**NATO Enlargement**

Author: Jeffrey Simon, SeniorFellow
Note:
**Conclusions**
**About the Workshop**
**Background**
**The meeting focused on the following topics:**
- The guidelines and paths of NATO enlargement;how enlargement has occurred historically, howenlargement might occur through the EU/WEU path,and finally through the Partnership for Peace (PFP)program. The implications of NATO enlargement from the perspectives of the WEU Associated Partners Poland, Romania, and Lithuania;
and from the perspectives of Former Soviet Union (FSU) states Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
Finally the various aspects of how the Alliance needs to change to accommodate new members; what political adjustments, military command alterations, and military infrastructure changes would be necessary.
**Guidelines and Paths of NATO Enlargement**
Previous NATO enlargements have derived fromdifferent circumstances and reasons. After the initialdecision to include the United States and Canada with theUK, France, and Benelux, the United States insisted thatNATO also include Norway, Portugal, Denmark, and Italybecause they shared common values and Iceland forgeographic reasons. The Korean War provided the catalystfor the entrance of Greece and Turkey (Lisbon Conference1952). When the Federal Republic of Germany joined in1955, Germany agreed to the following restrictions: toforce levels of 495,000 troops and no weapons of massdestruction. When post-Franco Spain entered the Alliancein 1982 it refused to participate in the integrated militarycommand, but sought membership to strengthen democracyand provide Spain with the opportunity to enter theEuropean Economic Community (now European Union).In sum, previous enlargements have been driven bycommon values, geographic and defense requirements, andincluded restrictions on new members and specialmembership arrangements.
Future NATO enlargement is not likely to occurthrough the path of the European Union (EU) and its West European  Union  (WEU).  The  WEU  has  made effortsto project stability to Central and Eastern Europe. In1992 it established a Consultation Forum and in 1994 astatus of association was established with nine AssociatePartner states: the Visegrad four, three Baltics, andBulgaria and Romania. The prospects for WEU'senlargement are dependent on developments in otherorganizations, the EU and NATO. The EU has agreed thatthe next phase of enlargement should begin only after theIntergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 and that sinceall three organizations (EU, WEU, and NATO) must takeinto account the different requirements of eachorganization, that, in the long run, the Europeanmemberships of the three organizations should converge.In sum, the WEU has already drawn lines in Europe andwill not precede NATO enlargement.
Future candidates for NATO enlargement are likely tobe from among the 25 states participating in thePartnership for Peace (PFP) program established inJanuary 1994. While we do not know precisely what theAlliance will approve as necessary guidelines forenlargement (presently being developed in NATO's draftstudy directed by the 1 December 1994 North AtlanticCouncil), it is likely that they will include: activeparticipation in North Atlantic Cooperation Council(NACC) and the Partnership program, the successfulperformance of democratic political institutions, a freemarket economy, and respect for human rights. It is alsolikely that effective democratic control of the military aswell as some minimal degree of military capability andNATO interoperability will be necessary conditions.
 NATO's challenge, though, will be how to define anddetermine what constitutes  effective  democratic controlof the military recognizing that each  state has its ownhistory, culture, and unique set of institutions. The currentstate of civil-military relations among those CentralEuropean (Visegrad) states frequently referred to as themost likely to first join NATO were examined accordingto the following four elements:
-  A clear division of authority between the president andgovernment (prime minister and defense minister) inConstitutions, Amendments, or through Public Law. TheLaw should clearly establish who commands and controlsthe military and promotes senior military officers inpeacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and whohas  authority for the transition to war. Parliamentary oversight of the military throughcontrol of the defense budget. Its role in deploying armedforces in emergency and war must be clear.
Peacetime government control of general staffs andmilitary commanders through civilian defense ministries.Control should include preparation of the defense budget,access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning,force structure development, arms acquisitions anddeployments, and military promotions.
Restoration of military prestige, trustworthinessand accountability for the armed forces to be effective.Having come from the communist period when the militarywas often used as an instrument of external or internaloppression, society must perceive the military as beingunder effective national control. Military training levelsand equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state.
     If NATO deems these four conditions necessary foreffective democratic control of the military, then most ofthe Visegrad states would not currently qualify. ThoughCentral Europe has already made enormous progress incivil-military relations since the 1989 revolutions, it isclear that much work still remains to be done.
**WEU Associated Partner Perspectives**
***Poland*** wants full membership in NATO (Article 5),and considers itself a net  producer  (with 250,000 troops,active peacekeeping experience, and an extensive PFPprogram), not  consumer  of security. Initially, Polandviewed PFP with apprehension, but now views it withenthusiasm for its integrating and interoperability aspects.Self-differentiation has gone much further than originallyplanned. Lines are not being drawn in Europe; theyalready exist. Poland's problems with democratic controlof its armed forces are a result of growing pains. If Polandis excluded from among NATO's first PFP entrants, it willcontinue to pursue active participation.
***Romania*** entered the post-Cold War era with falseexpectations. Originally it believed that the CSCE processcould replace the loss of the Warsaw Pact  pillar.  It hasnow changed its attitude and seeks inclusion in enlargedWestern institutions: EU/WEU and NATO. Romania is aWEU Associated Partner, but sees NATO and the UnitedStates presence in Europe as indispensable for security.Romania wants the PFP process to be clarified. Whatcriteria will be applied? Will admission be by individual,group, or so-called  checkers approach? If Romania andPoland (the  checkers ) the two most important states bypopulation, armed forces, and geostrategic location becamede jure members of NATO, Ukraine and the other CentralEuropean states would become de facto members ofNATO.
