Report to the Chairman, 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

June 2005 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Resolving 

Development Risks in 

the Army's Networked 

Communications 

Capabilities Is Key to 

Fielding Future Force 

GAO-05-669 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-669.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-669, a report to the 

Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman, House 

Committee on Appropriations 

June 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Resolving Development Risks in the 

Army's Networked Communications 

Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future 

Force 

Each of the programs for developing FCS’s communications network is 

struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep technical 

challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently structured, the 

programs are at risk of not delivering intended capabilities for the first spiral 

of FCS, slated to start in fiscal year 2008. 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program—a program to develop radios for ground 

vehicles and helicopters—began development with an aggressive schedule, 

immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable 

requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a transmission 

range of only 3 kilometers—well short of the required 10 kilometers—and 

will not meet security requirements for operating in an open networked 

environment. The program’s struggle to mature and integrate key 

technologies has contributed to significant cost and schedule growth. A 

recent review of the program concluded that the current program structure 

is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD directed the Army to stop work 

and notify the contractor that it was considering terminating the contract. 

Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios—miniaturized radios, 

including those that soldiers carry—is even more technically challenging 

given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The smallest of these 

radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1 

radios. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest 

have further slowed program progress. The Army is considering options for 

restructuring the program to meet the needs of FCS and address the 

technical issues encountered in the Cluster 1 program. 

The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-T—

communications equipment that supports an expanded area of battlefield 

operations and interfaces with JTRS radios—when production begins in 

March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly flawless 

execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting problems. 

Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies further 

increase overall program risk. The program was directed to deliver 

networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term 

warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS program. A 

plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to address FCS 

needs remains undetermined. 

 

According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE—the 

operating software to integrate the communications network—may not 

reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program 

milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving and 

have not been translated into more detailed specifications necessary for 

writing SOSCOE software. 

The Army has embarked on a major 

transformation of its force. Central 

to this transformation is the Future 

Combat Systems (FCS), a $108 

billion effort to provide warfighters 

with the vehicles, weapons, and 

communications needed to identify 

and respond to threats with speed, 

precision, and lethality. 

Establishing reliable, robust 

communications and networking 

capabilities is key to FCS‘s success. 

Each of the systems integral to the 

FCS communications network—

the Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS), the Warfighter Information 

Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the 

System of Systems Common 

Operating Environment 

(SOSCOE)—rely on significant 

advances in current technologies 

and must be fully integrated to 

realize FCS. Given the complexity 

and costs of this undertaking, GAO 

was asked to review each of these 

key development efforts to identify 

any risks that may jeopardize the 

successful fielding of FCS. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

aimed at reducing development 

risks so that FCS is provided with 

enabling communications and 

networking capabilities. If FCS 

proceeds without these 

capabilities, critical aspects of the 

FCS network will remain 

undemonstrated. In commenting 

on this report, the Department of 

Defense indicated it has begun 

taking actions to address our 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 4 

JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite 

Knowledge, Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems 11 

Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 

5 Progress 19 

Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of 

Cost and Schedule Growth 26 

SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and 

Evolving Requirements 30 

Conclusions 31 

Recommendations for Executive Action 32 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36 

Appendix II JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance 38 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 41 

Tables 

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities 

Compared with Current Capabilities 6 

Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of 

 Stored Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 

 Radios 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: FCS Network Components 8 

Figure 2: FCS Spirals’ Timeline 11 

Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS 

 Cluster 1 Development 14 

Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power 

 Compared with Helicopter Requirements 16 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS 

 Cluster 5 Development 21 

Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies 24 

Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T 

 Development 27 

Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform 

 Development from August 2003 to January 2005 39 

Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform 

 Development from August 2003 to January 2005 40 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

FCS Future Combat Systems 

GHz gigahertz 

JNTC-S Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

MHz megahertz 

SOSCOE System of Systems Common Operating Environment 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

June 15, 2005 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

To counter the complex set of battlefield threats that have emerged since 

the Cold War, the Army has embarked on a major transformation of its 

force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

program, a large and difficult effort to develop a suite of new manned and 

unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by a 

new information network, with a total cost of at least $108 billion. FCS will 

depend on this network to provide Army warfighters and commanders 

with the high-quality data and real-time communications needed to 

identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality. Indeed, 

the network’s performance is what makes the FCS concept work—

superior information enables the FCS vehicles to be lethal and survivable 

despite weighing a fraction of what today’s vehicles weigh. Continuously 

providing the quality and volume of information necessary for the force to 

operate seamlessly together places significant demands on the network 

components. The components must generate high power, work at long 

range, and be reliable while conforming to the tight physical constraints of 

the small FCS systems. 

Four key systems are integral to the FCS communications network: 

• Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, which is developing 

radios for ground vehicles and helicopters; 

• JTRS Cluster 5, which is developing small radios, including those that 

soldiers carry; 

• Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which is developing 

a high-capacity communications network for higher-level command 

units; and 

• System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), which 

is being developed as part of the FCS program and is the operating 

software that integrates the communications network. 

If JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE do not work as intended, battlefield 

information will not be sufficient for FCS units to operate effectively. JTRS 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 radios and new advanced networking waveforms1

are expected to provide the warfighter with a high-capacity, high-speed 

information link to access maps and other visual data, communicate onthe-move via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and 

obtain data directly from battlefield sensors. WIN-T is expected to provide 

military commanders access to intelligence, logistics, and other data 

critical to making battlefield decisions and supporting battlefield 

operations. Collectively, JTRS and WIN-T are estimated to cost over $34 

billion to develop and produce, above the $108 billion cost of FCS. 

SOSCOE is the interface that allows all the systems to communicate with 

one another. The Army plans to begin fielding the full set of FCS systems 

to brigade-size units in 2014. However, the Army also plans to field FCS 

capabilities to the current force incrementally through spirals. The first 

FCS spiral is scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe and emphasizes 

enhanced communications and network capabilities. 

Because JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE all rely on significant advances in 

current technologies and capabilities and must be fully integrated to 

realize FCS, there are substantial risks to this effort. Given the complexity 

of this undertaking and the size of the investment, you asked us to review 

each of these key development efforts to identify any risks that may 

jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS’s communications and 

networking capabilities. 

We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To 

assess the development risks of each system, we obtained and reviewed 

relevant documents, including program acquisition reports, technology 

readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, cost performance 

reports, and other information. We also met with various program and 

agency officials and obtained in-depth briefings on the system 

development efforts. More details about our scope and methodology are in 

appendix I. 

 1

A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency, modulation type, 

message format, and/or transmission system. In general usage, the term waveform refers to 

a known set of characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF), modulation 

techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS usage, the 

term waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur from the 

user input to the RF output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is implemented as a reusable, 

portable, executable software application that is independent of the JTRS operating 

system, middleware, and hardware. 
Page 3 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began development several years ago with an 

aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined 

and stable requirements. Since then, the program has continued to 

struggle to mature and integrate key technologies and has been forced to 

make major design changes. For example, the Cluster 1 design does not 

generate sufficient power or meet size and weight constraints. 

