1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 0:20-cv-61113-DIMITROULEAS

CODY BARNETT, et al., 

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY TONY, 

Defendant.

 /

ORDER APPROVING IN PART REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE; SUSTAINING 

IN PART OBJECTIONS; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION 

FOR ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enforcement and 

Modification [DE 130] and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Lurana S. 

Snow (the “Report”) [DE 166]. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Report [DE 

166], the parties’ cross-objections to the Report [DEs 167, 168], the Responses [DEs 169, 170]

thereto and the record herein. The Court is otherwise fully advised in the premises. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and proposed class members, filed this action against 

Gregory Tony, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida (“BSO” or 

“Defendant”), on June 5, 2020, alleging that detainees imprisoned at the Broward County Jail

(the “Jail”) were being exposed to a risk of COVID-19 infection in violation of their rights under 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the 

Rehabilitation Act. See [DE 1]. Plaintiffs sought remedies to address substantial risks of their 

contracting the COVID-19 virus, and of suffering serious illness or death should they contract 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 1 of 14
2

the virus. Id. Plaintiffs and Defendant subsequently negotiated a Settlement Agreement, which 

was executed on November 30, 2020 (the “Agreement” or “Consent Decree”). See [DE 103-1].

The Court approved the Agreement and certified the Settlement Class on May 13, 2021, 

obligating Defendant to undertake certain actions to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among 

detainees at the Jail. See [DEs 112,103-1]. In the approval Order, the Court retained jurisdiction 

over this action for the purpose of enforcing the Agreement. [DE 112] at ¶ 5.

On September 21, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Enforcement and 

Modification, asserting that Defendant’s failures combined with changed circumstances have led 

to a swell in infections, requiring this Court’s intervention to enforce and/or modify the 

Agreement. See [DE 130] at 8–10. First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed to carry out 

certain commitments as outlined in the parties’ Agreement. Id. at 9. For example, Plaintiffs assert 

that Defendant failed to fulfill the clear requirement for BSO to test all detainees for COVID-19 

upon admission. Id. at 9. In addition to an enforcement order directing Defendant to comply with 

Defendant’s obligations under the Agreement to cure these deficiencies, Plaintiffs argue that the 

Agreement should be modified to reflect knowledge not contemplated at the time the Agreement 

was originally executed in November 2020. Id. at 10.

After briefing and a full-day evidentiary hearing, Magistrate Judge Snow issued a Report 

and Recommendation on November 19, 2021, recommending that Plaintiffs’ Motion be granted 

in part and denied in part. See [DE 166] at 29–30. The parties subsequently filed cross-objections 

to the Report, which the Court will now resolve.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party seeking to challenge the findings in a report and recommendation of a United 

States Magistrate Judge must file “written objections which shall specifically identify the 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 2 of 14
3

portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the 

specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989)). “It is critical that the objection be 

sufficiently specific and not a general objection to the report.” Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 

(citing Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984)). If a party makes a timely and specific 

objection to a finding in the report and recommendation, the district court must conduct a de 

novo review of the portions of the report to which objection is made. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 

783-84; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may accept, reject, or modify in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Macort, 208 F. App’x 

at 784; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court has undertaken a de novo review of the 

record and the Objections.

III. DISCUSSION 

Magistrate Judge Snow found that BSO had violated several provisions of the 

Agreement, including by failing to test detainees upon admission, failing to test detainees before 

they are released or otherwise leave the Jail, failing to re-test detainees in quarantine units every 

3-7 days, failing to test and screen detainees prior to transfers to different facilities, and failing to 

maintain a list of medically vulnerable detainees to be symptom screened and temperature 

checked daily and to be housed in a manner that facilitates social distancing. See [DE 166] at 11, 

12, 13, 14–15, 20. As a result, Magistrate Judge Snow recommends specific relief regarding 

these areas of non-compliance. Id. at 29–30.

In addition, Magistrate Judge Snow found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden with 

respect to BSO’s violation of several other provisions of the Agreement. Specifically, Magistrate 

Judge Snow found no further action by Defendant is needed with regard to symptom screening 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 3 of 14
4

detained persons re-entering jail, testing symptomatic and exposed detainees, screening staff, 

separating quarantine and cohort units, contact tracing, cohorting upon admission, re-testing and 

monitoring during cohorting, medical isolation of symptomatic detainees, social distancing 

requirements, personal protective equipment, and educational information. Id. at 12, 15–19, 21–

23, 25, 30. Judge Snow also declined to recommend monthly compliance reporting and 

appointment of a monitor. Id. at 26, 30–31. Finally, Judge Snow recommends that Plaintiff’s 

request for modification be denied. Id. at 29, 31.

