Report to the Secretary of Defense

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

June 2005 MILITARY TRAINING

Better Planning and 

Funding Priority 

Needed to Improve 

Conditions of Military 

Training Ranges 

GAO-05-534 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-534.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

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Highlights of GAO-05-534, a report to the 

Secretary of Defense 

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Better Planning and Funding Priority 

Needed to Improve Conditions of Military 

Training Ranges 

GAO’s visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD’s own assessments 

show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This adversely 

affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of military personnel. To 

ensure readiness, servicemembers must have access to capable ranges—a 

key DOD transformation goal—that enables them to develop and maintain 

skills for wartime missions. However, GAO observed various degraded 

conditions at each training range visited, such as malfunctioning 

communication systems, impassable tank trails, overgrown areas, and 

outdated training areas and targets. Whenever possible, the services work 

around these conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of 

training, but officials have expressed concern that workarounds are 

becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the 

realism essential to effective training. Without adequate ranges, DOD 

compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal and 

assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for missions and 

subjected to hazards. 

DOD’s progress in improving training range conditions has been limited and 

is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to ensure that 

ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for 

warfare. First, while the services have individually taken a varying number of

key management improvement actions, such as developing range 

sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency across DOD or focus 

primarily on encroachment without including commensurate efforts on 

other issues, such as maintenance and modernization. Second, even though 

the services cannot precisely identify the funding required and used for their 

ranges, identified range requirements have historically been inadequately 

funded, as evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately addressed. 

Service officials identified a variety of factors that have exacerbated funding 

limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding decisions. 

Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either recommended or 

required specific actions, DOD has not fully implemented such actions. 

GAO’s Analysis of DOD’s Management Actions for Improving Training Range Conditions 

N/A Not applicable Action not taken Action taken but could be improved Action satisfactorily taken

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Policy

Strategic or 

implementation 

plan

Multilevel 

working

groups

Sustainable

range 

program

Range 

requirements

Systematic 

assessment

of range 

conditions and 

impacts

Web-based 

range

information

management

system

Local 

range plans

OSD N/A N/A

Army

Navy

Marine

Corps

Air Force

Military training ranges are 

important national assets and play 

a critical role in preparing military 

forces for their wartime mission. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

has reported for years that it faces 

increasing difficulties in carrying 

out realistic training at its ranges 

due to various constraints. While 

encroachment issues have had high 

visibility within DOD and the 

Congress, much less attention has 

been given to the overall conditions 

of training ranges, which can also 

have an adverse impact on training 

activities. 

This report, prepared under the 

Comptroller General’s authority, 

discusses (1) the condition of 

military training ranges and their 

impact on training activities, and 

(2) what factors are affecting 

DOD’s progress in improving 

training range conditions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

take various actions designed to 

improve training range conditions, 

including the implementation of a 

comprehensive approach to 

managing its ranges in order to 

accomplish its transformation 

goals and ensure the long-term 

viability of its ranges. DOD agreed 

with the recommendations, stating 

the department and military 

services are or will be taking steps 

to implement them. 
Page i GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6 

Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect 

Training Activities 10 

Various Factors Affect DOD’s Progress in Improving Training 

Range Conditions 20 

Conclusions 34 

Recommendations for Executive Action 35 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 39 

Appendix II Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive 

Approach for Managing Training Ranges 44 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 45 

Related GAO Products 49 

Table 

Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges 

We Visited 11 

Figures 

Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood 12

Figure 2: Tank Stuck in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of 

Hardened Crossing 14

Figure 3: Degraded Conditions at the Southern California 

Offshore Range 15

Figure 4: Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area 

with a Better Maintained and Modernized Area at 

Fort Bragg 17

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Figure 5: GAO’s Analysis of DOD’s Management Actions for 

Improving Training Range Conditions 21

Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the Fallon Range Training Complex 26

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

MOUT Military Operations on Urban Terrain 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page 1 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

June 10, 2005 

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld 

The Secretary of Defense 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

The success of our military forces in combat is directly linked to the 

effectiveness of their training beforehand. A fundamental military 

readiness principle is that the military must train as it intends to fight, and 

military training ranges provide the primary means to accomplish this 

principle.1

 However, Department of Defense (DOD) officials have reported 

for years that they face increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic 

training at their ranges due to a variety of constraints, such as those 

resulting from encroachment.2

 While encroachment issues have had high 

visibility within the department and the Congress, much less attention has 

been given to other training range constraints, such as those resulting from 

inadequate maintenance and modernization, which also has an adverse 

impact on training activities. DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report states that one of the basic tenets needed to meet its training 

transformation goal is to reverse the erosion of DOD’s training range 

infrastructure and ensure that ranges are sustainable, capable, and 

available. Because of the criticality of sustainable and capable training 

ranges to meeting the training needs of its military forces, it is imperative 

that the department addresses the full range of constraints that impact its 

training ranges. 

 1

 We use the term “training ranges” to collectively refer to airspace used to conduct 

training, live-fire and nonlive-fire and impact areas, ground maneuver areas, sea ranges 

(above or below the surface), and other operating areas. 

2

 DOD defines “encroachment” as the cumulative result of any and all outside influences 

that inhibit normal training and testing. DOD initially identified the following eight 

encroachment factors: endangered species and critical habitat, unexploded ordinance and 

munitions constituents, competition for frequency spectrum, protected marine resources, 

competition for airspace, air pollution, noise pollution, and urban growth around 

installations. Some of the emerging factors to be worked in the future are space, overseas 

ranges, water use, resource extraction, and civilian access. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

This report, with its focus on military training range conditions,3 is one in a 

series of our reports in recent years that have addressed risks associated 

with the department’s support infrastructure management. We initially 

identified DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area in the federal 

government in 1997 and, in our latest high-risk series report,4

 we pointed 

out that we continue to believe that it remains a high-risk area. Our reports 

on overall infrastructure conditions have frequently cited the 

underfunding of maintenance and repairs, resulting in deteriorating 

facilities. For the most part, our prior training range reports have focused 

on encroachment rather than issues such as appropriate range 

maintenance or modernization. A common theme in these reports has 

been the need for more comprehensive planning to include, for example, 

clearly establishing goals and milestones for tracking progress in 

addressing issues, identifying the funding needed to accomplish tasks, and 

assigning responsibility for managing and coordinating departmental 

efforts. 

In view of the department’s responsibilities to ensure the long-term 

viability and utility of its training ranges as critical national assets to meet 

the defense mission, we undertook this review to more closely examine 

training range conditions related to the maintenance and modernization of 

its ranges. We performed our work on the basis of the authority of the 

Comptroller General to evaluate U.S. governmental programs and are 

reporting the results to you because of your overall responsibilities as 

Secretary of Defense.5

 This report discusses (1) the current conditions of 

military training ranges and their impact on training activities and (2) what 

factors are affecting DOD’s progress in improving training range 

conditions. 

In performing our work, we collected and analyzed training range-related 

information from officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and 

the headquarters and selected major commands of the military services. 

We also visited eight active component training ranges located in the 

 3

 In this report we use the term “condition” to refer collectively to the physical features of 

DOD’s training ranges that rely on routine maintenance (e.g., roads and tank trails) as well 

as range capabilities to provide for modernized and realistic training environments (e.g., 

automated threat emitters, automated targets, and urban training facilities). 

4

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

5

 31 U.S.C. § 7 17(b)(1). 
Page 3 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

continental United States between June and October 2004 to observe 

training range conditions and discuss training impacts and actions taken 

to improve range conditions.6

 These ranges were selected by identifying 

the major training ranges for each service and seeking input from service 

range officials as to which ranges could best address our audit objectives. 

We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and audit reports addressing 

military training range condition and funding issues. From our review of 

these data and discussions with DOD officials, we believe that the data 

presented are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 

conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in completing 

this report as well as fulfilling congressionally mandated reporting 

requirements dealing with training range issues.7

 This work was completed 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 

more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 

appendix I. 

Our visits to eight major training ranges between June and October 2004, 

along with DOD’s own assessment, show that military training ranges are 

in varying degrees of degradation or lack necessary upgrades to meet 

current training needs, a condition that, in turn, adversely affects training 

activities and jeopardizes the safety of the military personnel using them. 

Whenever possible, servicemembers work around the degraded conditions 

by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of the training, but defense 

officials have expressed concern that these workarounds are becoming 

increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism 

essential to effective training. To ensure military readiness, 

servicemembers must have access to sustainable and capable training 

ranges—a key transformation goal—that enable them to develop and 

maintain their skills for wartime missions. However, we observed 

degraded conditions and limitations at each of the ranges we visited. 

 6

 Range locations included training areas at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 

Southern California Offshore Range, California; Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada; 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; Nellis Test and Training 

Range, Nevada; and the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona. 

7

 Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 

required OSD to report to the Congress in 2004 on a comprehensive plan to address 

training range constraints with annual updates through 2007 and for GAO to evaluate each 

of these reports. See GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not 

Fully Address Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 4, 2004). We expect to complete a separate assessment of DOD’s 2005 update after it 

is submitted to the Congress. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Collectively, these conditions included malfunctioning communication 

systems, impassable tank trails and roads that jeopardize safety,8

 training 

areas that were overgrown, inadequate number of automated targets, and 

outdated training areas and targets. At Fort Hood, erosion of the tank trails 

was such that tanks and other vehicles could not safely maneuver from 

one training area to another. DOD studies have recognized that training 

ranges are deteriorating. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

for example, stated that an aging training range infrastructure has suffered 

from underlying neglect and is in need of sustainment efforts and 

recapitalization. 9 Similarly, a number of service studies have reported 

degraded conditions. For example, a recent Navy study on the Southern 

California Offshore Range pointed out that, while 90 percent of the 

minimum antisubmarine warfare training requirements were being met, 

current range resources did not provide optimal training for over 

60 percent of the skills needed for a wartime environment.10 Without 

adequately maintained and modernized ranges, the department not only 

compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal of 

sustainable and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that its 

forces will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to safety 

hazards. 

While DOD has taken some actions designed to improve the conditions of 

its training ranges, progress has been limited, due in part to the lack of a 

comprehensive approach to improving them and ensuring that these 

ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for 

warfare. Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include several 

key elements, such as the following: well-defined policies that address all 

factors impacting range sustainability; servicewide plans that guide the 

timely execution of range sustainability actions; range requirements that 

are geared to meet both service and joint needs; adequate management of 

range funding; and a commitment to the implementation of this approach. 

While OSD and the services have individually taken a number of key 

actions to varying extents, such as developing policy and establishing 

working groups for range sustainment, these actions are incomplete, 

 8

 Tank trails are unpaved roads that allow units to travel to and from their motor pools to 

training areas safely and reduce negative impacts to the environment. 

9

 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 

2001). 

10 CNA, Assessing Training Range Capabilities: Application of a Range Resource 

Approach to SoCal ASW Training (Alexandria, Va.: November 2004). 
Page 5 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

focusing primarily on encroachment; fail to incorporate all relevant 

officials; or lack consistency. Further, even though the services cannot 

identify precisely the funding required—or allocated—to maintain and 

modernize their ranges, available information indicates that identified 

training range requirements have historically not been adequately funded. 

For example, according to training range data from Fort Stewart, the 

installation’s training range accounts were funded approximately 

44 percent for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton 

data indicated that the primary range accounts were funded approximately 

13 percent during fiscal years 1998 and 2002.11 Service officials identified a 

variety of factors that contributed to or exacerbated funding limitations, 

such as ranges being a lower priority in funding decisions. Additionally, 

although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either recommended or 

required specific actions, OSD and the services have not fully implemented 

such actions. For example, although the Senior Readiness Oversight 

Council in 2001 required the services,12 working with OSD, to prepare a 

prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and estimated 

costs for potential inclusion in the upcoming budget, the list was never 

developed or submitted for potential funding opportunities. Defense 

officials could not provide us with an explanation as to why no 

appropriate action was taken. Without a fully implemented comprehensive 

approach, DOD will be unable to ensure that it achieves the goals of its 

training transformation initiative or to ensure the long-term viability of its 

training ranges. Furthermore, the Congress will not be in a position to 

fulfill its oversight role. 

 11 For the purpose of this report, Fort Stewart’s and Camp Pendleton’s funding information 

include operations and maintenance funds, and do not include military construction 

funding. Fort Stewart’s range account also does not include facility sustainment funds. 

12 The Senior Readiness Oversight Council advises the Secretary of Defense on 

matters pertaining to DOD readiness, oversees readiness-related activities, provides 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on readiness policy matters, and provides 

reports on current and projected readiness issues. 
Page 6 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

We are making recommendations to you that are intended to improve the 

conditions at military training ranges. These recommendations are focused 

on the need for a more comprehensive approach for addressing training 

range deficiencies to ensure that ranges are sustainable and modernized, 

to provide for more realistic training, and to achieve DOD’s transformation 

goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations, stating the department and military services are or will 

be taking steps to implement them. The department also provided 

technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD’s ranges are used primarily to test weapon systems and train military 

forces; some ranges are used for both testing and training purposes, while 

others are limited to one use or the other. These ranges represent 

important national assets for the development and sustainment of 

U.S. military forces. This report focuses primarily on ranges used for 

training purposes. DOD requires ranges for all levels of training to include 

airspace for air-to-air, air-to-ground, drop zone, and electronic combat 

training; live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small arms, and munitions 

training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic force-on-force and 

live-fire training at various unit levels; and sea ranges to conduct surface 

and sub-surface maneuvers for training. In a February 2004 report to the 

Congress,13 DOD identified 70 major active-component training ranges in 

the continental United States—the Army has 35, the Navy 13, the Marine 

Corps 12, and the Air Force 10.14 The report also identified several National 

Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of military 

forces and provides oversight on training issues. The Secretaries of the 

military departments are responsible for training personnel and for 

maintaining their respective training ranges and facilities. Until recent 

years, DOD had no readiness reporting system in place for its defense 

 13 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, 

Implementation of the Department of Defense Training Range Comprehensive Plan 

(Washington, D.C.: February 2004). 

14 In this report, we refer to major training ranges as those that the services either identified 

as “primary” training ranges or those ranges used by major service combat commands, 

such as the Army’s Forces Command. 

Background 

Readiness Reporting for 

Defense Infrastructure to 

Include Training Ranges 
Page 7 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

installations and facilities, including training ranges. In fiscal year 2000, 

DOD reported to the Congress for the first time on the readiness of its 

defense infrastructure as an integral element of its overall Defense 

Readiness Reporting System. At the core of the system is a rating 

classification, typically referred to as a “C” rating. The C-rating process is 

intended to provide an overall assessment for each of nine facility classes 

(e.g., “operations and training” and “community and housing”) on a 

military installation. Training ranges fall within the operations and training 

facility class. While the services provide overall assessments by facility 

class, they may not always provide detailed separate ratings for 

installation assets, such as training ranges, within a class. With respect to 

training ranges, the Army and Marine Corps have data that provide 

C-ratings for their ranges, but the Navy and Air Force do not. 

The definitions for C-ratings are as follows: 

• C-1—only minor facility deficiencies with negligible impact on capability 

to perform missions; 

• C-2—some deficiencies with limited impact on capability to perform 

missions; 

• C-3—significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some 

missions; and 

• C-4—major facility deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission 

accomplishment. 

Although we have previously reported concerns about the consistency and 

quality of the services’ approaches to completing these assessments, their 

assessments nonetheless have shown a large portion of DOD facilities 

across all classes of facilities, which include training ranges, being rated 

either C-3 or C-4. 

To effectively support the needs of combatant commanders in the new 

strategic environment of the 21st century, DOD has undertaken a 

transformation initiative to change the way it conducts training by 

preparing military forces to learn, improvise, and adapt to constantly 

changing threats as they execute military doctrine.15 The joint national 

training capability is one of three capabilities of this initiative and calls for 

 15 We are completing a separate report that provides an overview of the training 

transformation program and the challenges the department faces in its implementation. 

DOD’s Training 

Transformation Initiative 
Page 8 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

the development of a live-virtual-constructive training environment.16 To 

meet this effort, defense planning guidance required OSD, in collaboration 

with the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces 

Command, to develop a plan to transform military training to, among other 

things, ensure that training ranges and devices are modernized and 

sustainable. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan, which 

identifies DOD’s vision, goals, and milestones, was initially issued in June 

2003 and subsequently updated in June 2004.17 Under the joint national 

training capability, DOD recognized the need for sustainable and 

modernized ranges and stated that range capabilities, such as 

instrumentation for the operating platforms, and modern range 

infrastructure are necessary to create the training environment, capture 

realistic ground situations, assess activity and performance, and promptly 

provide feedback to the training audience and serve as the foundation for 

the joint national training capability. 

In recent years, we have reviewed and reported on constraints, 

particularly those related to encroachment, on military training ranges. 

A brief summary on those reports follows: 

• In June 2004, we reported that DOD’s training range report to the 

Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, did not provide a 

comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations 

on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are available 

in the United States and overseas for training.18 We also reported that 

DOD’s training report did not fully identify available training resources, 

specific training capacities and capabilities, and existing training 

constraints; fully assess current and future training requirements; fully 

evaluate the adequacy of current resources to meet current and future 

training range requirements in the United States and overseas; or include a 

comprehensive plan with quantifiable goals or milestones to measure 

progress, or projected funding requirements needed to implement the 

 16 A live-virtual-constructive training environment is one that integrates training ranges with 

simulators to support joint training objectives at single or multiple locations. 

17 Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

18 GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address 

Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004). 

Prior GAO Reports on 

Training Ranges 
Page 9 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

plan. In response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan 

to fully address training constraints, DOD stated that the services had 

initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be 

evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not 

executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of 

its ranges. 

• In September 2003, we reported that through increased cooperation DOD 

and other federal land managers could share the responsibility for 

managing endangered species on training ranges.19

• In February 2003, we also reported that while the amount of money spent 

on facility maintenance has increased, the amounts have not been 

sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities, which include training 

ranges.20 In addition, we also reported a lack of consistency in the services’ 

information on facility conditions, making it difficult for the Congress, 

DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they are most 

needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions. 

• In April 2002, we reported that troops stationed outside of the continental 

United States face a variety of training constraints that have increased 

over the past decade and are likely to increase further.21 In June 2002, we 

reported on the impact of encroachment on military training ranges inside 

the United States with similar findings to those of the April 2002 report.22

In both reports, we stated that impacts on readiness were not well 

documented. In addition, we testified before the Congress twice on these 

issues—in May 2002 and April 2003.23

 19 GAO, Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase Interagency 

Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training Ranges, GAO-03-976

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2003). 

20 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning 

Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 19, 2003). 

21 GAO, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in 

Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2002). 

22 GAO, Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment 

on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002). 

23 GAO, Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training 

Ranges Still Evolving, GAO-03-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2003); and Military 

Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training 

Ranges, GAO-02-727T (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002). 
Page 10 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report for a more 

comprehensive list of our products related to the issues discussed in 

this report. 

Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD’s own assessments, 

show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating over 

time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions have 

adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not meeting 

DOD’s transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of military 

personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained and 

modernized ranges, the department not only compromises the opportunity 

to achieve its training transformation goal of sustainable and capable 

training ranges but also assumes the risk that its forces will be less 

prepared for its missions and subjected to safety hazards. 

Table 1 shows the wide variety of identified degraded conditions or lack of 

upgrades to meet current training needs at the ranges that we visited. The 

degraded conditions comprise both (1) those physical features of a 

training range that are subject to maintenance (e.g., tank trails and roads) 

over time and (2) those capabilities that are desirable for a modernized 

training range (e.g., automated threat emitters, automated targets, urban 

training facilities). Following the table is a discussion of degraded 

conditions that we observed. 

Degraded Conditions 

at Military 

Training Ranges 

Adversely Affect 

Training Activities 

Deficiencies Observed at 

Training Ranges We Visited 
Page 11 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges We Visited 

Training range C-ratings (2004) Identified deficiencies 

Fort Hood, Tex. C-2 Degraded tank trails and training areas; shortages in sniper, multipurpose 

machine gun, and designated marksman ranges; inadequate number of tank 

video feedback systems; Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) 

training facility not conducive to addressing current threats. 

Fort Stewart, Ga. C-3 Eroded tank trails; inadequate electrical wiring and convoy range; MOUT 

training facility does not reflect current threats; no hygiene facilities. 

Southern California Offshore 

Range, Calif. 

Not rated Nonworking undersea communication system; degraded roads; inadequate 

pier; insufficient mooring buoys and floating docks; no instrumented shallow 

water training range; insufficient and inadequate communication systems; 

shortage of realistic threats and targets. 

Fallon Range Training 

Complex, Nev. 

Not rated Electronic warfare range lacks density and current capabilities, and parts for 

current equipment are becoming obsolete; insufficient hard targets that could 

take multiple hits; insufficient time-sensitive and moving targets. 

Camp Lejeune, N.C. C-3 Overgrown vegetation; unmarked firing lanes; insufficient automated ranges; 

no instrumented feedback and scoring systems, multipurpose machine gun 

range, or convoy range; insufficient grenade ranges and elevated shooting 

positions; MOUT training facility is small and not conducive to addressing 

current threats. 

Camp Pendleton, Calif. C-2 Overgrown vegetation; range is in flood plain and lacks emergency access; 

inadequate hygiene facilities; inadequate or lacking target maintenance and 

storage facilities, elevated firing points, bullet containment, and turning and 

moving targets; insufficient automated targets; MOUT training facility not 

conducive to addressing current threats. 

Nellis Test and Training 

Range, Nev. 

Not rated MOUT training facility lacks appropriate density of buildings and scoring and 

feedback capabilities; insufficient surface-to-air missile threat systems and 

opposition forces. 

Barry M. Goldwater Range, 

Ariz. 

Not rated Inadequate or lacking MOUT training facilities, remote feedback site and 

capability, targets and scoring system on live-fire ranges, remote laser 

system, real-time or updated imagery of range, drop zone, emergency 

landing training airstrip, target identification area, and diversity of realistic 

targets; electronic warfare range lacks density and current threat capabilities, 

and parts for current equipment are becoming obsolete; inadequate 

communication systems; obsolete and insufficient recording systems for 

feedback on Army helicopters. 

Source: GAO observations and analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The C-rating in general represents the composite rating for all training areas on these ranges, 

as the condition of individual training areas may vary. However, because the Army considers range 

conditions and property replacement values in assigning its C-ratings and some training areas do not 

have replacement values, these training areas are not factored into the overall C-rating. The Navy 

and Air Force do not annually assess the condition of their ranges. 

While the overall C-rating of the Fort Hood ranges in 2004 was C-2, 

53 percent of the assessed training areas were identified by installation 

officials as having significant (C-3) or major (C-4) deficiencies that 

preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. According to Army 

Fort Hood, Texas 
Page 12 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

officials, the condition of Fort Hood’s training ranges is understated 

because the overall C-rating does not include all assessed training areas. In 

addition, training range officials identified 364 (91 percent) of the 

400 miles of their tank trails, which are not rated under training areas, as 

unusable or hazardous because of deteriorated conditions (see fig. 1). As a 

result, units typically detoured onto paved, public roads to travel to and 

from training areas causing road damage and creating safety hazards to 

the public who use the roads. 

Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood 
Page 13 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

In addition, the urban training facilities were outdated, having been 

designed for Cold War scenarios that are not applicable to current military 

operations. For example, the facilities at Fort Hood resemble European 

villages with narrow streets. But in current military operations, tanks and 

other military vehicles patrol Middle Eastern settings and downtown 

cities. Also, while entrances to these European homes at Fort Hood are 

immediately off the road and easily accessible, homes in the Middle East 

are generally protected by tall, gated walls and designed around a 

courtyard, making soldiers more vulnerable to enemy fire before entering 

a home.24

While the overall C-rating of the Fort Stewart ranges in 2004 was C-3, 

60 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as 

having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission 

accomplishment. In addition, range officials and units told us that the 

convoy training area limits soldiers to shoot out of only one side of a 

vehicle during ambush training exercises, although soldiers stated that in 

actual military operations they could be attacked from multiple directions. 

The range also lacks urban training facilities that accurately reflect the 

needs of current military operations, such as Middle Eastern-style building 

facades. A range official further stated that most of their ranges lack 

running water and therefore do not have functioning restrooms or 

showers, which leads to delays and inefficient use of training time. Similar 

to Fort Hood, the range also has deteriorated training areas that pose 

difficulties in maneuvering vehicles during training events (see fig. 2). 

 24 We are completing a separate review of DOD’s strategy for training forces to conduct 

urban operations, the incorporation of current operations lessons learned into recent 

training, and the challenges faced in implementing this training. 

Fort Stewart, Georgia 
Page 14 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Figure 2: Tank Stuck in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of Hardened Crossing 

A tank sinks into local vegetation due to lack of hardened crossing sites on training areas.

Source: Directorate of Public Works, Ft. Stewart, Ga.
Page 15 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

There are numerous identified deficiencies at this range—a primary site 

for West Coast Navy units to train before deploying—that adversely affect 

the quantity and quality of training activities. Range and submarine 

squadron officials told us that a major deficiency is the malfunctioning of 

the undersea training area’s communications system, which effectively 

reduces the available training area to the southern portion of the range 

(see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Degraded Conditions at the Southern California Offshore Range 

This situation is further exacerbated because the southern portion of the 

undersea training area overlaps with surface ship training areas, and so 

concurrent training cannot be conducted. Range officials stated that this 

and other deficiencies could also impede their ability to meet the 

increased demand created by the Navy’s revised ship deployment cycle, 

Southern California Offshore 

Range, California 

Source: GAO image based on information provided by the Southern California Offshore Range office.

Gunnery exercises and bombing exercises training area

Usable portion of underwater training area

Laser training area 

Unusable portion of underwater training area

San

Clemente 

Island

N

E

S

W
Page 16 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

which requires more carrier groups to be deployable at a given time.25

Moreover, the range does not have an instrumented shallow-water 

capability. A recent study on the range’s capabilities for antisubmarine 

warfare found that current range resources are sufficient to meet 90 

percent of the minimally required training tasks. However, the study found 

that the range does not provide a realistic training environment for 19 (63 

percent) of 30 Navy training skills, primarily due to the lack of a shallowwater instrumented training range.26 The range also lacks adequate support 

capabilities, such as piers, docks, and mooring buoys. For example, 

although range officials stated that current fleet requirements necessitate 

a minimum of eight mooring buoys, only two are in satisfactory condition. 

As a result, these buoys are rarely available, which leads to reduced 

training support and costly workarounds, such as travel to alternate 

locations for the night. In addition, the lack of mooring or docking 

capabilities has also resulted in damaged military property and canceled 

training events. Range officials and users cited other deficiencies, 

including an inadequate number and types of targets, electronic warfare 

capabilities, and tracking systems for aircraft, as well as the lack of a 

dependable secure high-capacity communication system. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, the Navy stated that it is currently funding efforts 

to establish dedicated shallow water training ranges on both coasts. 

