IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA19-1028

Filed: 1 September 2020

Cumberland County, No. 19 JA 72

In the Matter of: V.M.

Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 22 May 2019 and 6 August 

2019 by Judges Tiffany M. Whitfield and Cheri Siler-Mack, respectively, in 

Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 June 2020.

Cumberland County Department of Social Services, by Michael A. Simmons, 

for petitioner.

Benjamin J. Kull for respondent-mother.

Alston & Bird LLP, by Ryan P. Ethridge, for the Guardian ad Litem.

YOUNG, Judge.

Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order adjudicating V.M. 

(“Vinny”)1 neglected under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) and ordering respondentmother and respondent-father (collectively, “respondent-parents”) to submit to 

random drug screens. After careful review, we reverse and remand.

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading.
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

2

I. Background

This action arises out of a Cumberland County Department of Social Services 

(“DSS”) report concerning Vinny, who was admitted to the hospital with a blood 

alcohol level of 179 and diagnosed with acute alcohol intoxication. Respondentparents are the biological parents of Vinny, who was four months old at the time of 

the incident at issue. The events leading up to the incident are as follows.

Respondent-mother is a stay-at-home mom and the primary caretaker of 

Vinny. In January 2019, respondent-mother took Vinny with her to Atlanta, Georgia 

for an aunt’s funeral. Respondent-father was unable to accompany them on the trip 

due to a work conflict. Following the funeral service on Friday, 25 January 2019, 

respondent-mother and other family members gathered at a cousin’s house, which 

had a full bar. While there, some members of the family began drinking. Respondentmother and her brother, Domico, did not participate in the drinking, but were present 

in the home while the drinking took place. At some point, some of the family members

who were drinking, including respondent-mother’s sister Selenia, transferred the 

liquor into water bottles. Respondent-mother, Vinny, and Domico later spent the 

night at an Airbnb with Selenia.

The next morning, the group returned to their cousin’s home to pick up their 

grandmother, who was going to ride back to North Carolina with Domico, respondentmother, and Vinny. Before leaving, Domico grabbed some water bottles that he 
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

3

believed were unopened from the kitchen counter of their cousin’s home. During the 

car ride back to North Carolina, respondent-mother fed Vinny formula that she 

prepared using one of the water bottles. Domico testified that throughout this process 

he did not detect the smell of alcohol in the car. Vinny subsequently became fussy.

Despite respondent-mother’s attempts to console him, Vinny remained fussy even 

after they arrived home. Throughout all relevant times, Vinny was primarily in the 

care of respondent-mother.

Respondent-mother took Vinny to the hospital the next morning, where doctors 

determined he had alcohol in his system and diagnosed him with acute alcohol 

intoxication. After speaking with his sister about the situation, Domico smelled the 

water bottle respondent-mother had used to prepare Vinny’s formula and detected an 

odor of alcohol. Domico then realized he must have mistakenly grabbed one of the 

water bottles containing liquor from their cousin’s house, which respondent-mother 

later used to prepare Vinny’s formula. The matter was referred to DSS, and Vinny 

was temporarily placed in the care of his paternal grandparents on 29 January 2019. 

Respondent-parents cooperated with DSS and worked to satisfy the agency’s 

requirements. 

On 18 February 2019, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Vinny was 

neglected, dependent, and abused. DSS also made an ex parte request for non-secure 

custody of Vinny. The trial court denied this request, with the requirement that 
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

4

Vinny remain placed in the care of his paternal grandparents. On 22 May 2019, the 

trial court adjudicated Vinny to be a neglected juvenile but dismissed the allegations 

of abuse and dependency. The trial court also ordered that Vinny be returned to the 

care of respondent-parents and required respondent-parents to submit to two random 

drug screens. On 12 June 2019, the trial court held a full dispositional hearing. The 

trial court found that there were no safety concerns with respondent-parents, and on 

6 August 2019, ordered that Vinny remain in the home of respondent-parents. The 

trial court further ordered that respondent-parents submit to additional random drug 

screens, following their admission that if tested that day they would test positive for 

marijuana. Respondent-mother timely filed notice of appeal on 5 September 2019.

