April 2004

Federal Guidelines

for Dam Safety
FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR DAM SAFETY 

prepared by the 

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON DAM SAFETY 

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

JUNE 1979 

Reprinted April 2004 
PREFACE 

These guidelines represent the culmination of efforts, initiated by President Carter in April 1977, 

to review procedures and criteria used by Federal Agencies involved in the design, construction, 

operation, and regulation of dams and to prepare guidelines for management procedures to 

ensure dam safety. The guidelines are based on an intensive review of Agency practices 

conducted by the Departments and Agencies themselves, by an ad hoc interagency committee of 

the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET), and by 

an Independent Review Panel of recognized experts from the academic and private sectors. 

These reviews are summarized in two earlier reports: Improving Federal Dam Safety, a report of 

the FCCSET, November 1977, and Federal Dam Safety Report of the OSTP Independent Review 

Panel, December 1978. 

Publication of the guidelines marks the final step in the review process. However, the 

Departments and Agencies recognize that there must be a continuing Federal effort to improve 

dam safety. Federal dam safety remains a fundamental responsibility of each Federal employee 

in every Department and Agency involved and it is on their technical expertise and dedication 

that the safety of Federal dams rests. These guidelines recognize that underlying fact and support 

management efforts to discharge that responsibility effectively and efficiently. 

These guidelines apply to Federal practices for dams with a direct Federal interest and are not 

intended to supplant or otherwise conflict with State or local government responsibilities for 

safety of dams under their jurisdiction. Current Federal initiatives to assist States and others with 

non-Federal dam safety programs are being pursued under other authorities. The objective of 

both programs, however, is the same: to allow the people of this country to enjoy the benefits of 

water resource development with the best assurance of dam safety possible. 

The members of the FCCSET Ad Hoc Committee are to be commended for their diligent and 

highly professional efforts. Gratitude and appreciation are also due the several Departments and 

Agencies involved for their whole-hearted interest and support. 

Frank Press, Chairman 

Federal Coordinating Council 

for Science, Engineering and 

Technology 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. BACKGROUND 1

B. AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 

C. DEFINITIONS 4

II. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 7 

III. GUIDELINES 9

A. ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 9 

1. General 9

a. Administration 9

b. Design Responsibility 10 

c. Construction Responsibility 10 

d. Operation Responsibility 10 

e. Technical Coordination 10 

f. Emergency Planning 11 

g. Risk-Based Analysis 11 

2. Staffing 11 

a. Technical Support 11 

b. Competence 12 

c. Continuity 12 

d. Professional Advancement 12 

3. Training 12 

a. Internal 12

b. Academic 14

c. Professional 14

d. New Technology 14 

4. Communication 14 

a. Interdisciplinary 14 

b. Interagency 15 

5. Documentation 15

a. Design Record 16 

b. Construction Record 16 

c. Initial Reservoir Filling and Surveillance Record 16 

d. Operation and Maintenance Record 17 

e. Permanent Files 17 

6. Reviews 17

a. Extent 17 

b. Internal 17

c. External 18

7. Research and Development 19 

a. Methods and Materials 20 

b. Risk-Based Analysis 20 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 

Page 

c. Interagency Coordination 20 

8. Contracts 20 

a. Documents 20

b. Modifications 20 

9. Constraints 20 

a. Funding for Organizational Management 21 

b. Public Concerns 21 

B. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIESSITE INVESTIGATION AND DESIGN (SID) 21 

1. Hydrology 21 

a. Hazard Evaluation 21 

b. Flood Development 22 

c. Flood Selection for Design (or Evaluation) 22 

d. Hydrologic Design of Reservoir 22 

e. Downstream Effects 22 

f. Warning Systems 23

2. Earthquake Investigation and Design 23 

a. Investigation Factors 23 

b. Selection of Design Earthquakes 23 

c. Engineering Seismology 23 

d. Need for Earthquake Analysis 23 

e. Seismic and Geologic Studies 23 

f. Design for Earthquake Forces 24 

3. Geotechnics 24 

a. General 24

b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems 25 

c. Geotechnical Design 26 

d. Foundation Treatment 26 

e. Instrumentation 27

f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction 27 

g. Reevaluation at Existing Structures 28 

4. Hydraulic Appurtenances 28 

a. General 28

b. Design Flood Releases 28 

c. Other Water Releases 29 

d. Reservoir Evacuation 29 

e. Control of Flows during Construction 29 

f. Design Criteria and Guidance 29 

g. Reanalysis Because of Changes 29 

h. Hydraulic Design Involvement during Life of Structure 29 

5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dam 30 

a. Site Specific Design 30 

b. Materials 30

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 

Page 

c. Design of Structures 30 

d. Definition of Loads 30

e. Design Methods 31 

f. Design Evaluation 31

g. Instrumentation 31 

h. Construction and Operational Follow-up 31 

6. Embankment Dams 31 

a. Site Specific Design 31 

b. Materials 32

c. Design Constructability 32 

d. Embankment Design 32 

e. Instrumentation 33

f. Construction and Operational Follow-up 33 

C. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIESCONSTRUCTION (CON) 34

1. Introduction 34 

a. Construction Contracts 34 

b. Construction/Design Interface 34 

2. Evaluation during Construction 35 

3. Orientation of Construction Engineers and Field Inspectors 35 

a. Design Related 35 

b. Foundation 36 

c. Materials 36

d. Construction General 36 

4. Construction Assurance 37 

a. Construction Procedures 37 

b. Construction Materials Testing 37 

c. Quality Assurance 37 

D. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES- OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M) 38

1. Operation and Maintenance 38 

a. General 38

b. Operating Procedures 38 

c. Maintenance Procedure 39 

2. Periodic Inspection Program 39 

a. General 39

b. Types and Frequencies of Inspections 40 

c. Instrumentation 42

d. Correction of Deficiencies 43 

e. Documentation 44

3. Emergency Action Planning 45 

a. General 45

b. Evaluation of Emergency Potential 45 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 

Page 

c. Actions to Prevent Failure or Minimize Effects of Failure 46 

d. Actions Upon Discovery of a Potentially Unsafe Condition 49 

IV. APPENDICES

A. FCCSET AD HOC INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE MEMBERS A-1 

B. INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS B-1 

C. OCTP INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL MEMBERS C-1 

D. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS D-1 

E. BIBLIOGRAPHY E-1

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I. INTRODUCTION 

These guidelines apply to management practices for dam safety of all Federal agencies 

responsible for the planning, design, construction, operation, or regulation of dams. They are not 

intended as guidelines or standards for the technology of dams. The basic principles of the 

guidelines apply to all dams. However, reasonable judgments need to be made in their 

application commensurate with each dam’s size, complexity, and hazard. 

The Federal agencies have a good record and generally sound practices on dam safety. These 

guidelines are intended to promote management control of dam safety and a common approach 

to dam safety practices by all the agencies. Although the guidelines are intended for and 

applicable to all agencies, it is recognized that the methods of the degree of application will vary 

depending on the agency mission and functions. 

A. BACKGROUND 

Throughout history, in all parts of the world, dams built to store water have occasionally failed 

and discharged the stored waters to inflict sometimes incalculable damage in the loss of lives and 

great damage to property. Failures have involved dams built without application of engineering 

principles, but have also involved dams built to, at the time, accepted engineering standards of 

design and construction. The technology of dams has improved with the increased knowledge of 

design principles and of the characteristics of foundation and dam materials, and it is generally 

agreed that safe dams can be built and existing dams can be safely maintained with proper 

application of current technology. It is the intent of these guidelines to outline management 

practices that will help to ensure the use of the best current technology in the design, 

construction, and operation of new dams and in the safety evaluation of existing dams. 

As early as 1929, following the failure of the St. Francis Dam, the State of California enacted a 

dam safety program. Subsequently, other dam failures causing loss of life and property have 

prompted additional legislation on state and national levels. 

The Congress in 1972 enacted Public Law 92-367, known as the "National Dam Inspection Act." 

The Secretary of the Army was authorized to inspect non-Federal dams in the nation meeting the 

size and storage limitations of the Act to evaluate their safety; report inspection results to the 

States and advise the States on actions needed to ensure dam safety; report to the Congress the 

information given to the States; prepare a national inventory of dams; and make 

recommendations to the Congress “for a comprehensive national program for the inspection and 

regulation for safety purposes of dams of the nation.” Responsibilities under the law were 

delegated to the Corps of Engineers. The activities performed under the program consisted of an 

inventory of dams; a survey of each State and Federal agency's capabilities, practices, and 

regulations regarding the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of dams; development 

of guidelines for inspection and evaluation of dam safety; and formulation of recommendations 

for a comprehensive national program. A report on these activities and proposed legislation to 

implement a Federal dam safety program were transmitted to Congress in November 1976, but 

lack of funding prevented the execution of the detailed dam inspections. 

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The failure during initial filling in 1976 of the Teton Dam in Idaho, a Federal earth embankment 

dam over 300 feet high, reactivated intense public and governmental concern for dam safety. 

Congressional and Federal agency investigations were made into this disaster and the entire 

question of dam safety, and new Federal legislation for dam safety was initiated in the Congress. 

An April 23, 1977, Presidential memorandum (reproduced in Section I.B) directed federal 

agencies to review their dam safety practices, addressing many elements of dam safety. Major 

elements included internal and external review, qualifications of personnel, integration of new 

technology, emergency preparedness plans, and review of existing dams. The agencies’ reviews 

and the assessment of the reviews by a Federal ad hoc interagency committee and by an 

Independent Review Panel showed that sound practices are generally being used, but concluded 

that improvement is needed in some management practices for dam safety. 

B. AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTATION 

The authority for preparation of these guidelines is contained in a memorandum from President 

Carter dated April 23, 1977, which read as follows: 

“MEMORANDUM FOR: 

The Secretary of the Interior 

The Secretary of Agriculture 

The Secretary of the Army 

The Director, Office of Management and Budget 

The President’s Adviser on Science and Technology 

The Chairman, Federal Power Commission 

The Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority 

The Commissioner, U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission 

The safety of dams has been a principal concern of Federal agencies that are involved with the 

various aspects of their planning, construction, operation and ultimate disposal. Events of the 

past several years have highlighted the need to review procedures and criteria that are being 

employed by these agencies with the objective of ensuring that the most effective mechanisms 

are established to give the best assurance of dam safety possible within the limitations of the 

current state of knowledge available to the scientific and engineering communities. The safety of 

such projects should continue to be accorded highest consideration, and it is the responsibility of 

the head of each agency concerned to ensure the adequacy of his agency's dam safety program. 

I. Agency Dam Safety Reviews 

The head of each Federal agency responsible for, or involved with site selection, design, 

construction, certification or regulation, inspection, maintenance and operation, repair and 

ultimate disposition of dams shall immediately undertake a thorough review of practices which 

could affect the safety and integrity of these structures. This review will encompass all activities 

which can be controlled or regulated by the agency. 

Several aspects of the problem require special attention. In particular, the following items should 

be investigated: the means of inclusion of new technological methods into existing structures and 

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procedures; the degree to which probabilistic or risk-based analysis is incorporated into the 

process of site selection, design, construction, and operation; the degree of reliance on in-house, 

interagency, and outside expert interpretation of geologic data in site selection and design 

development; the effect on dam safety of earthquake or other earth movement hazards; the 

effects of cost-saving incentives on decisions both prior to and during construction; the 

procedures by which dam safety problems are identified, analyzed, and solved; the involvement 

of local communities in identifying, analyzing, and solving dam safety questions; and the major 

outstanding dam safety problems of the agency. 

II. Interagency Report and Proposed Guidelines 

The Chairman of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology 

(FCCSET) shall convene an ad hoc interagency committee to coordinate dam safety programs, 

seeking consistency and commonality as appropriate, and providing recommendations as to the 

means of improving the effectiveness of the Government-wide dam safety effort. The agency 

reviews described above should be provided to the FCCSET as a basis for the interagency 

analysis on a timetable established by the FCCSET group as reasonable and consistent with the 

October 1, 1977 deadline for a final report. Representation on the FCCSET for this activity 

should be expanded to include other appropriate Federal agencies or departments including, but 

not limited to, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the United States Section-International Boundary 

and Water Commission and the Federal Power Commission. The FCCSET effort will include 

preparation of proposed Federal dam safety guidelines for management procedures to ensure 

dam safety. FCCSET should report on all these items. 

III. Independent Review Panel 

In addition, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy will arrange for review 

of agency regulations, procedures and practices, and of the proposed federal dam safety 

guidelines, by a panel of recognized experts to be established immediately. The panel will 

obtain the views and advice of established organizations, professional societies, and others 

concerned with the safety of dams which are in any way affected by a Federal role. 

The review report thereon should be completed no later than October 1, 1978.” 

(signed) Jimmy Carter 

The ad hoc interagency committee called for in paragraph II of the memorandum was established 

by FCCSET, under the direction of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The committee 

was represented by: 

Office of Science and Technology Policy (Chairman) 

Department of the Army 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of the Interior 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (Formerly Federal Power Commission) 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 

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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was added to the dam agencies addressed in the 

memorandum. Members of the ad hoc committee are listed in Appendix A. 

Also established were subcommittees for the preparation of the proposed Federal dam safety 

guidelines called for in paragraph II of the memorandum. These subcommittees and their task 

groups had representatives from all the agencies with responsibilities for dams. Appendix B lists 

the members of the subcommittees and task groups and their agencies. 

In accordance with the Presidential memorandum, the participating agencies submitted their 

reports on review of agency management practices involving dam safety; the subcommittees 

submitted the proposed Federal dam safety guidelines; and the ad hoc committee prepared the 

FCCSET report, Improving Federal Dam Safety, dated November 15, 1977. The report contains 

summaries of the agency reports, and the subcommittee proposed guidelines and summary 

thereof; assesses the agency reports; and makes recommendations for improvement of 

management practices for dam safety. 

Pursuant to paragraph III of the President's memorandum, the Independent Review Panel was 

formed with specialists from the academic and private sectors concerned with dams. Members 

of the panel are listed in Appendix C. The panel reviewed the FCCSET and associated reports 

and proposed guidelines, and submitted a report, Federal Dam Safety, Report of the OSTP 

Independent Review Panel, December 6, 1978. 

These guidelines were developed from the FCCSET report and its proposed guidelines, from 

Independent Review Panel recommendations, and with the cooperation of the panel. 

C. DEFINITIONS 

The following definitions apply in these guidelines. 

Dam or Project. Any artificial barrier, including appurtenant works, which impounds or diverts 

water, and which (1) is twenty-five feet or more in height from the natural bed of the stream or 

watercourse measured at the downstream toe of the barrier or from the lowest elevation of the 

outside limit of the barrier if it is not across a stream channel or watercourse, to the maximum 

water storage elevation or (2) has an impounding capacity at maximum water storage elevation 

of fifty acre-feet or more. These guidelines do not apply to any such barrier which is not in 

excess of six feet in height regardless of storage capacity, or which has a storage capacity at 

maximum water storage elevation not in excess of fifteen acre-feet regardless of height. This 

lower size limitation should be waived if there is a potentially significant downstream hazard. 

The guidelines apply with equal force whether the dam has a permanent reservoir or is a 

detention dam for temporary storage of floodwaters. The impounding capacity at maximum 

water storage elevation includes storage of floodwaters above the normal full storage elevation. 

In addition to conventional structures, this definition of "dam" specifically includes "tailings 

dams," embankments built by waste products disposal and retaining a disposal pond. 

4 
Dam Failure. Catastrophic type of failure characterized by the sudden, rapid, and uncontrolled 

release of impounded water. It is recognized that there are lesser degrees of failure and that any 

malfunction or abnormality outside the design assumptions and parameters which adversely 

affect a dam's primary function of impounding water is properly considered a failure. Such lesser 

degrees of failure can progressively lead to or heighten the risk of a catastrophic failure. They 

are, however, normally amenable to corrective action. 

