F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

G I L B E R T O S A N T I L L A N , a n individual, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v.

USA W A S T E O F C A L I F O R N I A , I N C ., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 15-55238

D.C. No. 2 :14-cv-00335-AB -J CG

OPI N I ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Andre B irotte, J r., District J udg e, Presiding

Arg u ed and Submitted December 7, 2016

Pasadena, California

F iled April 7, 2017

B efore: Harry

Preg erson, J acqueline H. Ng uy en, and J ohn B . Owens, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Preg ersonS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 2

SUMMARY *

Em ploym ent Discrim ination

The pan e l reversed the district court’s g rant of summary judg me n t i n favor of USA W a ste of California, I nc. on Gilberto Santil l a n ’ s wrong ful termination claim under California law based on ag e discrimination and retaliation; affirmed the district court’s d enial of Santillan’s re q u e s t for l e ave to amend the complaint; and remanded for furth e r proceeding s.

The p anel h eld that the district court erred in holding that Santillan failed to e stablish a p rima facie ag e discrimination claim. The panel further held that USA W aste failed to rebut the p r e sumption of unlawful d iscrimination because it did not offer a leg itimate reason for f iring Santill a n when USA W a ste’s o nly proffered reason w as Santillan’s f ailure to provide p roof of his leg al rig ht to work in the United S t at e s

a s r equired by the I mmig ration Reform and Control Ac t o f 1 9 8 6 (I RCA). Specifically
, the panel held that I RC A

ex e mpted Santillan f

rom the proof of e mploy

ment elig ibility that USA W aste demanded. T h e panel also held that making Santillan’s reinstatement conting ent upo n such proof would violate California public policy

.

The panel held that Santillan established a prima facie retaliation case a

n d a presumption of unlawful retaliation. Specifically
, the panel held that the d istric t court erred in concluding that Santillan did not eng ag e in protected activity

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 3

when he used an attorney to neg o tiate his reinstatement. The panel held that California public policy p rotected Santillan’s rig ht to representation by a n attorney to ne go t i a te the terms and conditions of e mploy ment. The p anel further held that Santillan established a n ex u s between his termination and his protected activity where USA Waste fired Santillan because he was represented by his attorney a t t he settlement
ag reement neg otiations.

F inally
, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its d iscretion by d eny ing Santillan’s request for leave to amend the complaint. The panel held that Santillan failed to show he was dilig ent in seeking to amend the complaint because his request to a m e n d came e ig ht months after the deadline for making

such a request.

COUNSEL

H olly Noelle B oy er ( arg u ed), and Andrew N. Chang
, Esne r Chang & B oy e r, Pasadena, California; L ouanne Masry a nd J ohn C. T ay lor, Tay lor & Ring L L P, L os Ang e les, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher J

. B oman (arg ued), F isher & Phillips L L P, I rvine, C alifornia; K

risten J

. Nesbit, F isher & Phillips L L P
, L o s Ang eles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 4

OP INION

PREGERSON, Circuit J udg e :

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a wrong ful e mploy ment termination dispute between Gilberto Santillan, a 53-y ear-old g arbag e truck dri v e r, a n d his employ er of 32 y ears, USA W aste o f California, I nc. (“USA W aste”). S an t i llan filed this action
aga i n st USA W a ste alleg ing a wrong ful termination claim based on ag e discrimination and retaliation. T he district court g ranted summary

judg ment in favor of USA W aste.

W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. W e

reverse. W e hold that the district court erred by gr a nting
summary judg ment in f avor of USA W aste because (1) Santillan established a prima facie case under both his ag e discrimination and retaliation theories ; and (2) USA W aste failed to introduce any evidence that i t h a d a leg itimate reason for firing

him.

W e a lso hold that the d i s t r i c t court d id not abuse its discretion w hen it denied Santillan’s oral request f o r leave to amend the complaint eig ht months after the filing deadline.

F ACTUAL BACK G ROUND

Gilberto Santillan started working f or U S A W aste as a residential g arbag e truck d river in 1979. 1 F or 32 y e ars, he serviced the community of Manhattan B each, California.

1 Un less o t

h erw ise i n d i cated
, th i s f

actu al b ack g ro u n d co n tain s f acts th at eith er are u n d isp u ted o r USA W aste h as co n ced ed are im m aterial an d th eref o re d o n o t f

o reclo se su m

m ary j u dg m en t.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 5

Exemplary Employee

I n March 2 011, USA W aste’s g arbag e collection contract with the City of Manhattan B each was up for renewa l

. I n p resenting its case to the Manhattan B each City Counc i l
, U SA W aste specifically hig hlig hted Santillan’s e x emplary service to the community

. After hear i n g f r om Manhattan B each homeowners who praised Santillan’s ex emplary servi ce t o their community
, the Manhattan B each City Council renewed USA W aste’s contract.

December 5, 2011, Termination

Santillan was rarely disciplined during his f irst 30 y ears at USA Waste. B u t this situation chang ed i n J a n u ary 2009, after USA W aste assig n ed Steve Kobz off as Santillan’s new Manhattan B each route manag er.

B e tween J a

nuary 2009 and J uly 2010, Kobz off attempted
to d iscipline Santillan six times. The parties dispute whether these “write ups” violated the procedural protections afforded by USA W aste’s collective barg aining ag reement. USA W a ste does not defend its term i n ation of Santillan based on these six disputed write-ups.

