UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20-22471-CIV-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES

NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

CO., LTD., GOLDWIND INTERNATIONAL 

HOLDINGS (HK) LTD., DSV AIR & SEA INC.,

BBC CHARTERING USA, LLC, and

BBC CHARTERING SINGAPORE PTE LTD., 

Defendants. 

_________________________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant BBC Chartering USA, LLC’s (“BBC 

USA”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (hereafter, 

“BBC USA’s Motion to Dismiss”) [D.E. 197]; Defendant BBC Chartering Singapore PTE Ltd.’s 

(“BBC Singapore”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

(hereafter, “BBC Singapore’s Motion to Dismiss”) [D.E. 198]; Defendant DSV Air & Sea Inc.’s 

(“DSV US”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

(hereafter, “DSV US’ Motion to Dismiss”) [D.E. 201]; and Defendants Xinjiang Goldwind 

Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“Goldwind Science”) and Goldwind International Holdings 

(HK) Ltd.’s (“Goldwind International”) (Goldwind Science and Goldwind International, together, 

“Goldwind” or “Goldwind Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of 

Personal Jurisdiction (hereafter, “Goldwind’s Motion to Dismiss”) [D.E. 202, filed under seal]

(collectively, “Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction”). These matters were

referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 by the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United 

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States District Judge [D.E. 251]. The undersigned held a hearing on these matters on June 21, 

2022 (hereafter, “Hearing”). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned respectfully 

recommends that the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction be GRANTED. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff North American Sugar Industries, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) commenced 

this action against Defendants BBC USA, BBC Singapore (BBC USA and BBC Singapore, 

together, “BBC Defendants”), DSV US, and the Goldwind Defendants (BBC Defendants, DSV 

US, and Goldwind Defendants, together, “Defendants”), asserting claims for violations of the 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091 (hereafter, 

“Helms-Burton Act”). See Compl. [D.E. 1]. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, see Motions 

to Dismiss [D.E. 48, 52, 53, 107], and failure to state a claim, see Joint Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 

54]. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery on personal jurisdiction 

as to all Defendants. See Motions for Jurisdictional Discovery [D.E. 59, 120]. The Court granted 

these Motions for Jurisdictional Discovery, see Paperless Orders [D.E. 80, 122], as well as several 

extensions of the deadline by which to complete the jurisdictional discovery, see Paperless Orders 

[D.E. 125, 143, 144, 155, 184]. On August 24, 2021, the Court granted in part Defendants’ Joint 

Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 54] and denied as moot their Motions to Dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction [D.E. 48, 52, 53, 107]. See Order [D.E. 145]. 

On November 1, 2021, after the conclusion of jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiff filed its 

First Amended Complaint (hereafter, “Amended Complaint”) [D.E. 189]. Therein, Plaintiff, a 

New Jersey corporation formerly known as the Cuban-American Sugar Company, alleges that 

Defendants trafficked in Plaintiff’s property, which was confiscated by the Cuban government

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between 1959 and 1960, and are therefore liable to Plaintiff under Title III of the Helms-Burton 

Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–6085 (hereafter, “Title III”). Id. ¶¶ 1, 17. Plaintiff’s property consists of 

a Cuban port called Puerto Carupano (“the Property”). Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. According to Plaintiff, 

Defendants conspired to transport wind turbine blades from Tianjin, China to Carupano, Cuba 

aboard the Jade and Moonstone ships, which made stops at the Port of Miami. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. The 

blade cargoes were eventually unloaded at the Property and were to be used in the Herradura Wind 

Farm Project by the Cuban company Empresa Importadora-Exportadora de Objetivos ElectroEnergéticos (“Energoimport”). Id. The alleged scheme is described by Plaintiff as follows: 

 In 2013, Goldwind Science, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of 

China and with its principal place of business in China, contracted with Energoimport 

to supply Energoimport with wind turbine blades via the Property. In 2018, Goldwind 

Science secured insurance and other documentation for the blade cargoes aboard the 

Jade and Moonstone; and entered into an agreement with a non-party blade 

manufacturer (hereafter, “Blade Supply Agreement”) that ultimately governed the 

preparation and delivery of the cargoes. 

