Number 155, January 1999

Turkey’s Year ofLiving Dangerously
by Judith S. Yaphe

Conclusions- 
Turkey’s generals    temporarily resolved what they viewed as the country’s most serious political crisis    in 1997 by forcing the resignation of the government led by the leader of the Islamist    Refah Party. 

The next civilian government, which    resigned in late 1998, was too weak to direct policy or to govern the generals. A leader    is being sought to put together a new government. New elections, whenever held, are    unlikely to resolve the tensions between military and civilian leaders.

- Disputes with Greece over Cyprus and    missile deployments, and with Syria over support for anti-Turkish Kurdish terrorists, pose    a serious threat to Mediterranean security.  
- Turkey is becoming increasingly    alienated from Europe due to its virtual civil war against the Kurds of southeastern    Turkey and anti-Ankara Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, and a poor human rights record. An    unintended consequence has been closer ties with the United States, although some Turkish    policies continue to differ from current U.S. policy. 
- Turkey’s expanding ties to Israel    are drawing condemnation from its neighbors in the Arab and Muslim Middle East. The ties,    which include military upgrades, arms sales, and intelligence cooperation, raise    accusations of hostile encirclement and malevolent intent from Damascus, Tehran, and    Cairo. 
**Background: The Stealth Coup

The intervention by the Turkish militaryin June 1997, its fourth since 1960, was the first to stop short of a direct takeover ofthe government. The confrontation with civil authority began in early 1997, when theNational Security Council, dominated by the Turkish General Staff, declared *reactionism*—Islamistactivism—to be a greater threat to Turkish security than *separatism*—theinsurrection headed by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). The General Staff stepped upits campaign in February 1998 when it announced a series of demands outlining what waspermissible and what was banned to protect the security of the state and the legacy ofsecularism as defined by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish Republic inthe 1920s. The restrictions banned some forms of religious education, mosque construction,and the wearing of Islamic clothing (the *hijab*or headscarf for women and girls,the turban for men). They also provided for monitoring the media and prohibitedpoliticians and government officials from "contradicting the principles of therepublic."

Military leaders insisted the governmentenforce the demands. When Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz tried to distinguish areasappropriate for military scrutiny—national security issues, such as the Kurdishinsurgency—from areas of governance appropriate for civilian governmentoversight—education and dress code policy—the Turkish General Staff warned that"No one, for the sake of his personal interests or ambitions . . . can confuse,weaken, or overshadow the Turkish armed forces’ determination to fight separatist orfundamentalist activities."
**The Turkish General Staff: Preserving thePast

The military is Turkey’s oldest, mostdisciplined, and most respected institution. It enjoys a wide measure of popular support,according to opinion polls and most observers of Turkish politics. Its General Staff viewsthe world as hostile and threatening. While the generals apparently believe they havesuppressed Turkey’s Kurdish militants, Ankara continues to fight the Kurdish rebelsof Northern Iraq. The generals also accuse Greece, Iran, and Syria (which has shelteredPKK leader Abdullah Ocalan) of providing assistance to the PKK.

According to the generals, Turkey’sIslamists—Muslims with a political agenda—pose the greatest threat to nationalsecurity and identity. They make no apparent distinction between Islamists with politicalagendas, Islamists with more radical leanings, Islamists with no political ambitions, andMuslims desiring more personal piety in their daily lives. If Islamists view the 7thcentury community of the Prophet Muhammad as the ideal, the generals prefer the 1930s,when Ataturk ruled and the Republic seemed safe from domestic challenges. The February1998 demands emphasized that no concessions would be made to activities that threatenedTurkey’s democratic, secular, and social state.

In 1998, the generals escalated theircampaign against real and suspected enemies of the Republic. The campaign against theIslamists and the Kurds was expanded to include a ban on the Refah Party and possibly itssuccessor, the Virtue Party; trials and jail for Islamist politicians (includingIstanbul’s mayor, who was convicted of insulting Ataturk); a purge of civil servantsappointed by or suspected of sympathizing with the Islamists; and a ban on wearingtraditional dress at universities. Following the capture and confession of a senior PKKdefector, an unknown number of Turks, including prominent journalists and politicians whohad been implicated by the defector, were arrested for allegedly providing aid and comfortto the PKK.
**Risks of Domestic Containment

The Islamists are changing the way manyTurks think about the state and society. The Islamist goal is to reform society from thebottom up, with the ultimate goal of establishing rule by *shariat*(religious law)rather than the secular, western law codes instituted by Ataturk. Reform since Ataturk hasbeen based on a top-down theory, with the military as the model, definer, and purveyor ofmodernization and reform. Many Turks agree with the military that Turkey should remainsecular and democratic and that growing Islamist influence and power risk the freedomsthey prize, but the current repressiveness of the generals raises concerns amongsecularists and Islamists alike about civil rights and abuse of power. Turks are becomingmore polarized than they were in 1997 when the military began its confrontation with theRefah-led government.

The military risks losing popular supportas its repression of suspected enemies increases and the generals deny space for personalpiety or dissenting political opinion. The military still enjoys a reputation for honestyand integrity, qualities not always observed in the country’s civilian politicians.However, some intellectuals, while they back a secular, westernized Turkey, alsodiscreetly criticize the military for heavy-handed tactics and for deliberately leaking orplanting false information about who sympathizes or supports Kurdish activists in order toact against suspected sympathizers. The generals also risk a backlash from a broaderspectrum of Turkish society than previously thought—lower and middle class elementswho favor secularism *and* more personal piety; and younger military officers who mayfavor a degree of personal piety but keep quiet rather than endanger their careers.Finally, the military’s intolerance could provoke confrontation with studentdemonstrators and groups as universities reopen and women wearing the *hijab*aredenied entrance or refused permission to take exams.
**Disappointment in Europe

The greatest disappointments for the Turksand the most serious risks to regional security in 1998 came in Europe. Once again, firstin Luxembourg in December 1997 and then in Cardiff in June 1998, the Turks were denied theopportunity to join with 12 other governments in applying for membership in the EU. And tomake the point of omission more painful, Greek Cyprus was among those invited to apply forEU membership. Moreover, the European Customs Union failed to make promised payments toTurkey for its participation in the European Monetary Union, and some trade in foodstuffswas canceled in the spring of 1998. 

Turkish civilian politicians were quick tocondemn the European actions as racist, reactionary, and anti-Muslim. The Turkish GeneralStaff, however, values its membership in NATO and participation in European peacekeepingand other activities above all other ties. It has chosen to ignore the actions by the EUand gloss over trade imbalances while pursuing closer ties to Germany and other Europeancountries.

The risk to regional security is far moregrave. Turkey and Greece have long held rival claims to Cyprus and islands, airspace, andthe continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leaders insist thattwo states be recognized on Cyprus. Athens demands the withdrawal of the 30,000 Turkishtroops occupying the island. Athens also prefers to take the issue of the Aegean islandsto the International Court of Justice, where it would almost certainly win. Turkey refusesadjudication. Both have overflown Cyprus and sent combat aircraft to the island incontravention of international restrictions. Both have threatened to make good on promisesto conclude virtual union with their Cypriot clients. To underscore its security concerns,Greek Cyprus purchased S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Moscow. Turkey has warned it willnot allow the deployment of the missiles, which Russia has not yet delivered. 
**Enhancing Partnership

Turkey’s relations with the UnitedStates improved considerably in 1998. The improvement reflects, in part, the EU’srejection of Turkey and the removal of ‘irritants’ in U.S.-Turkish ties. Theseincluded the delivery of three frigates and Cobra helicopters to Turkey. In addition, U.S.efforts in support of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, trade and investment, and securitycooperation have been welcomed in Ankara. U.S. foreign assistance to Turkey has ended,however, and Ankara is troubled by U.S. attitudes on several issues:

*The Middle East Peace Process:*Turkeyprobably assumes that better relations with Israel are viewed favorably in Washington, butAnkara has been uncomfortable with seeming U.S. vacillation in advancing the peaceprocess. The generals seem to be out-of-step with many Turks who prefer closer ties toMuslim states rather than Israel. Ankara is even more unsettled by the prospect that Syriawill enter negotiations and gain U.S. and Western approval. If Damascus were to sign on topeace with Israel and draw down its forces on the Golan, where would Syrian troops bedeployed? For the Turkish generals, the answer is the Turkish border. But, the Turks alsoworry about a Syria without Assad, believing Syria needs a strong ruler to keep the PKKunder wraps and to observe water agreements.

*Iraq:*Sanctions on Iraq areunpopular with most Turks, and Ankara is growing increasingly uncomfortable with a U.S.policy that is unpopular among its Muslim citizens and of little economic value. Thegenerals claim to agree with the U.S. position that Iraq’s efforts to acquire anddevelop WMD represent a danger to the region, but agreement is probably intended more forU.S. consumption than Turkish. U.S. policy supports the territorial integrity of Iraq,while Turkey advocates its political and territorial integrity. The difference is Turkishwillingness, and perhaps preference, to deal with Saddam Hussein rather than a weaksuccessor or a chaotic civil war, either of which could result in renewed Kurdishrebellion and threats to Turkish security.

*Iran:* Turkey’s generals haveaccused Iran of supporting terrorism and encouraging an Islamic revolution in Turkeysimilar to the 1979 revolution in Iran. Some observers say that anti-Iranian attitudesamong Turkey’s generals are the result of the close ties they had with theShah’s military leaders, many of whom sought refuge in Turkey after the revolution.Nevertheless, Turkey’s civilian governments—both the Islamist-led Erbakangovernment and the secular regime of Yilmaz—have actively sought to improvediplomatic and trade ties with Tehran.

*Russia:*Russians have a longhistory of fighting Turks in Europe and Central Asia. Despite the benefits of Russiantrade, tourism, and expatriate earnings, Ankara sees Moscow as a threat to Turkisheconomic and cultural expansion in the Turkic republics of Central Asia.
**Outlook Bleak

The outlook for Turkey is bleak.Elections, regardless of when they are held, may result in another weak civil governmentwhile the General Staff pursues its list of real and imagined opponents. Most observers ofTurkish politics believe the generals will not abandon democratic practices, although theymay continue trying to manipulate the process and the politicians. Turks agree that theirpolitical system is in crisis, but it is unlikely that civilian leaders, parliamentarians,or political parties will be able to resolve this problem. There appear to be no newcivilian political leaders on the horizon.

Most participants of a workshop on Turkey,held at National Defense University in May 1998, believed that Turkey would not directlyattack the S-300 missiles if deployed, but they felt that the risk of an unintended ordeliberate incident over Cyprus or the Aegean islands is very high. For example, a Greekradar lock-on to Turkish aircraft overflying airspace claimed by Greece would certainlyprovoke a Turkish response, as it would be an act of war as defined by internationalconventions. Press sources in Israel and Turkey described training exercises last summerthat included dealing with SA-10 missiles, the not-for-export version of the Russian-madeS-300.

The EU debate has had widespread andunintended consequences for Turkey:
- It risks further isolating Turkey from    Europe. Although the Turkish General Staff has chosen to ignore the EU rejection, a    growing number of Turks may turn against lop-sided, pro-European policies at the expense    of ties with Muslim and Central Asian countries. 
- It pushes Turkey closer to the United    States. Ankara looks to Washington to mitigate the anti-Turkish trend in the EU and the    failure of the European Customs Union to deliver promised funding. Ankara was persuaded to    support NATO enlargement, but it is unlikely to back future expansion. It may distance    itself from U.S. interests by expanding ties to Iran and reopening full relations with    Iraq. 
- It also brings new importance to ties    with Israel. The Turkish General Staff sees Israel as a source of military hardware to    modernize its armed forces, weapons and system upgrades, should they be denied if the    United States were to reimpose an arms embargo. This relationship will increase in    importance if European and U.S. assistance in modernizing the Turkish military is denied. 

Several kinds of crises could arise:
- Accidental or intentional confrontation    with Greece over missile deployments on Cyprus or another island.  
- Confrontation between students and the    military when students wearing the *hijab* or other forms of traditional dress are    denied entrance to universities and refused permission to take exams. 
- A growing unease among younger military    officers who may favor a degree of personal piety but keep quiet rather than endanger    their careers. 
- Another flare-up with Damascus over    support for Turkish-Kurdish dissidents, the amount of water Ankara releases to Syria, or    Turkish military exercises held too near the border. 
- Problems with the United States if    Israel, which has agreed to upgrade Turkey’s aircraft with more advanced missiles,    transfers military technology it co-produces with the United States. 

Turkey’s generals are on guardagainst the enemy abroad—in the Middle East, Southern Europe, Central Asia, and theBalkans—as well as the enemy within. Ankara expects U.S. assistance in its struggleswith the EU and in meeting its economic and defense requirements. The Turks also believeWashington is too complacent about Russian intentions in Central Asia and the Caucasus,too willing to accommodate Syria in the peace process, and too uncompromising in itssanctions policies on Iran and Iraq. Several actions by the United States could help easeTurkish concerns about its external threats and internal security risks:
- Assist Turkish economic self-sufficiency    by supporting construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and increasing U.S. trade and    investment. 
- Keep Turkey engaged in Europe by urging    the EU to reconsider Turkish membership and encouraging the European Customs Union to    release promised funds to Turkey. NATO could expand joint military training opportunities    such as the Partnership for Peace exercises in Central Asia. The United States should try    to convince EU members that engagement is a more effective means of moderating Turkish    behavior than isolation. At the same time, Turkey’s generals should be encouraged to    be less intrusive in the country’s domestic political life and less restrictive on    the institutions of civil society. 
- Continue to work on confidence-building    measures between Athens and Ankara and discourage Moscow from delivering the S-300    missiles. In previous potentially dangerous scenarios, war has been avoided because both    sides agreed on face-saving measures to defuse tensions. Renewed mediation, perhaps to    include other NATO members, might have greater impact than solo U.S. efforts. The United    States should also support Arab efforts to repair relations between Ankara and Damascus.  
- Institutionalize U.S.-Turkish military    relationships. One observer sees strength in the personal relationships that have    developed between senior Turkish and U.S. military officials. But others warn of too much    reliance by U.S. and Turkish militaries on personal relationships and too little awareness    on the part of the United States of where Turkish society is heading. One scholar warned    that the apparent warmth of U.S.-Turkish military-to-military relations was restricted to    senior officers and may not permeate the lower levels of the Turkish military.  

U.S.-Turkish relations were the topic of aroundtable of specialists held at National Defense University in May 1998. Dr. Judith S.Yaphe is a Senior Fellow of INSS. Comments or questions should be referred to Dr. Yaphe at202-685-2224 or e-mail [email protected]. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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