Consequently, the radio’s projected range is only 3 kilometers—well short 

of the 10 kilometer range required. In addition, the radio design is not 

sufficient to meet security requirements for operating in an open 

networked environment. These factors have contributed to significant cost 

and schedule problems that led the Army in December 2004 to propose 

restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 24 months to the 

development effort. However, recently the Department of Defense (DOD) 

directed that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment 

is conducted to determine the future of the program. In addition, the Army 

is concerned about the contractor’s ability to develop the radios and 

notified the contractor that it was considering a contract termination. At 

this point it is not clear what the outcome will be and what impact this will 

have on the future of the program. Consequently, it is unlikely the Cluster 

1 radios will be available for the start of the first spiral of the FCS network, 

slated for fiscal year 2008. This is especially critical for FCS, as Cluster 1 is 

to provide what has been called the backbone of the FCS network—a 

Wideband Networking Waveform that will serve as the main conduit of 

information to and from Army tactical units. 

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has also experienced technical challenges 

and program changes that have impeded progress. Meeting requirements 

for JTRS Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than for Cluster 1, 

given Cluster 5 radios’ smaller size, weight, and power needs. For 

example, the smallest of these radios, which weigh only about 1 pound 

each, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1, are not going to be able to 

provide the power and cooling needed for the Wideband Networking 

Waveform. In addition, the program will require a new networking 

waveform, the Soldier Radio Waveform. Several programmatic changes 

and a contract award bid protest have also slowed progress of the Cluster 

5 program. Furthermore, in light of unresolved technical issues with the 

Cluster 1 program, DOD has initiated an assessment to restructure the 

Cluster 5 program. Consequently, Cluster 5 small form radios needed for 

the first spiral of FCS may not be available in time. The Army is seeking 

ways to accelerate program deliveries. 

The WIN-T program also began with an aggressive schedule and immature 

technologies. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

time production begins in March 2006. The tightly compressed schedule 

assumes nearly flawless execution and may not allow sufficient time for 

correcting problems. In addition, significant interdependencies among 

critical technologies further increase overall program risk. Any delay in 

maturing an individual technology may hinder the program’s ability to 

achieve its performance objectives—specifically, on-the-move 

communications. Other critical program issues, such as deciding on a 

suitable airborne platform to achieve on-the-move communications, 

remain unresolved. More recently, the program shifted its focus to deliver 

networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term 

warfighting needs while continuing to support the restructured FCS 

program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to 

address FCS needs remains undetermined. 

SOSCOE faces the dual challenge of a software development that is highrisk and evolving requirements. According to Army program officials, 

SOSCOE software may not reach the necessary technical maturity level 

required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS 

requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more 

detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software. As a 

result, it is unclear whether SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to 

support the first spiral of FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008. 

Given the criticality of these four systems to the performance of the FCS 

network, this report makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense 

aimed at reducing their development risks so that they provide the first 

spiral of FCS with enabling communications and networking capabilities. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD generally concurred with our 

findings and recommendations. As part of its comments, DOD provided 

some information on actions it has begun to take to address each of our 

recommendations. While these actions should help strengthen the 

management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain concerned that a 

demonstration of FCS’s communications and networking capabilities will 

not be known for some time. Until these capabilities are demonstrated, 

investment in FCS platforms and systems carries substantial risk. 

Over the last decade, the Army has begun to transform its warfighting 

capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of 

potential threats. According to Army officials, the transformation is the 

most comprehensive change in the Army in over a century, and will affect 

all aspects of its organizations, training, doctrine, leadership, and strategic 

plans as well as its acquisitions. Through this transformation, the Army 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

expects to establish a force that provides both the lethality and 

survivability of today’s heavily armored units and the deployability and 

responsiveness of today’s lighter combat units. As envisioned, the future 

force will operate very differently than forces have in the past. It will 

function in smaller, more agile and deployable modular brigade combat 

teams (composed of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 personnel) that can react 

quickly to changing missions and circumstances. To be effective, force 

components—soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors—must be “netcentric,” that is, closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together. 

The transformation involves two major, interrelated acquisitions: (1) 

development of new advanced communications and networking systems—

computers, software, and a wireless tactical internet—to acquire, 

exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace and 

(2) development of a new generation of battlefield vehicles, weapons, and 

sensors. The Army has taken initial steps toward transformation through 

its Digitization and Stryker programs. Under the Digitization program, the 

Army installed computers, software, and interfaces to communications 

systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and other vehicles in 

selected units that enable both in-theater and higher commands to share 

battlefield data with lower-level units. The Stryker program introduced a 

new family of vehicles expected to make units more lethal, mobile, and 

survivable than today’s light forces. In addition, the Army has initiated a 

major restructuring of its force into modular brigade combat teams—

brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design. 

FCS is the culminating stage in the Army’s ongoing transformation to a 

lighter, more agile and capable force. It is a large and complex 

development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other 

systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust communications 

and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. Without these capabilities, 

the lighter, more decentralized units would be vulnerable to enemy attack. 

Currently, the armed forces have limited communications and networking 

capabilities on the battlefield, making it necessary to patch together or 

reroute information through multiple radio, data terminal, and network 

systems to get critical information to the warfighter and commanders. 

Current “dial-up speed” data rates further delay forces’ ability to identify, 

assess, and respond to time-critical targets. FCS’s networked on-the-move 

communications for voice, data, video, and imagery are expected to be a 

revolutionary improvement over current communications capabilities (see 

table 1). 
Page 6 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared with Current Capabilities 

Capability Current Future force 

Interoperability Numerous unique systems, noninteroperable Small number of systems, interoperable 

Mobility Point-to-point, with limited mobility Mobile and integrated network operations 

Data rate Low data rate—mostly voice High data rate—voice, data, video, imagery that can 

communicate simultaneously 

Range Mostly line-of-sight, limiting performance in urban 

settings, mountainous terrain, and other complex 

environments 

Expanded to include beyond line-of-sight 

Links Single network thread to fixed/relocatable operations 

centers 

Network integrated warfighting platforms with mobile 

operations centers and seamless connectivity from 

foxhole to the Pentagon 

Speed Dial-up speed Broadband speed 

Security Susceptible to interception and detection by 

adversaries 

Multiple levels of security with reduced probability of 

interception and detection 

Efficiency Circuit-switched, spectrum inefficient Packet-switched, spectrum efficient 

Flexibility Defense unique/proprietary technology—inflexible Open-systems architecture—drawing on universal 

Internet-Protocol-based commercial technology, 

flexible, standards-based 

Source: GAO analysis. 

The FCS communications and networking capabilities are being designed 

around five components: 

• Platforms and sensors: Under FCS, the Army is developing new 

warfighting systems, including manned and unmanned aerial and 

ground vehicles that will provide and use intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance information. 

• Applications: Software applications will support battlefield command 

functions, including command and control, logistics support, training, 

and modeling and simulation. 

• Network services: SOSCOE will be the network-centric operating 

system, or middleware, that enables the integration of separate FCS 

communications software packages, independent of their location and 

the technology used to develop them. The Army likens the SOSCOE 

architecture to Microsoft Windows, but many times larger. SOSCOE 

represents about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS 

software code. 

