No. 84-445 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAEJA 

1985 

ALFRED L. BISHOP, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsROBERT E. HENDRICKSON , 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Alfred L. Bishop, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

R. P. Ryan, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 10, 1985 

Decided: March 7, 1985 

," f 1,- 

c- '.4' J if-- , //( LP, -w-:ryJ 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , d.el ivered. the Opini-on of 

the Court. 

Alfred L. Bishop appeals an Order of the Yellowstone 

County District Court granting Robert E. Hendrickson's motion 

for summary iudgrnent. The issues raised. are two: first, 

whether a conversation between Bishop and Hendrickson 

constituted an enforceable contract to employ Bishop's 

daughter; and second, if so, whether Hendrickson breached 

that contract, proximately causing damage to Bishop. We find 

that Eishop has failed to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact to preclude entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Bishop was employed by the law firm of Earl V. Cline and 

Hendrickson in 1952. After Cline's death, Hendrickson and 

Bishop formed a partnership, in 1965. In 1976, the 

partnership was expanded to take in Gary Everson under the 

partnership name of Hendrickson, Bishop and Everson. In 

1-978, the partners formed a professional corporation under 

the name of Hendrickson and Bishop, P.C. 

Both Hendrickson and Bishop had daughters who attended 

law school. Hendrickson's daughter worked for the firm for 

approximately one year as a law clerk, but not as a lahyer. 

For personal reasons, she left the firm. Bishop's daughter 

Debbie began working with the firm after law school 

gra.duation. She worked for approximately one month. When 

Debbie inquired about getting paid, she was told she would 

not be hired by the firm. 

Bishop filed an amended complaint in District Court on 

April 4, 1983, alleging that at some point during their 

period of association, he and Hendrickson contracted with 
each other that "in the event an~7 of their children ever 

became lawyers and wanted to practice law with the firm that 

there would be a place for such child or children in the Law 

firm," and that Hendrickson had breached the contract by 

refusing to hire Debbie. 

Hendrickson filed a motion for summary judgment. On 

August 13, 1984, the District Court entered its order 

granting Kendrickson's motion for summary iudgment, finding 

the alleged contract was highly uncertain, to-wit, "a plzce" 

in the law firm. 

Jt is well-settled that many contracts may he oral. 

Section 28-2-901, MCA, provides: 

"When contracts may be oral. A1.L contracts may be 

oral except such as are specially required by 

statute to be in writing." 

However, it is clear that a contract must be certain and that 

the words "a place" in the law firm for a person is not 

certain enough to meet the requirement. Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts S 33(1) (1979) states: 

"Section 33. Certainty. (1) Even though a 

manifestation of intention is intended to be 

understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as 

to form a contract unless the terms of the contract 

are reasonably certain." 

This alleged contract fails to sa.tisfy that requirement. 

It is not certaj-n whether children who may be born in the 

future come within such a contract; it is neither clear nor 

certain whether someone coming to the firm must be hired, and 

if so, to what position; and factors such as salary and terms 

of employment are totally unknown. At best, the alleged 

contract is ambiguous. 

In his deposition of April 4, 1983, Rishop conceded the 

conversation took pl-ace "way back, many years ago, when the 

kids were little." 
Bishop asserted Hendrickson reaffirmed the agreement on 

December 13, 1981, in a conversation with himself (Bishop) 

and others: "You know that A1 and I have an agreement." It 

is Bishop's position that this statement disposed of any 

problem with the one-year requirement of the statute of 

Frauds for oral contracts. 

In support of his argument that there was a contract, 

Bishop cited Davis v. Davis (19721, 159 Mont. 355, 497 P.2d 

315, which provides that oral contracts, fully executed by 

one of the parties represent a well-recognized exception to 

the statute of frauds. Bishop contended the hiring of 

Hendrickson's daughter as a law clerk completed the oral 

contract and satisfied the statute of frauds. That is 

inconsistent even with his own assertion that the alleged 

agreement was to hire their childrer as lawyers, not as law 

clerks. Hendrickson's daughter was not able to practice law 

with the firm at that time because she was not a member of 

the Rar, and thus her work as a law clerk could not perfect 

the alleged agreement. Therefore we do not reach the point 

at which the Davis rationale applies. 

In appeals from orders granting summary judgment, the 

standard of review is to resolve all factual disputes in 

favor of the appellant, against whom summary iudgment was 

granted. The party opposing summary judgment must come 

forward with substantial evidence raising an issue of 

material fact. Stepanek v. Kober Const. (Mont. 1981), 625 

P.2d 51, 52, 38 St.Rep. 385, 386. 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

Bishop, we do not find evidence to show the existence of an 

enforceable contract with Hendrickson to hire Debbie. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the District Court. 
We Concur: