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21–064 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–21

STRATEGIES FOR RESHAPING U.S. POLICY IN

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 1, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware ..................................... 77

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California ............................................. 98

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island ....................................... 96

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota ............................................ 90

Cordesman, Anthony H., Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke Fellow in Strategy, Center

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Iraq: Strategy Versus Metrics: The Case for Information-Based Policy ...... 12

‘‘Playing the Course:’’ A Strategy for Reshaping U.S. Policy in Iraq and

the Middle East ............................................................................................. 18

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut ................................ 87

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ..................................... 93

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 95

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska ................................................. 84

Khalil, Peter, Visiting Fellow, Saban Center for the Middle East Policy,

the Brookings Institution .................................................................................... 69

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana ............................................ 1

Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida .................................................... 100

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida ........................................................ 103

Newbold, Gregory S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Managing Director, Globesecnine ............................................................................... 60

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65

Voinovich, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared statement .............. 92

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Natsios, Andrew S., Administrator, USAID:

Letter to Senator Lugar ................................................................................... 118

Enclosure to letter: ‘‘USAID’s Iraq Reconstruction Program’’ ...................... 118

(III)

(1)

STRATEGIES FOR RESHAPING U.S. POLICY IN

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Voinovich,

Sununu, Martinez, Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and

Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. The Committee on Foreign Relations

meets for our first hearing on Iraq in the 109th Congress. In the

last Congress we held 23 hearings on Iraq, a level of scrutiny demanded by the critical impact that the progress in Iraq has on

United States national security.

The remarkable elections held in Iraq over the weekend demonstrated the courage and the commitment of the Iraqi people. Despite threats and acts of violence, reports indicate that millions of

Iraqis voted. The results will not be certified until February 15, but

there is little doubt that the election provides a basis for moving

forward with Iraqi self-government.

Most importantly, the election can strengthen the legitimacy of

Iraqi officials. The impact of having properly elected leaders in Iraq

for the first time could be substantial. Insurgents may find it

tougher to sell their propaganda that the government has no legitimacy and the United States is merely an occupying power. In addition, parties and groups in Iraq that participate in the government will have a growing stake in its success.

The election, however, does not guarantee that the path to democracy will be an easy one. The security situation in the Sunni

areas of Iraq will remain extremely tense. Protecting the newly

elected 275-member Transitional National Assembly must be a security priority. Methods also must be found to include Sunnis in

the government without being unfair to the winners of the election.

The Iraq election will be viewed by some as the first step in the

United States exit strategy, but we should recognize how much

work is left to be done. The coalition must assign priority to training Iraqi security forces. Ultimately, our success at training Iraqis

2

over time will determine how long United States forces will need

to be in Iraq. We must be prepared to provide stability while Iraqi

troops and police develop their capabilities, particularly during this

time of Constitution-building.

We must also be prepared for the Iraqi Government and the

Iraqi Constitution to develop in directions that are sometimes not

in perfect harmony with our expectations. The election moves the

Iraqis a step closer to achieving democracy, but that also means

that they will be making more decisions about their future. We anticipate and hope that the new government will work closely with

the United States and embrace democratic, pluralistic principles.

Inevitably, however, it will make some decisions that we do not

like.

Our Embassy in Iraq must work closely with the Iraqi Government to establish a positive counseling relationship. We also must

undertake a diplomatic offensive in the Middle East, Europe, and

elsewhere to encourage constructive relationships between the

Iraqi Government and other nations.

The President is reportedly seeking an additional $80 billion for

support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress should be

prepared to take up this proposal when it arrives and debate it soberly. We do not expect the request to include more infrastructure

reconstruction funds, but we do expect it will include money to

build and to operate the Embassy in Baghdad and to meet the urgent needs of training and equipping Iraqi security forces. Passage

of such a bill would be a strong signal to the world and to Iraq

about United States staying power.

We are pleased especially this morning to welcome back to the

committee Dr. Anthony Cordesman, holder of the Arleigh A. Burke

Chair for Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies. Dr. Cordesman has testified before this committee on

many occasions. We are grateful we can draw on his knowledge

once more today.

We also welcome retired Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, Managing

Director of GlobeSecNine and Executive Director of the Potomac

Institute of Policy Studies. Before retirement, General Newbold

was the Director for Operations on the Joint Staff.

Finally, we welcome Mr. Peter Khalil, who was the Director of

National Security Policy for the Coalition Provisional Authority in

Iraq from August 2003 to May 2004. He is now a Visiting Fellow

at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Today the committee will use Dr. Cordesman’s exceptional paper,

‘‘Playing the Course: A Strategy for Reshaping U.S. Policy in Iraq

and the Middle East,’’ to provide a framework for our discussion of

policy issues in Iraq. Following Dr. Cordesman’s testimony, the

committee will ask that General Newbold and Mr. Khalil provide

commentary and remarks on Dr. Cordesman’s conclusions and prescriptions.

The committee has taken no position on the contents of Dr.

Cordesman’s paper. Rather, it is our hope that by using this format, our members can have a more productive and focused dialogue with our witnesses.

3

When the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, arrives,

we will call upon him for his opening statement, but for the moment we’ll proceed with the testimony. Dr. Cordesman, would you

please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, PH.D., ARLEIGH A.

BURKE FELLOW IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you very much, Senator, and let me

thank the committee for the opportunity to testify. I think it is

clear that our strategy toward Iraq is today our most important

foreign policy issue and I hope the committee will forgive me if I

take just a few extra minutes to outline some of the views in ‘‘Playing the Course,’’ which I do request be included in the record.

In that paper, I pointed out that the odds of success in Iraq are

roughly even if we pursue the right policies and that the definition

of success is going to be a pluralistic Iraqi Government that can

work its way through years of difficulty without direct American

support and continuing large American military presence. But I

also pointed out that, while the United States must be prepared for

failure in Iraq, exiting is a tactic and it is not a strategy. It can

eliminate the costs of the war, it can eliminate casualties, but it

will inevitably create at least as many problems as it solves, unless

we exit under conditions that do define success. If we leave a legacy of political failure, chaos, or civil conflict in Iraq, that is not

a strategy.

Regardless of what we do, we will need to reassess and rebuild

our entire position in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, restructure our security policy and regional posture in the area, deal with

problems like energy and the problems of a nuclear Iran.

Let me also say that, while cut-and-run may ultimately be a necessity, it too is not a strategy. It is a massive defeat. That is why

I am going to argue that we really do need to do our best to salvage

the situation in Iraq. We should not stay at any cost. We should

not abandon Iraq as long as there is any hope of success.

I think, though, to understand what we can and cannot do in

Iraq we have to begin by admitting that we have to build on the

climate left by past mistakes, and I see nine major mistakes that

we now have to deal with. One is going to war on the basis of the

wrong intelligence and on the basis of a rationale we have not been

able to defend to the world or to the Iraqis.

The second is to bypass the inter-agency process during the planning and preparation for the war, which has left a legacy of difficulty in terms of intelligence, the role of State Department, and

civil-military relations.

The third is that we fought the war without any meaningful plan

for stability operations and nation-building and we allowed political

and economic chaos to take place as we advanced and in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s fall.

Fourth, we did not prepare our military forces for civil-military

missions, to develop human intelligence capabilities and deal with

terrorism and insurgency, to play the role of occupier in a nation

with an alien religion, language, and culture. As a result, we have

4

forced our military to adapt under pressure and in the face of a

growing enemy.

For a year we assumed that a proconsul in the form of CPA could

govern Iraq and plan its future rather than Iraqis, and we staffed

much of the CPA with inexperienced ideologues, many of which

spent virtually all of their time in a secure enclave and on 3- to

6-month tours. For a year we developed idealized plans for political

reform that did not survive engagement with reality, and we focused far too much on national elections and drafting a constitution

and not on effective governance. For a year we had military leadership that would not work closely with the leadership of the CPA,

and we lived in a state of denial about the level of popular hostility

we faced and a growing insurgency. For a year we made no effort

to create effective military, security, and police forces that could

stand on their own in dealing with the growing insurgency, terrorism, and lawlessness. Instead, we saw such forces largely as a

potential threat to our idealized democracy and felt our forces could

easily defeat an insurgency of some 5 to 6,000 former regime loyalists.

Finally, for a year we tried to deal with an Iraqi economy that

was a command kleptocracy as if it could quickly and easily be converted to a modern market-driven economy. Again, we sent in far

too many advisers with no real area expertise and with far too little continuity. We created a long-term aid plan without a meaningful understanding or survey of the economic problems Iraq faced,

without an understanding of Iraq’s immediate needs and expectations, and without the talent in either the United States Government or the contract community to implement such a plan or to develop the kinds of plans and programs that should have been focused on the short- and medium-term requirement that Iraq actually needed.

Many of the problems we face could have been avoided and I

think it is to the credit of the people in Iraq today that the past

does not have to be the prologue to the future. We have moved Iraq

policy beyond the policy cluster in the Pentagon, we have weakened

the hold of neoconservatives and we have begun to implement a serious inter-agency approach. We now have an ambassador and a

general that can work together and function as a civil-military

team. We have given sovereignty to the Iraqis and let them take

over the political process. We have begun to accept the true complexity of the political problems in Iraq and the level of popular

hostility and tension we face.

We have reorganized the U.S. and coalition military posture to

fight a serious counterinsurgency and counterterrorist war. In fact,

we have begun to rethink our entire process of force transformation

to focus on these threats. We have begun to train Iraqi military,

security, and police forces for the threat they actually face and not

for a secure, stable, and democratic world.

We have, at least partially, understood that our initial aid plans

were unrealistic and that priority has to be given to short- and medium-term stability and to using dollars as a substitute for bullets.

We have also begun to understand that USAID in Washington is

incompetent in dealing with the challenge it faces, that outside conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
5

tractors cannot manage an effective aid program in Iraq, and that

dollars need to go to Iraqis and not outsiders.

We need to give the Americans now serving in Iraq, and especially the civilians and military in the field, credit for these

changes. But more does need to be done. When we talk about this,

one problem we face is the lack of meaningful reporting coming out

of the U.S. Government on the nature of what is happening in the

military program, in the insurgency, and in the economic aid program.

Mr. Chairman, I have put a short paper together on the metrics

that should be provided and I ask again that this be included in

the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in the record.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, sir.

I do believe, however, that there are clearly five steps we do need

to take and that these steps could increase our chances of success

well beyond 50–50 during the coming year. First, we need to do everything we can to demonstrate the independence of the emerging

Iraqi political structure, while encouraging inclusiveness and some

form of federalism and while moving beyond a focus on elections

and the constitution and providing the full range of support for

governance that is needed in the field and outside the Green Zone.

We cannot measure legitimacy in terms of elections. Iraqis do

not. They measure it in terms of the ability to govern, to give all

Iraqis a fair share of wealth and power, to provide personal security, employment, and economic opportunity in terms of education

and health service and basic utilities. They also measure it in

terms of the ability of their government to disagree with the

United States and the coalition, to act independently, and to take

over the kind of roles that an independent government must perform. They look for our cooperation in terms of international institutions as well as within the process of the coalition.

Our fascination with elections needs to be matched with a focus

on aiding governance, while we steadily phase down high-level

intervention and pressure on the Iraqi Government. Every other

thing we do will fail if the Iraqis cannot stand alone and visibly

do so. We cannot save a government from itself and we will destroy

it if we try to do so.

Second, we need a clear plan to create the kind of independent

Iraqi military, security, and police forces that can replace United

States and coalition forces except when they are needed in an advisory role. We do not have 127,000 useful or meaningful men in today’s forces. We have somewhere around 7 to 11,000 that are beginning to have the necessary training and some of the equipment

to deal with an active counterinsurgency campaign and the threat

they face. We have something like two to three battalions today

that can actually stand alone in the face of a serious insurgent attack. The first battalion with the kind of armor necessary to survive serious attack went into service on the 15th of January and

its first actual appearance was during the course of the elections.

I prepared a detailed analysis of what has gone wrong and right

with this effort and if I may impose on the committee I again ask

that it be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in the record.

6

Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, sir.

The key point in this analysis, however, is simple: Once again,

we will fail in Iraq unless we develop a convincing plan to create

Iraqi forces with the leadership, experience, equipment, and facilities they need to secure their country without us and actually implement it. This is the sine qua non for American action and there

is no more devastating critique of the ongoing failures in United

States policy than the lack of such a plan in a public forum if one

exists at all; a plan that will show the Iraqi people, the region, the

Congress, and the American people that we can actually achieve a

meaningful form of victory in Iraq.

Let me say here too that equipment and facilities are not a casual issue and they are a major problem in all of the public reporting on our progress to date. We do not see any indication that

Iraqis are being given any of the equipment we see as vital to actually conduct operations in high threat areas. In fact, as an American I often find it contemptible that we so often criticize Iraqi

forces for their behavior when they send them out to isolated facilities that cannot be protected or in vehicles without armor or protection when we talk about up-armoring HMMV’s or replacing

them with M–113’s.

I find it equally strange that we do not report on Iraqi casualties

and that we do not treat their losses as being important in the way

we treat ours. If I may ask an obvious question, would any Senator

or Congressman send their son or daughter out with the vehicles,

with the combat equipment, and into the facilities where we send

Iraqis? Would they expect them to stay, to defend and operate

under these conditions?

Third, we need to complete the reorganization of our aid effort,

to focus on bringing short- and near-term stability in dealing with

the counterinsurgency campaign. Let me make it clear, I have

nothing but respect for the USAID and contract personnel in the

field, who have actually implemented useful projects and often

done so at the risk of their lives. I also appreciate that the almost

mindless focus on long-term aid efforts that shaped our initial aid

request has been replaced with substantial reprogramming. However, anyone who looks at the USAID web page sees nothing but

a long list of plans and project efforts that are not tied to any

meaningful measures of effectiveness or to any defendable requirements.

USAID seems to live in a Panglossian fantasy world where no

problems and challenges really exist and no public strategy plans

and metrics of success are needed. We need economic stability for

a nation of nearly 26 million people with an infrastructure better

suited to 16 to 18 million. We need jobs for a 7.8-million-person

workforce that now has at least 30 to 40 percent unemployment.

What we have is an aid program based on American decisions

about what is necessary, run largely by foreign contractors, with

far too much money going to non-Iraqis, much of it to protect

projects that end up being sabotaged or dysfunctional.

The good news is we have only disbursed about $2.5 billion out

of the $18.4 billion in fiscal 2004 aid. The bad news is that money

desperately needed to be spent. What we have seen is an aid program that hires all of 121,000 Iraqis out of a labor force of 7.8 milVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
7

lion and where the total of Iraqis hired under the aid program has

recently been dropping by about 9,000 Iraqis a week.

I would urge this committee to demand an immediate appearance by the director of USAID to explain the details of our aid program, to provide a clear plan for transferring funds and responsibility to the Iraqi government, to show how our projects meet valid

requirements, and to prove that USAID’s leadership is competent.

Unless he can meet every such test, that leadership should be

changed and the aid program should immediately be transferred to

more competent hands.

Fourth, we need a clear declaration of our goals and principles

for Iraq. We need clear and unambiguous statements from the

President and Secretary of State that refute the key conspiracy

theories that poison our relations and undercut the legitimacy of

the Iraqi government. To be specific, we need a clear statement

from the President that we will leave the moment the Iraqi government asks us to, that we will phase our forces down as soon as Iraq

forces are ready to do the job, that we will not maintain permanent

military bases, that we will not exploit Iraqi oil wealth or the economy, and that we will shift our aid funds to Iraq control and to

benefit Iraqis, insisting only that the uses be validated and there

be no corruption or waste.

Fifth, we need to have a regional strategy to support what we do

in Iraq. We must give settling the Arab-Israeli conflict top priority

and make our efforts fully visible. We must act through the Quartet whenever we can. In spite of our intervention in Iraq, survey

after survey shows there is no single issue which causes more

anger toward the United States than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or does more to aid extremists and terrorists like bin Laden

than the lack of visible high-level United States efforts to revitalize

the peace process and the perception that the United States fights

terrorism, but does nothing to halt settlements and occupation.

I do not for a moment advocate we halt any aspect of our struggle against terrorism or do anything to compromise the security of

Israel. But we can only adopt the right policies toward Iraq if we

adopt the right policies toward the Arab-Israel conflict.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we also need to have a strategy that

deals with the gulf region and with the Middle East that goes beyond rhetoric about democracy and reform. Far too much of our recent rhetoric has actually been used by our opponents to argue that

we seek to overthrow governments in the region or to impose our

own leadership. What we need now are practical, country by country efforts to quietly and steadily support the reformers in those

countries, not noisy outside exiles. We need to press for achievable

evolutionary progress steadily and without pause. We need to give

human rights, the rule of law, economic reform, and demographic

reform the same priority as democracy. And we need to recognize

that democracy cannot work unless there are meaningful political

parties and preparation for democracy to work.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement and related material of Dr. Cordesman

follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE FELLOW IN

STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Several months ago, I laid out the basic elements of a strategy for dealing with

Iraq in an analysis which I called ‘‘Playing the Course’’—a paper that I now request

be placed in the record of this hearing

In doing so, I pointed out that the odds of success in Iraq are at best even—if

one accepts the fact that in the real world the only definition of success we can actually hope to achieve is some form of pluralistic Iraqi government that can work its

way through years of political and economic difficulty without direct American military support.

AN EXIT IS NOT A STRATEGY

I also pointed out that the U.S. must be prepared for failure in Iraq, but that

exiting is a tactic and not a strategy. Exiting Iraq would eliminate U.S. casualties

and the cost of war fighting, but create as many or more problems as it solves.

Leaving a legacy of political failure, chaos, or civil conflict in Iraq is not a strategy.

A strategy means that we must reassess and rebuild our entire position in the

Middle East and Southwest Asia, restructure our security policy and regional posture in an area with some 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves, deal with what

Islamist extremism will claim as a massive victory, cope with a nuclear Iran, and

find some way to reestablish credibility in the world.

‘‘Cut and run’’ may become a necessity, but it can never be a strategy; only a massive defeat.

This is why I have argued that we must do our best to salvage the situation in

Iraq, and to correct our past mistakes. We should not do this at any cost; but we

should not abandon Iraq as long as there is any serious hope of success.

FACING THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR OWN MISTAKES

We also should recognize that we are where we are today as much because of

nearly two years of avoidable failures in U.S. policy and leadership as because of

the inherent difficulties in helping Iraq become a stable and successful nation.

In summary, we have made nine major mistakes:

• We went to war on the basis of the wrong intelligence and with a rationale we

could not defend to the world or the Iraqis.

• We bypassed the Interagency process. We ignored warning after warning by

U.S. intelligence experts, State Department officials, military officers with experience in the region, and outside experts that we would not be greeted as liberators fighting a just war, but by a highly nationalistic and divided people who

did not want outsiders and occupiers to determine their destiny.

• We fought the war to remove Saddam from power without any meaningful plan

for stability operations and nation building. We allowed political and economic

chaos to take place as we advanced and in the immediate aftermath of

Saddam’s fall.

• We did not prepare our military forces for civil-military missions, to deal with

terrorism and insurgency, to play the role of occupier in a nation with an alien

religion, language and culture, or have the mix of HUMINT and weapons they

needed for the ‘‘war after the war.’’ As a result, we forced our military to slowly

adapt under pressure and in the face of a growing enemy.

• For a year, we assumed that a proconsul in the form of the CPA could govern

Iraq and plan its future, rather than Iraqis. We staffed much of the CPA with

inexperienced political appointees and ideologues that spent virtually all of

their time in a secure enclave and only served for brief three to six month tours.

• For a year, we developed idealized plans for political reform that did not survive

engagement with reality. We focused far too much on national elections and

drafting a constitution without having a similar focus on effective governance

at the national, regional, and local levels.

• For a year, we had military leadership in Iraq that would not work closely with

the leadership of the CPA, and which lived in a state of denial about the level

of popular hostility we faced and a steadily growing insurgency.

• For a year, we made no serious attempt to create Iraqi military, security, and

police forces that could stand on their own in dealing with a growing insurgency, terrorism, and lawlessness. Instead, we saw such Iraq forces largely as

a potential threat to our idealized democracy and felt our forces could easily defeat an insurgency of 5,000–6,000 former regime loyalists.

9

• For a year, we tried to deal with an Iraqi economy that was a command

kleptocracy as if it could be quickly and easily converted to a modern marketdriven economy. We sent in CPA advisors with no real experience and no continuity. We created a ridiculous long-term aid plan without a meaningful understanding or survey of the economic problems Iraq faced, an understanding of

Iraqi needs and expectations, and the talent in either the U.S. government or

the contract community to implement such a plan or develop the kind of plans

and programs focused on short and medium-term requirements that Iraq actually needed.

THE PAST DOES NOT HAVE TO BE PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE

This past does not have to be a prologue to the future. During 2004, we began

to correct many of our past mistakes.

• We have moved Iraqi policy beyond the disastrous policy cluster in the Pentagon, weakened the hold of failed neoconservatives, and begun to implement

a serious Interagency approach.

• We have an ambassador and a commander that can work together, and much

more of a true civil-military team. We still lack the civilian elements that can

support nation building in high-threat areas, but the U.S. military has found

ways to partially compensate.

• We have given sovereignty to the Iraqis and let them take over the political

process.

• We have gradually accepted the true complexity of the political problems in

Iraq, the level of popular hostility we and our forces face, and the seriousness

of the insurgent threat.

• We have reorganized the U.S. and Coalition military posture in Iraq to fight

a serious counterinsurgency and counterterrorist war, and we have begun to

rethink our entire process of force transformation to shift from a Cold War focus

on advanced technology to fight conventional forces to one that can deal with

the very different asymmetric, political, and ideological threats we actually face.

• We have begun to train Iraqi military, security, and police forces for the threat

they actually face, and not for a perfect secure, stable, and democratic world.

• We have partially understood that our aid plans were totally unrealistic, and

that priority must be given to short and medium term stability and to using

dollars as a substitute and supplement to bullets. We have at least begun to

understand that USAID in Washington cannot deal with the challenge it faces,

that outside contractors cannot manage an effective aid program in Iraq, and

that dollars need to go to Iraqis and not outsiders.

We need to give the Americans now in Iraq—and especially the civilians and military actually in the field outside the Green Zone—full credit for these changes. They

have not stood idly by, failed to adapt, or failed to challenge the many failures in

leadership they received from Washington.

America’s ‘‘neoconservatives’’ may be an unmitigated national disaster in shaping

policy towards Iraq, and in virtually every other aspect of foreign policy they have

managed to affect. We have seen, however, that realists, true area experts, and

adaptive military professionals can produce far better answers and have already

begun to compensate for many of our past mistakes.

WHAT MUST BE DONE

The question now is what must be done to reinforce the steps we have already

taken.

I should stress that my proposed answers have had to be formulated in a climate

where there is remarkably little realistic U.S. government reporting of the metrics

necessary to understand the true nature of the insurgency.

We have little meaningful data on the results of our efforts to create effective

Iraqi forces, the economic problems Iraq faces, and the actual impact of our aid. We

have substituted self-serving polls to justify our positions rather than to seriously

and objectively poll Iraqi perceptions.

I have prepared a short paper on what needs to be done to improve the quality

of the reporting to the American people and the Congress, and again, I request that

it be included in the record.

Yet, I believe that enough data are available to show that there are five steps that

might well increase our chances of success well beyond the 50–50 level, and that

clearly need to be taken immediately if we are to move towards success during the

coming year:

10

• We must do everything we can to demonstrate the independence of the emerging

Iraqi political structure while encouraging inclusiveness and some form of federalism, and aiding in the process of governance.

Our fascination with elections needs to be matched with a practical focus on aiding governance while we steadily phase down any high level intervention or pressure on the Iraqi government.

Iraqis do not measure legitimacy primarily in terms of elections. They measure

it in terms of the actual ability to govern, to give all Iraqis a fair share of wealth

and power, to provide personal security, to provide employment and economic opportunity, to furnish education and health services, and to provide water, electricity

and sewers.

They also measure legitimacy in terms of the ability of an Iraqi government to

implement independent policies, to disagree with the U.S. and outside powers, and

visibly take decisions without anyone looking over the Iraqi government’s shoulder.

We cannot cease to advise, but we must cease to impose. Where outside support

is needed, it also will always be better if it comes from the U.N., the British, or

some broader international effort and not from unilateral action by the U.S.

Every other thing we do will fail if the Iraqis cannot stand alone and visibly do

so. We cannot save a government from itself, and we will destroy it if we try to do

so.

• We need a clear plan to create the kind of independent Iraqi military, security, and

police forces that can replace the U.S. and Coalition forces except when they are

needed in an advisory role.

We need to stop lying to the Iraqis, the American people, and the world about

our efforts to create Iraqi forces.

We do not have 127,000 useful or meaningful men in these forces of the kind

needed to fight an aggressive, experienced, and well-armed threat. We have somewhere around 7–11,000 that are beginning to have the training and some of the

equipment necessary to directly engage insurgent forces. We have about two to

three battalions that can honestly stand alone in the face of serious insurgent attack, and the first battalion with the armor necessary to survive went into service

in mid-January.

I have prepared a detailed analysis of what has gone wrong and right with this

effort, and again, I ask that it be included in the record. The key point of this analysis, however, is simple: Everything we do in Iraq will fail unless we develop a convincing plan to create Iraqi forces with the leadership, experience, equipment, and

facilities they need to secure their country without us and actually implement it.

Creating effective Iraqi forces to replace the Coalition forces is the sine qua non

for American action. There is no more devastating critique of the ongoing failures

in U.S. policy than the lack of such a plan in public form—if one exists at all. Furthermore, it must be a plan that shows the Iraqi people, the region, and the Congress and American people that we can achieve a meaningful form of victory in Iraq.

Equipment and facilities are not a casual issue. Nothing we have done to date

has begun to be adequate. In fact, as an American, I find it contemptible that we

so often criticize Iraqi forces for their behavior when we send them out to facilities

that cannot be protected in unprotected vehicles that no American would willingly

use with weapons inferior to their enemies. We then refuse to accurately report

Iraqi casualties along with our own, treating their losses as less significant than

ours.

Would any Senator or Congressman send their son or daughter out under these

conditions if they were Iraqi? Would any member of Congress expect their son or

daughter to stand and die without purpose?

The time has come for the Administration to explain exactly how our current

plans will meet the need for strong and independent Iraqi forces, and when Iraqi

forces will be given the equipment, facilities, and capabilities they really need to defeat the insurgents on their own.

• We need to complete the reorganization of our aid effort to focus on bringing shortand near-term stability and to support the counterinsurgency campaign, and seriously consider replacing USAID’s leadership of the Iraq aid effort.

Politics, governance, and security are critical, but so are economics. We need a

program to meet Iraq’s immediate economic needs, to help bring security, and that

is run and implemented by Iraqis in ways that provide virtually all of the money

to Iraqis.

Let me make it clear that I have nothing but respect for those USAID and contract personnel in the field in Iraq who have actually implemented useful projects,

and done so at the risk of their lives. Many have become combatant ‘‘noncombatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
11

ants’’ in a world where armed peacekeeping, nation building, and humanitarian

intervention have become all too common.

I also appreciate the fact that the almost mindless focus on long-term aid efforts

that shaped our initial aid requests has been replaced with substantial reprogramming for short-term projects that meet Iraqi needs, give the money to Iraqis, bring

stability and support security efforts.

Anyone who looks at the USAID web page, however, sees nothing but a long list

of plans and project efforts that are not tied to measures of effectiveness or defendable requirements. USAID in Washington seems to live in a Panglossian fantasy

world where no problems and challenges really exist and no public strategy, plans,

and metrics of success are needed.

We need economic stability for a nation of nearly 26 million people whose overall

infrastructure is better suited to 16–18 million. We need jobs for a 7.8-million-person Iraqi work force that now has 30–40% unemployment. What we still have is an

aid program based on American decisions about what is necessary run largely by

foreign contractors with far too much money going to non-Iraqis—much simply to

protect projects that end up being sabotaged or dysfunctional.

The good news is that we have so far only disbursed $2.5 billion out of $18.4 billion in FY2004 aid. The bad news is that the money is desperately needed in Iraq,

and that our projects only hire around 121,000 workers out of a work force of 7.8

million and the total has recently dropped by 8,000–10,000 a week.

I would urge this Committee to demand an immediate appearance by the Director

of USAID to explain the details of our aid program to Iraq, to provide a clear plan

for transferring the funds and responsibility to the Iraqi government, to show we

actually know how well our projects met valid requirements, and prove that

USAID’s leadership is competent.

If he cannot answer these questions to the Committee’s satisfaction, the aid program in Iraq should immediately be transferred to different hands.

• We need a clear declaration of our goals and principles. We do not need declarations of American values or general good intentions.

We need clear and unambiguous statements from the President and Secretary of

State that refute the key conspiracy theories that poison our relations and undercut

the legitimacy of the Iraqi government.

To be specific, we need a clear statement from the President that we will leave

the moment the Iraqi government asks us to; that we will phase down our forces

as soon as Iraqi forces are ready to do the job; that we will not maintain any permanent military bases; that we will not exploit Iraqi oil wealth or economy in any way;

and that we are shifting our aid funds to Iraqi control and to benefit Iraqis—insisting only that the uses be validated and there be no corruption and waste.

These are obvious points, but we have either made them poorly, in passing, or

at too low a level to be meaningful.

• Finally, we must give settling the Arab-Israeli conflict top priority, make our efforts

fully visible, and seek to act through the Quartet of the U.S., EU, U.N., and Russia

wherever possible.

In spite of our intervention in Iraq, no single issue creates more anger and hostility towards the U.S., or does more to aid extremists and terrorists like bin Laden,

than the lack of visible, high-level U.S. efforts to revitalize the peace process and

the perception that the U.S. fights terrorism but does nothing to halt settlements

and ‘‘occupation.’’

We must not halt our struggle against terrorism, or do anything to compromise

the security of Israel. We can only establish credibility in Iraq, the Arab world, and

Islamic world, however, if we both adopt the right polices towards Iraq and towards

the Arab-Israeli conflict, and if we show the same balance in our dealings with

Israel and the Palestinians as we did at Camp David and Tabah.

PLANNING FOR WITHDRAWAL

Let me conclude by saying that neither the positive actions we have taken during

2004, nor the proposals I have just made can guarantee success. We are beginning

late and we have wasted precious time we did not have. Success was always uncertain, and the idea Iraq would suddenly emerge as a success that would transform

the Middle East was always a fantasy that did little more than prove just how decoupled from reality America’s ‘‘neoconservatives’’ could be.

We may well have to leave Iraq without achieving the limited definition of success

I gave at the beginning of this testimony. If an elected Iraqi government asks us

to leave, we must do so as quickly and with as much integrity as possible. The same

12

is true if we are asked to compromise our military effectiveness or the integrity of

our aid process.

Failure is an option, and will scarcely be the only time the U.S. has faced defeat.

Abandonment, however, is not an option. If we are forced to leave Iraq, we should

not do so in bitterness or in anger. We should be prepared to offer aid and assistance. We should make it clear that we will do what we can regardless of the circumstances. As Vietnam and China have shown, history endures long beyond anger

and frustration, and so do our vital strategic interests.

In any case, even under the best conditions, we must leave in the next two to

three years, and as soon as Iraqi forces can replace us. This is not a choice. Being

an advisor and a friend is both possible and desirable. However, no policy in Iraq,

this region, or the world can succeed where the U.S. seeks to keep bases or remains

an ‘‘occupier.’’

We need to prepare for this contingency now, and the key to that preparation is

two fold: • First, it is to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in ways that can ease the

anger against us in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and ultimately give Israel true

security. • Second, it is to rebuild and strengthen our relations with the Southern Gulf

states and our other allies in the Arab world.

This second key to success is the subject for another hearing, but that we need

to act now to make it clear that we will ensure the security of our Southern Gulf

allies in every way we can regardless of what happens in Iraq. We will not withdraw; we will not leave them without protection against a nuclear Iran; and we fully

understand how vital they are at a time when 40% of all the world’s oil exports pass

daily through the Strait of Hormuz and our Department of Energy projects that that

percentage will raise to nearly 60% by 2025.

Finally, it would be to our vast benefit if the Administration and the Congress

government could be far more cautious about talking about political reform and democracy in ways our enemies use to say we seek to overthrow governments in the

region and impose our own leaders. What we need are practical country-by-country

efforts to quietly and steadily support the reformers actually in those countries—

not noisy outside exiles.

We need to press for achievable evolutionary progress. We need to give human

rights, the rule of law, economic reform, and demographic reform at least the same

priority as democracy, and we need to recognize that democracy cannot work without meaningful political parties and preparation.

To be blunt, we need a lot less lofty rhetoric, and a lot more pragmatic action.

We need country-by-country strategies and plans that move progressively towards

balanced and stable reform. We need country teams in each Embassy that can work

with both friendly governments and local reformers on a quiet and steady evolutionary basis. We need to work with regional experts and media, our allies, and international institutions.

We don’t need slogans; we need meaningful action.

IRAQ: STRATEGY VERSUS METRICS: THE CASE FOR INFORMATION-BASED POLICY

It is as easy to propose a strategy for Iraq as it is easy to have a strong opinion.

The problem is to substantiate any such strategy with something approaching facts.

At this point, ‘‘experts’’ are proposing everything from quick withdrawal to staying

the course regardless of cost. The practical reality, however, is that ‘‘experts’’ must

rely on media reports; unclassified, public relations-oriented government data; or

sheer seat of the pants guesswork.

1. A FLOOD OF OPINION; A DROUGHT OF FACT

No one who served during Vietnam can fail to notice that there has been a polarization of the information people do choose to use out of the limited information

available. Those who oppose the war and continued intervention choose every negative press report convenient to their case. The supporters of the war ‘‘mirror image’’

the opponents by choosing the favorable data.

The U.S. government has responded by suppressing past reporting that has

proved to be embarrassing, and by avoiding reporting information that might be

negative and ‘‘spinning’’ data. This bias in official reporting is compounded by operational problems. Streams of individual data requests hit overburdened military and

civilian staffs on the scene without any coherence and coordination. The end result

is no time for structured data collection and reporting, plus the feeling such exercises are a waste of time.

13

The end result is confusion, rather than insight. The problem for policy making

is not a lack of strategies, it is a lack of facts. It is the lack of metrics that can

shed some light on what is really happening and the level of progress, problems,

and risk.

Granted, no war ever has perfect metrics, but it would be far easier to know what

strategy the U.S. should propose if an objective effort was made to pull together the

data that are available in ways that would allow some coupling between strategy

and a knowledge of the facts on the ground.

2. LOOKING AT GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS

The elections to come will help provide a much better picture of the level of polarization and religious alignment of the Arab Shi’ites; Arab Sunnis, Kurds, and other

minorities. The elections in the governorates will also be useful, and will the postelection power brokering and new allotment of government positions.

Metrics of governance, however, may be more useful than metrics of politics.

• One key indicator of stability in Iraq is to map where the government is in full

control, where it has a limited or insecure presence, and where it is largely absent or ineffective. It is obvious that in at least four provinces, the Iraqi government is only partially functioning.

• Maps by governorate and city that show the scale of the insurgency are key measures of the level of risk and improvement/decline—this is particularly true if

such maps show the population in the area involved. It is obvious that in some

half-secure areas, the government does not meet a key test from Vietnam days,

it cannot operate at night or when insurgents are in the area.

• Similar mapping of government services adds meaning to the security test. Secure police presence is one key test. Ability to make government offices secure

and functional is another.

• It is equally important to map out the actual distribution of key government

services like pensions, economic aid, office services, etc. Most Iraqis, like most

people in the world, need government services every day. Elections and politics

are an episodic luxury.

All of the above options would be more effective if there was a census. The rough

estimates that say the population is 60% Shi’ite, 20% Sunni, 15% Kurd, and 5%

other are guesstimates first made over a decade ago. Having an accurate picture of

the ethnic and sectarian mix would greatly aid in understanding how the insurgency tracks relative to such factors, as well as the true nature of the population

size in threatened areas.

3. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Sophisticated, properly structured public opinion polls can be of great value in understanding Iraqi views and needs. Public opinion polls based on small samples

using limited questionnaires are little more than statistical drivel. The sample base

may be ‘‘statistically valid’’ within a limited range of percentage error in the mathematical sense, but far too often, the methodology and results are empirically absurd.

The sample base in many recent polls is far too small and excludes too many

areas and insurgents. Moreover results that cannot be broken out by area, ethnicity,

religion, and social background lump together so many disparate groups that they

provide few insights or no controls on who is really being surveyed with any adequacy.

The answer, however, is not to avoid public opinion polls. It is rather to see them

as a critical metric worth funding at a high level of repeated activity with as much

data on given localities and areas, and as much data on attitudes by ethnicity and

sect as possible. Some past polls have provided much of the scope for this, but few

recent polls seem to have made such an effort or to have credible transparency. A

key metric is being ignored or misused.

A key tool is being misused or not used at all.

4. MAPPING WARFIGHTING

It is obvious that the U.S. government is making steadily more detailed classified

efforts to understand the patterns in the fighting and the nature insurgents at a

time what it has virtually suppressed all meaningful public reporting. Its daily incident reports are no longer made available on background; the Iraqi government no

longer provides meaningful public estimates of Iraqi casualties, and even the broad

monthly incident totals vary so much from U.S. spokesman to U.S. spokesman that

they seem to have uncertain credibility.

14

There are several types of summary reporting that would provide far more insight

into the nature of the conflict, some of which the U.S. provided on a background

basis until the fall of 2004:

• Providing daily incident breakouts by type and effect by major city and

governorate with national totals. These data were available in the past. Their

censorship does not build confidence; simply confusion.

• Providing meaningful casualty reports by location, cause, and for all those being

attacked by category. The totals of U.S. killed and wounded are an important

measure, but totals are no substitute for pattern analysis by location and cause.

It is also a serious reflection on the U.S. that it does not provide any meaningful reporting on Iraqi government, military, police, and civilian casualties, much

less the kind of pattern and trend analysis that would help show what is happening in the war.

• Reporting on insurgent captures and kills. This again needs to be by

governorate and major city, and show the nationality and ethic/religious character of those involved where possible.

• Estimates of insurgent strength by group and location. These do not have to be

precise, but would both show the scope of the threat, and whether progress is

estimated to be made in defeating it. The inevitable lack of precision is not an

embarrassment, it is a warning.

• Summaries of U.S./Coalition military action. Like all of the metrics suggested

these should not be so precise as to risk compromising operational security. The

various press releases, however, give no picture of the level of overall military

activity or activity by region, and no picture of the level of intensity in operations or the resulting trends.

5. REALISTIC METRICS FOR PROGRESS IN CREATING EFFECTIVE IRAQI MILITARY,

SECURITY, AND POLICE FORCES

U.S. efforts to create capable cadres of effective Iraqi military, security, and police

forces seem to be gathering momentum at a time that the U.S. has again suppressed virtually all meaningful reporting. Some areas where meaningful metric

would be extremely useful are:

• Combat effective military, security, and police forces in terms of manning and

unit strength: The kind of meaningless totals for training and equipped manpower now being issued produce misleading totals with no correlation to war

fighting or self defense capability. Leadership and quality are the issue.

• Capable forces versus goals over time: The key projection for strategy is how

many effective forces will be created over time, and is there a stable set of goals

to measure progress by.

• Trained manpower by service/type of force showing different levels of training:

‘‘Trained’’ becomes milspeak for ‘‘meaningless’’ when it is not tied to a clear definition of exactly what training is involved.

• Equipped by type of equipment: Like ‘‘trained,’’ ‘‘equipped’’ is meaningless when

there are no data defining what this means, and whether it meets valid requirements. For example, send Iraqis out in unarmored vehicles is not a winning

move if the U.S. needs uparmored Humvees.

• Facility metrics: Sending men into soft or undefendable facilities is a way to either get them killed or see them break if attacked. Metrics of the adequacy of

facilities are as important as metrics of equipment levels.

• Patterns in casualties, and in desertions and defections: These are simple

metrics of how well the Iraqi forces are, or are not, doing.

• Chronologies and maps of Iraqi force engagements and outcome: These display

how well the Iraqis fight.

6. ECONOMIC MAPPING

This may be a need for nation wide economic data focused on long term planning

in the future. To have a future, however, the government and Coalition needs detailed economic mapping that looks at jobs, economic activity, and how aid is flowing

by major city, by governorate, and by key area.

It often will not be possible to assemble comparable or complete data, but this is

not operationally necessary. A mosaic of disparate data will often red flag key problems and areas. Unemployment, access to health care, and functioning education are

key metric. So are power, sanitation, water, and secure roads. The breakdown of

past existing services in any area is a major warning.

There are critical overlays to such data that help measure the realities in the war:

15

• Mapping sabotage and economic attacks. Iraqi officials have issued guesstimates like a $10 billion loss to sabotage. Incident records need to be used to take a

hard look at economic impacts of both insurgent and Coalition action. Sabotage

that deprives areas or services, cuts or restricts nation building, and hits at key

revenues or economic activity needs to be mapped and analyzed. The economic

impact of the war should be known. • Understanding the value and impact of aid. From the start, the public reporting

by USAID has been a self-congratulatory sick joke. Even the FSU only counted

actual project starts as success. Even the Communist system was not bold

enough to count funds obligated or contracts signed as progress. Aid is a key

weapon in counterinsurgency, but the real metrics for judging its success are:

• How well Iraqi expectations and requirements are being met, not simply

whether things are as good or better than under Saddam, and by area and

by group of Iraqis—not by some national total. • How money is being dispersed in the field by location, and particularly in

high threat or insurgent areas. • How sustainable project completions are in terms of surviving attack and continuing to function to meet a need once ‘‘completed.’’

• Linking aid to counterinsurgency impacts. The reprogramming of aid has tied

substantial funds to local efforts to use dollars as a substitute for bullets. Mapping this short term aid flow in insurgent areas is a metric of how aid impacts

on warfighting.

7. THE LIMITS OF DATA

One final, and hopefully obvious, point needs to be made about the above suggestions. A flood data may produce a flood of analysis but there is no reason it should

produce a flood of wisdom. Every metric suggested above has limits and can produce

confusing and sometimes contradictory result. No one set of metrics is likely to be

decisive, and trend analysis will be critical.

Nevertheless, any one who has to analyze the current insurgency in Iraq has to

be struck by how many strong opinions have been built on so weak a foundation

of facts.

IRAQ: STRATEGY VERSUS METRICS: THE CASE FOR INFORMATION-BASED POLICY

It is as easy to propose a strategy for Iraq as it is easy to have a strong opinion.

The problem is to substantiate any such strategy with something approaching facts.

At this point, ‘‘experts’’ are proposing everything from quick withdrawal to staying

the course regardless of cost. The practical reality, however, is that ‘‘experts’’ must

rely on media reports; unclassified, public relations-oriented government data; or

sheer seat of the pants guesswork.

1. A FLOOD OF OPINION; A DROUGHT OF FACT

No one who served during Vietnam can fail to notice that there has been a polarization of the information people do choose to use out of the limited information

available. Those who oppose the war and continued intervention choose every negative press report convenient to their case. The supporters of the war ‘‘mirror image’’

the opponents by choosing the favorable data.

The U.S. government has responded by suppressing past reporting that has

proved to be embarrassing, and by avoiding reporting information that might be

negative and ‘‘spinning’’ data. This bias in official reporting is compounded by operational problems. Streams of individual data requests hit overburdened military and

civilian staffs on the scene without any coherence and coordination. The end result

is no time for structured data collection and reporting, plus the feeling such exercises are a waste of time.

The end result is confusion, rather than insight. The problem for policy making

is not a lack of strategies, it is a lack of facts. It is the lack of metrics that can

shed some light on what is really happening and the level of progress, problems,

and risk.

Granted, no war ever has perfect metrics, but it would be far easier to know what

strategy the U.S. should propose if an objective effort was made to pull together the

data that are available in ways that would allow some coupling between strategy

and a knowledge of the facts on the ground.

2. LOOKING AT GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS

The elections to come will help provide a much better picture of the level of polarization and religious alignment of the Arab Shi’ites; Arab Sunnis, Kurds, and other

16

minorities. The elections in the governorates will also be useful, and will the postelection power brokering and new allotment of government positions.

Metrics of governance, however, may be more useful than metrics of politics.

• One key indicator of stability in Iraq is to map where the government is in full

control, where it has a limited or insecure presence, and where it is largely absent or ineffective. It is obvious that in at least four provinces, the Iraqi government is only partially functioning.

• Maps by governorate and city that show the scale of the insurgency are key measures of the level of risk and improvement/decline—this is particularly true if

such maps show the population in the area involved. It is obvious that in some

half-secure areas, the government does not meet a key test from Vietnam days,

it cannot operate at night or when insurgents are in the area.

• Similar mapping of government services adds meaning to the security test. Secure police presence is one key test. Ability to make government offices secure

and functional is another.

• It is equally important to map out the actual distribution of key government

services like pensions, economic aid, office services, etc. Most Iraqis, like most

people in the world, need government services every day. Elections and politics

are an episodic luxury.

All of the above options would be more effective if there was a census. The rough

estimates that say the population is 60% Shi’ite, 20% Sunni, 15% Kurd, and 5%

other are guesstimates first made over a decade ago. Having an accurate picture of

the ethnic and sectarian mix would greatly aid in understanding how the insurgency tracks relative to such factors, as well as the true nature of the population

size in threatened areas.

3. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Sophisticated, properly structured public opinion polls can be of great value in understanding Iraqi views and needs. Public opinion polls based on small samples

using limited questionnaires are little more than statistical drivel. The sample base

may be ‘‘statistically valid’’ within a limited range of percentage error in the mathematical sense, but far too often, the methodology and results are empirically absurd.

The sample base in many recent polls is far too small and excludes too many

areas and insurgents. Moreover results that cannot be broken out by area, ethnicity,

religion, and social background lump together so many disparate groups that they

provide few insights or no controls on who is really being surveyed with any adequacy.

The answer, however, is not to avoid public opinion polls. It is rather to see them

as a critical metric worth funding at a high level of repeated activity with as much

data on given localities and areas, and as much data on attitudes by ethnicity and

sect as possible. Some past polls have provided much of the scope for this, but few

recent polls seem to have made such an effort or to have credible transparency. A

key metric is being ignored or misused.

A key tool is being misused or not used at all.

4. MAPPING WARFIGHTING

It is obvious that the U.S. government is making steadily more detailed classified

efforts to understand the patterns in the fighting and the nature insurgents at a

time what it has virtually suppressed all meaningful public reporting. Its daily incident reports are no longer made available on background; the Iraqi government no

longer provides meaningful public estimates of Iraqi casualties, and even the broad

monthly incident totals vary so much from U.S. spokesman to U.S. spokesman that

they seem to have uncertain credibility.

