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U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY IN

AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR LEADERSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–17

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

JOHN MACKEY, Investigative Counsel 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Maureen E. Quinn, Coordinator on Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 6

Ms. Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 11

Michael A. Braun, Special Agent, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement 

Administration ..................................................................................................... 18

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Maureen E. Quinn: Prepared statement ..................................... 8

Ms. Mary Beth Long: Prepared statement ............................................................ 13

Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement ................................................................. 20

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 39

Mr. Alonzo Fulgham, Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, U.S. Agency 

for International Development: Prepared statement ........................................ 40

Responses from Mr. Doug Wankel, Director of the Office of Drug Control 

for the American Embassy, to questions submitted for the record by the 

Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations .................. 41

Response from the Honorable Maureen E. Quinn to question submitted for 

the Record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Texas ................................................................................................ 42

Responses from the Honorable Maureen E. Quinn to questions submitted 

for the Record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California ................................................................ 42

Responses from Michael A. Braun to Questions Submitted for the Record 

by Members of the Committee on International Relations .............................. 44

(1)

U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY IN 

AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR LEADERSHIP 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:49 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The meeting will come to order. Because today 

is an unusual day, we are going to accelerate our schedule so we 

can get as much testimony in as possible, so we are starting a little 

early. 

I am pleased to call to order this hearing on the question of our 

counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. The Committee on International Relations has long been troubled by the threat from the 

massive illicit drug production and narcotics trade in Afghanistan 

and the serious consequences for our national security should we 

fail to act. We ignore this crisis at our own grave peril. 

Democratic governance and stability in Afghanistan, which we 

have worked so hard for, are threatened by the current drug situation. We need our Department of Defense to work cooperatively 

and coordinate with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the 

State Department to take on this threat of narco-terrorism. Otherwise, all our efforts amount to spinning our wheels. 

We are familiar with the staggering data on opium and heroin 

production in Afghanistan today. For example, it produces 87 percent of the world’s opium supply, which provides 500 metric tons 

of heroin annually. This is in excess of the world’s demand for the 

most addictive, nearly untreatable, naturally produced illicit narcotic. 

I could go on with the frightening statistics, but it is time to provide clarity, unity and leadership in United States-Afghan drug 

policy. The days of shouting ‘‘the house is on fire’’ are over. Much 

damage has already been done from the massive quantities of illicit 

Afghan drugs. The 239 percent increase in the poppy crop in 2004 

estimated by the U.S. Government means we can delay serious action no longer. Now we need firemen on the scene to stem the 

spread of the flames and get this conflagration under control. 

[Chart depicting information referred to follows:]

2


20058a.eps
3

Chairman HYDE. I welcome the media reports yesterday of the 

helicopter raid by the new national interdiction police unit in 

Nangahar that seized two tons of opium. We have lost several 

years while the United States policy floundered in responding to 

the growing Afghan drug threat. I have often said: Time is not on 

our side, and a failed narco state is not beyond the realm of possibility. 

The democratically-elected Karzai Government realizes the magnitude of the threat and is committed to work with the U.S. and 

the world community to tackle the drug problem. I am very pleased 

to see the support we are receiving from our long-time and experienced friends in the Colombian National Police anti-drug unit. 

Their knowledge and their battle-hardened experience is already 

helping our DEA and the new Afghan counter-drug police with this 

crisis. 

The U.S. Government has been AWOL too long in the fight 

against illicit drugs in Afghanistan, which is part of the same war 

against the same enemy that is global terrorism. As it is in the 

case of our unified campaign against the evils of drugs and terror 

in Colombia, we can prevail when we recognize these links and 

interrelationships. 

Today, we will be exploring current United States efforts to 

counter the narcotics production and trade in Afghanistan through 

eradication and interdiction as well as alternative livelihoods and 

other means. 

Illicit drug production threatens democratic governance in Afghanistan and severely compromises the safety and security of coalition forces on the ground, including many brave American soldiers who must face the new weapons and land mines these drugs 

finance. 

While we will spend some time today talking about drug enforcement initiatives, we can’t ignore the plight of the poor Afghan 

poppy farmers. Those who turn to this cash crop, which has an 

ever-ready market and ever-willing buyer, will need assistance to 

find an alternative livelihood. 

Today, I am announcing that I will soon be introducing a resolution calling on the Administration to come forward with an Afghan 

Reconstruction, Trade Promotion, and Economic Development proposal. I believe it will be instrumental in helping the legitimate Afghan economy gain access to world markets as well as attract investment from around the globe. I look forward to working with my 

colleagues on both sides of the aisle on this new trade initiative 

modeled in part on the very successful Andean trade preference, 

which Congress renewed just recently and is counter-drug related. 

I welcome the comments of my good friend, Mr. Lantos, the 

Ranking Democratic Member who has worked closely with us to 

find solutions and move forward together on the Afghan drug crisis. Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Before commenting on today’s hearing, let me publicly express 

my appreciation to you for holding three extremely significant 

hearings this week: One on restructuring the United Nations, one 

on our new relationship with Libya, and today on this very imporVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

tant subject. And I look forward to working with you on your new 

Afghan legislative initiative. 

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan has made real progress toward becoming a stable, peaceful and democratic state. The Taliban has 

been forced from power. The national election last October was an 

unqualified success, with a massive turnout in defiance of Taliban 

threats. And progress has been made in restoring the basic human 

rights of Afghan women. 

In my own congressional district the other day, at a public meeting, we had the pleasure of welcoming a young high school student 

from Afghanistan who already made significant contributions to 

our educational endeavors. 

But Afghanistan is far from out of the woods. Progress in reconstruction and development, so necessary to bring economic opportunities and hope to millions, is painfully slow. The Parliamentary 

and district elections scheduled for next month, which are critical 

to institutionalize democracy throughout the country, have been 

postponed because of poor planning and inadequate preparations. 

And the biggest challenge of all to democracy and development is 

the unprecedented scale of opium and heroin cultivation and narco 

trafficking. 

Last year, nearly 70 percent of the world’s opium and heroin 

were produced in Afghanistan. Our State Department estimates 

that 40 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product 

comes from narcotics, an incredible figure. 

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Afghanistan is dire. The flood of 

narcotics riches could become a tidal wave of corruption and criminality, washing away the still nascent Afghani experiment in democracy. The State Department’s annual report on the global narcotic trade stated that, and I quote:

‘‘Afghanistan is on the verge of becoming a narcotics state. 

Drug kingpins may well be in control of Afghanistan’s Parliament by the end of this year, undermining everything that 

we have been trying to accomplish.’’

Mr. Chairman, this Committee has been sounding the alarm 

about the exploding Afghan narcotics problem for the last 2 years. 

Sadly, our protestations have fallen on deaf ears down in Foggy 

Bottom and over in the Pentagon. Now, finally, the U.S. Government claims to have a counternarcotics strategy, but I fail to see 

the commitment and the actions to implement it. 

The failure of the United States to respond early and with full 

force is making the struggle longer, more expensive and more uncertain of victory. While there may be some progress on reducing 

poppy cultivation, it comes as a result of President Karzai’s exhortations and the poppy-flooded market, not our own strategy. 

In January, there was hope that there could be a 75 percent reduction in poppy cultivation this season in some provinces. The 

U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad recently told us that the reduction may 

be closer to 30 percent, probably a more realistic prediction. Unfortunately, this decline may be temporary. President Karzai has said 

that we have only 1 year to demonstrate real progress in providing 

alternatives to opium farming. If we fail, no one will listen to him, 

5

his Government, or us again, and the farmers will return to growing poppy at record levels. 

I hope our witnesses today will convince us that everything humanly possible is being done by our Administration to heed President Karzai’s warning and make tangible progress on alternatives 

to opium farming. 

But reducing cultivation is only one side of the coin, Mr. Chairman. I see little progress in going after drug kingpins who finance 

the cultivation of poppy, operate the processing labs and sit atop 

tons of stored opium. The United States and the United Kingdom 

are finally beginning to provide some equipment and training to Afghan counternarcotics forces but not with the urgency or level of 

support the problem demands. 

I am very disturbed to learn that the Department of Defense has 

not even been approving requests from the Drug Enforcement 

Agency and Afghan counternarcotics units for air support for interdiction missions. 

Mr. Chairman, either the United States is serious about victory 

over the narcotics trade in Afghanistan—before it corrupts every 

election, every institution, every politician—or it is not. 

I caution our witnesses not to assume this Committee will accept 

the mere presentation of a strategy or half measures to implement 

it as sufficient. This Committee must push the United States Government on this at every opportunity, and I hope this will be the 

first of several hearings on this issue this year. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses. Ambassador 

Maureen Quinn is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, 

has served domestically and overseas with distinction. She joined 

the State Department’s Bureau of South Asian Affairs as Coordinator on Afghanistan in 2004. Welcome. 

From the Department of Defense, we have Ms. Mary Beth Long, 

who has held the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics since 2004. Ms. Long develops the Department’s counternarcotics policy, managing over 100 programs that 

support counternarcotics programs of domestic and international 

law enforcement; and she oversees a budget in excess of $850 million. 

Also with us today is Special Agent Michael Braun, the Chief of 

Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who was appointed last month to be Principal Advisor to the DEA Administrator on all enforcement-related matters. One of Special Agent 

Braun’s previous positions was as Interim Director of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Intelligence Fusion 

Center, the multiagency national drug intelligence center that supports the national drug strategy and our Nation’s war on terrorism. 

Welcome to you all. 

Ambassador Quinn, if you could proceed with your testimony, I 

respectfully suggest you attempt to encapsulate it to about 5 minutes. We will not be harsh in the administration of that suggestion, 

but it is to also suggest that your full statement will be made a 

part of the record. Ambassador Quinn. 

6

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAUREEN E. QUINN, COORDINATOR ON AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. QUINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today 

about United States counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. 

I will make a brief oral statement and ask that my written statement be submitted for the record. Thank you. 

The world has witnessed enormous strides toward security, democracy and new opportunities in Afghanistan in the past year. 

The United States has firmly supported that progress, and we cannot let narcotics undercut the enormous advances that Afghanistan 

has made. We recognize, however, that the narcotics problem is not 

new in Afghanistan. It is a problem that has its roots in a country 

that has suffered years of drought and war and where there has 

been minimal government and minimal rule of law for a very long 

time. 

We have an opportunity to address the narcotics problem in Afghanistan in 2005. The Government of Afghanistan is leading the 

way as President Karzai has challenged his people to end the growing of opium poppy. The Government of the United Kingdom is coordinating international counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

The United States Government has committed to make a major effort to ensure that narcotics production and the drug trade do not 

undercut the new institution of government we are supporting and 

advancing in Afghanistan. 

Chairman HYDE. Ambassador, we have just been notified there 

are three, maybe four votes to be dealt with on the Floor, so if you 

do not mind a little respite, we will run over and vote and hurry 

back. Thank you very much. 

The Committee stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. All right. The State Department’s 

worst nightmare, Rohrabacher has got the gavel. 

It is Saint Patrick’s Day today, so our hearts will fill with benevolence for all witnesses who come from Irish descent, and I bet that 

Quinn perhaps fits that category. Madam Ambassador, you may 

proceed with your testimony. Thank you very much. 

Ms. QUINN. Thank you very much. I will proceed from where I 

left off. 

The people of Afghanistan have demonstrated in the past year 

that they are choosing the rule of law. In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution that ensures equal rights for all 

Afghan citizens. In October, more than 8 million Afghans, including 

3.2 million women, turned out for the historic Presidential elections. 

Demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration are progressing as former militias turn in their arms. New security institutions, such as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, are being trained and equipped. Afghanistan has 

made, and continues to make, enormous strides to organize a legitimate, market-based economy. 

Finally, President Karzai has challenged the Afghan people to 

choose legitimate, legal economic activity, not opium poppy production. 

7

While the political and economic environment in Afghanistan has 

improved, the narcotics situation has worsened, despite positive 

steps by the Government and the international community. Opium 

poppy production puts at risk the significant progress the country 

has made. 

Addressing the problem is particularly challenging because Afghanistan still lacks an effective, transparent criminal justice system. Moreover, as a result of the profound disruption and destruction of normal life brought about by more than 25 years of conflict, 

the lack of legitimate income and the limited enforcement capacity 

of the national Government, many farmers have chosen to plant 

poppy to support themselves. 

President Karzai has committed himself and his Government to 

ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a narco state. On December 9, 2004, 2 days after his inauguration, President Karzai addressed a conference of Afghan religious and political leaders on 

the narcotics problem. At the conference, President Karzai called 

narcotics production in Afghanistan a disgrace. He said it was more 

threatening than terrorism or the Soviet invasion of 1979 and 

called for an anti-drug Jihad. 

President Karzai backed up his words with actions. The Afghan 

Government has issued an eight-part counternarcotics plan focusing on institution building, public information, alternative livelihoods, interdiction and law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, demand reduction and treatment, and regional cooperation. 

We are guardedly optimistic that President Karzai’s commitment 

may already be paying off. 

The United States Government is also demonstrating strong 

leadership in support of Afghanistan’s efforts to end narcotics production and trade. The Administration, in consultations with the 

United Kingdom, initiated work on a major effort to address the 

narcotics problem in early summer 2004. The Administration developed an approach that aims to reverse the tide of narcotics cultivation, processing and trade, and begins to combat the threat drugs 

pose to Afghanistan’s stability and pursuit of democracy. 

Our approach is a comprehensive, simultaneous, large-scale effort. The Administration has requested a total of $773.5 million to 

implement our counternarcotics program. 

The U.S. counternarcotics program offers incentives through alternative livelihoods, combined with strong disincentives in the 

form of forced eradication, law enforcement and interdiction, while 

a robust public information campaign helps spread President 

Karzai’s message about the disgrace of narcotics production. All of 

these United States efforts are intended to help build the Afghan 

Government’s capacity to conduct counternarcotics efforts on its 

own. Our aim is to produce results in 2005 while we build Afghan 

capacity. 

The United States is actively getting the message out on counternarcotics through the media and planned events. On alternative 

livelihoods, quick-impact programs have already employed approximately 18,000 people in Helmand and Nangarhar provinces. We 

have trained judges, prosecutors and police for the special counternarcotics judicial task force to promote law enforcement. The Afghan Special Narcotics Force is conducting major operations, and 

8

the intelligence fusion center is operational to support our interdiction goals. While the weather has delayed eradication, reconnaissance teams are in the field, and trained central poppy eradication 

teams are ready to deploy. 

The British Government is the lead for the international community on counternarcotics in Afghanistan. The United Kingdom is 

assisting the Afghan Government in creating a Counternarcotics 

Trust Fund. Once established, that fund will proceed a central 

point for funneling international contributions for counternarcotics. 

