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INDONESIA IN TRANSITION: RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 10, 2005

Serial No. 109–41

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN M. DONALD, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Marie Huhtala, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 8

The Honorable Alphonse F. La Porta, President, United States-Indonesia 

Society ................................................................................................................... 23

Douglas E. Ramage, Ph.D., Representative, Indonesia and Malaysia, The 

Asia Foundation ................................................................................................... 32

Mr. Edmund McWilliams, Board of Directors, Indonesia Human Rights Network and Former Political Counselor with the U.S. Embassy, Jakarta ......... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 6

The Honorable Marie Huhtala: Prepared statement ............................................ 10

The Honorable Alphonse F. La Porta: Prepared statement ................................. 26

Douglas E. Ramage, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 34

Mr. Edmund McWilliams: Prepared statement .................................................... 42

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 57

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Materials submitted for the record ...................................... 59

(1)

INDONESIA IN TRANSITION: RECENT 

DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 

FOR U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:47 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. I apologize to our 

witnesses, particularly Madam Secretary, but the one thing we do 

not control around here are the voting schedules. The good news, 

however, is that we just had the last vote of the day, so we will 

be uninterrupted henceforth. 

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to welcome all of our 

witnesses to this hearing today. I thank particularly the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for making time to appear before us and look 

forward to as well to our panel of private experts. 

With 238 million inhabitants and over a million square miles of 

territory, the Republic of Indonesia is the giant of Southeast Asia 

and the world’s largest Muslim majority country. It emerged from 

authoritarianism only 6 years ago, during an extended period of 

acute economic and social turmoil. Since then, it has consistently 

defied the dire predictions of some outside skeptics. Indonesia has 

neither disintegrated nor become a failed State. It has instead 

begun a dramatic transition from the authoritarian and corrosively 

corrupt structures of the Suharto era toward those of a functioning, 

decentralized democracy. 

Indeed, 2004 was pivotal for democratic institution-building in 

the country. Indonesia conducted three complex national elections, 

including its first direct Presidential election. Over 80 percent of 

the eligible public participated in what became the largest singleday election in history. The people of Indonesia are deservedly 

proud of the credible, orderly, and peaceful process that occurred, 

which would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. 

Some observers have correctly cited Indonesia as proof that 

Islam and democracy can coexist. But it is more than that. Civil 

Islam in Indonesia has not been merely passive or coincidental 

with democratization, it has been a catalyst. Here on behalf of the 

Congress, I would like to emphasize how appreciative this body is 

of the critical role that Islamic civil society has played over the 

2

past several years in promoting democracy in Indonesia. I fully expect that Islamic organizations, universities, schools, and NGOs 

will continue to play an important part in developing the political 

culture and public expectations necessary to make Indonesia’s nascent democratic institutions stable and sustaining. 

Six months into their new administration, President Yudhoyono 

and Vice President Kalla have begun addressing the numerous significant challenges facing their country. We wish them success in 

promoting economic growth, resolving peacefully separatist and 

communal conflicts, improving the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy, improving the human rights record 

and accountability of their security forces, combating terrorism, 

and ensuring that the institutions that wield public power are fully 

accountable to the people of Indonesia. 

In sum, we share the aspiration of the Indonesian people for expanding the process of reformasi, and foresee the reformation of 

public institutions away from the corruption, collusion, and nepotism that have weakened them in years past. 

Unfortunately, 2004 also brought great tragedy to Indonesia in 

the form of the December 26 earthquake and tsunami, which devastated coastal areas of Aceh in North Sumatra. Approximately 

240,000 people are dead or missing in Indonesia alone. Thankfully, 

due in part to the unprecedented outpouring of international support in the tsunami’s aftermath, further disease-related consequences of the disaster have been curtailed. However, social and 

economic reconstruction will be a considerably more complex and 

protracted process. This Committee and the Congress have clearly 

stated our commitment to assist in that long-term humanitarian 

endeavor. 

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the profound importance 

of people-to-people diplomacy in present circumstances. As Indonesia and the United States witness growth in the ideals we share 

as large, pluralistic democracies, it is only natural that the longstanding friendship between our peoples also should expand. To 

that end, I hope that the United States is able to facilitate increased numbers of visitors from Indonesia, and that both nations 

will significantly increase the pace of educational, professional, and 

private exchange programs. 

I thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Huhtala for appearing before 

us today, and look forward to her testimony. 

Mr. Faleomavaega? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses to our hearing this afternoon. I thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Huhtala 

for making time to appear before us today, and also look forward to our panel of 

private experts. 

With 238 million inhabitants and over a million square miles of territory, the Republic of Indonesia is the giant of Southeast Asia and the world’s largest Muslim 

majority country. It emerged from authoritarianism only six years ago, during an 

extended period of acute economic and social turmoil. Since then, it has consistently 

defied the dire predictions of some outside skeptics. Indonesia has neither disintegrated nor become a failed state. It has instead begun a dramatic transition from 

3

the authoritarian and corrosively corrupt structures of the Suharto era toward those 

of a functioning, decentralized democracy. 

Indeed, 2004 was pivotal for democratic institution building in Indonesia. The 

country conducted three complex national elections, including its first direct presidential election. Over 80% of the eligible public participated in what became the 

largest single-day election in history. The people of Indonesia are deservedly proud 

of the credible, orderly, and peaceful process that occurred, which would have been 

unimaginable just a few years ago. 

Some observers have correctly cited Indonesia as proof that Islam and democracy 

can coexist. But it is more than that. Civil Islam in Indonesia has not been merely 

passive or coincidental with democratization, it has been a catalyst. Here on behalf 

of Congress, I would like to emphasize how appreciative this body is of the critical 

role that Islamic civil society has played over the past several years in promoting 

democracy in Indonesia. I fully expect that Islamic organizations, universities, 

schools, and NGOs will continue to play an important part in developing the political culture and public expectations necessary to make Indonesia’s nascent democratic institutions stable and sustaining. 

Six months into their new administration, President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kalla have begun addressing the numerous, significant challenges facing their 

country. We wish them success in promoting economic growth, peacefully resolving 

separatist and communal conflicts, improving the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy, improving the human rights record and accountability 

of their security forces, combating terrorism, and ensuring that the institutions that 

wield public power are fully accountable to the people of Indonesia. In sum, we 

share the aspiration of the Indonesian people for expanding the process of 

reformasi—the reformation of public institutions away from the corruption, collusion, and nepotism that have weakened them in years past. 

Unfortunately, 2004 also brought great tragedy to Indonesia in the form of the 

December 26 earthquake and tsunami, which devastated coastal areas of Aceh in 

North Sumatra. Approximately 240,000 people are dead or missing in Indonesia 

alone. Thankfully, due in part to the unprecedented outpouring of international support in the tsunami’s aftermath, further disease-related consequences of the disaster 

have been curtailed. However, social and economic reconstruction will be a considerably more complex and protracted process. This Committee and the Congress have 

clearly stated our commitment to assist in that long-term humanitarian endeavor. 

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the profound importance of people-to-people diplomacy in present circumstances. As Indonesia and the United States witness 

growth in the ideals we share as large, pluralistic democracies, it is only natural 

that the longstanding friendship between our peoples also should expand. To that 

end, I hope that the United States is able to facilitate increased numbers of visitors 

from Indonesia, and that both nations will significantly increase the pace of educational, professional, and private exchange programs. 

I thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Huhtala for appearing before us today, and 

look forward to her testimony.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like 

to offer my personal welcome to Secretary Huhtala and the other 

distinguished members of the panel that will also testify this afternoon. 

Like yourself, I also would like to offer my congratulations to the 

238 million people of the most populous Muslim nation in the 

world, for their involvement in providing for a more pluralistic society, democratic reforms and a newly-elected President and the 

leadership that they now have through the principles of democracy. 

No doubt the legacies of Presidents Suharto and Sukarno still 

leave some scars concerning the history and the development of 

this most populous Muslim nation. 

Mr. Chairman, like many of my colleagues, I am deeply concerned by the Administration’s recent decision to certify full IMET 

for Indonesia’s military. For years, the United States has restricted 

foreign military financing for Indonesia, and rightfully so, given the 

horrendous human rights record of the Indonesian military. Even 

in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the recent tsunami, 

the media has reported that the Indonesian military has withheld 

4

food and other humanitarian assistance from those believed to be 

‘‘pro-independents.’’ It appears that the United States cannot and 

must not turn a blind eye to these abuses or to Indonesia’s repression of the people of Aceh and West Papua, New Guinea. 

While I am aware that in the year 2000, our last year, Congress 

narrowed the basis for its ban on IMET to a single condition requiring the State Department to certify that the Indonesian Government and military were cooperating in an FBI investigation in 

August 2002 which, I believe, caused the death of two American 

citizens in West Papua. I also believe there are equally serious reasons why the United States should renew bans on IMET and foreign military financing for the simple reason, Mr. Chairman, of the 

torture, and murder and killing of some 100,000 West Papuans by 

the Indonesian military for the past several years. 

The U.S. State Department has publicly acknowledged that the 

brutal Indonesian military record, as noted in the latest State Department annual Human Rights Report on Indonesia:

‘‘Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, and beat 

and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist 

movements, especially in Aceh and West Papua.’’

Retired and active duty military officers known to have committed 

serious human rights violations occupied, or were promoted, to senior positions in the government and within the Indonesian military 

structure. 

Defense Minister Sudarsono recently quoted and I note, the military retains the real levers of power. From the political point of 

view, the military remains the fulcrum in Indonesia. This is the 

case now and has been the case since Indonesia seized control of 

West Papua, New Guinea. 

In 1962, Mr. Chairman, I submit the United States mediated an 

agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands in which the 

Dutch were to leave West Papua, transfer sovereignty to the 

United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, known as UNTEA, 

for a period of 6 years, after which time a national election was to 

be held to determine West Papua’s future political status. However, 

after this agreement was reached, Indonesia violated the terms of 

the transfer and took over the administration of West Papua from 

UNTEA. In 1969 the Indonesian Government orchestrated an election that many regard as a brutal military operation, often called 

the ‘‘Act of Choice,’’ I call it the ‘‘Act of No Choice,’’ whereby some 

1,000 West Papuan elders under heavy military surveillance were 

practically forced to agree to Indonesia’s demand that West Papua 

become a colonial province of Indonesia, as it is now fancifully 

called Irian Jaya. 

Mr. Chairman, despite the opposition of some 15 countries and 

the cries for help of the Papuans themselves, the United Nations 

sanctioned Indonesia’s acts and on September 10, 1969, West 

Papua became a province of Indonesian rule. Since then the 

Papuans have suffered blatant human rights abuses, including exjudicial executions, imprisonment, torture and, according to Afrim 

Djonbalic’s 1998 report before the United Nations, environmental 

degradation, natural resource exploitation and commercial dominance of immigrant communities. 

5

Mr. Chairman, West Papua, New Guineans differ racially from 

the majority of Indonesians. West Papuans are Melanesians and 

are believed to have descended from West Africa, similar to the 

Solomon Islands, those from Vanuatu and also from Fiji. West 

Papuans number about 2.2 million people and almost a million are 

Christians. 

Years ago, my own relatives, Mr. Chairman, served as missionaries on this island of Papua. One of my own relatives served there 

for 17 years as a missionary and a minister and three of his own 

children are buried there. 

In 1990, Nelson Mandela reminded the United Nations that, and 

I quote: ‘‘It first discussed the South African question since 1946.’’ 

It was discussing the issue of racism. 

Mr. Chairman, I humbly submit I also believe the question of 

West Papua is an issue of racism. 

Furthermore, I believe there is also the issue of commercial exploitation. West Papua, New Guinea is renowned for its mineral 

wealth, including vast reserves of gold, copper, nickel, oil and gas. 

In 1995, for example, the Grasberg ore mountain in West Papua 

operated by Australian and United States mining interests was estimated to be worth more than $54 billion, yet little or no compensation has been given to local communities, and new provisions 

of the law fell well short of West Papuan demands for independence. 

The world knows little of the fact, Mr. Chairman, that the largest gold mining operation in the world is in West Papua, New 

Guinea and also one of the major environmental disasters in the 

world is also in West Papua, New Guinea. 

Last year, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Prize winner for 

peace, called upon the United Nations to act upon the issue of West 

Papua. On behalf of some 174 parliamentarians from all over the 

world, 80 non-governmental agencies also wrote to Secretary-General Kofi Anan asking for a review to be initiated for West Papua, 

New Guinea. 

Even now, Mr. Chairman, the Indonesian military operations in 

the highlands of West Papua have been going on since August of 

last year and there are indications that this operation is spreading 

to other regions, forcing thousands of villagers into the forests 

where they lack adequate food, shelter and medicine. Indications 

are that this operation is spreading and intensifying and given 

these circumstances, I am reminded of Nelson Mandela’s statement 

before the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid in 

South Africa in which he said, and I quote:

‘‘It will forever remain an indelible blight on human history 

that the apartheid crime ever occurred. Future generations will 

surely ask what error was made that this system established 

itself in the wake of the adoption of the universal declaration 

of human rights. It will forever remain an accusation and a 

challenge to all men and women of conscience that it took as 

long as it has before all of us stood up to say enough is 

enough.’’

I remember, Mr. Chairman, that a couple of my cousins were 

members of a national rugby team of the All Blacks in New ZeaVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

land. And when it came time for them to play against the 

Springboks of South Africa, they were refused a game because they 

said there were a couple of ‘‘darkies’’ as members of the New Zealand team. The All Blacks team was composed of Samoans and 

Maori Polynesians. We have a little taste of that, Mr. Chairman. 

On the question of West Papua I feel similarly. I believe it is 

time to say enough is enough. The question of West Papua is not 

an internal problem, Mr. Chairman. It was our national policy to 

sacrifice the lives and future of some 2.2 million West Papua, New 

Guineans to the Indonesian military supposedly in exchange for 

Sukarno and Suharto support to become our friends. Yet they organized the most repressive military regime ever known in the history of Indonesia. 

Almost three decades later, we continue to exacerbate the problem by making plans to certify full IMET for Indonesia as our 

brothers and sisters in West Papua, New Guinea live and struggle 

of their making. 

Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent for the two items of communications that have been prepared. 

Congressman Don Payne, Congresswoman Barbara Lee and myself 

will be circulating a petition letter and Members of Congress will 

be signing this letter to Secretary-General Kofi Anan for a full reexamination of what happened in 1969. Another petition letter has 

also been prepared for Members of Congress to sign to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice, fully opposing IMET authorization for 

Indonesia. 

Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for giving me this time to 

make my opening statement. I look forward to Secretary Huhtala’s 

statement. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. First, without objection, those two letters will be 

made part of the hearing record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Mr. Chairman: 

I thank you for holding this hearing. Like many of my colleagues, I am deeply 

concerned by the Administration’s decision to certify full IMET for Indonesia. For 

years, the U.S. has restricted foreign military financing for Indonesia and rightfully 

so given the horrendous human rights record of the Indonesian military. Even in 

the aftermath of the devastation caused by the recent tsunami, the media has reported that the Indonesian military has withheld food and other humanitarian assistance from those believed to be pro-independent. The U.S. cannot and must not 

turn a blind eye to these abuses or to Indonesia’s repression of the people of Aceh 

and West Papua. 

While I am aware that in 2004 Congress narrowed the basis for its ban on IMET 

to a single condition requiring the State Department to certify that the Indonesian 

government and military were cooperating in an FBI investigation of an August 31, 

2002 assault on a group of U.S. citizens in Timika, West Papua, I believe there are 

equally serious reasons why the U.S. should renew bans on IMET and foreign military financing (FMF) for Indonesia. 

In response to President Bush’s State of the Union address in which he talked 

about ‘‘our generational commitment to the advance of freedom’’ and in which he 

said ‘‘America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 

our world’’ and that ‘‘our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their 

7

own cultures,’’ I want to bring attention to the plight of West Papua New Guinea 

and assert that TNI remains the central threat to democracy in Indonesia. 

The U.S. State Department has publicly acknowledged the brutal TNI record. As 

noted in the latest State Department Annual Human Rights Report on Indonesia:

‘‘Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements especially in Aceh and 

Papua. Retired and active duty military officers known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or were promoted to senior positions in 

the government and in the TNI.’’

Defense Minister Sudarsono has further noted, ‘‘The military retains the real levers of power. From the political point of view the military remains the fulcrum in 

Indonesia.’’ This is the case now and has been the case since Indonesia seized control of West Papua New Guinea. 

In 1962, the United States mediated an agreement between Indonesia and the 

Netherlands in which the Dutch were to leave West Papua, transfer sovereignty to 

the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for a period of six 

years, after which time a national election was to be held to determine West 

Papua’s political status. 

However, after this agreement was reached, Indonesia violated the terms of transfer and took over the administration of West Papua from the UNTEA. In 1969, Indonesia orchestrated an election that many regarded as a brutal military operation. 

Known as the ‘‘Act of Choice,’’ 1,022 elders under heavy military surveillance were 

selected to vote for 809,327 Papuans on the territory’s political status. 

Despite the opposition of fifteen countries and the cries for help from the Papuans 

themselves, the United Nations (UN) sanctioned Indonesia’s act and, on September 

10, 1969, West Papua became a province of Indonesian rule. Since, the Papuans 

have suffered blatant human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, imprisonment, torture and, according to Afrim Djonbalic’s 1998 statement to the UN, 

‘‘environmental degradation, natural resource exploitation, and commercial dominance of immigrant communities.’’

The Lowenstein Human Rights Clinic at Yale University recently found, in the 

available evidence, ‘‘a strong indication that the Indonesian government has committed genocide against the Papuans.’’ West Papua New Guineans differ racially 

from the majority of Indonesians. West Papuans are Melanesian and believed to be 

of African descent. In 1990, Nelson Mandela reminded the United Nations that 

when ‘‘it first discussed the South African question in 1946, it was discussing the 

issue of racism.’’ I also believe the question of West Papua is an issue of racism. 

Furthermore, I believe this is an issue of commercial exploitation. West Papua 

New Guinea is renowned for its mineral wealth including vast reserves of gold, copper, nickel, oil and gas. In 1995, for example, the Grasberg ore-mountain in West 

Papua was estimated to be worth more than $54 billion. Yet little or no compensation has been made to local communities and new provisions in the law fall well 

short of West Papuan demands for independence. 

In a statement dated February 24, 2004 (attached), Archbishop Bishop Desmond 

Tutu called on the UN to act on West Papua and 174 parliamentarians and 80 nongovernmental agencies from around the world wrote to Secretary General Kofi 

Annan asking that a review be initiated. In the interim, Indonesian military operations in the highlands of West Papua have been ongoing since August 2004 and 

there are indications that this operation is spreading to other regions of West Papua 

forcing thousands of villagers into the forests where they lack adequate food, shelter 

and medicine. Indications are that this operation is spreading and intensifying. 

Given these circumstances, I am reminded of Nelson Mandela’s statement before 

the UN Special Committee against Apartheid in which he said:

‘‘It will forever remain an indelible blight on human history that the apartheid crime ever occurred. Future generations will surely ask—what error was 

made that this system established itself in the wake of the adoption of a Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 

It will forever remain an accusation and a challenge to all men and women 

of conscience that it took as long as it has before all of us stood up to say 

enough is enough.’’

On the question of West Papua, I feel similarly and I believe it is time to say 

enough is enough. The question of West Papua is not an internal problem. As early 

as 1961, Robert Johnson of the National Security Council Staff wrote a letter to Mr. 

Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, noting that 

the United States ‘‘must conclude that it is in our interests that a solution be devised which will lead to accession of West New Guinea to Indonesia.’’

8

In other words, it was our national policy to sacrifice the lives and future of some 

800,000 West Papua New Guineans to the Indonesian military in exchange, supposedly, for Sukarno and Sukarto to become our friends, and yet they organized the 

most repressive military regimes ever known in the history of Indonesia. Almost 

three decades later, we continue to exacerbate the problem by making plans to certify full IMET for Indonesia as our brothers and sisters in West Papua New Guinea 

live a struggle of our making. 

President Bush has publicly stated, ‘‘We are all part of a great venture—To extend the promise of freedom in our country, to renew the values that sustain our 

liberty, and to spread the peace that freedom brings.’’ In my opinion, the President’s 

mantra must and should include West Papua and I am hopeful that this means the 

Administration will support West Papua’s right to self-determination through a referendum or plebiscite sanctioned by the UN, as was done for East Timor, and that 

the U.S. will end its efforts to develop closer ties with the Indonesian military. 

I welcome your comments.

Mr. LEACH. They are very serious, so I am hesitant to say something less serious, but as someone who spent 7 years of my life on 

a rugby field, I would like to tell my distinguished Ranking Member that I cannot think of anything I would more rather be than 

on the same side of the scrum as he and less rather than to be on 

the opposite. 

Madam Secretary, please proceed as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARIE HUHTALA, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief oral 

statement. With your permission, I will read that. My complete testimony has been submitted. 