II. Standard of Review

“The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication of neglect . . . is 

to determine ‘(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of 

fact[.]’ ” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (quoting In 

re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000)), aff’d as modified, 

362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “If such evidence exists, the findings of the trial 

court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support a finding to the 

contrary.” Id. “We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.” In re J.R., 243 

N.C. App. 309, 312, 778 S.E.2d 441, 443 (2015).
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

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III. Analysis

In her first assignment of error, respondent-mother contends that the trial 

court erred in adjudicating Vinny a neglected juvenile. We agree.

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2019), a neglected juvenile is: 

Any juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . whose parent, 

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, 

supervision, or discipline; or who has been abandoned; or who 

is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided 

necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment 

injurious to the juvenile’s welfare . . . .

“In general, treatment of a child which falls below the normative standards imposed 

upon parents by our society is considered neglectful.” In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 

95, 99, 306 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1983). However, not every act of negligence on part of 

the parent results in a neglected juvenile. In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 

S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003). “In order to adjudicate a juvenile neglected, our courts have 

additionally ‘required that there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment 

of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure 

to provide “proper care, supervision, or discipline.” ’ ” Id. (quoting In re Safriet, 112 

N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-902 (1993)). Generally, North Carolina 

courts have found neglect where “the conduct at issue constituted either severe or 

dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either causing injury or potentially causing 

injury to the juvenile.” Id.

A. Finding of Fact 16
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

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In the trial court’s order, it states, “the Court, after reviewing the evidence, 

record, testimony and arguments presented, makes the following findings by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence” and lists facts numbered one through twenty. Of 

those twenty findings of fact numbers 16 and 18 are at issue. The trial court’s finding 

of fact 16 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

a. Respondent Mother stated that the child was primarily 

in her care on 1/25/19 and 1/26/19; however, the child 

was in the presence of other adults during that time 

frame. That by admission via testimony of the parties, 

there was alcohol being placed in water bottles. That 

the mother, along with the child, and at least two 

additional adults traveled from the State of Georgia to 

the State of North Carolina while preparing a bottle for 

the minor child with a water bottle removed from the 

previous overnight stay.

b. That the maternal uncle stated that upon returning to 

the vehicle after the child was admitted to the hospital, 

he retrieved a water bottle from the backseat, and 

placing it to his nose, he could smell the odor of alcohol.

c. That Respondent Parents have made no attempts to 

remove the child from the paternal grandparents’ care 

and physical custody. 

Respondent-mother concedes the majority of the substance of this finding. 

Respondent-mother concedes that Vinny was primarily in her care; that alcohol was 

placed into the bottles on Friday, 25 January 2019; that respondent-mother, her 

brother, and their grandmother traveled from Georgia to North Carolina; and that 

Domico, after Vinny was admitted to the hospital, discovered the smell of alcohol in 
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

7

one of the bottles. Respondent-mother does take issue with particular details of these 

findings – that it was not “the parties” but respondent-mother’s brother and sister 

who testified; that the evidence only supported a determination that alcohol was 

placed in bottles on Friday, 25 January 2019, and not any other day; that the evidence 

did not support a determination that respondent-mother returned to North Carolina 

with anyone other than Vinny, Domico, and her grandmother – but she does not 

challenge the fundamental determinations raised therein.

We likewise hold that there was evidence to support the thrust of each of these 

findings in turn. They are, ultimately, a factual recitation of the events of that day. 

The issue is not with finding of fact 16, but with the conclusion of law derived 

therefrom.

B. Finding of Fact 18

Respondent-mother contends that finding of fact 18 is actually a conclusion of 

law. We agree.

As a general rule, “[t]he labels ‘findings of fact’ and ‘conclusions of law’

employed by the lower tribunal in a written order do not determine the nature of our 

standard of review.” In re Estate of Sharpe, 258 N.C. App. 601, 605, 814 S.E.2d 595, 

598 (2018). Thus, “[i]f the lower tribunal labels as a finding of fact what is in 

substance a conclusion of law, we review that ‘finding’ as a conclusion de novo.” Id.

The trial court’s finding of fact 18 states, in pertinent part, that:
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Opinion of the Court

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Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court finds that 

the juvenile [Vinny] was a neglected juvenile, within the 

meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15), in that at the time 

of the filing of the Petition, the juvenile did not receive 

proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile’s 

parent, custodian, or caretaker and the juvenile lived in an 

environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare because 

Respondent Mother allowed the child to be in an 

environment in which alcohol was being poured into water 

bottles and the juvenile later tested positive for a high level 

of alcohol and was subsequently diagnosed with acute 

alcohol intoxication. That the acute alcohol intoxication 

occurred as a result of Respondent Mother using a water 

bottle containing alcohol to make a bottle of formula for the 

child. . . . 