***Lithuania*** feels that history has demonstrated that theBaltic states lack the essentials to independently safeguardtheir national security and sovereignty. That is whyLithuania has made a clear choice to join NATO andEU/WEU, and to develop good-neighbor relations. Themain external threats to Lithuania derive from instability inRussia (and in Kaliningrad) and in the CIS. Russia shouldhave no veto on NATO enlargement. If Lithuania isexcluded from the first NATO expansion, it would needpolitical and psychological reassurance, perhaps in theform of a different commitment such as  associatemembership status. If such an arrangement is not found,then enlargement will reduce rather than improve Europeansecurity. In this regard, Lithuania welcomed the 1993Copenhagen Summit of the EU Council which recognizedthat the E membership of associated states was anobjective and the December 1994 Esse Summit whichadopted a pre-accession strategy. Lithuania expects NATOto make a similar decision.
**Former Soviet Union Perspectives**
***Russia** opposes NATO enlargement. The Russianparticipant portrayed NATO enlargement as potentiallyvery explosive to Russian society, equating it to themistakes made in the Cuban missile crisis. Russia seesNATO as a militarist organization and needs the followingfrom NATO to soften the impact:  (1) time guarantees(e.g., no new members before the year 2000);  (2)enlargement should not border Russia;  (3) no nuclearweapons can be deployed in Central Europe;  (4) noforward deployments of military forces; and (5) NATOshould provide Russia with a strategic treaty.
***Ukraine*** wanted sovereignty and neutrality when underthe USSR. After disintegration, Ukraine did not join theCBS (May 1992), but did join NACC. Ukraine's 1993Military Doctrine modified its former neutrality to newconditions and declared its intention of joining Westerninstitutions. Hence, Ukraine criticizes the WEU's (6+3)Associated Partner program as too  exclusive  and applaudsPFP as inclusive (Ukraine was one of the program's firstsignatories). Ukraine's main concern is that it mightbecome a buffer between the CBS and NATO. Hence,Ukraine would like NATO to broaden from a defense tocollective security organization; and NATO's relationswith Russia to remain cordial so that Russia is not isolated.Russia's demands forbidding NATO expansion to Ukraineand the Baltic states are a negative process.
***Belarus*** was neutral last year, but is now solidly underRussia's influence and closely follows the CBS. Thischange is not due to NATO enlargement, but to the factthat Russia is in the process of revival and Belarusnaturally falls within Russia's sphere of influence. Belarusrenegotiated its May 1993 treaty with Russia and is thelitmus test of Russia's policies in the Near Abroad. PFP isa multi-speed arrangement; for Central Europe PFP is aroute to membership and can provide an open door toRussia and Belarus. Democratic values should remain thebasic criteria for PFP; hence, PFP should not be blind toviolations in Russia and Belarus.
**How the Alliance Needs to Change**
***Political dimensions* of NATO enlargement include theneed to: (1) forge a new trans-Atlantic bargain (e.g.,Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF); (2) focus on NATO'sfive southern members (e.g., Mediterranean initiative); (3)organize relations with those partners not in the first waveof enlargement (e.g., NACC allows political cooperationand PAP military cooperation under Article 4); and (4) dealwith the likely new problems created by enlargement.Aspects of NATO enlargement involve not just protection,but also common values and the political motivation ofbelonging to the West. Further enlargement will be part ofbuilding a new security structure, but must not lead toNATO's dilution. New members cannot blackball othernew members (they must transcend the animositiesresulting from post-World War I Threonine and SaintGerman treaties).
***Military dimensions***of NATO enlargement require thatany new member should have full rights (e.g., Article 4out-of-area coalition operations and Article 5 collectivedefense obligations). NATO's Strategic Concept providesguidance for NATO's enlargement. We must expect minormilitary contingencies or ethnic problems and can assumelong warning times and pre-conflict stages to allowpolitical negotiation. Because NATO has smaller activeduty forces with rapid reaction forces, this creates differentrequirements for: mobilization of reserves, dispersion ofmilitary forces, and coordinating forces by the integratedmilitary structure. NATO must look at new adaptations forheadquarters, simplify command structures (perhaps alongthe lines of CJTF), re-examine theater air defenses andballistic missile defenses, and begin to modify DefensePlanning Questionnaires (DPQ) for partners forhumanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.
***Defense program requirements* of NATO enlargementare significant because Article 5 commitments requirecorresponding partner commitments and NATO must avoidhollow political commitments. If NATO enlarges to includethe four Visegrad states, it will take about twenty years insteady step-by-step efforts to upgrade new member forces.(It took between 1975-1995 to achieve Rationalization,Standardization, and Interoperability RSI for NATOforces.) If NATO helps the new members upgrade theirforces (at burden sharing rates of 50-50), the first ten-yearcosts are estimated to be on the order of $35 billion.Because new-member forces were in the Warsaw Pact,they will be difficult to harmonize with NATO. Hence,NATO must aim to operate its forces side-by-side withpartners, rather than intermeshing with them. In addition,not only do NATO forces need to be restructured for out-of-area force projection. Costs could escalate if we decidethat we need to deploy POMCUS sets, COBs, air bases,ground reception facilities, and training sites, and basesmall combat forces on the territory of new members.*******