• Transport systems: Transport systems—primarily JTRS and WIN-T—

will provide wireless communication capabilities to transport 
Page 7 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

information within the FCS network and the broader DOD-wide 

network. 

• Standards: Standards implement DOD-wide policies and doctrine 

developed by offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Networks and Information Integration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Two critical objectives of these standards are net-centric operations 

and inter-service interoperability. 

Figure 1 shows a representation of the five FCS network components. 
Page 8 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 1: FCS Network Components 

Standards

Transport

Services

Applications

Platforms and sensors

Training

Modeling and Simulation

FCS Command and Control

Sustainment

JTRS

Cluster 5

SoSCOE

System services

Interoperability services

Messaging

Data store

Cluster 1 WIN-T

Spectrum

Common data models

Standards

Architecture

Engineering

Doctrine

Policy

Governance

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 9 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

JTRS is a software-reprogrammable radio that is intended to operate with 

many different legacy radio systems and provide the warfighter with 

additional communications and networking capabilities—including 

seamless interoperability and increased data throughput—to 

simultaneously access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice 

and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain information 

directly from battlefield sensors. A key component of JTRS is developing 

waveforms to operate with legacy radios as well as new waveforms to 

provide advanced networking capabilities, such as the Wideband 

Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform represents a 

new, critical capability for DOD. The development of the Wideband 

Networking Waveform is intended to address many of the current 

limitations associated with DOD tactical wireless networking, including 

line-of-sight limitations that cause many network partitions, unique 

network monitoring systems, and predefined security enclaves that require 

hardware for each security level. The waveform is expected to provide 

data rates of 5 megabits per second or more-–hundreds of times faster 

than existing communications systems-–and facilitate the routing of large 

amounts of information among users anywhere in the battlespace. 

DOD has structured the JTRS development effort into several programs 

clustered by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program is developing 

radios for ground vehicles and helicopters to equip the current force as 

well as FCS. The program is expected to cost $15.6 billion to develop and 

acquire over 100,000 Cluster 1 radios. The JTRS Cluster 5 program is 

developing handheld and manpack radios for soldiers as well as several 

smaller varieties of radios for use in weight- and power-constrained 

platforms—such as Unattended Ground Sensors and Intelligent Munitions 

Systems. The program is expected to cost $8.5 billion to develop and 

acquire over 300,000 Cluster 5 radios. 

The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that 

supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with 

JTRS radios to connect warfighters and command centers, including joint, 

allied, and coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on-themove communications—that is, continuously updated, real-time 

multimedia information from dispersed locations throughout the theater. 

It will replace existing communications networks that have limited 

capacity to support on-the-move communications. Leveraging advanced 

commercial technologies that enable mobile communications, the WIN-T 

system includes data routing and switching hardware, computers, video 

and teleconferencing equipment, high-capacity line-of-sight radios and 

satellite terminals—all of which make up a tactical operation center’s 
Page 10 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

communications element. WIN-T is being developed in three blocks, with 

each block adding capabilities. Based on current plans, Block 1 is 

projected to cost approximately $10 billion; Blocks 2 and 3 have yet to be 

funded. 

The SOSCOE software will reside within each FCS platform’s integrated 

computer system and provide a number of services for the users of the 

integrated computer system. These services include interoperability 

services, information assurance services, and communications services. 

SOSCOE will enable integrated management of the network and will allow 

systems within the network to access sources of information. The Army 

estimates that SOSCOE software development will be completed in 2011. 

The Army plans to field the SOSCOE software in increments to align with 

the overall FCS software builds and planned FCS spirals. 

When FCS began system development in May 2003, the JTRS and WIN-T 

programs were under way with schedules that aligned with FCS planned 

fielding. However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004 to 

address development risks. The restructuring added 4 years to develop the 

platform systems and established an evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS 

capabilities. Even though the restructuring provided additional time to the 

program, it also emphasized developing FCS capabilities in spirals and 

accelerating the development of the network into the current force. The 

Army now plans to test and field its FCS capabilities incrementally 

between 2008 and 2014 through four spirals. A 2-year period of testing will 

precede the actual fielding of capabilities in each spiral. The Army has 

defined the initial spiral of FCS around the capabilities needed by the 

current force, to include the main components of the communications 

network--JTRS Cluster 1 and 5 radios and the wideband waveforms, some 

form of WIN-T communications capability, and SOSCOE. The capabilities 

for the other FCS spirals will be defined over time. Figure 2 shows the FCS 

spirals’ timeline. 
Page 11 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 2: FCS Spirals’ Timeline 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and 

demonstration in 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature 

technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. These 

factors have contributed to significant cost and schedule problems that the 

program has not recovered from. The program has not been able to mature 

the technologies needed to produce radios that generate sufficient power 

as well as meet platform size and weight constraints and has been forced 

to make design changes to accommodate evolving security requirements. 

Because of cost, schedule, and performance problems, in December 2004, 

the Army proposed restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 

24 months to the development schedule. However, recently DOD directed 

that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment is 

completed to determine the future of the program. In addition, because of 

increased concern about the contractor’s ability to develop the radios, the 

Army notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination. 

At this point it is not clear what the outcome will be and what impact this 

will have on the future of the program. As a result, it is unlikely JTRS 

Cluster 1 radios will be available for the first FCS network spiral, slated to 

begin in fiscal year 2008. FCS and other users dependent on Cluster 1 

radios, such as Army helicopters, will have to rely on legacy radios to fill 

the gap. 

Prior to the start of system development in 2002, the JTRS Cluster 1 

schedule was accelerated 27 months to meet the Army’s plan to modernize 

its helicopters with various technological upgrades including advanced 

JTRS Cluster 1 Began 

System Development 

without Requisite 

Knowledge, Resulting 

in Cost and Schedule 

Problems 

Accelerated Schedule 

Incompatible with System 

Immaturity 

Development

start

Program

start

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Fiscal year

Source: Unit of Action Program Office.

Spiral 1 start Spiral 2 Spiral 3 Spiral 4

JTRS Cluster 1 and 5 radios

Wideband Networking Waveforms

WIN-T

SOSCOE

·

·

·

·
Page 12 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

communications. Cluster 1 proceeded into the system development and 

demonstration phase with none of the program’s 20 critical technologies 

sufficiently matured and with requirements not clearly defined—contrary 

to best practices and DOD guidance.2

 Although many of the technologies 

had been used in other radio applications, significant technical advances 

were nonetheless required for developing key components of the radio. 

The program’s acquisition strategy, for example, highlighted technology 

risks associated with the following requirements: 

• Wideband Networking Waveform: As the core of the JTRS networking 

capability, the Wideband Networking Waveform is to operate across a 

wide range of radio frequency spectrum, 2 megahertz (MHz) to 2 

gigahertz (GHz), and provide increased routing and networking 

capabilities. The Wideband Networking Waveform must also be 

compliant with the Software Communications Architecture, which 

demands a modular approach to waveform design, imposing much 

greater processing and memory requirements. This is especially 

critical for FCS, as the waveform is to provide what has been called the 

backbone or main conduit of the FCS network. 

