**America's Military Priorities**
Author: Dr. Hans Binnendijk
***Note:  Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed orimplied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily representthe views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National DefenseUniversity, the Department of Defense, or any other governmentagency.*
 Conclusions**Developing National Strategy in Time of Transition**
We remain in transition to a new international systemfollowing the Cold War, a transition that is likely to lastthrough the decade.  The nature of the new system will bedetermined largely by the health of America's alliances withEurope and Japan, by the outcome of Russian and Chinesetransitions, and the rate of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction.
Developing a new grand strategy to replace containmenthas proven difficult precisely because the  system remains intransition.  Both the Bush and Clinton administrations havestruggled with their international vision.
  The Bottom Up Review was developed in the context ofa strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" that emergedas speeches during the first nine months of 1993.  The criseswith Iraq and North Korea in the autumn of 1994 confirmedthe validity of the two major regional conflict threatenvisioned by the Bottom Up Review.  That concept mayneed to be amended in time, but it is appropriate for theinterim.
**The Nature of the Slowly Emerging International System**
There are at least three ways in which one might envisionthe emerging international system:
The first is a *geo-strategic* assessment of the majorpowers.  We are in an historically unique moment of relativecooperation among the great powers: the United States,  theEuropean Union,  Japan,  China, Russia  and  perhaps  India.  Generally,  the  major  powers don't envision each other ascurrent threats and are not building military establishments toeither attack or defend against each other.  Regional economic blocks are forming,but are not being used by the  great powers  to develop  closed alliances.  Spheres of  influence do not appear to overlap in ways that could causeconflict.  However, it is unclear how much longer thesefavorable conditions will last.
Another way to assess the emerging international systemis to look at political and economic orientations of individualcountries.  From this perspective, the world can be seen asconsisting of three groups.  The dominant marketdemocracies, a group much larger than the old "First World"of the Cold War, includes not just the OECD Countries, butmost of Latin America, the "tigers" of East Asia, andgradually, parts of Central Europe.  The success of the majortransitional states, including Russia, China, India, and SouthAfrica, is crucial to the future world order.  Troubled states,primarily in Africa and the greater Middle East, are fallingbehind politically and economically and many are torn byrampant ethnic or religious tensions. These countries are thebreeding ground for failed states and rogue states.  TheAdministration's strategy of "enlargement" is most consistentwith this perspective of the world order.
The third view looks at transnational threats.  Theporousness of international borders has positive effects:totalitarian regimes cannot last when they can no longermanage the flow of information to their people.  But porousborders also mean that international crime, narcotics,disease, terrorists, illegal immigrants, pollution, andsmugglers of nuclear material pose greater threats to ournational security. Each has a greater impact on the averageAmerican than what happens in Somalia.
Combining these perspectives, there are grounds for bothoptimism and pessimism.
The grounds for optimism include:
- The major powers are at peace and there are few signs          of exclusive spheres of influence or economic blocs;     Most nations aspire to democracy and the market          system; and;
The U.S. remains dominant militarily.

    The grounds for pessimism include:
- Transitions in Russia and China show signs of          instability; Multi-ethnic states are fragmenting violently;
    Traditional alliances are under stress;
Transnational threats are increasingly being felt in U.S.          cities; and;
Nuclear proliferation is creating greater risks in the event of conflict.
**Values, Interests, and Military Intervention**
A decision to intervene militarily should be based onAmerica's values and its interests.  But values in the post-coldwar era sometimes seem contradictory.  For example:
- Should we support self-determination or the inviolability of internationallyrecognized borders? Should we stress the right to refuge, or protection from disruptive levels ofillegal immigration?
 Should we stress human rights at the expense of vital US interests?
   Similarly, our vital national interests have shrunk in thepost-cold war era while foreign policy concerns haveexpanded.  We have intervened in situations that cannot bejustified as vital to the United States.
Regions of vital interests to the U.S. include:
- our alliances with Europe, Japan, South Korea and Australia, our historic relationship with Israel and our role in the Middle East peaceprocess,
our access to energy resources in the Persian Gulf, and
democracy and order in the Caribbean Basin.

**Setting Military Priorities**
To deal with the environment, values and interestsdescribed above, the United States must fulfill five  militarymissions, presented in priority order below.
The chart shows that most of the defense budget isallocated either to "investing in the future", (which is neededto hedge against the emergence of a peer competitor) or tothe "current force structure" (which is needed to fight andwin regional conflicts today).  Both are important, for wecannot afford to mortgage our future or to create a hollowforce today.
***Mission #1:  Hedging Against an Emerging Peer MilitaryCompetitor***
The most important focus for our national security policyshould be the major powers.  That entails sustaining our keyalliance systems and supporting the transition to marketdemocracy in Russia and hopefully China.  In this context,we need a phased  approach to NATO expansion, a newstrategic dialogue with Japan, an agreement with Russia on itsbehavior in the Newly Independent States, continued supportfor market-based economic reform in China, and developmentof closer ties with India.
 The United States is dealing from a position of greatmilitary strength.  Our nuclear deterrent is sound.  Ourequipment is the most advanced and capable of any nationand our uniformed personnel exhibit a high degree ofcompetence.  The resources the nation commits to defense aresubstantial.  Our defense spending is equal to that of the nextsix nations combined and we and our allies account for 80percent of the world's expenditures on defense.
Yet it was not long ago that we had a military peercompetitor, and if the reforms in Russia and China fail, wecould have another.  They might be particularly effective intheir own regions of the world and could use commerciallyavailable technology to begin to close the gap.  Hedgingagainst this eventuality and deterring it if necessary shouldremain our primary military priority.
This requires investing in the future.  The percentage ofthe defense budget dedicated to this investment has fallenfrom 45 per cent in 1986 to 30 per cent in 1996.  This shifthas been acceptable given the high tempo of currentoperations and the lack of a peer competitor,  but it's time toreverse the trend.
Until recently, our investment in research, development,test and evaluation has held up well.  It is  programmed  to drop  $7 billion  over  the  next  five  years. Privatecommercial sector R&D can increasingly be used formilitary purposes (particularly in the areas of telecommunications, sensortechnology, andautomated data processing).  The planned reduction needs tobe monitored carefully to insure that we can take fulladvantage of the revolution in military affairs (RMA).

The massive drop in procurement over the past decade iscause for concern. Due to the large investments of the1980s, we have a considerable inventory of weapon systemsthat are better than anything our potential adversaries canbring to the table.  There may also be reason to delaypurchases somewhat to see what new weapons requirementsthe RMA suggests.  Still, modernization of our equipmentcannot be deferred indefinitely.  In 1995, procurement of newNavy ships (6), fighter aircraft (28), and tanks (0), are all farbelow the steady state procurement rate needed to support theplanned 1999 force.  In ten to fifteen years, stocks of somekey weapons systems will be approaching obsolescence. Therecent $25 billion increase over six years requested by theAdministration is a down payment on the problem.
***Mission #2:  Regional Military Conflict and the Bottom UpReview***
The Bottom Up Review concluded that the U.S. can copewith the challenge of two nearly simultaneous MRCs with aforce structure 40 per cent smaller than the peak years of the1980s.  The forces need to be well trained and need adequatesea and airlift to make this strategy work.
The BUR force structure allows for only a small marginof error in executing a two MRC strategy.  If a Desert Stormsize force were once again deployed, only two active dutyArmy divisions, three Air Force wings and one MarineExpeditionary Force would remain available for the beginningof a second conflict.  There would be a significantrequirement for reserve forces, and it is likely that the UnitedStates would need to rely heavily on coalition partners. Programs like international military education and jointcombined exercises become increasingly important.
An issue has been raised about the readiness of this forceto engage in two MRCs.  The O&M account actually hadincreased slightly in FY95 and remains relatively constant forFY96.  Coupled with the reductions in force structure, moreresources were being planned for readiness and operationsper active duty unit than in previous years.  In 1995, O&Mspending per Army battalion was up 17 per cent over FY93,per Navy ship it was up 11 percent, and per combat aircraftit was up 12 percent.  Unexpected peace operations in Iraq,Haiti, Rwanda etc. ate into that planned increase and createdsome readiness problems.  The $2.6 billion supplemental nowbefore the Congress is designed to restore readiness.
 The two MRC strategy also requires the overseas presenceof U.S. forces, both in Europe and Asia.  These forcesprovide confidence and stability in both regions, but they alsoserve as forward staging areas in time of conflict.  Despitebudget pressures in the U.S., American  forces should remainat the planned level of about 100,000 in both Europe andAsia.
***Mission #3:  Counterproliferation Efforts***
Nonproliferation and counterproliferation has been apriority for recent administrations.  Some positivedevelopments have occurred.  South Africa, Kazakhstan,Belarus, and Ukraine have each pledged to eliminate theirnuclear arsenals.  Iraq's program has been further degradedunder IAEA supervision.  The Geneva FrameworkAgreement has provided a procedure which could removeNorth Korea's nuclear potential within a decade. It is aprocess under which North Korea can be held accountable.
  Nonetheless, at least twenty countries, many hostile to theUnited States, are seeking to develop the capability to producenuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons of massdestruction and the means to deliver them.  The May 1994Deutsch Report recommends an annual increase in spendingof about $400 million on 14 counterproliferation programs.
***Mission #4:  Developing Cost Effective Responses to Transnational Threats***
Problems like drug trafficking, refugees and pollution areincreasingly becoming transnational in character, as criminalsoperate across borders and environmental problems arise ona global scale.  For example, the U.S. Southern Commandhas been preoccupied recently with Cuban rafters, Haitianrefugees and drug interdiction.  The military's bill forenvironmental programs was $5.5 billion in FY94, includingbase restoration.
Some transnational threats seem to call for military forcesto back up police forces that are outgunned andoutmaneuvered by international criminal syndicates. Quasi-police operations have been normal for armed forces in manynations and for U.S. armed forces prior to World War II.
***Mission #5:  Engaging Selectively in Peace Operations for FailedStates***
Attitudes toward peace operations have changed as ethnicconflicts and failed states have overextended UN capabilitiesand America's patience.  PDD 25 has described the fairlystrict set of criteria that will be used to determine when theU.S. will support or participate in  UN peacekeepingoperations.
 We should approach peace operations cautiously becausethere is a high opportunity cost if we fail.  Humanitarianrelief and conflict containment may be appropriate temporaryactions for U.S. forces.  Regional powers should provide thepeacekeeping forces, as the Europeans are doing in Bosnia. Unless our vital interests are involved, we should not commitourselves to long term deployments, nor should we take onresponsibility for nation-building or ending age-old ethnictensions.  When our vital interests are involved a more robustU.S. involvement is warranted.
There are two Titles in H.R.7 that deserve comment. Title IV would prohibit placingU.S. forces under command or operational control of foreignnationals acting on behalf of the United Nations, except if aPresidential Certification is made.  Title V would subtractfrom America's annual UN peacekeeping assessment the non-reimbursed amount spent by U.S. forces in support of UNpeacekeeping operations for the previous year.  The first isunnecessary and the second could undermine UNpeacekeeping worldwide.
In the Sinai and Macedonia deployments U.S. forces reportto a non-U.S. force commander.  Both operations have beenextremely successful.  U.S. officers serve as the commanders'chief of staff.  U.S.  battalion commanders reserve the rightto consult the U.S. chain of  command if they receive ordersthat are unwise or inconsistent with their mission.  There is noreason to change these command arrangements.  Perhaps Title IV should be limited to UN Article VII peace enforcement operations where conflict is expected.
Title V is more troublesome.  In the Section 101 findings,the bill notes that U.N. assessments to the U.S. forpeacekeeping missions totalled almost $1.5 billion in 1994. The non-reimbursed cost of U.S. military participation in UNmandated operations (according to Sec. 101) was $1.7 billion.If Title V were in effect, the U.S. would have to defaultcompletely on its assessed contribution.  If other nationsfollowed suit, there would be little money for peaceoperations. 
These two provisions misjudge the value to the UnitedStates of UN peacekeeping.  Many of these multilateraldeployments are in areas important to U.S. interests likeKuwait, Israel's borders, Haiti, El Salvador and Cyprus. Most of the larger deployments were engineered by the U.S.in the Security Council to further our own national securityinterests.  Some provided international legitimacy for U.S.deployments.  Other UN deployments provide forhumanitarian  relief widely supported by the Americanpeople, but other nations are called upon to send forces.  Acollapse of UN peacekeeping would be a severe setback forU.S. interests.
**About the Author:**Dr. Hans Binnendijk is the director of INSS.  Aversion of this paper was presented as testimony before the SenateArmed Services Committee on February 7, 1995.  It doesnot necessarily represent the views of the National DefenseUniversity, the Department of Defense, or any othergovernment agency.**