Number 58, January 1996

BiologicalWarfare:
A Nation at Risk--A Time to Act

by the  Honorable Richard Danzig
Under Secretary of the Navy
Conclusion

	There is a regrettable tendency to think about defense against biological warfare either as unnecessary or as"too hard."  Unfortunately, the danger of biological warfare did not dissipate with the dismantling of our ownoffensive program in 1969, the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the fall of the BerlinWall, or the threat of nuclear retaliation against Saddam in 1991.  Only by planning and preparing will we be ableto diminish the likelihood that biological weapons will be used, and reduce the risks if they are.  Fortunately,substantial improvements can be made in our biological defensive capabilities at relatively small levels ofinvestment.

**Why Think About Biological Warfare?**

	There are three compelling reasons why the national security establishment ought to be thinking more about,and investing more in, defenses against biological warfare (BW).
***1.  Our future enemies' strategies.  To assess our vulnerabilities, it is useful to put ourselves in the shoesof our potential opponents.  The overwhelming conventional military superiority the United States displayed inthe Kuwaiti desert will make potential aggressors less likely to confront us directly.  Concomitantly, those whowish to challenge our resolve will be tempted to do so indirectly and unconventionally.  Additionally, theperception that America is reluctant to accept high mortality rates in combat will make high casualty weapons,such as biological agents, especially attractive to our enemies.   
***2.      Our future enemies' resources.  While a nuclear arsenal requires massive investments and asophisticated and capable military infrastructure to support it, an opponent does not need to be a superpower tohave a biological warfare capability.  Biological weapons are inexpensive and accessible.  A small pharmaceuticalindustry or even moderately sophisticated university or medical research laboratory can generate a significantoffensive capability.  Delivery can be by warheads on missiles, but also by means as simple as a crop sprayer. 
	Some sense of why biological weapons are the "poor man's nuclear bomb" is suggested by a United Nations expert's 1969  estimate  that  the  costs  of producing mass casualties per square kilometer are as follows:  biological-$1/km2;   chemical  (nerve agent)-$600/km2; nuclear-$800/km2; conventional-$2000/km2.  While thesefigures are outdated, the relative orders of magnitude they suggest are still quite valid.

***3.        Our blind spots.*  Our current vulnerabilities to BW are substantial.  Many of these blind spots arebeyond our immediate control; they result from the inherent nature of the biological weapons, such as theirrelative ease of production and concealment.  Many, however, are self-inflicted -- they are a result of ourunderinvestment and lack of attention.  In short, by our neglect, we are ourselves creating an incentive to use BW.  

	The history of the absorption of technology into the operational and warfighting capabilities of theDepartment of Defense suggests one reason for this blind spot.  Professor Alan Beyerchin of Ohio StateUniversity has suggested that we might think about WWI as a conflict that forced chemists and warfighters totalk with one another; WWII as a conflict that brought physicists and warfighters together; the Cold War as ahistory of Pentagon investments in computers, electronics, and telecommunication skills.   But, as Prof. Beyerchinnotes, this framework does not include events that led to the development and integration of biologists with thePentagon.  Today, the number of biologists employed by DOD is orders of magnitude less than the number ofscientists and engineers employed in other areas.
	Taken together, these factors suggest that it is important to think about biological warfare because it is anarea of weaknesses, because our opponents are likely to perceive this, and because they will have the resourcesto exploit it.  
**Characteristics and Associated Risks

     These concerns are exacerbated when the characteristics of biological weapons are considered:  

	 Extraordinarily small quantities of biological agents are all that are required for lethality.  In the case ofanthrax, for example, 1 gram produces one trillion spores -- an amount equivalent to 100 million lethal doses.
	 These small quantities make the concealment, transportation and dissemination of biological agentsrelatively easy.  
	 An adversary does not need sophisticated artillery, intercontinental ballistic missiles, or advancedcommunications gear to have effective biological warfare weaponry.  Rather, since aerosolization is thepredominant method of distribution, "homely methods" will suffice -- including agricultural crop dusters, backpack sprayers, land and sea mines, and even purse-size perfume atomizers.  
	 Information on how to develop biological agents is readily available in open source literature, and even nowon the Internet. 
	 The "invisibility of the archer" can complicate defensive efforts.  Ease of concealment and delivery, whencoupled with  difficulties in detection of agents and delays (often of days) in the appearance of symptoms, makean assailant difficult to detect and even identify after the fact.  

**Why Haven't They Been Used?

	Faced with these facts, policymakers often ask:  If these weapons are so potent and so easy to use, whyhaven't they been used before?  The short answer is that they have been.  History provides little comfort orsupport for the proposition that, though they exist, biological weapons, uniquely, will not be used.  Cadaversinfected with plague were catapulted over the walls of medieval European castles and cities under siege; theBritish supplied Indians with blankets infected with smallpox during the French and Indian Wars; wells werepoisoned during the Civil War to impede Sherman's march; and even as recently as the Second World War, theJapanese Unit 731 experimented with biological weapons on prisoners of war in Manchuria, resulting in over onethousand deaths.  
	More recent examples bring the threat closer to home: in 1995 two members of a Minnesota militiaorganization were convicted of possession of ricin, which they had produced themselves and intended to use inretaliation against local government officials.  It has also come to light that Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese culton trial for the horrifying sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway system, was also pursuing a sizable biologicalwarfare capability -- without the knowledge of any Western intelligence agency.
	Not only have they been used in the past, but the widespread international proliferation of these weapons alsoincreases the expectation that they will be used in the future.  The list of countries that possess them reads likea "Who's Who" of dangerous actors.  
**Is the Threat of Nuclear Retaliation a Sufficient Deterrent?

	Though our threats of nuclear retaliation apparently deterred Saddam from unleashing his BW at us, we nowknow that he developed and concealed a biological program and weapons that were substantial and sophisticated-- and continued even after the war's termination while subject to scrutiny from United Nations inspectors. There is not sufficient assurance that deterrence would be effective again, particularly if Saddam or his equivalentfelt that his regime, he himself, or his capital were threatened.  
	Nuclear deterrence will be of even more doubtful efficacy if we find ourselves dealing with non-state actors,a domestic terrorist contingency, or an unidentifiable opponent.  In those instances, whom would we threaten? Against what targets would we retaliate?  And what would constitute proportionality?  Moreover, even stateactors may not be deterred by a nuclear threat if they believe they can mask the nature or the source of their attack(it is easier to do this with biological than with most other weapons) or if they are already threatened by nuclearweapons and have ignored that threat when they went to war in the first place. 

**Where Do We Go From Here?

	Our current risks are substantial.  But investments to lower these risks can be made and, if made, they willyield two very attractive rewards:  1) they will lower the likelihood of biological warfare by signalling to potentialadversaries that we have reduced our vulnerabilities; and 2) they will lower the amount of death and disruptionif biological weapons are used.
	To make these investments meaningful, I offer seven recommendations for how we might begin to reorderour priorities to enhance our defenses against biological warfare. 