“The classification of a determination as either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law 

is admittedly difficult. As a general rule, however, any determination requiring the 

exercise of judgment, or the application of legal principles, is more properly classified 

a conclusion of law.” In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997)

(citations omitted). The first sentence of finding of fact 18 applies the facts of the case 

to the statutory definition of “neglected juvenile” and, through that reasoning, 

reaches a conclusion that Vinny is neglected. Consequently, this is more of a 

conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Indeed, this Court has held that 

determinations that a juvenile is neglected are “more properly designated conclusions

of law and we treat them as such for the purposes of . . . appeal.” Id.

As finding of fact 18, inasmuch as it determines Vinny’s status as a neglected 

juvenile, is more properly considered a conclusion of law, we review it de novo, to 
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

9

determine whether it is supported by the findings of fact. J.R., 243 N.C. App. at 312, 

778 S.E.2d at 443. It is here that the trial court’s analysis falters.

The trial court did not find that respondent-mother knew, or even reasonably 

could have discovered, the danger of alcohol in the bottles. The trial court did not 

find that respondent-mother’s behavior fell “below the normative standards imposed 

upon parents by our society.” Perhaps most glaringly, the trial court did not find that 

Vinny suffered “some physical, mental, or emotional impairment,” or that there was 

a substantial risk of the same.

Instead, the trial court summarily found that Vinny “did not receive proper 

care, supervision, or discipline from [his] parent . . . and [that he] lived in an 

environment injurious to [his] welfare” based solely on the fact that (1) Vinny was in 

an environment where alcohol was being poured into water bottles, and (2) Vinny was 

subsequently diagnosed with acute alcohol intoxication. In short, the trial court made 

a leap of logic which it did not adequately explain, and which this Court does not 

follow.

To be clear, we do not hold that the trial court could not have concluded that 

Vinny was neglected. Had the court engaged in more detailed analysis, offered 

additional factual findings, explained what steps respondent-mother could or should 

have taken, determined that the danger was in some way foreseeable, or even just 

offered more than a token conclusion, we might be able to uphold such a 
IN RE: V.M.

Opinion of the Court

10

determination. But the analysis in this case was cursory and conclusory, at best. The 

findings, such as they are, support a determination that a tragic and unfortunate 

accident occurred here – an accident which might have been preventable with the 

benefit of hindsight, but which respondent-mother had no way of knowing would 

occur, nor any means to prevent it, absent some form of precognition. The trial court’s 

analysis is simply too cursory to be permitted to stand.

Upon our de novo review, we hold that the findings of fact in the trial court’s 

order do not support its conclusion of law that Vinny is a neglected juvenile. 

Accordingly, we remand this order to the trial court. On remand, the trial court shall 

either make additional appropriate findings of fact, not inconsistent with this opinion, 

to support its conclusion, or properly comport its conclusion to fit the findings it has 

already made.

Because we reverse and remand the trial court’s order, we need not address 

the remainder of respondent-mother’s arguments.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judge DILLON concurs.

Judge ARROWOOD dissents in separate opinion.
No. COA19-1028 – In re V.M.

ARROWOOD, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding reversing the trial court’s 

adjudication of neglect. While the majority asserts the trial court’s findings of fact do 

not support its conclusion of law that Vinny is a neglected juvenile, I would hold the 

trial court did make sufficient findings to support its conclusion.

As the majority correctly notes, “[i]n general, treatment of a child which falls 

below the normative standards imposed upon parents by our society is considered 

neglectful.” In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 95, 99, 306 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1983). “In 

order to adjudicate a juvenile neglected, our courts have additionally ‘required that 

there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a 

substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide “proper 

care, supervision, or discipline.” ’ ” In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255, 

258 (2003) (quoting In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-902 

(1993)). Generally, North Carolina courts have found neglect where “the conduct at 

issue constituted either severe or dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either 

causing injury or potentially causing injury to the juvenile.” Id.