In conclusion, the narcotics problem is perhaps the greatest challenge facing Afghanistan today. Consequently, it is perhaps the 

greatest obstacle to our goal of seeing Afghanistan become a peaceful, prosperous country that never harbors terrorists like those who 

attacked the United States on September 11th. 

Although we have seen evidence of short-term success on counternarcotics in the past few months and may be hearing of more 

in the months to come, it is important that we not let up. This is 

a long-term problem that will require continued, focused attention 

by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, including the United States. 

We are very grateful for the assistance of Congress so far. With 

your continued support, we will see Afghanistan overcome this 

great challenge. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Quinn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAUREEN E. QUINN, COORDINATOR ON

AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about U.S. counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. 

The world has witnessed enormous strides towards security, democracy and new 

opportunities in Afghanistan in the past year. The United States has firmly supported that progress and we cannot let narcotics undercut the enormous advances 

that Afghanistan has made. We recognize, however, that the narcotics problem is 

not new in Afghanistan. It is a problem that has its roots in a country that has suffered years of drought and war, and where there has been minimal government and 

minimal rule of law for a very long time. 

We have an opportunity to address the narcotics problem in Afghanistan in 2005. 

The Government of Afghanistan is leading the way as President Karzai has challenged the Afghan people to end the growing of opium poppy. The Government of 

the United Kingdom is coordinating international counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and seeking financial contributions from other members of the international community to Afghanistan’s new counternarcotics trust fund. The U.S. government has committed to a major, comprehensive effort to ensure that narcotics 

production and the drug trade do not undercut the new institutions of government 

and the democracy we are supporting and advancing in Afghanistan. Our five-pillar 

plan, covering public information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication, recognizes the need for a balanced, comprehensive approach 

among all of these components. 

We need to see the problem of narcotics in the context of Afghanistan today, recognize that it is a difficult problem with a long history, and demonstrate our leadership in addressing the problem with the Government of Afghanistan, and with the 

Government of the United Kingdom and others in the international community 

fighting this battle. 

AFGHANISTAN TODAY

The people of Afghanistan have demonstrated in the past year that they are 

choosing the rule of law. In January 2004 Afghanistan adopted a new constitution 

that includes strong provisions for human rights, ensures equal rights for all Afghan 

citizens, regardless of gender, ethnicity, or faith, and outlines a democratic governVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

ment with executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. In October 2004, despite 

threats and attacks before the vote and serious logistical challenges, more than 8 

million Afghans—including more than 3.2 million women—cast ballots to choose 

their leader in a truly democratic and peaceful election for the first time. President 

Karzai was sworn in on December 7 during a solemn inauguration ceremony in 

Kabul. Shortly thereafter, Karzai appointed a new cabinet, including the selection 

of a new cabinet-level counternarcotics minister. 

While Afghanistan is still a dangerous place, the number of violent incidents has 

decreased markedly throughout the country since the elections. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration are progressing as former militias turn in their arms. 

New security institutions, such as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, are being trained and equipped. 

Afghanistan has made, and continues to make, enormous strides in organizing a 

legitimate, market-based economy. From the ruins of two decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s leaders have steadily advanced economic policy, implementing a stable 

new currency in 2002, passing a strong banking law in 2003, and adopting an overall national development strategy that recognizes the need to work toward sustainability by limiting spending and boosting revenues, including enhanced customs enforcement. 

In addition, U.S. reconstruction efforts have focused on rebuilding the country’s 

shattered road network, construction and rehabilitation of schools and health clinics, teacher training and maternal-child basic health care, agricultural extension 

and irrigation projects, and economic governance initiatives. 

Finally, President Karzai has challenged the Afghan people to choose legitimate, 

legal economic activity, not opium poppy production. 

THE DRUG PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN

While the political and economic environment in Afghanistan has improved, the 

narcotics situation has worsened, despite positive steps by the government and the 

international community. Opium poppy production puts at risk the significant 

progress the country has made. The area devoted to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2004 reached a record high of 206,700 hectares, more than three times the 

area devoted to poppy in 2003. 

The IMF estimates that drug revenue in Afghanistan is equivalent to about 60 

percent of the country’s legitimate economy. Afghanistan remains a significant location of the cultivation, refining, and transit of all forms of unrefined opium, refined 

heroin, and semi-refined (morphine base) opiates. Heroin processing and trafficking 

reached about $2.8 billion in 2004, according to UN estimates. 

Narcotics cultivation and trafficking is a corrupting influence on the Afghan government at virtually all levels and stunts the growth of the country’s legitimate 

economy. Addressing the problem is particularly challenging because Afghanistan 

still lacks an effective, transparent criminal justice system. Judges are not yet welltrained, and many are unfamiliar with current legal developments, including the 

precepts of the constitution enacted in 2004. The corrections system is underdeveloped and prison facilities are overcrowded. 

Moreover, as a result of the profound destruction and disruption of normal life 

brought about by more than 25 years of conflict, the lack of legitimate income 

streams, and the limited enforcement capacity of the national government, many 

farmers have chosen to plant poppy to support themselves. 

LEADERSHIP ON COUNTERNARCOTICS

President Karzai has committed himself and his government to ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a narco-state. 

On December 9, 2004—two days after his inauguration—President Karzai addressed a conference of Afghan religious and political leaders whom he had called 

together in Kabul to discuss the narcotics problem. At the conference, Karzai called 

narcotics production in Afghanistan ‘‘a disgrace.’’ He said it was more threatening 

than terrorism or the Soviet invasion of 1979, and called for an anti-drug ‘‘jihad.’’

President Karzai backed up his words with actions, appointing a cabinet-level 

minister for counternarcotics and creating a sub-cabinet interagency working group. 

The working group includes the key Ministries of Counternarcotics, Interior, Finance, and Rural Development, among others, to ensure a government-wide and 

countrywide effort. The Afghan government subsequently issued an eight-part counternarcotics plan focusing on institution-building, public information, alternative 

livelihoods, interdiction and law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, demand 

reduction and treatment, and regional cooperation. 

10

In addition to the new Ministry of Counternarcotics, the Government of Afghanistan has also taken other measures to address the problem of counternarcotics 

throughout 2004. A Central Poppy Eradication Force was established in April 2004 

to carry out centrally directed, forced eradication across the country. In October 

2004, the National Interdiction Unit, a special interdiction force being trained by 

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, was created under the existing Counternarcotics Police. In November 2004, the position of Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics was created in the Ministry of Interior to oversee counternarcotics enforcement activities. 

We are guardedly optimistic that President Karzai’s commitment may already be 

paying off. In recent months we have received anecdotal reports that poppy production is down this growing season. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force, 

with U.S. and UK advice, has organized to conduct ground eradication of poppy 

crops. We have also received reports that Afghan provincial officials have been engaged in additional eradication efforts. Afghan verification teams have deployed to 

the provinces; they will complete rapid assessment of the level of cultivation and 

monitor provincial eradication efforts. 

Alternative livelihood programs are also underway, to provide assistance for those 

choosing not to participate in the poppy economy, and to reinforce the effects of 

eradication in turning farmers from the cultivation of illicit poppy. U.S. programs 

are focusing on up to seven provinces that have the most poppy cultivation. Other 

nations, including the United Kingdom, are particularly interested in alternative 

livelihood programs and are supporting programs in these and other provinces. 

The U.S. government is also demonstrating strong leadership in support for Afghanistan’s efforts to end narcotics production and trade. The Administration, recognizing the growing seriousness of the problem and in consultations with the United 

Kingdom, initiated work on a major effort to address the narcotics problem in early 

summer 2004. The Administration developed an approach that aims to reverse the 

tide of narcotics cultivation, processing, and trade, and to begin to combat the threat 

it poses to Afghan stability and Afghanistan’s pursuit of democracy. Our approach 

is a comprehensive, simultaneous, large-scale effort that includes changing public 

attitudes, identifying and prosecuting drug traffickers and corrupt officials, destroying illicit crops, opiates, and processing labs, and creating legitimate income 

streams. 

The Administration has requested a total of $773.5 million in FY 2005 supplemental funding to implement our counternarcotics program in 2005 in Afghanistan. 

U.S. counternarcotics programming is set out in a five-pillar plan that offers incentives through alternative livelihoods, combined with strong disincentives in the 

form of forced eradication, law enforcement, and interdiction, while a robust public 

information campaign helps spread President Karzai’s message about the disgrace 

of narcotics production. All of these U.S. anti-drug efforts are intended to simultaneously produce results while building the Afghan government’s capacity to conduct 

counternarcotics efforts on its own. 

To get the message out on counternarcotics, the United States is actively supporting the spread of President Karzai’s counternarcotics message to the provinces 

through the media and planned events. On alternative livelihoods, quick-impact programs have already employed over 17,000 people in Helmand and Nangarhar provinces. The United Kingdom has played a strong role in this as well. We have trained 

judges, prosecutors, and police for the special prosecutorial counternarcotics task 

force to promote effective law enforcement and judicial capacity. The Department of 

Justice, through its senior U.S. prosecutors in Kabul, has provided advice and assistance in the drafting of new money laundering, asset forfeiture, and narcotics 

laws, and on extradition. The UK-trained Afghan Special Narcotics Force is conducting major operations, and the Combined Forces Command intelligence fusion 

center is operational to support our interdiction goals. While the weather has delayed eradication, reconnaissance teams are in the field and trained Central Poppy 

Eradication teams are ready to deploy. 

The British Government is the lead government for the international community 

on counternarcotics in Afghanistan. The British are contributing a total of $100 million in 2005, with half of that going toward alternative livelihood programs. 

The UK is assisting the Afghan government in creating a Counter Narcotics Trust 

Fund. Once established, the fund will provide a central point for funneling international contributions for counternarcotics and will ease coordination and 

deconfliction of programs. It will also help Afghanistan keep better track of donations. The fund will allow donors to earmark contributions for either alternative 

livelihood or law enforcement programs. 

Following up on its efforts to establish the fund, the British government last 

month conducted an international lobbying effort to encourage trust fund contribuVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
11

tions. As a result of that effort, several nations have already indicated that they will 

contribute through the fund or otherwise increase counternarcotics donations to Afghanistan. 

CONCLUSION

The narcotics problem is perhaps the greatest challenge facing Afghanistan today. 

Consequently, it is perhaps the greatest obstacle to our goal of seeing Afghanistan 

become a peaceful, prosperous country that never again harbors terrorists like those 

who attacked us on September 11. 

Although we have seen some evidence of short-term success on counternarcotics 

in the past few months, it is important that we not let up. This is a long-term problem that will require continued, focused attention by the Afghan government and 

the international community, including the United States. The Afghan Government, 

under President Karzai’s leadership, has made a strong commitment to fight drugs 

and deserves our support. We are grateful for Congress’s assistance so far, and with 

your continued support, we will see Afghanistan overcome this great challenge.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now Ms. Long from the Department of Defense. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARY BETH LONG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos 

and distinguished Members of the Committee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Rohrabacher, too. 

Ms. LONG. Thank you, and you, sir. And happy St. Patrick’s day 

to you. 

I am accompanied by Brigadier General Jeff Remington from the 

Joint Staff. I have a statement I would like to offer for the record 

and a few comments that I would like to make with your permission, sir. 

I am aware of the calls for United States military and coalition 

forces to adopt a more aggressive approach to combating Afghan 

narcotics networks. In the last year, the Department’s contributions to those have been significant. Every day our military continues its critical mission efforts to secure Afghanistan against 

counterterrorists and counterinsurgents, and those efforts were 

critical to bringing us safe and secure Afghan elections as well as 

its newly minted democratic Government. 

In the last year in Afghanistan, the United States forces have 

been authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking and target those traffickers in the course of their support 

for the stability mission. If our forces come across drugs or drugproducing equipment, they are authorized to take action. They are 

also to report all drug-related discoveries. Since July 14, 2004, 

there have been 19 reported instances of United States military 

forces encountering opium or other drugs and either destroying or 

transporting those drugs to the appropriate Afghan authorities. 

These efforts have resulted in the destruction or the disposition of 

nearly 4,000 kilograms of hashish, 2,500 kilograms of opium and 

nearly 20 kilograms of machined heroin. 

In addition, just 2 days ago, on Tuesday, March 15, United 

States military forces inserted, provided security, and extracted 6 

drug enforcement agents and 36 Afghan narcotics agents into a 

successful operation targeting three opium labs in Nangarhar province, one of the primary sources of opium. This operation produced 

a significant amount of evidence for the DEA and enabled the deVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
12

struction of nearly 2 tons of brown opium, 15 kilos of high-grade 

white opium, as well as over 30 barrels and other associated chemicals. United States military support to these operations included 

one Apache helicopter, a Blackhawk helicopter, and two DoD-contracted counternarcotics MI–18 helicopters. In addition, the Department trained and fully equipped the 36 Afghan counternarcotics police, 2 of which I am proud to say were women. 

But support to Afghan interdiction operations is just one of the 

elements of the Department’s counternarcotics plan, which is focused on building government or Afghan counternarcotics capabilities. As part of the United States’ integrated interagency counternarcotics strategy, we are helping the Afghans establish a public 

affairs capacity that both reaches out to the Afghan citizens but 

also seeks to coordinate and integrate the Government of Afghan 

officials’ messaging on counterdrug targets. This effort is designed 

to complement the heroic and historic public statements made by 

President Karzai shortly after his inauguration. 

We are also assisting in the development of Afghan law enforcement capacity, including border security forces and the highway police. Working closely with the Department of State, we assist in 

providing the Afghan border police with specialized training, equipment and facilities. Our current efforts have focused on the border 

of Pakistan, as a significant amount of the narcotics cross that border. This, of course, is also the general area of Department of Defense counterterrorism and counterinsurgent operations. We are 

also improving the borders with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 

and Tajikistan, where narcotics flow. 

In addition to the 36 counternarcotics police that I mentioned 

earlier, the Department provided the specialized training and 

equipping of the approximately 70 other police who perform this 

function. This force will work closely with our sister agency, the 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and their FAST advisory 

teams which will soon be rotating into Afghanistan. 

The Department trained the FAST teams and will be providing 

them with transportation in country. We are also providing the 

DEA FAST with extensive support, including bases of operation 

both here and in Afghanistan. 

The Department offers some support to the United Kingdomtrained Afghan interdiction force, the Afghan Special Narcotics Police. The success of this force is a tribute to the United Kingdom’s 

excellent work with the Afghans. Since last summer, the ASNF has 

seized and destroyed no less than approximately 81 metric tons of 

opium, 70 heroin labs and 28 metric tons of precursor chemicals. 