• Security: The JTRS radio set is intended to operate applications at 

multiple levels of security. For it to do so, developers not only have to 

be concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be 

prepared to implement the features required for network and computer 

security. This will require development of new technologies, obtaining 

certification through a rigorous process by the National Security 

Agency, and accommodating an expected growth in security 

requirements. 

• Interference mitigation: Prior to JTRS, tactical radios were largely 

designed for single channel and single band operations. Because JTRS 

radio sets will operate multiple channels—-as many as eight 

channels—-simultaneously within the same radio set, developers must 

ensure that communications over one channel do not interfere with 

communications over another, because such interference would 

degrade the quality of service and limit the radio’s high data rate 

capability. 

 2

To help avoid cost and schedule overruns, best practices and DOD guidance call for 

achieving a high level of technological maturity before allowing new technologies into 

product development.
Page 13 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

The accelerated acquisition strategy compressed the development cycle 

and allowed little time for testing prior to key development decisions. For 

example, the schedule called for making the initial production decision for 

selected platforms immediately following an early operational assessment 

of a partially functioning prototype of the JTRS radio in surrogate vehicles 

(see fig. 3). This is in contrast to the knowledge-based approach captured 

in best practices, which advocates making production decisions based on 

an assessment of production-representative prototypes in a realistic 

environment. Historically, programs that must define requirements, 

develop technology, and design products concurrently have experienced 

cost increases and schedule delays. While the Army recognized the risk of 

moving forward with immature technologies, it expected that emerging 

technologies in radio software technology would enable it to develop the 

critical technologies and integrate them into the product quickly. 
Page 14 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1 Development 

Despite the Army’s expectations to leverage current and emerging radio 

technologies, the critical technologies for the JTRS Cluster 1 radio have 

generally not matured. The program is also struggling to derive detailed 

specifications for Cluster 1 requirements. Despite the lack of mature 

technologies and detailed specifications, the Army held the program’s 

critical design review—the point at which design stability is to be achieved 

and demonstrated—in December 2003. However, with the requirements 

still evolving, the program expects to make several costly hardware and 

software design modifications. For example: 

Knowledge point 1: 

Resources (including 

technologies) match 

customer needs

Knowledge point 2: 

Product design demonstrates 

ability to meet performance 

requirements

Knowledge point 3:

Product can be manufactured 

within cost, schedule, and 

quality targets

Concept and technology

development

Concept and technology development

Product development and

demonstration

Production

Product development and

demonstration Production

Development start

Development

start

Low-rate

production decision

Initial production

decision

Early operational assessment

Knowledge-Based Development

JTRS Cluster 1 Program of Record

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Page 15 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

• The current processing and memory capacity of the Network INFOSEC 

Unit, which contains the operating software, is insufficient to support 

full systems operation, including waveform processing, enhanced 

security, and power management. The program plans to double the 

Network INFOSEC Unit’s capacity from 256 megabytes of memory to 

512 megabytes, which will require changes to the hardware design. 

• The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current 

design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an 

open networked environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS 

radios will be used by allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army to 

release specific source code of the software architecture to these 

forces. To address the release, the National Security Agency has 

required changes to the security architecture. While the program has 

not finalized or funded the changes, the current plan is to separate the 

networking and radio functions into two separate processors. 

A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting the 

size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and helicopters. 

To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, 

including transmission range, the Cluster 1 radio requires significant 

amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, 

and power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the 

result of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated 

by the electricity needed to power the additional memory and processing. 

Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size, 

weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission 

range is only 3 kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required 

for the Wideband Networking Waveform. As a consequence, more 

unmanned aerial vehicles may be needed to relay information. Intended 

ground vehicle users have accepted a deviation in the design—to have 

some of the radio’s hardware mounted separately outside the vehicle—

with the expectation that the contractor will develop a better solution later 

on. However, deviations were not accepted for the helicopters because it 

would necessitate major design changes to the aircraft and adversely 

affect the aircraft modernization schedules. Unlike ground vehicles, 

aviation platforms are limited in their ability to compromise on size, 

weight, and power issues because of the difficulty in maintaining 

equilibrium while airborne. The Cluster 1 radio’s size, weight, and peak 

power consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much 

as 80 percent (see fig. 4). 

Size, Weight, and Power 

Requirements for Key 

Platform Users Have 

Presented a Significant 

Challenge for Cluster 1 
Page 16 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with 

Helicopter Requirements 

To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the full 

capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant 

technology advances in power amplification and cooling are essential. The 

Army has initiated science and technology development efforts to address 

these issues, but it will take time to evolve the technologies to an 

acceptable level of maturity. In addition to conducting other research, the 

Army is evaluating technologies associated with a communications and 

navigation system that was being developed as part of the Comanche 

helicopter program. The Army approved further development of this 

system and plans to integrate it into the JTRS system and conduct a 

demonstration of its capabilities later this year. However, the Army will 

not be able to deliver Cluster 1 radios to support the helicopter fielding 

schedules and will have to purchase legacy radios instead. 

The FCS program is exploring solutions to meet a key transportability 

requirement that FCS vehicles must be limited to 19 tons in order to be 

airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft. To meet this transportability 

requirement, the program recently proposed significant size and weight 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Cubic inches

Source: Department of Defense.

JTRS size

3,379

5,826

0

50

100

150

200

250

Pounds

JTRS weight

115

207

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Watts

1,364

2,444

JTRS peak power 

consumption

Performance requirements for aviation

Size, weight, power (September 2004)
Page 17 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

reductions for vehicle components, including communications equipment. 

While Cluster 1 currently has no size, weight, and power requirements for 

the systems to be fielded in FCS, the JTRS radios may require further 

redesign to meet FCS’s aggressive weight requirements. Such a reduction 

would likely have a significant impact on the design of JTRS radios for the 

FCS vehicles. 

Since the program entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor 

has overrun cost estimates by $93 million-–nearly 28 percent above what 

was planned (see app. II). Although the program attempted to stabilize 

costs by adding approximately $200 million to the contract in January 

2004, costs continued to grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the 

contractor has increasingly fallen behind schedule and has had to devote 

more resources than originally planned. In January 2005, the prime 

contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and 

waveform development would be $531 million more than what was 

originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion. However, 

according to program officials, since contract award, the prime contractor 

has not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management 

techniques, and it is difficult to estimate with any confidence what the 

overall program is likely to cost. Key issues driving the cost growth are 

unanticipated complexity associated with developing the hardware, 

Wideband Networking Waveform, and other software. As a result, the unit 

costs for early prototypes have increased from the prime contractor’s 

original proposal. According to one DOD official, until the requirements’ 

specifications are stabilized, cost and schedule problems are likely to 

continue. For example, according to the Defense Contract Management 

Agency, meeting the design changes for security requirements is expected 

to cost an estimated $80 million. 

