a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Statement

Before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, May 3, 2005 Military Base Closures

Observations on Prior and 

Current BRAC Rounds

Statement of Barry W. Holman, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-05-614
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-614.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry Holman 

at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-614, a statement 

before the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission 

May 3, 2005

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES 

Observations of Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds 

DOD indicates that recommendations from the previous BRAC rounds were 

implemented within the 6-year period mandated by law. As a result, DOD 

estimated that it reduced its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent; 

about 90 percent of unneeded BRAC property is now available for reuse. 

Substantial net savings of approximately $29 billion have been realized over 

time. Most communities surrounding closed bases are continuing to recover 

from the impact of BRAC and faring well compared with average U.S. rates 

for unemployment and income growth. In examining DOD’s proposed 

closures and realignments, the Commission may want to ensure that all 

proposed closure and realignment actions can be implemented within the 

mandated 6-year period recognizing property transfers may take longer. 

DOD’s expectations for the 2005 BRAC round include the traditional 

emphasis on eliminating unneeded infrastructure and achieving savings. It 

also expects to use BRAC to further transformation and related efforts such 

as restationing of troops from overseas as well as efforts to further joint 

basing among the military services. DOD’s preliminary assessment of excess 

capacity completed outside the BRAC process in 2004 to help justify the 

2005 round has led to much speculation about the percentage of bases likely 

to close. While DOD’s assessment gave some indication of excess capacity 

across certain functional areas, GAO’s assessment showed the methodology 

had significant limitations, such as use of varying capacity metrics among 

the military services for similar type facilities. As a result, it is difficult to use 

that data to make a reliable projection of total excess capacity across DOD, 

or projections of number of bases likely to close. Further, the methodology 

neither fully considered the potential impact of major force structuring and 

other rebasing changes nor the impact of analyzing facilities or functions on 

a joint or cross-service basis, a priority for the 2005 round. As a result, we 

await the results of DOD’s proposed closures and realignments to see the 

extent of potential capacity reduction and how the results of this round 

compare with prior rounds. The Commission may want to look at such 

measures as projected net reduction in plant replacement value or square 

footage of space as reduction indicators. 

The 2005 BRAC round process follows a historical analytical framework 

with many elements of the process being carried forward or building upon 

lessons learned from the past. A key part of that framework is the selection 

criteria which essentially follow a framework similar to that employed in 

prior BRAC rounds, with more specificity in selected areas mandated by 

Congress. The Commission may want to be aware of changes for the 2005 

round based on lessons learned from the past related to such issues as 

privatizing functions in place as a closure option, considering total cost to 

the government in evaluating closure and realignment recommendations, 

clarifying the size of reserve enclaves that may be created, and strengthening 

the emphasis on cross-servicing of selected functions and increased 

jointness in basing decisions. 

The Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990, as 

amended, authorized a new round 

of base realignment and closures 

(BRAC) in 2005, the fifth such 

round in recent years but the first 

since 1995. The legislation requires 

the Secretary of Defense to submit 

his list of bases recommended for 

closure and realignment to an 

independent BRAC commission by 

May 16, 2005. The Commission is 

charged with reviewing these 

recommendations and submitting 

its report with recommendations to 

the President for his acceptance or 

rejection of them in their 

entirety by September 8, 2005. 

Subsequently, Congress has final 

action to accept or reject the 

recommendations in their entirety 

later this year. By law, GAO 

is mandated to review the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

process and recommendations 

and to report its findings by 

July 1, 2005. 

For the inaugural hearing of the 

2005 BRAC Commission GAO was 

asked to address: (1) the status of 

implementing recommendations 

from previous BRAC rounds, 

(2) DOD’s expectations for the 

2005 BRAC round, and (3) the 

analytical framework for the 2005 

BRAC round. GAO offers some 

suggestions for the Commission to 

consider as it prepares for the 

2005 BRAC round. 
Page 1 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:

I am pleased to have the opportunity today to provide you with an overview 

of our work involving the Department of Defense’s (DOD) base realignment 

and closure (BRAC) process and give some context for the challenging task 

before you through a retrospective view of prior rounds and some 

perspectives on the unfolding 2005 round that the BRAC Commission may 

want to consider. My testimony today addresses the (1) status of 

implementing the recommendations from the four prior BRAC rounds; 

(2) Secretary of Defense’s expectations for BRAC 2005 and the difficulty in 

getting a handle on the amount of excess capacity that may be reduced; and 

(3) analytical framework for the previous and current BRAC process, and 

how changes related to the 2005 round could affect the work of this year’s 

Commission.

GAO has played a long-standing role in the BRAC process. As requested by 

congressional committees (1988 BRAC round) or mandated by law since 

1990, we have served as an independent and objective observer of the 

BRAC process and have assessed and reported on DOD’s decision-making 

processes leading up to proposed realignment and closure 

recommendations in each of the four prior rounds. To make informed and 

timely assessments, we have consistently operated in a real-time setting 

since the 1991 BRAC round and have had access to portions of the process 

as it has evolved, thus affording the department an opportunity to address 

any concerns we raised on a timely basis. We have been observing the 2005 

BRAC process since DOD’s initial work began on the 2005 round. Because 

of our ongoing monitoring of DOD’s BRAC 2005 process, and some access 

to the internal workings of that process, any comments by me today 

regarding specifics of the 2005 round must of necessity be somewhat 

limited because of nondisclosure requirements that remain in place until 

DOD releases its list of recommended closures and realignments later this 

month.

In preparing this testimony, we relied largely on our prior work related to 

assessing BRAC decision-making processes and implementation of the 

previous four rounds. Appendix I has a listing of our previous reports on 

the base realignment and closure process. Our previous work was 

performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 2 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Summary DOD reported that as of September 30, 2001, it had taken all necessary 

actions to implement the recommendations of the BRAC Commissions for 

the four prior rounds. As a result, DOD estimated that it had reduced its 

domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent measured in terms of facilities 

plant replacement value.1

 The following summarize the status of 

recommendations with respect to property transfer, savings, and economic 

recovery of communities affected by the last four rounds.

• BRAC recommendations were implemented within the 6-year period 

mandated by law. As of September 2004, DOD data show that about 

72 percent (about 364,000 acres) of the approximately 504,000 acres of 

unneeded BRAC property from the previous four rounds had been 

transferred to other federal and nonfederal entities.2

 When leased 

acreage is added to property that has already been transferred, the 

amount of unneeded BRAC property that is available for reuse rises to 

90 percent. About 140,000 acres have not yet been transferred, primarily 

because of delays resulting from environmental cleanup requirements 

that DOD is obligated to address to ensure that former base property is 

cleaned up to a level sufficiently safe for its intended reuse. In looking at 

the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations for the 2005 BRAC round, 

the Commission may want to assure itself that all proposed closure and 

realignment actions can be implemented within the mandated 6-year 

period. Property transfers are not subject to the 6-year implementation 

period.

• Based on our analysis of DOD data, the department generated 

substantial net estimated savings (estimated total savings minus costs) 

of about $29 billion through fiscal year 2003 from the previous four 

BRAC rounds, and it expects to save about $7 billion annually thereafter. 

Our work has shown that these savings actually reflect cost avoidances, 

that is, money that DOD would likely have needed to operate BRAC 

bases had they remained open. At the same time, our reviews have 

found that DOD’s savings estimates are not precise but instead rough 

approximations of the likely savings, in part because the military 

services have not regularly updated their estimates over time and 

1

 DOD defines plant replacement value as the cost to replace an existing facility with a 

facility of the same size at the same location, using today’s building standards.