On December 5, 2 011, U SA W aste fired Santillan for the first t i m e

. U S A W aste contends that it fired Santillan then because he had four accidents in a 1 2-month period for which Kobz o ff disc i p lined Santillan using the procedures r equired by USA W a ste’s collective barg aining ag reement. Santillan disputes both that he had four accidents a nd that USA W aste followed the procedures required by the c ollective barg aining
ag reement.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 6

Another employ ee, J anson Vartanian, replaced Santillan. At summary judg ment, USA W a ste submi tted a declaration from its human resourc e s employ e e Maria Diaz stating that the employ e e who replac ed Santillan was “over 4 0 y ears o f
ag e” and had eleven y ears ex p erience driving g arbag e trucks.

Santillan testified that he was one of five o lder S p anishspeaking employ ees fired or suspended once Kobz o ff was assig ned a s USA W aste’s Manhatt a n B each route manag er. Althoug h Santillan c ould not r e ca l l the names of the four other Spanish-speaking employ ees, K obz off corroborated Santillan’s statement by identify ing J esus Z amora and Rojilio M e j i a as two such Spanish-speaking employ ees who were terminated.

Public Outcry

On December 7
, 2011, p u rs u ant to the collective barg a ining ag reement and w ith the assistance of his attorney , Santillan filed a form a l gr ievance ag ainst USA W aste challeng ing his December 5, 2011, termination.

After Santillan’s formal g rievance was filed, USA W aste received h u ndreds of letters from Manhat t a n B e ach homeowners who live in th e area served by Santillan, demanding that USA W aste reinsta t e S a n t i l l a n ’ s e m p l o y m ent. I n their letters, the homeowners r eminded USA W aste that it succeeded in securing the rene w a l of its important g arbag e collection contract with Manhattan B e ac h in March 2011, because the homeowners came out in droves to support Santillan, their “F irst Class” r esidential g arbag e truck driver.

T h e homeowners d emanded that USA W a ste reinstate S a n tillan because he “positively impacted every famil y o nS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 7

[ the] street,” and was “ex tremely hel pful,” g oing above a nd bey ond his responsibilities. One homeowner made it a point
to introduce h er sons to Santillan because he “works ha rd, and has a beautiful spirit and attitude,” and “in terms o f class and i n t e gr ity and a radiant personality there is no one in the world who can hold a candle to Gilberto [ Santillan] .” I n contrast, day s after Santi l l a n was f ired, Manhattan B e ach residents reported being frustrated findin g their trash cans emptied at dusk and left “ sit t i n g i n[ ] the street – creating a haz a rd to oncoming cars.”

The homeowners’ sentiments were publis h ed in a local
newspaper, wh ich also included a story from a homeowner whose son d

ressed up as Santillan for Halloween because he considers Santillan “a hero.”

The May 2012, Settlement Agreement

O n May 1 7, 2012, in the presence of USA W ast e ’s attorney , Santillan’s attorney , and a u n i o n representative, USA W as te a

nd Santillan sig ned a “Settlement Ag reement and L ast Chance Ag r eement” ( “Settlement Ag reement”), in which USA W aste ag reed to reinstate S a n tillan’s employ

ment if he passed the California Department o f Transportation d rug test and phy sical ex am, a criminal backg round check, a nd “ eVerify

. ” 2 I n ex chang e, Santillan ag reed to dismiss the

2 T h e term

“ e- Verif y ” w as n o t d ef

in ed i n th e Settlem en t A g reem en t. Ou r case law h as d escr i b ed “ e- V erif y ” as an “ electro n ic v erif icatio n sy stem ” th at is “ v o lu n tary ” u n d er f ed eral l aw an d is u sed “ to c h e c k th e

w o rk

- au th orizatio n statu s o f e m p lo y ees th ro u g h f

ed eral reco rd s.” Ch ica n o s Po r La Ca u s a , In c. v. Na p o l ita n o , 5 5 8 F.3 d 8 5 6
, 8 6 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ), a ff’d

, C h amb ers o

f Co mmerce o

f U.S

. v. W

h itin g , 5 6 3 U.S. 5 8 2 (2 0 1 1). USA W aste arg u es th at t h is t erm m ean t San tillan ag reed to ab id e b y a reg u latio n u n d er th e Im m ig ratio n Ref

orm an d Co n t r o l Act o f 1 9 8 6S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 8

December 7, 2011, g

r ievance he filed ag ainst USA W aste.

USA W aste Fails to Reinstate Santillan

Santillan successfully completed the California Department of Transportation drug test, the phy sical ex am, and the criminal backg

round check.

I n response, USA W aste’s human resources employ ee Maria Diaz sent Santillan a letter informing him that his first day back a t work would be J uly 16, 2012. The letter also told Santillian, “y ou will n eed to complete an I

- 9 form and show documentation of y our r i gh t t o work in the U.S.” D iaz ’s l e t t e r to Santillan was written in Eng lish, even thoug h U S A W a ste was aware that S a n t i l lan communicated in Spanish. The letter only included the fifth p a ge of the employ ment elig ibility verification F orm I -9 (“ F o rm I -9”), w hich was printed in Eng lish even thoug h it was available in Spanish. 3

Santillan reported to w ork on J uly 16, 2012, w ith his driver’s license and social security card to complete the F orm I -9. However, Diaz informed Santillan that he also needed a

(“ IRCA ”) ad d ressin g th e d o cu m en tatio n t h at n ew emp lo

yees su b m it to sh o w th eir au th o rizatio n t o w o rk in th e Un ited S tates. Ho w ev er, t h e IRCA

co n tain s tw o p ro v isio n s th at, f o r th e reaso n s d iscu ssed b elo w , ex em p t San tillan f ro m th is req u irem en t. S

ee d i scu ssio n , in

fra , P art II.B .1

.