In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Army in December 

2004 delayed the initial production decision, which was scheduled for the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2005, and proposed to add $458 million and 24 

months to the program. Before carrying out this restructure, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense directed the Army in January 2005 to stop work 

on portions of the Cluster 1 development and focus on preparing for an 

early operational assessment of the radio, which was intended to test the 

Cluster 1 Has Experienced 

Significant Cost and 

Schedule Growth 

Future of Cluster 1 is 

Uncertain 
Page 18 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

basic functionality of pre-engineering development models of the radio.3 In 

April 2005, however, the Army suspended the operational assessment and 

notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination. This 

action was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the Cluster 1 

program conducted by a newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive 

Office, which concluded that the current program structure is not 

executable and the contractor’s ability to develop the radio is 

questionable. 

At this point it is not clear whether the contract will be terminated and 

what impact a termination would have on the future of the program. The 

Joint Program Executive Office is expected to complete its assessment of 

the program, and a Defense Acquisition Board review will be held at the 

end of fiscal year 2005 to determine the future of the program. Program 

officials anticipate a new program acquisition strategy will evolve, with 

greater emphasis on developing the radio in blocks. If development 

resumes, it is anticipated that there will be start-up delays—3 to 12 

months, according to agency officials—associated with restaffing the 

contractor’s development team and bringing the team up the learning 

curve. 

Adding to the program’s uncertainty is the impact of pending requirements 

on program cost and schedule. According to agency officials, the program 

will likely be tasked with new requirements from key stakeholders. For 

example: 

• To meet FCS requirements for accessing intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance data on the battlefield, FCS will need a new network 

data link operating in the radio frequency range above 2 GHz. 

According to the Army, developing the new network data link is 

expected to cost approximately $170 million. Furthermore, additional 

costs are likely because the new network data link may require 

changes to the already challenging JTRS Cluster 1 radio design—which 

operates over a large 2 MHz to 2 GHz range—to operate at an even 

higher frequency. An analysis of alternatives is currently under way to 

determine how best to meet this requirement. According to FCS 

officials, a decision on the new network data link is needed by the end 

of the year to keep the FCS program on track. 

 3

The early operational assessment was originally scheduled for August 2004 but was 

rescheduled for December 2004 as a result of the Over Target Baseline in January 2004. 

Because of further technical challenges, the assessment was postponed to April 2005. 
Page 19 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

• To comply with the standards of the Global Information Grid, DOD has 

directed all systems to transition to the use of Internet Protocol 

Version 6 in the future. Cluster 1, which has been designed with 

Version 4, not only will need to upgrade but will need additional 

hardware and software to ensure Version 4 and Version 6 systems can 

interoperate. Reconciling security requirements for Version 6 is also 

expected to be a challenge. 

Given the many program uncertainties, it is unlikely that JTRS radios will 

be available to support intended users: the first increment of the FCS 

network slated for fiscal year 2008, Stryker Brigade Combat Team ground 

vehicles, and helicopters. The Army plans to purchase legacy radios, 

which have limited capabilities, for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 

and helicopters. According to Army officials, FCS is planning to 

experiment with early prototypes of JTRS radios and the Wideband 

Networking Waveform, but they will not know when the fully capable 

Cluster 1 radios would be available until after the program is restructured 

at the end of fiscal year 2005. In addition, because of ongoing military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has purchased a large 

number of legacy radios over the past few years. The fielding of so many 

new radios to the current force may call into question the affordability of 

replacing them prematurely with JTRS sets. The Army is assessing JTRS 

fielding plans in light of the additional investments in legacy radios and 

JTRS Cluster 1 cost, schedule, and technical problems. 

As with the Cluster 1 program, radio size, weight, power, and dataprocessing requirements have presented significant technical challenges 

for the JTRS Cluster 5 program, which is developing a series of radios 

much smaller than those for the Cluster 1 program. Several programmatic 

changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to disruptions 

in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. As a result, the Cluster 5 program 

is no longer synchronized with the FCS program. The Army is currently 

assessing the feasibility of accelerating the development of selected small 

form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light of the unresolved technical issues 

with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has 

initiated an assessment to restructure the Cluster 5 program into 

increments. In the event that Cluster 5 radios are not available, the Army 

plans to use surrogate radios for the initial spiral of FCS. In addition, users 

depending on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army’s Land Warrior 

program, have decided to move forward with surrogate radios. 

Technical Challenges 

and Program Changes 

Have Impeded Cluster 

5 Progress 
Page 20 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Meeting requirements for Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than 

for Cluster 1 because of their smaller size, weight, power, and large dataprocessing requirements. For example, a one-channel handheld version of 

the Cluster 5 radios has a maximum weight specification of 2 pounds and a 

volume of 40 cubic inches (see table 2). A two-channel manpack radio has 

weight and volume of 9 pounds and 400 cubic inches, respectively. A onechannel small form radio weighs about 1 pound and occupies 40 cubic 

inches. In comparison, a Cluster 1 two-channel radio weighs 84 pounds 

and occupies 1,732 cubic inches. Despite their extreme size and weight 

limitations, Cluster 5 radios are still required to store multiple waveforms. 

For instance, manpack radios will be required to store at least 10 

waveforms, handheld sets 6 waveforms, and the small form sets 2 

waveforms. 

Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 

Radios 

Cluster Radio type 

Size in cubic 

inches

Weight

in pounds

Number of

 stored waveforms

Power

 in watts

Cluster 5 two-channel manpack 400 9 10 20

Cluster 5 one-channel handheld 40 2 6 5

Cluster 5 one-channel small form 40 1.2 2 N/A

Cluster 1 two-channel 1,732 84 10 838

Source: Army documents. 

Note: N/A = not available. 

The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with 

immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and 

smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power allowances 

(see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for two-channel small 

form radios—wideband radio frequency capabilities up to 2500 MHz, 

thermal management and packaging, and complex security architecture—

all introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5 program officials 

had expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 1 program. 

However, the Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as anticipated. 

Program officials stated that backup technology will be identified as a part 

of a risk mitigation plan. 

Technical Challenges Have 

Impeded Cluster 5 

Program Progress 
Page 21 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5 Development 

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies as 

follows: 

• Microelectronics: Microelectronics addresses the processes for 

producing and packaging the electronic circuits and systems that make 

up the Cluster 5 radios. Miniaturization technology and 

microelectronics components are critical to the feasibility of Cluster 5 

radios because of their extremely small size. 

Knowledge point 1: 

Resources (including 

technologies) match 

customer needs

Knowledge point 2: 

Product design demonstrates 

ability to meet performance 

requirements

Knowledge point 3:

Product can be manufactured 

within cost, schedule, and 

quality targets

Concept and technology

development

Concept and technology development

Product development and

demonstration

Production

Product development and

demonstration Production

Development start

Development

start

Low-rate production decision

Knowledge-Based Development

JTRS Cluster 5 (Spiral 2) Program of Record

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Page 22 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

• Environmental protection: Environmental protection describes the 

technologies, tools, or design considerations necessary to protect the 

radios from potentially harsh effects of the operational environment, 

including, for example, lightning, short-duration force impacts, or 

radioactive contaminants. 

• Power management: One of the greatest challenges in designing and 

implementing the Cluster 5 radios is the management and conservation 

of the limited amount of available battery power. Power management 

refers to the set of technologies that facilitate a reduction in energy 

consumption or an increase in battery capacity with the goal of 

obtaining longer operating time and a reduced battery size and weight. 