Contract. Contracts relating to project design, construction equipment, operation, or regulation, 

as applicable to the project and the agency function. Where work is described using the terms 

contract or contractor, it is meant to include also similar work by the agency's own personnel 

Maintenance. Maintaining structures and equipment in intended operating condition; equipment 

repair and minor structure repair. 

Rehabilitation or Improvement. Repair of structure deterioration to restore original condition; 

alteration of structures to improve dam stability, enlarge reservoir capacity, or increase spillway 

and outlet works capacity; replacement of equipment. 

Hazard. Potential loss of life or property damage downstream of a dam from floodwaters 

released at the dam or waters released by partial or complete failure of the dam, and upstream of 

the dam from effects of rim slides. A hazard is considered significant if there is a potential to 

cause loss of life or major damage to permanent structures, utilities, or transportation facilities. 

Emergency Preparedness Plan. Formal plan of procedures to alleviate hazards during 

construction of or after completion of a dam or to reduce damages if conditions develop in which 

dam failure is likely or unpreventable. These emergency plans related to dam safety do not 

include flood plain management for the controlled release of floodwater for which the project is 

designed. 

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II. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 

The overall purpose of these guidelines is to enhance national dam safety. The immediate 

objective is to encourage high safety standards in the practices and procedures Federal agencies 

use or require of those they regulate for dam site investigation, design, construction, operation 

and maintenance, and emergency preparedness. As these guidelines are directly applied to make 

Federal dams as safe as practical, it is hoped that they will also influence state dam safety 

agencies and public and private dam owners to be more safety conscious where programs are 

now weak. 

The guidelines are intended to outline Federal agency management procedures that will 

continually stimulate technical methods in dam planning, design, construction, and operation for 

minimizing risk of failure. The objective of dam safety would be achieved as management and 

technical decisions during all project stages give proper recognition to safety considerations, and 

the strategy of these guidelines toward that end is to describe definite management practices to 

reinforce decision-maker awareness of safety needs. Those charged with administering these 

guidelines must recognize that the achievement of dam safety is through a continuous, dynamic 

process in which guidelines, practices, and procedures are examined periodically and updated. 

Technical procedures need to change with technological advancement, and management should 

ensure that observed deficient practices are corrected and that successful practices are duplicated. 

The goal of making dams as safe as practical implies a limit to maximum reasonable effort. 

Those charged with implementing these guidelines need to recognize that no dam can ever be 

completely "fail-safe" because of incomplete understanding of or uncertainties associated with 

natural (earthquakes and floods) and manmade (sabotage) destructive forces; with materials 

behavior and response to these forces; and in control of the construction process. Management 

must ensure that uncertainties are properly balanced with competent technical judgment. 

Although dams have been built for thousands of years, dam engineering is not an exact science 

and is more accurately described as an "art." It is true that this branch of engineering, like any 

other, draws heavily upon mathematical principles and physical laws, but every stage of the 

planning and execution of a dam project also requires the exercise of experienced judgment. This 

is true in designing and constructing new dams, and especially true in evaluating and/or 

improving existing dams. For many of these "older dams," there is little information available to 

document original site exploration, design, construction, and past operation. These dams must be 

carefully inspected and observed for indicators of distress. 

To illustrate a principle from just one aspect of dam design, there are practical limitations on the 

amount of physical data that can be obtained during planning and design. Judgment and 

extrapolation are necessary to assess foundation conditions and to design an appropriate 

structure. Experience is essential in applying these judgments. 

Construction is a critical phase in achieving a safe dam. Any project must be continuously 

evaluated, and "re-engineered" as required, during construction to assure that the final design is 

compatible with conditions encountered during construction. Quality of construction is also 

critical to safety. Deficiencies in materials or construction practices can occur during all stages of 

7 
the construction, and constant vigilance is necessary to prevent them. Sampling and testing at a 

completed project cannot be relied on as an effective substitute for inspection and quality control 

during construction. 

Monitoring existing dams and reacting quickly to inadequate performance or to danger signals is 

a continuing critical aspect for dam safety. Careful monitoring and quick response can prevent 

failures, including those caused by poor construction. 

The guidelines are intended to make as small as possible the failure risk inherent in constructing 

new dams, and to prioritize needs to improve existing dams according to hazard potential as 

estimated by technical analysis and as constrained by financial and personnel resources. 

In the development of these guidelines, consideration was given to the broad diversity of agency 

missions. The guidelines were designed to be free of specific agency policies and unnecessary 

details. The resultant level of detail in the guidelines represents an attempt to achieve a balance 

between general management goals for assuring dam safety and meaningful principles which can 

survive technological changes and be useful to the non-Federal community. 

A special situation exists regarding the application of these guidelines to dams of international 

nature. Several dams of concern to the United States are located partially in the United States and 

partially in Mexico or Canada. Those dams located at the U.S.-Mexican border are only partly 

subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Federal agency, the U.S. Section of the International 

Boundary and Water Commission. In this case, the U.S. should seek agreement with the Mexican 

Section of the Commission for adoption of applicable sections of these guidelines for ensuring 

dam safety. For dams located on the U.S.-Canadian border, the guidelines should be referred to 

the U.S. Section of the International Joint Commission (IJC) to seek agreement with the 

Canadian Section of the Commission on means by which the guidelines could be implemented 

through the entities that are responsible for construction, operation, and maintenance of the 

projects. 

Section III.A., Organization Management, outlines the elements of agency management responsibilities for dam safety. Sections III.B, III.C, and III.D, Management of Technical Activities, 

contain additional guidance on technical activities for Site Investigation and Design, 

Construction, and Operation and Maintenance (includes Periodic Inspection Program and 

Emergency Action Planning). Appendix E is a bibliography of references to related guidelines 

and practices developed by Federal dam building agencies and other scientific and technical 

organizations. The body of knowledge represented by the bibliography is intended to be 

representative of dam technology, but not inclusive of all available literature that may be helpful. 

8 
III. GUIDELINES 

A. ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 

1. General 

Heads of Federal agencies are responsible for the development and implementation of policy, 

resources and procedures for safe design, construction, operation, and inspection of each dam 

under their jurisdiction, as applicable to the agency mission. The agency management structure 

assists the head of the agency in discharging this responsibility and shares in it. The management 

structure is ultimately responsible for obtaining compliance with the intent of these management 

and technical activities guidelines, and for assuring that procedures are evaluated and updated 

periodically. 

a. Administration 

The head of each Federal agency having responsibility for design, construction, operation, or 

regulation of dams should establish a dam safety office (officer) which reports directly to the 

head of the agency or his designated representative. The office should be responsible for 

ensuring that the agency, as a matter of policy and in actual practice, makes every reasonable and 

prudent effort to enhance the safety of the dams under its jurisdiction. Duties of the office should 

include surveillance and evaluation of the agency's administrative and technical or regulatory 

practices related to dam safety concerning design and construction of new dams, and operation, 

maintenance and rehabilitation of existing dams; recommending improvements in the practices 

when evaluation reveals safety-related deficiencies; and maintaining an inventory of agency 

dams. 

The functions of the office should be advisory to the agency head, and through the agency head 

to the agency administrative and technical units. The staffing and detailed duties of the office 

should be commensurate with the agency mission. 

If a Federal dam safety office is established within the recently proposed Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), the heads of the dam safety offices in the respective agencies 

should be advisory in FEMA's interagency coordinating functions. 

The agency organization for the design, construction, operation, or regulation of a dam project 

should be structured so that a single identifiable, technically qualified administrative head has the 

responsibility for assuring that all management and technical safety aspects of dam engineering 

are adequately considered throughout the development and operation of the project. The position 

must have continuity of guidance and direction, and the authority and resources to ensure these 

responsibilities can be carried out. 

Management should ensure that organization staffing is sufficient and qualified for the projected 

workload, and that all programs necessary for the safety of dams are established, continued, and 

realistically funded. Allocation of manpower and funds should give high priority to safetyrelated functions. Safety-related functions and features must not be sacrificed to reduce costs, 

improve project justification, or expedite time schedules. 

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b. Design Responsibility

The design function can never be considered finished as long as the dam remains in place; design 

involvement should continue throughout construction and operation of the project. The design 

office should establish specific programs for onsite construction and operational inspection for 

review by appropriate design personnel and technical specialists. The programs should include 

frequent and mandatory inspections during construction to confirm that site conditions conform 

to those assumed for design or to determine if design changes may be required to suit the actual 

conditions. A major requirement is inspection and approval of the dam foundation and 

foundation treatment before placing of dam materials. Final design inspection of the construction 

should include complete project surveillance and testing of operating equipment. Operational 

design inspections should continue throughout the life of the project, in accordance with a formal 

inspection program covering all project features. Management must program adequate funds to 

assure dam safety is not compromised by failure to conduct regular and thorough inspections and 

reviews. 

The design function includes responsibility for planning any dam instrumentation to be installed 

during construction and/or operation to monitor conditions that could potentially threaten dam 

safety. The design should identify the purpose of the instrumentation, and include the plans for 

timely reading, collecting, reducing, and interpreting the data. It should include an advance 

determination of critical instrument observations or rates of data change, and a plan of action if 

observations indicate a critical condition may occur. 

c. Construction Responsibility 

The responsibility for administering construction and supply contracts, for understanding the 

design and contract intent, for maintaining technical coordination between design and 

construction engineers, and for managing the construction staff to assure compliance with 

specifications should be vested in an identified engineer at the construction project. He should 

have the administrative and technical control of all resources necessary to accomplish safe 

construction of the dam. Construction personnel should understand the conditions upon which 

the design is based and the relationship between these conditions and the design features. When 

unanticipated conditions are encountered, design personnel should be involved in determining 

their effect. 

d. Operation Responsibility 

The responsibility for project operation should be assigned to a single staff member of the 

operating organization. He should also handle the operating organization requirements for 

coordination with the design organization, including reporting changed conditions discovered by 

operators and participation of the operating organization personnel with design personnel in the 

periodic inspection program. 

e. Technical Coordination 

All technical specialties required to plan, design, construct, and operate dams to achieve dam 

safety should be staffed and their efforts coordinated to ensure technical adequacy. A project 

design engineer should be assigned technical coordination responsibility for each dam. He 

should handle necessary technical coordination within the agency and with private and public 

organizations. 

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Continuing liaison should be maintained among the personnel concerned with the various stages 

of project development and operation so that each concerned discipline and organizational unit 

knows and understands the relevant activities of the others. This coordination must be given 

constant attention to be sure proper action is taken. 

f. Emergency Planning 

An emergency plan should be formulated for each dam. The plan should be in the detail 

warranted by the size and location of the dam and reservoir. It should evaluate downstream 

inundation hazards resulting from floods or dam failure, and upstream conditions that might 

result from major land displacements or increased flood flows, including the effects from failure 

of upstream dams. 

Where applicable, the plan should include inundation maps for the flows resulting from design 

floods and from possible failure of the dam. The complete emergency plan should be transmitted 

to appropriate local, state, and Federal governmental bodies. The plan should be periodically 

reviewed and kept up to date, and periodically publicized to maintain awareness of its existence. 

In addition to the emergency plan for the completed dam, a similar plan should be prepared for 

the construction period, including area facilities that may remain during the period and floods 

that may be anticipated. 

g. Risk-Based Analysis 

Risk-based analytical techniques and methodologies are a relatively recent addition to the tools 

available for assessing dam safety. With further refinement and improvement, risk-based 

analyses will probably gain wider acceptance in the engineering profession and realize potential 

as a major aid to decision-making in the interest of public safety. However, even when fully 

developed, risk analyses cannot be used as a substitute for sound professional judgment of 

engineers, contractors, or review boards. In view of the dual problems of uncertainty in analysis 

and possibility of misinterpretation by the public, but in recognition of the high potential these 

techniques have, agencies should be encouraged to conduct research to refine and improve the 

techniques and to develop the methodologies and base of expertise necessary to apply them to 

dam safety evaluations. Specifically, agencies should strive to perfect techniques for evaluating 

the probability of possible deficiencies causing dam failure and estimating the potential losses 

due to such a failure. Meanwhile, the agencies should evaluate the potential consequences of 

failure of the dams under their jurisdiction. Although the value of potential property losses can 

be estimated, it is recognized that potential loss of lives can only be quantified, but not evaluated. 

On new dams, potential losses can be used in study of project alternatives and in assessment of 

additional safety incorporated into the dam facilities. On existing dams, a risk-based analysis 

should be considered in establishing priorities for examining and rehabilitating the dams, or for 

improving their safety. 

2. Staffing 

a. Technical Support 

Management should assure adequate and competent technical staffing to perform the essential 

functions in planning design, construction, and operation and maintenance of dams. Technical 

11 
staff should be well supported by administrative, clerical, and other elements to ensure that the 

technical staff is not diverted from technical work. In the planning and design function, particular 

emphasis should be given to adequate staffing in hydrology, hydraulics, geology, engineering 

seismology, field investigation, and geotechnical and structural design. Sufficient expertise 

should be available on the construction staff and on the operation staff to maintain an 

understanding of design decisions related to the various design specialties. 

Construction inspection staffing should assure quality as well as quantity inspection coverage. 

Staffing should be reviewed by higher authority than the local construction office. Field 

personnel should be well trained and experienced if the design is to be implemented and a safe 

structure is to be constructed. They must not only recognize the need for adherence to the design, 

but must be able to recognize when the design is at odds with conditions being encountered. The 

responsibility and importance of the construction staff to dam safety must be given appropriate 

consideration in organizational and position classification decisions. 

The operating personnel must be qualified to perform the many functions required in the 

operation, including the recognition of conditions possibly detrimental to dam safety. Operation 

and maintenance staffing requires careful attention to personnel responsible for operating 

inspections, and to personnel who participate in the periodic inspection program. It is essential 

that support personnel and equipment are provided to accomplish needed maintenance activities. 

b. Competence 

Job-related experience, professional aptitudes, and educational background should be major 

factors in evaluating the competence of individuals for the requirements of each responsible 

position concerned with the safe design, construction, and operation of dams. All positions 

should be staffed by competent engineers or specialists in the related disciplines. 

c. Continuity 

Staffing policies should recognize that continuity of technical positions is essential to maintain 

consistent high standards of practice. This applies in all elements of project development from 

design to operation, and is especially critical in those positions having supervisory responsibility 

related to dam safety. 

d. Professional Advancement 

The agencies should maintain a positive program for advancement of technical personnel in 

recognition of acquired experience, training and education, and increased competence. It is 

essential that agencies maintain the technical as well as the managerial expertise required for 

safe, effective dam design, construction, and operating programs. Organizational structure, 

position classification, and career incentives must recognize both technical and managerial 

responsibility and compensate both equitably. 

3. Training 

a. Internal 

To supplement technical staffing, agency management should provide internal personnel 

training. A rotational training program should be established to familiarize new personnel with 

12 
all major aspects of the agency functions and the interrelationships of its organizational units. 

Provisions should be made for technical personnel to observe and participate in decision-making 

meetings and to make site visits with more experienced staff. Staff members should be allowed 

to attend consultant meetings in order to gain valuable experience. 

Technical personnel concerned with all phases of project development should be given broad 

exposure to a variety of field conditions. For example, geologists and geotechnical personnel 

should gain experience with soil and rock drill crews and in the laboratory testing facilities; 

design personnel should be familiar with concrete and soil placing and testing techniques; 

operating personnel should be familiar with equipment installation and testing procedures. 

