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ZBIGNIEW ROZBICKI v. EUGENE M.

GISSELBRECHT ET AL.

(AC 35744)

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Bishop, Js.

Argued March 14—officially released September 16, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Litchfield, Roche, J. [summary judgment]; Danaher, J.

[motion for contempt, motion to disqualify].)

Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Ruth Nadeau Dwyer, with whom was J. Michael

Sconyers, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

BEACH, J. The plaintiff, Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, the

original executor of the estate of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

granting the motion for contempt of the defendant,

Eugene M. Gisselbrecht, individually and as the successor executor of the estate of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht,

his sister.1 The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred

in (1) ruling on a motion for contempt at a time when

the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter; (2)

finding him in contempt for violating an interlocutory

discovery order that had not been incorporated into

the judgment file; and (3) denying a motion to recuse

itself. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history, as

revealed by the record, are relevant to this appeal. In

2007, the plaintiff was the executor of the subject estate

under the will of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht. Because of

certain conduct of the plaintiff, he was removed for

cause from the position of executor in June, 2009. In

March, 2010, the plaintiff brought this action against

the defendant, individually and in his capacity as the

successor executor. In his third revised complaint, the

plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty as executor by depleting the assets of the

estate, leaving insufficient funds to pay to the plaintiff

his bequest under the will and his fiduciary fees. He

also sought attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant

filed an answer and special defenses claiming that the

plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of election of remedies, res judicata,

collateral estoppel, and the statute of frauds.

In August, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for a

protective orderrequesting that the court issue an order

preventing the self-represented plaintiff from continuing his deposition of the defendant, which had begun

on July 19, 2011. He argued that the plaintiff was emotionally involved in the matter, and was using the deposition process to harass the defendant. The court denied

the motion, but added that the defendant could have

the deposition videotaped at his own expense, and that

the defendant could seek additional assistance from

the court, including the cost of the videotaping or any

other appropriate remedy, if the conduct complained

of was apparent in the videotape of the next deposition.

On December 5, 2011, the court, Danaher, J., after viewing the videotape at the request of the parties, issued

a decision regarding a motion for compliance filed by

the defendant, and found that the plaintiff’s continuation of the deposition of the defendant was conducted

in a manner that served unreasonably to harass, embarrass, oppress, and annoy the defendant, and that there

would be no further deposition of the defendant. On

December 15, 2011, the defendant filed a motion
requesting the court to issue an order requiring the

plaintiff to reimburse him $675.32 for costs associated

with videotaping the plaintiff’s deposition of the defendant. On January 3, 2012, the court granted the motion,

ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs for videotaping

the deposition in the amount of $675.32 within thirty

days. On January 23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion

to vacate the order, and the court denied the motion

two days later.

Meanwhile, in August, 2011, the defendant had filed

a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the

plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute

of frauds. On December 19, 2011, the court, Roche, J.,

granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff

filed a motion to reargue or reconsider the judgment

on January 9, 2012; the motion was denied on January

11, 2012. The plaintiff filed a motion for extension of

time in which to appeal on January 23, 2012, which

was granted.

On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal

from the trial court’s summary judgment. The plaintiff

included as an issue in that appeal the January 3, 2012

order of payment. We dismissed the appeal on April

24, 2012. On October 10, 2012, our Supreme Court

denied the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal.

Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, 307 Conn. 917, 54 A.3d 181

(2012).

On January 16, 2013, the defendant filed a proposed

judgment file, which included the court’s granting of

his motion for summary judgment and the January 3,

2012 orderto pay the cost of videotaping the deposition.

On February 6, 2013, the court, Trombley, J., determined that a judgment file was not necessary because

a valid and binding order of Judge Danaher was issued

on January 3, 2012, which ‘‘remains in effect ordering

the plaintiff, an officer of this court, to pay to the defendant the sum of $675.32.’’ The plaintiff filed an objection

to thatruling, seeking its vacation, on February 27, 2013,

which was overruled by the court on March 11, 2013.

