alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsCascading a systolic array and a feedforward neural network for navigation and obstacle avoidance using potential fieldsA technique is developed for vehicle navigation and control in the presence of obstacles. A potential function was devised that peaks at the surface of obstacles and has its minimum at the proper vehicle destination. This function is computed using a systolic array and is guaranteed not to have local minima. A feedfoward neural network is then used to control the steering of the vehicle using local potential field information. In this case, the vehicle is a trailer truck backing up. Previous work has demonstrated the capability of a neural network to control steering of such a trailer truck backing to a loading platform, but without obstacles. Now, the neural network was able to learn to navigate a trailer truck around obstacles while backing toward its destination. The network is trained in an obstacle free space to follow the negative gradient of the field, after which the network is able to control and navigate the truck to its target destination in a space of obstacles which may be stationary or movable.Document ID19910010458Acquisition SourceLegacy CDMSDocument TypeContractor Report (CR)AuthorsPlumer, Edward S.*(Stanford Univ. CA, United States)*Date AcquiredSeptember 6, 2013Publication DateFebruary 1, 1991Subject CategoryCyberneticsReport/Patent NumberA-91066NASA-CR-177575NAS 1.26:177575Accession Number91N19771Funding Number(s)CONTRACT_GRANT: NGT-50642Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightWork of the US Gov. Public Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType19910010458.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
 No Fear Act | Freedom of Information Act | Office of the Inspector General | Agency Financial ReportsNASA Web Privacy Policy and Important Notices | NASA Guidelines for Quality of InformationDisclaimers, Copyright, Terms of Use | Accessibility | NASA OCIO | USA.gov | NASA.govContact Us | Site MapSTI LogoNASA Official: JoAnne R. Calhoun Site Curator: STI Compliance and Distribution Services Last Modified: September 12, 2024
### §1313. Definitions

#### (a) Determination

For purposes of this part, the term "determination" means—

(1) a decision by the Tax Court or a judgment, decree, or other order by any court of competent jurisdiction, which has become final;

(2) a closing agreement made under section 7121;

(3) a final disposition by the Secretary of a claim for refund. For purposes of this part, a claim for refund shall be deemed finally disposed of by the Secretary—

(A) as to items with respect to which the claim was allowed, on the date of allowance of refund or credit or on the date of mailing notice of disallowance (by reason of offsetting items) of the claim for refund, and

(B) as to items with respect to which the claim was disallowed, in whole or in part, or as to items applied by the Secretary in reduction of the refund or credit, on expiration of the time for instituting suit with respect thereto (unless suit is instituted before the expiration of such time); or

(4) under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, an agreement for purposes of this part, signed by the Secretary and by any person, relating to the liability of such person (or the person for whom he acts) in respect of a tax under this subtitle for any taxable period.

#### (b) Taxpayer

Notwithstanding section 7701(a)(14), the term "taxpayer" means any person subject to a tax under the applicable revenue law.

#### (c) Related taxpayer

For purposes of this part, the term "related taxpayer" means a taxpayer who, with the taxpayer with respect to whom a determination is made, stood, in the taxable year with respect to which the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, or disallowance was made, in one of the following relationships:

(1) husband and wife,

(2) grantor and fiduciary,

(3) grantor and beneficiary,

(4) fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee, or heir,

(5) decedent and decedent's estate,

(6) partner, or

(7) member of an affiliated group of corporations (as defined in section 1504).

(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 339; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, §1906(b)(13)(A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1976—Subsec. (a)(3), (4). Pub. L. 94–455 struck out "or his delegate" after "Secretary" wherever appearing.
#### § 6.51 Purpose.

It is the purpose of the regulations in this subpart to secure for the people of the United States the full benefits of Government research and investigation in the Department of the Interior (a) by providing a simple procedure under which the public may obtain licenses to use patents and inventions in which the Secretary of the Interior has transferable interests and which are available for licensing; and (b) by providing adequate protection for the inventions until such time as they may be made available for licensing without undue risk of losing patent protection to which the public is entitled.

[31 FR 10796, Aug. 13, 1966]
#### Sol Katzenstein, Appellant, v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Respondent.