A rotational training program should be considered that would place construction engineers in 

the design organization during design and design engineers in the field during construction on 

temporary assignments. Preconstruction training should be provided for inspection personnel, 

covering the design engineering considerations and the requirements and importance of thorough 

field inspection. The training should be given by embankment or structural engineers and 

geologists assigned from design or by the construction engineer who had received 

preconstruction orientation by the designers, geologists, and embankment and structural 

engineers (section III.A.4.a). This training should make sure that all inspectors know the 

expected requirements in detail. Onsite instruction sessions for inspection of new features of 

construction should be developed and given by supervisors or lead inspectors before initiation of 

the work. 

Operation and maintenance personnel should be trained by personnel experienced in operation of 

similar projects, covering all features of facilities operation and inspection. Thorough training 

should be provided for the personnel who will take observations on and monitor any installed 

dam instrumentation. The training should be conducted by experienced observers and by the 

engineers responsible for analyzing the structure effects revealed by the instrumentation data. 

Technically qualified operating personnel should be trained in problem detection and evaluation, 

and application of appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) measures. This is 

essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels of responsibility which, 

initially, must be based on observations made by trained operating personnel at the project. The 

training should cover the problems that experience has shown are most likely to occur with the 

type of dam and facilities, and include the kinds of monitoring best suited to early detection of 

those problems. Such training will permit prompt action when time is a critical factor. A 

sufficient number of personnel should be trained to ensure adequate coverage of all tasks at all 

times. If a dam is operated by remote control, training must include procedures for dispatching 

trained personnel to the site at any reported indication of distress. 

Personnel involved in inspections should be trained for the requirements of these duties. The 

training should cover the types of information needed to prepare for the inspections, critical 

features that should be observed, inspection techniques, and preparation of inspection reports. 

13 
b. Academic 

Agency management should establish and maintain a program for continuing formal education 

and training aimed at increasing and broadening the agency's base of professional expertise in 

areas related to safe design and construction of dams. Such training should provide for part 

and/or full time attendance at universities and at special courses prepared by technical and 

professional organizations. Programs should be designed to further the development of younger 

personnel and to provide refresher training or sabbaticals for senior personnel. 

Supervisory construction, inspection, and operation and maintenance staff should keep current 

on modern methods and techniques by attending technical courses. Pertinent courses are 

available from private sources and educational institutions. Also, agencies that develop internal 

educational programs for this purpose should make them available to other agencies, permitting 

the agencies to gain mutual benefit in the exchange of information on new methods and 

practices. 

c. Professional 

Professional growth of personnel should be encouraged by policies which ensure adequate 

training, support participation in technical and professional societies, and establish attractive 

career and promotional ladders for technical specialists. Professional registration and active 

membership in professional and technical societies should be given due consideration in 

assessing qualifications for higher technical positions. 

d. New Technology 

Provision should be made for the establishment of procedures to screen and disseminate 

information on technical advances relating to dam design, construction, and operation. Programs 

for continuing professional training should be oriented toward keeping the technical staff abreast 

of improved technology. Interagency coordination on training in new technology should be 

established in areas of mutual interest. 

4. Communication 

Effective methods of communication, coordination, and review should be established and 

functioning properly at all times, and be periodically reviewed and updated. Procedures for 

communications among Federal, State, and local agencies on safety-related matters should be 

established. Specific areas of suggested communication are discussed below. 

a. Interdisciplinary 

Direct and easily accessible means of communication should be established between personnel in 

planning, design, construction, and operations. Coordination is necessary for preparation of the 

site investigation plan and for a common understanding of information needed for design. Prior 

to the site investigation the design staff should arrange for meetings between geologists, 

geotechnical engineers, and designers to review known site conditions, project functional 

requirements, and preliminary design concepts. A visit to the site should be included in the 

review of existing information. 

A document, referred to by some agencies as "Design Considerations," should be prepared by the 

design staff to transmit site-specific design considerations to the construction staff. This 

14 
document should cover, but not be limited to, hydrologic and hydraulic considerations, geologic 

and geotechnical data, foundation conditions, foundation treatment details, and anticipated 

foundation problems. It should specify points at which inspection and approval are required by 

the design staff. Copies of the document should be furnished to those responsible for dam 

operation and inspection. 

Additionally, the design staff should arrange preconstruction orientation for the construction 

engineers by the designers, geologists, and embankment and structural engineers so that the 

construction engineer and his staff fully understand the design concepts and the significance of 

the results of the exploratory work. The construction engineers need to provide the designers, 

prior to advertising the construction contract, comments on the constructability and the ease of 

contract administration for the plans and specifications. 

During construction, the construction engineers should be alert for conditions that need to be 

reported to the design engineers. Field personnel should notify design personnel of any critical 

construction sequence or of a suspected change in conditions that could affect the design of the 

structure. Design engineers with relevant expertise must be available to make regular visits to the 

construction site, and additional visits as needed when varying conditions arc encountered. 

Changes in construction or materials should be made only after plans for changes are approved 

by design personnel. 

The design staff should furnish to the operation staff documents, referred to by some agencies as 

"Operation and Maintenance Manuals," containing pertinent design and construction information 

on structures and equipment required for effective and safe operation of the dam. A conference 

of design and operating personnel should be held to ensure that the operators understand the 

operating and inspection procedures required for safe and reliable operation. Both the operators 

and the designers should have copies of equipment operating and testing manuals and 

procedures. The operators should notify the designers of any safety-related operating 

malfunctions and the actions taken to correct them. There should be continuing communication 

between operating and design staffs regarding plans and schedules for periodic safety inspections 

of the dam. Copies of operation and maintenance manuals should be furnished to the dam 

inspection staff. 

b. Interagency 

Interagency communications should be maintained on safety matters related to design, 

construction, and operation of dams, and related research. This should include exchange of 

materials such as design standards, construction specifications, significant research reports, and 

final design and construction reports on major structures. The agencies should establish 

communications to periodically review investigation methods, construction materials testing 

standards, analytical methods, design philosophies, and management procedures. 

5. Documentation 

Throughout project development (planning, site investigation, design, construction, initial 

reservoir filling, and operation), all data, computations, and engineering and management 

decisions should be documented. Documentation should cover investigation and design, 

construction plans and construction history, operation and maintenance instructions and history, 

15 
damage and repairs and improvements, and periodic inspections during construction and 

operation. It should include, but not be limited to, memoranda, engineering reports, criteria, 

computations, drawings, and records of all major decisions pertaining to the safety of the dam. 

a. Design Record 

Written documentation should be maintained in standardized format on all design-related 

information for the project. Planning design documentation should cover the project objectives 

and the studies made to locate, size, classify as to potential hazard, and select the type of dam 

and auxiliary facilities. Site investigation documentation should cover geologic mapping and 

studies made of the geologic and geotechnical explorations and conditions for the various dam 

sites considered and the detailed investigations for the chosen site. Geological, seismological, 

and geotechnical features and considerations, whether specifically identified during the 

investigation, interpretations from the data and experience at other sites, or suspected by 

experienced personnel, should be fully documented. Design documentation should include all 

design criteria, data and qualitative information, assumptions, analyses and computations, studies 

on discarded alternatives, and derived judgments and decisions. 

As-built drawings should be prepared as facilities are completed, and should be made available 

to operation and maintenance personnel and to the dam inspection staff. 

b. Construction Record 

All phases of the construction should be documented, including reporting of routine and special 

activities. Changes in construction plans and departures from expected site conditions should be 

documented, with any consequent design changes. The record should include information on 

materials and construction processes, field exploration and test results, geologic mapping of 

foundations and excavations, inspection records, as-built drawings, and decisions to adapt the 

design to actual field conditions. 

A formal plan for a construction inspection system should be developed, including inspection 

procedures and types and forms of reports. The system should identify and record the status of 

inspection of approved and rejected materials. Survey notes, sketches, and records of all 

materials tests made for the control of construction quality should be maintained for the life of 

the project. A job diary should be maintained for each construction contract to provide a 

complete history of the work, listing in chronological order the events having a bearing on 

performance of the work, and analysis of cause and effects of special events. Photographic 

documentation of significant events, findings, and safety problems should be provided. The 

inspection program and record should give special attention to factors that may have a future 

influence on dam safety. 

Documentation must also be provided, as required, by applicable procurement, safety and health 

personnel, and financial regulations. 

c. Initial Reservoir Filling and Surveillance Record 

An initial reservoir filling and surveillance plan should be prepared by the design staff. Initial 

filling should be well documented, including a record of reservoir elevations and controlled 

water releases during the filling. The record should include complete written justification and 

16 
design approval of any deviations from the planned filling. The surveillance record should 

include all information obtained from inspection of the dam, appurtenant structures, abutments, 

and reservoir rim during the initial filling. 

d. Operation and Maintenance Record 

Operation and maintenance should be fully documented, including the routine activities and 

systematic inspection processes, and complete information on project maintenance, 

rehabilitation, and improvements. In addition to records on the actual operations, the operating 

record should include data on reservoir levels, inflow and outflow, drainage system discharge 

and structural behavior. 

If there are maintenance problems that require continuing remedial work, a thorough record of 

the work should be maintained, and a final report made after complete remedy of the problem. 

e. Permanent Files 

One copy of all documents concerning the project should be assembled in a single project file. 

The file should be kept up to date and should be maintained as a permanent archival reference. A 

second file of the materials should always be easily accessible to responsible personnel for 

reference in future reviews and inspections, and in dealing with problems, repairs, etc. Both files 

should be continuously updated with records on problems, repairs, operation, instrumentation, 

and inspection for the life of the project. Information such as foundation reports and as-built 

drawings and maps should be permanently retained at the project and also at the agency's 

engineering design office. 

6. Reviews 

a. Extent 

All factors affecting the safety of a dam during design, construction, and operation should be 

reviewed on a systematic basis at appropriate levels of authority. Reviews include those internal 

to the agency, and those external to the agency, by individuals or boards (consultants) with 

recognized expertise in dam planning, design, and construction. 

b. Internal 

Provision should be made for automatic internal review of all design decisions, methods, and 

procedures related to dam safety. Review should be at levels of authority above the design 

section or designer-supervisor relation. Uniformity of criteria and design technique should be 

maintained, as well as methods to ensure that specific experience is exchanged and used to 

advance the agency's ability to design, construct, and operate safe dams. 

Management technical personnel should review the construction periodically. Reviewing 

personnel should include geologists, geotechnical engineers, and embankment and/or structural 

engineers who have had experience in responsible positions relating to similar structures. When 

appropriate, the reviews should include mechanical and/or electrical equipment engineers. 

Preconstruction inspection should be made after geologic mapping is done and prior to ground 

surface disturbance. On large projects, construction reviews would normally be at critical 

construction periods such as start and completion of foundation preparation and grouting, dam 

17 
construction at several stages, and completion of the dam. Visits by appropriate personnel are 

recommended every six months, and to accompany the consultants during scheduled reviews. 

The final construction inspection should cover inspection of completed structures and equipment, 

the adjacent valley floor and abutments, and the reservoir rim. 

On smaller projects, the frequency of construction review and the disciplines represented in the 

review would vary with the size and complexity of the project. However, management should 

make certain that construction reviews arc sufficient to cover the requirements for dam safety. 

Reviews should be made of the agency's procedures for post-construction operation and periodic 

inspections. These would include the responsibilities for collection and evaluation of data from 

any dam instrumentation. 

Reviews should be made to ensure that the project emergency preparedness plan is periodically 

updated. 

Formal documentation should be made of all significant findings from reviews and inspections. 

c. External 

The need for review of a dam by independent experts (consultant board or firm) from outside the 

agency should be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the degree of hazard, size of 

the dam, complexity of the site geology and geotechnology, complexity of the design, or a 

specific need perceived by the public. Consultant reviews should provide appropriate overview 

evaluations of site investigation, design, and construction. 

Consultant reviews of operation and maintenance practices, and of alterations and improvements, 

should be conducted when the agency considers such reviews advisable. 

The following text deals first with design and construction reviews. Applicable portions apply 

also to post-construction reviews; specifics for post-construction reviews are in the last 

paragraph of the section. 

The agency should be represented at each consultant meeting by appropriate design and 

construction staff. When appropriate, meetings should include a site visit. At each meeting the 

agency should formally document all aspects of the continued development of the project for 

presentation in a meeting-opening briefing to the consultants. The consultants should formally 

document findings and recommendations and present them at a closing conference with the 

agency staff. 

The consultant board members should be chosen to assure coverage of all areas of expertise 

needed to assess the dam design, construction, and safety. The board should contain at least 

three, but normally not more than five, permanent members. The board should always contain a 

general civil engineer, a geologist and/or geotechnical engineer, as appropriate, a concrete and/or 

embankment dam engineer, and usually a member for the electrical and mechanical features, 

especially necessary if a power plant is part of the project. Additional specialists covering 

specific aspects such as structural integrity, earthquake response, or three-dimensional analysis 

18 
should be assigned for short intervals as recommended by the board. The board should be formed 

during the design stage and consulted (if possible) on site selection, on type of structure, and for 

input to the feasibility study. The board should be kept active throughout design and 

construction, in order to keep the board completely familiar with all aspects of the project so they 

are in a position to respond rapidly if problems arise. 

During design and construction of large projects, the board should meet every 6 to 12 months, 

depending upon activities and duration of the work. Meetings should be scheduled to review at 

specific phases of construction. These phases might include, but not be limited to, review during 

the early stages of foundation cleanup and treatment, on completion of foundation cleanup, and 

during the early stages of embankment and/or concrete placement. All board members should 

attend every meeting even though some meetings may not apply to all members. This would 

ensure that the entire board is fully aware of the complete work status before being asked for 

their input on specific points. 

The briefing to the board by agency personnel at the start of a meeting should include 

exploration data, structural adequacy and seepage characteristics of the foundation, proposed 

foundation treatment, grouting programs, quarry test data, test fill data, embankment 

requirements for zones and material for those zones, sources of materials, compaction 

requirements, inspection requirements, instrumentation program, type of spillway (gated or 

ungated), proposed water release control systems, diversion requirements and care and diversion 

of water, power generation anticipated, and surge tank design. For concrete dams, the review 

would include concrete design and placement requirements in lieu of the embankment 

information. 

On a smaller project, the use of consultants should be commensurate with the dam size and 

complexity, and with the degree of associated hazard. If there is significant hazard, the agency 

should obtain consultant reviews adequate to assure independent assessment of the dam safety. 

Consultants should be engaged during agency evaluations of existing dams if considered 

necessary to provide independent support for agency assessment of dam safety. This might be in 

connection with studies for alterations or improvements for potential criticality of dam stability 

resulting from structure deterioration, or from increased reservoir levels due to possible flood 

inflows larger than design floods and consequent inadequate spillway capacity. It might involve 

consultation on seismic design; and in the case of old dams, especially embankment dams with 

inadequate records of materials properties, it might include consultation on the advisability and 

procedures for new materials investigations. Consultants on features of existing dams may be 

individuals rather than formal boards. 

7. Research and Development 

A strong research and development effort is a necessary element in reducing the uncertainties 

still present in dam design, hydrology and hydraulics, materials behavior, and construction 

techniques, equipment and practices. As part of their dam safety programs, agency management 

should identify opportunities and needs for research and programs to meet those needs both 

internally and through other agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the U.S. 

Geological Survey. 

19 
a. Methods and Materials 

Management should ensure that a continuing review is made of state-of-the-art methods, 

experience, research, etc., and that improvements are incorporated into agency criteria and 

methods of analysis, exploration, construction, testing, and instrumentation. The process should 

build from experience on past projects relating to constructability, observed behavior, problems 

encountered, and problem solutions tried and their results. Experience histories should be 

reviewed, summarized, and disseminated to evaluate current practice in order to advance agency 

practices. Research and development needed on materials and their use as revealed by dam 

observation and monitoring and new developments should be conducted on a continuing basis. 