Mr. LEACH. Without objection, your full statement will be placed 

in the record as well. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you, sir. 

I am very happy to appear before you today to address one of the 

most exciting and important developments taking place in Southeast Asia today, indeed, in the world at large. The democratic transition underway in Indonesia, the largest majority Muslim country 

in the world and now the third largest democracy, represents an 

important opportunity for United States interests and for the people of Indonesia. 

Indonesia’s new directly elected President, Susilo Bambang 

Yudhoyono, has a genuine mandate from his people. He won 60 

percent of the votes in the Presidential run-off in September, when 

more than 75 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots. To put 

these numbers in context, just as many Indonesians voted in their 

Presidential election as did Americans last fall, about 118 million 

in each case. 

President Yudhoyono, whom everyone calls SBY, is an American 

University and IMET graduate, with firsthand knowledge of the 

U.S. and its people. He has articulated an ambitious program to reform the military, fight terrorism and control corruption. We want 

to see him succeed. 

It is perhaps ironic, certainly a sad coincidence, that the tragic 

tsunami of December 26th occurred just as the new Yudhoyono 

Government was finding its feet, not even 100 days into the new 

administration. 

The U.S. response to the disaster was immediate and substantial. During the relief phase, we experienced a high degree of coVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

operation with Indonesia, which welcomed international assistance 

and opened the tsunami-affected parts of Aceh province to foreign 

militaries, aid workers and NGOs. The TNI, contrary to the expectations of some, did not attempt systematically to siphon off aid, 

prevent relief workers from reaching tsunami victims or impose onerous restrictions on them. The situation on the ground was not 

perfect, it was confusing and difficult, of course, to say the least, 

but on the whole, our Embassy, our USAID mission and most 

NGOs on the ground reported that the Indonesian military performed admirably, given the extreme challenges presented by the 

emergency. 

As President Bush has stated, the success of Indonesia as a pluralistic and democratic state is essential to the peace and prosperity of the Southeast Asian region. In that context, we want to 

do everything we can to see Indonesia succeed and have our relationship develop to its full potential. Let me address the most important areas that we will be emphasizing. 

Our first priority is to encourage continued progress on democracy, human rights and justice. As our 2004 Human Rights Report

indicates, Indonesia’s human rights record is mixed and there is 

much to be done. 

That said, there has been progress, including an increased willingness among the Indonesian army to hold their own service 

members accountable for human rights violations. 

In 2004, the United States provided monetary and technical as- sistance totaling $25 million for Indonesia’s electoral process. We 

are building capacity in the judicial sector, combating corruption, 

strengthening civil society and helping with effective decentralized 

governance. Our programs include training for police, local government and judicial officials, internships for journalists, and special 

visitor exchange programs focusing on conflict resolution, human 

rights and rule of law. We are also engaged in a 6-year, $157 million initiative to 

strengthen the education sector by which we hope to promote tolerance, counter extremism and help provide critical thinking skills so 

necessary in the modern world. 

A second very important element of our policy is enhanced cooperation on security issues. Indonesia’s police and prosecutors 

have arrested and convicted more than 130 terrorists since the Bali 

bombings. Indonesia has established an effective counterterrorism 

police force which is working hard to bring terrorists to justice. 

Nevertheless, the threat of future attacks remains grave. The 

short sentence—only 30 months—that was recently handed down 

against terrorist mastermind Abu Bakar Baasyir was disappointing 

and shows that much work needs to be done in strengthening the 

judicial sector. 

The United States is making a major effort to help Indonesia relieve poverty and embark on sound economic development. In August of last year, our Embassy signed an agreement with the Government of Indonesia for a 5-year program that will provide a total 

of $468 million for basic education, water, nutrition and the environment. 

We are also strong supporters of enhanced trade and investment. 

At present, more than 300 United States companies have investVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
10

ments in Indonesia, totalling more than $7.5 billion. An estimated 

3,500 United States business people work in Indonesia. But there 

is still much to do in achieving respect for the sanctity of contracts, 

a transparent, non-discriminatory tax system and a business climate free of corruption. 

We strongly support negotiated settlements to the conflicts in 

both Aceh and Papua. In Aceh, the tsunami tragedy has left one 

consolation: The seeds of hope. We believe it is possible that this 

long-running conflict can be solved peacefully through negotiations 

that are now ongoing. We will work with Jakarta to ensure continued free access to Aceh by humanitarian groups, human rights 

workers and the media. 

We continue to seek justice for the Americans murdered in 

Timika in August 2002, an issue that we view with urgency. We 

appreciate the cooperation our FBI has received so far in its investigation, but we acknowledge there is much more to be done. Secretary Rice recognized this in her recent certification of Indonesian 

cooperation for the purpose of reinstating International Military 

Education and Training. We will work with the Indonesian authorities to move quickly to bring those responsible for this crime to justice. 

We continue to press for accountability for the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. We support the U.N. 

Commission of Experts and hope that it can work with the new bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission proposed by Indonesia 

and East Timor. 

We are hopeful that the day will come when the United States 

and Indonesia will be able to enjoy fully restored relations between 

our respective militaries. Secretary Rice’s recent decision to certify 

IMET will, we hope, result in increased professionalism of Indonesian military officers with respect to transparency, human rights 

and public accountability. 

We also think that under the proper conditions, U.S. assistance 

in the form of foreign military financing would be in the interests 

of both countries. However, we know that FMS cannot be considered until and unless the concerns of Congress, as laid out in section 572 of the Appropriations Act, are addressed. 

Let me conclude by emphasizing how much we all look forward 

to working with Indonesia as it faces this exciting, challenging new 

chapter in its history. Although many issues and problems will 

have to be resolved, we have a better opportunity now than at any 

time in the recent past to help strengthen democracy and respect 

for human rights and contribute to the stability and prosperity of 

an important strategic partner. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Huhtala follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARIE HUHTALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

I am happy to appear before you to address one of the most exciting and important developments taking place in Southeast Asia today, and indeed, in the world 

at large. The democratic transition under way in Indonesia, the largest majority 

Muslim country in the world and now the third largest democracy, represents an 

important opportunity for U.S. interests and for the people of Indonesia. How we 

11

approach our relations at this critical moment will have far-reaching effects on our 

long-term objectives, not only in Indonesia but also throughout the region. 

The successful series of democratic elections in Indonesia last year produced a sea 

change in its domestic politics. The voters brought into office a new, directly elected 

President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who understands the United States and who 

ran on a reform agenda. As a U.S. university and military college graduate, he has 

first-hand knowledge of the U.S. and its people. The tragic earthquake and tsunami 

of December 26, 2004, and the joint Indonesian-American response have made a 

deep impression on the Indonesian government and people, as they have on Americans. In Indonesia, the television coverage of American military, diplomats and aid 

workers efficiently providing massive amounts of much-needed humanitarian assistance from the air, the sea and on the ground to devastated corners of Aceh made 

a powerful impression. Those images showed once again that Indonesia has no better friend than the United States. We are there when it counts. 

Mr. Chairman, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has a genuine mandate 

from the Indonesian people. He won 60 percent of the voters in the presidential runoff in September of last year, an amazing feat by a challenger with only a small 

political party behind him running against an incumbent with a large political machine. More than 75 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots. To put those numbers in context, just as many Indonesians voted in their presidential election as did 

Americans last fall—about 118 million in each case. That demonstrates the very 

strong commitment of Indonesians to democracy. 

Our two countries have a great deal in common. The United States is the world’s 

third largest country, and the second largest democracy after India. Indonesia is the 

world’s fourth largest country, and its third largest democracy. The majority of the 

people of the United States call themselves Christians, but, of course, there are 

many other religions represented here and we have a history of tolerance of all 

faiths. The majority of the people in Indonesia call themselves Muslims, but there 

are many other religions represented there too, and Indonesians place a high value 

on the diversity of their country. Indonesia’s national motto, ‘‘Bhineka Tunggal 

Eka,’’ (‘‘Unity in Diversity’’) is roughly equivalent to ‘‘E Pluribus Unum’’ (‘‘Out of the 

Many, One’’). There is another, grimmer parallel. The United States has suffered 

terrible terrorist attacks in recent years that killed Americans and foreigners alike, 

and Indonesia too has suffered terrorist attacks that killed Indonesians and foreigners. Our two countries thus share an interest in addressing the causes of terrorism and protecting our people from further terrorist violence. 

Within a generation Indonesia will overtake the United States in population, 

making Indonesia the third most populous country in the world. The United States 

has an interest in ensuring that Indonesia succeeds as a democratic power, one that 

acts as a positive force on the global stage and ensures prosperity for its people at 

home. 

The Indonesian presidential election late last year was only the latest in a number of important institutional changes since 1998, when President Suharto lost 

power. The direct presidential election itself was a product of sweeping constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, accountability and 

transparency, and separation of powers. Other notable reforms have included the establishment of a police force separate from the military (TNI), the end of the military’s appointed seats in parliament, and the passage of legislation in 2004 to ensure that the parliament begins to exert control over the military’s budget process—

currently a highly opaque one. A free press and an increasingly active civil society 

have become important agents of change. People are debating the abuses and excesses of the Suharto years and are demanding real accountability for what happened. Citizens are demanding justice from the judicial sector. Finally, the country 

is going through one of the most ambitious decentralizations efforts ever. That process is empowering Indonesia’s far-flung 33 provinces and 421 districts, spread over 

17,000 islands and introducing unprecedented levels of transparency and accountability into local governance. 

All these changes represent rather substantial forward progress for a country that 

many in 1998 predicted would fall into chaos. How could such a vast, multi-ethnic 

nation with little history of popular rule transform itself? Most observers were betting against Indonesia in those days. But Indonesia not only has survived, it has 

thrived, conducting not just one but three peaceful presidential transitions in a row. 

By any measure, the people of Indonesia have shown that they are ready for democracy. Without any doubt, they deserve recognition and support from the world’s second largest democracy, the United States, and the rest of the international community. Since the late 1990s, the U.S. has indeed been a strong supporter of Indonesia’s democratic transition, and we will continue to support it. 

12

It is perhaps ironic, and certainly a sad coincidence, that the tragic tsunami of 

December 26, 2004, occurred just as the new Yudhoyono Government was finding 

its feet, not even 100 days into the new administration. As the members of this 

Committee are well aware, the U.S. response to the disaster was immediate and 

substantial, thanks in large part to the support of the Congress for making sure 

that our diplomats, relief professionals, and the U.S. military are adequately funded. 

Also significant is the high degree of close cooperation we experienced with President Yudhoyono’s government. This dramatic example of bilateral cooperation was 

not lost on anyone in the world with access to television or a newspaper. Once Indonesian authorities recognized the extent of the death and destruction in Aceh, they 

immediately asked for international help. The Indonesian Government welcomed 

the assistance of the United States, the United Nations, and other countries, and 

opened the tsunami-affected parts of Aceh province to foreign militaries, aid workers 

and NGOs. Indonesians and Americans worked side-by-side to rescue victims and 

deliver food, water and medicine. The Indonesian military, contrary to the assumptions of many in the international media, did not attempt systematically to siphon 

off aid, prevent relief workers from reaching tsunami victims, or impose onerous restrictions on them. The situation on the ground was not perfect—it was confusing 

and difficult, to say the least—and there were isolated instances of problems between soldiers and assistance workers. The military did require visiting NGOs to 

register their presence, which was not unreasonable given the real security concerns 

in Aceh. On the whole, however, our Embassy in Indonesia, including the AID mission, and most NGOs who participated in the relief work have reported that the Indonesian military performed admirably given the extreme challenges presented by 

the emergency. 

As President Bush has stated, the success of Indonesia as a pluralistic and democratic state is essential to the peace and prosperity of the Southeast Asian region. 

Indonesia is truly a front-line state in a trend we see all over the world: people want 

to rule themselves, and they want their governments to be accountable. We see Indonesia as advancing what President Bush has called the ‘‘agenda of freedom.’’ In 

that context, we want to do everything we can to see Indonesia succeed and have 

our relationship develop to its full potential. Let me address the most important 

areas we will be emphasizing. 

Our first priority is to encourage continued Indonesian progress on democracy, 

human rights, and justice. We envision an Indonesia that is democratic in the full 

sense of that term, a government that is transparent and accountable to its people, 

respects the rule of law, and protects the human rights of its citizens. As our 2004 

Human Rights Report indicates, Indonesia’s human rights record remains mixed, 

and there is much to be done, particularity in the area of accountability for abuses 

committed by members of the security services. 

That said, there has been progress, including an increased willingness among the 

Indonesian army to hold their own service members accountable for human rights 

violations. We have been impressed by President Yudhoyono’s frequent statements 

regarding the importance of democracy and accountability. Late last year, in an address by videoconference to the U.S. Chambers of Commerce, he said he is driven 

by ‘‘the hopes of the Indonesians who entrusted me to improve their lives.’’ He spoke 

of the power of good governance and said he is establishing a team that would be 

judged by its performance. He said he wanted to establish a system that was accountable to the people and, looking ahead, he wanted to ‘‘ensure smooth elections 

in 2009.’’

In 2004 alone, the United States provided monetary and technical assistance totaling $25 million to Indonesia’s electoral process. We also are also engaged in a 

range of programs to build capacity in the judicial sector, combat corruption, 

strengthen civil society, and help with effective decentralized governance. Our programs include training for police, local government and judicial officials, internships 

for journalists, and special visitor exchange programs focusing on conflict resolution, 

human rights, and rule of law. 

One of the best ways to solidify democratic principles and practices, of course, is 

through educational opportunity. The U.S. is engaged in a 6-year, $157 million initiative to strengthen the education sector in Indonesia. By providing support to Indonesian teachers and students, we hope to promote tolerance, counter extremism, 

and help provide critical thinking skills so necessary in the modern world. These 

programs will strengthen the management of schools, improve the quality of teaching, and increase the relevance of education to work and life skills for Indonesia’s 

youth, the next generation of leaders. 

A second very important element of our policy is enhanced cooperation on security 

issues. Indonesians know better than most the devastating effects of terrorist atVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

tacks, such as those that have occurred in Bali and Jakarta over the last three 

years. We applaud the Indonesian Government’s serious response to those attacks. 

Indonesia’s police and prosecutors have arrested and convicted more than 130 terrorists since the Bali bombings. Indonesia has established an effective 

counterterrorism police force, which is working hard to bring terrorists to justice. 

Nevertheless, the threat of future attacks remains grave. 

The short sentence (30 months) recently handed down against terrorist mastermind Abu Bakir Baasyir was disappointing and also shows that much work needs 

to be done in strengthening the judicial sector, including coordinating the efforts of 

police and prosecutors, and educating judges regarding the threat of terrorism. We 

welcome President Yudhoyono’s announcements that arresting key terrorists is a 

priority and that he seeks to enhance international cooperation on terrorism. 

We want to see an Indonesia that is open for investment and trade, and open to 

American investors playing a prominent role in the country’s economic development. 

When President Yudhoyono spoke to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, he spoke movingly of his determination to slash unemployment and poverty. These are worthy 

goals that deserve American support. In addition to providing aid aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, the U.S. is making a major effort to help Indonesia 

relieve poverty and embark on sound economic development. In August 2004, the 

U.S. Embassy signed an agreement with the government of Indonesia for a 5-year 

program that will provide a total of $468 million for basic education, water, nutrition, and the environment. 

Although aid is an effective tool for economic development, there is always more 

money available from trade and investment than from aid. Moreover, trade and investment tend to be self-perpetuating. 

At present, more than 300 U.S. companies have investments in Indonesia totaling 

more than $7.5 billion, and an estimated 3,500 U.S. business people work in Indonesia. Much of that investment is connected to Indonesia’s rich natural resources, 

but there is some manufacturing as well. But while many companies have invested 

in Indonesia, many others are reluctant because of concerns over rule of law and 

corruption in the judiciary. They want respect for the sanctity of contracts, a transparent, non-discriminatory tax system, and most of all they want to do business in 

a climate free of corruption. 

President Yudhoyono has said that attacking corruption and establishing legal 

certainty are key priorities for his government. We welcome those statements, and 

hope to assist in improving the investment climate and legal system. These issues 

have taken on even more urgency following the tsunami, because the international 

donor community expects that all funds given for the purpose of reconstruction must 

be closely monitored and carefully accounted for. To that end, the World Bank has 

created a trust fund that will include fiscal controls on the disbursal of donor funds. 

On the trade side, bilateral cooperation picked up in 1996, when the U.S. and Indonesia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. That framework 

provides a formal basis for our discussions of detailed trade issues, and those discussions will continue this month in Jakarta. Indonesia has recently taken important 

steps to uphold intellectual property rights; the U.S. business community will be 

watching to see how those rules are enforced. 

Finally, we are very interested in seeing Indonesia act as a stabilizing and responsible force in the region. Indeed, the United States has always viewed Indonesia as 

a pillar of regional security in Southeast Asia. In the past, Indonesia played a significant leadership role in regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. We look 

forward to seeing Jakarta reassert this prominent position in international fora and 

institutions. Our two countries share the important strategic objective of a stable 

Southeast Asian region that is free of transnational threats, including terrorism, 

weapons of mass destruction, smuggling, and trafficking in persons. American interests are best served by a democratic, prosperous Indonesia that respects and protects the rights of its citizens, is secure within its borders and is able to defend itself 

against transnational threats. For that reason, we firmly support the territorial integrity of Indonesia. 

Indonesia needs to be strong in order to manage successfully the many challenges 

of this age. Maritime security is one of the more important challenges it faces. The 

strategic sea lanes that pass through and along Indonesian territory carry roughly 

30 percent of the world’s sea-borne trade and are key transit routes for the U.S. 

naval fleet. Half the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Strait. Indonesia’s vast 

archipelago is difficult to monitor. We stand ready to assist Indonesia to address 

this important challenge in ways that we will decide on jointly, and we already have 

begun the effort to encourage the growing cooperation between Indonesia and its 

neighbors in this important field. 

14

As the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia has a key role to play 

in demonstrating the virtues of tolerance and mutual respect in a diverse, multiethnic polity. The ability of so many Muslims to thrive economically and pursue a 

democratic, just agenda respectful of other faiths serves as a powerful reminder of 

what a successful, tolerant society can look like. We will continue to provide exchange and training programs that promote interfaith dialogue. Our active and creative public diplomacy program for Indonesia is one of the most robust in the world 

today. 

As elsewhere in the world, the United States must address the range of our interests with Indonesia in an integrated way. Even as we champion a strong and democratic Indonesia secure within its borders, we also support negotiated settlements 

to the conflicts in Aceh and Papua. With respect to Aceh, the terrible tsunami tragedy has left one consolation—the seeds of hope. Given the new developments in 

play, we see the possibility that this long-running conflict can be solved peacefully 

through negotiations that are now ongoing. We think President Yudhoyono, who has 

worked toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict for many years, seriously and 

sincerely wants to end the conflict so that the people of Aceh can recover and rebuild their communities in an environment free of violence. We hope that his administration will succeed in championing a real reconciliation in Aceh. 

The tsunami disaster also demonstrated that the opening of Aceh to the international community could be a source of positive change. We will work with Jakarta 

to ensure continued free access by humanitarian groups, human rights workers, and 

the media. We also believe that to realize their democratic vision Indonesians will 

have to find the appropriate ways to further strengthen civilian control over the 

military and hold individuals accountable for human rights abuses. Again, improving the judicial process, eliminating corruption, and establishing solid professional 

standards will go a long way toward addressing these issues. 

We continue to seek justice for the Americans murdered in Timika in August 

2002, an issue we view with urgency. We appreciate the cooperation our FBI has 

received so far in its investigation, but there is much more to be done. Secretary 

Rice recognized this in her recent certification of Indonesian cooperation for the purpose of reinstating International Military Education and Training (IMET). We will 

work with the Indonesian authorities to move quickly to bring those responsible for 

this crime to justice. 

These same principles hold true with regard to accountability for the crimes 

against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. We encourage the Indonesian 

Government to cooperate with the UN Commission of Experts, which is in the process of reviewing the state of play on this issue in Dili and Jakarta. Meanwhile, the 

governments of Indonesia and East Timor have just announced details of a proposed 

bilateral truth and friendship commission. We urge Jakarta and Dili to respond 

positively to UN SYG Kofi Annan’s initiative to have the Commission of Experts 

work with and advise the bilateral truth and friendship commission. With goodwill 

the parties will be able to achieve internationally credible accountability, put the 

terrible events of 1999 behind them, and proceed with their evolving good relationship. 

We are hopeful that the day will come when the U.S. and Indonesia will be able 

to enjoy fully restored relations between our respective militaries. Secretary Rice’s 

recent decision to certify International Military Education and Training will, we believe, result in increased professionalism of Indonesian military officers with respect 

to transparency, human rights, and public accountability. We also think that, under 

the proper conditions, U.S. assistance in the form of Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) would be in the interests of both countries. However, FMF cannot be considered until and unless the concerns of Congress as laid out in Section 572 of the Appropriations Act of 2005 are addressed. That law requires accountability for the 

events of 1999 in East Timor as well as progress on military reform issues. We look 

forward to consulting with interested members of the Congress on how we might 

help Indonesia reach these goals. 