 Goldwind International, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Hong 

Kong and with its principal place of business in China, negotiated and signed the 

contract with Energoimport on behalf of Goldwind Science (hereafter, “Wind Farm 

Agreement”) and thereafter facilitated the Jade and Moonstone voyages. 

 DSV US, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Delaware and with its 

principal place of business in New Jersey, provided transportation and logistical 

services to facilitate the Jade and Moonstone voyages, which involved analyzing 

United States regulatory requirements and trade laws and executing filings with United 

States customs authorities. DSV US’ affiliate, non-party DSV Air & Sea A/S (“DSV 

Denmark”), functioned as the Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier (“NVOCC”) for 

both shipments. 

 BBC USA, a company organized and existing under the laws of Texas and with its 

principal place of business in Bellaire (Houston), Texas, assisted with logistical and 

compliance issues for the Jade’s and Moonstone’s stops in Miami and provided 

logistical support at the Property. BBC USA also signed a charter agreement on behalf 

of its affiliate, non-party BBC Chartering Carriers GmbH & Co. KG (“BBC Carriers”), 

to transport an unrelated shipment of cargo aboard the Moonstone for BBC Carriers’

client, McDermott, located in Port Arthur, Texas. BBC USA was involved in 

concealing from McDermott and United States authorities the Moonstone’s stop in 

Cuba before the ship proceeded to Port Arthur. 

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 BBC Singapore, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic 

of Singapore and with its principal place of business in Singapore, chartered and 

supported the Jade and Moonstone ships pursuant to a chartering agreement with DSV 

Denmark (hereafter, “DSV-BBC Chartering Agreement”); participated in discussions 

about the ships’ regulatory compliance; corresponded with port agents located in the 

Port of Miami about the Jade’s stop to help facilitate the Moonstone’s subsequent stop; 

and also participated in concealing from McDermott and United States authorities the 

Moonstone’s stop in Cuba. The BBC Defendants’ affiliate, non-party BBC Carriers, 

functioned as the Vessel Operating Common Carrier (“VOCC”) for both shipments. 

See Am. Compl. [D.E. 189]. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts individual claims for 

trafficking in confiscated property in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 6082 against each of the five 

Defendants (Counts I–V), and a claim for civil conspiracy under Florida law against all of the 

Defendants (Count VI). Id. ¶¶ 135–94. Plaintiff seeks to recover from Defendants the money 

damages allowed by Title III, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a), plus interest and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. 

On December 6, 2021, Defendants filed the instant Motions to Dismiss for Lack of 

Personal Jurisdiction [D.E. 197–98, 201, 202].1 In support of their argument that this Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over them, Defendants have proffered: the Declaration of BBC USA’s 

President Per Petersen (“Petersen”) (hereafter, “Peterson Declaration”) [D.E. 199]; the Declaration 

of BBC Singapore’s Managing Director Lars Schoennemann (“Schoennemann”) (hereafter, 

“Schoennemann Declaration”) [D.E. 200]; the Declaration of DSV US’ Director of Quality & 

Compliance Kenneth Witkowski (“Witkowski”) (hereafter, “Witkowski Declaration”) [D.E. 201-

1]; the Declaration of Goldwind Science’s Legal Director Li Guoliang (“Li”) (hereafter, “Li 

Declaration”) [D.E. 202-1, filed under seal]; and the Declaration of Goldwind International’s Chief 

1 On December 22, 2021, Defendants also filed four motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure 

to state a claim [D.E. 214–17]. These motions have not been referred to the undersigned and remain 

pending before the Court. 