Present—Close, P. J., Hagarty, Carswell, Johnston and Taylor, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          55,648
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                66,366
<PP&E>                                          72,993
<DEPRECIATION>                                (33,599)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 105,760
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          893,444
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        25,800
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,106,934
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   105,760
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  621,328
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,983
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (629,311)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (629,311)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (629,311)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JASON P. BRISCOE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 19-3261 (D.C. No. 6:18-CR -10031-EFM-1) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , BACHARACH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This matter is before us on the parties Joint Motion to Remand to Vacate Multiplicitous Counts and for Resentencing , in which appellant Jason Briscoe and the United States jointly move the court pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1)(c) to remand the case to the district court for further proceed ings. As grounds for the motion, the parties state: (1) the convictions M r. Briscoe challenges on appeal are multiplicitous and the district court should have entered judgment and imposed sentence on only one 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count (not two) and on only one 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) count (not six); and (2) Mr. Briscoe was erroneously assigned two crim inal history points for the conviction

* This matter is submitted on the briefs. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not bindi ng precedent, except u nder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 23, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 described in paragraph 60 of his Presente nce Investigation Report, which assignment placed him in a higher criminal hist ory category than was appropriate. Upon consideration, the court grants th e motion, dismisses the appeal, and remand the case to district cour t with instructions to:
A. Vacate Mr. Briscoe’s multiplicitous conv ictions and enter judgment on only one § 924(c) count and one § 922(g) count, see United States v. Elliott , 937 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2019) (re manding to the district court with instructions to vacate multiplicitous co nvictions where “it is immaterial which . . . conviction remained”); and
B. In light of the parties’ joint mo tion for remand, conduct any and all proceedings necessary to resentence Mr. Briscoe on the three remaining convictions under criminal history category IV. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.

Entered for the Court Per Curiam
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000             JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999             JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000             MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       9,092,028               1,470,906
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,770,594               2,586,693
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                    981,206               1,324,424
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,593,263               5,646,345
<PP&E>                                         283,898                 438,367
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,270,444               7,325,897
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,158,390               3,223,986
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         8,781                   6,285
<OTHER-SE>                                  11,103,273               4,095,626
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,270,444               7,325,897
<SALES>                                      7,840,093               7,844,285
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,840,093               7,844,285
<CGS>                                        6,312,377               6,955,669
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,236,042               3,367,165
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0               (406,930)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (86,946)                (13,610)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,621,380)             (2,058,009)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,621,380)             (2,058,009)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0                       0



</TABLE>
§ 9239.5-3 Coal. ( a ) *Determination of payment in coal trespass.* For coal trespass in a State where there is no State law governing such trespass, the measure of damages will be as follows: ( 1 ) For innocent trespass, payment must be made for the value of the coal in place before severance. United States v. Homestake Mining Company (117 Fed. 481).
( 2 ) For willful trespass, payment must be made for the full value of the coal at the time of conversion without deduction for labor bestowed or expense incurred in removing and marketing the coal. Liberty Bell Gold Mining Company v. Smuggler-Union Mining Company (203 Fed. 795). The mining of coal in trespass is presumed to be willful, in the absence of persuasive evidence of the innocence and good faith of the trespasser. United States v. Ute Coal and Coke Company (158 Fed. 20).
( b ) *Coal mined when there is no lease in effect.* Any mining of coal which is not pursuant to a coal lease in effect at the time of the mining shall constitute a trespass, and the coal so mined must be paid for on a trespass basis.
( c ) *Coal mined by successful bidder at public sale.* The successful bidder at public sale for a coal leasing unit does not acquire any right to mine coal until he has complied with all the formalities required by the regulations, including the furnishing of a bond, and a lease has been issued to him. Coal mined by such applicant prior to the date of the issuance of a lease is in trespass and must be paid for on a trespass basis.
( d ) *Coal permit, lease, or license not to issue until trespass account settled.* No coal permit, lease, or license will be issued to anyone known to have mined coal in trespass until the trespass account is settled.
( e ) *Right of surface owner to mine coal for domestic use.* The owner of land patented with a reservation of the coal deposits, either under the act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat. 844; 30 U.S.C. 81), or under the Act of June 22, 1910 (36 Stat. 583; 30 U.S.C. 83-85), has the right to mine coal for use upon the land for domestic purposes at any time prior to the disposal by the United States of the coal deposits.
( f ) *Penalties for unauthorized exploration for coal.* ( 1 ) Any person who willfully conducts coal exploration for commercial purposes without an exploration license issued under subpart 3507 of this chapter shall be subject to a fine of not more than $4,995 for each day of violation.
( 2 ) All data collected by said person on any Federal lands as a result of such violations shall immediately be made available to the Secretary, who shall make the data available to the public as soon as possible.
( 3 ) No penalty under this section may be assessed unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such violation pursuant to part 4 of this chapter.
[35 FR 9800, June 13, 1970, as amended at 41 FR 36023, Aug. 26, 1976; 42 FR 4460, Jan. 25, 1977; 86 FR 30550, June 9, 2021; 87 FR 14179, Mar. 14, 2022; 88 FR 11820, Feb. 24, 2023; 89 FR 13984, Feb. 26, 2024]
The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge 1