• Multichannel architecture: Multichannel JTRS radios are required to 

provide multiple, independent channels to simultaneously transmit and 

receive information using different waveforms. The compact size of the 

Cluster 5 radios and requirement for simultaneous multichannel 

operation present a co-site interference mitigation challenge. 

• Antennas: Cluster 5 JTRS radios are required to transmit and receive 

multiple waveforms over the large frequency range 2 MHz to 2.5 GHz 

and are further required to transmit and receive two separate 

waveforms simultaneously with a maximum of three antennas. The 

requirements impose unique technical challenges for both antenna and 

radio designs. 

• Security: Cluster 5 security framework must support Multiple Single 

Levels of Security to allow the processing of information with different 

classifications and categories. It also must support an over-the-air 

download capability of waveforms, which will entail large software 

files. It has yet to be demonstrated in a relevant environment. 

The Cluster 5 radios are required to store and operate the Wideband 

Networking Waveform. This will provide high data rates and networking 

capabilities for mobile forces. The full Wideband Networking Waveform 

requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which may 

not be available for the Cluster 5 radios. According to the program office, 

the principal challenge in operating the Wideband Networking Waveform 

on Cluster 5 radios stems from the significantly smaller size, weight, and 

power requirements when compared with those for Cluster 1, as well as 

safety and heat considerations for the soldier. Because of the difficulties in 

overcoming these challenges, the Cluster 5 program is seeking to ease the 

waveform’s requirements and reduce the power demands of the software. 
Page 23 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

The Cluster 5 program is also developing another new, wideband 

waveform called the Soldier Radio Waveform. Although less powerful than 

the Wideband Networking Waveform, it is expected to provide the needed 

network services for battery-powered radios with limited power and 

antenna size such as the handheld and the small form varieties. Cluster 5 

radios with the Soldier Radio Waveform will enable squad-level 

communications and interoperability with other radios and work on a 

network based on the Wideband Networking Waveform. The Soldier Radio 

Waveform is expected to be available in 2008. However, the development 

of this waveform is being managed as a science and technology effort by 

the Army’s Communications-Electronics Research Development and 

Engineering Center until it is matured and can be transitioned into the 

JTRS program. To support the first FCS spiral in the 2008-2010 timeframe, 

the Army has acknowledged that it may have to use an early version of the 

Soldier Radio Waveform and a surrogate radio to operate the waveform. 

Compounding the challenges in developing the waveform is the Army’s 

assessment that developing the Soldier Radio Waveform’s network 

manager is high risk and has yet to be funded.4

 Without the network 

manager functionality, the Soldier Radio Waveform will not be able to 

interface with the Wideband Networking Waveform. 

A number of JTRS Cluster 5 technologies are interdependent (see fig. 6) 

that, in our opinion, can exacerbate the technical and program risks of 

moving forward with immature technologies. For example, power 

management is dependent upon microelectronics, multichannel 

architecture, antennas, and security. A lag in the development of any of 

these technologies could result in a lag in the development of power 

management. 

 4

Network management is execution of a set of functions required for controlling, planning, 

allocating, deploying, coordinating, and monitoring the resources of a telecommunications 

network. 
Page 24 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies 

Because of the criticality of the size, weight, and power challenge faced by 

all variants of the JTRS radios, the program office is pursuing various 

solutions to the problem. The program, for example, hopes to benefit from 

the Army’s science and technology research on developing wideband 

power amplifiers and advanced passive cooling technology. 

Several programmatic changes have significantly affected the Cluster 5 

schedule, and the program has focused on delivering manpack radios for 

the near term and handheld and small form radios later. However, the 

availability of small form JTRS radios is of greater importance to FCS 

because they are needed for the planned fielding of three core systems in 

FCS spiral 1. The Army has concluded that the small form radios may not 

be able to meet the FCS schedule and may need to use surrogate radios to 

support the first FCS spiral. 

In May 2003, the responsibility for developing the JTRS handheld and 

manpack radios was shifted from the Special Operations Command to the 

Army because of difficulties in resolving differences over requirements 

and funding among the services. At the same time, the Acting Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics noted that 

the Cluster 5 capabilities would have to be delivered in at least two spirals 

and set an expectation that the Army would deliver prototype handheld 

and manpack radios in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005 and low rate 

initial production would begin by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006. 

Cluster 5 Schedule No 

Longer Synchronized with 

FCS Schedule 

Environ

protection

Multichannel

architecture

Antennas

Security

mental

Microelectronics

Power

management

Environmental protection

Power management

Multichannel architecture

Antennas

Security

Microelectronics

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 25 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

In May 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the Cluster 5 

program for the system development and demonstration phase of 

acquisition. The Army Acquisition Executive moved the Cluster 5 

handheld radios to spiral 2, and it delayed the delivery of the spiral 1 

prototype manpack radios to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005 and the 

low-rate initial production manpack radios to the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2007. The Army awarded the Cluster 5 contract in the middle of July 

2004, but had to issue a stop-work order to the contractor by the end of 

July because of the filing of a bid protest by the losing contractor. The bid 

protest was not upheld, but the program was delayed another 3 months 

while the protest was decided. 

In authorizing the May 2004 Cluster 5 program’s entry into the system 

development and demonstration phase, the Army Acquisition Executive 

noted the criticality of the JTRS Cluster 5 radio and directed that a review 

be conducted to assess the plans for the spiral 2 portion of the program. At 

a minimum, the review was to assess development schedule 

synchronization, technical performance expectations, integration and 

performance risks, waveform development, maturity, baseline, and 

program affordability. The review was scheduled for the spring of 2005. 

However, because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems 

with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has 

begun a broader assessment of the Cluster 5 program. On the basis of the 

initial findings of the assessment, development work on the Cluster 5 

spiral 1 radios has been suspended because the office determined that key 

waveforms being developed as part of the Cluster 1 program would not be 

delivered to Cluster 5 when needed. According to the JTRS Joint Program 

Executive Office, a restructuring of Cluster 5 spiral 1 and 2 is being 

developed, and it will identify more well defined and executable 

increments. 

While the Cluster 5 manpack and handheld radios are important 

deliverables, of greater urgency for the first spiral of FCS is the availability 

of the small form Cluster 5 radios. These radios will be embedded in a 

variety of sensors and weapons systems. In fact, three FCS core systems—

Unattended Ground Sensors, Intelligent Munitions Systems, and the Non 

Line of Sight Launch System—need Cluster 5 small form radios to support 

their planned inclusion in the first FCS spiral scheduled for the 2008-2010 

timeframe. The Army has concluded that the schedule for the small form 

radios is not synchronized with the FCS schedule and has asked the 

contractor for a plan to accelerate deliveries. The Army has acknowledged 

that it may have to use surrogate radios, which have limited capabilities, if 

the Cluster 5 small form radios are not available to support the initial 
Page 26 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

fielding of the three FCS core systems. In addition, other users depending 

on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army’s Land Warrior program, have 

decided to move forward with surrogate radios. 