There are several types of summary reporting that would provide far more insight

into the nature of the conflict, some of which the U.S. provided on a background

basis until the fall of 2004:

• Providing daily incident breakouts by type and effect by major city and

governorate with national totals. These data were available in the past. Their

censorship does not build confidence; simply confusion.

• Providing meaningful casualty reports by location, cause, and for all those being

attacked by category. The totals of U.S. killed and wounded are an important

measure, but totals are no substitute for pattern analysis by location and cause.

It is also a serious reflection on the U.S. that it does not provide any meaningful reporting on Iraqi government, military, police, and civilian casualties, much

less the kind of pattern and trend analysis that would help show what is happening in the war.

17

• Reporting on insurgent captures and kills. This again needs to be by

governorate and major city, and show the nationality and ethic/religious character of those involved where possible.

• Estimates of insurgent strength by group and location. These do not have to be

precise, but would both show the scope of the threat, and whether progress is

estimated to be made in defeating it. The inevitable lack of precision is not an

embarrassment, it is a warning.

• Summaries of U.S./Coalition military action. Like all of the metrics suggested

these should not be so precise as to risk compromising operational security. The

various press releases, however, give no picture of the level of overall military

activity or activity by region, and no picture of the level of intensity in operations or the resulting trends.

5. REALISTIC METRICS FOR PROGRESS IN CREATING EFFECTIVE IRAQI MILITARY,

SECURITY, AND POLICE FORCES

U.S. efforts to create capable cadres of effective Iraqi military, security, and police

forces seem to be gathering momentum at a time that the U.S. has again suppressed virtually all meaningful reporting. Some areas where meaningful metric

would be extremely useful are:

• Combat effective military, security, and police forces in terms of manning and

unit strength: The kind of meaningless totals for training and equipped manpower now being issued produce misleading totals with no correlation to war

fighting or self defense capability. Leadership and quality are the issue.

• Capable forces versus goals over time: The key projection for strategy is how

many effective forces will be created over time, and is there a stable set of goals

to measure progress by.

• Trained manpower by service/type of force showing different levels of training:

‘‘Trained’’ becomes milspeak for ‘‘meaningless’’ when it is not tied to a clear definition of exactly what training is involved.

• Equipped by type of equipment: Like ‘‘trained,’’ ‘‘equipped’’ is meaningless when

there are no data defining what this means, and whether it meets valid requirements. For example, send Iraqis out in unarmored vehicles is not a winning

move if the U.S. needs uparmored Humvees.

• Facility metrics: Sending men into soft or undefendable facilities is a way to either get them killed or see them break if attacked. Metrics of the adequacy of

facilities are as important as metrics of equipment levels.

• Patterns in casualties, and in desertions and defections: These are simple

metrics of how well the Iraqi forces are, or are not, doing.

• Chronologies and maps of Iraqi force engagements and outcome: These display

how well the Iraqis fight.

6. ECONOMIC MAPPING

This may be a need for nation wide economic data focused on long term planning

in the future. To have a future, however, the government and Coalition needs detailed economic mapping that looks at jobs, economic activity, and how aid is flowing

by major city, by governorate, and by key area.

It often will not be possible to assemble comparable or complete data, but this is

not operationally necessary. A mosaic of disparate data will often red flag key problems and areas. Unemployment, access to health care, and functioning education are

key metric. So are power, sanitation, water, and secure roads. The breakdown of

past existing services in any area is a major warning.

There are critical overlays to such data that help measure the realities in the war:

• Mapping sabotage and economic attacks. Iraqi officials have issued guesstimates

like a $10 billion loss to sabotage. Incident records need to be used to take a

hard look at economic impacts of both insurgent and Coalition action. Sabotage

that deprives areas or services, cuts or restricts nation building, and hits at key

revenues or economic activity needs to be mapped and analyzed. The economic

impact of the war should be known.

• Understanding the value and impact of aid. From the start, the public reporting

by USAID has been a self-congratulatory sick joke. Even the FSU only counted

actual project starts as success. Even the Communist system was not bold

enough to count funds obligated or contracts signed as progress. Aid is a key

weapon in counterinsurgency, but the real metrics for judging its success are:

• How well Iraqi expectations and requirements are being met, not simply

whether things are as good or better than under Saddam, and by area and

by group of Iraqis—not by some national total.

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• How money is being dispersed in the field by location, and particularly in

high threat or insurgent areas.

• How sustainable project completions are in terms of surviving attack and continuing to function to meet a need once ‘‘completed.’’

• Linking aid to counterinsurgency impacts. The reprogramming of aid has tied

substantial funds to local efforts to use dollars as a substitute for bullets. Mapping this short term aid flow in insurgent areas is a metric of how aid impacts

on warfighting.

7. THE LIMITS OF DATA

One final, and hopefully obvious, point needs to be made about the above suggestions. A flood data may produce a flood of analysis but there is no reason it should

produce a flood of wisdom. Every metric suggested above has limits and can produce

confusing and sometimes contradictory result. No one set of metrics is likely to be

decisive, and trend analysis will be critical.

Nevertheless, any one who has to analyze the current insurgency in Iraq has to

be struck by how many strong opinions have been built on so weak a foundation

of facts.

‘‘PLAYING THE COURSE:’’ A STRATEGY FOR RESHAPING U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ AND THE

MIDDLE EAST

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The odds of lasting U.S. success in Iraq are now at best even, and may well be

worse. The U.S. can almost certainly win every military battle and clash, but it is

far less certain to win the political and economic war. U.S. success is also heavily

dependent on two variables that the U.S. can influence, but not control. The first

is the emergence of a government that Iraqis see as legitimate and which can effectively govern. The second is the ability to create Iraqi military and security forces

that can largely replace U.S. and other Coalition forces no later than 2006.

Improving the Odds in Iraq

This paper argues that U.S. success in Iraq is too important for the U.S. to withdraw in spite of the present odds and that it should ‘‘play the course’’ as long as

it has a credible chance of success. It also argues that there are a series of steps

that the U.S. can take to improve the odds of success, many of which build on initiatives that the U.S. already has underway.

These suggestions affect five separate areas of U.S. effort:

• Providing a clear statement of U.S. intentions that will make it clear the U.S.

is seeking to create a viable and legitimate government in Iraq, and will not

stay in Iraq once this occurs. This statement will address the major conspiracy

theories that undermine U.S. efforts, and be backed by tangible actions.

• Stepping up aid efforts to develop effective governance, and placing a new emphasis on local as well as national governance.

• Giving even higher priority and resources to the effort to develop effective Iraqi

military and security forces.

• Altering U.S. methods of warfighting to strengthen the political content of U.S.

strategy and tactics.

• Recasting the economic aid effort to focus on Iraqi internal stability during

2005–2006, and transferring responsibility for planning, management and execution to the Iraqi government, while phasing out U.S. contracting efforts as

soon as possible.

Know When to Hold Them, Know When to Fold, and Know When to Run

Taking these steps does not mean that the U.S. should ‘‘stay the course’’ if such

measures do not work. The U.S. faces too much Iraqi anger and resentment to try

to hold on in the face of clear failure, and achieving any lasting success in terms

of Iraqi political acceptance means the U.S. must seek to largely withdraw over the

next two years.

To paraphrase an old country and western song, the U.S. needs to know when

to hold them, know when to fold them, and know when to run. If the U.S. is asked

to leave by an Iraqi government, it must leave. The same is true if Iraqi efforts at

governance decisively and/or if the U.S. cannot create effective enough Iraqi security

forces to largely replace U.S. and coalition forces. Fighting a counterinsurgency campaign is one thing; the U.S. must not stay if Iraq devolves into civil war.

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There are, however, different ways to leave and some are much better than others. Stating and demonstrating that the U.S. has the right intentions will make it

clearer to the world that the U.S. made every effort to succeed and help to defuse

the impact of U.S. withdrawal. Efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government as much

as possible as soon as possible not only raise the odds of success; they raise the odds

that stability will eventually emerge even if the U.S. is forced to withdraw. Efforts

to strengthen the role of the U.N. and to multilateralize as much of the aid process

as possible will have the same effect.

The Regional Dimension

At the same time, the U.S. must make every effort to strengthen its position in

other parts of the Gulf and the Middle East. Virtually the same strategy is needed

whether the U.S. succeeds or fails in Iraq. Even ‘‘victory’’ in Iraq will be highly relative, and defeat will force the U.S. to reinforce its position in the entire region. The

specific steps the U.S. needs to take are:

• Give the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict the highest possible priority in

the most visible form possible. • Rebuild U.S. ties to friendly Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and strengthen ties

to all of the GCC states, emphasizing cooperation in dealing with terrorism and

Islamic extremism. • Adopt a more flexible policy in dealing with Iran. • Prepare for the potential impact of problems in Iraq in dealing with the fighting

in Afghanistan. • Recast U.S. energy policy to deal with the reality that the U.S. will have growing strategic dependence on Gulf and Middle Eastern oil exports for the next

20 years, and their security will become steadily more important. • Adopt a realistic approach to political reform in the region that will improve

U.S. relations with both moderate regimes and with the peoples of the area. • Give the political dimension of counterterrorism a new priority, addressing the

many aspects of the way in which the U.S. now fights the war of terrorism that

needlessly hurt relations with the Islamic and Arab world, and restrict the educational, business, and other relations necessary to create a common effort to

deal with terrorism and extremism.

Almost all of these steps are necessary regardless of the outcome of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, but they become far more urgent if the U.S. is forced to withdraw

or Iraqi governance fails. In short, the U.S. strategy for Iraq must be part of a

broader strategy for the Middle East, and one founded on pragmatism and not ideology.

Regardless of how we got into Iraq, and regardless of our mistakes to date, we

are there. Our strategic interests are now linked to both our success and that of

the Iraqis. We can certainly survive withdrawal and failure, but the result will be

seen as a serious defeat unless an Iraqi government emerges that is clearly better

than Saddam Hussein’s regime, unless Iraq holds together, and unless Iraq makes

progress over time.

We have set the rules of the game to the extent we can, we hold the cards we

are going to get, and we have made our bet. The most we can do at this point is

hold, fold, or raise the ante. We do not need to rush towards some form of exit strategy before it is clear whether we will win or lose.

At the same time, we do not need a pointless ideological commitment to ‘‘stay the

course,’’ simply carrying on with what we are already doing. We need detailed and

tangible ideas about how to make things better, and improve the odds of success.

The challenge is how to best ‘‘play the course.’’ It is how to take a bad to mediocre

hand and increase the chance of getting a productive outcome.

The fact remains, however, that the odds of success are now at best even, and

may well be worse. Popular anger and hostility towards the U.S. and Coalition

forces has grown steadily since the spring of 2003. Some 11% of Arab Shi’ites and

over 33% of Arab Sunnis saw attacks on Coalition forces as justified by early 2004.1

The vast majority of Arab Iraqis never saw the Coalition invasion as legitimate, and

some 70% wanted Coalition forces to leave Iraq when sovereignty was returned to

the Interim Iraqi Government in June 2004. More than 80% of the Iraqi Arab’s surveyed this summer expressed deep distrust in Coalition forces.2 Iraqis still express

hope in the future, but they do not feel the Coalition is capable of bringing either

security or economic welfare. While no reliable polling has emerged since a new

surge in the fighting in September 2004, it seems virtually certain that Iraq resentment of the U.S. and Coalition has steadily increased in recent months.

We must do what we can within very tight time limits, knowing that we may well

fail. Iraq may divide, there may be civil war, and the Interim Government may fail

without leaving a viable option. The end result of the series of elections to come may

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well be that the U.S. is asked to leave, asked to stay on Iraqi terms that largely

consist of our providing aid, or tied to a government that does not have adequate

popular support and legitimacy. ‘‘Playing the course’’ does not mean the U.S. can

count on winning, and certainly does not mean staying beyond the point where

‘‘playing the course’’ is no longer productive. It also means that U.S. programs must

be carefully tailored to the limits imposed by the ‘‘art of the possible.’’ Trying to implement the ‘‘art of the desirable’’ is an almost certain road to failure.

Accordingly, we need to consider both whether there are steps we can take to improve the current odds and when and how to leave. To paraphrase a country and

western song, we have to ‘‘know when to hold them, know when to fold them, and

know when to run.’’ We also need to understand that any strategy to ‘‘play the

course’’ in Iraq must be tied to a regional strategy that will both increase our

chances of success and our ability to leave under the best circumstances possible.

‘‘AND KNOW WHEN TO HOLD THEM:’’ SEEKING AN ACHIEVABLE VICTORY

One key decision has to be made to have any real chance of winning. This is to

define ‘‘victory’’ in narrow and pragmatic enough terms so that we have a credible

hope of achieving it. By this standard, success can be measured as the emergence

of an Iraqi government that holds the country together, offers more in terms of pluralism and the rule of law than did Saddam and the Ba’ath, which is seen as broadly legitimate by most Iraqis, and which can establish conditions for economic development.

As a corollary, we need to recognize that we cannot overcome many critical forces

affecting the situation after more than a year of war and occupation. These forces

include the present level of Iraqi resentment of the invasion and occupation, Iraqi

nationalism, and cultural and religious tension. Success means the U.S. must transfer power to an Iraqi government that the vast majority of Iraqis see as legitimate,

and leave Iraq as soon as this is practical—at least to the extent that the U.S. does

not maintain significant military forces or military bases, and does not maintain the

Green Zone and an ‘‘imperial’’ Embassy. The U.S. can, at most, stay in Iraq for one

or two more years and it must do what it can as quickly as possible.

Moreover, we need to preserve a sense of history. Iraq has massive political, security, ethnic, religious, and economic problems that will take a half a decade to a decade to play out. The chances are that it will undergo several periods of crisis and

instability after we leave. We can continue to influence this situation, but we can

scarcely hope to control it. We need to understand—and make clear to Iraq and the

world—that the transition to full independence, and American military withdrawal,

place the responsibility for Iraq’s future clearly in Iraqi hands. We must not claim

either levels of success or responsibility that will allow critics to blame the U.S. for

future problems it cannot control.

Defining Success as Narrowly as Possible

A future Iraqi government does not have to be favorable to the U.S. in any narrow

sense. The U.S. does not need Iraqi dependency; it needs Iraqi success. A neutral

government that distances itself from the U.S., or even one that is aggressively

independent, will be perfectly acceptable. The key test of success is that such a government can hold the country together, gives every ethnic and religious group a relatively fair share of wealth and power, does not represent extreme factions, has no

broader regional ambitions, and creates a climate where both internal stability and

the welfare of the Iraqi people is likely to improve over time.

In fact, from both an Iraqi and regional viewpoint, the stronger and more independent the Iraqi government becomes the better. The U.S. does not need a client

or dependent, and its best chance for being seen as having conducted a ‘‘just war’’

(or at least an excusable one) is to show that it leaves when it is asked to and leaves

Iraqis clearly in charge. Put differently, the key in Iraq to knowing how long to

‘‘hold them’’ is having a clear plan to ‘‘fold.’’

As a corollary, ‘‘playing the course’’ means that there are several objectives the

U.S. not only must not pursue, but also must conspicuously and openly reject:

• One is to try to use Iraq as a tool or lever for changing the region. The Iraqi

example may have some impact over time, but nothing could be more destructive to regional efforts at reform than any deliberate effort to use Iraq as some

kind of springboard for change in other countries. A meaningful reform strategy

must be a country-by-country U.S. effort to encourage the positive evolutionary

trends inside each country. Moreover, the U.S. must accept the fact that any

foreseeable government that is legitimate in Iraqi eyes will sharply oppose

present U.S. policies in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and will be

hostile to Israel’s present government and policies.

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• Iraq must not become a U.S. military base. The U.S. may well need to maintain

a strong advisory effort, but if the U.S. tries to maintain combat forces and

bases under any conditions other than the broadest-based demand from Iraqis

as a whole, it will do even more to alienate the Iraqi people, the region, and

Islamic world. This does not, however, preclude U.S. efforts to create a regional

security structure—building on institutions like the GCC—which could tie Iraq

to a more stable regional security posture where the U.S. could both act as the

ultimate guarantor of Iraq’s security and work with Iraqi forces in a regional

context. • The U.S. must establish Iraq’s independence in terms of its politics, economics,

and above all oil. Iraq may well need continuing U.S. aid in its political and

economic development, in addition to its military and security forces. The U.S.

must, however, avoid even the image of seeking to continue to dominate Iraqi

politics, and one key aspect of U.S. policy during 2005 and 2006 must be to relocate the U.S. Embassy and Green Zone as quickly as possible, and shrink the

U.S. Embassy to something around 20% of its present size. The CPA will be a

lasting model of how not to do things, and its imperial image has left a legacy

that the U.S. must distance itself from as soon as possible. The U.S. mission

in Iraq must be sized to meet key needs, but the goal must be to make it an

equal among equals, not a center of political power. • Establish total transparency in showing that the U.S. has not taken any economic advantage of Iraq and has taken no steps to give U.S. firms a lasting advantage in any aspect of the Iraqi economy. This does not mean that the U.S.

should not encourage U.S. foreign investment, in oil and in every other area.

It must do so, however, purely in market terms. The U.S. government, and especially the U.S. Embassy, must be extremely careful not to lever influence to

the unfair advantage of U.S. firms, and it must cut itself loose from aid contractors as soon as humanly possible. It must exert Draconian ruthlessness in stopping any past ORHA, CPA, or U.S. military personnel from exploiting their past

positions.

Clearly Stating U.S. Goals and Intentions in Terms Acceptable to Iraq and the Region and Demonstrating the U.S. Will Make Good on Its Policy

The U.S. needs to openly demonstrate to Iraqis, the region, and the world that

it defines success in terms of Iraqi interests, not some effort to directly serve its economic and strategic interests. So far, the U.S. has not made this sufficiently clear

or even done a good job of articulating its intensions in ways that reach Iraqis and

the region. President Bush has spoken in generalities, and his senior officials have

either failed to define U.S. intentions and objectives or have done so in ways that

had had little practical impact—such as speaking in U.S. press conferences.

President Bush should take the opportunity of his reelection and/or the coming

Iraq elections to make a statement to the Iraqi people and the world that clearly

defines U.S. intentions and refutes the most dangerous conspiracy theories affecting

Iraqi and regional behavior. To be specific, he should state that:

• The U.S. will only stay in Iraq until the insurgency is over and the Iraqi people

have chosen a legitimate government, and will leave immediately if asked to do

so by an elected Iraqi government;

• The U.S. has no intention of interfering in Iraqi elections or internal politics.

It will accept any elected government as legitimate;

• The U.S. is training and equipping Iraqi forces to take over both the defense

of the nation and internal security missions, and will phase out its military

presence as Iraqi forces show they can perform these missions. It will do so earlier, if asked by the Iraqi government.

• The U.S. is bound by the policies set by the Iraqi Interim Government, and will

not conduct military operations that have not been approved by that government.

• The U.S. have no interest in controlling Iraqi oil resources and exports, and is

firmly committed to aiding the Iraqi Oil Ministry in developing Iraq’s resources

through open competition on global market terms. All decisions over the future

development of Iraq’s petroleum resources will be made by the Iraqi government.

• The U.S. is not seeking any other economic interest in Iraq, or any favoritism

for U.S. companies.

• The U.S. believes that Iraq must have modern, professional military forces

strong and well equipped enough to defend the nation without relying on U.S.

and Coalition forces. The U.S. will actively aid the Iraqi government in achieving this role. It will encourage the development of regional security efforts, possibly including the expansion of the GCC. It will provide future military support

22

to Iraq only if requested, and will consult with its regional allies and the U.N.

in doing so.

• The U.S. will not maintain any permanent military bases in Iraq, and will

transfer all facilities to the Iraqi government upon U.S. withdrawal.

• The U.S. will continue to provide military assistance and training if the Iraqi

government requests this, but actively encourages other nations to join it in this

role.

• The U.S. is not seeking to dictate the modernization and restructuring of the

Iraqi economy. It is removing the strings from its aid process, and will begin

to transfer the management of all U.S. economic aid to the Iraqi government,

and allow the government to use such funds for its own projects using Iraqi contractors. It will only act to ensure that the projects are legitimate and are honestly and effectively implemented.

• The U.S. will fully withdraw from the Green Zone once Iraq is secure and an

Iraqi government is in place, and will shift its mission to the size and role of

a conventional Embassy.

• The U.S. is seeking full debt and reparations forgiveness for Iraq, and is committed to providing long-term assistance if this is needed.

• The U.S. believes that the role of the U.N. and other nations in ensuring free

and fair elections, providing aid, and helping to train the Iraqi government and

security forces should be steadily expanded. Its only concern is that the expansion of multilateralism must be accompanied by effective plans and the consummate resources.

President Bush not only needs to formally state such goals, he and U.S. officials

will need to regularly repeat them and aggressively refute conspiracy theories and

charges as necessary.

MAKING IRAQI POLITICAL LEGITIMACY REAL

There are two critical variables in Iraq over which the U.S. still has considerable

influence, but no direct control: The first is how well Iraqis do in shaping their own

government, executing governance at the national and local level, and giving the

new Iraq true legitimacy among all of the key elements of Iraq’s population. The

second is the ability and willingness of Iraqi military and security forces to largely—

if not totally—replace U.S. and other Coalition forces no later than the end of 2006.

Past U.S. actions have helped to create an extraordinarily demanding political

schedule, and which ensures political tension, turmoil, and a constant risk of turnover in key officials and decision makers:

• November–December: Parties and candidates emerge, party lists are made public, platforms emerge; polling systems are defined.

• 27–31 January (30 January election day): Elections for 275-person National Assembly.

• February–March: Iraqi Transitional Government takes power.

• 15 August: National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution.

• 15 October: Referendum for permanent constitution.

• 15 December: Elections for government completed—if constitutional referendum

approves constitution.

• 31 December: Elected government assumes office.

There are four critical risks that both Iraqis and the U.S. will face throughout

this process, and that Iraqis will probably continue to face for up to a decade after

the U.S. and other coalition forces withdraw:

• The risk that a majority of Arab Sunnis will not participate in the political process or will be actively hostile to the U.S. and evolving Iraqi government. The

fighting in Fallujah and other areas may create a more secure climate where

Sunnis see participation as both necessary and desirable. This, however, is

highly dependent on the quality of the aid and governance that follows the

fighting and Sunnis seeing the government as providing valid political options.

The battle for Fallujah in November 2004 provoked a major increase in attacks

in other areas, and widespread Sunni anger and resentment. There is a significant risk the Sunnis will not join in the process and remain actively or passively hostile.

• The risk the Shi’ites will divide and see a return to the kind of violence and insurgency al Sadr has carried out in the past. It seems likely that the majority

of Shi’ites will support the political process because it is to their advantage.

This does not, however, mean Shi’ite support for the U.S. role, or that a significant minority of Shi’ites will not be alienated or follow more radical leaders like

23

Sadr. There is a natural dilemma in Shi’ite politics. Including leaders like Sadr

can radicalize them, excluding them can lead to violence. • No compromise between Kurd, Arab, and other ethnic factions can please everyone. The Kurdish leadership has so far been pragmatic in compromising its demands, and the leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government have been equally

pragmatic in accepting limited autonomy and de facto federalism. However, a

constitution still has to be written and implemented, oil revenues and other economic problems must be dealt with, and serious ethnic problems over land and

repatriation must be dealt with. Above all, the evolution of the Iraqi government must produce a political process the Kurds trust and are willing to participate in. • The political and electoral process will either break down, or—more probably—

produce a set of political compromises that keep the existing leadership in power

without allowing for legitimate opposition, debate, and electoral contests. As of

late November 2003, the Iraqi Electoral Commission had approved some 156 political parties out of requests by a total of 2l2. As of that time, no party had

had a chance to campaign or declare a clear program, and many were brand

new. The Interim Government was divided. For example, the Iraqi National Accord party led by Prime Minister Ayad was opposed by the new ‘‘Iraqi’’ party

of President Ghazi al-Yawer. The leading established parties include the KDP

and PUK Kurdish parties; three Shi’ite parties, and no Sunni parties.

The dilemma is that Iraq does need strong and coherent leadership, but also

needs a transparent enough political process to have legitimacy in the eyes of

the Iraq people and allow minorities and factions to feel they can be heard, participate in the process, and have a credible hope of being represented now or

in the future. The need to shape an effective Iraqi political process through the

elections in January, the constitution referendum, and the full elections in late

2005 would pose an immense challenge in a divided nation, with little real political experience, even in peacetime.

The Iraqis urgently need as much outside aid as possible in both learning how

to create a political process that can minimize these risks and making the new Iraqi

government as effective as possible. At the same time, an Iraqi government can only

become legitimate and effective if the U.S. and the international community recognize that Iraqis and the evolving Iraqi Government must make as many decisions

as possible and that the existing political process must become far more inclusive

and popular in character.

The U.S. cannot reinvent the wheel by trying to change the current political calendar. No form of U.S. interference can substitute for Iraqi progress, and the U.S.

cannot constantly interfere without discrediting Iraqi efforts. The U.S. is no longer

the decision-maker, it is an ally.

One of the hardest tasks the U.S. faces over the next two years is to restrict U.S.

actions to aid and advice, and to preserve a proper, steadily growing, and visible

distance between the U.S. team in Iraq and a sovereign Iraqi government. One

method is to try to expand the role of the U.N. and other nations in providing political advice and support so that the U.S. is not seen as dictating or as the only advisor. This could include expanding the role of Britain and other Coalition states and

give them the lead wherever possible. Turning to other nations, however, is likely

to offer only limited help, and will sometime do little more than introduce new complications.

The most important way to strengthen Iraqi capability to govern, and Iraqi legitimacy, is to give the Iraqis control over as much of every aspect of the nation building and security effort as soon as possible, and let them control and manage their

aid resources. It is to let the Iraqis make their own choices and own mistakes. In

general, it will be far better to have Iraqis do things badly than have Americans

do them badly—and some times even well.

U.S. Aid in Governance: Doing Too Little, Too Late

In this context, it is deeply disturbing to note that as of November 3, the U.S.

had dispersed only $96 million in aid funds for ‘‘democracy’’ as part of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Program (IRRP). The U.S. Embassy Weekly Report states

that the 2207 Report goal for the program was originally $831 million, of which the

Congress actually apportioned $541 million.

Even these totals may be misleading. An analyst from the Congressional Research

Service notes that there was no ‘‘recommended’’ program (Admin request) for democracy-building activities in the original FY2004 supplemental, although other activities, such as civil society and rule of law in the original request could be interpreted

as having something to do with ‘‘democracy.’’ Congress added $100 million for this

specific purpose in the enacted legislation. By January 2004, after the June 2004

24

transition plan was announced (November 15, 2003), the Administration shifted

funds around to make the democracy sector larger—it became $458 million, later

$451 million. The September 2004 Administration re-allocation request to Congress

would have raised ‘‘democracy’’ by $180 million to $631 million. It is unclear why

the figure for ‘‘democracy building’’ has gone up to $831 million, but it appears that

either Congress moved more money to the justice/democracy category than the Administration requested or the Administration did a quick re-think of needs in mid

to late-September. As of 11/17/04, the Administration has only obligated $473 million and spent $118 million of the $831 million available in ‘‘democracy building’’

funds.3

Similarly, the U.S. had dispersed only $33 million out of an apportionment of

$290 million in funds for education, refugees, human rights, and government. (The

2207 Report goal was $379 million.) It had dispersed only $56 million out of $979

million in funds for justice, public safety, and civil society. The 2207 Report goal

called for $1,122 million.4

If one ignores the fact there are conflicting data, and combines all of these programs as reported by the Department of State on November 3, 2004, the U.S. has

dispersed a total of only $185 million out of $1,800 million in apportioned funds,

with an original 2207 Report goal that called for $2,332 million. Given the scale of

requirement to prepare for pluralism and some form of federalism, and the desperate urgency imposed by the political calendar, the current level of effort simply

cannot support anything like the program needed. The U.S. effort to aid Iraqi governance is not playing the course; it is staying on the sidelines.

As in every aspect of the U.S. aid program in Iraq, there are many people in the

field doing a good job with the resources they have, and taking serious risks in

doing so. To put it bluntly, however, the U.S. either has a meaningful program it

can actually implement or it does not. If the U.S. does have anything approaching

an adequate program, it needs to develop a coherent statement of what that program is, establish clear metrics and milestones, and constantly reexamine its scale

and content separate from other aid activities. If—as seems more likely—it has incoherent good intentions—and bits and pieces of a program actually in the field—the

entire aid program affecting governance needs to be recast to suit the level of urgency in Iraq and the political calendar the U.S. is trying to make work.

The Problem of Local Government

The problems involved are further compounded by the past history of U.S. mistakes and failure in creating effective local governance documented in the International Crisis Croup (ICG) report of October 27, 2004. It will be extremely difficult

to work out a political process of power sharing at the top of the central government, and it will almost certainly be years before the national lists and parties

learn how to work together effectively and develop practical national political agendas. Effective and legitimate local government at the provincial, city, and town level

is one way to both give each area and faction representation and to shape the broader democratic process.

As the ICG report describes in detail, basic reforms are needed in the way the

Interim Government deals with provincial and local governments, in creating effective provincial councils and local governments, in the role played by the U.S. and

its Coalition allies, and in the role played by the U.N. Creating an effective national

consensus and government also requires that this progress be made in parallel with

the national political process—particularly if Iraqi political leaders choose lists and

rig a national government in the January 2005 elections which many Iraqis do not

regard as legitimate.

Some form of revenue sharing may also be critical if various regions and factions

are to be convinced that they will get a fair share of the nation’s wealth. This is

particularly true of oil revenue—which for the foreseeable future will underpin the

national budget instead of tax and other income sources. It is easy to mistake ‘‘federalism’’ as being a matter of political power. It is a matter of financial power as

well, particularly in almost exclusively Sunni areas like Al Anbar and in the Kurdish dominated north.

U.S. Transparency and the Role of the U.N. and Other Nations

The U.S. needs to publicize its efforts to help Iraq achieve success in governance

and make it clear that its aid program is designed to help the Iraqis make peaceful

pluralistic choices, not create a U.S. sponsored government. It needs to describe

what it is doing to show it does not favor a given mix of ethnic and religious groups,

and report problems and failures as well as success.

At the same time, the U.S. should make it clear to Iraqis and the world that when

there are problems in governance, U.S. aid and influence cannot directly alter or

25

correct them. As is the case in every area of U.S. action, Iraqis must not only be

in charge, but be held publicly accountable. The constant effort to spin every minor

accomplishment into success is precisely the wrong approach. Transparency and accountability serve three key purposes: (a) the independence and legitimacy of the

Iraqi government and political process is clear, (b) the U.S. is not held accountable

for Iraqi failures if it stays or withdraws, and (c) Iraqis are pressured to take responsibility.

The U.S. must demonstrate through its actions that it will actually begin to leave

as soon as the Iraqi government, military, and security forces can do the job. It

needs to demonstrate it through phased withdrawals and changes in its role. The

U.S. should not set rigid deadlines, which will become targets for insurgents and

opponents of the Iraqi government, but it should seek to do as much as possible during 2005 and if it does not succeed by the end of 2006, it seems likely that it will

have effectively been defeated. More than 70% of Iraqis polled wanted the U.S.

forces out as early as the fall of 2003, and the figure was well in excess of 80% by

mid-2004.

This is one of many reasons why the U.S. needs to aggressively and openly seek

to expand the role of the U.N. and other nations in helping Iraq develop its governance and political process. Just seeking multilateralism expands the legitimacy of

the U.S. effort. Achieving it, particularly if the country becomes more secure, will

be much more important. It will show Iraqis and the world that the U.S. is serious;

that its efforts are designed to create an independent and legitimate government

and that it is seeking to improve, not dictate, Iraq’s future. It will also create an

important process of continuity as the U.S. phases down its effort and if the U.S.

has to withdraw rapidly in a crisis.

REINFORCING THE CURRENT EFFORT TO CREATE EFFECTIVE IRAQI MILITARY AND

SECURITY FORCES

The second critical variable is the ability and willingness of Iraqi military and security forces to largely—if not totally—replace U.S. and other Coalition forces no

later than the end of 2006. As has been touched upon earlier, it has been clear since

early 2004 that Iraqis bitterly resent U.S. domination of the military security effort,

and polls in 2004 put hostility at well above the 80% level.

At the same time, poll after poll shows Iraqis see physical security as the most

important single issue in their lives, followed by economic and educational security.

Equally important, the same polls that reflected the unpopularity of Coalition forces

reflected great popular confidence in the Iraqi army and police—although far more

out of hope for what they might become in the future than their capabilities at the

time the polls were taken.5

There is no question that creating the kinds of Iraqi forces that are required is

a high risk effort that will have to be rushed forward under adverse circumstances.

It is also almost certain that if polls were taken now—after Najaf, Baghdad,

Samarra, Fallujah, and Mosul—the Iraqi people would show far less confidence.

Nevertheless, the only practical solution to popular hostility to coalition forces is to

create strong Iraqi military security forces as soon as possible, and to keep up the

effort regardless of any near term problems and reversals. ‘‘Iraqiazation’’ either has

to be made to work, or Iraq will become a mirror image of the failure of ‘‘Vietnamization’’ in Vietnam: Coalition military victories will become increasingly irrelevant.

The U.S. military and U.S. Embassy now seem to clearly understand this, as does

the Iraqi Interim Government. The failures at the policy levels of the U.S. government, CPA, and shadow Iraqi government that gave General Eaton a hopeless mix

of tasks and resources through May of 2004 seem to have been corrected. General

Petraeus and the Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC–I) may

now be getting much of the support they need.6

It is disturbing, however, that the U.S. has stopped issuing meaningful public information on the equipment and training effort, and has cut the content of the Iraq

Weekly Status Report to the point where it has limited value. Like the empty measures of success contained in USAID reports, the end result is that there is no way

to relate what is happening to any meaningful picture of actual requirements and

the measures of accomplishment that are provided are the kind of empty, self-congratulatory statements typical of public relations exercises.

Resources to Date

The only data on expenditure cover the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Program

(IRRP), but do not reflect reprogramming. Taken at face value, they indicate that

the U.S. had dispersed $798 million for its Security and Law Enforcement Program

at a rate of only $8 million a week.7 This compares with an original program level

of $3,235 million, which was raised to $5,045 million program for the FY2004 fiscal

26

year because of reprogramming on September 30, 2004 ($1,808.6 million was reprogrammed to ‘‘security and law enforcement.’’)

The true total for such spending is higher, because the figures just quoted only

cover the FY2004 program. Some $51.2 million was allocated to the Iraqi army in

PL–108–11 April 2003. At the urging of the U.S. Embassy, an additional $1,808.6

million out of the FY2004 total funding for IIRP was reprogrammed to ‘‘security and

law enforcement’’ in September 2004.

Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. government has reported on aid expenditures in Iraq is so dysfunctional as to be almost totally misleading.8 For example,

the Inspector General of the CPA reported on October 30, 2004 that, ‘‘As of March

2004, the U.S. had obligated about $58.5 billion to stabilize the security situation

in Iraq: About $57.3 billion for the U.S. military operations and $1.2 billion for Iraqi

security forces.’’ These figures dramatize the slow pace of the U.S. effort to create

effective Iraqi forces at the time, although they also reflect the disparity between

a large Coalition force presence in Iraq and the initial buildup of Iraqi Security

Forces, and the problems in trying to rapidly create effective Iraqi forces in a country with poor infrastructure, limited administrative capabilities, and in the midst

of an insurgency.

The Status of the Military Training and Equipment Effort in September 2004

As for manning and equipment, the U.S. used to provide reasonably detailed data

on progress in training and equipping Iraqi forces. The Department of Defense provided the following data as of September 22, 2004.9

Service

Manning Training

Required Actual Untrained In training Trained

Army .......................................................................................... 27,000 12,699 0 7,910 4,789

National Guard .......................................................................... 61,904 41,461 0 2,189 39,272

Iraqi Prevention Force ............................................................... 6,584 4,417 0 5,489 1,928

Iraqi Special Ops Forces ........................................................... 1,967 651 0 75 576

Air Force .................................................................................... 502 182 0 39 143

Coastal Defense Force .............................................................. 409 412 0 130 292

Total ............................................................................. 77,175 62,822 0 15,832 46,990

Weapons Vehicles Communications Body armor

Required On-hand Required On-hand Required On-hand Required On-hand

Army ............................................ 23,606 15,432 2,298 1,768 3,596 1,021 20,949 6,137

Nationa Guard ............................. 68,760 37,636 2,142 727 11,209 427 62,032 23,320

Iraqi Prevention Force ................. 8,850 3,300 583 152 1,789 1,583 6,584 2,741

Iraqi Special Ops Forces ............ 1,898 1,274 180 67 1,212 115 1,620 605

Air Force ...................................... 383 0 34 4 21 0 502 0

Coastal Defense Force ................ 486 12 15 15 156 1 409 0

Total ............................... 103,983 57,653 4,421 2,753 13,764 3,157 71,152 32,803

These data reflected serious problems in the progress made as of September:

• The manpower totals do not reflect the fact 25–33% of men were on leave or

in training at any given time. Many men are in units deployed a considerable

distance from their home, and must travel to give their families their pay, and

deal with family issues.

• Figures for training were uncertain, since all men are trained or in training,

but training was often very limited or did not prepare them for demanding aspects of their mission.

• Total armed forces had 55% of weapons authorized for prior force structure, half

of authorized total of 4,421 vehicles, 28% of communications, and 46% of body

armor.

• The weapons data shown were for small arms and crew served weapons, and

do not reflect Iraqi and U.S. plans to create heavier forces with armor.

• Some armor was being delivered; including at least 35 reconditioned Iraqi

tanks, AFVS, and APC and 50 armored cars from the UAE.

• Hoped to get armor for more Iraqi mechanized units from Jordan and UAE.

• DoD stated totals for communications equipment totals were misleading, because: ‘‘Some radios are on-hand, but they are interim capability only.’’ U.S. adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
27

visors feel that civilian and other radios bought as part of CERP program are

adequate, and communications are much better than statistics show.

The Army then had 12,699 actives of 27,000 man authorized force.

• Of active strength, 4,789 are defined as trained (3 weeks for former military

and 8 weeks for new recruits; the vast majority go through the 8 week course).

This total was roughly 18% of authorized strength and 38% of men actually on

duty. • Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, were 65% of authorized weapons,

77% of vehicles, 29% of communications, and 30% of body armor. • Training sufficiently limited so new forces normally need 6–8 weeks of working

with U.S. forces. Were exceptions where units were rapidly formed out of experienced army personnel and fought well. • Iraqi commandos had proven to be a well training and effective source of manpower.

The Iraqi National Guard was Iraq’s largest force, but most of it was not a ‘‘combat ready’’ force to fight insurgent battles on its own.

• 41,461 actives vs. requirement for 61,904. Claims that 39,272 are trained and

2,189 are in training ignored the fact such training is limited and generally

does not prepare most forces for demanding counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism missions. Their training does prepare them to conduct ‘‘framework operations,’’ which do play a significant role in a counterinsurgency conflict. • Were some effective, combat ready elements. • 40 of 44 National Guard Battalions operating with Coalition forces throughout

country. All except those in Fallujah-Ramadi area were carrying out joint operations with coalition on daily basis. • Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, are 55% of authorized weapons, 34%

of vehicles, 4% of communications, and 38% of body armor.

The Iraqi Prevention Force had 7,417 men active for a force with an authorized

strength of only 6,584.

• DoD reported that 26% have some training. • Equipment was 37% of authorized weapons, 26% of vehicles, 86% of communications, and 41% of body armor. • The creation of such specialized counterterrorism/counterinsurgency elements

was underway, but the force was anything but ‘‘combat ready.’’

Iraqi Special Operations Forces had 651 men active for a force with an authorized

strength of 1,967.

• DoD reports that 88% of actives have some training, and that 29% of full authorized force is trained and fielded. This force will grow once the conditions

for doing so are in place and properly set. • Equipment of 67% of authorized weapons, 37% of vehicles, 10% of communications, and 37% of body armor.

• The creation of such specialized counterterrorism/counterinsurgency elements is

underway. This force was more combat experienced and proven than any other

force in Iraq.

Air Force and Coastal Defense Force were only token forces.

Air Force had 0% of authorized weapons, 12% of vehicles, 0% of communications,

0% of body armor.

The Status of the Military Training and Equipment Effort as of November 2004

The data the U.S. has made public on Iraqi force development since September

have been cut to the point where they do no longer indicate whether the serious

problems in equipment delays that existed as of early September are being corrected; all equipment delivery data have been deleted from the report.

The same is true of data on trained manpower. All breakouts have been eliminated from public U.S. reporting from the Embassy, Department of Defense, and

Department of State. The only heading in the Weekly Status Report is now

‘‘Trained/On-Hand.’’ This figure has some value, however, since it reflects the manpower that have been trained and are still on duty, to avoid the problem of reporting those who are trained and are not on duty for whatever reason.

Useful data have, however, been provided by the Coalition training command in

Iraq, MNSTC–I, although such data cannot go into the detail needed to distinguish

between the total number of men trained and equipped, and what are sometimes

much smaller numbers of men with fully adequate training and equipment for

counterinsurgency and combat missions, or show the rapidly increasing size of the

cadres of fully trained officers and NCOs.

28

These data are current as of November 18, 2004, and are shown below: 10

Force element Current strength On duty, trained

and equipped Total authorized

Police ....................................................................................................... 87,133 47,342 135,000

Special Police Commando Battalions ..................................................... 2,019 900 2,019

Border Enforcement ................................................................................ 16,237 14,593 29,360

Highway Patrol ........................................................................................ 925 370 6,300

Bureau of Dignitary Protection ............................................................... 484 484 500

Intervention Force ................................................................................... 6,584 1,816 6,859

Emergency Response Force ..................................................................... 168 168 270

Civil Intervention Force ........................................................................... 1,091 1,091 3,720

National Guard* ...................................................................................... 43,318 41,409 55,921

(41,261) ? (61,904)

Special Operations Force ........................................................................ 604 590 1,967

Army ........................................................................................................ 16,634 4,507 27,000

Air Force .................................................................................................. 206 167 502

Coastal Defense Force ............................................................................ 409 536 582

Total ........................................................................................... 173,903 115,882 275,708

Military Forces ......................................................................................... (17,249) (5,210) (28,084)

Military and Elite Paramilitary (less National Guard) ........................... (29,124) (10,491) (49,719)

* Data from MNSTC–I are not clear. Data in parenthesis are taken from U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Report of November 3, 2004.

While the Iraqi security and military forces continue to experience problems in

terms of retention and performance, these totals do reflect significant progress since

the summer of 2004 and a number of Iraqi combat forces have performed well in

the fighting in Najaf, Samarra, and Fallujah. The performance of the police has

been less satisfactory, but the cadres of properly trained and equipped units is beginning to increase in significant numbers.

According to MNSTC–I, nine more active Army battalions should complete their

training by the end of December, and all 27 Regular Army or Intervention Force

battalions (including six more from the Intervention Force) are planned to complete

training by the end of January. This schedule has been maintained despite attacks

on training bases, infrastructure delays due to unexploded ordnance discovered at

one planned base, and forces being deployed to major combat operations earlier than

initially planned. Some battalions have had a number of AWOLs due to intimidation

attacks, and MNSTC–I is working with the Iraqis to adjust its numbers to reflect

those. MNSTC–I is also taking measures to reduce the likelihood and impact of

these in the future, and to assist them in recruiting of combat veterans.

Two battalions from the Iraqi Intervention Force conducted operations in Najaf.

These same two battalions plus another are conducting effective combat operations

in Fallujah together with two regular battalions, an Army Commando Battalion, a

Police Emergency Response Unit, and Shewani Special Forces trained by 1st MEF.

These constituted 2,700 Iraqis at their peak. Although not all Army battalions were

at full strength, soldiers who are in the battalions fought effectively and are certainly ‘‘combat ready,’’ with most being ‘‘combat proven.’’ The last six battalions

from the Iraqi Intervention Force will complete initial training (fourteen weeks) in

the next 30 days.

Sixteen National Guard battalions are conducting operations effectively at the

company level or above, with a number conducting operations effectively at the battalion level. Many Iraqi National Guard (ING) units have conducted combat operations. Current plans are to expand the National Guard from its previous authorized strength of 45 battalions and six brigades to 6 Division HQs, 21 Brigade Commanders, and 65 battalions.

The number of trained police now include over 31,000 former police trained in the

three-week Transition Integration Program. Over 15,000 police have been trained

in the 8-week Academy program of instruction. Capacity at the 8-week academies

in Jordan, Baghdad, and other regional academies should soon exceed over 3,000

graduates per month.

The numbers for trained border enforcement personnel reflect training done by

major subordinate commands (divisions). Capabilities among border enforcement

personnel vary widely. MNSTC–I has established a centralized program of instruction for border personnel, presently at the Jordanian Police Academy with Department of Homeland Security Instructors. Will move this instruction to Iraq in the

near future.

29

Key Iraqi Force Components

While detailed data are lacking on the progress in training and equipment, the

U.S. military team in MNSTC–I does provide useful data on the structure and type

of training and equipment in key elements of the emerging Iraqi forces: 11

• Special Police Commando Battalions: The Special Police Commando Battalions

represent the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s strike-force capability. The commandos—ultimately to be comprised of six full battalions—are highly vetted

Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen largely made up of prior service Special Forces professionals and other skilled servicemen with specialty unit experience.

The Special Police Commando Battalions represent the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s strike-force capability. The commandos—ultimately to be comprised of six

full battalions—are highly vetted Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen

largely made up of prior service Special Forces professionals and other skilled

servicemen with specialty unit experience. All members of the unit are chosen

based on loyalty to Iraq and its new democratic model. The unit focuses primarily on building raid operations, counter-terrorist missions including anti-airplane hijacker, kidnapping and other similar missions.

The force resembles more a paramilitary army-type force complete with heavy

weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, AK–47 assault rifles, mortars, and 9mm

Glock pistols. The commando battalions give the MOI a high-end strike force

capability similar to Special Forces units and was quickly stood up to capitalize

on previously existing skill sets in Iraq.

• Iraqi Police Service Emergency Response Unit: An elite 270-man team trained

to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies. Team members undergo a robust eight-week specialized training course spawned from the current

wave of anti-Iraqi forces actions.

The mission of the emergency response unit is to provide a national, high-end,

rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high-risk search,

arrest, hostage-rescue and crisis response operations. The emergency response

unit is the predominant force for national-level incidents calling for a DELTA/

SWAT capability and will only be used in extreme situations by local and national authorities.

The $64.5 million effort is part of a larger mission to create a nation-level law

enforcement investigative and special operations capability within the Iraqi

Ministry of Interior to counter terrorism and large-scale civil disobedience and

insurgencies throughout Iraq. The capability will eventually include a

Counterterrorism Investigative Unit and Special Operations Unit. Volunteers

for the force must first complete the standard eight-week basic training course

or three-week transition integration program course for prior service officers before entering the specialized emergency response unit training modeled after

the U.S. State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms training programs.