2

 In this statement, “transferred property” refers to property that has been deeded to another 

user; it does not include leased property.
Page 3 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

because DOD’s accounting systems are not oriented toward identifying 

and tracking savings. From the BRAC Commission perspective, it is 

important to note that historically most reported DOD savings result 

from reductions in operation and maintenance and military personnel 

costs.

• Most communities surrounding closed bases are continuing to recover 

from the impact of BRAC. DOD data show that almost 85 percent of 

local DOD civilian jobs that were lost on bases as a result of 

realignments and closures have been replaced through development of 

the properties. Two key economic indicators—the unemployment rate 

and the average annual real per capita income growth rate—show that 

BRAC communities are generally doing well when compared with 

average U.S. rates. As we have reported in the past, the recovery process 

has not necessarily been easy with the strength of the national economy 

and the diversity of local economies having a significant bearing on the 

recovery of any particular community facing a BRAC closure. From the 

BRAC Commission perspective, few bases were eliminated from closure 

or realignment in prior rounds due to economic impact, but this is an 

issue the Commission will hear much about as it engages communities 

affected by the Secretary’s proposed closures and realignments.

DOD’s expectations for the 2005 BRAC round include the traditional 

emphasis on eliminating unneeded infrastructure and achieving savings, 

but they also extend to using BRAC to further transformation efforts such 

as restationing of troops from overseas as well as improving joint basing 

among the military services. Nevertheless, much emphasis has been given 

to estimating the amount of excess capacity in advance of the BRAC round 

and that has led to much speculation about the number or percentage of 

bases that are likely to close. That is a tougher issue to deal with than it 

might seem on the surface as evidenced by an earlier assessment of excess 

capacity that DOD was required to complete in advance of the BRAC 

round. The results of that analysis were included in a 2004 report to 

Congress3

 in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round. While that report 

did give indications of excess capacity, our work shows the analysis did not 

give a well-grounded assessment of total excess capacity across DOD or 

the potential for achieving greater efficiencies in use of that capacity. It has 

also led to much speculation on the number of bases likely to be closed in 

this BRAC round. Our analysis indicated that DOD’s methodology for that 

3

 Report required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.
Page 4 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

report had limitations, such as use of varying capacity metrics among the 

military services for similar type facilities, that made it difficult to get a 

precise reading on excess capacity across various functional areas, and 

made it even more difficult to credibly project a total amount of excess 

capacity across DOD. Moreover, in completing its analysis, the military 

services assessed their bases as though they were being used for a single 

function, and did not consider either the existing or the potential for 

increased multi-functional/joint use that was identified as an objective of 

the 2005 BRAC round—and which provides the potential for better 

identifying excess capacity or opportunities to use existing capacity more 

efficiently for multiple purposes. As a result, we must await the results of 

DOD’s proposed closures and realignments to see the extent of capacity 

reductions and to determine how this round compares with prior rounds in 

that regard. The Commission may want to look at such measures as 

projected net reduction in plant replacement value or square footage of 

space as meaningful indicators of the magnitude of reductions in BRAC 

2005.

The BRAC process follows a historical analytical framework with many 

elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons 

learned from previous rounds. First, the selection criteria essentially follow 

a framework that is similar to that employed in previous BRAC rounds, 

with more specificity in selected areas—especially in those that speak to 

military value. In this regard, the criteria give priority to military value and 

incorporate such factors as joint warfighting, training, readiness, and the 

ability to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements, as is 

called for in the fiscal year 2002 legislation.4

 In addition, the 2005 round is 

expected to incorporate several lessons learned from the previous rounds, 

such as privatizing functions in place rather than closing facilities and 

moving affected work to other locations, not always considering total cost 

to the government when examining individual closure or realignment 

decisions, clarifying the size of reserve enclaves that may be created when 

bases are closed or realigned, and strengthening the role of the joint crossservice teams.

4

 P.L. 107-107, section 3002 (Dec. 28, 2001).
Page 5 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Background To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign other bases, Congress 

enacted legislation that instituted BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 

1995.5

 A special commission established for the 1988 round made 

realignment and closure recommendations to the Senate and House 

Committees on Armed Services. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, 

special BRAC Commissions were set up, as required by legislation, to make 

specific recommendations to the President for his approval, who in turn 

sent the Commissions’ recommendations to Congress. The four 

Commissions generated 499 recommendations—97 major closures and 

hundreds of smaller base realignments, closures, and other actions.6

 Of the 

499 recommendations, 451 required action; the other 48 were modified in 

some way by a later commission. DOD was required to complete BRAC 

realignment and closure actions for the 1988 round by September 30, 1995, 

and for the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds within 6 years from the date the 

President forwarded the recommended actions to Congress.

Legislation authorizing the BRAC rounds has also stipulated that closure 

and realignment decisions must be based upon selection criteria, a current 

force structure plan, and infrastructure inventory developed by the 

Secretary of Defense. Further, the selection criteria were required to be 

publicized in the Federal Register to solicit public comments on the criteria 

before they were finalized. The criteria historically have included four 

related to military value, one related to return on investment, and three 

related to community impacts. However, the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 20027

 required DOD to give priority to the criteria 

dealing with military value for the 2005 BRAC round.

5

 The 1988 round was completed under the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base 

Closure and Realignment Act (P.L. 100-526, Title II (Oct. 24, 1988), as amended). The last 

three rounds were completed under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 

(P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX (Nov. 5, 1990), as amended).

6

 The number of recommendations may vary depending on how they are categorized. In this 

report, the recommendations include closures, realignments, disestablishments, 

relocations, and redirections. In a closure, all missions that are carried out at a base either 

cease or relocate, while in a realignment, a base remains open but loses and sometimes 

gains missions. “Disestablishments” and “relocations” refer to missions; those 

disestablished cease operations, while those relocated are moved to another base. 

“Redirections” refer to cases in which a BRAC Commission changes the recommendation of 

a previous commission.

7

 P.L. 107-107, Section 3002 (Dec. 28, 2001).
Page 6 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

While DOD has closed or realigned bases as recommended by the various 

BRAC Commissions, other actions, such as the cleanup of environmentally 

contaminated property and the subsequent transfer of unneeded property 

to other users, have extended beyond the 6-year implementation period for 

each round. Once DOD no longer needs BRAC property, the property is 

considered excess and is offered to other federal agencies. As shown in 

figure 1, any property that is not taken by other federal agencies is then 

considered surplus and is disposed of through a variety of means to state 

and local governments, local redevelopment authorities,8

 or private parties.

Figure 1: DOD’s Usual Procedures for Transferring Property

The various methods noted in figure 1 to convey unneeded property to 

parties external to the U.S. government are targeted, in many cases, to a 

particular end use for the property. For example, under a public benefit 

conveyance, state and local governments and local redevelopment 

authorities acquire surplus DOD property for such purposes as schools, 

parks, and airports for little or no cost. Under an economic development 

conveyance, property is transferred for uses that promote economic 

recovery and job creation. Conservation conveyances, which were 

introduced in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2003,9

 provide for the transfer of property to a state or political 

subdivision of a state or qualified not-for-profit groups for natural resource 

8

 A local redevelopment authority is any authority or instrumentality established by a state 

or local government and recognized by the Secretary of Defense, through the Office of 

Economic Adjustment, as the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with 

respect to an installation or for directing implementation of the (land reuse) plan. 

9

 P.L. 107-314, § 2811, 2812 (Dec. 2, 2002).