However, during our review, Navy officials acknowledged that the west 

coast range will not be established until the service addresses more 

restrictive environmental requirements and other anticipated obstacles on 

the east coast. 

Pilots and training range officials stated that the Fallon Range Training 

Complex lacks adequate systems to replicate current threats and targets. It 

lacks advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems and has an inadequate 

concentration of electronic warfare systems. As a result, the quality of 

training is adversely affected. Furthermore, because replacement parts for 

the current electronic warfare systems are becoming obsolete, the systems 

are becoming difficult to maintain. In addition, the range has an 

insufficient number of targets, particularly time-sensitive and moving 

targets, to reflect the current threat. 

 25 We are performing a separate review of the Navy Fleet Response Plan, which assesses, 

among other things, the geographic combatant commanders’ ability to meet their 

warfighting objectives. 

26 CAB D0010901.A2. 

Fallon Range Training 

Complex, Nevada 
Page 17 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Lejeune ranges in 2004 was C-3, 

12 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as 

having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission 

accomplishment. We observed several training areas with overgrown 

vegetation that obstructed the visibility of targets and range boundary 

markers, thereby precluding the use of highly explosive ammunition for 

safety reasons. This condition also diminished the trainers’ ability to 

accurately observe the Marines’ shooting proficiency. Some training areas 

also lack marked firing lanes, and only 5 of the 120 live-fire training areas 

had automated targets, thereby limiting the amount of training time 

available since Marines must set up and take down targets as a 

workaround (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area with a Better Maintained and Modernized Area at Fort Bragg 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 

Clearly defined firing lanes

Automated targets with computer controlled feedback 

(protected by dirt and concrete shield)

Clean cut vegetation

Clean appearance/ease of maintenance

No targets at prescribed distances

Units bring their own targets (negative impact on unit training time)

No feedback capability

From the existing firing line, the right lateral limit marker is obscured

Firing lanes not defined (safety issue)

Debris from improvised targets

Vegetation obscuring target area

No hygiene facilities

Fort Bragg, N.C. Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Source: GAO graphic based on information from the Training Range Management Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Firing lane markers

Automated target sites
Page 18 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Similar to the conditions found at Fort Hood and Fort Stewart, the urban 

training facilities were outdated and the range lacks an area to conduct 

training for soldiers on convoy operations. Consequently, soldiers either 

have to travel to other ranges to receive such training, which increases 

training costs and the amount of time soldiers are away from their 

families, or soldiers remain at their primary ranges and may be less 

prepared for the conditions they will face in combat. 

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Pendleton ranges in 2004 was C-2, 

24 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as 

having significant (C-3) deficiencies that precluded accomplishment of 

some missions. Although encroachment is the primary problem for this 

range, several other deficiencies also affect its training and safety. For 

example, the range lacks a sufficient number of automated targets to 

provide feedback for users. In addition, one of the primary training areas 

is located in a dry riverbed lacking emergency escape routes, where range 

officials told us one Marine had drowned when it flooded. The training 

areas used by Navy special operation units have overgrown vegetation; are 

inadequately constructed to meet requirements and safety conditions; and 

lack target maintenance and storage facilities, bullet containment walls, 

turning and moving targets, and hygiene facilities. A lack of running water 

also creates a financial burden for the range office, which, as a costly 

workaround, must consequently rent temporary restroom structures. In 

addition, helicopter pilots stated that the range lacks needed mountaintop 

targets for them to train against threats from an elevated position. 

Although range officials stated that the Nellis Test and Training Range is 

the most capable in the Air Force, we were told about and observed 

several deficiencies that affect training, including an insufficient 

concentration of buildings to replicate an urban environment, inadequate 

scoring and feedback capabilities, and a lack of specific urban-setting 

target sets. The range also lacks a sufficient number of opposition forces 

for training exercises and advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems, 

which adversaries currently own and operate. 

Pilots and training range officials told us that the Barry M. Goldwater 

Range lacks moving targets, camouflaged or concealed targets, enemy 

targets embedded within friendly forces and the civilian population, cave 

entrances, time-sensitive targets, and strafing pits at specific tactical 

locations, which are necessary to provide users with a more realistic 

training experience. It also lacks scoring and feedback capability in the 

live-fire training areas. Without a scoring system and targets, pilots must 

shoot at barren mounds of dirt, which diminishes their ability to obtain 

Camp Pendleton, California 

Nellis Test and Training Range, 

Nevada 

Barry M. Goldwater Range, 

Arizona 
Page 19 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

feedback on the proficiency of their attack. The range lacks the capability 

to provide remote site feedback, thus diminishing the amount of training 

and personal time available to pilots who must as a workaround travel to 

another base to receive this feedback. It lacks an adequate concentration 

of electronic warfare systems, and the systems it has are becoming 

difficult to maintain as replacement parts become obsolete. Also, its 

communication system is inadequate. 

DOD is aware of training range deficiencies, having issued a number of 

studies over the past 10 years that identify these training range 

deficiencies. For example, DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report states that unique American training superiority is eroding from 

underlying neglect and needs support in sustainment and recapitalization, 

particularly as evidenced in the aging infrastructure and instrumentation 

of DOD’s training ranges.27 The Navy has completed a number of studies 

over the years that identify deficiencies at specific ranges. For example, in 

1995 it issued a tactical training range roadmap identifying deficiencies at 

each of its ranges. Many of these deficiencies still exist, such as 

inadequacies of shallow-water ranges and of realistic targets. In September 

2001, the Navy assessed its ranges and identified several deficiencies, 

including inadequate instrumentation at some of its most critical ranges.28

In September 2000, it completed a range needs assessment on 19 air-toground ranges and identified degraded range conditions and a lack of 

capabilities.29 A 2003 Air Force assessment of its training ranges found 

infrastructure deficiencies at 90 percent of its ranges, attributable to age 

and limited funding.30 The assessment considered the deficiencies 

significant at 24 of its 32 training ranges. While the Army and the Marine 

Corps have not issued composite studies on the deficiencies of their 

ranges, they have conducted overall annual range assessments as part of 

the readiness reporting system and identified deficiencies as well. Further, 

 27 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

28 Department of the Navy, Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 

2001) (Unpublished). 

29 Department of the Navy, Department of Navy Range Needs Assessment: Air-to-Ground 

Ranges (Washington, D.C., September 2000). 

30 U.S. Air Combat Command, Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and Air Space 

Mission Support Plan FY 2003 (Langley Air Force Base, Va.: October 2003). 

Deficiencies Identified by 

DOD Studies 
Page 20 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

the Navy and Marine Corps have identified a number of deficiencies at 

their ranges while developing local range complex management plans. 

While OSD and the military services have undertaken a number of 

management actions that could improve the conditions of their training 

ranges, progress in overall improvements has been limited, due in part to 

the lack of a comprehensive approach to manage their training ranges. 

Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include, at a minimum, 

several key elements, such as well-defined policies that address all factors 

impacting range sustainability; plans that guide the timely execution of 

range sustainability actions; and range requirements that are geared to 

meet both service and joint needs. Further, while the military services lack 

adequate and easily accessible information that could precisely identify 

training range maintenance and modernization funding, available 

information indicates that identified training range requirements have 

historically not been adequately funded. Additionally, OSD and the 

services have not fully implemented specific actions identified in their 

policy, management guidance, reports, and plans for improving training 

range conditions. Without a fully implemented comprehensive approach, 

OSD and the services will not be able to ensure the long-term viability of 

their training ranges, nor their ability to meet transformation goals, nor 

will the Congress be in a position to fulfill its oversight role. 

OSD and the military services have collectively taken a number of steps 

that are designed to improve the conditions of training ranges at the 

service and local range level. For example, to varying extents, the military 

services have developed policies for training range sustainment, developed 

service-specific plans, established working groups to coordinate efforts 

among multiple organizations, defined range requirements, assessed 

conditions, developed Web-based systems to share information within and 

among OSD and the services, and developed local range management 

plans. While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive 

approach to training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on 

encroachment, or they have not been consistently implemented among the 

services, or they have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of 

all officials. Our analysis of the status of OSD’s and the services’ 

management actions taken to improve range conditions is shown in 

figure 5. 

Various Factors Affect 

DOD’s Progress in 

Improving Training 

Range Conditions 

OSD and the Services Have 

Taken Limited Range 

Improvement Actions, 

but a Comprehensive 

Approach Is Lacking 
Page 21 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Figure 5: GAO’s Analysis of DOD’s Management Actions for Improving Training Range Conditions 

• Policy—While OSD promulgated a DOD range sustainment policy in 2003, 

that policy primarily focuses on external encroachment factors that 

impact training and does not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of 

several DOD commands that either provide oversight or are impacted by 

the conditions of the ranges.31 Specifically, the policy does not clearly 

define the maintenance and modernization responsibilities of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and Special 

Operations Command. Consequently, these organizations lack appropriate 

assignment of responsibility and accountability for the military training 

range improvements they oversee or manage. According to service 

officials, the Army and Marine Corps are finalizing draft revisions of their 

range sustainment policy, and the Air Force only recently started revising 

its policy. Navy officials stated that the service has not yet developed a 

policy to implement DOD’s 2003 policy or to clearly define the roles and 

responsibilities of the multiple Navy organizations responsible for 

maintaining and modernizing its training ranges. 