3 T h e o p erativ e v ersio n of t h e Fo rm I- 9 w a s fi v e p ag es w h en USA W aste f ired San t illan o n J u l y 2 4
, 2 0 12

. S ee Fo rm I- 9 Em

p lo y m en t Elig ib ility

Verif icatio n , OMB No . 1 61 5

- 0 0 47 (ex p ired 0 8 /3 1 /1 2 ).S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 9

work authoriz ation number and its ex p iration date. Santillan did not h ave that information with h im. Diaz asked Santillan to bring that information to work the nex t day

. 4

On e ach of the f

ollowing two day s, Santillan attempted to provide the requested information by g iving Diaz a letter with

an identification number. According to Diaz
, Santil l a n was unable to provide the e x piration date and s h e c o uld not complete electronic employ ment verification of h i s work authoriz ation without the ex p iration date.

On the third day
, Diaz sent Santillan home. Diaz testified that she “told him he couldn’t work, and that w e would b e in

c ontact.” Six day s later, on J u ly 24, 2012, USA W a ste se n t

a letter to Santillan informing h im that USA W aste was firing hi m b e c a use h e did not p rovide “proof of y o ur leg al rig h t to work in the United States within t h ree day s of hire, a s required by the I mmig ration Control and Reform Act of 1986, [ sic] [ and] the Settlement Ag reement.”

P ROCEDURAL BACK G R OUND

On D ecember 4
, 2013, Santillan filed a complaint ag ainst USA W aste in L o s Ang eles County Superior Court, alleg ing
wrong ful termination in violation of California public policy

. Santillan advanced two different theories for this claim based

on the violation of two differe n t p u b l ic policies: (1) ag e

4 USA W aste arg u es t

h at it n ee d e d S a n tillan ’ s in f o rm atio n w ith in th ree d ay s b ecau se th e IRCA req u ires t h at an em

p l o y e r c o m

p lete th e

v erif icatio n o f a n ew em

p l o y ee’ s w o rk au th o rizatio n s tatu s w i t h in th e n ew

em p l o y ee’ s f

irst th ree d ay s o f w o rk

. S e e 8 C.F.R. § 2 7 4 a.2 (b )(1 )(ii). Ho w ev er, as d iscu ssed

b elo w , San tillan w as ex em p t f ro m th is reg u latio n b ecau se h e w as co n t i n u i n g h is em p lo y m en t. S ee d iscu ssio n , in

fra
, P art II.B .1

.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 10

discrimination in violation of the public p olicy evinced in the F air Employ

ment and Housing Act ( “ FE HA”), Cal. G ov’t Code § 12940 5 ; and (2) that he was wrong fully terminated in retaliation for having an at t o r n ey represent him during the Settlement Ag reement neg otiations with USA W aste. 6 USA W a ste removed this case to federal court.

O n N o v ember 14, 2014, USA Waste filed a summary judg ment motion. The district c o urt held a hearing on J anuary 1 2
, 2015. At the summary judg ment hearing
, Santill an ’ s attorney asked the court for leave to a mend the complaint to add a breach of contract claim.

On J anua r y 1 6
, 2015, the district court: (1) g ranted
summary judg ment i n favor of USA W aste on Santillan’s
wrong ful termination claim b a sed on ag e discrimination, holding that Santil l a n f

ailed to establish a prima facie case; (2) g ranted summary judg ment in favor of USA W a s te on Santillan’s wrong f

ul termination claim based on r e t aliation, holding that Santillan’s failure to p rovide the documentation that U SA W a ste demanded in the three-day time frame it required w as a “leg itimate[ ]
, non-retaliatory reason for the

5 It is an u n law f

u l em p lo y m en t p ractice f

o r an e m

p lo y er to d iscrim in ate ag ain st a p er s o n b ased o n “ race, relig io u s creed
, co lo r,

n atio n al o rig in
, an cestry , p h y sical d isab ility
, m en ta l d isab ility
, m ed i cal

co n d itio n , g en etic in f

o rm atio n , m arital statu s, sex , g en d er, g en d er id en tity
, g en d er ex p ressio n , ag e, sex u al o rien tatio n , or m ilitary an d v eteran statu s.” Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 1 2 94 0

.

6 San t illan also alleg ed th e f o llo w in g claim s: (1 ) f

ailu re to p ay

o v ertim e, C al. L ab

. Co d e § 1 1 94 ; (2 ) w aitin g t im e p en alties, Cal. L ab

. Co d e § § 2 0 1– 0 3 ; an d (3 ) f ailu re t o pro v id e m eal an d rest b reak s, Cal. L ab

. Co d e § § 22 6 .7
, 5 1 2, 1 1 74

. H o w ev er, San tillan later ab an do n ed th ese claim s d u rin g th e h earin g on USA Waste’ s s u m m ary j u d g m en t m o tio n

. T h ese claim s are n o t relev an t to th is ap p eal.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 11

J uly 2012 termination;” a

nd ( 3) denied Santillan’s request for leave to amend.

Santillan timely

appealed these ruling s.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

W e have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1291. W e r eview de novo a district court’s g rant of summary judg ment. Albino

v

. Baca
, 747 F .3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en ban c ). Summary judg ment is appropriate w here “there is no g enuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo v a nt is e ntitled to judg ment as a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). I n our de novo review of t h e d istrict court’s summary judg ment ruling
, we view the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the non-moving party

. A lbino , 747 F .3d at 1168.

W e review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Crowley v. Bannister
, 734 F .3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013).

D ISCUSSION

Santillan appeals the district c ourt’s (1) g rant of summary judg ment in favor of USA W aste o n S a n t i llan’s wrong f ul termination cl a im under an ag e discrimination theory ; (2) g rant of summary judg ment in favor of USA Waste on Santillan’s wrong ful termination claim based on retaliation for using a

n attorney ; and (3) denial of Santillan’s request for leave to amend the complaint.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 12

I. McDonnell Douglas ’s three-prong burden-shi f ting f ram ew ork

I n a non-mix ed motive cas e s u c h as this, a California
wrong ful termination clai m i n v iolation of public policy is

a n aly z ed under the three-prong burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Dougl a s C o rp. v. Green
, 411 U .S. 792 (1973). See D iego v. Pi l g rim United Church of Christ
, 231 Cal. App. 4th 913, 930 (Ct. App. 2014); see also E arl v

. N ielsen Media Research, Inc.
, 658 F .3d 1108, 1112, 1 1 1 8 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) ( a

p ply ing b urden-shifting analy sis to wrong f ul termination claim based on ag e discrimination in violation o f F EHA and public policy

)

.

Under the first prong o f the McDonnell Douglas framework, Santillan must establish a prima facie case under either his ag e discrimination or retaliation theory

. See Earl
, 658 F .3d at 1 112; Stegall v. Citadel Broad Co.
, 350 F .3d 1061, 1 065–66 ( 9th Cir. 2003). I f Sant i l l a n establishes a prima facie case, there is a “presumption of discrimination.” Reid v. G o o g le, Inc.
, 50 Cal. 4th 5 12, 520 n.2 ( 2 010); Y a nowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc

. , 3 6 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005); see also Nidds v

. Schindler Elevator Corp.
, 113 F .3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996).

Then, u nder the second p rong , the burden o f p r o duction shifts to USA W aste to rebut the p resumption b y p r o d ucing admissible e vidence th at it had a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employ ment action. See Guz v. Be c h tel Nat’l, I

n c. , 24 Cal. 4th 3 17, 355–56 ( 2 000); see also Earl
, 658 F

. 3d at 1112.

I f U SA Waste satisfies it s burden, then, under the third
prong , Santillan must show that the r eason advanced by USAS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 13

W a ste constitutes mere pretex t, or he mus t produce other evidence of intentional discrimination. Reid
, 50 C a l

. 4 t h at 520 n.2; see also Earl
, 6 58 F .3d a t 1112; W inarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc. , 274 F .3d 1 276, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001).

F inally
, “the plaintiff in an e mploy ment discrimination action n eed produce very little evidence in order to overcome

an employ er’s motion for summary judg ment.” Diaz v. E agle Produce Ltd. P’ship
, 521 F

. 3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2 008) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, B d. of Trs.
, 225 F .3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).

II. We reverse sum m ary j udgm ent in f avor of USA Waste on Santillan’s age discrim ination claim

The district court erred when it evaluated Santillan’s ag e discrimination theory in a vacuum by n o t considering any events occurring before USA W aste fire d S a n tillan for the first time on December 5, 2011. 7 I n ana l y z ing Santillan’s claim based on ag e discrimination, we will consider the facts leading up to a

nd including Santillan’s J uly 24, 2012, termination.

7 In rev iew in g a FEHA claim
, th is co u rt m a y r ely o n related f ed eral

cases in terp retin g th e A g e Discrim in atio n in Em p lo y m en t A ct (“ A DEA ”), 2 9 U.S.C. § § 6 2 1 et seq ., an d T itle VII o f th e Civ il Rig h ts A ct, 4 2 U.S.C. § § 2 0 00 e et seq

. S

ee Nid d s , 1 1 3 F.3 d at 9 1 6

.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 14

A. The district cour t erred in holding that Santillan f ailed to establish a p rim a facie age discrim ination

case

To state a pr i m a f

acie ag e d iscrimination case under F EHA, Santillan must establish that: (1) he was a member o f

a protected class ( i.e.
, 40 y ears o f ag e or old e r) ; ( 2 ) he was performing competently i n the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employ ment action, such as termination;

a n d ( 4 ) “ s o m e o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t s u gge s t s discriminatory

motive.” See Guz , 24 Cal. 4th at 355.

T h e district court did not consider whether Santillan established the first three eleme n t s o f a prima facie ag e discrimination case. I t is undisputed that he did, as Santillan: (1) was a member of a protected c lass ( i.e.
, 40 y ears o f ag e o r older) g iven that he was 53 y ears old; (2) was p erforming competently in the position he had; a n d ( 3 ) suffered an adverse employ

ment action because USA W aste fired him.

The district court found that Santillan could not establish the fourth e lement: some other ci r cumstance that sug g ests a discriminatory motive. W e disag r ee. Evaluating the fourth element “ with some flex ibility ,” Nidds
, 113 F .3d at 917, a nd construin g t he facts in the lig ht most favorable to Santillan,

we conclude that he estab l i s h e d a prima facie ag e discrim ination case. Therefore, there is a presumption that USA W a ste unlawfully

discriminated ag ainst Santillan. See Reid
, 5 0 Cal. 4th. at 520 n.2; see also Nidds
, 113 F .3d at 917.

Two pieces of evidence lead us to this conclusion. F irst, Santillan testified that h e w a s o ne of five older Spanishs p e a king employ e e s who were fired or suspended once Kobz o ff was a s s ig ned as USA W aste’s Manhattan B e achS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 15

route manag er. 8 See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.
, 232 F .3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000) ( h old i n g that an employ ee established a prima facie ag e discrimination case because she

was among a g roup of older employ ees that w ere terminated
at a hig her rate than y oung er employ ees). Santillan c ould not remember the other Spanish-speaking employ ees’ names, but Kob z off identified J e sus Z amora and Rojilio Mejia as two Spanish-speaking employ ees who w ere terminated

. USA W a ste identified no o ther su p e r v isees of Kobz off who were fired or suspended after Kobz o ff became Santillan’s route manag er.

Second, there is a potential thirteen-y ear ag e g a p b etween Santillan an d his replacement, V artanian, who also has 21 fewe r y ea r s ex perience a s a g arbag e truck driver. 9 See

8 A n em p lo y ee’ s “ alb eit u

n co rro b o rated an d self

- serv in g ” testim o n y is su f f icien t to estab lish

a p rima fa cie w o rk

p l ace d iscrim in atio n case if a

reaso n ab le j u ry co u ld in f

er discrim in atio n f

ro m th e em

p lo y ee’ s t estim on y

. N i g ro v. S ea rs, Ro eb u ck & Co

. , 7 8 4 F.3 d 4 9 5
, 4 9 8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ) ( h o ld in g th at an em

p lo y ee’ s self

- serv in g d eclaratio n an d d ep o sitio n testim o n y estab lish ed a p rima fa cie case o f u n law f u l d iscrim i n atio n an d created a g en u in e d isp u te o f m aterial f act w h eth er th e em

p lo y er’ s reaso n f o r f irin g th e em

plo y ee w as p retex t

u al). T h i s is b ecau s e, “ [w ]h en j u d g in g th e ev id en ce at th e su

m m ary j u dg m en t stag e, t he d i strict co u rt is n o t to

m ak e cred ib i lity d eterm in a t i o n s o r w eig h co n f lictin g ev id en ce, an d is
req u ired to d raw all i n f

eren ces in a lig h t m o st f

av o rab le to th e n o n m o v in g p arty .” Mu sick v. Bu rke
, 9 1 3 F

. 2 d 1 3 9 0
, 1 3 9 4 (9 th Cir. 19 9 0 ); see a l so An d erso n v. Lib erty Lo b b

y, In c. , 4 7 7 U .S. 2 4 2
, 2 55 (1 9 8 6 ) (“ T h e ev id en ce

o f th e n o n

- m o v an t is to b e b eliev ed
, an d all j u stif iab le in f eren ces are to b e d raw n in h is f av o r.”).

9 USA W aste’ s h u m an reso u rces em p lo y ee Maria Diaz s u

b m i t ted a d eclaratio n in w

h ich s h e p ro v id ed Sa n tillan ’ s an d Vartan ian ’ s p erso n al in f o rm atio n o b tain ed th ro u g h USA W aste’ s co m p u terized h u m a n

reso u rces reco rd s

. Diaz p ro v id ed d etailed in f o rm atio n ab o u t San tillan
, s uc h a s h is em

p lo y m en t start d ate, pay rate, an d h o m e ad d ress. InS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 16

Schechner v. KPIX-TV

, 686 F .3d 1 018, 1023 ( 9th Cir. 2 012) (holding that an empl o y ee c an establish a prima facie ag e discrimination case with evidence that his or her replacement

w a s s u b s t an t i a l l y y o u ng er w i t h e q u a l o r i n f e r i o r qualifications); see also F r a n ce v. Johnson
, 795 F .3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) (ag e d ifference of ten y ears or more b etween a p laintiff and his or her replacemen t i s presumpti v e l y s ubstantial); cf. D ouglas v. Anderson
, 6 5 6 F .2d 528, 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1981) ( r e p lacing a 54-y ear-old bookstore manag er with som e o n e five y ears y oung er was sufficient to e s t a b l i sh a prima facie c ase of ag e discrimination).

F or the two reaso n s discussed above, the district court overloo k e d “the flex ibility these cases require and erred in

co n c luding that” Santillan failed to establish a prima facie
ag e discrimination case. Nidds
, 113 F .3d at 917. B ecause Santillan h as established a p rima facie a g e discrimination
case, there is “a presumption that [ US A W aste] unlawfully discriminated ag ainst [ him] .” I d. (citation o mitted); see also Reid
, 50 Cal. 4th at 5 20 n .2. Therefore, the b u r den shifts to USA W a ste to rebut this presumption.

co n trast, Diaz lim ited h er d escrip tio n o f Vartan i an to th e f act th at h e w as

“ ov er f o rty y ears o ld ” an d h ad w ork ed as a resid en tial g arb ag e t ru ck d riv er f o r elev en y ears. T h at Diaz w as aw are o f V artan ian ’ s ag e b u t ch o se n o t to d isclo se m o re detail su

p p o rts th e in f

eren ce th at th ere ex ists a p oten tially sig n i fica n t ag e g ap b etw een San tillan an d Vartan ian

.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 17

B. USA W aste f

ailed to r ebut the presum ption of unlaw ful discrim ination because it did not of fer a legitim ate reason f

or f iring Santillan

Under McDon nell D ouglas ’ s second prong , USA W aste bore th e b urden to produce admissible evidence of a leg itimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Santillan. Earl , 658 F .3d at 1112. USA W aste’s only proffered reason fo r f i r i n g Santillan in J uly 2012 was that his “reinstatement

was conting ent, in part, upon pr o v i d i ng proof of [ his] leg al rig ht to work in the United States within three day s of hire, a s required by the I mmig ration Control and Reform Act of 1986, [ sic] [ and] [ the] Settlement Ag reement.”

However, USA W aste cannot rely on t h e I RCA or the Settlement Ag reement to establ i s h that it is e ntitled to summary judg ment as a matter of law because, as ex p lained below: (1) the I RCA ex empts Santillan f r o m the proof o f employ ment elig ibility t h a t U SA W aste demanded; a nd (2) making Santillan’s reinstatement co n t i n g ent upon such proof would violate California public policy

.

1. The IRC A does not r equire proof of

em ploym ent eligibility f rom Santillan

The I RCA requires employ ers review certain documents
at the hiring stag e to confirm that n ew employ ees h ired a fter No v e mber 6, 1986, are authoriz ed to work in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(4). As part o f this
process, employ er s review certain documents specified b y statute to attest to the n ew employ ee’s employ ment elig ibility

on a F orm I -9. See id. at § 1324a(b); 8 C.F .R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(i). A n em p loy er may not seek “more o r d i fferent documents than a r e required under [ the I RCA ] o rS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 18

refus[ e ] t o honor documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be g enuine,” a s d o i n g so is an “unfair immig ration-related employ ment practice.” 8 U .S.C. § 1 3 24b(a)(6); see a ls o R i v e ra v. NIBCO, Inc.
, 364 F .3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004).

I n c ontrast to the I RCA’s mandate with respect to ne w employ e es, two different I RCA reg ulations ex empt Santillan from p r oviding the employ ment elig ibility documents demanded by USA W aste. F irst, the I RCA ex empts Santillan from having to provide proof of employ ment el i gi b i lity because he was “continuing in h i s

. . . employ ment [ a fter being ] reinstated after disciplinary suspension for wrong f ul termination

. . . resolved throug h reinstatement o r settlement.” 8 C.F .R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(viii)(A)(5). 1 0

10 T h e IRCA ex em

p tio n p ro v id es in

relev an t p art:

(v iii) A n em

p lo y ee will n o t b e d eem ed t o h av e h ired an in d iv i d u al f

o r em plo y m en t i f th e in d iv id u al is

co ntin u i n g in h is o r h er emp lo ymen t an d h a s a

reaso n ab le ex p ectatio n

o f em plo y m en t at all tim es.
(A ) A n in d iv i d u al is co n tin u i n g i n h is o r h er emp lo ymen t in o n e o f th e f ollo w in g situ atio n s:

. . . (5 ) An in d i v id

u a l is rein sta ted a

fter d iscip lin ary

su sp en sio n fo r wro n g

fu l termin a tio n , f

o u n d u n j u stif ied b y an y co u r t, arb itrato r, o r ad m in istrativ e b o d y , or

o t h e r w i s e re s o l v e d t h r o u g h r e i n s t a t e m e n t o r settlemen t [.]”

8 C.F.R. § 2 7 4 a.2 (b )(1 )(v iii)(A )(5 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ).S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 19

Second, a differe n t I RCA “g randfather” provision

ex e mpts employ ees hired before November 7
, 1986, from the employ ment elig ibility verifica t ion requirements applicable
at the hiring stag e. Maka v

. I .N.S.
, 904 F .2d 1 351, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990); see a lso 8 U.S.C. § 13 2 4 a (a )(4); 8 C.F .R. § 274a.7(a)(1). USA W aste hired Santillan in 1 979, and even thoug h h e was fired in 201 1
, h is reinstatement thereafter qualified him as a continui n g e mploy ee, rather than a new employ e e. See 8 C.F .R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(viii)(A)(5 )

. Thus, Santillan is ex empt from the I RCA e mploy ment elig ibility verification requirement under this I RCA provision as well.

USA W aste cites no authority to the contrary

. I nstead, it
arg ues that “the law” required Santillan to p rovide in three day s the employ

ment e lig ibility documents that USA W aste demanded. B ut that is not wha t the law required, and an employ e r’s incorrect view of the l a w is not a leg itimate reason for firing

an employ ee.

2. USA W aste could no t m ake Santillan’s reinstatem e nt contingent on verif ication of his im m igration status beca u s e doing so w ould violate Calif

ornia public policy

USA W aste alternatively arg ues that firing Santillan within three day s of his reinstatement was permitted by the Settlement Ag reement p rovision that r equired that he pass “ eVerify

. ” Howev e r , a contractual provision that contravenes public policy
, as ex p ressed in a statute or implied from its lang uag e, is “ either void o r unenforceable.” A kopyan v. W ells Fargo Home M

ortg., Inc.
, 215 Cal. App. 4th 120, 135–36 (Ct. App. 2013). USA W aste’s interpretation of the Sett l e m ent Ag reement would v iolate the public po l icy ex pressed inS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 20

several California statutes. Therefore, the e-Verify provision in the Settlement Ag reement was unenforceable.

California provides that “ [ a] ll protections, r ig ht s , a nd remedies available under state law, e x cept any reinstatement remedy prohibited b y federal law, 1 1 a re a vailable t o all individuals regardless of immigration status w ho have applied f or employ

ment, or who ar e o r w ho have been employed
, in this s t a t e

. ” Cal. L ab. Code § 1171.5(a) ( emphasis added); 1 2 see also Incalza v. Fendi N. A m ., I n c

. , 479 F .3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007); Salas v. S i e r r a Chem. Co.
, 59 Cal. 4th 407, 425–26 (2014).

California “statu t e s leave no r oom f or doubt about this state’s public policy w i t h reg ard to the irrelevance o f im m i gr a tion status in enforcement of state labor, employ ment, civil rig hts, a

nd employ e e housing laws.” Hernandez v. Paicius
, 109 Cal. App. 4th 452, 460 (Ct. App. 2003), disapproved of o n o ther grounds by P e ople v

. Fr eeman , 4 7 Cal. 4th 993 ( 2010). Therefore, under California p ublic policy
, USA W a ste could not make Santillan’s reinstatement remedy c o n t i n g e n t u p o n v e r i fication of his immig ration status. See Akopyan
, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 135–36 (disreg arding an ex pr es s contract term that was contrary to public policy ).

11 A s d iscu ssed su

p ra P art II. B

. 1

. , San tillan ’ s rein statem en t rem ed y is n o t pro h ib i ted b y f

ed eral law b ecau se it w as th e resu lt of th e Settlem en t A g reem en t. S

ee 8 C.F.R. § 2 7 4 a.2 (b )(1 )(v iii)(A )(5 ).

12 See a lso Cal. G o v ’ t Co d e § 7 2 8 5 (sam e); Cal. Civ

. Co de § 3 3 39 (b ) (“ [N]o in q u iry sh all b e p erm itted in to a p erso n ’ s im m ig ratio n statu s ex cep t

w h ere t h e p erso n seek in g to m ak e th is i n q u iry h as sh o w n by clear an d

co n v in cin g ev id en ce th at th i s in q u i ry is n ecessary in o rd er to co m p ly w i th f ed eral im m i g ratio n

law .”).S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 21

C. USA Waste f

ailed to m eet its b u r d en as t o Santillan’s claim based on age discrim ination

B e cause neither the I RCA nor the Settlement Ag reement justified f iring Santillan, USA Waste failed to meet its burden
to show it had a leg itima te, nondiscriminatory reason for fir i ng Santillan in J uly 2012. W e therefore REVERSE the district court’s g rant of s u m m ary judg ment on Santillan’s
wrong ful termination claim arising from ag e discrimination.

III. We reverse sum m ary judgm ent in f avor of USA Waste on Santillan’s retaliation claim

Santillan’s alternative theory for his w rong ful termination claim is that USA W aste fired h im in J u ly 2012, in retaliation for having an attorney represent him during the Settlement Ag reeme n t neg otiations with USA W aste. California

r e t aliation claims follow the same M cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as ag e discrimin a t i on claims

. Y a nowitz
, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042; Diego
, 2 3 1 Cal. A pp. 4th at 930.

A. Santillan established a p rim a facie retaliation case and a presum ption of unlaw ful retaliation

Santillan can establish a prima facie case of r e taliatory
wrong ful termination in violation of public policy by showing that: (1) having an a ttorney r epresent him during the S et t lement A g reement neg otiations with U SA W aste is activity protected b y California p ubli c p o l icy ; and ( 2 ) there

was a n ex us between the p ub l i c p o l icy and h is termination. S ee Dep’t of F

air E mp’t & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., In c

. , 6 4 2 F. 3 d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2011). As with the ag e discrimination claim, if Santill a n establishes a prima facieS A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 22

retalia t i o n case, there is a presumption that USA W aste unlawfully r e t al i ated ag a inst him. See Reid
, 50 Cal. 4th at 520 n.2.

1. Santillan’s use of an attorney is activ ity protected byCalif

ornia public policy

The district court concluded that Santillan did not eng ag e in protected activity when he used an attorney to neg otiate his reinstatement, reasoning that Californ i a public p olicy
recog niz es a ri gh t t o an attorney only in the collective barg a in i n g contex t. This conclusion is incorrect. F o r d e c a des, California courts have recog niz ed a wrong ful termination claim based o n the pu blic policy reflected in California L abor Code S e c t ion 923 1 3 where an employ er retaliates ag ainst a

n emplo y e e who has “desig nated an attorney to r epresent [ him] for the p urpose of neg otiating the
terms and conditions of employ ment.” Montalvo v. Zamora
, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 ( Ct. A pp. 1 970) (recogniz ing wrong f ul termination where an employ er fired wor k e rs shortly a fter their attorney sent a letter demanding a minimum w age ). California courts have rejected the a r g u ment that such a claim “applies only to collectiv e b a r g aining .” Gelini v. Tishgart
, 77 Cal. A pp. 4th 219, 2 23 (Ct. App. 1 9 9 9 )

. B ecause

13 “ [T ]h e p u

b l i c p olicy of th is State i s d eclared as f o llo w s: Neg o tiatio n o f t erm s an d co n ditio n s o f lab o r sh o u ld resu lt f ro m v o l u n tary

a g r e e m e n t b etw een em

p lo y er an d em

p lo y ees.

. . . T h eref

o re it i s

n ecessa ry th at th e in d i vid u al wo rkma n h ave fu l l freed o m o f a s so cia tio n , self

- o rg an izatio n , an d d

esig n a t io n o

f rep resen ta t ives o

f h is o w n ch o o sin g , to n eg o tia te th e t erms a n d co n d itio n s o f h is emp lo

ymen t, a n d th at h e s h a l l b e free fro m th e in terferen ce, r estra in t, o r co ercio n o f emp lo yers o f la b o r,

o r th eir a g en ts , in th e d esig n atio n o f su ch rep resen tativ es o r in self

o rg an i zatio n o r i n o th er co n certed activ i ties fo r th e pu rp o se o f

. . . o t her

mu tu a l a id

o r p ro tectio n .” Cal. L ab . Co de § 9 2 3 (em p h asis ad d ed ).S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 23

California public policy prot e cts Santillan’s rig h t to representation by a

n attorney to neg otiate t h e t erms a nd

c o nditions o f employ

ment, he eng ag ed in protected activ i t y when he was r epresented by an a ttorney during the Settlement Ag reement neg otiations.

2. USA Waste f

ired Santillan b e ca use he was represented by his a ttorney at the Settleme nt Agreem ent negotiations

Santillan also established a n ex us between his t e r m ination in J uly 2012, and his protected activity becau s e USA W aste fired him roug hly two months after an attorne y r e presented him during the Settlement Ag reement neg otiations with USA W a ste. “The causal link between a protected activity and the alleg ed retaliatory action ‘can be inferred from timing alone’ when there is a close prox imity between the two.” Thomas v

. City of Beaverton
, 3 79 F .3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Nidds
, 113 F .3d at 919 (holding that a p ri ma facie case was established where employ ee’s “lay off occurred only four months after” he first eng ag ed in protected a ctivity by filing

a complaint and “only one month after he filed his second complaint”); Flait v. N. Am. W atch Corp.
, 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 478 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding nex us est a blished where employ e e “was terminated o n l y a few months a fter” he
eng ag ed in protected activity ).

W e hold that Santillan established a prima facie retaliation case, w hich in turn g ives rise to a presumption o f unlawful retaliation.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 24

B. The district c ourt e rred in holding t hat U SA Waste provided a legitim ate reason f o r f iring Santillan

As discussed supra in Part I I .B
., USA W aste cannot rebut the presumption that it retaliated ag ainst Santillan by rely ing

o n t h e I RCA’s employ ment e li gi b i l i t y v er i fi c a t i o n requirements for new employ ees or the Settlement Ag r e e m e n t

as a leg itimate reason for firing Santillan. These reasons for firing Sa ntillan are not leg itimate because ( 1) the I RCA

ex e mpts Santillan from these requirements since he was continuing h is employ

ment with USA W aste because h e was reinstated as a result of a settlement, and ( 2) USA W aste could n ot make Santil lan’s reinstatement conting ent upon verification of his immig ration status because doing so would violate California public policy

. See discussion supra Part I I .B

.

C. USA Waste faile d t o m eet its burden a s t o S a n t i l l a n ’ s c l a i m b a s e d o n r e t a l i a t i o n discrim ination

F or the foreg o ing reasons, we RE VE R SE the district court’s g rant of summary judg ment in favor of USA W aste on Santillan’s wrong ful termination claim based on retaliation.

IV. The district court did not a buse its discr etion by denying Santillan’s request f or leave to am end the

com plaint

At the summary judg ment hearing
, Santillan’s at t o rney orally requested leave to amend the complaint to add a breach of contract claim.S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 25

Santillan failed to show that he was dilig ent in seeking to amend the complaint, as h is request for leave to amend came eig ht months after the deadline for making such a reque s t

. See Johnson v. Mammoth R e c r eations, Inc.
, 9 75 F .2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (“I f [ the moving ] party was not dilig ent, the inquiry should end.”). Morever, Santillan failed to show
g ood cause for modify ing t h e previously issued scheduling order. S e e Fe d

. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified o nly for g ood cause and with the judg e’s consent.”).

W e therefore conclude that the d istrict court did not abuse its d iscretion by d eny ing Santillan’s request for leave to amend the complaint.

C ONCLUSIONS

I n sum, we REVERSE the district c o u r t’s g r a nt o f
summary judg ment in favor of USA W aste on San tillan’s
wrong ful termination claim based on ag e discrimination a nd retaliation and REMAND for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion. 1 4

W e A F F I RM the district court’s d enial of Santillan’s request for leave to amend the complaint.

1 4 W e leav e to th e d istrict co u rt to d eterm in e o n rem an d w h eth e r triab le issu es of f

act r e m a i n th at w o u ld p reclu d e a g ran t o f su m m ary j u d g m en t in f

av o r o f San tillan

. S

ee Alb in o , 7 4 7 F.3 d at 11 7 6

– 7 7 (rev ersin g su

m m ary j u dg m en t f

o r d ef en dan t an d rem an d i n g w i th in stru ctio n s to en ter su

m m ary j u d g m en t f

or p lain t if f ); Po rtsmo u t

h S q u a re, I n c. v. S ’h o ld

ers Pro tective Co m m. , 7 7 0 F.2 d 8 6 6
, 8 6 9 (9 th Cir

. 1 9 8 5 ) ; Co o l Fu el, In c. v

. C

o n n ett , 6 8 5 F.2 d 3 0 9
, 3 1 1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ); see a l so Fed . R. Civ . P . 5 6 (f

).S A N T I L L A N V

. USA W A S T E O F C A L

. 26

Costs shall b e tax e d ag ainst Defendant-Appel l e e USA W a ste of California, I

nc.

RE VERSED IN P ART, AF F IRMED IN P ART, a nd REMANDED.