U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

" SENATE ! 109th Congress 

1st Session 

S. REPT. 

2005

109–54

THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL 

FIRMS IN THE 

U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY

R E P O R T

PREPARED BY THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

APRIL 13, 2005


congress.#13
(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

RAYMOND V. SHEPHERD, III, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LELAND B. ERICKSON, Counsel 

ELISE J. BEAN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. ROACH, Counsel and Chief Investigator to the Minority 

LAURA E. STUBER, Counsel 

MARY D. ROBERTSON, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY .................................... 3

III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 5

A. Findings ........................................................................................................ 5

B. Recommendations ........................................................................................ 7

IV. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................... 9

V. ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS ............................................................................ 11

A. KPMG ........................................................................................................... 11

(1) Developing New Tax Products ............................................................. 13

(2) Mass Marketing Tax Products ............................................................. 33

(3) Implementing Tax Products ................................................................. 48

(4) Avoiding Detection ................................................................................ 56

(5) Disregarding Professional Ethics ......................................................... 66

(6) KPMG’s Current Status ........................................................................ 73

B. ERNST & YOUNG ...................................................................................... 77

(1) Development of Mass-Marketed Generic Tax Products ..................... 77

(2) Ernst & Young’s Curent Status ........................................................... 85

C. PRICEWATERSHOUSECOOPERS ........................................................... 87

(1) Mass-Marketed Generic Tax Products ................................................. 87

(2) PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Current Status ............................................ 93

VI. ROLE OF LAWYERS ..................................................................................... 96

A. SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD ........................................................ 96

B. SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN ..................................................... 100

VII. ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS .................................................. 104

A. DEUTSCHE BANK ..................................................................................... 105

B. HVB BANK .................................................................................................. 109

C. UBS BANK ................................................................................................... 113

D. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK ............................................................ 114

VIII. ROLE OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS ..................................................... 121

A. PRESIDIO ADVISORY SERVICES ........................................................... 122

B. QUELLOS GROUP ...................................................................................... 125

IX. ROLE OF CHARTITABLE ORGANIZATIONS ......................................... 126

A. LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND POLICE PENSIONS . 127

B. AUSTIN FIRE FIGHTERS RELIEF AND RETIREMENT FUND ......... 131

(1)

THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE 

U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 

I. INTRODUCTION 

In October 2002, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, began an 

investigation into the development, marketing, and implementation 

of abusive tax shelters by accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, 

and bankers. The Subcommittee’s Minority Staff initiated this investigation, at the direction of Senator Carl Levin, with the concurrence and support of Subcommittee Chairman Norm Coleman. The 

information in this Report is based upon the ensuing bipartisan investigation by the Subcommittee’s Democratic and Republican 

staffs. 

In its broadest sense, the term ‘‘tax shelter’’ is a device used to 

reduce or eliminate the tax liability of the tax shelter user. This 

may encompass legitimate or illegitimate endeavors. While there is 

no one standard to determine the line between legitimate ‘‘tax 

planning’’ and ‘‘abusive tax shelters,’’ the latter can be characterized as transactions in which a significant purpose is the avoidance 

or evasion of Federal, state or local tax in a manner not intended 

by the law. 

The abusive tax shelters investigated by the Subcommittee were 

complex transactions used by corporations or individuals to obtain 

substantial tax benefits in a manner never intended by the Federal 

tax code. While some of these transactions may have complied with 

the literal language of specific tax provisions, they produced results 

that were unwarranted, unintended, or inconsistent with the overall structure or underlying policy of the Internal Revenue Code. 

These transactions had no economic substance or business purpose 

other than to reduce taxes. Abusive tax shelters can be custom-designed for a single user or prepared as a generic tax product sold 

to multiple clients. The Subcommittee investigation focused on generic abusive tax shelters sold to multiple clients as opposed to a 

custom-tailored tax strategy sold to a single client. 

Under present law, generic tax shelters sold to multiple clients 

are not illegal per se. They are potentially illegal depending on how 

the purchasers use them and report their tax liability on their tax 

returns. Certain statutory provisions, judicial doctrines, and IRS 

administrative guidance define and identify abusive tax shelters 

that may violate Federal tax law. Over the last 5 years, the IRS 

and the Treasury Department have begun to publish legal guidance 

on transactions they consider to be abusive. This guidance warns 

taxpayers that use of such ‘‘listed transactions’’ may lead to an 

2

1See ‘‘U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2,’’ Minority Staff Report of the 

U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (11/18/03) (hereinafter ‘‘Levin Report’’), 

S. Prt. 108–34, reprinted in ‘‘U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and 

Financial Professionals,’’ Subcommittee hearings (11/18/03 and 11/20/03) (hereinafter ‘‘Subcommittee hearings’’), S. Hrg. 108–473, at 145–274. This Subcommittee Report confirms the factual findings of the earlier Levin Report and draws heavily from its text. 

audit and assessment of back taxes, interest, and penalties for 

using an illegal tax shelter. 

After a one-year investigation, the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations held 2 days of hearings on November 18, 2003, and 

November 20, 2003, entitled U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of 

Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals. 

At the November 18 hearing, the Subcommittee heard testimony 

from three tax experts: Debra Peterson, Tax Counsel, California 

Franchise Tax Board; Mark Watson, Former Partner, KPMG LLP; 

and Calvin Johnson, Professor, The University of Texas at Austin 

School of Law. The Subcommittee also heard testimony from numerous tax professionals from various accounting firms. Tax professionals from KPMG LLP included: Philip Wiesner, Partner in 

Charge, Washington National Tax Client Services; Jeffrey Eischeid, 

Partner, Personal Financial Planning; Lawrence DeLap, retired 

National Partner in Charge, Department of Professional PracticeTax; Lawrence Manth, former West Area Partner in Charge, 

Stratecon; and Richard Smith Jr., Vice Chair, Tax Services. Accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers was represented by Richard 

Berry, Jr., Senior Tax Partner. Accounting firm Ernst & Young 

LLP was represented by Mark Weinberger, Vice Chair, Tax Services. 

At the November 20 hearing, the Subcommittee heard testimony 

from three lawyers: Raymond Ruble, former Partner, Sidley Austin 

Brown & Wood LLP; Thomas Smith, Jr., Partner, Sidley Austin 

Brown & Wood LLP; and N. Jerold Cohen, Partner, Sutherland 

Asbill & Brennan LLP. The Subcommittee also heard testimony 

from William Boyle, former Vice President, Structured Finance 

Group, Deutsche Bank AG; Domenick DeGiorgio, former Vice President, Structured Finance, HVB America, Inc.; John Larson, Managing Director, Presidio Advisory Services; and Jeffrey Greenstein, 

Chief Executive Officer, Quellos Group LLC, formerly known as 

Quadra Advisors LLC. Lastly, the Subcommittee heard testimony 

from three regulatory and oversight agencies: Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service; William McDonough, Chairman, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; and Richard 

Spillenkothen, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, The Federal Reserve. 

This Report is based upon the information gathered by the Subcommittee during those two hearings and the course of its investigation to date, including a report prepared by Senator Levin and 

released in connection with the November hearings, 1 review of 

over 250 boxes of documents and electronic disks, numerous interviews, three depositions, testimony presented by the 20 witnesses 

at two hearings, and supplemental post-hearing information. 

3

2 26 U.S.C. § 6700. 

3 26 U.S.C. § 6701. 

4See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011 (taxpayer must disclose reportable transactions); 6111 (organizers 

and promoters must register potentially illegal tax shelters with IRS); and 6112 (promoters 

must maintain lists of clients who purchase potentially illegal tax shelters and, upon request, 

disclose such client lists to the IRS). 5See, e.g., Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.6112–1 and Sec. 1.6011–4, which took effect on 2/28/03. 

6Petition dated 10/14/03, ‘‘United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve IRS ‘John Doe’ 

Summons on Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,’’ (D.N.D. Ill.), at ¶ 8. 7 Id. at ¶ 11. See also ‘‘Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters,’’ Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX–19–02), 3/19/02 (hereinafter ‘‘Joint Committee on Taxation report’’), at 

33; ‘‘Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters,’’ testimony by Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues, General Accounting Office (GAO) before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, No. GAO–04–104T (10/21/03) (hereinafter ‘‘GAO Testimony’’) at 7. The other five categories of transactions subject to disclosure are transactions offered under conditions of confidentiality; including contractual protections to the ‘‘investor’’; resulting in specific amounts of 

tax losses; generating a tax benefit when the underlying asset is held only briefly; or generating 

differences between financial accounts and tax accounts greater than $10 million. GAO Testimony at 7. 8Petition dated 10/14/03, ‘‘United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve IRS ‘John Doe’ 

Summons on Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,’’ (D.N.D. Ill.), at ¶¶ 11–12. 

II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 

Under current law, no single standard defines an abusive tax 

shelter. Abusive tax shelters are governed by statutory provisions, 

judicial doctrines, and administrative guidance used to identify 

transactions in which a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of income tax in a manner not intended by the law. 

Over the past 10 years, Federal statutes and regulations prohibiting illegal tax shelters have undergone repeated revision to clarify 

and strengthen them. Today, key tax code provisions not only prohibit tax evasion by taxpayers, but also penalize persons who 

knowingly organize or promote illegal tax shelters 2 or who knowingly aid or abet the filing of tax return information that understates a taxpayer’s tax liability.3 Additional tax code provisions 

now require taxpayers and promoters to disclose to the IRS information about certain potentially illegal tax shelters.4

In 2003, the IRS issued regulations to clarify and strengthen the 

law’s definition of a tax shelter promoter and the law’s requirements for tax shelter disclosure.5 For example, these regulations 

now make it clear that tax shelter promoters include ‘‘persons principally responsible for organizing a tax shelter as well as persons 

who participate in the organization, management or sale of a tax 

shelter’’ and any person who is a ‘‘material advisor’’ on a tax shelter transaction.6 Disclosure obligations, which apply to both taxpayers and tax shelter promoters, require disclosure to the IRS, 

under certain circumstances, of information related to six categories of potentially illegal tax shelter transactions. Among others, 

these categories of disclosure include any transaction that is the 

same or similar to a ‘‘listed transaction,’’ which is a transaction 

that the IRS has formally determined, through regulation, notice, 

or other published guidance, ‘‘as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion’’ and is subject to the law’s registration and client 

list maintenance requirements.7 The IRS has stated in court that 

it ‘‘considers a ‘listed transaction’ and all substantially similar 

transactions to have been structured for a significant tax avoidance 

purpose’’ and refers to them as ‘‘potentially abusive tax shelters.’’ 8

The IRS has also stated in court that ‘‘the IRS has concluded that 

taxpayers who engaged in such [listed] transactions have failed or 

4

9 Id. at ¶ 16. 10 In September 2004, the number of listed transactions was modified by the IRS and reduced 

to 30. See IRS Notice 2004–67 (9/23/04). 11See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 

F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. 

v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987) (‘‘The economic substance factor involves 

a broader examination of . . . whether from an objective standpoint the transaction was likely 

to produce economic benefits aside from a tax deduction.’’). 12See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & 

Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 916 (1949) (Judge 

Learned Hand) (‘‘The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering . . . means that in construing words of 

a tax statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them 

to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial purposes and not to include 

transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation.’’). 13See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924) (‘‘Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants; 

and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws . . . we must 

regard matters of substance and not mere form.’’). 14See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (‘‘The transaction 

must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes 

into a sale by another using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title.’’); Palmer v. 

Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 692 (1974). 15See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner,

752 F.2d 89, 91–92 (4th Cir. 1985); United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 

T.C.M. 262 at n. 29 (1999), rev’d 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (‘‘Courts have recognized two 

basic types of sham transactions. Shams in fact are transactions that never occur. In such 

shams, taxpayers claim deductions for transactions that have been created on paper but which 

never took place. Shams in substance are transactions that actually occurred but which lack the 

substance their form represents.’’). 16 Joint Committee on Taxation report at 7. 

may fail to comply with the internal revenue laws.’’ 9 As of March 

2004, the IRS had published 31 listed transactions.10

In addition to statutory and regulatory requirements and prohibitions, Federal courts have developed over the years a number of 

common law doctrines to identify and invalidate illegal tax shelters, including the economic substance, 11 business purpose, 12 substance-over-form, 13 step transaction, 14 and sham transaction 15

doctrines. A study by the Joint Committee on Taxation concludes 

that ‘‘[t]hese doctrines are not entirely distinguishable’’ and have 

been applied by courts in inconsistent ways.16

Bipartisan legislation to clarify and strengthen the economic substance and business purpose doctrines, as well as other aspects of 

Federal tax shelter law, has long been advocated by the Senate Finance Committee and approved by the Senate on multiple occasions, but not adopted by the House of Representatives. During the 

108th Congress, as a result of the Subcommittee investigation, Senators Levin and Coleman introduced S. 2210, the Tax Shelter and 

Tax Haven Reform Act, to strengthen penalties on tax shelter promoters, prevent abusive tax shelters, deter uncooperative tax havens, and codify the economic and business purpose doctrines. This 

bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee which subsequently reported a more comprehensive tax bill, S. 1637. This bill 

included some of the tax shelter provisions in S. 2210. In May, the 

Senate considered and adopted S. 1637. During the Senate debate, 

a Levin-Coleman amendment was accepted to further strengthen 

Federal penalties on promoters, aiders and abettors of abusive tax 

shelters. In October 2004, after a House-Senate conference, Congress enacted into law H.R. 4520, the American Jobs Creation Act. 

This tax legislation included a number of tax shelter reforms supported by the Subcommittee’s investigation and the Senate Finance 

Committee, including stronger penalties on promoters of abusive 

5

17See Amendment No. 3120 to S. 1637. The Levin-Coleman bill, S. 2210, had advocated a penalty equal to 150% of the gross income derived, or to be derived, by a promoter, aider, or abettor 

of an abusive tax shelter. S. 1637, in contrast, had proposed a 50% penalty solely on promoters. 

The Levin-Coleman amendment compromised by increasing S. 1637’s penalty to 100% of the 

gross income derived, or to be derived, by a promoter, aider or abettor of an abusive tax shelter. 

Unfortunately, the final bill approved by Congress, H.R. 4520, adopted only the lower 50% penalty and confined it to promoters, leaving the penalty for aiders and abettors still in need of 

reform. 18See PCAOB Release 2004–15 (12/14/04). 

tax shelters.17 Other tax shelter reforms, such as the codification 

of the economic substance and business purpose doctrines and 

stronger penalties on aiders and abettors of tax shelters, were not 

included in the final bill. 

In December 2004, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 

Board (PCAOB) proposed rules to strengthen auditor independence 

and restrict the tax services that accounting firms may provide to 

their audit clients.18 Among other provisions, the proposed rule 

would require any accounting firm that audits a publicly traded 

company to maintain strict independence from that company 

throughout the auditing engagement. The proposed rule would also 

bar such accounting firms from: (1) entering into a contingent fee 

arrangement with an audit client for tax services; (2) providing tax 

services to certain executives of an audit client; and (3) planning, 

marketing, or opining on aggressive tax positions with respect to 

an audit client, as further defined by the rule. The proposed rule 

would also require accounting firms, before providing any tax service to an audit client, to disclose detailed information about the tax 

service to the company’s audit committee and obtain the committee’s approval. This proposed rule, like the legislation enacted by 

Congress, represents a renewed effort to rein in abusive practices 

within the U.S. tax shelter industry. 

III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Subcommittee’s investigation to date has determined that in 

2003, the U.S. tax shelter industry no longer focused solely on providing individualized tax advice but had expanded its focus to include generic ‘‘tax products’’ aggressively marketed to multiple clients. The investigation also found that numerous respected members of the American business community were heavily involved in 

the development, marketing, and implementation of generic tax 

products whose principal objective was to reduce or eliminate a client’s U.S. tax liability. These tax shelters required close collaboration between accounting firms, law firms, investment advisory 

firms, and banks. 

A. FINDINGS 

Based upon its investigation, the Subcommittee makes the following findings:

(1) The sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters is a 

lucrative business in the United States, and some professional firms such as accounting firms, banks, law firms, 

and investment advisory firms have been major participants in the development, mass marketing, and implementation of generic tax products sold to multiple clients.

6

(2) During the period 1998 to 2003, KPMG devoted substantial 

resources and maintained an extensive infrastructure to 

produce a continuing supply of generic tax products to sell 

to clients, using a process which pressured its tax professionals to generate new ideas, move them quickly through 

the development process, and approve, at times, illegal or 

potentially abusive tax shelters.

(3) KPMG used aggressive marketing tactics to sell its generic 

tax products by turning tax professionals into tax product 

salespersons, pressuring its tax professionals to meet revenue targets, using telemarketing to find clients, developing an internal tax sales force, using confidential client 

tax data to find clients, targeting its own audit clients for 

sales pitches, and using tax opinion letters and insurance 

policies as marketing tools.

(4) KPMG was actively involved in implementing the tax shelters which it sold to its clients, including by enlisting participation from banks, investment advisory firms, and tax 

exempt organizations; preparing transactional documents; 

arranging purported loans; issuing and arranging opinion 

letters; providing administrative services; and preparing 

tax returns.

(5) KPMG took steps to conceal its tax shelter activities from 

tax authorities, including by claiming it was a tax advisor 

and not a tax shelter promoter, failing to register potentially abusive tax shelters, restricting file documentation, 

imposing marketing restrictions, and using improper tax 

return reporting to minimize detection by the IRS or others.

(6) Since Subcommittee hearings in 2003, KPMG has committed to cultural, structural, and institutional changes to 

dismantle its abusive tax shelter practice, including by dismantling its tax shelter development, marketing and sale 

resources, dismantling certain tax practice groups, making 

leadership changes, and strengthening tax services oversight and regulatory compliance.

(7) During the period 1998 to 2002, Ernst & Young sold generic tax products to multiple clients despite evidence that 

some, such as CDS and COBRA, were potentially abusive 

or illegal tax shelters.

(8) Ernst & Young has committed to cultural, structural, and 

institutional changes to dismantle its tax shelter practice, 

including by eliminating the tax practice group that promoted its tax shelter sales, making tax leadership changes, 

and strengthening its tax services oversight and regulatory 

compliance.

(9) During the period 1997 to 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers 

sold generic tax products to multiple clients, despite evidence that some, such as FLIP, CDS, and BOSS, were potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters.

7

(10) PricewaterhouseCoopers has committed to cultural, structural, and institutional changes intended to dismantle its 

abusive tax shelter practice, including by establishing a 

centralized quality and risk management process, and 

strengthening its tax services oversight and regulatory 

compliance.

(11) Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, through its predecessor 

firm Brown & Wood, provided legal services that facilitated the development and sale of potentially abusive or 

illegal tax shelters, including by providing design assistance, collaboration on allegedly independent tax opinion 

letters, and hundreds of boilerplate tax opinion letters to 

clients referred by KPMG and others, in return for substantial fees.

(12) Sutherland Asbill & Brennan provided legal representation to over 100 former KPMG clients in tax shelter matters before the IRS, despite a longstanding business relationship with KPMG and without performing any conflict 

of interest analysis prior to undertaking these representations.

(13) Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, and UBS Bank provided billions of dollars in lending critical to transactions which 

the banks knew were tax motivated, involved little or no 

credit risk, and facilitated potentially abusive or illegal 

tax shelters known as FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.

(14) First Union National Bank promoted to its clients generic 

tax products which had been designed by others, including 

potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters known as FLIP, 

BLIPS, and BOSS, by introducing and explaining these 

products to its clients, providing sample opinion letters, 

and introducing its clients to the promoters of the tax 

products, in return for substantial fees.

(15) Some investment advisors, including Presidio Advisory 

Services and the Quellos Group, helped develop, design, 

market, and execute potentially abusive or illegal tax 

shelters such as FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.

(16) Some charitable organizations, including the Los Angeles 

Department of Fire and Police Pensions and Austin Fire 

Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund, participated as 

counter parties in a highly questionable tax shelter known 

as SC2, which had been developed and promoted by 

KPMG, in return for substantial payments in the future. 

B. RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based upon its investigation and the above factual findings, the 

Subcommittee makes the following recommendations:

(1) The Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice should continue enforcement efforts aimed at stopping 

accounting firms and law firms from aiding and abetting 

tax evasion, promoting potentially abusive or illegal tax 

shelters, and violating Federal tax shelter regulations, and 

8

should impose substantial penalties on wrongdoers to punish and deter such misconduct.

(2) Congress should enact legislation to increase the civil penalties on aiders and abettors of tax evasion and promoters 

of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, to ensure that 

they disgorge not only all illicit proceeds from such activities, but also pay a substantial monetary fine to punish 

and deter such misconduct.

(3) Congress should appropriate additional funds to enable the 

IRS to hire more enforcement personnel and increase enforcement activities to stop the promotion of potentially 

abusive and illegal tax shelters by lawyers, accountants, 

and other financial professionals.

(4) Congress should enact legislation to clarify and strengthen 

the economic substance doctrine and to strengthen civil 

penalties on transactions with no economic substance or 

business purpose apart from their alleged tax benefits.

(5) Congress should enact legislation authorizing the IRS to 

disclose relevant tax shelter information to other Federal 

agencies, such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Federal bank regulators, and the Securities 

and Exchange Commission (SEC), to strengthen their efforts to stop the entities they oversee from aiding or abetting tax evasion or promoting potentially abusive or illegal 

tax shelters.

(6) The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should 

strengthen and finalize proposed rules restricting certain 

accounting firms from providing aggressive tax services to 

their audit clients, charging companies a contingent fee for 

providing tax services, and using aggressive marketing efforts to promote generic tax products to potential clients.

(7) Federal bank regulators, in consultation with the IRS, 

should review tax shelter activities at major banks, and 

clarify and strengthen rules preventing banks from aiding 

or abetting tax evasion by third parties or promoting potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters.

(8) The SEC, in consultation with the IRS, should review tax 

shelter activities at investment advisory and securities 

firms it oversees, and clarify and strengthen rules preventing such firms from aiding or abetting tax evasion by 

third parties or promoting potentially abusive or illegal tax 

shelters.

(9) The IRS should further strengthen Federal tax practitioner 

rules issued under Circular 230 regarding the issuance of 

tax opinion letters to ensure that such practitioners, including law firms and accounting firms, have written procedures for issuing tax opinions, resolving internal disputes 

over legal issues addressed in such opinions, and preventing practitioners or their firms from aiding or abetting 

tax evasion by clients or promoting potentially abusive or 

illegal tax shelters.

9

(10) The IRS should review tax shelter activities at charitable 

organizations, and clarify and strengthen rules preventing 

such organizations from aiding or abetting tax evasion by 

third parties or promoting potentially abusive or illegal 

tax shelters. 

IV. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This report details the Subcommittee’s investigation of the U.S. 

tax shelter industry. First, this report examines the development 

of mass-marketed generic tax products sold to multiple clients 

using prominent accounting firms, banks, lawyers, and investment 

firms. Second, as a result of the Subcommittee’s investigation, this 

report describes the commitments made by the accounting firms examined during this investigation to end their involvement with 

abusive tax shelters. 

The investigation found that by 2003, the U.S. tax shelter industry was no longer focused primarily on providing individualized tax 

advice to persons who initiate contact with a tax advisor. Instead, 

the industry focus has expanded to developing a steady supply of 

generic ‘‘tax products’’ that can be aggressively marketed to multiple clients. In short, the tax shelter industry had moved from providing one-on-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, designing, and mass marketing tax shelter products. 

Also, the investigation found that numerous respected members 

of the American business community had been heavily involved in 

the development, marketing, and implementation of generic tax 

products whose objective was not to achieve a specific business or 

economic purpose, but to reduce or eliminate a client’s U.S. tax liability. By 2003, dubious tax shelter sales were no longer the province of shady, fly-by-night companies with limited resources. They 

had become big business, assigned to talented professionals at the 

top of their fields and able to draw upon the vast resources and 

reputations of the country’s largest accounting firms, law firms, investment advisory firms, and banks. 

This report focuses on generic tax products developed and promoted by KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young, 

auditors and tax experts comprising three of the top four accounting firms in the United States. During the 1990’s, in response in 

part to the stock market boom and the proliferation of stock options, these firms and others designed and developed tax products 

used to generate large paper losses that could be used to offset or 

shelter gains from taxation. Tax products examined by the Subcommittee include: KPMG’s Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure 

(BLIPS), Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP), and Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy (OPIS); PricewaterhouseCooper’s Bond and Option Sales Strategy (BOSS); and Ernst & 

Young’s Contingent Deferred Swap (CDS) tax product. Each of 

these products generated hundreds of millions of dollars in phony 

paper losses for taxpayers, using a series of complex, orchestrated 

transactions, structured finance, and investments with little or no 

10

19FLIP and OPIS are covered by IRS Notice 2001–45 (2001–33 IRB 129) (8/13/01); while 

BLIPS is covered by IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00). PricewaterhouseCooper’s 

BOSS transaction is covered by IRS Notice 1999–59 (1999–52 IRB 761) (12/27/99). Ernst & 

Young’s CDS transaction is covered by IRS Notice 2002–35 (2002–21 IRB 992) (5/28/02). 20See IRS Notice 2004–30 (4/1/04). 

profit potential. All of these tax products have been ‘‘listed’’ by the 

IRS as potentially abusive tax shelters.19

Additionally, the Subcommittee examined a fourth tax product, 

S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2), developed 

by KPMG. SC2 is directed at individuals who own profitable corporations organized under Chapter S of the tax code (hereinafter 

‘‘S Corporations’’), which means that the corporation’s income is attributed directly to the corporate owners and taxable as personal 

income. SC2 was intended to generate a tax deductible charitable 

donation for the corporate owner and, more importantly, to defer 

and reduce taxation of a substantial portion of the income produced 

by the S Corporation, essentially by ‘‘allocating’’ but not actually 

distributing that income to a tax exempt charity holding the corporation’s stock. Recently, the IRS listed SC2 as a potentially abusive tax shelter.20

As a result of the Subcommittee’s hearings and investigation, 

each accounting firm has committed to cultural, structural, and institutional reforms and changes to end the promotion, development, 

implementation, and offering of mass-marketed abusive tax shelters. KPMG informed the Subcommittee that the firm has dismantled its development, marketing, and sales infrastructure used for 

offering mass-marketed tax shelters. In addition, KPMG indicated 

that it has dismantled various tax practice groups, made leadership 

changes, and strengthened oversight and compliance. KPMG indicated that these changes reflect a firm-wide commitment to attain 

the highest degree of trust from the firm’s clients, regulators, and 

the public at large. Similarly, Ernst & Young told the Subcommittee that the firm has instituted new oversight and leadership changes, IRS compliance and monitoring systems, and firmwide policies to ensure the highest standards of professionalism. 

Lastly, PricewaterhouseCoopers told the Subcommittee that the 

firm has instituted new leadership positions, and a centralized 

product development process to monitor all tax services to ensure 

that mass-marketed abusive tax shelters would not be marketed by 

the firm in the future. 

The investigation also examined a number of professional firms 

that assisted in the development, marketing, and implementation 

of tax shelters promoted by the three accounting firms. Leading 

banks, including Deutsche Bank, HVB, and UBS, provided multibillion dollar credit lines essential to the orchestrated transactions. 

Wachovia Bank, acting through First Union National Bank, made 

client referrals to KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, playing a 

key role in facilitating the marketing of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters. Leading law firms, such as Brown & Wood, which 

later merged with another firm to become Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood, provided favorable tax opinions on these tax shelters, advising that they were permissible under the law. The evidence also 

suggests collaboration between Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and 

KPMG on the OPIS and BLIPS tax shelters, including the issuance 

11

21 According to the General Accounting Office, a recent IRS consultant estimated that for the 6-year period, 1993–1999, the IRS lost on average between $11 and $15 billion each year from 

abusive tax shelters. See GA0–04–104T, at 3 (2003). GAO estimates potential tax losses of about 

$33 billion from transactions listed by the IRS as potentially abusive, and another $52 billion 

from non-listed abusive transactions, for a combined total of $85 billion. Id. at 10. 22The general information about KPMG is drawn from KPMG documents produced in connection with the Subcommittee investigation; Internet websites maintained by KPMG LLP and 

KPMG International; and a legal complaint filed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC v. KPMG LLP, Civil Action No. 03–CV–0671 (D. S.D.N.Y.) (1/29/03). 

of allegedly independent opinion letters on BLIPS containing numerous virtually identical paragraphs. Two investment advisory 

firms, Presidio Advisory Services and Quellos Group, formerly 

doing business as Quadra Capital Management LLP and QA Investments LLC, assisted in the design, development, marketing, 

and implementation of tax shelters promoted by KPMG. Additionally, Quellos served as the investment advisor for PricewaterhouseCooper’s version of FLIP. 

The following pages provide more detailed information about 

these and other problems uncovered during the Subcommittee investigation into the role of professional firms in the tax shelter industry. 

V. ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS 

The Subcommittee’s investigation of the U.S. tax shelter industry 

found that leading U.S. accounting firms were focused on developing generic ‘‘tax products’’ aggressively marketed to multiple clients from the late 1990’s to as late as 2003, despite increasing IRS 

enforcement efforts to halt the tax shelters they were promoting. 

Accounting firms were devoting substantial resources to develop, 

market, and implement tax shelters, costing the Treasury billions 

of dollars in lost tax revenues.21 To illustrate the problems, the 

Subcommittee developed case histories focused on tax shelters promoted by KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young. 

The investigation also uncovered evidence that these firms took 

steps to conceal their tax shelter activities from tax authorities and 

the public, including by failing to register potentially abusive tax 

shelters with the IRS. 

A. KPMG 

The Subcommittee conducted its most detailed examination of 

four potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters that were developed, 

marketed, and implemented by KPMG. KPMG International is one 

of the largest public accounting firms in the world, with over 700 

offices in 152 countries.22 In 2002, it employed over 100,000 people and had worldwide revenues of $10.7 billion. KPMG International, 

organized as a Swiss ‘‘non-operating association,’’ functions as a 

federation of partnerships around the globe, and maintains its 

headquarters in Amsterdam. 

KPMG LLP (hereinafter ‘‘KPMG’’) is a U.S. limited liability partnership and a member of KPMG International. KPMG is the third 

largest accounting firm in the United States, and generates more 

than $4 billion in annual revenues. KPMG was formed in 1987, 

from the merger of two long-standing accounting firms, Peat 

Marwick and Klynveld Main Goerdeler, along with their individual 

member firms. KPMG maintains its headquarters in New York and 

numerous offices in the United States and other countries. 

12

23 Internal KPMG presentation dated 7/19/01, by Rick Rosenthal and Marsha Peters, entitled 

‘‘Innovative Tax Solutions.’’ A chart included in this presentation tracks increases in the Tax 

Service’s gross revenues from 1998 until 2001, showing a cumulative increase of more than 45% 

over the 4-year period, from 1998 gross revenues of $830 million to 2001 gross revenues of $1.24 

billion. 24Minutes dated 11/30/00, Monetization Solutions Task Force Teleconference, Bates KPMG 

0050624–29, at 50625. 25Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 50621. 26KPMG told the Subcommittee that both groups were disbanded over time in 2002; it is unclear exactly when each ceased to function. 

KPMG’s Tax Services Practice is a major division of KPMG. It 

provides tax compliance, tax planning, and tax return preparation 

services. The Tax Services Practice employs more than 10,300 tax 

professionals and has generated more than $1.2 billion in annual 

revenues for the firm. These revenues have been increasing rapidly 

in recent years, including a 45% cumulative increase over 4 years, 

from 1998 to 2001.23 The Tax Services Practice is headquartered 

in New York, has 122 U.S. offices, and maintains additional offices 

around the world. The head of the Tax Service during the period 

of the investigation was Vice Chairman for Tax, Richard Smith, Jr. 

The Tax Services Practice has over two dozen subdivisions, offices, ‘‘practices,’’ or ‘‘groups’’ which over the years have changed 

missions and personnel. Many played key roles in developing, marketing, or implementing KPMG’s generic tax products, including 

the four KPMG products featured in this Report. One key group is 

the Washington National Tax (WNT) Practice which provides technical tax expertise to the entire KPMG firm. During the course of 

the Subcommittee’s investigation, a WNT subgroup, the Tax Innovation Center, led KPMG’s efforts to develop new generic tax products. Another key group is the Department of Professional Practice 

(DPP) for Tax, which, among other tasks, reviews and approves all 

new KPMG tax products for sale to clients. KPMG’s Federal Tax 

Practice addresses Federal tax compliance and planning issues. 

KPMG’s Personal Financial Planning (PFP) Practice focused on 

selling ‘‘tax-advantaged’’ products to high net worth individuals 

and large corporations.24 Through a subdivision known as the Capital Transaction Services (CaTS) Practice, later renamed the Innovative Strategies Practice, PFP led KPMG’s efforts on FLIP, OPIS, 

and BLIPS.25 KPMG’s Stratecon Practice, which focused on ‘‘business based’’ tax planning and tax products, led the firm’s efforts on 

SC2. Innovative Strategies and Stratecon were later disbanded, 

and their tax professionals assigned to other groups.26 The Tax Innovation Center was apparently closed in 2003. 

Several senior KPMG tax professionals interviewed by the Subcommittee staff, when asked to describe KPMG’s overall approach 

to tax services, indicated that the firm made a significant change 

in direction in the late 1990’s, when it made a formal decision to 

begin devoting substantial resources to developing and marketing 

tax products that could be sold to multiple clients. The Subcommittee staff was told that KPMG made this decision, in part, 

due to the success other accounting firms were experiencing in selling tax products, and, in part, due to new tax leadership that was 

enthusiastic about increasing tax product sales. One senior KPMG 

tax professional told the Subcommittee staff that some KPMG partVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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27 ‘‘Tax Innovation Center Overview,’’ Solution Development Process Manual (4/7/01), prepared 

by the KPMG Tax Innovation Center (hereinafter ‘‘TIC Manual’’), at i. 28 ‘‘TIC Solution Development Process,’’ TIC Manual at 6. 29KPMG presentation dated 5/30/01, ‘‘Tax Innovation Center Solution and Idea Development—Year-End Results,’’ Bates XX 001755–56, at 1754. 

ners considered it ‘‘important’’ for the firm to become an industry 

leader in producing generic tax products. 

(1) Developing New Tax Products 

Finding: During the period 1998 to 2003, KPMG devoted 

substantial resources and maintained an extensive infrastructure to produce a continuing supply of generic 

tax products to sell to clients, using a process which 

pressured its tax professionals to generate new ideas, 

move them quickly through the development process, 

and approve, at times, illegal or potentially abusive tax 

shelters.

During the investigation, KPMG preferred to describe itself as a 

tax advisor that responded to client inquiries seeking tax planning 

services to structure legitimate business transactions in a tax efficient way. The Subcommittee investigation determined, however, 

that KPMG had also developed and supported an extensive internal infrastructure of offices, programs, and procedures designed to 

churn out a continuing supply of new generic tax products, unsolicited by a specific client, for mass marketing to multiple clients. 

Drive to Produce New Tax Products. In 1997, KPMG established the Tax Innovation Center whose sole mission was to push 

the development of new KPMG tax products. Located within the 

Washington National Tax (WNT) Practice, the Center was staffed 

with about a dozen full-time employees and assisted by others who 

worked for the Center on a rotating basis. A 2001 KPMG overview 

of the Center states that ‘‘[t]ax [s]olution development is one of the 

four priority activities of WNT’’ and ‘‘a significant percentage of 

WNT resources are dedicated to [t]ax [s]olution development at any 

given time.’’ 27

Essentially, the Tax Innovation Center encouraged KPMG tax 

professionals to propose new tax product ideas and then provided 

administrative support to develop the proposals into approved tax 

products and move them into the marketing stage. As part of this 

effort, the Center maintained a ‘‘Tax Services Idea Bank’’ which it 

used to drive and track new tax product ideas. The Center asked 

KPMG tax professionals to submit new ideas for tax products on 

‘‘Idea Submission Forms’’ or ‘‘Tax Knowledge Sharing’’ forms with 

specified information on how the proposed tax product would work 

and who would be interested in buying it.28

In recent years, the Center established a firm-wide, numerical 

goal for new tax idea submissions and applied ongoing pressure on 

KPMG tax professionals to meet this goal. For example, in 2001, 

the Center established this overall objective: ‘‘Goal: Deposit 150 

New Ideas in Tax Services Idea Bank.’’ 29 On May 30, 2001, the 

Center reported on the Tax Services’ progress in meeting this goal 

as part of a larger Powerpoint presentation on ‘‘year-end results’’ 

in new tax solutions and ideas development. For each of 12 KPMG 

‘‘Functional Groups’’ within the Tax Services Practice, a one-page 

14

30KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.1 to 24.7. 31TIC Manual at 5. 32The TIC Manual states that a Tax Lab is supposed to evaluate ‘‘the technical viability of 

the idea, the idea’s revenue generation potential above the Solution Revenue threshold, and a 

business case for developing the solution, including initial target list, marketing considerations, 

and preliminary technical analysis.’’ TIC Manual at 5. 33 In an earlier version of KPMG’s tax product review and approval procedure, WNT did not 

have a formal role in the development and approval process, according to senior tax professionals interviewed by the Subcommittee. This prior version of the process, which was apparently the first firm-wide procedure established to approve new generic tax products, was established in 1997, and operated until mid-1998. In it, a three-person Tax Advantaged Product Review Board, whose members were appointed by and included the head of DPP-Tax, conducted 

the technical review of new proposals. In 1998, when this responsibility was assigned to the 

WNT, the Board was disbanded. The earlier process was used to approve the sale of FLIP and 

OPIS, while the existing procedure was used to approve the sale of BLIPS and SC2. Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 34KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.4.1, at 24–2. 

chart showed the precise number of ‘‘Deposits,’’ ‘‘Expected Deposits,’’ and ‘‘In the Pipeline’’ ideas which each group had contributed 

or were expected to contribute to the Tax Services Idea Bank. 

Development and Approval Process. Once ideas were deposited into the Tax Services Idea Bank, KPMG devoted substantial 

resources to transforming the more promising ideas into generic 

tax products that could be sold to multiple clients. 

KPMG’s development and approval process for new tax products 

was described in its Tax Services Manual and Tax Innovation Center Manual.30 Essentially, the process consisted of three stages, 

each of which could overlap with another. In the first stage, the 

new tax idea underwent an initial screening ‘‘for technical and revenue potential.’’ 31 This initial analysis was supposed to be provided 

by a ‘‘Tax Lab’’ which was a formal meeting, arranged by the Tax 

Innovation Center, of six or more KPMG tax experts specializing 

in the tax issues or industry affected by the proposed product.32

Promising proposals were also assigned one or more persons, sometimes referred to as ‘‘National Development Champions’’ or ‘‘Development Leaders’’ to assist in the proposal’s initial analysis and, if 

warranted, shepherd the proposal through the full KPMG approval 

process. For example, the lead tax professional who moved BLIPS 

through the development and approval process was Jeffrey 

Eischeid, assisted by Randall Bickham, while for SC2, the lead tax 

professional was Lawrence Manth, assisted and later succeeded by 

Andrew Atkin. 

If a proposal survived the initial screening, in the second stage 

it underwent a thorough review by the Washington National Tax 

Practice (‘‘WNT review’’), which was responsible for determining 

whether the product met the technical requirements of existing tax 

law.33 WNT personnel often spent significant time identifying and 

searching for ways to resolve problems with how the proposed 

product was structured or was intended to be implemented. The 

WNT review also included analysis of the product by the WNT Tax 

Controversy Services group ‘‘to address tax shelter regulations 

issues.’’ 34 WNT was required to ‘‘sign-off’’ on the technical merits 

of the proposal before it was approved for sale to clients. 

In the third and final stage, the product underwent review and 

approval by the Department of Practice and Professionalism (‘‘DPP 

review’’). The DPP review had to determine that the product not 

only complied with the law, but also met KPMG’s standards for 

15

35 Id., § 24.5.2, at 24–3. 36Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). The Subcommittee staff was told 

that, since 1997, DPP-Tax had very limited resources to conduct its new product reviews. Until 

2002, for example, DPP-Tax had a total of less than 10 employees; in 2003, the number increased to around or just above 20. In contrast, DPP-Assurance, which oversees professional 

practice issues for KPMG audit activity, had well over 100 employees. 37KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.5.2, at 24–3. 38 Id., § 41.19.1, at 41–10. 39 Id., § 24.4.2, at 24–2. See also TIC Manual at 10. 40TIC Manual at 10. 

‘‘risk management and professional practice.’’ 35 This latter review 

included consideration of such matters as the substantive content 

of KPMG tax opinion and client engagement letters, disclosures to 

clients of risks associated with a tax product, the need for any confidentiality or marketing restrictions, how KPMG fees were to be 

structured, whether auditor independence issues needed to be addressed, and the potential impact of a proposed tax product on the 

firm’s reputation.36

The KPMG development and approval process was intended to 

encourage vigorous analysis and debate by the firm’s tax experts 

over the merits of a proposed tax product and to produce a determination that the product complies with current law and does not 

impose excessive financial or reputational risk for the firm. All 

KPMG personnel interviewed by the Subcommittee indicated that 

the final approval that permitted a new tax product to go to market was provided by the head of the DPP. KPMG’s Tax Services 

Manual stated that the DPP ‘‘generally will not approve a solution 

unless the appropriate WNT partner(s)/principal(s) conclude that it 

is at least more likely than not that the desired tax consequences 

of the solution will be upheld if challenged by the appropriate taxing authority.’’ 37 KPMG defines ‘‘more likely than not’’ as a ‘‘greater than 50 percent probability of success if [a tax product is] challenged by the IRS.’’ 38 KPMG personnel told the Subcommittee that 

the WNT’s final sign-off on the technical issues had to come before 

the DPP would provide its final sign-off allowing a new tax product 

to go to market. 

Once approved, KPMG procedures required a new tax product to 

be accompanied by a number of documents before its release for 

sale to clients, including an abstract summarizing the product; a 

standard engagement letter for clients purchasing the product; an 

electronic Powerpoint presentation to introduce the product to 

other KPMG tax professionals; and a ‘‘whitepaper’’ summarizing 

the technical tax issues and their resolution.39 In addition, to 

‘‘launch’’ the new product within KPMG, the Tax Innovation Center 

was supposed to prepare a ‘‘Tax Solution Alert’’ which served ‘‘as 

the official notification’’ that the tax product was available for sale 

to clients.40 This Alert was supposed to include a ‘‘digest’’ summarizing the product, a list of the KPMG ‘‘deployment team’’ members 

responsible for ‘‘delivering’’ the product to market, pricing information, and marketing information such as a ‘‘Solution Profile’’ of clients who would benefit from the tax product and ‘‘Optimal Target 

Characteristics’’ and the expected ‘‘Typical Buyer’’ of the product. 

KPMG personnel sometimes, but not always, complied with the paperwork required by its procedures. For example, while SC2 was 

the subject of a ‘‘Tax Solution Alert,’’ BLIPS was not. 

16

41KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 41.17.1, at 41–8. 42 Id., § 41.15.1, at 41–8. A KPMG tax opinion often addresses all of the legal issues related 

to a new tax product and provides an overall assessment of the tax consequences of the new 

product. See, e.g., KPMG tax opinion on BLIPS. Other KPMG tax opinions address only a limited number of issues related to a new tax product and may provide different levels of assurance 

on the tax consequences of various aspects of the same tax product. See, e.g., KPMG tax opinions related to SC2. 43 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00). 

In addition to or in lieu of the required ‘‘whitepaper’’ explaining 

KPMG’s position on key technical issues, KPMG often prepared a 

‘‘prototype’’ tax opinion letter laying out the firm’s analysis and 

conclusions regarding the tax consequences of the new tax product.41 KPMG defines a ‘‘tax opinion’’ as ‘‘any written advice on the 

tax consequences of a particular issue, transaction or series of 

transactions that is based upon specific facts and/or representations of the client and that is furnished to the client or another 

party in a letter, a whitepaper, a memorandum, an electronic or 

facsimile communication, or other form.’’ 42 The tax opinion letter 

includes, at a minimum under KPMG policy, a statement of the 

firm’s determination that, if challenged by the IRS, it was ‘‘more 

likely than not’’ that the desired tax consequences of the new tax 

product would be upheld in court. The prototype tax opinion letter 

is intended to serve as a template for the tax opinion letters actually sent by KPMG to specific clients for a fee. 

In addition to preparing its own tax opinion letter, in some cases 

KPMG seeks an opinion letter from an outside party, such as a law 

firm, to provide an ‘‘independent’’ second opinion on the validity of 

the tax product. KPMG made arrangements to obtain favorable 

legal opinion letters from an outside law firm in each of the tax 

products examined by the Subcommittee. 

BLIPS Development and Approval Process. The development and approval process resulting in the marketing of the BLIPS 

tax product to 186 individuals illustrates how the KPMG process 

worked. BLIPS was first proposed as a KPMG tax idea in late 

1998, and the generic tax product was initially approved for sale 

in May 1999. The product was finally approved for sale in August 

1999, after the transactional documentation required by the BLIPS 

transactions was completed. One year later, in September 2000, the 

IRS issued Notice 2000–44, determining that BLIPS and other, 

similar tax products were potentially abusive tax shelters and taxpayers who used them would be subject to enforcement action.43

After this notice was issued, KPMG discontinued sales of the product. 

Internal KPMG emails disclose an extended, unresolved debate 

among WNT and DPP tax professionals over whether BLIPS met 

the technical requirements of Federal tax law, a debate which continued even after BLIPS was approved for sale. Several outside 

firms were also involved in BLIPS’ development including Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood, and Presidio Advisory Services, an investment advisory firm run by two former KPMG tax professionals. 

Key documents written at the beginning and during a key twoweek period of the BLIPS approval process are instructive. 

BLIPS was first proposed in late 1998, as a replacement product 

for OPIS, which had earned KPMG substantial fees. From the beginning, senior tax leadership put pressure on KPMG tax profesVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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44 Email dated 2/9/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to John Lanning, Doug Ammerman, Mark Watson, and Larry DeLap, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0001. 45 Email dated 2/10/99, from John Lanning to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ 

Bates MTW 0001. See also memorandum dated 2/11/99, from Jeffrey Zysik of TIC to ‘‘Distribution List,’’ Bates MTW 0002 (‘‘As each of you is by now aware, a product with a very high profile 

with the tax leadership recently was submitted to WNT/Tax Innovation Center. We are charged 

with shepherding this product through the WNT ‘productization’ and review process as rapidly 

as possible.’’) 46 Email dated 2/15/99, from Mark Watson to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS 

Progress Report,’’ Bates MTW 0004. 47 ‘‘Meeting Summary’’ for meeting held on 2/19/99, Bates MTW 0009. 48Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 

sionals to quickly approve the new product for sale to clients. For 

example, after being told that a draft tax opinion on BLIPS had 

been sent to WNT for review and ‘‘we can reasonably anticipate 

‘approval’ in another month or so,’’ 44 the head of the entire Tax 

Services Practice wrote: 

Given the marketplace potential of BLIPS, I think a month is 

far too long—especially in the spirit of ‘‘first to market’’. I’d like 

for all of you, within the bounds of good professional judgement, to dramatically accelerate this timeline. . . . I’d like to 

know how quickly we can get this product to market.45

Five days later, the WNT technical expert in charge of Personal 

Financial Planning (PFP) tax products—who had been assigned responsibility for moving the BLIPS product through the WNT review process and was under instruction to keep the head of the Tax 

Services Practice informed of BLIPS’ status—wrote to several colleagues asking for a ‘‘progress report.’’ He added a postscript: ‘‘P.S. 

I don’t like this pressure any more than you do.’’ 46

A few days later, on February 19, 1999, almost a dozen WNT tax 

experts held an initial meeting to discuss the technical issues involved in BLIPS.47 Six major issues were identified, the first two 

of which posed such significant technical hurdles that, according to 

the WNT PFP technical reviewer, most participants, including himself, left the meeting thinking the product was ‘‘dead.’’ 48 Some of 

the most difficult technical questions, including whether the BLIPS 

transactions had economic substance, were assigned to two of 

WNT’s most senior tax partners who, despite the difficulty, took 

just 2 weeks to determine, on March 5, that their technical concerns had been resolved. The WNT PFP technical reviewer continued to work on other technical issues related to the project. Almost 

2 months later, on April 27, 1999, he sent an email to the head of 

DPP stating that, with respect to the technical issues assigned to 

him, he would be comfortable with WNT’s issuing a more-likelythan-not opinion on BLIPS. 