Let me conclude by emphasizing how much we all look forward to working with 

Indonesia as it faces this exciting, challenging new chapter in its history. Although 

many issues and problems will have to be resolved, we have a better opportunity 

now than at any time in the recent past to help strengthen democracy and respect 

for human rights, and contribute to the stability and prosperity of an important 

strategic partner. The United States considers Indonesia a valued friend, and we 

hope to make that friendship with this, the largest democracy in East Asia, even 

stronger in the years ahead.

Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ambassador 

Huhtala. 

15

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking 

questions. 

Given the political and economic developments of the past year, 

is there greater reason for optimism regarding Indonesia’s longterm prospects as a stable, prosperous democracy? 

Ms. HUHTALA. I believe that there is, sir. In the past year, for 

instance, Indonesia conducted three national elections. They elected a new Parliament, which for the first time does not have reserved seats for the military, and then they had two rounds of their 

very first direct Presidential election. And those elections went off 

beautifully without a hitch. 

They also have new laws on the books to promote civil society. 

They are pursuing a program of judicial reform. They are working 

closely with us on things like police training, fighting corruption, 

counterterrorism. They have a great many new initiatives in the 

works right now. 

Now, that always makes it complex for a new leader to keep all 

of those balls in the air, but the political will is really quite impressive and we are hopeful that with the right kind of assistance they 

can make some progress in these areas. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. How would you assess the performance 

of President Yudhoyono during his first several months in office? 

How do his style and his policies compare with former President 

Megawati? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Well, he has a very different style, to start with, 

because he is a former military man and he also has studied in the 

United States—both at university and for IMET—so he has a very 

direct, hands-on style. I was fortunate to be in a meeting that he 

had with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in January and it really is 

impressive the way that he tackles issues forthrightly, admitting 

where they have shortcomings and discussing how we can cooperate to move forward. 

I think his performance so far is good. It was really unfortunate 

for him to have that tsunami just 2 months after he took office. I 

think that may have thrown him off stride a little bit, but truly the 

reaction to the tsunami has been outstanding. They have opened 

up the province that had been closed for so many years, allowed 

free access for aid workers and the media and NGOs, and done everything they could to cooperate with all of us. We really have no 

complaints on that score. 

Mr. CHABOT. Will President Yudhoyono’s electoral mandate 

translate into an ability to work effectively with the Parliament, in 

which his party is a distinct minority? What are the most important issues that will be facing the legislature in the months ahead? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Well, of course, we hope that his mandate will 

help him in the Parliament. I think you know that his Vice President, Yusuf Kalla, has been elected the head of the largest political 

party, Golkar. So to the extent that those two can work together 

and present a program to the Parliament, there is real hope for 

progress. Some of the important things that they will be tackling 

are reform of the judicial sector, a very serious program to fight 

corruption, and also counterterrorism. 

We are hoping that they will consider criminalizing the Jemaah 

Islamiah. This is something that their Parliament has not been 

16

able to do so far but it would be a very important step forward in 

terms of going after the members of that sect that are still around. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me shift over to the military for a 

moment here. Has the Indonesian military made any concrete 

progress during the past year in increasing the transparency of its 

budget or in submitting to civilian oversight? What should we look 

for as benchmarks of substantive progress in the months ahead? 

How much practical oversight and control does the civilian defense 

establishment exercise over the operations of the military? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Congressman, to be honest, this is a work in 

progress. There is not sufficient accountability yet, but the President and the Defense Minister have told us that they recognize the 

need to move in that direction and they have begun. They have 

begun working on it. 

Frankly, that is one of the reasons that we believed it was very 

much in the U.S. interests to be able to restore IMET training, so 

that we can give them some practical training and assistance in 

figuring out how to do this, because when you have had a military 

that has not been accountable to the people, to the civilian rulers, 

for so many years, it is a very big job to reform it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

My time has expired and I will now recognize the gentleman 

from Samoa, my good friend and a great Member of Congress, Eni 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have always had an admiration for Ohio State University and 

its ability to play football, knowing that my good friend hales from 

the great state of Ohio. 

We need to go back to the United Nations and attend some of 

the sessions that they are having there right now as former Representatives of the Congress before the United Nations. 

I want to thank Secretary Huhtala for her statement. 

Madam Secretary, if you were to put a sense of priorities on 

some of these basic issues that we have discussed this afternoon, 

one security, the other one the promotion of human rights, another 

one dealing with trade and investment, and maybe I will add a 

fourth one, IMET. What kind of a priority listing would you put in 

terms of importance from one to four, I suppose, as the least important? 

Ms. HUHTALA. That is a really tough question. I think I would 

have to put security at the top of the list because Indonesia, as you 

know, has been the victim of some horrendous terrorist attacks in 

the past few years. Not unlike the United States, they face a determined foe and they need to be able to protect the safety of their 

people. As I have mentioned, we have several programs in place to 

help them tackle that. 

But to be honest, human rights, trade and investment which is 

a way to alleviate poverty, are tremendously important goals as 

well and I think it is essential that the Government of Indonesia 

make progress in those areas, even as it goes about addressing its 

security concerns. 

IMET is at the bottom of the list because it is more of a tool than 

a goal. We strongly feel that it is in our interests to be able to have 

good training programs with the Indonesian military as a way of 

17

helping it reform. As you know, all of our IMET programs place 

heavy stress on teaching about human rights, about the role of a 

professional military in a democracy with civilian rule, and on protecting the rights of their people. 

We think that it is a great loss that we have not been able to 

do that kind of training with the Indonesian military for around 15 

years, and we think it is urgent that we begin to do this kind of 

training. It will have a long-term effect that will buttress the other 

goals that you have mentioned. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I know, Madam Secretary, there is a 

sense of institutional memory and as a career foreign service officer, you are very familiar with the issues attending Indonesia, but 

I have a problem with IMET. The problem stems from the fact 

that, I think, the good intentions that we had in providing military 

training to countries like Indonesia and others resulted in different 

consequences. And what I mean by this is that we provided the 

IMET training at the time of Suharto and Sukarno, and it was during that period of time, with all due respect to the newly-elected 

President, he may have been a good IMET graduate, we had some 

IMET graduates also who were dismissed on any of the accusations 

that were made against the tortures and the killings that took 

place in East Timor—and they were IMET graduates as well and 

that did not stand very well as far as Indonesia’s sense of justice. 

My point is this: We go there with good intentions, we are Americans. The purpose of giving that person a rifle or a pistol or a piece 

of military equipment is to defend freedom and democracy and all 

that we stand for. But in that period of time, these people were not 

advocating democracy. And I do not know if you will agree with 

me, but in my readings of history, President Sukarto and Suharto 

were not exactly genial and kind, if you put it mildly, given the fact 

that 200,000 East Timorese men, women and children were tortured and murdered and killed by the Indonesian military. My 

point is that we trained them and we also gave them the bullet and 

the trigger. 

And so that is where my concern comes in. With our intentions 

there is no question, but it is the issue of what these countries do 

with the training because you can easily use a weapon either to defend yourself or to kill another person. If some 300,000 lives of people in this country, whether you are from East Timor or from West 

Papua, as accounted by the fact of the actions taken by the Indonesian military, I find it very difficult to justify how we can continue doing this. 

As I stated in my statement earlier, it continues. The Indonesian 

military right now in West Papua, New Guinea has caused thousands of West Papuans to leave their homes, run into the jungles 

and become outcasts in their own land and I would not be surprised if killings continue even to this day. 

So please convey this to Secretary Rice. I do not see how we 

could justify giving the military again another added measure of 

power and authority. And I might also add the next question: What 

percentage of Indonesia’s economy and businesses are run by the 

Indonesian military at this point in time? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Well, sir, if I could make a few comments? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

18

Ms. HUHTALA. And I will certainly convey to the Secretary what 

you have said. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

Ms. HUHTALA. We very strongly support accountability for the 

human rights abuses that occurred in East Timor and the other 

human rights abuses that have occurred over the years, and we are 

pressing the Indonesian Government very hard to work with the 

Commission of Experts that Kofi Anan is sending out and to deliver true accountability, even though they are not happy about 

this, they do not want to do it. We think that it is essential for this 

to happen. 

As you know, of course, our IMET training never taught anyone 

to commit abuses. We all know that. I think one of the problems 

has been, first of all, that our engagement has been episodic. We 

first canceled our IMET, I believe it was in 1991, so when the 

abuses happened in 1999, there was not at that time a very strong 

U.S. influence over the behavior of TNI. 

As you know, you have passed legislation since then to require 

very serious human rights vetting for any candidates now who 

would receive IMET from us in the future, and we will carry that 

out with very great care to be sure that we are not providing training to anyone who has any kind of stain on their record with regard to human rights violations or other crimes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Secretary, could you submit for the 

record, as much as you can get, exactly to what extent the Indonesian businesses and the economy of that country is controlled 

and run and operated by the Indonesian military. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE MARIE HUHTALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Data on the share of the Indonesian economy represented by Indonesian military 

business is incomplete and often unreliable. There is little TNI activity in the oil 

and gas or manufacturing sector. Formal businesses represent only a portion of total 

military economic activity, and there is no reliable data on the informal, or illegal, 

activities of the military. 

Our Embassy does try to obtain and assess data on military business activity as 

part of its normal economic reporting responsibilities; this is a topic of interest to 

Washington agencies, as well as to the Congress. 

Indonesia’s 2004 defense budget was USD 2.3 billion, about 8 percent of total 

budget expenditures and about 1 percent of GDP. Estimates of the share of military 

expenditures that come from the budget vary from 30 to 50 percent. 

It is important to note that, as part of ongoing democratic reforms in Indonesia, 

the Ministry of Defense is publicly exploring options for establishing control and accountability of military businesses.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Another related question that adds onto this 

is the illegal logging that is going on, the billions of dollars. And, 

by the way, on an annual basis I think China is the major purchaser of logs that come out of Indonesia—you are talking about 

$600 million a year, I believe, that China is doing this. 

It talks about the environment, but I also understand that the 

Indonesian military has a lot of control on the illegal logging that 

continues to go on in that country. 

I would appreciate if you could submit that for the record. 

Ms. HUHTALA. I will, sir. 

19

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In terms of exactly how that is coming 

along. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Yes. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE MARIE HUHTALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

I do not believe anyone knows the actual value of illegal logging in Indonesia, or 

of exports of illegal logs to China, but both are high. The Indonesian Government 

estimates that illegal loggers cut down about 60 million cubic meters of timber each 

year, which represents lost tax revenue of US$3 billion. 

A 2002 memorandum of understanding between the governments of Indonesia 

and China to curb export of illegal timber has had little real effect. 

The Indonesian Government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has 

made the fight against illegal logging one of its top environmental priorities. The 

key to winning the battle against illegal loggers will be enforcement. Successful enforcement will require clear regulations, greater human resources, and the political 

will to break up vested interests that have long profited from this activity.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Here is a historical perspective I want to 

share with you, Madam Secretary. East Timor was a former colony 

of Portugal. People there speak Portuguese, they do not speak Indonesian, by the way. And, if they did, they were forced to speak 

Indonesian. Indonesia was a former colony of the Dutch, we all 

know that. West Papua, New Guinea was also a former colony of 

the Dutch, then it became a colony of Indonesia. I can tell you as 

a matter of history and fact, Madam Secretary, it just blares out 

that the United Nations exercised what I would not only call inequity and unfairness but the height of hypocrisy, the fact that it 

provided sanction and authorization for East Timor, both colonies, 

now, of Indonesia, the right to self-determination and yet not a 

squirt or even an understanding that here we have another colony 

sitting right next to it and not one cent of appreciation given to the 

fact that 2.2 million West Papuans should be given the same right 

of self-determination as East Timor. That is where I am having 

very serious problems. To suggest that it is all in the past, let us 

not bring it up again, West Papua is a province and it is an internal matter, Madam Secretary, I submit this is not an internal matter. The United Nations was party to the problems that now attend—the problems that we are faced with in West Papua. 

West Papuans have nothing to do ethnically, culturally, nationally, and even historically with Indonesia. They were Dutch colonies. 

So I am respectfully requesting if you can convey this to Secretary Rice, not only will I vehemently object to IMET authorization for the Indonesian military, but it is my sincere hope that Secretary Rice would also take this matter to Secretary Kofi Anan. We 

need to reexamine the entire history, especially what happened in 

1969 on how West Papua, New Guinea ended up the way it is right 

now. And I say this on behalf of some 2.2 million West Papuans 

who have no representation whatsoever, not even in any forum in 

the United Nations. Thank God for the Portuguese Government because they were the strongest advocates for the rights of the people 

of East Timor. But the poor West Papuans have nobody to speak 

on their behalf, not only before the United Nations, but any reVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
20

gional organization. So that is the problem I am having right now, 

Madam Secretary. And I would really, really appreciate it if you 

could convey that to Secretary Rice and see if we could work something out. I sincerely hope that we will have this, but I really do 

appreciate your statement. I look forward to working with you, 

hopefully, at finding some solution to this problem. Like I said, I 

have the highest admiration for the people of Indonesia at this 

point now in their achievement of pluralistic society and democracy, but somehow we have this load here that we just cannot ignore and pretend like it does not exist. 

I might also add that I sincerely hope that the Chairman and I 

might have a chance to visit West Papua and Aceh. I do not know 

if the President might be willing, but any rate, Madam Secretary, 

thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you, sir. I will convey those remarks and 

I do encourage you to come and make a visit to Indonesia. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. And end up getting shot. Thank 

you. 

Ms. HUHTALA. No, we will take care of you there. 

Mr. LEACH [presiding]. Madam Secretary, what is your assessment of the newly resumed talks between the Free Aceh Movement 

and the Government? Do you think that the feelings about the tsunami and its aftermath, and how the country of Indonesia and the 

international community responded, are helpful or hurtful to this 

process? Do they give grounds for more optimism or are they irrelevant to this process? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Mr. Chairman, to us, it really looks as if the horrible shock of the tsunami in which the GAM and the Indonesian 

local government forces and TNI, they all had very serious losses. 

We think that shock has been a catalyst for both sides to once 

again come to the negotiating table and try to work out a serious 

settlement to their differences. 

The talks that have been going on in Helsinki have been headed 

up by a very high-powered Indonesian Government delegation 

headed by their Coordinating Minister for Security. They have not 

engaged at this level before on the Government of Indonesia side 

and they have already had two rounds of discussions, one in January and one in February. They have a third round scheduled for 

April. And we understand they have begun to delve into some of 

the really serious issues that are of concern here, things like the 

difference between self-government and autonomy and the need for 

the GAM to drop a claim to independence if they are going to be 

able to achieve an agreement with the Indonesian Government. 

These, as you well appreciate, are extremely thorny issues and 

it will take them a while to work them out, but we have been encouraged by the progress that they have made so far and we have 

no role in this at the moment, although if we were asked to take 

a role I am sure we would give it very careful consideration, but 

in fact this is truly something between the Indonesian Government 

and the GAM. And we are hopeful that it will continue to move all 

the way to a negotiated settlement. 

Mr. LEACH. In terms of the United States presence in Indonesia, 

we currently do not have a Peace Corps mission. Is that correct? 

21

Ms. HUHTALA. I believe that is true. 

Mr. LEACH. And do the Indonesians, have they indicated any desire for this? 

Ms. HUHTALA. Not to my knowledge. No. 

Mr. LEACH. The only reason I raise it at this time, last week was 

a major birthday of the Peace Corps and its track record in the 

world is very impressive. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Yes. 

Mr. LEACH. And I think it is worthy of consideration whether we 

think it would be appropriate and if we thought it were appropriate 

whether we ought to speak with the Indonesian Government about 

it. 

I emphasize this because the other issue that is a little different 

in international relations, and it is not Indonesian specific but it 

certainly includes Indonesia, are new conceptualizations of international responsibility in the education arena. What I mean by this 

is that historically as public officials we have always thought of 

education as our responsibility for our kids and we have a decentralized way in America of delivering education with the primary 

responsibility being local, a lot of State involvement, and some Federal, but the Federal part is pretty small. In fact, it is 6–7 percent 

of the total education budget. 

But it is now dawning on us that how other people educate their 

children have implications for United States security as well as 

their own ability to get ahead in the world. So one of the questions 

is: What role will the United States play, and should the emphasis 

be on primary education, secondary, post-secondary—is it something that is all of the above and, if it is all of the above, what is 

the role of U.S. institutions as well? And here, again, we all know 

the national security concerns that exist on certain kinds of visas. 

On the other hand, we have historically found that kids that get 

educated here have beneficial consequences for themselves and for 

our society as well. And I am wondering if, from an Indonesian perspective, the State Department has focused on the education issue 

and just how have you focused on it and what set of balances and 

priorities do you apply? 

Ms. HUHTALA. In 2003, President Bush, during a visit to Indonesia, introduced a major new Presidential Initiative to assist them 

in their educational system. It is $157 million over 6 years, focused 

primarily on the primary schools. 

As you know, in Indonesia, primary education is done through a 

network of religious-based institutions where young people study 

the tenets of the Islamic faith, but they also get a complete education. Our program will aim to help them in developing critical 

thinking skills, building up the professionalization of their educational program at that level. 

It is an ambitious program. We will not go near the religious 

education part of it. We will stick to the more secular subjects, of 

course. And this is really a major commitment on our part in the 

primary education in Indonesia. 

At the same time, we have a modest Fulbright program. Like 

most Fulbrights, we would love to see it expanded, if we had additional resources. It sends over some scholars every year to the 

United States. And we also have our program of American Corners 

22

now where we have set aside parts of the libraries in various provinces in Indonesia, stocked them with American books and periodicals, provide a Web hookup so that students can contact the American Embassy in Jakarta, ask questions, do their research. And 

this, we hope, will help stimulate young minds around the country. 

With a country as vast as Indonesia, these efforts are not sufficient, obviously, but they do represent one of the largest investments in education that we have in the entire region. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, let me say on behalf of the Congress, we also 

want to indicate the reciprocal aspect of this. This Subcommittee 

was provided, through an exchange of services, a distinguished rector of a fine Indonesian university, so he has come and taught the 

Subcommittee a great deal about Indonesia and we are very appreciative of that. So education is a two-way circumstance. 

In any regard, we do have other witnesses and I want to get to 

them, but I want to just stress on the Subcommittee’s behalf our 

appreciation for the Department’s work in this area. I have been 

very impressed with the professionalism of our foreign service in 

Indonesia and I would be mistaken not to particularly emphasize 

the extraordinary professionalism that was demonstrated at the 

time of the tsunami by the Department of State officials in Indonesia. Without doubt our military did a wonderful job, but the coordination and other work done by our USAID people in particular 

deserves mention. And I think sometimes we forget that Americans 

serving in professional capacities abroad have an unbelievably important task, and at times of great difficulty—as in the last 6 

months—have shown real mettle, and I would particularly like this 

appreciation extended to them. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Faleomavaega? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would the Chairman yield? 

I would like to add to the Chairman’s statement, also, Madam 

Secretary, my own personal experience, having visited, with the 

Chairman, Sri Lanka and also India in looking at the tsunami disaster that occurred there. It was a very unfortunate experience for 

me because I am probably one of the few Members of Congress that 

has actually witnessed or seen what a tidal wave looks like and 

how it starts. My understanding is that thousands of women and 

children could have saved their lives if they understood, or if they 

were educated, that when they see the ocean sucked out of the 

reefs, thousands of yards away from the beaches—an unfortunate 

result was that the children watched the fish flapping all over the 

place as a result of this and not knowing they should be running 

in the opposite direction—a lot of those lives could have been saved 

if they knew what to do when they realized that it was a tsunami 

or tidal wave. 

I might also say that I got a present from Sri Lanka with 25 staples on my knee because I did not see the hole that was next to 

the helicopter. That is what you call a stupid rugby player that 

should know better. 

But with that said, Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank Secretary 

Huhtala for her testimony and I do look forward to working with 

her office on some of these issues that I have with Indonesia. 

Thank you. 

23

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Ms. HUHTALA. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. If the second panel could assemble? 

The second panel consists of Ambassador Alphonse La Porta, 

who is President of the United States-Indonesian Society, a 38-year 

veteran of the United States Foreign Service. He has served as 

United States Ambassador to Mongolia and at numerous posts in 

Asia, including tours as principal officer of the United States consulate in Medan, Indonesia, and chief of the consular section in Jakarta. Ambassador La Porta is a graduate of the National War College, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and New 

York University. 

Dr. Douglas Ramage is the Asia Foundation’s representative to 

Indonesia and Malaysia and the author of several books on Indonesian politics and the relationship between Islam and democracy. 