The Department has provided them with intelligence assets and intelligence packages that were developed in part by CFC Alpha. 

To support future operations of this force, in conjunction with 

DEA and the Afghan counternarcotics police, U.S. Central Command believes that it may be able to support four or more interdiction missions per month, when its counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency missions permit. In the long term, however, 

these interdiction forces will need dedicated organic ability to extend their reach for transportation and flexibility. 

Finally, the Department is working to build the counternarcotic 

capacity of border nations. This support will not only directly enVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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hance the capability of the Afghans at borders but will also bolster 

efforts of these border nations to stop the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. 

Narcotics trafficking not only poses challenges to our efforts to 

defeat extremists and terrorist forces, but it is a threat to the stability and security of the Afghan Government, the security of the 

United States, and to the region. 

President Karzai’s leadership and commitment to the narcotic 

fight have been and will remain critical to coalition efforts in Afghanistan. But all United States counterdrug efforts must be part 

of an integrated U.S. campaign strategy with each of these partner 

agencies effectively executing its role in furtherance of his overall 

Afghan policy. 

Interdiction without a working judicial system or the means of 

holding drug offenders, eradication without the means of providing 

Afghans with a meaningful way to feed their families, or lack of the 

appropriate leadership and training for Afghan security forces, including police, are all potentially destabilizing factors. 

Moreover, additional international support is needed. Those nations that provide ready markets for Afghan opium should contribute to this worthy and necessary effort. Our collective continued 

support to the Afghan Government and the people that it represents is critical. 

On behalf of the Department, I would like to extend my appreciation, sir, for your continued support to our programs and to the Department. I would like to thank you, Representative Rohrabacher, 

Representative Lantos and Chairman Hyde for allowing me this 

opportunity; and I welcome any questions. Thank you. Sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. MARY BETH LONG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

COUNTERNARCOTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the problem of opium 

and other narcotic trafficking in Afghanistan, and our approach to defeat this problem. I am accompanied today by Brigadier General Jeffrey Remington from the 

Joint Staff. The Department appreciates the support Congress has provided to respond to this challenge. It is critical to our effort to address the drug trade problem 

in Afghanistan. We thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

As you know, since Coalition forces evicted the Taliban in December 2001, the primary mission of US military forces in Afghanistan has been to defeat terrorists and 

an insurgency—being waged by Al Qaeda, the Taliban leadership, Hezb-i Islami 

Gulbuddin (HIG), and other anti-coalition and anti-government forces. In the ensuing years as part of this critical mission, we have worked with the Afghans to recruit, train, organize, equip, and employ effective security forces; to accelerate disarmament, to demobilize and reintegrate formerly hostile elements; and to establish 

control over their borders. In addition, Coalition and US forces have assisted the 

Afghans in developing important political and economic infrastructure, including 

government institutions capable of supporting the free, representative government 

that the Afghan people deserve. These efforts continue today. A true measure of our 

progress is the success of Afghanistan’s first presidential election just about six 

months ago, in which over 8 million people voted (including Afghanistan’s women) 

with virtually no incidents of violence on voting day. 

The drug problem in Afghanistan, however, could endanger much of the progress 

already made, and many of the ongoing efforts by Coalition forces, our allies and 

the Afghans. Afghanistan is the world’s leading source of heroin, supplying mostly 

regional markets, Europe, and Russia. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan was responsible for 87% of the world’s illicit opium production in 2004. 

14

There are two fundamentals about any plan designed to address the problem of 

drug trafficking and the drug trade networks in Afghanistan. First, that plan must 

be one that is endorsed and led by the Afghans themselves. And second, the plan 

must be one that nests within the USG’s overall strategic goals in that it recognizes 

the impact the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while complimenting 

(and not competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those objectives. 

President Karzai’s aggressive leadership and public commitment to the narcotics 

fight is impressive. Shortly after his inauguration, President Karzai conducted a two 

day National Conference on Counternarcotics for Afghan provincial governors, police 

chiefs, elders, tribal leaders, as well as members of the international community. 

During the conference, President Karzai declared to his provincial governors that 

the scourge of drug trafficking in Afghanistan was worse than the Soviet invasion, 

and that the jihad against this vile threat was analogous to the Afghan’s jihad 

against the Soviets. Since that motivational effort by President Karzai and his officers, the Kabul Embassy has received reports of significantly reduced poppy cultivation and Afghan eradication efforts in support of President’s heroic public stand. 

Our continued support to President Karzai’s policy is important and must be the 

core of the USG’s counternarcotics plan. 

This past year, our Ambassador in Kabul, in coordination with State Department, 

the Department of Justice, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other interagency participants, developed a five-pronged counternarcotics plan that nests this 

effort within the Administration’s overall Afghanistan campaign plan. In this manner, the plan compliments the interagency’s other policy efforts, including those addressing reconstruction and economic development, warlordism, continued security 

and stability issues, and other areas of concern. The key elements of the interagency 

counternarcotics plan are (1) public information, (2) alternative livelihoods, (3) law 

enforcement, (4) interdiction, and (5) eradication. This interagency plan has been coordinated and integrated with the United Kingdom’s counternarcotics plan and compliments that developed by the Government of Afghanistan. 

To deal with the drug trade problem successfully, it is necessary that all these 

key elements move forward. I am aware of calls for the US military and Coalition 

forces to adopt a more aggressive approach against Afghan narcotics networks. A 

counternarcotics effort that does not take into account political and economic realities may, however, have unintended consequences for both Coalition Forces and the 

Government of Afghanistan. In addition, interdiction without authority and the 

means by which to prosecute drug offenders; eradication without the means of providing Afghans a way to feed their families; lack of appropriate leadership and 

training for security forces and police—are all potential destabilizing factors to a 

newly democratic nation. The Department of Defense—and its sister agencies involved in this counternarcotics effort—each play an important role in executing this 

plan. 

THE DEPARTMENT’S FOCUS AND MILITARY ACTION

The Department of Defense focus is to build the Afghan government’s capacity to 

combat this problem and to coordinate those efforts with the United Kingdom, as 

lead nation. We believe that, whenever possible, our military efforts should support 

the Afghans or law enforcement efforts against this difficult problem. In the last 

year, the Department’s contributions to this plan have been significant. 

In Afghanistan, US troops are authorized to conduct military operations against 

drug trafficking targets when those military operations support our stability mission 

in Afghanistan. If our troops come across drugs or drug producing equipment during 

the conduct of other military operations, they are authorized to take action against 

these targets and report all drug related discoveries. Since July 14, 2004, there have 

been 19 reported instances of US military forces encountering drugs in the course 

of military operations and either destroying or transferring the drugs to the appropriate Afghan authorities; nine of those instances were in January 2005. 

More recently, on March 15, US military forces provided insertion, extraction and 

security support to six Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers and 36 Afghan narcotics police in a successful operation against three labs located in 

Nangahar province, one of the primary sources of Afghan opium. Significantly, DEA 

officers, US military forces and Afghan police planned, rehearsed and, finally, successfully executed this effort resulting in significant evidence collection by the DEA 

and the destruction of two metric tons of brown opium, 15 kilos of high-grade white 

opium, as well as associated chemicals. The 36 Afghan narcotics police were 

equipped and trained using Department contractors and funds. In addition, US military support included Apache, Blackhawk and MI–8 helicopters. This is just one exVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ample of the evolving partnership between the Department and DEA toward developing effective interdiction capabilities. 

PUBLIC INFORMATION SUPPORT

Reliable public information supportive of President Karzai’s anti-drug policies is 

a critical element of the interagency drug plan. Informing the Afghan population 

and ensuring their support is challenging due to the low literacy rate of the general 

public and the absence of sufficient communications infrastructure. At the request 

of the Department of State INL, the Department early on began to assist the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in establishing a public affairs capability that not only 

reaches out to its citizenry, but coordinates and instructs government officials on 

anti-drug messaging. We developed, in coordination with the Minister, a plan to 

build an office with the capacity to prepare and transmit counternarcotics messages 

via public fora or media events and to arrange formal and informal settings for the 

Afghan leadership to discuss the gravity of the drug threat and how to address it. 

Several Afghans within the Ministry of Interior, including one woman, are receiving public affairs training. This Department effort was instrumental in developing 

the messages for and in hosting the National Conference on Counternarcotics—the 

first major event following President Karzai’s inauguration. With Embassy concurrence, we will continue this effort into Fiscal Year 2005, and coordinate it with 

INL’s Embassy-based proposed public affairs activities and materials. 

SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING

A second essential element of the plan is the development of an Afghan law enforcement capacity, and a key component of that capacity is border security. The Department, in support of INL, is assisting the Afghan Border Police by providing specialized training, equipment, and facilities. Our current efforts have focused along 

the areas bordering Pakistan as a significant amount of narcotics trafficking from 

Afghanistan crosses that border. Increased security capacity along the Pakistan border also will benefit Coalition forces and the Afghan government by providing a 

means by which cross border violence from extremist and anti-government forces 

can be addressed. And the government of Afghanistan would benefit greatly from 

the capacity to collect revenue during traffic stops along these same routes. 

As for facilities, the US Army Corps of Engineers will oversee the construction 

of brigade, battalion, and company headquarters facilities. In Fiscal Year 2004 the 

ground work was laid for construction of two facilities for the Border Police in 

Kandahar and Paktika. In Fiscal Year 2005, we will build upon these efforts with 

11 additional facilities. These will provide a base of operations from which the Border Police can interdict drugs moving to Pakistan, and, importantly, provide a central government presence in a previously ungoverned area. 

Elsewhere at other major crossing points, we are assisting the Government of Afghanistan to improve border drug transit points along routes to Iran, Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In Fiscal Year 2004, we began construction of a border 

checkpoint at Spin Boldak. In Fiscal Year 2005, we will construct and/or improve 

8 additional border checkpoints. We will also support a transitional border unit at 

Islam Qala, Herat, while the assigned border unit has completed its formal training, 

and has been fully equipped. 

As for equipment, because Border Police will operate in an often hostile environment where heavily armed traffickers or militants are found, they often need equipment beyond the requirements of normal policemen. In Fiscal Year 2004 CFC–A 

oversaw the issuance of equipment such as vests and cold/wet weather gear. The 

Department also provided limited quantities of Global Positioning Systems. In Fiscal Year 2005, we plan to provide additional drug detection equipment, boots, cold/

wet weather gear, and other gear to the Border Police. 

In addition, the Department is providing a communications system for the Border 

Police that will link them with the existing National Police communications system—procured through Department of State funds—that will extend from the command to the tactical level. Training on the use of the radios and some instruction 

on minor repair will also be included with the delivery of the equipment. Finally, 

small unit and tactical training will enable the Border Police forces to operate as 

an effective team against potential foes. 

Away from the borders, the Defense Department will improve or construct police 

facilities and other infrastructure for the National Police in provinces stretching 

south along the Pakistan border from Nangahar to Nimruz. The Defense Department also will supplement existing personal equipment provided to the National Police in these provinces. All of the police units have some counternarcotics role. 

16

The National Highway Police will be responsible for interdicting drugs on Afghan 

highways and major transit routes. Even along major roads, there is little infrastructure to support basic law enforcement but these few highways provide a quick 

trafficking route for narcotics and other illicit goods. In Fiscal Year 2004, we began 

the construction process of building facilities for the Highway Police stretching from 

Kabul south and west toward Kandahar along the Ring Road. In Fiscal Year 2005, 

we will continue this effort by building 10 National Highway Police facilities along 

the Ring Road west and north towards Herat. Facilities for the Highway Police will 

also be constructed along the key route from Kabul east towards the Border checkpoint at Torkham. These facilities will allow for a greater law enforcement presence, 

improved security, and reduced drug trafficking along these major routes. 

SUPPORT TO INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Expanding Afghan interdiction capabilities so that its operations can result in 

criminal prosecutions is vital to a successful program. Using Fiscal Year 2004 funding, the Department, in support of law enforcement, funded the ongoing training 

and equipping of a specialized National Interdiction Unit (NIU), an element of the 

Afghan Counternarcotics Police. This unit currently consists of approximately one 

hundred trained officers and will work closely with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The training provided includes self defense, searches and entry 

into defended buildings, evidence handling, small unit tactics, marksmanship, close 

quarters combat, and human rights. DoD also will provide advanced medical, intelligence, and communications training to selected personnel within this unit, which 

will assist the force to be self sustaining. We are constructing a base of operations 

that will provide spaces for billeting, eating, and additional training of these officers. 

To work with this newly-minted Afghan interdiction force, DEA requested DoD to 

provide support to an enhanced, surge capability that will put rotating teams of 

DEA agents in country to work with their Afghan counterparts. The assistance provided by the Department includes field training at Fort Benning of team members, 

known as the DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) officers. In addition, 

in only a few weeks, DoD will transport the first DEA FAST team to Afghanistan 

to continue to train and mentor the NIU. The Department also is providing a base 

of operations for the Teams while in the US, where they can continue to train, and 

is providing the FAST Team members with transportation to Afghanistan. CFC–A 

will support this element with some transportation support, and in-extremis close 

air support and emergency medical evacuation, if needed. 

Conducting interdiction operations by using ground vehicles has proven to be 

somewhat impractical and also subjects the missions to compromise. In the near 

term, interdiction forces, including those working with the DEA and the United 

Kingdom-trained forces, may receive some tactical lift from DoD, using a mix of 

UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters and leased MI–8s. US Central Command currently 

believes that it may be able to support four (or more) operations per month. These 

missions will be weighed against priority counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

missions, and will require close planning, coordination and flexibility among CFC–

A, the NIU and TF333. Ultimately, the level of support will be the call of the Commander and the Ambassador on the ground as they are leading the fight. 

In addition to this support, the Department has leased two MI–8 helos for use 

by interdiction forces and Afghan police. These craft were used most recently in the 

March 15th joint DEA-Afghan NIU operation supported by US military forces. The 

Defense Department also is in the process of refurbishing two Afghan-owned helicopters. It is prepared to refurbish up to six additional helicopters for use by the 

Afghan police by Fiscal Year 2006. The helicopters will be used to form an Afghan 

police transportation unit for the interdiction force and other police actions. A training program to build the pilot, maintenance capacity and base of operations will be 

provided with Department funding and support. While pilots and maintenance 

crews are being trained, we have budgeted for contractors to provide this service. 

The Department also provides limited support to the United Kingdom-trained Afghan interdiction force—the Afghan Special Narcotics Police (ASNF). The success of 

this force is a tribute the United Kingdom’s excellent work with the Afghans. Since 

last Summer, the ASNF has seized and destroyed no less than approximately 81 

metric tons of opium, 70 heroin labs, and 28 metric tons of precursor chemicals. 