Here, in its finding of fact 18, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that:

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court finds that 

the juvenile [Vinny] was a neglected juvenile, within the 

meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15), in that at the time 

of the filing of the Petition, the juvenile did not receive 

proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile’s 

parent, custodian, or caretaker and the juvenile lived in an 

environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare because 
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

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Respondent Mother allowed the child to be in an 

environment in which alcohol was being poured into water 

bottles and the juvenile later tested positive for a high level 

of alcohol and was subsequently diagnosed with acute 

alcohol intoxication. That the acute alcohol intoxication 

occurred as a result of Respondent Mother using a water 

bottle containing alcohol to make a bottle of formula for the 

child. During the time that the juvenile obtained alcohol 

in his system, he was in the exclusive care of Respondent 

Mother. . . .

The majority asserts that finding of fact 18 is more properly considered a conclusion 

of law, and is thus subject to de novo review. “Under a de novo review, [this Court] 

considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the 

lower tribunal.” In re A.K.D., 227 N.C. App. 58, 60, 745 S.E.2d 7, 8 (2013) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Though the majority contends finding of fact 18 is not 

supported by the trial court’s other findings, I disagree.

The trial court made several findings leading up to its finding of fact 18, 

including the following:

15. That the Petitioner, the Guardian ad Litem, 

Respondent Mother, and Respondent Father made 

certain admissions of fact after having ample 

opportunity to consult with their respective counsel. 

That a written copy of those admissions was tendered 

to the Court. That those admissions are as follows:

a. The Cumberland County Department of Social 

Services (CCDSS) received a Child Protective 

Services (CPS) referral on 01/27/2019 

concerning the safety of the juvenile[].
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

- 3 -

b. On 01/27/19, Respondent Mother took the child 

to Cape Fear Valley Medical Center stating that 

the child had been fussing a lot.

c. On 1/27/19, the child tested positive for alcohol; 

his ethanol level was 242 mg/dl. The child was 

tested a second time and his blood alcohol level 

was 179. The child was diagnosed with acute 

alcohol intoxication.

d. Respondent Mother stated that the child was 

primarily in her care on 1/25/19 and 1/26/19.

. . . .

16. That the Court made the additional finding of facts by 

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence as it relates to 

the verified Petition filed on February 18, 2019 and 

sworn testimony provided before the Court on today’s 

date:

d. Respondent Mother stated that the child was 

primarily in her care on 1/25/19 and 1/26/19; 

however, the child was in the presence of other 

adults during that time frame. That by 

admission via testimony of the parties, there was 

alcohol being placed in water bottles. That the 

mother, along with the child, and at least two 

additional adults traveled from the State of 

Georgia to the State of North Carolina while 

preparing a bottle for the minor child with a 

water bottle removed from the previous overnight 

stay.

e. That the maternal uncle stated that upon 

returning to the vehicle after the child was 

admitted to the hospital, he retrieved a water 

bottle from the backseat, and placing it to his

nose, he could smell the odor of alcohol.
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

- 4 -

f. That Respondent Parents have made no attempts 

to remove the child from the paternal 

grandparents’ care and physical custody.

(emphasis in original). In finding of fact 18, the trial court summarized its findings 

in findings of fact 15 and 16 and applied the law to those facts in order to reach its 

determination that Vinny was a neglected juvenile. The majority acknowledges the 

trial court’s finding of fact 16 is supported by the evidence. However, it then proceeds 

to hold that finding of fact 18, which is based on finding of fact 16 and several of the 

trial court’s other findings, is not supported by sufficient findings.

The majority appears to take issue with the fact that, in its view, the trial court 

did not make certain findings, including that: (1) respondent-mother knew, or even 

reasonably could have discovered, the danger of alcohol in the bottles; (2) respondentmother’s behavior fell “below the normative standards imposed upon parents by our 

society[;]” and (3) Vinny suffered “some physical, mental, or emotional impairment,” 

or that there was a substantial risk of same. The majority further insists that, “[h]ad 

the court engaged in more detailed analysis, offered additional factual findings, 

explained what steps respondent-mother could or should have taken, determined that 

the danger was in some way foreseeable, or even just offered more than a token 

conclusion, [it] might be able to uphold such a determination.” However, this Court 

has made clear that, in determining whether a juvenile is neglected, a parent’s fault 

or culpability is not a determinative fact. In re A.L.T., 241 N.C. App. 443, 451, 774 
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

- 5 -

S.E.2d 316, 321 (2015). In addition, contrary to the majority’s assertions, the trial 

court’s findings make clear that respondent-mother’s oversight led to four-month old 

Vinny needing to be hospitalized and treated for acute alcohol intoxication. The 

evidence in the record also supports this.