Excess Surplus

Other

defense

activities

Other

federal

agencies

Public benefit conveyance

 Economic development conveyance

 Conservation conveyance

 Lease termination/expiration

 Negotiated and public sale

 Special legislation

Source: GAO.
Page 7 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

and conservation purposes. Property can, in other cases, also be conveyed 

to nonfederal parties through the other cited methods as shown in figure 1 

without regard, in many cases, to a particular end use. For example, 

property can be sold or special congressional legislation can dictate 

transfer to a particular entity.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200210 extended the 

authority of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, with 

some modifications, to authorize an additional BRAC round in 2005. 

The 2002 legislation also required the Secretary of Defense to publish in the 

Federal Register the selection criteria proposed for use in the BRAC 2005 

round and to provide an opportunity for public comment. The proposed 

selection criteria were published on December 23, 2003, with a public 

comment period ending January 30, 2004. The final criteria were published 

on February 12, 2004. The criteria for the 2005 BRAC round continue the 

tradition of having four criteria related to military value that are to be given 

priority consideration, and four others that require consideration. As 

discussed more fully later in this statement, while the eight criteria 

essentially follow a framework similar to that employed in previous BRAC 

rounds, greater specificity was added to selected criterion as mandated by 

Congress for the 2005 round.

Status of Prior BRAC 

Recommendations

Following the adoption of the previous BRAC recommendations, DOD 

declared 504,000 acres of property as unneeded and available for transfer 

to other federal or nonfederal entities. As of September 30, 2004, DOD had 

transferred about 72 percent of that property while 28 percent had not been 

transferred, due primarily to the need for environmental cleanup. 

According to DOD data, the BRAC recommendations have generated 

substantial savings—an estimated $29 billion in savings or cost avoidances 

through fiscal year 2003, with expectations of an additional $7 billion in 

annual net recurring savings thereafter. Finally, while BRAC can have a 

traumatic short-term effect on communities in the vicinity of closing or 

realigning bases, most nearby communities continue to recover from BRAC 

actions. Our analysis of key economic indicators shows that most 

communities are generally faring well in terms of national averages for 

unemployment and income growth rates.

10 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001).
Page 8 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Implementation of Previous 

Recommendations and 

Status of Property Transfers

DOD reported that as of September 30, 2001, it had taken all required 

actions to implement the recommendations of the BRAC Commissions for 

the four rounds.11 Currently, of the approximately 504,000 unneeded acres 

available for disposal external to DOD, 72 percent have been transferred 

either to other federal or nonfederal entities, while 28 percent, including 

leased acreage, remain in DOD’s inventory. A breakdown of the current 

status of unneeded BRAC property shows that as of September 30, 2004 

(1) 52 percent had been transferred to nonfederal entities, (2) 20 percent 

had been transferred to other federal agencies, (3) 18 percent had been 

leased but not transferred, and (4) 10 percent was untransferred and is 

awaiting future disposition (see fig. 2).

11 The 1995 BRAC round recommendation to close family housing units on Fort Buchanan, 

Puerto Rico, was not implemented because the National Defense Appropriations Act for 

Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-262, Section 8142 (Oct. 17, 1998), authorized the Secretary of 

Defense to retain all or a portion of the units to support the U.S. Army South’s (USARSO) 

relocation from Panama to Fort Buchanan. On September 30, 2003, USARSO officially 

completed a further restationing from Puerto Rico to Texas.
Page 9 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Figure 2: Disposition of Unneeded BRAC Acreage

Note: As part of the BRAC process, DOD retained approximately 350,000 acres for reserve 

component use.

Even though DOD has 140,000 acres of its BRAC property remaining to be 

transferred, much of this land is in long-term lease with other users. 

Altogether, the services have nearly 91,000 acres (65 percent) of their 

untransferred property under lease, leaving 49,000 acres (35 percent) that 

has not been transferred and is not in reuse. The department expects that 

this property will eventually be transferred to nonfederal users. Leased 

property, while not transferred to the user, can afford the user and DOD 

some benefits. Communities, for example, can opt for leasing while 

awaiting final environmental cleanup as an interim measure to promote 

property reuse and job creation. By adding leased acres to the number of 

transferred acres, the amount of unneeded BRAC property that is in reuse 

rises to 90 percent.

10% •

Untransferred 

49,000

18% • Untransferred (but leased)

91,000

20% • Transferred to federal

entities 

100,000

52%

•

Transferred to nonfederal

entities 

264,000

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.

Total acreage = 504,000
Page 10 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

What may be different for this BRAC round is that Congress, in authorizing 

the 2005 BRAC round, gave renewed emphasis to seeking fair market value 

in disposing of BRAC property12 and we have seen evidence of this in 

recent land sales by the Navy for some remaining property disposals from 

prior BRAC rounds. It is too soon for us to know to what extent land sales 

will occur in implementing results of the 2005 round in comparison with 

other forms of property disposal such as no-cost economic development 

conveyances, or transfers to other federal agencies. While this is not an 

issue that bears directly on the Commission’s task of assessing the 

Secretary’s recommendations, it could be an issue that will arise in your 

contacts with communities as you complete your task.

While DOD has closed or realigned bases as recommended by the various 

BRAC Commissions, other actions, such as the cleanup of environmentally 

contaminated property and the subsequent transfer of unneeded property 

to other users, continue beyond the 6-year implementation period for each 

round. As we have reported in the past, environmental cleanup constraints 

have delayed the military services from rapidly transferring unneeded 

BRAC property. Army data show that about 82 percent of the Army’s 

approximately 101,000 untransferred acres have some kind of 

environmental impediment, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO)13 or some 

level of chemical contamination that requires cleanup before transfer can 

take place. Navy data show that about 65 percent of the Navy’s almost 

13,000 untransferred acres could not be transferred because of 

environmental reasons. Likewise, about 98 percent of the Air Force’s 

approximately 24,000 untransferred acres is attributable to environmental 

cleanup issues. While the Commission is likely to be confronted with the 

issue of environmental cleanup in examining the Secretary’s 

recommendations, complete information is not always fully available 

during the time frame for the Commission’s work since cleanup costs are 

affected by yet-to-be-developed reuse plans.

12 P.L. 107-107, Section 3006 (Dec. 28, 2001).

13 UXO is ordnance that remains unexploded either through malfunction or design and can 

injure personnel or damage material. Types of UXO include bombs, missiles, rockets, 

artillery rounds, ammunition, or mines. DOD, Defense Environmental Restoration Program 

Annual Report to Congress—Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C., April 2004), Appendix F, 

page F-21. In this report UXO also refers to munitions and explosives of concern.
Page 11 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Net Savings Estimates for 

the Prior BRAC Rounds 

Remain Substantial

Our analysis of DOD data shows that the department had accrued an 

estimated $29 billion in net savings or cost avoidances through fiscal year 

2003 for the four previous BRAC rounds.14 In calculating net savings, DOD 

deducts the costs of implementing BRAC actions for the four closure 

rounds from the estimated savings. As figure 3 shows, the cumulative 

estimated savings surpassed the cumulative costs to implement BRAC 

actions in 1998, and the net savings have grown and will continue to grow 

from that point, even though some costs (e.g., environmental cleanup) have 

been incurred after that time and some costs will continue for a number of 

years until cleanup or required monitoring is completed.

