Number 152, December 1998**North Korean Leadership*Kim Jong Il’s IntergenerationalBalancing Act
by Jei Guk Jeon

Conclusions- One key to the unexpected longevity of    North Korea—the world’s last unreformed Stalinist polity—lies in Kim Jong    Il’s adroit balancing act between the old and young elites since coming to power in    1994 following his father’s death. 
- Based on "inclusive politics"    and an "honor-power sharing" arrangement, Kim Jong Il’s balancing act has    effectively reduced factional cleavages that might otherwise have crippled the hereditary    succession plan. 
- The "honor-power sharing"    arrangement—which gives honors to the older elites and real power to younger    elites—has secured the loyalty of both the old guard and younger hopefuls. 
- As long as Kim Jong Il’s balancing    act works and internal solidarity remains firm, the new regime could survive for a    prolonged period. 
- If the balance breaks down,    Pyongyang’s power circle will slip into a centrifugal spiral, followed by power    struggles among rival factions and the eventual collapse of the regime. 
**The Transition of Power

The death of a totalitarian leader in thecommunist world, such as Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao in China, can lead to a powerstruggle. North Korea’s Kim Il Sung was a totalitarian ruler no less absolutist thanany other socialist leader. Therefore, when Kim Il Sung died in July 1994 outsideobservers predicted an imminent power struggle. Surprisingly the demise of NorthKorea’s "Great Leader," however, did not result in any particular changesin court politics. To all appearances, Pyongyang’s power elite remained calm andstable, without any signs of factional infighting. Herein lies the mystery of contemporaryNorth Korean politics. 
**Is the Post-Kim Il Sung Power CircleReally Immune to Factional Cleavages?

Looking at the political landscape in1994, the North Korean power circle was not totally immune to factional cleavages. Rather,upon closer examination, factional rumblings were underway behind the scenes, feeding onthe uncertainties surrounding succession politics. For example, Kim’s clan appearedfar from monolithic—allegedly divided into several intra-clan factions. In additionto Kim Jong Il’s faction, prominent others included his uncle Kim Young Ju’sline, his step-mother Kim Song Ae’s faction, his half-brother Kim Pyong Il’sclique, and his father’s comrades-in-arms. With the head of the family [Kim Il Sung]gone, the clan itself might have turned into a seedbed of power struggles. 

Intra-military cleavages also seemed toexist. Allegedly there were three military factions: the old-generation hardliners; theyounger-generation officers mainly composed of Kim Jong Il supporters; and a neutralfaction indifferent to the old-young conflicts. Another potential source of intra-militarydiscord was a rift between the Pyongyang garrison command and the field army. 

A wider cleavage that developed in thepower circle was the intergenerational split that had been forming along the two differentleadership lines of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. As part of the father-to-son successionplan, Kim Il Sung had made every effort to create Kim Jong Il’s own power base. Basedon his father’s strong support, Kim Jong Il prepared a solid power base in the rulingtroika—the party, the state, and the army. Against this backdrop, however, NorthKorea’s power structure became "dualistic," with two semi-independenthierarchies of authority and two self-sustaining chains of command—one leading to KimIl Sung and another leading to Kim Jong Il. Whereas Kim Il Sung’s power structure wasfirmly founded on the old-generation revolutionaries, Kim Jong Il’s command line wasbuilt around the younger elite of the three-revolution squads, and the graduates ofMankyongdae Revolutionary Academy, Namsan School, and Kimil-sung University. The death ofKim Il Sung therefore signaled a dramatic shift of power toward the Kim Jong Il line. Aradical power shift could have triggered repercussions from the old guards who had doubtsabout Kim Jong Il’s leadership capacity.

Given the multiple sources of internaldicontent, there was no guarantee that Kim Jong Il could automatically ascend to power. Ifany of the potential cleavages had flared up for any reason, the succession plan wouldhave evaporated over night. 

Against this background, Kim Jong Ilemployed a balancing strategy aimed at preventing potential ruptures and pulling all agegroups into his own political orbit. For the old guards, he opted for"inclusive" politics. For the younger hopefuls, he created an "honor-powersharing" arrangement. In so doing, Kim Jong Il was prudent and cautious, at odds withhis image in the outside world as an "impatient, reckless, irrational actor."His behaviors toward the power elite turned out to be carefully crafted tactics based on arelatively rational calculation of political costs and benefits. 
**Care of the Old Guard: *InclusivePolitics*

After the death of Kim Il Sung, thesuccessor-designate Kim Jong Il’s strategic options with the old guards were toexclude or include them. Given some unreliable elements in the ruling circle, theexclusionary option could have been the surest way to eliminate all the potential rivalsand unreliable figures once and for all. 

However, Kim Jong Il was not in a positionto do away with the old guard. The aged revolutionaries, who had fought anti-Japaneseguerrilla warfare together with Kim Il Sung, still dominated leadership posts in theruling troika. During the transition period, therefore, assuring the loyalty of the oldguards was of greater value than jettisoning them in concluding the succession plan. IfKim Jong Il had chosen to be antagonistic toward the elders, it could have been costly.Also, considering their ages, the days of these elders are numbered. Therefore, it wasunnecessary to hurriedly remove them at the risk of political repercussions. 

Based on these calculations, Kim Jong Ilchose an "inclusionary" option toward the old guard. He managed to curb thepolitical passions of the younger elite, who have so far devoted their total loyalty tohim. He also controlled his own political ambition, refusing further honors for himselfand thereby sending a message to younger hopefuls that loyalty to Kim Jong Il is thesurest route to power in due time. 

Having calmed the aspirations of theyounger elite, Kim Jong Il declared that "to respect the revolutionary seniors is anoble moral obligation of all revolutionaries," and "the revolutionaryachievements of old guards must be inherited and protected." Along this policy line,he retained all the elders employed by Kim Il Sung and kept intact the ruling machineryand policies devised by his father. Few old revolutionaries, therefore, were replacedbefore the first meeting of the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly, held in earlySeptember 1998, when a number of posts went to the younger elite. Nor has he conductedpolitical purges to do away with the unreliable old guards. 

Kim’s strategic action toward the oldguard proved prudent enough to ensure their loyalty. Even when an elder dies, Kim appointsa successor only after a dignified period of time. For example, when his father’sdefense minister Oh Jin-U died in spring 1995, Kim Jong Il left the minister’sposition vacant for more than seven months before naming a new minister, Choe Kwang.Likewise, although Choe died in February 1997, the post was left vacant until September1998, when Kim Il Chul was appointed.

Kim strengthened the loyalty of the oldguard by retaining old high-ranking officials in their posts even when some of theirrelatives defected to Seoul. For example, Prime Minister Kang Song-San stayed in the samepost until recently although his son-in-law defected to Seoul in 1994. Taking into accountthat—in the past—families of defectors had been punished harshly, suchextraordinary treatment could be enough to induce the elders’ loyalty.

Thanks to his inclusivepolitics—retaining all the old revolutionaries in their incumbent posts—Kim hasbeen able to inherit not only his father’s leadership titles but also the sustainedloyalty of the old guard. 
**Appeasing Younger Hopefuls: *Honor-PowerSharing*

Having retained the old elite and itspolicies, post-Kim Il Sung North Korea looks like a "land that time forgot,"where nothing has ever changed. However, the indefinite continuation of such a phenomenonmight have triggered discontent among the younger hopefuls, who had long been waiting forthe Kim Jong Il era. Therefore, it was necessary for Kim to appease the young-elite tomaintain their loyalty to him. 

Once the loyalty of the old guards wasassured, Kim quietly began realigning power arrangements to please both the old and youngelite. He introduced an "honor-power sharing" practice. "Honors" aregiven to the elders while "real power" is given to the younger. Perhaps thisploy takes into account the value orientations varying across generations—the oldertend to seek honors while the younger seek power. Many old revolutionaries thus merelyremained in honorable, symbolic, prestigious posts, while the younger elite, mainlyKim’s friends and close associates, have been placed in key posts with real power. 

Also, during the three years of mourningKim Il Sung’s death (1994-97), about fifty power elite died, including deputy premierKang Hi-Won and the two aforementioned defense ministers. Taking advantage of thisopportunity, Kim Jong Il has quietly placed hand-picked junior elite to key posts in theparty, state, and army. 

Kim Jong Il has stabilized andsubstantially broadened his power base, encompassing all age groups, ranging from theelders (ages 60s, 70s and 80s) to the young hopefuls (ages 30s and 40s). A window has thusbeen opened for the peaceful transition of power from one generation to another. 
**Strategy Effectiveness

Kim Jong Il’s intergenerationalbalancing act turned out to be a "win-win" formula for himself as well as forall the old and young power elite. For Kim in particular, the balancing act bore richfruits. First, he reincorporated all age groups into his own political circle,successfully suturing all the potential cleavages within the ruling group. Thus far nosign of power struggles has surfaced. And, the foundation of the Kim Jong Il regime hasbeen firmly consolidated, based on the intergenerational harmony. Second, steered byKim’s balancing act, Pyongyang’s power circle has been undergoing a quietgenerational shift, without frictions between the old and young generations or substantialchanges in the existing power structure. 

