39–010 

Calendar No. 158 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 109–101 

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 

CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003 

JULY 12, 2005.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. GRASSLEY, from the Committee on Finance, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S.J. Res. 18] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 18) approving the renewal of import restrictions 

contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 

amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee ................................................. 2 

A. Report of the Committee on Finance ......................................................... 2 

B. Background .................................................................................................. 2 

1. The Government of Burma ................................................................... 2 

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (the Act) ........... 2 

3. Procedures for Renewing the Import Restrictions Contained in 

the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 ......................... 3 

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 18 ............................................ 3 

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions 

Against Burma ................................................................................... 4 

II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution ..................................................... 10 

III. Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters .................... 12 

IV. Changes in Existing Law ................................................................................. 13 

2 

I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE 

A. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 18) approving the renewal of import restrictions 

contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 

amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass. 

B. BACKGROUND

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA

Burma is governed by a military junta that took power in September 1988. The junta, the State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), violently suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators in September 1988. The junta allowed elections to a National Assembly 

in 1990, but it nullified the results when the opposition National 

League for Democracy (NLD) won most of the seats. Since 1990, reports from human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department have described a pattern of SPDC policies featuring the suppression of political liberties, jailing of thousands of political prisoners (more than 1,000 estimated imprisoned in July 2005), widespread physical abuses against civilians, the impressment of civilians into military service, and the conscription of thousands of civilians for work on economic projects. 

On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred 

people assaulted the opposition NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu 

Kyi and her supporters near Mandalay, Burma’s second-largest 

city. The attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development Association, a pro-government mass organization. Some NLD 

supporters were killed, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD 

leaders were taken into custody. The government closed NLD offices in the country. 

2. THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003 (THE ACT)

In response to the May 30th attack, the Burmese Freedom and 

Democracy Act of 2003 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) on June 4, 

2003. A revised version of the legislation was introduced in the 

Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, 

passed the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a recorded vote of 97–1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an 

amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418–2, 1 

Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed version of H.R. 

2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded vote of 

94–1. The legislation was presented to the President on July 22, 

2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 2003 (Pub. 

L. 108–61). 

As enacted, the Act generally bans imports from Burma, affecting mainly imports of Burmese textiles and garments. U.S. imports 

of these products from Burma rose from nearly $60 million in 1994 

to $408 million in 2001 before falling to $297 million in 2002, according to Department of Commerce statistics. Total imports from 

Burma in 2002 were $356 million. The ban on imports will remain 

3 

until the President certifies to Congress that the SPDC has made 

major progress to end human rights violations, including rapes, 

forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers, released 

political prisoners, allowed political, religious, and civil liberties, 

and reached agreement with the NLD for a civilian government 

chosen through democratic elections. The Act also freezes Burmese 

assets in the United States and requires the United States to oppose aid to Burma by international financial institutions. 

Pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act, the import ban will expire 

one year from the date of enactment unless a joint resolution (‘‘renewal resolution’’) approving a one-year renewal of the import ban 

is enacted into law prior to the anniversary of the date of enactment. The Act also provides that the import ban may be renewed 

for a maximum of three years from the date of enactment, i.e. until 

July 28, 2006. Last year, on June 14, 2004, the House passed H.J. 

Res. 97, by a recorded vote of 372–2, approving the renewal of the 

import ban until July 28, 2005. On June 24, 2004, the Senate 

passed the House-passed version by a recorded vote of 96–1. The 

legislation was signed into law by the President on July 7, 2004 

(Pub. L. 108–272). 

The purpose of S.J. Res. 18 is to comply with the Act’s requirement in order to renew the import ban for another year, i.e. until 

July 28, 2006. An identical resolution (H.J. Res. 52) was passed by 

the House on June 21, 2005 by a recorded vote of 432–2. H.J. Res. 

52 was placed on the Senate Calendar on June 22, 2005. 