Figure 3: Cumulative BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates for the Previous Rounds through Fiscal Year 2003

14 This does not include about $1.9 billion in costs incurred by other DOD and federal 

agencies to provide assistance to communities and individuals impacted by BRAC. DOD 

estimates of annual recurring savings beyond fiscal year 2003 do not take into account the 

estimated $3.6 billion in costs that are needed to complete environmental cleanup at BRAC 

bases.

Dollars in billions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Fiscal year

Cumulative BRAC costs

Cumulative BRAC savings

End of 

implementation 

period for 

1995 round

Net savings 

or cost 

avoidances

of $28.9 

billion

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.

52.2

23.3
Page 12 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Our analysis shows that the rate of net savings accumulation has increased 

over time because the cumulative BRAC costs flattened out just before the 

6-year implementation period for the last round ending in fiscal year 2001.

Most expenses associated with closures and realignments were incurred 

through fiscal year 2001; most of the expenses beyond fiscal year 2001 were 

primarily incurred for environmental cleanup. Through fiscal year 2003, the 

cumulative costs to implement the four previous round actions amounted 

to about $23.3 billion. As shown in figure 4, approximately one-third 

($7.8 billion) of this amount was spent for operations and maintenance, 

such as the maintenance and repair needed to keep facilities and 

equipment in good working order, as well as civilian severance and 

relocation costs. A little more than one-third ($8.3 billion) was spent on 

environmental cleanup and compliance activities, for example, to reduce, 

remove, and recycle hazardous wastes and to remove unsafe buildings and 

debris from closed bases. Finally, a little less than one-third ($6.7 billion) 

was used for military construction at bases that were not closed, including 

renovating existing facilities and constructing new buildings to 

accommodate relocating military units and various functions.
Page 13 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Figure 4: Costs Incurred for Prior BRAC Rounds through Fiscal Year 2003

As figure 5 shows, DOD estimates that it accrued BRAC savings of 

$52.2 billion through fiscal year 2003 as a result of eliminating or reducing 

operation and maintenance costs, including base support costs, and 

eliminating or reducing military and civilian personnel costs. Of this 

amount, about half ($26.8 billion) can be attributed to savings from 

operation and maintenance activities, such as terminating or reducing 

physical security, fire protection, utilities, property maintenance, 

accounting, civilian payroll, and a variety of other services that have 

associated costs. An additional $14.7 billion in estimated savings resulted 

from military personnel reductions.

2% Other 

$500 million

29% • Military construction 

$6.7 billion 

33% • Operations and maintenance

$7.8 billion

36%

•

Environmental cleanup

$8.3 billion

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.

Total = $23.3 billion

•
Page 14 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Figure 5: Estimated Savings Breakout for Prior BRAC Rounds through 

Fiscal Year 2003

Based on the previous rounds, the Commission should expect that the 

majority of the savings from the 2005 recommendations will result from 

reductions in operation and maintenance and military personnel costs.

Most Affected Communities 

Are Recovering from Prior 

BRAC Rounds

While the short-term impact can be very traumatic, several factors, such as 

the strength of the national, regional, and local economies, play a role in 

determining the long-term economic impact of the base realignment or 

closure process on communities. Our work has shown that recovery for 

some communities remains a challenge, while other communities 

surrounding a base closure are faring better. As DOD last reported, as of 

September 30, 2004, almost 85 percent (110,086) of the 129,649 DOD 

civilian jobs lost on military bases as a result of realignments or closures in 

the previous BRAC rounds had been replaced at these locations as the 

properties were redeveloped. I want to emphasize that this recovery figure 

does not include other jobs created off the bases. Appendix II gives a 

detailed listing of jobs lost and created at major BRAC locations during the 

2% Military construction 

$1.0 billion

4% Family housing 

$2.0 billion 

15%• Other 

$7.7 billion

28%•

•

•

Military personnel 

$14.7 billion

51%•

Operations and maintenance

$26.8 billion

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.

Total: $52.2 billion (exclusive of implementation costs)
Page 15 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

last four rounds. In addition, two key economic indicators—the 

unemployment rate and the average annual real per capita income growth 

rate—show that BRAC communities are generally doing well when 

compared with average U.S. rates. Since 1997 (after completion of the 

implementation periods for the first two rounds, in 1988 and 1991) and 

through the implementation periods of the past two rounds (1993 and 

1995), about 70 percent of the 62 BRAC-affected communities have 

consistently been at or below the national unemployment rate. 

Appendix III provides more information on the average unemployment 

rates and on the average annual real per capita income growth rates for 62 

communities affected by previous BRAC actions.

Our previous reports have pointed out a number of factors that can affect 

economic recovery including the robustness of the national economy, 

diversity of the local economy, and assistance from various federal 

agencies to facilitate recovery efforts. By way of comparison, I would note 

that the national unemployment rate at the time of the 1995 round was

5.4 percent; today it is 5.2 percent.

We have previously reported that as of September 30, 2004, federal 

agencies reported that they had spent about $1.9 billion for such purposes 

as base reuse planning, airport planning, job training, infrastructure 

improvements, and community economic development. These activities 

include the following:

• About $611 million was provided by the Department of Commerce’s 

Economic Development Administration to assist communities with 

infrastructure improvements, building demolition, and revolving fund 

loans.

• About $760 million was provided by the Federal Aviation Administration 

to assist with converting former military airfields to civilian use.

• About $223 million was provided by the Department of Labor to help 

communities retrain workers who lost their jobs.

• About $280 million was provided by DOD’s Office of Economic 

Adjustment to help communities plan and implement the reuse of BRAC 

bases.

While economic impact is one of the selection criteria used in BRAC 

decision making, few bases were eliminated from closure or realignment 
Page 16 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

consideration in previous rounds because of potential economic impact. 

Having said that, I would point out that while, from an economic impact 

standpoint, BRAC is most known for the losses suffered by communities, 

some communities gained missions and personnel as the result of BRAC 

decisions. The 2005 BRAC round could potentially have a greater impact on 

gaining communities than in past rounds since this round is expected to be 

used to inform decisions on placement of units and thousands of personnel 

returning from overseas in implementing the results of the department’s 

separate overseas basing study. Also, there are major force structure 

changes underway in the Army with the creation of new units of action 

which expand on existing brigade sizes. Each of these could impact 

community infrastructure in many areas such as housing and schools. 

However, we will not have a clear indication of any such expanded impacts 

until the Secretary’s BRAC recommendations are made public in a few 

days.

DOD’s Expectations 

for BRAC 2005

DOD recognized at the time it was completing its recommendations for the 

1995 BRAC round that excess infrastructure would remain and that 

additional closures and realignments would be needed in the future. The 

BRAC 2005 round continues the goal of previous rounds of reducing excess 

infrastructure within the department and achieving savings that could be 

applied to other priorities. However, DOD expanded the focus of BRAC 

2005 to include transformation issues, to accommodate restationing of 

forces from overseas, and to improve jointness efforts among the military 

services.

In a memorandum dated November 15, 2002, the Secretary of Defense 

issued initial guidance outlining goals for the 2005 BRAC round. He noted 

that, at a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity—

the operation, sustainment, and recapitalization of which diverts scarce 

resources from defense capability. At the same time, the Secretary’s 

guidance depicted the round as focusing on more than simply reducing 

excess capacity. He stated that the round could make an even more 

profound contribution to transforming the department by rationalizing its 

infrastructure and defense strategy. He further noted that another primary 

objective of the round was to examine opportunities for greater joint 

activity.