Respondent-mother’s brother and sister both testified that family members, 

including respondent-mother’s sister, were drinking liquor and pouring it into water 

bottles on Friday during a family gathering at their cousin’s house. Respondentmother, who was taking care of Vinny, was also present at the gathering while these 

activities were taking place. The next day, on the drive home from the environment 

in which alcohol had been poured into water bottles, respondent-mother fed Vinny 

formula she prepared using a water bottle taken from such environment. Due to 

respondent-mother’s conduct, four-month old Vinny suffered some physical 

impairment or injury, namely, acute alcohol intoxication. Notably, when respondentmother’s brother smelled the water bottle in question, he was able to detect the odor 

of alcohol. Had respondent-mother been more attentive, she likely would have 

noticed that the water bottle had already been tampered with and its contents 

smelled like alcohol. Ultimately, this mistake “constituted either severe or dangerous 

conduct” which “caus[ed] injury . . . to the juvenile[,]” supporting a finding of neglect. 

In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 283, 582 S.E.2d at 258.
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

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In finding of fact 18, the trial court’s logical reasoning is clear as it applies the 

law to the facts gleaned from its previous findings to determine that Vinny was a 

neglected juvenile. I would thus hold that finding of fact 18 is supported by the 

evidence and the trial court’s evidentiary findings, and would affirm the trial court’s 

adjudication of neglect.

I would further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 

dispositional order. Respondent-mother asserts the trial court abused its discretion 

when it ordered respondent-parents to submit to random drug screens and a 

substance abuse assessment. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-904(d1)(3) (2019), 

“[a]t the dispositional hearing or a subsequent hearing, the court may order the 

parent . . . [to] [t]ake appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the home that led to 

or contributed to the juvenile’s adjudication.” The trial court may also within its 

discretion order the parent to “undergo psychiatric, psychological, or other treatment 

or counseling directed toward remediating or remedying behaviors or conditions that 

led to or contributed to the juvenile’s adjudication.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-904(c). “For 

a court to properly exercise the authority permitted by this provision, there must be 

a nexus between the step ordered by the court and a condition that is found or alleged 

to have led to or contributed to the adjudication.” In re T.N.G., 244 N.C. App. 398, 

408, 781 S.E.2d 93, 101 (2015) (citation omitted). This includes “order[ing] services 

which could aid ‘in both understanding and resolving the possible underlying causes’ 
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

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of the actions that contributed to the trial court’s removal [or adjudication].” Matter 

of S.G., __ N.C. App. __, __, 835 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2019) (quoting In re A.R., 227 N.C. 

App. 518, 522, 742 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (2013)).

Though respondent-mother argues the trial court abused its discretion because 

there was no evidence of a history of substance abuse or a drug-related parenting 

problem, I disagree. The day after Vinny was diagnosed with acute alcohol 

intoxication, respondent-parents tested positive for marijuana. Based on these facts, 

the trial court in its adjudication order exercised its discretion to order respondentparents to submit to two random drug screens. Respondent-parents tested negative 

for those two tests, but refused to submit to a third. At the full dispositional hearing, 

respondent-parents admitted that if tested that day, they would test positive for 

marijuana. DSS then requested custody of the juvenile based on respondent-parent’s 

admissions to testing positive for illegal substances. The trial court denied the 

motion; however, evidently sensing a problem with respondent-parents’ inability to 

remain drug-free throughout the adjudication and disposition process, it pleaded with 

respondent-parents to “[j]ust don’t smoke anymore for the next little bit,” so that their 

case could be closed. Because respondent-parents admitted they would test positive 

for marijuana, and in light of the adjudication of neglect involving use of another 

intoxicant, I would hold the trial court’s order requiring respondent-parents to submit 

to additional drug screens and another substance abuse assessment was not “so 
IN RE V.M.

Arrowood, J., Dissent

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arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.N.G., 

244 N.C. App. at 408, 781 S.E.2d at 100 (citations omitted). I therefore respectfully 

dissent.