3. PROCEDURES FOR RENEWING THE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

Section 9(c)(2)(B) of the Act incorporates the procedures set forth 

in section 152(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 

U.S.C. 2192(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)), for consideration of a renewal 

resolution to renew the import ban for another year. 

Pursuant to those procedures, a renewal resolution introduced in 

the Senate shall be referred to the Finance Committee, which is afforded 30 days in which the Senate is in session to consider and 

report the resolution. A renewal resolution is not amendable. If the 

Committee does not report the resolution within that period, it is 

in order for any Member favoring the resolution to move to discharge the Committee from further consideration of the resolution. 

If, as in this case, a renewal resolution is introduced in the Senate before receipt of an identical resolution from the House, and 

the House passes its resolution before the Committee reports the 

Senate measure, then upon receipt of the House-passed measure 

the House resolution shall be placed on the Senate calendar and 

the Committee shall continue to report the Senate measure or be 

discharged from further consideration of the Senate measure, as 

noted. After the Committee reports the Senate measure, the vote 

on passage in the Senate shall then be on the identical Housepassed measure. 

4. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF S.J. RES. 18

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 18 in open executive session 

on June 28, 2005. The Chairman recessed that meeting until 9:00 

a.m. on June 29, 2005. At that time, the Chairman reconvened the 

meeting and the Committee voted unanimously, by voice vote and 

4 

without amendment, to favorably report S.J. Res. 18, Approving 

the Renewal of Import Restrictions Contained in the Burmese 

Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. 

5. REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE TRADE

SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

On May 23, 2005, the State Department submitted to Congress 

a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, as required 

by section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 

2003. At the request of the Chairman, that report was made a part 

of the record of the Committee’s consideration of S.J. Res. 18. The 

State Department report is reprinted below: 

INFORMATION ON U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST 

BURMA 

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of P.L. 108–61 (the Burmese 

Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003), this report reviews 

bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human 

rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act’s trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in Burma and the furtherance or 

United States policy objectives. 

Continued pressure by the U.S. Government sends a 

clear signal that the United States expects Burma’s junta 

to take meaningful steps toward genuine national reconciliation and the establishment of democracy. Such pressure also serves as a strong symbol of support for the 

members of the democratic opposition, as they continue 

their struggle inside the country. Many of those who have 

fled from the oppression inside Burma have supported the 

U.S. position and have called for other countries to follow 

the U.S. lead. 

The Administration continues diplomatic efforts, at all 

levels, to encourage other nations to sustain pressure on 

the Burmese junta. Some governments are able to offer little more than public support for a democratic transition, 

but it is through such sustained public messages that an 

atmosphere of change can come to Burma. U.S. punitive 

measures and calls for others to follow suit have not damaged U.S. relations with countries other than Burma. To 

date no other country has implemented U.S.-style economic sanctions. Cooperation on Burma issues with other 

members of the international community continues at the 

UN and in other multilateral fora, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Financial Action Task Force. 

II. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

USG EFFORTS

The United States has a broad range of sanctions in 

place including those enacted in 2003 and renewed in 

2004: a ban on all imports from Burma; a ban on the exVerDate Aug 04 2004 17:33 Jul 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\SR101.XXX SR101
5 

port of financial services from the United States or by U.S. 

persons to Burma; and, an asset freeze on certain named 

Burmese institutions. The United States also expanded existing visa restrictions to include the managers of stateowned enterprises and their immediate family members. 

The Treasury Department reports that it blocked over 

$900,000 worth of transactions between October 2004 and 

March 2005. Over the same period, the Treasury Department issued 42 licenses authorizing the release of blocked 

funds or otherwise prohibited transactions. By July 30, 

2003, U.S. banks maintaining correspondent accounts with 

Burmese banks had blocked the balances in those accounts, an amount that exceeds $320,000. Other measures 

put in place against the Burmese junta before 2003 include 

a ban on new investment in Burma, a ban on arms sales 

to Burma, limits on humanitarian assistance to Burma, 

and a provision directing relevant U.S. officials to vote 

‘‘no’’ on loans or assistance to Burma by international financial institutions. 