Three days later, at meetings held on April 30 and May 1, a 

number of KPMG tax professionals working on BLIPS attended a 

meeting with Presidio to discuss how the investments called for by 

the product would actually be carried out. The WNT PFP technical 

reviewer told the Subcommittee staff that, at these meetings, the 

Presidio representative made a number of troubling comments that 

led him to conclude that the review team had not been provided all 

of the relevant information about how the BLIPS transactions 

would operate, and re-opened concerns about the technical merits 

of the product. For example, he told the Subcommittee staff that 

a Presidio representative had commented that ‘‘the probability of 

18

49 Email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson to Larry DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011916. 50 Email dated 5/5/99, from Larry DeLap to Mark Watson, Bates KPMG 0011916. 51 Email dated 5/5/99, from Mark Watson to Larry DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011915–16. Mr. Watson was not the only KPMG tax professional expressing serious concerns about BLIPS. See, e.g., 

email dated 4/6/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Larry DeLap, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0024; 

email dated 4/26/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Larry DeLap, ‘‘RE: BLIPS Analysis,’’ Bates MTW 

0026; email dated 5/7/99, from Steven Rosenthal to multiple KPMG professionals, ‘‘Who Is the 

Borrower in the BLIPS transaction,’’ Bates MTW 0028; email dated 8/19/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Mark Watson, Bates SMR 0045. 

actually making a profit from this transaction is remote’’ and the 

bank would have a ‘‘veto’’ over how the loan proceeds used to finance the BLIPS deal would be invested. In his opinion, these 

statements, if true, meant the investment program at the heart of 

the BLIPS product lacked economic substance and business purpose as required by law. 

On May 4, 1999, the WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote to the 

head of the DPP expressing doubts about approving BLIPS:

Larry, while I am comfortable that WNT did its job reviewing 

and analyzing the technical issues associated with BLIPS, 

based on the BLIPS meeting I attended on April 30 and May 

1, I am not comfortable issuing a more-likely-than-not opinion 

letter [with respect to] this product for the following reasons:

. . . [T]he probability of actually making a profit from this 

transaction is remote (possible, but remote);

The bank will control how the ‘‘loan’’ proceeds are invested 

via a veto power over Presidio’s investment choices; and

It appears that the bank wants the ‘‘loan’’ repaid within approximately 60 days....

Thus, I think it is questionable whether a client’s representation [in a tax opinion letter] that he or she believed there was 

a reasonable opportunity to make a profit is a reasonable representation. Even more concerning, however, is whether a loan 

was actually made. If the bank controls how the loan proceeds 

are used and when they are repaid, has the bank actually 

made a bona fide loan?

I will no doubt catch hell for sending you this message. However, until the above issues are resolved satisfactorily, I am not 

comfortable with this product.49

The DPP head responded: ‘‘It is not clear to me how this comports with your April 27 message [expressing comfort with BLIPS], 

but because this is a PFP product and you are the chief PFP technical resource, the product should not be approved if you are uncomfortable.’’ 50 The WNT PFP technical reviewer responded that 

he had learned new information about how the BLIPS investments 

would occur, and it was this subsequent information that had 

caused him to reverse his position on issuing a tax opinion letter 

supporting the product.51

On May 7, 1999 the head of DPP forwarded the WNT PFP technical expert’s email to the leadership of the tax group and noted: 

‘‘I don’t believe a PFP product should be approved when the top 

19

52 Email dated 5/7/99, from Larry DeLap to three KPMG tax professionals, with copies to John 

Lanning, Vice Chairman of the Tax Services Practice, and Jeffrey Stein, second in command of 

the Tax Services Practice, Bates KPMG 0011905. In the same email he noted that another technical expert, whom he had asked to review critical aspects of the project, had ‘‘informed me on 

Tuesday afternoon that he had substantial concern with the ‘who is the borrower’ issuer [sic].’’ 

Later that same day, May 7, the two WNT technical reviewers expressing technical concerns 

about BLIPS met with the two senior WNT partners who had earlier signed off on the economic 

substance issue to discuss the issues. 53 Email dated 5/8/99, from John Lanning to four KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG 

0011905. 54 Email exchange dated 5/9/99, between Richard Smith and Steven Rosenthal, Bates SMR 

0025 and SMR 0027. 55 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to multiple WNT tax professionals, Bates MTW 

0031.

PFP technical partner in WNT believes it should not be approved.’’ 52

On May 8, 1999, the head of KPMG’s Tax Services Practice 

wrote: ‘‘I must say that I am amazed that at this late date (must 

now be 6 months into this process) our chief WNT PFP technical 

expert has reached this conclusion. I would have thought that 

Mark would have been involved in the ground floor of this process, 

especially on an issue as critical as profit motive. What gives? This 

appears to be the antithesis of ‘speed to market.’ Is there any 

chance of ever getting this product off the launching pad, or should 

we simply give up???’’ 53

On May 9, one of the senior WNT partners supporting BLIPS 

sent an email to one of the WNT technical reviewers objecting to 

BLIPS and asked him: ‘‘Based on your analysis . . . do you conclude that the tax results sought by the investor are NOT ‘more 

likely than not’ to be realized?’’ The technical reviewer responded: 

‘‘Yes.’’ 54

On May 10, the head of the WNT sent an email to five WNT tax 

professionals:

Gentlemen: Please help me on this. Over the weekend while 

thinking about WNT involvement in BLIPS I was under the 

impression that we had sent the transaction forward to DPP 

Tax on the basis that everyone had signed off on their respective technical issues(s) and that I had signed off on the overall 

more likely than not opinion. If this impression is correct, why 

are we revisiting the opinion other than to beef up the technical discussion and further refine the representations on 

which the conclusions are based. I am very troubled that at 

this late date the issue is apparently being revisited and if I 

understand correctly, a prior decision changed on this technical 

issue?! Richard, in particular, jog my memory on this matter 

since I based my overall opinion on the fact that everyone had 

signed off on their respective areas? 55

A few hours later, the head of WNT sent eight senior KPMG tax 

professionals, including the Tax Services Practice head, DPP head, 

and the WNT PFP technical reviewer, a long email message urging 

final approval of BLIPS. He wrote in part:

Many people have worked long and hard to craft a tax opinion 

in the BLIPS transaction that satisfies the more likely than 

not standard. I believed that we in WNT had completed our 

work a month ago when we forwarded the [draft] opinion to 

Larry. . . .

20

56 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to John Lanning and eight other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011904. See also email response dated 5/10/99, from 

John Lanning to Philip Wiesner and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 

0036 (‘‘you’ve framed the issues well’’). 57 Email dated 5/10/99, from Jeffrey Stein to Philip Wiesner and others, Bates KPMG 

0011903. 58 Email dated 5/10/99, from Mark Watson to John Lanning and others, ‘‘FW: BLIPS,’’ Bates 

MTW 0039 (emphasis in original).

[T]his is a classic transaction where we can labor over the 

technical concerns, but the ultimate resolution—if challenged 

by the IRS—will be based on the facts (or lack thereof). In 

short, our opinion is only as good as the factual representations that it is based upon. . . . The real ‘‘rubber meets the 

road’’ will happen when the transaction is sold to investors, 

what the investors’ actual motive for investing the transaction 

is and how the transaction actually unfolds. . . . Third, our 

reputation will be used to market the transaction. This is a 

given in these types of deals. Thus, we need to be concerned 

about who we are getting in bed with here. In particular, do 

we believe that Presidio has the integrity to sell the deal on 

the facts and representations that we have written our opinion 

on?! . . .

Having said all the above, I do believe the time has come to 

shit and get off the pot. The business decisions to me are primarily two: (1) Have we drafted the opinion with the appropriate limiting bells and whistles . . . and (2) Are we being 

paid enough to offset the risks of potential litigation resulting 

from the transaction? . . . My own recommendation is that we 

should be paid a lot of money here for our opinion since the 

transaction is clearly one that the IRS would view as falling 

squarely within the tax shelter orbit.56

Later the same day, the Tax Services operations head wrote in 

response to the email from the WNT head: ‘‘I think it’s shit OR get 

off the pot. I vote for shit.’’ 57

The same day, the WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote to the 

head of the Tax Services Practice:

John, in my defense, my change in heart about BLIPS was 

based on information Presidio disclosed to me at a meeting on 

May 1. This information raised serious concerns in my mind 

about the viability of the transaction, and indicated that WNT 

had not been given complete information about how the transaction would be structured. . . . I want to make money as 

much as you do, but I cannot ignore information that raises 

questions as to whether the subject strategy even works. Nonetheless, I have sent Randy Bickham four representations that 

I think need to be added to our opinion letter. Assuming these 

representations are made, I am prepared to move forward with 

the strategy.58

A meeting was held on May 10, to determine how to proceed. The 

WNT head, the senior WNT partner, and the two WNT technical 

reviewers decided to move forward on BLIPS, and the WNT head 

asked the technical reviewers to draft some representations that, 

when relied upon, would enable the tax opinion writers to reach a 

21

59 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to multiple KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG 

0009344. 60 Email dated 5/11/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Lawrence DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011911. 61Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 62 Id.

more likely than not opinion. The WNT head reported the outcome 

of the meeting in an email:

The group of Wiesner, R Smith, Watson and Rosenthal met 

this afternoon to bring closure to the remaining technical tax 

issues concerning the BLIPS transaction. After a thorough discussion of the profit motive and who is the borrower issue, recommendations for additional representations were made (Mark 

Watson to follow up on with Jeff Eischeid) and the decision by 

WNT to proceed on a more likely than not basis affirmed. Concern was again expressed that the critical juncture will be at 

the time of the first real tax opinion when the investor, bank 

and Presidio will be asked to sign the appropriate representations. Finally, it should be noted that Steve Rosenthal expressed his dissent on the who is the investor issue, to wit, ‘‘although reasonable people could reach an opposite result, he 

could not reach a more likely than not opinion on that 

issue.’’ 59

After receiving this email, the DPP head sent an email to the 

WNT PFP technical reviewer asking whether he would be comfortable with KPMG’s issuing a tax opinion supporting BLIPS. The 

WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote:

‘‘Larry, I don’t like this product and would prefer not to be associated with it. However, if the additional representations I 

sent to Randy on May 9 and 10 are in fact made, based on Phil 

Wiesner’s and Richard Smith’s input, I can reluctantly live 

with a more-likely-than-not opinion being issued for the product.’’ 60

The DPP head indicated to the Subcommittee staff that he did 

not consider this tepid endorsement sufficient for him to sign off on 

the product. He indicated that he then met in person with his superior, the head of the Tax Services Practice, and told the Tax 

Services Practice head that he was not prepared to approve BLIPS 

for sale. He told the Subcommittee staff that the Tax Services Practice head was ‘‘not pleased’’ and instructed him to speak again with 

the technical reviewer.61

The DPP head told the Subcommittee staff that he then went 

back to the WNT PFP technical reviewer and telephoned him to 

discuss the product. The DPP head told the Subcommittee staff 

that, during this telephone conversation, the technical reviewer 

made a much clearer, oral statement of support for the product, 

and it was only after obtaining this statement from the technical 

reviewer that, on May 19, 1999, the DPP head approved BLIPS for 

sale to clients.62 The WNT PFP technical reviewer, however, told 

the Subcommittee staff that he did not remember receiving this 

telephone call from the DPP head. According to him, he never, at 

any time after the May 1 meeting, expressed clear support for 

BLIPS’ approval. He also stated that an oral sign-off on this prodVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
22

63Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 64 Email dated 7/22/99, from Mark Watson to Richard Smith and Phil Wiesner, Bates MTW 

0078. 

uct contradicted the DPP head’s normal practice of requiring written product approvals.63

Over the course of the next year, KPMG sold BLIPS to 186 individuals and obtained more than $50 million in fees, making BLIPS 

one of its highest revenue-producing tax products to date. 

The events and communications leading to BLIPS’ approval for 

sale are troubling and revealing for a number of reasons. First, 

they show that senior KPMG tax professionals knew the proposed 

tax product, BLIPS, was ‘‘clearly one that the IRS would view as 

falling squarely within the tax shelter orbit.’’ Second, they show 

how important ‘‘speed to market’’ was as a factor in the review and 

approval process. Third, they show the interpersonal dynamics 

that, in this case, led KPMG’s key technical tax expert to reluctantly agree to approve a tax product that he did not support or 

want to be associated with, in response to the pressure exerted by 

senior Tax Services professionals to approve the product for sale. 

The email exchange immediately preceding BLIPS’ approval for 

sale also indicates a high level of impatience by KPMG tax professionals in dealing with new, troubling information about how the 

BLIPS investments would actually be implemented by the outside 

investment advisory firm, Presidio. Questions about this outside 

firm’s ‘‘integrity’’ and how it would perform were characterized as 

questions of risk to KPMG that could be resolved with a pricing approach that provided sufficient funds ‘‘to offset the risks of potential litigation.’’ Finally, the email exchange shows that the participants in the approval process—all senior KPMG tax professionals—knew they were voting for a dubious tax product that 

would be sold in part by relying on KPMG’s ‘‘reputation.’’ No one 

challenged the analysis that the risky nature of the product justified the firm’s charging ‘‘a lot of money’’ for a tax opinion letter predicting it was more likely than not that BLIPS would withstand an 

IRS challenge. 

Later documents show that key KPMG tax professionals continued to express serious concerns about the technical validity of 

BLIPS. For example, in July, 2 months after the DPP gave his approval to sell BLIPS, one of the WNT technical reviewers objecting 

to the tax product sent an email to his superiors in WNT noting 

that the loan documentation contemplated very conservative instruments for the loan proceeds and it seemed unlikely the rate of 

return on the investments would equal or exceed the loan and fees 

incurred by the borrower. He indicated that his calculations 

showed the planned foreign currency transactions would ‘‘have to 

generate a 240% annual rate of return’’ to break even. He also 

pointed out that, ‘‘Although the loan is structured as a 7-year loan, 

the client has a tremendous economic incentive to get out of loan 

as soon as possible due to the large negative spread.’’ He wrote: 

‘‘Before I submit our non-economic substance comments on the loan 

documents to Presidio, I want to confirm that you are still comfortable with the economic substance of this transaction.’’ 64 His superiors indicated that they were. 

23

65 Email dated 8/4/99, from Mark Watson to David Brockway, Mark Springer and Douglas 

Ammerman, Bates SMR 0039. 66 Id. 67Senior KPMG tax professionals again put pressure on its tax experts to quickly approve the 

BLIPS 2000 product. See, e.g., email dated 1/17/00, from Jeff Stein to Steven Rosenthal and others, ‘‘BLIPS 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0050 (technical expert urging the analysis of the new product 

‘‘so we can take this to market. Your attention over the next few days would be most appreciated.’’). 68 Email dated 3/6/00, from Steven Rosenthal to David Brockway, ‘‘Blips I, Grandfathered 

Blips, and Blips 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0056. See also Memorandum dated 3/28/00, to David 

Continued

A month later, in August, after completing a review of the BLIPS 

transactional documents, the WNT PFP technical reviewer again 

expressed concerns to his superiors in WNT:

However before engagement letters are signed and revenue is 

collected, I feel it is important to again note that I and several 

other WNT partners remain skeptical that the tax results purportedly generated by a BLIPS transaction would actually be 

sustained by a court if challenged by the IRS. We are particularly concerned about the economic substance of the BLIPS 

transaction, and our review of the BLIPS loan documents has 

increased our level of concern.

Nonetheless, since Richard Smith and Phil Wiesner—the WNT 

partners assigned with the responsibility of addressing the economic substance issues associated with BLIPS—have concluded they think BLIPS is a ‘‘more-likely-than-not’’ strategy, 

I am prepared to release the strategy once we complete our 

second review of the loan documents and LLC agreement and 

our comments thereon (if any) have been incorporated.65

The other technical reviewer objecting to BLIPS wrote:

I share your concerns. We are almost finished with our technical review of the documents that you gave us, and we recommend some clarifications to address these technical concerns. We are not, however, assessing the economic substance 

of the transaction (ie., is there a debt? Who is the borrower? 

What is the amount of the liability? Is there a reasonable expectation of profit?) I continue to be seriously troubled by these 

issues, but I defer to Phil Wiesner and Richard Smith to assess 

them.66

The senior partners in WNT chose to go forward with BLIPS. 

About 6 months after BLIPS tax products had begun to be sold 

to clients, an effort was begun within KPMG to design a modified 

‘‘BLIPS 2000.’’ 67 One of the WNT technical reviewers who had objected to the original BLIPS again expressed his concerns: 

I am writing to communicate my views on the economic substance of the Blips, Grandfathered Blips, and Blips 2000 strategies. Throughout this process, I have been troubled by the application of economic substance doctrines . . . and have raised 

my concerns repeatedly in internal meetings. The facts as I 

now know them and the law that has developed, has not reduced my level of concern.

In short, in my view, I do not believe that KPMG can reasonably issue a more-likely-than-not opinion on these issues.68

24

Brockway, ‘‘Talking points on significant tax issues for BLIPS 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0117–21 (identifying numerous problems with BLIPS). 69Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 70Powerpoint presentation dated June 1999, by Carol Warley, Personal Financial Planning 

group, ‘‘BLIPS AND TRACT,’’ Bates KPMG 00496339–45, at 496340. Repeated capitalizations 

in original text not included. 71 Email dated 5/5/99, from William Goldberg to Paul Kearns, ‘‘RE: BLIPs,’’ Bates KPMG 

0028162. 72 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00) at 255. 73See document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 50621. 74Memorandum dated 2/23/98, from Robert Simon to Gregg Ritchie, Randy Bickham, and 

John Harris, concerning OPIS, Bates KPMG 0010729. 

When asked by Subcommittee staff whether he had ever personally concluded that BLIPS met the technical requirements of the 

Federal tax code, the DPP head declined to say that he had. Instead, he said that, in 1999, he approved BLIPS for sale after determining that WNT had ‘‘completed’’ the technical approval process.69 A BLIPS Powerpoint presentation produced by the Personal 

Financial Planning group in June, a few weeks after BLIPS’ approval for sale, advised KPMG tax professionals to make sure that 

potential clients were ‘‘willing to take an aggressive position with 

a more likely than not opinion letter.’’ The presentation characterized BLIPS as having ‘‘about a 10 risk on [a] scale of 1–10.’’ 70 In 

response to an email on BLIPS stating that the firm would provide 

a more likely than not opinion, indicating a greater than 50 percent 

chance of success on the merits, one KPMG tax professional who 

refused to sell BLIPS to his clients wrote ‘‘[j]ust so we are clear, 

I personally view it no greater than 15%.’’ 71

In September 2000, the IRS identified BLIPS as a potentially 

abusive tax shelter. The IRS notice characterized BLIPS as a product that was ‘‘being marketed to taxpayers for the purpose of generating artificial tax losses. . . . [A] loss is allowable as a deduction 

. . . only if it is bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences. An artificial loss lacking economic substance is not allowable.’’ 72 The IRS’ disallowance of BLIPS has not yet been tested 

in court. Rather than defend BLIPS in court, however, KPMG and 

many BLIPS purchasers appear to be engaged in settlement negotiations with the IRS to reduce penalty assessments. 

OPIS and FLIP Development and Approval Process. OPIS 

and FLIP were the predecessors to BLIPS. Like BLIPS, both of 

these products were ‘‘loss generators’’ intended to generate paper 

losses that taxpayers could use to offset and shelter other income 

from taxation, 73 but both used different mechanisms than BLIPS 

to achieve this end. Because they were developed a number of 

years ago, the Subcommittee has more limited documentation on 

how OPIS and FLIP were developed. However, even this limited 

documentation establishes KPMG’s awareness of serious technical 

flaws in both tax products. 

For example, in the case of OPIS, which was developed during 

1998, a senior KPMG tax professional wrote a 7-page memorandum 

filled with criticisms of the proposed tax product.74 The memorandum states: ‘‘In OPIS, the use of debt has apparently been jettisoned. If we can not structure a deal without at least some debt, 

it strikes me that all the investment banker’s economic justification 

for the deal is smoke and mirrors.’’ At a later point, it states: ‘‘The 

only thing that really distinguishes OPIS (from FLIPS) from a tax 

25

75 Email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to Robert Wells, John Lanning, Larry DeLap, Gregg 

Ritchie, and others, ‘‘Simon Says,’’ concerning FLIP, Bates 638010, filed by the IRS on June 16, 

2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02. 

perspective is the use of an instrument that is purported to be a 

swap. . . . However, the instrument described in the opinion is not 

a swap under I.R.C. § 446. . . . [A] fairly strong argument could be 

made that the U.S. investor has nothing more than a disguised 

partnership interest.’’

The memorandum goes on:

If, upon audit, the IRS were to challenge the transaction, the 

burden of proof will be on the investor. The investor will have 

to demonstrate, among other things, that the transaction was 

not consummated pursuant to a firm and fixed plan. Think 

about the prospect of having your client on the stand having 

to defend against such an argument. The client would have a 

difficult burden to overcome. . . . The failure to use an independent 3rd party in any of the transactions indicates that the 

deal is pre-wired.

It also states: ‘‘If the risk of loss concepts of Notice 98–5 were applied to OPIS, I doubt that the investor’s ownership interest would 

pass muster.’’ And: ‘‘As it stands now, the Cayman company remains extremely vulnerable to an argument that it is a sham.’’ 

And: ‘‘No further attempt has been made to quantify why I.R.C. 

§ 165 should not apply to deny the loss. Instead, the argument is 

again made that because the law is uncertain, we win.’’ The memorandum observes: ‘‘We are the firm writing the [tax] opinions. Ultimately, if these deals fail in a technical sense, it is KPMG which 

will shoulder the blame.’’

This memorandum was written in February 1998. OPIS was approved for sale to clients around September 1998. KPMG sold OPIS 

to 111 individuals, conducting 79 OPIS transactions on their behalf 

in 1998 and 1999. 

In the case of FLIP, an email written in March 1998, by the Tax 

Services Practice’s second in command, identifies a host of significant technical flaws in FLIP, doing so in the course of discussing 

which of two tax offices in KPMG deserved credit for developing its 

replacement, OPIS.75 The email states that efforts to find a FLIP 

alternative ‘‘took on an air of urgency when [DPP head] Larry 

DeLap determined that KPMG should discontinue marketing the 

existing product.’’ The email indicates that, for about 6 weeks, a 

senior KPMG tax professional and a former KPMG tax professional 

employed at Presidio worked ‘‘to tweak or redesign’’ FLIP and ‘‘determined that whatever the new product, it needed a greater economic risk attached to it’’ to meet the requirements of Federal tax 

law. 

Among other criticisms of FLIP, the email states: ‘‘Simon was the 

one who pointed out the weakness in having the U.S. investor purchase a warrant for a ridiculously high amount of money. . . . It 

was clear, we needed the option to be treated as an option for Section 302 purposes, and yet in truth the option [used in FLIP] was 

really illusory and stood out more like a sore thumb since no one 

in his right mind would pay such an exorbitant price for such a 

26

76 IRS Notice 2001–45 (2001–33 IRB 129) (8/13/01). 77See ‘‘Settlement Initiative for Section 302/318 Basis-Shifting Transactions,’’ IRS Announcement 2002–97 (2002–43 IRB 757) (10/28/02). 78 Email dated 3/13/00, from Phillip Galbreath to Richard Bailine, ‘‘FW: S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0046889. 79 Email dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to Tax Professional Practice Partners, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052581–82. One of the KPMG tax 

partners to whom this email was forwarded wrote in response: ‘‘Please do not forward this to 

anyone.’’ Email dated 4/25/00, from Steven Messing to Lawrence Silver, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052581.

warrant.’’ The email states: ‘‘In kicking the tires on FLIP (perhaps 

too hard for the likes of certain people) Simon discovered that there 

was a delayed settlement of the loan which then raised the issue 

of whether the shares could even be deemed to be issued to the 

Cayman company. Naturally, without the shares being issued, they 

could not later be redeemed.’’ The email also observes: ‘‘[I]t was 

Greg who stated in writing to I believe Bob Simon that ‘the OPIS 

product was developed in response to your and DPP tax’s concerns 

over the FLIP strategy. We listened to your input regarding technical concerns with respect to the FLIP product and attempt[ed] to 

work solutions into the new product. . . .’ ’’

This email was written in March 1998, after the bulk of FLIP 

sales, but it shows that the firm had been aware for some time of 

the product’s technical problems. After the email was written, 

KPMG sold FLIP to ten more customers in 1998 and 1999, earning 

more than $3 million in fees for doing so. In August 2001, the IRS 

issued a notice finding both FLIP and OPIS to be potentially abusive tax shelters.76 The IRS has since audited and penalized numerous taxpayers for using these illegal tax shelters.77

SC2 Development and Approval Process. The Subcommittee 

investigation also obtained documentation establishing KPMG’s 

awareness of flaws in the technical merits of SC2. 

Documents preceding the April 2000 decision by KPMG to approve SC2 for sale reflect vigorous analysis and discussion of the 

product’s risks if challenged by the IRS. The documents also reflect, as in the BLIPS case, pressure to move the product to market 

quickly. For example, 1 month before SC2’s final approval, an 

email from a KPMG professional in the Tax Innovation Center 

stated: ‘‘As I was telling you, this Tax Solution is getting some very 

high level (Stein/Rosenthal) attention. Please review the whitepaper as soon as possible. . . .’’ 78

On April 11, 2000, in the same email announcing SC2’s approval 

for sale, the head of the DPP wrote:

This is a relatively high risk strategy. You will note that the 

heading to the preapproved engagement letter states that limitation of liability and indemnification provisions are not to be 

waived. . . . You will also note that the engagement letter includes the following statement: You acknowledge receipt of a 

memorandum discussing certain risks associated with the 

strategy. . . . It is essential that such risk discussion memorandum (attached) be provided to each client contemplating entering into an SC2 engagement.79

The referenced memorandum, required to be given to all SC2 clients, identifies a number of risks associated with the tax product, 

27

80 Undated KPMG document entitled, ‘‘S Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy[:] 

Summary of Certain Risks,’’ marked ‘‘PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0049987–

88.81See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015744. 82See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015745; KPMG document dated 3/13/00, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy—Variation #1,’’ Bates KPMG 0047895 (beneficial ownership is ‘‘probably our weakest link 

in the chain on SC2.’’); memorandum dated 3/2/00, from William Kelliher to multiple KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘Comments on S-CAEPS ‘White Paper’,’’ Bates KPMG 0016853–61. 83See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015746, and email from Mark Watson, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0013790–93 (raising 

assignment of income concerns); emails dated 3/21/00 and 3/22/00, from Larry DeLap and Lawrence Manth, Bates KPMG 0015739–40 (raising tax indifferent party concerns); various emails 

between 7/28/00 and 10/25/00, among KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG 0015011–14 (raising tax indifferent party concerns); and memorandum dated 2/14/00, from William Kelliher to 

Richard Rosenthal, ‘‘S-Corp Charitable and Estate Planning Strategy (‘S-CAEPS’),’’ Bates KPMG 

0047693–95 (raising valuation concerns). 

most related to ways in which the IRS might successfully challenge 

the product’s legal validity. The memorandum states in part:

The [IRS] or a state taxing authority could assert that some or 

all of the income allocated to the tax-exempt organization 

should be reallocated to the other shareholders of the corporation. . . . The IRS or a state taxing authority could assert that 

some or all of the charitable contribution deduction should be 

disallowed, on the basis that the tax-exempt organization did 

not acquire equitable ownership of the stock or that the valuation of the contributed stock was overstated. . . . The IRS or 

a state taxing authority could assert that the strategy creates 

a second class of stock. Under the [tax code], subchapter S Corporations are not permitted to have a second class of stock. 

. . . The IRS or a court might discount an opinion provided by 

the promoter of a strategy. Accordingly, it may be advisable to 

consider requesting a concurring opinion from an independent 

tax advisor.80

Internally, KPMG tax professionals had identified even more 

technical problems with SC2 than were discussed in the memorandum given to clients. For example, KPMG tax professionals discussed problems with identifying a business purpose to explain the 

structure of the transaction—why a donor who wanted to make a 

cash donation to a charity would first donate stock to the charity 

and then buy it back, instead of simply providing a straightforward 

cash contribution.81 They also identified problems with establishing 

the charity’s ‘‘beneficial ownership’’ of the donated stock, since the 

stock was provided on the clear understanding that the charity 

would sell the stock back to the donor within a specified period of 

time.82 KPMG tax professionals identified other technical problems 

as well involving assignment of income, reliance on tax indifferent 

parties, and valuation issues.83

More than a year later, in December 2001, another KPMG tax 

professional expressed concern about the widespread marketing of 

SC2 because, if the IRS ‘‘gets wind of it,’’ the agency would likely 

mount a vigorous and ‘‘at least partially successful’’ challenge to 

the product:

Going way back to Feb. 2000, when SC2 first reared its head, 

my recollection is that SC2 was intended to be limited to a relatively small number of large S corps. That plan made sense 

28

84 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates, KPMG 

0012723. 85See Manth testimony at the Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03), at 34–35. 86 Id., at 35. 87 Email dated 3/13/00, between Mr. Manth, Richard Baline, and other KPMG tax personnel, 

‘‘RE: S-CAEPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0015738–0015747, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as 

Hearing Exhibit 49, at 574–83.

because, in my opinion, there was (and is) a strong risk of a 

successful IRS attack on SC2 if the IRS gets wind of it. . . . 

Call me paranoid, but I think that such a widespread marketing campaign is likely to bring KPMG and SC2 unwelcome 

attention from the IRS. If so, I suspect a vigorous (and at least 

partially successful) challenge would result.84

At the Subcommittee hearings in November 2003, Lawrence E. 

Manth, KPMG’s designated National Product Champion for SC2 

and the tax professional primarily responsible for its creation and 

development, read a statement defending the tax product and 

claiming that SC2 was ‘‘consistent with the law.’’ 85 Certain statements made by Mr. Manth under oath, however, regarding two 

critical elements of SC2 are directly contradicted by KPMG documents, information from SC2 participants, and the actual implementation history of some SC2 transactions. 

The first element involves distributions of income by an S Corporation during the period in which most of its stock is being held 

by a tax exempt organization. This issue is important, because it 

provides evidence relevant to determining the true nature of the 

SC2 transaction. If distributions of income were limited or suspended while a tax exempt entity held most of the S Corporation 

stock (and was therefore entitled to most of the distributions), 

questions necessarily arise as to whether the stock ‘‘donation’’ was 

a genuine transfer of ownership to the tax exempt entity or a mere 

ploy to defer taxation on retained corporate income until the original owner of the stock redeems the shares a few years later. 

As part of his testimony before the Subcommittee, Mr. Manth 

made the following statement regarding the limitation or suspension of distributions by S Corporations implementing an SC2 transaction:

Some articles reported that S Corporations that implemented 

SC2 passed resolutions to limit or suspend dividends or other 

distributions to shareholders, basically to keep the charity 

from getting any share of earnings. So far as I know, a resolution limiting or suspending distributions was not an element of 

SC2. In fact, KPMG recommended that S Corporations make 

distributions during the period tax-exempts held their stock.86

Yet, in March 2000, when a KPMG colleague characterized the SC2 

transaction as ‘‘nothing more that a[n] old give stock to charity and 

then redeem it play,’’ Mr. Manth responded:

Yes, very similar, but during the time the tax exempt owns the 

stock it will be allocated 90% of the income, be paid no distributions, and be redeemed for a small value.87

In an e-mail written on April 11, 2000, Larry DeLap, head of 

KPMG’s Department of Professional Practice for Tax, provided the 

following description of the SC2 transaction:

29

88 Email dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to KPMG’s Tax Professional Practice partners, ‘‘SCorporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0015631, reprinted in the 

Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 50 at 584. 89Series of emails dated 3/05/2001, between Mr. Manth, Mr. Leak, and others, ‘‘RE: SC2 Solution—New Development,’’ Bates KPMG 0048251–54, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as 

Hearing Exhibit 96 x. 90 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda June 19th, 2000,’’ Bates KPMG 0013375–96, at KPMG 0013383, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 21. 

The strategy involves the transfer of a substantial portion of 

S Corporation stock to a section 401(a) governmental pension 

plan, with the intention that such stock be redeemed from the 

pension plan after about 2 years. The intent is that most of the 

earnings of the S Corporation would be allocated to the pension 

plan during the period it owns the S Corporation stock, but relatively little of the earnings would be distributed during that 

period.88

On February 22, 2001, James Councill Leak, a tax professional 

at KPMG who worked on the sale of the SC2 tax product, sent an 

email to a large number of KPMG employees and included this description of the SC2 product.

SC2 is designed to allow an S Corp shareholder to obtain a 

charitable deduction for a gift of non-voting stock to a qualified 

tax exempt entity. After the gift, the tax exempt will be allocated a significant portion of the S Corp taxable income. The 

S Corp will curtail cash distributions that would otherwise 

have been made to fund quarterly tax obligations. The cash 

will build up inside the S Corp and can be used for any corporate purpose. After 2 or 3 years, the tax exempt has the 

right to ‘‘put’’ the stock back to the S Corp for redemption. 

After redeeming the shares, the S Corp can resume making 

cash distributions. The end result is a deferral of income tax 

and the ultimate conversion from ordinary to capital gain tax 

rates on S Corp income.

Mr. Manth sent the following response to Mr. Leak’s memo:

Great e-mail, Councill!! Andrew [Atkin], you may consider 

sending this to other regions.89

In the spring of 2000, KPMG produced a packet of information 

describing the SC2 product, its implementation, and how to address questions raised by potential customers. Mr. Leak advised 

the Subcommittee that this was the packet of information used to 

train KPMG tax professionals who were going to sell the SC2 product, and that Mr. Manth and other KPMG employees conducted the 

training session. Mr. Manth informed the Subcommittee that he 

had a role in the development of the information packet. The packet includes a Powerpoint presentation on how the SC2 transaction 

works, and one of the pages in this presentation states: ‘‘For valid 

business purposes, the S-corporation will decrease its cash distributions during the tax-exempt shareholder’s stock ownership.’’ 90

Also included in the packet is a section entitled: ‘‘SC2 IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS,’’ which states the following:

c. Corporate issues—we need to review copies of Articles of Incorporation, By Laws and any shareholder agreements. Make 

sure that there are no provisions in any corporate documents:

30

91 Id., at KPMG 0013385. 92 ‘‘SC2 Outline’’ and ‘‘SC2 White Paper,’’ Bates 0013397–447, at KPMG 0013430 and 38, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 96 b. The addendum also states: 

‘‘WNT [Washington National Tax, the KPMG group that reviewed the technical aspects 

of SC2] thinks payment of dividends would reduce the taxpayers’ level of risk by making 

it more difficult for the IRS to successfully argue that the taxpayer has retained beneficial 

ownership of the stock contributed to the exempt pension fund. WNT thinks it would also 

bolster the taxpayers’ ‘economic substance’ argument. Although the payment of dividends 

to the exempt pension fund would be an additional cost to the taxpayer, that cost would 

provide a corresponding benefit in the event of an examination challenge.’’

Id., at KPMG 0013444. This advice was not, however, followed in most of the SC2 transactions reviewed by the Subcommittee. 93See sample documents, Bates KPMG 0015569–89, at KPMG 0015572–74, reprinted in the 

Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 96 l. 94For more information, see Section IX(A) of this Report. 

i. requiring the Corporation to make dividends (e.g. to pay 

taxes);

ii. allowing the corporation or other shareholders to redeem 

stock; or

iii. giving shareholders indemnification for any actions;

If any of these provisions exist, we will probably need to delete or alter them before the contribution.91

An addendum to the KPMG ‘‘White Paper’’ description and analysis 

of the SC2 product contains similar passages:

(1) Distribution requirements. Are there any provisions in the 

by-laws, articles of incorporation, shareholders’ agreements or 

elsewhere that mandates that the company make a distribution to pay the shareholders’ taxes? If so, these provisions 

should be deleted prior to implementation. . . .

(3) The issuance of notes may also be beneficial where the 

shareholders are dependent on distributions for their primary 

source of income. During the transaction period, distributions 

normally are not made. Therefore, if the shareholders will need 

cash from the corporation during the transaction period, a note 

should be distributed prior to the transaction.92

KPMG prepared packets containing boilerplate legal documents 

that could be provided to S Corporations planning to implement the 

SC2 transaction. One such packet included sample Board and 

Shareholder resolutions supporting the amendment of the shareholders agreement to provide that the S Corporation was not obligated to make distributions to shareholders for the payment of income tax due with respect to their S Corporation shares.93

Finally, as explained later in this Report, most of the SC2 transactions reviewed by the Subcommittee did not, in fact, include any 

distributions of income to the tax exempt entity holding the S Corporation stock.94 For example, the Los Angeles Department of Fire 

and Police Pensions, which engaged in 28 SC2 transactions, told 

the Subcommittee that only nine, or less than one-third of the S 

Corporations in which it held stock, actually paid any distributions 

of income while it held the stock. Two-thirds of the S Corporations 

made no distributions to the pension fund at all. 

In short, KPMG documents and communications, some of which 

were authored by or included Mr. Manth, as well as the actual SC2 

transactions examined by the Subcommittee, contradict Mr. 

Manth’s testimony that a resolution limiting or suspending disVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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95Manth testimony at the Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03), at 34–35.

tributions was not an element of SC2. Given his active involvement 

in the development, sale, and implementation of the SC2 product, 

Mr. Manth should have known that his testimony on this matter 

was not accurate. 

A second issue of concern involves Mr. Manth’s testimony at the 

Subcommittee hearings in November 2003, regarding the role of 

warrants in the SC2 transactions. In every SC2 transaction examined by the Subcommittee, the transfer of S Corporation shares to 

a tax exempt entity was preceded by the creation and distribution 

to the existing S Corporation shareholders of thousands of warrants, enabling these shareholders to purchase additional S Corporation shares. If exercised, these warrants would give the holders 

additional shares representing 85% to 90% of the S Corporation’s 

entire stock, and significantly dilute the percentage and value of 

the shares held by the tax exempt, as well as the percentage of distributions to which the tax exempt entity would have been entitled. 

If these warrants were used as a means to ensure that the tax exempt entity would re-sell the S Corporation shares to the original 

owner, as planned in the SC2 transaction, this tactic would provide 

evidence that the original owner had no real intent to donate the 

S Corporation shares to the tax exempt entity, but only to temporarily shift the shares to a tax exempt entity, thereby deferring and 

mitigating the tax liability of the original, and subsequent, owner 

of the shares. 

Regarding the intended use of warrants in the SC2 transactions, 

Mr. Manth testified at the Subcommittee hearings as follows:

I have also read descriptions that say that should the charity 

decide not to sell its stock, other S Corporation shareholders 

can exercise warrants for additional shares of stock, thereby 

making the charity’s share much less valuable. Actually, just 

the opposite would happen. An S Corporation shareholder who 

wanted to exercise the warrants would have to come up with 

a substantial amount of money to pay for the new stock. That 

money would be paid into the S Corporation and raise its market value. This would reduce the charity’s percentage ownership share, but the charity would end up owning a smaller percentage of a much more valuable company. In other words, 

owning 10 percent of $1 million is a lot better than owning 90 

percent of $100,000.95

Again, internal KPMG documents and communications contradict this statement. For example, the SC2 information packet 

produced by KPMG in the spring of 2000, which was used to train 

KPMG tax professionals planning to sell the SC2 product, contained a section entitled: ‘‘SC2—Appropriate Answers for Frequently 

Asked Shareholder Questions.’’ Question 1 reads as follows:

Q1: What happens if the tax-exempt (‘‘TE’’) does not want to 

redeem the stock to the S-corp?

A1: First, the longer the TE owns the stock, the more benefit 

the company will receive (assuming the company continues to 

make money). Secondly, the TE would have no reason not to 

sell the stock back, since the company is really its only source 

32

96‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda June 19th, 2000,’’ Bates KPMG 0013375–96, at KPMG 0013389, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 21. 97 ‘‘SC2 Outline’’ and SC2 White Paper, Bates KPMG 0013446–47, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 96 b.

of liquidity (nobody will want the stock). Third, the only reason 

for the TE to accept the stock is to get cash. Also, the TE 

knows the deal prior to accepting the stock. It signs a redemption agreement that discloses the warrants as well as the fact 

that no distributions are required to be made.

However, if we assume the TE gets a new board, and the board 

wants to hold the company ‘‘hostage,’’ the shareholders can exercise their warrants that can dilute the TE to less than 

10%.96

A similar message is contained in an addendum to the KPMG 

White Paper on SC2. One part of this addendum addresses a number of implementation issues. A section entitled ‘‘Frequently Asked 

Questions’’ contains the following:

(ii) What if the tax-exempt won’t redeem?

(1) The tax-exempt has no reason to hold onto the stock after 

the redemption period. First, it has no vote to authorize a distribution. Secondly, the market for it to sell the stock is severely limited because most holders of this stock would incur 

more tax liability than the stock is worth. In addition, the 

stock has limited appreciation potential. Therefore, the tax-exempt has nothing to gain by holding the stock beyond the redemption period.

(2) Still, if tax-exempt won’t redeem, exercising the warrants 

will immediately dilute the tax-exempt’s interest.’’ 97

These documents show that the warrants were characterized internally at KPMG and to potential clients as a tool which could be 

used, if necessary, to dilute a tax exempt entity’s interest in, and 

corresponding claim on, distributions from the S Corporation. The 

documents also show that KPMG viewed the possibility of the warrants being exercised to dilute the tax exempt’s holdings as a way, 

not only to ensure that the tax exempt entity would resell its 

shares to the S Corporation shareholders, but also prevent the tax 

exempt from threatening to retain the stock in order to extract 

large payments or a greater buyout price from the S-corporation 

shareholders. These documents present a very different picture 

from the one provided by Mr. Manth at the Subcommittee hearings. Given his active involvement in the development, sale, and 

implementation of the SC2 product, Mr. Manth should have known 

that his testimony on this matter was not accurate. 

Together, the BLIPS, OPIS, FLIP, and SC2 evidence demonstrates that the KPMG development process led to the approval 

of tax products that senior KPMG tax professionals knew had significant technical flaws and were potentially illegal tax shelters. 

Even when senior KPMG professionals expressed forceful objections to proposed products, highly questionable tax products were 

approved for sale and made their way to market. 

33

98KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 2.21.1, at 2–14. 99 Id.

(2) Mass Marketing Tax Products 

Finding: KPMG used aggressive marketing tactics to sell 

its generic tax products by turning tax professionals 

into tax product salespersons, pressuring its tax professionals to meet revenue targets, using telemarketing to 

find clients, developing an internal tax sales force, using 

confidential client tax data to find clients, targeting its 

own audit clients for sales pitches, and using tax opinion letters and insurance policies as marketing tools.

One of the more striking aspects of the Subcommittee investigation was its discovery of the substantial efforts KPMG had expended to market its tax products, including extensive efforts to 

target clients and, at times, use high-pressure sales tactics. Evidence shows that KPMG compiled and scoured prospective client 

lists, pushed its personnel to meet sales targets, closely monitored 

their sales efforts, advised its professionals to use questionable 

sales techniques, and even used cold calls to drum up business. The 

evidence also shows that, at times, KPMG marketed tax shelters 

to persons who appeared to have little interest in them or did not 

understand what they were being sold, and likely would not have 

used them to reduce their taxes without being approached by 

KPMG. 

Extensive Marketing Infrastructure. As indicated in the 

prior section, KPMG’s marketing efforts for new tax products normally began long before a product was approved for sale. Potential 

‘‘revenue analysis’’ was part of the earliest screening efforts for new 

products. In addition, when a new tax product was launched within 

the firm, the ‘‘Tax Solution Alert’’ was supposed to include key 

marketing information such as potential client profiles, ‘‘optimal 

target characteristics’’ of buyers, and the expected ‘‘typical buyer’’ 

of the product. 

KPMG typically designated one or more persons to lead the marketing effort for a new tax product. These persons were referred to 

as the product’s ‘‘National Deployment Champions,’’ ‘‘National 

Product Champions,’’ or ‘‘Deployment Leaders.’’ With regard to the 

tax products investigated by the Subcommittee, the National Deployment Champion was the same person who served as the product’s National Development Champion and shepherded the product 

through the KPMG approval process. For example, the tax professional who led the marketing effort for BLIPS was, again, Jeffrey 

Eischeid, assisted by Randall Bickham, while for SC2 it was, again, 

Larry Manth, assisted and succeeded by Andrew Atkin. 

National Deployment Champions were given significant institutional support to market their assigned tax product. For example, 

KPMG maintained a national marketing office that included marketing professionals and resources ‘‘dedicated to tax.’’ 98 Champions 

could draw on this resource for ‘‘market planning and execution assistance,’’ and to assemble a marketing team with a ‘‘National Marketing Director’’ and designated ‘‘area champions’’ to lead marketing efforts in various regions of the United States.99 These indiVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
34

100See, e.g., SC2 script dated 6/19 (no year provided, but likely 2000) developed for telemarketer calls to identify individuals interested in obtaining more information, Bates KPMG 

0050370–71. A telemarketing script was also developed for BLIPS, but it is possible that no 

BLIPS telemarketing calls were made. BLIPS script dated 7/8/99, Bates KPMG 002560. 101 Email dated 8/6/00 from Jeffrey Stein to 15 National Deployment Champions, Bates KPMG 

050016. The Opportunity Management System (OMS) is a software system that KPMG tax professionals have used to monitor with precision who has been contacted about a particular tax 

viduals became members of the product’s official ‘‘deployment 

team.’’

Champions could also draw on a Tax Services group skilled in 

marketing research to identify prospective clients and develop target client lists. This group was known as the Tax Services Marketing and Research Support group. Champions could also make 

use of a KPMG ‘‘cold call center’’ in Indiana. This center was 

staffed with telemarketers trained to make cold calls to prospective 

clients and set up a phone call or meeting with specified KPMG tax 

or accounting professionals to discuss services or products offered 

by the firm. These telemarketers could and, at times did, make cold 

calls to sell specific tax shelters such as SC2.100

An email sent in 2000, by the Tax Services operations and Federal Tax Practice heads to 15 KPMG tax professionals paints a 

broad picture of what KPMG’s National Deployment Champions 

were expected to accomplish:

As National Deployment Champions we are counting on you to 

drive significant market activity. We are committed to providing you with the tools that you need to support you in your 

efforts. A few reminders in this regard.

The Tax Services Marketing and Research Support is prepared 

to help you refine your existing and/or create additional [client] 

target lists. . . . Working closely with your National Marketing Directors you should develop the relevant prospect profile. Based on the criteria you specify the marketing and research teams can scour primary and secondary sources to compile a target list. This will help you go to market more effectively and efficiently.

Many of you have also tapped into the Practice Development 

Coordinator resource. Our team of telemarketers is particularly helpful . . . to further qualify prospects [redaction by 

KPMG] [and] to set up phone appointments for you and your 

deployment team. . . .

Finally tracking reports generated from OMS are critical to 

measuring your results. If you don’t analyze the outcome of 

your efforts you will not be in a position to judge what is working and what is not. Toward that end you must enter data in 

OMS. We will generate reports once a month from OMS and 

share them with you, your team, Service Line leaders and the 

[Area Managing Partners]. These will be the focal point of our 

discussion with you when we revisit your solution on the Monday night call. You should also be using them on your bi-weekly team calls. . . .

Thanks again for assuming the responsibilities of a National 

Deployment Champion. We are counting on you to make the 

difference in achieving our financial goals.101

35

product, who made the contact on behalf of KPMG, the potential sales revenue associated with 

the sales contact, and the current status of each sales effort. 102 Email dated 3/14/02, from Rick Rosenthal and other KPMG professionals, to ‘‘US Management Group,’’ Bates XX 001730–32 (emphasis in original). 103 Email dated 2/18/00, from Richard Rosenthal to multiple KPMG tax professionals, Bates 

KPMG 0049236. The Federal Tax head also called specific KPMG offices to urge them to increase their SC2 sales. This type of instruction from a senior KPMG tax official apparently sent 

a strong message to subordinates about the need to sell the identified tax product. See email 

dated 4/21/00, from Michael Terracina, KPMG office in Houston, to Gary Choate, KPMG office 

in Dallas, Bates KPMG 0048191.

In 2002, KPMG opened a ‘‘Sales Opportunity Center’’ to make it 

easier for its personnel to make use of the firm’s extensive marketing resources. An email announcing this Center stated the following:

The current environment is changing at breakneck speed, and 

we must be prepared to respond aggressively to every opportunity.

We have created a Sales Opportunity Center to be the ‘‘eye of 

the needle’’—a single place where you can get access to the resources you need to move quickly, knowledgeably, and effectively. This initiative reflects the efforts of Assurance (Sales, 

Marketing, and the Assurance & Advisory Services Center) 

and Tax (Marketing and the Tax Innovation Center), and is intended to serve as our ‘‘situation room’’ during these fast-moving times. . . .