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Financial Officer Zhu Hui (“Zhu”) (hereafter, “Zhu Declaration”) [D.E. 202-2, filed under seal].2

 

On January 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to 

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (hereafter, “Response”) [D.E. 218].3 On February 18, 

2022: BBC USA filed its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (hereafter, “BBC USA’s 

Reply”) [D.E. 238]; BBC Singapore filed its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (hereafter, 

“BBC Singapore’s Reply”) [D.E. 239]; the Goldwind Defendants filed their Reply in Support of 

their Motion to Dismiss (hereafter, “Goldwind’s Reply”) [D.E. 240, filed under seal]; and DSV 

US filed its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (hereafter, “DSV US’ Reply”) [D.E. 241]. 

After the Hearing on the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, the parties 

filed post-hearing briefs. See Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 260]; BBC Defendants’ PostHearing Brief [D.E. 262]; DSV US’ Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 263]; Goldwind’s Post-Hearing 

Brief [D.E. 264].4 On August 17, 2022, Defendants submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority 

in Support of their Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [D.E. 275]; and on August 

24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority [D.E. 276]. 

APPLICABLE LAW

1. Helms-Burton 

Title III of the Helms-Burton Act provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

[A]ny person that, after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the effective 

date of this subchapter, traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban 

Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States 

national who owns the claim to such property for money damages [as set forth in 

subsections (i)–(ii).]

2 On June 29, 2022, the undersigned denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [D.E. 220] with 

respect to these declarations and indicated that they would be given the appropriate weight when deciding 

the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. See Order [D.E. 258]. 

3

 Plaintiff also filed an unredacted version of its Response [D.E. 223, filed under seal]. 

4

 Plaintiff also filed an unredacted version of its post-hearing brief [D.E. 266, filed under seal].

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22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A). Under Title III, “a person ‘traffics’ in confiscated property if that 

person knowingly and intentionally—(i) . . . uses . . . [the] confiscated property, (ii) engages in a 

commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from [the] confiscated property, or (iii) causes, 

directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking . . . by another person, or otherwise engages in 

trafficking . . . through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who 

holds a claim to the property.” Id. § 6023(13)(A). 

2. Personal Jurisdiction 

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Initially, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts 

to establish a prima facie case in order to withstand such a motion to dismiss. Virgin Health Corp. 

v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 393 F. App’x 623, 625 (11th Cir. 2010). If the defendant produces affidavits 

or other evidence that contradicts the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the plaintiff must then offer 

affidavits or other competent proof and not just restate the facts in the complaint. Future Tech. 

Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). All reasonable 

inferences should be construed in favor of the non-movant plaintiff. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. 

Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010). 

A two-part test is applied to determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 

(11th Cir. 1990). First, the court must consider whether the applicable state long-arm statute 

permits exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. Florida’s long-arm statute extends 

specific personal jurisdiction over nonresidents “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying 

on a business or business venture in this state”, and “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)&(2). “Florida’s long-arm statute is to be strictly construed.” 

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Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Once the state’s long-arm statute is met, the court must then determine if there are sufficient 

“minimum contacts” to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Cable/Home, 902 F.2d at 855; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). So long 

as the actor’s efforts are “purposefully directed” to citizens of another state, physical presence is 

not necessary to establish “minimum contacts.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

476 (1985). Nevertheless, the contacts with the forum state must not be merely “fortuitous” or 

“random.” Id. at 475. 

For a claim arising under federal law, a party may also seek to establish personal 

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) (hereafter, “Rule 4(k)(2)”) if “the 

defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction” and “exercising 

jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(2)(A)–(B). In conducting such constitutional analysis, “the Fifth Amendment applies because 

personal jurisdiction is based on a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process, [and] 

the applicable forum for minimum contacts purposes is the United States, not the state in which 

the district court sits.” SEC v. Marin, 982 F.3d 1341, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff alleges that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over DSV US pursuant to 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). See Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 260 at 9]. Specifically, 

Plaintiff contends that DSV US has offices in Miami and Orlando; and that Plaintiff’s trafficking 

claim “‘aris[es]’ from DSV [US’] business activities in Miami”, thereby subjecting it to specific 

personal jurisdiction in this forum under the state’s long-arm statute’s business activity prong. Id.