Establishing a schedule of research priorities is necessary for overall research and development 

goals and for orderly and consistent progress in advancing dam technology. 

b. Risk-Based Analysis 

The agencies should individually and cooperatively support research and development of riskbased analysis and methodologies as related to the safety of dams. This research should be 

directed especially to the fields of hydrology, earthquake hazard, and potential for dam failure. 

Existing agency work in these fields should be continued and expanded more specifically into 

developing risk concepts useful in evaluating safety issues. Existing work is exemplified by (1) 

the interagency research conference cited in paragraph c below, (2) its adjunct meetings on 

hydraulics and earthquakes, and (3) the NRC methods of risk evaluation for nuclear plants as 

applicable to radiological safety-related dams. 

c. Interagency Coordination 

Existing interagency research coordination activities should be continued, with attention to 

minimizing unnecessary duplication. The biennial research coordination conference on water 

resources among the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority, 

and Bonneville Power Administration is an example of beneficial exchange needed on issues 

relating to dam safety. 

8. Contracts 

a. Documents 

Agency procedures should ensure that all contracts for dam design, construction, and operation 

are written to accomplish the design intent and to require that contractors provide complete 

documentation of their work. 

b. Modifications 

During the construction period, any modifications in the design or construction which result from 

significant departures from expected field conditions, design reviews, or other studies should be 

promptly included in revisions to appropriate contracts. Such modifications, and any discovered 

later, that affect operation should be included in operation contracts (and in agency operation, 

monitoring, and maintenance policy). The basis and justification for any change should be 

documented. 

9. Constraints 

Many constraints which are outside agency authority can directly or indirectly affect dam safety. 

Managers at all levels must be continually aware of their fundamental responsibilities for dam 

20 
safety and exercise vigilance in identifying constraints on fulfilling those responsibilities. Every 

manager has a duty to seek resolution or mitigation of such constraints through his own agency 

channels or through interagency or intergovernmental channels as appropriate and available to 

him. 

a. Funding for Organizational Management 

Continuity and adequacy of funding are essential to carry out the various programs which ensure 

safe dams. The Zero Based Budget system offers an opportunity to managers to identify for high 

funding priority those activities, programs, staff levels, and other operating requirements of a 

sound dam safety program. Managers should avail themselves of this opportunity. Agencies 

should cooperatively develop common budgetary terms and consistent processes to provide the 

necessary visibility of dam safety funding essentials at all levels and within all branches of the 

government. Long-term programming objectives should be established and adhered to, to meet 

the requirements of organization management, personnel staffing and training, research and 

development, quality construction and operation, a complete program of inspection and 

evaluation of the safety of existing dams, and a planned program for the rehabilitation and/or 

improvement of existing dams. 

b. Public Concerns 

Public individuals and groups should have the opportunity to voice their concerns in the 

development of public works projects and during their operation. These concerns often represent 

constraints in the form of local or regional political interests, legislation, perceptions of risk and 

hazard, environmental factors, social conflicts, etc., which can influence technical decisions. 

Agencies should develop and organize their procedures for early assimilation of those public 

views which affect possible design, construction, or operating parameters and, in turn, influence 

dam safety. Resolution of public issues conflicts and problems, including use of executive and 

legislative government decisions, should be made prior to the start of construction so that dam 

safety is not compromised. 

B. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES — SITE INVESTIGATION AND 

DESIGN (SID) 

This section of the guidelines outlines the site investigation and design technical activities that 

agency management should ensure are undertaken to obtain safe design of dams. It is recognized 

that the extent of application of these guidelines will vary depending on the size and function of 

the dam. 

1. Hydrology 

a. Hazard Evaluation 

Areas impacted by dam construction and existing dams should be examined for potential hazards 

to present and future developments in the event of major flooding by controlled flood discharges 

or flooding induced by dam failure or misoperation. This hazard evaluation is the basis for 

selection of the performance standards to be used in dam design or in evaluation of existing 

dams. 

21 
b. Flood Development 

Hypothetical floods, generally of severe magnitude, should be developed for use in design or 

evaluation of major dam and reservoir features, including development of appropriate floods for 

the construction period. 

c. Flood Selection for Design (or Evaluation) 

The selection of the design flood should be based on an evaluation of the relative risks and 

consequences of flooding, under both present and future conditions. Higher risks may have to be 

accepted for some existing structures because of irreconcilable conditions. 

When flooding could cause significant hazards to life or major property damage, the flood 

selected for design should have virtually no chance of being exceeded. If lesser hazards are 

involved, a smaller flood may be selected for design. However, all dams should be designed to 

withstand a relatively large flood without failure even when there is apparently no downstream 

hazard involved under present conditions of development. 

d. Hydrologic Design of Reservoir 

In addition to selection of a design flood, the hydrologic design of a new reservoir or the 

evaluation of an existing project involves consideration of discharge and storage capacities, 

reservoir regulation plans including constraints, land requirements, and wind/wave effects. The 

evaluation of existing projects also should include observed performance capabilities and 

whether improvements are necessary to ensure safety. 

Reservoir regulation plans should be developed in the planning of projects so that realistic 

release rates will be used in routing the design flood. Regulation plans should include the 

construction period. When gate operations are involved, a water control management plan should 

be established to direct reservoir regulation in an effective and efficient manner. An emergency 

regulation plan is also required for use by the dam tender in the event of loss of communication 

with the water control management staff during a flood. A data information system should be 

designed to collect and process pertinent hydro meteorological data in a timely and reliable 

manner. 

The reservoir regulation plans, water control management plan, and data information systems 

should be periodically reviewed for safely deficiencies and potential for misoperation during 

both severe flood events and normal conditions. Necessary corrections should be made as soon 

as practicable. 

e. Downstream Effects 

Safety design includes studies to ascertain areas that would be flooded during occurrence of the 

design flood and in the event of dam failure. The areas downstream from the project should be 

evaluated to determine the need for land acquisition, flood plain management, or other methods 

to prevent major damage. Information should be developed and documented suitable for 

releasing to downstream interests regarding remaining risks of flooding. 

22 
f. Warning Systems 

Safety design should include an emergency flood warning system and action plan that would 

effectively notify all concerned in ample time for appropriate action. 

2. Earthquake Investigation and Design 

a. Investigation Factors 

The following factors should be considered in selection of design earthquakes. 

(1) Geologic and tectonic setting of the site area by analysis of the lithology, stratigraphy, 

structural geology, and tectonic history. 

(2) Historical earthquake record to include the size, location, and other seismological 

characteristics as available, and the relationship, if possible, with the tectonic siting of the area in 

which the earthquakes have occurred. 

(3) Influence of the properties of the surficial materials on the determination of the size of 

historical earthquakes. 

(4) Influence of faulting or other tectonic features on the estimate of the occurrence, size, and 

location of possible future earthquakes. 

b. Selection of Design Earthquakes 

From the above factors, earthquakes should be selected that have sufficient potential of occurring 

to require consideration in the dam design. Earthquake description should include estimates to 

the extent practical of the size, location, depth, focal mechanism, and frequency of occurrence. 

c. Engineering Seismology 

Determination should be made of the characteristics of ground motion that would be expected 

from the design earthquakes, to the extent possible, to include amplitude (displacement, velocity 

and acceleration), frequency content, and duration. 

d. Need for Earthquake Analysis 

The probable effects of earthquakes on the dam and its appurtenant structures should be 

evaluated to determine the need for inclusion of earthquake forces in the structures analyses. 

Evaluation includes consideration of factors such as the project stage, hazard and risk factors, the 

size of the dam and reservoir, the potential ground motion at the site, site geology, and type of 

structure. Where determination is made that no earthquake forces are required in analysis, the 

determination should be justified. 

e. Seismic and Geologic Studies 

(1) Earthquake Sources. The essential first step is determination of the design seismic events 

(usually the maximum credible earthquakes) and an estimate of the ground motion at the site due 

23 
to these events. From a study of the regional tectonics and seismicity, and both regional and local 

geology, potential sources for seismic events are identified, and the maximum credible 

earthquake magnitudes postulated. 

(2) Design Events. A maximum credible earthquake (MCE) is defined herein as the hypothetical 

earthquake from a given source that could produce the severest vibratory ground motion at the 

dam. Time histories of the estimated rock motion (accelerograms) at the dam for the various 

seismic events are selected to characterize the severity of the strong motions by their peak 

accelerations, frequency content, and duration. 

f. Design for Earthquake Forces 

(1) Safety Concerns. All earthquake-related safety concerns should be identified. Potential safety 

concerns include but should not be limited to dam foundation integrity, stability, unacceptable 

stress levels, fault displacements; abutments stability; effects of dam overtopping; dam stability; 

susceptibility of embankment dams to embankment or foundation liquefaction, cracking or 

excessive deformation. 

A survey of component and accessory structures and equipment should be made to identify those 

which have functions that are essential for earthquake-related safety. 

(2) Analysis Method. Determination of appropriate earthquake analysis methods for evaluation 

of safety concerns may be, as appropriate, by qualitative evaluations, pseudostatic analysis, and 

dynamic analysis. The methods selected should be appropriate to the identified safety concerns, 

in accordance with good engineering practice and with currently available technology. 

(3) Structural Adequacy. Structural adequacy assessments should be made of all safety-related 

components and concerns identified. These assessments should incorporate all applicable data 

and analysis. 

3. Geotechnics

a. General 

(1) Site Specifics. After a site is selected, a program for the geotechnical exploration, design, and 

analysis of that specific site is required. No checklist can be made which would cover all 

eventualities at all sites, or at any one site, and attempts to formulate such a list would be 

counterproductive to the intent to ensure dam safety. The best insurance for adequate 

geotechnical work is a well-trained and experienced staff actively involved in field inspections 

throughout all phases of the development of the site. 

(2) Documentation. Because many evaluations are possible for a given set of geotechnical 

conditions, it is important that full documentation be made of the reasoning process involved in 

geotechnical decisions. General guidelines for documentation are given in section III.A.5. 

24 
(3) Management of Diverse Technical Expertise. Geotechnical work encompasses the expertise 

of geologists, geophysicists, and engineers—all with diverse experience, training, interest, and 

technical terminology. The administrative and technical supervision of these experts should be 

structured to optimize coordination and cooperation. Management should encourage intellectual 

curiosity and an inquisitive approach to all geotechnical work. Since the field of geotechniques is 

rapidly expanding, management should assure that those associated with site exploration and 

development maintain currency with the state of the art. 

b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems 

The exploration program needs to be site specific, flexible, and executed so as to obtain the 

maximum data from each part of the program. Agency management should ensure sufficient 

funding for an orderly development of the exploration program in order to reduce uncertainties 

and to make adequate provisions for required corrective measures. 

The initial onsite exploration should be preceded by a review of all available information 

pertinent to the development of the site (literature, maps, photographs, well and spring 

information, seismic data, area construction records, etc.). This should lead to the preparation of 

a detailed geological map of the site using all available data. Geotechnical explorations generally 

proceed from wide-spaced borings and geophysical surveys to determine the general geological 

conditions, to additional explorations assigned in an ongoing sequence to develop the geologic 

correlations and to determine the type of dams suitable for the site. The extent, depth, and type of 

exploration depend on the complexity of the geology and size and type of dam. 

Generally, explorations are not complete at the end of the planning phase but continue during the 

preparation of plans and specifications and into the construction phase. Conditions encountered 

during construction often require additional explorations to evaluate the need for changes in the 

design. 

All potential geological problems, inferred from onsite data and from experience at similar sites, 

should be fully explored and described. This information should cover the types of adverse 

features and geologic processes generally associated with a geological environment similar to 

that at the site. It should also cover the expected short- and long-term behavior of foundation and 

reservoir rim materials at the site when subjected to the changed geological environment 

associated with the construction and operation of the dam and to geologic processes operating 

during the life of the project. 

During the course of the design and continued exploration of the project, all potential problems 

should be investigated and corrected with appropriate treatment, or where uncertainty remains, 

design defenses should be provided to control or monitor the problems. Types of problems which 

might require consideration include reservoir-induced seismicity, solubility, pipability and 

liquefaction potential of materials, foundation heave or deterioration during excavation, reservoir 

rim leakage and stability, past and future mining, and differential consolidation associated with 

petroleum or water extraction. 

25 
c. Geotechnical Design 

Geotechnical design considerations for the dam foundation and reservoir area are essentially 

defined after the geologic conditions of the site, the type of dam, and the magnitude of the 

stresses imposed on the foundation by the dam and reservoir have been determined. 

Foundation design typically consists of four distinct elements. These are (1) definition of the 

geometry of the foundations and areas of potential instability in the foundations, abutments, and 

slopes; (2) determination of the properties of foundation materials using judgment, past 

experience, laboratory testing, and in situ testing; (3) an analytical procedure that predicts the 

behavior of the foundation in terms of stability, permeability, and deformation; and (4) a 

reevaluation of parts (1) through (3) as construction progresses so that a comparison can be made 

of preconstruction assumptions and conditions with the actual conditions revealed by the 

foundation excavation and treatment. Additional exploratory work may be required. 

d. Foundation Treatment 

(1) General. The preparation of the foundation, including the abutments, is one of the most 

important phases of construction. The primary purposes of foundation treatment are to provide 

stability, obtain positive control of seepage, and minimum adverse deformation. The geology, 

foundation conditions, foundation treatment, and proposed structure should be considered 

together. 

(2) Stability. Surfaces should be prepared to provide a satisfactory contact between the foundation and the overlying structure by removal of unsuitable materials. Deficiencies in the 

foundation which are not removed should either be treated by modification of the structure or by 

appropriate foundation treatment tailored to handle the conditions encountered. 

(3) Positive Control of Seepage. Highly permeable foundations should be treated by such 

measures as cutting off the pervious material, grouting, increasing the seepage path by upstream 

blankets, or controlling the seepage with drainage systems. Where appropriate, surficial cavities 

should be traced, cleaned out, and backfilled with material satisfying the design requirements. 

When cavities exist at depth, measures should be taken to ensure against the migration of cavity 

filling material. 

(4) Control of Piping. Silts and fine sands in the foundation, which are susceptible to piping, 

should be removed if practical, cut off near the downstream limits of the dam, covered with 

impervious material, or provided with filtered drainage systems. If pipable material is used in the 

dam, the foundation surface treatment should prevent migration of dam material into the 

foundation. 

(5) Deformation. Foundations subject to differential settlement or foundations having highly 

compressible anomalies can cause stress concentrations or cracking in dams. The foundation 

excavation should be shaped to remove abrupt changes in elevation to preclude excessive 

differential settlement or stress concentrations. Low shear strength material in a foundation can 

26 
cause shear failure. Excavation and replacement of low strength material is a positive method for 

treating a foundation that has either or both of these unfavorable conditions. 

e. Instrumentation 

Although a well conceived foundation instrumentation program serves to monitor the foundation 

and gives an indication of distress, it cannot of itself certify the safety of the foundation. The 

expertise of the engineer/geologist to analyze and design and prepare a foundation that will 

safely carry the loads and water pressure imposed by the dam and the reservoir is fundamental to 

the design adequacy of the foundation. The purposes of foundation instrumentation are fourfold: 

to (1) provide data to validate design assumptions; (2) provide information on the continuing 

behavior of the foundation; (3) observe the performance of critical known features; and (4) 

advance the state of the art of foundation engineering. 

The general requirements for foundation instrumentation should be determined early in the 

design of the project, and the rationale for the instrumentation should be thoroughly documented. 

Factors that will influence the need for and the type of instrumentation include the geology of the 

foundation, size and type of the dam and reservoir, and the location of the project. Flexibility 

must be provided in the program to allow for changes from anticipated foundation conditions 

that are encountered during construction and/or operations. 