The Sales Opportunity Center is a powerful demonstration of 

the Firm’s commitment to giving you what you need to meet 

the challenges of these momentous times. We urge you to take 

advantage of this resource as you pursue marketplace opportunities.102

Corporate Culture: Sell Sell Sell. After a new tax product was 

‘‘launched’’ within KPMG, one of the primary tasks of a National 

Deployment Champion was to educate KPMG tax professionals 

about the new product and motivate them to sell it. 

Documentation obtained by the Subcommittee shows that National Deployment Champions and senior KPMG tax officials expended significant effort to convince KPMG personnel to devote 

time and resources to selling new products. Senior tax professionals 

used general exhortations as well as specific instructions directed 

to specific field offices to increase their sales efforts. For example, 

after SC2 was launched, the head of KPMG’s Federal Practice sent 

the following email to the SC2 ‘‘area champions’’ around the country:

I want to personally thank everyone for their efforts during the 

approval process of this strategy. It was completed very quickly 

and everyone demonstrated true teamwork. Thank you! Now 

let[’]s SELL, SELL, SELL!! 103

National Deployment Champions did not end their efforts with 

phone calls and visits urging KPMG tax professionals to sell their 

tax product, they also produced detailed marketing plans, implemented them with the assistance of the ‘‘deployment team,’’ and 

36

104See e.g., email dated 1/30/01, from David Jones to Larry Manth, Richard Rosenthal, and 

Wendy Klein, ‘‘SC2—Follow-up to 1/29 Revisit,’’ Bates KPMG 0050389. 105See e.g., email dated 12/2/00, from Lawrence Manth to multiple tax professionals, Bates 

XX 000021. 106 Email dated 2/22/01, from Councill Leak to multiple tax professionals, Bates KPMG 

0050822–23. 107 Email dated 2/3/00, from Philip Wiesner to US-WNT Tax Partners, Bates KPMG 0050888–

90.108Presentation entitled, ‘‘KMatch Push Feature Campaign,’’ undated, prepared by Marsha 

Peters of the Tax Innovation Center, Bates XX 001511. 

pressured their colleagues to increase SC2 sales.104 Senior KPMG 

tax officials also set overall revenue goals for various tax groups 

and urged them to increase their sales of designated tax products 

to meet those goals.105 For example, a member of the SC2 deployment team, who also worked for Stratecon, sent an email to a 

group of 60 tax professionals urging them to try a new, more appealing version of SC2. In a paragraph subtitled, ‘‘Why Should You 

Care?’’ he wrote: 

In the last 12 months the original SC2 structure has produced 

$1.25 million in signed engagements for the SE [Southeast]. 

. . . Look at the last partner scorecard. Unlike golf, a low 

number is not a good thing. . . A lot of us need to put more 

revenue on the board before June 30. SC2 can do it for you. 

Think about targets in your area and call me.106

Stratecon was not alone in the push for sales. For example, in 

2000, the former head of KPMG’s Washington National Tax Practice sent an email to all ‘‘US-WNT Tax Partners’’ urging them to 

‘‘temporarily defer non-revenue producing activities’’ and concentrate for the ‘‘next 5 months’’ on meeting WNT’s revenue goals 

for the year.107 The email states in part: 

Listed below are the tax products identified by the functional 

teams as having significant revenue potential over the next 

few months. . . . [T]he functional teams will need . . . WNT 

champions to work with the National Product champions to 

maximize the revenue generated from the respective products. 

. . . Thanks for help in this critically important matter. As 

Jeff said, ‘‘We are dealing with ruthless execution—hand to 

hand combat—blocking and tackling.’’ Whatever the mixed 

metaphor, let’s just do it.

The evidence is clear that selling tax products was an important 

part of every tax professional’s job at KPMG. 

Targeting Clients. KPMG’s marketing efforts included substantial efforts to identify prospective purchasers for its tax products. 

KPMG developed prospective client lists by reviewing both its own 

client base and seeking new clients through referrals and cold calls. 

To review its own client base, KPMG has used software systems, 

including ones known as KMatch and RIA GoSystem, to identify 

former or existing clients who might be interested in a particular 

tax product. KMatch is ‘‘[a]n interactive software program that 

asks a user a series of questions about a client’s business and tax 

situation,’’ uses the information to construct a ‘‘client profile,’’ and 

then uses the profile to identify KPMG tax products that could assist the client to avoid taxation.108 KPMG’s Tax Innovation Center 

conducted a specific campaign requiring KPMG tax professionals to 

37

109See, e.g., email dated 3/6/01, from US-GoSystem Administration to Andrew Atkin of 

KPMG, ‘‘RE; Florida S Corporation search,’’ Bates KPMG 0050826; Subcommittee interview of 

Councill Leak (10/22/03). 110 Id. 111Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the presentation, Bates XX 001567–94. 112Presentation dated 10/30/00, ‘‘Intellectual Property Services (IPS),’’ by Dut LeBlanc of 

Shreveport and Joe Zier of Silicon Valley, Bates XX 001580–94. 113Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–94. 114Presentation dated 10/30/00, ‘‘Intellectual Property Services (IPS),’’ by Dut LeBlanc of 

Shreveport and Joe Zier of Silicon Valley, Bates XX 001580–94. 115Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–94.

enter client data into the KMatch database so that, when subsequent tax products were launched, the resulting client profiles 

could be searched electronically to identify which clients would be 

eligible for and interested in the new product. RIA GoSystem is a 

separate internal KPMG database which contains confidential client data provided to KPMG to assist the firm in preparing client 

tax returns.109 This database of confidential client tax information 

can also be searched electronically to identify prospective clients for 

new tax products and was actually used for that purpose in the 

case of SC2.110

The evidence indicates that KPMG also used its assurance professionals—persons who provide auditing and related services to individuals and corporations—to identify existing KPMG audit clients who might be interested in new tax products. Among other 

documents evidencing the role of KPMG assurance professionals 

are those requiring the combined participation of both KPMG tax 

and assurance professionals to market specified tax products. 

In 2000, for example, KPMG issued what it called its ‘‘first joint 

solution’’ requiring KPMG tax and assurance professionals to work 

together to sell and implement the product.111 The tax product is 

described as a ‘‘[c]ollection of assurance and tax services designed 

to assist companies in . . . realizing value from their intellectual 

property . . . [d]elivered by joint team of KPMG assurance and tax 

professionals.’’ 112 Internal KPMG documentation states that the 

purpose of the new product was ‘‘[t]o increase KPMG’s market penetration of key clients and targets by enhancing the linkage between Assurance and Tax professionals.’’ 113 Another KPMG document states: ‘‘Teaming with Assurance expands tax team’s knowledge of client and industry[.] Demonstrates unified team approach 

that separates KPMG from competitors.’’ 114 Another KPMG document shows that KPMG used both its internal tax and assurance 

client lists to target clients for a sales pitch on the new product: 

The second tab of this file contains the draft target list [of companies]. This list was compiled from two sources an assurance 

and tax list. . . . [W]e selected the companies which are assurance or tax clients, which resulted in the 45 companies on the 

next sheet. . . . What should you do? Review the suspects with 

your assurance or tax deployment counterpart. . . . Prioritize 

your area targets, and plan how to approach them.115

38

116See WNT presentation dated 9/19/02, entitled ‘‘Innovative Tax Solutions,’’ which, at 18–26, 

includes a presentation by Tom Hopkins of Silicon Valley, ‘‘New Enterprises Tax Suite,’’ Tax 

Solution Alert 00–31, Bates XX 001503–05. The Hopkins presentation states that the new product is intended to be used to ‘‘[l]everage existing client base (pull-through),’’ ‘‘[d]evelop and use 

client selection filters to refine our bets and reach higher market success,’’ and ‘‘[e]nhance relationships with client decisionmakers.’’ As part of a ‘‘Deployment Action Plan,’’ the presentation 

states that KPMG ‘‘[p]artners with revenue goals are given subscriptions to Venture Wire for 

daily lead generation’’ and that ‘‘[t]argeting is supplemented by daily lead generation from Fort 

Wayne’’ where KPMG’s telemarketing center is located. 117Presentation dated 3/6/00, ‘‘Post-Transaction Integration Service (PTIS)—Tax,’’ by Stan 

Wiseberg and Michele Zinn of Washington, D.C., Bates XX 001597–1611 (‘‘Global collaborative 

service brought to market by tax and assurance. . . . May be appropriate to initially unbundle 

the serves (‘tax only,’ or ‘assurance only’) to capture an engagement’’). 118 Email dated 8/14/01, from Jeff Stein and Walter Duer to ‘‘KPMG LLP Partners, Managers 

and Staff,’’ ‘‘Stratecon Middle Market Initiative,’’ Bates KPMG 0050369. 119 Email dated 2/9/01, from Ty Jordan to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2 revisit of 

stale leads,’’ Bates KPMG 0050814.

Additional tax products which relied in part on KPMG audit 

partners followed. In 2002, for example, KPMG launched a ‘‘New 

Enterprises Tax Suite’’ product 116 which it described internally as 

‘‘a cross-functional element of the Tax Practice that efficiently 

mines opportunities in the start-up and middle-market, highgrowth, high-tech space.’’ A presentation on this new product states 

that KPMG tax professionals are ‘‘[t]eaming with Assurance . . . 

[and] fostering cross-selling among assurance and tax professionals.’’ 117

Other tax products explicitly called on KPMG tax professionals 

to ask their audit counterparts for help in identifying potential clients. For example, a ‘‘Middle Market Initiative’’ launched in 2001, 

identified seven tax products to be marketed to mid-sized corporations, including SC2. It explicitly called upon KPMG tax professionals to contact KPMG audit partners to identify appropriate 

mid-sized corporations, and directed these tax professionals to pitch 

one or more of the seven KPMG tax products to KPMG audit clients. ‘‘In order to maximize marketplace opportunities . . . national and area champions will coordinate with and involve assurance partners and managers in their respective areas.’’ 118

In addition to electronic searches, National Deployment Champions regularly exhorted KPMG field personnel to review KPMG 

client lists personally to identify clients that might be interested in 

a new product. In the case of SC2, deployment team members 

asked KPMG tax professionals to review their client lists, not once, 

but twice:

Attached above is a listing of all potential SC2 engagements 

that did not fly over the past year. In an effort to ensure we 

have not overlooked any potential engagement during the revenue push for the last half of [fiscal year] 2001, please review 

the list which is sorted by estimated potential fees. I’d like to 

revisit each of these potential engagements, and gather comments from each of you regarding the following. . . . Would 

further communication/dialogue with any listed potential engagement be welcome? What were the reasons for the potential 

client’s declining the strategy? 119

In addition to reviewing its own client base, KPMG worked with 

outside parties, such as banks, law firms, and other accounting 

firms, to identify outside client prospects. One example is an arrangement KPMG entered into with First Union National Bank, 

39

120Subcommittee interview of Wachovia Bank representatives (3/25/03). 121See, e.g., Memorandum dated 9/3/99, from Karen Chovan, Financial Advisory Services to 

CMG Risk Review Oversight Committee, ‘‘Meeting Minutes of September 1 . . .,’’ Bates SEN–

008629–31 (‘‘Senior PFC Advisor and CMG Risk Review Subcommittee (‘subcommittee or SC’) 

member Tom Newman presented an overview of an enhanced investment strategy for OC vote 

to be able to present it to selected First Union clients. KPMG brought the BLIPS strategy (referred hereafter as the ‘Alpha’ strategy) to First Union. . . .’’); email dated 11/30/01, from 

Councill Leak to Larry Manth, ‘‘FW: First Union Customer Services,’’ Bates KPMG 0050842–

44 (‘‘I provide my comments on how we are bringing SC2 into certain First Union customers.’’). 

Because KPMG is also Wachovia’s auditor, questions have arisen as to whether their client referral arrangements violate SEC’s auditor independence rules. See Section V(A)(5) of this Report 

for more information on the auditor independence issue. 122See, e.g., email dated 1/30/01, from David Jones to Larry Manth, Richard Rosenthal, and 

Wendy Klein, ‘‘SC2—Follow-up to 1/29 Revisit,’’ Bates KPMG 0050389 (working to form accounting firm alliances). 123Memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, ‘‘Agenda from 

Feb 16th call and goals for next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135. 124See, e.g., email dated 8/14/00, from Postmaster-US to unknown recipients, ‘‘Action Required: Channel Conflict for SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0049125 (S Corporation list purchased from 

Dun & Bradstreet); memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, 

‘‘Agenda from Feb 16th call and goals for next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135 (Texas S Corporation list); email dated 3/7/01, from Councill Leak to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘South Florida SC2 Year End Push,’’ Bates KPMG 0050834 (Florida S Corporation list); email 

dated 3/26/01, from Leonard Ronnie III, to Gary Crew, ‘‘RE: S-Corp Carolinas,’’ Bates KPMG 

0050818 (North and South Carolina S Corporation list); email dated 4/22/01, from Thomas 

Crawford to John Schrier, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ Bates KPMG 0050029 (New York S Corporation 

list). 125 Email dated 3/6/01, from US-GoSystem Administration to Andrew Atkin of KPMG, ‘‘RE: 

Florida S Corporation search,’’ Bates KPMG 0050826. Subcommittee interview of Councill Leak 

(10/22/03). 126 Email dated 11/17/00, from Jonathan Pullano to US-Southwest Tax Services Partners and 

others, ‘‘FW: SW SC2 Channel Conflict,’’ Bates KPMG 0048309. 

now part of Wachovia Bank, in which Wachovia referred clients to 

KPMG in connection with FLIP. In this case, Wachovia told 

wealthy clients about the existence of the tax product and allowed 

KPMG to set up appointments at the bank or elsewhere to make 

client presentations on FLIP.120 KPMG also made arrangements 

for Wachovia client referrals related to BLIPS and SC2, again 

using First Union National Bank, but it is unclear whether the 

bank actually made any referrals for these tax products.121 In the 

case of SC2, KPMG also worked with a variety of other outside parties, such as mid-sized accounting firms and automobile dealers, to 

locate and refer potential clients.122 A large law firm 

headquartered in St. Louis expressed willingness not only to issue 

a confirming tax opinion for the SC2 transaction, but also to introduce KPMG ‘‘to some of their midwestern clients.’’ 123

In addition to reviewing its own client base and seeking client referrals, KPMG used a variety of other means to identify prospective 

clients. In the case of SC2, for example, as part of its marketing 

efforts, KPMG obtained lists of S Corporations in the states of 

Texas, North and South Carolina, New York, and Florida.124 It obtained these lists from either state governments, commercial firms, 

or its own databases. The Florida list, for example, was compiled 

using KPMG’s internal RIA-GOSystem containing confidential client data extracted from certain tax returns prepared by KPMG.125

Some of the lists had large blocks of S Corporations associated with 

automobile or truck dealers, real estate firms, home builders, or architects.126 In some instances, KPMG tax professionals instructed 

KPMG telemarketers to contact the corporations to gauge interest 

40

127See, e.g., email dated 6/27/00, from Wendy Klein to Mark Springer and Larry Manth, ‘‘SC2: 

Practice Development Coordinators Involvement,’’ Bates KPMG 0049116; email dated 11/15/00, 

from Douglas Duncan to Michael Terracina and Gary Choat, ‘‘FW: SW SC2 Progress,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0048315–17. 128See email dated 4/22/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0050029. 129See email dated 4/23/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0050029. 130 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, WNT head, Bates KPMG 

0013311. A responsive email from Mr. Brockway on the same document states, ‘‘It looks like 

they have already tried over 2/3rds of possible candidates already, if I am reading the spread 

sheet correctly.’’ 131Subcommittee briefing by Jeffrey Eischeid and Timothy Speiss (9/12/03). 132Subcommittee interview of Councill Leak (10/22/03). See also KPMG/Peat Marwick memorandum dated 11/24/98, from Jeffrey Stein to KPMG Tax Partners, ‘‘Tax Sales Organization and 

Telemarketing,’’ at 5 (‘‘The Tax practice has also made a significant investment in building our 

marketing capabilities and has expanded our telemarketing resources to support our national 

services and initiatives. . . . The telemarketers already have an impressive track record; they 

have played a critical role in our SALT practice and most recently helped drive the COLI and 

Export Tax Minimization product ‘blitzes.’ ’’) 

in SC2.127 In other cases, KPMG tax professionals contacted the 

corporations personally. 

The lists compiled by KPMG produced literally thousands of potential SC2 clients, and through telemarketing and other calls, 

KPMG personnel made uncounted contacts across the country 

searching for buyers of SC2. In April 2001, the DPP apparently 

sent word to SC2 marketing teams to stop using telemarketing 

calls to find SC2 buyers, 128 but almost as soon as the no-call policy 

was announced, some KPMG tax professionals were attempting to 

circumvent the ban asking, for example, if telemarketers could 

question S Corporations about their eligibility and suitability to 

buy SC2, without scheduling future telephone contacts.129 In December 2001, after being sent a list of over 3,100 S Corporations 

targeted for telephone calls, a senior KPMG tax professional sent 

an email to the head of WNT complaining that the list appeared 

to indicate ‘‘the firm is intent on marketing the SC2 strategy to virtually every S corp with a pulse.’’ 130

When KPMG representatives were first asked about KPMG’s use 

of telemarketers, they initially told the Subcommittee staff that 

telemarketing calls were against firm policy.131 When asked about 

the Indiana cold call center which KPMG has been operating for 

years, the KPMG representatives said that the center’s telemarketers sought to introduce new clients to KPMG in a general 

way and did little more than arrange an appointment so that 

KPMG could explain to a potential client in person all of the services KPMG offers. When confronted with evidence of telemarketing 

calls for SC2, the KPMG representatives acknowledged that a few 

calls on tax products might have been made by telemarketers at 

the cold call center, but implied such calls were few in number and 

rarely led to sales. In a separate interview, when shown documents 

indicating that, in the case of SC2, KPMG telemarketers made 

calls to thousands of S Corporations across the country, the KPMG 

tax professional being interviewed admitted these calls had taken 

place.132

Sales Advice. To encourage sales, KPMG would, at times, provide written advice to its tax professionals on how to answer questions about a tax product, respond to objections, or convince a client to buy a product. 

41

133 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013375–96.

For example, in the case of SC2, KPMG sponsored a meeting for 

KPMG ‘‘SC2 Team Members’’ across the country and emailed documents providing information about the tax product as well as ‘‘Appropriate Answers for Frequently Asked Shareholder Questions’’ 

and ‘‘Suggested Solutions’’ to ‘‘Sticking Points and Problems.’’ 133

The ‘‘Sticking Points’’ document provided the following advice to 

KPMG tax professionals trying to sell SC2 to prospective clients: 

(1) ‘‘Too Good to be true.’’ Some people believe that if it sounds 

too good to be true, it’s a sham. Some suggestions for this response are the following:

a) This transaction has been through KPMG’s WNT practice 

and reviewed by at least 5 specialty groups. . . . Many of the 

specialists are ex-IRS employees.

b) Many sophisticated clients have implemented the strategy 

in conjunction with their outside counsel.

c) At least one outside law firm will give a co-opinion on the 

transactions. . . .

e) Absolutely last resort—At least 3 insurance companies 

have stated that they will insure the tax benefits of the 

transaction for a small premium. This should never be mentioned in an initial meeting and Larry Manth should be consulted for all insurance conversations to ensure consistency 

and independence on the transaction.

(2) ‘‘I Need to Think About it.’’ . . . We obviously do not want 

to seem too desperate but at the same time we need to keep 

this moving along. Some suggestions:

a) ‘‘Get Even’’ Approach. Perhaps a good time to revisit the 

strategy is at or near estimated tax payment time when the 

shareholder is making or has made a large estimated tax 

payment and is extremely irritated for having done so. . . .

b) Beenie Baby Approach. . . . We call the client and say 

that the firm has decided to cap the strategy . . .and the cap 

is quickly filling up. ‘‘Should I put you on the list as a potential?’’ This is obviously a more aggressive approach, but will 

tell you if the client is serious about the deal.

c) ‘‘Break-up’’ Approach. This is a risky approach and should 

only be used in a limited number of cases. This approach entails us calling the client and conveying to them that they 

should no longer consider SC2 for a reason solely related to 

KPMG, such as the cap has been reached with respect to our 

city or region or . . . the demand has been so great that the 

firm is shutting it down. This approach is used as a psychological tool to elicit an immediate response from the client. . . .

This document was hardly the work product of a disinterested 

tax adviser. In fact, it went so far as to recommend that KPMG tax 

professionals employ such hard-sell tactics as making misleading 

statements to their clients—claims that SC2 will be sold to only a 

42

134 ‘‘ ‘The Blueprint’ National BDM Tax Sales Initiative: Objectives, Roles & Responsibilities’’ 

(undated) at 14. 135KPMG document, ‘‘Tax Business Development Stub Fiscal Year 2001 and Full Fiscal Year 

2002 (15 Months Beginning July 1, 2001 and Ending September 30, 2003) Compensation Plan 

Terms & Conditions,’’ (date uncertain) (hereinafter ‘‘Tax BDM 2001–2002 Compensation Plan’’) 

at 2. 136KPMG/Peat Marwick memorandum dated 11/24/98, from Jeffrey Stein to KPMG Tax Partners, ‘‘Tax Sales Organization and Telemarketing’’ (hereinafter ‘‘Stein Memorandum’’) at 1. 137See letter dated 1/15/04, from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 7. See also written responses 

to Subcommittee questions dated 4/25/04, from a former KPMG BDM, who estimated that, in 

FY2000, 65 to 70 of KPMG’s BDMs sold tax products and services (‘‘Tax BDMs’’), while 15 to 

20 sold assurance products and services (‘‘Audit BDMs’’). 138KPMG presentation dated 12/9/98, ‘‘Tax Sales Organization.’’ See also ANational Tax BDM 

Roster,’’ dated 2/1/01. The documents indicate that no ASD was appointed for the Mid-Atlantic 

region. 

limited number of people or that it is no longer being sold at all 

in order to ‘‘elicit an immediate response from the client.’’ In short, 

rather than present KPMG as a disinterested tax adviser, this type 

of sales advice is evidence of a company intent on convincing an 

uninterested or hesitant client to buy a product that the client 

would apparently be otherwise unlikely to purchase or use. 

Tax Shelter Sales Force. In addition to exhorting its tax professionals to spend more time selling KPMG tax products, beginning in 1997, KPMG established a dedicated sales position, known 

as a Business Development Manager (BDM), to market its tax shelters, as well as other KPMG products and services. The Subcommittee interviewed former BDMs and obtained documentation 

related to BDM involvement in KPMG’s tax shelter activities. 

A key KPMG document describing the newly established ‘‘National BDM Tax Sales Initiative’’ states that one of its goals was 

to ‘‘[h]elp create an aggressive sales culture’’ at KPMG.134 A document establishing the terms and conditions for BDM compensation 

states that the primary duty of a BDM selling tax products was to 

maximize revenue to KPMG through aggressive sales: 

The duty of each Tax Business Development Manager is to 

produce the Maximum revenue for the Firm. The Tax Business 

Development Manager’s contribution to maximum revenue will 

be primarily via the sale of Tax Services to new and existing 

Clients.135

A 1998 memorandum to KPMG tax partners urging greater use of 

BDMs declared that ‘‘a solid sales team dedicated to Tax is critical 

to our marketplace success.’’ 136

KPMG established an initial sales force of 6 to 10 BDMs in 1997, 

and increased the number of BDMs over the following 5 years to 

a maximum of 125 individuals. KPMG provided the Subcommittee 

with these total, annual BDM employment figures: FY1998: 34; 

FY1999: 84; FY2000: 88; FY2001: 98; FY2002: 125; and FY2003: 

89.137

The BDM sales force was organized by region, using six geographic areas: Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West.138 The BDMs within a region reported to an Area 

Sales Director (ASD), who in turn reported to a National Partner 

in Charge of the Business Development Managers. Each ASD was 

responsible for recruiting and training BDMs, ensuring the BDMs 

met specified sales quotas, leading sales effort on at least five 

major accounts within their markets, coordinating with the KPMG 

Area Managing Partner for Tax, and developing national sales 

43

139Stein Memorandum at 2. 140KPMG presentation, ‘‘BDM Training Program Components’’ (undated). 141Written responses to Subcommittee questions, dated 4/25/04, by a former KPMG BDM. 142Stein Memorandum at 1. 143 Id. at 4. The list of tax products available for sale by BDMs included tax products under 

the jurisdiction of Capital Transaction Strategies, the KPMG tax practice that led the efforts 

on FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. Id. at 3. Internal KPMG emails also indicate that at least one BDM 

was engaged in selling BLIPS. See email dated 2/22/00, from KPMG BDM Tobin Gilman to Ian 

Harrison and Robert Wells, ‘‘FW: Multi-Year Engagements, Contingent Engagements, Etc.’’ 144Stein Memorandum at 2. 145See, e.g., Tax BDM 2001–2002 Compensation Plan at 2. 146 Id. at 5. 147 ‘‘ ‘The Blueprint’ National BDM Tax Sales Initiative: Objectives, Roles & Responsibilities’’ 

(undated) at 3. 148KPMG presentation dated 2001, ‘‘BDM Tax Sales Organization Financial Trends.’’ 149KPMG document dated 4/20/99, ‘‘Fiscal Year 1999 Tax Business Development Manager 

Compensation Plan,’’ at 4. 

strategies with other ASDs.139 The BDM training program consisted of a new hire orientation, two sessions of sales ‘‘Boot Camp,’’ 

a course in ‘‘Selling with Confidence,’’ mock sales calls, self training 

videos, and weekly national conference calls launching new products.140 The program also included ‘‘intense training in several of 

the innovative Tax Products that KPMG was marketing.’’ 141

In a 1998 memorandum, the head of KPMG Tax Practice operations instructed KPMG’s tax partners to integrate BDMs into 

their sales operations.142 The memorandum explained that each 

member of the BDM sales force had been designated as either a 

‘‘Product’’ or ‘‘Area’’ BDM. Product BDMs, the memorandum explained, Awill be dedicated to and responsible for a select number 

of national tax products—that are perceived to yield the greatest 

return and represent our highest opportunities.’’ 143 With respect to 

Area BDMs, the memorandum stated that Atheir primary focus 

will be to team with the Tax Services Partners (TSPs) to promote 

a specific portfolio of tax products including select new tax initiatives as they are developed by the Tax Innovation Center (TIC).’’ 144

To promote tax product sales, KPMG set individual sales quotas 

for each BDM 145 and stated that it was Aexpected that each Tax 

Business Development Manager shall achieve 100% of their sales 

quotas.’’ 146 These individual BDM sales quotas were apparently 

based upon area and national BDM revenue targets that were also 

established by KPMG. For example, a KPMG presentation entitled 

‘‘The Blueprint’’ set national revenue goals for BDMs of $50 million 

in FY1999, $100 million in FY2000, and $150 million in FY2001.147

A later KPMG document cites actual BDM tax sales revenue of 

about $33 million in FY1999 and $109 million in FY2000, with projected FY2001 sales revenue of $125 million.148

BDM compensation routinely included sales commissions and, at 

times, also included bonuses or awards for meeting or exceeding 

sales revenue targets. In general, the evidence indicates that each 

BDM received a base salary and commission based on booked fees, 

billed accountancy income, and collected accountancy income.149 In 

FY 1999, for example, BDMs received a base salary of $75,000 plus 

a 3% commission on sales revenue. In FY 2000, BDMs received a 

base salary of $90,000 plus a 3% commission on sales to existing 

clients, a 4% commission for new sales to ‘‘idle’’ accounts, and a 6% 

commission on sales to new clients. In FY 2001, the evidence indicates that the 4% commission level was eliminated, and some expeVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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150Written responses to Subcommittee questions, dated 4/25/04, by a former KPMG BDM, at 

2. 151KPMG document dated 6/30/00, ‘‘BDM Comp. Plan Analysis,’’ at 1. 152Letter dated 9/29/99, from KPMG’s Ian Harrison to a BDM. 153KPMG presentation dated 2001, ‘‘BDM Tax Sales Organization Financial Trends,’’ at 4. 154 Id. at 9. 155 Id. at 13. 156 Id. at 9. 157 Id. at 19. 158 Id. at 25. 159 Id. 160See letter dated 1/15/04, from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 7. 

rienced new hires received base salaries of between $200,000 and 

$300,000.150

According to a June 2000 compensation plan analysis, the levels 

of compensation promised meant that a BDM with a base salary 

of $90,000 and who met a $3 million sales target would earn an 

annual income of up to $243,360. If the same BDM were to sell $4 

million worth of tax products, he or she would earn up to 

$324,000.151 Top-selling BDMs were also offered, at times, rewards 

for their sales, such as an opportunity to attend a luxurious ‘‘Performance Club 1999’’ retreat in Carmel, California.152

The BDMs were heavily involved in the marketing of tax shelter 

products. A lengthy Tax Sales Organization area analysis of 2001 

sales trends, for example, demonstrates the level of BDM involvement with KPMG tax shelter sales. It states that ‘‘BDMs are pushing heavily on SC2,’’ one of the tax shelters featured in this Report.153 It describes the sales efforts of a top-selling BDM based in 

Dallas by referring to his sales of several tax shelter products and 

to his working relationship with Stratecon, a KPMG group involved 

in developing and marketing tax shelter products to KPMG clients: 

‘‘Significant portion (90%) of pipeline is Stratecon, with CLAS, SC2, 

and Gain Mitigation. Works extremely close with Stratecon Partner—and is widely known as a strong prospector.’’ 154 The analysis also states that a Seattle-based BDM sold $5.4 million worth of tax 

products in FY 2000, focusing on SALT, TAS and SC2; while a Silicon Valley-based BDM had pending FY 2001 fees related to SC2 

totaling $2 million.155

This sales analysis suggests that KPMG encouraged its BDMs to 

engage in aggressive sales of its tax products. It describes a Dallasbased BDM as Aa strong prospector, who has already garnered 

strong praise from several Partners for his aggressive marketing 

stance.’’ 156 It commends a Stamford-based BDM projected to achieve $6 million in FY 2001 sales for being Aextremely aggressive, as he easily averages 1 to 2 new relationship meetings each 

week.’’ 157 It also singles out BDMs with the ability to make ‘‘cold’’ 

sales. An Atlanta-based BDM, for example, is cited for success with 

Aaccounts where KPMG has no acquaintances, the ‘coldest’ of category 1 gain accounts. Several have become KPMG solution buyers.’’ 158 The analysis notes that a number of BDMs had been deployed exclusively against cold accounts.159

In response to a Subcommittee inquiry about the current status 

of KPMG’s sales force, KPMG informed the Subcommittee that it 

was refocusing the BDM position by eliminating sales commissions 

and training BDMs as relationship managers.160 In September 

2004, KPMG held a national conference call in which it was announced that many BDMs would be terminated. Those remaining 

45

161 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, at Bates KPMG 0013394. 162 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013394. Another 

document identified Bryan Cave, a law firm with over 600 professionals and offices in St. Louis, 

New York, and elsewhere, as willing ‘‘to issue a confirming tax opinion for the SC2 transaction.’’ 

Memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, ‘‘Agenda from Feb 

16th call and goals for the next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135. See also email dated 7/19/

00, from Robert Coplan of Ernst & Young to ‘‘Dickensg@aol.com,’’ Bates 2003EY011939 (‘‘As you 

know, we go to great lengths to line up a law firm to issue an opinion pursuant to a separate 

engagement letter from the client that is meant to make the law firm independent from us.’’) 163 ‘‘SC2—Appropriate Answers for Frequently Asked Shareholder Questions,’’ included in an 

SC2 information packet dated 7/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013393.

with the firm would have their job titles changed to ‘‘Account Relationship Managers.’’ However, it appears as if their primary job responsibility continued to be sales, albeit primarily in audit and tax 

services.’’

Using Tax Opinions and Insurance as Marketing Tools.

Documents obtained during the Subcommittee’s investigation demonstrate that KPMG deliberately traded on its reputation as a respected accounting firm and tax expert in selling questionable tax 

products to corporations and individuals. As described in an earlier 

section on designing new tax products, the former WNT head acknowledged that KPMG’s ‘‘reputation will be used to market the 

[BLIPS] transaction. This is a given in these types of deals.’’ In the 

SC2 ‘‘Sticking Points’’ document, KPMG instructed its tax professionals to respond to client concerns about the product by pointing 

out that SC2 had been reviewed and approved by five KPMG tax 

specialty groups and by specialists who were former employees of 

the IRS.161

KPMG also used opinion letters as a marketing tool. Tax opinion 

letters are intended to provide written advice explaining whether 

a particular tax product is permissible under the law and, if challenged by the IRS, the likelihood that the tax product would survive court scrutiny. A tax opinion letter provided by a person with 

a financial stake in the tax product being analyzed has traditionally been accorded much less deference than an opinion letter supplied by a disinterested expert. As shown in the SC2 ‘‘Sticking 

Points’’ document just cited, if a client raised concerns about purchasing the product, KPMG instructed its tax professionals to respond that, ‘‘At least one outside law firm will give a co-opinion on 

the transactions.’’ 162 In another SC2 document, KPMG advised its 

tax professionals to tell clients worried about IRS penalties: 

The opinion letters that we issue should get you out of any 

penalties. However, the Service could try to argue that KPMG 

is the promoter of the strategy and therefore the opinions are 

biased and try and assert penalties. We believe there is very 

low risk of this result. If you desire additional assurance, there 

is at least one outside law firm in NYC that will issue a coopinion. The cost ranges between $25k–$40k.163

KPMG was apparently so convinced that an outside legal opinion 

increased the marketability of its tax products, that in the case of 

FLIP, it agreed to pay Sidley Austin Brown & Wood a fee in any 

sale where a prospective buyer was told that the law firm would 

provide a favorable tax opinion letter. A KPMG tax professional explained in an email: ‘‘Our deal with Brown and Wood is that if 

their name is used in selling the strategy they will get a fee. We 

46

164 ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03) at ¶ 18, citing an email dated 10/1/97, from Gregg 

Ritchie to Randall Hamilton. (Capitalizations in original omitted.) 165 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013375–96. 166See, e.g., Subcommittee interview of Lawrence Manth (11/6/03). 167See insurance policies reprinted in Subcommittee hearing record at 2911–29. 168 Email dated 2/9/01, from Ty Jordan to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2 revisit of 

stale leads,’’ Bates KPMG 0050814. 169Subcommittee briefing by Jeffrey Eischeid (9/12/03); Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey 

Stein (10/31/03). 170 Internal KPMG presentation, dated 6/18/01, by Andrew Atkin and Bob Huber, entitled ‘‘SCorporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2) Update,’’ Bates XX 001553.

have decided as a firm that B&W opinion should be given in all 

deals.’’ 164

On occasion, KPMG also used insurance as a marketing tool to 

convince reluctant buyers to purchase a KPMG tax product. In the 

case of SC2, the ‘‘Sticking Points’’ document advised KPMG tax 

professionals to tell clients about the existence of an insurance policy that, for a ‘‘small premium,’’ could guarantee SC2’s promised 

‘‘tax benefits.’’ 165

According to KPMG tax professionals interviewed by Subcommittee staff, the insurance companies offering this insurance 

included AIG and Hartford.166 In response to posthearing questions, KPMG produced copies of a redacted insurance policy from 

Lexington Insurance Company and a sample ‘‘fiscal event’’ insurance policy prepared by AIG, both of which related to SC2.167 The 

AIG policy, for example, promises to reimburse the policy holder for 

a range of payments made to a Federal or state taxing authority 

related to SC2, including any payment made for an assessment of 

unpaid taxes, interest, a fine or penalty. Once these policies became available, KPMG tax professionals were asked to re-visit potential clients who had declined the tax product and try again.168

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that at least half 

a dozen SC2 purchasers also purchased SC2 insurance. 

Tracking Sales and Revenue. KPMG repeatedly told the Subcommittee staff that it did not have the technical capability to 

track the sales or revenues associated with particular tax products.169 However, evidence gathered by the Subcommittee indicates 

that KPMG could and did obtain specific revenue tracking information. 

Specific evidence that revenue information was collected for tax 

products was obtained by the Subcommittee during the investigation from parties other than KPMG. For example, an SC2 ‘‘update’’ 

prepared in mid-2001, included detailed revenue information, including total nationwide revenues produced by the tax product 

since it was launched, total nationwide revenues produced during 

the 2001 fiscal year, and FY2001 revenues broken down by each of 

six regions in the United States: 170

Revenue since solution was launched: $20,700,000

Revenue this fiscal year only: $10,700,000

Revenue by Region this Fiscal Year

*West $7,250,000

*Southeast $1,300,000

*Southwest $850,000

*Mid-Atlantic $550,000

47

171 Another document provided to the Subcommittee by parties other than KPMG carefully 

traces the increase in the Tax Services Practice’s ‘‘gross revenue.’’ It shows a ‘‘45.5% Cumulative 

Growth’’ in gross revenue over a 4-year period, with $829 million in FY1998, $1.001 million in 

FY1999, $1.184 million in FY2000, and $1.239 million in FY2001. See chart entitled, ‘‘Tax Practice Growth Gross Revenue,’’ included in a presentation dated 7/19/01, entitled, ‘‘Innovative Tax 

Solutions,’’ by Marsha Peters of Washington National Tax, Bates XX 001503. 172KPMG/Peat Marwick memorandum by Jeffrey Stein to KPMG Tax Partners, ‘‘Tax Sales 

Organization and Telemarketing’’ (11/24/98), reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing 

Exhibit 97 kk. 173 Email dated 8/6/00 from Jeffrey Stein to 15 National Deployment Champions, Bates KPMG 

050016. See also KPMG 2001 presentation, ‘‘Tax Sales Organization Financial Trends,’’ indicating that KPMG carefully tracked the sales revenues generated by its Business Development 

Managers, not only to calculate their sales commissions, but also to develop BDM revenue targets and sales quotas. 174 Internal KPMG presentation, dated 5/30/01, by the Tax Innovation Center, entitled ‘‘Tax 

Innovation Center Solution and Idea Development—Year-End Results,’’ Bates XX 001490–1502. 

*Midwest $425,000

*Northeast $300,000

KPMG never produced this document to the Subcommittee.171

Another document obtained by the Subcommittee from a party 

other than KPMG is a 1998 memorandum sent by a senior KPMG 

tax official to all U.S. KPMG tax partners directing them to begin 

using a special database to track all KPMG tax sales activity.172

The memorandum states: 

The Opportunity Management System (OMS) will serve as the 

Tax practice’s central Database for all sales activity. It is essential that we have one system that captures the activity of 

the [Business Development Managers,] Telemarketers and our 

professionals. This will ensure that we leverage our relationships and coordinate our sales efforts for increased success. 

The BDMs, Telemarketers and Marketing already use OMS as 

their repository for all information. And plans are to make 

OMS available to all Tax partners on a read only basis by the 

beginning of December. . . . You must be sure to report your 

individual sales activity to your Area Marketing Leader-Tax 

for input into the system. Reports are generated from OMS are 

the tool the Tax Leadership Team will be using to measure individual partner activity.

A later email sent in August 2000, which KPMG did produce to 

the Subcommittee, indicates that by the year 2000, monthly OMS 

‘‘tracking reports’’ were used to measure sales results for specific 

tax products, and these reports were regularly shared with National Deployment Champions, Tax Service Line leaders, and Area 

Managing Partners.173

Moreover, KPMG’s Tax Innovation Center reported in 2001 that 

it had developed new software that ‘‘captured solution development 

costs and revenue’’ and had begun ‘‘[p]repar[ing] quarterly Solution 

Profitability reports.’’ 174 This information suggests that KPMG was 

refining its revenue tracking capabilities to be able to track not 

only gross revenues produced by a tax product, but also net revenues, and that it had begun collecting and monitoring this information on a regular basis. These documents, as well as other information, contradict KPMG’s statement that ‘‘the firm does not mainVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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175Letter from KPMG to Subcommittee, dated 4/22/03, attached one-page chart entitled, 

‘‘Good Faith Estimate of Top Revenue-Generating Strategies,’’ n.1. 176Quellos Group was then known and doing business as Quadra Capital Management LLP 

or QA Investments, LLC. 177KPMG actually did business with First Union National Bank, which subsequently merged 

with Wachovia Bank. 

tain any systematic, reliable method of recording revenues by tax 

product on a national basis.’’ 175

(3) Implementing Tax Products 

Finding: KPMG was actively involved in implementing 

the tax shelters which it sold to its clients, including by 

enlisting participation from banks, investment advisory 

firms, and tax exempt organizations; preparing transactional documents; arranging purported loans; issuing 

and arranging opinion letters; providing administrative 

services; and preparing tax returns.

In many cases, KPMG’s involvement with a tax product sold to 

a client did not end with the sale itself. Many KPMG tax products, 

including the four examined by the Subcommittee, required the 

purchaser to carry out complex financial and investment activities 

in order to realize promised tax benefits. KPMG typically provided 

clients with significant implementation assistance to ensure they 

realized the promised tax benefits on their tax returns. KPMG was 

also interested in successful implementation of its tax products, because the track record that built up over time for a particular product affected how KPMG could, in good faith, characterize that product to new clients. Implementation problems also, at times, caused 

KPMG to adjust how a tax product was structured and even 

spurred development of new products. 

Executing FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS 

each required the purchaser to establish a shell corporation, join a 

partnership, obtain a multi-million dollar loan, and engage in a series of complex financial and investment transactions that had to 

be carried out in a certain order and in a certain way to realize 

tax benefits. The evidence collected by the Subcommittee shows 

that KPMG was heavily involved in making sure the client transactions were completed properly. 

As a first step, KPMG enlisted the participation of professional 

organizations to help design its products and carry them out. In 

the case of FLIP, which was the first of the four tax products to 

be developed, KPMG sought the assistance of investment experts 

at a small firm called Quellos Group to design the complex series 

of financial transactions called for by the product.176 Using contacts it had established in other business dealings, Quellos helped 

KPMG convince a major bank, UBS AG, to provide financing and 

participate in the FLIP transactions. Quellos worked with UBS to 

fine-tune the financial transactions, helped KPMG make client 

presentations about FLIP and, for those who purchased the product, helped complete the paperwork and transactions, using Quellos 

securities brokers. KPMG also enlisted help from Wachovia Bank, 

where the bank referred bank clients who might be interested in 

the FLIP tax product to KPMG tax professionals.177 In some cases, 

the bank permitted KPMG and Quellos Group to make FLIP presVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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178Subcommittee interview of First Union National Bank representatives (3/25/03). 179KPMG actually worked with Brown & Wood, a large New York law firm which subsequently merged with Sidley & Austin. 180The two former KPMG tax professionals are John Larson and Robert Pfaff. They also 

formed numerous other companies, many of them shells, to participate in business dealings including, in some cases, OPIS and BLIPS transactions. These related companies include Presidio 

Advisors, Presidio Growth, Presidio Resources, Presidio Volatility Management, Presidio Financial Group, Hayes Street Management, Holland Park, Prevad, Inc., and Norwood Holdings (collectively referred to as ‘‘Presidio’’). 181Subcommittee interview of John Larson (10/21/03); email dated 7/29/97, from Larry DeLap 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Revised Memorandum,’’ Bates KPMG JAC 331160; forwarding memorandum dated 7/29/97, from Bob Pfaff to John Lanning, Jeff Stein and others, 

‘‘My Thoughts Concerning KPMG’s Tax Advantaged Transaction Practice, Presidio’s Relationship with KPMG, Transition Issues.’’ 182 Credit Request dated 9/26/99, Bates HVB 001166; Subcommittee interview of HVB representatives (10/29/03). 183Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey Eischeid (10/8/03). 

entations to its clients in the bank’s offices.178 KPMG also enlisted 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to issue a favorable legal opinion letter on the FLIP tax product.179

In the case of OPIS and BLIPS, KPMG, again, enlisted the help 

of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, but used a different investment 

advisory firm. Instead of Quellos Group, KPMG obtained investment advice from Presidio Advisory Services. Presidio was formed 

in 1997 by two former KPMG tax professionals, one of whom was 

a key participant in the development and marketing of FLIP.180

These two tax professionals left the accounting firm, because they 

wanted to focus on the investment side of the generic tax products 

being developed by KPMG.181 Unlike Quellos Group, which had 

substantial investment projects aside from FLIP, virtually all of 

Presidio’s work over the following 5 years derived from KPMG tax 

products. Presidio’s principals worked closely with KPMG tax professionals to design OPIS and BLIPS. Presidio’s principals also 

helped KPMG obtain lending and securities services from three 

major banks, Deutsche Bank, HVB, and NatWest, to complete 

OPIS and BLIPS transactions. 

In addition to enlisting the participation of legal, investment, 

and financial professionals, KPMG provided significant administrative support for the FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS transactions, using 

KPMG personnel to help draft and prepare transactional documents and assist the investment advisory firms and the banks with 

paperwork. For example, when a number of loans were due to be 

closed in certain BLIPS transactions, two KPMG staffers were stationed at HVB to assist the bank with closing and booking 

issues.182 Other KPMG employees were assigned to Presidio to assist in expediting BLIPS transactions and paperwork. KPMG also 

worked with Quellos Group, Presidio, and the relevant banks to ensure that the banks established large enough credit lines, at times 

in the billions of dollars, to allow a substantial number of individuals to carry out FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS transactions. 

When asked about KPMG’s communications with the banks, the 

OPIS and BLIPS National Deployment Champion initially denied 

ever contacting bank personnel directly, claiming instead to have 

relied on Quellos and Presidio personnel to work directly with the 

bank personnel.183 When confronted with documentary evidence of 

direct contacts, however, the Deployment Champion reluctantly admitted communicating on rare occasions with bank personnel. Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee, however, shows that KPMG 

50

184See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 at 2; email dated 5/13/99, sent by Barbara Mcconnachie but attributed to Doug Ammerman, to John Lanning and other KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘FW: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011903 (‘‘Jeff Eischeid will be attending a meeting 

. . . to address the issue of expanding capacity at Deutsche Bank given our expectation regarding the substantial volume expected from this product.’’) It is unclear whether this meeting actually took place. 185 Attachment entitled, ‘‘Tax Exempt Organizations,’’ included in an SC2 information packet 

dated 7/19/00, ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda,’’ Bates KPMG 0013387. 186Subcommittee interviews with Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police Pensions (10/

22/03) and the Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund (10/14/03). 187 Id.

communications with bank personnel were not rare. KPMG negotiated intensively with the banks over the factual representations 

that would be attributed to the banks in the KPMG opinion letters. 

On occasion, KPMG stationed its personnel at the banks to facilitate transactions and paperwork. The BLIPS National Deployment 

Champion met with NatWest personnel regarding the BLIPS 

transactions. In one instance in 2000, documents indicate that, 

when clients had exhausted the available credit at Deutsche Bank 

to conduct OPIS transactions, the Deployment Champion planned 

to meet with senior Deutsche Bank officials about increasing the 

credit lines so that more OPIS products could be sold.184

Executing SC2. In the case of SC2, the tax product could not 

be executed at all without a charitable organization willing to participate in the required transactions. KPMG took on the task of locating and convincing appropriate charities to participate in SC2 

transactions. The difficulty of this task was evident in several 

KPMG documents. For example, one SC2 document warned KPMG 

personnel not to look for a specific charity to participate in a specific SC2 transaction until after an engagement letter was signed 

with a client because: ‘‘It is difficult to find qualifying tax exempts. 

. . . [O]f those that qualify only a few end up being interested and 

only a few of those will accept donations. . . . We need to be able 

to go to the tax-exempt with what we are going to give them to get 

them interested.’’ 185

KPMG refused to identify to the Subcommittee any of the charities it contacted about SC2 or any of the handful of charities that 

actually participated in SC2 stock donations, claiming this was ‘‘tax 

return information’’ that it could not disclose. The Subcommittee 

was nevertheless able to identify and interview two charitable organizations which, between them, participated in more than half of 

the 58 SC2 transactions KPMG arranged.186

Both charities interviewed by Subcommittee staff indicated that 

they first learned of SC2 when contacted by KPMG personnel. Both 

used the same phrase, that KPMG had contacted them ‘‘out of the 

blue.’’ 187 Both charities indicated that KPMG personnel explained 

SC2 to them, convinced them to participate, introduced the potential SC2 donors to the charity, and supplied draft transactional documents. Both charities indicated that, with KPMG acting as a liaison, they then accepted S Corporation stock donations from out-ofstate residents whom they never met and with whom they had 

never had any prior contact. 

