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Number 150, October 1998

Sources of Balkan Insecurity:*The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy
by Jeffrey Simon

Conclusions- Many of the recent Balkan conflicts have    been temporarily halted through emergency crisis-resolution actions. These emergency    actions, though, have not focused on the interrelated sources of these conflicts, and have    not thus far led to a real, lasting regional solution. 
- Although the Organization for Security    and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has proven to be necessary in monitoring minority    activities and elections in the region, it has been insufficient to resolve the    region’s ills. 
- The European Union (EU) and West    European Union (WEU) remain "blind" to many of the region’s countries and    their problems. Unfortunately, some of the actions these organizations have taken may have    had a negative effect on the region’s stability.  
- Regional expectations about what NATO    (and the United States) can actually achieve far exceed NATO’s collective will,    political-military capacities and the realities of the United States’ limits. Yet,    almost all attention has been focused upon NATO intervention. Hence, regional expectations    are likely to remain unfulfilled with adverse implications for NATO’s prestige and    U.S. influence.  
**The Roots of Balkan Insecurity

The roots of Balkan insecurity andinstability can be attributed to at least the following four interrelated problems: (1)psychological factors; (2) state-building challenges; (3) economic development; and (4)security/defense issues. Efforts to eradicate the sources of Balkan insecurity andconflict must attack *all* these problems simultaneously. Because NATO is onlyeffective in ameliorating two of the four problems—psychological andsecurity/defense—a more comprehensive and coordinated strategy is necessary.
**Psychological Factors: Balkan versusSoutheast European

Two fundamentally different andcontradictory modes of thinking remain evident in the region. The predominant emphasizesthe pursuit of narrow nationalistic interests even at the expense of one’s neighbors.This mode could be labeled "Balkan" (with its images of Balkan powder kegs andghosts); it employs history to justify the need to rectify past political or socialinjustice.

A very different mode of thinking, whichremains latent in the region, stresses cooperation. This mode could be labeled as"Southeast European." It requires shedding historical blinders and transcendinglegacies by stressing the need for cooperative activities and institutions, such as theSoutheast European Cooperation Initiative (SEECI), the Southeast European Defenseministerial, or the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). 

The historical model for such cooperationis the successful reconciliation of former adversaries—Germany and France—inWestern Europe. We now need to implement this model in the southeast corner of Europe. Itneeds to be recalled, though, that the German-French project required attention tocooperative institution-building as well as substantial resources over a 50-year period. 

In sum, enormous time and effort will berequired to erode and eradicate the predominant psychological Balkan attitude. Compared toWestern Europe, which has had a 50-year head-start, the Southeast European region is onlybeginning. 
**State-building Challenges

The post-Communist legacy presents aregion-wide need to develop political and social institutions to meet the needs of eachstate’s citizens—the challenge of state-building at the most basic level.

While Germany and France were being slowlyembedded in the institutional web of NATO and the European Community/Union, Communistregimes uniformly suppressed historic national differences and the vestiges of theTreaties of Berlin (1878) and Trianon (1920) in Europe’s southeast corner. 

Complicating the challenge is the factthat the post-Communist regional legacy remains diverse. Some states, such as Albania,Romania, and Bulgaria, maintained statehood throughout Communist rule. Others, includingthe Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, andSlovenia must develop independent state institutions from the former Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY), much as Moldova must from the former Soviet Union. The FRY must developstate institutions to accommodate the varying needs of its ethnically diverse citizens inMontenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia. 

In all cases, though, the major challengeis how to develop state institutions that meet the needs of *all* citizens.State-building must accommodate ethnic minority participation and tolerate their contactswith ethnic brethren abroad. To the degree that minorities "feel" they have aplace within the state, the state might be judged as being democratically healthy andviable. To the degree citizens feel excluded from state institutions, they may pose apotential threat to the viability of that state, weakening it. Among the weak states,which predominate the region, two (Albania and Bulgaria in 1996) have already failed andothers (including Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) pose the potential for"failing" in the future. 

Southeast European states provide manysecurity risks arising from the alienation of ethnic minorities from state institutions.This alienation can and has led to violence, bloodshed, and the displacement of families,communities, and minority groupings with the resulting danger of conflict spilling acrossstate borders. For example, remaining from the legacy of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, andCommunist rule in Albania and FRY, is the unresolved Albanian "problem."Aggravated by Serbian policies, Kosovo has become its flashpoint, where 90 percent of theRepublic’s two million people are Albanian Kosovars who have been effectivelyexcluded from participation in the state’s institutions. 