Of the total force, 235 eligible candidates received rigorous instruction based

on the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Crisis Response Team training program while

the balance of 35 recruits are part of the Special Operations Explosive Ordinance Team, based on the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Explosive Incident Countermeasures training course.

Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordnance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets,

weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in

hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counterterrorism task

force coordination.

• Iraqi Intervention Forces: The Iraqi Intervention Force is the counter-insurgency

wing of the Iraqi army. Ultimately to be comprised of nine battalions, organized

into three brigades, forces negotiate the standard eight-week basic training all

Iraqi soldiers go through learning basic soldiering skills such as weapons, drill

and ceremony,

Soldier discipline, and physical training skills. After graduation, IIF battalions spend several weeks and months in intensive ‘‘military operations in urban

terrain’’ follow-on training—otherwise know as ‘‘MOUT’’ training. In this period,

soldiers work through instruction in the art of street fighting and building

clearing operations typical to anti-insurgent operations in cities and towns.

Units work in close coordination with other IA battalions and will be completely

stood-up to the nine-battalion force by early 2005.

30

• Iraqi Special Operations Force: The Iraqi Special Operations Force—the Iraqi

Armed Forces—high-end strike force resembling U.S. Special Forces units—continues training and operations in the country with multinational force assistance. The Iraqi Special Operations Force—the Iraqi Armed Forces’ high-end

strike force resembling U.S. Special Forces units—continues training and operations in the country with multinational force assistance.

Consisting of two trained battalions, including the 36th Commando Battalion—an infantry-type strike force—and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion,

the force has been involved in many operations throughout the country fighting

anti-Iraqi forces with great distinction while continuing the stand-up effort of

the unit. The force will add a third ‘‘support’’ battalion to its ranks in the coming months. Training is conducted at an undisclosed location.

‘‘Selection’’ for the force begins in the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi army

units already operating in the country, much like typical multinational Special

Forces’ recruiting efforts in their own countries. Outstanding recruits successfully negotiating the vetting process, including exhaustive background checks,

skill evaluations, and unit evaluations along with literacy, psychological, and

physical tests, are run through various team-building and physical events

meant to lean down the recruit pool. The selection process runs roughly 10 to

14 days.

The Iraqi Special Forces undergo intense physical, land navigation, small-unit

tactics, live-fire, unconventional warfare operations, direct action operations,

airmobile operations, counterterrorism, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

training. Special Forces soldiers are an army’s unconventional warfare experts,

possessing a broad range of operational skills. The unit was formed based on

a conversation between the Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and multinational force

personnel to give the Iraqi Armed Forces a high-end strike force in its ongoing

security mission against anti-Iraqi forces operating in the country.

• Iraqi Army: Iraqi army soldiers negotiate standard eight-weeks of basic training

including basic soldiering skills instruction in weapons, drill and ceremony, Soldier discipline, and physical training. Iraqi army soldiers negotiate standard

eight-weeks of basic training including basic soldiering skills instruction in

weapons, drill and ceremony, Soldier discipline, and physical training. Units negotiate advanced follow-on infantry, land navigation, and other operational

training after graduation before deployment.

The Iraqi army will ultimately be comprised of 27 battalions of infantry—including nine special Iraqi Intervention Force battalions—and three transportation battalions. The army will be organized into nine brigades and three divisions. The bulk of the force is slated to be in place by early 2005. Plans to create

heavier and better armored forces are still in flux, but there are now 259 soldiers in the 1st Mechanized Brigade, preparing to train with 10 MTLB armored

personnel carriers. These vehicles were drawn from a pool of over 300 armored

vehicles that the Iraqis intend to make ready as the unit grows. The brigade

has 50 T–55 tanks, 48 BMP–1s, 57 MTLBs, 36 Spartans, and 30 BTR–94s already. MNSTC–I hopes to have a combat ready armored battalion by the end

of January and the time of election, with others to follow.

• Iraqi Coastal Defense Force: The Iraqi Coastal Defense Force is the Iraqi Armed

Forces’ naval component. Ultimately to number just more than 400 servicemen,

the force also includes a land-based Coastal Defense Regiment resembling western-type ‘‘Marine’’ infantry forces. Land and sea based forces negotiate IAF

eight-week basic training courses before moving on to follow-on training and sea

training for the boat crews.

Boat crews learn the basics in seamanship before moving on to instruction in

advanced seamanship, towing, gunnery, sea rescue, chart reading, navigation,

anti-smuggling, operations, and rigid inflatable boat integration and small boat

drill instruction. Training is put in the context of a democratically based maritime sea force.

Primary duties include protecting the country’s roughly 50-mile coastline from

smuggling and foreign fighter infiltration operations as well as the port assets

at Umm Qasr in Southern Iraq and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force

patrols out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf

with five 27-meter long Chinese-made patrol boats and various other support

craft.

Setting the Right U.S. Short and Long-Term Objectives in Aid to Iraqi Military and

Security Forces and Providing the Necessary Transparency

These numbers and force descriptions show that the Iraqi military and security

forces are now far too weak to take over the security mission and will almost cerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
31

tainly remain so well into 2005. They also indicate that the U.S. may be moving

too slowly in creating military forces that can deal with the insurgency problem by

2006. While the U.S. is seeking to help Iraq build a three division force, it seems

clear that it is not yet committed to creating the kind of national military forces

that can defend the country and give the government legitimacy and respect.

In practice, the U.S. can only succeed in ‘‘playing the course’’ of the program for

training and equipping Iraqi military and security forces meets the following key

short-term and longer-term objectives:

• Create effective police and security forces capable of operating on a nation-wide

basis. • Create a suitable mix of military and specially trained and equipped security

forces that can help defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and come to maintain security without Coalition assistance.

• Create the structure and cadres that will allow an Iraqi government to expand

the Iraqi military to the point where it is capable of defending the nation and

with the size, professionalism, and equipment to act as an effective, modern

military force for national defense.

This latter objective means creating a longer term U.S. aid and advisory plan that

will give Iraq the modern, professional military forces it needs for defense and deterrence without risking a return to either a political role for the armed forces or

the kind of military buildup that could lead to an arms race and a destabilization

of the region.

More broadly, U.S. needs to carefully reexamine the level of effort it is making

in each area. There are serious tradeoffs in force quality if the training, force building, and equipment effort is rushed. The end result could be a failed force. Yet, the

U.S. can only ‘‘play the course’’ effectively if it works out goals and plans with the

Iraqi Interim Government that go far beyond the 28,000 man armed forces—and the

roughly 40–55,000 man total of military, paramilitary, and National Guard—the

U.S. currently says are ‘‘required.’’ This may well mean scaling up a much larger

training and equipment program over time than the U.S. currently plans.

U.S. Transparency and the Role of Allied Forces

Finally, the U.S. needs to communicate a clear plan for achieving all three of the

previous objectives to the Iraqi people and the region. Once again, it needs honest

and transparent reporting that is detailed enough to be convincing, while pushing

Iraqis towards responsibility and accountability.

It needs to show that it is truly dedicated to creating legitimate forces for a legitimate government, and creating the conditions necessary for a phased U.S. withdrawal. It needs to go back to reporting systems that are detailed and transparent

enough to show the progress it is making, and minimize the impact of the various

conspiracy theories rampant throughout the country.

The U.S. also needs to keep seeking as much allied and outside support in the

training effort as possible. The U.S. will not get significant numbers of additional

combat troops. In fact, it will be almost impossible for its current allies to maintain

their present troop strength unless it articulates a clear strategy for both improving

the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and phasing out Coalition troops. It is one

of the many strategic ironies in Iraq that any serious increase in foreign troops requires a level of internal security in Iraq that makes them largely unnecessary.

At the same time, an NATO or other country that plays a role in the training

process not only aids a critical mission; it also adds a degree of transparency and

legitimacy to the military effort. Their presence and activity will make it clear that

the U.S. is creating real Iraqi capabilities, and does intend to leave.

The U.S. State Department announced on November 19, 2004, that NATO’s decision to send military trainers to Iraq was the first collective, consensus decision the

alliance had made on Iraq in two years, and would substantially increase the number of military trainers in the country from around 65 to as many as 400. Not clear,

however, exactly when such manpower will arrive and it will require an additional

1,000 to 1,200 personnel to support the trainers by providing force protection, logistics, and communications—creating a mission total of between 1,500 and 1,700 people, some of which will be drawn from the United States. Most of the new military

personnel were scheduled to be in place within 5 to 6 weeks, and the U.S. military

personnel contributions will come from outside Iraq.12

SHAPING THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION

The U.S. has already learned that it can win virtually any direct military battle

or clash, but it cannot secure the country. Moreover, U.S. and Coalition forces are

so unpopular that their presence can create added hostility and new insurgents.

32

This is one key reason for creating effective Iraqi military and security forces. Winning the military action is only part of the story. As in Vietnam, if the interim Iraqi

government cannot win the political battle, U.S. victories in the military battles become irrelevant.

Interoperability, giving the Iraqis the Lead, and Replacement of U.S. Forces

The very professionalism of the U.S. military often makes it reluctant to give allied forces major responsibility or a lead role. There are also very tangible limits

to how quickly Iraqi forces can be trained, equipped, and gain enough experience

to be fully interoperable and take over from U.S. forces.

The key to political and military success will, however, be to create a pattern of

operations where Iraqi forces are as visible as possible, become truly interoperable,

and take over as many security and military missions as possible. This involves

more than the training and aid effort that has just been discussed. It requires detailed, ongoing U.S. efforts to transform operations into joint U.S.-Iraqi and then

Iraqi operations as quickly as this can be done with the proper level of effectiveness.

The Sunni Side of the Political, Military, and Economic Battle

The political and economic battle is very different from the military one. It will

be fought over several months, not days or weeks. It will extend far beyond the

bounds of cities like Fallujah. Barring a revival of the kind of Shi’ite insurgency led

by Al Sadr, it will be a struggle to give the Iraqi Interim Government enough control over the Sunni Arab-driven aspects of the insurgency in Iraq to achieve the following seven objectives:

• Defeat insurgents without alienating the Sunnis to the point where political compromise is impossible: A battle conducted in a political context in which a coalition and interim government victory does not become a convincing image of

martyrdom in Iraqi Sunni and Arab eyes. Civilian casualties and collateral

damage should not create convincing images of another Jenin in the Palestinian

West Bank or the massive use of excessive force.

• Establish sufficient security and control to deny Sunni insurgents and terrorists

any major sanctuary and ‘‘no-go’’ areas in Fallujah, Anbar province, and Iraq

generally. Not only defeat the insurgents who stay in Fallujah, but prevent their

dispersal or their going under cover to the extent that they cannot control any

major populated area, during daylight and at night.

• Ensure that Iraqi military and security forces demonstrate enough credibility so

that they play a major role in the battle, can be the most visible security presence

in the area after major fighting is over, and can erase the impression of failure

left by Iraqi forces in April. Further, they should provide a credible picture to

the Iraqi people, the region, and the world that government forces can—in

time—take over a fully sovereign role from U.S.-led coalition forces and lead to

the coalition’s withdrawal.

• Establish sufficient security in every high threat area so that Iraqi security forces

and administrators can function in Fallujah and key cities and towns in Anbar

province.

• Establish sufficient Iraqi Interim Government political control over Fallujah,

Anbar, and the ‘‘Sunni triangle’’ to give the government a major boost in legitimacy and make polling and elections possible in the area.

• Give the Sunnis incentives to join the political and electoral process. A significant number of Arab Sunnis must be persuaded to participate in the political

process and January’s election to avoid creating a Shiite- and Arab-Kurdishdominated Iraq. The Sunnis controlled Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule.

• Create conditions where there is immediate aid and compensation and longerterm economic hope. The military effort must be accompanied by U.S. and Iraqi

Interim Government efforts to institute an effective public-assistance and economic development process that offers jobs, hope and incentives to join the interim government as a functioning and tolerated entity.

This struggle may not be as difficult as it seems, but its course highly uncertain.

The good news is that there is no rigid separation between Arab Sunni and Arab

Shi’ite, and the estimates saying that Arab Sunnis are 20% of the populations and

Arab Shi’ites are 60% are decades old and are not based on a census. Many Sunnis

intermarry and live with Shi’ites, and most past clashes were the result of attacks

by the Ba’ath regime and not the result of popular tensions. Sunni insurgent numbers still seem relatively small, perhaps some 12,000–16,000 full time actives plus

perhaps twice to three times that number acting as a pool of part time insurgents

or ‘‘instant’’ volunteers. This is scarcely an insignificant number, but is a small fraction of the more than five million Arab Sunnis in Iraq.

33

The bad news is that the U.S. military victory in Fallujah probably only affected

10–20% of the full time Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and many seem to have escaped.

Other Sunni insurgents attacked throughout Iraq during the fighting, and had considerable success in starting an uprising in Mosul. The decision to attack Fallujah

was opposed by Iraq’s Sunni president, its leading group of Sunni clerics, and a

number of other Iraqi politicians. Sunni Arab media coverage was almost universally hostile both inside and outside Iraq, and these negative images were compounded by TV coverage that appeared to show a U.S. Marine killing a defenseless,

wounded prisoner and then a devastated and deserted city.

Fallujah illustrates the fact that U.S.-led military victories—regardless of how

convincing in military terms—can only be the prelude to an ongoing Iraqi-led political and economic struggle mixed with ongoing efforts to establish security in every

part of Iraq. Iraqis, not Americans, will have to shape the most critical part of their

destiny. U.S. forces can only give them the opportunity to succeed. Consequently,

the Iraqi Interim Government’s performance in achieving all of the above political

and economic objectives during the course of 2004–2006 will be the key litmus test

of whether the military actions in the war have meaning and offer Iraqis and the

Americans hope of lasting success.

No one in the United States, the Coalition, and Interim Government can afford

to forget this for a moment in the heat of the fighting. This is particularly true because the interim government failed to perform effectively in establishing governance, establishing aid, and providing security after the U.S. victory in Samarra, and

after the fighting in Najaf and Sadr City. If the interim government does not do

better in Fallujah, Anbar province, and Iraq as a whole, the insurgents will recover

and return, the Sunni Arabs will reject the interim government and political process, and the political process will be seriously discredited.

Put differently, it is critical to give the Iraqi Interim Government help in ‘‘stability operations’’ and nation building after each battle, and give it as much of a

lead and visibility as possible in both the fighting and its aftermath. It is not the

U.S. that has to win in terms of Iraqi and regional perceptions, it is the interim

government.

This ‘‘Iraqi first’’ aspect of successful military operations means highlighting Iraqi

military and security operations, not U.S. operations, and steadily expanding the

military security role of Iraqis over time. It means pushing the government into

more successful civil-military operations and downplaying the U.S. role. It means

giving U.S. commanders large discretionary (CERP-type) aid funds to both ease the

backlash civilian casualties and collateral damage cause to the U.S., and to back up

Iraqi government civic action programs and cover for any failures. It also means

educating U.S. forces to be extremely sensitive about the need to build up the interim government’s credibility and to defer to it in ways that reinforce its legitimacy.

The Shi’ite Side of the Political, Military, and Economic Battle

The political and economic battle also requires the U.S. to make every effort to

help the Iraqi Interim Government maintain the support of the Arab Shi’ite majority, and of the Kurds and other minorities. This balancing act is now largely Iraqi,

but the U.S. does retain significant influence, and can allocate and reprogram economic aid to this end.

‘‘Playing the course’’ also means supporting the interim government in its efforts

to pressure Sadr to join the political process and avoiding new clashes driven by his

militia. Here again, giving Iraqi leaders and forces maximum visibility in decisionmaking and any future fighting is critical. The most efficient way may be the U.S.

military way; the way to achieve political victory (and minimize any backlash

against the U.S.) will be the Iraqi way.

The U.S. must never forget that losing the Iraqi Shi’ites means losing the war

in terms of any ability to create a representative government of the kind the U.S.

is seeking to create. Like civil war or being asked to leave by an elected Iraqi government, it is a key indication the U.S. must leave. This, however, means accepting

that a Shi’ite majority may well emerge with values and goals from those of the U.S.

It also means exercising care in dealing with Iran. The U.S. cannot shape its Iran

policy around the risk that Iran may challenge the U.S. and interim government

far more directly than it has to date; it scarcely, however, can ignore this risk.

The Kurdish Side of the Political, Military, and Economic Battle

The U.S. should make it unambiguously clear to the Kurds that it will support

them and the protection of their legitimate rights as long as they remain part of

the Iraqi political process, and will not support them at all in any effort at sepaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
34

ratism or ethic cleaning in dealing with Iraqi Arabs and other minorities like the

Turcomans.

So far, the Kurds have shown they understand the political realities involved, although they naturally push their cause to the margin. The U.S. must do nothing

to change this perception. It must also make it clear to the Kurds that if things go

wrong in Iraq, it will not support or protect them as it did with Saddam, either

against their fellow Iraqis or from pressure and threats from Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The U.S. has no future strategic interest in the Kurds, and no humanitarian

obligation to protect them from the consequences of their own mistakes.

The Civil Side of U.S. Military Operations and the Need for New Kinds of Jointness

U.S. troops in Iraq face a serious and dangerous mix of insurgency and terrorism.

The U.S. can subordinate military effective and force protection to civil and political

concerns. At the same time, it seems clear that some elements of the insurgency

will continue indefinitely into the future, and that the U.S. cannot delay many civic

action and aid activities until something approaching local security is established.

The U.S. military has already established that it understands the need to use dollars as well as bullets. It has used the Commander’s Emerging Relief Program

(CERP) with considerable effectiveness, and has since used the reprogramming of

aid funds in similar ways. As of October 2, 2004, the U.S. had dispersed $578.3 million in CERP funds. Some $150.4 million had gone to police and security services

and the facilities protection service, but the rest had gone to civic action. Another

$383.8 million was approved for a somewhat similar time-urgent program called the

Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) in April 2004.13

What is less clear is how good the partnership is between the U.S. military and

the U.S. aid effort in governance and economic programs, and whether the U.S. Embassy and U.S. command have been able to establish the necessary level of civilmilitary jointness in making it possible to carry out such programs. The poor civilmilitary relations between the CPA and previous military command left what at

best was a poisoned chalice.

As will be discussed shortly, one of the keys to success in economic aid and stability, will be to terminate the U.S. contractor effort as immediately and fully as

possible, and to shift aid planning and execution to the Iraqi government and Iraqi

contractors. Such an effort, however, requires careful U.S. review in the field and

often hands-on advice and support by U.S. officials and direct, accountable employees of the U.S. government. It also requires removing non-Iraqi security personnel

as quickly as possible. This will make civil-military jointness even more critical than

in the past.

It also raises an issue that may be too late to address in Iraq, but that may be

critical in the future. The separation of U.S. civilian authority and operational military commands makes good practical sense during conventional warfighting. It is far

less clear that it should happen in stability, peacemaking, and nation building operations.

Many of the pointless civil-military tensions, and much of the lack of effective

civil-military coordination, during ORHA and the time of the CPA were the result

of a divided presence coupled to divided responsibility. The need for truly integrated

civil-military operations (including integrated effort in developing local military, security, and police forces) is simply too great to permit this to happen in the future,

and such integration should occur in Iraq as quickly as possible.

ECONOMIC AID AND STABILITY

The U.S. economic aid program in Iraq has had many individual success and accomplishment, and U.S. AID and contractor personnel have accomplished a great

deal in individual areas in spite of immense difficulties and the dangers in the field.

As an overall effort, however, U.S. economic aid has lagged far behind the need for

urgent action; has wasted vast resources on an impractical contracting effort; and

reflects U.S. views and priorities. As a result, it is decoupled from the needs of Iraq,

the political and military realities and pressures in the country, and the need to

transition responsibility and action to the Iraqi government as soon as possible.

The situation is made worse by an almost completely dysfunctional reporting system within the U.S. government that does not tie plans and accomplishments to realistic requirements, and that reports different kinds of aid in separate reports

using different categories. It has been compounded by the CPA’s inability to put its

ideas about economic reform into action while sustaining economic distortions like

the massive subsidies provided under Saddam Hussein. It was further compounded

by a focus on longer-term plans and expenditures in a country where the U.S. faced

serious security problems and needed to act decisively and to begin achieving far

more visible results over a year ago.

35

The U.S. has had problems in every aspect of its efforts in Iraq that threaten its

ability to ‘‘play the course.’’ Its efforts at economic aid, however, are a uniquely mismanaged mess.

Effective Plans and Action, Not Resources, Are the Problem

Any estimate of either Iraq’s near-term or overall needs for aid can only be a

crude guesstimate. Figures like $50–$100 billion have been quoted for ‘‘medium

term relief and reconstruction,’’ but they are not based on either reliable input data

or credible models. The present problem, however, is not one of resources. There are

enough funds to ‘‘play the course.’’

As of early November, the U.S. had only disbursed $3,255 million of $18,060 in

FY2004 IRRF aid. Disbursements were also running at well under $50 million a

week. It is disturbing that a total of $14,891 million of this total is said to be committed, and $10,437 is said to be obligated. This kind of ‘‘progress’’ may well be

wasted on delayed and unneeded efforts, or vast amounts of overhead and security

expenditures. At the same time, the Inspector General for the CPA has reported

that a total of some $55.1 billion had been provided or pledged for Iraqi relief and

reconstruction. As of September 30, 2004 this included: 14

• $24.1 billion in U.S. appropriated funds, used primarily for reconstruction.

These funds come from three public laws: (a) PL108–287 provides a total of

$300 million in CERP funds under PL108–287 ($100 million allocated to Iraq).

PL108–11 (April 2003) provides $2,475 million in IRRF funds, $802 million in

NRRRF, $684 million in CERP, $51 million for the new Iraqi Army, $413 million to USAID, and $66 million to the Department of State. PL108–106 (November 2003) provides $18,439 million in IRRF, $877 million in CPA OPS/IG, $106

million in IRMO, and $140 million in CERP.

• $28.2 billion in Iraqi funds, used primarily for ongoing operating expenditures,

but also for reconstruction and relief: $1,724 million in vested funds from frozen

funds; $927 million in seized funds and confiscated cash and property, and

$25,782 million in the Development fund for Iraq, financed by oil revenues, repatriated funds, and money in the oil for food account.

• Some $2.8 billion in donor funds: $849 million in humanitarian relief, $435 million in IMF EPCA funds, and $1,355 billion in actual deposits for the $13,589

million pledged at the Madrid International Donors Conference for Iraq Reconstruction.

Iraq will almost certainly need more aid over the next few years, as well as debt

relief and forgiveness of reparations from the Gulf War. The immediate task, however, is to put an aid program in place as soon as possible that helps establish security, meets the urgent needs of the people, and moves money to Iraqi projects run

by Iraqis.

Restructuring the Near Term Approach to Economic Aid and Stabilization

The U.S. Embassy has already successfully sought reprogramming of $3,460.1

million aid funds to meet urgent security needs. President Bush approved this

transfer on September 30, 2004. It cut $1,074.6 million out of electricity projects and

$1,935.6 million in water projects that could not be executed in a timely way and

which faced many security problems. It added $1,809.6 million to security and law

enforcement, $460.5 million to justice and public safety, $660 million to private sector employment development, and $80.00 million to governance. The U.S. has

stepped up emergency aid expenditures to deal with contingencies like Fallujah.

There also is a base of valid aid projects underway that should be successfully pursued.

Nevertheless, there seems ample reason for the U.S. to act immediately to ‘‘zero

base’’ the current economic aid effort to achieve the following objectives:

• Ensure adequate financing for short term CERP/AIRP projects to allow intensive U.S. operations in CY2005 and CY2006, and make military and political

stability efforts the key priority. The priority is to make things work in Iraq in

the middle of drastic political change, insurgency, and economic crisis. Mid- and

long-term efforts will have priority when—and if—there is a longer term.

• Focus on unemployment and immediate social needs. The latest weekly report

on aid related jobs shows a loss from 68,000 jobs to 61,000. This trend, however,

is irrelevant. The Iraqi labor force totals at least 7.8 million. More than 11 million Iraqis are young dependents between 0 and 14 years of age (more than 40%

of the population). The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that there are 4.2 million

Iraqis in the critical employment age between 20 and 24, and more than 2.2

million are male. There are no accurate employment statistics, but real and disguised unemployment is probably around 30–40%, and may be 40–60% among

36

young males. Stability at the local level is the issue. Classic infrastructure and

institutional development must wait. • Put the Iraqis in charge of planning, project development, and project management for mid- and long-term projects. The U.S. has not shown any special competence in formulating and executing such projects. If anything, trying to do

things the U.S. way, with a heavy emphasis on large, long-term infrastructure

projects and construction efforts has helped convince a large part of the Iraqi

people that the U.S. is not even trying to help them. There will be a continuing

need for the U.S. to review projects, take steps to limit corruption, and ensure

proper completion. The Iraqi government, however, must be given as much authority as soon as possible, and the Iraqi people must see that it is in charge. • Encourage short-term and mid-term solutions with clear local benefits in troubled and high risk areas. The need to do this should be obvious but the current

aid plan still tends to emphasize mid- to long-term construction. Over $8 billion

out of the $18.4 billion in FY2004 IRRF funds, and puts $5.248 billion into

water and electricity projects that are time consuming and vulnerable.15 These

efforts may well be needed in time; but local needs should be met right now

and even if this means patchwork efforts that are not cost-effective. • Minimize the role of USAID in Washington. Iraq is not a traditional ‘‘client’’ for

aid, and the USAID contracting process is a slow moving nightmare oriented

towards U.S. formulated and executed projects. USAID personnel have often

done well in the field, but direction should come out of the U.S. Embassy and

aid flows should be programmed to go directly to the Iraqi government and contractors. • Minimize or eliminate the use of U.S. or non-Iraqi contractors. Reliance on large

U.S. contractors may have made some kind of sense at the start. At this point,

their overheads and security costs, and the non-performance of many foreign

subcontractors, is a major problem. It compounds the Iraqi impression that the

U.S. aid effort is not serious and does not help Iraqis. It adds major delays and

creates far more security risks than letting Iraqis do the job. This effort is not

about ‘‘buy American’’ and meeting accounting and contracting standards. It is

about nation building and achieving a strategic result. • Multilateralize the aid process to minimize direct U.S. responsibility and allow

the U.S. to use joint pressure on the Iraqis to perform. The U.S. should seek to

create international groups to handle key aspects of the aid effort. This is necessary both to make it clear that the U.S. is not attempting to dictate and that

it is no longer responsible for Iraqi actions. It is also a key way to seek further

aid from other countries. • Make the aid and economic development process transparent. No one can talk

to Iraqis and not be aware of the fact that their expectations are grossly exaggerated and they are badly informed about both what must be done and what

is being done. Part of the problem is that they simply do not know the scale

of the challenges involved. Part is the contrast between the constant lists of ‘‘accomplishments’’ being claimed by the U.S. and the realities they live with. The

U.S. needs to provide far more honest reporting on the scale of the problems

Iraq has inherited from Saddam’s regime, how much must be done to correct

them, the realities of what the U.S. aid program is actually accomplishing, and

how such accomplishments relate to real world needs and goals.

• Make a major point of multilateralizing development aid for the petroleum sector. It is still far from clear how much Iraq’s oil fields have suffered from mismanagement and the years of underfunding that began early in the Iran-Iraq

War. The present oil ministry goal of 2.5 MMBD may or may not be suitable

given current reservoir problems. The recent weekly average of 2.39 MMBD certainly does not meet this goal, or compare with estimates of 2.8–3.0 MMBD in

prewar capacity.16

Average oil exports have been ranging from 1.1 to 1.8 MMBD in 2004, generally on the lower side. High oil prices and export revenues per barrel have

allowed Iraq to earn $14.6 billion in oil revenues in 2004, as of November 2004,

but it seems unlikely that Iraq will earn the $18 billion it earned in 2002, much

less the $22 billion in near term annual earnings the U.S. projected at the time

the war began. Moreover, as of November 2004, the U.S. had actually dispersed

only $56 million of $1,701 million in IRRF aid for oil infrastructure.17

There is no single area more critical to the Iraqi economy, to giving the Iraqi

government the resources it needs, and to refuting charges that the U.S. and

Britain are seeking to grab Iraqi oil than helping the Oil Ministry create an effective plan to repair and develop Iraq’s oil resources in a way that is multilateral and transparent enough to make it clear to Iraqis and the world that the

U.S. truly wants to help and not to profiteer.

37

• Push debt and reparations forgiveness to the limit: The last thing Iraq needs is

a burden similar to one place on the Weimar Republic. A stable and secure Iraq

cannot emerge with massive foreign obligations and debts. Nations in general

find it easier to foreign such obligations than to provide real aid money, and

a major U.S. effort to open pressure all of Iraqi debtors and reparations holders

is a good way to externalize the aid effort and counter nations that are willing

to be critics, but not to help.

The Paris Club agreement on November 21st to reduce some $31 billion of $38.9

billion in Iraq’s debt in three stages is an 80% reduction that does not meet the

goal of a 95% reduction set by the U.S., but is an important step forward, particularly if it can be extended to all debtors and remain linked to pressure on

Iraq for effective economic reform.18 It does, however, leave Iraq with combination of reparations and remaining debt that may exceed $120 billion. This is one

of the few political weapons the U.S. has in dealing with outside powers and

it should use it to the maximum extent possible.19

Restructuring the Mid- and Long-Term Approach to Economic Aid

In addition to these immediate priorities, the U.S. needs to take a similar approach to encouraging the Iraqi government to carry out multilateral and study

plans that will allow it to act when (and if) security and stability are established,

and Iraq’s longer term needs can really be established.

• Infrastructure planning: Roads, electricity, water, and sewers: The U.S. has

placed far too heavy an emphasis on infrastructure recovery without having

clear Iraqi plans and priorities, and Iraqi decisions designed to correct the massive imbalances and inadequacies Saddam’s regime created in the services and

facilities provided to given groups. This is an area where Iraq needs to make

hard decisions and choose its own path, not have the path chosen for it.

• The financial sector: The U.S. made some good beginnings in this area, but

Iraqis now see many of its efforts to open up the financial sector in conspiracy

theory terms. The U.S. needs to shift as much of the burden in this sector to

the World Bank and IMF as possible, and ideally, to work with Iraq to find

some European or Asian nation to take the lead.

• State industries: Iraq’s state industries are a major economic millstone around

the neck of its development efforts. They are also a political nightmare. The

U.S. should encourage reform, but distance itself from direct involvement. Let

Iraqis, the IMF/World Bank, and other nations take the lead.

• Subsidies: As above. The U.S. has already done enough damage by failing to

come to grips with the problem immediately after the war, when something

might have be done with far more ease.

• The agricultural sector: Some progress has already been made here. Creating

an efficient and competitive sector, however, again involves political issues that

the U.S. should be careful to give the Iraqi government the lead in. Aid efforts

should be as multilateral as possible.

• Education: The issue is not facilities; it is quality and relevance in term of job

creation. Unlike some countries in the region, Iraqis see this on their own. The

U.S. role should be to encourage them to plan and act, and provide aid. It can

be largely passive.

• Austerity and Financial Discipline: Iraq needs job creation, sustainment, and

stability first. The U.S. should help it resist any types of rapid economic reform

that will be internally destabilizing. Landings need to be as soft as possible.

Plans for U.S. withdrawal and phasing down the U.S. aid effort should not mean

abandoning Iraq. They should instead mean mid- and long-term aid plans that can

actually be implemented on terms the Iraqis want, can execute, and can sustain.

The U.S. also needs to be careful to multilateralize such efforts as much as possible

to give them international legitimacy, avoid taking responsibilities that belong with

the Iraq government, and demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions.

‘‘KNOW WHEN TO FOLD AND KNOW WHEN TO RUN:’’ WHEN AND HOW TO GET OUT

While any form of conspicuous U.S. failure in Iraq will be serious defeat, such a

defeat is still all too thinkable and all too possible. This is why every section of this

analysis has not only addressed what can be done to create some acceptable form

of ‘‘victory,’’ but the need to transfer responsibility to Iraqis, and to create the kinds

of transparency that will minimize the political backlash and blame the U.S. will

face if it must withdraw.

As has been stated in the introduction, the key to any feasible form of ‘‘victory’’

is to plan to ‘‘fold’’ just as rapidly as the Iraqi government can take over the political

and security burdens, and has some basis for dealing with the economic crisis. The

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only way to win the game in Iraq is to stop playing it as soon as the Iraqis are

ready to take over. Ideally, this should occur no later than the end of 2006, and take

place earlier if Iraqi governance, legitimacy, and security can be established during

2005.

At the same time, the U.S. does not need the kind of exit strategy that means

deliberately planning for failure. It also does not need to set deadlines for withdrawal that may well make failure a self-fulfilling prophecy. The odds may not be

good, but they are scarcely unacceptable and it may well be possible to improve

them substantially during 2005—if the U.S. acts promptly and decisively.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the U.S. should not set deadlines for

a U.S. troop presence, or ceilings on U.S. aid. These are a dangerous signal to the

insurgents, who will see such deadlines as a reason to keep fighting and as a key

sign of American weakness and lack of resolve. They will make it even more difficult

to attract and keep coalition and international support. They also are far more likely to make Iraqis think about protecting themselves, and make them avoid the risks

of supporting the interim government and nation building process. Morality and

ethic also play a role, not just expediency. This is a war the U.S. started, and a

peace process that it initially bungled. Quite aside from power politics and strategy,

it has a moral and ethical responsibility to the Iraqi people.

Yet, the U.S. and its allies do need to think and plan for the ‘‘unthinkable.’’ They

need contingency plans to deal with different kinds of failure, and they must plan

for the possibility that Iraqis may either demand an exit or the situation may become untenable in spite of U.S. and allied efforts. No one can guarantee success in

Iraq; or that Iraq will not descend into civil war, come under a strongman, or split

along ethnic or confessional lines. The U.S. must be ready if the Iraqis fail to move

forward and reach a necessary political consensus, divide or move towards civil war,

or ask the U.S. and its coalition allies to leave.

It is silly and dangerous to deny the possibility this can happen, or to claim the

U.S. can never withdraw. If anything, this encourages precisely the kind of Iraqi

government dependence on the U.S. that will make things worse for both Iraq and

America. The U.S. should make it clear the length and nature of its effort in Iraq

is conditional. It should make it clear that the Iraqi government has goals it must

meet, that it must take the creation of Iraqi military and security forces seriously,

and must focus on economic, power sharing, and other key realities and succeed.

Iraqis should know that the U.S. does have credible plans to leave if an elected

government asks it to leave, and to reduce its role and presence in response to any

such legitimate request. It should make it equally clear that it has a presence to

phase out its military role, and reduce the size of its Embassy, as Iraqi capabilities

expand and the Iraqi political process and capability to govern reaches the point

where an Iraqi government feels it is ready.

Rather than setting deadlines, the U.S. should make it clear that it is committed

to an ‘‘exit strategy’’ tied to the Iraqi political process, and to the ‘‘legitimacy’’ of

its own position in Iraq. Iraqis and the world should know the U.S. plans to leave

under two conditions: Whenever this is demanded by a legitimate Iraqi government,

or in phases as Iraqis take over given missions. The U.S. must recognize that its

ability to stay and perform meaning roles over the next few years is directly linked

to a firm and open commitment to leave in the future.

The U.S. should, however, also make it clear to Iraqis that it will not stay if the

situation deteriorates beyond certain limits. It should set clear metrics for Iraqi success and continuously pressure Iraqi leaders and the government to meet them. It

should not go beyond aid in counterinsurgency; it should leave if the political process fails and the civil war breaks out. It should leave if the Iraqi government and

security forces fail to develop over the next two years, and it should not attempt

to stay if the Iraqi government cannot manage the budget, economy, or its foreign

aid. Any of these contingencies are a clear message that the U.S. should begin to

‘‘run,’’ and should quietly prepare plans for such action.

Regardless of how the U.S. departs, it should still try to do as much in withdrawing to ensure that the future situation in Iraq will be as favorable as possible.

It should not take key assets with it, and should continue with valid aid programs

if this is possible. However, it is one thing to play the game and quite another to

try to deal with defeat by reinforcing failure or ‘‘doubling the bet.’’ If it is clear by

2006 that the U.S. cannot win with its current level of effort, and/or the situation

seriously deteriorates to the point where it is clear there is no new Iraqi government

and security force to aid, the game is over. There no longer is time to fold; it is time

to run.

39

THE BROADER REGIONAL CONTEXT: HAVING SOMEPLACE ELSE TO ‘‘RUN’’ TO

The U.S. must also recognize that the game in Iraq is only one arrow part of the

strategy it must develop in the Middle East. Win, lose, or draw in Iraq, the U.S.

needs to pursue major initiatives that will improve its overall position in the region,

reassure it allies, and allow it to stay in an area with some 63% of the world’s proven oil reserves and some 37% of its natural gas.

In the worst case of force withdrawal, the U.S. must also be ready with major

efforts to reassure the friendly Gulf states and other Arab allies, demonstrate that

the U.S. will maintain a major presence in the Gulf, contain any risk that civil conflict in Iraq will spill over into other countries, contain any Iranian actions, and deal

with the inevitable Islamist claims of ‘‘victory.’’

The U.S. must make every effort to strengthen its position in other parts of the

Gulf and the Middle East. Virtually the same strategy is needed whether the U.S.

succeeds or fails in Iraq. Even ‘‘victory’’ in Iraq will be highly relative, and defeat

will force the U.S. to reinforce its position in the entire region. The specific steps

the U.S. needs to take are:

• Give the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict the highest possible priority in

the most visible form possible.

• Rebuild U.S. ties to friendly Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and strengthen ties

to all of the GCC states, emphasizing cooperation in dealing with terrorism and

Islamic extremism.

• Adopt a more flexible policy in dealing with Iran.

• Prepare for the potential impact of problems in Iraq in dealing with the fighting

in Afghanistan.

• Recast U.S. energy policy to deal with the reality that the U.S. will have growing strategic dependence on Gulf and Middle Eastern oil exports for the next

20 years, and their security will become steadily more important.

• Adopt a realistic approach to political reform in the region that will improve

U.S. relations with both moderate regimes and with the peoples of the area.

• Give the political dimension of counterterrorism a new priority, addressing the

many aspects of the way in which the U.S. now fights the war of terrorism that

needlessly hurt relations with the Islamic and Arab world, and restrict the educational, business, and other relations necessary to create a common effort to

deal with terrorism and extremism.

Giving Solving the Arab-Israeli Conflict the Highest and Most Visible Priority

Arafat’s death has created an opportunity that the U.S. must act upon as immediately as possible. There is nothing to be gained from waiting for two inadequate

governments to try to bludgeon each other into peace. A common solution cannot

be imposed by force, and the U.S. and Arab world will never agree on all the details

of a final settlement. The time has come, however, for an open and continuing effort

by both the Quartet and Arab world to define a final settlement, and to build on

the lessons of Camp David and Taba.

The time has come for the U.S. to both act on its own and put pressure on the

rest of the Quartet and moderate Arab states to take every possible measure to persuade the Palestinians to reject terrorism and on the Israelis to both evacuate the

Gaza, and roll back the settlements the West Bank that extend beyond ‘‘Greater Jerusalem’’ and security adjustments to the 1967 boundaries.

This means the kind of compromise that President Clinton proposed at Camp

David and that was discussed at Taba. Adjustments involving some 3% of the area

of the West Bank, not the 10–20% included in some maps of the Israeli security barrier or the 30–40% some times proposed by hard-line settlers. At the same time, 35

years of facts on the ground are facts on the ground. The worlds of 1949 and 1967

are gone forever, and peace must be based upon this reality.

The challenge is to persuade Israel to make as many compromises as possible,

and to find ways to compensate the Palestinians. The time has come to look beyond

the narrow terms of a settlement and see what a massive aid program could do to

guarantee a future Palestinian state’s economic and political success, and give the

Palestinians living standards that could underpin a peace. More ambitiously, it is

to look at how Jordan, Israel, and a Palestinian state could cooperate to live in

peace.

Boundaries are the past. With the exception of the holy places, the focus should

be economics, demographics, living standards, and security in the broadest sense.

This may well require a Western and Arab economic aid program totaling billions

of dollars over a period of years. It will certainly require a continuing U.S. aid program to Israel as well.

40

Moreover, it requires Palestinians and Arab governments to look honestly at the

demographics of Gaza and the West Bank, and to understand that it is going to be

an incredible challenge to deal with the inherent population growth in both areas.

Gaza only had less than 245,000 people in 1949, and around 330,000 in 1967. The

CIA estimates it now has more than 1.3 million, a growth rate of more than 3.8%,

and 49% of its population is 14 years of age or younger. The U.S. Census Bureau

estimates that it will grow to 1.7 million by 2010, and 4.2 million by 2050.

The West Bank had 775,000 people in 1949, and around 680,000 at the end of

the 1967 war. The CIA estimates it now has more than 2.3 million, a population

growth rate of more than 3.2%, and 44% of its population is 14 years of age or

younger. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that it will grow to 2.8 million by 2010,

and 5.6 million by 2050.

Far too many generations of young Palestinians have already been wasted in conflict. If the generation that now exists and the generations to come are to have hope,

then the Palestinian refugees outside Gaza and West Bank—nearly 90% of whom

have never seen what will be ‘‘Palestine,’’ must be made full citizens of the countries

where they now reside as refugees.

Rebuild U.S. ties to friendly Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Strengthen ties to

all of the GCC states, Emphasizing Cooperation in Dealing with Terrorism and

Islamic Extremism

The U.S. needs to take broad steps to encourage evolutionary political, economic,

and demographic reform in the region, and to recast its approach to

counterterrorism to take more consideration of its political impact. Both steps are

discussed later in this report. In the short term, however, the U.S. needs to prepare

now to strengthen its security ties to every friendly state in the Gulf, and to key

neighboring states like Egypt and Jordan.

The security posture of Saudi Arabia and every other Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) state is undergoing major changes. They no longer face a major near to midterm threat from Iraqi military forces, but must deal with instability in Iraq and

the growing risk that Iran will become a nuclear power. This confronts Saudi Arabia

and its neighbors with hard strategic choices as to whether to ignore Iran’s efforts

to proliferate, seek U.S. military assistance in deterring Iran and possibly in some

form of missile defense, or to acquire more modern missiles and its own weapons

of mass destruction.

The most urgent security threats to the Southern Gulf states, however, no longer

consist of hostile military forces. They have become the threat of Islamic extremism

and terrorism. Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has faced an active internal and external threat from Islamic extremists, many affiliated with Al Qaida or exile groups,

and it must pay far more attention to internal security than in the past. At the

same time, the Saudi government must deal with the fact that this threat not only

is internal, but also is regional and extends throughout the Islamic world. Saudi

Arabia’s religious legitimacy is being challenged, and its neighbors and allies face

threats of their own.

Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman faces Islamist security threats at a lower level, but

must also mix reform with improved internal security. The UAE has some Islamist

elements, and Qatar has essentially chosen to buy time by mixing U.S. basing and

reform with the tolerance of Islamist extremists as long as they do not act within

Qatar.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, must make major adjustments in its alliances. The

events of ‘‘9/11,’’ the backlash from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, differences over

how to deal with terrorism, and differences over the Iraq War have all combined

to complicate Saudi Arabia’s security relations with the U.S., and to force it to distance itself from the U.S. in some ways. At the same time, the Al Qaida terrorist

attacks on Saudi Arabia in May 2003 made it brutally clear that Saudi Arabia was

a full participant in the war on Islamic terrorism and had even stronger incentives

to cooperate with the U.S. in anti-terrorism. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has not found

any substitute for U.S. power projection capabilities in dealing with Iran, instability

in Iraq, or Yemen, and needs U.S. technical assistance to deal with massive and

continuing deliveries of U.S. military equipment.

The other Gulf states face somewhat similar problems, and the past failure to create an effective regional security structure has made their problems worse. The Gulf

Cooperation Council has made some advances in military cooperation and internal

security, but remains largely a hollow shell. There is no true integration of security

efforts and only symbolic progress towards collective security. Interoperability remains poor at every level, and there is little progress towards effective power projection and sustainability.

41

There is little meaningful progress towards the creation of the kinds of information technology, C41 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence), IS&R (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and net-centric systems) that could tie together the forces of the GCC, as well as make Saudi cooperation with U.S. forces far more effective. At the same time, petty rivalries continue

to divide the Southern Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia face serious problems in dealing with Yemen and in obtaining Yemeni cooperation in blocking the infiltration of

terrorists and the smuggling of arms and narcotics.

All of these factors interact with a longer-term set of threats to the stability of

every Gulf State that are largely economic and demographic, but which may ultimately be more important than outside military threats and the threat of Islamic

extremism and terrorism. Recasting military plans and improved internal security

efforts must be coupled to political, economic, and demographic reform.

Saudi Arabia, for example has embarked on a process of political, economic, and

social reforms that reflect a growing understanding by the governing members of

the royal family, Saudi technocrats, and Saudi businessmen that Saudi ‘‘oil wealth’’

is steadily declining in relative terms, and that Saudi Arabia must reform and diversify its economy to create vast numbers of new jobs for its young and growing

population. These efforts so far are still faltering and have failed to gather the necessary momentum, but their success is at least as essential as any change in Saudi

Arabia’s security structure.

Every Gulf state must find ways to combine economic reform with political and

social reform to remain stable in the face of change, and every state must be far

more careful about the ways in which it uses the revenues from its oil exports and

its other revenues. This means hard decisions about future arms imports and investments in military and security forces. Massive changes are needed in military

planning, and especially in military procurement and arms imports, to create balanced and effective forces at far lower cost.

As yet, Gulf states have only begun to react to these changes. Their military and

internal security forces are only beginning to adapt to the fact the Iraqi threat has

largely disappeared, that Iran’s threat is a mix of proliferation and capabilities for

asymmetric warfare and not the build-up of conventional forces, and that they are

engaged in a generational struggle against domestic and foreign Islamic extremism.

They have only begun the process of deeper political, economic, and social reform;

their plans are still half formed, and no aspect of reform as yet has the momentum

necessary to succeed.

Even if the U.S. succeeds in Iraq, it needs to work with every Gulf state to help

them make the necessary changes in their respective security structures. It also

needs to move decisively and openly away from an emphasis on arms sales and U.S.

basing and deployments to encouraging effective security cooperation, strengthening

the right kind of internal security efforts, creating more cost-effective military

forces, and slowing down arms imports to fund higher priority needs. The U.S. also

needs to emphasize that its presence in the Gulf will be tailored to meet local and

not just U.S. security needs, that the size of its forward posture will be tailored to

the threat, and that it is seeking military partnership and interoperability. The U.S.

also needs to lay the groundwork now for reshaping its military posture in the Gulf

when it withdraws its forces from Iraq and leaves all of its bases in that country.

If the U.S. fails in Iraq, this will create an even stronger incentive to have the

strongest possible ties to the Southern Gulf States. Saudi Arabia remains the key

to any coordinated effort—just as it remains the key to including Iraq in some

broader regional security concept. This does not mean seeking a return to the direct

basing of the pre-Iraq War era, or trying to create some form of U.S. pillar. It does

mean rebuilding ties with Saudi Arabia focused in counterterrorism and energy

interdependence. At the same time, the U.S. needs to strengthen its ties to Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE, as well as work as closely as possible with Yemen.

The U.S. should quietly develop a clear strategy and action plan for discussing

such future cooperation with each country that will lay the groundwork for action

if the U.S. is forced to withdraw from Iraq, and prepare aid efforts and incentives

for cooperation in adjusting to this contingency. The same is true in preparing for

the impact of any U.S. withdrawal on Jordan and Egypt.

As a side issue, the U.S. needs to be far more careful about talking about NATO

initiatives in the region. To date, far too many of the discussions of this issue have

focused on what NATO wants without any discussion of how this is going to benefit

the Gulf states in terms of security, interoperability, and better arms sales policies.

There is no evidence that NATO or European countries will actually provide more

military capability, or seriously ease the burden on U.S. force deployments. There

is a very real risk that another ‘‘talk shop’’ will be layered over the existing problems in Gulf security structures. U.S. efforts focused on getting NATO forces for

42

Iraq that the U.S. clearly is not going to get now seem more likely to end in counterproductive tokenism than anything else.

Adopt a More Flexible Policy in Dealing with Iran

The U.S., the West, and Gulf states cannot afford to ignore either the military

realities in Iran, or the risk it will pose to Iraq whether the U.S. fails or succeeds.

At one level, there is a clear case for the U.S. to encourage its Gulf and other allies

to try to halt or limit Iranian proliferation and for the U.S. to work with Gulf states

to create an effective level of military containment, deterrence, and defense. At another level, the U.S. will need to work with Iran to make it clear that there are

good options for negotiation and improving relations, and options for cooperation in

dealing with Iraq that will be to the advantage of Iran, Iraq, and the U.S.

Iran is the only military power that poses a direct threat in terms of conventional

military forces and proliferation. The disclosures made by the IAEA over the last

year indicate that it is nearly certain that Iran will continue to covertly seek nuclear weapons, regardless of what it claims to agree to. It is developing long-range

missiles, it has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the

status of its biological weapons programs is unknown.

Moreover, the disclosures that have come out of Libya’s decision to end its nuclear

program indicate that Iran may well have one Chinese fission weapons design, with

a 1,000-pound payload, and all of the technology necessary to make high capacity

P2 centrifuges. This would eliminate the need for many aspects of nuclear weapons

testing, as well as make it far easier to create small, dispersed trains of covert centrifuge facilities.

Iran is still a significant conventional power. It has some 520,000 men under

arms, and over 300,000 reserves. These include 125,000 Iranian Revolutionary

Guards trained for land and naval asymmetric warfare. Iran’s military also includes

holdings of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored fighting vehicles,

3,200 artillery weapons, 300 combat aircraft, 50 attack helicopters, 3 submarines,

59 surface combatants, and 9 amphibious ships.

Iran is a potential threat to Gulf shipping as well as to shipping in the Gulf of

Oman. It occupies islands near the main shipping channels in the Gulf and has

close contacts with outside terrorist movements. At the same time, virtually all of

Iran’s military equipment is aging or second rate and much of it is worn. It has not

been able to modernize its air forces, ground based air defenses, or develop major

amphibious warfare capabilities. Iran lost some 50–60% of its land order of battle

in the climatic battles of the Iran-Iraq War, and has not imported a cutting edge

weapon system since that time, or created advanced new C41 systems.

According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Iran imported $2.0 billion worth of arms

during 1996–1999, and $600 million from 2000–2003. Iran only signed $1,700 million worth of new arms agreements during 1996–1999, and only $500 million in new

arms agreements during 2000–2003.20 This is roughly 30% to 35% of the level necessary to recapitalize and modernize its forces. Though Iran may be able to compensate in part through its domestic military production, its current weapons developments are scarcely advanced enough to solve its problems. As a result, it must

either succeed in proliferation or rely heavily on asymmetric warfare.20

Iran has declared it has the capacity to make chemical weapons. The details of

its biological warfare efforts are unknown but it continues to import suspect biotechnology. It is also moving forward in the nuclear dimension. The IAEA has discovered a number of disturbing details about its uranium enrichment program that

are very similar to Libya’s nuclear weapons program, including the ability to

produce P–2 centrifuges. Iran has conducted experiments with Uranium

Hexafluoride that could fuel a weapons-oriented enrichment program, and has

worked on a heavy water plant that could be used in a reactor design that would

produce fissile material far more efficiently than its Russian supplied light water

reactor. While it is not yet confirmed, Iran may well have received the same older

Chinese design data for a 1,000–2,000 pound nuclear weapon that Libya acquired

through Pakistani sources.

The report by the Director General of the IAEA, dated September 1, 2004, states

that Iran continues its nuclear development program, has a design for P–2 centrifuge, and that there has been low and highly enriched uranium contamination in

Iranian nuclear sites.22 The Board of Governors met on September 13, 2004, they

are divided over what to do with Iran, and they are likely to postpone their decision

until their November meeting.

There is also evidence that Pakistan might have helped Iran in its enrichment

program. The Agency argues that Pakistan has helped Iran since 1995, and that the

Pakistanis delivered the P–2 design to the Iranians. IAEA goes on to claim that

Iran is intending to ‘‘turn 37 tons of nearly raw uranium called yellowcake, into uraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
43

nium hexafluoride.’’ Experts contend that this could be enough to create 5–6 atomic

weapons.23

It is doubtful that Iran will really fully comply with the NNPT, and it seems more

likely that it is only a matter of time before Iran acquires nuclear weapons. It’s,

however, very unclear what kind of a nuclear power Iran will be. No plans have

ever surfaced as to the number and type of weapons it is seeking to produce or the

nature of its delivery forces. Nothing meaningful is known about Iranian nuclear

doctrine and targeting, or plans to limit the vulnerability of its weapons and facilities—and whether these could include a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack

capability.

Iran might be content to simply develop its technology to the point it could rapidly

build a nuclear weapon. It might choose to create an undeclared deterrent, limit its

weapons numbers and avoid a nuclear test. It might test and create a stockpile, but

not openly deploy nuclear-armed missiles or aircraft. It also, however, might create

an overt nuclear force. Each option would lead to a different Saudi response, as well

as provoke different responses from Israel and the U.S., creating different kinds of

arms races, patterns of deterrence, and risks in the process.

Delivery systems are also a problem. Iran is reaching final development of its

Shahab-3 missile, and working on a longer-range version of the missile as well as

the Shahab-4, and Shahab-5. These missiles will be able to reach most Gulf cities

and area targets, but are far too inaccurate and lacking in total payload to be effective conventional weapons. They are useful militarily only if they have warheads

carrying weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Gulf states face the risk of some

form of covert attack or the possibility of the transfer of weapons to some anti-Saudi

extremist group or proxy. These currently do not seem to be probable scenarios, but

they are possible.

Much will depend on whether Iran feels it faces a threat of attack or preemption

if it openly deploys nuclear forces, and on its perception of the level of cooperation

between the U.S. and the Southern Gulf states in creating effective defenses and

deterrence. Iran will never be a regional ‘‘superpower,’’ but it may well become dangerous if any power vacuum or lack of resolve emerges in the region. It will certainly exploit any gap between U.S. policies and efforts and those of other Gulf

states, as well as any opportunities offered by states outside the region.

Much will also depend on how Iran perceives its options in dealing with the U.S.

over both its overall security position and Iraq. The U.S. needs to offer carrots as

well as sticks. It needs to make it clear to Iran that the U.S. will not stay in Iraq

or uses its position there against Iran. It needs to stop talking about an ‘‘axis of

evil,’’ and act from a stance of ‘‘more in sorrow than in anger,’’ calling for cooperation and putting the onus on Iran’s hardliners. It needs to adopt a clear posture of

being willing to engage in unrestricted official dialog, and show it will engage Iran

in any area where quiet talks and mutual cooperation can help both nations. Afghanistan is an example, and should have been a prelude to such cooperation over

Iraq.

Above all, the U.S. needs to stop talking vaguely about Iran at the ‘‘official

spokesman’’ level and making charges it does not substantiate in detail. The U.S.

needs to makes its concerns clear and specific, and back them up. It needs to advance proposals, not just problems. It needs to recognize Iranian concerns and show

how cooperation over Iraq and other issues could benefit Iran more than confrontation. It also needs to think long and hard about how to approach Iran in the case

of either success or failure in Iraq. A stable Iraq means a Shi’ite majority; a failed

Iraq means a power vacuum. Iran should be quietly told what U.S. policy is, and

what its options are, in both cases.

Prepare for the Potential Impact of Problems in Iraq in Dealing with the Fighting

in Afghanistan

It is time to need to think long and hard about the future of Afghanistan, and

what can actually be done about it—particularly if the U.S. is forced to withdraw

from Iraq. There already is a serious risk that the legacy of the defeat of the Taliban

is making Afghanistan the ‘‘poster child’’ of politically correct and unobtainable

goals. This situation is difficult now, and could become explosive if the U.S. is seen

as being defeated in Iraq.

What is need is realism, and not good intentions. As is the case in Iraq, it is plans

that can be actually implemented. This requires several existential questions to be

dealt with that the U.S. (and Europe) often seem determined to ignore:

• What constitutes achievable success in nation building in Afghanistan, and is

it that much different from what the West normally regards as failure?

• How long and intensive should the fight to deal with the remnants of the

Taliban and Al Qaida go on? What kind of fight is actually worthwhile? When

44

do the problems in terms of domestic hostility to Western intervention, for Pakistan, etc. exceed the benefits? • Is a true central government really practical or necessary? • Is any kind of economy other than a drug economy actually possible, and what

does economic reform and development in Afghanistan actually mean? • What can NATO really accomplish? As the Economist points out (June 19,

2004), NATO and Western international efforts to date are not a success story:

Many pledges in aid and in providing police and security forces have not been

kept. • NATO only now has 6,500 men in the ISAF, and most have such light equipment they are undergunned compared to some warlords. They currently only

function in Kabul and have a limited presence in Kunduz. Adding some 3,500

men more, as a result of the NATO summit of June 2004, will fall far short

of the 5,000 President Karzai requested as a minimum. Only 1,500 of the personnel will evidently actually be deployed to Afghanistan, including one battalion of 700 men. (2,000 more of the 3,500 will be a ready reserve, including

two more battalions). Those deployed will provide token Europe support for the

PRTs planned for Faizabad, Maimana, Baghian, and Mazar-I-Sharif, but not

deal with the Pushtun issue.24

• What can be done to make aid more real and more effective? What can be done

to convert non-U.S. pledges into actual aid deliveries (only about $386 million

of a total of only $1,24 billion in such pledges had actually been provided as

of June 2004, versus $1.4 billion out of U.S. pledges of $3.3 billion)? Moreover,

is actual aid needed and not loans? Do NGOs need new fiscal monitoring and

controls to examine how much money they actually spend in country, as distinguished from overhead and salaries?

Afghanistan does not have to be ‘‘mission impossible,’’ but the U.S. and Europe

must focus on ‘‘mission practical’’ to make real progress. They also need to look far

beyond democracy and politics, and come to grips with governance, economic, demographics, and the hard realities on the ground.

The U.S. also needs clear contingency plans for having to leave Iraq under any

conditions that the region will perceive as defeat. This may well mean moving some

elements of U.S. forces eastward, rather than to the Gulf, or bring them home. The

U.S. will need to take tangible action in Afghanistan to show that a local reversal

is not a regional defeat, and that the U.S. will act to strengthen both Afghanistan

and Pakistan.

This does not, however, mean expanding its role in Central Asia. That role is already conspicuously tied to dictators and failed regional leaders, and the U.S. needs

to be far more careful about the extent to which it becomes coupled to such regimes

in local eyes. ‘‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’’ is a proverb that requires far

more judgment and restraint.

Recast U.S. Energy Policy to Deal with the Reality that the U.S. Will Have Growing

Strategic Dependence on Gulf and Middle Eastern Oil Exports for the Next 20

years, and Their Security will Become Steadily More Important

The election campaign is over and it is time for both parties, and the Administration and the Congress, to be honest about energy. The U.S. can and must find substitutes for petroleum, but this will take decades. In the interim, the U.S. and the

global economy will actually become steadily more dependent on energy imports,

and particularly on energy imports from the Gulf. The Department of Energy estimates that oil will account for some 39% of the world’s energy consumption through

2015, and that the U.S. and its major trading partners in developing Asia will account for 60% of the increase in world demand through this period.25

The MENA region has some 63% of all of the world’s proven oil resources, and

some 37% of its gas. In 2001, the Gulf alone had over 28% of all of the world’s oil

production capacity, and the entire MENA region had 34%.26 These reserves, and

low incremental production costs, ensure the region will dominate increases in oil

production through at least 2015. The EIA estimates that Saudi Arabia alone will

account for 4.2 MMBD of the total increase, Iraq for 1.6 MMBD. Kuwait for 1.3

MMBD, and the UAE for 1.2 MMBD. These four countries account for 8.3 MMBD

out of a worldwide total of 17.9 (46%). To put these figures in perspective, Russia

will account for an increase of only 1.3 MMBD.27

The International Energy Agency estimates cover a longer period than the EIA

estimates. They predict that total conventional and non-conventional oil production

will increase from 77 MMBD in 2002 to 121.3 MMBD in 2030. This is a total increase of 44.3 MMBD worldwide. The Middle East will account for 30.7 MMBD, or

69% of this total. The IEA also estimates that the rate of dependence on the Middle

East will increase steadily after 2010 as other fields are depleted in areas where

45

new resources cannot be brought on line. It estimates that 29 MMBD, or 94% of

the total 31 MMBD increase in OPEC production between 2010 and 2030 will come

from Middle Eastern members of OPEC.28

This dependence will be easier to secure with a friendly and stable Iraq, but the

U.S. has no choice. The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) summarizes the

trends in Gulf oil exports as follows in its International Energy Outlook for 2004,

and it should be noted that its estimates are based on favorable assumptions about

increases in other fuels like gas, coal, nuclear and renewables, and favorable assumptions about increases in conversion and energy efficiency: 29

In 2001, industrialized countries imported 16.1 million barrels of oil per day

from OPEC producers . . . Of that total, 9.7 million barrels per day came from

the Persian Gulf region. Oil movements to industrialized countries represented

almost 65 percent of the total petroleum exported by OPEC member nations

and almost 58 percent of all Persian Gulf exports.30

By the end of the forecast period (2025), OPEC exports to industrialized countries are estimated to be about 11.5 million barrels per day higher than their

2001 level, and more than half the increase is expected to come from the Persian Gulf region.31

Despite such a substantial increase, the share of total petroleum exports that

goes to the industrialized nations in 2025 is projected to be almost 9 percent

below their 2001 share, and the share of Persian Gulf exports going to the industrialized nations is projected to fall by about 13 percent. The significant shift

expected in the balance of OPEC export shares between the industrialized and

developing nations is a direct result of the economic growth anticipated for the

developing nations of the world, especially those of Asia.

OPEC petroleum exports to developing countries are expected to increase by

more than 18.0 million barrels per day over the forecast period, with threefourths of the increase going to the developing countries of Asia. China, alone,

is likely to import about 6.6 million barrels per day from OPEC by 2025, virtually all of which is expected to come from Persian Gulf producers.

North America’s petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf are expected to

double over the forecast period. At the same time, more than one-half of total

North American imports in 2025 are expected to be from Atlantic Basin producers and refiners, with significant increases expected in crude oil imports anticipated from Latin American producers, including Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. West African producers, including Nigeria and Angola, are also

expected to increase their export volumes to North America. Caribbean Basin

refiners are expected to account for most of the increase in North American imports of refined products. With a moderate decline in North Sea production,

Western Europe is expected to import increasing amounts from Persian Gulf

producers and from OPEC member nations in both northern and western Africa. Substantial imports from the Caspian Basin are also expected.

Industrialized Asian nations are expected to increase their already heavy dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The developing countries of the Pacific Rim are

expected to almost double their total petroleum imports between 2001 and 2025.

While quantified estimates of export dependence are uncertain, its clear that it

would take a massive breakthrough(s) in technology or discoveries of reserves outside the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to change these trends.

Moreover, both the military security of the MENA region, and its ability to

achieve the necessary investment in new energy production are critical U.S. strategic interests. For example, some 40% of all world oil exports now pass daily

through the Strait of Hormuz and both EIA and IEA projections indicate this total

will increase to around 60% by 2025–2030.32

The IEA projections, for example, indicate that Middle Eastern Exports will total

some 46 MMBD by 2030, and represent more that two-thirds of the world total. This

means that the daily traffic in oil tankers will increase from 15 MMBD and 44%

of global interregional trade in 2002, to 43 MMBD and 66% of global interregional

trade in 2030. This means that the daily traffic in LNG carriers will increase from

28 BCM and 18% of global interregional trade in 2002, to 230 carriers and 34% of

global interregional trade in 2030.33 The IEA does, however, estimate that these increases would be some 11% lower if oil prices remained consistently high in constant

dollars.

The International Energy Agency also estimates that imports will rise from 63%

of total OECD demand for oil in 2002 to 85% in 2030 some $3 trillion dollars must

be invested in the oil sector from 2003 to 2030 to meet world demand for oil, and

something approaching half of this total must be invested in the Middle East. Some

46

$234 billion will be required for tankers and oil pipelines, and again, a substantial

amount must go to the MENA area.34

Under most conditions, the normal day-to-day destination of MENA oil exports is

strategically irrelevant. Oil is a global commodity, which is distributed to meet the

needs of a global market based on process bid by importers acting in global competition. With the exception of differences in price because of crude type and transportation costs, all buyers compete equally for the global supply of available exports,

and the direction and flow of exports changes according to marginal price relative

to demand. As a result, the percentage of oil that flows from the MENA region to

the United States under normal market conditions has little strategic or economic

importance. If a crisis occurs, or drastic changes take place in prices, and the U.S.

will have to pay the same globally determined price as any other nation, and the

source of U.S. imports will change accordingly. Moreover, the U.S. is required to

share all imports with other OECD countries in a crisis under the monitoring of the

International Energy Agency.

The size of direct imports of petroleum is also only a partial measure of strategic

dependence. The U.S. economy is dependent on energy-intensive imports from Asia

and other regions, and what comes around must literally go around. While the EIA

and IEA do not make estimates of indirect imports of Middle Eastern oil in terms

of the energy required to produce the finished goods, the U.S. imports them from

countries that are dependent on Middle Eastern exports, analysts guess that they

would add at least 1 MMBD to total U.S. oil imports. To put this figure in perspective, direct U.S. oil imports increased from an annual average of 7.9 MMBD in 1992

to 11.3 MMBD in 2002, and 2.6 MMBD worth of U.S. petroleum imports came directly from the Middle East in 2002.35 If indirect U.S. imports, in the form of manufactured goods dependent on imports of Middle Eastern oil were included, the resulting figure might well be 30–40% higher than the figure for direct imports.

Moreover, the U.S. and other industrialized states are increasingly dependent on

the health of the global economy. With the exception of Latin America, Mexico, and

Canada, all of America’s major trading partners are critically dependent on Middle

Eastern oil exports. In 2002, the Middle East and North Africa supplied 5.0 MMBD

of 11.9 MMBD of European imports (42%). MENA exporters supplied 4.0 MMBD of

Japanese imports of 5.1 MMBD (79%). While MENA countries supplied 0.8 MMBD

out of China’s imports of 2.0 MMBD (39% and growing steadily in recent years), 0.2

MMBD of Australia’s imports of 0.6 MMBD (33%), and 6.5 MMBD of some 8.6

MMBD in imports by other Asian and Pacific states (76%).36

The EIA and IEA project that the global economy will also grow far more dependent on the Middle East and North Africa in the future. The EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2004 projects that North American imports of MENA oil will increase

from 3.3 MMBD in 2001 to 6.3 MMBD in 2025—an increase of 91%, almost all of

which will go to the U.S. The increase in exports to Western Europe will be from

4.7 MMBD to 7.6 MMBD, an increase of 62%. This assumes major increases in oil

exports from the FSU and conservation will limit the scale of European imports

from the Middle East. Industrialized Asia—driven by Japan—will increase its imports from 4.1 MMBD to 6.0 MMBD, or nearly 50%. China will increase its imports

from 0.9 MMBD to 6.0 MMBD, or by nearly 570%; and Pacific Rim states will increase imports from 5.0 MMBD to 10.2 MMBD, or by 104%.

U.S. oil imports are only a subset of U.S. strategic dependence on Middle East

oil exports. It is important to note, however, that neither the Bush energy policy,

nor any recent Congressional energy bills, are projected to have any meaningful

strategic impact on U.S. import dependence if they are ever passed into law and

transformed into action. It takes massive shifts in U.S. energy consumption and

supply over extended periods of time to accomplish this and there are good reasons

that the Bush Administration, Kerry energy policy, and Congressional advocates of

different policies have either failed to make meaningful analysis of the impact of

their proposals on U.S. import dependence or have provided ‘‘blue sky’’ estimates

that are little more than political posturing.

If one turns to the EIA estimates made since the Bush Administration came to

office, it is clear that realistic models of U.S. energy needs will lead to steady increases in U.S. energy imports. The EIA’s 2003 Annual Energy Forecast reports that

net imports of petroleum accounted for 55 percent of domestic petroleum consumption in 2001. U.S. dependence on petroleum imports is projected to reach 68% in

2025 in the reference case. This is a rise in U.S. net imports from 10.9 MMBD in

2021 to 19.8 MMBD in the reference case (+82%). In the low oil price case, net imports would rise to 21.1 MMBD. They would be 18.2 MMBD in the high oil price

case, 17.8 MMBD in the low economic growth case, and 22.3 MMBD in the high

economic growth case.37

47

The EIA’s annual U.S. energy forecast for 2004 predicts that imports will be even

higher. It reports that net imports of petroleum accounted 53 percent of domestic

petroleum consumption in 2002. U.S. dependence on petroleum imports is estimated

to reach 70 percent in 2025 in the reference case, versus 68 percent in the 2003

forecast. Imports are expected to be 65 percent of total consumption. In the low oil

price case this number is estimated to be 75 percent.38 (The AEO2003 report indicated that estimated imports as a share of total oil consumption would be 65 percent

in high price case in 2025, and 70 percent in the low price case.)

The specific figures will vary according to oil price s and the growth of the U.S.

economy, and the EIA contingency forecasts are summarized below in millions of

barrels per day: 39

Year and projection Product

supplied Net imports Net crudeimports

Net product

imports

2002 ............................................................................................................... 19.8 10.5 9.1 1.4

2025:

Reference .............................................................................................. 28.3 19.7 15.7 3.9

Low oil price ......................................................................................... 31.1 23.3 18.2 5.1

High oil price ........................................................................................ 25.6 16.6 14.3 2.2

Low Growth ........................................................................................... 25.9 17.6 15.0 2.6

High Growth .......................................................................................... 30.6 21.8 16.4 5.4

In 2002, net U.S. imports of petroleum accounted for 53 percent of domestic petroleum consumption. Increasing dependence on petroleum imports is projected, reaching 70 percent in 2025 in the reference case. The corresponding import shares of

total consumption in 2025 are expected to be 65 percent in the high oil price case

and 75 percent in the low oil price case.

In short, the practical problem for the foreseeable future is how to ensure that

the MENA states can obtain the more than $1 trillion the International Energy

Agency estimates they will need to expand energy production capacity and exports,

and to protect growing U.S. and global dependence on MENA energy exports, particularly from the Gulf. There are no meaningful near and mid-term options that

will allow the U.S. to reduce dependence in any meaningful strategic sense at anything like today’s market prices for energy. The U.S. must shape its security policies

accordingly, regardless of what happens in Iraq. It must also shape them in light

of U.S. dependence on a global economy—not simply direct U.S. dependence on oil

imports.

Encourage Evolutionary Political, Economic, Demographic, and Social Reform

The U.S. cannot secure its narrow strategic interests in the Middle East unless

it also seeks far broader strategic goals that will meet the needs of its peoples as

well as those of the United States. The battle for hearts and minds extends far beyond Iraq, and the West and the Middle East, particularly the U.S. and Arab world,

need to take a more honest approach to reform.

So far, governments have reacted largely by treating the symptoms and not the

disease. Counterterrorism is essential to deal with the most obvious and damaging

symptoms, but it cannot deal with the underlying causes. Military force is sometimes necessary. However, it is now all too clear in Iraq that it can create as

many—or more—problems than it solves.

The practical results are all too clear from an August 2004 survey by the Pew

Research Center, and one that clearly shows how the divisions between the West

and Middle East affect moderate and traditionally friendly states. The Pew group

reported, ‘‘In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the

United States remains pervasive . . . Osama bin Laden is viewed favorably by large

percentages in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%) and Morocco (45%). Even in Turkey,

where bin Laden is highly unpopular, as many as 31% say that suicide attacks

against Americans and other Westerners are justifiable.

There are many other surveys that deliver the same message, just as there are

many surveys of U.S. and Western opinion that reflect anger against terrorism, and

hostility towards Islam and the Arab world. The events of 9/11, the rise of Islamic

extremism and the faltering Western reaction, the broad regional backlash to the

Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq War, and the growing clash between religions and cultures, have all led to a crisis in relations that governments cannot address in such

conventional terms.

U.S. and Arab relations are where they are today for many reasons, but one of

them is that the Western and Islamic worlds have previously defined ‘‘tolerance’’ in

48

terms of mutual ignorance, and in terms of governmental indifference at the ideological, political, and cultural level.

Empty U.S. calls for instant, region-wide democracy and political reform are producing a dangerous counterreaction in much of the Arab world. A Western focus on

counterterrorism—without a balancing focus on creating bridges between the West

and Middle East—is often breeding extremism rather than defeating it.

At the same time, token pledges and efforts at reform within the Arab world fall

far short of the needs of Arab peoples, and are weak and ineffective counters to extremism. Neither Middle Eastern governments nor Middle Eastern intellectuals

have yet shown they can honestly address the scale of the region’s problems or act

decisively at the speed and depth required.

These efforts cannot deal with problems that are ‘‘generational’’ in nature. They

are not the product of one temporary series of conflicts and tensions, or of the threat

posed by today’s groups of terrorists and extremists. Weak regimes, population

growth, demographic, hyperurbanization, and a failure to develop and diversify regional economies all act to create pressures on the Middle East that will outlive Bin

Laden and Al Qaida by decades.

Most of the nations of the Arab and Islamic world now face pressures and changes

that they can only deal with if they come firmly to grips with the need for reform:

• Failed secular regimes and political parties have pushed the peoples of the region back towards Islam and made them seek to redefine the role of religion

in their lives.

• Massive population increases: The Middle East and North Africa had a population of 112 million in 1950. The population is well over 415 million today, and

approaching a fourfold increase. It will more than double again, to at least 833

million, by 2050.

• A ‘‘youth explosion,’’ where ages 20–24—the key age group entering the job

market and political society—has grown steadily from 10 million in 1950 to 36

million today, and will grow steadily to at least 56 million by 2050.

• Some 36% of the total MENA population is under 15 years of age versus 21%

in the U.S. and 16% in the EU. The ratio of dependents to each working age

man and woman is three times that in a developed region like the EU.

• A failure to achieve global competitiveness, diversify economies, and create jobs

that is only partially disguised by the present boom in oil revenues. Direct and

disguised unemployment range from 12–20% in many countries, and the World

Bank projects the labor force as growing by at least 3% per year for the next

decade.

• A region-wide average per capita income of around $2,200 versus $26,000 in the

high-income countries in the West.

• A steady decline in non-petroleum exports as a percentage of world trade over

a period of nearly half a century, and an equal pattern of decline in regional

GDP as a share of global GDP.

• Hyperurbanization and a half-century decline in agricultural and traditional

trades impose high levels of stress on traditional social safety nets and extended

families. The urban population seems to have been under 15 million in 1950.

It has since more than doubled from 84 million in 1980 to 173 million today,

and some 25% of the population will soon live in cities of one million or more.

• Broad problems in integrating women effectively and productively into the work

force. Female employment in the MENA region has grown from 24% of the

labor in 1980 to 28% today, but that total is 15% lower than in a high growth

area like East Asia.

• Growing pressures on young men and women in the Middle East and North Africa to immigrate to Europe and the U.S. to find jobs and economic opportunities that inevitably create new tensions and adjustment problems.

• Almost all nations in the region have nations outside the region as their major

trading partners, and increased intraregional trade offers little or no comparative advantage.

• Much of the region cannot afford to provide more water for agriculture at market prices, and in the face of human demand; much has become a ‘‘permanent’’

food importer. Regional manufacturers and light industry have grown steadily

in volume, but not in global competitiveness.

• Global and regional satellite communications, the Internet, and other media,

have shattered censorship and extremists readily exploit these tools.

• A failed or inadequate growth in every aspect of infrastructure, and in key

areas like housing and education.

• Growing internal security problems that often are far more serious than the external threat that terrorism and extremism pose to the West.

49

• A failure to modernize conventional military forces and to recapitalize them.

This failure is forcing regional states to radically reshape their security structures, and is pushing some toward proliferation. • Strong pressures for young men and women to immigrate to Europe and the

U.S. to find jobs and economic opportunities that inevitably create new tensions

and adjustment problems.

Unlike today’s crises and conflicts, these forces are so great that they will play

out over decades. They cannot be dealt with simply by attacking today’s terrorists

and extremists; they cannot be dealt with by pretending religion is not an issue, and

that tolerance can be based on indifference or ignorance.

Today, both sides take a dysfunctional approach to reform. The Arab world tends

to live in a state of denial about both the scale of its need for reform, and the ineffectiveness of most of its present efforts. Arab governments and Arab intellectuals

have generally failed their peoples. They promise, plan, and talk but falter in taking

meaningful action. The end result is that the failure of evolution breeds revolution,

and the failure of moderates breeds extremists.

Far too many of these failures also transcend culture and religion. A failed state

sector is a failed state sector. Policies that block economic growth block economic

growth. Bad education is bad education, and rote learning is rote learning. A development plan that is never really implemented cannot lead to development. Slow

progress in the rule of law and basic human rights is simply too slow to be acceptable. A virtual conspiracy of silence on the subject of population growth and demographics amounts to intellectual cowardice.

There is no question that much in the U.S. and the West also deserves criticism.

The answer, however, is not to stifle criticism, but rather to encourage mutual criticism and common pressure for reform and change. Moreover, the problems involved

are relative; the Arab world and Middle East simply are moving too slowly, making

far too many excuses, and exporting a great deal of the problems that can only be

solved through action at home.

Blaming the West, ‘‘globalism,’’ the U.S., and a colonial heritage, are all further

forms of moral and intellectual cowardice. At least 90% of the problems of Arab

states and Middle Eastern governments are self-inflicted wounds. They will only be

solved when individual Arab countries have the courage and will to solve them on

their own.

The other side of this coin, however, is that U.S. calls for instant progress towards

region-wide ‘‘democracy’’ and ‘‘elections’’—the kind of vague generalities that called

for the initial drafts of the U.S. ‘‘Greater Middle East Initiative’’—only make things

worse. They treat all countries as the same, ignore the need for political parties,

experience with elections, and moderate opposition movements. They also ignore the

human rights, rule of law, economic, demographic, educational, and social reforms

that often have a higher priority and are the precursors to meaningful pluralism.

Far too often, the U.S. has adopted a ‘‘one man, one vote, one time’’ approach to

change in the Middle East; and has ignored the need for evolution by its friends

in the search for a revolution that would bring extremists and its enemies to power.

The vague generalities of the G8 communique ́ that took the place of the ‘‘Greater

Middle East Initiative’’ were far less damaging, but also provide no basis for real

progress. They do not offer incentives in terms of economic aid, accession to the

WTO, better trade, or foreign investment. They talk in meaningless terms about regional solutions and intraregional cooperation.

A broad debate, indeed dialectic, is needed on reform in the Arab world and Middle East. The primary force for this debate must come from within, but it must be

provoked, challenged, and aided from without. At the same time, the U.S., EU, and

all of the members of the G8 need to move beyond both political mirror imaging and

vacuous good intentions.

Calls for reform need to be evaluated, planned, and prioritized on a country-bycountry basis. They need to build on what countries, and their reformers, are doing

wherever possible. They need to find out the best evolutionary path to human

rights, rule of law, economic, demographic, educational, and social reforms in a

given country; and provide real incentives not just criticism. They need to understand that democracy without stability, and the proper checks and balances, is simply a different form of extremism.

Give the Political Dimension of Counterterrorism a New Priority

The same pressure for reform are both an underlying cause of terrorism and a

reason why the U.S. must give the political dimension of counterterrorism a new

priority. The U.S., the West, and every moderate state and movement in the Islamic

world now face a common threat in forms of Islamic extremism that cannot tolerate

other interpretations of Islam, much less Judaism and Christianity.

50

This threat is inevitably coupled to the threat posed by forms of Christianity that

see all non-Christians as damned, and Jews simply as a convenient mechanism to

trigger the second coming. It is coupled to Israeli extremist statements that effectively dehumanize Palestinians and reject the legitimacy of Islam, and statements

in the Arab world that go from anger against Israel to attacks on all Jews and Judaism.

The result to date has been a flood of mutually hostile press reports, television

coverage filled with conscious and unconscious bias, and in movie villains that exploit, rather than counter, prejudice. We see it in a series of public opinion polls

that reflect a growing polarization between broad sectors of the public, and again,

particularly in the U.S. and Arab world.

Most tangibly and dangerously, the practical result is terrorism and violence; endless conspiracy theories, vicious stereotypes; detentions; and growing barriers to

travel and immigration. It is reflected it in the breakdown of long-standing alliances, in the growing bitterness and underlying hatred in the Arab-Israeli conflict;

in Afghanistan and Iraq in the form of religiously inspired insurgency and asymmetric war; and in threats to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against

those with different cultures and religions.

So far, the U.S. has responded by focusing on counterterrorism. In the process,

it has created growing barriers between it in the Arab world, undermined past alliances, and focused on short-term expedience. Many Arab regimes have acted in

terms of denial, taken half measures, and failed to address extremism. The end result of both approaches is that the problem is growing, not diminishing. The problem is also that extremist movements are developing new linkages and finding new

ways to exploit popular anger, emotion, and religious prejudice.

The U.S. needs to work with Arab and other Islamic regimes to take a new approach to public policy that goes beyond the traditional approach to strategy, and

one that must have the active support of both Western and Islamic governments.

Governments—and particularly the U.S. government and the moderate governments

of the Arab world—need to make a concerted effort to make religious and cultural

tolerance a matter of public policy. They need to support this effort in the ways they

structure education, diplomacy, law enforcement, immigration, and all of the other

tools available to the state.

What are some of the practical actions that the U.S., other Western, and Arab

and Islamic governments need to employ to bring balance and depth to their actions, and to implement such a grand strategy? The answers must be empirical, and

many must be found on a nation-by-nation and case-by-case basis. The best approach should be the subject of an intense debate in both the West and at appropriate points along the continuum of the Arab countries, the Middle East, and the

Islamic world. It is clear, however, what some of the answers must be:

• Western and Islamic governments must make enduring efforts to bridge the gap

between cultures and religions, and create a common effort to move towards development and reform.

• Governments need to fund dialogue and mutual exchanges at the levels only

governments can mount, and do so through a mix of grants, public information

campaigns, and governmental use of all the tools available to influence domestic

and foreign public opinion.

• The leaders of governments need to encourage the highest-ranking religious

leaders of the West and Islamic world to deal as firmly with the divisions between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as the Vatican finally dealt with the

divisions between Judaism and Christianity.

• Comprehensive educational reform is needed in both the Middle East and the

West to teach tolerance based on understanding at every level from the earliest

levels of education through graduate education, and a systematic purging of

education material with prejudice, hate, or stereotypes.

• Use should be made of all the legitimate tools of law to put an end to extremist

and hate-oriented literature and use of the media.

• Governments need to carry out a comprehensive review of visa policies based

on the understanding that encouraging legitimate study abroad, media presence

and visits, academic exchanges, visits for dialogue and cultural familiarization,

and international business are as much a critical element in the war on terrorism as defeating or interdicting terrorists.

• An equally comprehensive review is needed of counterterrorism policies that

looks beyond a narrow focus on defeating terrorists and seeks to ensure that

necessary action to defeat terrorism does not create unnecessary anger and hostility, detain or arrest the innocent, or fail to compensate those who are unfairly

arrested.

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• Western policies towards immigration must emphasize tolerance and equality

for Arab and Islamic immigrants, not just economic need and security.

• Governments need to act to set common ground rules for handling deportations

and detainments that fully consider the human rights and political aspects of

such actions, and their ‘‘backlash’’.

• A common effort to develop efficient means for reviewing charitable and other

fund transfers and activities so that legitimate activity is not blocked by the effort to reduce the funding of extremism and terrorism.

• Creation of new mechanisms for security dialog between groups like NATO and

the GCC, and on a national basis, to ease the pressure for arms sales, strengthen mutual security efforts to deal with threats like proliferation and asymmetric

warfare, and create true security and arms control partnerships in regions like

the Gulf.

There is one other critical step the U.S. needs to take to deal with terrorism and

every other issue in the region. The U.S. needs strong, well-funded, and proactive

U.S. Embassy teams that can deal with the needs and perceptions of each country

in the region. It needs to adequately fund public diplomacy at the national level,

and tie together its efforts at encouraging reform, building effective security structures, and counterterrorism.

Effective national policies are not enough. The U.S. needs coherent efforts tailored

to the need of given countries, and to give the term ‘‘country team’’ real meaning.

It needs to put an end to the underfunding of U.S. efforts in the field, and break

out of the increasing tendency to see Embassies as fortresses that need to be defended, rather than as the first line of action.

Shaping the Post-Iraq Environment

Wars are usually a bad time to try to shape regional policy. It should be clear,

however, that even the best outcome in Iraq is not going to transform any other nation in the region in the near to mid-term if ever. Any U.S. defeat in Iraq is going

to immediately affect the U.S. in every other area of U.S. policy in the region.

The U.S. cannot afford to defer any of these other issues and concentrate on

Iraq—whether it adopts a ‘‘play the course’’ strategy in Iraq or any other approach.

It needs a comprehensive strategy and action plan for dealing with the Middle

East—win, lose, or draw.

NOTES 1There are many poll results that make this point. Perhaps the best in terms of

detail was one sponsored by ABC and conducted in February 2004. It showed that

the Iraqi people as a whole still had real hope for the future. At the same time,

the polls made it clear that there already were deep divisions within Iraqi society

that could block nation building, or even lead to civil war. The results of the poll

were mixed. Some reflected the deep ethnic and religious differences in Iraq. Other

results were more optimistic. Even if one looks at results for the least confident

group—the Sunnis—it is obvious that most Iraqis saw life as getting better, understood that Iraq was in transition, and had hope for the future.

The ABC News poll found the following attitudes:

Percent responding to survey question

Sunni Arabs Shi’ite Arabs Kurds

Life these days:

Good .......................................................................... 66 67 85

Bad ............................................................................ 33 33 13

Life compared to one year ago:

Better ........................................................................ 50 60 69

Worse ........................................................................ 25 16 13

Expectations:

Better ........................................................................ 61 72 83

Worse ........................................................................ 12 4 2

The attitudes reflected in the ABC poll scarcely provided any guarantee of success, victory, and peace. Minorities generally shape violence and civil war, not majorities. It was clear from the broader range of results discussed throughout this

analysis that there were Iraqis that remained extremely hostile to the Coalition.

52

This was particularly true in Iraq’s western province of Anbar and the most hostile

cities in the Sunni triangle, but it was also true of some Shi’ites as well.

The evolving mix of insurgents that the U.S. and Coalition had begun to fight in

the late spring of 2003 also had significant popular support in their ethic area.

Anbar is the single most Sunni Arab-dominated province in Iraq, the area with violently hostile cities like Fallujah, and anger over the U.S.-led invasion spikes in that

group, which was favored under Saddam Hussein’s regime. ABC estimates that

Anbar has some 5% of Iraq’s population and is 92% Sunni and 91% Sunni Arab.

It also accounts for 17% of all Sunni Arabs.

In a February ABC News poll of Iraq, 71 percent of respondents in Anbar viewed

attacks on coalition forces as ‘‘acceptable’’ political action. Among all Iraqis, just 17

percent held that view. Similarly, 56 percent in Anbar said attacks on foreigners

working alongside the CPA are acceptable, compared with 10 percent of all Iraqis.

The ABC analysis found that Anbar residents are no worse off economically than

most Iraqis. But they are less apt to say their lives are going well (52 percent in

Anbar, compared with 70 percent in all Iraq); their expectations for the future are

less positive; and above all, they are far more deeply aggrieved over the invasion

and occupation.

• Eighty-two percent in Anbar say the invasion was ‘‘wrong,’’ compared with 39

percent of all Iraqis. (Sixty-seven percent in Anbar say it was ‘‘absolutely’’

wrong, compared with 26 percent nationally.)

• Residents of Anbar are twice as likely as all Iraqis to say the invasion humiliated rather than liberated Iraq.

• Sixty-five percent in Anbar say coalition forces should leave now, compared with

15 percent of all Iraqis.

• More residents in Anbar prefer ‘‘a strong leader for life’’ than either a democracy or an Islamic state. In all Iraq, more prefer democracy.

Attitudes in Hostile Areas: The Sunni Triangle

The ABC poll figures for the attitudes in the entire Sunni triangle (Ramadi,

Fallujah, Tikrit, Samara, Baquba, and Baaji) are only marginally more reassuring.

This area is estimated to have some 12% of Iraq’s population and is 81% Sunni and

79% Sunni Arab. It has 34% of all the Sunni Arabs in Iraq.

• Seventy-one percent in the Sunni Triangle say the invasion was ‘‘wrong,’’ compared with 39 percent of all Iraqis. (Fifty-six percent in Sunni Triangle say it

was ‘‘absolutely’’ wrong, compared with 26 percent nationally.)

• Residents of Sunni Triangle are nearly twice as likely as all Iraqis to say the

invasion humiliated rather than liberated Iraq.

• Thirty-eight percent in Sunni Triangle say coalition forces should leave now,

compared with 15 percent of all Iraqis.

• More residents in Sunni Triangle prefer ‘‘a strong leader for life’’ than either

a democracy or an Islamic state. In all Iraq, more prefer democracy. The ABC

Poll found the following results and they seem likely to be equally true of the

rest of the ‘‘Sunni triangle.’’

[In percentage]

Anbar

Entire Sunni

Triangle

(Ramadi,

Fallujah, Tikrit,

Samara,

Baquba, Baaji)

All Iraqis

Attacks ‘‘acceptable’’ on:

Coalition forces ............................................. 71 44 17

Foreigners working with CPA .................... 56 33 10

Presence of coalition forces:

Support ......................................................... 85 80 51

Oppose ........................................................... 9 9 39

‘‘Strongly’’ oppose ......................................... 76 63 31

Say coalition forces should leave now ............... 65 38 15

Invasion was:

Right ............................................................. 9 16 48

Wrong ............................................................ 82 71 39

Invasion was ‘‘absolutely’’ wrong ....................... 67 56 26

Invasion:

Liberated Iraq .............................................. 9 14 42

Humiliated Iraq ........................................... 83 75 41

Confident in CPA ................................................ 12 14 28

53

[In percentage]

Anbar

Entire Sunni

Triangle

(Ramadi,

Fallujah, Tikrit,

Samara,

Baquba, Baaji)

All Iraqis

Confident in occupation forces ........................... 9 17 25

Preferred political system:

Single leader for life .................................... 45 41 28

Islamic state ................................................. 18 19 21

Democracy .................................................... 18 26 49

No opinion .................................................... 19 14 4

Sunni ............................................................. 92 81 40

The Risk of Shi’ite Hostility

This mix of ethnic, regional, and national results does not imply that Iraq as a

whole cannot reach agreement on a new government. The ABC poll data show a

lack of interest in retribution with regard to the Ba’athists, and the desire (even

in Kurdistan) to keep Iraq as a single nation in spite of extreme political fragmentation and wariness.

The polling does, however, reflect a host of problems that have been apparent on

the ground ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein. These include high and unrealistic expectations for the future. They reflect ongoing public concerns and demands—nationally and locally—for such essentials of life as security, jobs and electricity. It also shows that U.S. and Coalition success is critically dependent on

Shi’ite goodwill. Or, to be more objective, success is dependent on Shi’ite tolerance

and intelligent self-interest.

The first year of occupation showed that the Coalition could hope to win a fight

against part of Iraq’s Sunnis—if it could eventually persuade the majority to support the nation building process and accept peaceful solutions. It showed the Coalition could largely count upon Kurds—who had nowhere else to go—if they remained

unified and were willing to accept a realistic form of autonomy while respecting the

rights of Arabs and other minorities. Sheer demographics made it clear, however,

that the Coalition effort had no hope of dealing with a true popular uprising or rejection by the majority of Iraq’s Shi’ites, or with the result of a serious civil war

either between Sunni and Shi’ite or mass popular Shi’ite factions.

It is important to note in this regard that 37% of the Shi’ites felt humiliated by

Iraq’s defeat. 35% felt the invasion was wrong, 12% felt the Coalition should leave

immediately, and 12% felt that attacks on Coalition personnel were acceptable.

While only 7% of the Shi’ites polled preferred a religious leader, 32% preferred a

strong leader versus 39% for democracy.

This is a significant and potentially violent Shi’ite minority, although the ABC

poll also shows that Shias in the South—a region heavily repressed under Saddam’s

regime—are more likely than those elsewhere to say it was right for the coalition

to invade, and to say the invasion liberated rather than humiliated their country.

[In percentage]

Southern

Shia Arabs

Shia Arabs

elsewhere

U.S.-led invasion was:

Right ................................................................................................. 56 44

Wrong ............................................................................................... 28 47

Invasion:

Liberated Iraq .................................................................................. 49 34

Humiliated Iraq ............................................................................... 27 53

What Iraq needs at this time: A gov’t mainly of religious leaders ..... 79 52

Preferred system:

Democracy ........................................................................................ 39 41

Islamic state ..................................................................................... 31 16

Single strong leader ......................................................................... 18 33

Confident in religious leaders ................................................................ 57 44

2 Based on the analysis by my colleagues Rick Barton and Sheba Crocker in

‘‘Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,’’ CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS, 2004.

54

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [U.S. and UK occupation forces]?