KPMG also distributed to its personnel a document entitled, 

‘‘SC2 Implementation Process,’’ listing a host of implementation 

tasks they should complete in each transaction. These tasks included technical, administrative, and logistical chores. For examVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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188 ‘‘SC2 Implementation Process,’’ included in an SC2 information packet dated 7/19/00, Bates 

KPMG 0013385–86. 189Subcommittee interview of Lawrence Manth (11/6/03). 190Subcommittee interview of William Stefka, Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund (10/

14/03). 191 Email dated 12/27/01, from Larry Manth to Andrew Atkin and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0048773. See also email dated 8/18/01, from Larry Manth to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: New Solutions—WNT,’’ Bates KPMG 0026894.

ple, KPMG personnel were told they should evaluate the S Corporation’s ownership structure and incorporation documentation; 

work with an outside valuation firm to determine the corporation’s 

enterprise value and the value of the corporate stock and warrants; 

and physically deliver the appropriate stock certificates to the charity accepting the client’s stock donation.188

Both charities said that KPMG often acted as a go-between for 

the charity and the stock donor, shuttling documents back and 

forth and answering inquiries on both sides. KPMG apparently also 

drafted and supplied draft transactional documents to the S Corporations and corporate owners.189 One of the pension funds informed the Subcommittee staff that, when one corporate donor 

needed to re-take possession of the corporate stock due to an unrelated business opportunity that required use of the stock, KPMG 

assisted in the mechanics of selling the stock back to the donor.190

The documentation shows that KPMG tax professionals also expended significant effort developing a ‘‘back-end deal’’ for SC2 donors, meaning a tax transaction that could be used by the S Corporation owner to further reduce or eliminate their tax liability 

when they re-took control of the S Corporation and distributed 

some or all of the income that had built up within the company 

while the charity was a shareholder. The SC2 National Deployment 

Champion wrote the following to more than 20 of his colleagues 

working on SC2:

Our estimate is that by 12/31/02, there will be approximately 

$1 billion of income generated by S-corps that have implemented this strategy, and our goal is to maintain the confidentiality of the strategy for as long as possible to protect these 

clients (and new clients). . . .

We have had our first redemption from the LAPD. Particular 

thanks to [a KPMG tax professional] and his outstanding relationship with the LAPD fund administrators, the redemption 

went smooth. [Three KPMG tax professionals] all worked together on structuring the back-end deal allowing for the shareholder to recognize a significant benefit, as well as getting 

KPMG a fee of approx. $1 million, double the original SC2 fee!!

[Another KPMG tax professional] is in the process of working 

on a back-end solution to be approved by WNT that will provide S-corp shareholders additional basis in their stock which 

will allow for the cash build-up inside of the S-corporation to 

be distributed tax-free to the shareholders. This should provide 

us with an additional revenue stream and a captive audience. 

Our estimate is that if 50% of the SC2 clients implement the 

back-end solution, potential fees will approximate $25 million.191

52

192Treas. Reg. § 1.6664–4(c)(1)(ii).

This email communication shows that the key KPMG tax professionals involved with SC2 viewed the strategy as a way to defer 

and reduce taxes on substantial corporate income that was always 

intended to be returned to the control of the stock donor. It also 

shows that KPMG’s implementation efforts on SC2 continued long 

past the sale of the tax product to a client. 

Preparing KPMG Opinion Letters. In addition to helping clients complete the transactions called for in FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, 

and SC2, when it came time for clients to submit tax returns at 

the end of the year or in subsequent years, KPMG was available 

to help its clients prepare their returns. In addition, whether a client’s tax return was prepared by KPMG or someone else, KPMG 

supplied the client with a tax opinion letter explaining the tax benefits that the product provided and could be reflected in the client’s 

tax return. In three of the tax shelters examined by the Subcommittee, KPMG also arranged for its clients to obtain a second 

favorable opinion letter from an outside law firm. In the fourth instance, SC2, KPMG knew of law firms willing to issue a second 

opinion letter, but it is unclear whether any were actually issued. 

A tax opinion letter, sometimes called a legal opinion letter when 

issued by a law firm, is intended to provide written advice to a client on whether a particular tax product is permissible under the 

law and, if challenged by the IRS, how likely it would be that the 

challenged product would survive court scrutiny. The Subcommittee investigation uncovered disturbing evidence related to 

how opinion letters were being developed and used in connection 

with KPMG’s tax products. 

The first issue involves the accuracy and reliability of the factual 

representations that were included in the opinion letters supporting KPMG’s tax products. KPMG tax professionals expended 

extensive effort drafting a prototype tax opinion letter to serve as 

a template for the opinion letters actually sent by KPMG to its clients. One key step in the drafting process was the drafting of factual representations attributed to parties participating in the relevant transactions. Such factual representations play a critical role 

in the opinion letter by laying a factual foundation for its analysis 

and conclusions. Treasury regulations state:

The advice [in an opinion letter] must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as 

to future events) and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. For example, the advice must not 

be based upon a representation or assumption which the taxpayer knows, or has reason to know, is unlikely to be true, 

such as an inaccurate representation or assumption as to the 

taxpayer’s purposes for entering into a transaction or for structuring a transaction in a particular manner.192

KPMG stated in its opinion letters that its analysis relied on the 

factual representations provided by the client and other key parties. In the BLIPS prototype tax opinion, for example, KPMG stated that its ‘‘opinion and supporting analysis are based upon the folVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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193Prototype BLIPS tax opinion letter prepared by KPMG, (12/31/99), Bates KPMG 0000405–

417, at 1. 194See, e.g., email dated 3/27/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Richard Smith, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ and email dated 3/28/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0025753 (depicting negotiations between KPMG and Deutsche Bank over factual 

representations to be included in opinion letter). 195Prototype BLIPS tax opinion letter prepared by KPMG, (12/31/99), Bates KPMG 0000405–

417, at 9. 

lowing description of the facts and representations associated with 

the investment transactions undertaken by Investor.’’ 193 The Subcommittee was told that Sidley Austin Brown & Wood relied on the 

same factual representations to compose the legal opinion letters 

that it drafted. 

Virtually all of the FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS opinion letters contained boilerplate repetitions of the factual representations attributed to the participating parties. For example, virtually all the 

KPMG FLIP clients made the same factual representations, worded 

in the same way. The same was true for KPMG’s OPIS clients and 

for KPMG’s BLIPS clients. Each of the banks that participated in 

BLIPS made factual representations that varied slightly from bank 

to bank, but did not vary at all for a particular bank. In other 

words, Deutsche Bank and HVB attested to slightly different 

versions of the factual representations attributed to the bank participating in the BLIPS transactions, but every BLIPS opinion letter that, for example, referred to Deutsche Bank, contained the 

exact same boilerplate language to which Deutsche Bank had 

agreed to attest. 

The evidence is clear that KPMG took the lead in drafting the 

factual representations attributed to other parties, including the 

client or ‘‘investor’’ who purchased the tax product, the investment 

advisory firm that participated in the transactions, and the bank 

that provided the financing. In the case of the factual representations attributed to the investment advisory firm or bank, the evidence indicates that KPMG presented its draft language to the relevant party and then engaged in detailed negotiations over the 

final wording.194 In the case of the factual representations attributed to a client, however, the evidence indicates KPMG did not 

consult with its client beforehand, even for representations purporting to describe, in a factual way, the client’s intentions, motivations, or understanding of the tax product. KPMG alone, apparently without any client input, wrote the client’s representations 

and then demanded that each client attest to them by returning a 

signed letter to the accounting firm. 

Equally disturbing is that some of the key factual representations KPMG attributed to its clients appear to contain false or misleading statements. For example, in the BLIPS prototype letter, 

KPMG wrote: ‘‘Investor has represented to KPMG . . . [that the] 

Investor independently reviewed the economics underlying the 

[BLIPS] Investment Fund before entering into the program and believed there was a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable pretax profit from the transactions.’’ 195 The existence of a client profit 

motive and the existence of a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable pre-tax profit are central factors in determining whether a 

tax product like BLIPS has a business purpose and economic substance apart from its tax benefits. It is the Subcommittee’s underVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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196See email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Larry DeLap, DPP, Bates KPMG 

0011916 (quoting Presidio investment experts who set up the BLIPS transactions, a KPMG tax 

expert states: ‘‘the probability of actually making a profit from this transaction is remote (possible, but remote).’’). 197KPMG required the investment advisory firm, Presidio, to make this same factual representation, even though Presidio had informed KPMG personnel that ‘‘the probability of actually making a profit from this transaction is remote (possible, but remote).’’ The evidence indicates that both KPMG and Presidio knew there was only a remote possibility—not a reasonable 

possibility—of a client’s earning a profit in the BLIPS transaction, yet both continued to issue 

and stand behind an opinion letter attesting to what both knew was an inaccurate factual representation. 198 Email dated 4/14/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0017578–79. 

standing that this client representation was repeated substantially 

verbatim in every BLIPS tax opinion letter KPMG issued. 

The first stumbling block is the notion that every client who purchased BLIPS ‘‘independently’’ reviewed its ‘‘economics’’ beforehand, and ‘‘believed’’ there was a reasonable opportunity to make 

a reasonable profit. BLIPS was an enormously complicated transaction, with layers of structured finance, a complex loan, and intricate foreign currency trades. A technical analysis of its ‘‘economics’’ 

was likely beyond the capability of most of the BLIPS purchasers. 

In addition, KPMG knew there was only a remote possibility—not 

a reasonable possibility—of a client’s earning a profit in BLIPS.196

Nevertheless, since the existence of a reasonable opportunity to 

earn a reasonable profit was critical to BLIPS’ having economic 

substance, KPMG included that questionable client representation 

in its BLIPS tax opinion letter.197

BLIPS was constructed so that the potential for client profit from 

the BLIPS transactions increased significantly if the client participated in all three phases of the BLIPS loan, which required a full 

7 years to finish. The head of DPP-Tax observed that KPMG had 

drafted a factual representation for inclusion in the prototype 

BLIPS tax opinion letter stating that, ‘‘The original intent of the 

parties was to participate in all three investment stages of the Investment Program.’’ He cautioned against including this factual 

representation in the opinion letter: ‘‘It seems to me that this [is] 

a critical element of the entire analysis and should not be blithely 

assumed as a ‘fact.’ . . . I would caution that if there were, say, 

50 separate investors and all 50 bailed out at the completion of 

Stage I, such a representation would not seem credible.’’ 198

The proposed representation was not included in the final 

version of the BLIPS prototype opinion letter, and the actual 

BLIPS track record supported the cautionary words of the DPP 

head. In 2000, the KPMG tax partner in charge of WNT wrote:

Lastly, an issue that I am somewhat reluctant to raise but I 

believe is very important going forward concerns the representations that we are relying on in order to render our tax opinion in BLIPS I. In each of the 66 or more deals that were done 

at last year, our clients represented that they ‘‘independently’’ 

reviewed the economics of the transaction and had a reasonable opportunity to earn a pretax profit. . . . As I understand 

the facts, all 66 closed out by year-end and triggered the tax 

loss. Thus, while I continue to believe that we can issue the tax 

opinions on the BLIPS I deals, the issue going forward is can 

we continue to rely on the representations in any subsequent 

55

199 Email dated 2/24/00, from Philip Wiesner to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS/

OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011789. 200 Email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Larry DeLap, DPP, Bates KPMG 

0011916. See also document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies 

Business Plan—DRAFT,’’ authored by Jeffrey Eischeid, Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1–2 (referring to BLIPS and its predecessors, FLIP and OPIS, as a ‘‘capital loss strategy,’’ ‘‘loss generator,’’ or ‘‘gain mitigation solution’’). 201See, e.g., email dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0050562 (discontinuing SC2); email dated 10/1/99, from Larry DeLap 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011716 (discontinuing BLIPS); 

email dated 12/7/98, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025730 (discontinuing OPIS). 202Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 203 Id. 204See next section of this Report on ‘‘Avoiding Detection.’’

deals if we go down that road? . . . My recommendation is that 

we deliver the tax opinions in BLIPS I and close the book on 

BLIPS and spend our best efforts on alternative transactions.199

This email and other documentation indicate that KPMG was 

well aware that the BLIPS transactions were of limited duration 

and uniformly produced substantial tax losses that ‘‘investors’’ used 

to offset and shelter other income from taxation.200 This growing 

factual record, showing that BLIPS investors invariably lost 

money, made it increasingly difficult for KPMG to rely on an alleged client representation about BLIPS’ having a reasonable profit 

potential. KPMG nevertheless continued to sell the product and to 

issue tax opinion letters relying on a critical client representation 

that KPMG had drafted without client input and attributed to its 

clients, but which KPMG knew or had reason to know, was unsupported by the facts. 

Discontinuing Sales. Still another KPMG implementation issue 

involved decisions by KPMG to stop selling particular tax products. 

In all four of the tax products examined by the Subcommittee, 

KPMG stopped marketing the tax product within 1 or 2 years of 

its first sale.201 The decision was made in each case by the head 

of DPP-Tax, after consultation with the product’s Deployment 

Champion and other senior tax professionals. 

When asked to explain why sales were discontinued, the DPP 

head offered several reasons for pulling a tax product off the market.202 The DPP head stated that he sometimes ended the marketing of a tax product out of concern that a judge would invalidate 

the tax product ‘‘as a step transaction,’’ using evidence that a number of persons who purchased the product engaged in a series of 

similar transactions.203 Limiting the number of tax products sold 

limited the evidence that each resulted in a similar set of transactions orchestrated by KPMG. Limiting the number of tax products sold also limited information about them to a small circle and 

made it more difficult for the IRS to detect the activity.204

Evidence shows that internal KPMG directives to stop sales of a 

particular tax product were, at times, ignored or circumvented by 

KPMG tax professionals marketing the products. For example, the 

DPP head announced an end to BLIPS sales in the fall of 1999, but 

allowed KPMG tax professionals to complete numerous BLIPS 

sales in 1999 and 2000, to persons who had been approached before 

56

205See, e.g., email dated 10/13/99, from Carl Hasting to Dale Baumann, ‘‘RE: Year 2000 Blips 

Transactions,’’ Bates KPMG 0006485 (‘‘I thought we were told to quit marketing 200[0] BLIPS 

transactions.’’); email dated 10/13/99, from Dale Baumann to Carl Hasting and others, ‘‘RE: Year 

2000 Blips Transactions,’’ Bates KPMG 0006485 (‘‘No marketing to clients who were not on the 

BLIPS 2000 list. The BLIPS 2000 list were for those individuals who we approached before 

Larry told us to stop marketing the strategy. . . .’’). 206See, e.g., two emails dated 10/1/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011714. 207Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 208See, e.g., email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle of Deutsche Bank to other Deutsche 

Bank personnel, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280 (‘‘Presidio and 

KPMG are developing an expanded version of BLIP’s which it will execute on a limited basis 

for its wealthy clientele. They anticipate executing approximately 10–15 deals of significant size 

(i.e. in the $100–300m. Range).’’). 209See Section V(A)(2) of this Report on ‘‘Mass Marketing Tax Products.’’ See also, e.g., email 

dated 4/23/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ Bates KPMG 

0050029; email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0013311; and email response dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to William Kelliher, 

David Brockway, and others, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0013311. 210See, e.g., email dated 9/30/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Wolfgang Stolz and others, ‘‘OPIS,’’ 

Bates QL S004593. 211Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 

the marketing ban was announced.205 These purchasers were referred to internally at KPMG as ‘‘grandfathered BLIPS’’ clients.206

A handful of additional sales took place in 2000, over the objection 

of the DPP head, after his objection was overruled by head of the 

Tax Services Practice.207 Also in 2000, some KPMG tax professionals attempted to restart BLIPS sales by developing a modified 

BLIPS product that would be sold to only extremely wealthy individuals.208 This effort was ultimately unsuccessful in restarting 

BLIPS sales. 

In the case of SC2, KPMG tax professionals simply did not comply with announced limits on the total number of SC2 products 

that could be sold or limits on the use of telemarketing calls to 

market the product.209 In the case of FLIP and OPIS, additional 

sales again took place after the DPP head had announced an end 

to the marketing of the products.210 The DPP head told Subcommittee staff that when he discontinued BLIPS sales in 1999, he 

was pressed by the BLIPS National Deployment Champion and 

others for an alternative product.211 The DPP head indicated that, 

because of this pressure, he relented and allowed KPMG tax professionals to resume sales of OPIS, which he had halted a year earlier. 

(4) Avoiding Detection 

Finding: KPMG took steps to conceal its tax shelter activities from tax authorities, including by claiming it 

was a tax advisor and not a tax shelter promoter, failing 

to register potentially abusive tax shelters, restricting 

file documentation, imposing marketing restrictions, 

and using improper tax return reporting to minimize 

detection by the IRS or others.

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee shows that KPMG has 

taken a number of steps to conceal its tax shelter activities from 

IRS, law enforcement, and the public. In the first instance, it has 

simply denied being a tax shelter promoter and claimed that tax 

shelter information requests do not apply to its products. Second, 

evidence with regard to FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2 indicate that 

KPMG took a number of precautions in the way it designed, marVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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212Memorandum dated 5/26/98, from Gregg Ritchie to Jeffrey Stein, then head of operations 

in the Tax Services Practice, ‘‘OPIS Tax Shelter Registration,’’ Bates KPMG 0012031–33.

keted, and implemented these tax products to avoid or minimize 

detection of its activities. 

No Tax Shelter Disclosure. KPMG’s public position has been 

it does not develop, sell or promote tax shelters. As a consequence, 

as of the time of the Subcommittee hearings in 2003, KPMG had 

not voluntarily registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS, a single one of its tax products, even after being advised by a senior tax 

professionals that a particular tax product should be registered. 

One glaring example of this flawed approach involves a 1998 

memorandum sent by a KPMG tax professional to the second most 

senior KPMG tax official at KPMG advising the firm not to register 

the OPIS tax product with the IRS, even if OPIS qualified as a tax 

shelter under the law.212 The memorandum stated in part: 

For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that we will conclude that the OPIS product meets the definition of a tax shelter under IRC section 6111(c).

Based on this assumption, the following are my conclusions 

and recommendations as to why KPMG should make the business/strategic decision not to register the OPIS product as a 

tax shelter. . . .

First, the financial exposure to the Firm is minimal.

Based upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, we 

conclude that the penalties would be no greater than $14,000 

per $100,000 in KPMG fees. . . . For example, our average 

deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum 

penalty exposure of only $31,000. . . .

Third, the tax community at large continues to avoid 

registration of all products. Based upon my knowledge, the 

representations made by Presidio and Quadra, and Larry 

DeLap’s discussions with his counterparts at other Big 6 firms, 

there are no tax products marketed to individuals by our competitors which are registered. This includes income conversion 

strategies, loss generation techniques, and other related strategies.

Should KPMG decide to begin to register its tax products, I believe that it will position us with a severe competitive disadvantage in light of industry norms to such degree that we 

will not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products 

market.

Fourth, there has been (and, apparently, continues to 

be) a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Service to enforce section 6111. In speaking with KPMG individuals who 

were at the Service . . . the Service has apparently purposefully ignored enforcement efforts related to section 6111. In informal discussions with individuals currently at the Service, 

WNT has confirmed that there are not many registration applications submitted and they do not have the resources to dedicate to this area. . . .

58

213See, e.g., email dated 5/26/98, from Mark Springer to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘Re: OPIS Tax Shelter Registration,’’ [Bates KPMG 0034971 (‘‘I would still concur with Gregg’s 

recommendation. . . . I don’t think we want to create a competitive DISADVANTAGE, nor do 

we want to lead with our chin.’’ Emphasis in original). 214Lawrence DeLap, then DPP head, told the Subcommittee he had advised the firm to register OPIS as a tax shelter. Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). See also 

handwritten notes dated 3/4/98, author not indicated, regarding ‘‘Brown & Wood’’ and ‘‘OPIS,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0047317 (‘‘Must register the product. B&W concerns—risk is too high. Confirm w/

Presidio that they will register.’’ Emphasis in original.) (‘‘B&W’’ refers to Brown & Wood, the 

law firm that worked with KPMG on OPIS; Presidio is the investment firm that worked with 

KPMG on OPIS.). 215Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 216KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.4.1, at 24–2.

I believe the rewards of a successful marketing of the OPIS 

product . . . far exceed the financial exposure to penalties that 

may arise. Once you have had an opportunity to review this information, I request that we have a conference with the persons on the distribution list . . . to come to a conclusion with 

respect to my recommendation.

This memorandum assumes that OPIS qualifies as a tax shelter 

under Federal law and then advocates that KPMG not register it 

with the IRS as required by law. The memorandum advises KPMG 

to knowingly violate the law requiring tax shelter registration, because the IRS is not vigorously enforcing the registration requirement, the penalties for noncompliance are much less than the potential profits from the tax product, and ‘‘industry norms’’ are not 

to register any tax products at all. The memorandum warns that 

if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place the firm at such a competitive disadvantage that KPMG would ‘‘not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products market.’’

The Subcommittee learned that some KPMG tax professionals 

agreed with this analysis, 213 while other senior KPMG tax professionals provided the opposite advice to the firm.214 The head of 

KPMG’s Tax Services Practice, the Vice Chairman for Tax, ultimately determined not to register the tax product as a tax shelter. 

The head of DPP-Tax told the Subcommittee staff that he had recommended registering not only OPIS, but also BLIPS, but was 

overruled in each instance by the Vice Chairman for Tax.215

Other documents show that consideration of tax shelter registration issues was a required step in the tax product approval process, 

but rather than resulting in IRS registrations, KPMG appears to 

have devoted resources to devising rationales for not registering a 

product with the IRS. KPMG’s Tax Services Manual states that 

every new tax product must be analyzed by the WNT Tax Controversy Services group ‘‘to address tax shelter regulations 

issues.’’ 216 For example, one internal document analyzing tax shelter registration issues discusses the ‘‘policy argument’’ that 

KPMG’s tax ‘‘advice . . . does not meet the paradigm of 6111(c) 

registration’’ and identifies other flaws with the legal definition of 

‘‘tax shelter’’ that may excuse registration. The email also suggests 

possibly creating a separate entity to act as the registrant for 

KPMG tax products: 

If we decide we will be registering in the future, thought 

should be given to establishing a separate entity that meets 

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217 Email dated 5/11/98, from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Registration,’’ Bates KPMG 0034805–06. See also email dated 5/12/98, from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple 

KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Registration requirements,’’ Bates KPMG 0034807–11 (reasonable 

cause exception, tax shelter definitions, number of registrations required); email dated 5/20/98, 

from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Misc. Tax Reg. issues,’’ Bates KPMG 

0034832–33 (‘‘reasonable cause exception for not registering’’; application of regulatory ‘‘tax shelter ratio’’ to identify tax shelters; ‘‘establishing a separate entity to act as the entity registering 

ALL tax products. . . . Otherwise we must submit our name as the tax shelter organizer.’’). 218Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 2. 219See United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1: 02MS00295 (D.D.C. 9/6/02). 220See Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03), at 65–67. 221Testimony of Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice, before the Senate Committee on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, 

Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ (10/21/03), at 3. 

istration potential. This entity, rather than KPMG, would then 

be available through agreement to act as the registering organizer. . . . If such an entity is established, KPMG can avoid 

submitting its name as the organizer of a tax shelter on 

Form(s) 8264 to be filed in the future.217

Another KPMG document, a fiscal year 2002 draft business plan 

for the Personal Financial Planning Practice, describes two tax 

products under development, but not yet approved, due in part to 

pending tax shelter registration issues.218 The first, referred to as 

POPS, is described as ‘‘a gain mitigation solution.’’ The business 

plan states: ‘‘We have completed the solution’s technical review and 

have almost finalized the rationale for not registering POPS as a 

tax shelter.’’ The second product is described as a ‘‘conversion 

transaction . . . that halves the taxpayer’s effective tax rate by effectively converting ordinary income to long term capital gain.’’ The 

business plan notes: ‘‘The most significant open issue is tax shelter 

registration and the impact registration will have on the solution.’’

The IRS has issued ‘‘listed transactions’’ that explicitly identify 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2 as potentially abusive tax shelters. 

Due to these tax products and others, the IRS is investigating 

KPMG to determine whether it is a tax shelter promoter and is 

complying with the tax shelter requirements in Federal law.219

At the November 18 hearing before this Subcommittee, KPMG 

was asked directly whether its tax professionals promoted the sale 

of its tax products to potential clients. Then head of KPMG’s Tax 

Practice avoided answering the question in sparring that lasted 

more than ten minutes, before finally admitting that KPMG did.220

A second consequence of KPMG’s public denial that it is a tax 

shelter promoter has been its refusal fully to comply with the document requests made by the IRS for lists of clients who purchased 

tax shelters from the firm. In a recent hearing before the Senate 

Finance Committee, the U.S. Department of Justice stated that, although the client-list maintenance requirement enacted by Congress ‘‘clearly precludes any claim of identity privilege for tax shelter customers regardless of whether the promoters happen to be accountants or lawyers, the issue continues to be the subject of vigorous litigation.’’ 221 The Department pointed out that one circuit 

court of appeals and four district courts had already ruled that accounting firms, law firms, and a bank must divulge client information requested by the IRS under the tax shelter laws, but certain 

accounting firms were continuing to contest IRS document requests. At the same hearing, the former IRS chief counsel characVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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222Testimony of B. John Williams, Jr. former IRS chief counsel, before the Senate Committee 

on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing 

About It?’’ (10/21/03), at 4–5. 223Testimony of Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, before the Senate Committee on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ 

(10/21/03), at 11. 224 Email dated 4/9/02, from Deke Carbo to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘Larry’s Message,’’ Bates KPMG 

0024467.

terized the refusal to disclose client names by invoking either attorney-client privilege or Section 7525 of the tax code as ‘‘frivolous,’’ 

while also noting that one effect of the ensuing litigation battles 

‘‘was to delay [promoter] audits to the point of losing one or more 

tax years to the statute of limitations.’’ 222

IRS Commissioner, Mark Everson, testified at the same hearing 

that the IRS had filed suit against KPMG in July 2002, ‘‘to compel 

the public accounting firm to disclose information to the IRS about 

all tax shelters it has marketed since 1998.’’ 223 He stated, ‘‘Although KPMG has produced many documents to the IRS, it has 

also withheld a substantial number.’’

Some of the documents obtained by the Subcommittee during its 

investigation illustrate the debate within KPMG over responding to 

the IRS requests for client names and other information. In April 

2002, one KPMG tax professional wrote:

I have two clients who are about to file [tax returns] for 2001. 

We have discussed with each of them what is happening between KPMG and IRS and both do not plan to disclose at this 

time. Since Larry’s message indicated the information requested was to respond to an IRS summons, I am concerned 

we are about to turn over a new list of names for transactions 

I believe IRS has no prior knowledge of. I need to know immediately if that is what is happening. It will obviously have a 

material effect on their evaluation of whether they wish to disclose and what positions they wish to take on their 2001 returns. Since April 15th is Monday, I need a response. . . . [I]f 

we are responding to what appears to be an IRS fishing expedition, it is going to reflect very badly on KPMG. Several clients have seriously questioned whether we are doing everything we can to protect their interests.224

Tax Return Reporting. KPMG also took a number of questionable steps to minimize the amount of information reported in tax 

returns about the transactions involved in its tax products in order 

to limit IRS detection. 

Perhaps the most disturbing of these actions was first taken in 

tax returns reporting transactions related to OPIS. To minimize information on the relevant tax returns and avoid alerting the IRS 

to the OPIS tax product, some KPMG tax professionals advised 

their OPIS clients to participate in the transactions through 

‘‘grantor trusts.’’ These KPMG tax professionals also advised their 

clients to file tax returns in which all of the losses from the OPIS 

transactions were ‘‘netted’’ with the capital gains realized by the 

taxpayer at the grantor trust level, instead of reporting each individual gain or loss, so that only a single, small net capital gain or 

loss would appear on the client’s personal income tax return. 

61

225 ‘‘Grantor Trust Reporting Requirements for Capital Transactions,’’ KPMG WNT internal 

memorandum (2/98). 226 Email dated 9/2/98, from Mark Watson to John Gardner, Jeffrey Eischeid, and others; 

‘‘RE:FW: Grantor trust memo,’’ Bates KPMG 0035807. See also email dated 9/3/98, from Mark 

Watson to Jeffrey Eischeid and John Gardner, ‘‘RE:FW: Grantor trust memo,’’ Bates KPMG 

0023331–32 (explaining objections to netting at the grantor trust level). 227 Email dated 1/21/99, from Mark Watson to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: Grantor 

trust reporting,’’ Bates KPMG 0010066. 228 Email dated 1/21/99, from Carl Hasting to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘FW: Grantor trust reporting,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0010066. 229 Email dated 1/22/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Carl Hasting, ‘‘FW: Grantor trust reporting,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0010066. Other OPIS tax return reporting issues are discussed in other KPMG 

documentation including, for example, memorandum dated 12/21/98, from Bob Simon/Margaret 

Lukes to Robin Paule, ‘‘Certain U.S. International Tax Reporting Requirements re: OPIS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0050630–40. 

This netting approach, advocated in an internally-distributed 

KPMG memorandum, 225 elicited intense debate within the firm. 

KPMG’s top WNT technical tax expert on the issue of grantor 

trusts wrote the following in two emails over the span of 4 months: 

I don’t think netting at the grantor trust level is a proper reporting position. Further, we have never prepared grantor 

trust returns in this manner. What will our explanation be 

when the Service and/or courts ask why we suddenly changed 

the way we prepared grantor trust returns/statements only for 

certain clients? When you put the OPIS transaction together 

with this ‘‘stealth’’ reporting approach, the whole thing 

stinks.’’ 226

You should all know that I do not agree with the conclusion 

reached in the attached memo that capital gains can be netted 

at the trust level. I believe we are filing misleading, and perhaps false, returns by taking this reporting position.227

One of the tax professionals selling OPIS wrote:

This ‘‘debate’’ . . . [over grantor trust netting] affects me in a 

significant way in that a number of my deals were sold giving 

the client the option of netting. . . . Therefore, if they ask me 

to net, I feel obligated to do so. These sales were before Watson 

went on record with his position and after the memo had been 

outstanding for some time.

What is our position as a group? Watson told me he believes 

it is a hazardous professional practice issue. Given that none 

of us wants to face such an issue, I need some guidance.228

The OPIS National Deployment Champion responded: ‘‘[W]e concluded that each partner must review the WNT memo and decide 

for themselves what position to take on their returns—after discussing the various pros and cons with their clients.’’ 229

The technical reviewer who opposed grantor trust netting told 

the Subcommittee staff that it was his understanding that, as the 

top WNT technical expert, his technical judgment on the matter 

should have stopped KPMG tax professionals from using or advocating the use of this technique and thought he had done so, before 

leaving for a KPMG post outside the United States. He told the 

Subcommittee staff he learned later, however, that the OPIS National Deployment Champion had convened a conference call without informing him and told the participating KPMG tax professionals that they could use the netting technique if they wished. He 

62

230Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 231 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00) at 256. 232Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). See also Memorandum of Telephone 

Call, dated 5/24/00, from Kevin Pace regarding a telephone conversation with Carl Hastings, 

Bates KPMG 0036353 (‘‘[T]here is quite a bit of activity in the trust area . . . because they have 

figured out that trusts are a common element in some of these shelter deals. So our best intelligence is that you are increasing your odds of being audited, not decreasing your odds by filing 

that Grantor Trust return. So we have discontinued doing that.’’) 233 Email dated 2/15/00, from Robert Jordan to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘Tax reporting for BLIPS,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0006537.

indicated that he also learned that some KPMG tax professionals 

were apparently advising BLIPS clients to use grantor trust netting to avoid alerting the IRS to their BLIPS transactions.230

In September 2000, the IRS issued Notice 2000–44, invalidating 

the BLIPS tax product. This notice included a strong warning 

against grantor trust netting:

[T]he Service and the Treasury have learned that certain persons who have promoted participation in transactions described in this notice have encouraged individual taxpayers to 

participate in such transactions in a manner designed to avoid 

the reporting of large capital gains from unrelated transactions 

on their individual income tax returns (Form 1040). Certain 

promoters have recommended that taxpayers participate in 

these transactions through grantor trusts and . . . advised 

that the capital gains and losses from these transactions may 

be netted, so that only a small net capital gain or loss is reported on the taxpayer’s individual income tax return. In addition to other penalties, any person who willfully conceals the 

amount of capital gains and losses in this manner, or who willfully counsels or advises such concealment, may be guilty of a 

criminal offense. . . .231

The technical reviewer who had opposed using grantor trust netting told the Subcommittee that, soon after this notice was published, he had received a telephone call from his WNT replacement 

informing him of the development and seeking his advice. He indicated that it was his understanding that a number of client calls 

were later made by KPMG tax professionals.232

Other tax return reporting concerns also arose in connection with 

BLIPS. In an email with the subject line, ‘‘Tax reporting for 

BLIPS,’’ a KPMG tax professional sent the following message to 

the BLIPS National Deployment Champion: ‘‘I don’t know if I 

missed this on a conference call or if there’s a memo floating 

around somewhere, but could we get specific guidance on the reporting of the BLIPS transaction. . . . I have ‘IRS matching’ concerns.’’ The email later continues:

One concern I have is the IRS trying to match the Deutsche 

dividend income which contains the Borrower LLC’s FEIN 

[Federal Employer Identification Number][.] (I understand 

they’re not too efficient on matching K–1’s but the dividends 

come through on a 1099 which they do attempt to match). I 

wouldn’t like to draw any scrutiny from the Service whatsoever. If we don’t file anything for Borrower LLC we could get 

a notice which would force us to explain where the dividends 

ultimately were reported. Not fatal but it is scrutiny nonetheless.233

63

234 Email dated 3/28/00, from Jean Monahan to Jeffrey Eischeid and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘presidio K–1s,’’ Bates KPMG 0024451. See also email dated 3/22/00, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘Nondisclosure,’’ Bates KPMG 0025704. 235 Email dated 3/27/00, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘presidio K–1s,’’ Bates KPMG 

0024451. 236See, e.g., emails dated 4/1/00–4/3/00 among Mark Ely, David Rivkin and other KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘RE: Blips and tax filing issues,’’ Bates KPMG 0006481–82; emails dated 3/23/00, 

between Mark Watson, Jeffrey Eischeid, David Rivkin and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: 

Blips and tax filing issues,’’ Bates KPMG 0006480. See also email dated 7/27/99, from Deke 

Carbo to Randall Bickham, Jeffrey Eischeid, and Shannon Liston, ‘‘Grouping BLIPS Investors,’’ 

KPMG Bates 0023350 (suggests ‘‘grouping’’ multiple, unrelated BLIPS investors in a single 

Deutsche Bank account, possibly styled as a joint venture account, which might not qualify as 

a partnership required to file a K–1 tax return); email response dated 7/27/99, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘Grouping BLIPS Investors,’’ KPMG Bates 0023350 (promises followup on 

suggestion which may ‘‘[solve] our grouping problem’’). 237See email dated 3/11/98 from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Potential 

FLIP Reporting Strategy,’’ Bates KPMG 0034372–75. See also internal KPMG memorandum 

dated 3/31/98, by Robin Paule, Los Angeles/Warner Center, ‘‘Form 5471 Filing Issues,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0011952–53; and internal KPMG memorandum dated 3/6/98, by Bob Simon and Margaret Lukes, ‘‘Potential FLIP Reporting Strategy,’’ Bates KPMG 0050644–45. 

About a month later, another KPMG tax professional wrote to 

the BLIPS National Deployment Champion:

We spoke to Steven Buss about the possibility of re-issuing the 

Presidio K–1’s in the EIN of the member of the single member 

[limited liability corporations used in BLIPS]. He said that you 

guys hashed it out on Friday 3/24 and in a nutshell, Presidio 

is not going to re-issue K–1’s.

David was wondering what the rationale was since the instructions and PPC say that single member LLCs are disregarded 

entities so 1099s, K–1’s should use the EIN of the single member.234

She received the following response:

It was discussed on the national conference call today. Tracey 

Stone has been working with Mark Ely on the issue. Ely has 

indicated that while the IRS may have the capability to match 

ID numbers for partnerships, they probably lack the resources 

to do so. While technically the K–1’s should have the social security number of the owner on them, it is my understanding 

that Mark has suggested that we not file a partnership for the 

single member LLC and that Presidio not file amended K–1’s. 

. . . Tracey indicated that Mark did not like the idea of having 

us prepare partnership returns this year because then the IRS 

would be looking for them in future years.235

Additional emails sent among various KPMG tax professionals discuss whether BLIPS participants should extend or amend their tax 

returns, or file certain other tax forms, again with repeated references to minimizing IRS scrutiny of client return information.236

In the case of FLIP, KPMG tax professionals devised a different 

approach to avoiding IRS detection.237 Again, the focus was on tax 

return reporting. The idea was to arrange for the offshore corporation involved in FLIP transactions to designate a fiscal year that 

ended in some month other than December in order to extend the 

year in which the corporation would have to report FLIP gains or 

losses on its tax return. For example, if the offshore corporation 

were to use a fiscal year ending in June, FLIP transactions which 

took place in August 1997, would not have to be reported on the 

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238 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013375–96, at 

13394. 239 ‘‘Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions,’’ report prepared by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Prt. 107–82 (1/2/03), 

at 32. 240 Email dated 3/25/00, from Larry Manth to Larry DeLap, Phillip Galbreath, Mark Springer, 

and Richard Smith, ‘‘RE: S-corp Product,’’ Bates KPMG 0016986–87. 241 Email dated 3/27/00, from Larry DeLap to Larry Manth, Phillip Galbreath, Mark Springer 

and Richard Smith, ‘‘RE: S-Corp Product,’’ Bates KPMG 0016986.

vidual taxpayer involved with the same FLIP transactions would 

have reported the gains or losses in his or her tax return for 1997. 

The point of arranging matters so that the FLIP transactions 

would be reported by the corporation and individual in tax returns 

for different years was simply to make it more difficult for the IRS 

to detect a link between the two participants in the FLIP transactions. 

In the case of SC2, KPMG advised its tax professionals to tell potential buyers worried about being audited:

[T]his transaction is very stealth. We are not generating losses 

or other highly visible items on the S-corp return. All income 

of the S-corp is allocated to the shareholders, it just so happens 

that one shareholder [the charity] will not pay tax.238

No Roadmaps. A Subcommittee hearing held in December 2002, 

on an abusive tax shelter sold by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. to 

Enron presented evidence that the bank and the company explicitly 

designed that tax shelter to avoid providing a ‘‘roadmap’’ to tax authorities.239 KPMG appears to have taken similar precautions in 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2. 

In the case of SC2, in an exchange of emails among senior 

KPMG tax professionals discussing whether to send clients a letter 

explicitly identifying SC2 as a high-risk strategy and outlining certain specific risks, the SC2 National Deployment Champion wrote:

[D]o we need to disclose the risk in the engagement letter? . . . 

Could we have an addendum that discloses the risks? If so, 

could the Service have access to that? Obviously the last thing 

we want to do is provide the Service with a road map.240

The DPP head responded:

If the risk has been disclosed and the IRS is successful in a 

challenge, the client can’t maintain he was bushwhacked because he wasn’t informed of the risk. . . . We could have a 

statement in the engagement letter that the client acknowledges receipt of a memorandum concerning risks associated 

with the strategy, then cover the double taxation risk and penalty risks (and other relevant risks) in that separate memorandum. Depending on how one interprets section 7525(b), 

such a memorandum arguably qualifies for the Federal confidential communications privilege under section 7525(a).241

This was not the only KPMG document that discussed using attorney-client or other legal privileges to limit disclosure of KPMG 

documents and activities related to its tax products. For example, 

a 1998 document contained handwritten notes from a KPMG tax 

professional about a number of issues related to OPIS states under 

65

242 Handwritten notes dated 3/4/98, author not indicated, regarding ‘‘Brown & Wood’’ and 

‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0047317. 243 Email dated 1/3/00, from Dale Baumann to ‘‘Jeff,’’ ‘‘988 election memo,’’ Bates KPMG 

0026345. 244 Email dated 9/16/98, from Bob to unknown recipients, ‘‘Documentation,’’ Bates KPMG 

0025729. Documents related to other KPMG tax products, such as TEMPEST and OTHELLO, 

contain similar information. See, e.g., message from Bob McCahill and Ken Jones, attached to 

an email dated 3/1/02, from Walter Duer to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: TCS Review 

of TEMPEST and OTHELLO,’’ Bates KPMG 0032378–80 (‘‘There is current IRS audit activity 

with respect to two early TEMPEST engagements. One situation is under fairly intense scrutiny 

by IRS Financial Institutions and Products specialists. . . . Although KPMG has yet to receive 

a subpoena or any other request for documents, client lists, etc. we believe it is likely that such 

a request(s) is inevitable. Since TEMPEST is a National Stratecon solution for which Bob McCahill and Bill Reilly were the Co-Champions . . . it is most efficient to have all file reviews and 

‘clean-ups’ (electronic or hard copy) performed in one location, namely the FS NYC office. This 

effort will be performed by selected NE Stratecon professionals . . . with ultimate review and 

final decision making by Ken Jones. . . . [W]e want the same approach to be followed for 

OTHELLO as outlined above for TEMPEST. Senior tax leadership, Jeff Stein and Rick Rosenthal concur with this approach.’’) 245See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to PFP Partners, ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43, at 2–3 (‘‘subject to their signing a confidentiality agreement’’); Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 6:02–CV–510 (District Court for the Middle District of Florida) Complaint (filed 4/29/02), at paragraph 9 (‘‘KPMG executives told [Mr. 

Jacoboni] he could not involve any other professionals because the investment ‘strategy’ [FLIP] 

was ‘confidential.’ ’’) (emphasis in original); Subcommittee interview of Mr. Jacoboni (4/4/03). 246 Email dated 6/8/98, from Gregg W. Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE[2]: 

OPIS,’’ Bates XX 001932 (emphasis in original). 

the heading, ‘‘Brown & Wood’’: ‘‘Privilege[:] B&W can play a big 

role at providing protection in this area.’’ 242

Other documents obtained by the Subcommittee include instructions by senior KPMG tax professionals to their staff not to keep 

certain revealing documentation in their files or to clean out their 

files, again, to avoid or limit detection of firm activity. For example, 

in the case of BLIPS, a KPMG tax professional sent an email to 

multiple colleagues stating: ‘‘You may want to remind everyone on 

Monday NOT to put a copy of Angie’s email on the 988 elections 

in their BLIPS file. It is a road map for the taxing authorities to 

all the other listed transactions. I continue to find faxes from 

Quadra in the files . . . in the two 1996 deals here which are 

under CA audit which reference multiple transactions—not good if 

we would have to turn them over to California.’’ 243 In the case of 

OPIS, a KPMG tax professional wrote: ‘‘I have quite a few documents/papers/notes related to the OPIS transaction. . . . Purging 

unnecessary information now pursuant to an established standard 

is probably ok. If the Service asks for information down the road 

(and we have it) we’ll have to give it to them I suspect. Input from 

(gulp) DPP may be appropriate.’’ 244

Marketing Restrictions. KPMG also took precautions against 

detection of its activities during the marketing of the four products 

studied by the Subcommittee. FLIP and OPIS were explained only 

after potential clients signed a confidentiality agreement promising 

not to disclose the information to anyone else.245 With OPIS, 

KPMG tax professionals were instructed ‘‘you should NOT leave 

this [marketing] material with clients or targets under any circumstances. Not only will this unduely [sic] harm our ability to 

keep the product confidential, it will DESTROY any chance the client may have to avoid the step transaction doctrine.’’ 246 In the case 

of BLIPS, KMPG tax professionals were instructed to obtain 

‘‘[s]igned nondisclosure agreements . . . before any meetings can 

66

247 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106. 248Subcommittee interview of Wachovia Bank representatives (3/25/03); Subcommittee interview of legal counsel of Theodore C. Swartz (9/16/03). 249 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106. 250 Email dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to Tax Professional Practice Partners, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052582. 251 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106. 252 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to WNT head David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0013311. 253 Email dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to Larry Manth, David Brockway, William 

Kelliher and others, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0013311. 

be scheduled.’’ 247 KPMG also limited the paperwork used to explain the products to clients. Client presentations were done on 

chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and written materials were 

retrieved from clients before leaving a meeting.248 KPMG determined as well that ‘‘[p]roviding a copy of a draft opinion letter will 

no longer be done to assist clients in their due diligence.’’ 249 In 

SC2, the DPP head instructed KPMG tax professionals not to provide any ‘‘sample documents’’ directly to a client.250

KPMG also attempted to place marketing restrictions on the 

number of products sold so that word of them would be restricted 

to a small circle. In the case of BLIPS, the DPP initially authorized 

only 50 to be sold.251 In the case of SC2, a senior tax professional 

warned against mass marketing the product to prevent the IRS 

from getting ‘‘wind of it’’: 

I was copied on the message below, which appears to indicate 

that the firm is intent on marketing the SC2 strategy to virtually every S corp with a pulse (if S corps had pulses). Going 

way back to Feb. 2000, when SC2 first reared its head, my 

recollection is that SC2 was intended to be limited to a relatively small number of large S corps. That plan made sense 

because, in my opinion, there was (and is) a strong risk of a 

successful IRS attack on SC2 if the IRS gets wind of it. . . . 

[T]he intimate group of S corps potentially targeted for SC2 

marketing has now expanded to 3,184 corporations. Call me 

paranoid, but I think that such a widespread marketing campaign is likely to bring KPMG and SC2 unwelcome attention 

from the IRS. . . . I realize the fees are attractive, but does 

the firm’s tax leadership really think that this is an appropriate strategy to mass market? 252

The DPP head responded: ‘‘We had a verbal agreement following 

a conference call with Rick Rosenthal earlier this year that SC2 

would not be mass marketed. In any case, the time has come to formally cease all marketing of SC2. Please so notify your deployment 

team and the marketing directors.’’ 253

(5) Disregarding Professional Ethics 

In addition to all the other problems identified in the Subcommittee investigation, troubling evidence emerged regarding how 

KPMG handled certain professional ethics issues, including issues 

related to fees, auditor independence, and conflicts of interest in 

legal representation. 

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254See, e.g., email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Simon 

Says,’’ Bates 638010, filed by the IRS on June 16, 2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02 

(addressing a dispute over which of two tax groups, Personal Financial Planning and International, should get credit for revenues generated by OPIS). 255Letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee, at 2. 256KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 31.11.1 at 31–6. 257See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 302 (‘‘[A] contingent fee is a fee established 

for the performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged 

unless a specified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise 

dependent upon the finding or result of such service.’’) 258See, e.g., AICPA Rule 302; 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01(c)(5) (SEC contingent fee prohibition: ‘‘An 

accountant is not independent if, any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accountant provides any service or product to an audit client for a contingent fee.’’); 

KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 32.4 on contingent fees in general and § 31.10.3 at 31–5 (DPP 

head determines whether specific KPMG fees comply with various rules on contingent fees.). In 

December 2004, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board proposed rules which would, 

among other provisions, bar any accounting firm that audits a publicly traded company from 

entering into a contingent fee arrangement with an audit client for tax services. 259Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03); memorandum dated 7/14/98, from 

Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026557–58. 260Memorandum dated 7/14/98, from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 

302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026555–59. 261 ‘‘CaTS’’ stands for KPMG’s Capital Transaction Services Group which was then in existence and charged with selling tax products to high net worth individuals. 

Contingent and Joint Fees. The fees charged by KPMG in 

connection with its tax products raise several concerns. It is clear 

that the lucrative nature of the fees drove the marketing efforts 

and helped convince other parties to participate.254 For example, 

KPMG made more than $124 million from just the four tax products featured in this Report. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood obtained 

fees for issuing concurring legal opinions on these three tax products, FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS, totaling more than $23 million.255

Traditionally, accounting firms charged flat fees or hourly fees 

for tax services. In the 1990’s, however, accounting firms began 

charging ‘‘value added’’ fees based on ‘‘the value of the services provided, as opposed to the time required to perform the services.’’ 256

In addition, some firms began charging ‘‘contingent fees’’ that were 

paid only if a client obtained specified results from the services offered, such as achieving specified tax savings.257 Many states prohibit accounting firms from charging contingent fees due to the improper incentives they create, and a number of SEC, IRS, state, 

and AICPA rules allow their use in only limited circumstances.258

Within KPMG, the head of DPP-Tax took the position that fees 

based on projected client tax savings were contingent fees prohibited by AICPA Rule 302.259 Other KPMG tax professionals disagreed, complained about the DPP interpretation, and pushed hard 

for fees based on projected tax savings. For example, one memorandum objecting to the DPP interpretation of Rule 302 warned 

that it ‘‘threatens the value to KPMG of a number of product development efforts,’’ ‘‘hampers our ability to price the solution on a 

value added basis,’’ and will cost the firm millions of dollars.260 The 

memorandum also objected strongly to applying the contingent fee 

prohibition to, not only the firm’s audit clients, but also to any individual who ‘‘exerts significant influence over’’ an audit client, such 

as a company director or officer, as required by the DPP. The 

memorandum stated this expansive reading of the prohibition was 

problematic, because ‘‘many, if not most, of our CaTS targets are 

officers/directors/shareholders of our assurance clients.’’ 261 The 

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262 If a client objected to the requested fee, KPMG would, on occasion, negotiate a lower final 

amount. 263Document dated 7/21/99, entitled ‘‘Action Required,’’ authored by Jeff Eischeid, Bates 

KPMG 0040502. See also, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 at 2 (‘‘In the past 

KPMG’s fee related to OPIS has been paid by Presidio. According to DPP-Assurance, this fee 

structure may constitute a contingent fee and, as a result, may be a prohibited arrangement. 