The Albanian minority in Macedonia is alsoconnected to this crisis. In marked contrast to Kosovo, Macedonia’s Albanian minoritydoes participate in state institutions. But to the extent that differences persist overthe actual size of the minority population (state statistics claim Albanians comprise 22percent of the population; while the minority claims they comprise 35-40 percent) thepotential for alienation exists. Many Slavic Macedonians perceive an annual MacedoniaAlbanian growth rate of 3.5 percent as a potential threat to the state’s security.Such perceptions weaken the state. (Bulgarians also tend to portray their decliningpopulation—resulting from a high death rate, declining birthrate, andemigration—as a threat to security.)

The OSCE has been one of the mosteffective institutions in dealing with these security problems. It has evaluated thetreatment of ethnic minorities and monitored elections. While this institution has beennecessary and useful in preventing some conflicts, it has clearly been insufficient.Nevertheless, it remains one of the more effective tools for dealing with these aspects ofthe region’s risks.
**Economic Development

General economic deprivation tends toexacerbate the region’s ethnic tensions. Unfortunately, economic sanctions on FRY dueto the Yugoslav crisis have contributed to further economic dislocation in the region.Many in the region still do not understand why they must bear the costs of sanctionswithout reimbursement, and view them not as a security cost, but as a burden imposed byforeign states.

Most citizens in the region define therisks to their security predominantly in domestic terms—from drug and peopletrafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and state corruption. State interior ministries,which are responsible for domestic security, tend to be ineffective. Since the EU and WEUare the multinational institutions that are not only responsible for, but also the mostcapable of dealing with these internal security issues and concerns, they should assume amore active regional role.

The EU has had a positive role instabilizing Slovenia by extending an opening for ultimate EU membership. To a lesserdegree, the WEU’s offer of associate partnership to Bulgaria and Romania has alsooffered hope. However, it might be argued that the EU and WEU have had an unwitting, but *negative*effect on the security of other regional countries by offering encouragement to some butnot all. 
- Regrettably, some states in the region    have remained "invisible" to the EU and WEU, particularly Albania and Macedonia.     
- The Schengen Agreement, which controls    and limits the flow of people across borders, increases a sense of regional isolation from    Europe.  
- Despite NATO’s adoption of the    Combined Joint Task Force in January 1994, and the creation of a European deputy SACEUR in    1996 to become NATO’s WEU military liaison, the WEU did *not* respond when the    Albanian crisis erupted over the pyramid scheme and resulting economic collapse.    Fortunately, Italy stitched together an international force (Operation Alba) to restore    order. 

Many in the region correctly see thateconomic stability is critical to their security. Many, though, incorrectly continue tosee EU membership as a "life raft"—a tool to solve the problems that the"weak" regional states are unable to solve themselves. To the degree that thisperception exists, and the EU remains distant and disengaged, the feelings of isolationand abandonment will persist.

The EU and WEU need to focus moreattention and resources on the region. Their lack of attention in Albania and Macedonia,the unwitting results of Schengen, and lack of commitment of economic resources andattention, contribute to the region’s sense of increasing "isolation" fromEurope. If ever there was a need for an EU-style Marshall Plan for the Balkans—a planthat would be in the European pillar’s direct strategic interest—the time isnow! 

Other than Bosnia, the efforts undertakento date by the UN, NATO, and EU/WEU in various Balkan states have mainly involved the useof military forces to prevent collapse or deter cross-border problems and to improvemilitary-to-military relations. Too little effort has been directed toward building localcapacity for democratic public security and law enforcement—as opposed to thetraditional authoritarian ethos from the Communist era. By building upon and broadeningthe Partnership for Peace (PFP) approach—so that it includes rebuilding andre-educating local border guards, constabulary, and police—a combined effort couldreduce internal tensions and minimize the need for continued external involvement.However, to be successful, this must include parallel attention and assistance to judicialinstitutions. The EU is much better suited than the United States on this issue, given thedifferences in European and American jurisprudence.

At a minimum, an active EU program thatwould support deepening cooperation among the region’s internal security organs (toinclude judicial and legal reform, and police training and cooperation for example, withFrench gendarmerie and Italian carabinieri) would be appropriate. Such a response wouldgive credibility to the EU/WEU’s exhortations about a European Security and DefenseIdentity (ESDI).
**Security/Defense Issues

Regional misperceptions about NATO areprevalent and vary greatly. They range from the extreme Serbian view that NATO (and theUnited States) are the major source(s) of instability, to the more widespread and extrememisperception that NATO has an almost magical capacity to solve any security issue and toguarantee the security of any state lucky enough to slide under its umbrella (e.g.,Moldovans argue that NATO should get the Russians to remove their 14th Army from Moldova).NATO’s limitations are neither widely understood nor appreciated. Hence, whateverNATO ultimately does decide to do in the region is likely to result in disappointment anddisillusionment because of unfulfilled expectations based upon misperceptions about theAlliance’s capacity.

