, 


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1 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 

2 States. 

3 SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL REPORTS. 

4 (a) VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

6 entering into an agreement with North Korea, the 

7 Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Di8 rector of National Intelligence, shall submit to the 

9 appropriate congressional committees a report on 

10 North Korea’s record of verification and compliance. 

11 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The report required 

12 under paragraph— 

13 (A) may be submitted in classified form; 

14 (B) shall contain an unclassified executive 

15 summary; and 

16 (C) may contain an unclassified annex. 

17 (b) SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 

18 days after entering into an agreement with North Korea, 

19 and not less frequently than once every 180 days there20 after for a period of two years, the President shall submit 

21 to the appropriate congressional committees and leader22 ship a report on North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro23 gram and the compliance of North Korea with the agree24 ment during the period covered by the report, which shall 

25 include— 


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1 (1) a description of any action or failure to act 

2 by the Government of the Democratic People’s Re3 public of Korea that breached the agreement or is 

4 in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement; 

5 (2) a description of the status and activities of 

6 any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the nu7 clear fuel cycle, including mining and exploration, 

8 milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, re9 actors, reprocessing, and storage; 

10 (3) a description of the status and activities of 

11 any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the 

12 North Korean nuclear weaponization program, in13 cluding research and development, education and 

14 training, and testing; 

15 (4) a description of the status and activities of 

16 any North Korea missile facilities, including research 

17 and development, production, testing, and basing; 

18 (5) a description of any delay by the Govern19 ment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

20 of more than 1 week in providing inspectors access 

21 to facilities, people, and documents in North Korea 

22 as required by the agreement; 

23 (6) a description of any covert nuclear activities 

24 undertaken by the Government of the Democratic 

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1 clear weapons-related, covert fissile material activi2 ties, covert missile activities, or research and devel3 opment; and 

4 (7) a description of any transfer or diversion by 

5 the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 

6 of Korea of its nuclear materials, components, tech7 nology, or equipment to state or non-state actors. 

8 SEC. 10. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN CYBER ACTIVITIES 

9 TO FUND ITS WEAPONS PROGRAM. 

10 (a) FINDING.—As North Korea continues to be cut 

11 off from the international financial system, North Korea 

12 increasingly relies on new methods and means—such as 

13 cryptocurrency, digital currency, and cyberattacks—to fi14 nance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs. 

15 A February 2022 United Nations report found that North 

16 Korean hackers stole more than $50,000,000 in 

17 cryptocurrencies between 2020 and mid-2021. The report 

18 follows the United Nations’ 2019 findings that North 

19 Korea had accumulated an estimated $2,000,000,000 in 

20 stolen assets to facilitate its weapons program through 

21 cyberattacks. 

22 (b) REPORT.— 

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

24 after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually 

25 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination 


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1 with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Na2 tional Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bu3 reau of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, 

4 and the Attorney General, shall submit to the appro5 priate congressional committees a report on North 

6 Korea’s use of cyberattacks and cryptocurrency and 

7 other digital currency to finance its nuclear weapons 

8 and ballistic missiles programs, including through 

9 the evasion of sanctions. 

10 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

11 subparagraph (A) shall include— 

12 (A) a review of how North Korea uses 

13 cyberattacks, including stealing virtual assets, 

14 to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic 

15 missiles programs; 

16 (B) a discussion of how cryptocurrency ex17 changes and exchange operators facilitate North 

18 Korean theft, and recommendations for sanc19 tioning persons and entities linked to illicit 

20 cryptocurrency exchange; 

21 (C) a review of how the United States Gov22 ernment is tracing, disrupting, interdicting, and 

23 deterring these attacks, including— 

24 (i) efforts to deter telecommunications 

25 companies from facilitating North Korean 


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1 cyberattacks directed at digital financial 

2 platforms; 

3 (ii) efforts to deter over-the-counter 

4 (OTC) brokers and other actors from laun5 dering digital assets and converting such 

6 assets to fiat currencies; 

7 (iii) efforts to coordinate 

8 cryptocurrency regulations with partners 

9 and allies, including through forums like 

10 the United Nations, the Financial Action 

11 Task Force, the Group of Seven, and the 

12 Group of Twenty; and 

13 (iv) efforts to increase intelligence 

14 sharing on cyber threats with partners and 

15 allies to better trace North Korean 

16 cyberattacks and cyber theft of digital as17 sets; and 

18 (D) a review of how the United States 

19 Government is working with its allies and part20 ners, as well as international institutions and 

21 the private sector, to trace, disrupt, interdict, 

22 and deter North Korea’s cyberattacks. 


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1 SEC. 11. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

2 USE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY TO EVADE SANC3 TIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO NORTH 

4 KOREA AND ABDUCTION BY NORTH KOREAN 

5 PERSONS OF CITIZENS OF JAPAN. 

6 Section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions and 

7 Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214(a)) is 

8 amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (14), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and 

10 inserting a semicolon; 

11 (2) by redesignating paragraph (15) as para12 graph (17); 

13 (3) by inserting after paragraph (14) the fol14 lowing: 

15 ‘‘(15) knowingly uses or has used, or directly 

16 facilitates or has directly facilitated the use of, 

17 cryptocurrency, a digital currency, or a comparable 

18 monetary instrument to evade sanctions with respect 

19 to North Korea imposed by the United States or 

20 pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security 

21 Council resolution; 

22 ‘‘(16) is a North Korean person and knowingly 

23 participated in or facilitated the abduction of a cit24 izen of Japan; or’’; and 


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1 (4) in paragraph (17), as redesignated by para2 graph (2) of this section, by striking ‘‘(14)’’ and in3 serting ‘‘(16)’’. 

4 SEC. 12. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 

5 STABILITY OF NORTH KOREA. 

6 Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this 

7 Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 

8 the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit 

9 to Congress a classified report on the political, economic, 

10 and social stability of North Korea. 

11 SEC. 13. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within the 

13 Department of State, the Office of the Special Representa14 tive for North Korea (in this section referred to as the 

15 ‘‘Office’’). The head of the Office shall have the rank and 

16 status of ambassador and shall be appointed by the Presi17 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

18 The head of the Office shall report directly to the Sec19 retary of State. 

20 (b) DUTIES.—The head of the Office shall have such 

21 duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of State 

22 shall prescribe, including implementing the policy of the 

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1 ning for various scenarios with respect to the Korean Pe2 ninsula. 

3 (c) INDEPENDENCE OF THE OFFICE.—The Office of 

4 the Special Representative for North Korea shall maintain 

5 management and budget independence and shall maintain 

6 an adequate number of dedicated staff. 

7 (d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Department of State 

9 shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on 

10 the structure and priorities of the Office, including with 

11 respect to staffing and management. 

Æ 


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