Page 1 of 10 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ANUEL ST. CLAIR, individually and on behalf 

of all others similarly situated,

 Plaintiff, 

vs.

USHEALTH ADVISORS, LLC, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________________/

Case No. 20-CV-61206-RKA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH DEFENDANT’S SUBPOENA TO GOOGLE

AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff Anuel St. Clair, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 45, hereby moves to quash 

Defendant USHealth Advisors, LLC’s document subpoena to non-party Google, LLC (Plaintiff’s

cell phone provider) and for entry of a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the information

and documents identified in the subpoena, and in support thereof states as follows: 

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this TCPA class action after Defendant sent unsolicited, pre-recorded 

voice mails to his cellular telephone, and the cell phones of thousands of other putative class 

members, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant served a document

subpoena on Google, LLC (Plaintiff’s cell phone provider), identifying ten categories of 

documents or data for production, seeking, among other things, (i) recordings of Plaintiff’s 

voicemails, his voicemail history, metadata, call logs, call history, invoices, payment records, 

receipts, and IP Addresses for two telephone numbers, from January 1, 2019 to the present; (ii) 

Plaintiff’s GPS and/or cell site information; (iii) documents sufficient to identify if and when 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 1 of 10
Page 2 of 10 

Plaintiff received voicemails from certain telephone numbers, whether the voicemails were later 

deleted, and if so, the date of deletion; and (iv) all of Plaintiff’s service agreements and account 

opening statements for two telephone numbers, without limitation as to time. A copy of 

the subpoena is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Through extensive discovery competed to date, Plaintiff has already produced many of the

documents, or the information underlying the documents being sought from Google, which 

includes, among other things, recordings of the prerecorded voicemails referenced in the 

complaint, Plaintiff’s call logs showing the telephone number that transmitted the subject

prerecorded voicemail, Plaintiff’s IP Addresses, and other relevant information. 

As will be shown below, all of the documents listed in the subpoena are either irrelevant, 

protected by Plaintiff’s personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone records, or not subject to 

discovery pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs the scope of permissible discovery. It provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

[U]nless otherwise limited by court order . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or

defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance

of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'

relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of

the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the

proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Although Rule 26 allows for broad discovery, it is not an unlimited license for 

a fishing expedition. Dellacasa, LLC v. John Moriarty & Assocs. of Fla., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 84898, 2007 WL 4117261, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2007) (internal quotations omitted).

Moreover, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) requires the Court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if: 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 2 of 10
Page 3 of 10

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 

less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to 

obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery 

is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2)(C).

Pursuant to Rule 26(c), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 

or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... 

forbidding the disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A). “The scope of discovery 

under a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.” Woods v. On 

Baldwin Pond, LLC, No. 6:13-CV-726-ORL-19DAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194001, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2014).

They court may quash a subpoena if it (1) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (2) 

requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (3) requires 

disclosure of privileged or other protected matter if no exception or waiver applies; or (4) subjects 

a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).

ARGUMENT

The Court should quash the document subpoena issued to Google for several reasons. First,

it is overly broad and seeks information that is irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the 

case. Second, Plaintiff has a well-established personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone 

records, which outweighs any conceivable need by Defendant for production of the documents. 

Third, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq, prohibits disclosure of Plaintiff’s 

private information, electronic communications, and other electronic data managed and controlled

by Google.

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 3 of 10
Page 4 of 10

A. The Subpoena is Overly Broad and Seeks Information that is Irrelevant and Not 

Proportional to the Needs of the Case

The items requested in Defendant’s subpoena are irrelevant, unimportant to resolving any

of the key issues, and not proportional to the needs of the case. As detailed below, the requested 

materials are not relevant to any material issue in this TCPA action, which would include, among 

other things, “whether Defendant[] violated the TCPA and whether Plaintiff gave prior express

[written] consent to receive” calls from Defendant using an artificial or prerecorded voice.

See Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23739, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016). 

As courts have noted when considering, and ultimately quashing or modifying, subpoenas to 

cellular carriers, litigants “should not have unfettered access ... to the phone numbers of all persons 

that [an opposing party] has called or texted over” a certain period of time. C.H. v. School Board, 

No. 3:18-cv-2128, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210848, at *12-13 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2020); see also 

Smith v. Pefanis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12613, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding the 

defendants “have not shown any reason that they should be granted unrestricted access to plaintiff's 

entire personal cell phone records during the time period specified in the subpoena.”). 