[In percentage]

Oct.–Nov. ’03 Feb. ’04 Mar.–Apr. ’04 Jun. ’04

Great Deal ................................................ 7.60 8.70 7.00 6

Quite a Lot ............................................... 13.60 19.00 18.40 14

Not Very Much ........................................ 22.20 25.60 22.30 30

None at All ............................................... 56.60 46.80 52.30 51

Oxford Research International ‘‘National Survey of Iraq.’’

IIACSS: How much confidence do you have in [Coalition forces] to improve the

situation in Iraq?

[In percentage]

Jan. ’04 Apr.–May ’04 May ’04

Great Deal ....................................................................... 11.60 2.60 1.50

Fair Amount .................................................................... 16.70 4.40 8.20

Not Very Much ................................................................ 13.70 4.70 6.10

None at All ....................................................................... 53.30 83.50 80.60

IIACSS, Department of State, CPA, ‘‘National Poll of Iraq.’’

3 E-mail dated 22–11–2004 from Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 202–707–7656, ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov. 4Once again, the data are uncertain. The original (FY04) request in education/refugees, etc. was $300 million, in January 2004, it became $280 million, in April 2004,

$259 million, and $379 million under the re-allocation plan. E-mail dated 22–11–

2004 from Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 202–707–7656, ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov. 5 Based on the analysis by my colleagues Rick Barton and Sheba Crocker,

‘‘Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction.’’ CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS, 2004.

Attitudes towards Iraqi Police Forces

IIACSS: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi police] to improve

the situation in Iraq?

[In percentage]

Jan. ’04 Apr.–May ’04 May ’04

Great Deal ....................................................................... 44.80 47.90 47.30

Fair Amount .................................................................... 35.00 29.60 28.70

Not Very Much ................................................................ 6.70 8.60 5.70

None at All ....................................................................... 11.00 11.20 15.80

IIACSS, Department of State, CPA, ‘‘National Poll of Iraq.’’

Iraqi Perception. Also see Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, ‘‘Iraq Index: Tracking

Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,’’ and ‘‘Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,’’

CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project.

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi police]?

[In percentage]

Oct.–Nov. ’03 Feb. ’04 Mar.–Apr. ’04 Jun. ’04

Great Deal ................................................ 19.70 7.60 33.00 35

Quite a Lot ............................................... 30.60 43.30 39.20 39

Not Very Much ........................................ 33.40 20.60 17.60 20

None at All ............................................... 16.30 8.50 10.20 7

Oxford Research International, ‘‘National Survey of Iraq.’’

Attitudes Toward Iraqi Army Forces

IIACSS: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi army} to improve

the situation in Iraq?

55

[In percentage]

Jan. ’04 Apr.–May ’04 May ’04

Great Deal ....................................................................... 34.70 36.50 32.90

Fair Amount .................................................................... 28.40 25.00 28.50

Not Very Much ................................................................ 9.70 9.90 8.60

None at All ....................................................................... 17.20 17.80 20.10

IIACSS, Department of State, CPA, ‘‘National Poll of Iraq.’’

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi army]?

[In percentage]

Oct.–Nov. ’03 Feb. ’04 Mar.–Apr. ’04 Jun. ’04

Great Deal ................................................ 16.00 19.70 24.40 24

Quite a Lot ............................................... 30.10 42.20 46.70 50

Not Very Much ........................................ 34.30 27.50 17.10 20

None at All ............................................... 19.50 10.70 11.80 6

Oxford Research International, ‘‘National Survey of Iraq.’’

6For a discussion of some of the problems involved, see ‘‘Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,’’ Washington, GAO–04–902R, June 2004. 7The money allocated to total obligations had only put $2,325 million into the

start of the pipeline. Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘‘Report to Congress,’’ October 30, 2004. p. 59. 8The Deputy DoD OIG for Inspections and Policy is about to begin a joint project

with the DoS OIG to cover all phases of the training effort for the Iraqi police forces.

This should be extended to cover Iraqi military and security forces. 9Department of Defense, ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Report,’’ September 22, 2004.

10Department of Defense, ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Report,’’ November 3, 2004 and information provided from MNSTC–I. 11http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/factsltroops.htm, accessed November 11,

2004. 12State Department Report, November 19: NATO’s Iraq Training Plans, press release on 23–1–04 as of 9:32 AM. 13Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘‘Report to Congress,’’ October 30, 2004, p. 69. 14Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘‘Report to Congress.’’ October 30, 2004. 15Department of Defense, ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Report,’’ November 3, 2004. 16 Iraq’s oil situation is considerably more complicated than some estimated indicate. An in depth analysis by DOE/EIA in its Country Analysis Brief of November

2004 raised the following issues:

In early August 2003, the CPA put the cost of rehabilitating Iraq’s oil sector to

its pre-war state at $ 1.144 billion, and the time frame to do so at nine months.

Much of this work is being performed by KBR under the supervision of the USACE

and the ‘‘Restoration of Iraqi Oil’’ (RIO) program. In late January 2004, USACE

awarded two major upstream contracts, worth $1.9 billion, under RIO 2. Contracts

went to KBR (for $1.2 billion) in the south; Parsons and Australia’s Worley (for $800

million) in the north.

According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven

oil reserves, the third largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Canada). Estimates of Iraq’s oil reserves and resources vary widely, however, given that only 10%

or so of the country has been explored. Some analysts (the Baker Institute, Center

for Global Energy Studies, the Federation of American Scientists, etc.) believe, for

instance, that deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert

region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100

billion barrels or more), but have not been explored. Other analysts, such as the

U.S. Geological Survey, are not as optimistic, with median estimates for additional

oil reserves closer to 45 billion barrels.

. . . Iraq generally has not had access to the latest, state-of-the-art oil industry

technology (i.e., 3D seismic, directional or deep drilling, gas injection), sufficient

spare parts, and investment in general throughout most of the 1990s. Instead, Iraq

reportedly utilized sub-standard engineering techniques (i.e., overpumping, water

injection/‘‘flooding’’), obsolete technology, and systems in various states of decay (i.e.,

corroded well casings) in order to sustain production. In the long run, reversal of

56

all these practices and utilization of the most modern techniques, combined with development of both discovered fields as well as new ones, could result in Iraq’s oil

output increasing by several million barrels per day. In February 2004, former Iraqi

Oil Minister Issam al-Chalabi stated that recent efforts to boost Iraqi production

might be harming the country’s oil reserves.

According to the U.N. Joint Logistics Centre (JLC), in August 2003 ‘‘about 40%

of [northern Iraqi] production [was being] transferred to the Baiji refinery, with the

balance into the fields, ostensibly to maintain pressure. This is a most unusual practice but extraction of the surplus crude is necessary to produce much needed LPG.

It means, however that crude oil production is overstated by the volume reinjected

(it not being available for refining or export, but counted as production). The reinjected crude may be lost forever.’’ Meanwhile, the USACE has stated that its mission was to focus on war-damaged, above-ground oil facilities, not ‘‘redeveloping the

oil fields,’’ with Iraqi engineers reportedly estimating that expected recovery rates

at Kirkuk have fallen as low as 9%, far below industry norms.

On August 13, 2003, Iraq’s main oil export pipeline from its main northern oilfield

of Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan reopened (see below for more details), but

the line was shut down once again shortly thereafter due to sabotage on August 15

and 17. The pipeline reopened once again in early March 2004. Iraq currently is

aiming to increase its exports to around 2.0 MMBD by the end of March 2004, but

this goal depends in large part on security being maintained. Between April 2003

and the end of the year, there were an estimated 86 attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, including the country’s 4,350-mile-long pipeline system and 11,000-mile-long

power grid. In response, the U.S. military set up a 9,700-person force, called Task

Force Shield, to guard Iraq’s oil infrastructure, particularly the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line.

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi pipelines were guarded in part by local tribes, and

in part by two army divisions dedicated to the task.

. . . As of early March 2004, Iraqi production (on a net basis) had reached perhaps 2.2 MMBD, with ‘‘gross’’ production (including reinjection) of around 2.4 million bbl/d. Although Iraq is a member of OPEC, its oil output has not been constrained by OPEC quotas since it resumed oil exports in December 1996.

Prior to the latest war, oil industry experts generally assessed Iraq’s sustainable

production capacity at no higher than about 2.8–3.0 MMBD, with net export potential of around 2.3–2.5 million bbl/d (including smuggled oil).

Among other challenges in maintaining, let alone increasing, oil production capacity, were Iraq’s battle with ‘‘water cut’’ (damaging intrusion of water into oil reservoirs) especially in the south. In 2000, Saybolt International had reported that

NOC and SOC were able to increase their oil production through use of short-term

techniques not generally considered acceptable in the oil industry (i.e., ‘‘water flooding,’’ injection of refined oil products into crude reservoirs). The Saybolt report now

appears to have been largely accurate. In addition, a U.N. report in June 2001 said

that Iraqi oil production capacity would fall sharply unless technical and infrastructure problems were addressed.

Oil market consultants PFC Energy have stated that ‘‘unless water injection used

to maintain pressure in the southern fields is restarted, there is a strong possibility

that [they] will go into more rapid decline and suffer permanent reservoir damage.’’

PFC added that ‘‘this means the rehabilitation work at the Garmat Ali water processing plant is crucial.’’ U.N. oil experts reportedly have estimated that some reservoirs in southern Iraq have been so badly managed that their ultimate recovery

rates might be only 15%–25%, well below the 35%–60% usually seen in the oil industry.

Iraq’s southern oil industry was decimated in the 1990/1991 Gulf War, with production capacity falling to 75,000 bbl/d in mid-1991. That war resulted in destruction of gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at Rumaila, storage facilities, the l.6–MMBD (nameplate capacity) Mina al-Bakr/Basra export terminal,

and pumping stations along the l.4–MMBD (pre-war capacity) Iraqi Strategic

(North-South) Pipeline. Seven other sizable fields remain damaged or partially

mothballed. These include Zubair, Luhais, Suba, Buzurgan, Abu Ghirab, and Fauqi.

Generally speaking, oilfield development plans were put on hold following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, with Iraqi efforts focused on maintaining production at existing

fields.

. . . In December 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute

released a report on Iraq’s oil sector. Among other things, the report concluded that:

(1) Iraq’s oil sector infrastructure is in bad shape at the moment, being held together by ‘‘band-aids,’’ and with a production decline rate of 100,000 bbl/d per year;

(2) increasing Iraqi oil production will require ‘‘massive repairs and reconstruction

. . . costing several billions of dollars and taking months if not years’’; (3) costs of

repairing existing oil export installations alone would be around $5 billion, while reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
57

storing Iraqi oil production to pre-1990 levels would cost an additional $5 billion,

plus $3 billion per year in annual operating costs; (4) outside funds and large-scale

investment by international oil companies will be needed; (5) existing oil contracts

will need to be clarified and resolved in order to rebuild Iraq’s oil industry, with

any ‘‘prolonged legal conflicts over contracts’’ possibly ‘‘delay[ing] the development

of important fields in Iraq’’; (6) any ‘‘sudden or prolonged shut-down’’ of Iraq’s oil

industry could result in long-term reservoir damage; (7) Iraq’s oil facilities could

easily be damaged during any domestic unrest or military operations (in early February 2003, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan claimed that Iraqi soldiers were mining oil wells in the north of the country in anticipation of war); and (8) given all

this, a ‘‘bonanza’’ of oil is not expected in the near future.

According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), problems at Iraqi oil

fields include: years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various

oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials,

equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities; and more. MEES estimates that Iraq could reach production capacity of 4.2 MMBD within three years

at a cost of $3.5 billion. The International Energy Agency, in contrast, estimates a

$5 billion cost to raise Iraqi output capacity to 3.7 MMBD by 2010, and a $42 billion

cost to raise capacity to 8 MMBD by 2030. 17Department of Defense, ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Report,’’ November 3, 2004. 18Office the Press Secretary, Press Release, November 21, 2004, 508 PM. 19 An EIA report dated 11–04 notes that, ‘‘the country’s economy, infrastructure,

environment, health care system, and other social indicators all deteriorated sharply. Iraq also assumed a heavy debt burden, possibly as high as $116 billion if debts

to Gulf states and Russia are counted, and even more if $250 billion in reparations

payment claims stemming from Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait are included. It is

possible, however, that much of Iraq’s debt will be written off in the end, and that

reparations will be capped at a certain level, possibly around $40 billion. In December 2003, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was sent as an envoy to several of Iraq’s major creditor nations, attempting to secure pledges to write off some

of Iraq’s debt. Russia stated that it would be willing to write off part or all of the

$8 billion it is owed in exchange for favorable consideration for Russian companies

on Iraqi oil and reconstruction projects. In January 2004, Kuwaiti Prime Minister

al-Sabah announced that his country would be willing to waive some of the $16 billion owed by Iraq, and would help reduce Iraq’s overall foreign debts as well. Under

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, Iraq’s oil export earnings are immune from

legal proceedings, such as debt collection, until the end of 2007.’’ 20 Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations,

1996–2000,’’ Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS RL32547, August

26, 2004, pp. 50 and 61. 21 Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations,

1996–2000,’’ Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS RL32547, August

26, 2004, pp. 50 and 61. 22 IAEA GOV/2004/60, ‘‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

Islamic Republic of Iran,’’ Report by the Director General, 1 September 2004. 23Sanger, David, ‘‘Pakistan Found to Aid Iran Nuclear Efforts,’’ The New York

Times, September 2, 2004. 24Michael Evans and David Charter, ‘‘NATO will send More Troops to Afghanistan,’’ London Times, June 29, 2004; Defense News.com, June 30, 2004. 25See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html, DOE/EIA estimated in September 2004 that the Persian Gulf contains 715 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, representing over half (57%) of the world’s oil reserves, and 2,462 Tcf of natural gas reserves (45% of the world total). Also, at the end of 2003, Persian Gulf

countries maintained about 22.9 MMBD of oil production capacity, or 32% of the

world total. Perhaps even more significantly, the Persian Gulf countries normally

maintain almost all of the world’s excess oil production capacity. As of early September 2004, excess world oil production capacity was only about 0.5–1.0 MMBD,

all of which was located in Saudi Arabia.

According to the Energy Information Administration’s International Energy Outlook 2004, Persian Gulf oil production increased from 18.7 MMBD in 1990 to 22.4

MMBD in 2001. It is expected to reach about 27.9 MMBD by 2010, and 38 MMBD

by 2020, and 45.0 MMBD in 2025. This would increase Persian Gulf oil production

capacity to over 33% of the world total by 2020, up from 28% in 2000.

The estimate does, however, change significantly in the high oil price case: It is

expected to reach about 21.4 MMBD by 2010, and 27.3 MMBD by 2020, and 32.9

MMBD in 2025. 26 Estimates differ according to source. The last comprehensive USGS analysis

was performed in 2000, and was seriously limited by the fact many countries were

58

affected by war or internal turmoil and declared reserves without explaining them

or provided data by field. Standard estimates of reserves by non-USG sources like

those in the Oil and Gas Journal and World Oil do not adjust reported data according to a standardized methodology or adjust for the large number of countries that

never alter their estimates of reserves for actual production.

For example, six of the ten nations with the largest proven reserves are in the

MENA region. An IEA analysis shows a range of 259–263 billion barrels for Saudi

Arabia, 105–133 billion for Iran, 66–98 billion for the UAE, and 31–29 billion for

Libya. The figure of 115 billion for Iraq is consistent only because it is a figure announced in the past by the Iraqi government and there are no accurate, verified estimates. To put these figures in perspective, the range for Russia is 60–69 billion,

25–35 billion for Nigeria, 23–21 billion for the U.S., and 52–78 billion for Venezuela.

(International Energy Agency, ‘‘Oil Market Outlook,’’ World Energy Outlook, 2004,

OECD/IEA, Paris, October 2004, Table 3.2.)

Estimates alter radically if an unconventional oil reserve like Canadian tar sands

are included. The Middle East has only about 1% of the world’s known reserves of

oil shales, extra heavy oil, tar sands, and bitumen. Canada has 36%, the U.S. has

32%, and Venezuela has 19%. The rest of the world has only 12%. The cost-effectiveness of producing most of these reserves, and the environmental impact, is highly

uncertain, however, even at high oil prices. (International Energy Agency, ‘‘Oil Market Outlook,’’ World Energy Outlook. 2004, OECD/IEA, Paris, October 2004, Figure

3.13.)

Reserve estimates also change radically if ultimately recoverable reserves are included, and not simply proven reserves. Some estimates put the total for such reserves at around 2.5 times the figure for proven reserves. For example, the IEA estimate for the Middle East drops from around 60% to 23%. Such estimates are speculative however, in terms of both their existence and recovery price, and do not have

significant impact on estimates of production capacity through 2025–2030. They also

ignore gas and gas liquids. The Middle Eastern share of undiscovered oil and gas

resources rises to 27% based on existing data.

Such estimates are also heavily biased by the fact that so little experimental drilling searching for new fields occurred in the Middle East between 1992 and 2002.

The IEA estimates that only 3% of some 28,000 wildcat explorations for new fields

worldwide took place in the Middle East. Recent exploration in key countries like

Iran, Iraq, and Libya has been minimal. Some 50 Saudi fields, with 70% of the reserves that are proven, still await development. (International Energy Agency, ‘‘Oil

Market Outlook,’’ World Energy Outlook, 2004, OECD/IEA, Paris, October 2004,

Figure 3.15.) 27Guy Caruso, ‘‘U.S. Oil Markets and the Middle East, DOE/EIA,’’ October 20,

2004. 28 IEA estimate in the World Energy Outlook for 2004, Table 3.5, and analyzed

in Chapter 3. 29The DOE/EIA, ‘‘International Energy Outlook for 2004,’’ can be found at http:/

/www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/download.html. 30See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html. In 2003, Persian Gulf countries had estimated net oil exports of 17.2 MMBD of oil (see pie chart). Saudi Arabia

exported the most oil of any Persian Gulf country in 2003, with an estimated 8.40

MMBD (49% of the total). Also, Iran had estimated net exports of about 2.6 MMBD

(15%), followed by the United Arab Emirates (2.4 MMBD—14%), Kuwait (2.0

MMBD—12%), Iraq (0.9 MMBD—9%), Qatar (0.9 MMBD—5%), and Bahrain (0.01

MMBD—0.1%).

U.S. gross oil imports from the Persian Gulf rose during 2003 to 2.5 MMBD (almost all of which was crude), from 2.3 MMBD in 2002. The vast majority of Persian

Gulf oil imported by the United States came from Saudi Arabia (71%), with significant amounts also coming from Iraq (19%), Kuwait (9%), and small amounts (less

than 1% total) from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Iraqi oil exports to the

United States rose slightly in 2003, to 481,000 bbl/d, compared to 442,000 bbl/d in

2002. Saudi exports rose from 1.55 MMBD in 2002 to 1.77 MMBD in 2003. Overall,

the Persian Gulf accounted for about 22% of U.S. net oil imports, and 12% of U.S.

oil demand, in 2003.

Western Europe (defined as European countries belonging to the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development—OECD) averaged 2.6 MMBD of oil imports

from the Persian Gulf during 2003, an increase of about 0.2 MMBD from the same

period in 2002. The largest share of Persian Gulf oil exports to Western Europe

came from Saudi Arabia (52%), with significant amounts also coming from Iran

(33%), Iraq (7%), and Kuwait (6%).

Japan averaged 4.2 MMBD of net oil imports from Persian Gulf during 2003. Japan’s dependence on the Persian Gulf for its oil supplies increased sharply since the

59

low point of 57% in 1988 to a high of 78% in 2003. About 30% of Japan’s Persian

Gulf imports in 2003 came from Saudi Arabia, 29% from the United Arab Emirates,

17% from Iran, 12% from Kuwait, 11% from Qatar, and around 1% from Bahrain

and Iraq combined. Japan’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf as a percentage of demand continued to rise to new highs, reaching 78% in 2003. 31 Estimates by country and necessarily uncertain. The ‘‘International Energy

Outlook for 2004’’ estimate of production capacity in MMBD for MENA countries is

as follows:

Country 2001

2010 2020 2025

Reference High

price Reference Highprice Reference Highprice

Iran ............................................. 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.7 3.8 4.9 4.3

Iraq ............................................. 2.8 3.7 2.9 5.3 3.7 6.6 4.6

Kuwait ........................................ 2.3 3.7 2.3 4.4 2.9 5.0 3.4

Qatar ........................................... 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7

Saudi Arabia .............................. 10.2 13.2 9.4 18.2 12.9 22.5 16.0

UAE ............................................ 2.7 3.3 2.7 4.6 3.3 5.2 3.9

Total Gulf ........................ 22.4 27.9 21.4 38.0 27.3 45.0 32.9

Algeria ........................................ 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.2

Libya ........................................... 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.1 2.9 2.4

Other Middle East ..................... 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.1

Total Other ...................... 4.3 6.2 5.7 7.6 7.0 8.4 7.7

Total MENA .................... 26.7 34.1 26.1 45.6 34.3 53.4 40.6

Total World ................................ 79.3 95.1 90.0 114.9 107.2 126.1 117.3

(US) ............................................. 9.0 9.5 9.9 8.9 9.6 8.6 9.0

OPEC data are labeled confidential but are very similar. The IEA does not provide country-by-country estimates, but uses very similar models with similar results. It estimates total world production was 77 MMBD in 2002, and will increase

to 121 MMBD in 2030. If one looks at the data for the Middle East, the latest IEA

estimates are as follows:

The IEA estimate in the ‘‘World Energy Outlook for 2004,’’ Table 3.5, is:

2002 2010 2020 2030

Ave.

annual

growth

(percent)

OPEC Middle East ................................................ 19.0 22.5 37.4 51.8 3.6

Other Middle East ................................................. 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.0 ¥2.7

Total ............................................................. 21.1 24.3 38.8 52.8 ..............

Non-Conventional Oil (Worldwide) ...................... 1.6 3.8 6.1 10.1 6.7

World ...................................................................... 77.0 90.4 106.7 121.3 1.6

32See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/choke.html#HORMUZ. The Strait is

the narrow passage between Iran and Oman that connects the Persian Gulf with

the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It consists of 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile-wide buffer zone. The EIA

estimates that some 13 MMBD flowed through the Strait in 2002. The IEA puts the

figure at 15 MMBD in 2003. Both agencies indicate that the amount of oil moving

by tanker will increase steadily as Asian demand consumes a larger and larger

share of total exports.

Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require use of longer alternate routes (if

available) at increased transportation costs. Such routes include the 5 millionbbl/d capacity Petroline (East-West Pipeline) and the 290,000-bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu

natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Theoretically, the l.65–

MMBD Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA) also could be utilized, more oil

could be pumped north to Ceyhan (Turkey), and the 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to

Lebanon could be reactivated. 33 International Energy Agency, ‘‘Oil Market Outlook,’’ World Energy Outlook,

2004, OECD/IEA, Paris, October 2004, Table 3.7 and 3.8.

60

34 International Energy Agency, Oil Market Outlook, World Energy Outlook, 2004,

OECD/IEA, Paris, October 2004, Chapter 3. 35 BP/Amoco, ‘‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy,’’ London, BP, 2003, p. 17. 36 BP/Amoco, ‘‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy,’’ London, BP, 2003, p. 17. 37 EIA ‘‘Annual Energy Outlook, 2003,’’ pp. 80–84. 38 Energy Information Administration, ‘‘Annual Energy Outlook 2004,’’ p. 95. 39 EIA, ‘‘Annual Energy Outlook, 2004,’’ Table 26.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman, for

a very comprehensive, very important paper. As you saw, some

members were nodding at various points. A good number of these

issues are ones in which we find accord. You have phrased the

issue in an articulate way. Now, there are others that we may

want to question, and we will be doing that in a moment. This is

why we have called General Newbold and Mr. Khalil for immediate

commentary on your paper.

Let me mention, if I can engage in a colloquy with the distinguished ranking member for a moment, that the distinguished

ranking member requests that after the comments by General

Newbold and Mr. Khalil, he be recognized for his opening statement. That seems to be a reasonable thing to do.

Senator BIDEN. I do not want to interrupt the flow here.

The CHAIRMAN. The other reasonable thing to do, if we can. We

have nine members present. We are approaching a quorum. We

could obviate the need to meet in a business meeting at 2:30, given

the fact that there appears to be unanimous consent, as far as I

can tell, on the effective busywork that we need to do, namely the

adoption of our rules, budget resolution, subcommittee organization

and membership.

Senator BIDEN. That is correct. There is no disagreement on our

side.

The CHAIRMAN. So, not to disconcert the witnesses, but at the

proper moment, I might call for order and dispense with that business if possible. If not, I would ask all members to be prepared to

meet at 2:30 this afternoon in S–116 to do that business.

I call now on General Newbold.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. NEWBOLD, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.), MANAGING DIRECTOR,

GLOBESECNINE

General NEWBOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to

be here, obviously, on the subject before this committee.

The first thing I would like to offer is that I am comforted that

the debate, the discussion, the dialogue, is taking place before this

committee. Too often this is viewed as a solely military issue with

military solutions and the fact is that it is not. It takes all elements of our national power to address this issue, and most fundamentally this committee is the appropriate one.

Sir, I have prepared a written testimony that I would like to

offer for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record in full.

General NEWBOLD. Thank you, sir.

I will make comments that highlight what are in the written testimony. I know that your first priority is that I comment on Dr.

Cordesman’s paper and I will do that and then offer some of my

own views.

61

I have read a lot of Dr. Cordesman’s writings and we have discussed these issues at length. I have a great deal of regard for him

and for his paper. I find very little not only to disagree with, but

virtually everything to support. I have also read his written testimony and, frankly, I find that even better. I think it is more focused and pointed. It is critical, but where it is critical it makes

a great deal of sense, and it matches my personal experience.

I will not regurgitate the points he has made, but I would like

to highlight and reinforce some of my own that complement what

Dr. Cordesman has said. In particular and in no particular order,

I think our public diplomacy, information operations campaign, not

only in Iraq but elsewhere, have been abysmal. It is almost a cultural weakness of ours, but very costly when we are this inefficient

and this ineffective.

Our regional policies, as Dr. Cordesman pointed out, are viewed

as one-sided and they have implications and effects that reach far

beyond Iraq. In fact, when I am asked about an appropriate Iraq

strategy my first answer is that there is no independent Iraq strategy; it has to be a regional strategy. When our policies are viewed

as so totally one-sided, the complications are evident.

We had an extremely poor plan prior to the invasion for what

would take place after the invasion. There was some planning done

on the military level. It was done in spite of the process, not because of it. We have inherited the seeds that we have sown and the

vacuum that we created, and that is very unfortunate. More unfortunate is that if we do not correct this process that resulted in such

flawed and even arrogant planning, we are doomed to repeat it.

I would like to point out that I think the United States military

in Iraq has performed magnificently at the operational and at the

tactical level. I have a number of friends that have been involved

in the fight and, frankly, I spend part of every single day trying

to take care of the wounded sailors and marines who are at Bethesda, Walter Reed, and elsewhere. I have enormous respect for

what they have accomplished, but I believe that much of it is in

spite of our policies and our strategy and not because of it. They

deserve all the credit and all the support we can give them.

But the truth is we have overly focused on military solutions. We

focused on military strategy for Iraq and in the postwar phase we

have been very energetic on the military front, but that should not

be the centerpiece for our policies, as I will point out.

At the national level, we have been deluding ourselves on some

key points, probably most importantly on the nature of the insurgency in Iraq, but also on the nature of what it will take, more

broadly than Iraq, to counter radical Islam and terrorism and to

develop the policies and procedures that will accommodate that.

The state of training of Iraqi forces were described by Dr.

Cordesman and in my own opinion we are either deluding ourselves or it is being misrepresented. I will talk a little bit more

about the Iraqi national guard and the Iraqi army later on. But if

the centerpiece for our withdrawal is the state of training, then we

first must be honest about it.

We also have not had truly an international coalition to the degree that has been described and we will begin to lose additional

members of the coalition.

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The fundamental reality of what exists in Iraq right now is that

we have an intractable insurgency of great vehemence that has

cost us over 10,000 casualties and over 1,000 Americans. It has no

immediate end in sight and we ought to know by now what our

strategy is. I do not think we do.

No matter what strategy we adopt, I think we ought to have a

clear goal to be out of Iraq within 2 years. That may not be achievable, but it ought to be our goal. If we set it as our goal, perhaps

we will assign the assets, the resources, and the mental energy to

achieve it. If we are content to stay in Iraq for 5 years, if we are

content to sustain the casualties at the rate we have to date, then

it will be our future.

A fundamental weakness of what we have been doing in Iraq in

my view is that we have viewed the Iraq situation overwhelmingly

from an American perspective. This is not unique to this administration. It is something I have witnessed in administrations for as

long as I have been involved in the process. But it is the problem

we have right now, and examples of what I am talking about, the

ethnocentric view of this situation, include on the political front expectations that I believe are exaggerated of what are immediately

achievable in Iraq.

Our goals ought to be noble and they ought to be very challenging. But we cannot set them as the minimum standard for

what we will accept in Iraq. It is not Iowa. It has a rich history

of clan-tribal accommodations and government that will take generations to overcome.

The second problem I see on our American perspective of the

issue is that we see the insurgency as a military problem. As I will

point out later, we have failed to grasp what has caused the insurgency and what has sustained it. If we view it only in military

terms, then we will have only military solutions. We have done a

wonderful job on the tactical level. We have killed literally thousands of insurgents. We have inflicted punishing defeats on the insurgents in Najaf, in Samarrah, and in Fallujah. But during the

same timeframe we have had such great victories on the tactical

level, the insurgent strength has grown from 5,000 to 20,000. We

cannot kill the insurgents as fast as they can recruit them, so we

have to look for a different strategy.

Most troubling of all the American perspective problems I have

described is that we have yet to articulate why we believe that ordinary Iraqis, Shiites and Sunnis, men and women, old and young,

Baathist and the downtrodden, have joined the insurgency. Until

we describe its root causes, we will not come up with the solutions

that address them. The most basic primer at any war college will

tell you that you begin to fight an insurgency by understanding

why there is an insurgency. In all my contacts and all my reading

and all the expressions I have heard, I have yet to see the government address that.

I would like to point out that among the solutions I would recommend, none of them involve an immediate withdrawal. I think

that would be a catastrophic mistake——

Senator BIDEN. Say that again, General, because I did not hear

it. I did not hear what you just said.

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General NEWBOLD. Sir, I think it would be a catastrophic mistake to have a strategy that would call for an immediate withdrawal.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

General NEWBOLD. I think the implications of that would be catastrophic because, not only in the Iraqi sense, but for the signal it

sends to the world and the encouragement it would give to those

who have confronted us. I am not asking for that, not recommending that at all.

However, we have to understand that the fundamental reason for

the insurgency, the thing that ties all of the various groups together, is that in their view we are an occupying power. It does not

matter how noble our reasons and our rationale. It does matter

what they believe the reasons are. They see us as a western power

in their country, in their region, for oil, and we have to do something that addresses that.

I have close friends and people I respect that have countered the

milestones and timelines argument by saying that the insurgents

will hunker down and wait for our withdrawal and then go on the

offensive. I think they make a fundamental and sad mistake. If

they would address first why so many people, why 20,000, are in

the insurgents and why so many more are supporting the insurgency, they will examine that and find that if we withdrew then

the insurgency would unravel. Now, there are conditions we must

establish for a withdrawal and I will address them.

We have to have a new strategy, a recrafted one. It has to be

bolder, more flexible, and more imaginative than we have had to

date. It has to be based on military actions that strike the insurgency and dissipate its strength. But even more important, it must

tie ordinary citizens of Iraq to the future that we have described

and the new elected government will describe. They have to have

more stake in the future that we postulate than the one the insurgents do and they must believe that we can achieve what we said.

Dr. Cordesman has talked about the woeful steps that have been

taken to provide the ordinary comforts of life to the Iraqi citizens,

ordinary comforts that are not ordinary in Iraq. Six hours of electricity a day in Baghdad is one testimony to that.

Our troops have performed with distinction, but they cannot do

it all. We have a golden opportunity with the election. It is a wonderful manifestation of what is possible. But we will lose the momentum quickly if we do not sustain the effort on a broader array

of fronts.

More specifically, in the security realm there has been an enormous amount of progress and innovativeness in the last month.

With General Casey and General Luck’s visit and most especially

with General Abizaid’s plan to greatly augment the forces that will

train the Iraqi army, I see a good amount of hope. The Iraqi national guard effort was a huge mistake. It was not only ineffective,

it was counterproductive. It consumed an enormous amount of

equipment and money and, at least in the Sunni areas, it was a

totally ineffective force.

The Iraq army, on the other hand, much more competent. In

places where it has had to fight it has fought well. It will take

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some time, but it will take time according to the surge efforts we

make. I am encouraged by what has happened in the last month.

Dr. Cordesman has talked about the pitiful efforts we have made

to equip. After a year and a half, we are now approaching the 50-

percent level in most of the items that are desperately needed, and

we have to do better than that. We have to call on our allies, not

only to make promises to help train, but to deliver on those promises. And in my view, if it takes additional forces in the short term

to control the rest of areas like Mosul and others that percolate,

then we ought to do that, rather than sustain this level of effort

for 5 more years of bleeding.

In the political realm, if it had matched the efforts on the military side we would not be having the problems we are today. The

fact is most of the political effort was expended in Baghdad and the

insurgency will be won or lost in the interior. After a year of trying,

there has been almost no success in getting political training teams

out into the interior to help with the provinces, and that is unsatisfactory.

My recommendation is that we regionalize our effort in Iraq, that

we create a graduated or an exaggerated system of carrots and

sticks, incentives and disincentives, by which stable areas of Iraq

can receive benefits that make them a clear model for the others

to emulate. The areas unstable will be told that they will receive

the benefits, the gratuities, the independence, independence of

judgment, etcetera, only when they become stable. As it stands

right now, all of the regions are created equally, treated equally,

and that is unfortunate. Unless there are incentives we cannot condition human behavior to adjust.

In the economic realm, Dr. Cordesman has talked at length

about that. Suffice it to say that the meager expenditure of our resources has had an outcome that has undermined our effort. Quality of life for Iraqis must improve. We must provide jobs to give

people an alternative to the insurgency, and we frankly have to

overhaul what has been done there, as Dr. Cordesman said.

Finally, in the war of public opinion, I have already described

how poorly we have done. In that regard, I go out on a limb independent of many of the people whose opinion I respect. I truly believe that one of the reasons for the vehemence of the insurgency

is that they view us as an occupying power. While I do not recommend timelines, I do recommend that we break away from a

blind obedience to the code of conditions only and offer some hope

to the Iraqis conditioned on a roadmap. We ought to provide an example that will indicate that if conditions in Iraq or in the provinces—one at a time, become more stable, that they will see the coalition forces are withdrawing.

There is a way to do that. We can do it with illustrative examples that shift the responsibility directly to the insurgents for the

length of the stay of the U.S. forces. I believe that we have to do

that. The ordinary Iraqi has to know that United States and coalition forces are there because the insurgents have made that a requirement. Together with the newly elected government of Iraq, we

ought to indicate that forces can begin withdrawing when the insurgent activity declines, as soon as the end of the year. If conditions were such that the Iraqi army was fully capable of handling

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an inconsequential insurgency, then it is possible that our forces

could largely be withdrawn by the end of 2006.

If conditions do not allow that because the insurgents refuse to

comply, then it is their responsibility for an extended stay. We

ought to use this in an information campaign broadcast by the

President and articulated on a daily basis to ensure that the message is loud and clear, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.

I think the elections gave us a wonderful opportunity, but the

momentum will soon slip. We need to be more open-minded about

possible alternatives to our strategy in Iraq. We need to listen to

different voices. We need to be flexible and adaptive and we need

to re-invigorate the three elements of national power that have

been so weak so far.

Mr. Chairman, thanks for the time to appear before the committee.

[The prepared statement of General Newbold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. NEWBOLD, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S.

MARINE CORPS (RET.), MANAGING DIRECTOR, GLOBESECNINE, ARLINGTON, VA

First, I am honored to have been invited before this Committee, composed of these

members, on a subject of such vital importance to our country.

Second, I am comforted that the forum for this discussion is the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee because too often we view these issues as military in their origins, processes, and solutions. They are not. These issues don’t start, and their answers don’t lie, strictly in the military realm. To address the issue at hand appropriately, our nation and this committee must take into account both all elements

of our national power and the character of this insurgency more fully than we have

in the past.

In this paper and during my oral testimony, I will provide my views about the

most productive course for our strategy in Iraq, but will first comply with the Committee Chairman’s letter of invitation, in which I was asked to provide commentary

on Dr. Cordesman’s paper, ‘‘Playing the Course: A Strategy for Reshaping U.S. Policy in Iraq and the Middle East.’’

Dr. Cordesman’s Paper. As you know, Dr. Cordesman is an astute and prolific analyst of issues that affect our national security. ‘‘Playing the Course,’’ and a host

of other of his papers, perform a great service by their dissection of key issues in

both a detailed and frank way. Perhaps more importantly, Dr. Cordesman’s prescriptions are generally ahead of government thinking.

In my view, Dr. Cordesman’s analysis hinges on his five main recommendations

and four central observations. The recommendations are essentially these:

• Craft a dramatically improved statement of U.S. intent for Iraq and the region

and implement it in an overhauled communication effort. • Develop more effective Iraqi governance at the local, provincial, and national

level. • Increase the effort to adequately train and equip the Iraqi security forces. • Improve the political and informational effects of U.S. military strategy and operations. • Recast the economic focus of effort to increase near term stability and transition

to Iraqi management of this effort as soon as possible.

Dr. Cordesman’s four central observations—as extracted by me—that I will use

as the basis for my comments are these:

• The odds of a successful outcome in Iraq are about even.

• The U.S. has to seize upon the opportunity to declare victory and withdraw as

soon as possible—probably by the end of 2006.

• The U.S. must see the conflict in broader terms than we are now. The U.S.

must implement regional policies that bring due credit to us, and we must see

the conflict in ways that can address the root causes of terrorism and the clash

of cultures.

• The U.S. must free itself from hindrances to its strategic freedom of action imposed by dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

First, I agree with Dr. Cordesman’s recommendations and observations without

caveat or criticism. They are correct. To be useful to this committee, though, I will

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reinforce specific points that I think are crucial to a meaningful analysis, and offer

some additional specificity in recommendations that I think should be fundamental

elements in a re-crafted U.S. strategy.

My reinforcement of Dr. Cordesman’s recommendations is based on my own

thoughts:

• Our public diplomacy/information operations have been poor throughout the last

several decades and are distinctly not up to the task today.

• Our regional policies are almost universally viewed as one-sided, and our credibility on almost every other issue is undermined by this fact.

• We had a poor to non-existent plan for the post-invasion phase, and are now

reaping what we sowed. In fact, failing to correct the conditions that resulted

in poor planning may doom us to repeat them.

• The U.S. military has performed magnificently and heroically—not because of

the strategy, but in spite of it.

• We have focused overly on the military as a tool to contain the insurgency, and

have been woeful in providing the other elements of national power that are

needed in at least equal measure.

• At the national level, we are deluding ourselves in many key ways—examples

are the public assessments of the state of training of the Iraqi forces and police,

the underlying nature of and prospects for the insurgency, the degree to which

we truly have an international coalition in support, and in the strategy for adequately addressing the root causes of terrorism, radical Islam, and instability

in the region.

First, as I see the fundamental reality—we are facing a tough, resilient insurgency that has no end in close sight. We’ve had over 10,000 casualties and over

1,000 deaths, and by now we should know whether our strategy has a realistic

chance of creating appropriate conditions in Iraq and bringing our troops home. In

my view, five years of this is unsustainable in what it will cost us materially (our

most patriotic young citizens), economically, diplomatically, and politically. We

should not accept five years of what we are experiencing now. No matter whose

strategy is adopted, it ought to set at its goal a termination within two years. Better

to surge now—with whatever that costs us—than to bleed for five years.

A fundamental weakness in my view, and one we must correct, is that we continue to view Iraq overwhelmingly from an American perspective. (This is not a phenomenon unique to this Administration, and was equally a characteristic of the previous one.) Two examples in the current crisis are illustrative of our myopia. The

first is that we define a satisfactory political outcome—federalism and democracy—

in ways that are more realistic for Iowa than for Iraq. The dream is correct and

noble; the standards for near term attainment are unrealistic. The second is that

we view the insurgency as a military problem that can be defeated principally by

killing more insurgents. In the past six months we’ve killed thousands of insurgents

and inflicted significant defeats on them at Fallujah, Samarra, and Najaf—and by

our own estimation the insurgent ranks have grown from 5,000 to 20,000. What is

most troubling is that I have yet to see or hear of a government assessment that

adequately describes what motivates thousands of young and old, male and female,

Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish Iraqis to attack us with suicidal fervor. The basic primer

in all of the service war colleges instructs you that you cannot formulate an effective

strategy for an insurgency, if you have not adequately assessed its root causes. As

it stands now, we think of the problem and the target as the insurgents; rather than

what creates the insurgents. We attack the insurgents, rather than what produces

them.

Iraq is now fractionalized; some discord and factional fighting are part of its future. If we departed peremptorily, the cost to Iraq, the region, our credibility, and

probably to our national security, would be severe. Pared to its core, though, our

central problem is that our attempts to stabilize the country are being undermined

by the insurgency—and the fundamental reason for the insurgency is that we are

occupying Iraq. It does not matter how nobly we view our presence; what matters

is that the absolutely overwhelming view of Iraqis (and of others in the region) is

that we are occupiers. Worse, in their view, we are Western infidels there only to

control oil. Their recruiters are having a good deal easier time than ours.

The irony of our occupation is simple, but profound—there is no stability without

us, but our presence inflames the insurgency that causes instability. The trick, then,

is to craft a strategy that neutralizes the rationale for the insurgency—the chief

complaints that drives the active insurgents and their supporters to violence—while

strengthening the stake of the ordinary Iraqi in a future tied to the legitimate government.

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A re-crafted strategy must be far bolder and broader than has been initiated thus

far. Thus far, we have attempted a military defeat of the insurgents, augmented by

weak efforts to improve the material condition of the Iraqis. As Dr. Cordesman

points out, only a small portion of funding for infrastructure, security, and quality

of life improvements have been spent. The ordinary things that most symbolize a

life with hope—jobs, electricity, clean water, security, and sewage and trash removal

are not ordinary enough. Coalition military training teams operated throughout the

provinces, while training teams to assist in governance, economics, and information

dissemination are scarce outside of the capital. Our troops have performed with distinction, but they can’t do it all.

We have an opportunity to seize important initiative with the significant success

of the election, but the momentum we gained can be transitory if not reinforced. The

theme to a reinvigorated strategy should address root causes, and be no more complicated than dramatically enhanced incentives and disincentives (‘‘carrots and

sticks’’) that make clear that the dreams and aspirations of ordinary Iraqis lie with

the new Iraqi government, and the insurgents are the enemy of their hopes.

Where we need to sustain and augment the effort:

In the Security Realm. While we strike insurgent forces and keep them off balance, we must give full weight to Gen. John Abizaid’s call for a dramatically enhanced force to train the Iraqi Army. The National Guard proved to be largely useless in the Sunni areas, and our main efforts have to focus on the more promising

Iraqi Army. We also need our European allies immediately to fulfill their promise

to help train Iraqi security forces. We must ruthlessly overcome the inertia that has

taken over a year and a half to provide only half of what is needed to fully equip

the Iraqis security forces. Soon, we are going to lose a portion of our allies on the

ground, and we need to replace them as the need arises. Finally, if we don’t want

the insurgency to drag on for five years, we need to be ready to surge adequate

forces to dominate restive areas like Mosul and Ramadi. We have operational momentum, and we ought to exploit it.

Where we need to overhaul our effort:

In The Political Realm. Our diplomatic and political efforts pale in comparison to

our military ones. Our political assistance is almost completely restricted to Baghdad, while the insurgency will be won or lost in the outlying areas. We should implement a regionalization strategy that empowers the more stable provinces and

motivates the restive areas to change, consistent with a carrot and stick approach.

To the stable areas, we should offer increased financial assistance, less Coalition

presence, and greater autonomy in disbursing aid. This strategy won’t work, however, unless the benefits are exaggerated enough to encourage emulation by those

who don’t have them. Alternatively, the restive areas would receive restricted

amounts of aid, less autonomy, and more Coalition force presence because they

would be augmented by those who are released from duty in the stable areas. Those

in the unstable areas need daily reinforcement that a better life ensues when the

area is stable. When the people believe this, the insurgents lose their protective

cloak and their support network.

In The Economic Realm. As Dr. Cordesman points out, our inability to dispense

appropriated funds where they are needed is nothing short of astounding. To a significant degree, the inability to improve the daily lives of the Iraqi citizen is our

biggest failure, and one of the biggest sources of dissatisfaction. We need to create

or restore basic human services, and we need to establish jobs. If we don’t dramatically alter the speed at which we are dispensing aid, all other efforts may be moot.

The CETA funds, by which military commanders have been able to fund projects

that improve the quality of life for Iraqis in their area, ought to be an immediate

and active model for other agencies.

In The War of Public Opinion. By any poll, scientific or otherwise, we have performed dismally in attempting to win hearts and minds. [This almost seems to be

an American cultural deficiency, because this trait has been symptomatic for generations of administrations.] But beyond our inability to grasp and articulate the

themes that resonate most heartily with the various groups in Iraq, we have little

to advertise. If root causes are important, then we need to find the ways to neutralize them. When the reasons are material—quality of life issues—then we need

to work to address them, and advertise our success. Solutions here were previously

discussed. The more difficult situation, though, occurs when the root cause of violent

opposition to our forces, is our forces. To legions of Iraqis driven by what we would

call nationalism, the cause is simple—they are an occupied country.

Since the issue most fueling the insurgency is our presence, we need to shift responsibility/blame for our current presence to the insurgents. Simply communicated,

we would probably have withdrawn by now, if not for the actions by the insurgents.

And, we could make a fairly speedy withdrawal now, if not for insurgent actions.

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The key to success in the war for public opinion is that we need to be able to discuss

what would happen with success. This approach must be a unified front with the

newly elected Iraqi leadership. In my view, closed mindedness about discussing anything except that our withdrawal is wholly ‘‘condition based,’’ fuels the perception

that we have no intention of withdrawing. To be sure, we don’t need or want precise

timelines, but we ought to be imaginative enough to provide examples of what could

happen if the insurgency was measurably suppressed and the Iraqi Army was

stronger. We must be utterly convincing that the length of our stay can be short

or long—and it is entirely dependent on the violence currently tolerated by the silent majority of Iraqis.