Inside Burma, U.S. Embassy officials maintain frequent 

and active contacts with representatives of the democratic 

opposition and major ethnic groups to learn their views of 

the situation. Meetings with members of multilateral organizations and other diplomatic missions likewise help focus 

the international community’s efforts in support of national reconciliation. Although Embassy officials have limited contact with Burmese Government officials due to the 

poor state of bilateral relations, even limited contact is important to urging reform and facilitating communication 

by all parties. The continued detention of senior officials of 

the NLD as well as over 1,300 political prisoners by the 

military junta blocks progress toward national reconciliation. The United States continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. 

The United States coordinates with other members of 

the international community in support of democratic 

change in Burma. The United States has consistently cosponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly and 

the UN Commission on Human Rights that condemn the 

human rights situation in Burma and call for national reconciliation. Such resolutions support the efforts of UN Secretary General Special Envoy Razali Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. 

U.S. representatives participate in other UN discussions 

on Burma. Then-Ambassador Danforth sent a letter to UN 

Secretary General Annan in November 2004 urging action 

on Burma. Similarly, U.S. participants in meetings of the 

ILO have been supportive of ILO efforts to eliminate the 

use of forced labor in Burma and to respect fundamental 

workers’ rights. 

EFFORTS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS

No other nation has imposed economic sanctions as severe as those imposed by the United States. Nonetheless, 

during 2003 and 2004, many states indicated concern for 

6 

the situation in Burma and instituted new or expanded 

measures to promote democracy and human rights. In 

2003, the European Union (EU) expanded its existing visa 

and travel restrictions and its asset freeze list to include 

a broader set of Burmese who benefit from the oppressive 

policies of the junta. The EU also has in place a ban on 

arms sales and limits on assistance to the government. In 

April, the EU renewed measures announced in 2004, including a ban on extending credit to a list of Burmesestate run enterprises, and an even more restrictive visa 

ban. The EU also calls on its members to vote against assistance to Burma by international financial institutions, 

though they are not required to do so. The EU has traditionally drafted the annual General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights resolutions on Burma. 

The United Kingdom has called on its companies to review their investments in Burma. Canada has also expressed concern for the lack of progress in Burma and imposed visa and travel restrictions on Burmese officials following the May 30, 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and 

her supporters. 

Norway has sanctions similar to the EU, banning arms 

sales and enforcing a broad visa ban and asset freeze. In 

addition, Norway has been a supporter of the Burmese 

exile movement and hosts a radio service dedicated to providing uncensored information to those inside Burma. 

Japan has frozen all new development assistance to the 

government in response to the May 30 attacks. However, 

Japan does continue funding, on a case-by-case basis, certain humanitarian programs, democracy capacity-building 

projects, and those projects supporting economic structural 

reform. Senior Japanese officials, including Prime Minister 

Koizumi, have called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi 

and progress toward democratization. 

Since May 30, 2003 Australia has deferred its recurring 

human rights training program and put certain agricultural assistance programs on hold. Australian officials 

have also called publicly for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release. 

The majority of ASEAN members continue to consider 

events in Burma to be an internal matter, although there 

are indications some ASEAN governments are pressing 

Burmese leaders on democracy behind the scenes. The 

United States continues its dialogue with countries in the 

region and has made clear the important role that ASEAN 

has to play in encouraging reform. Administration officials 

have noted to ASEAN counterparts that the United States 

will not send senior representatives to ASEAN meetings 

hosted by Burma absent significant political reform. 