Because the data and cell phone records sought in the subpoena would not tend to prove or 

disprove any of the claims or defenses asserted in the pleadings, the Court should quash the 

subpoena in its entirety. See Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23739, 2016 

WL 720967, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016) (“[T]he Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to 

Plaintiff's and Ms. Worsena's entire telephone records ... because Defendants have not made a 

showing that they are all relevant to the issues in this case, which are whether Defendants violated 

the TCPA and whether Plaintiff gave prior express consent to receive text messages from 

Defendants. For instance, telephone records of calls or text messages between Plaintiff and his 

mother are irrelevant to the issues in this case.”); Al-Rayes v. Willingham, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 4 of 10
Page 5 of 10

193701, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2016) (“Even assuming Defendant used these phone numbers, 

this subpoena is overbroad, seeks largely irrelevant information, and is not proportional to the 

needs of this case because it seeks to discover all activity regarding the two phone numbers, 

without limitation,” which “would encompass a great deal of irrelevant calls, text messages, and/or 

data usage that is entirely unrelated to any claim or defense in this case. Thus, a protective order 

is appropriate.”).

The decision in C.H. v. School Board., No. 3:18-cv-2128, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210848

(N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2020) is instructive. That case involved a motion to quash a similar subpoena

to a wireless carrier, seeking production of a party’s voicemails, call logs of inbound and outbound

calls, text message history, data communications, information showing the authorized users on the 

account, customer service and account notes, billing records, and invoices, which the court

ultimately quashed, finding the requested information “to be overly broad” and seeking “largely 

irrelevant information.” School Board, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210848, at *15-16. 

Here, the same documents, data, and cell phone records are being sought in Defendant’s 

subpoena to Google, and thus, the Court should, consistent with above-referenced authorities,

similarly find that the subpoena is “overly broad” and seeks “largely irrelevant information,” and 

in doing so, refuse “to grant [Defendant] permission to rifle through the private, irrelevant 

communications” of Plaintiff. Id. at *15 – 16.

B. Plaintiff Has a Personal Interest in the Privacy of His Cell Phone Records

As noted above, discovery is not meant to be a fishing expedition. That consideration 

carries even more weight here given that Plaintiff has a personal interest in the privacy of his cell 

phone records, which has been validated by courts time and time again. See Winter v. Bisso Marine 

Co., Inc., No. 13-5191, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103281, 2014 WL 3778833, at *2 (E.D. La. July 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 5 of 10
Page 6 of 10

29, 2014) (Wilkinson, M.J.) (“[Plaintiff] has standing to object to the subpoena because it 

implicates his personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone records.”). 

Moreover, the information sought by Defendant, namely, the IP Addresses associated with 

Plaintiff’s mobile devices, call logs, and voicemail history “can be obtained through less intrusive 

means.” School Board, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210848, at *13-14; see also Howard v. Seadrill 

Americas, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165799, No. CV 15-2441, 2016 WL 7012275, at *4 (E.D. 

La. Dec. 1, 2016) (“[T]he Court may also limit discovery where the discovery 'can be obtained 

from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.'“). For 

example, Defendant could (and, on some issues, already has) question Plaintiff “about this

information at a deposition or through written discovery.” School Board, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

210848, at *14 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2020).

Although Plaintiff “is not the person to whom the subpoena was served, [he] has a sufficient 

personal interest in the information to have standing to challenge the subpoena.” Id. at *13 n.2; see 

also Clark v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-582, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103079, 2015 WL 4694045, at *2 

(N.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2015) (“Courts have held that an individual has a personal interest sufficient 

to give him standing to challenge a subpoena for discovery of personal information in the custody

of a third party. This includes cell phone information.”); Winter v. Bisso Marine Co., Inc., No. 13-

5191, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103281, at *2 (E.D. La. July 29, 2014) (“[Plaintiff] has standing to 

object to the subpoena because it implicates his personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone 

records.”).

“Numerous courts . . . have held that parties have a personal interest in their financial and 

telephone records sufficient to confer standing to challenge a subpoena directed to a thirdparty.” Mancuso v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., No. 09-61984-CIV, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161770, at 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 6 of 10
Page 7 of 10

*1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2011); Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, No. 12-80577-CIV, 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 23739, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016) (finding party had standing to challenge subpoena 

to his telephone carrier).

C. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, Prohibits Disclosure of

Plaintiff’s Private Information and Communications 

The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq, “precludes disclosure 

of any content from text messages or other electronic communications related to the wireless 

[telephone] accounts” belonging to Plaintiff. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701; see also Classic Soft Trim, Inc.

v. Albert, No. 6:18-cv-1237, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218314, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2020). 

The SCA generally prohibits “'providers of communication services from divulging private 

communications to certain entities and/or individuals.” Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 

529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008). Wireless telephone carriers, such as Google, AT&T, and 

Verizon, “must comply with the rules applicable to electronic communication services under the 

SCA and ‘shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication 

while in electronic storage by that service,’ unless one of the specifically enumerated exceptions 

in 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) apply.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1); Albert, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218314, 

at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2020) (quoting Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., 885 F. Supp. 2d 

987, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2012)).

The relevant exceptions include: 1) disclosure of the contents of a communication “to an 

addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended 

recipient”; and 2) disclosure of the contents of a communication “with the lawful consent of the 

originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication.” Id. § 2702(b)(1) and (2).