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at 13–14 (alteration in original). 

Plaintiff also alleges that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over all Defendants

pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Id. at 9. As to the Goldwind Defendants, Plaintiff argues 

that they affirmatively approved the Jade’s and Moonstone’s stops in Miami; and actively 

participated in acquiring insurance and other documentation to facilitate the ships’ compliance 

with United States regulatory requirements. Id. at 10–11, 22–24. As to DSV US, Plaintiff argues 

that: DSV US “analyzed, agreed to, and facilitated the Miami stops”, as evidenced by its Miamibased employee, Carol Scheid’s (“Scheid”), participation in email correspondence regarding 

matters of customs compliance and Witkowski’s regulatory analysis of the Miami stops; and DSV 

US prepared, filed, and furnished customs forms for the ships bearing its Miami office’s address. 

Id. at 11–15. As to BBC Singapore, Plaintiff argues that it participated in securing legal approval 

of documentation for the ships, corresponded with Miami-based port agents about the Jade’s stop 

in Miami, and concealed the Moonstone’s stop in Cuba from McDermott and United States 

authorities. Id. at 15–19. As to BBC USA, Plaintiff argues that its employees reviewed and 

approved customs and port documentation for the ships’ stops in Miami; and engaged in 

discussions about logistics at the Property and concealment of the Moonstone’s stop in Cuba. Id.

at 19–22. In sum, Plaintiff argues that, in undertaking these activities, Defendants committed

tortious acts within Florida, thereby subjecting themselves to specific personal jurisdiction in this 

forum under the state’s long-arm statute’s tortious act prong. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that BBC Singapore’s and Goldwind’s general contacts with 

the United States subject them to personal jurisdiction in the United States under Rule 4(k)(2); and 

that jurisdiction over all Defendants is otherwise proper via its conspiracy claim. Id. at 9, 18, 24. 

Conversely, Defendants contend that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them 

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because they are non-resident defendants that did not take any actions in this forum with respect 

to the Jade and Moonstone shipments, including their stops in Miami. BBC USA argues that it 

“had no involvement at all” in the Jade voyage and “no involvement in the cargo on the Moonstone

[that was] delivered to Cuba”. See BBC USA’s Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 197 at 6]. BBC 

Singapore argues that it “merely monitored the voyages after they left [China]” so that it could 

keep DSV Denmark apprised of their progress. See BBC Singapore’s Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 

198 at 6–7]. DSV US argues that it was “not a carrier for or a party to either of the two shipments 

at issue” and “did not take any actions in Florida or direct any activity at Florida that was related 

in any way to Plaintiff’s claims”. See DSV US’ Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 201 at 7]. Finally, the 

Goldwind Defendants argue that they have no presence or contact with Florida, had no control 

over the decision to have the ships stop in the Port of Miami, and were otherwise uninvolved in 

the logistics of the Jade and Moonstone voyages. See Goldwind’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 264 

at 3–8]. 

DISCUSSION

The undersigned first addresses Plaintiff’s contention that this Court has specific personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s individual claims for trafficking under the 

Helms-Burton Act (Counts I–V) pursuant to the Florida long-arm statute and Rule 4(k)(2). The 

undersigned next addresses Plaintiff’s contention that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction 

over Defendants with respect to its civil conspiracy claim (Count VI) under Florida law. As 

discussed below, the undersigned concludes that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants under any of Plaintiff’s theories. 