 31 Department of Defense Directive, Sustainment of Ranges and Operating Areas 

(OPAREAs), 3200.15 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003). 

N/A Not applicable

Action not taken

Action taken but could be improved

Action satisfactorily taken

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Policy

Strategic or

implementation

plan

Multilevel

working

groups

Sustainable

range

program

Range

requirements

Systematic

assessment of

range conditions

and impacts

Web-based range

 information

management

system

Local

range plans

OSD N/A N/A

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force
Page 22 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

• Range sustainment programs—As shown in table 2, OSD and some of 

the services have initiated specific range sustainment programs to 

integrate their individual components and commands.32 The Army has 

developed such an integrated program that incorporates the multiple 

facets of range sustainment, including maintenance and modernization, 

and includes involvement of all responsible officials. OSD and the Navy 

have established similar programs, but their programs focus primarily on 

encroachment issues and not on other factors that impact training, such as 

the maintenance and modernization of ranges. The Marine Corps has 

taken multiple sustainment initiatives, but has not named their efforts as a 

program. 

• Strategic or implementation plans—Although DOD has developed 

strategic plans in other areas, such as the 2004 Defense Installations 

Strategic Plan and Training Transformation Strategic Plan, to guide the 

services with goals and milestones, it has not developed a comprehensive 

strategic plan for the long-term viability of its military training ranges. In 

June 2004, we reported that DOD’s training range report to the Congress, 

which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense 

Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, did not, among other things, provide 

a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations 

on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are available 

in the United States and overseas for training.33 In response to our 

recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan to fully address training 

constraints, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for tracking 

planned actions and measuring progress, DOD stated that the services had 

initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be 

evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not 

executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of 

its ranges. Defense planning guidance has mandated DOD to develop a 

plan to ensure that training ranges are sustainable, but the plan addressed 

only encroachment issues impacting military training ranges. Similarly, the 

2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan identifies and provides goals for 

addressing encroachment factors impacting DOD’s training ranges, but not 

for other issues that affect the quality of training, such as range 

 32 In this report, we refer to a sustainable range program generically as a collective effort 

that integrates the initiatives designed to ensure the long-term viability of military training 

ranges. Such a program should address the maintenance, modernization, environment, and 

encroachment issues related to the ranges. 

33 GAO-04-608. 
Page 23 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

maintenance and modernization.34 The absence of such a plan could 

adversely impact DOD-wide initiatives, such as the joint national training 

capability and the overseas rebasing of forces to the United States. 

Furthermore, lacking a comprehensive DOD strategic plan, none of the 

services has developed implementation plans of their own. The Army and 

Air Force have developed documents on their sustainable range programs, 

but they do not provide specific goals or milestones that the services can 

use to measure their progress in meeting their vision and overall goals for 

ensuring the long-term viability of their ranges. While the Navy has taken 

several actions under its sustainable range program, it still lacks a plan 

with specific goals, milestones, funding sources and amounts, defined 

roles and responsibilities, and other critical components of a strategic 

plan. 

• Multilevel integrated working groups—OSD and most of the services 

have developed formal sustainable range working groups at multiple levels 

that are intended to address training range constraints, since range 

viability is dependent on a number of fragmented organizations within 

OSD and the services. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

established a multilevel DOD-wide working group, which includes 

representatives from the services and some of the other OSD offices.35

However, the working group does not include a representative from 

Special Operations Command, although they are responsible for and 

impacted by the maintenance and modernization of military training 

ranges. Also, both the DOD-wide and Navy headquarters-level sustainable 

range working groups are primarily focused on encroachment issues and 

not on other issues that impact ranges and training, such as maintenance 

and modernization. For example, the Navy’s southwest regional range 

director stated that his primary responsibility is encroachment and 

munitions cleanup, and that he has not been assigned or been provided the 

resources to address the maintenance and modernization of ranges in his 

region. Also, on the basis of our discussion with officials, we noted that 

only the Marine Corps’ and Air Force’s working groups included all 

 34 Department of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment, 2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: September 

2004). 

35 In December 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the formation of the 

Defense Readiness and Range Initiative Integrated Product Team to act as DOD’s 

coordinating body to address encroachment. The team consists of an overarching 

integrated product team and a working integrated product team. The overarching team is 

primarily responsible for strategic planning, while the working team is the staff-level 

working body that supports the overarching team. 
Page 24 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

relevant organizations, such as special operations units, which have an 

interest in having maintained and modernized ranges. 

• Range requirements—The Navy and Marine Corps have begun to 

identify or have identified specific requirements or capabilities needed for 

their ranges, which could be used for budgeting purposes as well as 

assessing training range deficiencies. In addition, the Navy has linked and 

the Marine Corps is in the process of linking its training requirements to 

these range requirements so that the services can identify specific training 

standards that are impacted by the conditions of a specific training area. 

However, only the Navy’s draft range requirements document links its 

ranges to special operations and joint training requirements to show the 

potential impact on the special operation units’ or combatant 

commanders’ needs, which is a key objective of DOD’s training 

transformation initiative. Also, none of the range requirement documents 

identify range support facility needs, although facility conditions directly 

impact the quantity and quality of training provided and the level of safety 

on the ranges. 

• Systematic assessment of range conditions and impacts—At the time 

of our review, we found that none of the services regularly assessed the 

conditions of their ranges, including whether the ranges are able to meet 

the specific training requirements of the service and combatant 

commanders. While the Army and Marine Corps annually assessed the 

physical condition of their training ranges, the services do not assess the 

capabilities of the ranges or any impacts to training. While the Army’s 

assessment contained clearly defined criteria, local training range officials 

stated that because the criteria are revised regularly, comparing 

assessments across years is impossible. In addition, the overall assessment 

of Army training ranges does not accurately reflect the condition of all 

training areas on the range since it does not include the condition of a 

number of training areas. Also, according to service officials, both the 

Army’s and Marine Corps’ assessments are conducted by public works 

officials who do not have the background or specific knowledge of range 

infrastructure, as opposed to training range officials or training unit 

representatives. In addition, local officials stated that the Marine Corps’ 

assessment is highly subjective and does not provide the evaluator with 

specific criteria. While the Navy and Air Force do not routinely conduct 

annual assessments of their training ranges, the Air Force does perform 

assessments from time to time and the Navy has completed some one-time 

assessments on their ranges while developing local range complex 

management plans. We also found that none of the services regularly 

assess the impacts to training, and none of the services have linked their 

funding resources to the results of the assessments. 
Page 25 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

• Web-based range information management system—DOD reports and 

officials have increasingly called for a range information management 

system that would allow range offices and users to share information 

within and across the services. Such a Web-based system would include 

best practices, lessons learned, a scheduling tool, policies, points of 

contact, funding information, and range conditions and capabilities. Local 

range offices have undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure that their 

ranges remain viable while trying to minimize the negative impact on 

training, but they often lack an effective mechanism for sharing these 

initiatives with other organizations. For example, the range officials at the 

Fallon Range Training Complex routinely obtained targets and training 

structures at no cost from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service 

to enhance their training capability,36 but other training offices we visited 

were having difficulty obtaining these items or were paying for the items 

they were able to obtain. For example, figure 5 shows a mock airfield that 

was constructed at the Fallon Range out of materials obtained from the 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. 

 36 The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service manages the DOD surplus property 

sales program and disposes of excess property received from the military services. 
Page 26 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the Fallon Range Training Complex 

The Marine Corps has an active, centralized training range Web site to 

provide information to units and ranges across the world, including related 

service regulations, general and detailed information about each of its 

ranges, and training range points of contact. The Web site also allows units 

from any service to schedule their training events remotely, and provides 

them with a map of each training range including photographs and, in 

some instances, video footage to assist them in scheduling and designing 

their training events. However, to date, the Marine Corps has not used its 

Web site to exchange information, such as lessons learned and best 

practices, between and among training range offices and military units. 

Meanwhile, the Army has developed an initial Web site that provides 

similar, but more limited, information about its sustainable range program. 

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona, Calif.
Page 27 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

The Air Force has also established a training range Web site to share 

information about its training ranges, but it has remained nonfunctional, 

since the service did not enter information into the site. The Air Force’s 

Air Combat Command is developing a separate training range information 

management system. While a cognizant command official stated that the 

command plans on adding a chat room feature to exchange information, 

the official stated that the system might not be Web-based, so the 

information would not be available to other range offices or units within 

and across the services. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD 

stated that the Air National Guard is in the process of developing a Webbased range scheduling system that could meet some of the service’s 

needs, but additional funding is needed to complete this effort. While Navy 

reports and officials recognize the need for a servicewide training range 

management system, the service has not developed such a system. 

However, the Southern California Offshore Range has its own 

management system that is used for scheduling, identifying specific 

training requirements for each training event, documenting reasons why 

training is modified or canceled, tracking training range utilization rates by 

specific units, and recording maintenance issues and resolutions. In 

addition, the system allows the range office to compute the costs of 

training each unit using specific training requirements and warfare areas. 