Neither exception applies here. Plaintiff -- as the “originator,” “addressee,” or “intended 

recipient” of the subpoenaed communications -- has not provided consent for Google to disclose 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 7 of 10
Page 8 of 10

his communications, and Defendant is not an “addressee or intended recipient” of the

communications targeted in the subpoena. Consequently, the SCA applies under these 

circumstances and thus “prohibits [Google] from divulging private communications to”

Defendant. Albert, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218314, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2020).

Here, as in Albert, Plaintiff moves to quash because the subpoenas seek production of 

private communications that are barred from disclosure under the Stored Communications Act, the 

documents sought are private, confidential, and privileged, and the requests are overbroad and 

have no relevance to the underlying litigation. Id. at 4. Because the electronic materials and cellular 

data identified in the Google subpoena is materially identical to the documents and data that the

court in Albert determined could not be produced, the SCA’s prohibition applies equally to the 

subpoena in this case, by operation of law, requires a finding that “no content within any of 

[Plaintiff’s] electronic communications may be disclosed” by Google or otherwise provided to 

Defendant.

To be sure that the SCA’s prohibition cannot be overcome by a subpoena served in a civil 

proceeding, the Act specifically states that “a provider may not disclose the content of electronic 

communications pursuant to a civil subpoena.” Albert, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218314, at *9

(emphasis added). Based on this statutory language, numerous courts have recognized that “[t]he 

SCA does not contain an exception for civil discovery subpoenas.” Mintz, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 

991; Hawn v. Vitas Hospice Servs. LLC, No. 1:19-cv-220, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160166, at *10 

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2020).

CONCLUSION 

The Court should quash, or substantially limit, Defendant’s document subpoena to Google

because (1) it seeks information that is irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the case; (2) 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 8 of 10
Plaintiff has a well-established personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone records, which 

outweighs any conceivable need by Defendant for the information; and (3) the Stored 

Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq, prohibits disclosure of Plaintiff’s private 

information and communications. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Anuel St. Clair respectfully requests that the Court quash, or 

substantially limit, the subpoena served on non-party Google, LLC by Defendant USHealth 

Advisors, LLC; enter a protective order prohibiting disclosure of all information, documents, and 

data identified in the subpoena; and grant any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 

CERTIFICATE OF ATTEMPTED GOOD FAITH CONFERRAL

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)(B), the undersigned certifies that counsel for the movant 

has made several efforts to confer with Defendant’s counsel regarding the relief sought in the 

instant Motion but has been unable to do so. The reasonable efforts made were as follows: 

Movant’s counsel first emailed one of the attorneys representing Defendant, Mr. Gregg Strock, 

requesting a telephone call to confer on the subpoena underlying the instant motion, and after 

receiving no response to the email, movant’s counsel telephoned Mr. Strock on his office line to 

discuss the matter directly. When no one answered, movant’s counsel left a voicemail requesting 

a call back to confer on Plaintiff’s motion. After receiving no response to the prior email and 

voicemail, movant’s counsel then called another one of the attorneys representing Defendant, Mr. 

Jeffrey Backman, on his direct office line, hoping he would be available to confer, but the 

telephone call was not answered. Movant’s counsel subsequently tried contacting another one of 

the attorneys representing Defendant, Mr. Roy Taub, but there was no answer when movant’s 

counsel called his direct office line. Next, movant’s counsel sent an email addressed to all three of 

the attorneys listed above, which advised of the attempts to meet and confer on Plaintiff’s 

motion, 

Page 9 of 10 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 9 of 10
Page 10 of 10 

detailed the specific grounds on which Plaintiff’s motion was based, and requested that they 

promptly respond, either by telephone or email, with Defendant’s position on same, so that 

movant could satisfy his conferral obligations under Local Rule 7.1 and file the motion with 

the court in an expeditious fashion. It was only after receiving no response from any of 

Defendant’s attorneys, either to the joint email, prior telephone calls, the voice message, or 

individual email sent by movant’s counsel, all of which represented his efforts to confer on 

Plaintiff’s motion, ascertain whether Defendant objected in whole or in part to the motion, and, 

if possible, resolve the issues without judicial intervention, that the instant motion was filed with 

the Court. 

Dated: December 11, 2020 Respectfully submitted by: 

/s/ Aaron Ahlzadeh___________

Aaron M. Ahlzadeh, Esq.

aaron@edelsberglaw.com

Florida Bar No. 111329 

Scott Edelsberg, Esq.

scott@edelsberglaw.com

Florida Bar No. 100537 

EDELSBERG LAW, P.A. 

20900 NE 20th Ave, Suite 417

Aventura, FL 33180 

Tel: (786) 289-9471 

Andrew J. Shamis, Esq. 

ashamis@shamisgentile.com 

Florida Bar No. 101754 

SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A. 

14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400 

Miami, Florida 33132 

(t) (305) 479-2299

(f) (786) 623-0915

Counsel for Plaintiff Anuel St. Clair 

Case 0:20-cv-61206-RKA Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2020 Page 10 of 10