Although NATO’s regional role islimited, it nonetheless *is* essential and significant. It has been a very effectivetool in developing cooperative security through confidence-building programs andactivities. NATO remains (aside from the OSCE) the one institution that has an extensivenetwork in the region. Since it launched PFP in January 1994, all countries in the region(except Croatia and FRY) are participating. In addition, since 1994 the forms of PFPcooperation have also broadened. Initially, at the Partnership Coordination Center (PCC)at Mons, the PFP focused on developing partner military cooperation in peacekeeping,search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. In the Fall of 1995, in preparation forpartner participation in the Implementation Force (IFOR)—and the Stabilization Force(SFOR) follow-on—in Bosnia, PFP’s terms of reference were expanded to include"peace enforcement" operations. Finally, in July 1997 when the Madrid Summitannounced enhanced PFP, partner cooperation expanded to include civil emergency planning.In sum, NATO’s PFP programs and activities in the region have been wider and deeperthan EU/WEU programs.

NATO enlargement plays a positive regionalrole through its efforts to *not* draw new division lines in contrast to the EU/WEUenlargement process which specifically excludes much of the region. The NATO Madrid Summitreiterated Article 10, specifically mentioned the progress made by Romania and Slovenia,and instructed its foreign ministers to report on their progress at the Washington Summitin April 1999. Also, the Madrid Summit announced the establishment of the Permanent JointCouncil (PJC) with Russia and a Joint Commission with Ukraine. Finally, as a replacementto the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which was created in 1991, the MadridSummit established the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC has thepotential to become the Alliance’s political body for coordinating and enhancingcooperative security programs and policies in the region. To this end, the EAPC couldestablish a Southeast European action group to coordinate NATO cooperative securityactivities and programs with the OSCE and the EU/WEU. 

One example in support of furtherdeepening the region’s embryonic cooperative security efforts has resulted from themisfortune in Bosnia. In addition to halting the conflict in Bosnia, the Dayton Accordsprovided the conditions for regional states to fulfill their responsibility in IFOR/SFOR.This has been a most significant laboratory for imparting the lessons and habits ofcooperative security. (See, for example, "The IFOR/SFOR Experience: Lessons Learnedby PFP Partners," *Strategic Forum,* No. 120, July 1997.) 

A second example has been the attempt toestablish combined military units to enhance transparency and build confidence. Someregional examples can be found in the Hungarian-Romanian combined battalion and in theItalian-Hungarian-Slovenian battalion.

Another example might be found in theresults from the slowly developing cooperation among regional defense ministers. Followingthe first meeting of Defense Ministers in Tirana in 1996, a second meeting convened inSofia in October 1997. From it resulted the May 22, 1998 Southeast European Deputy DefenseMinisterial meeting in Tirana which signed a letter of intent to create a MultinationalPeace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). The initiative—signed by Romania,Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Macedonia, and Italy (with the United States andSlovenia as observers)—intends to create a brigade-sized unit. The issues of theunit’s relationship to NATO, its missions, and headquarters location remain to bedetermined.

No single security institution (OSCE,EU/WEU, NATO) or country (such as the United States) is capable of resolving *all*the sources of Balkan insecurity alone. Because psychological factors, state-buildingchallenges, economic development problems, and security/defense issues are allinterrelated aspects of Balkan insecurity, a comprehensive "action program"needs to be created and implemented; and a coordinated effort needs to beinstitutionalized between NATO and the EU. The EAPC seems the best equipped institutionfor developing a comprehensive plan for the region’s security.
**Recommendations
The EU/WEU should be encouraged toactively promote Southeastern Europe’s economic and political development, as well asto prevent its increasing sense of isolation resulting from the Schengen Agreement. Theyalso need to more aggressively assist the countries of Southeastern Europe with theirinternal security risks.

NATO needs to better coordinate itsexternal security activities with the EU/WEU, perhaps through the EAPC which couldestablish a Southeast European action group to coordinate the cooperative securityactivities and programs of the OSCE, EU/WEU, and NATO.  

This paper is a result of a conference hosted by INSS andthe Romanian Defense Ministry Institute for Political Studies of Defense and MilitaryHistory held in Bucharest July 9-11, 1998. Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow at INSS.He can be reached at (202) 685-2367, by fax at (202) 685-3972, or by e-mail at[email protected].

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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