• Local range complex management plans—The Navy and Marine Corps 

have started to develop local range complex management plans for their 

training ranges, which, among other things, provide descriptions of the 

training ranges, a strategic vision for range operations, and 

recommendations for environmental planning; identify and analyze 

required capability shortfalls derived from fleet training needs; and include 

an investment strategy to address these deficiencies. Although most of the 

Navy’s and Marine Corps’ local range offices have started to develop plans 

with investment strategies, these strategies are not linked to any service 

investment strategies. Also, due to funding expectations, current needs 

have been pushed out 20 years. Consequently, today’s training 

requirements are being met with yesterday’s ranges and tomorrow’s 

training requirements will be met with today’s ranges. Further, six of the 

Marine Corps’ range complex management plans, including two of the 

service’s most significant training ranges, are currently unfunded. In 

addition, the Army and Air Force ranges we visited have outdated plans. 

The Army recently started developing standardized local range plans and 

the Air Force is creating a management system to develop plans for its 

ranges. However, the system is not scheduled to be operational until 2007. 

While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive approach 

to training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on 
Page 28 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

encroachment, have not been consistently implemented among the 

services, or have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of all 

officials. Such an approach should include, at a minimum, several key 

elements, such as an overall comprehensive strategic plan that addresses 

training range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for 

tracking planned actions and progress. Other key elements include welldefined policies that address all factors impacting range sustainability, 

servicewide plans that guide the timely execution of range sustainability 

actions, range requirements that are geared to meet both service and joint 

needs, and a commitment to the implementation of this approach. 

(See app. II for a more comprehensive list of what we consider to be key 

managerial elements of a comprehensive approach). 

Various documents and training range officials report that training range 

requirements have not been adequately funded historically to meet 

training standards and needs. According to service officials, a variety of 

factors—such as ranges having a lower funding priority amid competing 

demands—have contributed to or exacerbated funding limitations. 

However, the military services lack adequate and easily accessible 

information that could precisely identify the required funding and track 

what is allocated to maintain and modernize its ranges. 

Available data indicate that funding for training ranges has historically 

been insufficient to meet range requirements. For example, the 2003 

Special Operations Command report on training ranges states that ranges 

are inadequately funded for construction, maintenance, repairs, and 

upgrades.37 In addition, a 2001 Navy range study states that both range 

operation funds and base operation funds, which also support range 

sustainment, were not adequate, thus adversely impacting utilization of the 

Navy’s ranges.38 A 2004 Naval Audit Service report also found that Navy 

range accounts were not being adequately funded and thus were 

dependent on funds from other accounts.39 Further, funding information 

provided by training range officials during this review showed that funding 

has not adequately met their requirements. For example, Fort Stewart 

 37 U.S. Special Operations Command, Tiger Team Report: Global Special Operations 

Forces Range Study (MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: Jan. 27, 2003). 

38 Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study.

39 Naval Audit Service, Navy Range Operations Support Funding, N2004-0061 

(Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004). 

Services Have Not 

Adequately Funded 

Training Range 

Maintenance 

and Modernization 

Available Data Reflect 

Funding Shortages for 

Range Requirements 
Page 29 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

training data indicated that the installation’s training range maintenance 

account was funded approximately 44 percent for fiscal years 1998 

through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton data revealed that the overall 

identified range needs were funded approximately 13 percent from fiscal 

years 1998 through 2002. DOD reports and officials identified the following 

as factors in the funding shortages: 

• Training ranges typically have a lower funding priority than many other 

installation activities. Specifically, training ranges do not compete well for 

funding against other installation activities that are more visible or related 

to quality-of-life issues, such as gymnasiums, child care centers, and 

barracks, and consequently training funds are often reallocated from the 

range to support other base operations programs.40 For example, the 2003 

Air Force training range assessment stated that critically needed 

sustainment funds for ranges were often diverted to fund other base 

requirements identified as more pressing.41

• Service officials identified a number of organizational structure issues that 

exacerbate the extent to which training range requirements are prioritized 

and funded. While OSD’s and the services’ training range offices are 

located in an operations directorate, this directorate does not prioritize or 

fund base programs that provide resources for the sustainment, 

restoration, and modernization of DOD infrastructure (including ranges). 

Recognizing this as an issue, the Navy recently hosted a conference to 

address the fragmented management for budgeting and allocating funds to 

ranges. During the meeting, Navy officials agreed to 20 specific actions 

that could be taken to minimize future funding issues. Also, while local 

range personnel are responsible for maintaining and modernizing ranges, 

some of these offices are not directly linked to the command that 

prioritizes installation resources. For example, the range office at the 

Southern California Offshore Range, which is an operational unit, is not 

organizationally aligned with the installation management organization 

that prioritizes sustainment funds for San Clemente Island. In addition, 

although the majority of the Southern California Offshore Range’s 

exercises are fleet operations and not air operations, the range office is 

aligned under a naval air command and not the fleet command. 

 40 Our recently completed review of the management and funding of base operations and 

facilities support illustrates how funds designated for one activity are redesignated for 

other activities and the potential adverse effects on operations and training. 

41 Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and Air Space Mission Support Plan FY 2003. 
Page 30 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

In addition, the relative position of training ranges in the organizational 

framework affects the extent to which training range requirements are 

prioritized and funded. Specifically, while some local range offices report 

directly to the senior mission commander that prioritizes funding 

resources, other range offices report to offices several echelons below the 

commander. For example, the Air Force’s Air Warfare Center commander 

stated that since the range office for the Nellis Test and Training Range is 

an Air Force wing, it has the same opportunity to identify its requirements 

and deficiencies to him as have the other wings at Nellis Air Force Base, 

Nevada. Conversely, although the Fallon Range Training Complex range 

office used to report directly to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 

commander, who sets funding priorities and requirements, the range office 

has since been aligned to a lower echelon position, thus placing the office 

at a less advantageous position in having its requirements and deficiencies 

identified as priorities. 

• A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can also result in 

overlooked training range requirements as well. Specifically, several 

training range officials stated that the Navy’s regional installation support 

structure lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each of the 

program directors within the structure, which results in overlooked 

requirements at its training ranges. For example, because the Southern 

California Offshore Range is only a portion of the San Clemente Island in 

the Pacific Ocean, there are multiple officials responsible for the different 

operations occurring on the island, including training ranges, port, airfield, 

environmental, facilities, information technology, and safety. However, 

according to training range officials, deficiencies on the island are 

overlooked because the Navy has not issued guidance providing clearly 

defined roles and responsibilities for each of these program directors. 

Specifically, training range officials stated that they are unable to obtain 

funds to maintain or modernize support facilities on the island, such as the 

pier and roads, because program managers either tend to view the entire 

island as a training range and therefore not their responsibility or to view 

it as not one of their top priorities, since the adverse impact on their 

primary missions is relatively limited. Nevertheless, the condition of these 

support facilities directly impacts range activities. 

• Various documented reports and testimonies of cognizant officials suggest 

that range needs are understated to the Congress due to the following 

factors: (1) installation real property inventories, which are used to 

calculate the installations’ sustainment funding requirements, do not 

contain complete and accurate information needed to compute 

requirements; (2) commands typically understate range needs because 

they have come to expect lower funding amounts; and (3) ranges may 
Page 31 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

receive supplemental funding from units to help maintain conditions. For 

example, the 2003 Special Operations Command training range report 

found that Army installations had incorrectly categorized their range 

facilities built with operations and maintenance funds as multipurpose 

ranges, which are considered less costly to maintain than those specially 

targeted for the command. Therefore, these installations underbudgeted 

for the maintenance and repair of these facilities. In addition, Marine 

Corps officials stated that they recently updated their installation real 

property inventories and discovered numerous discrepancies that had 

resulted in understatement of their ranges’ needs. Also, officials at Fort 

Hood stated that 30 percent of its tank trails are not included in its real 

property records because the tank trails do not meet military construction 

standards. As a result, Fort Hood is unable to obtain sufficient funds to 

either sustain or improve the tank trails to an acceptable standard and add 

them to the real property inventory. Further, officials stated that 

commands understate range funding requirements because they have 

come to expect lower funding levels. For example, officials at Fort Hood 

stated that although their range modernization funding requirements 

totaled at least $8 million, they had programmed and budgeted for only 

$4 million. Also, the requirements and budget documents at the Southern 

California Offshore Range office showed that the range’s requirements 

were understated by about 30 percent for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. 

Consequently, range officials stated that even if this amount were fully 

funded and not transferred to other accounts, their needs would be unmet. 

Since the range has a management system that captures the cost to train 

units on the range, the office reported that they would have to cancel 

operations due to a lack of funds in May of each year, or eliminate all 

command and control and battle group exercises, including 20 already 

scheduled significant training events. In addition, a 2004 Naval audit found 

that the regular transfer of funds from units to training ranges resulted in 

understated requirements and senior Navy management, DOD officials, 

and the Congress not having important information needed to efficiently 

and effectively manage and fund Navy programs identified by the Congress 

as significant to readiness.42

• The services do not link funding for their training ranges to range 

conditions, capabilities, impacts on training, or utilization. For example, 

while the number of training hours on the Southern California Offshore 

Range increased by 153 percent between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, range 

funding data reflect that funding increased by less than 10 percent. As a 

 42 N2004-0061. 
Page 32 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

result, range officials told us that the training range requirements 

continued to be underfunded, conditions continued to deteriorate, and the 

capabilities continued to be lacking. 