He has previously-held research and teaching appointments at the 

East-West Center and the University of Hawaii. Dr. Ramage was 

a Fulbright Scholar in Indonesia and is a graduate of the University of Maryland and the University of South Carolina. 

Mr. Edmund McWilliams is a member of the board of directors 

of Indonesia Human Rights Network, as well as Secretary of the 

U.S. East Timor Society and a member of the West Papua Advocacy Team at the RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights. A decorated 26-year veteran of the United States Foreign Service, Mr. 

McWilliams previously served as political counselor at the Embassy 

in Jakarta and as Director for International Labor in the Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 

Unless there is a previous arrangement, I will go in the order in 

which I have introduced you and we will begin with Ambassador 

La Porta. 

Thirty-eight years is a long time in the foreign service, Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALPHONSE F. LA PORTA, 

PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES–INDONESIA SOCIETY 

Mr. LA PORTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today and also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to cite your own remarks, if I may, in talking 

about Indonesia as the largest single country in the world where 

the United States remains only tangentially involved. And that is 

the theme of my testimony today. 

I would like to abbreviate my oral remarks, if I may, sir, and I 

have provided a full text for the record. 

Mr. LEACH. Without objection, your full statement will be placed 

in the record, as will the full statements of the other two witnesses. 

Mr. LA PORTA. Thank you very much. 

My remarks today are my own and, as you correctly recalled, 

based on my service in the State Department and much of that 

time spent on Indonesian relations. I think that it is essential for 

the United States, at this particular time, to strengthen our relationship with Indonesia and to support Indonesia on its journey of 

democracy. 

24

Indonesia, as this Committee is well aware, plays an important 

role in the region and I do not need to belabor that any further. 

There are three points that I think deserve mention: First, to 

strengthen Indonesia’s political system and regard for human values through legislative and executive cooperation; secondly, to assist tsunami reconstruction; and, thirdly, expand cooperation in 

education. 

I would also submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is high time to upgrade our defense cooperation with Indonesia in order to advance 

democracy and civilian control. 

I think it is a truism to say that Indonesia is a nation striving 

for democracy. It is true that in the three elections held last year 

that the Indonesian armed forces and police did not involve themselves in the political processes, although there were a few very 

minor local incidents. But from my own observation as an observer, 

grassroots democracy is prospering and accountability will be further strengthened by the election of local officials beginning this 

year. 

Also, I would like to second a remark that was made earlier 

about democracy and Islam. There is a vigorous debate in Indonesia today about the role of Islam in both the national and personal life of Indonesians and I think the United States should support that discussion in every way possible. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make mention of and support the work that USAID is doing in providing for the direct election of provincial and local officials, the promotion of democratization measures, and working with the Parliaments. I think all of 

this is essential to strengthening democracy. 

United States assistance in tsunami relief has been formidable, 

and I think there is already beginning to be seen a turning of opinion in Indonesia as cited in a recent Terror-Free Tomorrow poll. 

This is a United States non-governmental organization. Based on 

a poll of 1,200 respondents, 65 percent answered that there was indeed a positive impression of the role of the United States armed 

forces in tsunami relief. 

I daresay while it is too early to say that this will result in a 

turning of overall opinion in favor of the United States, it certainly 

is an initial indicator. 

I would like to go on and just mention a few areas where I think 

the United States can enlarge its support of democracy. First is in 

relations of this body, the United States Congress, with the Indonesian Parliament. Some Members of Congress met with a delegation from the Indonesian Parliament last week, and I think the encounters were very informative on both sides. But Indonesia should 

take part in more fulsome interparliamentary exchanges, whether 

through the IPU or through the Congress’ own Democratic Assistance Initiative. 

Consideration should also be given to establishing a high-level 

continuing leadership dialogue with Indonesia comprising the public sector, the United States Executive Branch, Congress, business 

and industry, academia, media and civil society representatives 

similar to those that we have with China, Australia and others in 

the Asia region. 

25

On the tsunami reconstruction, I think there are several things 

that are quite important to pay attention to, and I think that my 

initial discussions with people in Jakarta and discussions with people in our Embassy and in the Departments of State and USAID 

indicate that there are a number of areas where the United States 

and Indonesia can work together. 

First, though, I think that the planners for the reconstruction 

have to listen to the people in Aceh and North Sumatra. 

Secondly, I think the efforts to pursue a political settlement of 

the insurgency have to be continued, if not stepped up, but also a 

wide consultative process involving local leaders and the people’s 

elected representatives—for example, the Acehnese members in the 

national Parliament—need to be consulted in order to try to form 

a new consensus on the special autonomy law. 

There also needs to be effective accountability and transparency. 

The help of the foreign and private sectors as well as the Indonesian private sector needs to be effective. 

I would also like to go on just to use my remaining time, Mr. 

Chairman, to talk a little bit about education. And this in particular devolves on a conference which USINDO, the U.S. Indonesian Society, is holding in Jakarta next week to try to develop 

an increasing number of higher educational partnerships. We hope 

that a Presidential Scholars Initiative will result from that. 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I think it is time to look for a new era of 

cooperation in defense relations. I think that a lot of the critics 

have made much of the fact of the alleged abuses and other problems that have been evidenced in Indonesia, and I think it is now 

time for the critics to join with the United States in having a new 

collaborative relationship with the democratic Government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in trying to make gains in improving Indonesian defense capabilities, in improving accountability, and improving the civilian control of the military. 

In particular, Mr. Chairman, we need a crash program to train 

middle-grade officers. We need to improve air transport and logistics and interoperability for maritime security and other operations. We need to improve United States assistance to Indonesia 

for maritime security. 

There are also opportunities to help Indonesia construct a modern command, control and communications network to strengthen 

the role of the Presidency’s civilian control, to assist in the formation of a national defense council, expert staff and reporting system. We also need to help in the development of competencies in 

the civilian ministry of defense and in this respect, Minister 

Juwono Sudarsono, the Defense Minister, will be in Washington 

next week. 

Also, there are opportunities for NGO assistance in helping to 

promote public discussion on security matters, NGO assistance to 

help work on the interface between the civil and military justice 

systems, also providing legal and advisory assistance to the Truth 

and Friendship Commission with East Timor, Aceh and Papua demobilization—basically retraining and resettling insurgents, increasing the number of policemen in Indonesia to over 1 million, 

more in line with the U.N. standard, and to assist the Government 

in privatization of the military-run businesses to bring them under 

26

control, full Government surveillance and prepare them for privatization. 

We are working with a new and democratic Government in Indonesia, one that has a very strong mandate. As Professor Karl Jackson of Johns Hopkins has said in relation to the United States 

working with Indonesia, ‘‘If not with SBY, who; if not now, when?’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. La Porta follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALPHONSE F. LA PORTA, PRESIDENT, 

UNITED STATES-INDONESIA SOCIETY

OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss United States relations 

with Indonesia—a country which you, Mr. Chairman, aptly observed is the ‘‘single 

largest country in the world where the U.S. remains only tangentially involved.’’

My remarks today are my own and are based on over 38 years of diplomatic experience in the U.S. Foreign Service and close involvement with Indonesia. They do 

not necessarily reflect those of USINDO and its Board of Trustees. 

Mr. Chairman, we have a tremendous opportunity before us to strengthen our relationship with Indonesia and to support Indonesia in its journey of democracy. 

With the recent free and open election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono last 

September, and a new determination among the Indonesian government and people 

to pursue fundamental democratic reforms, we can truly say that Indonesia is a nation striving for democracy. Furthermore, the tragic earthquake and devastating 

tsunami of December 26, 2004 has provided both the United States and Indonesia 

with a new opportunity for positive cooperation. It is essential that the United 

States take advantage of these opportunities so that we can support Indonesia in 

its efforts at democratization and pursue our mutual interests. 

I need not remind this committee of the important role that Indonesia can play 

in our world at this time. It is not only the largest democratic nation in the world 

with a predominantly Muslim population. But as an Asian nation Indonesia is a 

vital partner for the United States in a new century where an expanding Asia indisputably has a main economic and political role. 

Today I would like to share with you some views on Indonesia’s recent efforts at 

democratization and in the process discuss how the United States can further support Indonesia by offering some specific policy recommendations in four key areas:

• Strengthen Indonesia’s political system and regard for human values through 

legislative and executive cooperation;

• Assist tsunami reconstruction in northern Sumatra, following on the crucial 

assistance provided by the United States in the immediate relief phase;

• Expand United States-Indonesian cooperation in education; and

• Upgrade defense cooperation to achieve real gains in Indonesian military professionalism and capabilities, together with strengthening civilian control. 

Indonesia is a Nation Striving for Democracy. 

Mr. Chairman, the Indonesian government and people have demonstrated that 

they are now a nation truly striving for democracy. In the past few years, Indonesia 

has held three free and open political elections, has put an end to dwifungsi or ‘‘dual 

function,’’ signifying the end of direct involvement of the military in politics and society, has increased the freedom of the media and press, has created a stable macroeconomic environment, and has demonstrated progress in implementing the rule of 

the law. 

It is especially significant that the armed forces and police did not involve themselves in the three elections held in 2004, except for a very few minor localized instances. As I observed as a member of the Carter Center’s delegation for the first 

round presidential election last July, grassroots democracy is prospering and accountability will be further enhanced by the first-ever popular election of provincial 

and local officials beginning this year. 

Indonesia’s democratic experience since the fall of Soeharto and the first free elections in 1999 clearly show that Indonesia is not only on the road to democracy, but 

that democracy and Islam can exist side by side. Indonesia exemplifies to the world 

how Islam can play a positive and healthy role in a society. Within Indonesia, as 

27

well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there exists vigorous discussion over the nature of how Islam should be practiced. Indonesians think critically about Islam and 

the role of religion in their lives. The positive role it has played in Indonesian society, with its strong and unique culture, far outweighs the negative consequences 

generated by fringe groups of the Muslim body politic. 

The United States has already played a significant role in contributing to Indonesia’s progress both as a democratic nation and progressive Muslim nation. Most 

welcome is the continuing support that USAID is providing for the direct election 

of provincial and local officials beginning this year and continuing assistance to develop local government capabilities and political party effectiveness. On the national 

level, maintaining U.S. assistance to the Parliament (DPR), civil society organizations, and pushing forward on judicial reform and other measures to promote the 

Rule of Law are likewise to be applauded. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to underscore that U.S. assistance in tsunami relief has 

been exemplary and a strong determinant in generating support among the Indonesian people for improved ties with the United States. Indeed, there may already 

be a turning of the tide of public opinion as shown in a poll sponsored by a U.S. 

non-governmental organization, Terror Free Tomorrow, which was conducted by the 

authoritative Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia). The results, 

released only last Friday, March 4, indicate that the role of the U.S. armed forces 

in tsunami relief was viewed positively by 65% of the 1,200 poll respondents. Moreover, the poll showed that appreciation of U.S. counter-terrorist actions has increased and regard for Osama bin Laden has dropped to less than half of former 

levels. It is important to note however, that while this poll found overall U.S. popularity increased from 15% in 2003 to almost 34%, we still have a long way to go 

in establishing an overall positive opinion of the United States. 

Recommendations 

I would like now to suggest how the United States can enlarge its support of democracy in Indonesia and Indonesia’s role as a progressive Muslim-majority society 

by implementing policies in four key areas: legislative and executive level exchanges; continuing to assist in tsunami recovery and reconstruction; assistance to 

higher education; and defense cooperation. 

1. Continuing to Strengthen Indonesia’s Democratic Political System 

Mr. Chairman, the United States can continue to strengthen Indonesian democratization through interactions on the executive and parliamentary levels. High level 

dialogue not only fosters increased understanding of democracy and its global benefits, but also increases the political will and enthusiasm of elected Indonesian officials for sound democratic practices. 

As you may know, last week a delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians, members of the People’s Consultative Assembly or DPR, visited Washington and had a 

wide range of meetings with Members of Congress. Dialogues and exchanges such 

as this lead to knowledge-sharing in key areas such as foreign affairs and defense, 

a transfer of skills in budgeting, legislative drafting and research, and the promotion of sound oversight practices. It is important that the United States continue 

to promote interaction through Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) mechanisms and 

through Indonesian participation in the new congressional Democracy Assistance 

Initiative. The United States Congress should also send a strong delegation to the 

Asian Parliamentary Union (APU) meeting to be held in Indonesia in January 2006. 

The continued advancement of democracy in Indonesia depends on establishing a 

closer pattern of relations and mutual understanding with the Yudhoyono government. Recent visits of high administration officials and Members of Congress have 

been instrumental in identifying areas of common concern, and these contacts have 

a beneficial public impact. Consideration also should be given to establishing a high 

level continuing Leadership Dialogue, comprising the public sector, business and industry, academia, the media and civil society representatives, similar to the bilateral dialogues with China, Australia and others in the Asia region. 

2. Earthquake and Tsunami Reconstruction. 

Mr. Chairman, the terrible disaster that struck northern Sumatra on December 

26, 2004 has drawn an unprecedented response from the American people and 

around the world. The Yudhoyono government is grappling with the enormous task 

of reconstruction planning, the management of millions, indeed billions, of dollars 

in external assistance, and establishing the processes to guide the rebuilding effort. 

Based on my visit to Indonesia two weeks ago, reports from USINDO colleagues 

who have visited Aceh and other information available to us, we hope that our government will collaborate closely with and support the Yudhoyono government in the 

following five areas to help ensure success in the reconstruction:

28

• Listen to the people to ensure that reconstruction projects, planning for new 

human settlements and economic recovery have a sound popular basis;

• Energetically pursue efforts to achieve a political settlement of the long-festering insurgency, but also change the model. In addition to political talks 

with the expatriate leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 

Merdeka or GAM), there should also be a wide consultative process involving 

local leaders and the people’s elected representatives in the regional assembly 

and the national Parliament. A new consensus should be found to implement 

the special autonomy law in order to fulfill Aceh’s potential within a united 

Indonesia;

• Ensure that there is effective accountability and transparency in the use of 

external assistance flows; the United States can make special expertise available to ensure that maximum possible financial integrity is maintained and 

institutions are strengthened against corruption. The millions of Americans 

who have contributed to this northern Sumatra relief and reconstruction effort demand no less.

• Enlist the help of the Indonesian and foreign private sectors by establishing 

a ‘‘one-stop shop’’ for project approvals to rebuild schools and other public facilities, restore economic livelihoods and promote dignity and self-reliance. 

The projected U.S. ‘‘private sector summit,’’ now envisaged for May will be an 

important step in ensuring public and business support for long term reconstruction needs. USINDO is cooperating with the Asia Society, the Asia Foundation, the U.S.–ASEAN Business Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in this private sector initiative.

• Keep Aceh open to bona fide organizations, experts and visitors assisting in 

reconstruction. International media coverage is also important to tell the 

story of Aceh reconstruction to the world, among other things to engender 

long term support. Although exercising prudence regarding personal security 

is necessary in certain areas, the people of Aceh will benefit from working 

closely with foreign donors in ways that will open up new choices other than 

siding with the GAM rebels.

Mr. Chairman, based on my experience as principal officer of the U.S. Consulate 

in Medan in the late 1970’s, the people of Aceh and neighboring areas are resourceful, direct and action-oriented. Aceh’s human resources should be mobilized through 

community development, civil society organizations and open-handedness to create 

a new society in the stricken areas and to strengthen the integration of reconstructed communities into the regional economy and infrastructure of northern Sumatra as a whole. 

Indeed, there is already good news. A USINDO colleague who is developing our 

Aceh school reconstruction project visited the devastated west coast of Aceh last 

week. On the ruins of the flattened town of Calang, Indonesian Marines were establishing schools for orphaned and homeless children and were helping local citizens 

to construct temporary housing. Signs of new growth, both physical and psychological, are beginning to emerge and the always resourceful Acehnese are developing 

their own plans for reconstituting their communities. 

I would submit that opportunities also should be found, through the wise use of 

external assistance, to upgrade priority national sectors, particularly tertiary education, Islamic schools and universities, and secondary schools so that no region is 

left behind. Creating a ‘‘gold standard’’ for only the hardest-hit disaster areas will 

not contribute in my view to national solidarity or democracy building. 

3. Education, Education, Education 

USINDO Co-Chair Edward Masters testified before this committee a year ago 

about the importance of human resource development to strengthen United StatesIndonesian relations. As recommended in the National Commission report 18 

months ago, there is a pressing need to expand cooperation between educational institutions of our two countries as existed in the 1970’s and 1980’s when U.S. assistance programs were better funded and centered on a web of university-level collaborations. Reductions in U.S. development assistance, public diplomacy and other programs in the 1990’s have taken a serious toll. President Bush’s initiative to channel US$157 million into mainly basic education 

over the next six years is an excellent start, but U.S. educational assistance should 

be increased to focus especially on developing university centers of excellence to increase the numbers of Ph.D.’s, vastly upgrading tertiary-level teacher training, and 

enhancing English language and other academic skills. Attention should also be 

given to encourage the development of first-class academic research capabilities and 

enlarging the flow of students to the United States (presently less than 9000 IndoVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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nesians are in American colleges and universities in contrast to 60,000 Chinese and 

80,000 Indians). Finally, it is important that the United States continue to assist 

mainstream Islamic schools, universities and civil society organizations in a balanced and non-intrusive way. 

Mr. Chairman, USINDO has been very active during the past year to promote 

university-to-university partnerships, the development of which will be pursued further in a conference in Jakarta on March 17–18, 2005. The United States should 

provide additional assistance to Indonesian higher education, and it is hoped that 

concrete proposals for a Presidential Scholars Initiative, named for President Bush 

and President Yudhoyono, will emerge from these deliberations, together with expanded individual university cooperative programs. Other bi-national and multilateral donors should also contribute to this effort, which is also aimed at restoring 

tertiary education in badly hit institutions in Aceh where over 100 Ph.D. scholars 

were lost in the tsunami disaster. 

4. New Cooperation in Defense Relations 

Mr. Chairman, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—still 

less than six months old—and its renewed commitment to democratic reforms offer 

unparalleled opportunities to expand bilateral defense cooperation. It is little secret 

that Indonesian military capabilities have suffered from nearly 15 years of constrained assistance and contacts with the United States. This was seen in command 

and control deficiencies, airlift and technical shortcomings, and diminished interoperability skills during the recent disaster relief operations. 

The reasons for the downturn in military-to-military cooperation have also permeated the overarching U.S.-Indonesian political relationship. But let me be clear: 

no one is arguing for impunity in alleged abuses that have been cited over the years, 

whether related to East Timor, domestic insurgencies, the suppression of democratic 

rights in connection with the reformasi movement beginning in 1999, inter-ethnic 

and inter-religious strife, or the killings of Americans and others in the well known 

Timika incident of August 2002 in Papua. Accountability, personal and national reconciliation, new efforts to promote political accommodation, and the application of 

internationally accepted human rights standards should pervade the more intensive 

relations now manifest between our two nations. 

Mr. Chairman, within this frame of reference, there are important opportunities 

not to be lost. 

An experts’ review of United States-Indonesia defense relations, supported by a 

private foundation, was issued by USINDO in December 2004 and was discussed 

in conferences held in Washington, D.C. and Jakarta. USINDO soon will publish 

three monographs in the important areas of internal stability and defense reform, 

counter-terrorism and maritime security. The overriding conclusion of these experts 

(copies of their report are available) was that urgent and overlapping interests regarding maritime security and counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia require expanded U.S. assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in addition to substantial upgrading of police (POLRI) capabilities. Furthermore, access to U.S. training in order 

to upgrade the professionalism of middle grade officers is a cardinal requirement, 

combined with assistance to modernize logistical and other systems, in order to promote defense reform and contribute to internal stability, taking into account the 

new roles of the TNI and POLRI in a democratic society. 

Mr. Chairman, my view is that future United States assistance should be addressed in two ways: first, build up TNI capabilities, and second, advance defense 

reform in the government and civil sectors. 

Core military priorities are:

1. Training: IMET, Enhanced IMET and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

should be devoted to a five-year ‘‘crash’’ program to retrain captains, majors 

and lieutenant colonels in essential military skills, the humanitarian and 

other roles of today’s military forces, and international standards of conduct. 

Improved military professionalism not only will lead to better individual performance, but also will promote interoperability with foreign forces (a need 

evidenced in Aceh relief operations), update international peacekeeping 

skills, and enhance sensitivity to the human rights aspects of military operations. This upgrading of military skills across the board is needed to fulfill 

the TNI’s valid internal security role until police capabilities can be considerably improved.

2. Air transport and logistics: It is gratifying to know that, due to the U.S. release of impounded spare parts and equipment, 13 C–130 aircraft are operating now in contrast to 4 before the tsunami disaster. Other forms of air 

transport and logistical systems of the air force, navy and ground forces 

30

should be upgraded to minimum operational standards. If there is to be effective regional cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security, the 

TNI must have the support platforms necessary to sustain patrolling and 

interdiction operations.