On March 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for

contempt, claiming that the plaintiff had not complied

with the court’s January 3, 2012 order to pay the videotaping fee of $675.32 within the allotted time, and sought

as damages the $675.32 in costs plus $2500 in attorney’s

fees. On May 9, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to

dismiss the defendant’s motion for contempt, arguing

that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the motion for contempt after summary judgment was rendered, on December 19, 2011.

The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and

on May 30, 2013, the court, Danaher, J., issued a memorandum of decision regarding the defendant’s motion

for contempt, in which it found that the plaintiff was

in wilful contempt of the court’s clear and unambiguous
order to pay to the defendant $675.32 within thirty days.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay $675.32 to the

defendant’s counsel within two weeks.

On May 28, 2013, the day on which the motion for

contempt was argued on the short calendar, the plaintiff

filed a motion for disqualification of Judge Danaher,

which was denied. This appeal followed.

I

We first address the plaintiff’s claims regarding the

jurisdiction of the trial court to act on various motions.

Although the plaintiff divides his argument into two

issues, the claims are somewhat related, in that all

involve the timing of the various rulings regarding the

costs of videotaping against the backdrop of the court’s

rulings on the merits of the case and the appeal process

on the merits. We have considered all of the plaintiff’s

claims, but organize their discussion somewhat differently.

Our review of the jurisdictional issues is plenary. ‘‘We

have long held that because [a] determination regarding

a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question

of law, our review is plenary. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate

the type of controversy presented by the action before

it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits

of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . . ’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferguson Mechanical Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 282 Conn. 764, 770–71,

924 A.2d 846 (2007).

A

The plaintiff claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion for contempt, which was

filed approximately eleven months after the appeal on

the merits of the summary judgment was dismissed.

We agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find

the plaintiff in contempt unless the contempt order was

an exercise of the trial court’s inherent jurisdiction to

enforce its orders. We assume, for the purpose of this

subpart of the opinion, that the January 3, 2012 ruling

of the court ordering the payment of the videotaping

costs was valid, and that the court had the authority

to make the order at the time it was made.2

The Superior Court has the inherent authority to

enforce its orders. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc.

v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 246, 796

A.2d 1164 (2002); see also Bauer v. Bauer, 308 Conn.

124, 130, 60 A.3d 950 (2013). ‘‘[E]ven in the absence of

a finding of contempt, the trial court has broad discretion to make whole any party who has suffered as a

result of another party’s failure to comply with a court

order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay

Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission,

supra, 243.
Although ordinarily our trial courts lack jurisdiction

to act in a case after the passage of four months from

the date of judgment; see General Statutes § 52-212a;

there are exceptions. One exception arises when the

exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to effectuate prior

judgments or otherwise enforceable orders. Our

Supreme Court has explained the continuing jurisdiction exception to § 52-212a as follows: ‘‘We reject [a]

hypertechnical understanding of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to effectuate prior judgments. We conclude, instead, that the trial court’s continuing

jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather, derives

from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments.

. . . Moreover, we hold that such equitable authority

. . . [derives] from its inherent powers.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; footnote omitted.) AvalonBay Communities,

Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 260 Conn.

243. ‘‘[T]he trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering

compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an

ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate

the judgment as interpreted, is grounded in its inherent

powers, and is not limited to cases wherein the noncompliant party is in contempt, family cases, cases

involving injunctions, or cases wherein the parties have

agreed to continuing jurisdiction.’’ Id., 246 (continuing

jurisdiction existed in case where trial court ordered

planning and zoning commission to impose only reasonable and necessary conditions on approval of applicant’s affordable housing application); see also Papa

v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725,

737, 444 A.2d 196 (1982) (recognizing ‘‘the inherent

power of the court to coerce compliance with its

orders’’); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn, 148 Conn.