A. Defendant’s Objections

Defendant does not object to the factual findings of the Report. Rather, Defendant objects 

to the Report solely on the basis that Plaintiff’s Motion was procedurally erroneous and 

improper. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Magistrate erred because the procedure and 

standards governing a motion for contempt and sanctions apply to the instant Motion, which 

requires Plaintiff meet an elevated “clear and convincing” burden of proof and not the 

preponderance of the evidence standard upon which the Magistrate’s finding of facts are based. 

Having carefully considered Defendant’s Objections and Plaintiffs’ Response to 

Defendant’s Objections and having reviewed the arguments, case law, and evidence presented, 

the Court overrules the Objections. The Court agrees with the analysis and conclusions

regarding the proper procedure and burden of proof for enforcement of a settlement agreement 

set forth in Magistrate Judge Snow’s well-reasoned Report. See [DE 166] at 7–9.

In its Objections to the Report, Defendant argues, as it did in its Response to Plaintiffs’

Motion for Enforcement and Modification, that Plaintiffs’ motion is procedurally improper 

because Plaintiffs must first establish by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants have

violated a prior Court order, after which a show cause order would be entered by the Court.

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 4 of 14
5

Plaintiffs have repeatedly stated, however, that they are not requesting the Court hold Defendant 

in contempt and are only seeking enforcement and modification of the Agreement. See [DE 130] 

at 35 (“Because compliance is the urgent goal, Plaintiffs at this time ask only for a detailed 

enforcement order.”); see also [DE 170] at 5–6 (“Plaintiffs opted not to seek contempt and 

sanctions at that time, however, and instead sought enforcement and modification to ensure 

BSO’s compliance.”). As noted by Magistrate Judge Snow, courts have recognized the 

distinction between a motion to “punish violators for contempt” and a motion to “enforce 

settlement agreements in actions pending before them.” S. Beach Suncare, Inc. v. Sea & Ski 

Corp., No. 98-1114-CIV-MORENO, 1999 WL 350458, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1999). 

Numerous courts in this district have granted a motion to enforce a settlement agreement or 

consent decree without applying the procedure and standards governing a motion for contempt 

and sanctions. See, e.g., Malvaes v. Constellation Brands, Inc., No. 14-21302-CIV, 2016 WL 

4007332, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2016); United States v. City of Fort Pierce, No. 08-14309-

CIV, 2011 WL 13174650, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011).

Here, Magistrate Judge Snow made a ruling on the proper procedure and standard of 

proof at the outset of the evidentiary hearing and reaffirmed the ruling in the Report. See [DE 

163] at 5–6; [DE 166] at 8–9. Magistrate Judge Snow noted that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs cite in 

their Motion cases relating to civil contempt, they make clear that they are not requesting the 

Court to hold Defendant in contempt at this time. Plaintiffs seek only enforcement and 

modification of the Settlement Agreement.” [DE 166] at 8. Further, Magistrate Judge Snow 

acknowledged that “the Settlement Agreement specifically contemplates such a motion for 

enforcement and distinguishes it from a motion for contempt.” Id.; [DE 103-1] at ¶ 24.

Defendant fails to cite any authority suggesting that the only way to enforce a settlement 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 5 of 14
6

agreement is through a contempt proceeding. See, e.g., Peery v. City of Miami, 977 F.3d 1061 

(11th Cir. 2020) (setting forth the proper procedure for obtaining contempt sanctions); Mercer v. 

Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). Nor does Defendant cite to any authority holding 

that a Court’s approving and adopting a settlement agreement dispenses with the Court’s power 

to enforce such an agreement independent of holding a defendant in contempt.

1 Accordingly, the 

Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Snow; unlike contempt proceedings, Plaintiffs may enforce 

the Agreement by proof of violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See S. Beach Suncare, 

1999 WL 35058, at *11.

B. Plaintiffs’ Objections

Plaintiffs object to four specific findings in the Report that they claim are unrelated to the 

Magistrate’s evaluation of live testimony. The Court will address each objection in turn. 

1. Testing and Medically Isolating Symptomatic Detainees

The Agreement obligates Defendant to “house symptomatic persons in medical isolation 

in individual cells in separate housing units,” and test those “who display symptoms” and 

detainees “who are exposed to a person who has tested positive for COVID-19.” [DE 103-1] at 

¶¶ 39, 43. All testing must comply with CDC guidance pursuant to Paragraph 44 of the 

Agreement. Id. at ¶ 44.