The WIN-T program entered the system development and demonstration 

phase with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies close to full maturity. None 

of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the time production 

begins in March 2006. Because there are significant interdependencies 

among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an individual 

technology further increases overall program risk. WIN-T has gone 

through a number of program changes, including shifts in the program’s 

focus. In the fall of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved 

the Army’s proposal to combine the work of two contractors to facilitate 

early delivery of WIN-T capabilities to the warfighter while continuing to 

focus on the restructured FCS program. A decision has recently been 

made not to accelerate the program or develop capabilities sooner. It 

remains unclear what WIN-T capabilities will be provided to the first FCS 

spiral. The changes, along with existing technical challenges, put the 

program at risk of cost and schedule overruns and failure to achieve 

performance objectives. 

During WIN-T’s 32-month systems development and demonstration 

schedule, the program must mature 9 of its 12 critical technologies. 

Although risk mitigation plans were developed in mid-2003 for the 9 

immature technologies, a program review sponsored by the Army in July 

2004 concluded that the plans lacked sufficient detail. Eight backup 

technologies have been identified, but they are less robust and only 3 are 

close to full maturity. Relying on these substitutes may degrade network 

performance resulting in reduced operational capability. 

Contrary to best practices under knowledge-based development, the 

program will continue technology development concurrently with the 

product development and demonstration phase (see fig.7). The tightly 

compressed schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not 

allow sufficient time for correcting problems. For example, the combined 

testing to demonstrate system performance and operational functionality 

is slated to occur just 1 month after critical design review. With immature 

technologies, it will be difficult, at best, to demonstrate the system’s 

design stability and determine whether the system can be produced 

affordably and work reliably. In fact, WIN-T program officials may be 

unable to conclude a reliable operational capability of on-the-move 

Ambitious WIN-T 

Acquisition Approach 

Puts Program At Risk 

of Cost and Schedule 

Growth 

Uncertainties about 

Technology Development 

Persist 
Page 27 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

communications until the system is demonstrated in an operational 

environment early in fiscal year 2009—long after production begins. 

Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development 

The significant interdependencies among WIN-T’s critical technologies 

exacerbate the technical and program risks of moving forward with 

immature technologies. For example, the on-the-move satellite 

communications technologies rely on wideband waveforms, antennas, and 

other technologies to achieve their performance objectives. Therefore, a 

lag in the development of any of these technologies may result in a lag in 

Knowledge point 1: 

Resources (including 

technologies) match 

customer needs

Knowledge point 2: 

Product design demonstrates 

ability to meet performance 

requirements

Knowledge point 3:

Product can be manufactured 

within cost, schedule, and 

quality targets

Concept and technology

development

Concept and technology development

Product development and demonstration

Production

Product development and demonstration Production

Development start

Development

start

Low-rate production decision

Knowledge-Based Development

WIN-T (Block 1) Program of Record

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Page 28 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

the overall development of mobile communications technologies—a 

critical component of the operational concept for WIN-T. 

Not only is the program faced with technical challenges, but its 

dependence on other programs puts the WIN-T program at risk. WIN-T’s 

ability to significantly improve upon current communications capabilities 

relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and the ability to 

work on the move. The WIN-T system depends on other programs to 

provide needed capabilities. Although separate from the WIN-T program, 

changes or delays in these external programs may impair WIN-T’s ability 

to perform. 

For WIN-T, unmanned aerial vehicles are fundamental to the program as 

they route information and extend transmission range that ground systems 

are constrained by—preserving network reliability, connectivity, and 

mobile throughput. Citing their capacity to fly at high altitudes, program 

officials have identified two platforms to support WIN-T, the Extended 

Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or the High Altitude 

Airship. However, one is not adequately funded for a dedicated 

communications capability, and the other is still in the concept 

development phase. Therefore, a study is under way to assess the 

consequence of not having unmanned aerial vehicles and its resulting 

effect on the network. It is unclear whether the issue will be resolved in 

time for the upcoming development test/operational test event. The 

program plans to use a surrogate plane, but it is unknown whether this 

will adequately assess network reliability and critical on-the-move 

communications. 

Central to the WIN-T operational effectiveness is the development of a 

software-programmable radio and wideband waveforms. Together, the 

radio and waveforms are expected to allow warfighters to receive large 

volumes of data while moving around the battlefield at increasing speeds. 

However, given the uncertainty of whether a JTRS radio would be 

available to support WIN-T, the program plans to develop its own highcapacity radio, operating above the 2 GHz radio frequency range. To meet 

FCS requirements, the WIN-T radio is expected to run above 2 GHz with 

two new waveforms—a net-centric waveform and a high-capacity 

waveform--and the existing Global Broadcast Service waveform. In 

particular, these waveforms enable distribution of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance data to provide a more detailed picture 

of the battlefield. To address the need for waveforms operating above 2 

GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an assessment to 

Dependence on External 

Programs May Hinder the 

System’s Performance 
Page 29 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

identify solutions. However, the results of the study may not be available 

by the critical design review. 

Since the WIN-T program was conceived nearly 5 years ago, the program 

strategy has shifted several times. Originally, the program focused on 

designing a network that would meet current force needs. In 2002, the 

program was realigned to focus on a network that would support future 

force needs. Two contractors were to work independently on designing 

the future force network architecture, and the program office would select 

the better of the two. The contractors were given significant flexibility in 

designing the network architecture and developing system performance 

specifications. Two years later, with the global war on terrorism and 

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, WIN-T was directed to focus 

on developing and fielding network capabilities to meet both current and 

future force needs. To expedite completion of the architecture’s design, 

the Army eliminated competition between the two contractors in 

September 2004. Army officials believe that the combined team provides a 

stronger technical solution by taking the best elements of each 

contractor’s proposed architecture and maintains some competition 

because over 50 percent of the work will still be competed among 

sub-contractors. In fact, the contractors working together completed the 

network architecture by January 2005—a year earlier than previously 

planned. According to Army officials, the early completion of the network 

architecture allows other Army programs, particularly FCS, to stabilize 

their network designs earlier than planned. 

In conjunction with the WIN-T program’s shift in focus to address both 

current and future force needs, the Army fielded a separate program, in 

2004, a beyond-line-of-sight communications network to units deployed in 

Iraq: the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S). Although an 

improvement over past capabilities, JNTC-S is stationary —units must 

come to a standstill and set up their satellite equipment to communicate. 

In contrast, WIN-T is expected to maintain satellite connection—

regardless of distance, weather conditions, or terrain—-while units are in 

motion. Currently, the Army is assessing how best to transition JNTC-S to 

WIN-T. In addition, the Army is assessing whether the WIN-T program can 

be modified to address the restructured FCS plan to field communications 

and networking capabilities in spirals. Army officials concede that, based 

on available technologies and resources, WIN-T block 1 performance 

requirements may need to be scaled back to meet the FCS spiral 1 time 

frame. For example, the data rate requirements for block 1 WIN-T—which 

calls for an unprecedented data throughput rate of 256 kilobits per second 

while units are moving at 25 miles per hour—may need to be reduced. 

Program Has Undergone 

Several Strategy Changes 
Page 30 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Although the Army has decided not to accelerate development of WIN-T, it 

is unclear when plans to migrate from the JNTC-S program and address 

FCS needs will be completed. 