While we share with Thailand the goal of advancing democracy in Burma, our approaches differ. Thailand is unlikely to change its national policy of engagement or adopt 

sanctions against Rangoon. Thailand, however, has played 

a critical role for many years as a refuge to Burmese fleeing their country, and we have stressed to the Thai the importance of continuing to fulfill this role and supporting 

7 

UNHCR in its work with Burmese refugees. The ‘‘Bangkok 

Process,’’ organized by Thailand in 2003, was a planned series of meetings of interested governments discussing the 

political situation in Burma with the Burmese Government. It is now moribund due to Burma’s refusal to attend 

the meeting scheduled for April 2004. 

China continues to be Burma’s primary financial, and 

one of its primary military, supporters. Chinese officials 

participated in the Bangkok Process, though they did not 

make any public statements critical of the government’s 

presentation. China has, however, expressed support for 

national reconciliation. We have raised our concerns about 

Burma in discussions with China. 

India has neither provided strong public support for the 

democratic opposition nor called for an improvement in the 

human rights situation. Since the 1990s, India has vied 

with China for influence in Burma, sending high-level delegations, including a July 2003 visit by the Commerce 

Minister and a November 2003 visit by the Vice President, 

and offering significant financial and diplomatic support. 

Senior General Than Shwe paid a state visit to India in 

October 2004, during which several economic agreements 

and a Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Traditional 

Security were signed. Burma has also cooperated with 

India on the question of Indian insurgent groups operating 

out of Burmese territory. 

UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

The United States supports the work UN Special Envoy 

Razali Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio 

Pinheiro. However, neither has been allowed to visit 

Burma in well over a year. Secretary General Kofi Annan 

hosted a meeting with interested governments in September 2004 to discuss the situation on the ground in 

Burma, The Secretary General has also issued a number 

of statements calling upon the Burmese authorities to include the democratic opposition in the National Convention and to release all political prisoners. 

The UN country team inside Burma has focused its efforts on a range of humanitarian issues. The United States 

backs UN initiatives to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 

support returned refugees, and fight narcotics. The UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and humanitarian assistance for the communities 

of Muslim Burmese in Northern Rakhine State [Rohingya] 

who have returned to Burma after fleeing to Bangladesh 

in 1991. UNHCR representatives continued efforts in eastern Burma to assess conditions for the large-scale return 

of refugees from Thailand. U.S. officials in Rangoon maintain close communication with UN counterparts. 

8 

III. EFFECTS OF TRADE-RELATED MEASURES

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

The junta continues to follow its seven-point ‘‘roadmap 

to democracy,’’ which it announced allowing international 

pressure, including new U.S. trade and financial sanctions, 

in 2003. A key component of the roadmap is the National 

Convention to draft a new constitution. The junta handpicked pro-regime delegates to attend the Convention, refused to include the NLD or pro-democracy groups, and 

prohibited free and open debate. The Convention’s most recent session adjourned on March 31, 2005. Absent the participation of the democratic opposition and ethnic minority 

political groups, the National Convention does not reflect 

the true political aspirations of the Burmese people, nor 

does it serve as a real forum for the meaningful dialogue 

that is needed to achieve genuine national reconciliation. 

Given these deep flaws, any constitution that emerges 

from the National Convention, and any subsequent referendum or general election would by extension lack legitimacy, and would not constitute meaningful steps toward 

the establishment of democracy in Burma. The junta has 

not announced a timetable for a transition to democracy. 

In December 2004, the junta extended the detention of 

Aung San Suu Kyi for an additional year, and restricted 

her access to medical care and contacts with the outside 

world, leaving her virtually incommunicado. In February 

2005, authorities also extended the detention of National 

League for Democracy Vice Chairman U Tin Oo, and arrested Hkun Htun Oo, head of the Shan Nationalities 

League for Democracy—Burma’s second largest political 

party. 

In recent months, there have been limited contacts between the military junta and Burma’s largest remaining 

ethnic insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU). 

If a final agreement between the parties is reached, it 

could end over five decades of conflict, and could open up 

Karen and Mon states for badly needed international economic and humanitarian assistance and the eventual voluntary repatriation of thousands of refugees from Thailand 

with UNHCR involvement and the return home of thousands of internally displaced persons. Over twenty groups 

have concluded cease-fire agreements with the junta. 