While the broader goals of BRAC 2005 have increased traditional interest in 

the potential outcome of this BRAC round, great public attention has been 

devoted to the issue of excess capacity and how many bases are likely to be 
Page 17 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

closed in this round. While we await the Secretary’s announcement of 

proposed closures and realignments in a few days, the Commission may 

want to review an earlier assessment of excess infrastructure capacity that 

DOD was required to complete in advance of the BRAC round which has 

led to much public speculation about what could result from this round. 

The result of that analysis was included in a 2004 report to Congress in 

justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round. Although that report did give 

indications of excess capacity, our work shows the analysis on which it 

was based did not provide a well-grounded assessment of total excess 

capacity across DOD or the potential for achieving greater efficiencies in 

use of that capacity. It also led to much speculation on the number of bases 

likely to be closed in this BRAC round.

DOD’s analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 report, which was 

completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, indicates the presence of 

excess capacity across certain functional areas through fiscal year 2009. 

However, the limitations of the methodology used for that analysis, such as 

use of varying capacity metrics among the military services for similar type 

facilities, prevented it from giving a precise indication of excess capacity 

across all classes of facilities. This raises questions about the 

appropriateness of its use to project a total amount of excess capacity 

across DOD. Furthermore, DOD’s methodology did not analyze facilities or 

functions on a joint or cross-service basis to determine any additional 

excess capacity, but such a cross-service analysis is a priority for the 2005 

round. Moreover, it did not fully consider the impact of force structure 

changes underway and the planned restationing of thousands of forces 

from overseas bases. Based on this, it is problematic for anyone to try to 

add up these diverse measures and point to a single cumulative figure of 

excess capacity. Even more problematic are efforts to translate this figure 

to a set percentage of bases that are likely to be closed.

While previous BRAC rounds have focused primarily on reducing excess 

capacity, DOD officials have stated that in addition to that goal, the 2005 

BRAC round aims to further transform the military by correlating base 

infrastructure to the force structure, and enhancing joint capabilities by 

improving joint utilization. That approach takes you past the point of 

simply focusing efforts on reducing excess infrastructure and generating 

savings. As a result, we must await the results of the Secretary of Defense’s 

closure and realignment recommendations to see how the extent of 

capacity reduction proposed in this round compares to that in prior rounds. 

If you are looking for indicators of capacity reduction in BRAC 2005, the 

Commission may want to focus on such measures as net reduction in plant 
Page 18 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

replacement value or square footage of space. While these are not allinclusive indicators, they should give you some sense of the potential 

impact of the 2005 round.

2005 BRAC Analytical 

Framework Builds on 

Historic Structure

The framework used in the 2005 BRAC round continues the historical 

framework used in previous rounds. The Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990 led to the creation of what has become a 

structured process for making BRAC recommendations and one that gives 

the public insight into the basis for recommendations made by the 

Secretary of Defense. Selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round preserve 

a framework similar to that used in earlier BRAC rounds, with specificity 

added in several areas that pertain to military value. In addition, the 

framework for the 2005 round is expected to incorporate several lessons 

learned from the previous rounds, related to privatization in place, total 

cost to the government, reserve enclaves, and cross-service issues.

Requirements to Ensure 

Fairness of BRAC Process

Closing unneeded defense facilities has historically been difficult because 

of public concern about the economic effects of closures on communities 

and the perceived lack of impartiality in the decision-making process. A 

variety of requirements or procedures have been either mandated by the 

1990 act, as amended, or adopted by DOD over time to ensure the fairness 

and objectivity of the base closing process. Some of these requirements or 

procedures include:

• All installations must be compared equally against selection criteria and 

a current force structure plan must be developed by the Secretary of 

Defense.

• Decisions to close military installations with authorization for at least 

300 civilian personnel must be made under the BRAC process. Decisions 

to realign military installations authorized for at least 300 civilian 

personnel that involve a reduction of more than 1,000—or 50 percent or 

more of the civilian personnel authorized—also must undergo the BRAC 

process. DOD components retain the option of including 

facilities/activities that fall below the threshold.

• Selection criteria for identifying candidates for closure and realignment 

must be made available for public comment before being finalized.
Page 19 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

• All components must use specific models for assessing (1) the cost and 

savings associated with BRAC actions and (2) the potential economic 

impact on communities affected by those actions.

• Information submitted for use by the Secretary of Defense or the 

Commission in the BRAC decision-making process must be certified-–

that is, certified as accurate and complete to the best of the originator’s 

knowledge and belief. This requirement was designed to overcome 

concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in the 

process.

• An independent commission is required to review DOD’s proposed 

closures and realignments and to finalize a list of proposed closures and 

realignments to be presented to the President for his review and 

subsequent submission to Congress.

• The BRAC Commission is required to hold public hearings.

• The BRAC process imposes specific time frames for completing specific 

portions of the process.

• The President and Congress are required to accept or reject the 

Commission’s recommendations in their entirety.

• In addition to GAO’s legislatively mandated role in reporting on the 

BRAC process, the military service audit agencies and DOD Inspector 

General personnel are extensively involved in auditing the process to 

better ensure the accuracy of data used in decision making and enhance 

the overall integrity of the process.

An important tool used in the BRAC process for analyzing estimates of 

costs and savings for potential recommendations is the Cost of Base 

Realignment Actions (COBRA) model. This model has been used in the 

base closure process since 1988, with improvements made to the model in 

the intervening years. We noted in 1995 that two of the more significant 

actions affecting BRAC 1995 were the validation of the COBRA model by 

the Army Audit Agency and a greater emphasis on using standard cost 

factors. Refinements to the model historically have been initiated and 

controlled by a COBRA Joint Process Action Team. We will be reporting on 

recent efforts to update the model in our upcoming report on the BRAC 

2005 process.
Page 20 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

In the interim, it is important to distinguish between the use of the COBRA 

model for evaluating alternative closure and realignment scenarios and use 

of other efforts to produce more refined cost and budget data for 

implementing BRAC decisions. Differences between COBRA and budget 

quality data used in implementing BRAC decisions include the following. 

First, COBRA estimates, particularly those based on standard cost factors, 

are averages, which are later refined for budget purposes. Further, COBRA 

costs are expressed in constant-year dollars; budgets are expressed in thenyear (inflated) dollars. 

Our work in examining lessons learned from previous BRAC rounds found 

general agreement that the previous legislation and the framework it 

established served the process well, and general agreement that this 

framework would be useful for a future round.15 That is not to say that the 

previous process was perfect or entirely devoid of concerns over the role of 

politics in the process. As we have previously noted, we recognize that no 

public policy process, especially none as open as BRAC, can be completely 

removed from the U.S. political system. However, the elements of the 

process noted above provide several checks and balances to hold political 

influences at a minimum. That said, the success of these provisions 

requires that all participants of the process adhere to the rules and 

procedures.

15 See GAO/NSIAD-97-151.
Page 21 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Selection Criteria for 2005 

Round Continue Sound 

Framework Used in Prior 

Rounds

The department’s final selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round 

essentially follow a framework similar to that employed in previous BRAC 

rounds, with specificity added in selected areas in response to 

requirements mandated by Congress. The 2002 legislation authorizing the 

2005 BRAC round required that DOD give priority to military value and 

consider (1) the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness; 

(2) the availability and condition of training areas suitable for maneuver by 

ground, naval, or air forces throughout diverse climates and terrains, and 

staging areas for use by the armed forces in homeland defense missions; 

and (3) the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future 

force requirements. The legislation also required DOD to give 

consideration to other factors, many of which replicated criteria used in 

previous BRAC rounds. Further, the legislation required DOD to consider 

cost impacts to other federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC 

decision making. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 200416 required DOD to consider surge requirements in the 2005 

BRAC process. Table 1 compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with those 

adopted for 2005, with changes highlighted in bold.