App. 1, 85 A.3d 1 (2014) (continuing jurisdiction existed

where as part of judgment of strict foreclosure bank

was required to send notice to nonappearing defendants

before filing certificate of foreclosure and bank falsely

certificated to court that notice requirement had been

satisfied). ‘‘In a contempt proceeding, even in the

absence of a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad

discretion to make whole a party who has suffered as

a result of another party’s failure to comply with the

court order.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Clement v. Clement, 34 Conn. App. 641,

647, 643 A.2d 874 (1994).

The trial court in the present case had ordered the

plaintiff to pay videotaping costs to the defendant. The

plaintiff had never complied with the order. The passage

of time itself did not serve to deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce its order.

The plaintiff, however, has raised severalrelated challenges to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction; these may

be addressed more summarily. One is that the court

lost jurisdiction by virtue of General Statutes § 51-183b,
which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny judge of

the Superior Court . . . who has the power to render

judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil

cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall

renderjudgment not laterthan one hundred and twenty

days from the completion date of the trial of such civil

cause. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The court heard the

motion on May 28, 2013, and granted it on May 30, 2013,

two days later. The primary purpose of § 51-183b is to

compel timely completion of matters in the trial court;

see, e.g., Building Supply Corp. v. Lawrence Brunoli,

Inc., 40 Conn. App. 89. 96–97, 669 A.2d 620, cert. denied,

236 Conn. 929, 674 A.2d 1326 (1996); and the trial court

in the present case could hardly have acted more efficiently. The effort to peg the starting point of the 120

day period to the judgment on the merits, or perhaps

to the argument on the motion for summary judgment,

is entirely inconsistent with the concept of continuing

jurisdiction to enforce judgments and orders.

An additional argument raised by the plaintiff is that

the court’s order to pay the costs of videotaping was

not specifically included in the judgment file, and, therefore, was not part of the judgment that the court had

continuing jurisdiction to enforce. This contention fails

for at least two reasons: the judgment file is ministerial;

see, e.g., Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526,

529 n.1, 893 A.2d 389 (2006); and the contempt order

related to an independent order of the court, issued

shortly after judgment, in any event.

B

Part I A of this opinion is predicated on the assumption that the January 3, 2012 order was issued within

the jurisdiction of the trial court. The plaintiff claims

that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue the

order. He contends that the order was an interlocutory

discovery order, which ordinarily would be subsumed

in the judgment, rather than an independent judicial

order, and that it was issued after judgment was rendered on the merits, so that it was not properly subsumed in the judgment in any event. In the unusual

circumstances of this case, we disagree.

The timing in this case was complicated by the parallel short calendar scheduling of the motions regarding

payment for discovery costs and the motion for summary judgment. Significantly, the motions regarding the

order of the payment of the videotaping costs no longer

directly concerned the preparation of evidence for trial,

but, rather, involved the payment of costs. Ordinarily,

orders regarding what may be discoverable, the scheduling of discovery, and related matters do conclude

with the judgment, and ordinarily such orders are not

immediately appealable, but, rather, may be raised as

issues on appeal.3 The order for payment, however, was

not an order directing the progress of discovery toward

trial, but,rather, was an independent orderto effectuate
the authority of the court. In the unusual circumstances

of this case, the order properly served as the predicate

for the order of contempt.4

The facts of this case are analogous to those of CFM

of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 400–

404, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996), overruled in part on other

grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 154–55,

735 A.2d 333 (1999). There, the plaintiff’s attorney was

ordered to pay $10,000 to the defendant as sanctions

for bad faith behavior. Our Supreme Court held that

the sanction was a final judgment for the purpose of

appeal because the order was not dependent on further

proceedings and the amount would be owed irrespective of the eventual outcome of the case; the rights

affected were solely between the attorney and the

defendant.5 See also Bryant v. Bryant, 228 Conn. 630,

636, 637 A.2d 1111 (1994).

The second subsidiary issue is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the court had the authority to rule

on the defendant’s motion for order after its granting

of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. At

the time the court granted the motion for summary

judgment on December 19, 2011, the defendant’s motion

for order, which had been filed on December 15, 2011,

was pending. Less than two weeks after granting the

motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2011,

the court ruled on the defendant’s pending motion for

order on January 3, 2012.