3. Maritime security: The full US$6 million in FMF, as proposed in 2004, 

should be provided for the Indonesian Navy in 2005 to upgrade its sea patrolling operations. Additional assistance should be sought from South Korea 

and Japan, which also have important interests in maintaining maritime vigilance in Southeast Asia. The United States should also assist Indonesia and 

its neighbors to develop a Common Maritime Picture, entailing the integration of information from all sources, to track ship traffic in the Malacca 

Strait and critical sea space in the surrounding region. Secure, compartmented and reliable communications are also required to facilitate exchanges 

of information relating to counter-terrorism and maritime law enforcement. 

Consequently, I recommend that the United States fund a modern multinodal communications network whereby military, intelligence and law enforcement officials in the region can readily exchange sensitive operational 

information.

Mr. Chairman, an essential part of the advancement of democracy is capacity 

building to promote effective command and control of the armed forces as well as 

to enhance civil society’s role in national defense and security affairs. My suggestions for priority U.S. assistance in the civil sector would include:

1. National command authority: The Aceh experience showed that Indonesia’s 

command and control system requires upgrading and connectivity with the 

President’s Office, the Coordinating Minister for Justice, Political and Security Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, TNI headquarters at all levels, the Police, associated national security bodies, and disaster management agencies. 

Any chief executive in today’s world must have reliable and redundant 

means of communicating with all key elements of government. The United 

States is uniquely qualified to help Indonesia construct a modern command, 

control and communications (C3) network to provide connectivity with the 

top-most level of government that would also include an effective, real-time 

reporting system for all echelons of the national security structure.

2. National Defense Council and expert staff: There already is provision in law 

for the creation of a National Defense Council and U.S. experience is directly applicable to Indonesia’s needs. The United States should provide advisory assistance to establish a system in the President’s Office to ensure 

that the chief executive is able to coordinate with his key national security 

advisors and that processes are in place to expedite essential advice on important policy and operational matters.

3. Ministry of Defense: Training and advisory assistance, in addition to expanded technical staffs in strategic planning, management, budgeting, logistics, and force planning are needed to enable the ministry under its present 

farsighted and experienced leader, Minister Juwono Sudarsono (who will 

visit Washington next week) to fulfill its essential constitutional role. The 

United States should set up special programs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey and elsewhere to provide intensive assistance 

and training on a multi-year basis. Additionally, the Center of Excellence 

of the Pacific Command should provide intensive training and other assistance to develop an effective national disaster management system.

4. Civil Sector: U.S. assistance should not only be confined to the government 

and armed forces, but civilian capacities also should be built up, perhaps 

through a qualified non-governmental organization (NGO) or think tank, to 

expand academic courses and research for the study of military affairs, 

civil-military policy development and institutional reform. Elevating public 

discussion of important politico-military policy matters will enrich national 

policy making as appropriate in a democratic society.

5. Military Justice System: In a little heralded development last September, 

the military justice system was placed under the Supreme Court which is 

undergoing its own wide-scale reform and restructuring. Targeted U.S. assistance could be provided through a qualified NGO to help mesh the military and civil systems, provide cross-training, enhance judicial accountability, and sponsor training in international humanitarian law and the law 

of armed conflict.

31

6. Parliamentary Oversight: As evidenced in the visit to Washington of a parliamentary delegation last week, there is scope for improving linkages between the U.S. Congress and the DPR, as well as providing training and 

orientation in key defense and foreign relations subjects, international 

human rights law and practice, legislative drafting and research support. 

USAID assistance and direct Congress-DPR programs should be expanded 

to promote effective oversight by Indonesia’s democratically elected representatives.

7. Reconciliation with East Timor: With the imminent launching of a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) by Indonesia and East Timor, it should 

be possible for the United States to provide legal and other advisory assistance through a qualified NGO to make this process more meaningful. As 

the former head of the U.S. Department of State’s Cambodian Genocide Initiative, I believe that American specialists can offer a great deal to enrich 

the work of the commission in a non-intrusive and politically neutral fashion, while correctly upholding the responsibility of the two governments to 

guide this process.

8. Aceh and Papua Demobilization: As done in the southern Philippines, the 

United States should support qualified organizations to retrain and resettle 

demobilized insurgents in war-torn Aceh and also in Papua. Providing insurgents with new livelihoods, reuniting them with their families, and relocating them in stable and non-threatening environments would facilitate 

political accommodations within the framework of Indonesia’s special autonomy law.

9. Police Assistance: The United States should help marshal international assistance to increase the size national police (POLRI) to over 1 million officers, closer to the United Nations civil policing standard. Community policing should also be expanded, as should the number of indigenous police officers in Aceh and Papua taking into account special autonomy provisions. 

U.S. counter-terrorism assistance to the police should also be maintained.

10. Privatization: The Ministry of Defense, under national law, has already 

begun to regularize the status of military-run businesses and to try to supplant extra-budgetary support with annual allocations from the national 

budget. This process should be enhanced and there is an opportunity for the 

United States to provide assistance, perhaps in connection with the World 

Bank, to bring military businesses under appropriate national surveillance, 

prepare them for privatization, and provide compensatory budgetary support.

Mr. Chairman, I fully realize that the foregoing menu of areas for potential U.S. 

engagement with Indonesia is extensive, if not overly ambitious. We at USINDO are 

hopeful that next week’s visit to Washington of Defense Minister Juwono 

Sudarsono, who is a well-recognized authority on defense reform, will launch the 

United States and Indonesia on a path of collaborative, multi-year cooperation to 

address foremost professional, capabilities, structural and civil sector needs. Strong 

United States commitment to advance democracy is fully justified in light of developments in Indonesia since 1999. In my personal view, the Bush Administration’s 

decision to lift restrictions on U.S. training and assistance is timely, if overdue, in 

terms of pressing joint interests in maritime security and counter-terrorism as well 

as the recent earthquake and tsunami tragedy. 

Concluding, Mr. Chairman, my assessment is that the government of President 

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono offers the best opportunity in well over a decade to 

deepen cooperation along a broad front for the purpose of locking in democracy for 

all the people within a united Indonesia. As Professor Karl Jackson of Johns Hopkins University, a prominent expert on Indonesia, remarked at a USINDO seminar 

last November, ‘‘If not SBY, who? If not now, when?’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time and attention of this eminent committee.

[Ambassador La Porta’s remarks are his own and do not necessarily represent those 

of the USINDO boards of trustees and advisors, corporate supporters or Friends of 

the Society.]

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Dr. Ramage? 

32

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS E. RAMAGE, PH.D., REPRESENTATIVE, INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA, THE ASIA FOUNDATION 

Mr. RAMAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify 

before this Subcommittee on Indonesia’s democratic transition. It is 

an honor to be here today. 

As you know, I reside in Indonesia, in Jakarta, where I have 

been the Asia Foundation’s representative since 1996. Since that 

time, I have been fortunate to witness Indonesia’s remarkable transition to democracy over the past 8 or 9 years. 

It is my experience and support for Indonesia’s democratic transition through the foundation’s support for democracy programs 

that informs my testimony this afternoon. 

Given time constraints, I will summarize my remarks and, as my 

colleagues have requested, ask that my written statement be 

placed in the record. 

Indonesia in 2005 is not a nation in crisis any longer. Following 

an enormous amount of turmoil over the past several years, Indonesia has emerged, as you have stated in your opening remarks, 

as a relatively stable country with a democratic system of government. It is also a highly decentralized system of government. 

As we have just heard other witnesses mention, Indonesia under 

its recently-elected President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is continuing on a path of democratic consolidation and, importantly, is 

also taking steps to improve Indonesia’s economic performance. 

And despite the earthquake and tsunami devastation in Aceh, we 

must consider Indonesia to be in relatively good shape, particularly 

when we compare Indonesia today to the things we worried about 

with regard to Indonesia over the past several years. The state of 

United States-Indonesian relations is stable, mature, cordial and, 

I believe, mutually beneficial. 

It is worth asking how this could be the case. Why should we be 

somewhat upbeat about Indonesia today, especially because they 

only ended their authoritarian period a few years ago, and particularly when here in Washington a lot of our concerns were that Indonesia was either disintegrating—some would say Balkanizing—

or being taken over by radical Islam, Talibanizing, as one Member 

mentioned to me a couple of years ago? 

That Indonesia is not that way, that in the wake of free and fair 

elections last year, Indonesia is democratic, unified and at peace is 

remarkable. 

Having said that, Indonesia faces enormous problems of governance, terrorism, poverty, unemployment, and threats to the environment. But let us briefly consider what has been achieved, it is 

worth mentioning very briefly, since 1998: A thriving free media, 

free labor unions, free political parties, a powerful Parliament, 

passing a batter of reforms, checking the power of the Presidency, 

and, finally, modest economic recovery. 

Some other forms I would like to mention with a little more specificity because they have moved with an alacrity and a commitment 

that was unimaginable just a couple of years ago. The first I want 

to highlight are reforms in the Indonesian judicial system. The Indonesian judiciary is in the midst of a thorough going reform process. The reform-oriented chief justice has launched a far-reaching 

restructuring and reform process with support from the Asia FounVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

dation and USAID, an important step in achieving a judiciary free 

from political interference. Even though we tend to focus on the 

bad decisions of the court, as was mentioned earlier—the light sentencing of Abu Bakar Baasyir last week—few have noted the way 

the courts have been busily convicting and sentencing scores of terrorists. I think we can say it arguably has the best record in the 

region. 

The issues now and the problems for the courts in Indonesia are 

dealing with pervasive corruption and criminal interference in the 

judiciary, but the one thing we can say for sure, the Indonesian 

courts are not used to enforce the political will of the Government 

as they were during the authoritarian period. 

As has already been heard from previous witnesses, the Indonesian armed forces have also begun to reform and although there 

is still a pressing agenda for further civil military reform, we must 

acknowledge the Indonesian military out of Parliament and 

secundments to civilian posts have ended. 

Importantly, and this will probably be an issue which will come 

up in your discussions with the Minister of Defense in his visit to 

Washington this week, there is a degree of defense budget transparency emerging in Indonesia which was unimaginable just a year 

or 2 ago. 

Just a year ago, I would not have told this Committee that the 

Indonesian national police is also on a surprisingly firm reform 

path. The reform started with the separation of the police from the 

Indonesian armed forces 4 years ago. They are now increasingly 

under civilian control and are undertaking ambitious communityoriented policing programs for the first time in years in actual response to citizen needs. The Indonesian police now for the first 

time is focusing on reducing crime, something they had not really 

been focused on for a long time, and the police have also demonstrated their competence by showing they can investigate complicated terrorism cases. What that is doing is prompting Indonesian citizens to say, if you can do that, if you can handle complicated terrorism cases, then you can reduce crime in our neighborhoods. Now that is starting to happen in a number of Indonesian cities. 

I think the most striking reform, and you highlighted it in your 

opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, is the adoption of free and fair 

elections which resulted in such a peaceful change of government 

now on several occasions. As we know, these are the hallmarks of 

any stable, mature democracy. 

It is worth reemphasizing that last year more Indonesians voted 

in more elections for more candidates and more peacefully than 

any other citizens anywhere in the world. It is ironic to me, residing in Indonesia, to hear Indonesians complain that voter turnout 

dropped from 90 percent in 1999 to only 80 percent last year. They 

think this is a problem and it shows their democracy is not as vibrant as it should be. A culture of democracy to my mind has clearly taken root in Indonesia. 

I think the other important thing to emphasize on the elections 

is that citizens did not vote based on Islam. People did not choose 

political parties based upon their religious affiliation. Instead, conVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

cerns about good governance and corruption seemed to most animate the way people voted. 

Let me mention in my concluding remarks two things that I 

think indicate the way the Government under President 

Yudhoyono is on a reform path. The appointment of a competent 

cabinet, particularly in the areas of human rights and law enforcement. Indonesia now has a noted legal aid campaigner as its Attorney General and it has a noted human rights activist as its Minister for Justice and Human Rights. Again, this was unimaginable 

a few years ago and a sharp difference from the Megawati Government. 

I think the other important thing to mention is evidence that the 

President will make tough, politically unpopular decisions to help 

reform the economy. He just reduced the fuel subsidies, resulting 

in a 30 percent increase in fuel prices, but this was a critical move 

to remove distortions from the Indonesian economy. 

In conclusion, in returning to the overall theme of Indonesia’s 

successful democratization, I would like to emphasize that even 

though Indonesia democratized because of Indonesians’ political 

will and commitment, it is also United States development assistance which has made a difference and been important in Indonesia’s democratic transition. 

Indonesia is a country where the United States has gotten it 

right. In other words, through assistance to build democracy starting back in the 1980s, a full decade before Suharto fell, the United 

States invested in civil society organizations and importantly, 

many of them were Muslim organizations, and individuals who 

have since become leaders of today’s democratic Indonesia. I think 

it is a record and a relationship to be proud of. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramage follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS E. RAMAGE, PH.D., REPRESENTATIVE, INDONESIA

AND MALAYSIA, THE ASIA FOUNDATION

‘‘INDONESIA IN 2005: STABLE, DEMOCRATIC AND DECENTRALIZED’’

I. Introduction 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before this Subcommittee on Indonesia’s 

democratic transition. It is an honor to be here today. I reside in Jakarta, Indonesia 

where I have been the Representative of The Asia Foundation since 1996. I have 

been fortunate to witness, and as the Foundation’s Representative, to provide support for, Indonesia’s remarkable transition to a stable democracy during this time. 

My experience supporting Indonesia’s democratic transition through the Foundation’s technical assistance and grants to both Indonesian democracy organizations, 

as well as in support of reformist Indonesian government agencies, informs much 

of my testimony today. Given time constraints I will summarize my remarks in the 

time allowed and I ask that my written statement be placed in the record. 

Indonesia in 2005 should not be seen as a nation in crisis. Following a lot of turmoil over the past several years, Indonesia has emerged as a relatively stable country, with a highly decentralized, democratic system of government. Indonesia, under 

its recently elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is continuing on a path 

of democratic consolidation and slowly improving its economic performance. Despite

the earthquake and tsunami devastation in Aceh, Indonesia should be considered 

to be in relatively good shape—particularly given the fairly dire predictions and worries of the past several years. And the state of U.S.-Indonesian relations is also stable, mature, cordial and mutually beneficial. 

Yet how could this be the case? Why should we be somewhat upbeat about Indonesia today? After all, it’s been only seven years since the end of four decades

authoritarianism under President Soeharto. Especially when over the past several 

35

years many observers feared that Indonesia was either disintegrating—Balkanizing—or being taken over by radical Islam—Talibanizing. 

II. Context: Indonesia’s Emergence as a Stable Democracy 

In the past seven years Indonesia has experienced a severe economic recession 

and hyperinflation brought on by the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, shocking episodes of communal violence, and political instability. And yet in 2005, in the wake 

of three free and fair elections last year, Indonesia is more stable, democratic, unified, and at peace than it has been for years. In short, Indonesia feels more like 

a ‘‘normal’’ country than it has for years, struggling with the normal, albeit challenging, and in some instances, severe problems of governance, poverty, slow economic growth and unemployment, social welfare and environmental protection. 

But let us consider briefly what has been achieved since Indonesia threw off 

authoritarianism in 1998 and has been rarely captured in journalists’ reporting: a 

thriving free media, free labor unions, free political parties, a powerful parliament 

passing a battery of reform legislation and checking the power of the presidency, 

and modest economic recovery. Some reforms have even moved with alacrity and 

commitment that could not have been imagined even a few years ago, and tend to 

be only barely recognized now. Let me focus in further on these particularly striking 

examples of reform and democratization:

1. The Indonesian judicial system is in the midst of thorough-going reform. The 

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has launched a far-reaching reform and 

restructuring process, which The Asia Foundation and USAID have supported through our law reform programs. This is an important step toward 

achieving an independent judiciary free from political interference. (Many observers have focused on the ‘‘bad’’ decisions, such as light sentencing of Abu 

Bakar Ba’asyir last week; but few have noted the way the courts have been 

busily convicting and sentencing scores of terrorists—arguably the best 

record in the region.) Corruption and ‘‘criminal’’ interference in the judiciary 

are the issues now, but the courts are absolutely not used to enforce the political will of the government as they were under Soeharto.

2. The Indonesian armed forces have also begun to reform. The military gave 

up much of their political power under pressure from civil society and voters 

and with a speed that is striking when compared with situations in some 

other post-authoritarian states. Though there is still a pressing agenda for 

further civil-military reform, it must be acknowledged that the military are 

now out of parliament, secondments to civilian posts have ended, there is the 

very beginning of a degree of defense budget transparency unimaginable a 

few years ago, and the military is increasingly under civilian control. While 

much remains to be done to further entrench a professional armed forces in 

the context of a democratic Indonesia, but clearly a lot of the hard work has 

begun, and begun to take root.

3. Just two years ago I would not have told this Committee that the Indonesian 

National Police would, today, be on a surprisingly firm reform path. And this 

reform started with the separation of the police from the armed forces four 

years ago. The police are now are also increasingly under civilian control, 

and are undertaking ambitious ‘‘community-oriented policing’’ programs in 

response to citizens’ needs—focusing increasingly on the need to reduce 

crime and improve services to citizens. The police have also repeatedly demonstrated their increasing competence in investigating acts of terrorism and 

apprehending perpetrators of recent bombings—Bali, Marriot, and the Australian Embassy bombings. It’s a relatively strong record, one of the better 

police records in the region on the terrorism issue.

4. Of all the reforms, one of the most important is the change from Jakartacentric government to a highly decentralized system. Most government authorities have been rapidly shifted to districts—essentially counties—and 

municipal or city governments, over 440 in total. Most citizens can now effectively interact with their government and where communities are best able 

to hold government accountable. Now citizens know who is responsible, who 

is accountable—and its no longer distant bureaucrats in Jakarta. The challenge now is for citizens and local governments to use these new authorities 

and to show that democracy in Indonesia will also lead to tangible improvements.

5. Finally, the most striking reform is the adoption of free and fair elections resulting in peaceful changes of government. Peaceful, transparent, transfers 

of power, from one government to the next, from one leader to another, are 

hallmarks of stable, mature democracies. Transfers of power in Indonesia 

36

have in the past been wrenching and violent, in 1942, 1945 and 1965/66. In 

May 1998, many fully expected Soeharto to use force to remain in power. The 

fact that he did not, and at the end of the day, quietly stepped aside will 

likely be acknowledged in history. His successor, hand-picked B.J. Habibe 

graciously conceded his electoral loss in 1999, and in ,the past year President 

Megawati has quietly left the presidency after the people passed judgment 

on her government and found it wanting.

And in 2004, in the first direct presidential elections in Indonesian history voters 

gave an overwhelming popular mandate to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s 

6th, and first-ever popularly elected, president. 

It is worth reemphasizing: In 2004, more Indonesians voted in more elections and 

for more different candidates—and more peacefully—than any other country’s citizens, anywhere in the world. In fact, Indonesians actually complained that voter 

turnout ‘‘dropped’’ from the world’s highest in a free society (over 90 percent in the 

1999 elections) to about 75 percent in 2004 (still one of the world’s highest voter 

turnout rates). A culture of democracy has not only taken root in Indonesia, but 

begun to flourish, in ways often not seen in supposedly ‘‘mature’’ democracies. 

And moreover, when Indonesians got the chance to vote freely and fairly for the 

first time in nearly fifty years, citizens did not choose parties and candidates based 

on their religious affiliations. In other words, people did not vote based upon Islam 

per se. The emergence of terrorism, inspired by radical groups mis-appropriating 

Islam, led some analysts to worry that voters would be attracted to parties espousing an Islamist perspective. However, these observers failed to separate the decadeslong growing piety of Indonesians, from militancy and radicalism. That is, terrorism 

in no way demonstrated any popular, citizen base of support for the theology and 

politics of the terrorists. Clearly, there is no broad-based support for militant Islam. 

Voters instead chose based on a more ‘‘modern’’ combination of interests—concern 

about good governance and corruption and, of course, personality and perceptions 

of ‘‘leadership.’’

Yet our impressions, drawn from headlines and images, and from analysis we can 

now see as off-base, have been of a nation disintegrating and radicalizing. In 1998–

99, some analysts and plenty of journalists talked of the ‘‘Balkanization’’ of the nation, buying the line that Indonesia had been ‘‘held together’’ through coercion and 

that national unity was a facade, maintained and enforced by the military-backed 

New Order regime. Images of separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh were 

extrapolated and assumed to reflect the situation in much of the nation. 

When the Habibie government crafted and passed a package of radical decentralization measures, the ‘‘woe is me’’ crowd pronounced that the planned rapid 

devolution of most political and financial authority to over 440 district and municipal governments would be disastrous. The nation would soon be in the grips of 

‘‘warlords’’, ‘‘little Soehartos’’ and other unaccountable mini-dictators. And to further 

dramatize the prediction of a splintered, ravaged Indonesia, observers also assumed 

that corruption would actually increase in the post-Soeharto period. (In fact, we see 

today that while corruption is extremely widespread and pervasive, it has also ‘‘decentralized,’’—and it has become easier to tackle at the local level. In West Sumatra, 

for instance, 43 members of the provincial assembly have been convicted and sentenced for graft—boondoggles of $700,000 uncovered thanks to the efforts of a local 

NGO. 

So why has Indonesia endured so well in recent years, confounding these apocalyptic forecasts? How did Indonesia shrug off so quickly the repression of the New 

Order? There are three likely answers: 

First, many of Indonesia’s reformers knew prior to Soeharto’s fall that the overconcentration of power in Jakarta threatened the integrity of the nation, thus devolution of that power—the voluntary and wholesale surrender of authorities by the 

central government—occurred remarkably swiftly. The result of this transfer of 

power to local governments immediately removed one of the longstanding complaints of citizens—that Jakarta controlled ‘‘everything.’’ Now, responsibility and accountability of government to citizens rested primarily in districts and municipalities. Does this mean that local governments are providing better services to citizens? 

No, in most cases not yet, but local government is now structured in a way that 

will eventually allow better provision of improved services and higher accountability 

to voters. 

Observers also failed to consider a link between centralized politics and governance and communal violence. Why didn’t the vicious post-Soeharto communal violence, some of it based on religious and ethnic conflict (in Ambon, for example), 

spread throughout the archipelago? Because the problems of Indonesia may have 

never been really based in what former President Abdurrahman Wahid called the 

37

‘‘primordial’’ issues of race, religion and ethnicity, but were instead derived from 

highly localized economic and political problems. Local problems did not lend themselves to Jakarta-based solutions. Indeed, once Indonesia decentralized there was an 

accompanying decline in local, supposedly ‘‘religious’’ and ‘‘ethnic’’ conflict. While 

such a decline in conflict may be coincidental, it is more likely because of the brilliance of a democratic Indonesia devolving problem-solving to local communities. 

Second, much of the basic structure of a modern state was already in place. The 

New Order bore the structure and language of a democratic state—such as regularized elections—but not the content. And, somehow, citizens knew what was missing. 

Third, rhetoric matters. During the New Order the government never ceased to 

use the language and institutions of democracy—representation, peoples’ sovereignty, legislatures, elections, rule of law, courts, and the constitution—to buttress 

its legitimacy. But precisely because under the New Order Indonesia remained a 

relatively open society, with access to information, mass media, and even entertainment from around the world, citizens knew what a democracy should look like and 

how a democracy should be implemented. The first nationwide survey of Indonesian 

understanding of democracy in 1999—it was conducted by The Asia Foundation—

showed that citizens had a remarkably well-informed view of what values constituted a democratic state, and which parts were lacking in Indonesia. Similarly, 

in 2001 in the first-ever nation-wide survey of citizen attitudes towards the judiciary 

and police, also conducted by the Foundation, we also saw that citizens knew how 

police should behave and what kind of treatment courts should give citizens. 

These surveys provided a remarkable snapshot of the persistence, and even development, of a ‘‘culture of democracy’’ in Indonesia throughout the New Order. Therefore, when we consider again the question ‘‘Why has Indonesia made such a remarkably swift and peaceful transition to democracy?’’ we must look harder at the New 

Order itself and how it may have, ironically, bequeathed to Indonesia, in part, its 

current democracy. 

Indonesia’s democratization movement did not begin with the fall of the New 

Order. Rather, it began with the overthrow of the Sukarno and those citizens who 

envisioned a country that deserved more than the dictatorship known as ‘‘Guided 

Democracy’’ under Sukarno. Perhaps ironically, Soeharto’s New Order itself, by improving lives through expanded education, improved infrastructure, telecommunications, and better health, gave Indonesians a cushion—thereby allowing Indonesian civil society to plan for the day when Soeharto left the scene. 

One of the lessons of the authoritarian New Order for Indonesia’s new democracy 

may be that ideas matter. Ideas and language and discourse about a democratic Indonesia, born in the struggle against feudalism and against colonial rule and then 

continued against dictatorship and authoritarianism, amply prepared Indonesians to 

flesh out the democratic outline the New Order had, paradoxically, indoctrinated 

into them. 

‘‘Formal’’ politics may have been stilted, repressed and the freedom to mobilize the 

masses severely restricted, but now, well into Indonesia’s new democratic era, we 

can see that repression diverted citizens’ energies, and creativity flowed into areas 

of civic life that were not conspicuously ‘‘political.’’

Religious organizations and civil groups flourished. NGOs under the umbrella of 

Islamic mass organizations were particularly dynamic. Islam in Indonesia began a 

thorough-going theological and social renaissance, in which enormous innovation 

went into re-thinking the role of religion in democratic life, and the relationship between Islam and politics in a pluralist Indonesia. Almost unique in the Muslim 

world, Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and community leaders came to the forefront 

of what later became the democratization movement. The quiet resistance of some 

Muslim organizations to the New Order’s intervention in their affairs established 

these groups and their leaders as key forces for a democratic Indonesia from the 

1980s on. In fact, it was precisely these leaders of Islamic organizations that came 

to play such a critical, reform-oriented role in Indonesia’s new democracy. 

In the foreword to a forthcoming book, Indonesia in the Soeharto Years: Issues, 

Incidents and Images, Goenawan Muhammad states that ‘‘control of community life 

was almost total’’ in the New Order. Indeed, almost. It was in the intellectual, community, civil society, religious, and arts communities that the idea of a better, more 

just, more open, and more democratic Indonesia remained vivid. Thus, when 

Soeharto fell, the nation did not fall. In the New Order the state was perceived to 

have tried to control most, if not all, aspects of national and community life. And 

yet either because the Soeharto regime may have consciously decided not to try to 

control everything, or simply because they tried and failed, the end result was the 

same: the decades of the New Order were highly varied in terms of social and political control, control was never uniform, constant, or total, despite episodes of appalling violence, repression, and restrictions on civil liberties. By the mid-1990s, when 

38

Soeharto was his most powerful, Indonesia boasted over 12,000 active non-governmental organizations, many working since the early 1970s to strengthen community 

development, to improve human rights, to provide legal services to the poor and politically disenfranchised, to protect the environment, and even to monitor elections. 

The arts also flourished and, like religion, became an outlet for political dissent and 

creativity. 

Ironically, the New Order’s obsession with democratic ‘‘structure’’ (if not content), 

democratic language and rhetoric (if not reality), and an unwillingness, or inability, 

to control all aspects of community life, has somehow left Indonesia more stable, 

democratic, and hopeful than could have been imagined just a few years ago. For 

the first time in modern Indonesia’s history, government has been held accountable 

to ordinary citizens, spectacularly so, through peaceful, orderly processes. Indonesia’s severe problems of poor governance, environmental degradation, and poverty 

are the challenges—and opportunities—of a normal nation. The crisis has passed. 

And seven years into Indonesia’s new democracy, Indonesians have surprised the 

naysayers and the analysts, and perhaps even themselves, and emerged as an increasingly self-confident, democratic nation. 

Given this overall context of Indonesia’s relatively rapid transition to a stable democracy, let’s turn to brief overview of how Indonesia is faring under the first four 

months of the Administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Five developments in recent months merit note:

1. The appointment of a reasonably competent cabinet, with some outstanding 

choices, particularly in the justice, politics, and human rights sectors. A 

noted legal aid campaigner and law reform advocate was named as Attorney 

General. And a recognized human rights activist became Minister of Justice 

and Human Rights. A highly respected civilian is now Minister of Defense.

2. The appointment of a professional, competent, reasonably apolitical, trio of 

military service chiefs. There was a clear rejection by the President of the 

more hardline, politicized officers.

3. There is also evidence that the President will make tough, politically unpopular decisions to help reform the economy—seen in his decision to significantly 

reduce fuel subsidies (key to improving the budget and removing distortions 

in the economy) that resulted in a 30% increase in fuel prices.

4. The President and the government appear to have a commitment to an anti 

corruption program—seen in the appointment of the Attorney General, and 

permission of the government to try the Governor of Aceh on corruption 

charges (the prosecution is seeking an eight year sentence);

5. President Yudhoyono has also kept to his campaign commitment to refocus 

attention on Indonesia’s infrastructure and investment needs—and to highlight the need for Indonesia to attract much greater foreign investment.

It is also relevant to take note of how the Indonesian government has responded 

to the December 26th Tsunami, particularly in terms of how Indonesia allowed and 

facilitated immediate and massive international assistance to flow into Aceh—an 

area that has been wracked by conflict for decades, including an on-going insurgency and on-going military operations against it. Despite the massive loss of life 

and destruction in Aceh, the Yudhoyono administration also demonstrated that it 

continues its overall Indonesia-wide development and reform agenda. In other 

words, I believe the government deserves accolades for not focusing solely on Aceh, 

at the expense of other pressing reform issues, particularly related to the economy. 

President Yudhoyono resisted some suggestions from the international community 

to postpone his much-promoted ‘‘infrastructure summit’’ and the annual Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) meeting, of which Indonesia was, for the first time, 

the Host this year. The overall effect: demonstration that this government is competent and professional at managing multiple issues and agendas. 

I know the committee is already deeply aware that the American relief operations 

have also strengthened US-Indonesian bilateral relations—which, as I noted in my 

introduction, were already stable, mature, cordial and mutually beneficial. But there 

was clearly a positive demonstration effect of massive US public and private assistance in Aceh. Indonesians have explicitly noted their appreciation for not only the 

American, but especially the huge five year Australian commitment of one billion 

Australian dollars, as well as other bilateral pledges. 

This disaster also presents an opportunity, to some extent, to resolve the Aceh 

conflict—restating of negotiations with the Free Aceh Movement. The President also 

surprised observers with the appointment of new negotiating team, with Hamid 

Awaluddin, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, and Chief Negotiator, and oversight by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security affairs, retired Admiral 

39

Widodo. It is a fresh team, hopefully bringing new approaches and style to the negotiations. 

In conclusion, and returning to the overall theme of Indonesia’s successful democratization—I would also like to emphasize that, although Indonesia democratized 

because of widespread Indonesian political will and commitment, U.S. development 

assistance, much of it in collaboration with The Asia Foundation, has also made a 

difference and has been important in Indonesia’s democratic transition. 

Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a country where the U.S. has gotten it right—In other 

words, through assistance to build democracy starting in the 1980s, a full decade 

before Soeharto fell, the United States invested in organizations—many of them Islamic organizations—and individuals who have since become the leaders of today’s 

democratic Indonesia. It is a record and a relationship to be proud of. 

Thank you.

Douglas E. Ramage has been The Asia Foundation Representative to Indonesia since 

1996. The author of Politics in Indonesia: Islam Democracy and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995 Second Edition 1997), Ramage first came to Indonesia as student in 1983 and has lived and worked in Indonesia for over twelve 

years.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Dr. Ramage. 

Mr. McWilliams? 

STATEMENT OF MR. EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK AND FORMER 

POLITICAL COUNSELOR WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY, JAKARTA 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity 

to talk to the Committee and to the people in the room about the 

situation in Indonesia. 

Essentially, you have heard the good news and I am afraid by 

virtue of the topic I have been assigned to talk about, that is, 

human rights, this is the bad news. 

We have in Indonesia a new Government, a fragile, fledgling 

Government that unfortunately is not prepared and not capable of 

defending fully the fundamental human rights of their own people. 

The principal menace to those fundamental human rights and also 

to this Government is posed by essentially the Indonesian military. 

The U.S. State Department in its annual Human Rights Report

described the military force, and I would just quote as follows from 

that report:

‘‘Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat and 

arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements especially in Aceh and Papua. Retired and active duty 

military officers known to have committed serious human 

rights violations occupied or were promoted to senior positions 

in the government and in the TNI.’’

The Indonesian military operates a huge bureaucratic infrastructure that reaches from the central Government down to the village 

level. It is essentially a shadow government that challenges the civilian infrastructure at all levels. 

The Indonesian military also operates a vast business empire 

which includes many illegal businesses, to include drug trafficking, 

extortion of foreign firms and also domestic firms, prostitution 

rings, illegal trafficking in timber and endangered species and also 

human trafficking. 

The Indonesian military uses this very large business enterprise 

and specifically the income from it to provide funding for over 75 

percent of its budgeting on an annual basis. This income enables 

40

it to avoid the controls of civilian budgetary advisors and implementers. 

Defense Minister Sudarsono, who has no effective power over the 

Indonesian military, recently said very candidly, ‘‘The military retains the real levers of power. From the political point of view, the 

military remains the fulcrum in Indonesia.’’

Over the last decade or more, the U.S. Congress, recognizing the 

situation regarding human rights in Indonesia, has imposed very 

severe restrictions on our capacity to work the Indonesian military. 

Originally, the concern was raised by an incident in 1991 when the 

Indonesian military in East Timor slaughtered over 270 peaceful 

demonstrators. Since that time, the conditionality that has been 

imposed by the Congress, and I might say under bipartisan consensus, has been extended. 

In 1999, as was mentioned earlier, the Indonesian military and 

its militias responded to a vote by the people of East Timor for 

independence by slaughtering over 1,400 East Timorese, forcefully 

displacing 250,000 of them from their homes and destroying 70 to 

75 percent of the infrastructure of that small country. 

In recent years, while conditionality has remained in place on 

FMF and other matters of relationships between our two militaries, 

IMET conditionality has been reduced to a single condition. 

In 2002, as has been mentioned earlier today, a small group of 

American teachers were attacked by people still unknown on a 

militarily-secured road in Timika in West Papua. Two American 

citizens were killed, also one Indonesian citizen was killed, and 

eight Americans were wounded. 

Reacting to the very slow cooperation on the part of the Indonesian Government with the FBI, the Congress imposed a requirement that before IMET could be extended to the Indonesian military, the Secretary of State would have to certify that cooperation 

had improved. And indeed there was full cooperation between the 

Indonesian Government, military and our FBI. 

On February 26th, Secretary Rice actually offered that certification. 

With due respect, sir, I would say that that certification is bogus. 

In point of fact, the Indonesian cooperation has been inadequate 

and, in fact, we can speak of obstruction in terms of the Indonesian 

reaction to that investigation. For example, in 2004, a United 

States grand jury indicted one single Indonesian individual for the 

attack in Timika in 2002. The Indonesians for their part, however, 

have not indicted anyone at all and indeed specifically have not indicted the Indonesian that our courts indicted; moreover, they have 

not even detained this one individual. 

In addition, the Indonesians have delayed for 8 months the return of the FBI team to Indonesia to conduct its investigations into 

this murder which is still unresolved. 

I think also it is important to note, sir, that the TNI has itself 

been alleged to be involved in that murder. Indeed, the initial Indonesian police investigation pointed to the TNI as being involved in 

the murder. 

I would also note, sir, that we have a situation in which the TNI, 

according to recent evidence supplied to the Administration, was 

actually directly related to the one indicted individual. 

41

This growing embrace of the TNI by the U.S. Administration ignores other realities, specifically, ongoing human rights depredations in Indonesia. 

Congressman Faleomavaega spoke eloquently earlier about what 

is going on in West Papua, where military operations since last 

summer have forced thousands of civilians into the forests. Their 

villages have been burned, their stocks destroyed, their livelihood 

basically destroyed. Moreover, it has been impossible for church organizations and other human rights organizations to get assistance 

in to these people because of the travel ban imposed by the military. 

In Aceh, where Secretary Huhtala has said that basically they 

have had an admirable performance, the TNI in fact has a very bad 

record. As you probably know, for the last three decades, they have 

run a military operation which has cost the lives of over 12,000 

Acehnese. Many people thought in the wake of the tsunami that 

there would be a chance to basically get to a more peaceful resolution of the conflict between GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, and 

the Indonesian military. Unfortunately, the Indonesian military, 

despite calls from President Bambang Yudhoyono for a cease-fire, 

have continued military operations. This is a continuing problem in 

Aceh. 

I would also like to speak very briefly, sir, about the notion that 

the United States would like to seek from the TNI a partnership 

in the war on terror. It is important that we understand the Indonesian military has been directly involved in terrorizing and intimidating its own population. This has been in part through the formation of militias and more recently essentially Islamic fundamentalist militias who have been direct participants in fighting in 

places like Maluku and Centra Sulawesi, where in the last few 

years thousands of people have died. 

It raises the question of whether a military such as the TNI that 

has been directly involved with terrorist militias, such as Laskar 

Jihad and Laskar Mujahideen in Indonesia, would make worthwhile partners for the United States. 

I would say in conclusion, sir, that it is important to understand 

that the Indonesian people themselves, despite this backdrop of terror and intimidation, have shown great courage in basically confronting the corrupt and often undemocratic elements in their own 

society and in the military, but this courage has had its costs. A 

number of human rights advocates, perhaps the most prominent of 

them being Munir, have been killed for their efforts. Munir was 

poisoned with arsenic back in September of this past year. Another 

individual, Jafar Siddiq, known to many people in this room, who 

was actually a U.S. permanent resident, returned to Aceh to fight 

for human rights in 2000. He was kidnapped, tortured and murdered. Both for Munir and for Jafar and for 12 other human rights 

advocates who have been killed since 2000, there has been no justice. There have been no prosecutions, no one has been detained in 

any of these incidents. 

I would recommend very shortly, sir, that we continue to speak 

out against intimidation of these human rights activists. I would 

also suggest, sir, that the United States should demand full accountability for the TNI, that we should encourage the Government 

42

to deal with grievances of the people of Aceh and West Papua and 

other areas through dialogue, rather than resort to the use of military. We should continue with our restrictions on FMF, and I 

would strongly recommend that we reinstate the ban on IMET for 

2006. 

Thank you for your attention, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McWilliams follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK AND FORMER POLITICAL COUNSELOR WITH THE

U.S. EMBASSY, JAKARTA

THE INDONESIAN MILITARY’S THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

The Annual Human Rights Report regarding Indonesia, recently released by the 

State Department accurately portrays the Indonesia as a fragile, fledgling democracy whose government is not yet capable of protecting the fundamental human 

rights of its people. As documented clearly in the State Department’s report, the 

principal menace to those rights and to that fledgling democratic government itself 

is a rogue institution with vast wealth and power that has committed crimes 

against humanity and perhaps genocide and which remains unaccountable. 

That institution, the Indonesian military, recently saw its stature dangerously enhanced by a decision of the U.S. administration to end a bipartisan Congressionally 

imposed sanction against the military, imposed over a decade ago. 

The decision, announced by Secretary of State Rice, restored International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to the Indonesian military. The 

Congress banned that assistance in 1992 in response to the military’s murder of 276 

peaceful demonstrators in East Timor. The Congress reinforced the ban in 1999 in 

response to the military’s ravaging of East Timor following the Timorese people’s 

courageous vote for freedom. In 2004, the Congress narrowed the ban to a single 

condition. It required that the State Department certify that the Indonesian government and military were cooperating in an FBI investigation of an August 31, 2002 

assault on a group of U.S. citizens at the Freeport copper and gold mine in West 

Papua that saw two U.S. citizens killed and eight wounded. 

Dr. Rice’s February 26 certification that the Indonesians were cooperating manifestly misrepresents the obstructions and malign inaction of the Indonesian side 

with regards to that investigation. Contrary to the State Department’s contention 

that the Indonesian side is ‘‘cooperating,’’ the Indonesians have failed to bring 

charges against or even detain the one individual indicted by a U.S. grand jury in 

the attack. Moreover, for over eight months it has stalled a return of the FBI team 

to Indonesia to continue its investigation. 

This Indonesian obstruction of the FBI investigation is possibly explained by indications that the Indonesian military itself was involved in the attack. The initial 

Indonesian police report, as well as reports by independent researchers, journalists 

and others, all point to military involvement. Recently, evidence of ties between the 

one indicted individual and the military was provided to the FBI and the State Department. Moreover, the military’s presentation of false evidence and subsequent 

military threats and intimidation targeting those Indonesian human rights advocates who had assisted the FBI also suggest the military’s culpability. 

Ms. Patsy Spier who was wounded and widowed in the attack has asked me to 

share with you her concern about the importance of genuine Indonesian cooperation 

in the investigation: 

‘‘The investigation into the Timika Ambush, a terror attack, is completely in 

Americans interest. Two American citizens who were working in Indonesia for an 

American company were murdered on a secure road. The ambush lasted from 35 

to 45 minutes before help came. The eight Americans wounded were American citizens working in Indonesia (the eighth American being a 6 year old girl). The investigation, and cooperation needed, is in Americans interest to assure the safety of the 

other thousands of Americans working and living in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities must cooperate fully with our US investigators. American companies working, and thinking of working, in Indonesia must be assured that the murder of 

Americans is taken seriously by the Indonesian Government . . . and cooperating 

with our investigators would show that.’’

In addition to being indefensible on the basis of the ‘‘cooperation’’ criterion established by the Congress, the decision was also a practical blunder. Restoration of 

IMET assistance removes the only leverage available to the U.S. to press for the 

43

genuine Indonesian cooperation essential to a successful completion of the FBI’s investigation. 