16 P.L. 108-136, section 2822, (Nov. 24, 2003). 
Page 22 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Table 1: BRAC Criteria from 1995 and Those Adopted for 2005

Source: GAO based on information from DOD and legislation (emphasis bolding added by GAO to denote changes from 1995).

I want to note that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 codified these criteria in its entirety.17

Our analysis of lessons learned from previous BRAC rounds affirmed the 

soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their retention for 

the future, while recognizing the potential for improving the process by 

which the criteria are used in decision making.18 Adoption of these criteria 

adds to the approach an element of consistency and continuity with those 

of the past three BRAC rounds.

Criteria for 1995 round Criteria for 2005 round

Military value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on 

operational readiness of DOD’s total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and 

future total force requirements at both the existing and 

potential receiving locations.

4. Cost and manpower implications.

Return on investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including 

the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of 

the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Community impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving 

communities’ infrastructures to support forces, missions, and 

personnel.

8. The environment impact.

Military value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the Defense Department’s total force, 

including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by 

ground, naval, or air forces throughout diversity of climate 

and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the 

Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both 

existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, 

and future total force requirements at both existing and 

potential receiving locations to support operations and 

training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including 

the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of 

the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity 

of military installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and 

potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, 

and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs 

related to potential environmental restoration, waste 

management, and environmental compliance activities.

17 P.L. 108-375, Section 2832 (Oct. 28, 2004).

18 See GAO/NSIAD-97-151.
Page 23 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Apart from changes to DOD’s criteria required by legislation, DOD received 

a variety of comments on the draft criteria once they were published for 

comment in the Federal Register in December 2003, but did not make any 

changes before issuing the final criteria in February 2004. Most of these 

comments were on the four military value criteria and centered on the 

maintenance of adequate surge capacity; the roles military installations 

fulfill in homeland defense missions; the unique features of research, 

development, test, and evaluation facilities; and the preservation of vital 

human capital in various support functions. In responding to those 

comments, DOD expressed the view that the draft criteria adequately 

addressed these issues and DOD did not see the need to make any changes 

to its draft criteria. For example, DOD said that surge requirements will be 

addressed under criterion one, which requires the department to consider 

“current and future mission capabilities,” and criterion three, which 

requires DOD to consider an installation’s ability to “accommodate 

contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements” to support 

operations and training.

Collectively, in our view, many of the public comments on DOD’s criteria 

expressed concern that the criteria for the 2005 BRAC round focused more 

on assessing military value based on military missions and operational 

capabilities without recognizing important support capabilities such as 

research, development, test, and evaluation. Although modifications to the 

criteria might have been made to address some of these concerns, the 

absence of such changes did not indicate that these issues would not be 

considered in applying the criteria during the BRAC process. For example, 

the department has established a variety of joint cross-service groups19 to 

analyze various support functions during the upcoming round and each 

group has had to adapt the selection criteria to assess military value related 

to each functional area. Historically, in assessing military value DOD 

components typically identify multiple attributes, facets, or evaluative 

components related to each military value criteria, then identify a number 

of qualitative metrics and numerous questions to collect data to support the 

overall military value analysis. Our July report on the 2005 process will 

highlight the use of military value criteria by each service and cross-service 

group.

19 DOD has established seven joint cross-service groups to examine the following defense 

functional support areas—industrial, technical, medical, headquarters and support 

activities, supply and storage, education and training, and intelligence—during the 2005 

BRAC process.
Page 24 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Lessons Learned from 

Previous Rounds Have 

Implications for 2005 BRAC 

Round

Our prior work has identified several lessons learned from the conduct 

of the prior BRAC rounds that we believe you should be aware of in 

reviewing DOD’s proposed closure and realignment recommendations 

for the 2005 round and finalizing your decisions on the merits of those 

recommendations. These lessons learned relate directly to the 

development of individual recommendations and include issues related to 

(1) the privatization-in-place of specific DOD facilities; (2) the 

consideration of total costs to the government in implementing specific 

recommendations; (3) the retention of property and facilities, typically 

referred to as enclaves, on closing bases; and (4) the consideration of 

cross-servicing in fostering jointness in the decision-making process.

Privatization-in-place The 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds were notable for a few recommendations 

that resulted in functions being privatized-in-place rather than being closed 

with the work moved to another location. In December 1999,20 we reported 

that privatization-in-place had not optimized reductions in excess capacity 

in DOD’s infrastructure, but that it can allow for some cost savings in the 

overall public-private defense infrastructure. Rather than closing facilities 

to reduce excess capacity, privatization-in-place enables the workload to 

remain at those sites. As a result, DOD continues to support costs 

associated with maintaining that facility infrastructure through rates 

charged by the contractors for the work performed. We concluded that 

privatization-in-place would only be a more cost-effective alternative if 

contractors can achieve savings that are significant enough to offset the 

savings lost by not relocating workloads to DOD’s underutilized facilities. 

In enacting authority for the 2005 BRAC round, Congress stipulated that 

privatization-in-place can occur only if it is specified in the Commission 

recommendations and determined by the Commission to be the most costeffective method of implementing the recommendation.21 I am not in a 

position today to say to what extent this will be a factor in the 2005 round, 

but I did want to bring this to your attention in case it does become an issue 

during your deliberations.

20 GAO, Military Base Closures: Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness Analyses of 

Privatization-in-Place Initiatives, GAO/NSIAD-00-23 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 1999).

21 P.L. 107-107, Section 3004 (Dec. 28, 2001).
Page 25 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Total cost to the government Our report on the 1995 BRAC process noted that although the proposed 

closure of one Air Force base would decrease the Air Force’s overhead, it 

could result in an increase in operational costs to the Department of 

Energy. We reiterated a concern we had made in an earlier BRAC round 

that some DOD BRAC decisions excluded consideration of costs that may 

be incurred by other federal agencies, and we recommended that DOD at 

least disclose such costs. In enacting authority for the 2005 BRAC round, 

Congress stipulated that the selection criteria related to cost or savings of 

proposed closures would have to take into account the effect of the 

proposed action on the costs of any other DOD activity or any other federal 

agency.22 I am not in a position today to say to what extent this may be an 

issue in the 2005 BRAC round but did want to bring it to your attention for 

its potential consideration.

Reserve enclaves The four previous BRAC Commissions recommended 27 actions in which 

either a reserve enclave or similar reserve presence was to be formed at a 

base that was to be closed or realigned. In June 2003,23 we reported that the 

specific infrastructure needed for many reserve enclaves was generally not 

identified until after the base closure and realignment commission for a 

closure round had rendered its recommendations. According to Army 

officials, while the Army had generally decided it wanted to retain much of 

the available training land for its enclaves prior to completion of 

commission decision making during the 1995 round, time constraints 

precluded the Army from fully identifying the specific training acreages and 

facilities needed until after the commission made its recommendations. 

Consequently, while some of the commission’s recommendation language24

for the 1995 closure round suggested that many Army reserve enclaves 

would retain minimum essential facilities, the language was nevertheless 

sufficiently general to allow the Army wide flexibility in creating such 

enclaves. Subsequently, several enclaves were created by the Army that 

were nearly as large as the closing bases on which they were located. In 

contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force enclaves was more clearly 

22 P.L. 107-107, Section 3002 (Dec. 28, 2001).

23 GAO, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves, 

GAO-03-723 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003).