for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-3687

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Terry Michael Bainter, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: April 14, 1997

 Filed: April 28, 1997

___________

Before, HANSEN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Terry M. Bainter appeals the 72-month sentence imposed by the

district court following his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute

1

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We affirm.

We reject Bainter's contention that the district court erred in

denying his request for sentencing under U.S. Sentencing 
Bainter also argued the district court erred in concluding

2

that application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1)

(1995) precludes a defendant, as a matter of law, from eligibility

under the safety-valve provision. Our decision makes it

unnecessary to reach this issue.

-2-

Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2 (1995) (safety-valve provision). Under the

2

safety-valve provision, a drug defendant may be sentenced within the

otherwise applicable Guidelines range without regard to any statutory

minimum sentence if, among other things, "the defendant did not . . .

possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant

to do so) in connection with the offense." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 5C1.2(2) (1995).

Bainter testified at sentencing that he stored both firearms and the

drugs in the same room of his house. Further, he stipulated as part of his

plea agreement that during the conspiracy, he "possessed a firearm and said

firearm was used to protect the drugs and money." These admissions were

sufficient to establish that Bainter possessed a firearm in connection with

the offense. See United States v. Burke, 91 F.3d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir.

1996)(per curiam).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT
10.4


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 1


TO


HANCOCK
JAFFE LABORATORIES, INC.


2016
OMNIBUS INCENTIVE PLAN


 


(Effective
December 17, 2020)


 


Reference
is made to the Hancock Jaffe Laboratories, Inc. 2016 Omnibus Incentive Plan (as Amended and Restated Effective April 26, 2018)
(the “Plan”). In accordance with Section 5.2 of the Plan, the Board of Directors of Hancock Jaffe Laboratories, Inc.
(the “Company”) adopted and approved and the stockholders of the Company thereafter approved the amendments to the
Plan contemplated by this Amendment No. 1 to the Plan, as follows:


 


Section
4.1 of the Plan is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows:


 


“4.1.
Authorized Number of Shares.


 


Subject
to adjustment under Section 15, the total number of Shares authorized to be awarded under the Plan shall not exceed 600,000, plus
an annual increase each year on January 1 until the Termination Date equal to 3% of the total issued and outstanding Shares as
of such anniversary (or such lesser number of Shares as may be determined by the Board). Shares issued under the Plan shall consist
in whole or in part of authorized but unissued Shares, treasury Shares, or Shares purchased on the open market or otherwise, all
as determined by the Company from time to time.”


 


All
other terms and provisions of the Plan shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect as written.
NUMBER 13-13-00466-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

MARIO SUAREZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 28th District Court 

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Mario Suarez, attempts to appeal his conviction for aggravated assault. 

The trial court has certified that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO 

right of appeal,” and “the defendant has waived the right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(a)(2).
2

On August 22, 2013, this Court notified appellant’s counsel of the trial court’s 

certification and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether 

appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel’s findings 

as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to the 

existence of any amended certification.

On September 6, 2013, counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel’s 

response does not establish that the certification currently on file with this Court is 

incorrect or that appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. 

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be 

dismissed if the trial court’s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of 

appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, this 

appeal is DISMISSED. 

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

19th day of September, 2013.
### §1342. Rate orders of State agencies

The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:

(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and,

(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,

(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and,

(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §41(1) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091; May 14, 1934, ch. 283, §1, 48 Stat. 775; Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, §1, 50 Stat. 738; Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143).

This section rearranges and restates the fourth sentence of section 41(1) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Other provisions of section 41(1) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 1331, 1332, 1341, 1345, 1354, and 1359 of this title.

Words "at law or in equity" before "in the courts of such State" were omitted as unnecessary.

Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Word "operation" was substituted for "enforcement, operation or execution" for the same reason.