They have detained numerous drug traffickers. The UK’s contributions in other 

areas of counter-drug efforts have been no less significant—it has significantly increased its contributions to Alternative Livelihood programs offered to cultivators—

and the Department is pleased to be working with our UK counterparts in close coordination of our efforts and plans. DoD has contributed where it can by providing 

17

close air security support and some equipment. Thus far this year, US military 

forces have transported the ASNF to Kandahar for recent interdiction operations, 

has provided access to a predator and intelligence support for interdiction operations, and plans are underway to construct a forward Operating Base (FOB) near 

Khandahar. In coordination with the UK, we also will continue to provide the ASNF 

with some equipment, including night vision goggles. In addition, DoD is financing 

the refurbishment of an additional MI–8 helicopter to compliment the UK refurbished MI–8s used by this force. 

To improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations, the Defense Department is establishing counter-narcoterrorism Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) within Combined Forces Coalition—Afghanistan 

(CFC–A) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Thus far, intelligence packages developed, at least in part, by the CFC–A cell have been used in several successful Afghan interdiction operations, including those of the ASNF. The cell is working closely with other USG agencies, such as DoS and DEA, as well as our UK partners. 

The Afghan Intelligence Fusion Center will not only house counternarcotics information in support of interdictions and prosecutions, but will support police operations 

against insurgent and other illicit activities. This database will be the first step in 

reconstructing Afghanistan’s criminal justice records, which were destroyed by the 

last two decades of war. In Fiscal Year 2005, we will continue to support this effort 

and expand its capability. 

REGIONAL EFFORTS SUPPORTED BY THE DEPARTMENT

In addition to DoD counternarcotics support directly to Afghanistan, we support 

regional efforts with bordering nations. Department efforts in Uzbekistan include 

constructing three maritime patrol bases located along the Amu Darya River bordering Afghanistan to support interdiction operations along that river. We also are 

constructing a police Special Investigative Unit Headquarters in Uzbekistan. That 

force will work closely with the DEA. As for maritime interdiction support, we are 

currently reviewing a concept to provide boats, radio equipment, facilities, etc for 

a dhow tracking system along the Makran coast in Pakistan. Last year, an interdiction operation in this area of a vessel linked to Al Qaeda supporters resulted in a 

drug seizure. More recently, the US Navy, under the direction of NAVCENT, interdicted a significant drug shipment in the same general area. We are installing a 

maritime communications surveillance system for Oman which will improve the 

coastal patrolling capabilities or their Coast Guard and interoperability with coalition naval forces. Finally, DoD will provide some training and equipment for antidrug forces in Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in support of a regional counternarcotics plan currently under review by our Central Command. 

BUDGET

To accomplish these goals, the Department has requested $257 million in supplemental funding to continue counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. This is in addition to $15.4 million currently budgeted in Fiscal Year 2005 for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Because of the urgency of this 

problem, we have initiated some activities using $70 million from existing fourth 

quarter funds dedicated to other counternarcotics programs in other parts of the 

world. This funding will be put back into those accounts once the supplemental is 

approved by Congress. 

To ensure the effective use of these funds, the Department also requested a modification to existing Section 1033 authority, which allows for the provision of equipment and supplies to build partner nation counternarcotics capabilities. This modified provision seeks an increase in the yearly authorized funding caps and the ability to provide a wider array of equipment, including weapons, to Afghan counternarcotics forces. 

CONCLUSION

But the Department’s support to interdiction efforts, and its efforts to build Afghan counter-drug capacity, are not enough. Without facilities to hold detained drug 

offenders and others; and a civil justice system in which to prosecute them; and viable economic alternatives to the drug trade, there are severe limits to the impact 

of the Department’s efforts. Additional attention and resources must be dedicated 

to these issues. Narcotics trafficking not only poses challenges to our efforts to defeat extremist and terrorist forces; it also is a threat to the stability and legitimacy 

of the Afghan government. While President Karzai’s aggressive leadership and commitment to the narcotics fight has been, and will remain, crucial to the Coalition 

effort in Afghanistan, additional international support is needed. Those nations that 

18

provide ready markets for Afghan opium should contribute to this worthy, and necessary, effort. Our collective continued support to the Afghan government—and to 

the people it represents—is critical. 

On behalf of the Department, I appreciate your continued support of our counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan. By your support of our activities, as well as the 

funding and authorities you provide, you are our ally in this fight against 

narcoterrorism. I would like to thank you, Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, 

and the Members of the Committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues with 

you. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will have our last witness, then go into 

some questions and answers. 

We have Special Agent Braun from the Drug Enforcement Administration, and you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BRAUN, SPECIAL AGENT, CHIEF 

OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BRAUN. Chairman Hyde, Mr. Rohrabacher and distinguished 

Members of the Committee on International Relations, on behalf of 

Administrator Karen P. Tandy, I appreciate your invitation to testify regarding the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

The DEA is keenly aware that the continued production of opium 

in Afghanistan is a significant threat to Afghanistan’s future and 

the entire region’s stability. It also could have worldwide implications. In response to this threat, the DEA has undertaken an aggressive approach to combat the production of opium in Afghanistan, and we are making progress. 

I would like to take this opportunity to announce that, on March 

15, the DEA’s Kabul country office, along with the DEA and DoDtrained counternarcotics police, Afghanistan, and the National 

Interdiction Unit executed its first operation on a clandestine laboratory complex. Our U.S. military support was vital to the success 

of this operation. 

This mission in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province led to the seizure of three fully operational clandestine heroin labs, approximately 2,200 kilograms of opium, 15 pounds of heroin and hundreds of pounds of chemicals. This operation and the other operations we are involved in are not possible without the assistance 

and cooperation of our U.S. Government counterparts, both law enforcement and nonlaw enforcement agencies, as well as our foreign 

partners. 

With respect to DEA’s response to the eight-pillar plan, we have 

joined with coalition partners, the State Department and the Department of Defense, in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics 

Implementation Plan. This eight-pillar plan provides the DEA opportunities, as never before, to reduce heroin production in Afghanistan and contribute to the stabilization and rebuilding of this wartorn country. 

Our primary role in this plan falls under the interdiction pillar, 

where DEA will assist with the goal of destroying clandestine labs 

and seizing precursor chemicals, opium, and opiate stockpiles. 

The two other DEA components of the interdiction pillar are the 

Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams and Operation Containment. The DEA’s Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support 

Teams, FAST, are supported, trained and largely funded by the DeVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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partment of Defense. They consist of five teams of DEA special 

agents and intelligence research specialists who will be deployed 

two teams at a time in Afghanistan for 120-day rotations. These 

FASTs will provide guidance to their Afghan counterparts, while 

conducting bilateral investigations aimed at disrupting or dismantling transnational drug trafficking organizations operating in the 

region. The FASTs will also help with the destruction of opium 

storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, and precursor 

chemical supplies. 

Mr. Chairman, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s FASTs 

may begin their initial deployment in Afghanistan as early as 

March 30. 

Operation Containment is a DEA-led multinational cooperative 

program initiated in 2002 in an effort to place a security belt 

around Afghanistan that would prevent processing chemicals from 

entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving. In fact, 

in fiscal year 2004, approximately 3.27 metric tons of precursor 

chemicals were seized as a result of Operation Containment. This 

program has the participation of 19 countries in Central Asia, the 

Caucuses, the Middle East, Europe, and Russia. 

The success of this program has been tremendous. During just 

the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, Operation Containment seized 

2.4 metric tons of heroin, 985 kilograms of morphine base, 3 metric 

tons of opium gum, 152.9 metric tons of cannabis and 195 arrests. 

With respect to drugs and terrorism, although the DEA has evidence that some terrorist groups are involved in drug trafficking, 

the drug trade continues to be dominated at all levels by traditional drug trafficking organizations. Nevertheless, terrorist groups 

have turned to alternative sources of financing, including fund-raising from sympathizers and nongovernmental organizations, as well 

as criminal activities such as arms trafficking, money laundering, 

kidnap for ransom, and drug trafficking. 

In a new era of mobilization, both terrorist groups and criminal 

organizations have expanded and diversified their activities, taking 

advantage of the internationalization of communications and banking systems as well as the opening of borders. As a result, the traditional boundaries between terrorist groups and other criminal 

groups have begun to blur. As of December 31, 2004, the DEA had 

identified 45 percent, 18 of 40, of the organizations on the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the drug trade. 

In conclusion, the DEA continues to take an active leadership 

role in the multinational efforts aimed at combating the drug 

threat posed by Afghanistan. We are confident that these efforts 

and those of other U.S. Government agencies, Afghan law enforcement and our other law enforcement partners will lead to a reduction of opium production and, ultimately, the stabilization of Afghanistan and the region. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your recognition and assistance on 

this important issue and the opportunity to testify here today. I 

will be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]

20

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BRAUN, SPECIAL AGENT, CHIEF OF

OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Hyde, and distinguished members of the Committee on International 

Relations, on behalf of Administrator Karen Tandy, I appreciate your invitation to 

testify today regarding the Drug Enforcement Administration’s efforts in Afghanistan. 

OVERVIEW

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is keenly aware that the continued 

production of opium in Afghanistan is not only a significant threat to Afghanistan’s 

future and the region’s stability, but also could have worldwide implications. In response to this threat, the DEA has undertaken an aggressive approach to combat 

the production of opium in Afghanistan. In fact, I am pleased to announce that our 

Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) may initiate their first deployment in Afghanistan as early as March 30, 2005. These teams of DEA Special 

Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists will provide guidance and conduct bilateral investigations to identify and dismantle illicit drug trafficking and money 

laundering organizations. Our efforts, combined with those of our law enforcement 

partners, through a program known as Operation Containment, have resulted in 

significant opium and heroin seizures in the region. We are also providing training 

and assistance to law enforcement personnel in Afghanistan, and the DEA is directly involved in overseeing and advising U.S. Government and Afghan officials in 

counter narcotics programs and drug policy issues in Afghanistan. The DEA is confident that our efforts, along with those of our U.S. and foreign counterparts, will 

result in the reduction of drugs produced in Afghanistan, and will ultimately assist 

in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the region. 

OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Years of warfare, punctuated by the Soviet invasion and occupation throughout 

the 1980s and the civil strife of the 1990s, decimated Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure. During this period, the drug trade unfortunately emerged as Afghanistan’s largest source of income. In 2001, the Taliban banned the cultivation of 

opium, which temporarily resulted in a significant decrease in production, to an estimated 74 metric tons. However, since the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, production 

has increased substantially. Official U.S. Government estimates for 2004 indicate 

that Afghanistan had the potential to produce 4,950 metric tons of oven-dried 

opium, up from 2,865 metric tons in 2003, and 1,278 metric tons produced in 2002. 

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan 

produced 87 percent of the world’s illicit opium supply in 2004, up from 75 percent 

in 2003. But in spite of these cultivation projections, there was not a commensurate 

rise in total opium yields. This was due to drought, disease, and the inexperience 

of new ‘‘farmers,’’ which depressed the total per hectare output of opium. Although 

opium cultivation will continue throughout 2005, early surveys suggest a possibly 

significant decrease in opium production. 

Meanwhile, the Karzai Administration has announced that there will be 100 percent eradication in 2005. This sends a clear message to farmers and opium cultivators that no amount of opium production will be tolerated. At present, there are two 

concurrently operating eradication programs in Afghanistan. The first is a U.K. 

Government-supported Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). CPEF is comprised 

of 500 security personnel and about 1,000 locally hired Afghans who travel throughout the country to conduct ground eradication. In 2004 CPEF managed to eradicate 

only about 4,000 hectares because of internal management issues and security concerns (some poppy growers laid explosive booby traps in their fields; 4 eradicators 

were killed). In 2005, CPEF intends to travel to Nangarhar and Helmand Provinces 

to strike the densest growth regions. The other eradication program is the governorled eradication program. Although this program appears to be fraught with corruption issues (there are reports some governors are allowing opium growth in some 

areas, while eradicating the fields of political opponents), all governors in 2005 have 

pledged to support President Karzai’s eradication initiatives. The governors’ eradication program hires local militia, farmers, and police to destroy poppy fields. 

The U.S. Government led the discussion in 2004, encouraging aerial eradication. 

However, the Afghanistan government is against such an approach for the time 

being. 

21

THE PRODUCTION AND SMUGGLING OF HEROIN AND MORPHINE

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or 

one of several grades of brown heroin. The large processing labs are primarily located in southern Afghanistan, with smaller laboratories located in other areas, including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing laboratories were 

located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). These 

laboratories relocated to Afghanistan, to be closer to the source of opium and to 

avoid increasing law enforcement actions by the Government of Pakistan. 

Opiates produced in Afghanistan are typically consumed or smuggled to markets 

within the region, and also are smuggled to markets in the West, with the majority 

of the opiate products in Europe originating in Afghanistan. Some small quantities 

of heroin produced in Afghanistan are smuggled to the United States. 

Afghan heroin is trafficked via many routes, with traffickers quickly adjusting 

smuggling routes based on law enforcement and political actions, not to mention 

weather-related events. Traffickers in Afghanistan primarily rely on vehicles and 

overland routes to move drug shipments out of the country. A number of reports 

have been received indicating that large convoys of well-armed passenger trucks (up 

to 60 or more vehicles) loaded with opiates have been driven across western Afghanistan into Iran. Large freight trucks, known as ‘‘jinga’’ trucks are also loaded with 

drugs and sent toward Pakistan, while smaller shipments of drugs are sent through 

the northern Afghanistan border with Tajikistan. Afghan traffickers have become 

adept at using sophisticated concealment methods, such as traps and hidden compartments to hide opium, morphine, and heroin. 

Also, reports indicate that heroin shipments moving north from Afghanistan 

through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased. Tajikistan law enforcement agencies report that approximately 80 percent of their drug seizures in Central Asia are opiates. Tajikistan is a primary transshipment location for opiate shipments destined for Russia. While some of the heroin is used in Russia, a portion 

transits Russia to other consumer markets in Western and Eastern Europe. Afghan 

heroin also transits India en route to international markets and continues to be 

trafficked from Afghanistan through Pakistan, with seizures frequently reported at 

Pakistan’s international airports. Some heroin is smuggled by sea on vessels leaving 

the port city of Karachi. 

Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to 

Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey, where Turkey-based trafficking 

groups convert the morphine base to heroin prior to shipment to European and 

North American markets. Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base are also 

sent by sea from Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Smuggling routes north through the 

Central Asian States, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey also are 

used. 

Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals. Acetic anhydride (AA), 

which is the most commonly used acetylating agent in heroin processing, is smuggled into Afghanistan from Pakistan, India, the Central Asian States, China, and 

Europe. 

MONEY LAUNDERING IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan’s legitimate banking sector was decimated by a generation of war. 

The ‘‘hawala,’’ which is a centuries-old, sophisticated underground banking system 

used in Afghanistan and throughout Asia, was the only way refugees and residents 

could remit money domestically and internationally. This system provides a confidential, convenient, efficient, and inexpensive service in areas that are not served 

by traditional banking facilities. While there is virtually no external paper trail of 

any financial transfers, the ‘‘hawala’’ dealers (hawaladars) keep very meticulous internal records. Drug proceeds in Afghanistan are likely remitted overseas using this 

system. 

In 2004, Afghanistan promulgated a number of laws to regulate the activities of 

the hawala system. It is generally accepted that Afghanistan will never rid itself 

of these ‘‘hawaladars’’ as long as they are an efficient and competitive substitute for 

legitimate banks. The Karzai Administration, however, has taken steps to ensure 

that a number of anti-money laundering statutes are enacted, including Know Your 

Customer and Terrorist Financing Laws. 

THE FIVE PILLAR PLAN

The DEA has joined with coalition partners, the State Department, and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Plan. This ‘‘Five Pillar Plan’’ provides the DEA opportunities, as never before, 

22

to reduce heroin production in Afghanistan and contribute to the stabilization and 

rebuilding of this war-torn country. Our primary role in this plan falls under the 

‘‘Interdiction Pillar,’’ where DEA will assist with the goal of destroying clandestine 

labs and seizing precursor chemicals, opium, and opiate stockpiles. To achieve that 

goal, the DEA is expanding its presence in Afghanistan by permanently stationing 

additional Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts to enhance that country’s counternarcotics capacity. The DEA also will continue lending its expertise by providing 

drug enforcement training to our counterparts in the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP–A). This effort will build Afghanistan’s institutions of justice and 

strengthen internal counternarcotics capabilities. The other two DEA components of 

the ‘‘Interdiction Pillar’’ are the Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams and 

Operation Containment. 

DEA’S PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

The DEA’s Kabul Country Office reopened in February 2003, and it has made significant progress, while enduring difficult conditions. Security constraints, as well 

as other conditions in Afghanistan, initially severely limited our agents’ movements 

and their ability to conduct traditional drug enforcement operations. Fortunately, 

the DEA is now permitted to travel outside the Kabul city limits, if specific security 

criteria can be met. This expanded travel will greatly increase our ability to conduct 

operations and gather intelligence. We also have increased our staffing levels in Afghanistan to more effectively complete our mission. As of January 2005, the Kabul 

Country Office established permanent positions for a Country Attache ́ and two Special Agents. We included another four Special Agent positions on a temporary duty 

status (TDY), as well as three Intelligence Research Specialists (IRS) (TDY) and two 

Support Staff positions. One Intelligence Research Specialist is assigned to the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC–A) Intelligence Fusion Center and another is assigned to the Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF–76) at Bagram Air 

Field. The other IRS is assigned to the Kabul Country Office. In addition to increasing our strength in the Kabul Country Office, the DEA responded to a request from 

the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, by detailing our Assistant Administrator for 

Intelligence to Afghanistan in August 2004, to serve as the head of the U.S. Embassy Office of Drug Control Policy in Kabul. This office is responsible for overseeing 

all U.S. Government counter narcotics programs in Afghanistan and advises both 

the U.S. Ambassador and the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior on drug policy issues. 

The Kabul Country Office’s primary counterpart in Afghanistan is the Counter 

Narcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP–A). The DEA has established the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), which is comprised of CNP–A officers who have been selected 

to work in narcotic enforcement operations with the Kabul CO. The DEA will assist 

the unit by supporting the U.S. Embassy’s plan to destroy clandestine labs and seize 

precursor chemicals, opium, and opiate stockpiles. With DEA advisory assistance, 

training, and mentoring, we anticipate the NIU will be capable of conducting independent operations within two years. These officers also will be working with the 

DEA’s newly initiated Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team Agents. Since October 2004, 77 Counter Narcotic Police-Afghanistan (CNP–A) NIU officers have graduated from their six-week training program and are operationally deployed. Included in this number are six female officers. The involvement of the female officers 

is of particular significance, due to cultural sensitivities, which prohibit women from 

being touched or searched by male law enforcement officers. These female officers 

will ensure that female suspects can be questioned, searched, and detained, if necessary. It is expected that, by April 2005, 100 NIU officers will have completed 

training and will work directly with the Kabul Country Office and other DEA entities. 

FOREIGN-DEPLOYED ADVISORY AND SUPPORT TEAMS

In support of the ‘‘Five Pillars Plan,’’ we have initiated the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST). As early as March 30th, the FAST groups may begin 

their initial deployment in Afghanistan. The FAST program directly improves the 

DEA’s work force and capabilities in Afghanistan by enhancing connectivity with its 

Afghan counterparts to identify, target, investigate, disrupt or dismantle 

transnational drug trafficking operations in the region. The FAST groups will provide guidance to their Afghan counterparts, while conducting bilateral investigations aimed at the region’s trafficking organizations. The FAST groups, which are 

supported and largely funded by the Department of Defense, also will help with the 

destruction of existing opium storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, and 

precursor chemical supplies. 

23

Each of the five FAST groups will consist of a Supervisory Special Agent, four 

Special Agents and one Intelligence Research Specialist. The FAST groups, who 

have received specialized training, will be deployed in Afghanistan, two groups at 

a time, and will rotate every 120 days. The remaining three groups will remain at 

the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia, where they will engage in training and provide operational support for the deployed teams. 

OPERATION CONTAINMENT

DEA’s participation in the Five Pillar Plan is an expansion of the DEA-led Operation Containment, which was initiated in 2002. The intensive, multi-national program known as Operation Containment was initiated in an attempt to place a security belt around Afghanistan, which would prevent processing chemicals from entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving. This program was necessary 

due to the lack of fully developed institutional systems for drug enforcement in Afghanistan, such as courts and law enforcement agencies. This program involves 

countries in Central Asia, the Caucuses, the Middle East, Europe, and Russia and 

has the participation of 19 countries. Through Operation Containment, in May 2003, 

the DEA was also able to establish a 25-member Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) 

in neighboring Uzbekistan—a country critical to containing the threat of Afghan 

opium entering Central Asia for further transit to Russia and Western Europe. 

The success of this multi-national cooperative program has been tremendous. 

Prior to the initiation of Operation Containment, in 2002, only 407 kilograms of heroin were seized. In FY 2004, Operation Containment resulted in the seizure of 14.9 

metric tons of heroin, 7.7 metric tons of morphine base, 5.9 metric tons of opium 

gum, approximately 3.27 metric tons of precursor chemicals, 77 metric tons of cannabis, 11 heroin labs, and the arrest of 498 individuals, as well as the dismantlement or disruption of major distribution and transportation organizations involved 

in the Southwest Asian heroin drug trade. During the first quarter of FY 2005, Operation Containment resulted in the seizure of 2.4 metric tons of heroin, 985 kilograms of morphine base, 3 metric tons of opium gum, 152.9 metric tons of cannabis, 

and 195 arrests. 

DRUGS AND TERRORISM

In the past, terrorist groups derived much of their funding and support from state 

sponsors; however, with increased international pressure, many of these sources 

have become less reliable and, in some instances, disappeared altogether. As a result, terrorist groups have turned to alternative sources of financing, including fundraising from sympathizers and non-governmental organizations, as well as criminal 

activities, such as arms trafficking, money laundering, kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, 

racketeering, and drug trafficking. Both criminal organizations and terrorist groups 

continue developing international networks and establishing alliances of convenience. In the new era of globalization, both terror and crime organizations have expanded and diversified their activities, taking advantage of the internationalization 

of communications and banking systems, as well as the opening of borders. As a result, the traditional boundaries between terrorists groups and other criminal groups 

have begun to blur. 

Although the DEA has evidence that some terrorist groups are involved in drug 

trafficking, the drug trade continues to be dominated at all levels by traditional 

drug trafficking organizations. The DEA does not specifically target terrorist groups, 

except those that are involved as major drug trafficking or money laundering organizations (eg. FARC and AUC). For example, the DEA has achieved stunning successes in investigating, indicting, and causing the arrest of high-level narco-terrorists in Colombia that are on the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. Additionally, the DEA’s intelligence program is working very closely with 

law enforcement and the Intelligence Community to identify and anticipate emerging threats posed by the links between drugs and terrorism. 

As of December 31, 2004, the DEA had identified 45 percent (18 of 40) of the organizations on the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the drug trade. In addition, it is noteworthy as of February 18, 

2005, 13 of the 42 organizations on the Department’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list—the ‘‘Most Wanted’’ drug trafficking and money laundering organizations believed to be primarily responsible for our nation’s illicit drug 

supply—had links to these Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

CONCLUSION

The DEA continues to take an active leadership role in the multi-national efforts 

to combat the drug threat posed by Afghanistan. To date, our efforts have included 

24

increasing staffing levels in the Kabul Country Office and assigning our Assistant 

Administrator for Intelligence to lead the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Drug Control Policy in Kabul. In addition, the FAST groups are nearing their initial deployment in 

Afghanistan, and we will continue working with our law enforcement partners in 

Operation Containment. We are confident that these efforts, and those of other U.S. 

Government agencies, Afghan law enforcement, and our other law enforcement partners, will lead to a reduction of opium production, and ultimately, the stabilization 

of Afghanistan and the region. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your recognition and assistance on this important 

issue and the opportunity to testify here today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I appreciate all of your testimonies. 

Let me just poll the panel here for a moment. Does anyone contend that our antidrug program in Afghanistan has been a success? 

No? I wouldn’t think so. 

We noted that in the last 10 months there has been 19 instances 

where American military personnel have reported some contact 

with drug dealing or growing or producing or whatever. They have 

been followed through on, and we have a list of a certain number 

of tons or pounds or kilograms that have been confiscated in this 

last 10 months. 

Can anyone tell me that the drug production in the last 10 

months in Afghanistan has gone down? No. 

The situation in Afghanistan, the fact that after all of this time 

in Afghanistan that the production of heroin and of poppies has 

grown as much as it has, frankly, is a disgrace, a total disgrace; 

and we are going to get some of the details today. 

Mr. Wankel, I know that you have been right on the front line. 

Why has not it been working? Why do we face even more drugs on 

the market today grown in Afghanistan than we did 2 years ago? 

You have been right there fighting it out. I know that you have 

been doing your best. You are a tough guy. We have got very dedicated people over there. Why haven’t we succeeded? Why has it 

been a failure? 

Mr. WANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

First, I would like to say it is pretty impressive to me when I 

went over there last year about summer, and I first walked into 

Afghanistan, to see our young men and women, dedicated young 

men and women in the military forces, to see what they have done 

from the standpoint of securing Afghanistan and providing for the 

security of the men and women working at the Embassy. So it 

makes me proud to be an American. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think it is important to note that we have 

had a tremendous success in that part, and thank you for making 

sure that we do not take things totally out of perspective. But 

today, unfortunately, we are only looking at this one avenue. 

Mr. WANKEL. Right. I am a little older than some of my DEA colleagues that go over there, so it strikes my heart very dearly. I 

would say in the last 31⁄2 years there has been tremendous 

progress in Afghanistan as far as securing the nation and having 

a democratic election process and the President elected. 

Frankly, I would agree with many of the comments that have 

been made from the Chair, by yourself, and others previous to you. 

I think the Government of Afghanistan was focused on things other 

than drugs. I think that is very obvious. I will say in the last part, 

the last quarter of 2004, we did see the Government of Afghanistan 

25

increase their emphasis, their focus of prioritization. I think the 

most telling features of that are the impassioned speech that President Karzai gave on December 9th, the new cabinet that he put 

into power after he was elected, the Subcommittee that he has 

placed for the cabinet that is taking on drugs, the deputy minister 

for counternarcotics that he has created who may be a force within 

the Government. So I think that we are seeing increased action. 

We are also seeing increased commitment and action on the part 

of the Government of the U.K., the lead nation, and also the United 

States in Afghanistan as a full partner to the U.K. with the strategy that we are now signed off on by the deputy’s committee here 

in Washington and the efforts taking place. So I am very encouraged by the activity on the part of the Government of Afghanistan 

and the coalition partners, and I think that we will see marked 

progress there in the near term very soon. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, I personally have been talking 

about this issue—actually, I talked about this issue before the 

Taliban were thrown out. Every hearing, I brought this up and 

have been told the British are in charge and every other excuse of 

why we were not succeeding. Mr. Wankel, maybe you could tell us 

what entity on the ground should have the decisionmaking about 

launching aerial operations against targets that are identified as 

drug targets in Afghanistan. 

Mr. WANKEL. You are not talking about eradication but aerial 

support otherwise? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Aerial interdiction and attacks on laboratories or whatever. 

Mr. WANKEL. It is my belief that the Afghans are embracing a 

rule of law. Developing the institutional capabilities the Government of Afghanistan is to have that process there. I think it is very 

important that the law enforcement entities, whether it is the 

ASNF, the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, or the National Interdiction Unit supported by the Drug Enforcement Administration 

with also some support from DoD, is critical and important if we 

are going to be able to go after these labs and these bazaars. But 

also to strike at the leadership, the individuals behind it, is critical 

and important; and it takes law enforcement to do that with support from DoD. 

That is kind of what I see as the aerial need. We need mobility, 

we need logistical support for them to do law enforcement operations, but the law enforcement entities are the best ones to exercise the rule of law. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s be very specific. Do you believe that the 

DoD should have veto power—yes or no—on whether or not a specific effort would go or not go? 

Mr. WANKEL. I think that is a difficult question to answer, depends where we are going with that. DoD is still responsible for the 

security of the nation, so the DoD has to do the planning. DEA understands that and deconfliction with DoD as far as where these 

operations are taking place within Afghanistan. So from that 

standpoint, yes. 

If it is a matter of there are no assets available, then that is very 

difficult. To hold up a law enforcement operation because of the unavailability—and, as Ms. Long spoke to, at some point we have to 

26

have dedicated resources for the mobility and logistical support for 

these law enforcement operations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me ask our representatives from 

the Administration here. Obviously, this isn’t just the case where 

we can eradicate the drug production and not think of the economic 

consequences, and obviously this consideration has had something 

to do with the decisionmaking as to whether or not we should move 

forward, and that is not an irrational process to go through. What 

are we doing to make sure that people who—well, first of all, let 

me ask this. Ambassador Quinn, how much money is the Afghan 

economy reaping out of the drug trade a year? 

Ms. QUINN. The estimate from the IMF is that the value of the 

trade is approximately 60 percent of their GDP. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much is that? 

Ms. QUINN. I think it is about $2.5 billion. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Anybody else have another? Two and a half 

billion dollars, that is what the heroin production in Afghanistan 

is making? Anybody else? 

That money, of course, does not go to the Afghans. A significant 

amount of that money goes to the people who are selling it and the 

people who are transporting it and the people who are collecting it 

and organizing the effort to market the drug. In terms of what actually reaches Afghan hands, does anyone have an estimate of 

what we are talking about? 

Let me note that I have a piece of legislation that is ready to 

drop and will be dropped some time soon. This is the title I have 

come up with—the Afghan Poppy Eradication and Economic Prosperity Act. I think those two go hand in hand. 

I would suggest—and my suggestion in the bill is that we authorize a billion dollars, but it might be less or more, depending on 

what the need is, that we have a work program for Afghans, that 

we move forward as quickly as possible to eradicate poppy production in Afghanistan. We can do it very quickly, which I will come 

to in a moment, and then immediately offer people on the scene a 

chance to work for $10 a day. I would submit that $10 a day to people who are willing to do 

manual labor—building schools, roads, irrigation canals, whatever 

work needs to be done, clearing land mines, et cetera—that $10 a 

day pumped into the Afghan economy will actually bring greater 

prosperity than $2.5 billion of heroin trade. 

But unless we are willing to do something of that magnitude and 

do it on an emergency basis, there will be a dislocation; and obviously that is a rational position. 

Now what I want to ask the panel is this, and this is very important, because as I say, I have been involved in Afghanistan for over 

20 years now. I follow these things very closely, and I am very 

aware of the monies that Congress has allocated for the study of, 

basically, a herbicide that will tackle the opium problem. And I 

hope all of you aware of it. If you are not, please tell me. 

This is no longer a secret and classified issue, because it has 

been brought up before here in this panel. Why are we not using 

the herbicide in question that—how do you pronounce it—

mycoherbicide—that was developed in Uzbekistan and gone 

through tests here that could eliminate the entire poppy crop in AfVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
27

ghanistan very quickly without having to risk all of these people’s 

lives? Why have we not gone forward with that? And where does 

that stand after we have already allocated money for the research 

and development to make sure that that was a viable alternative? 

Ambassador Quinn, we will go right down the line. 

Ms. QUINN. Mr. Rohrabacher, I am familiar with the study of 

this mycoherbicide but not really the details. I do not have a lot 

of expertise in that area. However, I will speak broadly on our program in Afghanistan. 

Our commitment and our effort this year is to put the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan police forces, you know, the 

police force, the central poppy eradication force, Afghan special 

narcotics force, put them out in front in the effort. We believe that 

it is very important that there be the Afghan face on the program 

in Afghanistan, obviously. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Especially if you take the old approach or the 

tried-and-true approach, which has never worked anywhere, of having these raids into areas where they are growing. I can only think 

of one major success and that has been Turkey where we have 

managed to do this job, and I think the Turks themselves are so 

tough that they were able to do this. And I would say there is only 

one group of people I have met in the world who are tougher than 

the Turks and that is the Afghans. 

Does anyone else know about the herbicide and want to comment 

on the herbicide? 

Let me note that I brought this up several times. And if you are 

responsible for Afghanistan and you do not know the answer to 

this question, I would suggest that you go back and do your homework. Because all you are doing is listening to ‘‘yes’’ people or you 

are listening to people who are basically unable to seriously look 

at alternatives that have not yet been tried. All the other efforts 

I have seen that have been tried have failed. 

Seeing that we have an Afghanistan awash in heroin, we can’t 

even get attention—how many reporters are here? If we are talking 

about steroids in baseball, we would probably—steroid use on the 

Afghan baseball team, we would have a roomful of reporters here. 

But, instead, we are talking about heroin that goes into our schools 

and destroys the lives of young people around the world. 

So let me admonish you and, through you, the Administration 

that I expect, and this Committee will expect, some hard answers 

on that herbicide. 

For the record, what we understand—I say we, the number of us 

who have been working on this project—is that the poppy production could be eliminated within a week in Afghanistan; and it 

would only attack the poppies and would have no impact on human 

beings and would eliminate poppy production for over a decade in 

Afghanistan. I want to know why we are not doing that? And I am 

putting everybody on record right now that we are going to follow 

up on this every hearing that we have dealing with Afghanistan in 

the next 6 months and are going to expect an answer on that. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a moment? 

I was over in the steroid hearing. You can’t get through the hall 

to it. It is like going through a maze because all the press is out 

there. 

28

But I heard your proposal. You said something about $10 a day. 

Was that intended for those who grow the opium poppies to eradicate on their own? Or was that intended for them to find work and 

to pay them to substitute for the money they make? Can you clarify 

that, please? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Rohrabacher plan, whatever that is, is 

basically that we use the herbicide, and we get rid of the poppies. 

Once we do, as part of that whole process, we offer any Afghan citizen willing to work for a day’s pay $10 for a day’s labor; and that 

infusion into the economy should make up for the millions of dollars that are pumped into the economy. I say only millions because 

it may be $2.5 billion worth of heroin being produced but probably 

only $50 million of that is going into the hands of Afghan people. 

That would then make up for that and create a more general prosperity. 

Ms. WATSON. Would you yield for another response? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Ms. WATSON. I saw them interviewing an Afghan farmer in his 

field and he said, ‘‘I have no income. The only thing I can do is to 

plant the poppy to support my family.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ms. WATSON. And immediately I thought, why are we not 

supplementing his income so that we can get him to produce another crop? So if your proposal would include a provision that 

would allow him to get these micro-loans or whatever to be able to 

grow an alternative crop—and I am reading our Committee’s information sheet that GPA is dependent—60 percent of Afghan GPA 

is raising these illegal products or drugs. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time, that is the idea of 

spending the huge amount of money on a works program that 

would put enough money into their economy where people would 

then be able to buy food, the level of food consumption would go 

up, and the Afghan farmers would then have a new market to sell 

to. It would stimulate the economy in a broad way, rather than the 

drug way which is creating, almost, a very rich and a very poor 

type of class in Afghanistan. 

But that is just an idea that I am kicking out in terms of some 

legislation. 

But what is most important is that we get serious and we look 

at all alternatives, and I do not believe that, until now, this Government, our Government, has been serious about eliminating and 

confronting the challenge of heroin production that finds its way 

back to Afghanistan. Your testimony today has indicated to me 

that perhaps there is an awakening, but it is not going to solve the 

problem. What I see outlined today is not going to solve this problem unless we do something much more dramatic in terms of eradication and bold eradication. 

With that said, Congresswoman McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we are all tracking along the same line here. I have some 

different numbers and, unfortunately—Mr. Chair, I will get these 

cites for you to see where I got them from—but some numbers I 

have from 2002 to 2004, the aid funding spent on relief and reconVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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struction projects in Afghanistan was $3.4 billion. The drug income 

amounted to $6.8 billion. 

So as we moved and shifted some of our emphasis on Afghanistan, as we have continued to spend more and more dollars in Iraq, 

we have not fulfilled some of the promises and the expectations 

that the Afghani people had of us and the coalition partners that 

went in after September 11th. 

And to go to the point—and I will cite where I am getting this 

quote from. This is from The New York Times, February 27, 2005, 

the last paragraph in an article where they were talking about how 

the farmers really aren’t seeing the money on this, it is the traffickers. So if we can cut the traffickers out, that helps. But this is 

a quote from a farmer:

‘‘Karzai lied to us. He said we will give you assistance, and 

he did not. So we grew poppy to feed our families. Then the 

President ordered it destroyed.’’

And the article talks about how they came in and destroyed the 

poppies. 

So we destroyed it, and now they are destroying our wheat. They 

are talking about the spraying that is going on. So there is a way 

to do spraying and to do it right if we are to spray. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to note, if the gentlewoman would 

yield——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Certainly. I am sure the Chair is going to be 

generous with my time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Absolutely. 

On that point, the herbicide that I have presented today that I 

want answers about—because we are just tired of going around 

and not getting straight answers on it and people forgetting the 

issue. That herbicide, apparently, from what I have determined 

and others, would only affect the poppy production. Because it can 

be genetically aimed specifically at poppies and will not hurt 

human beings and will eliminate poppy production but not other 

plants for a period of over a decade. So just to answer that. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Coming from Minnesota, a farming State, and 

I think a lot of people are familiar with what Round-Up is because 

they advertise it is just for killing weeds in general. In the article, 

that is what American officials are talking about, is spraying 

Round-Up, indiscriminate spraying. 

So we need to do a better job in our commitment to aid, and we 

need to do a better job working with the farmers in the area who 

are, some of them, trying to change things. 

I would be also interested in knowing what our Government is 

doing to really reduce the demand for heroin and opium in this 

country. As long as there is a market, there will be people out 

there trying to find a way to produce it and sell it. So are we doing 

enough here at home in our budgets to address addiction and to reduce the demand on heroin? I think that, maybe, is not the exact 

purview of the International Relations Committee, but these things 

are all interrelated. 

Going back to finding ways of dealing with drug use that is illegal, I have received some information that perhaps what we should 

do is work with some of the farmers in working toward the legal 

30

production of morphine in Afghanistan and really ratcheting it 

down and controlling it. They could produce as much as 25 percent 

of the world’s medical supply. In other words, it is a drug that is 

used, but legally control it and find a way to legally have this be 

part of their economy. 

But we have a lot of work to do in this area. So I am curious 

as to—if you can speak to the fact or if you can give this Committee some information as to what we are doing in upcoming 

budgeting to help improve with reconstruction for Afghani’s capability—what we are doing actually with the spraying, as I think 

you are going to get back to Chairman Rohrabacher on, and what 

kind of plans has the State Department discussed? Or maybe they 

have never discussed working with the Karzai Government to work 

toward the legal use of heroin and morphine and opium for medical 

supply and not allowing in a black market but an accountable market to put dollars back into the economy for the country. Anybody 

want to comment on that? 

Mr. BRAUN. Your first question, I believe, had to do with demand 

reduction, what are we doing in our country to reduce the demand 

for drugs, which equates to education, prevention and that kind of 

thing. 

I am speaking outside of my lane. We do not have a representative from ONDCP here today, but I can tell you that over the years 

we are all sold on this notion that we are losing the war on drugs. 

I can tell you that there has been about a 40-percent reduction in 

drug abuse in this country since the height of the problem in 1979, 

and that is significant. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Excuse me, Agent, when you use that—we know 

what is happening with meth throughout this country. So your 40 

percent is what? Total? 

Mr. BRAUN. I am talking about overall drug abuse in this country. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I just met with law enforcement, and they 

would say the exact opposite in Minnesota. 

Mr. BRAUN. Ma’am, with all due respect, I have been involved in 

law enforcement for 30 years—local police officer for 4 and State 

police officer for 7—and I have been with DEA for 20 years. We 

have a very robust local and State law enforcement program in 

DEA. We work very closely with our local and State counterparts 

across the country. 

I am not here to tell you that we are not faced with problems 

out there. We have a tremendous problem with methamphetamines 

that we are faced with now. But I can tell you that most of the statistics are not coming from the Government, they are coming from 

the University of Michigan and other groups out there that have 

conducted surveys for years and years, and those are the numbers. 

ONDCP has a very aggressive program, I believe, to get the message out to young people, parents, and people of all ages across our 

country that not only are drugs bad, but, when it comes to focusing 

on kids, the importance of making the right decisions, not only 

about drugs, but about many different things in life. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So you would say the budget has increased? 

Mr. BRAUN. The budget has increased? 

31

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Has increased for reaching out to people? Because the only thing I routinely hear, Mr. Chair, are alcohol commercials that we hear, and I haven’t even seen some of the spots 

that we saw right after September 11th that were saying the way 

to stop terrorism was to stop the flow of drugs into and drug use 

in this country. With budgets being cut, are we doing what we need 

to do to keep it up? Because a message needs to be repetitive. 

Those of us who are parents know. And I have to tell you, I haven’t 

heard the message. 

Mr. BRAUN. Okay. Again, Ma’am, I am not from ONDCP, but we 

work with ONDCP very closely. What I can do is, I can contact the 

right people at ONDCP and give you the information that you 

need. I know what you are after. Yes, Ma’am. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So anybody want to tackle the economy? 

Mr. Chair, that the Government spends $10 per person in Afghanistan is the statistic that I have that I think is a very solid 

one. So your $10 just for a day would make a difference. But, Ambassador, I think you wanted to say something. 

Mr. FULGHAM. I would like to address the alternative livelihoods 

and some of the economic issues. 

Just to give Congressman Rohrabacher some context as to where 

we are in the alternative livelihoods program, we started in October 2004, with a small grant of about $12 million, to address some 

of the key areas in Kandahar and Helmand to get programs underway to support the alternative livelihoods program. We also financed about 500 tons of wheat seed for the winter planting program in Nangarhar where farmers were restrained from planting 

poppy. We also recognized the immediate need for visibility and 

quick impact. We found another $37 million in December to start 

doing the cash for work program to provide a social safety net. 

That addresses some of the short-term issues that you are concerned about as far as getting support. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did you say $12 million and $37 million? 

Mr. FULGHAM. $12 immediately in October when we were 

asked——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And $37 followed? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Followed, yes, sir. 

We also established a social safety net for vulnerable families 

and households that will provide direct resource transfer for food 

and other household necessities. 

The program has three principal contractors who are now establishing logistics and personnel and bases in Helmand, Kandahar, 

Nangarhar and Badakhshan. What is important about this is that 

75 percent of the production of the poppies in Afghanistan are in 

those five regions, and we are setting up programs immediately in 

there. We have also been asked by the Government to set up programs additionally in Faryab, Ghor and Uruzgan. So we are talking about potentially eight provinces. 

As we mentioned, it is a monumental task. In 2005, we are talking about $180 million to go into a new program that we are setting up to work in those eight provinces so they will be working 

schools-to-work, farm-to-market roads, agricultural activities, and 

these are all programs that are specifically addressing the alternative livelihoods program. 

32

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the aid was going to pump in how much? 

Mr. FULGHAM. $180 million. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that starts when? 

Mr. FULGHAM. That is starting immediately. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that money has already been appropriated and is in the pipeline? 

Mr. FULGHAM. $70 million of it is in the pipeline, and the other has been requested in the supplemental; $110 in the supplemental. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, it is on this point—so when you 

talk dollars, how much of it—I mean, what percent goes into letting the contracts, what percent is going into—I mean, how much 

of it is actually going to the person in the village? 