Intrinsic to an instrumentation program is the schedule for reading the instruments before and 

during construction, during initial reservoir filling, and through the service life of the project. No 

less important is the need for clear instructions for the prompt evaluation of data and prompt 

notification to responsible personnel when observations are atypical or diverge markedly from 

the design assumptions. 

f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction 

Those responsible for the investigation and design of the foundation should make onsite 

evaluations to confirm that actual conditions conform to those assumed in the design and to 

review documentation of site conditions. 

A qualified project geologist should examine and map geologic details of the foundation as it is 

being exposed during construction. Investigation and testing at this point provide details useful in 

controlling grouting and other improvements and in confirming the competency of the 

foundation. Even though extensive exploration and testing may have been conducted prior to 

construction, most foundations can be expected to reveal unanticipated conditions which may 

require redesign or changes in the type or extent of foundation treatment. 

Approval should be obtained from the geotechnical and design staffs before placement of dam 

materials on the foundation. This approval should be documented and should indicate that all 

unanticipated conditions encountered were dealt with and that the foundation and its treatment 

meet the design requirements. 

27 
g. Reevaluation at Existing Structures 

Older Federal dams may not have been designed to standards equal to current criteria. Also, a 

substantial portion of safety-related dam incidents are associated with foundation problems 

which develop in a time-dependent fashion after construction. For these reasons, systematic 

reevaluation of existing Federal dams should be made. 

These reevaluation should go beyond analysis of problems which are observed visually or from 

instrumentation data. A review should be made of all existing exploratory information, design 

information, construction records, and operation records, to determine the adequacy of the 

foundation with respect to the present site of the dam. Where available information is insufficient 

or where deficiencies are found or suspected, modern criteria for analysis, instrumentation, 

exploration, and testing should be used as appropriate to gather the necessary data to show that 

no problem exists or to furnish information to modify the structure or foundation. 

4. Hydraulic Appurtenances 

a. General 

(1) Protective Measures. All hydraulic appurtenances used for releasing water should be 

designed to preclude jeopardy to the damming provisions. 

(2) Blockage. Allowances for or preclusion of blockage of hydraulic facilities should be incorporated in the design. 

(3) Reliability. When operational failure of a gated passage would jeopardize the damming 

provisions, alternate capacity should be provided. When operation of a gated passage is essential 

to safety, reliable manpower, communications and accessibility should be assured. 

(4) Hydraulics and Hydrology. Hydraulic and hydrologic design considerations should be 

correlated with section III.B.1. 

b. Design Flood Releases 

(1) Spillway and Outlets. Gated spillways are the usual hydraulic appurtenances for control of all 

or the major portion of the design flood and major emergency releases. Outlets (sluiceways, 

conduits and tunnels) may be used alone or in conjunction with spillways to control flood 

discharges. 

(a) Selection of type. Spillways and outlets should be selected to meet the site specific purposes 

of the project. For a drainage area with short concentration time combined with reservoir storage 

capacity that is small relative to the flood volume, especially for embankment dams, (1) the 

spillway should usually be uncontrolled, and (2) outlets should not normally be used for sole or 

part control of the design flood except in special cases where the outlets can be uncontrolled. 

(b) Capacity. Spillway and outlet capacity should be sufficient to satisfy the discharge 

28 
requirements of the reservoir regulation plan and other design considerations. 

(2) Power Facilities. A portion of installed turbine flow capacity may be considered to assist in 

control of the design flood if it is demonstrated that possible power load interruptions during the 

design flood would not preclude operation of the power facilities. 

c. Other Water Releases 

Other water release hydraulic appurtenances such as navigation facilities, locks, fish facilities, 

ice sluices, trash sluices, and water quality facilities should conform to the requirements of 

section 4.a. 

d. Reservoir Evacuation 

Where practicable, reservoir release facilities should be provided to lower the pool to a safe level 

adequate to correct conditions that might threaten the integrity of the dam. 

e. Control of Flows during Construction 

The provisions of section 4.a also apply generally to the design of hydraulic appurtenances used 

during construction. The capacity of these appurtenances should be sufficient to satisfy the 

discharge requirements of the regulation plan for control of water during construction. 

f. Design Criteria and Guidance 

(1) General. If existing design criteria and guidance from past projects and experience are used 

for design of the hydraulic appurtenances, their sufficiency should be documented. 

(2) Hydraulic Model Tests. When sufficient criteria and guidance are not available for analytical 

design of the hydraulic appurtenances, physical hydraulic model studies should be performed. 

(3) Prototype Testing. Features of safety-related hydraulic appurtenances that are beyond the 

state of the art, or for which model to prototype relationships have not been verified, should be 

tested in the prototype. 

g. Reanalysis Because of Changes 

Changes in project purpose, new purposes, operational requirements, limitations of constraints, 

design criteria, or legal requirements may require that a reanalysis be made of the hydraulic 

appurtenances. 

h. Hydraulic Design Involvement during Life of Structure 

Hydraulic design engineers should participate in the project periodic inspection program to 

evaluate the operational adequacy of all hydraulic appurtenances essential to dam safety 

throughout the life of the structure including final disposition. 

29 
5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dams 

a. Site Specific Design 

Because all dam sites are unique, the type of dam and its appurtenances should be specifically 

matched to site conditions and project requirements. It is essential when reviewing the safety of 

existing dams to consider conditions which may have changed physically and new concepts 

resulting from new technology, or because of additional project information since construction, 

such as foundation deterioration, increased flood hydrographs, or larger design earthquakes. 

b. Materials 

Concrete for the structures requires competent investigation of materials sources and adequacy of 

supply testing of materials properties in accordance with accepted standards, and proper 

proportioning of concrete mixes (including additives) for strength, durability, control of thermal 

properties, and economy. 

c. Design of Structures

There are three components of a dam which must be considered for safety: the foundation, the 

dam, and its appurtenant structures. 

(1) Foundation. Proper design of a concrete dam requires information on the foundation 

geological conditions and materials properties to assure its capability to support the loads of the 

dam and reservoir, in its natural state or as improved by foundation treatment. 

(2) Dam. Concrete dams should be designed to be safe against overturning and sliding without 

exceeding allowable stresses of the foundation and the concrete for all loading conditions 

imposed on the dam. The shape and/or curvature of a dam and its contact with the foundation are 

extremely important in providing stability and favorable stress conditions. Proper consideration 

should be given to ensure the dam's safety in the event of overtopping. 

Joints in the dam should be properly designed to control cracking due to thermal, shrinkage, and 

structural effects. Temperature control measures such as proper concrete mix design, pre-cooling 

of the concrete mix, and post-cooling of the concrete blocks can also be used to control cracking. 

Openings in the dam such as waterways, galleries, chambers, and shafts should be designed with 

consideration for their effects on the behavior of the structure. 

(3) Appurtenances. Safety-related appurtenances, such as outlet works structures, spillways, and 

navigation locks, should be designed with the same degree of safety as the main dam. If the 

project has a powerhouse as an integral part of the dam, it should be designed for the same safety 

requirements as the dam. 

d. Definition of Loads 

The dam and appurtenances should be designed for all static and dynamic loads to which they 

will be subjected. Dynamic loadings to be considered should include inertial, hydrodynamic, and 

earth pressures from earthquake ground motions and structural response; and dynamic loads 

resulting from flowing water. 

30 
e. Design Methods 

The methods required for design of the several types of concrete dams and their appurtenances 

vary from simple to complex, depending on the type and size of the structure, the hazard 

potential of the site, the kinds of loading, and foundation conditions. The design process involves 

judgment and analytical expertise to select appropriate methods to analyze a structure whether it 

requires a simple or complex analysis, and to determine design input data that is representative of 

the range and variation of foundation and structural material properties. The selection of input 

parameters is just as important as the mechanics of the analysis used. 

f. Design Evaluation 

Technically qualified supervisory personnel should assure that structures are designed to meet 

the requirements for safety. This includes confirmation of design input parameters, design 

methods, and utilization of allowable factors of safety against overturning, sliding, and stressing 

appropriate to the probability of the loading conditions. 

g. Instrumentation 

Knowledge of the behavior of structures and their foundations may be gained by studying the 

service action of the structures using observations on embedded and other internal 

instrumentation and external measurements. Information from which a continuing assurance of 

the structural safety of the dam can be assessed is of primary importance, but information on 

structure behavior and the properties of dam and foundation materials serve to verify the design 

and to provide information for improvement of design. Observations may be made in the dam 

and foundation in terms of strain, deflection, pressure, temperature, stress, deformation, and 

drainage flows. External measurements for deflection and settlements may be made by precise 

surveys on targets set on the dam, in galleries, in vertical wells in the dam, in tunnels, and on the 

foundation. Status reports on the condition of structures should be issued regularly. Examinations 

of existing structures should include assessments of whether additional instrumentation is 

required. 

h. Construction and Operational Follow-up 

It is necessary that the designers should be involved in the construction and operation processes 

to confirm that the design intent is carried out, and to allow changes and modifications resulting 

from redesign necessitated by differences between design assumptions and actual field or 

operating conditions. 

6. Embankment Dams 

Section 5 contains general dam considerations; the following additional considerations are 

applicable to embankment dams. 

a. Site Specific Design 

Embankment design should be developed for specific site conditions and based on adequate 

exploration and testing to determine all pertinent geologic and material factors with particular 

emphasis on shear strength and stability, permeability and control of seepage, and consolidation 

and settlement. 

31 
Embankment dams are particularly vulnerable to damage and possible failure from internal 

erosion when founded on rock having large cavities, open joints, discontinuities, or other 

geologic defects. The sites should be carefully explored and special attention given to design of 

cutoffs, foundation treatment, and other defensive measures. Special problems related to 

embankment integrity may include soft rock such as clay shales, areal subsidence, old mining 

activity, solution-susceptible rock, and collapsing soils. 

b. Materials 

Embankments can generally be designed to utilize locally available construction material; 

investigation of materials characteristics is required and problem materials should be either 

discarded or protected by defensive design. There is often a need for importing special materials 

for slope protection, filters, and drainage systems. Any embankment zoning should consider the 

properties and quantities of available materials and the effect of their characteristics on the 

construction process. 

c. Design Constructability 

Embankment designs should be constructible with regard to such items as location of borrow 

areas with respect to flooding, in-situ moisture conditions, climatic effects on construction 

schedules, width of zoning, and needs for special material processing. Design should include 

protection of critical features from overtopping by floods during construction. 

d. Embankment Design 

The safety of an embankment is dependent on its continued stability without excessive 

deformation under all conditions of environment and operation, and on control of seepage to 

preclude adverse effects on stability and prevent migration of soil materials. Design 

considerations given below are specific to embankment dams. 

(1) Seismic. Where earthquake design is necessary, consideration should be given to earthquakerelated concerns of soil liquefaction and cracking potential, stability and excessive deformation, 

abutment stability, overtopping effects, and required defensive measures. 

(2) Stability. Embankment stability should be analyzed for all pertinent static and dynamic 

loading conditions without exceeding allowable shearing stresses in the embankment or 

foundation. Factors of safety should be appropriate to the probability of the loading conditions, 

and should consider the effects of loading and time on shear strength, particularly if limited 

placement volume can result in rapid construction. In most cases, embankments should be 

designed for unrestricted rates of reservoir filling and drawdown. 

(3) Settlement and Cracking. The potential for transverse cracking of the embankment caused by 

differential settlement, tension zones, and possible hydraulic fracturing should be minimized by 

careful consideration of abutments, foundation and cutoff trenches, and their geometry and 

treatment. Filter zones of adequate size should be positioned upstream and downstream of the 

impervious zone at all locations where there is a possibility of transverse cracking regardless of 

cause. Potential problems of differential settlement should be considered in establishing the 

construction sequence. 

32 
(4) Seepage. The design should attempt to prevent or minimize seepage through the embankment 

and its foundation and abutments; however, the designer should recognize that seepage usually 

occurs and that protective control measures must be provided. Filtering transition zones and 

foundation and abutment treatment to seal openings should be provided wherever necessary to 

preclude migration of soil materials into or out of all embankment element contacts both 

upstream and downstream. Filters, drainage blankets, and transitions should be of a quality and 

size to conservatively control and safely discharge seepage for all conditions for the life of the 

project. Particular attention should be given to contacts with foundation, abutments, embedded 

structures, and the end slope of closure sections to ensure adequate compaction and bonding to 

control seepage. 

(5) Zoning. Embankment zoning when used should ensure adequate stability for all pertinent 

conditions, and should control seepage through the embankment and provide filter action to 

prevent migration of material. 

(6) Erosion. Upstream and downstream slopes and foundation and abutment contacts should be 

protected against erosion from surface runoff, wave action, and impinging currents. Spillways 

and outlet works should be located and designed so that discharges do not erode the embankment 

or its foundation. 

e. Instrumentation 

Embankment design and prediction of embankment performance are based on an imprecise 

combination of theory and empirical procedure; consequently, performance during construction 

and operation should be monitored by a designed system of external measurements and/or 

installed instrumentation. A well planned system of instruments, when appropriate, should be 

installed to provide data on internal and external movements and on water pressures at critical 

locations in the embankment and foundation during both construction and operation. 

f. Construction and Operational Follow-up 

In addition to the need for designers to be involved in construction and operation of dams in 

general to confirm the design intent and assess the need for possible design changes, certain 

other requirements should be observed at embankment dams. Stability should be evaluated 

during and after construction using strength parameters from as-placed materials and 

observations of pore pressure and seepage if and when conditions warrant. Designers should 

inspect and review performance of embankments during and after reservoir impoundment to 

detect and provide prompt remedial treatment for problems. While major emphasis is placed on 

initial impoundment, the surveillance should continue for the life of the project. As the state of 

the art advances in analysis, material behavior, and methods of observation, deficiencies in 

embankments may be suspected or become obvious and should be investigated and corrected. 

Collected experience information should be summarized and used to further advance the state of 

the art. 

33 
C. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES — CONSTRUCTION (CON) 

1. Introduction 

This section of the guidelines outlines the construction technical activities that agency 

management should ensure are undertaken to obtain safe construction of dams. The principles 

and guidelines arc prepared in a broad sense to ensure that construction of a safe structure is the 

prime requisite. 

a. Construction Contracts 

Construction contracts should be based on site conditions as interpreted at the time of contract 

award. All anticipated work on foundation cleanup, preparation, and treatment should be 

included as specified items of the work. Contract provisions should require the contractor to 

submit to the construction engineer advance notice of significant shift change, to enable adequate 

inspection coverage of multishift operations. 

b. Construction/Design Interface 

Many aspects of construction directly overlap in design considerations. Reference is made below 

to numbered paragraphs in Section III.B. Management of Technical Activities-Site Investigation 

and Design, which concern such common interests: 

3. Geotechnics 

a. General 

(1) Site Specifics 

b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems 

c. Geotechnical Design 

d. Foundation Treatment 

e. Instrumentation 

f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction 

4. Hydraulic Appurtenances 

e. Control of Flows during Construction 

5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dams 

a. Site Specific Design 

b. Materials 

c. Design of Structures 

(1) Foundation 

g. instrumentation 

h. Construction and Operational Follow-up 

6. Embankment Dams 

a. Site Specific Design 

b. Materials 

c. Design Constructability 

d. Embankment Design 

(3) Settlement and Cracking 

(4) Seepage 

34 
e. Instrumentation 

f. Construction and Operational Follow-up 

2. Evaluation during Construction

Field personnel must be highly trained and experienced if the design principles and site 

conditions are to be understood and a safe structure is to be constructed. 

When differing site conditions (different from those anticipated) are encountered, construction 

supervisory forces must have authority to suspend any or all portions of the work affected until 

the design engineers, with assistance as needed, can evaluate the condition and determine if 

design modification is required. 

Construction milestones should be identified when the design engineers will inspect the work 

and concur with the progress of construction. 

3. Orientation of Construction Engineers and Field Inspectors 

Construction engineers need to be aware of design philosophies and assumptions as to site 

conditions and function of project structures, and must understand the designers' intent 

concerning special technical provisions in the specifications. Identified preconstruction 

activities should include the orientation of construction engineers to the site specificity of the 

design and to the close communication requirements with all concerned engineering disciplines 

during the construction process. For major projects, there should be periodic meetings between 

design and construction engineers to discuss upcoming construction activities. Also, during the 

initial stages of important construction activities, the construction engineers should request site 

inspection by the design engineers to assure construction procedures are in accordance with 

design requirements. 

Construction specifications, supplemental reports, and conferences to orient field personnel to 

the particular site, the features of the dam, and the designers' intent for construction should, as 

applicable, include the following: 

a. Design Related 

(1) Design concepts. Explanation of philosophies and assumptions and the reasons for special 

requirements in the specifications to assure accomplishment of design intent. 

(2) Construction sequence. Identification and explanation of the dates to which construction 

progress must conform to satisfy project requirements, and the special sequences for 

construction activities that are required by design. 

(3) Instrumentation systems. Description of the instrument types, their purpose, the procedures 

for installation of each instrument type, the method and time interval for reading each 

instrument, and the importance of prompt data transmission for analysis and feedback. 

35 
(4) Care and diversion of water. Description of the design features included to prevent and/or 

control flooding and turbidity and accomplish diversion and closure of the dam. This should 

also contain the design requirements for controlling normal flows through the work area to 

assure that construction is always accomplished under dry conditions. Critical aspects of the 

construction schedule related to flood problems should be emphasized. 

b. Foundation 

(1) Description. Discussion of the type of foundation conditions expected to exist, i.e., overburden, general rock description, formation weaknesses such as joints, shears and faults, and 

acceptable foundation conditions. 

(2) Excavation. Discussion of the depth and nature of materials expected to be encountered, the 

controls for dewatering and blasting, identification of critical areas, quantity estimates, and an 

acceptable foundation. 

(3) Preparation. Review of the methods of rock foundation preparations such as: cleaning; the 

use of wire mesh, mortar, shotcrete, or rock bolts; grouting, and treatment of faults, shears and 

joints; as well as subsequent exploration to assure desired results. Review of methods of earth 

foundation preparation. 

c. Materials

(1) Materials from required excavation. Definition of acceptable and unacceptable properties of 

materials, the usage and the processing requirements if used, and identification of waste area 

locations. 

(2) Other excavated materials. Identification of the location and amount of usable material, 

"based on current test data," available from all designated areas, including borrow pits. Review 

of the blasting methods that are expected to produce the desired rock quality and sizes. 

Discussion of the expected amounts of waste and the areas where borderline material may be 

used in lieu of wasting, such as in berms or certain zones of the downstream shell of an 

earthfill dam. 

(3) Embankment. Description of both acceptable and unacceptable material properties, placement, and compaction procedures for each zone. Review of required procedures for areas 

adjacent to abutments, around instruments, and at interfaces between zones and/or structures. 

(4) Concrete and concrete materials. Identification of acceptable aggregate sources and review 

of mix designs, joint and surface treatment, finish requirements, form tolerances, and 

placement procedures. Cooling as well as hot and cold weather protection requirements should 

be defined. 

d. Construction General 

(1) Field control. Discussion of the quality assurance procedures required to control all phases 

of construction. Acceptable placement standards should be established for concrete, earth and 

rock materials, and embankments. 

36 
(2) Structural. Discussion of structural steel installation, reinforcing steel placement, and anticipated problem areas and specified treatment for such areas. 

(3) Mechanical-electrical. Description of equipment installation requirements, special procedures, performance tests, protective coatings, and protection devices such as ground fault 

indicators. 

(4) Environmental-Identification of those construction controls required to minimize environmental damage, comply with environmental regulations, and assure public involvement. 

4. Construction Assurance 

a. Construction Procedures 

Agency criteria must assure that acceptable methods and procedures are specified and utilized 

to accomplish design requirements. At the same time, the design and construction 

organizations must maintain the flexibility necessary to modify design, material requirements, 

and construction specifications as conditions dictate without altering the basic design intent. 

b. Construction Materials Testing 

A materials laboratory must be established at the field construction office that is adequately 

staffed and equipped to accomplish the on-site testing requirements set forth in the engineering 

considerations and instructions to field inspection personnel. Provisions should be made for a 

thorough and periodic review "above project level" of the construction materials testing procedures to assure their continued suitability. Periodic companion test samples of embankment 

material should be checked by higher echelon for uniform test assurance. 

c. Quality Assurance 

It is mandatory that adequate construction quality assurance systems and procedures be 

established to assure safe dam construction. The quality assurance system must guarantee, by 

direct inspection and testing, that construction is accomplished in compliance with the contract 

plans and specifications. The quality assurance system must identify when site conditions 

require modification of the design to ensure construction of a safe dam and must document the 

construction activities and test results. Daily inspector’s reports, laboratory test data records, 

and photographs are the minimum mandatory methods of documentation. General guidelines 

for documentation are given in section III.A.5. 

As a part of the quality assurance program the contractor should normally be required to 

submit various plans for approval not limited to, but including, the following: 

Construction Schedule Safety Program 

Care and Diversion of Water (including pollution control) 

Fire Protection 

Plant Layout (including haulroads) 

Environmental Measures 

Equipment Inventory 

Dewatering Foundations and Borrow Areas 

37 
Excavation Sequence of Foundations and Borrow Areas 

Drilling and Blasting Procedures 

Concrete Placement 

Restoration of Construction Area 

D. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES-OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE (O&M) 

This section of the guidelines outlines the technical activities for operation and maintenance, 

periodic inspection program, and emergency action planning that agency management should 

ensure are undertaken to obtain safe operation of dams. 

1. Operation and Maintenance 

a. General 

The intent is to define practices which will ensure safe operation of dams and reservoirs and to 

require a maintenance program that will provide timely repair of facilities. It is assumed that 

each Federal agency is responsible for proper operation and maintenance of dams that are 

owned by the agency or that are under its jurisdiction. 

Operation and maintenance personnel should be selected on the basis of their capability to 

acquire the knowledge needed to perform the many functions of operation and maintenance, 

and should be trained for the associated duties at each specific project. 

All operation and maintenance manuals should be kept current, and records should be 

maintained of instructions, inspections and equipment testing, with copies to those responsible 

for design and dam safety inspections. General guidelines for documentation are given in 

section III.A.5. 

In the following sections, outlets or outlet gates refer to gates or valves on any outlets such as 

sluices, conduits or tunnels, pumps, generating units, and infrequently operated plant intake 

and discharge gates. If the project has a navigation lock, emergency closure and other 

infrequently operated equipment are also included. 

b. Operating Procedures 

Written operating instructions should be prepared for the dam and its associated structures and 

equipment. The instructions should cover the functions of the dam and reservoir and describe 

procedures to follow during flood conditions to ensure dam safety. 

Reservoir operating rule curves should be available for each normal mode of operation and for 

emergency conditions. 

An auxiliary power system, such as a gasoline or diesel-operated generator, is essential if the 

outlet and spillway gates and other dam facilities are electrically operated. 

38 
All spillway and outlet gates should be tested on a regular schedule. The tests should include 

use of both the primary and the auxiliary power systems. 

Project security is a matter of concern at all major dams. This includes preventing structural 

damage by vandals or saboteurs and unauthorized operation of outlet or spillway gates. In most 

cases, restricting public access is essential, and in some instances armed guards may be 

necessary. 

Public safety is of paramount importance at all dams and reservoirs. Specifically, public safety 

on the reservoir, in areas adjacent to the reservoir, and below the dam should be considered, 

particularly in recreational areas. Safety measures should include identification of high 

watermarks to indicate past or probable reservoir levels and streamflows, posting of safety 

instructions at highly visible and key locations, and providing audible safety warnings 

upstream of and below outlets as appropriate. 

Communication should be maintained among affected governmental bodies and with the 

public to enhance the safety aspects of the operation of the dam. Communication alternatives 

include written communications, radio, telephone, television, and newspapers. 

c. Maintenance Procedures 

Written instructions should provide information needed for proper maintenance of all water 

control facilities. 

Specialists should prepare maintenance checklists indicating the maintenance procedures and 

protective measures for each structure and for each piece of operating, communications, and 

power equipment, including existing monitoring systems. Special attention should be given to 

known problem areas. 

Special instructions should be provided for checking operating facilities following floods, 

earthquakes, tornados, and other natural phenomena. 

Maintenance procedures include preventive measures such as painting and lubrication as well 

as repairs to keep equipment in intended operating condition, and minor structural repairs such 

as maintaining drainage systems and correcting minor deterioration of concrete and 

embankment surfaces. The design staff should be apprised of any significant maintenance 

work. 

2. Periodic Inspection Program 

a. General 

The purpose of a periodic inspection program is to verify throughout the operating life of the 

project the structural integrity of the dam and appurtenant structures, assuring protection of 

human life and property. Periodic inspections disclose conditions which might disrupt 

operation or threaten dam safety, in time for them to be corrected. When such conditions are 

encountered, it is necessary to determine the adequacy of structures and facilities to continue 

39 
serving the purposes for which they were designed, and to identify the extent of deterioration 

as a basis for planning maintenance, repair or rehabilitation. 

The following general principles and guidelines for a periodic inspection program should be 

used by Federal agencies responsible for operation or regulation of dams. 

All existing dams with a significant hazard potential should have a safety evaluation based on 

current technical guidelines and criteria. New dams added to the inspection program should be 

planned, designed, and constructed in accordance with current technical criteria. Improvements 

in dam technology require that dams and appurtenant structures be reassessed to assure dam 

safety for more stringent design and materials criteria. 

Periodic inspection of dams, reservoirs, and appurtenant structures involves important aspects 

other than dam safety; however, these guidelines encompass only dam safety issues. Each 

agency is responsible for assuring that the existing dams for which it is responsible are 

periodically inspected, and that new dams are re-inspected initially upon completion of 

construction and periodically thereafter. 

b. Types and Frequencies of Inspections 

The inspection types and intervals herein recommended are for general guidance in developing 

inspection programs for all Federal dams. These guidelines do not preclude other inspections 

or more frequent inspections if deemed necessary depending on project history and importance 

of the facility. For some projects less frequent inspections may be permissible where hazard 

potential and structural integrity warrant such relaxation. 

To maintain control of the inspection program, a formal inspection schedule should be 

maintained which lists each feature to be inspected, frequency of inspection, date last 

inspected, date of last inspection report, maintenance record, description of repairs made, and 

date of next inspection. The schedule should also have a note on major alterations that are 

made. 

Inspection personnel should be selected carefully, have qualifications commensurate with their 

assigned levels of responsibility, and receive training in the inspection procedures. 

Qualifications and training required for inspection personnel may vary with the complexity of 

the facility and with the level of inspection. 

(1) Informal Inspections. The purpose of informal inspections is to have as far as practicable a 

continuous surveillance of the dam. Employees at the project are to make frequent observations 

of the dam and appurtenances and of operation and maintenance. They are to identify and 

report abnormal conditions in accordance with adequate instructions and guidance. A detailed 

checklist of items to be inspected may be provided. The instructions or checklists should be 

prepared specifically for the project by engineering and operating specialists. The personnel 

performing these inspections should be properly trained and made aware of the heavy reliance 

placed upon them, and the great importance and absolute necessity of their careful inspection 

and reporting. Any unusual conditions that seem critical or dangerous should be reported 

40 
immediately to the agency's inspection organization or to those assigned inspection 

responsibility. 

Particular attention should be given to detecting evidence of (or changes in) leakage, erosion, 

sinkholes, boils, seepage, slope instability, undue settlement, displacement, tilting, cracking, 

deterioration, and improper functioning of drains and relief wells. 

(a) Frequency of informal inspections. Informal inspections should be scheduled by experienced, trained engineers as needed according to the dam's size, importance, and potential 

for loss of life and damage to property. The schedule for inspection should be changed by the 

engineers as required to be responsive to observed changing conditions. 

Operating personnel should make an inspection immediately after any unusual event such as 

large floods, earthquakes, suspected sabotage, or vandalism. 

(b) Qualifications of personnel for informal inspections. Informal inspections in most instances 

can be performed satisfactorily by dam tenders or operation and maintenance personnel not 

formally educated in the field of engineering or geology. Persons selected to make informal 

inspections, however, must have sufficient training and experience to allow them to recognize 

abnormal conditions, must have demonstrated their ability to perform operation and 

maintenance functions, and must have an appreciation for the importance of their 

responsibilities. They must be provided adequate written instructions on performance of 

responsibilities and must be evaluated periodically to assure that they understand the 

requirements and are capable of performing them. In addition, procedures for monitoring 

structural performance, observing the structure, its foundation, abutments, and appurtenances, 

and reporting abnormal conditions must be clearly defined and understood by these personnel. 

(2) Intermediate Inspections. Intermediate inspections should include a thorough field inspection of the dam and appurtenant structures, and a review of the records of inspections 

made at and following the last formal inspection. If unusual conditions are observed that are 

outside the expertise of these inspectors, arrangements should be made for inspections to be 

conducted by specialists. 

(a) Frequency of intermediate inspections. Intermediate inspections should be performed 

preferably on an annual basis, but at least biennially, where there is a high probability that dam 

failure could result in loss of life. For other dams, intermediate inspections should be scheduled 

by responsible engineers on the basis of the dam's size, importance, and potential for damage 

to property. 

(b) Qualifications of personnel for intermediate inspections. Intermediate inspections should be 

performed by technically qualified engineers, experienced in the operation and maintenance of 

dams and trained to recognize abnormal conditions. The inspectors should have access to and 

be familiar with all permanent documentation, especially the operation and maintenance 

histories for the dam and should be directly responsible for and intimately familiar with the 

operating characteristics of the dam. The dam tender or operator should be a participant in 

these inspections. 

41 
(3) Formal and Special Inspections. A formal inspection is required periodically to verify the 

safety and integrity of the dam and appurtenant structures. Formal inspections should include a 

review to determine if the structures meet current accepted design criteria and practices. The 

inspection should include a review of all pertinent documents including instrumentation, 

operation, and maintenance and, to the degree necessary, documentation on investigation, 

design, and construction. In making the detailed inspection of the dam appurtenant structures 

and equipment, diving inspections of underwater structures affecting the integrity of the dam 

should be included. All formal inspections should be conducted by a team of highly trained 

specialists. To assure that a dam and its appurtenant facilities are thoroughly inspected, 

checklists should be prepared to cover the condition of structural, electrical, and mechanical 

features. This inspection should also verify that operating instructions are available and 

understood, instrumentation is adequate and data is assessed to assure structures are 

performing as designed, and there are emergency provisions for access to and communication 

with all project operating facilities. 

(a) Frequency of formal inspections. Formal inspections should be made periodically at 

intervals not to exceed 5 years. Depending on past experience or the project history, some 

dams may require more frequent formal inspections. 

(b) Frequency of special inspections. Special inspections should be performed immediately 

after the dam has passed unusually large floods and after the occurrence of significant 

earthquakes, sabotage, or other unusual events reported by operating personnel. 