. . . KPMG’s fee must be a fixed amount and be paid directly by the client/target.’’) (emphasis 

in original). 264 Email dated 5/24/00, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Angie Napier of KPMG, ‘‘RE: 

BLIPS–7 percent,’’ Bates KPMG 0002557.

memorandum states: ‘‘At the present time, we do not know if DPP’s 

interpretation of Rule 302 has been adopted with the full awareness of the firm’s leadership. . . . However, it is our impression 

that no one other than DPP has fully considered the issue and its 

impact on the tax practice.’’

In the tax products examined by the Subcommittee, the fees 

charged by KPMG for BLIPS, OPIS, and FLIP were clearly based 

upon the client’s projected tax savings.262 In the case of BLIPS, for 

example, the BLIPS National Deployment Champion wrote the following description of the tax product and recommended that fees 

be set at 7% of the generated ‘‘tax loss’’ that clients would achieve 

on paper from the BLIPS transactions and could use to offset and 

shelter other income from taxation: 

BLIPS . . . [A] key objective is for the tax loss associated with 

the investment structure to offset/shelter the taxpayer’s other, 

unrelated, economic profits. . . . The all-in cost of the program, 

assuming a complete loss of investment principal, is 7% of the 

targeted tax loss (pre-tax). The tax benefit of the investment 

program, which ranges from 20% to 45% of the targeted tax 

loss, will depend on the taxpayer’s effective tax rates.

FEE: BLIPS is priced on a fixed fee basis which should approximate 1.25% of the tax loss. Note that this fee is included in 

the 7% described above.263

Another document, an email sent from Presidio to KPMG, provides additional detail on the 7% fee charged to BLIPS clients, ascribing ‘‘basis points’’ or portions of the 7% fee to be paid to various 

participants for various expenses. All of these basis points, in turn, 

depended upon the size of the client’s expected tax loss to determine their amount. The email states: 

The breakout for a typical deal is as follows:

Bank Fees 125

Mgmt Fees 275

Gu[aran]teed Pymt. 8

Net Int. Exp. 6

Trading Loss 70

KPMG 125

Net return to Class A 91 264

Virtually all BLIPS clients were charged this 7% fee. 

In the case of SC2, which was constructed to shelter certain S 

Corporation income otherwise attributable and taxable to the corporate owner, KPMG described SC2 fees as ‘‘fixed’’ at the beginning 

of the engagement at an amount that ‘‘generally . . . approximated 

10 percent of the expected average taxable income of the S CorVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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265Tax Solution Alert for S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy, FY00–28, revised 

as of 12/7/01, at 2. See also email dated 12/27/01, from Larry Manth to Andrew Atkin and other 

KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0048773 (describing SC2 fees as dependent upon 

client tax savings). 266 Id. 267Memorandum dated 7/1/98, from Gregg Ritchie and Jeffrey Zysik to ‘‘CaTS Team Members,’’ ‘‘OPIS Engagements—Prohibited States,’’ Bates KPMG 0011954. 268See ABA Model Rule 5.4, ‘‘A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer.’’ Reasons provided for this rule include ‘‘protect[ing] the lawyer’s professional independence 

of judgment.’’ 269KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 52.1.3 at 52–1. 270 Id., § 52.1.1 at 52–1. 271Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74, at 1373. 

poration for the 2 years following implementation.’’ 265 SC2 fees 

were set at a minimum of $500,000, and went as high as $2 million 

per client.266

The documents suggest that, at least in some cases, KPMG deliberately manipulated the way it handled certain tax products to circumvent state prohibitions on contingent fees. For example, a document related to OPIS identifies the states that prohibit contingent 

fees. Then, rather than prohibit OPIS transactions in those states 

or require an alternative fee structure, the memorandum directs 

KPMG tax professionals to make sure the OPIS engagement letter 

is signed, the engagement is managed, and the bulk of services is 

performed ‘‘in a jurisdiction that does not prohibit contingency 

fees.’’ 267

Still another issue involves joint fees. In the case of BLIPS, clients were charged a single fee equal to 7% of the tax losses to be 

generated by the BLIPS transactions. The client typically paid this 

fee to Presidio, an investment advisory firm, which then apportioned the fee amount among various firms according to certain factors. The fee recipients typically included KPMG, Presidio, participating banks, and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and one of the factors determining the fee apportionment was who had brought the 

client to the table. This fee splitting arrangement may violate restrictions on contingency and client referral fees, as well as an 

American Bar Association prohibition against law firms sharing 

legal fees with non-lawyers.268

Auditor Independence. Another professional ethics issue involves auditor independence. Deutsche Bank, HVB, and Wachovia 

Bank are all audit clients of KPMG, and at various times all three 

played roles in marketing or implementing KPMG tax products. 

Deutsche Bank and HVB provided literally billions of dollars in financing to make OPIS and BLIPS transactions possible. Wachovia, 

through First Union National Bank, referred clients to KPMG and 

was paid a fee for each client who actually purchased a tax product. 

KPMG Tax Services Manual states: ‘‘Due to independence considerations, the firm does not enter into alliances with SEC audit clients.’’ 269 KPMG defines an ‘‘alliance’’ as ‘‘a business relationship 

between KPMG and an outside firm in which the parties intend to 

work together for more than a single transaction.’’ 270 KPMG policy 

is that ‘‘[a]n oral business relationship that has the effect of creating an alliance should be treated as an alliance.’’ 271 Another provision in KPMG’s Tax Services Manual states: ‘‘The SEC considers 

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272 Id., § 52.5.2 at 52–6 (emphasis in original). The SEC ‘‘Business Relationships’’ regulation 

states: ‘‘An accountant is not independent if, at any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accounting firm or any covered person in the firm has any direct or material indirect business relationship with an audit client, or with persons associated with the audit 

client in a decision-making capacity, such as an audit client’s officers, directors, or substantial 

stockholders.’’ 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01(c)(3). 273 Undated document prepared by Deutsche Bank in 1999, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6906–10, at 6909–10. 274See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 (‘‘Currently, the only institution participating in the transaction is a KPMG audit client. . . . As a result, DPP-Assurance feels there 

may be an independence problem associated with our participation in OPIS. . . .’’); email dated 

2/11/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 

0037992 (‘‘The opinion letter refers to transactions with Deutsche Bank. If the transactions will 

always involve Deutsche Bank, we could have an independence issue.’’); email dated 4/20/99, 

from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011737–38 

(Deutsche Bank, a KPMG audit client, is conducting BLIPS transactions); email dated 11/30/

01, from Councill Leak to Larry Manth, ‘‘FW: First Union Customer Services,’’ Bates KPMG 

0050842 (lengthy discussion of auditor independence concerns and First Union). 275See, e.g., email dated 4/20/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011737–38 (discussing using Deutsche Bank, a KPMG audit client, in 

BLIPS transactions). 276See, e.g., Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ 

at page 1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–94. 277Presentation dated 3/6/00, ‘‘Post-Transaction Integration Service (PTIS)—Tax,’’ by Stan 

Wiseberg and Michele Zinn of Washington, D.C., Bates XX 001597–1611. 278See e.g. email dated 8/14/01, from Jeff Stein and Walter Duer to ‘‘KPMG LLP Partners, 

Managers and Staff,’’ ‘‘Stratecon Middle Market Initiative,’’ Bates KPMG 0050369. 

independence to be impaired when the firm has a direct or material 

indirect business relationship with an SEC audit client.’’ 272

Despite the SEC prohibition and the prohibitions and warnings 

in its own Tax Services Manual, KPMG worked with audit clients 

Deutsche Bank, HVB, and Wachovia, on multiple BLIPS, FLIP, 

and OPIS transactions. In fact, at Deutsche Bank, the KPMG partner in charge of Deutsche Bank audits in the United States expressly approved the bank’s accounting of the loans for the BLIPS 

transactions.273 KPMG tax professionals were aware that doing 

business with an audit client raised auditor independence concerns.274 KPMG apparently attempted to resolve the auditor independence issue by giving clients a choice of banks to use in the 

OPIS and BLIPS transactions, including at least one bank that was 

not a KPMG audit client.275 It is unclear, however, whether individuals actually could choose what bank to use. It is also unclear 

how providing clients with a choice of banks alleviated KPMG’s 

conflict of interest, since it still had a direct or material, indirect 

business relationship with banks whose financial statements were 

certified by KPMG auditors. 

A second set of auditor independence issues involves KPMG’s decision to market tax products to its own audit clients. Evidence appears throughout this Report of KPMG’s efforts to sell tax products 

to its audit clients or the officers, directors, or shareholders of its 

audit clients. This evidence includes instances in which KPMG 

mined its audit client data to develop a list of potential clients for 

a particular tax product; 276 tax products that were designed and 

explicitly called for ‘‘fostering cross-selling among assurance and 

tax professionals’’; 277 and marketing initiatives that explicitly 

called upon KPMG tax professionals to contact their audit partner 

counterparts and work with them to identify appropriate clients 

and pitch KPMG tax products to those audit clients.278 A KPMG 

memorandum cited earlier in this Report observed that ‘‘many, if 

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279Memorandum dated 7/14/98, from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 

302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026555–59. CaTS stands for the 

Capital Transaction Services Group, which was then in existence and charged with selling tax 

products to high net worth individuals. 280Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74. (Capitalization in original omitted.) 281 Id. at Bates XX 001369. 282Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74. 283 Id. at Bates XX 001370 (emphasis in original). 

not most, of our CaTS targets are officers/directors/shareholders of 

our assurance clients.’’ 279

By using its audit partners to identify potential clients and targeting its audit clients for tax product sales pitches, KPMG not 

only took advantage of its auditor-client relationship, but also created a conflict of interest in those cases where it successfully sold 

a tax product to an audit client. This conflict of interest arises 

when the KPMG auditor reviewing the client’s financial statements 

is required, as part of that review, to examine the client’s tax return and its use of the tax product to reduce its tax liability and 

increase its income. In such situations, KPMG is, in effect, auditing 

its own work. 

The inherent conflict of interest is apparent in the minutes of a 

1998 meeting held in New York between KPMG top tax and assurance professionals to address topics of concern to both divisions of 

KPMG.280 A written summary of this meeting includes as its first 

topic: ‘‘Accounting Considerations of New Tax Products.’’ The section makes a single point: ‘‘Some tax products have pre-tax accounting implications. DPP-Assurance’s role should be to review the 

accounting treatment, not to determine it.’’ 281 This characterization 

of the issue implies not only a tension between KPMG’s top auditing and tax professionals, but also an effort to diminish the authority of the top assurance professionals and make it clear that they 

may not ‘‘determine’’ the accounting treatment for new tax products. 

The next topic in the meeting summary is: ‘‘Financial Statement 

Treatment of Aggressive Tax Positions.’’ 282 Again, the section discloses an ongoing tension between KPMG’s top auditing and tax 

professionals on how to account for aggressive tax products in an 

audit client’s financial statements. The section notes that discussions had taken place and further discussions were planned ‘‘to determine whether modifications may be made’’ to KPMG’s policies 

on how ‘‘aggressive tax positions’’ should be treated in an audit client’s financial statements. An accompanying issue list implies that 

the focus of the discussions will be on weakening rather than 

strengthening the existing policies. For example, among the policies to be re-examined were KPMG’s policies that, ‘‘[n]o financial 

statement tax benefit should be provided unless it is probable the 

position will be allowed,’’ 283 and that the ‘‘probable of allowance’’ 

test had to be based solely on technical merits and could not consider the ‘‘probability’’ that a client might win a negotiated settlement with the IRS. The list also asked, in effect, whether the 

standard for including a financial statement tax benefit in a financial statement could be lowered to include, not only tax products 

that ‘‘should’’ survive an IRS challenge, which KPMG interprets as 

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284 Email dated 4/9/02, from Erin Collins to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘FLIPS/OPIS/

BLIPS Attorney Referrals,’’ Bates KPMG 0050113. See also email dated 11/4/02, from Ken Jones 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: Script,’’ Bates KPMG 0050130 (‘‘Attached is a list of 

law firms that are handling FLIP/OPIS cases. Note that there are easily another 15 or so law 

firms . . . but these are firms that we have dealt with in the past. Note that we are not making 

a recommendation, although if someone wants to talk about the various strengths/weaknesses 

of one firm vs. another . . . we can do that.’’). 285Letter dated 12/19/03, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan to the Subcommittee. See also 

Section VI(B) of this Report. 

having a 70% or higher probability, but also tax products that are 

‘‘more-likely-than-not’’ to withstand an IRS challenge, meaning a 

better than 50% probability. 

Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation. Another set of 

professional ethics issues involves legal representation of clients 

who, after purchasing a tax product from KPMG, have come under 

the scrutiny of the IRS for buying an illegal tax shelter and understating their tax liability on their tax returns. The mass marketing 

of tax products has led to mass enforcement efforts by the IRS 

after a tax product has been found to be abusive and the IRS obtains the lists of clients who purchased the product. In response, 

certain law firms have begun representing multiple clients undergoing IRS audit for purchasing similar tax shelters. 

One key issue involves KPMG’s role in referring its tax shelter 

clients to specific law firms. In 2002, KPMG assembled a list of 

‘‘friendly’’ attorneys and began steering its clients to them for legal 

representation. For example, an internal KPMG email providing 

guidance on ‘‘FLIPS/OPIS/BLIPS Attorney Referrals’’ states: ‘‘This 

is a list that our group put together. All of the attorneys are part 

of the coalition and friendly to the firm. Feel free to forward to a 

client if they would like a referral.’’ 284 The ‘‘coalition’’ referred to 

in the email is a group of attorneys who had begun working together to address IRS enforcement actions taken against taxpayers 

who had used the FLIP, OPIS or BLIPS tax products. 

One concern with the KPMG referral list is that at least some 

of the clients being steered to ‘‘friendly’’ law firms might want to 

sue KPMG itself for selling them an illegal tax shelter. In one instance examined by the Subcommittee, for example, a KPMG client 

under audit by the IRS for using BLIPS was referred by KPMG to 

a law firm, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, with which KPMG had 

a longstanding relationship but with which the client had no prior 

contact. In this particular instance, the law firm did not even have 

offices in the client’s state. While KPMG did not obtain a fee for 

making those client referrals, the firm likely gained favorable attention from the law firm for sending it multiple clients with similar cases. These facts suggest that Sutherland Asbill would owe a 

duty of loyalty to KPMG, not only as a longstanding and important 

client, but also as a welcome source of client referrals. In fact, although Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan represented 39 ‘‘matters,’’ involving 113 separate clients, in connection with a KPMG tax product or service, 17, or nearly half of these ‘‘matters’’ were directly 

attributable to referrals from KPMG.285 The conflict of interest 

issue here involves, not only whether KPMG should be referring its 

clients to a ‘‘friendly’’ law firm, but also whether the law firm itself 

should be accepting these clients, in light of the firm’s longstanding 

and close relationship with KPMG. 

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286Prepared statement of Richard Smith, Jr., Vice Chair, Tax Services, KPMG, Subcommittee 

Hearings (11/18/03). 287Letter dated 5/10/04 from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 2. 288See id., at 2. See also KPMG testimony at the Subcommittee hearing: ‘‘[W]e have shifted 

our approach from one focused on taking solutions to clients to one that works with clients to 

address their individual situations.’’ Testimony of Jeffrey Eischeid at Subcommittee Hearings 

(11/18/03). 289See testimony of Jeffrey Eischeid, Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03) (‘‘None of these strategies—nor anything like these strategies—is currently being presented to clients by KPMG. . . . 

Today, KPMG does not present any aggressive tax strategies specifically designed to be sold to 

multiple clients, like FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2.’’) KPMG also stated at the hearing: ‘‘[T]he 

strategies presented to our clients in the past were complex and technical, but were also consistent with the laws in place at the time, which were also extremely complicated.’’ Id. 290Letter dated 1/15/04, from Richard Smith, Jr., to the Subcommittee, at 8. In apparent contradiction to its action closing its own telemarketing center, KPMG disclosed that it had also 

contracted with MarketSource Corporation to perform centralized business development telemarketing for KPMG for the purpose of scheduling face-to-face or conference call appointments 

between KPMG professionals and prospective clients. Id. at 8–9. When asked about this telemarketing contract, KPMG subsequently informed the Subcommittee that the firm had also terminated all contracts with Marketsource for telemarketing services. KPMG meeting with the 

Subcommittee (5/12/04). 

(6) KPMG’s Current Status 

Finding: Since Subcommittee hearings in 2003, KPMG 

has committed to cultural, structural, and institutional 

changes to dismantle its abusive tax shelter practice, including by dismantling its tax shelter development, marketing and sale resources, dismantling certain tax practice groups, making leadership changes, and strengthening its tax services oversight and regulatory compliance.

At the Subcommittee hearing on November 18, 2003, the head of 

KPMG’s Tax Practice testified that ‘‘[i]t is no longer enough to say 

that a strategy complies with the law or meets technical standards. 

Today, the standard by which we judge our conduct is whether any 

action could in any way risk the reputations of KPMG or our clients.’’ 286 KPMG also told the Subcommittee that the firm ‘‘recognizes that certain tax strategies previously offered, and the manner 

in which they were offered, were inconsistent with the role expected of a professional organization to which public trust and confidence is indispensable.’’ 287

Dismantling its Tax Shelter Development, Marketing and 

Sales Infrastructure. As part of KPMG’s commitment not to engage in tax services that ‘‘could in any way risk the reputations of 

KPMG or [its] clients,’’ the firm announced a number of changes 

in its Tax Practice. KPMG informed the Subcommittee that it had 

refocused its tax services to emphasize advice tailored to a client’s 

specific facts and circumstances, rather than continue mass marketing generic tax products to multiple clients.288 KPMG also told 

the Subcommittee that it no longer offers, implements, or endorses 

aggressive strategies such as FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, or SC2.289

In addition, KPMG has indicated that it has dismantled much of 

the development, marketing, and sales infrastructure it had used 

to mass market its tax products to multiple clients. For example, 

KPMG has eliminated the Tax Innovation Center, which was responsible for coordinating the development and deployment of new 

generic tax strategies. It has closed the telemarketing center in 

Fort Wayne, Indiana, which KPMG had used to market tax products through cold calls and sales appointments.290 KPMG also inVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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291Letter dated 5/10/04, from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 2 and 5; KPMG meeting with 

the Subcommittee (5/12/04). 292Letter dated 5/10/04, from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 3. 293 Id., at 2. 294Letter dated 1/15/04, from Richard Smith, Jr., to the Subcommittee, at 2. 295 Id. at 3. 296PFP Practice Reorganization (5/18/01), ‘‘Innovative Strategies Business Plan—DRAFT,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0050620–23. 297 Id. As recently as last year KPMG seemed committed to maintaining or expanding tax 

services. For example, KPMG had provided the Subcommittee a 2003 list of more than 500 acformed the Subcommittee that it was in the process of ‘‘disbanding 

our network of business development managers,’’ although the current status of these employees is unclear.291 KPMG told the Subcommittee that it was also re-evaluating its personnel requirements for market research and account management.292 KPMG 

further announced that it had ‘‘abolished positions such as national 

deployment champions and area deployment champions,’’ which 

had been used to facilitate nationwide sales of its tax products to 

multiple clients.293

Dismantling of Stratecon and Innovative Strategies Practice Groups. At the November 18, 2003, Subcommittee hearing, 

the head of KPMG’s Tax Practice testified that two of the key practice groups responsible for the FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2 tax 

products, known as Stratecon and Innovative Solutions, had been 

disbanded. Under questioning by Senator Levin, the Tax Practice 

head testified that both groups had been eliminated in April 2002, 

when he first assumed his position as head of the Practice. When 

asked at the hearing about KPMG’s FY2003 organizational chart 

which listed Stratecon as a functioning office and a November 2002 

document listing tax products then being sold by Stratecon, 

KPMG’s Tax Practice head testified that the documents reflect ‘‘the 

fact that the systems that we had had not yet been changed at the 

particular point in time when this document was produced.’’

In a letter dated January 15, 2004, to the Subcommittee, KPMG 

clarified that the Stratecon and Innovative Strategies practice 

groups had actually been disbanded over a period of time, although 

the decision to terminate these groups had been made in April 

2002.294 In response to a request from the Subcommittee for contemporaneous documentation, KPMG provided a number of documents demonstrating the process undertaken to dismantle the 

Stratecon practice group. KPMG also stated, however, that it had 

‘‘not been able to locate any specific documentation relating to the 

closure or the decision to close Innovative Strategies.’’ 295

The absence of any Innovative Strategies documentation is particularly troubling in light of a draft Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan for 2002, which suggests that this group was continuing to 

work on abusive tax shelters. The 2002 draft business plan stated, 

for example, that after the IRS listed the BLIPS transaction as potentially abusive, KPMG had made the business decision to stay 

out of the loss generator business ‘‘for an appropriate period of 

time.’’ 296 Nevertheless, Innovative Strategies reported that it had 

continued to work on developing a new tax shelter product known 

as POPS, in which ‘‘[t]he last significant hurdle in aggressively taking the solution to market [SIC] will likely be obtaining a commitment from tax leadership to re-enter the individual ‘loss-generator’ 

business.’’ 297 In addition, the draft business plan identified six tax 

75

tive tax products for various tax practice groups, which were intended to be offered to multiple 

clients for a fee. 298Letter dated 5/10/04 from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 3. 299 Id. 300 Id.; KPMG meeting with the Subcommittee (5/12/04). 301Letter dated 5/10/04 from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 3. 302 Id.

products which had been approved for sale or were awaiting approval, and which were ‘‘expected to generate $27 million of revenue in fiscal ’02.’’ Two of these strategies, called ‘‘Leveraged Private Split Dollar’’ and ‘‘Monetization Tax Advisory Services,’’ were 

not explained, but were projected to generate $5 million in 2002 

fees each. 

On May 10, 2004, KPMG assured the Subcommittee that 

Stratecon and Innovative Strategies had been disbanded, because 

the firm ‘‘realized that these practices were not consistent with our 

commitment to upholding the trust placed in us by our clients, or 

with meeting the responsibilities incumbent upon us from our regulators and the public at large.’’ 298 KPMG indicated that of the 13 

partners and professionals assigned to Innovative Strategies, five 

have left the firm, two had been transferred to the Federal Tax 

practice and six had been transferred to the Personal Financial 

Planning practice. KPMG stated that of the approximately 115 

Stratecon professionals, 57 partners and professionals had left the 

firm, and the remaining 58 had been reassigned to other practice 

groups within the firm. KPMG told the Subcommittee that the individuals transferred from Stratecon and Innovative Strategies to 

other KPMG practices were ‘‘not involved with the development or 

deployment of aggressive look-alike strategies like FLIP, OPIS, 

BLIPS or SC2.’’ 299

Leadership Changes, Strengthening Oversight and Regulatory Compliance. In addition to dismantling various practice 

groups and tax development and marketing units, KPMG has reported taking steps to strengthen oversight and regulatory compliance within the firm. In May 2002, to strengthen the independence 

and objectivity of its regulatory compliance functions, for example, 

KPMG established a new senior position of Vice Chair for Risk and 

Regulatory Matters. This senior officer is authorized to report directly to the chief executive officer of KPMG rather than to any 

business unit.300 Another change is the establishment of a new position of a Partner in Charge of Risk and Regulatory Matters for 

Tax. This position is supposed to work independently of tax operations, report directly to the Vice Chair for Risk and Regulatory 

Matters, and wield ultimate authority to define the parameters for 

acceptable tax services.301

In addition, KPMG announced that it had strengthened the independence of its Department of Practice and Professionalism for Tax 

(DPP), which provides final approval of new KPMG tax products, 

helps draft KPMG tax analysis, helps determine which tax products should be registered with the IRS, and can take existing 

KPMG tax products off the market, among other tasks. KPMG told 

the Subcommittee that the head of DPP now reports directly to the 

Partner in Charge of Tax Risk and Regulatory Matters rather than 

to the business leaders of the Tax Practice.302 In light of the instances described in this Report in which the KPMG Tax Practice 

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303Letter dated 5/10/04 from KPMG to the Subcommittee, at 3–4. 304 Id., at 4. 305 Id. 306KPMG meeting with the Subcommittee (5/12/04). 307 Id.

head overruled or pressured the DPP head on matters related to 

tax shelters, this institutional change appears necessary and 

should help ensure that tax issues raising questions of reputational 

risk or legal or ethical concerns receive scrutiny from senior KPMG 

officers outside of the Tax Practice. 

In addition, KPMG told the Subcommittee that it has instituted 

a more rigorous and formal procedure to review its tax services, requiring three levels of approval. Approval is required from the 

Partner in Charge of Risk and Regulatory Matters for Tax, the 

Washington National Tax Practice, and the Department of Professional Practice for Tax. If any of these three withhold approval, the 

Partner in Charge of Risk and Regulatory Matters for Tax and the 

DPP-Tax make the ultimate joint determination on whether a proposed tax service is acceptable.303 In another change, KPMG said 

that it was requiring audit clients with tax services resulting in 

material financial statement benefits to obtain a ‘‘should’’ level tax 

opinion from a third party before KPMG would accept the financial 

statement benefits.304

KPMG also told the Subcommittee that it had instituted firmwide enhanced training programs to strengthen regulatory compliance.305 KPMG reported that this effort included intensive training 

on compliance with Treasury and IRS tax shelter regulations, compliance with Treasury and SEC auditor independence rules, and 

ethics matters. KPMG also indicated to the Subcommittee that the 

firm had registered a tax transaction with the IRS last year, which 

the Subcommittee understands is the first time it has done so.306

Tax Leadership Changes. On January 12, 2004, KPMG announced changes in its tax leadership. Jeffrey Stein, Deputy Chair 

of KPMG and former Vice Chair of Tax Services, was required to 

retire at the end of January, 2004. Richard Smith, Jr., then head 

of the Tax Services Practice, was removed from office and assigned 

to other duties within the firm. Jeff Eischeid, Partner in Charge of 

KPMG’s Personal Financial Planning Practice, was placed on administrative leave and later left the firm. 

KPMG indicated to the Subcommittee that these cultural, structural, and leadership changes reflect a firm-wide commitment to 

restoring KPMG’s reputation for professional excellence and integrity. The Subcommittee was told that the mandate to attain the 

highest degree of professional trust from the firm’s clients, regulators, and the public at large came directly from Eugene O’Kelly, 

KPMG’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. KPMG told the 

Subcommittee, ‘‘we are embarrassed, and we are committed to ensuring that the past will never happen again.’’ 307

Current Legal Proceedings. KPMG continues to be the subject 

of numerous legal proceedings related to its tax shelter activities. 

In February 2004, the media reported that the U.S. Attorney for 

the Southern District of New York had initiated a Federal grand 

jury investigation of KPMG regarding its participation in the sale 

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308See, e.g., David Cay Johnson, ‘‘Grand Jury is Investigating KPMG’s Sale of Tax Shelters,’’ 

New York Times, Feb. 20, 2004, at C5. 309 Id. 310 Id. 311See Testimony of Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Subcommittee 

Hearings (11/20/03). The law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist allegedly collaborated with The Diversified Group to create the COBRA tax shelter and allegedly participated in the sale of at least 

600 COBRA tax shelters, bringing the law firm substantial fees for issuing legal opinions letters. 

Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, American Lawyer, December 2003, at 65–66. 312General information about E&Y is taken from information provided by E&Y in response 

to the Subcommittee’s investigation and from Internet websites maintained by E&Y. 

cape at least $1.4 billion in Federal taxes.308 KPMG responded in 

a statement that ‘‘it is our understanding that the investigation is 

related to tax strategies that are no longer offered by the firm.’’ 309

KPMG also stated that ‘‘KPMG has taken strong actions as part 

of our ongoing consideration of the firm’s tax practices and procedures, including leadership changes announced last month and numerous changes in our risk management and review processes.’’ 310

The IRS and Department of Justice are continuing to investigate 

KPMG’s compliance with Federal tax shelter laws and regulations. 

At the Subcommittee hearing in 2003, IRS Commissioner Mark 

Everson testified that:

As you have learned some organizations have decided to turn 

away from the promotion of abusive tax shelters, have reached 

agreements with the IRS, and are moving on. That is good 

news. I believe it reflects a reassessment by these firms and 

an improvement in their professional ethics. Others, such as 

KPMG and Jenkins and Gilchrist, remain in litigation with the 

IRS and have not yet complied with our legitimate documents 

requests.311

As of the date of this report, KPMG remains in civil litigation with 

the IRS and Department of Justice over its tax shelter activities. 

In addition, KPMG remains the subject of civil suits filed by a 

number of its former clients who claim that KPMG improperly sold 

them illegal tax shelters. 

B. ERNST & YOUNG 

(1) Development of Mass-Marketed Generic Tax Products

Finding: During the period 1998 to 2002, Ernst & Young 

sold generic tax products to multiple clients despite evidence that some, such as CDS and COBRA, were potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters.

Ernst & Young (hereinafter ‘‘E&Y’’) was created after the 1989 

merger of the two firms Ernst & Ernst and Arthur Young & Company.312 A global firm with 670 locations in 140 different countries, 

E&Y currently employs about 100,000 individuals, including 20,000 

tax professionals worldwide. In 2002, it reported over $10 billion in 

revenues. It is managed by a 6-member Global Executive Board, 

and its current Chairman and Chief Executive Officer is James S. 

Turley. The current head of E&Y’s global tax practice is Vice Chair 

for Tax Services, Mark A. Weinberger. 

E&Y is organized into nine geographic areas, including the 

Americas Area which encompasses the United States. Like KPMG 

and PwC, E&Y is one of the four largest accounting firms operating 

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313See, e.g., email dated 10/26/99, from Brian L. Vaughn of E&Y to multiple E&Y tax professionals, Bates 2003EY011 (describing current status of seven E&Y tax products, including CDS, 

COBRA, SOAP, and PICANTE). For more information about COBRA, please see ‘‘Tax Shelters: 

Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling, and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ before the Senate 

Committee on Finance, S. Hrg. 108–371 (10/21/03) (including prepared statement of Henry 

Camferdam). 314See 1/17/00 email from Robert Coplan to numerous recipients re: ‘‘CDS Lives!,’’ Bates 

2003EY011613–14. 315Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 1. 316 E&Y meeting with the Subcommittee (5/4/04). 317 Email dated 10/26/99, from Brian L. Vaughn of E&Y to multiple tax professionals, Bates 

2003EY011. 318 Email dated 9/8/99, from Brian L. Vaughn of E&Y to multiple E&Y tax professionals, ‘‘Capital Loss/Ordinary Loss Technique,’’ Bates 2003EY011349. 319 Email dated 5/10/00, from Brian L. Vaughn of E&Y to multiple E&Y tax professionals, 

‘‘CDS Update,’’ Bates 2003 EY022850 (This email also states: ‘‘With your help we can make this 

goal. As of today, I have the following list of leads that have been given to me. Please send 

me your leads and the amount of potential loss. I want to help each of you obtain your own 

CDS goals. Please let me know how I can help. Also, please provide me with updates to this 

list. Thanks and good luck!!!’’). 

in the United States, and provides both audit and tax services to 

its clients. E&Y employs more than 23,000 individuals in the 

United States, including over 6,000 tax professionals. The current 

Chair of the Americas Area is James S. Turley. 

E&Y participated in the U.S. tax shelter industry during the periods relevant to the Subcommittee’s investigation. During that 

time, E&Y marketed a number of questionable tax products to multiple clients, including products known as the Contingent Deferred 

Swap (CDS), Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives 

(COBRA), SOAP, and PICANTE.313 E&Y marketed these tax products through a group of five to seven tax professionals initially 

called ‘‘VIPER’’ and later renamed the ‘‘more benign’’ and ‘‘less sinister sounding’’ Strategic Individual Solutions Group (SISG).314

E&Y told the Subcommittee that the tax products it sold to multiple clients generally were not developed in-house but originated 

with an outside source. E&Y explained that it examined each such 

tax product to ‘‘determine whether it was something that SISG 

would offer to its clients and, if it was, would usually take steps 

to restructure the strategy to enhance the likelihood that it would 

be sustained on the merits.’’ 315 E&Y also acknowledged that, during the years in question, the SISG review and approval process for 

new tax products was an ‘‘ad hoc, decentralized, and informal process.’’ 316

The documents show that E&Y engaged in an aggressive effort 

to develop and market generic tax products to multiple clients. For 

example, an internal E&Y email from October 1999, recites seven 

tax products then under development and closes with the statement: ‘‘As you can see, we have a great inventory of ideas. Let’s 

keep up the R&D to stay ahead of legislation and IRS movements.’’ 317 An E&Y email from September 1999, promises the imminent completion of a particular tax product and states: ‘‘We will 

have until 10/31 to market the strategy. . . . Once we roll this 

product out, I will travel to each area to help you present this 

strategy to your clients. . . . Let’s have fun with this new strategy 

and kick some KPMG, PWC and AA???’’ 318 Still another E&Y 

email, from May 2000, sets a nationwide sales goal for one of the 

firm’s tax products, asking its tax professionals to work to generate 

‘‘$1 billion of loss.’’ 319

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320Subcommittee interview of Robert Coplan (5/4/04). The Subcommittee was told that David 

Lippman-Smith of TPCMG made the initial contact with Richard Shapiro of E&Y. 321 Email dated 9/15/99, from Robert Coplan to Robert Garner, ‘‘Subject: VIPER PRODUCTS—

IRS Representation, etc.,’’ Bates 2003EY011387–88. 322See email dated 6/4/00, from Robert Coplan to multiple recipients, ‘‘SISG Solution Update—CDS Add-On,’’ Bates 2003EY011874–75; Contigent Deferred Strategy Powerpoint Slide 

(indicating that the $20 million swap payment offsets ordinary income in year paid and that 

termination of the swap produces a $20 million capital gain tax benefit in the following year). 323 Email dated 1/14/00 from Sixbelle@aol.com to Melinda Merk, ‘‘Subject: Re: Quick Question 

re: CDS,’’ (describing that David Smith ‘‘is the Managing Director of TPCMG (which of course 

is the general partner of the partnership). TPCMG has an office in California. David Smith is 

the only person in it. David directed the activities of the trading partnership through BOLTON. 

Bolton is located in Memphis, Tennessee.’’) Bates 2003EY011612. In 2000, TPCMG ceased its 

activities with the CDS transaction, and Bolton Capital Planning took over as the general partner of the trading partnerships. Subcommittee interview of Robert Coplan (5/4/04). 324 CDS was apparently approved by UBS’s internal tax, legal, and regulatory functions. However, the bank created some ‘‘bottlenecks’’ with executing transactions as each particular transaction was required to be submitted to the bank’s Chief Credit Officer, Marco Suter, to determine whether any specific transaction gave rise to unacceptable reputation risk for the bank. 

See email dated 9/28/99, names withheld, ‘‘Subject: Re: Fwd: CDS trades for TPCMG,’’ Bates 

2003EY011416. In 2000, UBS ceased its activities with CDS. In 2000–2001, Bear Sterns and 

Refco Bank participated as the counter-parties for the swaps and provided the loans. Letter 

dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 6. 325 Email dated 2/29/00, from Robert Garner to Robert Coplan, ‘‘Subject: VIPER Communication,’’ Bates 2003EY011660–61. 326 Id.

Contigent Deferred Swap. E&Y’s Contingent Deferred Swap 

or CDS was a particularly lucrative tax shelter for the firm and illustrates the firm’s flawed process for developing, marketing, and 

implementing potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters. 

E&Y first learned of CDS when, in 1998, it was approached by 

The Private Capital Management Group (TPCMG) which was then 

handling CDS transactions for PricewaterhouseCoopers.320 The tax 

shelter involved a transfer to a partnership that generates a level 

of trading activity designed to enable the partnership to achieve 

trading partnership status that, in turn, allegedly allows swap payments and other first year expenses of the partnership to be treated as ordinary losses that can offset the client’s ordinary income in 

that year.321 Upon termination of the transaction the following 

year, the taxpayer allegedly received the additional benefit of capital gains tax treatment generated by termination of the swap.322

Essentially, CDS was a conversion strategy, converting ordinary income to capital gains income, with the additional benefit of deferral. 

E&Y enlisted a number of professional firms to help carry out 

CDS transactions, including two investment firms TPCMG and 

Bolton Capital Planning. TPCMG acted as the general partner in 

each trading partnership involved in a CDS transaction and directed the activities of each partnership through Bolton Capital 

Planning.323 UBS was retained for the bank loans and swap agreements. 324 Locke, Liddell & Sapp provided clients with a legal 

opinion indicating that, if challenged by the IRS, CDS ‘‘should’’ be 

upheld in court.325

According to E&Y, in a typical CDS $20 million loss transaction, 

E&Y would receive $250,000, Bolton Capital Planning would receive $250,000, and Locke, Liddell & Sapp would receive 

$50,000.326 In its CDS engagement letters, E&Y expressed its fee 

as a flat dollar amount to avoid contingent fee issues; however, internal documents show that this fee was, in fact, calculated as 

1.25% of the tax loss to be generated through the CDS transVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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327 Email dated 9/15/99, from Robert Coplan to Robert Garner, ‘‘Subject: VIPER PRODUCTS—

IRS Representation, etc.,’’ Bates 2003EY011387–88. 328See Sample Engagement Letter, Bates 2003EY011138 (emphasis in original). 329 E&Y meeting with the Subcommittee (5/4/04). CDS was approved for sale in 1999. Subsequently, in 2000, E&Y required new tax products to undergo an independent review by firm tax 

professionals outside SISG. 330 An email from Robert B. Coplan of E&Y to Dickensg@aol.com, Bates 2003EY01139, states: 

‘‘As you know, we go to great lengths to line up a law firm to issue an opinion pursuant to a 

separate engagement letter from the client that is meant to make the law firm independent 

from us.’’

action.327 In fact, E&Y’s sample CDS engagement letter stated explicitly: ‘‘Our fee for providing the professional services referred to 

above will be $[Insert amount at 1.25% of losses to be generated. If size of transaction is not certain at the time this 

letter is signed, add ‘based on your investing $ million in 

the Partnership’] and it will be paid by the Partnership.’’ 328

The Subcommittee investigation found that the internal process 

used by E&Y to review and approve CDS was marked by 

dissention and dissatisfaction within the firm. E&Y indicated that 

SISG tax partners had conducted their own analysis of the technical merits of the CDS transaction in 1999, after consulting with 

other E&Y tax professionals and an outside law firm, and determined that CDS met the requirements of Federal tax law and could 

be sold by the firm.329 E&Y also acknowledged, however, that the 

firm never issued an opinion letter supporting the CDS tax product, either as one that ‘‘should’’ survive a legal challenge or as one 

that would ‘‘more likely than not’’ survive such a challenge. E&Y 

told the Subcommittee that it never issued a CDS opinion letter because, as a promoter of the product, E&Y was unable to provide a 

letter upon which its clients could reasonably rely to protect them 

from possible IRS penalties if CDS was challenged. E&Y said that 

it had, instead, arranged for an outside law firm, Lock, Liddell & 

Sapp, to provide clients with a CDS opinion letter.330

This explanation fails to acknowledge or disclose, however, the 

divergence of opinion within the firm regarding CDS’ technical 

merits. Internal documents show that some E&Y tax professionals 

outside of SISG raised serious concerns not only about the tax 

product’s technical validity, but also about the firm’s failure to disclose the risks associated with the product when marketing CDS to 

clients. On September 8, 1999, for example, one E&Y tax professional sent this email complaining how the firm had presented 

CDS to one of her clients:

It has come to my attention that our firm is not at the ‘‘should’’ 

level opinion with respect to this transaction. I clearly was 

under the impression from your references with my client that 

our firm, in particular, David Garlock, was behind this transaction. You indicated that we were not issuing an opinion because we would be considered a promoter—not because we 

would not issue a ‘‘should’’ opinion. . . .

I left the meeting, as did Meloni Hallock, with the impression 

that our firm, including David Garlock was at a ‘‘should’’ level 

of opinion on this transaction. It has come to my attention that 

the above statement is not entirely true. In fact, I think if you 

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331 Email exchange dated 9/8/99, between Mary Sigler of E&Y and Brian Vaughn of SISG, ‘‘Re: 

CDS Transaction,’’ Bates 2003EY011351–52. 332 Id. 333 Id. 334 Interview with E&Y representative (5/4/04). While E&Y wrote opinion letters supporting 

its SOAP and PICANTE tax products, it apparently did not write opinion letters for its CDS 

or COBRA products. According to E&Y, the firm issued opinions for SOAP and PICANTE because these products were less likely to give rise to a challenge by the IRS. However, E&Y told 

the Subcommittee that no investors who purchased a SOAP or PICANTE tax product were told 

that E&Y would be considered a promoter and therefore they could not rely on an E&Y opinion 

if challenged by the IRS. 335See, e.g., letter dated 10/1/99, from Brent Clifton, Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP, to Wolfgang 

Stolz, UBS, Bates 2003EY011434 (disclosing that the law firm had ‘‘undertaken a review of the 

proposed contingent deferred swap strategy (‘‘CDS’’) offered by the Private Capital Management 

Group (‘‘PCMG’’) and is prepared to issue a tax opinion in connection with each such transaction 

executed by a PCMG partnership following our engagement by each such partnership and our 

review of all relevant documentation.’’).

speak with David directly, as I have done, he isn’t even at 

‘‘more likely than not’’ let alone ‘‘should.’’ . . . 331

The SISG representative who had made the client presentation, responded:

David Garlock did review [Locke, Liddell & Sapp’s] opinion on 

our firm’s behalf. David may disagree with [the law firm’s] 

level of comfort, but his opinion was never needed in this situation. I represented to your client, our firm will not issue an 

opinion because the client could not rely on the opinion. This 

came from a discussion between Robert Coplan and Ron Friedman. Our firm will be considered a promoter in their view, and 

therefore, our clients cannot rely upon an EY opinion. . . .332

The E&Y tax professional replied:

[D]on’t you think if you were the client it would be an important fact for you to know if E&Y could not get to a ‘‘should’’ 

level on this transaction? Don’t you think that my client went 

away with the impression that not only the law firm was at 

a ‘‘should’’ level, but so must be E&Y since we said nothing to 

the contrary? Care to take any bets? 333

These emails demonstrate that at least two E&Y tax professionals lacked confidence in the CDS product; one was uncertain 

whether the product reached even a ‘‘more likely than not’’ standard. While SISG claimed that the firm did not issue an opinion 

supporting CDS because of its position as a promoter of the product, that argument appears to be inconsistent with E&Y’s actions 

with respect to other tax products, such as SOAP and PICANTE, 

in which E&Y acted as both promoter and a writer of favorable 

opinion letters.334

Locke Liddell and Sapp LLP did, however, issue legal opinions 

for CDS.335 According to one potential investor, however, the law 

firm’s opinion letter was deficient in many respects. The client’s 

legal advisor sent the following email to E&Y criticizing the opinion’s weak legal analysis: 

I have reviewed the materials you provided to me and from all 

indications, the transaction appears to be a classic ‘‘sham’’ tax 

shelter that would be successfully challenged on audit by IRS. 

The transaction apparently has little, or any, economic significance outside the tremendous tax breaks promised to the investors and is apparently highly tax motivated, as opposed to 

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336 Email dated 9/7/99, forwarded to Patricia Klitzke, ‘‘FW: CDS Transaction at Risk,’’ Bates 

2003EY011345–50. 337Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 8. 338 Email dated 5/10/00, from Brian Vaughn to multiple E&Y tax professionals, ‘‘CDS Update,’’ 

Bates 2003EY011850–51. 

being a bona fide transaction that people would invest in regardless of the tax breaks. The concept of a packaged tax shelter sold to investors who need specific tax breaks is under attack by the IRS and courts. My understanding is that IRS has 

a huge project underway to ferret out these types of tax shelters and will aggressively litigate them (expect penalties to be 

asserted, in addition to taxes and interest owed).

The opinion provided to me did not discuss the relevant facts, 

as I understand them. There was little discussion of the hedging within the transaction that will protect the investors 

against risk of loss or the high level of tax motivation behind 

the concept. The analysis of the downside to the transaction 

was weak and often irrelevant. Apparently, there is a dubious 

loan interest deduction for funds that will be parked in Treasuries. I understand that a very small portion of the investment 

will involve trading.

The largest problem with the structure and the opinion, however, is that the partnership is not engaged in a trade or business as a ‘‘trader;’’ but will have the status of an investor. 

Trader status is critical to claim the deductions discussed in 

the opinion. The opinion states that the general partner will 

delegate the actual trading to a Fund Manager. The opinion 

then wrongly states that the Fund Manager’s activities will be 

attributed to the partnership, thus making the partnership a 

trader. The opinion relies on Adda v CM (10 TC 273), 1458, a 

50-year-old case that has nothing to do with trader vs. investor 

status.

The opinion fails to address the relevant case law, which includes Mayer v CM, 94 USTC Para 50, 509 (1994), a case when 

[SIC] expressly states that the trading activities of others are 

not attributed to the taxpayer (citing the U.S. Supreme Court 

case of Higgins, 312 US 214) in support of its conclusion. 

Mayer unequivocally states that the taxpayer must personally 

made [SIC] the trading decisions and cannot delegate this task 

to others.

Based on what I have provided, my recommendation would be 

not to invest in this transaction until the issues raised in the 

email are satisfactorily addressed.336

This September 1999 email provides additional evidence that 

E&Y knew CDS had technical problems and could qualify as an 

abusive tax shelter. Despite this knowledge, E&Y made the decision to continue selling CDS in 1999 and 2000. 

E&Y apparently marketed CDS aggressively. From 1999 until 

2001, E&Y sold 70 CDS transactions involving 132 taxpayers, obtaining fees of more than $27.8 millions.337 The SISG group set an explicit goal in 2000, of using CDS to shelter $1 billion of losses.338

In April 2000, a key E&Y tax professional in SISG reported: ‘‘I just 

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339 Email dated 4/26/00, from Brian Vaughn of E&Y to Robert B. Coplan of E&Y, ‘‘CDS Update,’’ Bates 2003EY011830. 340 Email dated 7/18/00, from Robert Coplan, ‘‘Re: family-potential CDS deal,’’ Bates 

2003EY011938–39. 341 Id. 342 E&Y contended to the Subcommittee that its CDS fee was not dependent on the actual 

tax benefits received by the client and, thus, was not a contingent fee. 

wanted to update you on the success we are having with the CDS 

transaction in 2000. With the new UDS/Yen model as an option, 

the sales activity has drastically increased. . . . [W]e are well on 

our way to meeting the $1 billion loss goal we set at the beginning 

of this year.’’ 339 E&Y continued to market CDS and other tax products at the same time the IRS increased its efforts to stop abusive 

tax shelters. 

In early 2000, PricewaterhouseCoopers announced that, because 

the IRS had listed one of its tax products, the Bond and Options 

Sales Strategy (BOSS), as an abusive tax shelter, it would refund 

all BOSS fees to its clients. When a potential client asked whether 

E&Y would refund fees if the CDS transaction was subsequently 

determined to be abusive, the firm answered ‘‘an unequivocal no.’’ 

One E&Y tax professional wrote:

They are a client of mine . . . I suggested CDS (with the option 

add-on) as an alternative. They would like to move forward. 

However, there are two issues. One, the amount of income they 

wish to offset is $10 to $12 million rather than the $20 million. 