Mr. FULGHAM. For example, Congresswoman, I was just in 

Nangarhar and Badakhshan—Nangarhar about 2 weeks ago with 

our Administrator. We visited a village, Mufti, which is up against 

the Tora Bora mountains. This is a village that last year produced 

about 78 hectares of poppy last year. This year, there was not one 

poppy seed planted there. We have 400 people currently working 

in that community, paying them $3 a day. They are also putting 

up a bed wall that will keep the village from being washed away. 

So this community is working well because of the fact that we 

are working with the community leaders, with the shiras, with the 

mayors. It goes to the Congressman’s point that you have to get the 

money down to the level of the people, and I think we have done 

an excellent job of doing that in a short period of time. This new 

program for $120 million will help us move toward addressing 

those issues in other parts of the country as well. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And let us note, all 

the money that comes out of this profit, very little of it goes to the 

Afghan people but a lot of it goes to terrorist organizations that 

hate everything that we are standing for in that part of the world. 

Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Long and General Remington, if you could help me understand a little more about exactly what happens when our troops 

come into contact with poppies, drug production, whether it is the 

growing of poppies or labs or anything else. According to Ms. 

Long’s testimony, it says, in Afghanistan, United States troops are 

authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking 

targets when those military operations support our stability mission in Afghanistan. Troops coming across drugs or drug production 

equipment during the conduct of other military operations are authorized to take action against these and report all drug-related activities. 

Authorized to do so. Do you always do so? If, in fact, the military 

comes in contact with any of these drug production activities, what 

will be the result? Whether it is in, ‘‘the support of our military—

our stability mission’’ or not? 

General REMINGTON. Yes, sir. If our troops do come in contact, 

they do make every effort to turn over the drugs or weapons cache 

or whatever they discover to the appropriate authorities, normally 

the Afghan authorities; and they do that every time they come 

across it. 

33

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay. So they will not take any action themselves unless it is deemed to be part of the stability program or 

whatever; is that correct? Direct action against them other than reporting it to somebody? 

General REMINGTON. They will seize it and make sure that it 

does not get out from under their control and then hand it off to 

the appropriate civilian authorities, Afghan national police, those 

kinds of authorities from Afghanistan. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Why not just destroy it as you would in conducting military operations? 

General REMINGTON. I can’t say oftentimes, but sometimes they 

do destroy it. Sometimes they are unable to make contact with 

higher headquarters and, as a result of that, they have authority 

to dispose of it, which is normally blow it up. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay. Do you feel comfortable that, in fact, every 

time that our military confronts—comes across something like this, 

drug manufacturing, production in any form, that we address it immediately? That there is no, you know, well, let’s wait until somebody else takes care of this issue? Do you feel comfortable that is 

always the case? 

General REMINGTON. Yes, sir, I do. I mean, you could never say 

always and never say never. But I am very comfortable that it is 

a fair statement to say that if our troops come across drugs in the 

field, that they will seize those drugs. They will make every effort 

to contact the Afghan authorities. If they can’t make contact, they 

will seize the drugs themselves and dispose of them appropriately. 

Mr. TANCREDO. And how about the growing of poppies? They are 

not yet drugs. 

General REMINGTON. No, sir. The United States military does not 

do the eradication mission. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, why? Why not? 

General REMINGTON. Sir, the eradication mission is a law enforcement mission. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I mean, there you are. The military is on the 

scene. There is a large field of poppies. Why not just simply destroy 

it? I mean, why wouldn’t that be conducting military operations in 

support of our stability mission? Seems to me that is in support of 

our stability mission. 

Ms. LONG. Yes, sir. Let me actually scoot back around. We have 

answered this question several times, and let me clarify what, in 

many cases, happens. 

In many instances, our forces are actually out conducting 

counterinsurgency or counterterrorism missions and in the course 

of doing so they come across either poppies or a drug lab or drugs 

or whatever. In those occasions, the commander in the field and 

particularly the individual in charge of that mission has to weigh 

a lot of risks. If he conducts a particular destruction or stops to 

turn over the drugs, he may compromise his larger-priority counterterrorism or counterinsurgency mission he is on the way to do. 

In some cases, of course, the military makes that assessment. Of 

course, the primary goal of the mission is retained, and we do not 

divert to either destroy or turn over the drugs. 

In cases where there is poppy for eradication, our forces are not 

equipped for, and are not experienced with eradication. They do not 

34

even have the tools in order to do that when they are out in the 

field. That is traditionally a long-standing function of the Department of State. Very early on in the division of labor in the whole 

counterdrug war, a division was made. Because the State has the 

expertise, they have the tools and the resources and, in this case, 

the men on the ground to perform the eradication functions. 

The military does not involve itself. We are out primarily conducting the stability and security operation; and, as General Remington pointed out, when we can, without compromising those 

other priority missions, we do dispose of or destroy or turn over the 

drugs. I hope that clarifies it. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I understand the division of labor. But I must 

admit to you, Ms. Long, that our concerns, as I think already expressed by the Chairman and the Ranking Member here, would indicate to you that we do not have great confidence in the Department’s commitment to getting this job done as officially and as effectively as possible. Therefore, that is why it is not really clear to 

me why it cannot happen as a result of military operations. 

Believe me, when you say they do not know how to deal with it, 

the military knows how to break things and kill people. That is 

their job, and I am glad they do it, and they do it well. And I am 

just wondering why you can’t figure out a way to destroy a poppy 

field. It seems to me a relatively simple task. But, nevertheless, let 

me go on to a couple of other things. 

While I have Ms. Long, you limit yourself to four missions, I understand, four missions per month? 

Ms. LONG. We do not limit ourselves to four missions a month. 

Right now, given the resources that we have in country and the 

continuing focus on stabilization with counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency—as you are all aware, we lose guys practically 

every week in continuing operations against al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban. I have pressed, and the military has done, I think, a realistic assessment that at this point in time they are prepared to 

support approximately four operations a month; and it is our understanding that, given the law enforcement resources that are 

available, that is about right. That is about the support that they 

will be needing per month, so I think we are on target, sir. 

Mr. TANCREDO. So it is a resource-driven issue, not necessarily 

any other criteria applied to it? 

Ms. LONG. It is resource both in the aspect of DoD resources but 

also law enforcement and Afghan capacity. Remember, we are dealing with a nation that is just now beginning to rebuild its police 

and interdiction forces. Right now, the NIU consists of a grand 

total of 100 trained officers, very few of which actually have done 

these things before with either their DEA or their DoD counterparts; and it is going to take a little more time and patience to get 

some experience under their wings. 

Mr. TANCREDO. One other question for you in terms of your testimony. The public’s information support, it seems to me to be a really important and excellent way for us to try to address the issue. 

If you could help me understand, given the society and the culture, 

what is it exactly that we are going to do? What is the way in 

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point? Is it the same thing we would do here or anywhere else and 

say, ‘‘Just Say No’’ type of thing? 

How does the Afghan society respond to the fact that you have 

such a huge percentage of their domestic product in the production 

of heroin and poppies and then, if they see that, how do you attack 

that from a public relations standpoint? 

Ms. LONG. Actually, as far as the tactical application on the 

ground, probably the most experienced experts on this is Department of State, but I will answer that to the best of my ability. Actually, I appreciate the question, because it is important for you to 

know that the capabilities that the Department of Defense is working with the Afghans in building are complementary to the capabilities that the Department of State is very ably setting up with 

the Embassy there, which is working actually with the messaging 

that is coming out of the United Kingdom but, most importantly, 

with the messaging that is coming out of the Karzai Government. 

You are exactly right. The way that we are doing the messaging 

and the way the Karzai Government is messaging is different than 

the way we would here in the United States. People are not turning on CNN and are not surfing the Internet for their news. 

Mr. TANCREDO. The first part of that is good. We need somebody 

on our side giving out the message. 

Ms. LONG. The State Department has taken the lead in getting 

the religious community involved, in getting the governmental community involved at a grassroots level, including mullahs and the 

unofficial tribal leadership to which the Afghan people look for 

their guidance, not only from a religious and social standpoint, but 

also from a personal standpoint; and I know that the effort that is 

in place is attempting to reach out in that way. 

We are going to radio, which is one of the more popular means 

of spreading messages. They are holding meetings where they invite religious, tribal and other leaders in and, basically, everybody 

sits down in a tent and talks not only about ‘‘Just Say No’’ but 

about—and this was Karzai’s idea—but about the disgrace this 

brings about on the proud Afghan people, and about the health 

issues, about demand reduction issues, about infant mortality 

issues, and really attempting to weave the message into all aspects 

of Afghan life. In this respect, President Karzai, I think, set the 

tone in his post-inauguration; and we are attempting to augment 

that. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you all being here. I have a few questions that I 

would like to ask you, and let me give you a little bit of background. 

I spent all of my career until recently in the criminal justice system as a prosecutor and as a judge, not as a participant on the 

other side. In the ’70s, we were prosecuting those heroin cases; and 

all of those heroin addicts that we prosecuted and sent to penitentiary, they all died. And heroin, in Houston, it wasn’t a drug of 

choice—and went to other things, cocaine. They did not use 

methamphetamines because Texas blew up their labs, so we did 

not have that problem, and now we see it coming back again. 

36

I see the results of what heroin does to people. Eighty percent 

of the people in the Texas penitentiary have some drug affiliation, 

those 165,000 were involved in drugs possession or sales. 

So I see the war on terror as really three issues: There is what 

we think of as the war on terror, and then there is the funding of 

terrorist activity through opium. But the secondary terrorist activity is the result of heroin and opium when it gets into the United 

States. When those drugs get here, they go someplace; and that 

concerns me as much as the other two problems. 

So I say all of that just to give you a little background and ask 

you, first of all, What is the attitude of the Afghan people toward 

opium? Anybody can answer that. 

Mr. WANKEL. Well, living in Afghanistan, I guess I am the one 

to answer that. Depends on where you are in Afghanistan. 

If you are in Badakhshan, especially where opium has been 

grown for several hundred years, it is common there for mothers 

to use it for their children when they are teething or when they 

have other ailments. It is a form of medicine. Can be, if it is properly administered. There are a lot of women also that, since the 

last 20, 25 years, and especially during and since the Taliban 

times, have been users themselves to escape from some of their 

misery. 

The use, number one, is increasing in Afghanistan. A lot of people in Afghanistan do not understand yet what the outcome of 

being around opium from the standpoint of use and abuse is. And 

that is why the public information campaign and getting the demand reduction, prevention, treatment aspect development—which, 

by the way, is one of the pillars of the Afghan drug program—of 

their strategy. It is critical that we get it out. 

The educated Afghan—unfortunately, there is not enough of 

those, I guess—but the educated Afghan is understanding the fact 

that opium is dangerous. They have listened to President Karzai. 

He has made it very clear that it is dangerous, as Ms. Long said, 

for their health, for the integrity, if you will, of Afghanistan. It is 

also dangerous environmentally to have the heroin laboratories and 

the chemical runoffs that goes into the water table, so we are doing 

more work to make that known. But a lot of people have to be educated more as to the ills and the danger of drugs, particularly 

opium and heroin in Afghanistan. It does not come easily. 

If you look at this across the border in Pakistan, they now have 

about a half million heroin addicts, and 25 years ago they had 

none. And they have another 1.5 million so-called recreational 

users of heroin in Pakistan. So it is something that is very critical. 

I think that it is something that we do a good job ourselves of 

supporting the Afghans on the educational element. It can make a 

difference to show them that it can be their problem. We have to 

convince them it is not just a demand-driven drug. Heroin—just 

like cocaine—is a drug where supply can create demand. We have 

seen that in Russia. Russia now has at least 15 tons of heroin use 

a year, when 20 years ago they had virtually none. We do need a 

lot more work on that, Congressman. 

Mr. POE. Special Agent Braun, a couple of questions about DEA. 

How come there is no office in Dubai to cover the major threat of 

37

the money laundering that is going on in Afghanistan? Can you 

give me an answer to that question? 

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir. Our Administrator, in fact, just spoke with 

the Ambassador in Dubai a few days ago and are in the process 

in the next couple of weeks of sending an agent TDY to Dubai for 

3 months to conduct an assessment to determine—to answer the 

question, do we need an office? We believe we need an office. The 

question is, Where exactly do we put it? Do we put it in Dubai or 

in Abu Dhabi, where most of the banking infrastructure is located? 

So we, of course, will have to seek congressional approval to open 

an office and go through the entire process, but I feel certain we 

will be asking for just that in 2007. 

Mr. POE. Again, can you report back to this Committee as to the 

decision that is made, whether to open an office there or want? Regardless of what the results are? 

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir, we will. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Congressman, I would suggest that you personally take responsibility to see that they follow up on that. And 

I am serious. So many times we get commitments in hearings like 

this, and the minute people walk out the door they forget it. I 

would like very much if you would work with me and let me know 

whether or not they have followed through on that question. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As you can see, we have 10 minutes before 

we have to be down on the Floor for a vote. I would like to thank 

all the witnesses who have been with us today. I have a couple 

more questions that I will submit in writing to Mr. Wankel and 

Braun, and hopefully you can get that back to me in writing. 

Let me note that the testimony that we had about $49 million 

that was spent since October, 2004, to help create the type of economic environment for alternatives, that is good. Except that is 

only 6 months ago, and we have been in Afghanistan a long time. 

I have gone through years of hearings here. 

Let us hope that this is a good beginning. Like you said, there 

is going to be $180 million following. And you mentioned that they 

were paying $3 a day for help. Again, if we can stop the heroin production in Afghanistan, which is in the billions of dollars, it is 

worth it to us to pay the people of Afghanistan $5 or $10 a day 

to make sure they have a strong economy and that their people 

won’t suffer because of taking this heroin money out of their country. 

So I need an answer to the question about mycoherbicide. I want 

to know why it is not being used. 

We hear about the new teams that are being created. These are 

people risking their lives. That is why the military does not do this. 

The military has another mission, and for them to risk their lives 

on the anti-drug mission when we have an alternative is sinful. It 

really is. If we can use this herbicide, let’s do it. 

My guess is there are powerful forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are saying do not use it. We need to question the motives 

of those people who are saying do not use it. You know, they can 

cry all they want, and if they are bad guys, they may not want us 

to use this because they are benefiting from the drug trade. The 

38

fact that drug production continues to go up indicates that some of 

the people we are working with are not really serious about it. 

So I am wishing you all success in those efforts to offer the alter- native. If you want to use my formula, $10 a day, fine, but let’s get 

some money into the economy and eradicate as quickly as possible 

the opium production. Because that is financing the people who 

hate the United States of America, the people who are committing 

terrorist acts against us, the people that are killing our troops. 