An Example. Our goal is to leave Iraq a stable country, able to administer to its

own needs and security. This is not now possible. Should the insurgency wane significantly, however, you might expect to see reduction in U.S. and Coalition forces

by the end of the year. If, on the other hand, the insurgents refuse to respect the

will of the Iraqi people and its government, we would be compelled to remain until

conditions permitted a beginning to our withdrawal. We would prefer to begin a

withdrawal, but apparently the insurgents are not willing to see either our departure or the government of the Iraqi people succeed. Continuing the example, if the

insurgency were to be assessed as ‘‘controlled and of minor consequence’’ by the end

of 2006, there would be no reason for continued U.S. presence in Iraq—other than

those minor forces requested by the Iraqi government to assist in training the new

Iraqi Army. Such a withdrawal, though, is entirely dependent on the ability of the

Iraqi Army to provide reasonable security. If the insurgents continue to disrupt the

daily lives of Iraqis and their attempt at democratic government, and the government requests our continued operations, then we would have no choice but to stay.

We have a chance to build on the success of Sunday’s elections, and future demonstrations of democracy in Iraq, by undermining the legitimacy of those who violently oppose us. To exploit this success, though, we need to demonstrate more honesty in self-appraisal, and greater flexibility and imagination in implementation,

than we have to date. We cannot accept further delays in administering the political, economic, and public information aspects of our strategy, because the cost will

ultimately be measured in young Americans. We should set goals for how long we

want to sustain this effort, and take the actions that provide a real opportunity for

making them achievable.

This will take flexibility among our key decision-makers, and a willingness to exploit alternative views and options—neither have been the norm.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Newbold,

for your very comprehensive and thoughtful statements. Members

will have questions for you as well as for Dr. Cordesman and Mr.

Khalil in just a few moments.

As the chair announced before General Newbold’s testimony, we

would like at this point to have a business meeting, which would

obviate the need to meet this afternoon at 2:30. I have asked the

distinguished ranking member for his permission, and he has told

us to proceed.

So let me just say, now, that more than 10 members are present.

The hearing is now recessed, to reconvene shortly at the conclusion

of the business meeting. For the interest of our audience, this

should take just a moment.

I now call the committee to order and convene the business meeting. I call members’ attention to the business meeting agenda. The

committee must approve subcommittee organization and membership, subcommittee jurisdiction, Foreign Relations Committee

rules, and the committee budget resolution. These items are described in your committee memo and all have been agreed on in

discussions between the chairman and the ranking member. Our

responsibility today is to pass these organizational items so that

the committee can become fully functional in this Congress.

Do you have any further comments, Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to survey again

my colleagues.

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My understanding is from staff and each of your staffs that everyone has signed off on and we are all on the same page on this.

[No response.]

Senator BIDEN. That being the case, Mr. Chairman, we have no

objection and suggest we adopt the changes, the agenda, as you

have laid it out.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there further debate?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no debate, I move that the items on

the agenda be approved en bloc by a voice vote. All in favor say

aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. All opposed say nay.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The ayes have it and the agenda is passed.

Please record the members who are present. If other members

come in they would have the opportunity to vote. I appreciate very

much the cooperation of the membership.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, a minor little point. Since we had

called the meeting for this afternoon, can we leave the record open

the entirety of the day for those members who may not make it to

this hearing but would like to be recorded?

The CHAIRMAN. By unanimous consent, the record will be kept

open for the rest of the day for members’ comments or votes or

both.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank Senator Biden.

This concludes the business meeting. I now call to order the

hearing and the Chair recognizes Mr. Khalil. Thank you for your

patience.

STATEMENT OF PETER KHALIL, VISITING FELLOW, SABAN

CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS

INSTITUTION

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I would

also like to thank you and the committee for the honor to testify

today for the first time, and I hope not for the last time. I am going

to start, Mr. Chairman—I have a prepared written statement also

I hope to place in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, sir.

I am going to keep my remarks brief and to the point. I have

studied Dr. Cordesman’s paper and noted his comments today and

General Newbold’s comments and agree with the broad thrust of

their arguments. I hope to make apparent any points of difference

as I deliver my comments.

By way of quick introduction and to set the context for my remarks, I was sent to Iraq as an independent civil servant of the

Australian Government, not a political appointee and I hope not

one of the ideologues that Dr. Cordesman referred to earlier. I was

working in my time there very closely with the Iraqi political leadership and also the tribal leaders and the clerics and academics

across the country on the issue of rebuilding the Iraqi security

forces and national security institutions, such as creating the newly

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civilian-led Iraqi ministry of defense. I was also involved for some

time in conducting negotiations with Iraqi political militia leadership in transitioning their forces into the state security services.

It was, if I may say, a great honor to serve my country and to

serve within the U.S.-led coalition. I am honored to be part of that

long tradition of United States-Australian alliance and real friendship, which I think actually springs not just from our shared strategic interests but also our shared values.

Even though today I will be focusing on security aspects, I do

agree with Dr. Cordesman that any Iraq strategy must, both at the

operational and strategic level, push progress in a combination of

political transition, security and economic reconstruction for it to be

successful. A successful Iraq strategy not only defeats the insurgency but makes possible two very important goals which I do not

think are mutually exclusive. They are: First, a speedy return of

United States troops in the next few years; and second, the longer

term strategic goal of a free and democratic Iraq, able to defend

herself from external threats and no longer a threat to her neighbors, nor a haven for terrorists. These are goals which I assume all

the Senators on the committee share, although there may be some

disagreement on how to get there.

There are three key areas I want to touch on this morning, all

of which I believe are critical to the successful Iraq strategy and

which can make the achievement of these goals possible. First, the

policy direction of training of Iraqi security forces, their capabilities, and my firm belief that it is actually the quality, not the quantity, of these forces which is critical in ensuring a realistic transfer

of security responsibilities from United States forces to Iraqi forces,

and basically how we should proceed on this front. Second, the second key area is the critical importance of reform and rebuilding of

the Iraqi security institutions and ministries and the capacitybuilding efforts in those structures. Third, very quickly, where the

two tracks of security reforms and political transition meet and the

need, I believe, for the United States to ensure that there is a commitment to the underlying principles and democratic practices,

which I think are crucial to a genuine Iraqi democratic state.

The first key area, security and training policy. We are, at

present, in a situation which is essentially United States and coalition forces leading the counterinsurgency effort with Iraqi forces

only in a very supporting role. General Casey said in the past that

what the Iraqis want to do in the next year is reverse that. I think

that is possible, and I also think that the exit strategy as outlined

by the administration is, at least at the strategic level, fundamentally sound: Train Iraqi security forces and have them take over responsibility for directly dealing with the insurgency so that United

States forces can gradually withdraw. The devil is in the detail,

however. It is the quality, not the quantity, of the forces, as I have

said, which is critical to a realistic transfer.

At present, as Dr. Cordesman has pointed out, the vast majority

of the Iraqi security forces, 127,000 I think is the number, have not

actually been given the required counterinsurgency or

counterterrorism training and therefore do not have the required

capabilities to conduct offensive or even at times, as we have seen

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in Mosul and other places, defensive operations against the insurgents.

Now, I do not imply that there should not be this large number

of Iraqi forces in existence. It is just that they each have a role and

function, as in any society, and not all of them can actually be

thrown out into the front line against the insurgency.

The assumption of the Pentagon in the early postwar phase was

that there would not be such an intense and deadly insurgency. So

consequently a lot of the plans to train Iraqi security forces were

broad and based on large numbers of recruits doing very basic

training in local policing and also conventional military operations.

Dr. Cordesman is also correct in saying that the emphasis has

clearly shifted to training the right type of Iraqi security forces

with the capabilities to take over offensive operations from the

United States with minimal support.

I have more detail in my written testimony about the problems

with both the Iraqi police and the Iraqi national guard training

and there is a detailed discussion in that of the specific training

policy for each of the Iraqi forces. The main point I wish to make

here is that, even with the improvements in the vetting and training process having become centralized, firstly under General Eaton

and now currently under General Patraeus, the bulk of these

forces—that is, the national guard and the police—will not necessarily have the capabilities to take on the insurgents even with

the training they get now.

While I was in Baghdad, I have seen as late as May 2004 national guard and police forces, local police forces, providing perimeter security, even in the Green Zone, outer perimeter security, and

they also performed with distinction in securing polling centers in

the recent election. But that is what they are trained to do, basic

fixed-point security. They do not have the capabilities to take on

the insurgents offensively. Only the specialized units, police units

and army special forces, which are currently very limited in number, as Dr. Cordesman has pointed out, have the required capabilities to take on the insurgents offensively.

I would also like to note that the bulk of Iraqi army training and

capabilities are geared toward conventional military operations—

defending Iraq from external aggression. I believe that, given the

past history of the Iraqi army and its use as a tool of repression,

the United States must be very careful not to overemphasize the

use of the army in internal security operations.

It was in early 2004 that the Iraqi interim political leadership

and the CPA put in place the policy to raise and train high-end internal security forces, commonly known as the Iraqi Civil Intervention Force, an umbrella grouping which includes several types of

specialized police units with this specialized training, SWAT teams

and special police commando units. I think these are the critical

forces, with the capabilities to take on the insurgents.

They are particularly important, not just because of the specialized training and skill sets, but the ability to combine intelligence,

law enforcement, and light infantry capabilities. They are also important in my view in the sense that we can limit a heavy emphasis on army internal security operations.

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So, I think the key to a realistic transfer of security responsibility, that is Iraqi security forces that can successfully conduct offensive and defensive counterinsurgency operations with minimal

United States support, rests not only with building up the Iraqi

army special forces, but more importantly these high-end internal

police forces under the ministry of interior.

As far as I understand, these forces are growing in number.

There are, I think, plans for something like 33 battalions of these

forces to come out of the training pipeline over the next 24 months.

But I actually believe a concerted and concentrated effort must be

made in the next 12 months to intensify and increase the training

of these specialized units, particularly in counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism, to ensure a realistic handover in the next 24

months.

I think it is short of a plan, but specifically an increase and-or

a shift in the allocation of U.S. and coalition training resources and

manpower to the specific co-in and counterterrorism training of

these forces, I think this will lead to a realistic handover and the

consequent withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The second key area is building the capacity of Iraqi security institutions and ministries. There is obviously more to Iraqi security

strategy than training forces. A key area where progress has been

made to date and the groundwork laid is the capacity-building efforts within the newly civilian-led Iraqi ministry of defense. A good

example for the Senators is the time I spent there conducting interviews and selection of senior leadership for the ministry of defense,

up from the ministry down through the deputy secretaries and the

secretary and the senior leadership in the ministry. We had to discount around half of the hundreds of Iraqis that we interviewed for

these positions because they either did not understand or would

not accept the very simple concept of a civilian minister of defense.

So I do really believe that the training, mentoring, and educational and technical assistance for this new civilian service in the

ministry of defense and also for the more troubled ministry of interior is an area that the United States has made good ground in

over the past 2 years, but really needs to remain committed to,

likewise with other coalition partners such as the U.K. and Australia, which have committed assistance there.

To the third and last point, the political transition process and

the need for underlying democratic practices to be instilled in the

Iraqi structures. Democracy is not just about elections, as Dr.

Cordesman has pointed out. There are underlying principles and

practices in the security sector specifically which make democracies

work and must be encouraged in Iraq.

The principles and democratic practices which are specific to ensuring Iraqi security institutions work in a democratic state include some of the following, and I want to emphasize the principle

of civilian control over the military, but more specifically democratic civilian control over the military and, more broadly, the security forces, so a clear chain of command up through the operational

military, Iraqi military and police commanders, to the civilian ministers of defense and interior and of course up to the prime minister and the security cabinet.

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An even distribution of power among the key security ministries,

particularly important to Iraq, so that not one minister has dominant control over Iraqi forces.

Transparency in both the executive and the national assembly

and a clear separation of the two, particularly in the need to establish oversight committees in the new national assembly, something

I am sure the Senators here would be very much behind.

Checks and balances in the national assembly on the use of force

and in the executive on this insofar as such decisions require cabinet consensus and the approval of the president always, I think,

are critical and they must be adhered to to ensure the newly

formed Iraqi security institutions work in a democratic state.

The United States does have considerable ability to influence and

encourage the new Iraqi political leadership, but these principles

and practices, some of which have been established over the past

2 years, need to be respected and enshrined, and that there is no

serious deviation from these important foundations, because I do

believe that whatever progress is made with the elections that we

have just seen, these will be in jeopardy without the ongoing presence of some of these democratic practices.

I think the focus of United States policy and continued United

States support in these areas will ensure longer term success in

Iraq and mitigate the need to return to a possibly failed state in

20 years time. Put simply, during this political transition process

over the next 12 months the administration really should focus its

efforts in supporting the commitment to these underlying structural foundations and principles common to all democracies and

really stay out of some of the meddling and internal Iraqi politics

and political personalities.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think three key points can be

summarized here. One, increasing or shifting the allocation of resources to training counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training for Iraqi forces over the next 12 months. That may include

army ranger battalion special training from the United States

being committed to that effort.

Second, continued United States focus on capacity-building for

the Iraqi security institutions, such as the ministry of defense and

the ministry of interior, which back up these forces and are very

important.

Third, United States influence of the political process should be

focused on encouraging and enshrining these underlying democratic practices and principles I have outlined within the Iraqi security and political structures.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalil follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER KHALIL, VISITING FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Anthony Cordesman’s paper ‘‘Playing the Course: A Strategy for Reshaping U.S.

Policy in Iraq and the Middle East’’ presents sound strategic assessments which can

aid U.S. policy towards Iraq. My agreements with his ideas and a few points of difference are made apparent in the following analysis and recommendations. Any Iraq

strategy both at the operational and strategic level must push progress in a combination of political transition, security and economic reconstruction for it to be successful.

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A successful Iraq (exit or victory) strategy aims to achieve two goals: 1. the speedy

return of U.S. troops in the next few years; and 2. the establishment of a free democratic and pluralistic Iraq, secure and stabilized, able to defend herself from external threats, no longer a threat to her neighbors nor a haven for terrorists. These

do not have to be mutually exclusive. A weakening and defeat of the insurgency

through a combination of progress of Iraqi security reform, democratic political transition and economic reconstruction will lead to the achievement of both.

There are three key areas of U.S. policy over the next 12 months which can ensure the achievement of these goals:

1. The training of Iraqi security forces and the building up of their capabilities.

The quality, not the quantity, of these forces is critical in ensuring a realistic transfer of security responsibilities from U.S. forces to Iraqi forces.

2. The reform and rebuilding of Iraqi security institutions and ministries, capacity

building in those structures and the practice of underlying principles and democratic

practices within those structures that are crucial to a genuine Iraqi democratic

state.

3. The political transition process and the point at which the two tracks of security reforms and political transition form an important nexus which the U.S. must

help to shape.

1. SECURITY AND TRAINING

At present U.S. and coalition forces are leading the counterinsurgency effort with

Iraqi forces in support. General Casey has said that ‘‘What the Iraqis want to do

in the next year is reverse that,’’ and he has added that ‘‘We’re an outside force,

and the Iraqis in some parts of the country see us as an occupation. We need to

get the Iraqis in front.’’

The exit strategy concerned with security as outlined by the administration is, at

least at the strategic level, fundamentally sound: to train Iraqi security forces and

have them takeover responsibility for directly dealing with the insurgency so that

U.S. forces can gradually withdraw. The devil is in the details, however. It is the

quality, not the quantity, of the Iraqi security forces which is critical to a realistic

transfer of security responsibility from U.S. forces to the Iraqi security forces. At

present the vast majority of these forces (130,000 trained and in uniform) have not

been given the required training and do not have the required capabilities to conduct offensive (or even defensive) operations against the insurgents.

This is not to imply that there should not be the large numbers of Iraqi forces

which exist. It is just that they each have a role and function, as in any society,

and not all of them can or should be thrown on the front line of the insurgency.

Problems with both the Iraqi Police and Iraqi National Guard (ING) can be traced

back to the fact that initially, throughout 2003 and early 2004, much of the training

and vetting of recruits for these services was decentralized. Local U.S. and coalition

military commanders were given the responsibility to raise these units, leading to

a lack of standardization in their training and in uneven vetting of these recruits

across the country. The pressure on the United States and coalition military to get

Iraqi boots on the ground led to many local police simply being ‘‘reconstituted’’—

former police officers who were brought to work without having to go through the

required police academy training. National guardsmen went through minimal levels

of basic training and then were expected to be the bulk of Iraqi forces facing the

insurgents.

To a certain extent, these training and vetting problems have been rectified. The

raising and equipping of Iraqi Police and ING have been centralized, first under

Major General Eaton from spring 2004 until June 2004 and since then under his

successor, Lt. Gen. David Petraus. Under General Petraus, ING training involves

3 weeks of basic training and 3–4 weeks of collective training. However, ING capabilities are still limited to basic tasks such as fixed-point security, route-convoy security and joint patrolling with coalition troops. The ING performed these tasks admirably during the January 30 elections, when they were charged with creating cordon and perimeter security around polling centers; yet they still require heavy U.S.

logistical and combat support.

Local Iraqi police forces currently complete 8 weeks of training (or a 3–week refresher course for former officers) in police academies around Iraq and in Jordan.

Still, their capabilities are limited to local policing duties and ensuring basic law

and order. Given their skill sets, they are unable to combat the insurgency effectively as a frontline force. It should be noted that even the best-trained Western police forces would have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such intense and continuous attacks with RPGs, small-arms fire, and suicide bombings on their officers and

police stations.

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1http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/factsltroops.htm.

In contrast to the ING and the police, the Iraqi Army has had a centralized recruiting and vetting structure from its inception. As a result, the Army has attracted a higher quality of recruits who must undergo thorough and standardized

vetting, and the training itself has been of a higher standard. The basic 8-week

army boot camp is supplemented by additional training for recruits moving into special forces, such as the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF).

It should be noted that the bulk of Iraqi Army capabilities are attuned to conventional military operations, especially defending Iraq from external aggression. Given

the past history of the Iraqi Army, including its use as a tool of repression against

the Iraqi people, and the propensity for the military to dominate Iraqi politics, the

United States must be very careful not to overemphasize the use of the Iraqi army

in internal security operations. Necessity, however, has required the building up of

the IIP (9 battalions by the end of January 2005) as the Army’s key

counterinsurgency wing. This force has proven to be extremely capable in operations

in Samarra and Fallujah in late 2004. The Iraqi armed forces also has at its disposal two trained battalions: the 36th Commando Battalion—a special ING battalion put together to serve as an infantry-type strike force in late 2003, with fighters from many of the different Iraqi militias—and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion, with fighters drawn from both the ING and Army units.

The key to a realistic transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces rests not

only with these Iraqi Army special forces (such as the IIF), but more importantly

with the building of high-end internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior.

These specialized national police units are particularly important because of their

specialized training and skill sets and their ability to combine intelligence, law enforcement, and light infantry capabilities. They are also important in the sense that

a heavy emphasis on Army internal security operations can be limited as much as

possible.

It has taken some time for the building of these internal security forces to get

underway. The assumption of the Pentagon in early 2003 and in the early postwar

phase was that there would not be such an intense and deadly insurgency. Consequently, the initial plans to train the Iraqi security forces were broad, relying on

large numbers of recruits with very basic training in policing and conventional military operations. Only in early 2004 did the Iraqi interim Governing Council and the

Coalition Provision Authority put in place a policy to begin building specialized internal security forces to fight the insurgency. Since then, the emphasis has clearly

shifted to training the right type of Iraqi security forces with the capabilities to take

over offensive operations from U.S. forces with minimal support.

These high-end internal security forces are commonly known as the Iraqi Civil

Intervention Force, an umbrella grouping that includes several types of specialized

police forces:

• The Iraqi Police Service Emergency Response Unit: an elite 270-man team

trained to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies—essentially a

SWAT capability. • The 8th Mechanized Police Brigade (MPB): a paramilitary, counterinsurgency

Iraqi police unit. The MPB will comprise three battalions. • The Special Police Commando Battalions. The Special Police Commando Battalions provide the Ministry of Interior with its strike-force capability. The commandos—which will ultimately comprise six full battalions—are highly vetted

Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen largely made up of Special Forces

professionals with prior service. 1

These internal security forces, which are specifically and intensively trained in

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, are the key to the transfer of security to

Iraqi forces.

2. BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF IRAQI SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND MINISTRIES

It should be made clear to U.S. policymakers that democracy is not just about

elections, and there is more to the Iraqi security strategy than training forces. There

are underlying principles and practices in the security sector which make democracies work and must be encouraged in Iraq. Thus, it is imperative that U.S. policy

makers ensure that fundamental principles inherent in all democratic states are

part of the security and political structures of the future Iraq. The focus of U.S. policy and continued U.S. support in these areas will ensure longer term success in

Iraq and mitigate the need to return to a failed Iraq in 20 years’ time.

A key area where progress has been made to date and needs to be continued is

capacity building within security institutions, such as the newly civilian-led Iraqi

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Ministry of Defense. A functioning and strengthened civilian-led Iraqi Ministry of

Defense (IMoD) is critical given the past history of civil-military relations in Iraq.

During the Baathist regime, the Baath Party emptied the military of independent

professional officers and replaced them with Baathist ideologues in uniform who

held the key security posts in the cabinet. In turn, this Baathified military dominated the ministry.

The new IMoD, headed by a civilian Minister of Defense, was established in April

2004. The United States and its coalition partners, such as the United Kingdom and

Australia, must remain committed to capacity building, training of civil servants,

mentoring, and technical assistance for the new civilian service in the IMoD. This

is critically important, as the ministry’s civil service not only provides the logistical

and administrative support for the new armed forces, but also articulates and develops the strategic defense policy for the country under the guidance of the civilian

Minister of Defense and ultimately up to the security cabinet of ministers.

An independent civil service with no political appointees has been established in

the IMoD. The Iraqi Minister of Defense cannot bring ‘‘his people’’ into the IMoD.

Iraqi civil servants are professional and objective, dedicated to serving the national

interests of Iraq without fear of losing their jobs with a change of minister. Unfortunately, Iraq has a predilection for nepotism and corruption, and the Interim Ministry of Interior was rife with examples of different ministers appointing cousins,

uncles, and other personal favorites to senior leadership positions. This cannot afford to be replicated in the newly established IMoD.

There are many critical principles that underlie a democratic state: the separation

of powers, freedom of expression, and a host of civil and political rights. Principles

and democratic practices specific to ensuring that Iraqi security institutions such as

the new IMoD work in a democratic state include:

• The principle of civilian control over the military, but more specifically democratic civilian control over the military. This entails a clear chain of command

up through the operational Iraqi military commanders to the civilian Minister

of Defense, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the security cabinet. • Transparency in both the executive branch and the National Assembly.

• An even distribution of power among the key security ministries. This is particularly important to Iraq, in order to assure that no one minister has dominant control over the Iraqi security forces.

• Checks and balances in the National Assembly on the use of force and in the

executive, insofar as such decisions require cabinet consensus and the approval

of the President.

• The establishment of oversight committees in the National Assembly.

These are fundamental principles and practices which are critical to the long term

goals as outlined. They must be adhered to ensure the newly formed Iraqi security

institutions work in a democratic state. A genuinely free democratic Iraq requires

democratic practices and democratic institutions. The U.S. ability to influence and

encourage the Iraqi political leadership to enshrine these principles and structures

(some which have already been put in place during the past two years) but also to

ensure there is no serious deviation from some of these important foundations is

critical to achieving long-term U.S. strategic goals in Iraq.

Although these principles and practices may seem like intangibles in comparison

to concrete needs such as training, they may be even more important. No matter

how well the Iraqi security forces are trained and take over their security responsibilities, the real danger exists that U.S. policy makers will drop the ball on ensuring the maintenance of these democratic security structures and practices. The

United States needs to keep its assistance up in ensuring that these institutions

and these democratic practices continue through political transition process over the

next 12 months.

3. THE POLITICAL TRANSITION PROCESS AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN SECURITY REFORM

AND POLITICAL TRANSITION

Put simply, the political transition is one in which the Administration should

focus on those underlying structural foundations and principles common to all democracies. The United States must ensure that in the political transition over the

next 12 months, including the drafting of the constitution and the development of

Iraqi security and political institutions, that they encourage the practice of these

principles in governance in the security and political spheres while essentially foregoing interference in individuals and political personalities.

The legitimacy of the newly elected National Assembly and the executive government that is formed will be key to accomplishing the long-term goal: a free democratic Iraq. Thus, the United States must resist the temptation to try to control the

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political process which will form the new Iraqi government. Certainly, in a general

sense the United States should encourage a Shi’a leadership to include key Sunnis

in the new cabinet. However, overall the United States needs to play the ball and

not the man—in other words, focus on maintaining sound structural foundations

and underlying principles and not supporting personalities who may be in or out

of favor.

A democratically elected Iraqi government in which Sunni, Shiite, Kurd,

Turkoman, Christian, Yazidi, Communist, capitalist, secularist, and Islamist are all

represented may not even be a government the United States particularly likes—

particularly if Sunni ex-Baathists or radical clerics like Muqtada al-Sadr hold key

cabinet posts. But such a government will be legitimate, with the support of an

overwhelming Iraqi majority, and will serve to hold the country together to the detriment of the insurgents. As long as this future government does not attempt to

erode the important principles which buttress a pluralistic democratic state, the

United States should not attempt to fiddle with the internal Iraqi political process—

even if it does not like who wins.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Khalil.

I call now upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator

Biden, for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR

FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Tony, I am sorry I missed the very beginning of your statement,

but I can assure you quite literally there is not a thing you have

written that I have not read in the last 2 years, and that is not

an exaggeration.

As I listened to your statement, General, I think we should point

out for the record, nothing either of you are saying is new today

in terms of what you have been saying from the very beginning.

It is kind of dumbfounding we are here at this point having to be—

reiterating these points.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing. As

we have all seen, we obviously have an extremely distinguished

panel. I have already relied a great deal on the advice of two of our

witnesses over the last 2 years in formulating my own views thus

far. So it will not be surprising for them to hear that I agree with

virtually everything they have had to say.

Sunday’s elections were, to state the obvious, a significant positive tribute to the courage of the Iraqi people and to the courage

of our soldiers and civilians in Iraq. The images of children dancing

in the streets and elderly walking miles to polling stations despite

the obvious danger were incredibly moving. Given the trauma of

the past 2 years, to say nothing about the past 3 decades, it was

encouraging to have some good news coming out of Iraq.

But, as all of you have pointed out, one election does not make

a democracy or even a stable government make. Whether the history books look back on Sunday as a transformational event in Iraq

is going to depend on what the Iraqis do and what we do in the

next several months. It seems to me that we have several very important challenges, some of which you all have mentioned.

First, in my judgment we have to use our influence to work the

Sunnis back into the constitutional writing process here, which will

define minority rights and protections. Quite frankly, in my most

recent trip to Iraq last month, I got the sense, from some of the

Shias with whom we met that they understood that, that the

Kurds understood that. Now, whether or not they can translate

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that understanding to reality remains to be seen. But it seems to

me that is a critical step that has to be undertaken.

Second, the Iraqi Government, to state the obvious, needs more

capacity. When Senators Lugar and Hagel and I were there a year

and a half ago, right after Saddam’s statue went down, we kept

talking about capacity, what we were going to do to provide the

Iraqi people with any capacity.

When the transfer of sovereignty occurred last summer, it was

clear that we transferred sovereignty, but virtually no capacity. I

want to ask you in the question and answer period more about why

it has been we have failed to focus on that and instead have insisted on this arbitrary number of 127,000 trained Iraqis as if it

provided capacity for this government.

Third—and I am summarizing here, Mr. Chairman—we need to

show reconstruction results. I am going to be anecdotal. I was with

my friend from Rhode Island on a recent trip. We met with a number of people, the same people we met with, I met with, 2 months

earlier, 3 months earlier, with Senator Hagel.

General Chiarelli of the First Cav, he was very, very simple and

straightforward. I think he has done a hell of a job. He said:

Look—he showed us Sadr City and he said: This is my responsibility. Then he showed us HMMV’s going down the streets with

sewage up to the hubcaps and piles of garbage literally 10, 12 feet

high in front of the front doors of homes, not much further away

than this rail is from that door. He said: I talked to the CPA and

I have talked to their successors about what we do about that, and

they talk about $100 million, hundreds of millions of dollars, tertiary treatment plant.

He said: Give me some PVC, let me run it with Iraqis from the

homes to the Tigris River, drain the swamp. You know, we have

all seen the Powerpoint presentations the military, that you guys,

General, love so much; He then showed us where all the attacks

on his forces had been, where the most environmentally degrading

circumstances existed, where he had, I think it was—correct me,

Chuck or staff, if I am wrong. I think he said he had 30 million

bucks he was able to spend right away, where he used it.

Then he put another graph right on top and said: Now look what

has happened. CNN 3 or 4 days ago—some of you may have seen

it; I was at Davos and I turned on CNN. They had Chiarelli walking down a street with Iraqis who were turning in insurgents because they now had a street built, the garbage taken away, the

sewage diverted, and lights on.

The idea that we have only spent $2.4 billion—not very well, I

might add—out of the 8—as you said, Tony, the good news and the

bad news. The good news is we have only wasted $2.4 billion. The

bad news is we still have this vast bulk of this reconstruction

money we have not used.

So I would like to ask you some more specific questions about

that, but the failure of us being able to use more than 15 percent

of the so-called Marshall Plan reconstruction has not been all because of insurgents. It is not all because it is too dangerous. It is

the method we have chosen as to how to lay it out.

In my judgment we have to move away from these massive

projects that are costly, slow, susceptible to both the incompetence

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of American contractors and the difficulty they have in dealing

with security, as well as not providing any immediate tangible results for folks in the street.

Fourth, it seems to me we finally have to make Iraq the world’s

problem, not just ours. I had the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to

spend I do not know how much time, but a considerable amount

of time with a few of my colleagues, with President Chirac. The

President, our President, has a unique opportunity when he heads

to Europe now. It is time the Europeans stop bleeding for the Iraqi

people and ante up a little bit. It is time they get over George

Bush. It is time they get over the election. It is time to get over

it. They love beating up Bush and I believe it has been used as an

excuse, in some cases from their perspective legitimate, to avoid

their own responsibility.

Talking with the French president, he was very specific—it is not

appropriate to lay it out here—very specific about things he is willing to do relating to training on and off the scene, relating to involvement in civil society issues. We should ask, ask. We should

give them a way out and into their responsibilities. I know some

of you have mentioned that.

Fifth, it seems to me we have to articulate much more forcefully

what our plan is. We are going to come up and we are going to

have to vote for $80 billion, I say to my colleagues here. I am prepared to vote for it, but this time I am not voting for it unless they

tell me what they want to do. I am not looking for a withdrawal

date. I am one who has been calling for more forces up until recently. I have been one who has been suggesting that we have to

do more.

But I want to tell you something. As that old song goes, what is

the plan, Stan? I do not see any evidence, except on the training

side and only in the last 4 to 6 weeks, that there is any coherent

notion about how Iraq fits into our regional strategy and about

how, in fact, we even define what the insurgency is.

The Secretary of Defense started off calling them dead-enders

and jihadists. Give me a break. They are dead-enders, a bunch of

dead-enders and jihadists. Well, what are they? I want the administration to tell me what they think they are, so I have any notion

to whether or not there is any maturation in the thinking of this

administration, because otherwise we are faced with a situation,

Dr. Cordesman, in my view that you had said in your November

article which you have updated for this presentation here, which is

that we do not have much better than a 50-percent chance.

You indicate if we do these things we have a much better than

50-percent chance. I think we do as well. But I want to tell you:

If there is no change, no change in the thinking of this administration, significant change in the last 10 months, we do not have a

shot in my view of prevailing. And I am not in on the game any

more, because then I am faced, as we always are in the Senate,

with Hobson’s choices by presidents, two bad choices. The one is,

do we continue to drain American blood for an approach that seems

to be, I think, a loser, or has there been a change in the strategy.

And if it is, what is the strategy? So I want to know what it is as

just one Senator.

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I also believe, to state the obvious, we have to support our military, and that relates to their training, their mission, their rotation

schedule, the equipment they are provided. We can go into that

later and I do not want to take the committee’s time since so many

of our colleagues are here now.

I think maybe most importantly, I say to my colleagues more

than the witnesses, we need some straight talk to the American

people here. We need to level with them. I know you are tired of

hearing me saying this, but no foreign policy can be sustained very

long without the informed consent of the American people, and

there has not been informed consent. We still operate in this fiction

that we do not have to put money for Iraq in the budget, in the

regular budget.

I do not know how you guys in good conscience can support that

notion, that it is unknowable what we need. We still talk about

this in terms of what great success we are having. I recommend

any administration official who tells us what great success we are

having to get back in a HMMV with the Senator from Rhode Island

and me and go 50 to 60 miles an hour inside the Green Zone, with

automobiles weaving in and out and while sitting there, although

I did not hear them, six mortar attacks in broad daylight inside the

Green Zone; flying in, making sure we cannot go anywhere at all

except on a helicopter at high speeds about 100 feet off the ground.

Tell me about how much more security we have. Why do they insist

on this fiction that we have 125,000 trained Iraqis?

So we better level with the American people. There are a number

of questions that are going to have to be answered by the administration. They will get my continued support if they try to answer

them, but I want to tell you something. We should use this opportunity, I will say parenthetically, Mr. President, of voting for

money to get a real live strategy written, stated, articulated by the

administration as to what their plan is, because if it is a repeat of

the last 2 years we are doomed to fail in my humble opinion.

I thank you for allowing me to make this statement, Mr. Chairman, and I will reserve my questions until after you question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Let me

just say that, one characteristic of the hearing on both sides, both

the witnesses and the Senators, is that there will be a lot of

straight talk this morning. It is meant to have oversight, but likewise a constructive purpose. We appreciate your papers as well as

your responses to the questions that we will ask to try to flesh out

what you have said to us.

We have many Senators here. The chair would suggest that we

have a 7-minute question period for our first round, so that we try

to get to as many Senators as possible. I know you, Dr. Cordesman,

must leave us, I understand, at about 11:30; is that correct?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I changed the plane until later, Senator, so I

can extend it. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you will be able to stay longer. That

is great.

Now, let me just ask members to be thoughtful about the 7-

minute limit. As always, the chair will try to be liberal and make

sure answers have been given and questions have been asked. But

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at the same time, as a courtesy to all of our members, it would be

helpful if we can try to observe the time limit.

Let me start by asking a question and then ask the three of you

for comments. In the testimony that you have given today there is

a question about definition of the insurgents. Who are they? To

contain or defeat them, calls for careful definition of the enemy.

Likewise, why do they appear to be growing in number even as a

number are killed by our security forces or the Iraqi security forces.

An assertion has been made that essentially the insurgency

comes because we, that is the United States and our allies, are perceived as occupiers, and that the end of occupation would end a rationale for the insurgency. Let me just ask for more definition of

this proposition. Some have suggested that the insurgency is primarily focused in four of the 18 provinces of the country. One of

the characteristics of those provinces is a high number of Sunnis.

Furthermore, some have suggested that a number of the insurgents

have in mind not only the end of American occupation, but likewise

the end of the Iraqi democracy experiment. In other words, they

would simply like to take power again, and one way of doing that

is, of course, the elimination of outsiders, ourselves included, but

also of those who are involved in this fledgling experiment, including those who would be involved in the constitution-building, or at

least the present leaders, to be replaced by those whom the insurgents would attempt to install by force.

That may be a stretch for 20,000 people, but then no one knows

whether just 20,000 are involved. So I am curious, how do we have

this situation in which, on the one hand, we are pledged to try to

defend the fledgling democracy, the 275 people that will now assemble, the election procedure of a referendum on their constitutional development, and the December 15th election of the new officers of the country, while at the same time providing the training

that we have all talked about today, including certainly much more

training? The people you have identified need to have specific types

of training to be more effective.

How do we go about trying to determine, as Dr. Cordesman has

suggested, the metrics of how well we are doing? Clearly, in our

hearing with Dr. Rice, Senator Biden raised the point about the

120,000 that are suggested as trained and the estimates of 12,

14,000, maybe, who really seem to be effective against an insurgency, or capable of replacing U.S. forces. We raised the metrics

question during that confirmation hearing.

How would we know how that training is coming so that we can

have this dialogue with the Iraqis or with the world as to our withdrawal, as to how this handover occurs, and thereby leave behind

a group of people who are prepared to defeat insurgents who may

be after them by then and no longer after us?

Dr. Cordesman, would you begin with your comments on this

broad question?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, Senator, you have hit on, I think, one of

the key questions. Let me say, all of these numbers when you talk

to intelligence people who actually serve in the field have to be

generated as guesstimates. They will tell you, if you keep asking

us to provide an estimate we will provide you with an estimate.

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But we do not have a basis for counting. We do not have a methodology that we can defend. We have to make rough estimates.

So General Newbold quoted 20,000. I am perfectly happy to support the figure. I have seen estimates as low as 14,000. Iraqi officials have talked about 200,000 sympathizers. The truth is that we

do not have an intelligence structure that can give us precise numbers.

We are talking, too, about a very diverse movement, and I will

concentrate here on the Sunnis. Some 35 groups have claimed to

exist. I think the latest estimate I heard was that we could confirm

the existence of about 18. Some of these have outside leadership.

There are no outside groups per se except for a relatively small but

fairly lethal group that is responsible for a lot of the suicide bombings.

The most recent estimate for General Casey was that only 1,000

of the insurgents were foreign volunteers, and most of these foreign

volunteers are not trained, experienced people. They are being recruited locally in Arab countries and funneled in through primarily

Syria, but also to some extent Iran.

When we talk about these movements, they are organized so

there are core cadres of people who do planning and organization.

There seem to be finance and infrastructure cadres who do not operate, but do provide services. Then you keep recruiting locally

young men, most of them young Sunnis, in an area where unemployment is put at the 70-percent mark for this particular age

group.

Some of the groups are Islamic. They seem to be relatively small

as pure Islamist extremist groups, but certainly there is a growing

number of Sunni groups that are Islamists there. Some are

Baathists, some are former regime loyalists, many are local.

So we really need to understand. Why are they growing? Well,

they are growing because many of them are hostile to the new government. They are hostile to the loss of Sunni power. They are hostile to the existence of a more democratic structure in an artificial

country where the Sunnis led because Britain used divide and conquer tactics from the foundation of Iraq to the present.

Now, when it comes to metrics, the metrics we had in Vietnam

were better than the metrics we have now. We broke them down

locally. We showed what areas could be secured. We showed what

the number of incidents were. We broke the incidents down by type

and we had pattern analysis of what the incidents were trying to

do. We have suppressed that data, although we initially published

it.

Since time has run out, I will try to get back to metrics on how

you can deal with measuring the improvements in the Iraqi forces

later.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, following an example that I

hope we will set, we will not proceed with additional comments of

others. You may want to make those comments as you respond to

other Senators or in a second round.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. I promise I will adhere to the same

discipline.

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I would like to just focus in the 7 minutes on training, if I may.

Dr. Cordesman, through my four trips into Iraq and regular e-mail

contact between the trainers that are there and my staff, I share

the view that has been expressed I think by all of you, that I think

that there has been a bit of, as we Catholics say, an epiphany of

the need for fundamental change in training. I think General

Petraeus is first rate. I think he is making a genuine effort. I think

they are changing the way in which this is going on. I think they

are much more realistic about what the reality is there.

Without getting us into numbers—and by the way, Dr.

Cordesman, you said up to 16 or 17 thousand. I think that was the

number. I have been using the figure, based on what I have been

able to glean from the folks in the field, somewhere at the low end

of around 5,000, at the high end, 18,000, depending on how you define their mission and what you define as capacity.

We all agree that part of, quote, a ‘‘success strategy’’ is giving the

capacity to the emerging elected government to not only govern

itself with some legitimacy, but also to be able to maintain its position with a capacity to have a security force available to it. How

long are we talking about, assuming the change has taken place as

to how to train and what the goals are as we think it has? I am

vastly oversimplifying in the interest of time. How long are we

talking about, assuming everything went according to plan, we

work like heck, we have a rational new policy?

What are we talking about? Are we talking months? Are we talking more than a year, Dr. Cordesman? What are we talking about

to be able to give an Iraqi government the capacity to maintain its

own security?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think, briefly, Senator, we are talking some

point in 2006. We had only one operational battalion of the Iraqi

army in the spring of 2004. We have been able to increase that to

something like 27 battalions at the end of this month. But that is

training and equipment. Let me stress, that does not mean they

are combat-ready.

Senator BIDEN. I understand.

Dr. CORDESMAN. You have to have leaders. You have to have unit

integrity and you have to have experience. We can do that by putting in U.S. advisers. We can do it by selectively moving units into

the field. But to actually get to combat-ready forces, that process,

once you have trained and equipped, is going to take you a matter

of at least 3 to 4 months.

You also, in terms of equipment, have not equipped these forces

with what they need to survive. What you have are a few old Soviet APC’s, but you do not have a real mechanized battalion in the

field yet. We will have a mechanized brigade by some time in the

summer. But we are talking about three divisions eventually and

that would be some point in 2006.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

General, do you want to add to that? You have done it.

General NEWBOLD. Sir, just a couple of quick comments. As is obvious to everybody here, we are not training them to western

standards. The real standard is how good are they against the insurgents. So to some degree it depends on how quickly we and the

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Iraqis can destroy the power of the insurgents, not just military

but political as well.

I would argue that we ought to—in certain areas of Iraq—use

moderately trained Iraqis to control the situation, as we have seen

both in the north and in the south of Iraq. We certainly cannot in

western Iraq. But we can incrementally feed them into the more

benign areas with the state of training that they have right now.

I think it will take until the end of this year to be able to do that

in many areas of Iraq. It will take through next year, if we overhaul our strategy, before the predominance of the security mission

can be undertaken by the Iraqis. They will be at a self-generating

point, dependent upon the activity of the insurgency, probably

within a year. That does not mean that——

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand. By the way, in communicating

with some folks on the ground these last couple days, on the Iraqi

performance. They did perform well in the election. But what everybody forgets is the United States secured the perimeter. The

United States essentially established martial law. The United

States on election day actually shut down the country in terms of

vehicles, etcetera. Then within the second perimeter you had the

Iraqi army performing well, and within the interior perimeter you

had the national guard and police performing well.

But absent that outer perimeter, being able to be locked down,

figuratively speaking, by the United States military, no one should

read into what happened on election day the idea that the Iraqi

forces have the capacity. Let me put it another way. Absent the

presence of American forces in Iraq on Sunday, I do not think the

kind of situation that existed would have been possible.

Well, I can see the light is about to go on. I am going to come

back and ask you about the notion of building an integrated Iraqi

force—I am talking about an army that can shoot straight, have

the proper equipment, be under the control of a civilian Iraqi government, being in the range of 30 to 40,000 over the next couple

years. Is it likely to be integrated, that is Sunni, Shia, Kurd? What

are the problems we face there?

But I have many more questions, but I will abide by the yellow

light and yield back the last few seconds I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEBRASKA

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming before our committee this

morning. You have each made a significant contribution and your

careers attest to that as well.

For the record, General Newbold, I think it would be helpful if

you would tell this committee what you did at the Pentagon in your

last job and how you were involved in the lead-up to our invasion

of Iraq and when you left the Pentagon?

General NEWBOLD. Okay, sir. I became the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August of 2000. The Director

of Operations, as you know, is responsible for oversight for the employment of our forces around the world and is the communicator

85

between the Joint Staff and the equivalent operations that go on

in the combatant commanders’ realm. I left that job in November

of 2002.

Senator HAGEL. 2002.

General NEWBOLD. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. So you had a considerable amount of experience

on the inside at the Pentagon as we were preparing to go into Iraq?

General NEWBOLD. Sir, I had virtual access to every bit of intelligence. Other than the Presidential daily briefings, I think I had

100 percent other than that. I participated in all the planning, all

the conduct of operations for Afghanistan and all the planning for

operations for Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. My point in asking you to put that on the record

is so that we will all clearly understand that you are not a very

distinguished lieutenant general retired who is before us today just

commenting or speculating. In fact, you were there and had a very

significant responsibility for our efforts. So thank you for your service.

Let me ask each of you, and because of our time restraints I

would appreciate a brief answer: The issue is Kurdistan. What in

your opinion is the likelihood of the Kurds moving to establish an

independent state? Dr. Cordesman, may I start with you.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think they will only do that, Senator, if they

cannot find a way to protect what they already have in some form

of not necessarily autonomy, but federalism. If there are compromises, if as it seems this new government remains inclusive,

then I think the Kurds will be more than willing to stay and will

not seek independence, particularly given the risks of seeking independence and the problems with the Turks.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Senator. Having spent many hours and

days with Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, I think I can summarize their key concerns as: First, political instability—they do

not know what this future government will hold—and second, security, obviously terrorist attacks in their region and Irbil and

Sulaimaniya and so forth. So until they find out what the political

situation will be, they are committed and have been on the record

to be committed to a federal structure so long as the autonomy that

they have developed over the last 10 years remains. That is a red

line for both Barzani and Talabani. So they are committed to this

stage.

The other point I should make is we made great efforts to include the Kurds in the central governmental structures, in the security institutions and in the political structures. You see obviously

Barham Salih is the deputy interim prime minister. The secretary

general of the ministry of defense is a Kurd. One of the four-star

generals is a Kurd. There are Kurds in the Iraqi army, in the security forces.

They feel that they have a place within that central government.

I think they will also have a place, given their turnout in the elections, a place in the new, newly elected government as well.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Newbold.

86

General NEWBOLD. Sir, I think the Kurds have set the minimum

conditions, politically, economically, and culturally, that they expect to be met. On the economic side, other than the political—on

the economic side, they want access to oil; and on the cultural side

they want to protect what elements there are of Kurdish culture.

As long as those are met, I think you will hear proclamations and

politics about independence, but I think they will be content to be

part of a greater Iraq. If any of those three or all of those three

are endangered, I think they will probably seek alternatives.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Both Dr. Cordesman and General Newbold mentioned in your

testimony on more than one occasion the future of Iraq being very

significantly attached to regional security, the regional dynamic,

which I happen to agree with and I have spoken on that point over

the last few years. Would you each develop that regional security,

regional strategy dynamic, with some context? What are you referring to when you talk about a regional strategy? Dr. Cordesman,

we will begin with you.

Dr. CORDESMAN. First, Senator, as I said earlier, we need to have

a strategy that will reassure moderates, people in the Arab world

who want a peace settlement, that we are aggressively out seeking

to create an Arab-Israeli peace settlement and a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. It is not necessary that we compromise or give up on Israel’s security. It is absolutely necessary

we be constantly visible and pushing for the kind of conditions

which were advanced by President Clinton and again at Taba.

Second, we need to reassure people in the region that, regardless

of what happens in Iraq, we will stay in the region, maintain a security presence, and that they can count on us being there to support them.

Third, we need to get away from this constant emphasis on general rhetoric about democracy and have Embassy teams and practical policies that encourage reform on an evolutionary basis, working with governments when we can, and working with reformers in

the countries, not working with people from the outside, who in

general have no impact or influence.

Senator HAGEL. General Newbold.

General NEWBOLD. Sir, I think we have to understand not only

our goals and have them be crafted realistically, but we have to understand what the people in the region consider their fundamental

goals and objectives involving security, economic interests. Again,

we view these overwhelmingly in American perspective through our

eyes. The Iranians’ role in this, the Gulf States, and the internal

frictions they have among themselves, their forms of governance,

and the interrelationship of all the Arab states just in their future

is critically important that we understand, and I would submit that

we do not very well.

We need to match our goals and objectives to theirs more closely

and to appreciate what they consider the fundamental requirement. Most importantly is, as Tony Cordesman has pointed out,

our treatment of the Palestinian-Israeli issue is perceived to be a

factor which undermines our credibility in all other issues. Unless

we are perceived as more evenhanded, I think we will have trouble

87

throughout the region convincing people that our goals are objective.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Dodd.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank

you for holding this hearing. The timing was tremendously appropriate, to come immediately after the events on Sunday, and it is

tremendously worthwhile to have such competent witnesses before

us.

Mr. Cordesman, let me tell you, your statement here today is—

I hesitate to speak as glowingly about it for fear that others may

not pay as much attention to it. But I want to tell you, this is about

as clear and thoughtful a set of recommendations as I have seen

and I commend you for them.

Let me ask you, just without getting too open-ended, but obviously I would like to hear how you read the elections. What should

we take from this? If you are being asked to give a brief analysis

of what happened on Sunday and what should we as Americans

read from that and how do we then take that decision and try and

move it forward a bit? I wonder if you might comment on the elections themselves.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, first, Senator, one of the problems we

have is we do not know how many people turned out. We do not

know who they voted for and we do not know what the people they

voted for are going to decide. But whatever happened, it is quite

clear that very large numbers of Kurds went out and voted, not

simply for a national election, but for a Kurdish assembly and for

local elections. A lot of the tensions and problems that people

feared did not take place, particularly given the history of Kurdish

rivalry.

Sunni parties went out and voted in large numbers. We probably

will never be able to know how many really voted because one

problem is the registration lists are the Oil for Food list. They are

not people who went out to register to vote and only about 60 percent of the polling places that were required could actually be put

into the field and many did not open.

But all that said, it is quite clear that the Sunnis not only went

out and voted, they voted for different parties, they did not vote

along some clear theological line, and the party that was most religious, it is the quietest party that is not seeking any kind of theocracy. It is seeking a government which again is based on coalitions.

In those areas where Sunnis could vote, the vote was very, very

mixed. But there are indications that in places like Mosul when

people saw it was safe to go out to vote in Sunni areas they did

begin to vote, not in the numbers required.

The other thing to put this in context is we keep talking about

the Sunnis, but they are at most 20 percent of the population. More

recent estimates put them into the 12- to 15-percent category. The

areas where people could not vote, like Al-Anbar Province or

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Nineveh or elsewhere, probably had something on the order of 7

percent of the population of the country.

So the election I think, given the conditions, is a much better

tribute or a much better sign of hope than can be indicated simply

by how many people out of the registration list went to the polls.

Senator DODD. Dr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Senator. All of the Iraqis, whether they

be Sunni, Shia, or Kurd, also voted for local provincial elections as

well as the national assembly. The Kurds, as Dr. Cordesman pointed out, had the additional vote for the Kurdish assembly.

He is right that the Sunnis make up around 20 percent of the

population, but they do make up about 99 percent of the insurgency. The important point about this is that, even though there

was much talk about boycott by the Iraqi Islamic Party, a more

moderate Sunni party, and the Moslem Scholars Association, the

leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party actually said before the elections

that he would not prevent his candidates, who were still on the

slate and still on the ballot, from taking their seats if they won.

So there might still be some Sunni representation on the assembly.

The other point which is important is as far as bringing more

moderate Sunnis into the political process, I think it is important

that they be made part of the constitutional drafting process, the

Sunni jurists and clerics, and also that the new cabinet has some

Sunni leaders appointed as ministers. Both Shia leaders have said

that they will commit to this. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and Jafri have

said this. So there is the potential to bring the Sunnis into the political process and I think there are some positive signs.

Senator DODD. General, I want you to comment as well, but I

want to ask you something as well. When I came in you were talking about the withdrawal or the exit strategy. I do not have your

exact words here, but you said we could leave when the insurgents

allow us to leave. What occurred to me, just for the sake of discussion, is there a realistic assessment here that there are certainly

significant parts of the insurgency or elements of the insurgency

that would like us to stay for their own broader political purposes,

that having the United States in Iraq on a daily basis, the informational benefit to them throughout the Arab world and elsewhere,

engaged in sort of a quagmire, may serve their longer term and

deeper interests than having us leave Iraq?

Is that a fair criticism of the assumption that we can go when

they allow us to go?

General NEWBOLD. Yes, sir. Just on the election very quickly, I

thought it was a wonderful, courageous display by ordinary Iraqis

and it ought to give us hope and it gave them tremendous hope.

There is the potential for it to have a contagious effect throughout

the region. We should not overplay that, but we ought to try to

take advantage of it.

The momentum will slip quickly unless we are effective at pushing the things that made it possible. The Sunnis will be the key.

They are a minority that believes they have majority rights and an

almost cultural disposition to rule. If the new government provides

them opportunities and gives comfort to quell their fears, then I

think they’ll participate and I think we have some opportunities

there.

89

As far as the exit strategy, my comment of course was to shift

the responsibility to the insurgents so that we shift the blame if

we stay there longer than we would desire, than they would desire.

But I do believe there is a hard-core element, Islamists, radical

Islamists most particularly, who take some comfort by our presence

in Iraq to allow them to increase their vitriolic statements throughout the world and to attack us in the place where we are vulnerable.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for holding this important hearing

just two days following elections in Iraq. I would also like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses who are here today to share their thoughts on U.S. policy

toward that country and the greater Middle East. There is no more important issue

facing us than the future of that region, and I look forward to hearing the expert

testimony of all our witnesses, and to engaging in a productive dialogue. Dr.

Cordesman, I would especially like to thank you for the various items you have submitted for the record. You make some very important recommendations that I believe the Bush Administration would do well to heed.

Obviously, it will be some days yet until we know the results of the Iraqi elections. But I think it is important to say that regardless of the many challenges we

face and any disagreements we may have over the direction of U.S. foreign policy,

the holding of elections in Iraq was a momentous event for the Iraqi people. But

we shouldn’t take that to mean something it doesn’t.

The elections are not the end of our task in that country—they are a beginning.

First of all, we will not always have troops there. If the new Iraqi government requests that the U.S. withdraw its troops, we should abide by its request. And if it

doesn’t make this request, we should still do everything in our power to ensure that

we adequately prepare Iraqis for handling the defense and stability of their country

as quickly as possible.

That means we will have to start being honest about the numbers of Iraqis currently up to the task of defending and stabilizing their country. Common sense dictates that if the number of those types of forces were even close to the figure that

Secretary of State Rice quoted for trained forces generally in that country—120,000,

including 50,000 police—then U.S. troops would likely be able to start withdrawing

as we speak. That is obviously not the case.

Simply put, when it comes to the training of Iraqi forces, we have a long way to

go. And we are in desperate need of an effective plan to get there.

But paying lip service to withdrawal and having a realistic plan to do so are not

one and the same. We can’t approach withdrawal from Iraq in the same haphazard

and shortsighted way that we approached the invasion of that country. We have to

have a plan or we could turn a difficult situation into something much worse. I

couldn’t agree more with Dr. Cordesman on this point—that regardless of whether

we withdraw gradually over the next couple of years or if the Iraqi government asks

us to leave in the coming weeks—we must not abandon the people of that country.

What does that mean? It means that there is more to nation building—and I

think it is safe to call it that—than the use of military might. Regardless of when

we exit, we should be generous with offers of aid and assistance to the new Iraqi

government—even if that government sometimes takes stands on issues with which

we disagree. We’ve refused to learn this lesson with respect to democratically elected governments in our hemisphere, such as Venezuela, and I hope that we don’t

make the same mistake with respect to Iraq.

What is needed more than anything else when it comes to nation building is the

partnership of the people in the nation you are trying to build. To loosely borrow

a well-known phrase, the new Iraq needs to be a country built by Iraqis and for

Iraqis. That means using U.S. aid increasingly to put Iraqis to work in the building

of their country. According to statistics, at least 2 million Iraqis are currently unemployed. American aid could be used to put them to work in rebuilding their country’s

infrastructure. This is the right thing to do. But more importantly, it would give

Iraqis a greater stake in the success of a democratic Iraq, which is in our mutual

interests.

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Moreover, U.S. aid should be focused on short term projects, not long-term lofty

ideas. Because the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government will be based in large

part on whether it is able to provide the basic services that every citizen expects

of their government.

However, the subject of this hearing rightly extends beyond U.S. policy in Iraq

and seeks to address the future of our policy throughout the greater Middle East.

Iraq is not the only place where elections were recently held. In the Palestinian territories too, there is a new democratically-elected government in power led by

Mahmoud Abbas. That government has not only paid lip service to the need to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—it has also taken some steps toward that

end. The Israeli government has responded in a positive way to these steps. But

we’re at a delicate juncture here. A door is open, and we do not know how long it

will remain so.

I commend Secretary Rice for using the beginning days of her service as Secretary

of State to travel to Israel and the Palestinian territories and meet with both sides.

I hope that her trip will mark the beginning of a high-level and personal involvement by the Bush administration to advance the cause of peace between Israelis

and Palestinians.

Another issue that cannot be ignored is that of Iran. It is obviously in our best

interest, as well as in the interest of regional Middle East security, to prevent Iran

from acquiring nuclear weapons. To that end, the U.S. must do two things.

First, I believe we must work more closely with the Euro-3—Britain, France, and

Germany—to put together a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Iran’s nuclear

program that includes both credible carrots and credible sticks. And second, we

must reassure our allies in the region that our twin commitments to development

and security—especially in the event that Iran achieves nuclear capability—extend

beyond Iraq. Our allies will be more confident in the U.S. commitment to that region knowing that U.S. interest will not fade as we eventually disengage from Iraq.

In short, we have our work cut out for us. But the future could hold great potential if we get our act together with respect to our policy in the Middle East. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Coleman.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on the questions about the election. I had a

chance to be in Iraq about 3 weeks ago. We were in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then went to Brussels and met with the Secretary

General of NATO, met with the new President of the European

Union, President Barroso. Two observations and then a question.

In Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai talked about—these are his

words—‘‘the paradigm-shifting impact of the election.’’ He talked

about the impact that had on the Taliban, that really it gutted any

strength that they had by the fact that people showed up. He

anecdotally told the story of one polling place in a tribal area

where mortar shells were lobbed in. The women refused to leave

the line. They were going to vote. The men scattered but came

back. So he talked about the paradigm-shifting impact of the election.

On the last comment and then the question. I was struck in visiting with the NATO ambassadors with the level of pessimism

amongst almost every one of them about what was going to happen

on Sunday in Iraq. It was almost as if they could not conceive that,

in fact, an election, a valid election, would take place. It just was

not going to happen. It did.

So my question is kind of looking to the future. What do you see?

You have done a good job, Dr. Cordesman, of kind of explaining

what happened. Look a little bit to the future. Is there this potenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tial for this election to be a paradigm-shifting event? Was it just

because of great security that the insurgents were not able to come

forth and do all that they did? If the insurgents, as Mr. Khalil

talked about, are 90 percent Baathists, it is internal then, they are

not external folks, what does the statement that the Iraqis made

about democracy, about voting, what does that do to the insurgency?

Dr. CORDESMAN. We need to be very careful, Senator, because

the latest estimate I have seen is there were over 100 attempted

or actual incidents in the Baghdad area and somewhere between

260 and 300 attempted incidents in the area outside Baghdad. It

was not as if they were passive. So the insurgents are not going

to go away quickly. As General Newbold and Mr. Khalil have pointed out, they are a serious issue and a lot of them are committed.

But they certainly do remain a relative minority, both in terms

of their religion and ethnicity, and that has to be kept in perspective. Now, where is this going to go? I do not think you can say

that you have seen any turning point here until you see what the

results of the election are. I do not mean the vote. If the Iraqi parties come together, if as has been suggested by my colleagues they

are inclusive to the Sunnis in the ministers and in terms of the

convention for the constitution, if they show they can cooperate, retaining the good ministers—and this is important, continuity—but

sharing power among each other, then this step forward in governance, combined with the election, will over time, I think, become

a turning point.

But we should not expect that to occur simply because there is

a vote. People have to show they can govern. They have to show

they can make the right political decisions. They have to show they

can be inclusive. If they meet these tests, that is a turning out.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Senator.

I traveled to Ramadi and had a very interesting meeting with

the governor of Al-Anbar Province, the tribal leaders, and also

around a dozen or 15 insurgents, basically ex-military personnel.

These are rational actors, and I am talking about the exBaathists—they are still Baathists—the Saddam loyalists, the exmilitary personnel and the intelligence folk. They will come to the

negotiating table.

It is the extremists, the Islamic extremists, the foreign jihadists,

which you cannot negotiate with. Obviously, with Zarqawi saying

democracy is wicked, that is not a negotiating point. So if you look

at Muqtada Sadr as a template, there is a potential to bring these

guys into the political tent. He laid down his arms, or the Mahdi

army’s arms, and thought about coming into the political process

rather than using force, and there you see reconstruction occurring

in Sadr City.

I think this can occur in the Sunni Triangle with some of these

more moderate Sunni resisters, the ex-Saddam security personnel.

Senator COLEMAN. General Newbold.

General NEWBOLD. I agree with the comments of my colleagues.

I think it has the potential to be a seminal event. We need to

quickly reinforce what was positive about it and give concrete evidence of what the Iraqis were looking for. We need to take some

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combination of the Sunnis—just a quick reminder: The Sunni areas

in the west of Iraq are not naturally wealthy areas. There are little

resources, little hope out there, independent of the central government who will sustain them. The central government needs to indicate that it will sustain them politically, economically, and culturally.

Senator COLEMAN. I have a little time. Could you follow up? Can

you give your assessment of the impact and the opportunities on

the international community? I have talked about the pessimism I

saw before the election amongst our allies. Talk a little bit about

the impact of the election on our allies and how do we seize—if

there are opportunities there, how can we seize them?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, very briefly, Senator, it is already clear

that there is much more positive Arab press and media coverage

as a result of the output of the election. The coverage was more

balanced in some ways than I expected, which is not to say that

it was perfectly objective. A lot of people who had remarkably pessimistic statements up to the point where the election was held

have begun to either back off or be more accepting.

But again, I think General Newbold made the point. If we see

a pattern of violence develop over the next week, if we see the coalitions do not work together, if we see any split from a major faction, then this temporary boost could be just that. So is it positive

so far? Yes. Is it going to stay positive? Everything depends on

what the actions are.

Senator COLEMAN. General Newbold, I think we have got a couple of seconds left. Is there anything you want to add to that?

General NEWBOLD. Yes, sir. I am not surprised by the comments

you heard at the NATO ministerial level and I think it was very

grudging accord that al-Jazeerah and the other Middle Eastern

outlets gave to the elections. I think that the bias is unfortunate;

not helpful.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

The chair wishes to announce that a full statement on the hearing from Senator Dodd will be made a part of the record. Likewise

a full statement by Senator Voinovich, who had to leave to be involved in another hearing, should be a part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have the opportunity to be here with my

colleagues on this Committee to continue discussion on U.S. policy toward Iraq and

the greater Middle East. This conversation is appropriate on the heels of Sunday’s

historic elections, in which an estimated eight million Iraqis cast ballots to choose

members of a national assembly, who will have the opportunity to write a new chapter in the history of a free and democratic Iraq.

The significance of the elections the world witnessed just two days ago should not

be understated. This event marks a major step in efforts to move toward a new era

of peace, stability and democracy in Iraq, and the Iraqi people are to be commended

for their commitment to the principles of democracy and their perseverance when

faced with very real threats of violence from those who do not wish to see freedom

prevail in Iraq.

We must also recognize the role played by dedicated American men and women

in uniform, who, working with coalition partners and Iraqi security forces, worked

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to provide a secure and stable environment so that the elections could in fact take

place. Their service was not without cost or personal sacrifice.

More than 1,400 American service members have lost their lives while serving in

Iraq. Moreover, it is reported that in addition to an estimated 35 Iraqis who were

tragically killed by suicide bombers who attacked polling stations on Sunday, a 22-

year-old Army medic from Cincinnati, Ohio, Private First Class James H. Miller IV,

lost his life while providing security for the elections. Last week, four United States

Marines from the State of Ohio were killed when a helicopter crashed near Iraq’s

border with Jordan. These men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice not

only in order to promote a free, democratic and prosperous future for the people of

Iraq and the greater Middle East, but also to protect the national security interests

of the United States.

As our witnesses will discuss, it is essential that the U.S. policy makers constantly re-examine strategies to bring lasting peace to Iraq. We owe it to the Iraqi

people and to our men and women in uniform to ensure that we move forward with

a solid plan, doing all that we can to empower Iraqis so that they are able to provide

for their own security and stability as soon as possible. This is not an easy task,

which makes our discussion this morning even more important.

I would like to join the Chairman and Ranking Member in welcoming our distinguished witnesses this morning: Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS); Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, USMC

(Ret.) of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and GlobeSecNine; and Mr. Peter

Khalil, who is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Thank you. I look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and

Senator Biden for holding this hearing. Like many Americans and

Iraqis and people around the world, I was deeply moved by the

courage of the Iraqi men and women who went to the polls to participate in Sunday’s election and to make their voices heard in determining the future of their country. Iraqi’s election was unquestionably an inspiring event.

I do have, of course, a series of very serious continuing concerns

that I have outlined briefly in an opening statement that I would

ask to be put in the record if I could.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the record in full.

Senator FEINGOLD. Given the limited time, Dr. Cordesman, I

would like to go on to a point you mentioned in your testimony.

You underscore the need for clear statements from the President

and the Secretary of State that help refute the sort of key conspiracy theories that poison our relations and undercut the legitimacy of the Iraqi government.

Among the statements you call for is one clearly stating that we

will not exploit Iraqi oil wealth in any way and that we will shift

our aid funds to Iraq control, insisting only on sound accountability

measures. As I consider these recommendations, my thoughts turn

to the report that the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction issued on Sunday. This is an office that I fought hard to

make sure would exist and now this report indicates that the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to impose adequate controls on

nearly $9 billion that was distributed to various Iraqi ministries

during the period prior to the transfer of sovereignty late last June.

I find this extraordinarily disturbing. The $8.8 billion in question

was Iraqi money, proceeds from oil sales and repatriated funds,

that the United States as the occupying authority was responsible

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for administering. But today we simply cannot account for what

happened to these funds. This kind of mismanagement is a gift to

those forces who want the world, and particularly the Muslim

world, to mistakenly believe that the United States is a corrupt

and imperialistic power.

In my view, this is not just an oversight failure. It is a policy failure, with the potential to help the very forces that wish to do us

harm. How will Iraqis and others in the region understand this

failure? In light of the inability of the CPA to account for what happened to this Iraqi money, how likely is it that the nascent Iraqi

government could provide meaningful accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars if they were given the kind of control over the reconstruction budget that you actually have advocated?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, the argument always in the field is we

are too busy today doing things to account for all of these expenditures. The problem, as you pointed out, is tomorrow always comes

and you are then judged by how well you accounted for them.

I think that these figures are at least somewhat excusable, simply because of the pressures, the uncertainties, the reprogramming.

But it should not have been that difficult to maintain a modern accounting system. This is not the kind of cash flow problem where

you have to get down to individual dollars and cents. These are

massive expenditures.

What I find a lot more disturbing is when I read the reporting

that comes out weekly as to what we are doing with the money

now. We have reporting on electricity which is the amount of power

generated, not the amount of power distributed. Often the reporting on the electricity generated is the theoretical capacity, not the

amount actually delivered. We have reporting on the oil sector,

which is a critical earning area, the oil sector indicates we not only

are not coming close to meeting our goal, we do not have significant

stocks to deal in the area with the winter.

More than that, I look at the latest figures on expenditure on the

oil program and you allocated $3.6 billion to help renovate the oil

sector in this $18.4 billion tranche and they spent all of—let us see.

Let me correct that. They spent all of $123 million of that money

to date. You look down the list, there is 15 percent of the money

disbursed on electricity, which does not mean completions. We

spent 15 percent on trying to improve governance. We spent something like 5 percent of the money that was allocated on health care

and 7 percent of the money on water. For those of us who do believe in the private sector, we spent about 9 percent on private sector development.

When I look down the list of what people claim is done, it is just

one list after another of a project started. Nobody says whether the

project survived. Nobody says whether the project can ever be used.

We have massive projects like water plants north of Basra that

cannot feed the system, so even if they are not sabotaged it does

not matter.

What bothers me is not that there is an accounting problem.

What bothers me is this incredibly powerful tool is not being used

to support Iraq, is not being used to fight insurgency, is not being

used to support the government. I think any soldier or commander

in the field will tell you that dollars are as important as bullets,

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and we are getting plenty of bullets and we are not spending the

dollars.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, doctor. You note that United

States success in Iraq is heavily dependent on two things, the

emergence of a government that Iraqis see as legitimate and which

can effectively govern and the ability to train Iraqi military and security forces that can largely replace United States forces.

It seems to me that that will become increasingly difficult for

Iraqis seeking to broaden their political power base. It is going to

be hard for them to avoid publicly rejecting the U.S. presence in

the country and publicly rejecting any kind of collaboration with

the United States. So in a way their political imperatives would

lead them in this direction even if these leaders recognize that

Iraqi’s security forces are ill-prepared to provide security without

international assistance.

So I am concerned that one of your conditions might, of course,

clash with the other, that Iraqis seeking political legitimacy may

be unable to support a United States presence for long enough to

train Iraqi forces. I would like your thoughts on that.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, there were several parties that went

into this election initially talking about having a fairly rapid U.S.

exit. Both of them changed their positions before the elections were

held. We do not have a major party out there that participated in

the election that is calling for any kind of rapid or precipitous U.S.

withdrawal.

What they are calling for is creating Iraqi forces as soon as possible which can replace us, which I think is exactly what we want.

So certainly there will be plenty of people in the insurgency who

do not like us there, but at least as yet none of the major lists that

participated in the election do not see the need to keep us until

their own forces are ready.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD

I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing

today, and I thank all of our witnesses for taking the time to be here to help the

Committee think through the very serious challenges and the high stakes that confront our policy in Iraq and the broader Middle Eastern region today.

Like many Americans, Iraqis, and people around the world, I was deeply moved

by the courage of the Iraqi men and women who went to the polls to participate

in Sunday’s elections and to make their voices heard in determining the future of

their country. Iraq’s election was, unquestionably, an inspiring event.

But while I commend the Iraqis, and the brave servicemen and women who

helped to make the conditions for elections possible, common sense also tells me

that Iraqi elections are not a silver bullet for resolving ongoing instability in Iraq,

and celebrating these elections is no substitute for articulating and implementing

a clear, efficient plan for handing off responsibility for Iraq’s security to the Iraqis

themselves and bringing American troops home.

Our troops on the ground have been performing courageously—sometimes even in

the inexcusable absence of adequate equipment, support, and mission-appropriate

training. They deserve better policy. American taxpayers have been asked to contribute hundreds of billions of dollars to this effort—and the Administration has

failed to budget responsibly for these costs. The next generation of Americans is

going to get stuck with the bill, and they deserve better policy. All Americans have

a real, urgent stake in prevailing in the fight against terrorism, in denying terrorists new recruits and shoring up a global coalition to hunt down and eliminate terrorist networks. But Iraq has become the new premier training ground for terrorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ists, and our international standing has been dramatically weakened by our policies

there. America’s national security deserves better policy.

We need a strategic plan, not lofty rhetoric. We need a clearly defined and realistic mission, not a sweeping set of abstract commitments. And we need a concrete

timetable for achieving clear goals, not vague policies that wander from objective to

objective with no end in sight. So I look forward to this hearing, and hope that soon

we will hear from the Administration about how, precisely, they intend to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Chafee.

STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM

RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. Senator Biden mentioned Dr. Cordesman’s

November paper and I see that in that paper you talk about advocating a regional strategy, and I know Senator Hagel touched on

that while I was gone. In particular you talked about being more

flexible with Iran. Maybe you could add to that and illuminate on

how we can be more flexible with Iran?

Dr. CORDESMAN. It is odd, Senator, that ‘‘containment’’ was a

word that became so unpopular and which in retrospect in the case

of Iraq does not necessarily look all that bad. In the case of Iran,

I think the challenges are much worse than they were in the case

of Iraq. We are not talking about a simple dictator, nor are we talking about a broken military force. We are talking about a more cohesive country which has its own political turmoil.

I think the key here is in many ways containment. It is to work

with the Europeans. It is to put pressure on, but work with, the

International Atomic Energy Agency to see if we can block proliferation. I cannot make you any promises, but I do not believe

that any effort to rush into military threats or military options is

the way that we can deal with the problem of proliferation in Iran.

Similarly, I am afraid that Iran is moving toward a less democratic, more conservative, more isolationist, traditionalist political

structure, and the coming presidential elections will cement the

problems that occurred in the Majlis, when you essentially would

not let the more moderate candidates even run, much less be elected. But it is still possible to have dialogue with Iranians. It is still

possible to talk to people. It is possible to make it clear that our

objectives are not ones which challenge Iran’s basic national interests. These are ways we can, at least, hope that we can move toward a more open dialog and a better situation in the future.

But I think it is absolutely clear that we cannot permit transfers

of technology for proliferation if we can block them. We cannot

allow Iran to operate in other countries in asymmetric or terrorist

operations if we can put pressure on them to halt it. We must do

all we can to block the transfer of arms.

The one caution I would give is that American sanctions against

Iran have been almost totally ineffective and as Iran has learned

how to make better oil deals we are watching those sanctions essentially become almost purposeless. We need to take a very hard

look at that aspect of our policy and see if there is not some way

to work with countries rather than put out sanctions which no

longer impede them.

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Senator CHAFEE. What would be a good venue for dialogue? How

would we start that?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Unfortunately, Senator, I think a lot of that—

I have been in many second track dialogues with Iranians and it

was always very interesting and I learned a great deal. The end

reaction every time, however, is we have a long list of things we

would like you to do, but if you did them our internal politics prevent us from actually moving forward. Those dialogues over time

have shown that the people who advocate dialogue in Iran are progressively more cautious and more frightened of the consequences

of being in them.

We still have to try. We have to meet with them in second track

meetings wherever we can. But I think one of the great tools we

have here is to work with the Europeans, who have been allies

here and cooperated with us in trying to block proliferation. It is

to make use of countries which can talk to Iran and do not have

the same history and communicate wherever we can a positive

message, that if Iran will back away from the policies that divide

us, none of which really serve its ultimate interests, we are ready

to have an official dialogue, to deal with Iran in economic terms,

to have the kind of relations we should have.

Senator CHAFEE. Who of the Europeans have the best relations

with the Iranians, the ruling government that exists in Iran now,

which European or a number of them?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think often we are talking about some of the

smaller countries, like Switzerland, who have more continuity, talk

to the people in Iran. Germany certainly has worked hard at this

issue. Britain has tried. Unfortunately, Britain has found, as have

others, that when you go beyond dialogue to actually set policies

you often provoke reactions among the Iranians which make it difficult.

But one of the problems we have is these countries, Senator, are

virtually all talking to the Khatemi faction. They are talking to the

people who will not be there when this President leaves office. We

do not even know if the more pragmatic traditionalists, like the

Rafsanjani faction, will be represented in large numbers. If they

are, then the Europeans will be able to talk to them. But it does

seem to vary by country and on a given day the country that seems

to favor Iran the most has the best relations. It is a very troubled,

difficult situation.

Senator CHAFEE. Would any of the other two guests like to add

anything?

General NEWBOLD. Just very quickly, Senator. I think Iran is a

schizophrenic society and has to be dealt with to some degree that

way. That is, it reminds me of when I was Director of Operations,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, our path toward Iraq was becoming obvious.

I suggested that we look at Iraq and those things that would undermine Saddam Hussein and those things that would reinforce his

power. A clear analysis there, a simple analysis, would show that

many of the things we were doing, in fact, reinforced the power of

Saddam Hussein.

In a like way with Iran, if we are bellicose, if we are too threatening, we reinforce the radicals and we undermine the people that

might be predisposed to align with us.

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Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CALIFORNIA

Senator BOXER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel. You have just been so interesting, I

think, for all of us. I really appreciate your being here and extending your time.

Secretary of State Rice said after the election, she said the election signals a new day for Iraq. I agree with that, but I think it

also should signal a new day for America and our policy toward

Iraq. Of course, for me that is what I am grappling with, how do

we take this good news and how do we put a light at the end of

the exit tunnel. And I know ‘‘exit’’ has suddenly become a somehow

charged word. I am not wedded to the word, but an end, an end

of so much money, an end of so many troops, etcetera, an end of

being a target to the insurgents, all of that.

Friday I visited with the families of marines stationed at Camp

Pendleton and this particular marine—First Marine Expeditionary

Force has taken a huge hit. I want to report that their families are

just extraordinary and I think we all know that. General, you know

this. They are just extraordinary. They are willing to make even

more sacrifices. If they are asked to by their Commander in Chief,

they will absolutely do it.

So I think it is up to us to show our appreciation to them, not

only by doing what I am very excited to see is going to happen, I

think, in the State of the Union, a great increase in some of the

benefits, which members of both parties want to see happen along

with the President, but also I do think we need a light. We need

to light a candle here so we have some goal.

General, you actually used the word ‘‘goal,’’ and I think in many

ways for me you did light a candle to our exit, although you said

we should set a goal of being completely out of Iraq in 2 years. Is

that correct? That is what you said? Yes.

I assume you believe that should be done gradually, is that correct?

General NEWBOLD. I am sorry, ma’am?

Senator BOXER. I assume you believe that should be done gradually. Okay, so it seems to me if we were just to, just for the sake

of discussion, adopt that goal, we then have to take your next

statement, which is disheartening—that one was heartening—and

that was that you said that you don’t see an end in sight of this

insurgency. Those were your words.

So if we have this strategy, this goal to be out in 2 years, doing

it gradually, but yet there is no end in sight to this insurgency,

clearly the training of Iraqi forces, which I have to say—Senator

Biden has just been on this for so long, and Senator Lugar as well,

in hearing after hearing after hearing. It looks like this goal that

you set can only be met if we can transfer authority to the Iraqis

themselves, because there is, quote, ‘‘no end in sight of this insurgency.’’

99

So I guess it is frustrating for us because, first, we cannot seem

to find out exactly how many troops are trained, and there are reasons for that. But Senator Biden asked Secretary Rice a number

of questions. I am not going to go over the give and take, but at

the end of the day Senator Biden said—and Joe, if I misstate this

please tell me—that you felt if they were properly trained that they

could replace our people one on one, if they were properly trained.

To which she replied: I really do not think so; I do not think they

can do all of that which American forces do.

Then she said: But in some ways, she said, they will be better

because—and I am liberally quoting her now; she said—they really

know the neighborhood. They know better than our people who are

these insurgents.

So with that, I want to ask a question. If Secretary Rice—first,

I want to know if you agree that we cannot make this one to one

transfer, because if we could that would begin a drawdown and it

could begin to gradually bring our forces home in direct relationship to the training of their forces. So I want to ask you about that.

But I also, Dr. Cordesman, wanted to ask you: If Secretary Rice

is correct and the Iraqis know the neighborhood better, why is it

that we do not believe them when they are telling us, the Iraqi intelligence, that they may have 30,000 fighters and up to 200,000

supporters? You alluded to it, but you did not seem to give it too

much credence.

So those are those two questions I have.

General NEWBOLD. Senator, on the direct swap one for one, I do

not believe that we can swap the units and the individuals one for

one, but I am also not sure we need to. Again, my recommendation

is that we regionalize our approach and we use the newly trained

Iraqi forces, who are clearly not up to United States standards

right now, but use them in the more benign areas, freeing up some

of our forces—coalition forces, United States forces—to move to the

more active and violent ones, and over time as the Iraqi forces become better trained and become stronger quantitatively, then they

can replace us in those areas.

So a one for one swap is not required in order to achieve what

we want to to withdraw our forces.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, part of the problem I have with all of

these numbers, as I said earlier, is intelligence, if it is not based

on facts, is intelligence based on guesswork. We do not have a way

of measuring the number of insurgents in any meaningful way. If

you want to make a conservative guess, you push the number

down. If you want to make a pessimistic guess, you push it up.

I think that the Iraqi Minister of Defense and other Iraqi officials rounded the numbers off because they first wanted to make

the point that we are dealing with considerable sympathy for the

insurgency. That is where the 200,000 came from. Where the

30,000 came from and whether it is better than 14,000 gets back

to whether you define core insurgents, people who are members of

organized cells, fighters, part-time sympathizers.

Now, we broke those out in Vietnam. What we have today in

Iraq is virtually meaningless reports coming out by way of public

data, and to the extent I understand it, one reason they are meaningless is we have not standardized the way we break out the asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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sessment of insurgents in given areas, and our numbers are bad

even when we pull together the intelligence estimates. But I have

not seen the classified data, I cannot assure you of that.

Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, I have

had meetings with the military, our military, trying to find out the

size of this. It is frustrating since our coming home depends on the

size of this insurgency.

I just wondered if I could simply ask one quick question and that

would be the end of me.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator BOXER. That is, what do you think was the role of the

Grand Ayatollah Sistani in the turnout?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think it was extremely positive. He has

pushed for elections. He has pushed hard. But he has pushed for

coalitions. He has been a quietist. He has not pushed for any kind

of theocratic rule. It is clear that he sees a Shiite Iraq as an Iraq

that has to have Sunnis and Kurds in it, rather than something

that is a Shiite enclave. So I think his role was consistently positive.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Senator Martinez.

STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM

FLORIDA

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and

thank you for holding this hearing. I think it is extremely timely.

I too share in the delight of seeing these pictures on television of

people voting, standing in line, daring the insurgents and daring

the negative forces who do not believe in democracy. So I am, for

one, extremely pleased with where we are today and I am delighted

we have a chance to hear from these gentlemen, and thank you all

for coming.

Dr. Cordesman, I wanted to ask if you might lay out for me one

of the things I heard in following up on the euphoric day of the

election about not losing the momentum. I know we have talked in

several ways about that issue, but I would like to know from each

of you if you could detail out a perhaps one, two, three approach

of how to maintain the momentum, but then again how to build on

that momentum to achieve the goal that we seek, which is obviously to empower an Iraqi Government to handle their own affairs

and yet allow us to have a timely withdrawal.

Dr. CORDESMAN. The key to the momentum, Senator, I think is

ultimately Iraqi. We need to encourage them—and here my colleagues have made the same points—to be inclusive, to bring in the

Sunnis, to try to defuse the insurgency by showing those Sunnis

who will be part of the country that they have a future in spite of

the economic and other problems they face.

We need to encourage the kind of settlement with the Kurds, the

type of federalism that will stabilize the structure. We need to

work with the new ministries and new parties and make it clear

we will support them and that we accept their sovereignty. One of

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consuls, but we are working with these new elected officials as

truly sovereign officials.

I have already suggested one key tool would be to move toward

transferring control of the aid funds and the aid projects to them.

I think that would give a lot of momentum. Another would be to

announce a plan for training and equipping Iraqi forces that

showed Iraqis that we will indeed give them the quality, the capability, to take over as many of the missions as possible, as soon as

possible.

I think, as I mentioned earlier, it would be equally valuable if

we understood that a Presidential or a Secretary of State policy

statement outlining our goals for Iraq and for this government,

that dealt with each of the major conspiracy theories, which was

actually set forward openly by the President—and General Newbold made a key point. It is incredible to me that American officials

cannot understand you do not communicate policy in press conferences. Nothing you say in a press conference is a policy statement.

If you have a policy toward Iraq, the President or the Secretary

of State—and those are the only two officials—have to announce it

openly, clearly, and in a specific speech. This to me is just one proof

of what General Newbold said, that our public diplomacy is often

as much an enemy as the insurgents.

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Senator. On how to maintain momentum, I agree with Dr. Cordesman. The political process has to be

inclusive of the Sunnis clearly, involve them in the drafting of the

constitution and get them involved in the new cabinet.

Second, economic reconstruction needs to be targeted in the

Sunni Triangle towns and cities. I think, in reference to what Senator Biden said earlier, smaller projects, Iraqi companies, and contractors being involved in this is absolutely critical.

Third, obviously a focus on training, counterinsurgency training,

for the Iraqi forces to ensure a realistic handover.

Just on the insurgency a quick point. They do not all see eye to

eye in the insurgency. When we spoke to the Fallujan tribal leaders, for example, they referred to the foreign Islamists as ‘‘the destroyers’’ and they are happy to get rid of them. But they could not

move against what they called the ‘‘sons of the tribe,’’ who were

Iraqi ex-military personnel. So there is some room for maneuver

here.

They have been coordinating their efforts because they have the

same short-term goals of derailing the political process, but in the

long term they certainly don’t have the same agenda, and you can

start to break up that insurgency by bringing some of the exSaddamists and ex-Baathists, the military personnel, into the political process.

Senator MARTINEZ. General.

General NEWBOLD. Senator, in order to ensure we do not lose the

momentum I would do four things that match my colleagues’ statements. First, we have to have a quick display, visible evidence that

there is an increased transfer of power and authority to Iraqis in

the political, economic, and military realms. It has to be that visiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:04 May 12, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 21064.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ble. It has to be articulated and displayed, so the Iraqis believe

that the situation is changing.

Number two, I have already spoken to the accommodation of the

Sunnis in which they are made more comfortable that they will be

taken care of politically and economically.

Number three, I agree very strongly with the Presidential statement. I think it needs to be done, not just for Iraq but for the

world.

Finally, at the end of the day the Iraqis need to believe not just

the elections, but the follow-on actions that constitute forming their

democracy, bring them hope for the future. That in and of itself,

that hope will sustain them until such time as they completely govern the country and we withdraw.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

One other area I wanted to follow up on, Dr. Cordesman, your

mention of transferring the management of the aid or the funds to

the Iraqis, which I can certainly understand would be an important

consideration. I notice your criticism of those funds that appear to

not have been properly accounted for. As someone who had a little

bit of experience in running a multi-billion dollar department of

government that often had a difficult time tracking funds that were

transferred to others to spend, I wonder if the transferring to the

Iraqis would not then also be accompanied by those kinds of problems in accountability.

I am not suggesting by that we should not do it. But you know,

we used to work an awful lot at HUD on what we called capacitybuilding and it seems like in order to be able to spend the dollars

you almost have to invest dollars so the folks know how to spend

them, and then the very complicated process of accounting for how

you spend them. So in other words, there is a whole bureaucracy

that has to be in place. There has to be, frankly, information technology, a lot of things have to happen in order for us to apply our

standard to how they account for the funds that we might transfer.

Would you delve into those? Maybe too much into the weeds, but

I really wonder how we would do that.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, very briefly, I do not believe that you

can transfer money to Iraq without seeing significant corruption.

This is a society which has inherited a kleptocracy and people are

desperate for money. But I think we need to be very careful about

what our goals here are. It is not to create a very large cadre of

Iraqi CPA’s, and here I mean accountants. It is to get the money

into Iraqi hands where, as my colleagues have said, it is going to

buy stability, it is going to help deal with the Sunnis, it is going

to compensate the Kurds, who, incidentally, have lost the money

they have through smuggling and Oil for Food and there is a potential stability problem there.

How do you measure success? It is not by accounting. It is by

projects out in the field. It is by things accomplished. It is by having U.S. people observe and see that the projects actually get implemented. It is by giving people the equivalent of things like the

CERP program so our commanders still retain the money that they

can give again, so dollars can be used instead of bullets.

If we lose 10 to 15 percent to corruption, so what? We are losing

more than that now simply to buy mercenaries to protect projects

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that do not work. I think this is a fundamentally different issue.

Our problem is not accounting; it is winning.

Senator MARTINEZ. I agree with you and I appreciate my time is

up, but I do want to point out that I agree with that approach. I

think we have to get the money out there. I was just hearing, on

the other hand, Ambassador Bremer being blamed at times for perhaps putting out too much money early on that has not been as

fully accounted as it should be. I do not think we can apply our accounting standards to what needs to be done on the field, and I appreciate your point of view on that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.

I will just comment without asking you to reply further. The answer you gave, Dr. Cordesman, that the Kurds have lost money

from the smuggling and the Oil for Food program, is an interesting

footnote for the current investigation of Oil for Food. I make that

point simply because, as we get into the weeds of that, our own policy, or lack of it, is likely to come to the fore.

Senator Nelson.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM

FLORIDA

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Speaking of Ambassador Bremer. I would like to ask you all

about my colleague from Florida. He countermanded a Floridian,

General Garner, who was put in charge of Iraq to begin with. General Garner wanted the Iraqi army to virtually stay intact. Bremer

came in and said dismantle it. I would like your comments on that.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, I think that in reality—and I overflew

quite a number of those concerns when I was in Iraq and I am sure

that my colleague has seen a lot more of them—it was gone. There

were elements of one corps left intact, not a particularly good one,

up in the northeast. The army was a conscript-oriented force, the

parts that we would probably have wanted to have retrained. It

left, came back, looted, and left again.

One of our basic problems in training the Iraqi army was just

creating new barracks and facilities once we decided to do it. I

think that the decision that was wrong, was having watched it disband, we had no plan to create a credible force to deal with security either in terms of the police, the security forces, or the military. We talked about a token force to be on the borders, policemen

who would operate basically in a more secure environment than

you can find a mile away from Capitol Hill, and security forces

whose main purpose was not to be security forces.

That was a decision which simply should not have been made.

There should have been from the start the understanding of how

difficult the problems would be. Moreover, in disbanding it took a

long time to decide that it is not a good idea to have several hundred thousand young men wandering around with no income and

no job and some of the best trained people in the country with no

meaningful pension. And even then we could not get the money to

them for a matter of months, and this is a cash economy. Most

Iraqis cannot go to the bank or cash a check.

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So I think the problems here were not the fabled disbanding of

the Iraqi army, which we did with some 18,000 precision-guided

munitions and quite a lot of tanks. It was the aftermath.

Senator NELSON. General, in your statement you said, and I am

quoting: ‘‘We had a poor to nonexistent plan for the post-invasion

phase.’’ Then you go on to say: ‘‘At the national level we’’—meaning

the United States—‘‘are deluding ourselves in many key ways. Examples are the public assessments of the state of training of the

Iraqi forces and police, the underlying nature of, and prospects for,

the insurgency, the degree to which we truly have an international

coalition in support, and in the strategy for adequately addressing

the root causes of terrorism, radicalism, and instability in the region.’’

I have felt, along with our colleagues here, our leaders in the

committee, that the United States has not stepped out vigorously

enough to get other nations of the world to help us in the plan for

the occupation and in the training of Iraqis. So we have gotten all

of these countries, in Europe and others, that have hardened their

positions publicly, saying they will not come in and help us with

the occupation.

But is there not the indication that these countries have told us

that they will help with the training of the Iraqi army and the

Iraqi police? And, what are your observations about the United

States unwillingness to step out and really implore these nations,

including Arab nations in the region, to help us with training? And,

if they would, how do you see that helping us to accelerate the

training of the Iraqi forces?

General NEWBOLD. Senator, I think it is critical that we get our

international partners to participate more fully. Two reasons:

Quantitatively, and that is simply we could use more trainers; and

also symbolically, to broaden this from a United States occupation

to an international effort to rebuild Iraq. Senator Biden, I know,

has worked closely to try to gain more from our traditional allies.

There are two faults really there. Frankly, my experience in my

dealings was that sometimes we dealt with them arrogantly and

the reaction of some of our allies was predictable. On the other

hand, some of our allies were the ones that would not support Secretary Powell’s attempts at smart sanctions and the failure of

smart sanctions led down a path toward what became the invasion

of Iraq and the power of the people that wanted to, the power within our government, that wanted to do that.

So on the part of the allies, they have been recalcitrant, reluctant, and halting, and that is unfortunate. Iraq is important not

just for the United States, not just for the region, but for the world.

As Senator Biden pointed out, I think we need to redouble our efforts, perhaps swallow a little bit of our pride. But we also need

to expect some of our traditional allies to be more accommodating,

and if they are not, it will stick with us for some time, I am afraid.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, could I make just one comment. You

referenced ‘‘Arab training.’’ One thing we need to be very careful

about: If we take the figures that are normally used, 80 percent of

this country is not Sunni Arab. The neighbor to the east is Iran.

It is very difficult to bring in outside people for training, for training missions, beyond what we have already gotten from Jordan,

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and Jordan is conducting these training missions at the cost of potentially serious political instability.

So I think if we are going to solve this problem it has to be

through us, Europe, and outsiders, not through people in the region.

Senator NELSON. Which outsiders?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Hopefully Europeans. But I will tell you honestly, I do believe the administration and people in the field have

made every effort to try to bring more trainers in from Europe. The

truth is that European countries, that are not present, are not

going to send training people in there. Remember, what we need

is interoperability, leadership, and units that can have quality and

function with unit integrity. So simply pushing people through a

training facility, particularly if it has a different language and different customs and patterns, can almost be counterproductive, not

a help.

Senator NELSON. Well, is this to say then that we are doomed?

Dr. CORDESMAN. No, sir. It is to say that I think General Luck’s

strategy of putting more United States and hopefully British forces

into Iraqi units, concentrating on stiffening and training them

while they are in service to supplement the programs General

Petraeus has under way, is a good solution in the way of moving

toward the quality we need. But if we wait for the Europeans, we

are going to be in very serious trouble, and it is important to note

that both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan the Europeans have

only delivered about 30 percent of the police forces they pledged

and those were problems where there was a great deal more support than we have in Iraq.

Senator NELSON. So we are looking at a force of 120,000 U.S.

troops for at least a couple of years?

Dr. CORDESMAN. No, sir. I think that what you are looking at is,

if you move to the point where you go from two or three experienced battalions to the point where the 27 battalions in the army

now in existence are actually in the field and experienced by the

middle of the year, if you see the national guard phased out and

the better manpower used in the army, as General Newbold has

said, and I think my colleague as well, you can by late 2005 and

through 2006 see a steady drawdown in United States forces and

see competent Iraqi units replace ours.

But to do that they not only need training, they need standardized equipment, they need standardized rules of engagement, they

need to be fully interoperable, and they need to be units which can

cooperate with each other in the field. It is nice to have NATO

units, it is nice to have units trained outside, it is helpful as a sign

of solidarity, but when we stress so much interoperability and

standardization in NATO, we have to remember it is a lot more important in putting together a force like this in a country that faces

an ongoing insurgency.