24 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1995 Report to the President 

(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 1995). The report recommendation language generally provided 

that the Army bases be closed or realigned, except that minimum essential ranges, facilities, 

and training areas be retained for reserve component use.
Page 26 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

defined during the decision-making process and subsequent commission 

recommendations were more specific than those provided for the Army. 

Table 2 provides a comparison of the reported size and number of facilities 

of pre-BRAC bases with those of post-BRAC enclaves for DOD’s 10 major 

enclaves.

Table 2: DOD Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC Base Acreage and Facilities for Bases Where Major Reserve Enclaves Were Created

Source: DOD.

Note: “Major” reserve enclaves refer to those enclaves with more than 500 acres. “Pre-BRAC” refers to 

base data at the time of the BRAC Commission recommendation while “Post-BRAC” refers to enclave 

data as of the end of fiscal year 2002. Percentages are rounded to nearest whole number.

Number of acres Square footage of facilities

Service Base Pre-BRAC Post-BRAC

Percent

retained Pre-BRAC Post-BRAC

Percent

retained

Army Fort Hunter 

Liggett

164,762 164,272 100 836,420 832,906 100

Fort Chaffee 71,381 64,272 90 4,839,241 1,695,132 35

Fort Pickett 45,145 42,273 94 3,103,000 1,642,066 53

Fort Dix 30,997 30,944 100 8,645,293 7,246,964 84

Fort 

Indiantown 

Gap

17,797 17,227 97 4,388,000 1,565,726 36

Fort McClellan 41,174 22,531 55 6,560,687 873,852 13

Fort Devens 9,930 5,226 53 5,610,530 1,537,174 27

Air Force March Air 

Force Base

6,606 2,359 36 3,184,321 2,538,742 80

Grissom Air 

Force Base

2,722 1,380 51 3,910,171 1,023,176 26

Homestead Air 

Force Base

2,916 852 29 5,373,132 867,341 16

Total 394,430 351,386 89 46,450,795 19,823,079 43
Page 27 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

We also reported that the Army did not include estimated costs to operate 

and maintain most of its major reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated 

base savings during the decision-making process. Our analysis as well as 

that of the Army Audit Agency25 showed that the omission of these costs 

had a significant impact on the estimated savings and payback periods26—

important considerations in the realignment and closure decision-making 

process—for several of these bases. In particular, the estimated savings 

were overstated and the estimated payback periods were understated for 

those specific bases. DOD concurred with our recommendation that in 

BRAC 2005 it should ensure that data provided to the BRAC Commission 

clearly specify the (1) infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage 

of facilities) needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated 

costs to operate and maintain such enclaves. To the extent that DOD 

proposes the creation of enclaves in the 2005 round, the Commission may 

want to ensure that both infrastructure requirements and costs to operate 

and maintain the enclaves are clearly identified and factored in relevant 

BRAC recommendations.

Cross-service issues While previous BRAC rounds were generally effective in dealing with 

basing decisions within individual services and defense agencies, they did 

not provide an adequate forum for resolving cross-service issues. While 

some cross-service emphasis occurred in the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, 

their contributions were essentially marginalized by a process that was 

largely driven by the individual military services. Our previous lessons 

learned report27 noted that parochial interests and disagreements among 

the services over evaluations of their facilities served as barriers to 

achieving significant cross-service agreements in 1993 and 1995. As a 

result, the department missed opportunities to reduce its infrastructure in 

various support-functional areas.

25 The Army revised its estimate of costs and savings from these actions following an Army 

Audit Agency review of this issue in July 1997.

26 A payback period is the time required for cumulative estimated savings to exceed the 

cumulative estimated costs incurred as a result of implementing BRAC actions.

27 GAO, Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds, 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997).
Page 28 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

A primary objective of BRAC 2005 is to examine and implement 

opportunities for greater joint activity. Based on lessons learned from 

previous efforts to analyze jointness, the Secretary of Defense has 

established seven joint cross-service groups28 to analyze common businessoriented support functions. Each group is chaired by a senior member of 

the department and includes representatives from each service. The joint 

cross-service groups were empowered to make recommendations directly 

to the Infrastructure Steering Committee, the group established by the 

Secretary of Defense to oversee the analyses of the joint cross-service 

groups and ensure integration of that process with the military 

departments. This suggests the potential for these cross-service groups to 

have a stronger role in the 2005 BRAC process than they had in the past.

In conclusion, we have completed much work to date in monitoring DOD’s 

decision-making process but much work remains to finalize our review and 

issue our report by the mandated July 1 time frame. From a front-end 

perspective, we have gained much insight observing the military services 

and cross-service teams developing and implementing their plans for 

completing their analyses, and identifying and analyzing potential closure 

and realignment scenarios. However, we still have much work to do before 

finalizing and issuing our report to meet our congressionally mandated 

reporting time frame. In the time remaining, as DOD’s candidate 

recommendations are finalized, we will be looking back through the 

process examining the collection of recommendations against the 

framework of DOD’s selection criteria, its objectives for the round, and 

with a special emphasis on cost and savings. I look forward to discussing 

the results of our work with you and your staff once our work is completed. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions 

you or other Members of the Commission may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this statement, please contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581. Individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include Michael Kennedy, James Reifsnyder, Tom Mahalek, 

Alissa Czyz, and Cheryl Weissman.

28 These teams are Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities, Industrial, 

Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. 
Page 29 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Appendix I

Key Previous GAO Reports on DOD’s Base 

Realignments and Closures ApendxiI

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignment and 

Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for 

a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 

Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve 

Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior 

Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002.

Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 

Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.

GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 

Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds.

GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but 

Not Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations 

for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: 

April 14, 1995.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection 

Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.
Appendix I

Key Previous GAO Reports on DOD’s Base 

Realignments and Closures

Page 30 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: 

May 15, 1991.

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and 

Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.: 

November 29, 1989.
Page 31 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Appendix II

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major 

BRAC Locations Affected by the Previous 

Four Rounds ApendxiI

The closure or realignment of military bases creates job losses at these 

facilities, but subsequent redevelopment of the former bases’ property 

provides opportunities for creating new jobs. The data presented in table 3 

include civilian jobs lost and created at major base realignments and 

closures during the previous four BRAC rounds, as of September 30, 2004. 

The data do not include the job losses that may have occurred elsewhere in 

a community, nor do they capture jobs created from other economic 

activity in the area.

Table 3: Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major Locations Affected by Four Previous BRAC Rounds (as of September 30, 2004)

Major base BRAC round

Estimated jobs

lost

Estimated jobs

created

Recovery

(percent)

Alameda Naval Air Station and Naval Aviation Depot, Calif. 1993 3,228 1,448 45

Barbers Point Naval Air Station, Hawaii 1993 618 100 16

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, N.J. 1995 2,015 995 49

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Tex. 1991 927 4,359 470

Carswell Air Force Base, Tex. 1991 869 271 31

Castle Air Force Base, Calif. 1991 1,149 2,326 202

Cecil Field Naval Air Station, Fla. 1993 995 1,615 162

Chanute Air Force Base, Ill. 1988 1,035 1,869 181

Charleston Naval Complex, S.C. 1993 6,272 2,797 45

Chase Field Naval Air Station, Tex. 1991 956 1,018 106

Eaker Air Force Base, Ark. 1991 777 509 66

El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, Calif. 1993 979 123 13

England Air Force Base, La. 1991 682 1,963 288

Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Colo. 1995 1,612 1,116 69

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. 1991 1,050 1,171 112

Fort Devens, Mass. 1991 2,178 4,180 192

Fort McClellan, Ala. 1995 2,156 2,028 94

Fort Ord, Calif. 1991 2,835 2,020 71

Fort Pickett, Va. 1995 245 272 111

Fort Ritchie, Md. 1995 1,373 42 3

Fort Sheridan, Ill. 1988 1,681 0 0

Gentile Air Force Station, Ohio 1993 2,804 1,800 64

George Air Force Base, Calif. 1988 506 1,631 322

Glenview Naval Air Station, Ill. 1993 389 4,098 1,053

Griffiss Air Force Base, N.Y. 1993 1,341 1,297 97
Appendix II

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major 

BRAC Locations Affected by the Previous 

Four Rounds

Page 32 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Grissom Air Force Base, Ind. 1991 792 1,036 131