• Service officials across all commands lack adequate knowledge and 

training about the various resources available for range maintenance and 

how modernization impacts funding levels. For example, very few of the 

training range officials that we met during our review were aware of 

sustainment funds that were generated by the range property in the 

installation’s real property inventory systems. 

• The services lack clearly defined range requirements that distinguish 

special operations-specific range needs and servicewide range needs, 

which results in confusion between which organization is responsible for 

funding range maintenance and modernization. Specifically, the 2003 

Special Operations Command training range report stated that when 

Special Operations Forces are the primary users of a range funded with 

service dollars, disagreement sometimes arises over responsibility for 

maintenance costs. Consequently, there needs to be better clarification of 

what comprises Special Operations-specific facilities and what comprises 

service-common facilities. 

We found, and DOD recognizes, that the services lack the capability to 

accurately and easily capture training range funding information. DOD’s 

sustainable range working group officials told us that the services were 

unable to easily and precisely identify their funding requirements, funding 

levels, and trends in expenditures on an annual basis. Consequently, the 

group developed a subcommittee in 2004 to begin addressing this issue. 

Also, the 2004 Naval audit on range operations funds found that the lack of 

a range management system resulted in problems related to the visibility 

of the amount and use of funds being provided.43 Further, while training 

range officials for each of the services stated that they could identify some 

training range requirements or funding amounts, none were able to 

identify all of the funds that their ranges need and receive. For example, 

while the Army was able to identify its range operations requirements and 

funding levels, it was unable to identify its range sustainment requirements 

and funding levels. Officials in these range offices stated that they should 

have the ability to accurately identify all funding provided to their ranges if 

they are going to be effective program sponsors. Local training range 

officials were also unable to identify all their funding requirements and 

 43 Ibid. 

Services Lack the Capability 

to Accurately Capture 

Training Range Requirements 

and Funding Levels 
Page 33 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

levels. They noted that a centralized system would provide a mechanism 

for service headquarters officials to identify funding requirements and at 

the same time relieve them of the burden of responding to constant 

requests for information. 

Although policy, management guidance, reports, and plans have either 

recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not 

fully implemented these previously recommended actions. For example, 

although DOD’s sustainable range policy requires OSD to, among other 

things, provide oversight of training ranges and ensure that DOD-level 

programs are in place to protect the future ability of DOD components to 

conduct force training, a cognizant OSD official told us that OSD believes 

it should be a facilitator rather than a provider of oversight. Without 

adequate oversight, DOD-level initiatives, such as transformation efforts, 

could be jeopardized. In addition, OSD has not established a means to 

assess the readiness benefits of range sustainment initiatives, as required 

by the policy. In response to DOD guidance stating that DOD was to 

reverse the erosion of its training range infrastructure and ensure that 

ranges are sustainable, capable, and available, the Senior Readiness 

Oversight Council required the services, working with OSD, to prepare a 

prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and estimated 

costs for potential inclusion in the fiscal year 2003 budget. However, the 

list was never developed and submitted for potential funding 

opportunities. Defense officials could not provide us with an explanation 

as to why no appropriate action was taken. In addition, the 2003 Special 

Operations Command training range report identified a number of 

recommendations that could improve the conditions of training ranges 

units within the command use.44 For example, the report stated that all 

special operations’ components need to create master range plans that 

address their current and future range issues and solutions; identify and 

validate training requirements as well as facilities available and needed; 

and define acceptable limits of workarounds. However, according to a 

knowledgeable defense official, these recommendations have not been 

implemented to date because of resource shortages. Also, in July 1995, the 

Navy issued a tactical training range roadmap that, among other things, 

applied training requirements to training range capabilities and identified 

deficiencies to produce an investment plan for training range 

development. Although the plan stated that it should be updated 

 44 Tiger Team Report: Global Special Operations Forces Range Study. 

OSD and the Services 

Have Not Fully 

Implemented Previously 

Recommended Actions 
Page 34 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

biannually to remain current and accurately reflect fleet training 

requirements and associated instrumentation needs, the Navy has not 

updated the plan since that time. Without a commitment to 

implementation, it is unlikely that the OSD and the services will be able to 

ensure the success of their transformation efforts and long-term viability 

of their training ranges. 

DOD training ranges are important national assets that have not been 

adequately maintained or modernized to meet today’s needs. While DOD 

has undertaken a number of actions in an effort to maintain and 

modernize its training ranges, it lacks a comprehensive approach to 

address range issues. We have previously recommended and continue to 

believe that DOD needs an overall strategic plan that identifies specific 

goals, actions to be taken, milestones, and a process for measuring 

progress and ensuring accountability. In turn, each service needs to 

develop a comprehensive implementation plan if deteriorating conditions 

are to be abated and overall training capabilities improved to meet today’s 

and tomorrow’s requirements. Similarly, OSD and the services have issued 

policies, conducted studies containing recommendations, identified range 

officials at various command levels, and developed working groups. 

However, not all relevant officials are included, their roles and 

responsibilities are not clearly defined, the policies and recommendations 

have been ignored or only partially implemented, and several of these 

actions focus only on external encroachment issues. DOD needs to ensure 

that OSD’s comprehensive strategic plan, the services’ implementation 

plans, DOD’s training transformation plan, DOD policies, and identified 

recommendations include all relevant officials, clearly define their roles 

and responsibilities, comprehensively address all sustainability issues, 

including the maintenance and modernization of military training ranges, 

and are fully implemented to ensure the long-term viability of these 

national assets. Although military training ranges are generally in degraded 

condition, which adversely affects the quantity and quality of training and 

safety of the users, the military services do not accurately and 

systematically assess their ranges, including whether the ranges are able 

to meet the specific training requirements of the service and combatant 

commanders. Without systematically assessing the conditions of their 

ranges, the services cannot accurately identify the ranges where the 

conditions negatively impact training and need improvements, the best 

locations for training, or which training ranges best meet the needs of 

DOD’s training transformation plan and of service and combatant 

commanders. Although local training range officials have undertaken a 

number of initiatives to ensure that their ranges remain viable while trying 

Conclusions 
Page 35 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

to minimize negative impact on training, the services have not provided 

these officials or military units with a Web-based range information 

management system. Without such a system, the range offices are unable 

to share best practices and lessons learned within and across the services 

and military units are unable to identify which ranges best meet their 

needs. 

Various documents and training range officials report that training range 

requirements have historically not been adequately funded to meet 

training standards and needs. Without appropriate attention and adequate 

funding, the services will be unable to meet DOD’s transformation goals 

and ensure the long-term viability of their ranges. The military services do 

not have the capability to accurately and easily identify the funding 

amounts needed or provided for maintaining and modernizing their 

ranges. Without this capability, the military services are constrained in 

their ability to accurately plan, program, and budget for the maintenance 

and modernization of their training ranges; provide complete and accurate 

information to the Congress for appropriation and legislative decision 

making; and obtain this information without constant requests for 

information from multiple officials at different commands. A variety of 

factors, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding, contributes to or 

exacerbates funding limitations. Without addressing these and other 

factors, training range conditions will continue to degrade. 

We have previously recommended that OSD develop an overall 

comprehensive strategic plan for its training ranges that addresses training 

range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for tracking 

planned actions and progress.45 In response to our recommendation, DOD 

stated that the services had initiated a comprehensive planning process, 

which it considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with the implication 

that DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the 

sustainability of its ranges. However, our work has shown that this 

recommendation still has merit and should be addressed because it is 

fundamental to the comprehensive approach for managing training ranges 

that we are advocating. 

 45 GAO-04-608. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 36 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

We are making other recommendations to you as follows: 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to: 

• Update DOD Directive 3200.15 to broaden the focus of the policy to 

clearly address all issues that affect the long-term viability of military 

training ranges; and clearly define the maintenance and modernization 

roles and responsibilities of all relevant DOD components, including 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment, Joint Forces Command, and Special Operations 

Command. 

• Broaden the charter of the DOD-wide working group, the Sustainable 

Range Integrated Product Team, to address all issues that could affect 

the long-term viability of military training ranges; and include all DOD 

components that are impacted by range limitations. 

• Update DOD’s training transformation plan to address all factors that 

could impact the sustainability of military training ranges and not just 

external encroachment issues. 

• Direct the Secretaries of the Military Services to implement a 

comprehensive approach to managing their training ranges, to include: 

• A servicewide sustainable range policy that implements the updated 

DOD Directive 3200.15 and clearly defines the maintenance and 

modernization roles and responsibilities of relevant service officials at 

all levels. 

• A servicewide sustainable range implementation plan that includes 

goals, specific actions to be taken, milestones, funding sources, and an 

investment strategy for managing their ranges. 

• Defined training range requirements and a systematic process to 

annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent 

impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the 

specific training requirements of the service and combatant 

commanders. 