At the time of the court’s January 3, 2012 ruling on

the motion for order, the trial court was fully engaged

in managing the case, and no appeal had yet been filed.

As noted previously, motions for reargument of trial

court rulings and decisions were pending. On January

23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension

of time to file an appeal on the ground that the trial

court had yet to rule ‘‘on discovery motions which shall

be included in the issues on appeal.’’ The motion was

granted, and the plaintiff included on appeal issues

regarding the court’s ruling on the motion for order

of payment.

Ordinarily, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain

motions until the expiration of four months from the

date of judgment. Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 107,

733 A.2d 80 (1999); see also Rocque v. Light Sources,

Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 432–33, 881 A.2d 230 (2005). Especially in light of the practical circumstances in this case,

we see no reason why the court did not have the authority to rule on outstanding motions. The order that

formed the predicate for the contempt order, then, was

properly granted by the trial court.

II

The plaintiff claims that the court, Danaher, J.,

improperly denied his motion for judicial disqualification on the ground of bias. We disagree.
‘‘In reviewing a claim of judicial bias, this court

employs a plain error standard of review. . . . The

standard to be employed is an objective one, not the

judge’s subjective view as to whether he or she can be

fair and impartial in hearing the case. . . . Any conduct

that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the

circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for

the judge’s disqualification.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 416, 10 A.3d 507 (2011);

see also Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a).

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied

his May 28, 2013 motion for judicial disqualification.

He essentially argues that the court improperly failed

to refer the motion to another judge and improperly

denied the motion when the court exhibited bias toward

him, as evidenced by the court’s adverse rulings. He also

claims that the court called him ‘‘a liar.’’ We disagree.

A hearing before another judge was not required in

this case. In order to require an evidentiary hearing

before another judge on a motion for disqualification,

the party asserting bias of the trial judge must ‘‘state

facts on the record which, if true, give fair support to

his claim. If those facts, taken as true, give that fair

support, the party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing

on those facts before another judge.’’ Szypula v. Szypula, 2 Conn. App. 650, 656, 482 A.2d 85 (1984). The

facts alleged in this case, however, do not give fair

support to the claim of judicial bias.

The plaintiff’s claim of judicial bias was based essentially on claims that Judge Danaher had exhibited bias

by issuing rulings adverse to him. ‘‘It is axiomatic, however, that an adverse or unfavorable ruling is not, in

itself, evidence of judicial bias against a litigant.’’

Traystman v. Traystman, 141 Conn. App. 789, 803, 62

A.3d 1149 (2013). The plaintiff also asserts that the court

exhibited bias by calling him a liar ‘‘in a deposition

controversy in a companion case.’’ There is nothing in

the record before us showing that Judge Danaher called

the plaintiff a liar. In his appellate brief, the plaintiff

has cited transcript excerpts in which Judge Danaher

stated that he believed that a claim made by the plaintiff,

to the effect that the court had not read a document

prepared by the plaintiff, was false. Characterizing a

claim as false is different from calling someone a liar.

We have thoroughly reviewed the materials presented

and conclude that, although relations may have been

strained; compare Traystman v. Traystman, supra,

803; Judge Danaher did not act improperly in denying

the plaintiff’s motion for judicial disqualification.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We refer to Eugene M. Gisselbrecht in both capacities as the defendant.
2 The issue whether the court had the jurisdiction to make the order on

January 3, 2012, will be discussed in the following subpart of this opinion.

3 The plaintiff correctly asserts that most discovery orders are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. The issuance of a contempt order may

alter the situation. See Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488,

498, 736 A.2d 851 (1999). Here, we are not directly concerned with the

question of whether the order for payment was independently appealable,

because the appeal has been taken from the subsequent order of contempt.

4 The analysis is complicated by the fact that the self-represented party

was also an attorney. Ordinarily, findings of contempt where nonparties are

involved are reviewed by means of writs of error.

5 Similar to the present case, the sanctions order was deemed to be equivalent to a judgment, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings on a contempt action. CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury,

supra, 239 Conn. 404.