Mr. KHALIL. Mr. Chairman, could I add a quick comment to the

Senator’s question? Just on the issue of outside help, Senator, I did

travel a fair bit to some of the Arab countries in the region to ask

them for support and assistance in some of the training. I traveled

with General Eaton and other CPA leadership. Many of them

wanted to help because it was in their strategic interest to see a

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stabilized Iraq, but many did so very privately. They did not want

it made public because of domestic pressures, and there is some assistance from some of these Arab states that is not out there as far

as public information.

On the issue of the Iraqi army, it was dissolved and many of the

conscripts, around 400,000 of the conscripts, the largest share were

not going to come back. I think the real problem was in the immediate postwar phase, knowing that there was going to be this security vacuum, that there was not an increase in U.S. and coalition

troops to fill that vacuum and to provide basic law and order.

There was a grace period where Iraqis did view the coalition

forces as liberators, but that quickly eroded because of the lack of

basic law and order and the looting that occurred.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Let the record show that Senator Obama has been here from the

beginning of the hearing. I appreciate your patience, Senator. We

are delighted that you are here as our 11th questioner. We have

very good participation today by the committee. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the guests. It has been very informative, so I

very much appreciate their presence and patience with us. This

weekend I think we saw an enormous glimmer of hope in what has

been a very difficult situation, and I think that it is a testimony

to the Iraqi people. It is also a testimony to our military, which,

as you indicated, General, have performed oftentimes despite bad

policies to provide the kinds of security that facilitated the election.

So I am very proud of our troops.

I have mentioned before, Illinois I think, would be the third or

fourth largest coalition partner if it was a country. So I am just

grateful that we reached the point that we did this weekend. We

have a lot of work to do.

A couple of questions I have. One, I am just going to pick up off

the training issue that Senator Nelson and certainly Senator Biden

have been pursuing vigorously. I was out of the room. I understood

that I think someone asked, and my staff indicated that it might

have been you, Dr. Cordesman or General Newbold, that you did

not think that we needed a one-to-one replacement of American

troops to Iraqi security forces. I was not sure whether you were

able to elaborate on that, but do you have an estimate at this stage

in terms of a reasonable minimum number of security personnel

that are fully trained and equipped in the way that you have discussed to allow us then to phase out and let them take on the full

responsibility of security in their country?

Dr. CORDESMAN. No, Senator; I do not. I think the reasons are

this. First, this is an ongoing battle. We do not know what the insurgency will be over time. As we have all said, a lot of this depends on the politics and to some extent the aid policies that are

pursued. More inclusive policies could reduce the size of the Sunni

threat. If you get the Islamists, the outsiders, the extreme units,

more isolated, you need far less troops, both American and Iraqi.

If you make mistakes, the reverse is going to be true. We do not

have a core understanding at this point of what units in the Iraqi

military structure we can build on. I am looking at a report dated

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21st of January from the U.S. Embassy and it refers to special operations forces, a counterterrorist force, and a commando battalion

as having conducted independent operations. That is a very limited

number of men.

But you have got 27 battalions in the field. If you build up to

solid brigades and the insurgency goes down, then the Iraqi forces

can replace us more quickly. If the insurgency goes up and the

Iraqi forces remain weak, then one-to-one ratios become almost

theoretical. It has been pointed out that police can operate in much

of this country if the country is secure and the police are properly

deployed, trained, and equipped.

But the fact is that today, out of 55,000 supposedly trained Iraqi

police forces, about half do not have real training and you have

something on the order of 13 battalions out of that force—that is

somewhere around 8,000 police—with the core capability to deal

with significant threats.

On January 6th they folded the national guard in—and I will

leave that to General Newbold or to my other colleague—into the

army. That had 68 battalions in the national guard, which sounds

incredibly impressive, except maybe two to three of them could actually function because this was the old Facilities Protection Service.

What we desperately need is a clear plan to create a balanced,

integrated approach to strengthening Iraqi forces, one that Iraqis

can see, that you in the Congress can see, and that the world can

see. But for us to sit here and say we can give you these numbers

under these conditions, we simply do not have the kind of information. That is one of the reasons why our efforts are being given so

little credibility in much of the region.

Senator OBAMA. That is a good point, so let me follow that up,

and any of you can respond to this. But where does that plan for

security force development and training, where does that get articulated? Now that we have had these elections, although the job

of the assembly is primarily to draft this constitution, is that still

primarily our function in consultation with them? Who announces

it? How do we track it?

Part of my interest is figuring out how, on an ongoing basis, we

are going to be able to evaluate the progress that is made.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, in a practical way, Senator, first, we do

not know if the Minister of Defense or the Minister of the Interior

will stay. The last time we had considerable turbulence and lost 3

months simply because the Ministers changed. The Minister of Defense in the old government did not get along well with the Minister of the Interior and got along even less well with the Minister

of Finance.

I would suggest that in practice the best way to approach this

would be to have the people actually in the field—General

Petraeus, General Sanchez, General Casey—propose an integrated

plan which would include the police and security forces with the

military to the Iraqi government, so they would have a clear plan

to work from rather than ask them to do something they will not

be able to do for months, but give them the sovereign right to make

the key decisions.

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I would make that plan clear and public so people could see what

our intentions were and that we were really stepping up to the job

with the mix of equipment, training, leadership, and advisory presence that is really needed.

Senator OBAMA. General, Mr. Khalil, do you want to add anything to that?

General NEWBOLD. Real quickly, over the last 6 weeks the

United States military in Iraq through Central Command has developed actually quite a good security plan. You could argue it is

a bit later than the need, but——

Senator OBAMA. It is a year late.

General NEWBOLD. But it is a pretty good plan. My most important point would be that that is a security plan and, unless articulated into a broader plan that shows much more energy and imagination in the economic, political, and informational realm, then we

will become more efficient without becoming more effective in Iraq.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Senator. Just very quickly also, I think

the plan also has to emphasize shifting the focus of training and

training resources on the counterinsurgency forces that can really

take over responsibility, so increasing police trainers, increasing

army ranger training personnel, even FBI trainers in some cases,

and not just from the United States, from other coalition partners,

I think is imperative, even to the point where you might want to

think about not going ahead with the full 68 battalions of the National Guard. I think they are currently at around 40 battalions or

45 battalions, and shift those resources to training

counterinsurgency forces. I think that is a critical element.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time, but

maybe if I could just have one last follow-up question and then I

can turn it over to you and Senator Biden.

Shifting gears a little bit, but it picks up on your last point there,

General. That is, it is our task as the U.S. Government to articulate our policies. Dr. Cordesman, you, I think, laid out what I find

a very persuasive suggestion, that we specifically, unequivocally, in

a policy statement as opposed to in an ad hoc fashion debunk some

of the conspiracies that may be—conspiracy theories that may be

out there with respect to our presence.

I thought all those are suggestions that I hope this administration pays attention to. I am wondering whether we should rightly

expect a well-articulated exit strategy as part of that broader statement, because when Dr. Rice was here I recognized this administration’s reluctance to put a firm timetable. On the other hand, it

strikes me that, particularly given some of your comments, General, about the fact that our presence there may actually inhibit

some of the political developments that we want to see happen,

that this now may be the time post-election where we stake out a

position, recognizing that there may be some flexibility involved,

but that we say very clearly, here is what we anticipate doing on

the security front, on the economic front, on the political front, and

that it would actually enhance our ability to execute over the next

year or two.

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So I wanted to see if what you talked about, doctor, was inclusive

of a broader exit strategy or you were restricting your comments

to those five or six points that you thought needed to be made.

Dr. CORDESMAN. The problem I have with exit strategies become

so confused with simply leaving as distinguished from strategy.

Senator OBAMA. Let me interrupt then just to say, I have been

very clear and I think the majority, the strong majority of this committee, has been clear that we want also a success strategy and not

simply a cut-and-run strategy. So I asked the question in that context.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think it is exactly as General Newbold has

said, I think frankly we have all said. It should not just be a military strategy. It should be an economic strategy. It should be a political strategy. It should be a clear statement of American objectives. And it should be quite clear to the Iraqis in the world that

at the end of this, when Iraq is able to have a government that

stands on its own, when it has military forces that, at most, require

a United States advisory presence, that when its economy has

taken the benefits of the aid that is needed, we will be out of Iraq

except for whatever very limited remnant is needed and we will

have no bases, we will make no effort to exploit the situation, our

objectives will be to create the kind of Iraq which can stand on its

own, deal with its own problems, and remain hopefully pluralistic

and federalistic.

The only caution I would give you, Senator, is I do not believe

we should set some calendar. If a calendar is to be proposed it

should be proposed by the Iraqis, first, because it is their choice to

make and, second, because I become frightened that the minute

you put a date down and for any reason you cannot make the economic program work, the military program takes more time, there

is some kind of political division that is not a crisis but difficult,

and you cannot meet that deadline, all of a sudden your credibility

comes into question and, more than that, as you move toward the

deadline the insurgents are going to try to find every fault line

they can to make that deadline impractical and unworkable.

Senator OBAMA. Could you argue that that was the same argument that was being made about the election? I guess what I am

wondering is whether just creating some sense of urgency actually

then accelerates activity and shapes and channels and focuses people’s attentions in ways that are useful and makes it less likely

that we would drift and continue failed policies when we know that

we are going to have to make this thing work in a time certain.

Dr. CORDESMAN. There is a difference between, I think, putting

out a plan that shows the urgency we have in economic aid and in

creating effective military forces and in setting deadlines for withdrawal. Do not forget, Senator, we have two more deadlines just

this year, the constitutional election and then an election at the

end of the year. We are going to be moving very, very rapidly there.

I think the best thing to do is not to set deadlines for withdrawal, but to set very clear milestones for practical U.S. action.

One obvious area is to make the aid program work. Another is to

get effective Iraqi forces on line. Those give the kinds of urgency

I think we need without potentially trapping us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

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We will have a second round of questioning now. We promise not

to hold you indefinitely through your lunch hour, but we will allow

10 minutes for our second round.

I will commence by raising a question just pragmatically. We on

this committee and you today as witnesses have found a number

of deficiencies in terms of our planning and execution of whatever

we were doing in the past. But pragmatically, what is your assessment of how we are doing now? For example, Ambassador

Negroponte went to Iraq at midyear to stand up a very large Embassy. We estimated, at least at the time of our hearings, that

there would be maybe 700 employees in that Embassy, maybe more

than that, for that matter, with a number of Iraqis employed in

various capacities.

Ambassador Negroponte has been in operation now for several

months of service there. You have cited Generals Petraeus, Casey,

and Sanchez who are now in our military leadership capacity there.

I raise this question because frequently as we all talk about this

we point out that these things happened and that they did not

work out particularly well. But then, as opposed to simply condemning the whole efforts therefore, we are all in favor of making

things work out well now, playing the ball where it lies and moving

ahead.

How well are we doing with the current leadership that we have

in the country? Or should the question be broader? Does it include

the President, the Secretaries of Defense and State? In other

words, can you give some assessment of how we are doing?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Senator, as I said in my testimony, I see significant improvements taking place in the area. I think that just talking to people, the relationships between the Embassy and the military, the inter-agency cooperation, is far better than it was a year

ago.

I think there is the feeling that Ambassador Negroponte has created an effective team on the civil side. You have several other Ambassadors, all of which have a very high reputation. You do have

a problem. The Embassy, for reasons which we should have

thought about harder, was put in the wrong place and the Green

Zone is not the place to have an Embassy. You have people too concentrated in the Embassy. One of the complaints I hear from the

military is they need civilians to assist them in a lot of the missions they have and those people are not going out into the field,

I think often more because they are not allowed to than because

of any reluctance, although there were recruiting problems in getting that Embassy staffed with many of the sort of people at the

lower and mid-level.

So I think you do see a more powerful team, and certainly in the

field you have people, I think, that can implement a policy effectively. My greatest concern there would be twofold. One is continuity, because I am very much afraid we are going to rotate people yet again in a society where having people stay is absolutely

critical. A 1-year tour is almost a recipe for difficulty, if not failure.

The other is I do not know if we have a meaningful problem—

a plan, rather, for dealing with this Embassy. I am afraid we have

a very expensive building going up in the Green Zone, rather than

one which is being moved out into areas at a reasonable size and

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cost to meet the future need and reduce the security profile. I

would want to have a very clear picture of exactly why we are

doing this, because I often get the impression we have people tripping over each other in that Embassy rather than being functional

as we go down the level.

But in general, when you ask how we are doing, we do not have

a viable aid plan, we do not have a public broad plan for making

the Iraqi forces ready and capable, we do not have a clearly articulated plan for supporting governance, and we do not have a series

of public statements from the President or Secretary of State which

deal with the issues which are of great concern, rightly or wrongly,

conspiracy theories, to many Iraqis. Those are four areas that have

got to be fixed as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me then follow through this way. Before the

military action occurred, this committee had hearings with regard

to the planning that we felt would be required following military

victory. One of the more discouraging hearings was one in which

we asked for testimony from the Department of Defense and it was

not forthcoming. So we were led to speculate as to what was occurring with the 150 persons reportedly back in the Pentagon interdepartmental, presumably thinking about what we were going to

do. But it was never clearly articulated by anyone in the administration. We had some witnesses who likewise aided our speculation

and a good number of people who offered suggestions of what probably should be in the plan, some of them specialists on Iraq from

think tanks in this country and on some occasions actual Iraqis

who had some experience with their own country.

Now, I mention that because it is conceivable, as I have reflected

back, that, audacious as it may seem, perhaps this committee,

aided by some of our expert witnesses and others, might have

drafted a plan or some plans. Not that we are supplanting the

Commander in Chief or the Department of Defense or State or anyone else, but maybe for sake of argument there was, at least, some

cohesive thought, as opposed to our commenting again and again

that there was not much of a plan and that we were not hearing

from anybody and therefore our oversight was somewhat frustrated.

Maybe our responsibility was a little bit broader. This is one reason why we are having this hearing today, to try to think, building

upon what has been, I believe, a very important moment with the

election, however one wants to describe what that means and what

it means in the future: What do we do now?

You have suggested, all three of you, the need for a plan or

plans. You have just outlined about four plans, Dr. Cordesman,

that you felt were required. Maybe there are more. What if, just

for sake of argument, this committee said, we really do not see the

administration’s plans and so as a result we are going to suggest

some plans ourselves? Not to be provocative or overstepping our

bounds, but nevertheless we just think somebody needs to be thinking about these things.

Is it conceivable that this might stimulate those responsible at

various levels in the administration, the military, Ambassador

Negroponte, whoever, to say, okay, but you have got it wrong, this

is really what we ought to do? Would this sort of tease out of the

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system the plans that might occur and that, absent our being this

bold, might not happen for a while?

Do any of you have any thoughts or guidance to our committee

along those lines?

Senator BIDEN. Our collective staff behind us are rolling their

eyes.

I think you are dead right, but anyway go on.

The CHAIRMAN. Notwithstanding rolling of eyes.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I am sure your loyal staff can have such a plan

within the next 4 days.

More seriously, I think we have to do something. This is the first

day of February. It is an obvious statement, but we are now down

to 11 months in 2005. We have a constitution which to be made

work there has to be as much support to federalism as we can possibly give by way of tangible plans between now and the late

spring. We need to be ready to have an election where people fully

believe in the future by the end of this year.

Those plans should exist in every area. They do not have to be

my plan and I am sure each of the colleagues would agree. But it

is very, very discouraging that what we have today is no plan in

every important area, no plan that can convince the Iraqis, no plan

that can convince the Congress, no plan that can win the support

of the American people or the world.

One way or another, that plan should exist. I do not care what

it takes to force it to the surface. It should exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just comment quickly that this committee

did believe that we ought to be engaged in some type of permanent

organization for nation-building or reconstruction, as I think it is

now called at the State Department. We proceeded to have a plan

for this. Immediately the State Department and other people in the

administration said: Well, we are already behind the scenes doing

a lot of this and so we really do not want you to pass a bill mandating such; it has to happen administratively.

So, in fairness, we heard Secretary Rice testifying the other day

about quite a considerable effort going on in this area, which is a

180 change from the thought, say of 4 years ago, that we are just

not engaged in nation-building, never intend to be. But clearly we

are. The State Department actually has some people thinking

about this and doing it.

This is why I raise this suggestion, that from time to time people

say, well, this is not your province. In fact, behind the scenes: You

do not know what you are talking about; we are actually doing

these things. But I hope that is the case, for the same reason that

you have suggested, Dr. Cordesman, because the plans are not apparent and they are probably very necessary for all the reasons you

have given.

I would just conclude by saying specifically that you have raised

a very important question that this committee probably should be

seized with, and that is the Embassy building, the location and so

forth. You are testifying that putting it in the Green Zone is not

a very good idea. We are about to appropriate money, as I understand, as part of an $80 billion supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan to build an Embassy.

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Some would say, well, of course it is there. That is the only conceivable place you could protect all these people. In other words, as

Senator Biden has described his travels, currently in Iraq this is

a pretty dangerous place for all of our folks to be going. So some

would say, no wonder you do not have many volunteers, this is not

exactly the best kind of duty. So you, at least, ought to hunker

down, provide some security, build the Embassy there.

Likewise, public diplomacy is a topic that we have explored to a

fair degree. We held one hearing after another. But we always keep

coming up with the fact that whatever we are doing simply misses

the mark. Now, surely in this whole country there are some persons of sufficient intelligence who could formulate a plan that is

better than what we have, as opposed to our holding hearings

pointing out that whatever we have done is ineffective, as one person after another leaves the administration having had a go at it

for 6 months or more.

This is why I query the idea of somebody having a try. Our staffs

are very good at it, but plagiarizing broadly from your papers and

testimony today and from others who have testified before us, we

may now have some good ideas.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I would like to follow up on that, Mr. Chairman.

I know this is a strange, a strange turn of events. I think that we

are sitting here as loyal Americans trying very hard to support an

administration that finds itself in a very difficult spot, and trying

to, at least speaking for myself and based on the struggle you have

just seen my colleague go through here, trying to not overstep our

bounds, understanding the constitutional limitations on the role of

the Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

But I now regret in retrospect not having taken the documents

we produced here back, even in the bad old days when I was chairman straight through to the follow-on and amplification of the effort when my friend became chairman, before the war. In hearings

going back to the summer of 2002, the nature of the problem we

were going to face was laid out in exquisite and excruciating detail,

as if—I have press occasionally approach me and say, well, all

right, you say this now. I say: No, no, no, no, we are not saying

this now. We said this a month ago, 3 months ago, 5 months ago,

7 months ago, a year ago, 2 years ago.

What I am afraid I am doing again, in a public admission here,

is, to use the phrase for the third time to this committee, engaging

in what Samuel Johnson said people engage in who consider second

marriages. That is the triumph of hope over experience. I am afraid

I am engaging in that again.

Let me get right to it here. The truth of the matter is this is still

a divided administration. As much as we state just authoritatively

that we have no intention of having a permanent military base

here, that is not my understanding of what is still being debated

within this administration. The reason why no one from this administration has said, in my view, we have no intention of having

a permanent military base, is there are still powerful voices, not

the President, powerful voices in this administration who want a

permanent base.

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I recently got back from the World Economic Forum. Every major

player in the region in what they call bilateral meetings came up

to me and said: Are you trying to have a permanent military base

there? You know, sometimes paranoia is justified. The reason why

I would respectfully suggest many of the obvious questions and

plans you lay out that should be on the table now, are not on the

table is, there is still disagreement, not among our uniformed military in my observation, General, thus far, but with the civilians

over there, the civilians over there.

Now, maybe I am wrong, but why in the Lord’s name would the

Secretary-designee, now Secretary of State, sit before us and say

without equivocation, followed on by every civilian leader in this

administration, no, we have 125,000 folks trained, knowing full

well what was meant by ‘‘trained’’? Why would they say that, except that I do not think they are on the same page yet.

Now, I realize this is mildly heretical, but I do not get the sense

they are on the same page regionally. Do any of you—this is a rhetorical question. Do any of you think that the administration has

a position on Iran, yet? If it does, I would like you to secretly tell

me. I am not being a wise guy. I am not being a wise guy here.

They have not resolved their positions.

We sit here and say we need a regional plan. My lord. They are

in disagreement in this administration on what to do about the

Palestinian election, whether or not to move to the road map immediately, whether or not to sit back and twiddle our thumbs, whether or not to get engaged. We are divided on whether or not we are

going to join the Europeans in an attempt to actually try to reach

an accommodation, at least test the possibility of an accommodation with the Iranians, or whether we are going to sit back and

stay out of the deal.

So I do not know. I think we are all kind of engaging in this notion of a triumph of hope over experience. I have yet to see—and

if it exists, I pray they come forward with it; maybe the beginning

of the outlines will occur in the State of the Union. And I am not

being political. I think when I said this 4 years ago about how divided this administration was, everybody thought I was being political. This is the single most divided administration of the seven

Presidents I have served with. Absolutely like a San Andreas Fault

ran down the center of this administration, or ran down somewhere

in this administration.

I tell you what, I am not sure, notwithstanding Powell’s exodus,

notwithstanding some of the changes that have taken place, that

there is a resolution of the fundamental underlying questions we

all say has to be dealt with. A regional strategy; how can you have

a regional strategy if you do not have a bilateral strategy, a strategy on a bilateral issue of Iran-United States? How can you have

a regional strategy if I have yet to hear an articulation of what our

Mideast policy is now? I have yet to hear it privately, publicly.

On the central issues that we are going to allay the concerns of

the Iraqi people, I would like to have them allayed internally. I

would like the President to say: We guarantee you there will be no

permanent American base in Iraq, period. That is so easy to say.

Why has he not said it? It is not that he is not a bright guy. It

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is not that he does not understand the consequences of that. I believe they have not made up their mind.

So it leads me to the following question. I have been implying as

I look back on it to my constituencies and to my colleagues and to

my own caucus in a partisan sense that the administration has got

it now, because I constantly am pointing out General Petraeus’s efforts, General Luck, what he is about to recommend, and so on,

and that is all progress. But I do not get any sense—Mr. Khalil,

I quoted you in the hearing. The response I got was—they continue

to talk about, when you hear the President speak, the jihadists. I

am constantly saying I have not heard a single military person tell

me that that makes up more than 10 percent of our problem in

terms of the insurgency. Yet, when the President speaks he talks

about if we do not fight them in Baghdad, we are going to fight

them in Boston. Give me a break. The election is over.

I hear talk about the inability to articulate our position on Iran,

in the Middle East. So where is the regional plan? I hear the economic plan. I do not see any evidence—it may exist. I do not see

any evidence, doctor, that this administration has made at the

Presidential level a decision that we are fundamentally going to

change our approach on the distribution of the remaining roughly

$16 billion in reconstruction funds.

Lastly, what concerns me almost as much as anything, I do not

get the sense that at the Presidential level, the Secretary of State,

President, Secretary of Defense, the Vice President’s office, that

there is a recognition that this is a tribal society and that the core

constituencies are tribal and clerical. They are not the sort of generic Shia, Sunni, Kurd. May I remind everybody, which you guys

already know in spades, what prompted a trip, occasionally on the

floorboards of an automobile, in 2002 by Senator Hagel and me to

Irbil was, guess what, we wanted to hear firsthand that Barzani

was not going to kill Talabani and Talabani was not going to kill

Barzani. That was only 21⁄2 years ago.

But I see nothing to indicate to me that at the policy level of this

administration there is a recognition of any of these fundamental

points relating to regional policy, relating to the distribution of reconstruction moneys. What do you hear when you ask the Secretary of Defense why there is not more reconstruction? I will say

in advance, if the Secretary is listening, I am paraphrasing the

best of my understanding of your position; Mr. Secretary: The reason why it is not going on is totally a consequence of the insurgency. That is the only reason nothing is being done; the insurgency. We have no progress on the economic front because of the

insurgency.

Obviously that is an impediment. But my observation, that is not

the primary problem. It is a plan. When are we going to move from

Brown and Root—and I am not beating up on Brown and Root. I

am not pulling the Democratic stuff about that. When are we going

to move from they are the solution to all our problems to the idea

that you pointed out, Mr. Khalil, for some time: You got to get in

the neighborhoods, you got to get down to specific things.

So that is a reflection of my intense frustration, which leads me

to my question: Do you think the administration realizes how fundamentally they need to change their policy of the past 2 years?

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Dr. CORDESMAN. I see a hint, Senator, but there are no secrets

in Washington and there certainly is no such thing as a secret

strategy that has to be implemented on the interagency basis. As

Senator Lugar pointed out, that strategy is absolutely vital. It

needs to be public, it needs to be understood here, in Iraq, and in

the world, and it is not.

If it exists, there is no conceivable reason not to make it public,

to articulate it, and to provide it in detail. If it does not exist, we

have, depending on whether you take us seriously, at most 23

months to make this work, and we do not have time not to force

the issue.

I would just say one remark in conclusion. I had as one of my

assignments, a very long time ago writing for the Secretary of Defense, an assessment of why the collapse took place in Vietnam,

why the ARVN could not defend itself, and why the Viet Cong

dominated so quickly. That report vanished into the hands of the

OSD historian and was never seen again, but it is not a report that

I would like to write in the future about Iraq.

Senator BIDEN. General.

General NEWBOLD. Senator, I have absolutely no reason to believe that this administration will change the process that resulted

in this mess to begin with. I continue to have close friends in every

building that is central to this and have long discussions with

them, no disagreements. I do not believe the things that we propose in here, or the chairman has articulated about what we need

for the future, are going to change.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Senator, the way it works—and I have viewed this

firsthand as both a participant and an observer—is a bottom-up,

trickle-up effect almost. The people in the field, the military, the

officers, the enlisted, the civilian personnel, based on trial and

error get things right and it sort of trickles up, higher up if you

like. But there is not strategic guidance from the top down.

I always found it very curious that there was no clear strategic

plan or strategic objectives articulated at the top of the government, and I always thought it was the immense nature of the U.S.

Government, all the agencies and departments and they could not

get it together. But there certainly does need to be this clear strategic objective articulated so that the policy can be formed in all

these key areas we have talked about today—political transition,

economic reconstruction, and security—and have that flow downward rather than having it be a bottom-up.

But clearly the administration—it eventually does make its way

up because we hear talk about the importance of shifting to training security forces. This was in December that there was a real emphasis on this from the White House. So it sort of makes its way

up very slowly.

Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, I do not think that would

have occurred had we not continued to beat them up and beat them

up and beat them up and raise it and raise it and raise it and raise

it and raise it. I could be wrong about that. But I tell you what,

I would like to suggest, and I will conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would

like to suggest that, with a requisite degree of humility—and there

cannot be too large a dose of it—that this committee under your

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leadership, you and I, attempt to lay out, attempt to lay out, what

we think the strategy should be or encompass, and where we cannot agree at least lay out the alternatives that are available, because quite frankly, Mr. President—Mr. Chairman—I do not know

that it is likely to come in any form that is discernible from any

other source, quite frankly.

But if we do it—look, you are the guy who put together very

quietly a group of the leading people in this country, military,

State, retired, active—I mean, employed—left and right, to deal

with this nation-building notion. I came along for the ride with you

on that. It was your leadership. I am absolutely positively convinced that it would not have reached the point where there is action occurring now had you not done that.

So again, I mean this with absolute—there is not a large enough

dose of humility for me to suggest that we should try this. But

somebody—it has got to be started somewhere. You guys do it. You

guys do it from your think tanks, from your background, from your

interest, from your great credibility. But it does not quite get there

no matter how good you are.

So I think it ends up having to—I think it will force the issue.

I am going to be presumptuous: I think there will be a lot of grateful administration people if, in fact, we could somehow begin to

force this issue. And maybe, if we begin, Mr. Chairman, midterm

or right in the beginning, it will maybe prove to be unnecessary,

and that will be a wonderful moment if that occurs. But I think

until we politically help, quite frankly, in a bipartisan way, help

make it clear that there is a general consensus on the kinds of

things we have to know, I am not sure it is going to happen.

I want to point out now for the record and for the press that remains here, there has been very little disagreement on post-Saddam Iraqi policy, suggestions, criticisms, constructive criticisms, between and among Democrats and Republicans in the Senate. Almost every one of us who have taken this on as our major responsibility, foreign policy and this, have been, if not in the same pew,

clearly in the same church. So I do not see that much disagreement

based on any partisan, partisan approach to this. So I hope we can,

at least, take a crack at some version of that.

I personally want to thank each of you. Your testimony and your

advice for the last 2 years has been invaluable. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking member

for his comments, and I would concur that it is very important for

our committee in a bipartisan way to view the situation and to

offer constructive ideas. We have been attempting to do that, I

think with some success. But I think that probably we need to do

more. Stimulated by your guidance this morning, and the excellent

testimony you have given, we will proceed to do that.

Certainly it would be a better idea than simply having partisan

arguments about the competence of the President, of the Secretary

of State or Defense or whoever as individuals, personalizing the situations, or debating which administration does better. What we

really need now are plans, as you pointed out, with a fairly narrow

timeframe in which some things have to occur. If we are able to

help stimulate that, this may be for the better.

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But in any event, we thank the three of you for your comprehensive testimony and for being so forthcoming in your responses. We

are hopeful that we can call upon you again for testimony, but in

the meanwhile, perhaps at least, for some expert advice.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

LETTER FROM ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, USAID

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

Washington, DC, February 22, 2005.

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate your continued support for the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) and your determination to ensure that our nation has the capability it needs to face our present engagements in Iraq and the

Middle East. Your efforts to engage the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a

discussion of the strategies necessary for the success of the Iraq reconstruction effort

is welcome.

In that spirit, I would like to bring to your attention the erroneous criticism of

USAID in testimony before your Committee on February 1, 2005. The subject of the

hearing was ‘‘Strategies for Reshaping U.S. Policy in Iraq and the Middle East.’’ The

assessment of USAID provided at the hearing was misinformed and displayed a significant misunderstanding of our activities and the roles of the different U.S. Government agencies involved in the decision-making process for Iraq reconstruction.

The acknowledgement of the courageous efforts of USAID government and contract personnel in Iraq who are implementing programs under dangerous circumstances was much appreciated. Also noted, and we agree, was the U.S. Government’s effort to adapt to the need for more short-term, quick-impact projects that

realize more immediate results for Iraqis. It was quite striking, however, that many

of the policy prescriptions and adaptations called for in the hearing are precisely

the activities that USAID has been implementing for some time.

Mr. Chairman, the enclosed document covers several points concerning the successful performance of programs USAID has designed and is implementing in Iraq.

USAID has held and retains a vital role in the U.S. Government effort to assist

Iraqis in reconstruction and in the transition to a stable democracy. May I request

that you make this letter and its enclosure a part of the record of your February

1, 2005, hearing?

As always, I am available to provide you and your staff with any information

needed regarding our activities in Iraq.

Sincerely,

ANDREW S. NATSIOS,

Administrator.

Enclosure.

USAID’S IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

USAID has and continues to measure progress in Iraq and has demonstrated a

pattern of success in its reconstruction programs. USAID has maintained transparency in its reporting to Congress and the American public about how U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent in Iraq.

• USAID continues to issue both daily updates (to date, nearly 500 have been

issued) for internal government use and weekly updates for public consumption

(posted on our website) which report on the progress of our different reconstruction projects in Iraq.

• Each USAID reconstruction program is linked to appropriate strategic objectives within the U.S. National Strategy for Supporting Iraq.

• USAID cooperates with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to

ensure full support for U.S. Government objectives and strategies, and integrates its reports on progress with other U.S. Government efforts in Iraq,

through IRMO.

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• All USAID programs are implemented using a well-established USAID procedure for the supervision of programs. Work plans are generated and approved

for every implementing partner. They are adjusted as necessary based on the

evolving, and extremely dynamic, situation in Iraq.

• To date, the USAID Inspector General (IG) has conducted 20 performance audits and 45 financial audits of USAID programs in Iraq.

• Performance audits conducted by the USAID IG generally found USAID programs in Iraq to be in compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and

made recommendations to the process going forward. These audit reports are

available at www.usaid.gov/oig/.

• In addition, on performance of individual USAID contracts for Iraq, the IG has

generally found that the activities are being carried out according to the contracts.

• For example, an IG performance audit of USAID’s Community Action Program

found that based on a statistical sample of 89 selected projects (e.g., citizen participation, inter-community and local government cooperation) 98 percent were

achieving intended results. (January 2005)

• An audit of USAID’s reconstruction and rehabilitation activities found that 64

of 72 of Bechtel’s activities were complete or on schedule. Remaining delays

were due to changes in scope, security and coordination issues with the Coalition Provisional Authority or Iraqi ministries. (June 2004)

• Additionally, an audit of results data reported by USAID for Iraq education activities found that for eight activities reviewed (e.g., schools rehabilitated, student kits and furniture delivered) six were under-reported, one was reported accurately, and one activity was over-reported (1,500 schools rehabilitated verses

1,356 actual due to a differing definition of what constituted completion). (June

2004)

• The IG has completed 45 financial audits of USAID contracts in Iraq. Twenty

more are in process. These audits covered various costs incurred under USAID/

Iraq contracts totaling approximately $591 million. Of those completed, questioned costs have been minor (less than five percent of total amount audited),

and they have not been related to fraud. Moreover, since these questioned costs

are not related to fraud, much of the questioned amount is subsequently allowed when additional records are found to support the costs.

• The USAID IG also works with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and the results of all USAID IG audits are included in his quarterly

reports to Congress.

• The IG is continuing to perform performance and financial audits of the Iraq

program. Our regional office in Iraq is currently conducting three audits of

USAID activities: Health Care, Electrical Generation and Water and Sanitation

activities. These audits are examining whether intended outputs are being

achieved and whether sustainability in these programs has been addressed by

USAID.

Initial reconstruction funding under what is referred to as the first Iraq Relief

and Reconstruction Fund I (IRRF I), were appropriated by Congress directly to

USAID; however, USAID did not make all program funding decisions.

• IRRF I reconstruction funds implemented by USAID in Iraq were targeted to

the immediate needs identified by the U.S. Government Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and as approved by the CPA.

• USAID made program funding decisions under IRRF I with the approval of the

CPA, and in many cases, received carefully defined tasks to implement from the

CPA.

• Under IRRF I, USAID was appropriated approximately $2.1 billion for Iraq reconstruction efforts. To date, all of those funds have been obligated and $1.7 billion (77.8 percent) has been spent.

• For example, of the $69,732,000 obligated by USAID for healthcare programs

in Iraq under IRRF I, $67,320,000 (96.6 percent) have been spent. These funds

are being used to directly benefit Iraqis—immunizing literally millions of Iraqi

children and hundreds of thousands of pregnant women, equipping healthcare

centers to improve primary care, and building capacity at the Iraqi Ministry of

Health.

• Additionally, of the $1.03 billion apportioned under a USAID contract to Bechtel

for infrastructure reconstruction under IRRF I, 100 percent has been obligated,

and $766.9 million (77.4 percent) has been spent. Tasks under this contract included: power plant rehabilitation; rehabilitation of water treatment facilities;

telecommunications rehabilitation; rehabilitation of essential roads, bridges, and

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habilitation of the Baghdad and Basrah International Airports; and rehabilitation and management of the Port of Umm Qasr.

Funding under IRRF II ($18.4 billion), as appropriated by Congress, was managed

by the now-expired CPA, and is currently managed by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) under the U.S. Department of State Embassy in Iraq.

• USAID does not maintain the responsibility for the overall strategic programming and program funding decisions for IRRF II funds. • Strategic programming authority under IRRF II resided with the CPA under

Ambassador Bremer until it expired, and is now with IRMO under the direction

of Ambassador Negroponte. • All IRRF II funds apportioned to USAID, under both the CPA and IRMO, are

programmed to fulfill specific U.S. government-wide reconstruction goals. • USAID does not retain responsibility for programming the entire $18.4 billion

appropriated under IRRF II. • As of January 26, 2005, USAID had been apportioned slightly less than $3 billion of the IRRF II funds. Of that total, over $2.5 billion (87 percent) has been

obligated to existing contracts and grants and over $480 million has been spent

on ongoing CPA/IRMO-approved projects in support of the Iraqi people. • The great bulk of the remainder of the $18.4 billion was apportioned initially

through the CPA to the Iraq Project Management Office (PMO), and then to the

Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO), an organization of the U.S. Department of Defense (post-CPA, the PMO was renamed as the PCO). • The role of the CPA/PMO, and the programming decisions that it made prior

to its expiration, is an essential component to any discussion of reconstruction

strategy and spending. • Despite the relatively small share of reconstruction funds apportioned to

USAID, USAID has provided successful programs which address short and medium-term needs while setting the foundations for long-term stability. • Under the IRRF II, for example, a total $786 million is dedicated to healthcare.

USAID has been apportioned only $75 million (9 percent) of that amount. Of

this, $50 million is obligated to the current construction of a children’s hospital

in Basrah, and the remaining funds are currently being programmed to build

capacity at the Ministry of Health. All other dedicated healthcare funds have

been apportioned to PCO. • Additionally, under IRRF II, USAID is implementing successful programs in

local governance, community development, transition initiatives, health, education, private sector development, economic governance, vocational education,

business skills training, agriculture, infrastructure rehabilitation (power, water

and sanitation, and telecommunications), humanitarian assistance, and assistance to the elections process.

USAID has undertaken a comprehensive approach to democratic development in

Iraq, not limited to elections as an event, but encompassing the deeper and more

profound changes required to establish stable democratic institutions. Most importantly, USAID recognizes that the spirit of democracy is rooted not in the institutions of government, but in the people. Therefore, we have worked creatively and

vigorously to ensure that the Iraqi people have an active voice in the creation of

their own democracy.

• USAID recognized, before arriving in Iraq, the importance of effective regional

and local governance to Iraq’s future, both as a tool of governance, and as an

incubator for a new generation of democratic elite. Toward that end, USAID

programs have worked in a coordinated fashion to support Iraq’s political transition, informing Iraqis of the process, assisting in the devolution of authority

to provincial and city governments, and constructing the mechanisms to foster

a new cadre of democratic leaders in Iraq. • To promote diverse and representative citizen participation in communities

throughout Iraq, USAID designed the Iraq Community Action Program (CAP).

Under this program, USAID awarded cooperative agreements now worth nearly

$168 million to five international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). • These NGOs are working in different regions across Iraq to foster stability and

improve Iraqis’ lives by ensuring that citizens’ basic needs are met within their

respective communities in a process that gives Iraqis a voice in those decisions.

Specifically, this program:

• Establishes community committees that are representative of the gender, ethnic, and religious composition of the community;

• Demonstrates rapid improvements in Iraqis’ lives and the positive outcome of

citizens working together to identify common priorities; and

• Draws upon local expertise to address identified priority needs.

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• To date, CAP has worked with over 700 community groups to implement over

3,000 immediate impact local projects, chosen by the communities themselves. • The CAP process facilitates the development of community leaders through the

creation of the community groups. Over 12,000 Iraqis have stepped forward and

been selected by their communities to represent them in project selection and

implementation. This has provided a training ground for future leaders, many

of whom have gone on to fill leadership roles in city, provincial, and national

venues. • USAID also committed more than $2.4 million to a nationwide Civic Education

Campaign, which educates Iraqis on democracy and Iraq’s political situation. To

date, USAID partners have facilitated over 29,000 civic dialogue meetings attended by over 750,000 Iraqis, helping them understand the concepts of democracy and participate in the shaping of their future. • These meetings provided a forum for debate and the development of democratic

understanding. Never before in the history of Iraq have so many Iraqis had the

opportunity to learn the fundamentals of democracy and prepare themselves to

actively participate in the development of their government. • A solid local government system in Iraq is the foundation upon which a democratic national government can be built. Effective local governance encourages

citizen participation, builds experience in governance, fosters dialogue among

competing groups, and delivers essential services based on community priorities. • USAID is performing a thorough analysis of those candidates elected to the

Transitional National Assembly to determine how many of those newly elected

officials began their public service at the local community and provincial levels

with the indirect support of USAID activities. • A near total vacuum existed in Iraq in the ability of government institutions

at all levels to provide basic services such as water, sewer, electricity, solid

waste collection and disposal. USAID, therefore, designed and is implementing,

in April 2003, a $236 million Local Governance Program (LGP). Since its inception, the LGP has worked with Iraqis in all 18 governorates to promote diverse

and representative citizen participation in provincial, municipal, and local councils. • During the first year of the program, USAID awarded $15.5 million in rapid

response grants to strengthen the capacity of municipal authorities to deliver

core municipal services. • The LGP facilitated the establishment and reconstitution of 16 governorate

councils, 90 district councils, 194 city or sub-district councils, and 445 neighborhood councils. • The LGP also works to strengthen the management skills of city and

governorate administrations, local interim representative bodies, and civic institutions to improve the delivery of essential municipal services such as water,

sewer, electricity, solid waste collection and disposal; and civil society organizations and their participation in public life. LGP staffs have trained thousands

of Iraqi civil servants in the details of effective governance.

• The LGP has fostered new Iraqi leaders whose leadership in Iraq’s govemorates,

cities, and towns improves the quality of life of Iraqi citizens. This new, nonBa’athist cadre of civil servants is playing an integral role in helping to secure

Iraq’s evolving democratic future as they participate in elections and the constitutional process.

• Since the announcement of the November 15 agreement in 2003, USAID has

planned, implemented, and managed a comprehensive package of technical assistance and commodities supporting Iraq’s transitional election process. This

technical and operational assistance, along with broader democratization and

civil society programs like CAP and the LGP, has contributed greatly to the

positive election outcome.

• In support of the January elections, USAID’s partners implemented domestic

election monitoring programs resulting in the training of approximately 12,000

domestic observers and 15,000 of the accredited political party observers mobilized on Election Day.

• Through our partners, USAID implemented a comprehensive, country-wide

voter education and get-out-the-vote campaign, including special programming

for Sunni areas.

• In the post-election period, USAID will continue to plan and implement a variety of programs matching the needs of the evolving Iraqi democracy, undertaken in full partnership with Iraqi counterparts. In particular, USAID is undertaking activities in four key areas—constitutional development, institutional

development, civic participation, and local governance development—ensuring

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follow-up to elections success with comprehensive support to the Iraqi democratic transition.

USAID has adapted to the challenges of the insurgency and is providing short and

medium-term deliverables through its programs—directly and more visibly improving the lives of Iraqis.

• USAID’s programs have been designed, from the outset, to balance the need for

short and medium-term deliverables with the need for setting the foundation

for longer-term stability in Iraq.

• USAID’s ongoing agriculture, civil society, education, health, and local governance programs all institute grant programs designed precisely for flexibility and

short and medium-term impact while linking these short-term impacts into a

coherent long-term strategy.

• USAID has formed a unique partnership with the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav). Together, USAID and the lst Cav are focusing their efforts on

reducing tensions in Sadr City and other poor neighborhoods throughout Baghdad that have become dangerous.

• Since April 2004, USAID, in coordination with the 1st Cav, has targeted immediate assistance, through its infrastructure and transition initiative programs,

to improve the provision of essential services as well as to provide labor-intensive projects such as trash pick-up and surface sewage removal in restive Baghdad neighborhoods. In this joint effort, USAID has approved more than 860

transition initiative grants, worth nearly $100 million.

• This effort has generated both extensive short-term employment for thousands

of Iraqis and provides the foundations for medium-term stability. Since June

2004, USAID grants have created temporary (60-day plus) jobs for an average

of 21,000 local residents per month in the Baghdad districts of Sadr City, Tissa

Nissan, Abu Ghraib, Karradah, Al Rasheed, Al Mansour, Al Adahamiyah and

Al Khark.

• Moving forward, these projects served as models for collaboration between

USAID and the U.S. military that was replicated in other strategic cities, including Najaf, Tal’Afar, and Samarra.

USAID has taken a comprehensive approach to the particular challenges of market economic transitions.

• USAID has extensive, successful experience assisting in command-to-market

economic transitions. We are well aware of the time and effort this transition

requires and our programs reflect the long-term view, but do not ignore short

and medium-term deliverables.

• Drawing on our experience, from Poland to Mongolia, we designed and are implementing a comprehensive program of systematic and sustained assistance in

Iraq.

• Individual programs in economic governance, private sector development, vocational education, and agricultural reform address both the immediate problems

of Iraq’s economy, and are establishing the foundations for the long-term process of economic transformation.

USAID has deployed highly qualified personnel to Iraq and these staffs have

maintained USAID’s continuity on the ground.

• USAID personnel joined a multi-agency effort to plan for humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Iraq in late 2002, and USAID was prepared to mobilize

its significant development resources and technical expertise to support humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in Iraq.

• Following the cessation of major conflict, the U.S. Government deployed a

multi-agency Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)—including USAID

staff—to Iraq to assess and respond to humanitarian needs and to help coordinate the emergency relief effort.

• At the same time, USAID deployed technical staff to prepare for the immediate

reconstruction requirements. USAID established offices in Arbil, Baghdad, Al

Hillah, and Al Basrah and USAID personnel were located in Kuwait, Doha,

Amman, and Cyprus to provide regional support. On July 27, 2003, the USAID

Mission Director officially announced the formation of USAID’s Mission to Iraq.

The USAID Mission in Baghdad coordinates all USAID programs.

• USAID has deployed numerous expert personnel, with post-conflict development

experience in regions including Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, West Bank/

Gaza, and East Timor, to Iraq.

• Regional experts with experience in programs throughout the Arab world, from

Jordan to Egypt to Morocco, are a core part of USAID’s staff, as well as of the

staffs of our contractors.

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• USAID experts include career foreign service officers with decades of overseas

experience; academics who have spent many years doing research on topics as

diverse and relevant as local governance in the Arab world, peace-building, and

strategic planning for reconstruction and stabilization; economists and lawyers

specialized in command-to-market transitions who have served from Poland to

Mongolia; engineers with major project experience in infrastructure development throughout the developing world; and civil society experts who have run

programs in countries as diverse as Guatemala, Mali, Egypt, and Romania.

• Our experts are not merely visiting Iraq. They are deployed there for an extended period of time. In fact, there are still USAID personnel on the ground

that entered Iraq immediately following the war in 2003. As a result of their

exceptional skill and dedication, the majority of USAID senior staff tours in

Iraq have averaged over one year from the beginning of our service there. This

pattern does not evidence a lack of continuity.

USAID has, and continues to work in close cooperation, indeed partnership, with

both the appropriate government agencies in Iraq, as well as with the Iraqi people.

• All USAID programs have been developed, and are implemented in the closest

possible consultation with Iraqi government leaders and organizations.

USAID and all of its partners employ large numbers of Iraqi professional staff in

a wide range of technical and expert roles in every program area.

• We continue to expend considerable effort to train Iraqi contractors to function

as productive sub-contractors on various reconstruction projects using substantial numbers of Iraqi labor.

• For example, Bechtel has used 120 different Iraqi subcontractors on 160 subcontracts for a total value of $185 million under its first contract. Additionally,

Bechtel employed an average of 3–4,000 Iraqis per day in 2004 on projects in

Iraq.

• At present, USAID programs, contracts and grants alone are employing 53,900

Iraqis.

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