Second, against my advice they did the BOSS transaction last 

year. . . . They got most of their money back since PWC could 

not issue the opinion. They want a similar [deal] right here. If 

the opinion can’t be issued because of a change in the law they 

get a refund of the fee (or most of it, e.g. trading costs would 

not be refunded).340

In response, the SISG head wrote:

Finally, on the big issue of promising to give back the fee or 

some part of it if the deal doesn’t work, the answer is an unequivocal no. We are not able to do that, and I doubt PWC had 

that built into their engagement letter. WE have a dispute resolution procedure in our engagement letters that protects the 

client if he doesn’t receive the value he has paid for. Obviously, 

a big 5 firm would not retain a fee if the client was never put 

in a position to obtain the tax benefits on the transaction. But 

that doesn’t mean we could insert such a provision up front 

that would clearly make our fee contingent on the tax outcome 

of the transaction. That is nonnegotiable. We have been down 

this road many times before.341

It is ironic that E&Y rejected a client’s request for a refundable fee, 

in part, because it would be a non-permissible contingent fee dependent upon ‘‘the tax outcome of the transaction,’’ when, at the 

same time it was charging clients a CDS fee equal to a percentage 

of the client’s expected tax loss.342

In late 2000, CDS itself began attracting IRS attention, but even 

IRS inquiries did not deter E&Y from continuing to market the tax 

product to new clients. Bolton Capital Planning, the investment 

firm involved in carrying out CDS transactions, for example, inVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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343 Email dated 12/12/00, from Brian Vaughn to Robert Coplan, ‘‘Subject: New LLC strategy,’’ 

Bates 2003EY012125. 344 Email dated 1/5/01, from Robert Coplan to Quickstrike Team, ‘‘Subject: SISG Update, 1/

8 Conference Call,’’ Bates 2003EY012139–41. 345 Ernst & Young’s CDS transaction is covered by IRS Notice 2002–35 (2002–21 IRB 992) (5/

28/02). 

formed E&Y that it had received an IRS letter inquiring about 

CDS. An SISG tax professional responded in an email to his supervisor as follows:

With regard to CDS, we all knew one day we would receive a 

letter. We told our clients to expect the letter. What we don’t 

know at this point is whether the IRS will pursue an IRS exam 

of the strategy. You ask me this afternoon would I buy the 

strategy assuming the IRS was aware of the trade. The answer 

is definitely ‘‘YES.’’ Remember, the IRS knew about COBRA, 

but our clients still made the purchase. In fact, the clients continued to buy the ‘‘add-on’’ trade even though we knew the IRS 

was extremely familiar with the issues. If the IRS pursues and 

audit and we successfully defend the strategy, then why 

wouldn’t our clients want to buy the trade. It would be premature at this point to assume our clients would not buy a 

strategy that the IRS has knowledge of. Why don’t we let the 

clients decide? Therefore, I would like to propose that CDS is 

not ‘‘stopped’’ at this point. Brian Upchurch and I have a client 

that is considering CDS and I would be happy to let him know 

that the IRS has issued a notice to Bolton requesting information on the trade. My belief is he would say ‘‘so what.’’

That is my two cents worth. As I told you, I am a fighter. I 

don’t enjoy giving up before I get my chance to fight. Remember our opinion on CDS is a should. Let them bring their 

guns!!!! I believe they will turn their tales and run the other 

direction. CDS has economic substance and has the best promoter in the business associated with the trade. I think we 

owe it to Belle and ourselves not to give up and stop the sales 

process at this point. Let the clients decide.343

E&Y ultimately decided to continue selling CDS in 2001, with 

some revisions designed so that the ‘‘transaction would not have to 

be registered with the IRS.’’ 344 In fact, E&Y never registered CDS 

with the IRS at any time during the 3 years it sold the product. 

Instead, according to E&Y, it had an oral arrangement with 

TPCMG in 1999, and with Bolton Capital Planning in 2000, that 

the general partner of the CDS partnerships was responsible for 

registering specific CDS transactions with the IRS. 

In May 2002, the IRS listed the CDS transaction.345 In March 

2002 and June 2003, the IRS commenced two different investigations of E&Y’s tax shelter activities occurring between January 1, 

1995 and June 30, 2003. These investigations looked not only at 

CDS, but a variety of other tax products, including COBRA, SOAP, 

and PICANTE. On July 2, 2003, E&Y settled with the IRS. Along 

with a $15 million settlement payment, E&Y was required to institute systemic reforms of its tax strategies practice. 

At the time of the E&Y settlement, IRS Commissioner Mark 

Everson commented:

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346See Discussion of the Ernst & Young Agreement with the Internal Revenue Service. 347Testimony at Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03). 348Subcommittee meeting with Ernst & Young (5/4/04). 

This represents a real breakthrough and is a good working 

model for agreements with practitioners. . . . [W]e are trying 

to differentiate between those who cooperate with the IRS, who 

try to remedy past mistakes and who seek transparency in 

their dealings with the Service, and those others who simply 

refuse and continue to peddle abusive transactions. Our intention is to differ in our approach to them based on their behavior.346

At the November 18, 2003 Subcommittee hearing, Mark Weinberger, Vice Chair Tax Services, Ernst & Young, testified that the 

firm has ‘‘taken, and are taking, numerous steps to ensure that 

quality and professionalism are touchstones for everything that we 

do.’’ 347

(2) Ernst & Young’s Current Status 

Finding: Ernst & Young has committed to cultural, 

structural, and institutional changes to dismantle its tax 

shelter practice, including by eliminating the tax practice group that promoted its tax shelter sales, making 

leadership changes, and strengthening its tax oversight 

and regulatory compliance.

E&Y, along with their settlement with the IRS, committed to a 

number of cultural, structural, and institutional changes to dismantle its tax shelter practice, including by eliminating the tax 

practice group that promoted its tax shelter sales, establishing a 

new tax product review and approval process, and strengthening 

its tax services oversight and regulatory compliance. As a first step, 

E&Y disbanded the VIPER/SISG group that had taken the lead 

within the firm in selling CDS, COBRA, and other tax products to 

multiple clients. 

New IRS Registration and Compliance Monitoring Procedures. E&Y, as part of their settlement with the IRS, proposed the 

development and implementation of a Quality and Integrity Program (QIP) to strengthen its compliance with specific Federal requirements for tax shelter registration, client list maintenance, and 

disclosure of reportable transactions. This program, which E&Y 

said became operational on October 1, 2003, is staffed by four E&Y 

personnel who provide centralized national oversight to ensure 

compliance by E&Y tax professionals with compliance with Federal 

tax shelter regulations.348

E&Y told the Subcommittee that the QIP process requires that 

any tax transaction resulting in a fee in excess of $10,000 be recorded in a centralized database, so that the firm is aware of and 

can track all such transactions. The QIP database is also tied to 

the firm’s financial system so that, for example, if a client billing 

is in excess of $10,000 and does not have a corresponding QIP 

record, E&Y is able to identify this discrepancy and correct it. E&Y 

said that, for all transactions generating fees of $100,000 or more, 

QIP requires a tax shelter registration analysis. A QIP review 

board performs this registration analysis and, in cases where the 

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349Subcommittee meeting with Ernst & Young (5/4/04). According to E&Y, the firm recently 

solicited guidance from the IRS with respect to a transaction where the QIP review board was 

unable to determine if a potential transaction triggered registration requirements. 350These tax professionals consist of partners, principals, and senior managers, whose responsibilities include the engagement of clients for tax services. 351Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 5. 352 Id., at 1. 353 Id. 354Subcommittee meeting with Ernst & Young (5/4/04). 355Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 8–9. 356Subcommittee meeting with Ernst & Young (5/4/04). 357Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 1, 8. 

review board cannot reach agreement on the firm’s obligations, solicits guidance from the IRS.349

As part of the QIP implementation, 3,100 tax professionals were 

required to participate in a comprehensive review of the requirements related to registration and list maintenance as well as training on the QIP process. 350 E&Y requires annual certification of 

compliance with QIP by all partners, principals, senior managers, 

and tax compliance engagement managers.351

Institutional Changes. Aside from the settlement, Ernst & 

Young has instituted firm-wide policies and actions to improve 

E&Y professionalism. For example, E&Y established the position of 

Americas Vice Chair of Quality and Risk Management, charged 

with enhancing quality and compliance across all E&Y product 

lines in the United States, including tax services. The current ViceChair, Susan Friedman who, with a twenty person staff, reports directly to the E&Y Chairman.352

E&Y also established a new position, Americas Director for Tax 

Quality, charged with ensuring that all new tax products sold by 

E&Y in the United States meet high standards for professionalism 

and do not run afoul of Federal tax shelter prohibitions.353 To correct problems identified with E&Y’s past procedures for approving 

new tax products, which E&Y told the Subcommittee had been ad 

hoc, decentralized, and informal, this new position was created to 

ensure a centralized review processes and high standards.354 E&Y 

told the Subcommittee that, to assist in this effort, the Director for 

Tax Quality had recently created Tax Technical Review Committees for each of E&Y’s tax product functional areas, such as International Tax, Partnerships, and Mergers and Acquisitions. E&Y explained that these committees were charged with reviewing and 

approving technical tax issues in their areas of expertise.355 In 

cases where a Tax Technical Review Committee cannot reach consensus on a product or issue, E&Y said that the committee is required to notify the Director for Tax Quality to resolve the matter 

at issue. The current Americas Director for Tax Quality is Joseph 

Knott who reports directly to both the Vice Chair of Tax Services 

and the Vice Chair of Quality and Risk Management.356

In addition, in 2003, E&Y established a senior advisory Tax Review Board, whose members include senior executives from outside 

the firm’s Tax Practice to review the firm’s tax policies and procedures for current or proposed services and products. The Tax Review Board is supposed to conduct an annual review of all E&Y tax 

practice offerings in conjunction with the firm’s tax leadership; it 

may also discuss any matter warranting review on an interim 

basis. The Board is advisory to the Americas Vice Chair of Tax 

Services.357

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358Letter dated 5/3/04, from Ernst & Young to the Subcommittee, at 8–9. 359Subcommittee meeting with Ernst & Young (5/4/04). 360 Id. 361See, e.g., Camferdam v. Ernst & Young, (USDC SDNY) Case No. 02 Civ. 10100 (BSJ) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and other misconduct by E&Y for selling 

COBRA to the plaintiff). 362General information about PwC is drawn from documents produced to the Subcommittee 

and Internet websites maintained by PwC. 

Still another step taken by E&Y is the establishment of a Tax 

Quality Review program to review compliance by individual E&Y 

tax professionals with firm policies. E&Y told the Subcommittee 

that this review is supposed to be supervised by its National Tax 

Quality and Standards Group and that the review itself is to be 

performed by tax professionals from a practice unit other than the 

one of the individual being reviewed.358 E&Y indicated that every 

E&Y tax partner, principal, and senior manager providing tax advice will be reviewed at least once every 3 years by this program, 

separate and apart from E&Y’s annual performance evaluation 

process. 

E&Y indicated to the Subcommittee that all of E&Y’s cultural, 

structural, and institutional changes reflect a firm-wide commitment to quality and professionalism with the ‘‘mandate coming directly from James S. Turley, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.’’ 359 E&Y communicated that these changes are part of an ongoing process designed to ensure the highest professional standards.360

Current Legal Proceedings. Although E&Y has settled with 

the IRS with respect to its tax shelter registration and client list 

maintenance obligations, it remains the subject of other litigation 

over its tax shelter activities. In May 2004, the U.S. Attorney for 

the Southern District of New York apparently initiated a Federal 

grand jury investigation of E&Y regarding its sale of tax shelters 

to corporations and wealthy individuals to escape or reduce Federal 

taxes. That criminal inquiry is on-going. In addition, several former 

E&Y clients have sued the firm for improperly selling them illegal 

tax shelters.361

C. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 

(1) Mass-Marketed Generic Tax Products

Finding: During the period 1997 to 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers sold general tax products to multiple clients, despite evidence that some, such as FLIP, CDS, 

and BOSS, were abusive or potentially illegal tax shelters.

PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd., was created in 1998 

from the merger of two firms, Pricewaterhouse and Coopers & 

Lybrand.362 PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. encompasses an international network of member firms using the 

PricewaterhouseCoopers name. It operates in over 140 countries 

with more than 750 offices worldwide. As of June 2004, it employed 

more than 120,000 individuals and reported global net revenues totaling about $16.3 billion. The company is managed by a 19-member ‘‘Global Board.’’ The current chief executive officer of PriceVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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363PwC prepared statement for Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03). 364FLIP is covered by IRS Notice 2001–45 (2001–33 IRB 129). CDS transaction is covered by 

IRS Notice 2002–35 (2002–21 IRB 992) (5/28/02). BOSS is covered by IRS Notice 1999–59 (1999–

52 IRB 761). 365PwC prepared statement for Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03). 366Subcommittee meeting with PricewaterhouseCoopers (5/27/04). 367 Id. 368 Id.

waterhouseCoopers International Ltd. is Samuel A. DiPiazza, Jr., 

who is based in New York. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (hereinafter ‘‘PwC’’) is a U.S. limited liability partnerhip and a member of PricewaterhouseCoopers 

International Ltd. Like KPMG and Ernst &Young, PwC is one of 

the four largest accounting firms operating in the United States, 

and provides both audit and tax services to its clients. PwC is managed by a U.S. Executive Board. The current Chairman and Senior 

Partner heading PwC’s U.S. operations is Dennis M. Nally. The 

current head of PwC’s U.S. Tax Practice is Richard J. Berry who 

oversees more than 6,500 tax professionals. 

PwC participated in the U.S. tax shelter industry during the period relevant to the Subcommittee’s investigation. With respect to 

generic tax products marketed to multiple clients, PwC was involved in selling its version of the Foreign Leveraged Investment 

Program (FLIP), Contingent Deferred Swap (CDS), and the Bond 

and Options Sales Strategy (BOSS). PwC sold about 50 FLIP transactions to clients in 1997 and 1998, sold 26 CDS transactions in 

1998 and 1999, and was in the process of selling about 120 BOSS 

transactions in 1999, when the firm halted product sales and later 

refunded all BOSS fees.363 Each of these tax products has been 

identified by the IRS as an abusive tax shelter.364

PwC told the Subcommittee:

In the 1990’s there was increasing pressure in the marketplace 

for firms to develop aggressive tax shelters that could be marketed to large numbers of taxpayers. This had not been a traditional part of our tax practice, but regrettably our firm became 

involved in three types of these transactions.—Although the 

total number of transactions that were done was limited to 76 

over a 3-year period, we acknowledge that we should not have 

done any. Since late 1999, we have taken strong action to prevent our involvement in transactions like these again.365

Review and Approval Process in General. According to PwC, 

the firm’s development and sale of abusive tax products such as 

FLIP, CDS, and BOSS occurred due to a lack of a centralized review process with proper authority, accountability, and oversight.366

PwC told the Subcommittee, that during the 1997–1999 time 

frame, its review and approval process for new tax ideas, including 

FLIP, CDS, and BOSS, occurred on a decentralized and ad hoc 

basis.367 PwC indicated that, at that time, to analyze and develop 

a new tax product, individual business units within the firm typically established an internal, ad hoc review committee whose members were typically senior tax partners selected by the tax partners 

advocating the new tax idea.368 PwC explained that this committee 

then conducted a technical review of the proposed tax product to 

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369 Id. 370 Id. 371 Id. 372 Id. 373 Id. 374Subcommittee interview of John Larson (10/3/03). 375Subcommittee interview of Michael Schwartz (5/26/04). 376 Id.

determine whether it complied with Federal tax law, but did not 

consider such factors as reputational risk or ethics considerations.369 PwC indicated that it now recognizes that this process 

lacked independence from the business unit which stood to profit 

if the product was approved. 

PwC explained that the review committee was supposed to reach 

a consensus on whether ‘‘it was more likely than not’’ that the proposed tax idea would be upheld in court, if challenged by the IRS. 

PwC explained further, however, that individual committee members were not required personally to determine that the tax product met the requirements of the law; the standard was whether 

each member could reasonably see that others could reach a ‘‘more 

likely than not’’ conclusion on the technical merits.370 PwC told the 

Subcommittee that once a review committee approved a new tax 

product, the individual business unit that established the committee was then free to market it, without obtaining the approval 

of any other PwC authority, including PwC’s tax leadership or senior PwC partners outside of the tax practice. 

PwC told the Subcommittee that the review committee typically 

did not consider any issues related to the firm’s compliance with 

the IRS tax shelter registration or client list maintenance obligations and that, during the 1997–1999 period, these issues had, at 

times, received little or no attention in connection with the approval of a new tax product.371 PwC explained that while it had assigned these issues to its Practice and Procedures group, that 

group was focused primarily on handling audit controversies, obtaining private letter rulings from the IRS, and assisting clients resolve accounting issues.372 PwC also indicated that the Practice 

and Procedures group had been subject to little oversight, and the 

firm then lacked a centralized process for reviewing decisions regarding its tax shelter registration and list maintenance obligations.373

Developing, Marketing, and Implementing FLIP. PwC’s 

handling of the FLIP tax product demonstrates the firm’s flawed 

process for developing, marketing, and implementing potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters. 

FLIP, which was first developed by KPMG, apparently migrated 

to PwC after a KPMG tax partner familiar with the tax product 

took a position with one of PwC’s predecessor firms, Coopers & 

Lybrand. The Subcommittee was told that, in 1997, Michael 

Schwartz, a former KPMG tax partner and member of the KPMG 

development team for FLIP, 374 was hired by Coopers & Lybrand 

as an international tax partner to run the Foreign Bank Group.375

The Subcommittee was told that, after the merger between Coopers 

& Lybrand and Pricewaterhouse in 1998, Mr. Schwartz worked in 

the resulting firm’s Finance and Treasury Group.376

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377 Id. While Mr. Schwartz introduced partners to FLIP at Coopers & Lybrand and later PwC, 

these activities were apparently in addition to his primary duties serving clients within the Foreign Bank and Finance and Treasury Groups. Id. 378 Id. The Subcommittee was told that, from 1998 to 1999, PwC assigned additional staff, 

three managers and a tax partner, to assist Mr. Schwartz in explaining generic tax products 

to potential clients. Id. 379Prepared statement of Richard J. Berry, Senior Tax Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

during Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03). 380Letter dated 2/17/99 from Michael Schwartz, PwC, to Diane Stanford, Senior Vice President, First Union National Bank, Bates SEN–014602. 381 Id. 382Subcommittee interview of Quellos representative (11/7/03). 383Letter dated 5/10/04, from PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Subcommittee, at 2. 

PwC told the Subcommittee that Mr. Schwartz introduced the 

FLIP product to various partners at the firm and was responsible 

for presenting the tax product to potential clients.377 By 1998, the 

Personal Financial Services group within PwC had assumed the 

lead in marketing FLIP to potential clients and implementing FLIP 

transactions.378 PwC told the Subcommittee, that, altogether, in 

1997 and 1998, led by Mr. Schwartz, Coopers & Lybrand participated in 12 FLIP transactions and PwC participated in 38, for a 

total of 50.379

Like KPMG, PwC enlisted other professional firms in its tax 

shelter activities. For example, in addition to identifying potential 

FLIP clients on its own, PwC entered a client referral arrangement 

with First Union National Bank, which later merged with 

Wachovia National Bank. Under this arrangement, First Union 

agreed to refer its banking customers to PwC for a FLIP presentation. PwC also had an informal agreement with an investment 

firm called Quadra Investments, later renamed the Quellos Group, 

to carry out the complex financial transactions called for by the 

FLIP transaction. Quellos helped set up the offshore partnerships 

required by FLIP, for example, and also worked with various banks 

to arrange millions of dollars in required financing. Quellos performed similar services for KPMG. 

Among other actions to ensure the smooth implementation of 

FLIP transactions, PwC issued opinion letters to its clients, stating 

that it was ‘‘more likely than not’’ that FLIP would be upheld, if 

challenged by the IRS.380 PwC apparently continued to issue these 

favorable opinion letters even after learning that the FLIP transactions was the subject of Federal legislation. As PwC explained in 

a letter to First Union: 

We have determined with the help of our Washington National 

Office that the effective date [of the proposed legislation barring FLIP transactions] should occur well after any transactions currently contemplated have been completed. As well 

we have taken precautions that will allow us to accelerate the 

completion should we learn that the effective date could occur 

in advance of our expectations. . . . I can guarantee that we 

will be able to write an opinion letter for any of your clients 

that engage in this transaction. . . .381

Similar to KPMG and other promoters, PwC failed to register 

FLIP with the IRS as a tax shelter. The Subcommittee was told 

that, instead, PwC advised Quellos Group to register the tax shelter with the IRS.382 The 1998 and 1999 FLIP transactions, based 

upon the advice of PwC, were registered with the IRS.383 At the 

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384Quellos testimony at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03). 385See ‘‘An Overview of the Bond & Option Sales Strategy (‘Boss’),’’ Bates SEN–016966–7. 386Suppose, for example, that a client’s target income to be sheltered was $10 million. The 

BOSS transaction required the client to invest $850,000 from personal funds and obtain a $10 

million recourse loan from a cooperating bank. The client would then use these funds to purchase common shares of a newly created offshore entity, referred to here as Newco. A cooperating investment firm would then purchase preferred shares of Newco for $10.9 million. At the 

same time, Newco would borrow $10 million from the bank. Newco would then use its $31 million in capital ($10 million from the clients, $10.9 million from the investment firm, and $10 

million from the bank) to invest in two portfolios consisting of secure investments, such as 2-

year money market obligations from the cooperating bank. Newco would also enter into two financial transactions known as ‘‘swaps’’ involving the $10.25 million and $21.1 million portfolios. 

In the end, only $450,000 out of the $30 million would be actually invested into a hedge fund 

with a chance to earn profits. All $450,000 would be taken from the personal funds contributed 

by the client, while the remaining $450,000 contributed by the client would be spent on fees 

paid to PwC, the bank, and the investment firm. At the conclusion of 2 years, Newco would 

distribute its $10.25 million portfolio to the client subject to the bank loan. The client would 

claim a $10 million capital loss upon the sale of his investment in Newco, while the client’s loan 

of $10 million would ultimately be paid by Newco’s portfolio of secure investments. 

same time, however, Quellos failed to register KPMG’s FLIP transaction, even though the transactions were substantially the same, 

because, according to Quellos, KPMG had advised it not to register 

the product. Under questioning by Subcommittee Chairman Coleman at the November 20, 2003 hearing, the Quellos Chief Executive Officer testified that his firm had asked KPMG about registering FLIP and KPMG’s response was that ‘‘[w]e have done our 

analysis and it is our opinion that it does not need to be registered.’’ 384 The end result was that two substantially similar tax 

products, both called FLIP, received different registration treatment by Quellos, based upon differing advice provided by the two 

accounting firms using Quellos to help implement the FLIP transactions. In addition, neither accounting firm ever completed its own 

registration of FLIP, despite, in the case of PwC, advising another 

party to do so. 

Developing, Marketing, and Implementing BOSS. The Bond 

and Options Sales Strategy or BOSS tax product provides a second 

illustration of PwC’s flawed process for developing, marketing, and 

implementing potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters. 

The BOSS transaction was a so-called ‘‘loss generator’’ intended 

to produce either capital or ordinary income losses at the end of a 

2-year transaction which a client could then use to offset other income and shelter it from taxation.385 It required a series of complex 

financial transactions to be undertaken in certain ways and at certain times to generate the promised tax losses.386

Like KPMG’s BLIPS transaction, the BOSS transaction appeared 

to involve millions of dollars in at-risk investments when, in fact, 

the vast majority of funds used in the transaction were held in secure investments that posed little or no risk to the participating client, investment firm, or bank, while allegedly yielding multi-million dollar paper losses. The transaction typically required an outof-pocket cash investment by the client equal to 8.5% of the target 

income to be sheltered or tax loss to be achieved. About half of that 

amount was used to pay fees to PwC; the investment advisor 

known as The Private Capital Management Group; the investment 

manager of the hedge fund trading account for the transaction, 

Bolton Asset Management; and Refco Bank which provided financVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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387 ‘‘Capital BOSS attributes,’’ Bates SEN–016968. The evidence indicates that the typical 

BOSS fees for a $10 million capital loss transaction were as follows: PricewaterhouseCoopers—

$150,000; The Private Capital Management Group—$150,000; Bolton Asset Management—a 

performance based fee; and Refco Bank—$100,000. 388 ‘‘Capital BOSS attributes,’’ Bates SEN–016968. 389 Id. 390Minutes dated 4/22–23/99, of a meeting of First Union’s Financial Advisory Services, Enhanced Investment Strategies, Risk Management Process/Due Diligence Committee, (‘‘Basis Offset Strip Strategy (‘BOSS’) strategy minimizes ordinary income and/or capital gains. . . . The 

strategy will be in place by July to give as much time as possible between the steps of the strategy. This strategy will be a tax shelter due to the high level of leverage.’’), Bates SEN–014588–

89. 391Letter dated 5/10/04 from PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Subcommittee, at 1. 392Prepared statement of Richard J. Berry, Senior Tax Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 

Subcommittee Hearing (11/18/03). 393 BOSS—Basis Offset Strip Strategy, Critical Issues, May, 1999, Bates SEN–014599–600. 394 Id. 395PricewaterhouseCooper’s BOSS transaction is covered by IRS Notice 1999–59 (1999–52 

IRB 761). 396Letter dated 9/28/00 from Donald McMullen, First Union Vice Chairman, Capital Management Group to James Schiro, Chief Executive Officer, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Bates SEN–

016757–58. 

ing.387 While the transaction also required the client to take out a 

large bank loan equal to the target income to be sheltered, the 

transaction was structured so that ‘‘all debt can be repaid without 

the advance by [client] of additional personal funds.’’ 388 In short, 

the BOSS transaction was structured to allow the client to claim 

millions of dollars in tax losses, while limiting the actual funds at 

risk to the initial 8.5% cash contribution minus fees.389

Like the FLIP shelter, PwC used First Union to obtain referrals 

and access to the bank’s clients. In April 1999, senior PwC tax professionals presented the BOSS tax product to First Union’s Financial Advisory Services Due Diligence Committee. The meeting minutes attest that both First Union and PwC understood that ‘‘[t]his 

strategy will be a tax shelter due to the high level of leverage.’’ 390

First Union ultimately referred 25 investors to PwC for BOSS presentations.391

In 1999, PwC was in the process of selling 120 BOSS transactions in exchange for substantial fees.392 The evidence suggests 

that, at the time of these sales, PwC knew that this shelter was 

highly questionable. For example, a critical issues outline for BOSS 

indicates that ‘‘there exists no statutory or regulatory authority 

under Section 301 that illustrates a ‘reduction for liabilities’ ’’ as assumed by the tax product.393 The document also shows PwC was 

aware of legislative efforts to bar further use of the BOSS tax product. It notes ‘‘efforts underway in Congress to clarify the definition 

of ‘subject to a liability’ as opposed to ‘assumption of a liability’ ’’ 

which would have caused problems for BOSS, although ‘‘PWC 

views the current strategy—as being outside the scope of legislation being proposed.’’ 394 Despite the lack of statutory provisions 

supporting key elements of the BOSS strategy and pending legislative concerns, PwC continued to sell BOSS to its clients. 

In December 1999, prior to any legislative change, the IRS issued 

Notice 1999–59 identifying the BOSS transaction as an abusive tax 

shelter.395 For many customers, the ‘‘lynchpin of the BOSS strategy 

was the issuance of a PwC opinion, reflecting PwC’s interpretation, 

on which customers could rely.’’ 396 PwC also declared in a prepared statement issued at the time of the IRS notice that it was 

providing ‘‘advice to our clients with regard to legitimate tax-saving 

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397See John D. McKinnon, ‘‘IRS Moves to Disallow a Tax Shelter That Generates Paper Investment Losses,’’ Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1999 at A6. 398 Id. 399Letter dated 1/5/00, from PricewaterhouseCoopers to Dear Investor, ‘‘Re: Bond & Option 

Sales Strategy Investment,’’ Bates SEN–020060. 400PwC prepared testimony at Subcommittee hearings (11/18/03), at 54–55. 401 Id., at 59. 402 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, none of these tax strategies were determined by the 

IRS to require tax shelter registration. Letter dated 5/10/04 from PricewaterhouseCoopers to the 

Subcommittee, at 5. 403 Id.

opportunities.’’ 397 However, after IRS Notice 1999–59 was published, PwC apparently declined to issue new opinion letters for 

BOSS.398

Moreover, in early 2000, unlike other tax shelter promoters, PwC 

decided to refund clients approximately 85% of the cash they had 

invested in the BOSS transaction. That amount, according to PwC, 

included all fees paid by the client to PwC in connection with the 

BOSS transaction.399

According to PwC, its negative experience with the BOSS tax 

product convinced the firm to abandon its abusive tax shelter activities. A senior PwC Tax Partner testified at the Subcommittee 

hearing as follows:

The BOSS transaction triggered widespread public attention 

and controversy in the fall of 1999. As a result, we decided that 

we had made a regrettable mistake being in this business. Our 

reputation was hurt, our clients and people were embarrassed. 

...

We got out of this business immediately. We established an 

independent and centralized quality control group. We 

strengthened our procedures ensure that we would never again 

engage in this activity. . . .

We take responsibility for our actions, and we have learned 

from our mistakes.400

In response to questioning by Chairman Coleman, Mr. Berry testified that, ‘‘with respect to the BOSS transaction, . . . that in my 

judgment is an abusive shelter, . . . With respect to FLIP and 

CDS, if not abusive, they come very close to that line. . . . We regret that we ever got involved in those transactions, and we would 

not do them today.’’ 401

On June 26, 2002, PwC settled with the IRS regarding the compliance and registration requirements of the tax law for the promotion of abusive tax shelters. PwC told the Subcommittee that it 

was the first accounting firm to settle with the IRS. PwC entered 

into a settlement agreement with the IRS in which PwC agreed to 

make a $10 million payment to the IRS, turn over certain client 

lists, and allow the IRS to review not only its quality control procedures but over 130 tax planning strategies intended for sale to 

multiple clients.402 According to PwC, the IRS reviewed their quality control procedures and told PwC that they were comprehensive, 

thorough, and effective.403

(2) PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Current Status 

Finding: PricewaterhouseCoopers has committed to cultural, structural, and institutional changes intended to 

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404Subcommittee meeting with PricewaterhouseCoopers (5/27/04). 405PwC prepared statement at Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03), at 4. 406See id., at 4. 407Subcommittee meeting with PricewaterhouseCoopers (5/27/04). 408 Id. 409 Id. 410Subcommittee meeting with PricewaterhouseCooopers (5/27/04). 411 Id. 412Letter dated 5/10/04, from PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Subcommittee, at 6–7. 

dismantle its abusive tax shelter practice, including by 

establishing a centralized quality and risk management 

process, and strengthening its tax services oversight 

and regulatory compliance.

According to PwC, after BOSS was identified by the IRS in December 1999, as an abusive tax shelter, PwC’s senior management 

recognized that BOSS, CDS, and FLIP represented an ‘‘institutional failure’’ and undertook a number of reforms to ensure that 

similar abusive tax shelters would not be marketed by PwC in the 

future.404

Leadership and Institutional Changes. PwC stated that, as 

a first step in late 1999, it disbanded the group of tax professionals 

responsible for the sale of FLIP, CDS, and BOSS.405 In 2000, PwC 

appointed a new head of its U.S. Tax Practice, Richard Berry, and 

charged him with establishing a centralized quality and risk management function for the firm’s tax practice. As Head of Tax Services, Richard Berry reports directly to the Chief Executive Officer 

of PwC. 

In the summer of 2000, PwC created a new Quality and Risk 

Management group to oversee the development of new PwC tax 

products and services, prevent PwC’s participation in abusive tax 

shelters, and protect PwC from reputational risk.406 The Quality 

and Risk Management Group (Q&RM) was established as an independent administrative unit within the Tax Practice separate from 

its other business units.407 The Q&RM head reports to the head of 

the U.S. Tax Practice. The Q&RM group currently has seven fulltime partners and five other professional staff.408 In addition, nine 

tax partners in PwC regional offices spend one-third to one-half of 

their time on Q&RM duties, advancing quality and risk management policies and procedures across the firm’s nine U.S. regions.409

PwC told the Subcommittee that the Q&RM head was also made 

a member of PwC’s Tax Core Leadership group. This group includes the leaders of each of PwC’s tax services business units, and 

PwC indicated that the Q&RM head was included to ensure that 

Q&RM was aware of the tax products and services being offered by 

each business unit and to place the Q&RM head on an equal footing with PwC’s other tax leaders.410 According to PwC, the Tax 

Core Leadership has weekly conference calls, face-to-face meetings 

once a month, and meetings with tax professionals three times a 

year.411

Centralized Product Development Process. In addition to 

the Quality and Risk Management group, PwC established a new 

centralized tax product development process for all tax products 

and services.412 PwC explained that this ‘‘quality review process is 

comprehensive and has differing levels of review depending upon 

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413PwC prepared statement at Subcommittee Hearings (11/18/03), at 5. 414Subcommittee meeting with PricewaterhouseCoopers (5/27/04). 415 Id.

the complexity of the issues involved.’’ 413 As part of this process, 

PwC created a new PINNACLE database as a centralized repository for tax service offerings that the firm may provide to more 

than one client.414 PwC requires every proposed new tax product 

intended to be offered to more than one client be entered into the 

database so that senior PwC leadership could track and monitor all 

product development. PwC also requires that its business unit leaders affirm annually that all of the tax products implemented for 

more than one client have been included in the PINNACLE database.415 PwC further requires the authors of specific tax products 

to review the PINNACLE database on a semi-annual basis to identify any compliance problems, changes in the law, or other matters. 

In addition, PwC established a centralized review and approval 

process for all new PwC tax products. For tax products that may 

be applicable to more than one client but not widely applicable, socalled ‘‘Shared Solutions,’’ PwC requires the proposed product to be 

reviewed and approved by a senior tax partner or recognized tax 

expert prior to submission into the PINNACLE database. Once included in the database, PwC requires Q&RM to review the products and determine whether Q&RM approval or Tax Core Leadership approval is required. 

For tax products deemed potentially suitable for national distribution, so-called ‘‘Distributed Solutions,’’ PwC requires additional levels of review. PwC told the Subcommittee that the proposed product must first undergo a technical analysis by ‘‘appropriate specialists,’’ a preliminary ‘‘qualification’’ review by a Q&RM 

partner, and a preliminary review by a member of Tax leadership 

to identify potential problems. PwC indicated that Q&RM also has 

the authority to establish an independent review panel of experts 

to review the proposal further. PwC indicated that this panel typically consists of three tax partners who must be independent of the 

tax professionals developing the tax product and who must reach 

unanimous agreement on its technical merits in order for the proposal to advance. PwC indicated that Q&RM could also require approval of Tax Core Leadership which considers such factors as tax 

policy, firm ethics, and the risk of adverse publicity. PwC then requires final approval of the proposed ‘‘Distributed Solution’’ by both 

Q&RM and its Federal Tax Policy group. 

PwC also implemented a system requiring mandatory Q&RM 

training for all PwC tax professionals lasting 2 days every 4 

months. The required course includes computer-based training regarding IRS registration and list maintenance obligations. 

At the Subcommittee hearing on November 18, 2003, PwC testified:

Our experience almost 4 years ago served as a wake-up call to 

the Tax practice. Our partners were adamant that we get out 

of this business immediately. We shut down the largest transaction and returned all of our fees. We settled with the IRS. 

We implemented comprehensive quality control procedures to 

ensure that the firm would never again be engaged in the marVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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416For more information on the role of law firms in abusive tax shelters, see e.g., ‘‘Helter Shelter,’’ American Lawyer (12/03), at 65 (Jenkins and Gilchrist’s tax partner Paul Daugerdas wrote 

legal opinions and participated in the sale of at least 600 COBRA tax shelters promoted by E&Y 

and the Diversified Group). 417See ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosh,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03). 418 Id. 419See email dated 12/24/97, from R.J. Ruble to Randall S. Bickham, ‘‘Confidential Matters,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0047356–57. 420See, e.g., letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee at 

4; Subcommittee interview of Randall Bickham (11/17/03). 

keting and development of potentially abusive tax products. As 

a firm, this was the best thing that could have happened to us. 

We acknowledge our actions and we have learned from this regrettable mistake. 

VI. ROLE OF LAWYERS 

Accounting firms were far from the only professional firms active 

in the U.S. tax shelter industry. Some large, respected law firms 

also played a prominent role as illustrated by the following two 

case histories.416

A. SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD 

Finding: Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, through its predecessor firm Brown & Wood, provided legal services that 

facilitated the development and sale of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, including by providing design assistance, collaboration on allegedly ‘‘independent’’ tax opinion letters, and hundreds of boilerplate 

tax opinion letters to clients referred by KPMG and others, in return for substantial fees.

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (hereinafter ‘‘Brown & Wood’’) provided legal services that included design assistance on potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters as well as collaboration on opinion 

letters representing to clients that a tax product could withstand 

an IRS challenge. In return, Brown & Wood received substantial 

fees. According to the IRS, Brown & Wood provided approximately 

600 opinions for at least 13 ‘‘listed’’ or other potentially abusive tax 

shelters, including KPMG’s FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, E&Y’s COBRA, 

and PwC’s BOSS.417 Brown & Wood’s participation was coordinated and directed largely through the efforts of one Brown & 

Wood tax partner, R.J. Ruble.418

The evidence shows, for example, that Brown & Wood had a close 

relationship with KPMG that lasted at least 5 years and involved 

at least three key KPMG tax products, FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. 

One of the earlier communications uncovered by the Subcommittee 

is a December 1997 email sent by R.J. Ruble to a KPMG tax partner informing KPMG that Mr. Ruble knew various people in the 

‘‘tax advantaged product’’ area.419 While Brown & Wood and 

KPMG both deny entering into a formal agreement to develop or 

market tax products, 420 some documents suggest that an alliance 

did exist in practice. One 1997 KPMG email states, for example, 

that KPMG and Brown & Wood had formed an alliance or agreement ‘‘to jointly develop and market tax products and jointly share 

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421See email dated 12/15/97, from Randall Bickham at KPMG to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Joint Products,’’ Exhibit 116. 422Memorandum dated 12/19/97, from Randall S. Bickham to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘Business 

Model—Brown & Wood Strategic Alliance,’’ Bates KPMG 0047228–30. 423See Memorandum dated 3/2/98, from Randall S. Bickham to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘B&W Meeting,’’ Bates KPMG 0047358–59. 424 Brown & Wood New Matter Memorandum dated 1/6/99, Bates SIDL–SCGA082444. 425 Email dated 12/3/98, from Randall Bickham to numerous recipients including R.J. Ruble, 

‘‘RE: Blips meeting,’’ Bates KPMG 0037336. 426Memorandum dated 12/3/98, from R.J. Ruble to Randy Bickham, George Theofel, ‘‘Re: 

BLIPS,’’ Bates SIDL–SCGA083244.

in the fees.’’ 421 Another 1997 KPMG memorandum proposes that 

a Brown & Wood strategic alliance ‘‘can make significant contributions to the product development process and would allow immediate brand recognition.’’ 422 Still another KPMG memorandum, in 

1998, discusses an upcoming meeting with R.J. Ruble to ‘‘institutionalize the KPMG/B&W relationship.’’ 423 A 1999 Brown & Wood 

memorandum indicates that the law firm’s management committee 

had specifically approved BLIPS as a new client matter for tax advice services to KPMG.424

Other evidence details the nature of the interactions between 

Brown & Wood and KPMG. Some suggest that R.J. Ruble participated in the development of KPMG tax products like BLIPS. For 

example, an email regarding BLIPS sent on December 3, 1998 from 

KPMG to various KPMG employees states:

I spoke with R.J. this morning about a ‘‘tax-focused’’ meeting 

next week. As a first step before scheduling a meeting, we 

thought that we should first draft the base of an opinion letter 

in an outline format. . . . [W]e are currently working on the 

document and expect to circulate it next week.425

A memorandum dated December 3, 1998, from R.J. Ruble to KPMG 

demonstrates the detailed technical nature of the assistance contributed by Mr. Ruble to the development of BLIPS. Mr. Ruble 

writes:

In looking at the bond premium rules in another context (i.e. 

a legitimate deal), I found an issue that we need to address for 

BLIPS. As I read it, the treatment of bond premium received 

by an issuer is governed by Treas. Reg. 161–12(c) and Treas. 

Reg. 1.163–13. The latter treats the premium as an offset to 

the issuer’s interest deduction. The former provides that it not 

included in income when received and by reference to the latter. . . .

When the investor transfers the assets subject to the loan to 

the partnership, I have always assumed that the partnership’s 

acquisition of the property is governed solely by section 721 

etc. Is this true? Could 1.61–12 over ride. Even if it did could 

we also say that the drop down of [the] amount equal to the 

premium would create an offsetting deduction. Am I worrying 

too much? 426

Such communications indicate that Mr. Ruble was part of the development team for BLIPS at its earliest stages. In fact, the advice 

offered by him in his December 1998 email was provided 3 months 

before KPMG initiated its formal internal review and approval 

process for BLIPS in February 1999. 

98

427 Email dated 2/3/00, from R.J. Ruble to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘RE: RJ Ruble’s email.’’ Bates 

KPMG 0033591. 428 Email dated 2/22/00, from Jean Monahan to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘Subject: OPIS opinions,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0033585. 429 Email dated 11/9/98, from numerous authors to numerous recipients, ‘‘Subject: FLIP opinions for,’’ Bates KPMG 0033447. 430Letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee, at 2. 431 Email dated 5/15/00, from Angie Napier to Jeffrey Eischeid and others, ‘‘B&W fees and generic FLIP rep letter,’’ Bates KPMG 0036342.

In addition to development assistance, Brown & Wood provided 

a steady steam of concurring legal opinions to purchasers of 

KPMG’s FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS tax shelters. The evidence also 

suggests that the opinion writing for these tax products was a collaborative rather than independent process. For example one Ruble 

email to KPMG on BLIPS asks: ‘‘[D]id Shannon [KPMG employee] 

ever do the side by side comparison to make sure our legal analysis 

were compatible? Any changes she might suggest would be important.’’ 427 Another KPMG email on BLIPS and OPIS states: 

Client just called, do we have an ETA on when we should be 

seeing the Brown & Wood OPIS opinions? It is my understanding the [SIC] for both BLIPS and OPIS, B&W is using 

our opinion as the starting point for their opinion? 428

Still another KPMG email on FLIP states: ‘‘Brown & Wood requested a copy of the [FLIP] opinions to issue their opinion.’’ 429

Eventually, in the case of BLIPS, KPMG and Brown & Wood actually exchanged copies of their drafts, eventually issuing two allegedly independent opinion letters that contained numerous, virtually 

identical paragraphs. The evidence suggesting side-by-side comparisons and Brown & Wood’s use of KPMG opinions to write its 

own supposedly ‘‘independent’’ legal opinions shows that Brown & 

Wood and KPMG were close collaborators, rather than independent 

actors. 

Brown & Wood received lucrative fees for writing opinion letters 

supporting tax products like FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. Brown & 

Wood told the Subcommittee that it estimates that that the firm 

wrote 62 opinions for FLIP, 72 opinions for OPIS, and 180 opinions 

for BLIPS.430

Brown & Wood documents show that the firm was paid at least 

$50,000 for each of these legal opinions. Documents and interview 

evidence obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that the law firm 

was paid even more in transactions intended to provide clients with 

large tax losses, and that the amount paid to the law firm may 

have been linked directly to the size of the client’s expected tax 

loss. For example, one email describing the fee amounts to be paid 

to Brown & Wood in BLIPS and OPIS deals appears to assign to 

the law firm ‘‘basis points’’ or percentages of the client’s expected 

tax loss:

Brown & Wood fees:

Quadra OPIS98—30 bpts 

Quadra OPIS99—30 bpts

Presidio OPIS98—25 bpts 

Presidio OPIS99—25 bpts 

BLIPS—30 bpts 431

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432Letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee, at 2. 433 Email dated 7/20/97, from Angie Napier to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘FW: brown & wood,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0036577. 434See Billing Records, ‘‘Cash Receipts,’’ Bates SIDL–SCGA039315; SIDL–SCGA037620; 

SIDL–SCBA063485; and SIDL–SCGA006056. 435Letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee, at 2 (‘‘it appears that approximately 2,500 hours were recorded by Mr. Ruble with respect to KPMG transactions.’’). 436 In October 2003, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood terminated R.J. Ruble for breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of its partnership agreements. 437Prepared statement of Thomas R. Smith, Jr., Tax Partner, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 

at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03). 

Brown & Wood estimates that the firm received $3,418, 290 in fees 

from FLIP, $6,427,637 from OPIS, and $13,286,790 from BLIPS for 

a grand total of more than $23 million.432

It is also important to note that most of the ‘‘independent’’ Brown 

& Wood opinions apparently did not require extensive effort, but 

could be produced quickly. For example, an email states: ‘‘[i]f you 

have a KPMG opinion, you should also have a B&W opinion. We 

do ours and they use it as a factual template for their opinion, usually within 48 hours.’’ 433 In fact, Brown & Wood reported to the 

Subcommittee that, in December 1999 alone, it issued 65 BLIPS 

opinions totaling approximately $9,290,476.434 This data indicates 

that the law firm issued an average of two or more BLIPS opinions 

per day, at a cost of $142,000 per opinion—very quick and lucrative 

work. Brown & Wood also estimated that, altogether, Mr. Ruble 

spent about 2,500 hours preparing legal opinions for KPMG tax 

products, a pace that, in light of the firm’s overall $23 million in 

fees, generated an average hourly rate of more than $9,000 per 

billable hour.435

American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.5 states that ‘‘[a] 

lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee,’’ and cites as the factors to consider when setting 

a fee amount ‘‘the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 

the legal service properly.’’ Brown & Wood charged the same minimum fee—more in cases of larger transactions—for each legal 

opinion it issued to a FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS client, even when opinions drafted after the initial prototype opinion contained no new 

facts or legal analysis, were virtually identical to the prototype except for client names, and in many cases required no client consultation. These fees, with few costs after the prototype opinion 

was drafted, raised questions about the firm’s compliance with 

ABA Model Rule 1.5. 

At the Subcommittee hearings, Mr. Ruble, invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to questioning by the Subcommittee.436 Thomas R. Smith, Jr., former 

managing partner of Brown & Wood, testified that Mr. Ruble was 

virtually the only lawyer within the firm engaged in providing concurring opinions for generic tax products sold to multiple clients.437

He also testified that the firm Brown & Wood was unable to 

produce a copy of the firm’s written procedures for reviewing tax 

opinion letters prior to 2000, and did not, until recently, maintain 

a central file of the letters actually sent to clients. 

Mr. Smith testified at the hearing that, before a tax opinion letter was issued by the firm, Brown & Wood had required approval 

of the draft opinion by a second tax partner, but the firm had no 

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438Letter dated 1/16/04, from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to the Subcommittee, at 4. 439 Id. 440 Id. at 3. 441Letter dated 12/19/03, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan to the Subcommittee, at Exhibit 

B. 

procedures for tracking compliance with that requirement. After 

the hearing, a letter provided by the law firm stated that none of 

the partners in the tax department considered themselves to have 

functioned as the requisite reviewing partner for the Ruble opinions.438 The letter also indicated that although the firm had made 

the decision to discontinue the practice of issuing generic tax product opinions in May 2001, after Brown & Wood merged with another law firm, Sidley Austin, the firm discovered that additional 

opinions by Mr. Ruble had been issued after the date of the merger, in clear violation of the firm’s policy decision.439

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood told the Subcommittee that to correct the problems uncovered in connection with Mr. Ruble, the firm 

hired in 2003, a tax attorney whose principal responsibility is to 

monitor internal procedures respecting tax matters and compliance 

with IRS requirements.440

B. SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN 

Finding: Sutherland Asbill & Brennan provided legal 

representation to over 100 former KPMG clients in tax 

shelter matters before the IRS, despite a longstanding 

business relationship with KPMG and without performing any conflict of interest analysis prior to undertaking these representations.

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan is a law firm that played a very 

different role in the U.S. tax shelter industry. It did not help develop, promote, or implement tax shelters; nor did it write legal 

opinions supporting tax shelters. Instead, Sutherland Asbill & 

Brennan’s role was to defend clients accused by the IRS of buying 

illegal tax shelters and understating their tax liabilities. Because 

many clients bought the same or similar tax shelter products from 

the same promoter, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan at times represented multiple clients in IRS and court proceedings, and at 

times attempted to negotiate ‘‘global settlement agreements’’ with 

the IRS that would allow multiple taxpayers to resolve their 

desputes. 