Let’s get that money out of their hands. 

Thank you all very much. We are going to keep a very close eye 

on this. As I said to Mr. Poe, I am not just going to walk away and 

not expect a response. I am going to follow through. And I thank 

Chairman Hyde for the leadership he is providing on this very important issue. We are here to work with you, and thank you very 

much for the hard work. 

I have got 1 minute. Go right ahead. 

Mr. WANKEL. It has been in the press and I just want to make 

sure that there is no misunderstanding. In the hearing today people talked about an article in The New York Times. I want to make 

clear that there has been no aerial spraying to this point by the 

United States or any other country in Afghanistan. It was alluded 

to in November of last year and then again in February of this 

year. But there has been no aerial spraying. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for putting that on the 

record. And I am not talking about the type of spraying that we 

have done in the past, which is very risky as well as also affects 

people’s health. I am talking about something that is a brand-new 

alternative in the last 3 or 4 years that nobody has touched. Let’s 

take a look at it. 

Thank you very much, and God bless all of you for the work you 

are trying to do, the good things that you are trying to do for our 

country. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely and important hearing to highlight the United States’ counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan. 

Over two years ago, the United States and a brave coalition of allies—31 Nations 

strong—launched a bold military campaign that resulted in the liberation of some 

50 million people. In the process, the U.S.-led Coalition toppled the oppressive 

Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and overthrew the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein 

in Iraq. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Rice, and Ambassador Khalilzad have all made the stability, peace, and prosperity of Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy a top foreign policy 

priority of the United States Government. 

As Afghanistan takes another step in its democratization, and prepares for historic parliamentary elections this Fall, a looming threat quietly lies throughout the 

Afghan fields—the poppy seed—which may unfortunately lead to the destabilization 

of the whole process. The production, cultivation, and distribution of this one substance has the potential to derail all of the U.S. and coalition forces efforts in Afghanistan, destabilize the Karzai Administration, and may even lead Afghanistan 

down the road of civil war and unrest. 

As you already know Mr. Chairman, poppy—the precursor of heroin—is one of the 

world’s most addictive and poisonous substances, and is currently thriving in Afghanistan, making its way to the streets of America. In fact, government statistics 

estimate that the 2004 Afghanistan poppy crop netted roughly 510,000 acres—an increase of 239% from 2003. 

As a result, Afghanistan supplied approximately 87% of the world’s opium in 

2004, which translated to over $2.8 Billion dollars. Experts indicate that those illegal dollars end up in the hands of rogue Afghan warlords, and possibly even terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban. These huge increases in production, and 

the large profits they produce, should alarm the entire world—especially the Afghan 

and U.S. governments. 

As Afghan warlords get rich off the addiction of others, they become empowered, 

and more emboldened against the rule and power of one of our most strategic partners in Kabul, President Karzai. 

Now is the time for the U.S. to act, and combat the harmful production of Afghan 

poppy. In order to achieve our political goals of stability and democratization in Afghanistan, we need to seriously engage the issue of poppy production and distribution, and formulate a comprehensive and multi-lateral policy of education, training, 

interdiction, and eradication. 

One essential step in this comprehensive strategy is eradication. The United 

States Government has been assisting governments throughout the globe; especially 

those of Central and South America who have conducted and implemented eradication efforts to combat the spread of narcotics. 

Successful eradication efforts, specifically aerial eradication, such as that in Colombia, where cocaine and heroin have fallen to historic lows, can and should be 

used as a model for our combined efforts to destroy the poppy in Afghanistan, both 

successfully and safely. By utilizing the AT–802 Air Tractors, flown by highly-specialized pilots, we can successfully execute aerial eradication operations in Afghanistan, and lessen poppy production. 

Only through a well-defined policy of education, training, interdiction, and eradication can the United States and its Allies successfully and effectively combat the 

cultivation and production of opium and heroin. 

40

I urge all levels of government to fully appropriate the manpower and funds needed to fully combat this narcotic epidemic in Afghanistan and encourage the development and implementation of a multi-faceted, multi-lateral strategy. 

Once again Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this important and timely 

hearing. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and hope—by the days end—

that we will have a better understanding of how best to proceed with our counternarcotics efforts throughout Afghanistan. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. ALONZO FULGHAM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTH

ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the other members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development. I would also like to recognize this Committee’s strong support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Your continued commitment is crucial to 

the success of our efforts there. 

As this committee is well aware, the production, processing and trafficking of the 

opium poppy and its derivatives in Afghanistan has become a critical problem that 

threatens both the security of the Afghan state as well as U.S efforts to stabilize 

and reconstruct the country. An estimated 2.3 million people are involved in Afghanistan’s opium economy, which constitutes approximately 60% of the country’s 

non-drug gross domestic product. Poppy is produced in all of Afghanistan’s provinces, and is grown on approximately 4.5% of all arable land nationwide. 

Since poppy production is such a fundamental part of the Afghan economy, I 

would like to address what the U.S. Government is doing to provide the economic 

incentives needed to complement the deterrent effects of the other parts of our 

counter-narcotics strategy. The alternative livelihoods program, led by USAID, will 

increase the benefits of participating in the legal economy and accelerate economic 

growth in the principal poppy producing provinces of Afghanistan. The combination 

of increasing the cost and risk of producing poppy while providing viable economic 

alternatives to the illicit crop is the key to our counter-narcotics strategy. 

The alternative livelihoods program commenced last fall with cash-for-work 

projects in Helmand and Nangarhar, the two most important poppy-producing provinces in Afghanistan. This first component of the alternative livelihoods program is 

providing an immediate alternative source of income to households that are dependent on the opium economy. Through these immediate needs activities we are also 

building or rehabilitating critically needed rural infrastructure, such as irrigation 

and drainage canals, which are essential to agricultural production. 

These labor-intensive infrastructure projects have been placed in districts that are 

targeted for eradication or have not moved to poppy cultivation; moreover these 

projects are highly visible and demonstrate to farmers that the Afghan government 

is committed to providing alternatives to poppy production. To date, over 20,000 

people have been employed on these projects, which have improved irrigation for 

over 8,000 hectares of farmland. 

We have also launched the main component of the alternative livelihoods program. This will promote long-term comprehensive development in urban and rural 

areas of the principle poppy-producing provinces of Afghanistan. The program will 

be carried out in partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and 

Development, as well as provincial and district-level representatives, in order to ensure that Afghans are closely involved in the planning and implementation of the 

program. 

Initiatives of the Afghan government, such as the National Solidarity Program, 

are already in place and will complement the Agency’s alternative livelihoods activities. We are also closely coordinating our work with other donors, particularly the 

U.K, in order to ensure that resources are most effectively allocated to the areas 

of highest priority. 

The alternative livelihoods program is designed to respond to the needs of the 

local environments. However, there are a number of common activities which constitute the program. 

First, a substantial effort to augment agricultural productivity and increase the 

production of high-value crops through the provision of agricultural inputs, training, 

and extension. 

Second, the development and expansion of credit markets and financial services 

in order to provide the stimulus needed for investment in local businesses both on 

and off the farm. Business development services will complement these financial 

services by providing training in accounting, marketing, and the other critical asVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:38 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\031705\20058.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
41

pects of business management that will increase Afghan managerial acumen and 

build upon the strong entrepreneurial culture that already exists in the country. 

Third, the rehabilitation or construction of market centers, roads, cold storage facilities and other physical infrastructure that will provide the public goods necessary 

to facilitate trade and provide a platform for local businesses to grow and thrive. 

Fourth, a concerted effort to develop new internal and export markets for Afghan 

products, in order to secure higher prices and greater trade volumes for burgeoning 

local businesses. 

Finally, sustained engagement with local officials in order to promote policies and 

rules that support competition and fair business practices, and remove administrative barriers that hinder the creation, operation, and growth of local businesses. 

Since there is no licit crop that can compete with the profitability of poppy production in the short term, the five components of our Alternative Livelihoods program 

incorporate activities that stimulate other sectors of the economy as well as agriculture. These activities are also complemented by existing USAID programs that 

strengthen the rule of law, which is essential for contract enforcement and transparent governance. Ongoing work in land titling is strengthening the property 

rights regime in Afghanistan, and will be a major spur to the provision of credit 

as new sources of collateral emerge. Further, our economic growth activities are 

identifying areas of strategic competitiveness for the Afghan economy, and these 

programs will be complemented by efforts to integrate Afghanistan into regional 

trade frameworks such as the South Asia Free Trade Agreement. 

While we are confident of our results achieved thus far and our plans for the future, we are cognizant of the challenges we may face in this counter-narcotics effort. 

First, security remains a vital concern. As we work in new areas there will be a 

need for accurate assessments of the threat situation. Second, there are varying levels of competence within local government in Afghanistan. If local leaders lack managerial capacity or political will, our progress will be hindered. Third, because poppy 

production is mobile, cultivation could shift to areas where there are no alternative 

livelihoods programs or sufficient rural development initiatives. 

We are fully aware of the pitfalls. However, we believe that the full implementation of the five facets of the counter-narcotics program—public awareness, alternative livelihoods, interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement—provides strong 

disincentives against growing poppy while offering concrete incentives for adopting 

alternative crops and obtaining sources of agricultural as well as non-agricultural 

employment. And it is this mix of carrots and sticks that can begin to turn the situation around. 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this information to the Committee, and 

will be pleased to answer questions. 

RESPONSES FROM MR. DOUG WANKEL, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL

FOR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Question: 

In the dangerous areas of Afghanistan where labs and high value targets are operating, what agency or entity on the ground will be charged with making the final 

call on launching operations against these targets? Will DoD have absolute veto authority on whether these aerial anti-drug missions by the new NIU are a ‘‘go’’ or a 

‘‘no-go’’? 

Response: 

As it relates to the United States Government’s drug law enforcement operations 

in conjunction with GOA law enforcement and in support of the Government of Afghanistan’s CN strategy, DEA will be the US entity that will be responsible for 

planning, coordinating, deconflicting and the approving of all drug law enforcement 

operations in Afghanistan. As long as Afghanistan is a war zone and or the security 

situation is such as to warrant continued DOD support and or control, the DOD will 

be able to declare ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘no go’’ to DEA/GOA law enforcement operations when 

in the view of the DOD said law enforcement operations have the potential to 

threaten the security of Afghanistan or an area of Afghanistan beyond an acceptable 

level as determined by the DOD. 

Question: 

Do you see any major problems in the allocation of air time for the shared helicopter assets to be used in eradication and interdiction, as we have seen in Colombia? 

42

What criteria will be used to pick one function over another when there are competing demands for the limited number of helicopters and blade hours for missions 

in country? 

Response: 

As the eradication program is currently configured and as the Embassy envisions 

poppy elimination and eradication going forward in the 2006 and 2007 timeframe, 

Post does not anticipate major problems in the allocation of air time for shared helicopter assets to be used for eradication and interdiction operations in Afghanistan. 

As regards the criteria to be utilized to determine which enforcement operation will 

take precedence for competing demands, the Chief of Mission, DEA and INL will 

resolve the matter based upon the determined priorities at the time. The Chief of 

Mission will be the final arbiter. 

RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE MAUREEN E. QUINN, COORDINATOR ON AFGHANI- STAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

TEXAS

Question: 

What is the percentage of Afghans using some form of opium? 

Response: 

We are unaware of any recent study of the overall Afghan population’s use of 

opium and its derivatives, including heroin. However, a 2003 survey by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shed light on the prevalence of opium and heroin 

use in the city of Kabul. The resulting report—which relied on interviews with users 

and with healthcare workers, teachers, government officials, and others—estimated 

that there were at least 10,700 opium users and 7,000 heroin users in Kabul. The 

report stressed that those figures were bare minimums, and that actual numbers 

of users may have been considerably greater. The report did not determine the rate 

of opium and heroin use in Kabul, although it estimated Kabul’s population at the 

time at 2.5 million. 

Use of narcotics in Afghanistan is not surprising, given the large amount of opium 

that is cultivated there and the social breakdown that resulted from more than two 

decades of war. The Afghan government is aware of the problem; its comprehensive 

strategy for countering the narcotics threat includes components on drug-use prevention and treatment of users. President Karzai himself, in a speech at a counternarcotics conference in December 2004, decried heroin addiction, calling it a killer 

of Afghan youth and blaming it for the destruction of Afghan families. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE MAUREEN E. QUINN, COORDINATOR ON AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question: 

What is the status of the research on mycoherbicides? 

Response: 

As you are aware, mycoherbicides are naturally occurring enemies of unwanted 

plant species employed as an eradication technology. Various strains of 

mycoherbicides are used in commercial agriculture to control pests worldwide, including in the United States. 

From 1998 to 2002, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime conducted research in Uzbekistan on the fungus Pleaspora Papaveracea. Upon completion of this 

research, a technical expert review panel convened by the UN concluded that 

Pleaspora Papaveracea indeed had potential as an agent for opium poppy eradication. However, the panel stressed that more research was required, including a 

study of the fungus’s environmental safety. 

Questions remain unanswered about the transmission range of Pleaspora 

Papaveracea, along with its possible impact on humans and animals, and the chance 

that it might mutate and attack additional species. Concerns have also been raised 

over a possible mycoherbicide spill-over effect, which could damage licit opium 

poppy crops in India and Turkey that are used to produce morphine. 

Further research would require field-testing in a suitable environment, but the 

UN has been unable to identify a country that is willing to host additional testing. 

43

At one point the UN had hoped to conduct mycoherbicide field tests in Colombia, 

but the Colombian Government refused. 

The chemical glyphosphate, which is currently used in Colombia for eradication, 

is 90 percent effective. It is approved for use in Colombia and in the United States 

and has been shown to have no adverse effects on human health or on the environment. We believe that if the Afghan government eventually agrees to use aerial 

eradication, glyphosphate would meet our needs. 

Question: 

Why aren’t mycoherbicides being used by the United States Government in Afghanistan or elsewhere? 

Response: 

President Karzai, our allies, and the U.S. have agreed that the counternarcotics 

strategy for 2005 will focus on manual eradication, combined with law enforcement, 

interdiction, alternative development, and public information. If the Government of 

Afghanistan decides in the future to pursue other eradication options, such as aerial 

spraying or mycoherbicides, we would be willing to work with Afghanistan and our 

allies, particularly the UK, to assist in that effort. 

However, considerable additional research and field-testing would be needed to 

determine the efficacy and environmental safety of a mycoherbicide before its widespread use to eradicate opium poppy. We therefore do not consider mycoherbicides 

to be a viable eradication strategy for the short or medium term. 

44

RESPONSES FROM MICHAEL A. BRAUN, SPECIAL AGENT, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG

ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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