Guam Naval Complex 1993 2,193 552 25

Homestead Air Force Base, Fla. 1993 136 423 311

Hunters Point Annex Naval Shipyard, Calif. 1991 93 1,150 1,237

Indianapolis Naval Air Warfare Center, Ind. 1995 2,196 1,776 81

Jefferson Proving Ground, Ind. 1988 387 179 46

Kelly Air Force Base, Tex. 1995 10,912 5,296 49

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Mich. 1993 788 1,202 153

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pa. 1995 2,512 916 36

Lexington Army Depot, Ky. 1988 1,131 1,316 116

Long Beach Naval Complex, Calif. 1991 4,487 3,975 89

Loring Air Force Base, Maine 1991 1,311 1,161 89

Louisville Naval Ordnance Station, Ky. 1995 1,435 822 57

Lowry Air Force Base, Colo. 1991 2,275 5,666 249

March Air Force Base, Calif. 1993 997 678 68

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Calif. 1993 7,567 1,363 18

Mather Air Force Base, Calif. 1988 1,012 4,498 444

McClellan Air Force Base, Calif. 1995 8,828 3,469 39

Memphis Defense Distribution Depot, Tenn. 1995 1,289 1,045 81

Memphis Naval Air Station, Tenn. 1993 250 148 59

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, S.C. 1991 784 1,571 200

New York (Staten Island) Naval Station, N.Y. 1993 1,001 0 0

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio 1993 1,760 944 54

Norton Air Force Base, Calif. 1988 2,133 4,551 213

Oakland Military Complex, Calif. 1993 2,834 487 17

Ogden Defense Distribution Depot, Utah 1995 1,105 2,468 223

Orlando Naval Training Center, Fla. 1993 1,105 412 37

Pease Air Force Base, N.H. 1988 400 5,124 1,281

Philadelphia Defense Distribution Supply Center, Pa. 1993 1,485 1,270 86

Philadelphia Naval Complex, Pa. 1991 8,119 2,775 34

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, N.Y. 1993 352 1,096 311

Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. 1988 3,150 1,087 35

Red River Army Depot, Tex. 1995 386 183 47

Reese Air Force Base, Tex. 1995 1,238 468 38

Sacramento Army Depot, Calif. 1991 3,164 1,900 60

San Diego Naval Training Center, Calif. 1993 402 120 30

(Continued From Previous Page)

Major base BRAC round

Estimated jobs

lost

Estimated jobs

created

Recovery

(percent)
Appendix II

Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major 

BRAC Locations Affected by the Previous 

Four Rounds

Page 33 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Source: DOD Office of Economic Adjustment.

Savanna Army Depot, Ill. 1995 436 103 24

Seneca Army Depot, N.Y. 1995 273 1,205 441

Sierra Army Depot, Calif. 1995 374 7 2

Stratford Army Engineering Plant, Conn. 1995 1,400 0 0

Tooele Army Depot, Utah 1993 1,942 907 47

Treasure Island Naval Station, Calif. 1993 454 282 62

Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, Calif. 1991 348 16 5

Vint Hill Farms Station, Va. 1993 1,472 901 61

Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center, Pa. 1991 2,311 789 34

Watertown AMTL, Mass. 1988 540 1,167 216

Williams Air Force Base, Ariz. 1991 728 3,704 509

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Mich. 1991 690 830 120

Total: 73 bases 129,649 110,086 85

(Continued From Previous Page)

Major base BRAC round

Estimated jobs

lost

Estimated jobs

created

Recovery

(percent)
Page 34 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

Appendix III

Economic Recovery at Major BRAC LocationsApendxiI

Unemployment rates in BRAC-affected communities continue to compare 

favorably with the national average. Since 1997 (after completion of the 

implementation periods for the first two rounds in 1988 and 1991) and 

through the implementation periods of the last two rounds (1993 and 1995), 

about 70 percent of the 62 BRAC-affected communities have consistently 

been at or below the national unemployment rate (see fig. 6).

Figure 6: Comparison of the Percentage of 62 BRAC-Affected Communities at or 

below the Average National Unemployment Rate over Time

According to our analysis of the annual unemployment rates for the 

7-month period ending July 31, 2004, most of the 62 BRAC-affected 

communities compared favorably with the national average and were 

consistent with the results we reported in 2002. During this period, 43 of 

the 62 communities (69 percent) affected by base closures had 

unemployment rates at or below the average 7-month national rate of 

5.8 percent. This is one less community than in our 2002 report, when 

44 communities (71 percent) had average unemployment rates lower than 

the (then) average 9-month national rate of 4.6 percent. For all BRAC 

communities with higher-than-average calendar year 2004 unemployment 

rates through July 2004, 4 had double-digit rates: Merced County, California 

Percentage

0

20

40

60

80

100

1988 

(5.5)

1997 

(5.1)

2001 

(4.6)

2004

(5.8)

Year (national rate)

60

68

71 69

Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.
Appendix III

Economic Recovery at Major BRAC Locations

Page 35 GAO-05-614 Military Base Closures

(Castle Air Force Base), 15.8 percent; Mississippi County, Arkansas (Eaker 

Air Force Base), 13.0 percent; Salinas, California (Fort Ord Army Base), 

11.1 percent; and Iosco County, Michigan (Wurtsmith Air Force Base), 

10.2 percent. Salinas, California, is the one addition to the other three 

communities that we also cited in our 2002 report for having double-digit 

unemployment rates.

Annual real per capita income growth rates for BRAC-affected 

communities exhibit mixed results. The latest available data (1999-2001 

time frame) show that 30 (48 percent) of the 62 communities we studied 

had an estimated average real per capita income growth rate that was 

above the national average of 2.2 percent.1

 This represents a decline from 

our 2002 report in which 33 communities (53 percent) matched or 

exceeded the national rate of 3.03 percent during the 1996-1999 time frame. 

Additionally, our current analysis shows that of the 32 communities below 

the national average, 6 communities (10 percent) had average annual per 

capita income growth rates that were close to the national average (defined 

as within 10 percent), while the remaining 26 communities (42 percent) 

were below the national average growth rate. Forty-six (74 percent) of the 

62 communities had lower per capita income growth rates than when we 

last reported on them in 2002. Three communities—Merced, California 

(Castle Air Force Base); Austin-San Marcos, Texas (Bergstrom Air Force 

Base); and Carroll County, Illinois (Savanna Army Depot)—had negative 

growth rates. By comparison, our 2002 report showed that no communities 

experienced a negative growth rate.

1

 Average annual real per capita income rates for 2002-2003 or later incorporate new Office 

of Management and Budget metropolitan area definitions that are not consistent with those 

for the communities we have assessed in this and previous BRAC update reports.

(350700)
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