(c) Qualifications of personnel for formal and special inspections. Formal and special 

inspections should be conducted under the direction of licensed professional engineers 

experienced in the investigation, design, construction, and operation of dams. The inspection 

team should be chosen on a site-specific basis considering the nature and type of the dam. The 

inspection team should comprise individuals having appropriate specialized knowledge in 

structural, mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, and embankment design; geology; concrete 

materials; and construction procedures. They must be capable of interpreting structural 

performance and relating conditions found to current criteria and safety aspects. It is 

imperative that the inspection team adequately prepare for the inspections by reviewing and 

discussing all documents relative to the safety of the dam. 

c. Instrumentation 

Instrumentation or performance observation devices are used to supplement visual inspections 

in evaluating the performance and safety of dams. Careful examination of instrumentation data 

on a continuing basis may reveal a possible critical condition. Conversely, instrumentation may 

be a means of assuring that an observed condition is not serious and does not require 

immediate remedial measures. 

(1) Adequacy of Instrumentation. Instrumentation to monitor structural and functional performance should be installed in dams where complex or unusual site conditions have been 

encountered or where there is a high probability that failure could result in loss of life or 

extensive property damage. Instruments should be examined periodically for proper 

functioning. The adequacy of the installed instrumentation should be assessed from time to 

42 
time by specialists to determine if it is sufficient to help evaluate the performance of the dam. 

When required, additional instrumentation should be installed to confirm suspicious trends or 

to explore an indicated potential adverse trend. 

(2) Observation of Monitoring Devices. The instrumentation data should be collected by personnel trained specifically for the purpose, including training to recognize and immediately 

report to those responsible for inspections any anomalies in the readings or measurements. 

Performance observation data should be properly tabulated for record purposes. 

(a) Frequency of observations. The frequency of instrument readings should be established at 

the time the instrumentation system is designed in order to give a timely warning of possible 

adverse conditions. Whenever necessary, more frequent readings, sometimes as often as 

hourly, should be taken to monitor a suspected rapidly changing adverse condition. The 

frequency or number of readings may be reduced after the project has been in operation for an 

extended time and performance observation data indicates that readings have stabilized. 

(3) Data Analysis. It is essential that instrumentation data be processed, reviewed and assessed 

in a timely manner by specialists familiar with the design, construction, and operation of the 

project. Operation manuals and design information should be referred to in the evaluation of 

possible adverse trends. The performance observation data should be periodically analyzed to 

determine whether project structures are reacting as assumed in the design, and to detect 

behavior conditions that may indicate the need for corrective action. 

d. Correction of Deficiencies

The inspection program could reveal those deficiencies or potential deficiencies which, if 

uncorrected, could eventually lead to failure of the dam. Deficiencies may vary from 

emergency type items where immediate action is required, to non-emergency type items which 

must be corrected in a timely manner but do not present an immediate danger to the safety of 

the structure. In all cases corrective action should be made under the supervision of qualified 

personnel. Emergency action plans to be implemented when failure has already occurred or is 

imminent are discussed in Section III.D.3, Emergency Action Planning. 

(1) High Priority Corrective Action. High priority corrective action is required for deficiencies 

which could result in failure of the dam within a short period of time. Heads of agencies should 

have authorities, procedures and levels of delegation for transfer of funds and other emergency 

funding provisions to ensure they are adequate for accomplishing corrective actions in cases 

where time constraints will not permit allocation through the normal budget process. 

Procedures for seeking transfer authority beyond that delegated to the agency and/or requests 

for supplemental appropriations should also be reviewed to ensure such requests can be 

forwarded quickly and with all necessary supporting documentation to enable expeditious 

action by the President and/or the Congress. 

(2) Non-emergency Corrective Action. Non-emergency corrective action is action taken when 

there is no immediate threat to the safety or operation of the dam, nor any threat to life or 

property downstream. The corrective action should be scheduled in advance of the fiscal year 

in which the work is to be done to allow time for planning, funding through the normal 

43 
budgeting process, and arranging for special reservoir operations when required. Some of these 

deficiencies may be corrected through the regular operation and maintenance program 

discussed in Section III.D.1, Operation and Maintenance. 

(3) Follow-up Action. Periodic inspection reports should continue to list previously identified 

deficiencies along with any newly discovered deficiencies and show the status of corrective 

action. Appropriate inspection personnel should make frequent field examinations as long as 

the problem exists to see all corrective measures are being completed. When deficiencies are 

not corrected in a reasonable length of time, an investigation should be made to determine the 

reason for delay and appropriate management personnel should be notified of the findings. 

e. Documentation 

Proper documentation of the dam’s current condition and past performance is necessary to 

assess the adequacy of operation, maintenance, surveillance, and proposed corrective actions. 

A complete record or history of the investigation, design, construction, operation, maintenance, 

surveillance, periodic inspections, modifications, repair, and remedial work should be 

established and maintained so that relevant data relating to the dam is preserved and readily 

available for reference. This documentation should commence with the initial site investigation 

for the dam and continue through the life of the structure. 

(1) Instrumentation. All instrumentation observation data and evaluations thereof should be 

properly tabulated and documented for record purposes. Maintenance of instrumentation 

systems requires that details of the installation be available for a clear understanding of its 

functioning. A complete history of past repairs, testing, readings, and analyses should be 

available as pertinent reference data in the evaluation of current instrumentation data. 

(2) Inspections. All inspection observations, especially as related to the safety of the dam, 

should be documented. The extent and nature of inspection reports required for the informal, 

intermediate formal, and special inspections will vary in proportion to the intensity of the 

inspection and the nature of the findings. Informal inspection reports may range from 

memoranda to supervisors which describe conditions and corrective actions, to detailed 

accounts of an event or occurrence. Intermediate inspection reports may vary from similar 

memoranda or trip reports to more formal reports containing substantial records, detail, and 

recommendations. Formal and special inspections require complete formal technical reports of 

all findings, corrective actions and recommendations, for permanent record and reference purposes in order to form a basis for major remedial work when required. 

All reports should be in a self-explanatory form that permits their retention as permanent 

records and should carefully document times of inspections, inspection personnel, and findings 

of the inspection. 

44 
(3) Correction of Deficiencies. All deficiencies corrected as a result of the recommendations 

contained in periodic inspection reports should be fully documented in report form and made a 

part of the permanent project record. Alterations made to the facility as a result of changes in 

criteria to meet current practices or changes in dam technology should be fully documented, 

including as-constructed drawings. 

3. Emergency Action Planning 

a. General 

It is intended that the guidelines for the design, construction, operation and maintenance, and 

inspection of dams will minimize the risk of future dam failures. Nevertheless, it is recognized 

that despite the adequacy of those guidelines and their implementation, the possibility of dam 

failures still exists. Even though the probability of such failures is small, preplanning is 

required to identify conditions which could lead to failure, in order to initiate emergency 

measures to prevent such failures as a first priority, and, if this is not possible, to minimize the 

extent and effects of such failure. These guidelines provide operating and mobilization 

procedures to be followed upon indication of an impending or possible dam failure or a major 

flood. 

Each Federal agency which owns or is responsible for dams and each public or private owner 

of a Federally regulated dam (hereinafter, dam agency or owner) should evaluate the possible 

modes of failure of each dam, indicators or precursors of failure for each mode, possible 

emergency actions appropriate for each mode, and the effects on downstream areas of failure 

by each mode. In every case the evaluation should recognize the possibility of sudden failure, 

and should provide a basis for such "worst case" emergency planning actions in terms of 

notification and evacuation procedures where failure would pose a significant danger to human 

life and property. Plans should then be prepared in a degree of detail commensurate with the 

hazard, and instructions provided to operators and attendants regarding the actions to be taken 

in an emergency. Planning should be coordinated with local officials, as necessary, to enable 

those officials to draw up a workable plan for notifying and evacuating local communities 

when conditions affecting dam safety arise. 

b. Evaluation of Emergency Potential 

Prior to development of an emergency action plan, consideration must be given to the extent of 

land areas, and types of development with the areas, that would be inundated as a result of dam 

failure or flood, and the time available for emergency response. 

(1) Determination of Mode of Dam Failure. There are many potential causes and modes of dam 

failure, depending upon the type of structure and its foundation characteristics. Similarly, there 

are degrees of "failure" and, often progressive stages of failure. Many dam failures can be 

prevented from reaching a final catastrophic stage by recognition of early indicators or 

precursor conditions, and by prompt, effective emergency actions. While emergency planning 

should emphasize preventive actions, recognition must be given to the catastrophic condition 

and hazard potential. Analysis should be made to determine the most likely mode of dam 

failure under the most adverse condition and the resulting peak water outflow following the 

failure. Where there is a series of dams on the stream, analyses should include consideration of 

45 
the potential for progressive "domino" failure of the dams. 

(2) Inundation Maps. To evaluate the effects of dam failure, maps should be prepared 

delineating the area which would be inundated in the event of failure. Land uses and significant 

development or improvements within the area of inundation should be indicated. The maps 

should be equivalent to or more detailed than the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 

quadrangle maps, 7-1/2 minute series, or of sufficient scale and detail to identify clearly the 

area that should be evacuated if there is evident danger of failure of the dam. Copies of the 

maps should be distributed to local government officials for use in the development of an 

evacuation plan. 

(3) Classification of Inundation Areas. To assist in the evaluation of hazard potential, areas 

delineated on inundation maps should be classified in accordance with the degree of occupancy 

and hazard potential. The potential for loss of life is affected by many factors, including but not 

limited to the capacity and number of exit roads to higher ground and available transportation. 

Hazard potential is greatest in urban areas. Since the extent of inundation is usually difficult to 

delineate precisely because of topographic map limitations, the evaluation of hazard potential 

should be conservative. 

The hazard potential for affected recreation areas varies greatly, depending on the type of 

recreation offered, intensity of use, communication facilities, and available transportation. The 

potential for loss of life may be increased where recreationists are widely scattered over the 

area of potential inundation since they would be difficult to locate on short notice. 

Many industries and utilities requiring substantial quantities of water for one or more stages in 

the manufacture of products or generation of power are located on or near rivers or streams. 

Flooding of these areas and industries can, in addition to causing the potential for loss of life, 

damage to machinery, manufactured products, raw materials and materials in process of 

manufacture, interrupt essential community services. 

Rural areas usually have the least hazard potential. However, the potential for loss of life 

exists, and damage to large areas of intensely cultivated agricultural land can cause high 

economic loss. 

(4) Time Available for Response. Analyses should be made to evaluate the structural, foundation, and other characteristics of the dam and determine those conditions which could be 

expected to result in slow, rapid or practically instantaneous dam failure. 

c. Actions to Prevent Failure or Minimize Effects of Failure 

(1) Development of Emergency Action Plan. An emergency action plan should be developed 

for each dam that constitutes a hazard to life and property, incorporating preplanned 

emergency measures to be taken prior to and following assumed dam failure. The plan should 

be coordinated with local governmental and other authorities involved in public safety and be 

approved by appropriate top level agency or owner management. To the extent possible, the 

emergency action plan should define emergency situations that require immediate notification 

of local officials. The emergency action plan should include notification plans, which are 

46 
discussed in section (2) below. 

Emergency scenarios should be prepared for possible modes of failure for each dam. 

Periodically these scenarios should be used to test the readiness capabilities of project staff and 

logistics. 

A procedure should be established for review and revision, as necessary, of the emergency 

action plan, including notification plans and evacuation plans, at least once every 2 years. Such 

reviews should be coordinated among all organizations responsible for preparation and 

execution of the plans. 

(2) Notification Plans. Plans for notification of key personnel and the public are an integral part 

of the emergency action plan and should be prepared for slowly developing, rapidly 

developing, and instantaneous dam failure conditions. Notification plans should include a list 

of names and position titles, addresses, office and home telephone numbers, and radio 

communication frequencies and call signals, if available, for agency or owner personnel, public 

officials, and other personnel and alternates who should be notified as soon as emergency 

situations develop. A procedure should be developed to keep the list current. 

Each type of notification plan should contain the order in which key agency or owner 

supervisory personnel or alternates should be notified. At least one key supervisory level or job 

position should be designated to be manned or the responsible person should be immediately 

available by telephone or radio 24 hours a day. A copy of each notification plan must be posted 

in a prominent place at the project site near a telephone and/or radio transmitter. All project 

personnel should be familiar with the plans and the procedures each is to follow in the event of 

an emergency. Copies of the notification plans should be readily available at the home and the 

office of each person involved. 

Where dams located upstream from the dam for which the plan is being prepared could be 

operated to reduce inflow or where the operation of downstream dams would be affected by 

failure of the dam, operators of those dams should be kept informed of the current and 

expected conditions of the dam as the information becomes available. 

Civil defense officials having jurisdiction over all or part of the area subject to inundation 

should receive early notification. Local law enforcement officials and, when possible, local 

government officials and public safety officials should receive early notification. 

The capabilities of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency's National Warning System 

(NAWAS) should be determined for the project and utilized as appropriate. Information can be 

obtained from State or local civil defense organizations. 

Potentially affected industries downstream should be kept informed so that actions to reduce 

risk of life and economic loss can be taken. Coordination with local government and civil 

defense officials would determine responsibility for the notification. Normally, this would be a 

local government responsibility. 

47 
When it is determined that a dam may be in danger of failing, the public officials responsible 

for the decision to implement the evacuation plan should be kept informed of the developing 

emergency conditions. 

The news media, including radio, television, and newspapers, should be utilized to the extent 

available and appropriate. Notification plans should define emergency situations for which 

each medium will be utilized and should include an example of a news release that would be 

the most effective for each possible emergency. Use of news media should be preplanned 

insofar as is possible by agency and owner personnel and the State and/or local government. 

Information should be written in clear, concise language. Releases to news media should not be 

relied upon as the primary means of notification. 

Notification of recreation users is frequently difficult because the individuals are often alone 

and away from any means of ready communication. Consideration should be given to the use 

of standard emergency warning devices such as sirens at the dam site. Consideration should be 

given to the use of helicopters with bullhorns for areas further downstream. Vehicles equipped 

with public address systems and helicopters with bullhorns are capable of covering large areas 

effectively. 

Telephonic communication should not be solely relied on in critical situations. A backup radio 

communication system should be provided and tested at least once every 3 months. 

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a radio communication system prior to 

the beginning of construction and to the maintenance of the system throughout the life of the 

project. 

(3) Evacuation Plans. Evacuation plans should be prepared and implemented by the local 

jurisdiction controlling inundation areas. This would normally not be the dam agency or 

owner. Evacuation plans should conform to local needs and vary in complexity in accordance 

with the type and degree of occupancy of the potentially affected area. The plans may include 

delineation of area to be evacuated; routes to be used; traffic control measures; shelter, 

methods of providing emergency transportation; special procedures for the evacuation and care 

of people from institutions such as hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons; procedures for 

securing the perimeter and for interior security of the area; procedures for the lifting of the 

evacuation order and reentry to the area; and details indicating which organizations are 

responsible for specific functions and for furnishing the materials, equipment, and personnel 

resources required. 

The assistance of local civil defense personnel, if available, should be requested in preparation 

of the evacuation plan. State and local law enforcement agencies usually will be responsible 

for the execution of much of the plan and should be represented in the planning effort. State 

and local laws and ordinances may require that other State, county, and local government 

agencies have a role in the preparation, review, approval, or execution of the plan. Before 

finalization, a copy of the plan should be furnished to the dam agency or owner for information 

and comment. 

(4) Stockpiling Repair Materials. Suitable construction materials should be stockpiled for 

48 
emergency use. The amounts and types of construction materials needed for emergency repairs 

should be determined based on the structural, foundation, and other characteristics of the dam; 

design and construction history; and history of prior problems. 

(5) Locating Local Repair Forces. Arrangements should be made with, and a current list 

maintained of, local entities, including contractors, and Federal, State and local construction 

departments, for possible emergency use of equipment and labor. 