The Burmese junta’s dismal economic policies have led 

to widespread poverty and the flight of most foreign investors from the country. Likewise, Burma’s dreadful employment situation reflects decades of economic mismanagement by the Burmese Government. However, the 2003 

U.S. ban on Burmese imports had an impact on at least 

one sector of the economy: the garment industry. The result was the closure of more than 100 garment factories, 

which had already been in dire economic straits before losing the U.S. market. There was an initial estimated loss 

of around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs. However, new orders from 

importers in EU member countries, Canada and Latin 

9 

America helped remaining factories continue production 

and factories that had previously closed to re-hire some 

workers. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

Despite the Burmese Government’s purported desire to 

make progress toward democracy, its extremely poor 

human rights record has worsened over the past year, and 

it has continued to commit serious abuses. The State Department produces an annual report on the human rights 

situation in Burma. In 2004, the report noted that the 

Burmese Government’s extremely poor human rights 

record continued to deteriorate. The junta extended for at 

least another year the unjustified detentions of Nobel 

Peace Prize Laureate and leader of the National League 

for Democracy (NLD) Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Vice 

Chair U Tin Oo. The report also noted that citizens of 

Burma still do not have the right to change their government, and that security forces have continued to commit 

extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocate persons, 

use forced labor, and reestablish forced conscription of the 

civilian population into militia units. The military junta 

continues to be hostile to all forms of political opposition. 

With the exception of its Rangoon headquarters, all of the 

NLD’s offices remain closed. Arrests and disappearances of 

political activists continue, and members of the security 

forces torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. The government has allowed two visits by Amnesty International (the latest in 2003) and maintained cooperation with the International Committee of the Red 

Cross. 

Our expanded sanctions represent a clear and powerful 

expression of American opposition to the developments in 

Burma over the past two years and signal strong support 

for the pro-democracy movement. Sanctions are a key component of our policy in bringing democracy to Burma and 

have been a key source of support for the morale of many 

democracy activists. 

IV. EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS POLICY ON BROADER POLICY

INTERESTS AND RELATIONS

U.S. steadfastness sends a clear signal to the junta of 

U.S. support for change. The measures in place have the 

broad backing of Burmese democracy activists. 

Although the EU and others have taken some steps, no 

other country has taken measures as strong as those of the 

United States. We continue diplomatic efforts at all levels 

to urge other countries to adopt broad sanctions similar to 

ours or other targeted approaches to dealing with Burma. 

We have found that many in the international community 

have a different view on how best to achieve our shared 

goals in Burma. 

The trade-related sanctions implemented pursuant to 

the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 have 

10 

had a limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations. 

Although some foreign businesses and their representative 

embassies have complained about the impact on their operations, all who have invested in Burma have done so recognizing the difficult operating environment and overall 

poor economic climate fostered by the junta. Furthermore, 

many U.S. and other companies had already pulled out of 

Burma prior to the passage of the Burmese Freedom and 

Democracy Act of 2003. 

The NLD remains very supportive of U.S. sanctions and 

urges additional steps to pressure the government. However, some other opposition politicians have questioned 

whether the sanctions have any chance of success without 

the participation of ASEAN and other regional countries 

and, if not, whether they are worth the pain caused to 

Burmese workers. 

CONCLUSION

International pressure and support for the Burmese democracy movement continues to be essential for promoting 

change in Burma. However, the import ban implemented 

in 2003 would be far more effective if countries importing 

Burma’s high-value exports (such as natural gas and timber), which also tend to have closer economic links with 

the SPDC, would join us in our actions. Other U.S. measures, such as the ban on new investment in Burma and 

the ban on the export of financial services to Burma, would 

also be more effective were the EU and others to take 

similar steps. The Administration remains unwavering in 

its support for the establishment of democracy and a greatly improved human rights situation in Burma. 

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, July 12, 2005. 

Hon. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, 

Chairman, Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 18, approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom 

and Democracy Act of 2003. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Emily Schlect. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, Director. 

Enclosure. 

11 

S.J. Res. 18—Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 

Summary: S.J. Res. 18 would renew for one year the ban of all 

imports from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108–61) and was 

set to expire on July 28, 2004. Public Law 108–272 renewed the 

ban for one year through its current expiration on July 28, 2005. 

The import restrictions may be lifted if the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military regime of Burma, has made 

substantial and measurable progress to end violations of human 

rights, implemented a democratic government, and met its obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also would have the authority to terminate the restrictions 

upon the request of a democratically elected government in Burma 

or waive them in the national interest. CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 2005 and by $1 million in 2006, with 

no effect thereafter. CBO estimates enacting S.J. Res. 18 would not 

affect federal spending. 

By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18 

would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot estimate the cost of 

those mandates for two reasons. First, information on the value of 

lost profits to importers resulting from the ban are not available. 

Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO should measure the 

cost of extending a mandate relative to the mandate’s current costs 

or assume that the mandate will expire and measure the costs of 

the mandate’s extension as if the requirement were new. For those 

reasons, CBO cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost 

of the mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted 

annually for inflation). 

S.J. Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 

in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of S.J. Res. 18 is shown in the following table. 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

CHANGES IN REVENUES 

Estimated Revenues ..................................................................... (1) ¥1 0 0 0 0 

1 Loss of less than $500,000. 

Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 18, the President would have 

the authority to lift or waive the ban that would be imposed by the 

resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President 

would not exercise this authority before the termination of the oneyear ban. 

Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission on 

recent U.S. imports from Burma, information from several government agencies, and CBO’s most recent forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 18 would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 2005 and by $1 million in 

2006, net of income and payroll tax offsets. 

12 

In recent years, over half of all U.S. imports from Burma have 

been knitted or crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports include apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain 

types of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious 

and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties collected on 

these imports came from knitted and crocheted articles. CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be replaced with imports from other countries. 

The President could remove the ban on imports upon the request 

of a democratically elected government in Burma or if he were to 

determine and notify Congress that to do so is in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. companies would be allowed 

to resume importation of goods produced, manufactured, grown, or 

assembled in Burma. It is unclear whether or when the President 

would exercise the authority to lift or waive the ban on imports 

from Burma. If such an action were taken during the 2005–2006 

period, the impact on federal revenues would be reduced accordingly. 

Estimated impact on the private sector: By renewing the ban on 

all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18 would impose private-sector 

mandates as defined in UMRA. CBO cannot estimate the cost of 

those mandates for two reasons. First, information on the value of 

lost profits to importers resulting from the ban are not available. 

Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO should measure the 

cost of extending a mandate relative to the mandate’s current costs 

or assume that the mandate will expire and measure the costs of 

the mandate’s extension as if the requirement were new. For those 

reasons, CBO cannot determine whether the aggregate direct cost 

of the mandates would exceed the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted 

annually for inflation). 

Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments: S.J. 

Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in 

UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Revenues: Emily Schlect. Impact 

on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell. Impact 

on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant Director 

for Tax Analysis. 

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION 

AND OTHER MATTERS 

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the 

resolution will not significantly regulate any individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy of individuals, and will 

result in no significant additional paperwork. 

The following information is provided in accordance with section 

423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub. 

L. No. 104–04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S.J. 

Res. 18 as approved by the Committee on June 29, 2005. In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. No. 104–04, the Committee 

has determined that the bill contains no intergovernmental manVerDate Aug 04 2004 17:33 Jul 15, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR101.XXX SR101
13 

dates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not affect the budgets 

of State, local, or tribal governments. 

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW 

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 

the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law made 

by S.J. Res. 18, as ordered reported. 

Æ