On the basis of this erroneous certification alone, the Congress should restore the 

ban on IMET in FY2006. It is also imperative that the Congress maintain the ban 

on FMF for the Indonesian military which remains in place despite the restoration 

of IMET. 

But there are broader issues in play than even the critical matter of ensuring justice in this case of murdered and wounded U.S. citizens. 

The restoration of IMET dangerously conveys to the Indonesian military that 

long-standing U.S. concerns about its notorious and continuing human rights 

abuses, its threats to its neighbors, illegal business empire and its impunity in committing these acts is no longer on the U.S. agenda. Such a U.S. exoneration of the 

Indonesian military removes a well-founded international censure that has given Indonesian government and civil society members the political space to press for reform of that notorious institution. It is not surprising that leading Indonesian 

human rights activists reacted with dismay to the U.S. action. 

The notorious record of the Indonesian military is well documented by reliable reporting of well-respected human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Tapol as well as in the State Department’s Annual 

Human Rights Reports. Therefore, I will only summarize that record here and then 

focus the rest of my remarks on the current activity of the Indonesian military, specifically its ongoing abuse of human rights, its involvement in a broad range of 

criminal enterprises, its contempt for and threat to democratic institutions and its 

unaccountability. 

In 1965–68 the Indonesian military engineered the slaughter of more than a half 

million Indonesians whom it alleged had been involved in a ‘‘coup’’ against the sitting President Soekarno. Employing a tactic it would resort to again in the current 

period, the Indonesian military allied itself with Islamic forces that did much of the 

actual killing. The Soeharto regime which rose to power as a consequence of the 

coup and which directed the massive killings sought to justify them in U.S. and 

western eyes by labeling the victims as ‘‘communists.’’

Following the Indonesian military’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, an estimated 

200,000 East Timorese, one quarter of the population, died as a consequence of living conditions in TNI-organized re-location camps or as direct victims of Indonesian 

security force violence. 

In West Papua, it is estimated that over 100,000 Papuans died in the years following the forced annexation of West Papua under a fraudulent ‘‘Act of Free 

Choice,’’ perpetrated by the Soeharto regime in 1969. An April 2004 study by the 

Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at the Yale Law School 

concluded that the atrocities in West Papua are ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and may 

constitute genocide. 

In Aceh, over 12,000 civilians have fallen victim to military operations that have 

included mass sweeps and forced relocations. These operations, almost constantly 

since the late 1970’s, have entailed brutal treatment of civilians including extra judicial killings, rape, torture and beatings. While the military’s quarry in these attacks, the pro-independence Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM has also been responsible for human rights abuses, the State Department’s Annual Human Rights reports have consistently reported that most of those civilians died at the hands of 

the military. 

Throughout this period, extending from 1965 to the early 1990’s the U.S. military 

maintained a close relationship with the Indonesian military, providing training for 

thousands of officers as well as arms. From the late 1970’s to 1992, that training 

included grant assistance under IMET. The arms provided by the U.S. were employed by the Indonesian military not against foreign foes (the Indonesian military 

has never confronted a foreign foe except for brief clashes with the Dutch in West 

Papua) but rather against their own people. In the 70’s and 80’s, U.S.-provided OV–

10 Broncos bombed villages in East Timor and in West Papua. Military offensives 

conceived and directed by IMET-trained officers against usually miniscule resistance 

caused thousands of civilian deaths. 

Even with the end of the cold war, the U.S. embrace of the dictator Soeharto and 

his military continued as if U.S. policy were on auto pilot. That relationship endured 

largely unquestioned until 1991 when the Indonesian military was caught on film 

by U.S. journalists slaughtering peaceful East Timorese demonstrators. The murder 

of over 270 East Timorese youth by Indonesian soldiers bearing U.S.-provided M–

16’s so shocked the U.S. Congress that in 1992 it imposed tight restrictions on further U.S. military-to-military aid, including training for the Indonesian military. 

Since the imposition of those restrictions various U.S. Administrations, with the 

support of non-governmental organizations bankrolled by U.S. corporations with 

44

major interests in Indonesia have sought to expand military to military ties. Those 

efforts were accompanied by claims that the Indonesian military had reformed or 

was on a reform course. 

Claims of Indonesian military reform were confounded in 1999, when, following 

an overwhelming vote by East Timorese for independence from Indonesia, the Indonesian military and its militia proxies devastated the tiny half island. U.N. and 

other international observers were unable to prevent the killing of over 1,500 East 

Timorese, the forced relocation of over 250,000 and the destruction of over 70 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure. The Indonesian justice system has failed to hold 

a single military, police or civil official responsible for the mayhem. That failure to 

render justice demonstrated that even when confronted by unanimous international 

condemnation, the Indonesian military remained unaccountable. 

Moreover, TNI abuse of human rights is not a matter only of history. Indonesian 

military operations that began in mid-2004 in West Papua continue. Burning villages and destroying food sources, the Indonesian military has forced thousands of 

villagers into the forests where many are dying for lack of food and medicine. A government ban on travel to the region by journalists and even West Papuan senior 

church leaders has limited international awareness of this tragedy. More critically, 

the ban has prevented Papuan church leaders and others from distributing humanitarian relief to the thousands forced into the forests. A similar campaign in West 

Papua in the late 1990s led to the death of hundreds of civilians who did not survive 

their forced sojourn in the deep jungles of West Papua. 

The recent devastating Indian Ocean tsunami turned international attention to 

Aceh, another primary arena in which the Indonesian military continues a brutal 

military campaign. Notwithstanding calls by President Yudhoyono for a ceasefire 

and declaration by GAM of unilateral ceasefire the Indonesian military has continued to conduct operations. These operations jeopardize relief operations and will 

likely stall rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both GAM and the Government appear to be genuinely pursuing a settlement through talks organized by former Finish President Martti Atahisaari. But as the former Finnish President has emphasized, to be successful, both sides must act with restraint in the field. With boasts 

that it has killed over 230 GAM members since the tsunami struck, the TNI clearly 

is not acting with restraint. 

Throughout the Soeharto period (1965–1998) critics and dissenters generally were 

not tolerated. Despite the genuine democratic progress made since the fall of the 

Soeharto dictatorships, critics of the military and those whom the Indonesian military regard as enemies are in grave jeopardy. Reflecting the Indonesian military’s 

power in ‘‘democratic’’ Indonesia, those critics who meet untimely ends are often the 

most prominent. Indonesia’s leading human rights advocate, Munir, a prominent 

critic of the Indonesian military died of arsenic poisoning in 2004. An independent 

investigation authorized by the Indonesian President has uncovered evidence of 

Government involvement in this murder. In recent years Jafar Siddiq, a U.S. green 

card holder who was in Aceh demanding justice for Achenese suffering military 

abuse was himself tortured and murdered. Theys Eluay, the leading nonviolent Papuan proponent of Papuan self-determination was abducted and strangled to death. 

In a rare trial of military officials, his Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) killers 

received sentences ranging up to three and one half years. Yet Army Chief of Staff, 

Ryamazad Ryacudu publicly described the murderers as ‘‘heroes.’’ Farid Faquih, a 

leading anti-corruption campaigner who has targeted military and other government 

malfeasance recently was badly beaten in Aceh by military officers as he sought to 

monitor tsunami aid distribution. He was arrested and is now facing charges of 

theft of the assistance he was monitoring. Papuan human rights advocates who supported FBI investigations of the U.S. citizens murdered in 2002 in West Papua are 

under continuing intimidation by the military and were sued by the regional military commander. 

More generally, the Indonesian military poses a threat to the fledgling democratic 

experiment in Indonesia. It receives over 70 percent of its budget from legal and 

illegal businesses and as a result is not under direct budget control by the civilian 

president or the parliament. Its vast wealth derives from numerous activities, including many illegal ones that include extortion, prostitution rings, drug running, 

illegal logging and other exploitation of Indonesia’s great natural resources, and as 

charged in a recent Voice of Australia broadcast (August 2, 2004), human trafficking. With its great institutional wealth it maintains a bureaucratic structure 

that functions as a shadow government paralleling the civil administration structure from the central level down to sub-district and even village level. 

There are also reasons why many of us should be directly concerned about the 

TNI’s lawlessness. As investors—through our pension and mutual funds—our hardearned wealth is invested with U.S.-based corporations: ExxonMobil and Freeport 

45

McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc., among others—that are subject to extortion of ‘‘protection money’’ from the TNI for their Indonesian operations. Recognizing the 

reputational risks and potential and actual shareholder liabilities resulting from 

these financial relationships between U.S. companies and the TNI, institutional investors including all of New York City’s employee pension funds have brought 

shareholder resolutions this year calling on Freeport and ExxonMobil management 

to review and report to shareholders about the risks associated with corporate ties 

to the TNI. In short, investors should be concerned, too, about the TNI’s human 

rights record and the implications for the bottom line. 

For much of the last decade, advocates of closer ties between the Indonesian military and the U.S. military have contended that a warmer U.S. embrace entailing 

training programs and education courses for TNI officers could expose them to 

democratic ideals and afford a professional military perspective. This argument ignores the decades of close U.S.—Indonesian military ties extending from the 1960’s 

to the early 1990’s when U.S. training was provided to over 8,000 Indonesian military officers. This 30-year period also encompasses the period when the Indonesian 

military committed some of its gravest atrocities and when a culture of impunity 

became ingrained. 

The argument for reform through engagement also ignores the fact that the U.S. 

Defense Department already maintains extensive ties and channels for assistance 

under the guise of ‘‘conferences’’ and joint operations billed as humanitarian or security-related. 

In the wake of 9/11, proponents of restored U.S.-Indonesian military ties have also 

argued that the U.S. needs the Indonesian military as a partner in the war on terrorism. This argument overlooks the Indonesian military’s close ties to and support 

for domestic fundamentalist Islamic terror groups, including the Laskar Mujahidin 

and Front for the Defense of Islam. The Laskar Jihad militia, which the Indonesian 

military helped form and train, engaged in a savage communal war in the Maluku 

Islands in the years 2000 to 2002 that left thousands dead. Many thousands more 

died in Central Sulawesi in the same period, in fighting that involved militias with 

security force ties. 

Absent tangible evidence of Indonesian military action to curb abuses, to allow 

itself to be held accountable, to end corruption, to submit itself to civilian rule and 

to end its sponsorship of terrorist militias, the Indonesian military should be seen 

for what it is: a rogue institution that directly threatens democracy in Indonesia. 

Existing restrictions on military-to-military ties between the United States and Indonesia must remain in place, conditionality should be strengthened and the IMET 

ban reinstated in FY 2006. 

Finally, a word about the future. The Indonesian people, Indonesian non-governmental organizations, the Indonesian media and individual Indonesians have demonstrated great courage in standing up to the intimidation of entrenched corrupt interests in their society and most especially its security forces to demand their right 

to live in a democratic society. The brave students who rallied in the streets in 1998 

wrought a revolution, though since that historic victory, entrenched undemocratic 

elements have sought to undo reforms. Sadly, in some parts of Indonesia the 1998 

reforms have had little meaning. The military, often employing terrorist militias, 

have most brutally repressed the popular struggle for reform in Aceh, West Papua 

and the Maluku Islands. It is vital that the central government engage civil society 

in these areas in peaceful dialogue and, in order to make such a dialogue viable, 

demilitarize those areas. 

The U.S. should encourage reform and peaceful dialogue where it can. It should 

encourage the Government to enforce worker rights, to make far more serious efforts and to end injurious exploitation of child labor and human trafficking. The 

U.S. should encourage the Indonesian Government to pass legislation implementing 

the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 

Women. The U.S. should also urge an end to intimidation of journalists through 

physical threat and intimidation through misuse of the courts. Moreover, the U.S. 

Government should itself recognize the importance of social, economic and cultural 

rights and encourage the Government of Indonesia to pursue development strategies 

that address the urgent health, education and shelter needs of the poor. 

But direct U.S. involvement in Indonesian affairs would be unwelcome and most 

likely ineffective. Critical questions such as the role of Islam in modern Indonesia 

and the shape and character of its economy are for Indonesians to decide. The most 

pro-active course for the U.S. at this time is to step back from its growing embrace 

of the Indonesian military that remains the gravest threat to democracy and human 

rights throughout the archipelago.

Mr. LEACH. I want to thank you all for your excellent testimony. 

46

Let me just begin with you, Mr. McWilliams, because you are the 

last. I think everyone recognizes a historical problem with Indonesian human rights. Is there any barometer that you can provide 

of whether since the election of the new President there has been 

improvement or would you say that it is static or would you say 

it has gone backwards? How would you assess this? 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. I think, sir, that there is hope for improvement, hope in the sense that from all accounts Bambang 

Yudhoyono is a thoughtful man who is devoted to reform. He has 

appointed men like Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, who has 

a very good reputation. The new potential chief of the armed forces 

or at least chief of the army, Joko Santoso from Maluku, is actually 

reported to be a relatively good military officer. 

The problem is at this point there is no indication that the President or his Defense Minister are going to be able to control the 

TNI. And until some mechanism is established whereby they can 

control the TNI, I am not sure that human rights will improve significantly in Indonesian. 

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Ramage or Ambassador La Porta, would you like 

to comment on that? 

The perspective I want to raise is not the understood one, that 

we have had great difficulties in the past, but where are we today 

and what are the prospects for the immediate future? 

Mr. LA PORTA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think that I would like to 

just pick up from where Mr. McWilliams left off in the sense that 

I believe that the election of SBY, the appointment of the officials 

that he has mentioned and indeed some initial indications of what 

is happening in the defense ministry in terms of asserting control, 

will eventually lead to an amelioration of a lot of the difficulties 

that have been mentioned. 

It seems to me that building up the civilian defense capabilities, 

encouraging greater public dialogue, NGO involvement, supporting 

civil society institutions, getting the military justice system right—

it is a little known fact that last September the military justice system was placed under the Supreme Court. People tend to overlook 

that, but there is an opportunity there in making the civil structure and the military structure mesh. 

I think also there is a great deal of work to be done in creating 

instruments of civilian control, including the establishment of the 

national defense council that is already provided in law, as well as 

fulfilling the terms of the current defense law which provides for 

greater transparency and the eventual shift of military-run businesses to privatized status, let us say. 

On the other hand, I think that it is true that a lot of the indiscipline, corruption in the military and a lot of the local level abuses 

are there to be dealt with, but that can only be done by strengthening the hands of the civilian leadership. 

It is also worth noting that there has been some progress. In 

Aceh, for example, at least a dozen military cadres have been tried 

or disciplined for alleged abuses. I cannot give you all the details, 

but there is at least an awareness of those issues. 

Mr. LEACH. Do you share the judgment on IMET? 

Mr. LA PORTA. In terms of maintaining restrictions? I do not. It 

is in my view very clear that we have to remove both the psychoVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
47

logical and real impact of the IMET restrictions by joining in a new 

and collaborative arrangement with the Indonesians to retrain 

their officer corps, give them the exposure that they have been, basically, denied during the past more than a decade, 13 years I 

think. I think the military has to join the ranks of democratic military forces in Asia. They have to get it right on disaster management, which is not something that they have heretofore paid attention to, and the United States has a very important role to play in 

those respects in terms of improving their capabilities as well as 

improving transparency and respect for human rights. 

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Ramage, would you want to comment on the 

same? 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. I wonder if I could just make a brief response. 

Mr. LEACH. Yes, you may, Mr. McWilliams. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. I think we have heard from several of the participants today the concept that perhaps exposure to IMET training 

would in some manner help reform the Indonesian military. It is 

important that we remember that the Indonesian military had decades of contact with IMET. Moreover, they have even today a very 

extensive relationship with the U.S. military through anti-terror 

training programs and so on. 

I think the notion that somehow by exposure to U.S. techniques 

in combat skills, for example, they would become more of a reformed institution is not realistic. Again, just holding out for evidence the fact that they had decades of exposure to U.S. IMET, for 

example, and there was no significant improvement in their performance through the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

To my colleague, Eni, we are going to lead a congressional rugby 

team over there. Please, go ahead. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies, I 

was taken away necessarily for another meeting, but I want to 

thank the members of our panel for testifying this afternoon and 

I suppose I can ask some questions based on my earlier discussions 

with Secretary Huhtala. 

Back to the issue of the Indonesian military. I know Mr. La 

Porta is supportive of this idea that we provide the military training for this. 

Do you think that providing this military training, Mr. La Porta, 

is going to help the Indonesian military even better? In what respect? 

Mr. LA PORTA. Mr. Congressman, I think that the IMET is only 

one part of the puzzle because there are a number of instruments 

or tools, as Assistant Secretary Huhtala mentioned. There is IMET, 

enhanced IMET, which is aimed at upgrading skills for peacekeeping purposes, as well as foreign military financing. 

IMET itself is not going to solve the problem or provide the scope 

of training, retraining, and other things that are required. Basically a 5-year crash program to retrain captains, majors, lieutenant 

colonels, in not only combat skills but other kinds of skills, including management and logistics, and also humanitarian and other 

things done by today’s military forces and international standards 

of conduct and professionalism, I think, will have a positive effect. 

48

Basically, we have excluded a generation of military officers from 

this kind of training and it is time to get back in and help them 

do the job that the civilian leaders, the Government of President 

SBY wants them to do. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It seems to me that you had mentioned 

something about management training. The process that you have 

indicated is that we have excluded a generation of military officers 

from training. However, it seems to me that we have done such a 

good job, and one reason why the Indonesian military has such a 

good control of the economy and the businesses, is in my humble 

opinion perhaps it has no business being involved in that aspect. 

Which again, as I had asked Secretary Huhtala, to what extent, 

how pervasive is the Indonesian military’s involvement with the 

economy and the businesses that are currently being operated out 

of Indonesia? My guess, Mr. La Porta, is very extensive. I would 

say not necessarily for military purposes, but there seems to be a 

network on how the military officers not necessarily shooting and 

firing, but doing it from an economic point of view where the structure is still in tight format. You do not have to shoot a person, but 

certainly can squeeze them when it comes to economic opportunities and that is the reason why there was the need for the question 

that I raised earlier. Are you aware of how extensive is the Indonesian military’s involvement with the businesses? 

I understand the mining and the companies that currently operate out of West Papua, New Guinea by Australian and United 

States companies, are the largest corporate taxpayers in the Indonesian Government today. My curiosity also raises another question as to what extent are those mining operations also controlled 

by the Indonesian military? 

Mr. LA PORTA. Mr. Congressman, I think on the very last point, 

I do not think there is any evidence that those mining operations 

are controlled by the Indonesian military. I think that it is well 

known that for almost all economic facilities in Indonesia, the military does provide security and is compensated for that. But on the 

other hand, I myself have served in Embassies where we basically 

hired local police or local paramilitary forces to protect our diplomatic installations and have provided funds to do that. So it seems 

to me that the TNI, the Indonesian armed forces, are what is there 

and right now they have the capabilities. 

I think it is important to look at the civil security aspects as a 

process whereby, if there is an effort to build up the police, the Indonesian armed forces’ role in internal security and ordinary civilian security functions would be expected to decrease. But right 

now, the police are nowhere able to provide the extent of security 

that they should. 

On the other areas, military-run businesses, I am not aware of 

any data or any really good estimates as to the overall economic 

value of military-run businesses. I do not think there have been 

any systematic studies, although my friend, Mr. Ramage, might be 

aware of some. 

What we do know is that a lot of the military-run businesses 

have not necessarily been the most successful in terms of simply 

generating profits. Rather, they have been more—as they were 

originally started out to be in the late 1960s and early 1970s—to 

49

be military cooperatives that gradually expanded into running hotels and running local transportation or whatever. But it is the 

clear intent of the Indonesian law to bring those military-run businesses under national control and I think that is the important 

thing. I would submit that not only the United States but other 

friendly governments and the World Bank should help to encourage 

this process in various ways. 

With regard to illegal activity and abuses, I would be the last 

person sitting before you, Mr. Congressman, Mr. Chairman, to 

argue for impunity. There should be no impunity and I would be 

the last person to do that. I think there has to be accountability 

but I think now is the time to join with the Government to help 

improve the processes, to mitigate the problems that do occur, to 

bring the military forces under effective civilian oversight and control and to establish the kind of structures where you have effective 

command and control that reaches down to the lowest levels. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Ramage? 

Mr. RAMAGE. The only thing I would like to add relates to the 

Indonesian police. I think it bears underlining that the Indonesian 

police were separated from the armed forces 4 years ago and that 

began quite a dramatic divergence in their functions. The Indonesian police are increasingly focused on providing better services 

in their communities. There are some terrific statistics already 

available to suggest that the Indonesian police, by adopting a community-oriented policing approach in central Java, has reduced 

crime by 25 percent in the city of Yogyakarata. This is great news 

and it is tangible. These are also programs supported by the 

United States. 

The Indonesian police have also been rather successful in reducing the levels of force that they use in controlling demonstrations, 

for example. There was a time, and we all know it, when the Indonesian police would fire indiscriminately into a crowd to control a 

demonstration or a riot and that has not happened for a number 

of years, if I am not mistaken. And it is directly attributed to training that is provided by primarily the United States and Japan in 

terms of levels of force, how to handle crowd control and things like 

this. 

So I think that in our discussions of the Indonesian armed forces, 

that we make some of these distinctions between the police, which 

are reforming, I would say, at a rather rapid clip, although they 

are coming from an extremely low base. I would endorse what the 

Ambassador said, that I believe with the police, as with the military, the reform trajectory is heading in the right direction, but 

from a very low base. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. If I could just speak briefly on two things that 

were raised by my colleagues here, one about impunity and the 

other about extortion. With regards to impunity for the military, 

yes, we are in a new era, hopefully, but nonetheless, on Monday, 

the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Tono Suratman, 

Brigadier General Tono Suratman. He was the 17th official to be 

charged with responsibility for the mayhem in East Timor in 1999. 

All 17 of those who were charged have been released. No one has 

served any time in jail, not a day in jail, for the crimes of East 

Timor in 1999. 

50

I would also like to describe, in a little different way, the relationship between the military and the Freeport operation in Papua, 

this very large gold mine you discussed earlier. 

In 1996, when I was there, the Indonesian military felt they 

needed more money from Freeport, so they organized a demonstration. It was violent and one person died in that demonstration and 

they got the money. This is the nature of the relationship as it was 

then and it has continued now in many ways. So I think we should 

not think about the Indonesian military as simply providing security. This is a force that actually extorts from U.S. and other foreign companies. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am not going to repeat with Mr. La Porta 

and Mr. Ramage what we have already discussed with Secretary 

Huhtala. 

I think this is just something that we will have to continue looking into, Mr. Chairman, and I do have very strong feelings about 

the fact of the issue of West Papua, New Guinea. It is not a closed 

book. It is my sincere hope that in the coming weeks and months 

that more will come out of this as far as bringing it to the forefront 

and hopefully that the people of West Papua will be given their 

right of self-determination, just as the United Nations has given 

the same opportunity and privilege to the people of East Timor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Eni. 

If I could turn to another question——

Ambassador La Porta, do you want to respond? 

Mr. LA PORTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just add a 

point. Several months ago, after the spate of decisions on dismissing cases and so forth against military people accused of various abuses, USINDO provided travel grants to two civilian researchers—I don’t know these people, I do not know their qualifications—to go to Indonesia to conduct a wide range of interviews 

with prosecutors, with judges, and other officials there. 

Their conclusions were that the judges we spoke to, this is their 

words, were very candid about their lack of expertise in international human rights law. The problem was that most of the career judges had no training in international law and that the ad 

hoc judges, while academic experts, had never been judges. 

The prosecutors did not present strong enough cases and, while 

there were obviously some cases of pressure where the judges and 

the prosecutors said that their decisions had more to do with the 

lack of training than political interference, they admitted that 

there needed to be a strengthening of the rule of law in the judiciary but did not believe that an international legal process was required in order for justice to be rendered to the victims in East 

Timor. 

The results of this research have not yet been published, to the 

extent I am aware, but that was their report to us based on the 

work that we supported. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. 

I would like to just turn to one last subject and particularly to 

Dr. Ramage. I have always been intrigued that Indonesia is the 

one country in the world of significance that is making a defined 

central Government effort for decentralization. I think that is a 

51

very profound thought. And I would like to ask a couple of questions related to it. One, there are some that argue that this is the 

one hope to bring some sort of resolution in the Aceh region, that 

if you can implement what is a defined goal of the central Government for greater decentralization, if you can define this further in 

a little bit of regional autonomy kinds of terms, that that might 

have some prospect for making all sides come to an agreement. 

The other is just decentralization in general, and you have apparently some definitional issues in Papua and going back and 

forth on just how to proceed, but just as a Member of Congress, I 

will tell you I have often thought that a decentralized democracy 

might fit a country like China better than many might suspect. Is 

there any aspect of the Indonesian model that might be of interest 

to a greater China? 

But let me first ask you about decentralization and how it is 

working in Indonesia. What is the commitment of the Government? 

What is the tone in which people talk about it, and is it in the 

framework of accountability at local levels in ways that are a little 

bit implicit in the American system? And I will finally conclude, 

when I mention the American system, everybody knows we have a 

‘‘federal system,’’ but one of the lectures I give to my college students and they are always surprised by this is that when we study 

American history and when foreigners study American history the 

one thing we know is that we had separation of powers between 

Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches. The one thing nobody 

thinks about is that we basically quadruplicated this. That is, we 

did the same thing at the State level, the same thing at the city 

levels and at county levels. And so we have four levels of separation of power and so that defines a decentralized mode of operation 

of government in some competition at each level between the 

groupings and then within the groupings. And so that has kind of 

been the American dynamic. 

I just wonder how the discussion has gone on in an Indonesian 

context. 

Mr. RAMAGE. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. In my 

written statement, in fact, I addressed this because I think one of 

the most important reforms in the past several years in Indonesia 

has been the rapid devolution of authorities from the central Government to about 440 or 450 local governments. 

The rationale for decentralization was that Indonesia needed to 

move from one of the most highly centralized States in the world 

to one of the most decentralized in order to preserve the Republic 

of Indonesia. The rationale was that the complaints were against 

Jakarta and abuse from a distant bureaucracy which was not sensitive to local needs. So after the fall of Suharto, the new Government under Habibie had a team of American-educated political scientists, most from the midwest, most with their degrees from 

Northern Illinois University and Iowa State and Ohio, who comprised the team. 

Mr. LEACH. The middle group were the wise ones. 

Mr. RAMAGE. They argued that if you gave authority to basically 

county- and city-level governments, that these units would have a 

greater stake in staying part of Indonesia. If you did not do that, 

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pendent and the republic would unravel and you would indeed 

have Balkanization, the fear that a lot of us had after 1998. 

There was also a sense that you had to locate government at the 

lowest possible level to provide citizens with access to their representatives. And, in fact, the decentralization process, they proceeded with what they call a big bang approach, overnight, 4 years 

ago, they devolved almost all authorities except for foreign affairs 

and finance and trade issues to local authorities. 

What is the result? Over the past several years, the Foundation 

has commissioned a series of rolling assessment of what Indonesians think of decentralization and also importantly how it is 

going. 

The overwhelming reaction from both citizens throughout Indonesia at the district level, at the local level, as well as bureaucrats 

at the local level, is that people now know where the buck stops. 

This is what people say again and again and again makes most 

sense to them. They know who is responsible for trash collection. 

They know who is responsible for safety and security in their community. They know who is responsible for whether or not the local 

primary school gets rebuilt or not. And this seems to be the biggest 

change and citizens tell us again and again through surveys and 

polling that this is a huge change. 

What has not happened yet is that this new system has not improved services to citizens, but the criticism of it a few years ago 

was that services would dramatically decline, that there would be 

no way that poorly-trained local officials could provide services to 

citizens as good as they got in the Suharto period. Well, the big 

surprise of this is that the level of services has either remained 

constant and in a few areas, a small number of the governments, 

it has actually started to improve. 

I think this is the story of decentralization and this is where all 

the elections are going to happen. 

Ambassador La Porta mentioned that Indonesia in the next 

year—you did not say it, but I will say it this way—it is going to 

be all elections all the time. There will be about 250 elections this 

year, about 150 next year. It is everything from basically what we 

would think of as county executives to mayors, to governors, will 

all be directly elected. And for the first time, they are going to have 

to answer to a relatively small number of constituents as to whether or not they are providing better services or not. And I think that 

is where the trend is in Indonesia and you are going to see a lot 

more accountability in the next several years among Indonesian 

Government at the local level. 

Mr. LEACH. Maybe one of the others can add, what about the 

Aceh issue? Is this hopeful? With regard to decentralization. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. If I could just make a comment about Aceh 

and also West Papua? 

Mr. LEACH. Yes. Of course. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. Doug, I think, has spoken very eloquently and 

very accurately about the whole process of decentralization in Indonesia, but you almost have to think of Aceh and West Papua as 

being fundamentally different. 

In Aceh, of course, you have an ongoing negotiation, essentially 

trying to have the difference between self-government and special 

53

autonomy. Neither term is well defined by either side, so it is very 

unclear where that is going. 

Unfortunately, that discussion is taking place largely between, as 

it has in the past, the militants on both sides, the GAM and basically the TNI-led forces on the other side. What we need to do is 

involve the civil society in those discussions, as I think Ambassador 

La Porta mentioned. 

So there is hope there, but right now, to the extent those talks 

involve everyone else but the people of Aceh, it is not too hopeful 

in that regard. 

I would say on West Papua it is a very different situation. What 

has happened there is, rather than self-government or anything approaching devolution of power from the center to the regions, the 

central Government, against the will of the people of West Papua, 

have started to divide that one province into now two and potentially three or five. This very much violates the interests and the 

will of the people of West Papua. 

Essentially, West Papua is being treated as—forgive me for saying it, but Congressman Faleomavaega said it earlier—almost as a 

colony. 

I recall being in West Papua in one of my early visits there and 

I asked, ‘‘Do you consider yourselves Indonesians?’’ And the West 

Papuans that I was talking to were saying that is not the right 

question. The point is Jakarta does not consider us Indonesians. 

Until Jakarta begins to consider West Papua part of Indonesia and 

gives it the same kinds of powers at the local level that it is now 

giving to the rest of Indonesia, West Papua will always be estranged. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman? May I have——

Mr. LEACH. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry. 

Mr. LEACH. Please. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I just got inspired after hearing from Ambassador La Porta, Dr. Ramage and Mr. McWilliams. 

Mr. LEACH. The gentleman is recognized for an inspiration. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McWilliams, 

you had indicated earlier and there seems to be a desire on the 

part of the Indonesian Government to divide West Papua into three 

separate subdivisions or separate provinces. What does this do to 

the people there in West Papua as far as this new proposal to divide West Papua into subdivisions now? 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. Well, it has already prompted fighting. We 

have had people basically killed over this issue. What you see, basically, are significantly Jakarta interests, essentially economic interests but also military interests that recognize this is a very, very 

rich province and they want to be in a position to control the outflow of natural resources and that is why creating these provinces 

is to their advantage. 

I think another consideration that is very real for the individual 

people of Papua is that with the creation of three new or five new 

provinces, you get three or five new military commands so that in 

addition to the 25,000 troops already in West Papua, you are likely 

to get more. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. 25,000 troops? 

54

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. The 25,000 troops are confronting what the 

military describes as a force of 650 oppositionists. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So this idea of having a police force and 

trading and all of that does not in any way apply to West Papua, 

what has just been shared with us from Dr. Ramage? 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. West Papua is different. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. A few more questions I have—I remember 

meeting with former President Magawati when she was here. I was 

very honored by the fact that she invited me to personally come to 

West Papua. Unfortunately, she did not get re-elected, so I do not 

know if President SBY may want me there. But I do very much 

want to know, Mr. McWilliams, in terms of this new autonomy status that the Indonesian Government has proposed for West Papua, 

what is your understanding of that new autonomy status? Because 

my understanding from the West Papuan leaders, it is a farce, it 

is a sham. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. Well, in fact, sir, when offered, it was a wonderful idea, but unfortunately the central Government has now 

pulled back on most of the promises entailed in that offer. 

It was made back initially under the administration of President 

Wahid, who appeared to have some genuine sympathy and understanding of the problems of Papua, but in the succeeding administrations, that offer essentially has been reneged upon so that what 

is left of special autonomy is pretty nebulous. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Does that seem to indicate that there is a 

strong business industrial interest in this from Jakarta for somewhat flip-flopping in their policies toward West Papua? 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. Perhaps West Papua is simply too rich a province to be left to its own deserts. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think Ambassador La Porta might want to 

add something to this. 

Mr. LA PORTA. If I may, I would like to just simply add a couple 

of points, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, there are special autonomy laws on the books now 

for both Papua and Aceh and they are different, and so the question in Aceh is how to push forward with the special autonomy provisions. I will have to say in this regard it did not appear that the 

Megawati Government was willing to move very far in that direction to fulfill the provisions of the law that were on the books, but 

one of the things that is under discussion with the GAM high command in Stockholm in these talks in Helsinki is the definition of 

special autonomy and what would be involved therein. For example, having a preponderance of Acehnese in the police force is one 

of the provisions of the law. 

With regard to Papua, the SBY Government has come out and 

said very clearly that the first requirement is to constitute the people’s consultative council, a council made up of all the tribes and 

ethnic groups in Papua. The Government has also said that they 

would review the provisions of the law to divide up the province in 

that light. In fact, a court has ruled against the further division of 

Papua, and so that is on hold. The only province that has been created thus far is in West Papua. 

So as Assistant Secretary Huhtala mentioned earlier, this is still 

very much a work in progress, but here again I think the SBY GovVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ernment has to be supported in those efforts to make sure that 

they get sound solutions. 

President SBY was in Papua, in fact, on December 26th when 

the tsunami occurred and he was consulting with the people, the 

leaders there on the formation of this new basically tribal council. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. If I could, Congressman? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

Mr. MCWILLIAMS. That tribal council which was promised in the 

initial special autonomy offer by President Wahid has been denatured to the point where it is basically a cultural institution. For 

example, that body was supposed to pass on legitimacy of candidacies running in the future elections. It no longer has that 

power. As the most visible offer from special autonomy, it is a great 

disappointment to the people of West Papua. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You mean that the council has been 

neutered? Is that another way of saying it? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Let me thank our three distinguished witnesses who 

have provided excellent testimony and a nice balance. 

Mr. McWilliams, we are honored you could join us. 

Dr. Ramage, good to see you again. 

Ambassador La Porta, there is reason you have such a distinguished record, it is obvious. 

Thank you all. 

The Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(57)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this important and timely hearing to 

highlight the importance of the world’s third largest democracy, fourth largest nation, and home of the largest Muslim population. 

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) is one country that should be a major focus 

of American foreign policy. When so many positive stories in the Muslim world are 

obscured by protracted violence in areas of historic conflict, it is high time to take 

notice of the important strides Indonesia is making. As you are well aware, Indonesia has embarked on a dramatic transition to democratic governance over the past 

six years, culminating in the country’s first directly elected President. Indonesia 

serves as a role model for democracies throughout the world. 

A major secular state with a Muslim majority, Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy and is gaining International recognition for its strides towards complete democratization, making progressive political and constitutional reforms while 

also demonstrating that Islam and democracy are not mutually exclusive and can—

in fact—successfully work in tandem. Moreover, newly elected President Susilo 

Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has made clear his intentions to actively work to rid Indonesia of its problems with corruption, pledging to bring to an end a ‘‘culture of 

impunity’’ while enforcing greater transparency throughout his government. 

In one calendar year, Indonesia has successfully demonstrated its commitment to 

embrace democracy on three separate occasions: Parliamentary elections in April; a 

first round of Presidential elections in July; and of course the September 20th Presidential runoff that ultimately determined the first directly-elected Indonesian President. 

Now the real work begins. Economic growth and political reforms can and must 

occur in tandem, and we wish the new leadership in Jakarta great success in both 

areas. More foreign investment in this resource-rich country will not only create 

new employment opportunities, but it will also help improve the standard of living 

for many Indonesians. The positive role that U.S. business and investment can play 

is enormous. 

Currently, the United States actively supports the Indonesian Navy to protect the 

vitally important sea lanes of Southeast Asia, through which an estimated 60 percent of global shipping tonnage passes. The threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia 

is real and Indonesia has suffered from several major attacks in recent years. In 

order to quell terrorist threats, Indonesia’s government is discovering new ways of 

working with regional law enforcement and intelligence communities in hopes of 

rooting out homegrown radicalism. We should continue to work closely with the GOI 

on counterterrorism operations to thwart the efforts of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—AlQaeda’s Southeast Asia franchise—and other groups bent on creating a Pan-Islamic 

state within the region. The most impressive successes have been in the area of law 

enforcement; hundreds of JI members have been arrested, thus disrupting the network’s command and control structure. 

On December 26, 2004, the American public—and International community at 

large—was forced to learn a lot about Indonesia as a result of the tsunami that left 

behind a path of devastation and destruction throughout Indonesia and other East 

African, South and Southeast Asian nations. This unfortunate natural disaster was 

a seminal event in both of our nation’s histories and ultimately demonstrated that 

our governments, civil society institutions, and militaries can effectively come together and work towards a common goal. We were pleased to witness such a positive signal for the future relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia, and were reVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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assured that this cooperation is one of many indications that both of our countries 

will continue to benefit from increased engagement. 

As you already know Mr. Chairman, one of the many consequences of this devastating disaster was the call for renewed military cooperation between the United 

States and Indonesia. While the GOI has made dramatic reforms to weed out corruption and increase transparency, the same unfortunately cannot be said for several rogue units within Indonesia’s Army (ABRI). Previously existing patterns of behavior by these rogue elements continue to persist in very troubling ways. Currently, it is estimated that only 30 percent of TNI’s budget comes directly from the 

GOI itself, and the military engages in private and sometimes illegal businesses in 

order to make up their budget shortfall. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the recent 

tsunami, TNI utilized their resources to airlift members of the militant group Front 

Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) to Aceh. Reports still surface from Aceh 

and West Papua implicating elements of the TNI in human rights abuses. We are 

deeply concerned about the slow pace of military reforms within Indonesia as members of the TNI continue to avoid justice in cases involving gross violations of 

human rights, whether committed in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, or elsewhere in the 

archipelago. 

The U.S. State Department’s decision to certify Indonesia for International Military and Education Training (IMET) is one step in our long-term goal of broadening 

and strengthening our military relationship with Indonesia. However, we must support deeper reform efforts by the GOI to institutionalize professionalism, respect for 

human rights, weed out corruption and increase transparency in the Indonesian 

Armed Forces (TNI). It is my sincere hope that our government will continue to 

practice careful and diligent oversight with regards to IMET funding for all nations. 

Regardless, I am still particularly concerned about the slow pace of legal resolution of cases involving gross violations of human rights, whether committed in East 

Timor, Aceh, Papua, or elsewhere in the archipelago. The reinstatement of IMET 

was predicated on the GOI’s cooperation with the FBI in their investigation of a 

brutal attack that occurred on August 31, 2002, when 10 schoolteachers and a 6 

year old child were ambushed—with heavy gunfire—as they were returning from a 

picnic to their residences in Tembagapura, Indonesia. The attack resulted in the 

death of two American citizens, Rick Spier and Leon Burgon, and one Indonesian 

citizen—Bambang Riwanto. Seven of the eight surviving Americans were seriously 

wounded. Initial investigations led some to believe that a rogue group from the military was involved in the ambush. Regardless, a joint U.S.-Indonesian investigation 

culminated in the indictment by a U.S. grand jury of Anthonius Wamang, an Indonesian citizen purportedly with connections to rogue militant groups in the region. 

However, to our disappointment, Anthonius Wamang remains free to this day, and 

the Indonesian authorities—as we have been informed—have not issued an indictment for Wamang’s arrest. 

I am also particularly concerned about the trafficking of women and children—

especially since the recent Tsunami. Following the Tsunami, I was pleased to see 

that President Susilo issued a decree that prevented children under the age of 16 

from leaving the country without their parents to prevent traffickers from praying 

on these vulnerable orphans. Furthermore, the Minister for Social Affairs ordered 

that all orphaned children be taken to the Home for Social Protection of Children 

(RPSA), where they were offered protection and medical care until reunited with 

their families. 

On June 14, 2004, the U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons released their annual report, stating that ‘‘Indonesia is a 

source, transit and destination country for persons trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Indonesian victims are trafficked to Malaysia, 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South 

Korea, Singapore, and Australia. Extensive trafficking occurs within Indonesia’s 

borders for forced labor and sexual exploitation.’’ Since that report was issued, I am 

encouraged by the Indonesian’s increased law enforcement efforts and greater convictions for trafficking-related offenses. We must continue to work with the GOI to 

ensure that there are continued improvements within their judiciary in order to ultimately make certain that there is effective prosecution of traffickers. 

With regards to U.S. and other international investment, we must not forget that 

Indonesia’s economy was battered in the financial crisis of 1997 and governing this 

sprawling archipelago has not been easy in the wake of the economic meltdown and 

dramatic political change we have witnessed in the seven short years of postSoeharto Reformasi. Much remains to be done, particularly in the areas of judicial 

reform, corruption, human rights and social welfare. 

U.S. investment in the country totals some $25 billion, and more than 300 major 

American firms do business there as a massive decentralization process is being imVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:00 Jul 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\031005\99826.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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plemented. The United States should continue providing support to help Indonesia 

stabilize and consolidate these political and economic gains. Through a combination 

of strategic development supports and more effective public diplomacy we can engage Indonesia well into the future. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of all of our witnesses today. It is my hope that by the end of 

the day we will have a better understanding of Indonesia’s transition towards complete democratization. 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA


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