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I. INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

A. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

As noted above, Florida’s long-arm statute extends specific personal jurisdiction over 

nonresidents for any cause of action arising from “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying 

on a business or business venture in this state” or “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)&(2). The undersigned first addresses Plaintiff’s contention that this 

Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over DSV US under the business activity prong, 

pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), then turns to Plaintiff’s contention that this Court may 

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over all Defendants under the tortious act prong, pursuant 

to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 

1. Jurisdiction over DSV US pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). 

Plaintiff claims that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over DSV US because it 

“operat[es], conduct[s], engag[es] in, or carr[ies] on a business or business venture in this state or 

[has] an office or agency in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1); Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief 

[D.E. 260 at 9]. “To establish that a [non-resident] defendant is conducting or carrying on a 

business for the purposes of Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), the activities of the defendant must be 

considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary 

benefit.” Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A., 537 F. App’x 852, 860 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Moreover, Florida’s long-arm statute “requires that a plaintiff’s claim 

‘aris[e] from’ a non-resident defendant’s Florida-based business operations”, which in turn 

“requires a direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection to exist between the basis for the 

cause of action and the business activity.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

DSV US counters Plaintiff’s contention by arguing that, although it maintains offices in 

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Miami and Orlando, its business activity in Florida was not connected to the Jade and Moonstone 

shipments; and that any activity “tangentially related to the [s]hipments occurred entirely outside 

of Florida and did not involve” its Florida offices or employees. See DSV US’ Motion to Dismiss 

[D.E. 201 at 15] (emphasis in original). DSV US avers, in relevant part, that it was not the carrier 

for either shipment at issue; that it was not hired for any activity relating to either shipment; that it 

did not communicate with the Cuban client, Energoimport, about the delivery of blades from China 

to Cuba; that it did not plan or partake in the ships’ routes, including their stops in Miami; and that 

none of its employees, including those based in Florida, were present when the ships docked in 

Miami or boarded the ships at any point during their voyages from China to Cuba. See Witkowski 

Decl. [D.E. 201-1 ¶¶ 9–16, 22–25]. These averments support the conclusion that, “[w]hile [DSV 

US] has some Florida business connections, none of them were utilized in” the alleged trafficking. 

Saft Am., Inc. v. Jabil Cir. (Guangzhou), Ltd., No. 3:18-cv-446-J-32JBT, 2019 WL 4600401, at 

*6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2019). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a 

“direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection . . . between” DSV US’ Florida-based business 

activity and Plaintiff’s trafficking claim under the Helms-Burton Act. Melgarejo, 537 F. App’x at 

860. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on: Scheid’s email activity; spreadsheets prepared by nonparties containing the address of DSV US’ Miami office, which address was removed on 

subsequent forms submitted to United States customs authorities; communications between DSV 

US employees based in New Jersey and Texas regarding an export license; and a compliance 

assessment rendered by Witkowski, who is based in New Jersey, are all insufficient to satisfy 

Plaintiff’s burden of connecting DSV US’ Florida-based business activity to the alleged 

trafficking. Herederos de Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 

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1305 (S.D. Fla. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 3330347 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (“The Plaintiff fails to 

explain how its claim for unlawful trafficking in Cuba is related to Teck’s activities in Florida”.); 

see also Oviedo v. Ramirez, No. 21-cv-23750, 2022 WL 1641865, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2022) 

(“Plaintiff fails to allege that [the] cause of action arose out of Sunflower’s business transactions 

with the Florida-based companies, or that the cause of action arose out of Orchard’s office in 

Florida.”) (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over 

DSV US based on the Florida long-arm statute’s business activity prong. 

2. Jurisdiction over all Defendants pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 

Plaintiff next argues that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over all Defendants 

pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), which provides that “a nonresident is subject to personal 

jurisdiction in Florida for any cause of action arising from . . . committing a tortious act within 

Florida.” Frida Kahlo Corp. v. Pinedo, No. 18-21826-Civ, 2021 WL 4147876, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 

Sept. 13, 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This long-arm jurisdiction even extends 

to defendants who committed their tortious acts outside the state if their acts ‘cause injury in 

Florida.’” Id. (quoting Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 1999)). 

“Thus, a foreign defendant can commit a tortious act in Florida through telephonic, electronic, or 

written communications into Florida so long as the cause of action arises from these 

communications. However, the place of injury must be within Florida.” Macrotrend Cap. Grp.