(6) Training Operating Personnel. Technically qualified project personnel should be trained in 

problem detection, evaluation, and appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) 

measures. This is essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels of 

responsibility which, initially, must be based on at-site observations. A sufficient number of 

personnel should be trained to assure adequate coverage at all times. If a dam is operated by 

remote control, arrangements must be made for dispatching trained personnel to the project at 

any indication of distress. 

(7) Increasing Inspection Frequency. Frequency of appropriate surveillance activities should be 

increased when the reservoir level exceeds a predetermined elevation. Piezometers, water level 

gauges, and other instruments should be read frequently and on schedule. The project 

structures should be inspected as often as necessary to monitor conditions related to known 

problems and to detect indications of change or new problems that could arise. Hourly or 

continuous surveillance may be mandated in some instances. Any change in conditions should 

be reported promptly to the supervisor for further evaluation. 

The supervisor should issue additional instructions, as necessary, and alert repair crews and 

contractors for necessary repair work if developing conditions indicate that emergency repairs 

or other remedial measures may be required. 

d. Actions Upon Discovery of a Potentially Unsafe Condition 

Action to be taken will depend on the nature of the problem and the time estimated to be 

available for remedial or mitigation measures. As time permits, one or more of the following 

actions will be required. 

(1) Notification of Supervisory Personnel. This is essential, if time permits, since development 

of failure could vary in some or many respects from previous forecasts or assumptions, and 

advice may be needed. 

(2) Initiation of Predetermined Remedial Action. It is imperative that at least one technically 

qualified individual, previously trained in problem detection, evaluation, and remedial action, 

be at the project or on call at all times. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the problem 

and the time available, emergency actions can be initiated, such as lowering the reservoir and 

holding water in upstream reservoirs. Other actions to be taken include notifying appropriate 

highway and traffic control officials promptly of any rim slides or other reservoir embankment 

failures which may endanger public highways. 

(3) Determination of Need for Public Notification. To the extent possible, emergency situations 

49 
that will require immediate notification of public officials in time to allow evacuation of the 

potentially affected area should be predefined for the use of management and project 

personnel. If sufficient time is available, the decision to notify public officials that the dam can 

be expected to fail will be made at a predetermined supervisory level within the agency or 

owner organization. If failure is imminent or has already occurred, project personnel at the dam 

site would be responsible for direct notification of the public official. The urgency of the 

situation should be made clear so that public officials will take positive action immediately. 

50 
APPENDIX A 

FCCSET AD HOC INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Members 

Phillip M. Smith (Chairman) 

Assistant Director for Natural Resources 

and Commercial Services 

Office of Science and Technology 

Policy 

Washington, D.C. 

William S. Bivins 

Hydrology and Meteorology Branch 

Director of Site Safety and 

Environmental Analysis 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 

Neil F. Bogner 

Director, Engineering Division 

Soil Conservation Service 

Department of Agriculture 

Washington, D.C. 

Joseph Friedkin 

Commissioner, U.S. Section 

International Boundary and Water 

Commission 

Washington, D.C. 

Gary Wicks 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land and 

Water Resources 

Department of the Interior 

Washington, D.C. 

Gerald R. Wilson, Jr. 

Chief, Project Analysis Branch 

Licensed Projects Division 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 

Consultant to OSTP 

George L. Buchanan Bruce A. Tschantz 

Chief, Civil Engineering and Design Department of Civil Engineering 

Branch University of Tennessee 

Division of Engineering Design Knoxville, Tennessee 

Office of Engineering Design and 

Construction 

Tennessee Valley Authority 

Knoxville, Tennessee 

Donald Dillon 

Deputy for Policy Planning and 

Legislative Analysis 

Department of the Army 

Washington, D.C. 

A-1 
APPENDIX B 

INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Members 

Site Investigation and Design (SID) 

Subcommittee Members 

George L. Buchanan, TVA, Chairman 

David C. Ralston, SCS 

Ernest L. Dodson, Army-Corps 

Robert A. Wilson, BLM 

William D. Woodbury, BOM 

Geotechnical 

James H. Coulson, TVA, Chairman 

Jake Redlinger, Army-Corps 

James Legas, BoR 

Robert Peterson, MESA 

Henry W. Coulter, USGS 

Harry Thomas, FERC 

E.T. Scherich, BoR 

Walter L. West, FWS 

Robert Fujimoto, MESA 

Henry W. Coulter, USGS 

Gerald R. Wilson, Jr., FERC 

William S. Bivins, NRC 

Hydraulics 

Svein Vigander, TVA, Chairman 

Sam Powell, Army-Corps 

Edwin C. Rossilon, BoR 

Robert F. McVain, FWS 

Gus Center, MESA 

SID Task Group Members Concrete Dams 

Hydrology 

Vernon Hagan, Army-Corps, Chairman 

Norman Miller, SCS 

Fred A. Bartle, BoR 

Dennis Tarmay, FERC 

Ed Hawkins, NRC 

Donald W. Newton, TVA 

Seismology 

Jim Divine, USGS, Chairman 

Al Geiger, SCS 

Ellis Krimitzsky, Army-Corps 

Andy Vikone, BoR 

John Kellerher, NRC 

Donald J. Reinhold, TVA 

Glenn Tarbox, BoR, Chairman 

Keith O’Donnell, Army-Corps 

Billy F. Horton, FWS 

Kuo-Hua Yang, FERC 

Earl L. Spearman, TVA 

Embankment Dams 

Robert L. James, Army-Corps, 

Chairman 

David C. Ralston, SCS 

Edwin W. Gray, BoR 

Dan Kealy, BOM 

Constantine Tjoumas, FERC 

Samuel D. Stone, TVA 

Construction (CON) Subcommittee 

Members 

Seismic Engineering 

Richard W. Kramer, BoR, Chairman Donald A. Giampaoli, BoR, Chairman 

A.G. Franklin, Army-Corps 

Jim Talbot, SCS 

Richard McMullen, NRC 

Thomas J. Abraham, TVA 

Neil F. Bogner, SCS 

Joseph M. Nelson, Army-Corps 

William R. Groseclose, BoR 

Walter L. West, FWS 

Herman E. Smalling, TVA 

B-1 
CON Task Group Members 

Inspection 

Joseph M. Nelson, Army-Corps, 

Chairman 

William R. Groseclose, BoR 

Herman E. Smalling, TVA 

Contractor Quality Control 

Neil F. Bogner, SCS, Chairman 

Joseph M. Nelson, Army-Corps 

Walter L. West, FWS 

Staffing 

Walter L. West, FWS, Chairman 

Joseph M. Nelson, Army-Corps 

Herman E. Smalling, TVA 

Standardization of Materials Testing 

William R. Groseclose, BoR, Chairman 

Neil F. Bogner, SCS 

Dess L. Chapelear, BoR 

Identification of Acceptable 

Construction Methods 

Herman E. Smalling, TVA, Chairman 

Joseph M. Nelson, Army-Corps 

Dess L. Chapelear, BoR 

Construction Documentation 

Neil F. Bogner, SCS, Chairman 

Dess L. Chapelear, BoR 

Herman E. Smalling, TVA 

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 

Subcommittee Members 

Gerald R. Wilson, Jr., FERC, Chairman 

James A. Wolfe, FS 

William F. Britnell, Army-Corps 

Philip Corke, BIA 

Roy H. Boyd, BoR 

S. Anthony Stanin, MESA 

Sears Y. Coker, FERC 

Desloge Brown, Initial Chairman (ret’d) 

T.R. Martin, IBWC 

Harold C. Buttrey, TVA 

O&M Task Group Members 

O&M Procedures 

Roy H. Boyd, BoR, Chairman 

Paul E. Nylander, SCS 

William F. Britnell, Army-Corps 

Philip Corke, BIA 

S. Anthony Stanin, MESA 

Ronald A. Lesniak, FERC 

T.R. Martin, IBWC 

Meigs Brewer, Jr., TVA 

Periodic Inspection Program 

Harold C. Buttrey, TVA, Chairman 

James A. Wolfe, FS 

Ralph H. Fike, Army-Corps 

S.J. Occhipiati, FERC 

B.A. Pritchard, BoR 

Emergency Action Planning 

Sears Y. Coker, FERC, Chairman 

James E. Shanks, Army-Corps 

Edgar C. Roper, BoR 

Robert A. Shelton, TVA 

Legend 

Army-Department of the Army 

BIA-Bureau of Indian Affairs 

BLM-Bureau of Land Management 

BOM-Bureau of Mines 

BoR-Bureau of Reclamation 

Corps-Corps of Engineers 

DOI-Department of the Interior 

FERC-Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

FS-Forest Service 

FWS-Fish and Wildlife Service 

IBWC-International Boundary and Water 

Commission 

MESA-Mining Enforcement and Safety 

Administration 

NRC-Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

SCS-Soil Conservation Service 

TVA-Tennessee Valley Authority 

USDA-Department of Agriculture 

USGS-United States Geological Survey 

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APPENDIX C 

OSTP INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL MEMBERS 

Members 

Professor Frank E. Perkins, Chairman 

Department of Civil Engineering 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Cambridge, Massachusetts 

Mr. Gordon W. Prescott 

Department of Geosciences 

Purdue University 

W. Lafayette, Indiana 

Professor Clarence R. Allen 

Department of Geology 

California Institute of Technology 

Pasadena, California 

Professor H. Bolton Seed 

Department of Civil Engineering 

University of California, Berkeley 

Berkeley, California 

Dr. Elio D’Appalonia Professor Erik H. Vanmarcke 

D’Appalonia Consulting Engineers, Inc. Department of Civil Engineering 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Cambridge, Massachusetts 

Mr. Gerald W. Farquhar, Attorney 

Ford, Farquhar, Kornblat & O’Neill Consultant to OSTP 

Washington, D.C. 

Professor Bruce A. Tschantz 

Mr. H. Keith Honeker Department of Civil Engineering 

Kentucky Department of Natural University of Tennessee 

Resources and Environmental Protection Knoxville, Tennessee 

Frankfort, Kentucky 

Professor L. Douglas James, Director 

Utah Water Research Laboratory 

Utah State University 

Logan, Utah 

Mr. Eric B. Kollguard 

International Engineering Company 

San Francisco, California 

Mr. Ray E. Lineley 

Hydrocomp, Inc. 

Palo Alto, California 

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APPENDIX D 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The authority for preparation of the guidelines is given in section I.B. They were 

prepared by an interagency guidelines task group composed of the Chairmen of the 

subcommittees identified in Appendix B. Specific sections preparation assignments 

were: 

Section I. SID Chairman, George L. Buchanan, TVA 

Section II, CON Chairman, Donald A. Giampaoli, BoR, and O&M Chairman, Gerald R. 

Wilson, FERC, with the cooperation of L. Douglas James, representative of the 

Independent Review Panel (Appendix C) to the guidelines task group, and Bruce A. 

Tschantz, consultant to OSTP and advisor to the task group. 

Section III A. and III.B. SID Chairman 

Section III.C. CON Chairman 

Section III.D. O&M Chairman 

The Chairmen were assisted by their subcommittee and task groups members (listed in 

Appendix B). 

Reviews were made by subcommittee members and by representatives of the agencies 

other than the preparing agency and by L. Douglas James of the Independent Review 

Panel. Major contributory reviews were made by representatives of the major dam 

building agencies, BoR, Corps, SCS, and TVA, and the Independent Review Panel 

member. 

Editing and assembly of the final working draft for submittal to FCCSET were handled 

by the SID Chairman (TVA). Oliver H. Raine of the SID Chairman’s engineering staff 

assisted in the preparation and review of various portions of the guidelines and in the 

editing and assembly of the working draft. 

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APPENDIX E 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The listed references are selected as representative of Federal agency and other publications related to dam 

safety, and are not intended to be inclusive of dam technology. 

GENERAL 

Engineering Foundation Conference Proceedings, Published by the American Society of Civil Engineers: 

Inspection, Maintenance and Rehabilitation of Old Dams, Pacific Grove, CA, 

1973 

Safety of Small Dams, Henniker, NH, 1974 

Responsibility and Liability of Private and Public Interests on Dams, Pacific Grove, CA, 1975 

The Evaluation of Dam Safety, Pacific Grove, CA, 1976 

Lessons from Dam Incidents, International Commission on Large Dams, 1973 

Lessons from Dam Incidents, USA, United States Committee on Large Dams/American Society of Civil 

Engineers, 1975 

Earth and Earth-Rock Dams, Sherard, Woodward, Gizienski and Clavenger, 1963 (Wiley) 

Foundations of Earthquake Engineering, Newmark and Rosenblueth, 1971 (Prentice-Hall) 

Public Law 92-347, National Program of Inspection of Dams, U.S. 92nd Congress, 1972 

BUREAU OF MINES 

IC 8755, Design Guide for Metal and Nonmetal Tailings Disposal, 1977 

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 

Concrete Manual, 8th Edition, 1975 

Earth Manual, 2nd Edition, 1974 

Ground Water Manual, 1st Edition, 1977 

Design of Gravity Dams, 1st Edition, 1976 

Design of Arch Dams, 1st Edition, 1977 

Design of Small Dams, 2nd Edition, 1973; Rev. Reprint 1977 

Manual for Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams, 1st Edition, 1977 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

Engineering Manuals (EM): 

EM-1110-2-1602, Hydraulic Design of Reservoir Outlet Structures 

EM-1110-2-1603, Hydraulic Design of Spillways 

EM-1110-2-1902, Stability of Earth and Rockfill Dams 

EM-1110-2-1908, Instrumentation of Earth and Rockfill Dams 

EM-1110-2-1911, Construction Control for Earth and Rockfill Dams 

EM-1110-2-2200, Gravity Dam Design 

EM-1110-2-2300, Earth and Rockfill Dams General Design and Construction Considerations 

EM-1110-2-4300, Instrumentation for Measurement of Structural Behavior of Concrete Gravity 

Structures 

E-1 
Engineering Reports (ER): 

EM-1110-2-50, Low Level Discharge for Drawdown of Impoundments 

EM-1110-2-1450, Hydrologic Frequency Estimates 

EM-1110-2-1806, Earthquake Design and Analysis for Corps of Engineers Dams 

National Program of Inspection of Dams, Volume I, Appendix D, Recommended Guidelines for Safety 

Inspection of Dams, 1975 

MINING ENFORCEMENT AND SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Engineering and Design Manual, Coal Refuse Disposal Facilities, 1975 

Design Guidelines for Coal Refuse Piles and Water, Sediment, or Slurry Impoundments and Impoundment 

Structures, 1976 

Coal Refuse Inspection Manual, 1976 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Regulatory Guides Related to Radiological Safety and Construction for Nuclear Power Plants: 

1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), 1977 

1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973 

1.64, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1976 

1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants, 1977 

NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power 

Plants, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 1975 

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE 

National Engineering Handbook: 

Section 4, Hydrology 

Section 8, Engineering Geology 

Section 19, Construction Inspections 

Section 20, Specifications for Construction Contracts 

Technical Releases: 

TR52, A Guide for the Design and Layout of Earth Emergency Spillways 

TR60, Earth Dams and Reservoirs 

Soil Mechanics Notes: 

1. Tentative Guides for Determining Gradation of Filter Materials 

2. Soil Mechanics Considerations for Embankment Dams 

3. Flow Net Construction and Use 

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 

General Construction Specifications: 

No. G-2 for Plain and Reinforced Concrete 

No. G-9 for Rolled Earthfill for Dams and Power Plants 

No. G-26 for Pressure Grouting of Rock Foundation with Portland Cement 

Engineering Procedures (EP): 

EP 1.04, Inspection and Maintenance of Nonpower Water Control Projects 

EP 1.07, Inspection and Maintenance of Hydroelectric Projects 

EP 1.08, Navigation Lock Inspections 

E-1