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan was one of a number of so-called 

‘‘friendly’’ law firms to which KPMG referred tax shelter participants for legal representation after the IRS had initiated enforcement action against them. KPMG apparently considered Sutherland Asbill & Brennan a ‘‘friendly’’ law firm due to the firm’s longstanding and ongoing representation of KPMG in business litigation matters unrelated to cases involving tax shelters. In most of 

these cases, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan had defended KPMG 

against claims of malpractice by former clients. In fact, Sutherland 

Asbill & Brennan told the Subcommittee that, for the 4-year period 

from 1998 to 2002, KPMG had paid the firm $13.9 million for legal 

representation in matters unrelated to tax shelters.441 In light of 

the law firm’s longstanding close relationship with KPMG, one of 

the issues examined by the Subcommittee was whether a potential 

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442 Id. 443 Id., at Exhibits A and B. 444 Id., at 5. 445See, e.g., engagement letter dated 7/3/02, between Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP and 

the client, Bates SA 001964.

conflict of interest existed regarding this law firm’s representation 

of former KPMG clients in tax shelter matters raising questions 

about the quality of advice rendered by KPMG to those clients. 

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan told the Subcommittee that it had 

engaged in 39 ‘‘matters,’’ involving a total of 113 separate clients, 

in connection with KPMG tax products such as FLIP, OPIS, or 

BLIPS.442 The firm also told the Subcommittee that at least 17 of 

these ‘‘matters’’ had come from KPMG referrals, while an additional 8 referrals came from Quellos Group, which was the investment advisor for KPMG’s FLIP and OPIS transactions, or 

Wachovia Bank, whose subsidiary, First Union National Bank, had 

referred bank customers to KPMG for tax products.443 This data 

indicates that the majority of the law firm’s KPMG clients resulted 

from direct referrals by KPMG or other professional entities affiliated with the KPMG tax products. 

While both KPMG and a former KPMG client have an immediate 

joint interest in defending the validity of the tax product that 

KPMG sold and the client purchased, the interests of these two 

parties could quickly diverge if the suspect tax product is found to 

be in violation of Federal tax law. This divergence in interests has 

happened repeatedly since 2002, as more than a dozen lawsuits 

have been filed by former KPMG clients seeking past fees paid to 

the firm and additional damages for KPMG’s selling them an illegal tax shelter. 

A lawyer has a professional responsibility to analyze whether a 

conflict of issue may impede his or her ability to zealously assert 

a client’s interest. Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, in response to the 

Subcommittee’s request, was unable to produce any written procedures for undertaking this type of conflict of interest analysis prior 

to accepting a client engagement. It was also unable to produce any 

analysis prepared prior to entering into its representation of former 

KPMG clients in matters involving KPMG tax products.444

The firm did produce, however, engagement letters signed by 

former KPMG clients, informing these clients of a possible conflict 

of interest should they wish to sue the accounting firm that sold 

them the illegal tax shelter. For example, each engagement letter 

signed by a former KPMG client, in which the client agreed to pay 

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan to represent him before the IRS in 

connection with a KPMG tax product, contained this disclosure:

In the event you desire to pursue claims against the parties 

who advised you to enter into the transaction, we would not be 

able to represent you in any such claims because of the broad 

malpractice defense practice of our litigation team (representing all of the Big Five accounting firms, for example).445

According to one KPMG client interviewed by the Subcommittee, 

he had not understood at the time that the above statement meant 

that Sutherland Asbill & Brennan was already representing KPMG 

in other ‘‘malpractice defense’’ matters and therefore could not represent him if he decided to sue KPMG for selling him an illegal 

102

446This client asked Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP about the merits of suing KPMG and 

was told that the firm could not represent him in such a legal action. Subsequently, the client 

switched to new legal counsel. 447KPMG has told the Subcommittee that this is the only instance it knows in which a former 

KPMG client has ended up suing KPMG for selling an illegal tax shelter. Letter dated 12/9/

03, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan to the Subcommittee, at 5. 448Letter dated 2/13/02, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP to client, at 1. Bates 

SAB0035. 449Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP attorney notes to file, dated 7/14/02. Bates SAB0174. 450 Id., Bates SAB0052. 451 Id., Bates SAB0053. 

shelter.446 This client told the Subcommittee that he had hired the 

law firm solely on the recommendation of KPMG—he had never 

employed the firm before, and it did not even have an office in his 

state. The client told the Subcommittee that when he finally understood that the law firm was already representing KPMG in other 

matters, he switched counsel from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan to 

another firm and eventually decided to sue KPMG for selling him 

an illegal tax shelter.447

This former KPMG client was apparently not the only client unclear about the significance of the disclosure in the engagement letter. For example, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan wrote the following 

to another KPMG tax shelter participant to clarify the significance 

of the disclosure:

All this paragraph is meant to tell you is that because of a conflict, we could not represent you in the pursuit of any claim 

against the parties who advised you in connection with the 

transaction. It was meant to alert you to this in case you wanted to retain someone who was not conflicted to advise you of 

your rights in that respect.

This paragraph clearly was not meant to waive any rights that 

you might have against any of the parties who advised you to 

enter into the transaction. . . .448

A review of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan attorney notes to client 

files of other KPMG clients indicates that other KPMG clients 

seemed to have expressed interest in exploring the merits of suing 

KPMG and to be unaware of the law firm’s inability to pursue such 

claims on the client’s behalf. One attorney’s notes state: ‘‘I advise[d] 

him that I cannot advise [the former KPMG client] about any 

rights he has vis a vis KPMG.’’ This statement was made after the 

former KPMG client had signed an engagement letter with Sutherland Asbill & Brennan.449 Another attorney’s notes disclose: ‘‘They 

also asked [about] suits against promoters. I told them that ‘I need 

to duck my head in the sand on these.’ I purposefully try not to 

know anything.’’ 450 Later, the same client ‘‘asked again about 

suing KPMG.’’ 451 Both of these conversations took place after the 

former KPMG client had signed an engagement letter with the law 

firm. In short, the firm’s ‘‘blanket disclosure’’ in its engagement letter seemed to leave at least some clients uninformed about Sutherland Asbill & Brennan’s longstanding relationship with KPMG and 

the inability of the law firm to consider filing suit against KPMG 

for selling illegal tax shelters, due to its duty of loyalty to its longtime client, KPMG. 

In another matter involving a former KPMG client, Sutherland 

Asbill & Brennan ‘‘engaged KPMG’’ itself to assist the law firm in 

103

452 Engagement letter dated 9/3/02, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan and KPMG, Bates 

SAB0180–82. 453Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP attorney notes to file, dated 11/24/03. Bates SAB0024. 454 Email dated 7/11/02, from Ken Jones to Jeffrey Eischeid, then forwarded to multiple 

KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG0027990. 455See, e.g., letter dated 11/18/03, from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP to the Subcommittee, at 2. Bates XX–002186. 

its representation of the former KPMG client, including with respect to ‘‘investigation of facts, review of tax issues, and other such 

matters as Counsel may direct.’’ 452 This engagement meant that 

KPMG, as Sutherland Asbill’s agent, would be given access to confidential information related to its client’s legal representation, and 

that KPMG itself would be providing key information and analysis 

in the case. It also meant that the KPMG client would be paying 

for the services provided by the same accounting firm that had sold 

him the tax shelter. Sutherland Asbill & Brennan told the Subcommittee that, despite this engagement letter, the law firm never 

actually utilized the services of KPMG in this case. In still another 

matter, the law firm’s notes suggest that a former KPMG client 

wanted to exclude all KPMG participation from their case, but the 

law firm demurred: ‘‘The only reason I see to cut KPMG out completely is if they want to sue. And we cannot advise on that.’’ 453

Still another disturbing document is a 2002 email from one 

KPMG tax professional to another, later forwarded to numerous 

additional KPMG tax professionals stating that KPMG had been 

given notes taken by a Sutherland Asbill & Brennan attorney during a meeting with the IRS.454 The email states: ‘‘Notes from Jerry 

Cohen’s meeting w/IRS on the 9th. You may distribute this. Please 

not[e] the comments on Flip/Opis.’’ This email suggests that the 

law firm was sharing information with KPMG about tax shelter 

discussions that the law firm held with the IRS while representing 

KPMG’s former clients. This information was of such interest that 

KPMG sent it to more than three dozen of its tax professionals. 

Such information sharing—obtained on behalf of one client and 

shared with a party that is not being legally represented by the 

firm in the same manner 455—raises additional questions about the 

law firm’s dual loyalties. 

The preamble to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 

Rules states ‘‘a lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a 

representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public 

citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. . . . 

As (an) advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 

under the rules of the adversary system.’’ The problem with the 

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan representation is the conflict of interest that arises when a law firm attempts to represent an accounting firm’s former client at the same time it is representing the accounting firm itself in other matters, and the issue in controversy 

is a tax product that the accounting firm sold and the former client 

purchased. In such a case, the issue is how the attorney can zealously represent the interests of both its clients in light of potential 

conflicting loyalties. A related issue is whether the law firm can 

ethically use the accounting firm as the tax expert in the client’s 

case, given the accounting firm’s self interest in the case outcome. 

At the request of the Subcommittee, the Congressional Research 

Service’s American Law Division analyzed the possible conflict of 

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456Memorandum dated 11/14/03, by Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, ‘‘Attorneys and Potential Conflicts of Interest Between 

New Clients and Existing Clients.’’ 457 NatWest apparently also participated in a significant number of BLIPS transactions in 

1999 and 2000, providing credit lines totaling more than $1 billion. See, e.g., email dated 6/20/

interest issues.456 The CRS analysis concluded that, under ABA 

Model Rule 1.7, a law firm should decline to represent an accounting firm’s client in a tax shelter case if the law firm already represents the accounting firm itself on other matters. The CRS analysis identified ‘‘two possible, and interconnected, conflicts of interest’’ that should lead the law firm to decline the engagement. The 

first is a ‘‘current conflict of interest’’ at the time of engagement, 

which arises from ‘‘a ‘substantial risk’ that the attorney . . . would 

be ‘materially limited’ by his responsibilities to another client’’ in 

‘‘pursuing certain relevant and proper courses of action on behalf 

of the new client’’ such as filing suit against the firm’s existing client, the accounting firm. The second is a ‘‘potential conflict of interest whereby the attorney may not represent the new client in litigation . . . against an existing, current client. That particular, potential conflict of interest could not be waived.’’

Alternatively, the CRS analysis also recommends that the law 

firm fully inform a potential client about the two conflicts of interest prior to any engagement, so that the client can make a meaningful decision on whether he or she is willing to be represented 

by a law firm that already represents the accounting firm that sold 

the client the tax product at issue. According to ABA Model Rule 

1.7, informed consent must be in writing, but ‘‘[t]he requirement of 

a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer 

to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, 

of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as 

reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise 

questions and concerns.’’ The CRS analysis opines that a ‘‘blanket 

disclosure’’ provided by a law firm in an engagement letter is insufficient, without additional information, to ensure the client fully 

understands and consents to the conflicts of interest inherent in 

the law firm’s dual representation of the client and the accounting 

firm. Clearly, some Sutherland Asbill & Brennan clients were less 

than fully aware of the firm’s conflict of interest in relation to 

KPMG, and did not seem to receive additional information prior to 

signing an engagement letter with Sutherland Asbill & Brennan. 

VII. ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 

Finding: Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, and UBS Bank provided billions of dollars in lending critical to transactions which the banks knew were tax motivated, involved little or no credit risk, and facilitated potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters known as FLIP, OPIS, and 

BLIPS.

The tax shelters examined in this Report could not have been executed without the active and willing participation of major banks. 

Banks provided the requisite loans for hundreds of these tax shelter transactions. Three major banks investigated by the Subcommittee participated in KPMG’s FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.457

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00, from William Boyle of Deutsche Bank to other Deutsche Bank personnel, ‘‘Updated Presidio/

KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280. 458See prepared statement by Deutsche Bank at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 2. 459 Id. 460See prepared statement by HVB Bank at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 5. 461See, e.g., UBS memorandum dated 12/21/99, from Teri Kemmerer Sallwasser to Gail 

Fagan, ‘‘Boss Strategy Meetings . . .,’’ Bates SEN–018253–57; Subcommittee interview of UBS 

representatives (4/4/03). 462See prepared statement by Deutsche Bank at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 2. 463 HVB credit request dated 1/6/00, Bates HVB 003320–30 (HVB ‘‘earned USD 4.45 million’’ 

from BLIPS loan fees and ‘‘approximately USD 1 million’’ from related foreign exchange activities for BLIPS transactions completed from October to December 1999); HVB document dated 

8/6/00, from Thorpe, marked ‘‘DRAFT,’’ Bates HVB 001805. 

Deutsche Bank participated in 56 BLIPS transactions in 1999, providing credit lines to KPMG clients totaling $7.8 billion.458 Deutsche Bank also participated in 62 OPIS transactions from 1997 to 

1999, providing credit lines that totaled $3 billion.459 HVB Bank 

participated in 29 BLIPS transactions in 1999 and 2000, providing 

BLIPS credit lines that totaled about $2.5 billion.460 UBS AG participated in 100 to 150 FLIP and OPIS transactions in 1997 and 

1998, providing credit lines which, in the aggregate, were in the 

range of several billion Swiss francs.461

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee shows that the banks 

knew they were participating in transactions whose primary purpose was to provide tax benefits to persons who had purchased tax 

products from KPMG. Some of the documentation also makes it 

plain that the banks were aware that the tax products were potentially abusive and carried a risk to the reputation of any bank 

choosing to participate in it. In exchange for their active and knowing participation, the banks obtained lucrative fees. For example, 

Deutsche Bank obtained $44 million in bank fees from the BLIPS 

transactions, and $35 million from OPIS, for a grand total of $79 

million.462 HVB obtained over $5.45 million for the BLIPS transactions it completed in less than 3 months in 1999, and won approval of increased BLIPS transactions throughout 2000, ‘‘based on 

successful execution of previous transactions, low credit risk and 

excellent profitability.’’ 463

A. DEUTSCHE BANK 

The critical role played by major banks in KPMG’s tax shelter activities is illustrated by Deutsche Bank’s participation in 56 BLIPS 

transactions in 1999. 

A number of Deutsche Bank documents show that the bank 

knew BLIPS was a tax related transaction and posed a 

reputational risk to the bank if the bank chose to participate in it. 

One Deutsche Bank official working to obtain bank approval to 

participate in BLIPS wrote:

In this transaction, reputation risk is tax related and we have 

been asked by the Tax Department not to create an audit trail 

in respect of the Bank’s tax affairs. The Tax department assumes prime responsibility for controlling tax related risks (including reputation risk) and will brief senior management accordingly. We are therefore not asking R&R [Risk & Resources] 

Committee to approve reputation risk on BLIPS. This will be 

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464 Email dated 7/30/99, from Ivor Dunbar of Deutsche Bank, DMG UK, to multiple Deutsche 

Bank professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6554. 

See also email dated 7/29/99, from Mick Wood to Francesco Piovanetti and other Deutsche bank 

personnel, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6556 (paper prepared for the Risk & Resources Committee ‘‘skirts around the basic issue rather than addressing 

it head on (the tax reputational risk).’’). 465 Undated document entitled, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01959–63. 466 Email dated 7/1/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Ivor Dunbar, ‘‘ ‘Hugo’ BLIPS Paper,’’ with 

attachment entitled, ‘‘Bond Linked Indexed Premium Strategy ‘BLIPS’,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6585–

87 at 6587. 467See email dated 10/13/99, from Peter Sturzinger to Ken Tarr and other Deutsche Bank personnel, ‘‘Re: BLIPS,’’ attaching minutes dated 8/4/99, from a ‘‘Deutsche Bank Private Banking, 

Management Committee Meeting’’ that discussed BLIPS, Bates DB BLIPS 6520–6521.

dealt with directly by the Tax Department and [Deutsche Bank 

Americas Chief Executive Officer] John Ross.464

Another Deutsche Bank memorandum, prepared for the ‘‘New 

Product Committee’’ to use in reviewing BLIPS, included the following statements explaining the transaction:

BLIPS will be marketed to High Net Worth Individual Clients 

of KPMG. . . . Loan conditions will be such as to enable DB 

to, in effect, force (p)repayment after 60 days at its option. . . . 

For tax and accounting purposes, repaying the [loan] premium 

amount will ‘‘count’’ like a loss for tax and accounting purposes. . . . At all times, the loan will maintain collateral of at 

least 101% to the loan + premium amount. . . . It is imperative that the transaction be wound up after 45–60 days and the 

loan repaid due to the fact that the HNW individual will not 

receive his/her capital loss (or tax benefit) until the transaction 

is wound up and the loan repaid. . . . At no time will DB Private Bank provide any tax advice to any individuals involved 

in the transactions. This will be further buttressed by signed 

disclaimers designed to protect and ‘‘hold harmless’’ DB. . . . 

DB has received a legal opinion from Shearman & Sterling 

which validates our envisaged role in the transaction and sees 

little or no risk to DB in the trade. Furthermore opinions have 

been issued from KPMG Central Tax department and Brown 

& Wood attesting to the soundness of the transactions from a 

tax perspective.465

Still another Deutsche Bank document states: ‘‘For tax and accounting purposes, the [loan] premium amount will be treated as 

a loss for tax purposes.’’ 466

Bank documentation indicates that a number of internal bank 

departments, including the tax, accounting, and legal departments, 

were asked to and did approve the bank’s participation in BLIPS. 

BLIPS was also brought to the attention of Deutsche Bank Americas’ Chief Executive Officer John Ross, who made the final decision on the bank’s participation.467 Minutes describing the meeting 

in which Mr. Ross approved the bank’s participation in BLIPS 

state: 

[A] meeting with John Ross was held on August 3, 1999 in 

order to discuss the BLIPS product. [A bank representative] 

represented [Private Banking] Management’s views on 

reputational risk and client suitability. John Ross approved the 

product, however insisted that any customer found to be in litiVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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468 Id. at 6520. 469 Email dated 3/20/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025754. 470 Email dated 3/27/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Richard Smith, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025753. 471 Email dated 3/28/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025753. 472KPMG prototype tax opinion letter on BLIPS, dated 12/31/99, at 11. 

gation be excluded from the product, the product be limited to 

25 customers and that a low profile be kept on these transactions. . . . John Ross also requested to be kept informed of 

future transactions of a similar nature.468

Given the extensive and high level attention provided by the Bank 

regarding its participation in BLIPS, it seems clear that the bank 

had evaluated BLIPS carefully and was fully aware of the nature 

of the financial product they would be financing. 

Additional evidence shows that Deutsche Bank was aware that 

the BLIPS loans it had been asked to provide were not standard 

commercial loans, but had unusual features. Deutsche Bank refused, for example, to sign a letter representing that the BLIPS 

loan structure, which included an unusual multi-million dollar 

‘‘loan premium’’ credited to a borrower’s account at the start of the 

loan, was consistent with ‘‘industry standards.’’ The BLIPS National Deployment Champion had asked the bank to make this representation to provide ‘‘comfort that the loan was being made in 

line with conventional lending practices.’’ 469 When the bank declined to make the requested representation, the KPMG’s BLIPS 

National Deployment Champion tried a second time, only to report 

to his colleagues: ‘‘The bank has pushed back again and said they 

simply will not represent that the large premium loan is consistent 

with industry standards.’’ 470 He tried a third time and reported: 

‘‘I’ve pushed really hard for our original language. To say they are 

resisting is an understatement.’’ 471 The final tax opinion letter 

issued by KPMG contained compromise language which said little 

more than the loan complied with the bank’s own procedures: ‘‘The 

loan . . . was approved by the competent authorities within [the 

Bank] as consistent, in the light of all the circumstances such authorities consider relevant, with [the Bank’s] credit and documentation standards.’’ 472

A year after Deutsche Bank began executing BLIPS transactions, 

a key bank official handling these transactions wrote an email 

which acknowledged the ‘‘tax benefits’’ associated with BLIPS and 

noted, again, the reputational risk these transactions posed to the 

bank:

During 1999, we executed $2.8b. of loan premium deals as part 

of the BLIP’s approval process. At that time, NatWest and 

[HVB] had executed approximately $0.5 b. of loan premium 

deals. I understand that we based our limitations on concerns 

regarding reputational risk which were heightened, in part, on 

the proportion of deals we have executed relative to the other 

banks. Since that time, [HVB], and to a certain extent 

NatWest, have participated in approximately an additional 

$1.0–1.5 b. of grandfathered BLIP’s deals. . . . [HVB] does not 

have the same sensitivity to and market exposure as DB does 

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473 Email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle to multiple Deutsche Bank professionals, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280. 474See Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 114. 475 Email dated 4/3/02, from Viktoria Antoniades to Brian McGuire and other Deutsche Bank 

personnel, ‘‘US GROUP 1 Pres,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6329–52, attaching a presentation dated 11/

15/99, entitled ‘‘Structured Transactions Group North America,’’ at 6336, 6346. 476 Id. at 6337. 477 Id. at 6346. 478 Email dated 7/19/99, involving multiple Deutsche Bank employees, ‘‘Update NY Issues,’’ 

Bates DB BLIPS 6775. 479 Email dated 7/29/99, from Mick Wood to Francesco Piovanetti and other Deutsche Bank 

professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6556.

with respect to the reputational risk from making the high-coupon loan to the client. . . . As you are aware, the tax benefits 

from the transaction potentially arise from a contribution to 

the partnership subject to the high-coupon note and not from 

the execution of FX positions in the partnership, activities 

which we perform in the ordinary course of our business.473

To address the issue of reputational risk, the email went on to 

propose that, because HVB had a limited capacity to issue more 

BLIPS loans, and Deutsche Bank did not want to expose itself to 

increased reputational risk by making additional direct loans to 

BLIPS clients, ‘‘we would like to lend an amount of money to 

[HVB] equal to the amount of money [HVB] lends to the client. 

. . . We would like tax department approval to participate in the 

aforementioned more complex trades by executing the underlying 

transactions and making loans to [HVB].’’ In other words, Deutsche 

Bank wanted to be the bank behind HVB, financing more BLIPS 

loans in exchange for fees and other profits. At the Subcommittee 

hearing on November 20, when asked about this proposal, the 

Deutsche Bank representative seemed to deny that the bank had 

actually presented it to HVB, while HVB testified that Deutsche 

Bank had, in fact, made the proposal to HVB which declined to accept it.474

Other Deutsche Bank documents suggest that the bank may 

have been helping KPMG find clients or otherwise marketing the 

BLIPS tax products. A November 1999 presentation by the bank’s 

Structured Finance Group, for example, listed BLIPS as one of several tax products the group was offering to U.S. and European clients seeking ‘‘gain mitigation.’’ 475 The presentation listed as the 

bank’s ‘‘strengths’’ its ability to lend funds in connection with 

BLIPS and its ‘‘relationships with [the] ‘promoters’ ’’476 later named 

as Presidio and KPMG.477 An internal bank email a few months 

earlier asked: ‘‘What is the status of the BLIPS. Are you still actively marketing this product[?]’’ 478

In light of the bank’s concerns regarding the reputational risk associated with BLIPS, the bank discussed using attorney-client 

privilege to conceal its activities. In an internal email, one Deutsche Bank employee wrote to another regarding the BLIPS risk 

analysis documents: ‘‘I would have thought you could still ensure 

that . . . the papers are prepared, and all discussion held, in a way 

which makes them legally privileged. (. . . you may remember that 

was one of my original suggestions).’’ 479 Earlier, when considering 

whether to participate in BLIPS initially, the bank decided to limit 

its discussion of BLIPS on paper and not to obtain the approval of 

the bank committee that normally evaluates the risk that a transVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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480 Email dated 7/30/99, from Ivor Dunbar of Deutsche Bank, DMG UK, to multiple Deutsche 

Bank professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6554. 481Subcommittee interview of Deutsche Bank (11/10/03). 482See Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 107–112. 483Letter dated 1/9/04, from Deutsche Bank’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, at 2. 484Subcommittee interview of HVB Bank (10/29/03). 

action poses to the reputation of the bank, in order not to leave ‘‘an 

audit trail’’: 

1. STRUCTURE: A diagramatic representation of the deal may 

help the Committee’s understanding—we can prepare this.

2. PRIVILEDGE [sic]: This is not easy to achieve and therefore 

a more detailed description of the tax issues is not advisable.

3. REPUTATION RISK: In this transaction, reputation risk is 

tax related and we have been asked by the Tax Department 

not to create an audit trail in respect of the Bank’s tax affaires. 

The Tax department assumes prime responsibility for controlling tax related risks (including reputation risk) and will brief 

senior management accordingly. We are therefore not asking 

R&R Committee to approve reputation risk on BLIPS. This 

will be dealt with directly by the Tax Department and John 

Ross.480

Despite the bank’s apparent sophisticated knowledge of generic 

tax products, when asked about BLIPS during a Subcommittee 

interview, the Deutsche Bank representative insisted that BLIPS 

was an investment strategy which, like all investment products, 

had tax implications. The bank representative also indicated that, 

despite handling BLIPS transactions for the bank, he did not understand the details of the BLIPS transactions, and downplayed 

any reputational risk that BLIPS might have posed to the bank.481

At the Subcommittee hearings, although the Deutsche Bank representative testified that, ‘‘it was very clear from the opinions and 

everything that there were significant tax benefits that the investor 

may report on its return’’ from the BLIPS transaction, he resisted 

characterizing BLIPS as a ‘‘tax-driven’’ transaction, as set forth in 

an internal bank document.482

Deutsche Bank told the Subcommittee that, in October 2000, it 

reorganized and refocused the business strategy of the Structured 

Transaction Group that had been handling tax products like 

BLIPS. According to Deutsche Bank, the group is now called the 

Structured Capital Markets Group and does not execute tax advantaged transactions such as BLIPS to multiple clients. Instead, the 

bank provides investment and borrowing services to meet specific 

client requirements.483

B. HVB BANK 

HVB Bank participated in 29 KPMG BLIPS transactions during 

1999 and 2000, providing credit lines totaling about $2.2 billion 

and generating millions of dollars in bank fees. According to HVB, 

Robert Pfaff first approached HVB Bank in late August or early 

September 1999 to solicit their participation in BLIPS.484 Mr. 

Pfaff, a former KPMG tax professional, was then an employee of 

Presidio, the investment firm assisting KPMG with BLIPS transactions. During that initial meeting, Mr. Pfaff told HVB that 

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485 Id. 486 Id. 487 Id. 488 Id. HVB told the Subcommittee that, although BLIPS was represented as a 7-year investment program, HVB knew that BLIPS was a 60-day transaction driven by tax benefits. In fact, 

HVB’s credit request documentation given to senior management for approval of BLIPS states: 

‘‘HVB has been approached by Presidio to make the series of 7-year premium term loans noted 

above to the investment vehicles of individuals interested in investing in Presidio’s product. . . . 

HVB will earn a very attractive return if the deals runs to term. If, however, the advances are 

prepaid within 60 days (and there is a reasonable prospect that they will be), HVB will earn 

a return of 2.84% . . .),’’ BLIPS credit request dated 9/14/99, Bates HVB 000148. 489 Undated one-page, handwritten document outlining BLIPS structure entitled, ‘‘Presidio,’’ 

which Alexandre Nouvakhov of HVB acknowledged during his Subcommittee interview had been 

written by him, Bates HVB 000204. 490Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 102. 491 Id. at 103. 492 Credit request dated 9/26/99, Bates HVB 001166.

KPMG and Presidio worked together to develop the structure of the 

investment transaction and wanted HVB to provide financing.485

According to HVB, as a result of that meeting, HVB Bank was 

put in touch with Deutsche Bank which provided HVB with copies 

of draft loan documentation.486 Presidio then arranged a meeting 

in which its staff explained the BLIPS transaction and, according 

to HVB, emphasized that BLIPS was an investment strategy. HVB 

told the Subcommittee, however, that it was clear to HVB at this 

meeting that BLIPS had inherent tax benefits.487 In addition, HVB 

told the Subcommittee that Presidio had indicated that Stage I of 

BLIPS was to start and end within the same calendar year, requiring HVB to participate in the transaction by no later than October 

1999.488 Handwritten notes stemming from this meeting with Presidio also characterize the 7% fee charged to KPMG clients for 

BLIPS as ‘‘paid by investor for tax sheltering.’’ 489

At the Subcommittee hearing, when asked whether the bank 

knew that BLIPS was a transaction that had been designed to 

avoid taxes, HVB’s representative stated, ‘‘I think to dispute the 

notion that there were inherent and significant tax benefits is ridiculous. However, the investment strategy was described to us as a 

significant motive for these investors to enter into this transaction.’’ 490 He also denied learning later that BLIPS was primarily 

a tax avoidance scheme.491 HVB Bank indicated further that, at 

the time it became involved with BLIPS, KPMG had provided the 

bank with an opinion stating that BLIPS complied with Federal 

tax law and the bank felt it could rely on that opinion. For example, in one document seeking approval to provide a significant line 

of credit to finance BLIPS loans, HVB wrote this about the tax 

risks associated with BLIPS: 

Disallowance of tax attributes. A review by the IRS could potentially result in a ruling that would disallow the [BLIPS] 

structure. . . . We are confident that none of the foregoing 

would affect the bank or its position in any meaningful way for 

the following reasons. . . . KPMG has issued an opinion that 

the structure will most likely be upheld, even if challenged by 

the IRS.492

A year later, when it became clear that the IRS would list BLIPS 

as an abusive tax shelter, an internal HVB memorandum acknowledged that BLIPS was a tax transaction and ordered a halt to fiVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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493Memorandum dated 8/16/00, from Dom DeGiorgio and Richard Pankuch to Christopher 

Thorpe and others, ‘‘Presidio BLIPS Transactions,’’ Bates HVB 003346. 494Subcommittee interview of HVB representative (10/29/03). 495See, e.g., email dated 10/29/99, from Richard Pankuch to Erwin Volt, ‘‘KWG I capital treatment for our Presidio Transaction,’’ Bates HVB 000352 (‘‘Our structure calls for all collateral 

to be placed in a collateral account pledged to the bank.’’); email dated 9/24/99, from Richard 

Pankuch to Christopher Thorpe and other HVB professionals, ‘‘Re: Presidio,’’ Bates HVB 000682 

(‘‘all collateral is in our own hands and subject to the Permitted Investment requirement’’). Compare undated Deutsche Bank document, likely prepared in 1999, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01959–63, at 1961 (‘‘At all times, the loan 

will maintain collateral of at least 101% to the loan + loan premium amount. If the amount 

goes below this limit, the loan will be unwound and the principal + premium repaid.’’); email 

dated 7/1/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Ivor Dunbar, ‘‘ ‘Hugo’ BLIPS Paper,’’ with attachment 

entitled, ‘‘Bond Linked Indexed Premium Strategy ‘BLIPS’,’’ Bates HVB DB BLIPS 6885–87 

(‘‘The loan proceeds (par and premium) will be held in custody at DB in cash or money market 

deposits. . . . Loan conditions will be such as to enable DB to, in effect, force prepayment after 

60 days at its option.’’). 496 BLIPS credit request dated 9/14/99, Bates HVB 000155. See also Memorandum dated 7/

29/99, from William Boyle to Mick Wood and other Deutsche Bank personnel, ‘‘GCI Risk and 

Resources Committee—BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 06566, at 3 (The BLIPS loan ‘‘will 

be overcollateralized and should the value of the collateral drop below a 1.0125:1.0 ratio, DB 

may liquidate the collateral immediately and apply the proceeds to repay amounts due under 

the Note and swap agreements.’’) 497 BLIPS credit request dated 9/14/99, Bates HVB 000155. 

nancing the product, while disavowing any liability for the bank’s 

role in carrying out the BLIPS transactions:

[I]t is clear that the tax benefits for individuals who have participated in the [BLIPS] transaction will not be grandfathered 

because Treasury believes that their actions were contrary to 

current law. . . . It is not likely that KPMG/Presidio will go 

forward with additional transactions. . . . As we have stated 

previously, we anticipate no adverse consequences for the HVB 

since we have not promoted the transaction. We have simply 

been a lender and nothing in the notice implies a threat to our 

position.

In view of the tone of the notice we will not book any new 

transactions and will cancel our existing unused [credit] lines 

prior to the end of this month.493

HVB’s representative explained to the Subcommittee that the apparent bank risk in lending substantial sums to a shell company 

had been mitigated by the terms of the BLIPS loan, which gave the 

bank virtually total control over the BLIPS loan proceeds and enabled the bank to ensure the loan and loan premium would be repaid.494 The bank explained, for example, that from the time the 

loan was issued, the borrower was required to maintain collateral 

equal to 101% of the loan proceeds and loan premium, and could 

place these funds only in a narrow range of low-risk bank-approved 

investments.495 These requirements meant the bank treated not 

only all of the loan proceeds and loan premium as collateral, but 

also additional funds supplied by the KPMG client to meet the 

101% collateral requirement. HVB wrote: ‘‘We are protected in our 

documentation through a minimum overcollateralization ratio of 

1.0125 to 1 at all times. Violation of this ratio triggers immediate 

acceleration under the loan agreements without notice.’’ 496 HVB 

also wrote: ‘‘The Permitted Investments . . . are either extremely 

conservative in nature . . . or have no collateral value for margin 

purposes.’’ 497 KPMG put it this way: ‘‘Lender holds all cash as collateral in addition to being custodian and clearing agent for Partnership. . . . All Partnership trades can only be executed through 

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498Document dated 3/4/99, ‘‘BLIPS—transaction description and checklist,’’ Bates KPMG 

0003933–35. 499 Email dated 12/28/99, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Alexandre Nouvakhov and Amy 

McCarthy of HVB, ‘‘FX Confirmations,’’ Bates HVB 002035. 500See, e.g., memorandum dated 12/23/99, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Amy McCarthy 

of HVB, ‘‘Transfer Instructions,’’ Bates HVB 001699; memorandum dated 1/19/00, from Steven 

Buss at Presidio to Alex Nouvakhov at HVB, ‘‘FX Instructions—Mobile Ventures LLC,’’ Bates 

HVB 001603; email dated 1/19/00, from Alex Nouvakhov at HVB to Matt Dunn at HVB, ‘‘Presidio,’’ Bates HVB 001601 (‘‘We need to sell Euros for another Presidio account and credit their 

[U.S. dollar] DDA account. It is the same deal as the one for Roanoke you did earlier today.’’); 

email dated 1/19/00, from Alex Nouvakhov at HVB to Steven Buss at Presidio, ‘‘Re: mobile,’’ 

Bates HVB 001602; memorandum dated 1/19/00, from Steven Buss at Presidio to Timothy 

Schifter at KPMG, ‘‘Sale Confirmation,’’ Bates HVB 001600. 501Subcommittee interview of HVB bank representatives (10/29/03). 502Letter dated 1/12/04 from HVB’s legal counsel, Caplin & Drysdale, to the Subcommittee, 

at 3. 503Subcommittee interview with HVB’s legal counsel, Caplin & Drysdale (2/20/04). 504 Id.

Lender or an affiliate. . . . Lender must authorize trades before 

execution.’’ 498 As indicated earlier, both Deutsche Bank and HVB 

received lucrative fees in exchange for providing the low-risk loans 

KPMG clients needed. 

Documents related to two transactions that allegedly took place 

in 1999, involving HVB clients, raise further questions about the 

investments allegedly undertaken by HVB in connection with the 

BLIPS transactions. An email sent by Presidio to HVB states:

I know that Steven has talked to you regarding the error for 

Roanoke Ventures. I have also noted an error for Mobile Ventures. None of the Euro’s should have been converted to [U.S. 

dollars] in 1999. Due to the tax consequences that result from 

these sales, it is critical that these transactions be reversed 

and made to look as though they did not occur at all.499

Other documents suggest that, as Presidio requested, HVB then 

‘‘reversed’’ the referenced 1999 currency trades and executed them 

the next month in early 2000.500 When asked about this matter, 

HVB told the Subcommittee that they had been unaware of this 

email exchange, that the bank could not make currency trades 

‘‘look as though they did not occur at all,’’ and they would research 

the transactions to locate the paperwork and determine whether, 

in fact, the trades or paperwork had been altered.501

HVB later told the Subcommittee that it had been unable to ‘‘locate any tickets documenting the original or reversing trades.’’ 502

In fact, HVB said that trade tickets had not been created for many 

of the currency transactions associated with the BLIPS transactions.503 HVB explained that the lack of documentation meant 

that the bank was unable to evaluate either the specific trades or 

the paperwork. In a letter to the Subcommittee dated January 12, 

2004, HVB theorized that the original transactions had been executed in error and the bank had executed another foreign currency 

transaction to offset the results of the first trade. HVB also told the 

Subcommittee that, because the bank is not a tax advisor, it could 

not explain the email’s assertion that the original trades had negative ‘‘tax consequences’’ requiring correction.504

HVB’s inability to find any of the trade tickets documenting the 

currency trades discussed in the email is disturbing. Its admission 

that the bank often failed to prepare documentation for BLIPS-related currency trade raises added concern, since such paperless 

113

505Subcommittee interview of UBS representative (10/28/03). 506 UBS internal document dated 3/1/99, ‘‘Equities Large/Heavily Structured Transaction Approval,’’ with attachment entitled, ‘‘U.S. Capital Loss Scheme—UBS ‘redemption trades,’ ’’ Bates 

UBS000009–15. 507 Id. at Bates UBS000010. 508 UBS internal document dated 11/13/97, ‘‘Description of the UBS ‘Redemption’ Structure,’’ 

Bates UBS000031.

trades are not only contrary to normal banking and securities practice, but raise questions about whether the trades actually took 

place or were simply bookkeeping shams undertaken to justify a 

BLIPS client’s alleged tax losses. 

C. UBS BANK 

UBS AG, one of the largest banks in the world, participated in 

100 to 150 FLIP and OPIS transactions in 1997 and 1998, providing credit lines for KPMG clients which, in the aggregate, were 

in the range of several billion Swiss francs. UBS told the Subcommittee that it became involved with these tax products after 

being contacted by KPMG and the Quellos Group and asked to assist in KPMG’s FLIP and OPIS transactions, referred to collectively 

by UBS as ‘‘redemption transactions.’’ 505

UBS documentation clearly and repeatedly describes these transactions as motivated by tax considerations. For example, one UBS 

document explaining the transactions is entitled: ‘‘U.S. Capital 

Loss Scheme—UBS ‘redemption trades.’ ’’ It states:

The essence of the UBS redemption trade is the creation of a 

capital loss for U.S. tax purposes which may be used by a U.S. 

tax resident to off-set any capital gains tax liability to which 

it would otherwise be subject. The tax structure was originally 

devised by KPMG. . . . In October 1996, UBS was approached 

jointly by Quadra . . . and KPMG with a view to it seeking 

UBS’ participation in a scheme that implemented the tax loss 

structure developed by KPMG. The role sought of UBS was one 

purely of execution counterparty. . . . It was clear from the 

outset—and has been continually emphasized since—that UBS 

made no endorsement of the scheme and that its connection 

with the structure should not imply any implicit confirmation 

by UBS that the desired tax consequences will be recognized 

by the U.S. tax authorities. . . . UBS undertook a thorough investigation into the propriety of its proposed involvement in 

these transactions. The following steps were undertaken: [redacted by UBS as ‘‘privileged material’’].506

At another point, the UBS document explains the ‘‘Economic Rationale’’ for redemption transactions to be: ‘‘Tax benefit for client,’’ 507 while still another UBS document states: ‘‘The motivation 

for this structure is tax optimization for U.S. tax residents who are 

enjoying capital gains that are subject to U.S. tax. The structure 

creates a capital loss from a U.S. tax point of view (but not from 

an economic point of view) which may be offset against existing 

capital gains.’’ 508

In February 1998, an unidentified UBS ‘‘insider’’ sent a letter to 

UBS management in London ‘‘to let you know that [UBS unit] 

Global Equity [D]erivatives is currently offering an illegal capital 

114

509Letter dated 2/12/98, addressed to SBC Warburg Dillon Read in London, Bates 

UBS000038. 510See email dated 3/27/98, from Chris Donegan of UBS to Norm Bontje of Quadra and others, 

‘‘Re: Redemption Trade,’’ UBS 000039 (‘‘Wolfgang and I are presently unable to execute any redemption transactions on UBS stock. The main reason for this seems to be a concern within 

UBS that this trade should be registered as a tax shelter with the IRS.’’). 511Subcommittee interview with UBS representative (10/28/03). 

gains tax evasion scheme to US tax payers,’’ meaning the redemption transactions. The letter continued:

This scheme is costing the US Internal Revenue [S]ervice several hundred million dollars a year. I am concerned that once 

IRS comes to know about this scheme they will levy huge financial/criminal penalties on UBS for offering tax evasion 

schemes. . . . In 1997 several billion dollars of this scheme 

was sold to high networth US tax payers, I am told that in 

1998 the plan is continu[ing] to market this scheme and to 

offer several new US tax avoidance schemes involving swaps.

My sole objective is to let you know about this scheme, so that 

you can take some concrete steps to minimise the financial and 

reputational damage to UBS. . . .

P.S. I am sorry I cannot disclose my identity at this time because I don’t know whether this action of mine will be rewarded or punished.509

In response to the letter, UBS halted all redemption trades for several months.510 UBS apparently examined the nature of transactions as well as whether they should be registered in the United 

States as tax shelters. UBS later resumed selling the products, 

stopping only after KPMG discontinued the sales.511

The UBS documents show that the bank was well aware that 

FLIP and OPIS were designed and sold to KPMG clients as ways 

to reduce or eliminate their U.S. tax liability. The bank apparently 

justified its participation in the transactions by reasoning that its 

participation did not signify its endorsement of the transactions 

and did not constitute aiding or abetting tax evasion. The bank 

then proceeded to provide the financing that made these tax products possible. 

D. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK 

Finding: First Union National Bank promoted to its clients generic tax products which had been designed by 

others, including potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters known as FLIP and BOSS, by introducing and explaining these products to its clients, providing sample 

opinion letters, and introducing its clients to the promoters of the tax products, in return for substantial 

fees.

Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, and UBS helped KPMG implement 

its tax products by providing KPMG clients with substantial financing and securities transactions necessitated by the tax products. Other banks, such as, Wachovia Bank, acting through First 

Union National Bank, played a different role, assisting KPMG by 

providing client referrals and marketing assistance for its tax products, in return for substantial fees. The Subcommittee investigation 

115

512Letter dated 12/17/99, from Diane Stanford to Gail Fagan, ‘‘RE: BOSS,’’ Bates SEN–

016895–6.

determined that First Union provided this same assistance to other 

tax shelter promoters, including PricewaterhouseCoopers, and, in 

fact, had implemented a systematic review and approval process for 

offering a variety of third-party tax shelter products to First Union 

clients. 

The manager of First Union’s Financial Advisory Services Group 

describes the development of this review and approval process in 

a 1999 email:

The Financial Advisory Services Group (FAS), specifically the 

Personal Financial Consulting Group within FAS began introducing Enhanced Investment Strategies (‘‘Strategies’’) to qualified First Union clients under the direction of my predecessor, 

Ralph Lovejoy in 1997. Ralph left First Union in April 1998 to 

join Quadra Investments and later TPCMG. Both firms have 

been heavily involved in the creation of leading edge strategies.

When I was appointed manager of FAS in April 1998, Personal 

Financial Consulting was in the process of being introduced to 

certain strategies offered by KPMG. KPMG was offering these 

strategies through Quadra Investments. The law firm of Pillsbury Madison had written a tax opinion letter on both, but we 

wanted a Big 5 firm to write one if we were going to consider 

introduction of these strategies to any of our clients. As the 

year progressed, KPMG could not reach a decision as to whether or not to write the tax opinion letter on each strategy so 

Quadra (Ralph Lovejoy) introduced us to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, who was also familiar with both strategies and had 

been writing a tax opinion on them.

As I learned more and more about these strategies, it was evident that a due diligence process needed to be established to 

more formally evaluate and select which strategies and/or 

strategy providers should be considered before introducing any 

strategies to future clients. As a result, in early 1999 we established a Due Diligence Committee (see attached) and sent an 

RFP to contacts we or our integral partners with First Union 

had with four of the five Big 5 firms. (see attached). We met 

with these firms (KPMG, PWC, Deloitte & Touche and Arthur 

Andersen) and received formal responses from KPMG and 

PWC indicating their interest in presenting their strategies to 

the newly formed Due Diligence Committee. After review of 

each strategy and strategy provider (including review of both 

financial and non-financial facts), the committee approved 

KPMG and PWC as strategy providers on April 9, 1999 and, 

the use of three strategies for 1999, one of which included 

[PwC’s] BOSS. For each strategy reviewed and approved by the 

Committee, the strategy provider agreed to write a tax opinion 

of at least ‘‘More likely than not.’’ 512

This document shows that First Union began introducing banking 

clients to third-party tax products as early as 1997. In addition, it 

shows that, in 1999, the bank set up a formal procedure to evaluate specific tax shelter promoters and their tax product offerings. 

116

513First Union also provided referrals to strategy providers other than KPMG and PwC. According to a former First Union employee, the due diligence process was designed in part to 

centralize referrals of various strategies and strategy providers to banking clients. Multiple 

banking groups were providing referrals of various strategies and strategy providers designed 

by law firms and investment advisors. Subcommittee interview with former First Union employee (5/27/04). 514Subcommittee interview with First Union representatives (5/21/04). 515 Id. 516 Id. 517 Id. First Union indicated that the senior advisors in Personal Financial Consulting were 

compensated indirectly through bonuses. 518These revenues included First Union referrals related to eight other tax products provided 

by entities other than KPMG and PwC. Subcommittee meeting with First Union representatives 

(5/21/04). 

As a result, in April 1999, First Union formally approved making 

client referrals to KPMG and PwC and offering these firm’s tax 

products to its clients.513

First Union explained to the Subcommittee how its new procedure worked in practice. It said that its relationship managers or 

trust specialists who dealt with wealthy bank customers typically 

identified suitable potential clients for third-party tax products.514

These bank employees then referred the clients to First Union’s Financial Advisory Services Group. The FAS Group, in turn, assigned 

senior advisers within its Personal Financial Consulting Group to 

explain the particular tax products to the clients and arrange introductions to KPMG, PwC, or other tax shelter promoters such as 

Quellos Group.515

First Union told the Subcommittee that, with respect to KPMG 

and PwC tax products, First Union typically received $100,000 for 

each client referral.516 This fee was then split between the relationship manager or trust specialist who had identified the client and 

the Financial Advisory Services group that had arranged the referral to KPMG or PwC.517 First Union estimated that, for the 5-year 

period 1997 to 2002, the revenues it obtained for providing client 

referrals on tax products totaled about $13 million.518

First Union told the Subcommittee that its Financial Advisory 

Services Due Diligence Committee, also known as the Capital Management Group Risk Review Subcommittee, met periodically with 

various tax shelter promoters to discuss and approve specific tax 

products that could be presented to First Union clients. For example, according to the Due Diligence Committee’s minutes, the committee met on April 27, 1999 to review five new tax products being 

promoted by KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers:

The committee reviewed five strategies and scored each strategy as a committee . . .:

KPMG PWC 

Name Score 

—TRACT 3.85 

—IDV 2.825

—CREW 3.52

PWC 

Name Score 

—BOSS 3.66

—PACT 3.64

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519First Union Due Diligence Committee Minutes, Bates SEN–014577–78. 520Memorandum dated 9/3/99, from Karen Chovan, Financial Advisory Services to CMG Risk 

Review Oversight Committee, ‘‘Meeting Minutes of September 1. . . .’’ Bates SEN–008629–31.

Because IDV did not score a 3.0 or higher, it was eliminated 

for further consideration. Reasons for the low score included (a) 

long term time frame and the transaction causes high economic 

risk to the client and bank, (b) projected low demand of the 

product mostly due to economic risk.519

Tax products which received the committee’s initial approval 

were then sent to First Union’s Capital Management Group (CMG) 

Risk Review Oversight Committee, which periodically met to discuss them and provide the final approval necessary before a tax 

product could be presented to First Union clients. For example, a 

CMG Risk Review Oversight Committee memorandum discusses 

the approval of the KPMG BLIPS transaction:

The CMG Risk Review Oversight Committee (‘‘committee or 

OC’’) met on September 1. . . .

Senior PFC Advisor and CMG Risk Review Subcommittee 

(‘‘subcommittee or SC’’) member Tom Newman presented an 

overview of an enhanced investment strategy for OC vote to be 

able to present it to selected First Union clients. KPMG 

brought the BLIPS strategy (referred to hereafter as the 

‘‘Alpha’’ strategy) to First Union. . . .

Before the Alpha strategy was discussed, each member of the 

committee signed a confidentiality agreement at KPMG’s request. In general, signing the agreement confirmed the understanding that committee members would hold the information 

about the strategy in the strictest of confidence and specific details of Alpha would not be discussed outside the meeting. . . .

Highlights of the Alpha discussion:

• The Alpha strategy is a highly leveraged investment strategy that could be used to generate either a capital gain offset or an ordinary income offset.

• The strategy is to be considered only for individuals with 

more than $20 million in capital gains or ordinary income 

in either 1999 or future year. . . .

• First Union’s fees would be determined and outlined in an 

engagement letter entered into directly with the client and 

would approximate 50 basis points for non-KPMG clients 

who implement the strategy (minimum fee of $100,000) 

and 25 basis points for existing KPMG clients (minimum 

fee amount of $50,000). . . .

When discussion concluded, members of the committee immediately and unanimously approved the strategy.520

These and other documents demonstrate that First Union had an 

active and elaborate structure for the review and approval of thirdparty tax shelters to be marketed to First Union clients. The evidence also demonstrates that First Union was well aware that it 

was promoting products intended to reduce or eliminate taxes and 

was willing to keep these products confidential, perhaps in an atVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
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521Subcommittee meeting with First Union representatives (5/21/04). First Union’s legal department was apparently limited to drafting and approving engagement letters to banking clients. 522First Union approved KPMG’s BLIPS, FLIP, and SC2 tax products for their banking clients. See memorandum dated 9/3/99, from Karen Chovan, Financial Advisory Services to CMG 

Risk Review Oversight Committee, ‘‘Meeting Minutes of September 1 . . .’’ Bates SEN–008629–

008631 (approving BLIPS); memorandum dated 6/12/00 from Karen Chovan, Financial Advisory 

Services to CMG Risk Review Oversight Committee, ‘‘Meeting Minutes of June 2 . . .,’’ Bates 

SEN–008637–39 (approving SC2); letter from Thomas Newman to First Union customer, Bates 

SEN–021020 (‘‘we [First Union] brought to your attention a transaction referred to as the Bond 

& Option Sales Strategy (‘BOSS’) developed by Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP (‘PwC’) and The 

Private Capital Management Group. . . . In connection with that transaction, First Union 

earned a fee as a selling agent.’’). According to First Union, the total number of bank customers 

that actually implemented KPMG products is as follows: 23 FLIP; 1 OPIS, 1 BLIPS; 3 FOCUS; 

3 SC2; 25 SOS. For the SOS strategy, First Union indicated that KPMG was involved but did 

not issue opinions. According to First Union, the following number of bank customers that actually implemented PwC products is as follows: 19 BOSS; 6 CDS. Subcommittee interview of First 

Union representatives (5/21/04).

tempt to evade IRS detection. It is also worth noting that First 

Union’s due diligence process for approving third-party tax products nowhere required either the bank’s legal counsel or an outside 

tax expert to review the technical merits of the proposed products 

to ensure compliance with the law.521

Once a KPMG or PwC tax product was approved by First 

Union, 522 the bank appears to have expended considerable effort to 

interest its banking clients, arrange a meeting with the promoter, 

and facilitate sales. The extent of First Union’s efforts is illustrated 

in this letter written by a First Union banking client who purchased a FLIP tax product but never received a promised legal 

opinion supporting it. The client wrote: 

[T]he Bank [First Union] prior to the Engagement Date introduced the partnership to the investment counseling firm of QA 

Investments of Seattle Washington (‘‘Quadra’’). The Bank and 

Quadra together presented an Investment Strategy (the ‘‘Strategy’’) . . . which involved the organization of an off shore partnership with a foreign entity for the purpose of making investments in foreign corporations. The Bank and Quadra represented the Strategy as having the foremost potential to make 

a significant profit while having in a circumstance or situation 

of an investment loss a significant income tax advantage. The 

Bank and Quadra represented that they would assist the Partnership in its latter efforts to engage the services on an independent accounting firm to provide the Partnership with tax 

advice and opinion which would address the Partnership’s concerns pertaining to Internal Revenue Code 6662.

The Bank and Quadra represented that they would cause to 

have issued in a timely manner to the Partnership a Legal 

Opinion which could provide the Partnership with a defense in 

the event that the whole or certain aspects of the Strategy 

were ever challenged by the Internal Revenue Service (the 

‘‘IRS’’) or in the event that the tax returns of the Partnership 

were examined as regards the transaction of the Strategy. The 

Legal Opinion was to be issued by the law firm of Pillsbury, 

Madison & Sutro, LLP, its successor being: Pillsbury, Winthrop. LLP. The Bank and Quadra even supplied Partnership 

council with a sample draft opinion. Needless to say the Partnership does rely upon its receipt of the reference Legal Opinion and did rely upon the representations made regarding reVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
119

523Letter from Partnership to Thomas D. Newman dated 4/6/01, ‘‘Re: Engagement of First 

Union National Bank to provide financial advisory services,’’ Bates SEN–008750–52.

ceipt of same in arriving at its decisions to engage the services 

of both the Bank and Quadra. The partnership would most 

likely not have invested in the Strategy in the absence of these 

representations. To the best of its knowledge at no time has 

the Partnership ever received a Legal Opinion from the law 

firm referenced nor does the Partnership have any knowledge 

of the existence of such a Legal Opinion.523

This letter as well as other evidence indicate that First Union expended significant effort introducing and explaining tax products 

designed by others to the bank’s clients, providing sample opinion 

letters, and introducing financial advisors and accountants to their 

clients. Without these activities, First Union clients might not have 

purchased KPMG or PwC tax products. The $13 million in tax 

product fees obtained by First Union indicate that, because of the 

bank’s activities, more than one hundred First Union clients purchased these and other tax products promoted by the bank. 

Because KPMG was the bank’s auditor, First Union’s multi-year 

participation in the promotion of KPMG tax products also raises 

disturbing auditor independence issues. In 2003, the SEC opened 

an informal inquiry into whether the client referral arrangement 

used by KPMG and Wachovia violated the SEC’s auditor independence rule. In its second quarter filing with the SEC in August 2003, 

Wachovia provided the following description of the ongoing SEC inquiry:

On June 19, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission 

informally requested Wachovia to produce certain documents 

concerning any agreements or understandings by which Wachovia referred clients to KPMG LLP during the period January 1, 1997 to the present. Wachovia is cooperating with the 

SEC in its inquiry. Wachovia believes the SEC’s inquiry relates 

to certain tax services offered to Wachovia customers by KPMG 

LLP during the period from 1997 to early 2002, and whether 

these activities might have caused KPMG LLP not to be ‘‘independent’’ from Wachovia, as defined by applicable accounting 

and SEC regulations requiring auditors of an SEC-reporting 

company to be independent of the company. Wachovia and/or 

KPMG LLP received fees in connection with a small number 

of personal financial consulting transactions related to these 

services. During all periods covered by the SEC’s inquiry, including the present, KPMG LLP has confirmed to Wachovia 

that KPMG LLP was and is ‘‘independent’’ from Wachovia 

under applicable accounting and SEC regulations.

In its third quarter filing with the SEC, Wachovia stated that, on 

October 21, 2003, the SEC had issued a ‘‘formal order of investigation’’ into this matter, and the bank is continuing to cooperate with 

the inquiry. 

The SEC’s Business Relationship rule states: ‘‘An accountant is 

not independent if, any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accounting firm or any covered person in the 

firm has any direct or material indirect business relationship with 

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524 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01(c)(3). 525KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 52.1.3 at 52–1. 526 Id., § 52.1.1 at 52–1. 527Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74, at 73. 528Memorandum dated 5/25/98, from Diane Stanford to Ted Beringer, ‘‘KPMG Tax Strategies,’’ Bates SEN–014862–63. 529See email dated 5/19/98, from Diane Stanford to multiple bank personnel, ‘‘Subject: IMPORTANT UPDATE—TAX STRATEGIES,’’ Bates SEN–014864 (emphasis in original). 530 Capital Management Group Enhanced Investment Strategy Series Overview, Bates SEN–

014700–02. 

an audit client. . . .’’ 524 KPMG’s Tax Services Manual states: ‘‘Due 

to independence considerations, the firm does not enter into alliances with SEC audit clients.’’ 525 KPMG defines an ‘‘alliance’’ as 

‘‘a business relationship between KPMG and an outside firm in 

which the parties intend to work together for more than a single 

transaction.’’ 526 KPMG policy is that ‘‘[a]n oral business relationship that has the effect of creating an alliance should be treated 

as an alliance.’’ 527

In Subcommittee interviews, KPMG denied any alliance with 

First Union with respect to tax product referrals, but evidence uncovered by the Subcommittee suggests otherwise. For example, an 

interoffice memorandum dated May 25, 1998, from First Union to 

KPMG states: ‘‘Ted, I thought I’d write to confirm our discussions 

by phone on Friday regarding the alliance that [First Union National Bank] FUNB has with KPMG/Peat Marwick on offering Enhanced Investment Strategies (Tax Strategies) to selected clients. 

. . .’’ 528 Another First Union document, also in May 1998, sent by 

a First Union manager to other bank professionals, shows the bank 

working directly with KPMG on an ongoing basis to promote 

KPMG tax products, and its insistence that KPMG personnel be included in all tax product presentations to the bank’s clients: 

As you know . . . [w]e have agreed to a process that requires 

that our Personal Financial Consultant Sr. Advisors (Castrucci, 

Rudolph, Newman, and Martin) be introduced to the client 

FIRST and then after making a further assessment of the client’s qualification, will bring in KPMG. It is our understanding 

that our ability to be paid a planning fee (which is generally 

in the range of $100,000) is dependent on this agreement with 

KPMG. We have been aware of some instances where Trust 

Specialists and/or Trust admin are going directly to Quadra, 

cutting out KPMG AND our planners. PLEASE COMMUNICATE TO YOUR SENIOR PEOPLE THAT A PLANNER 

MUST BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS TO ENSURE 

THAT OUR ONGOING RELATIONSHIP AND AGREEMENT 

WITH KPMG IS PRESERVED.529

Still another First Union document, written in 1999, by First 

Union’s Capital Management Group, to provide an overview of the 

bank’s client referral services states: ‘‘CMG has entered into agreements with outside investment advisors in order to bring leading 

edge investment techniques to First Union customers (and prospects). . . . [A]s part of this relationship, KPMG Peat Marwick 

LLP will serve as the ‘Tax Strategist and Consultant’ with respect 

to all the investment strategies to protect the interests of First 

Union and its customers.’’ 530

121

531Minutes dated 4/23/99, of Financial Advisory Services ‘‘Enhanced Investment Strategies,’’ 

‘‘Risk Management Process/Due Diligence Committee Meeting,’’ Bates SEN–014588–89. 532First Union denies any formal agreement or alliance despite the language used in these 

documents. Subcommittee meeting with First Union representatives (5/21/04). 

Another internal First Union document, describing a 1999 meeting between KPMG and First Union’s Financial Advisory Services 

Due Diligence Committee, shows that both firms were fully aware 

that a formal alliance between the two businesses raised auditor 

independence concerns:

Present from KPMG were Sandy Spitz and Jeff Eischeid. 

Sandy answered questions regarding their proposal to be a 

strategy provider, specifically regarding fee sharing and internal overlap. Regarding a fee sharing arrangement, Sandy 

stressed that KPMG and FUNB can never appear to be involved in a joint venture. The two organizations must always 

be independent, due to the audit relationship.531

While First Union and KPMG claim that each client paid First 

Union directly, and there was no fee sharing arrangement nor referral fee paid by KPMG to First Union, the evidence suggests that 

such claims attempt to elevate form over substance. The overwhelming evidence is that KPMG and First Union had an on-going 

alliance to promote the sale of KPMG tax products to First Union 

customers.532 In the Subcommittee’s view, this relationship comprised a ‘‘direct or material indirect business’’ relationship between 

the bank and its auditor. 

VIII. ROLE OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS 

Finding: Some investment advisors, including Presidio 

and Quellos, assisted in the development, design, marketing, and execution of potentially abusive or illegal 

tax shelters such as FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.

Investment advisors also played a major role with respect to the 

development, marketing, and implementation, of generic tax shelters sold to multiple clients. The Subcommittee’s in-depth examination of KPMG tax shelters provided a detailed view of this role 

with respect to two investment firms: Presidio Advisory Services 

and the Quellos Group, formally known as Quadra. 

Both Presidio and Quellos assisted in the development and design of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters sold by KPMG. 

Both assisted in the marketing of these tax shelters to multiple clients. In addition, both assisted KPMG in the implementation of 

these tax shelters by establishing partnerships, participating in 

loans, and executing some of the currency or security trades required to produce the claimed tax benefits for KPMG clients. In addition, each had relationships with banks that were instrumental 

in providing the client loans necessary for the tax shelters, as well 

as certain investment services. Presidio and Quellos were far from 

alone in providing such services in the tax shelter industry. Many 

other investment advisors such as the Diversified Group, Bolton 

Capital Planning, The Private Capital Management Group, and 

Bricolage Capital have provided similar services with respect to tax 

shelters that were developed and promoted by others. 

122

533Messrs. Larson and Pfaff also formed numerous other companies, many of them shells, to 

participate in business dealings including, in some cases, OPIS and BLIPS transactions. These 

related companies include Presidio Advisors, Presidio Growth, Presidio Resources, Presidio Volatility Management, Presidio Financial Group, Hayes Street Management, Holland Park, Prevad, 

Inc., and Norwood Holdings (collectively referred to as ‘‘Presidio’’). 534See email dated 7/29/97, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG employees, ‘‘Subject: Revised 

Memorandum,’’ Bates KPMG JAC331160–69. 535 Id. 536 Id. 537 Id. 538 Id. 539Subcommittee interview with Presidio representative (6/20/03). The Presidio representative 

told the Subcommittee that 95% of the company’s revenues had come from its work with KPMG. 540See Letter dated 9/19/97, from Gregg Ritchie to John Larson, Bates P41292–94. 541 Id. 542 Id.

A. PRESIDIO ADVISORY SERVICES 

Robert Pfaff and John Larson are two former KPMG employees 

who left the firm in 1999, to form Presidio Advisory Services.533

While at KPMG, Mr. Pfaff was a partner and Mr. Larson was a 

senior manager. Evidence uncovered by the Subcommittee shows 

that Mr. Pfaff played an instrumental role in formulating KPMG’s 

business plan for promoting generic tax shelters to multiple clients. 

For example, in July 1997, a month before he left KPMG, Mr. Pfaff 

wrote a memorandum to the top two officials in KPMG’s tax practice with a number of suggestions for KPMG’s Tax Advantaged 

Transaction Practice.’’ 534 The memorandum stated, for example, 

that KPMG needed to reward ‘‘idea-generators’’ for tax products, a 

suggestion later carried out by KPMG’s Tax Innovation Center.535

It recommended that KPMG ‘‘gain entrance to the international 

banking, investment and leasing community and have an alignment with the ‘handful’ of law firms who are skilled and respected 

in this area.’’ 536 KPMG eventually formed relationships with Deutsche Bank, HVB, First Union, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and 

others, as chronicled in this Report. 

Mr. Pfaff also recommended that KPMG establish a relationship 

with an investment firm, such as Presidio, to market its tax products. He explained: ‘‘To avoid IRS scrutiny, KPMG had to market 

its tax products as investment strategies, but if it characterized it 

services as providing investment advice to clients, it could attract 

SEC scrutiny and have to comply with Federal securities regulations. . . . [I]t was this dilemma that led me to the conclusion that 

KPMG needs to align with the likes of a Presidio.’’ 537 He expressed 

his desire for a close relationship between KPMG and Presidio with 

the ‘‘goal of developing mutually-beneficial products.’’ 538

In fact, since Presidio’s inception in 1997, the vast majority of its 

work has involved developing, marketing, and implementing tax 

products with KPMG.539 The basis for this working relationship 

was a formal operating agreement that Presidio and KPMG entered into in September 1997, with respect to the FLIP tax product. 

Under the terms of this agreement, KPMG offered Presidio the 

right of first refusal to present FLIP to KPMG clients.540 KPMG 

also committed to using its best efforts to introduce Presidio to its 

clients, on a right of first refusal basis.541 In return, Presidio offered KPMG a right of first refusal to promote all other tax-based 

products Presidio developed.542 In addition, Presidio committed to 

using its best efforts to assist KPMG in developing tax products 

123

543 Id. 544 Id. 545 Id. 546See memorandum dated 7/2/98, from Gregg Ritchie to Larry DeLap, ‘‘Subject: Presidio Operating Agreement,’’ Bates KPMG 0047221–23. KPMG later determined that the original agreement was a ‘‘Level II alliance,’’ as defined in KPMG’s Tax Manual due to each of the parties 

‘‘right of first refusal’’ and the provisions to ‘‘jointly develop products.’’ See email dated 6/5/98, 

from Larry DeLap to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘Subject: Re[2]: Presidio Alliance Form,’’ Bates KPMG 

0047208–17 (stating that removal of provisions would create a Level I alliance not requiring 

Management Committee approval). This statement implies that the original agreement did not 

get the necessary Management Committee approval in contravention of KPMG procedures. The 

modified 1998 agreement removed the two provisions. 547See email dated 6/5/098, from Larry De DeLap to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘Subject: Re[2]: Presidio 

Alliance Form,’’ Bates KPMG 0047208–17, at 13. 548 Email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘Subject: Simon Says,’’ Bates KPMG 

0034380–88. 549Subcommittee interview with Presidio representative (10/3/03). 550 Id. One attorney is believed to be George Theofel. See Memorandum dated 12/3/98, from 

R.J. Ruble to Randy Bickham, George Theofel, ‘‘Re: BLIPS,’’ Bates SIDL–SCGA083244; email 

dated 4/28/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Nancy Donohue, ‘‘Subject: presidio—w.revisions, I 

will call u in 1 min.,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6911–13 (stating that ‘‘Presidio, in conjunction with ICA, 

have developed a new product called BLIPS.’’). George Theofel was affiliated with Jackson Tufts 

Cole & Black, a law firm in San Francisco, and later Integrated Capital Associates. According 

to Martindale-Hubbell, George Theofel is currently an attorney based in San Rafael, CA. 551Subcommittee interview with Presidio representative (10/3/03). 552 Id. 553See email dated 12/3/98, from Presidio Advisors to Randy Bickham, Jeff Eischeid, Tracie 

Henderson, George Theofel, and R.J. Ruble, ‘‘Subject: RE BLIPS meeting,’’ Bates KPMG 

0037336. 

that KPMG brought to Presidio’s attention.543 KPMG committed to 

using its best efforts to assist in developing and distributing new 

tax products with Presidio.544 Also, KPMG committed that its development costs in jointly developing tax products with Presidio 

would be borne by KPMG.545 In July 1998, KPMG and Presidio 

modified and again executed this agreement.546

Presidio played a key role in three of the KPMG tax shelters examined by the Subcommittee, FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. While at 

KPMG, both Robert Pfaff and John Larson were part of the development team for FLIP. After they established Presidio, they implemented six FLIP transactions for KPMG.547 According to an internal KPMG email, Mr. Pfaff was also part of KPMG discussions to 

re-design FLIP, which eventually led to development of the OPIS 

tax product.548 The email indicates that, for about 6 weeks, a senior KPMG tax professional and Robert Pfaff worked ‘‘to tweak or 

redesign’’ FLIP and ‘‘determined that whatever the new product, it 

needed a greater economic risk attached to it’’ to meet the requirements of Federal tax law. 

Presidio took an even more substantial role in developing BLIPS. 

According to Presidio, it initiated the development of this product 

in the fall of 1998.549 Whereas the idea for FLIP started within 

KPMG, and Presidio and KPMG co-developed OPIS, Presidio alleges that the idea for BLIPS originated in discussions involving 

Messrs. Pfaff, Larson, and two San Francisco based attorneys.550

To develop the idea further, Presidio told the Subcommittee that it 

hired Amir Makov, formerly with Deutsche Bank, to provide economic and investment expertise.551 Presidio told the Subcommittee 

that it had wanted to present KPMG with a polished ‘‘turn-key’’ tax 

product that could be easily sold to multiple clients.552 The evidence suggests that, at some point in 1998, Presidio formed a working group which also included KPMG tax professionals Randy 

Bickham, and Jeff Eischeid, and Brown & Wood’s R.J. Ruble.553

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554See Levin Report, reproduced in the Senate hearing record, at 178–184. 555Subcommittee interview of HVB Bank (10/29/03). 556See memorandum dated 9/14/99, from Robert Pfaff to Dom DiGiorgio, ‘‘Subject: BLIPS loan 

test case,’’ Bates HVB 000202. 557 Email dated 4/28/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Nancy Donohue, ‘‘Subject: presidio—

w.revisions, I will call u in 1 min.,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6911–13. 558See Presidio Year 2000 Strategic Plan, Bates KPMG 0042855–59. 

In addition to contributing to the development of the BLIPS concept, Presidio played a critical role in KPMG’s internal evaluation 

of BLIPS’ viability. KPMG documentation indicates that, at a critical meeting in May 1999, Presidio described BLIPS as presenting 

only a remote probability of producing a profit for the clients who 

bought it, thereby causing several KPMG tax professionals to recommend against approving the product for sale to clients.554

KPMG subsequently determined to approve BLIPS sales despite 

the concerns of its tax professionals, but only after also requiring 

Presidio and each BLIPS purchaser to represent in writing that 

BLIPS provided a reasonable opportunity to produce a profit. At 

the Subcommittee’s hearing on November 18, 2003, a former 

KPMG tax partner, Mark Watson, testified that Presidio had essentially changed its analysis of BLIPS’ profitability, while at the 

hearing on November 20, a Presidio representative, John Larson, 

testified that Mr. Watson may have misunderstood the firm’s earlier analysis. Upon further questions by Subcommittee Chairman 

Coleman, however, Mr. Larson also acknowledged that none of the 

BLIPS transactions executed by KPMG clients ever actually made 

a profit. KPMG nonetheless claims to have relied on Presidio’s representation about BLIPS’ profitability in reaching its conclusion 

that BLIPS met the requirements of Federal tax law and could be 

sold to KPMG clients. 

In addition to contributing to the development of KPMG tax 

products, Presidio also played a key role in marketing and implementing them. For example, Presidio made numerous presentations to KPMG clients related to FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. Presidio also undertook many actions to implement the transactions 

called for by the tax products, including by forming partnerships, 

executing trades, and working with banks to secure client loans 

and develop the trading strategies for the tax shelter transactions. 

With respect to BLIPS, for example, Presidio initiated contact with 

HVB Bank in the fall of 1999, 555 and then worked with HVB to 

help structure loan terms and refine the investment strategy.556

Earlier in 1999, while KPMG was still vetting BLIPS through its 

Washington National Tax review and approval process, evidence 

indicates that Presidio was already talking to Deutsche Bank about 

the product. For example, a Deutsche Bank email dated February 

28, 1999, mentions that Presidio has ‘‘developed a new product 

called BLIPS,’’ and urges the need for Deutsche Bank to get ‘‘TOP 

Level Global Markets Go Ahead to proceed.’’ 557 Another Presidio 

document, detailing the strategic business plan for the year 2000, 

suggests ‘‘schedule[ing] a meeting with Deutsche Bank the week of 

November 15, 1999 to discuss the 2000 business plan and to introduce the ‘specs’ for the ‘1001’ product’’ and scheduling a ‘‘meeting 

with UBS in November 1999 with the goal of securing their buyin as the ‘co-lead’ bank.’’ 558

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559Subcommittee interview of Presidio representative (10/3/03). 560Subcommittee interview of Quellos representative (11/7/03). 561See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/12/96, from Jeff Greenstein to Wolfgang Stolz, Bates UBS 

000002 (stating with respect to FLIP, ‘‘this tax motivated transaction is designed for U.S. companies requiring a tax loss.’’). 

A final point concerns the legal obligation of tax shelter promoters to register their tax products with the IRS and maintain 

lists of the clients who bought them. At the Subcommittee hearings, a former senior tax official at KPMG, Larry DeLap, testified 

that he thought the BLIPS transaction should have been registered 

with the IRS and that Presidio should have completed the registration. Presidio told the Subcommittee in an interview, however, that 

while it did conduct activities rising to a level of a promoter, Presidio did not believe the KPMG transaction met the definition of 

a tax shelter under IRS regulations.559 Presidio failed to register 

FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS. 

B. QUELLOS GROUP 

The Quellos Group, formerly known as Quadra Capital Management, provided investment advisory services similar to Presidio 

with respect to KPMG’s FLIP and OPIS transactions. In addition, 

Quellos promoted PwC’s version of FLIP. According to Quellos, it 

began its relationship with KPMG in 1994, when structuring a 

portfolio for a mutual client. 560 In May 1996, John Larson, then 

still employed by KPMG, called Quellos for assistance with structuring the investment aspects of FLIP. Quellos told the Subcommittee that KPMG gave it specific criteria under which to develop the financial transactions. Quellos told the Subcommittee 

that it had understood at the time that designing financial transactions with criteria such as using a foreign corporation’s stock and 

options, setting up an offshore corporation, completing the transaction within a short time frame (i.e., 51 days), purchasing a warrant, and hedging to limit downside risk, were intended to produce 

beneficial tax consequences. Quellos also noted that the tax structure was developed first, and the investment strategy was then incorporated into the tax structure—facts which further demonstrate 

that FLIP was primarily intended as a tax transaction. 

Like Presidio, Quellos also helped KPMG convince a major bank, 

UBS AG, to provide financing to FLIP clients and participate in 

specific FLIP transactions.561 Quellos told the Subcommittee that, 

among other tasks, it worked with UBS to fine-tune the FLIP financial transactions, helped KPMG make client presentations 

about FLIP and, for those who purchased the product, helped complete the required paperwork and transactions, using Quellos securities brokers. 

In addition to serving as the investment advisor for KPMG’s 

FLIP and OPIS transactions, Quellos also served as the investment 

advisor for PwC’s version of FLIP, a transaction which was substantially similar in all material respects to the KPMG version. At 

the Subcommittee hearings, however, Quellos testified that it had 

taken action to register with the IRS the FLIP transaction promoted by PwC, but not the FLIP transaction for KPMG. When 

questioned by Chairman Coleman about this disparate treatment, 

Quellos explained that it acted in accordance with the guidance 

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562Memorandum dated 10/9/97, from David L. Smith to Gregg Ritchie, Bates KPMG JAC 

329291. 563Memorandum dated 10/10/97, from Gregg Ritchie to David L. Smith, Bates KPMG JAC 

328964. 564Quellos testimony at Subcommittee Hearings (11/20/03), at 127. 565For a more detailed description of the SC2 shelter, see the Levin Report, Appendix B, at 

122–125. 566For more information about KPMG’s efforts to locate qualified tax-exempt entities willing 

to participate in SC2 transactions, see Section V(A)(1) of this Report. 

provided by the two accounting firms, one of which advised it to 

register and the other of which advised it that registration was unnecessary. 

Quellos also told the Subcommittee that it subsequently raised 

the registration issue again with KPMG. On October 9, 1997, 

Quellos wrote a memorandum to KPMG seeking ‘‘a letter confirming earlier discussions that the redemption transaction [FLIP] 

was not required to be registered as a tax shelter.’’ 562 In response, 

KPMG wrote a memorandum on October 10, 1997, stating that the 

tax shelter registration requirements applicable to Quadra ‘‘must 

be made by your Firm in conjunction with your own tax counsel,’’ 

and that KPMG ‘‘has determined that it will not register this engagement as a tax shelter.’’ 563 Quellos testified at the Subcommittee hearings that it ‘‘deferred again to their decision, viewing [KPMG] as the primary promoter, that if they decided that it 

did not need to be registered for themselves that we would go with 

that assessment.’’ Quellos also stated that they viewed KPMG’s 

statement that Quellos had to make its own registration decision 

as an attempt by KPMG ‘‘to absolve them of any liability that they 

may have for our decision.’’ 564

IX. ROLE OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 

Finding: Some charitable organizations, including the 

Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police Pensions 

and the Austin Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement 

Fund, participated as counter parties in a highly questionable tax shelter known as SC2, which had been developed and promoted by KPMG, in return for substantial payments in the future.

In the case of the SC2 tax shelter examined in this Report, 

KPMG and its clients could not have executed any SC2 transaction 

without the active and willing participation of a special type of 

charitable organization, such as a governmental pension plan, that 

is authorized to own S Corporation stock and receive distributions 

or allocations of income from that stock without incurring a tax on 

unrelated business income.565

KPMG encountered difficulties in locating and convincing appropriate charitable organizations to participate in SC2 transactions, 

but eventually convinced several tax-exempt entities to do so.566

KPMG refused to identify to the Subcommittee any of the tax-exempt entities it contacted in connection with the SC2 or any of the 

tax-exempt entities that actually participated in SC2 transactions 

by accepting S Corporation stock, claiming their identity was Atax 

return information’’ that it could not disclose. The Subcommittee 

was nevertheless able to identify and interview two tax exempt organizations which, between them, participated in 33 of the 58 SC2 

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567Subcommittee interviews with the Fire and Police Pensions of Los Angeles (10/22/03) and 

the Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund (10/14/03) confirmed their participation in the SC2 

transactions. The Subcommittee also learned of a fire fighter’s pension fund in West Virginia 

that participated in SC2 transaction by accepting S Corporation stock donations. 568While documents provided by KPMG to the pension funds made it clear that the persons 

providing stock would be able to shelter income through the SC2 transaction, the Los Angeles 

Department of Fire and Police Pensions indicated that it had not realized the SC2 transactions 

were elaborate tax avoidance schemes until contacted by the Subcommittee staff about them. 569 IRS Notice 2004–30 (4/1/04). 570 Information about the Los Angeles pension fund and its participation in SC2 transactions 

is taken from documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the pension fund; Subcommittee staff 

interviews with representatives of the pension fund; a Statement for the Record by Thomas 

Lopez, Chief Investment Officer of the Fire and Police Pensions of Los Angeles, reprinted in the 

Subcommittee hearings (11/18/03) at 3016 as Hearing Exhibit 153 (hereinafter ‘‘Los Angeles 

pension fund statement’’); and Responses to Supplemental Questions for the Record by the pension fund, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings at 3017–24 (hereinafter ‘‘Los Angeles pension fund supplemental response’’). 571See Los Angeles pension fund statement; documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the 

pension fund. In two of the instances, the pension fund had participated in the SC2 transactions 

by accepting S Corporation stock from KPMG clients on December 31, 1999, 3 months prior to 

KPMG’s approving SC2 as a generic tax product in March 2000. See e-mail dated 3/30/2000, 

from William Kelliher to Larry DeLap and other KPMG personnel, ‘‘SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 

0049901–03, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings at 1861–63. The pension fund also told 

Subcommittee staff that one of the 28 SC2 transactions, implemented on December 31, 2001, 

was subsequently revoked by the taxpayer on June 18, 2002. The redemption agreement speciContinued

transactions KPMG arranged.567 Both turned out to be municipal 

pension funds: the Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police Pensions, and the Austin Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund. 

The evidence indicates that both of these pension funds knew 

that they were participating in transactions whose primary purpose was to provide tax benefits to each person who ‘‘donated’’ S 

Corporation stock to the fund.568 Both pension funds also knew 

that the shares they received were intended to be in their possession on a temporary basis, to be followed in a few years by their 

re-sale of the shares to the original owners. Both pension funds 

agreed to participate in the transactions in exchange for what they 

hoped would be substantial payments in the future. The Los Angeles pension fund, for example, as of November 2003, had participated in 28 SC2 transactions over 3 years, re-sold ‘‘donated’’ stock 

to 11 of the original ‘‘donors,’’ and obtained $5.9 million in exchange, while the ‘‘donors’’ themselves attempted to shelter from 

taxation many millions of dollars in S Corporation income earned 

during the period in which the pension funds held the shares. 

On April 1, 2004, the Internal Revenue Service declared SC2 and 

similar transactions to be abusive tax shelters that did not legally 

exempt S Corporation income from Federal taxation.569

A. LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND POLICE 

PENSIONS 

The Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police Pensions (re- ferred to as ‘‘Los Angeles pension fund’’ or ‘‘pension fund’’) is a $10 

billion pension fund that serves the police and fire departments in 

the city of Los Angeles, California.570 The Los Angeles pension 

fund participated in 28, or nearly 50 percent, of the 58 SC2 tax 

products sold by KPMG between 1999 and 2002. 

At the time of the Subcommittee hearings in November 2003, the pension fund held $7.3 million worth of S Corporation stock received through 16 SC2 transactions, and had sold back stock to 11 

S Corporation shareholders in exchange for payments totaling $5.9 

million.571 Subsequently, in December 2003, three more donors reVerDate jul 14 2003 01:53 Apr 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR054.XXX SR054
128

fied that redemption period did not begin until December 31, 2004, but the pension fund returned the stock without remuneration. 572Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 8. 573See Los Angeles pension fund statement; Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response 

at 2; and other documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the pension fund. The Los Angeles 

pension fund was contacted by Lawrence E. Manth, then a partner in KPMG’s Los Angeles office, and Douglas P. Duncan, then a manager in the same Los Angeles office. 574Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. The 

pension fund also sought and received legal guidance from Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & 

Geraldson, its legal counsel. See letter dated 12/30/99, from Sayfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & 

Geraldson to the pension fund, reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 155 

at 3757–66. The advice sought by the fund and provided by the law firm did not, however, address the tax consequences of the SC2 transaction, but merely the narrow issue of whether the 

fund had the legal authority to accept a donation of S Corporation stock. The letter stated in 

part: 

It should be noted that, from a procedural and due-diligence standpoint, (1) we have not 

been asked to conduct, and we have not conducted, any investigation into the company and/

or the individual involved, (2) we have not yet reviewed any of the underlying documentation in connection with the donation or the possible future redemption of the stock, and offer 

no opinion on such agreements on their impact on any of the views expressed in this letter, 

(3) we have not examined, or opined in any way about, the impact of the transaction on 

the ‘‘donor’’ from a tax or other standpoint, and (4) we have not checked the investment 

against any investment policy guidelines that may have been adopted by the Board. Id. at 

2. The law firm’s letter to the pension fund also characterized the transaction as ‘‘very unusual.’’ Id. at 1. 575Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. At the 

same time KPMG was marketing SC2 to tax exempt organizations, as explained earlier in this 

Report KPMG tax professionals were expressing uncertainty within the firm as to whether SC2 

would withstand IRS scrutiny. See, e.g., e-mail dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David 

Brockway, Bates KPMG 0012720–24 (‘‘. . .In my opinion, there was (and is) a strong risk of 

a successful IRS attack on SC2 if the IRS gets wind of it.’’), reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings 

as Hearing Exhibit 59, at 604–608; and e-mail dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to KPMG’s Tax 

Professional Practice Partners, AS-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015631 (‘‘This is a relatively high risk strategy.’’), reprinted in the Subcommittee Hearings as Hearing Exhibit 50 at 584. 576Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 2–3. 577 Id. at 3; Subcommittee staff interviews of representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. 578Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund; and 

documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the pension fund related to particular transactions. 

The Los Angeles pension fund also told Subcommittee staff that, after September 2002, it dealt 

deemed their S Corporation shares from the pension fund, while 

one donor revoked a gift of stock that had been made in an SC2 

transaction.572

The Los Angeles pension fund told Subcommittee staff that 

KPMG had contacted it ‘‘out of the blue’’ about the SC2 tax shelter 

in the fall of 1999, and that although it willingly participated in 

the SC2 transactions, it would not have done so absent being approached, convinced, and assisted by KPMG.573 The pension fund 

also told the Subcommittee that it never conducted its own due 

diligence review into whether the SC2 transactions complied with 

Federal tax law.574 Instead, the pension fund had relied upon representations made to it by KPMG that the transaction met the requirements of the tax code.575

The Los Angeles pension fund’s lack of due diligence extended to 

other matters as well. For example, the pension fund relied upon 

KPMG to make sure that specific donations were from legitimate 

businesses, and frequently depended upon KPMG to screen donors 

and companies prior to its accepting donations.576 The pension 

fund told Subcommittee staff that KPMG often did not disclose the 

names of specific donors and companies to the fund until shortly 

before a transaction was entered into by the parties.577 Over a 3-

year period, the Los Angeles pension fund accepted stock donations 

from S Corporations located in Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, and North Carolina, relying primarily on the 

representations and due diligence conducted by KPMG.578

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with a second professional firm, Meritage Financial Partners, LLC (‘‘Meritage’’), in connection 

with the SC2 transaction. The founding members of Meritage include former KPMG employees 

Lawrence Manth, Douglas Duncan, Andrew A. Atkin, and Robert E. Huber, all of whom had 

worked on the SC2 tax shelter. The California Secretary of State indicates that Meritage Financial Partners, LLC, filed for certification with the state on August 2, 2002. Meritage remains 

listed as an active business. 579Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 4–5, 7; Subcommittee interviews with 

representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. 580Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 1–2; Subcommittee staff interviews 

with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. 581 In its Supplemental Response to the Subcommittee, the Los Angeles pension fund reported 

eight corporations had made distributions. The pension fund later informed the Subcommittee 

that an additional S Corporation had subsequently made a distribution of income to the fund. 582Documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the pension fund related to particular transactions; and Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension 

fund. The six instances in which a distribution was made by an S Corporation to the pension 

fund are as follows: 

(a) A redemption agreement between the pension fund and one S Corporation extended the 

redemption date from June 15, 2003 to June 15, 2004, if the S Corporation made a dividend 

payment in the amount of $50,000. Although the S Corporation paid a dividend of only $9,000, 

the pension fund extended the redemption date to July 15, 2004. (b) A redemption agreement 

automatically extended the beginning of the redemption period date from June 30, 2002 to June 

Continued

On paper, in each SC2 transaction, the Los Angeles pension fund 

generally received 90% of an S Corporation’s outstanding shares 

and was entitled to 90% of the corporation’s distributions. Yet the 

pension fund did not manage or oversee its S Corporation holdings 

as if it were a true shareholder with a substantial financial interest 

in the performance of the corporation. For example, the pension 

fund indicated to the Subcommittee that it did not know whether 

the distributions, if any, that were made to it while it owned the 

S Corporation stock were consistent with the historical distributions of the S Corporation; the pension fund did not keep track of 

the annual income allocated but not distributed to it; and it did not 

know what happened to any unallocated funds after it re-sold the 

shares to the original owners. When the owners of shares in one 

S Corporation asked the pension fund to redeem their shares earlier than the time period specified in the redemption agreement, so 

that the S Corporation could be purchased by another company, the 

pension fund relied on KPMG’s assertion that the per share redemption price paid to the pension fund reflected the new, higher 

value of the S Corporation’s shares.579

Further, the Los Angeles pension fund told the Subcommittee 

that it did not expect to obtain significant amounts of money from 

the S Corporations during the period in which it was a shareholder, but expected instead to obtain a substantial payment when 

it re-sold the shares to the original owners or their S Corporation.580 In fact, the pension fund disclosed that, in many instances, 

the S Corporations in which it was a shareholder had suspended 

all distributions during the period of time in which the pension 

fund held its stock. The Los Angeles pension fund told the Subcommittee that only nine corporations, less than one-third of the 28 

S Corporations in which it had holdings through SC2 transactions, 

had made any distributions to the pension fund while it was a 

stockholder.581 The pension fund also disclosed that at least six of 

these nine S Corporations had apparently made a distribution to 

the pension fund only to take advantage of an extension clause in 

the redemption agreement enabling the S Corporation owners to 

shelter income for an additional year if a distribution was made to 

the pension fund.582

130

30, 2003, if the S Corporation made dividend payments in the amount of $75,600, before June 

30, 2002, which it did. The S Corporation made a second dividend payment of $7,600 before 

June 30, 2003, and the pension fund again extended the redemption date to June 30, 2004. (c) 

A redemption agreement automatically extended the beginning of the redemption period date 

from June 30, 2002 to June 30, 2003, if the S Corporation made a dividend payment of $114,975. 

On June 25, 2002, the corporation made a distribution of exactly $114, 975. The S Corporation 

had a further option to extend the redemption date from June 30, 2003, to June 30, 2004, if 

it made another distribution of $144,900, before June 30, 2003. On June 27, 2003, it made a 

distribution of exactly $144,900. (d) A redemption agreement automatically extended the beginning of the redemption period date from June 30, 2002 to June 30, 2003, if the S Corporation 

made distributions of $144,900, to the pension fund before June 30, 2002. On June 26, 2002, 

the S Corporation, in fact, made a distribution of exactly $144,900. (e) A redemption agreement 

automatically extended the beginning of the redemption period date from July 15, 2003, to July 

15, 2004, if the S Corporation made a dividend payment in the amount of $135,000. The S Corporation had a further option to extend the redemption until June 30, 2004, if it made an additional dividend payment of $114,975, before June 30, 2003. It paid dividends of $114,975, before 

June 30, 2003, and extended the redemption agreement until June 30, 2004. (f) A redemption 

agreement automatically extended the beginning of the redemption period date from January 

2004 until January 2005, as long as the S Corporation paid the pension fund $30,000 in dividends. The pension fund did not provide the Subcommittee with the amount of dividends it received from the S Corporation. The pension fund did not provide information to the Subcommittee about the redemption agreement between the pension fund and a seventh S Corporation. 583Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. 584Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund; Los 

Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 1–3; documents provided to the Subcommittee 

by the pension fund related to specific transactions. The redemption agreement also required 

that if the tax exempt received a purchase offer from an outside party for the shares, the S 

Corporation and its shareholders had a right of first refusal. While none of the redemption 

agreements entered into by the pension fund explicitly required the pension fund sell its nonvoting shares back to the original owners, there were no instances in which the pension fund 

sold S Corporation shares to any party other than the original owners of the stock. 585Documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the Los Angeles pension fund related to particular transactions; Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Los Angeles pension fund. 586See documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the Los Angeles pension fund related to 

particular transactions. In seven of the 28 SC2 transactions, the original owners of the shares 

or the related S Corporation had sought an early redemption (in five instances) or revoked the 

gift outright (in two instances). The pension fund indicated that, in some instances, Douglas 

Duncan from KPMG’s Los Angeles office, acting on behalf of the original stock owners, had approached the pension fund about early redemption or revocation of the stock donation. The pension fund told Subcommittee staff that it had agreed to these early redemptions because ‘‘a dollar in the hand is worth two in the bush.’’ In other instances, the pension fund had agreed to 

an extension of the redemption period at the request of the original owners of the shares or 

The pension fund told the Subcommittee that, in all of the 28 

SC2 transactions in which it participated, it had expected to retain 

ownership of the S Corporation stock only for a specified period of 

time, generally 2 to 4 years, as established in a redemption agreement which it entered into with the original stock owners at the 

time of the stock assignment.583 The pension fund indicated that 

every SC2 transaction had included an executed redemption agreement, and every one of the redemption agreements had enabled the 

pension fund, after holding the S Corporation stock for a specified 

period of time (typically 2, 3, or 4 years), to require the original 

stock owners or their S Corporation to redeem the shares.584 The 

pension fund further indicated that the SC2 transactions had unfolded as planned, ending in a re-sale of stock to the owners or 

their S Corporation, unless the owner or corporation had asked the 

pension fund to return the shares earlier or later than the specified 

period or had otherwise revoked the gift. The evidence shows that 

there were no instances in which the Los Angeles pension fund sold 

S Corporation shares to any party other than the original owners 

of the stock.585 In addition, in all instances in which the pension 

fund returned shares to the original owners earlier or later than 

the period originally established in the redemption agreement, it 

was the owners who had requested the change.586

131

the related S Corporation. In one other instance, the pension fund indicated that the S Corporation had asked the pension fund to retain ownership of the stock after the redemption period 

had lapsed, because the original owners of the shares did not have sufficient funds at that time 

to redeem the stock at fair market value. The pension fund then retained the stock for 11 

months beyond the time period established in the redemption agreement. See Los Angeles pension fund Supplemental Response at 4. 587 Information about the Austin pension fund and its participation in SC2 transactions is 

taken from documents supplied to the Subcommittee by the pension fund; and Subcommittee 

staff interviews with representatives of the pension fund. 588Subcommittee staff interviews with representatives of the Austin pension fund. 589 Id. 590 Id., the Austin pension fund told the Subcommittee staff during a telephone interview conducted on May 11, 2004, that ‘‘it [referring to SC2] appeared to be a tax loophole, but from the 

standpoint of our members we couldn’t overlook a donation.’’

B. AUSTIN FIRE FIGHTERS RELIEF AND RETIREMENT 

FUND 

The Austin Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund (referred 

to as ‘‘Austin pension fund’’ or ‘‘pension fund’’) is a $400 million 

pension fund that serves the fire departments of Austin, Texas.587

Like the Los Angeles pension fund, the Austin pension fund told 

the Subcommittee that KPMG had contacted the pension fund ‘‘out 

of the blue’’ about the SC2 transaction. The pension fund administrator told Subcommittee staff that he was ‘‘uncertain why anyone 

out-of-state would be interested in contributing to the Austin pension fund . . . but that the fund could not look a gift horse in the 

mouth.’’ 588 The Austin pension fund participated in five SC2 transactions and received stock from S Corporations in California, Mississippi, New Jersey, and New York. The first transaction occurred 

in October 2000, and the last in March 2001. 

The Austin pension fund told the Subcommittee staff that documents it received from KPMG in connection with the SC2 transaction were referred to its legal counsel for review prior to accepting any stock donations. The pension fund indicated that its legal 

counsel conducted a due diligence review only with respect to the 

materials KPMG had provided, and concluded that KPMG had 

found a ‘‘loophole’’ or ‘‘wording’’ in the Internal Revenue Code 

which enabled the pension fund to accept S Corporation stock donations.589 However, legal counsel did not provide the pension fund 

with a written legal opinion, and the pension fund did not seek further legal advice from another outside firm before accepting S Corporation stock. The pension fund told the Subcommittee staff that, 

regardless of the advice it had received from legal counsel, it remained skeptical that such S Corporation stock donations would 

ever result in future income to the pension fund.590 The pension 

fund nonetheless participated in five SC2 transactions over a 6-

month period. 

Like the Los Angeles pension fund, the Austin pension fund conducted little, if any, due diligence related to the specific SC2 transactions presented to the fund by KPMG. For example, the Austin 

pension fund told the Subcommittee that it had relied on KPMG 

or the relevant S Corporation to determine the fair market value 

of the non-voting stock that was donated to the pension fund and 

for the value of that same stock several years later when the fund 

re-sold it to the donors or their S Corporation. The Austin pension 

fund administrator told the Subcommittee staff that the pension 

fund did not conduct any of its own valuations, but simply ‘‘took 

132

591 Id. 592 Id. 593 Id. With respect to the two transactions still outstanding, the Austin pension fund indicated that the redemption date for one of the transactions had been extended in a similar fashion as in the examples cited earlier with the Los Angeles pension fund, and in the second transaction, the original stock owner was seeking to extend the redemption date to a future year after 

the distribution of dividends to the Austin pension fund. 594 IRS Notice 2004–30 (4/1/04). 595 ‘‘Treasury and the IRS Issue Guidance on S Corporation, Tax Exempt Entity Transaction,’’ 

IRS 2004–44 (4/1/04). 

KPMG’s word’’ regarding the value of the donated stock.591 Moreover, the fund administrator characterized the S Corporation stock 

as ‘‘basically useless’’ and stated that he believed the fund would 

only receive income from the stock when the original owner repurchased it. He indicated, however, that the sentiment at the pension 

fund was not to ‘‘look a gift horse in the mouth.’’ 592

The Austin pension fund told the Subcommittee that the SC2 

transactions were, in fact, carried out as planned by KPMG. Of the 

five SC2 transactions in which the pension fund had participated, 

the Austin pension fund administrator indicated that one original 

stock owner had redeemed the shares at the conclusion of the period specified in the redemption agreement; in two instances, 

shares were redeemed by the original owners earlier than the period established in the redemption agreement, at their request; and 

two transactions remained outstanding.593

On April 1, 2004, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice 

declaring the SC2 shelter and similar transactions to be abusive 

tax avoidance transactions and deeming them ‘‘listed transactions.’’ 594 In addition, the IRS declared that tax exempt parties 

in the transactions would be treated as participants in the transactions. According to an IRS release accompanying the 2004 notice, 

it was ‘‘the first time the IRS has exercised its authority under the 

tax shelter regulations to specifically designate a tax exempt party 

as a participant in a tax avoidance transaction.’’ 595

KPMG stopped marketing new SC2 transactions in 2002, but 

many of the 58 SC2 products it had sold previously remained active 

in 2003 and 2004. Similarly, while the Los Angeles and Austin pension funds told the Subcommittee that they had stopped entering 

into new SC2 transactions, both continued to hold S Corporation 

stock from earlier transactions and planned to re-sell their S Corporation holdings to the original stock owners for additional, substantial sums. 

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