Inc. v. Edwards, No. 18-cv-61327, 2019 WL 2106421, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2019) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, if a “substantial aspect of the alleged tort” was 

committed in Florida, then the plaintiff need not have suffered his injury in Florida. Tavakoli v. 

Doronin, No. 18-21592-CIV, 2019 WL 1242669, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing Williams 

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Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir. 1988)). 

Defendants argue that they did not commit a tortious act within Florida and that none of 

their actions outside of Florida caused injury in Florida. In response, Plaintiff contends that the 

Goldwind Defendants affirmatively approved and facilitated the Miami stops, including the 

acquisition of insurance for the shipments. See Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 260 at 10–11, 

22–24]. Plaintiff further contends that DSV US’ Scheid and Witkowski “analyzed, agreed to, and 

facilitated the Miami stops” and that DSV US was instrumental in the preparation and furnishment 

of customs forms in Miami when the Jade and Moonstone docked. Id. at 11–13. As for BBC 

Singapore, Plaintiff argues that it knew about the “planned U.S. stopover as early as March 2018”, 

sought legal advice with respect to the export license and complying with United States trade laws, 

communicated with Port of Miami agents about takeaways from the Jade’s stop in Miami, and 

endeavored to “hide the [Moonstone’s] Cuba stop from U.S. entities”. Id. at 15–19. Finally, 

Plaintiff contends that BBC USA also learned about the planned stops in March 2018, that its 

employees advised on the legality of the shipping plan and the substance of the customs filings, 

and that its Vice President was involved in discussions about logistics at the Property and in 

concealing the Moonstone’s Cuba stop from authorities. Id. at 19–22. 

However, none of these purported actions resulted in an injury to Plaintiff in Florida. Even 

when construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not alleged that any of 

Defendants’ conduct—from outside Florida—harmed it or others in this state. Posner, 178 F.3d 

at 1216 (acknowledging state court split regarding whether the defendant’s presence in Florida is 

required under the long-arm statute’s tortious act prong but indicating that both interpretations

nevertheless require an injury to occur in Florida); see also CJS Sols. Grp., LLC v. Tokarz, No. 

3:20-cv-65-MMH-JRK, 2021 WL 848159, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2021) (“[Notwithstanding this 

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split,] the Court is bound to follow firmly established [Eleventh Circuit] precedent, which 

interprets subsection [(1)(a)(2)] to apply to defendants committing tortious acts outside the state 

that cause injury in Florida.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Though Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants “engaged in unlawful trafficking” under the HelmsBurton Act, see Am. Compl. [D.E. 189 ¶¶ 135–94], these allegations are devoid of information 

regarding how this conduct came to injure Plaintiff, a New Jersey entity, in this forum. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that it need not have suffered an injury in Florida because 

Defendants committed a substantial aspect of the alleged tort in Florida, “meaning that those 

activities were essential to the success of the tort.” See Response [D.E. 218 at 82] (citing Williams 

Elec., 854 F.2d at 394). However, the record does not support a finding that “a substantial aspect 

of [the] Helms-Burton Act violation” occurred in Florida. Id. at 83. Rather, the record reflects 

that neither the Goldwind Defendants nor BBC USA engaged in any Florida-based activities with 

respect to the alleged trafficking violation, much less any that were “essential to the success of the 

tort”. Cf. Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 260 at 9–11, 19–24]. As for BBC Singapore, its 

few communications with Port of Miami agents about the Jade’s stop in Miami do not amount to 

a “substantial aspect” of the alleged trafficking violation; nor can it be said that these 

communications were “essential to the success of” the alleged trafficking in Cuba. Id. at 15–19. 

With respect to DSV US, the record likewise establishes that Scheid’s sparse email activity from 

her office in Miami, coupled with DSV US’ instruction to furnish certain customs forms in Miami 

upon the ships’ arrival, do not amount to a “substantial aspect” of the alleged trafficking violation 

or constitute “activities that were essential to” its success. Id. at 11–15. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants based on the Florida long-arm statute’s tortious act prong. 