• A Web-based range information management system that allows 

training range officials at all levels to share information, such as range 

conditions and their impact on training; funding sources, requirements 

and expenditures; and local range initiatives. 
Page 37 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

• Regularly developed strategies to address the factors contributing to 

funding shortages for ranges, including the reassessment of funding 

priorities for maintaining and modernizing ranges relative to other 

needs. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Readiness agreed with our recommendations, stating the 

department and military services are or will be taking steps to implement 

them. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense’s comments are included in this 

report in appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which 

we incorporated as appropriate. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit 

a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on 

Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A 

written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees 

on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made 

more than 60 days after the date of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Mark A. Little, James R. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 38 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Reifsnyder, Patricia J. Nichol, Tommy Baril, Steve Boyles, and Cheryl A. 

Weissman were major contributors to this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Barry W. Holman, Director, 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 39 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

To determine the conditions of military training ranges and their 

consequent impact, we collected and analyzed training-range-related 

information from officials within the headquarters and selected major 

commands of the military services. We also visited eight major active 

component training ranges situated at various locations in the continental 

United States—Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Southern 

California Offshore Range, California; Fallon Range Training Complex, 

Nevada; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; 

Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada; and the Barry M. Goldwater 

Range, Arizona—to observe training range conditions and discuss 

consequential impacts.1

 These ranges were selected by identifying the 

major training ranges for each service and seeking input from service 

range officials as to which ranges could best address our audit objectives. 

During our visits we met with installation officials, range managers, and 

units that use the ranges. We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and 

audit reports identifying the conditions of military training ranges. 

To assess the progress the department has made in improving training 

range conditions, we discussed and reviewed information relating to 

training range initiatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and the 

headquarters and selected major commands of the military services. 

We also examined key documents related to the funding of training ranges 

including associated funding requirements and funding allocations. In 

addition, we reviewed prior GAO reports and internal service audits 

addressing funding issues for military facilities, including training ranges.2

We also obtained and reviewed range-related information from range 

officials of each of the eight installations that we visited. Further, we 

toured the training areas or support facilities at each of the ranges we 

visited to observe initiatives implemented by local range offices to 

improve the condition or capability of their ranges. Although we found 

 1

 While we did not specifically include National Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges 

in the scope of this review, based on discussions with DOD officials and reviews of 

relevant studies and audit reports many of the conditions and issues discussed in this 

report apply to them as well. 

2

 GAO, Military Infrastructure: Real Property Management Needs Improvement, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-100 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 1999); and Defense Infrastructure: Changes 

in Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of 

Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.19, 2003); U.S. Army Audit Agency, 

Range Sustainment, A-2003-0434-IME (Alexandria, Va.: Sept. 9, 2003); and Naval Audit 

Service, Navy F/A-18 Combat Aviation Training, N2003-0039 (Washington D.C.: 

Mar. 31, 2003). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Page 40 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

limitations in the availability of certain data, we believe the available data 

gathered are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on 

our discussions with OSD and military service officials and our review of 

the prior GAO reports and internal service audits. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• Office of the Director of Readiness and Training, Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness 

• Office of Installations Requirements and Management, Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 

Combatant Commands 

• Chief of Staff, Joint Forces Command 

• Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Joint Forces 

Command 

• Joint Training Policy and Validation Division, Special Operations 

Command 

Army 

• Training Directorate, Training Simulations Division, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

• Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management 

• Installation Management Agency—Headquarters 

• Installation Management Agency—Southeast Region 

• Installation Management Agency—Southwest Region 

• Forces Command 

Navy 

• Navy Fleet Training Branch, Fleet Readiness Division, Fleet Readiness and 

Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 

• Operating Forces Support Division, Chief of Naval Installations 

• Live Training Ranges Office, Fleet Forces Command 

Marine Corps 

• Range and Training Area Management Division, Training and Education 

Command 

Organizations and Units 

Visited or Contacted for 

This Review 
Page 41 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Air Force 

• Office of the Director of Ranges and Airspace, Air and Space Operations 

• Air Combat Command 

• Air Education and Training Command 

Fort Hood, Texas 

• Garrison Commander, Fort Hood 

• Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, III Corps 

• Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division 

• 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division 

• 16th Field Artillery, 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division 

• Headquarters Company, 1st Cavalry Division 

• 3rd Air Support Operations Group (U.S. Air Force) 

• Directorate of Plans, Training and Security 

• Directorate of Public Works 

• Range Division, Directorate of Plans, Training and Security 

• Garrison Resource Management Office 

Fort Stewart, Georgia 

• Deputy Garrison Commander, Fort Stewart 

• 64th Armored Regiment, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division 

• Headquarters Company, 3rd Infantry Division 

• Training Division, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization an Security 

• Directorate of Public Works 

• Garrison Resource Management Office 

Southern California Offshore Range, California 

• Commodore, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander Submarine Force, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet 

• Training and Readiness Department, 3rd Fleet 

• Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific 

• Naval Special Warfare Command 

• Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility Detachment Southern 

California Offshore Range 

• Commander Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light Wing, Pacific 

• Public Works Office, Naval Base Coronado 
Page 42 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada 

• Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Fallon 

• Program Manager of Ranges, Navy Region Southwest, Chief of Naval 

Installations 

• N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 

• Training Range Branch, N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air 

Warfare Center 

• Comptroller, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 

• Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune 

• Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations 

• Range Development Division 

• Training Resources Management Division 

• Modeling and Simulation Division 

• School of Infantry 

• Special Operations Training Group 

• 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force 

• Weapons and Field Training Battalion 

• Office of the Comptroller, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune 

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Environment 

Department 

Camp Pendleton, California 

• Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations 

• Range Operations Division 

• Training Resources Management Division 

• School of Infantry 

• 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 

• Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force 

• Special Operations Training Group 

Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada 

• Commanding Officer, Air Warfare Center 

• 98th Range Wing, Air Warfare Center 

• 414th Combat Training Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing, 

Air Warfare Center 

• 57th Operations Support Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing, 

Air Warfare Center 
Page 43 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona 

• 56th Fighter Wing 

• 944th Fighter Wing 

• 56th Fighter Wing Range Management Office 

• 56th Operations Group, 56th Fighter Wing 

• 355th Operations Group, 355th Wing 

• 162nd Fighter Wing Operations Group, Arizona Air National Guard 

• 563rd Rescue Group, Air Force Special Operations Command 

• Western Army National Guard Aviation Training Site 

We conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 44 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

The flow chart below depicts what we consider to be the defense 

organizational roles and responsibilities needed to implement a 

comprehensive approach for managing training ranges. 

Appendix II: Key Management Elements 

of a Comprehensive Approach for Managing 

Training Ranges 

a

 These documents should identify, at a minimum, specific actions, quantifiable goals, and 

milestones to measure progress, projected funding requirements and sources, and clear assignment 

of responsibility. 

OSD

Army Army Navy Marine Corps Marine Corps Air Force Air Force

Military Training Ranges

Source: GAO.

• Promulgate DOD policy for comprehensive management of military training ranges.

• Develop a comprehensive DOD strategic plan.1

• Ensure accountability of policy, strategic plan, and other identified actions.

• Establish a working group that includes all affected officials (including special operations, 

installation management, and operational forces, combatant commanders) to address all 

factors that impact military training ranges.

• Promulgate servicewide policy for comprehensive management of military training ranges.

• Develop a servicewide implementation plan.a

• Ensure accountability of policy, implementation plan, and other identified actions.

• Identify requirements for military training ranges (including cross-service and joint 

requirements).

• Link training ranges to training requirements (including service-specific, special operations, 

and combatant commanders).

• Develop a training range investment strategy.

• Accurately and easily account for training range funding requirements and funding levels.

• Establish a working group that includes all affected officials (including special operations, 

installation management, and operational forces) to address all factors that impact military 

training ranges.

• Develop a Web-based mechanism to share information and remotely schedule training 

events within and across the services. 

• Develop and keep current range management plans with investment strategy.a

• Accurately identify funding requirements and funding levels.

• Identify requirements of all users, regardless of service.

• Accurately capture training constraints, modifications, and cancellations.

• Regularly assess the conditions and capabilities of the range and their impact on training.

• Share lessons learned and best practices with other training range officials.
Page 45 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Page 46 GAO-05-534 Military Training 
Page 47 GAO-05-534 Military Training 
Page 48 GAO-05-534 Military Training 
Related GAO Products

Page 49 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not 

Fully Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates 

and a Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed. 

GAO-04-601. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004. 

Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Approach 

for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites. GAO-04-147. Washington, D.C.: 

December 19, 2003. 

Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase 

Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training 

Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003. 

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management 

Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and 

Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003. 

Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on 

Training Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 2, 2003. 

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and 

Strategic Planning Needed to Improve Condition of Military Facilities. 

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003. 

Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have 

Significant Deficiencies. GAO-02-786. Washington D.C.: June 13, 2002. 

Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage 

Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: 

June 11, 2002. 

Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage 

Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 16, 2002. 

Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected 

in Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products

Page 50 GAO-05-534 Military Training 

Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base 

Operations Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: 

February 29, 2000. 

Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces 

for Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 2000. 

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