However, upon closer examination, theseemingly adroit tactics have their own inherent limits and contradictions, which mightundermine the foundation of the regime in the long run. Kim’s inclusive politics laidan unexpected obstacle to internal reform and external opening, by keeping intact theconservative old-revolutionaries who prefer *status-quo* to substantial changes. Aslong as the old guard has leverage in politics, meaningful reform is unlikely to occur.

The "delicate" balance betweenold and young elites and/or truce between hawks and doves may not last indefinitely.Ironically, thanks to Kim’s inclusive politics, some "unreliable" elementscontinue to survive in the ruling circle. Herein lies the seed of potential cleavages anddissidence. As long as Kim’s balancing act continues to work, the power elite willremain openly loyal to him. However, if the balancing act breaks down, the power elite islikely to fragment and may turn against Kim Jong Il.

For example, if the balancer disappearsfrom the scene—perhaps due to an accident, illness, or for any other reason, thedelicate balance he has devised may evaporate. Kim Jong Il’s balancing could also befractured by radical political changes caused by events such as a palace coup, food riots,or external pressures. Given some unreliable and/or alienated elites, the possibility of apalace coup cannot be ruled out. If a coup were to remove Kim Jong Il, the successorprobably could not duplicate Kim’s balancing act.

The ailing economy is a challenge toKim’s balancing act. Although the economic pain alone might not be automaticallytranslated into political unrest, it could be a catalyst leading to internal disputes.However tightly controlled and thoroughly inured to Spartan hardship, the North Koreanmasses, if starved enough, may rise up in food riots. Food riots might initially besuppressed by military force, but this would invite intense criticism from theinternational community. Moreover, brutal suppression of starving masses might lead tosome military units breaking with the regime, because the extended families of soldiersand lower-echelon officers could be affected by food shortages.

Even if such events do not happen, theever-deepening economic ills could reduce the political leverage that is indispensable toKim’s balancing act. Thus far he has been able to manage political patronage at hisown will, using a huge sum of political funds. However, if he could no longer providesufficient favors for the power elite due to a depletion of economic resources, hispolitical leverage and maneuverability would be reduced and his balancing act disturbed.

If the delicate balance breaks down, thepower circle would turn into a downward spiral. Not only would all the latent cleavagescome to the surface, but new factions might also arise. Pyongyang thus might turn into apolitical ground of factional rivalries along family lines, the inner-circle *vs*.outer-circle, the Party *vs.* the Army, field commands *vs.*border/securityguards, political officers *vs.* regular army commanders, politico-security apparatus*vs.* socio-economic/diplomatic apparatus, hardliners *vs.* reformists, and soon. Intense power struggles could result in anarchy, followed by the collapse of theStalinist regime and even the state.

**Personality Reconsidered**
The persona of Kim Jong Il    still remains an enigma. Above all, his reclusive behaviors continue to puzzle the outside    world. He has rarely traveled outside the cocoon of the hermit kingdom. His public    appearances are extremely rare. His public utterances are almost nil. Such behaviors give    birth to numerous speculations over his personality. He is characterized, particularly by    westerners, as "an unstable madman," "a black prince of terror,"    "a reckless and unpredictable leader," "a provocative actor," or    "a closet reformer." Casting Kim Jong Il into such a stereotype, however, is    misleading. He appears to be more clever, calculating and tactful than expected. In the    light of his political actions, he is likely to master and/or enjoy dual tactics. His    dualistic ploy may be seen in such practices as: (a) "controlled reform" to    attract foreign investments while reiterating "our own-style socialism"; (b) the    provision of exclusive favors for the People’s Army while taming it with harsh    sticks; (c) the rejection of official dialogues with Seoul while encouraging unofficial    contacts with businessmen; and (d) a brinkmanship diplomacy toward Washington with a    nuclear card in one hand and with a peace card in another. Although these tactics have not    always produced benefits, it might be safe to say that Kim Jong Il is neither stupid nor    crazy.
Jei Guk Jeon, of the Republic of Korea, isa visiting fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. For more information hecan be contacted by e-mail at [email protected].

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