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B. Minimum Contacts

Despite Plaintiff’s inability to satisfy the relevant prongs of the Florida long-arm statute, 

for the sake of completeness, the undersigned considers whether Defendants have sufficient 

“minimum contacts” with Florida to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

“In specific personal jurisdiction cases, [courts] apply the three-part due process test, which 

examines: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ himself of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum 

state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 

1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472–75). To assess purposeful 

availment, courts consider whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are related to the 

cause of action; involve an act by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the 

privileges of doing business in the forum; and are such that the defendant would reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court in the forum. Id. at 1357. Moreover, where the defendant is 

alleged to have committed an intentional tort specifically aimed at a plaintiff who was injured in 

Florida, due process may also be satisfied under the “effects test” established by the Supreme Court 

in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). See also Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357 (“The 

‘effects test’ provides an additional means . . . of determining the appropriateness of personal 

jurisdiction—one that is based on a plaintiff’s ties to the forum state and the harm suffered by the 

plaintiff.”). 

Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy either test. Under the traditional minimum contacts analysis 

articulated in Louis Vuitton, the Goldwind Defendants and the BBC Defendants have not 

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purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting any activities in Florida; and 

Plaintiff cannot establish that DSV US’ contacts with Florida arise out of or relate to Plaintiff’s 

cause of action. Regarding the Goldwind Defendants, neither of them has an office or any 

employees in Florida or the United States. See Goldwind’s Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 264 at 3]. 

Likewise, neither of the BBC Defendants are registered to do business in Florida; have any offices, 

employees, bank accounts, telephone numbers, mailing addresses, or registered agents in Florida; 

own or operate any ships; or, as noted above, have engaged in any Florida-based activities relating 

to Plaintiff’s claim for trafficking. See Petersen Decl. [D.E. 199 ¶¶ 5–8]; Schoennemann Decl. 

[D.E. 200 ¶¶ 5–8]. Finally, with respect to DSV US, its only Florida-based activity—that is, 

Scheid’s sporadic email correspondence and DSV US’ instruction to keep certain forms on hand

in Miami—did not arise out of or relate to Plaintiff’s ultimate claim of trafficking the Property. 

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (“The contacts must 

be the defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’”) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the “effects test” articulated in Calder, which provides 

that jurisdiction over a defendant is proper when the “effects” of its out-of-state conduct—in this 

case, the intentional tort of trafficking—are felt in the forum. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90. As was 

the case under the Florida long-arm statute’s tortious act prong, Plaintiff has not alleged that it 

experienced any injury in Florida, let alone that the “effects” of Defendants’ conduct were felt in 

Florida. Indeed, given that Plaintiff’s claims hinge on the alleged trafficking that occurred in Cuba,

Florida was neither the “focal point [of] the story [nor] of the harm suffered”. Id. at 789. 

Hence, the due process “minimum contacts” requirement is not met for any of the 

Defendants. 

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C. Rule 4(k)(2) Jurisdiction

Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that the Goldwind Defendants and BBC Singapore are 

subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2). As previously noted, Rule 

4(k)(2) applies if “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 

jurisdiction” and “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and 

laws.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(A)–(B). “[T]he personal-jurisdiction analysis under the Fifth 

Amendment is the same as that under the Fourteenth [Amendment]”, except the applicable forum 

is the United States. Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., No. 21-12834, 

2022 WL 3330347, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2022). However, “it is a rare occurrence when a 

court invokes jurisdiction under the rule.” Sturmanskie LLC v. Picturemaxx Ag, No. 21-cv-21091, 

2022 WL 3030451, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 5, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Thompson v. Carnival Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2016)). 