***1.  Establish a new mindset.*  This is a purely conceptual step--it doesn't cost any money.  But it isimportant.  We must declare our independence from the term "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), andrecognize that biological weapons have special characteristics that distinguish them from chemical and nuclearweapons.  In many respects, biological warfare defense requires an altogether different approach than that fornuclear or chemical warfare.  For example, counting enemy warheads for arms control or donning full protectivegear in a potentially contaminated environment are relevant for nuclear and chemical scenarios, but not forbiological.  Our intelligence and masking requirements are different for biological warfare.  Even decontaminantsare different.
***2.  Identify personnel.  Within DOD, we should identify selected operational units, including Army, Marineand Special Operations Forces, to be trained, equipped, inoculated, and exercised to respond specifically tobiological warfare threats.  While these forces would be designated principally to deal with operational militaryscenarios, their skills and capabilities should also be available to the National Command Authorities as requiredfor domestic response and consequence management.  
	We have already made some progress in this area.  The Secretary of Defense recently assignedcounterproliferation as an additive mission for Special Operations Forces.  The Army's well-establishedTechnical Escort Unit has expertise in this regard.  In addition, at the Commandant's direction, and with theadvice of a distinguished panel of civilian technical experts, the Marine Corps is establishing a unit designedspecifically for these types of contingencies.  
***3.  Focus on Antibiotics.  There has already been a substantial amount of attention focused on vaccines asan active defensive measure.  Comparatively little effort has been devoted to the development of antibioticdefenses.  I believe we would benefit tremendously from close association with the pharmaceutical industry todevelop a research program, a supply strategy for prophylactic and post-exposure uses, and a system ofintelligence alerts.
***4.  Develop and Acquire Masks.  If the principal method of infection from BW is inhalation, then a simple,relatively low-cost mask that filters out dangerous airborne particles might be all that is required for effectiveindividual protection. Differentiating between the protective requirements for chemical and biological threats canpreclude the need to don cumbersome suits and gas masks that can degrade troop performance. 
***5.  Acquire state-of-the-art detectors.  The CINCs have articulated this as a top priority.  To the extent thatwe are constrained in this area, it should be by the technology and not by a failure of funding.  There arenumerous fielded and developmental detectors for biological warfare agents.  We should seek to accelerate, tothe maximum extent possible, the integration of these stand-off and point detection systems into our warfightingand civil defense infrastructures, and continue our investments in the development of future technologicalapproaches to bio-detection.
***6.  Focus on Intelligence.  The recent revelations about Iraq's capabilities were a "wake-up call" for theintelligence community. Knowledge about our adversaries' intentions and capabilities lies at the very heart of ourdefense against this heinous type of warfare.  Additional human intelligence resources are clearly warrantedalongside of the pharmaceutical industry relationships raised above.  Additionally, we should expand ourcooperation with our allies in this regard, and enhance the relationship between our own intelligence andcounterintelligence communities.
***7.  Strengthen Coordination.  Interagency coordination is critical in the event of either international ordomestic biological contingencies.  Existing mechanisms must be strengthened and exercised, and DOD'sbio-defense assets should be more effectively integrated for both traditional military operations abroad as wellas civil defense at home.  

	There is much to be done, but much can be done.  Given proper priority, biological defense will be a valuableinvestment for the United States.

This paper is based on a recent presentation made by Under Secretary Danzig at the National Defense University. 

***The one that scares me to death, perhaps even more so than tactical nuclear weapons, and the one we have theleast capability against is biological weapons.*

				- General Colin Powell, 1993

***If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure ... One of ourmost urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they arenuclear, chemical, or biological.*

				    - President Clinton, 1993

***... BW is a weapon of mass destruction.  But no agency has done any serious planning about how to defendagainst a BW attack on our own cities, or those of our allies...  We urge DOD to take the initiative, together withthe Center for Disease Control and Prevention, in formulating a comprehensive plan for civil defense against BWattack.  If such an attack should occur, the military establishment will be blamed for the failure in nationaldefense, regardless of the purported mandate -- and above all, we will blame ourselves.*

			 - 1993 Defense Science Board Study

About the Author

The Honorable Richard Danzig is the 26th Under Secretary of the Navy. He earned a doctorate in history fromOxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and a law degree from Yale.  Besides teaching and practicing law, Mr.Danzig served in the late 1970s as Prinicipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, ReserveAffairs and Logistics where he made substantial contributions to U.S. mobilization capabilities.  He has also beena senior evaluator for Joint Chiefs of Staff mobilization exercises, a State Department consultant on defense tradecontrols, and Director of the National Semiconductor Corporation.
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