With respect to testing symptomatic detainees, Magistrate Judge Snow found:

All of the evidence put forth by Plaintiffs serves to establish only delayed

testing and disputes over whether a detainee has shown sufficient COVID-19

“symptoms” to warrant a test. The undersigned recognizes that there may be a 

practical disparity between a medically defined symptomatic person and a 

detainee’s nonmedical understanding of what constitutes a symptomatic person. 

Without a clear definition in the Settlement Agreement of what it means to “display 

1 Indeed, the language of the Court’s May 13, 2021 Order Certifying Settlement Class and Approving Class Settlement 

requires otherwise. See [DE 112] at 2–3 (“The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of 

enforcing the Settlement Agreement and all other Orders in this action.”).

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 6 of 14
7

symptoms” for the purpose of warranting a test, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs 

have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant failed to comply 

with testing symptomatic and exposed detainees. 

[DE 166] at 15. Magistrate Judge Snow made similar findings with respect to medically 

isolating symptomatic detainees, finding that the lack of “a clear definition of what it means to 

be a ‘symptomatic person’ sufficient to warrant medical isolation” under the Agreement warrants 

a denial of Plaintiff’s request. Id. at 21. Plaintiffs object on grounds that these findings

overlooked the description of COVID-19 symptoms in the Agreement, CDC guidance 

incorporated in the Agreement by reference, and the uncontested evidence Plaintiffs proffered at 

the hearing.

Upon review of the parties’ filings, including the Agreement and CDC guidance, and 

arguments by both sides, the Court sustains Plaintiffs’ Objections the extent that the Magistrate’s 

analysis did not consider CDC guidance incorporated into the Agreement by reference.

According to CDC guidance, symptoms of COVID-19 include but are not limited to “cough, 

shortness of breath or difficulty breathing, fever, chills, muscle pain, sore throat, and new loss or 

taste of smell.” [DE 154-3] at 29. Therefore, while Magistrate Judge Snow is correct “that there 

may be a practical disparity between a medically defined symptomatic person and a detainee’s 

nonmedical understanding of what constitutes a symptomatic person,” there is an objective way 

to measure what constitutes a symptomatic person for purposes of testing and medically isolating 

pursuant to the Agreement’s terms. [DE 166] at 15. This can be accomplished through 

temperature checks, identification of symptoms by medical staff, or substantially similar means.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Snow’s conclusion that Plaintiffs 

have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant failed to comply with testing 

and medically isolating symptomatic detainees. At the October 21, 2021 hearing, Plaintiffs 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 7 of 14
8

proffered the testimony of several detainees regarding the subjective symptoms they witnessed 

and experienced, including coughing, sweating, chills, and loss of taste and smell. See, e.g., [DE 

163] at 106:25-108:15, 147:17-149:20, 155:20-159:12. In light of the definition of COVID-19 

symptoms identified by CDC guidance incorporated into the Agreement, and the subjective

evidence Plaintiffs proffered at the hearing, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ Objections as to the 

Magistrate’s ultimate conclusion. 

2. Educating Detainees

The Agreement requires Defendant to “[i]nstruct prisoners on the latest CDC and other 

public health guidance on COVID-19, including best practices about preventing COVID-19 

infection and transmission.” [DE 103-1] at ¶ 61. As Magistrate Judge Snow noted, current CDC 

guidance “unambiguously instructs that the best practice to prevent COVID-19 infection and 

transmission is to receive one of the three FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccines.” [DE 166] at

24–25. Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Snow found Defendant complied with Paragraph 61 of the 

Agreement by: (1) posting educational materials on COVID-19 prevention and vaccination 

throughout the Jail, (2) making at least three loudspeaker announcements per day regarding the 

availability of vaccinations, and (3) educating in-person on vaccination through its nurses and 

healthcare professionals during chronic care visits and routine contact. Id. at 25. Magistrate 

Judge Snow also noted that Plaintiffs conceded that Defendant has taken steps to encourage 

vaccination. Id.

Plaintiffs object to the first finding on grounds that these materials were not delivered in 

such a way to reach detainees. As to the second finding regarding loudspeaker announcements, 

Plaintiffs contend that such announcements are not education as they merely advise about the 

availability of vaccines rather than information about the vaccines, such as their efficacy and 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 8 of 14
9

safety. As to the third finding regarding in-person education, Plaintiffs dispute this finding on 

grounds that it is based on the conclusory and inadmissible hearsay declaration of Acting 

Director Darren Sieger.

Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’ Objections and Defendant’s Response thereto,

and having reviewed the arguments, and evidence presented, the Court overrules the Objections.

The Court agrees with the analysis and conclusions regarding educating detainees in Magistrate 

Judge Snow’s Report and finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden with respect to 

Paragraph 61 of the Agreement.

3. Reporting Requirements and Appointment of an Independent Monitor

Plaintiffs also disagree with Magistrate Judge Snow’s finding that the monthly 

compliance reporting and independent monitor sought by Plaintiffs is not warranted. In their 

Objections, Plaintiffs argue “the lengthy and resource-intensive nature of Plaintiffs’ monitoring 

shows precisely why such monitoring alone is insufficient,” that compliance with the Agreement 

is Defendant’s responsibility, and that the Agreement’s provision regarding Plaintiffs’ 

monitoring should merely be a “confirmatory backstop.” [DE 168] at 17. Plaintiffs further argue

that appointment of a monitor and regular compliance reporting are tools commonly utilized in 

jail and prison litigation. [DE 168] at 18–19; see, e.g., United States v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 

1:13-cv-21570, [DE 5-2] at 30–33.

Upon careful consideration, the Court overrules the Objections. The Court agrees

with Magistrate Judge Snow that appointing a monitor and requiring more stringent 

reporting requirements is not appropriate at this time. Magistrate Judge Snow correctly 

observed that “Plaintiffs concede that they ‘ask only for a detailed enforcement order’ at

this time, and not an order holding Defendant in civil contempt” but nevertheless

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 9 of 14
10

“analogize to contempt cases to substantiate their argument that sanctions such as 

appointing a monitor and requiring more stringent reporting is appropriate in the instant 

case.” [DE 166] at 25–26. In the absence of authority permitting this Court to impose 

sanctions through a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, the Court will not impose 

such sanctions at this time. See, e.g., Mercer, 908 F.2d at 769 (finding that a district court 

abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions without making a finding of contempt).

4. Modification

Finally, Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate’s finding that Plaintiffs’ request for 

modification of the Consent Decree be denied. The Eleventh Circuit has determined that the 

district court may modify a consent decree if the movant shows that: (1) there has been “a 

significant change either in factual conditions or in law”; and (2) “the proposed modification is 

suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1033 

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384, 391 (1992)). 

“One way a plaintiff may be able to establish a change in circumstances justifying modification 

of a consent decree is by demonstrating that the consent decree has failed to achieve its purpose.” 

F.T.C. v. Garden of Life, Inc., No. 06-80226-CIV, 2012 WL 1898607, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 

2012) (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, however, that “consent decrees 

generally do not have overarching purposes” and “cannot be interpreted as requiring whatever 

might be necessary and appropriate” to achieve a more general, overarching purpose. Sierra 

Club, 296 F.3d at 1031–32.

Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit has warned that “[a] party seeking to modify a consent

decree has a high hurdle to clear and the wind in its face.” Id. at 1034. Indeed, modifications to 

consent decrees are rarely granted “because consent decrees are normally compromises between 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 10 of 14
11

parties with opposing positions in which each party gives up their rights to litigation and to prove 

their position.” Id. at 1032.

Plaintiffs request modification of the Consent Decree in light of changed factual 

circumstances, namely, the advent, approval, and widespread availability of COVID-19 

vaccines. In the Report, Magistrate Judge Snow recommends Plaintiffs’ request for modification 

be denied given “the high burden of proof required to support modification, the availability of 

vaccines prior to approval of the Agreement, Defendant’s voluntary steps to address changed 

circumstances, and the Eleventh Circuit’s disfavor for overarching contractual ‘purposes[.]’” 

[DE 166] at 29. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Snow’s analysis and conclusions.

Plaintiffs primarily object to the Magistrate’s finding on grounds that it was based on the 

mistaken premise that Plaintiffs could have re-negotiated the Agreement after it was executed in 

November 2020. After execution, Plaintiffs contend, they lacked the power to negotiate the 

Agreement’s terms when the vaccines later became available. The Court disagrees. The parties 

were more than capable of re-negotiating and amending the Agreement’s terms before the 

Court’s fairness hearing and Order Certifying Settlement Class and Approving Class Settlement 

in May 2021.2 That the parties elected not to do so does not surmount the high burden of 

demonstrating a significant change in factual circumstances to warrant modification. Therefore, 

the Court overrules the Objections.

As a final note, and particularly in the light of the emergence of Omicron variant3

, the 

Court reiterates Magistrate Judge Snow’s observation that “it is in the parties’ interests to 

2 At the Court’s fairness hearing in May 2021, the Court questioned whether the Settlement Agreement contained 

provisions that considered vaccinations and, if not, why those provisions were absent. Plaintiffs’ counsel explained 

that the Agreement was executed just a few weeks prior to approval and release of the vaccines, but that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel had been in communication with BSO about vaccinations. See [DE 126] at 7:6-19. 3 The CDC advises that “breakthrough infections in people who are fully vaccinated are likely to occur” but that, 

importantly, “vaccines have remained effective at preventing severe illness, hospitalizations, and death.” Omicron 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 11 of 14
12

increase the vaccination rate at Defendant’s facilities, both to ensure the safety of detainees and 

staff, and to lower the burden on Defendant.” [DE 166] at 29.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Objections [DE 167] are OVERRULED.

2. Plaintiffs’ Objections [DE 168] are SUSTAINED IN PART.

3. The Report [DE 166] is hereby APPROVED IN PART.

4. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enforcement and Modification [DE 130] is GRANTED IN 

PART as follows:

a. Defendant shall, in accordance with CDC Guidance, conduct a COVID19 test on all individuals at intake;

b. Defendant shall test for COVID-19 all detainees being released or 

otherwise leaving the Jail, such as to attend court appearances. Defendant 

shall utilize rapid tests to ensure that the time for receiving results will not 

delay the detainee’s exit from the Jail;

c. Defendant shall, in accordance with CDC Guidance, ensure that 

individuals in quarantine units are tested for COVID-19 every 3-7 days 

until testing identifies no new cases in the quarantine unit for fourteen (14) 

days after the most recent positive result;

d. Defendant shall conduct temperature and COVID-19 symptom checks 

prior to all transfers of detainees to different facilities;

Variant: What You Need to Know, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (updated Dec. 20, 2021), 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html.

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 12 of 14
13

e. Defendant shall maintain a list of medically vulnerable detainees and 

conduct COVID-19 symptom screening and temperature checks of such 

detainees;

f. Defendant shall track the housing location of medically vulnerable 

detainees; and

g. Defendant shall ensure that detainees possess two face coverings in usable 

condition at all times.

5. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enforcement and Modification [DE 130] is DENIED IN 

PART as follows:

a. No action by the Defendant is needed with regard to symptom screening 

detained persons re-entering jail, testing symptomatic and exposed 

detainees, screening staff, separating quarantine and cohort units, contact 

tracing, cohorting upon admission, re-testing and monitoring during 

cohorting, medical isolation of symptomatic detainees, social distancing,

personal protective equipment, and educational information.

b. No enhanced reporting requirements and appointment of an independent 

monitor to oversee compliance with the Agreement is required.

c. No modification of the Agreement is necessary.

It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk shall mail a copy of this order 

to Kenneth A. Frank and Peter Davis at the addresses listed below.4

4 On January 24, 2022, the Court received a letter from Kenneth A. Frank, an inmate at the Conte Correctional 

Facility, listing a number of grievances related to overcrowding, cleanliness, and treatment endured by himself and 

other inmates at the Conte Correctional Facility. See [DE 171]. Mr. Frank requests the Court “enter an injunction or 

order to show cause requiring immediate discontinuance of double bunking, reduction of population, and strict 

adherence to sanitary polices, inter alia.” Id. On January 28, 2022, the Court received a letter from Peter Davis, an 

inmate at the Paul Rein Detention Facility, requesting the Court deny Defendant’s request for an extension of time 

and “grant the T.R.O. to stop further irreparable harm being inflicted to the Plaintiff.” See [DE 172]. Kenneth A. 

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 13 of 14
14

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, 

this 31st day of January, 2022.

Copies furnished to: 

Counsel of record 

Kenneth A. Frank, #231700416

Conte Correctional Facility

P.O. Box 407016

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33340

Peter Davis, #381701573

Paul Rein Facility

P.O. Box 407003

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33340

Frank and Peter Davis are both housed at Broward County corrections facilities and are therefore class members

represented by Class Counsel in this matter. See [DE 103-1] at ¶¶ 5, 7, 10. The Court does not allow hybrid 

representation. Class members should report any instances of noncompliance with the Settlement Agreement to 

Class Counsel, who may then seek appropriate relief from the Court. The Court will not address further letters 

from class members requesting relief from the Court unless filed by Class Counsel.

Case 0:20-cv-61113-WPD Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2022 Page 14 of 14