As noted above, there is no specific personal jurisdiction over the Goldwind Defendants or 

BBC Singapore under Florida’s long-arm statute. Moreover, these Defendants have no presence 

in “any other forum where [they are] amenable to jurisdiction.” Herederos, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 

1306. However, Plaintiff has not established that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Goldwind 

Defendants and BBC Singapore would be consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the 

United States, as Rule 4(k)(2) requires. The Goldwind Defendants and BBC Singapore do not 

conduct business in the United States, see Schoennemann Decl. [D.E. 200 ¶¶ 5–7]; Goldwind’s 

Post-Hearing Brief [D.E. 264 at 3]; nor are Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the Goldwind 

Defendants’ direct or indirect ownership of U.S.-based entities, see Am. Compl. [D.E. 189 ¶¶ 18–

19], sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Herederos, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 1306

(finding similar allegations to be insufficient “because there is no alleged connection between [the 

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defendant] and the alleged subsidiaries”). Plaintiff’s allegations about the Goldwind Defendants’ 

limited patent, asset, and dispute resolution activities in the United States, as well as Goldwind 

International’s purported maintenance of a Montana wind farm project, see Am. Compl. [D.E. 189 

¶¶ 18–19], are also insufficient to establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), as none of these 

activities are “related to the unlawful trafficking [of] the [Property] in Cuba”. Herederos, 535 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1307 (citing GolTV, Inc. v. Fox Sports Latin Am. Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1318 

(S.D. Fla. 2017)); see also Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (“We emphasize that a nonresident corporation’s contacts with the forum that are 

unrelated to the litigation must be substantial in order to warrant the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2).”). Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Goldwind’s and BBC 

Singapore’s occasional functions as shipper or carrier for shipments to the United States, see Am. 

Compl. [D.E. 189 ¶¶ 18–19, 22], likewise do not establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), given 

that these activities do not relate to the alleged trafficking of the Property in Cuba. Herederos, 535 

F. Supp. 3d at 1307. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the 

Goldwind Defendants and BBC Singapore pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2). 

II. CIVIL CONSPIRACY

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants 

based on its civil conspiracy claim. See Response [D.E. 218 at 83]. “Under Florida law, a civil 

conspiracy must have as its object the commission of an underlying tort.” United Techs. Corp. v. 

Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009). “Florida courts have held that the state’s long-arm 

statute can support personal jurisdiction over any alleged conspirator where any other coconspirator commits an act in Florida in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if the defendant over 

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whom personal jurisdiction is sought individually committed no act in, or had no relevant contact 

with, Florida.” Id. at 1281–82. 

Although Defendants have challenged the sufficiency of Count VI in their pending motions 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim [D.E. 214–17], the undersigned assumes without deciding its 

sufficiency strictly for purposes of this Report and Recommendation. The undersigned concludes 

that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim does not confer personal jurisdiction over Defendants

because Plaintiff has not established that any Defendant committed a tortious act in Florida in 

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to traffic the Property. Here, as under the tortious act prong 

of Florida’s long-arm statute, a substantial part of Defendants’ alleged tortious conduct did not 

occur in Florida, and Plaintiff does not otherwise allege that it has been harmed by Defendants’ 

conduct in Florida. Thus, “the [Amended Complaint] does not allege viable facts from which the 

inference could reasonably be drawn that [Defendants were] part of a conspiracy either engineered 

in Florida or pursuant to which a tortious act in furtherance was committed in Florida.” Mazer, 

556 F.3d at 1283. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, even if viable, does not provide a basis to 

establish this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 

RECOMMENDATION

In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [D.E. 

197, 198, 201, 202] be GRANTED.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Judge Rule 4(b), the parties have fourteen days from the date 

of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Darrin 

P. Gayles, United States District Judge. Failure to file timely objections may bar the parties from 

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attacking the factual findings contained herein on appeal. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Hallmark 

Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993). Further, “failure to object in accordance 

with the provisions of [28 U.S.C.] § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” See 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (I.O.P. 

- 3). 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 30th day of

August, 2022. 

____________________________________ 

ALICIA M. OTAZO-REYES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

cc: United States District Judge Darrin P. Gayles

Counsel of Record 

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