The Army assesses SOSCOE as high-risk. SOSCOE software may not reach 

the necessary technical maturity level required to meet FCS milestones. In 

addition, FCS system-level requirements are still being defined, which 

could affect the SOSCOE design. Consequently, it is unclear whether 

SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to support the initial fielding of 

FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008. 

Because SOSCOE software will tie together FCS systems, support battle 

command applications, and enable interoperability with current and future 

forces, it is the fundamental building block upon which a substantial 

portion of FCS will be built. Thus, delays in SOSCOE software 

development could affect FCS’ ability to meet production and fielding 

milestones. Since the start of system development, the Army has assessed 

SOSCOE software availability and maturity as high-risk. According to 

program officials, SOSCOE development does not require “cutting edge” 

software technology. However, there are some aspects of particular 

service families that are more challenging than others and result in an 

overall SOSCOE development effort that varies in complexity. The key to 

SOSCOE development is the “threading model,” which is intended to allow 

an interface between different subsystem operating systems. The high risk 

is derived from the fact that SOSCOE may not reach the necessary 

technical maturity level required to meet program milestones. 

The SOSCOE risk mitigation strategy is to develop and deliver the 

software in increments to provide the functionality required by SOSCOE 

users when they need it. Specifically, the SOSCOE software is scheduled 

for delivery in a series of seven software builds between the end of 2005 

and 2011. FCS functionality will increase with each successive software 

build. The Army will need about one-half of the SOSCOE software in time 

for the fielding of the initial FCS capability in fiscal year 2008. If the 

software risks materialize, the SOSCOE build plan may have to be 

modified, deferring some functionality to later software builds. 

SOSCOE 

Development at Risk 

because of Software 

Maturity and Evolving 

Requirements 

SOSCOE Software 

Availability and Maturity 

are High-Risk 
Page 31 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after the 

program started development. As in most engineering efforts, FCS 

requirements are first defined at a general or high level. Once these are 

defined, more detailed specifications that flow down to the subsystem 

level are derived. It is the specifications that provide the details necessary 

to design subsystems like SOSCOE. In the case of FCS, very few 

specifications have flowed to SOSCOE, as higher-level specifications are 

still being defined. The lack of specific requirements flow-down could 

affect the SOSCOE software build needed to support the first FCS spiral. 

In addition, program officials are concerned that SOSCOE will have 

difficulty meeting emerging requirements without significant cost and 

schedule impacts. Costs are likely to grow as SOSCOE is reworked to 

meet new requirements, or applications software is reworked to 

accommodate the limitations of SOSCOE. Further, if design assumptions 

underlying SOCOE during the spiral 1 and 2 builds are wrong, because of 

incomplete technical information, requirements for future software builds 

might not be met or the software could require extensive rework, resulting 

in cost and schedule problems. 

As part of the original FCS schedule, a DOD-level Network Maturity 

Milestone Decision was scheduled for 2008 to assess demonstrated 

communications and networked functions. The demonstration was to 

verify the performance of FCS software, including SOSCOE. The purpose 

of the demonstration would have been to provide confidence that all 

networked operations software would meet initial operational capability 

objectives and to use the results of the milestone decision to initiate longlead production for the network equipment. However, the restructuring of 

the overall FCS program allowed the reduction of the high concurrency in 

the SOSCOE development and fielding schedule. The development 

schedule has now been extended to 2011. The DOD-level assessment of 

demonstrated network capabilities will be deferred until the formal FCS 

production milestone decision in 2012. 

Although DOD and the military services have produced the best armed 

forces in the world, their effectiveness in carrying out military operations 

has been hampered by communications and networking systems that lack 

interoperability and have limited capacity to transfer information where 

and when it is needed. The Army’s efforts to develop JTRS, WIN-T, and the 

SOSCOE as components of the network are essential to overcoming these 

limitations. However, to achieve the desired capabilities, not only must 

FCS Program 

Requirements Are Still 

Evolving 

FCS Restructuring 

Reduced SOSCOE 

Development Concurrency 

Conclusions 
Page 32 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

each program be successfully executed, but because the programs are 

interdependent, they must be closely synchronized. In particular, the 

successful fielding of FCS capabilities is critically dependent on the 

outcome of the JTRS and WIN-T programs. If they do not work as 

intended, there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the future 

force to operate effectively. 

As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at 

risk of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly for 

the first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an ambitious set 

of user requirements, steep technical challenges, and stringent timeframes. 

While the Army’s restructuring of the FCS program last year into spiral 

increments was a positive step, the first spiral may not demonstrate key 

networking capabilities. The first spiral of FCS should provide a 

meaningful demonstration of the networking capabilities that can then 

serve as a basis to support further development of the future force. In 

particular, demonstrating the capability of the Wideband Networking 

Waveform is important, given that the design of FCS vehicles and systems 

in later spirals is predicated on this capability. It is reasonable that such a 

demonstration should include JTRS with the Wideband Networking 

Waveform, WIN-T, and basic capability from SOSCOE. 

Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a 

successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced 

wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the 

communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be 

based on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T 

will be demonstrated. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense: 

• establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and 

SOSCOE capabilities; 

• synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS, 

WIN-T, and SOSCOE; and 

• develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an 

evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production 

decisions. 

In addition, in light of the delays in JTRS Cluster 1 and the criticality of the 

Wideband Networking Waveform for FCS, we recommend the Secretary of 

Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on 

demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 33 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the 

Cluster 1 development program. 

In its letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our 

findings and three of our recommendations and partially concurred with a 

fourth recommendation. (DOD’s letter is reprinted in app III.) As part of its 

comments, DOD provided some information on actions it has begun to 

take to address each of our recommendations. While these actions should 

help strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain 

concerned that a demonstration of FCS’s communications and networking 

capabilities will not be known for some time. Until these capabilities are 

demonstrated, investment in FCS platforms and systems carries 

substantial risk. DOD also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. 

Regarding our first recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense 

establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE 

capabilities—DOD concurred, noting (1) that its newly established JTRS 

Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the condition of each JTRS 

product line and will make recommendations to ensure effective control 

of cost, schedule, and performance and (2) that the Army is managing 

risks associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense is applying the appropriate level of oversight. While the actions 

being taken by DOD and the Army will help, it remains unclear whether 

they will be sufficient to ensure JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE—the critical 

components of the enhanced communications network—are successfully 

executed. We remain concerned that the requisite knowledge needed to 

effectively manage program development risks has not been sufficiently 

developed. A low-risk fielding schedule for each of the components should 

set the pace for the Army’s transformation to FCS. 

Regarding our second recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense 

synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with the fielding schedules for JTRS, 

WIN-T, and SOSCOE—DOD partially concurred, but stated that “the 

Army’s strategy for spiraling out FCS technology is not constrained to any 

one particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make 

available mature and military useful system capability in increments, 

leveraging opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with 

current force capability.” DOD further stated that “the FCS spirals will 

make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the use of 

surrogate applications where they apply.” DOD also noted that the Army 

did not define the first FCS spiral around the main components of the 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 34 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

communications network, but around the capabilities needed by the 

current force. While we agree with DOD that mature and military useful 

capabilities should be fielded as expeditiously as possible, we believe that 

the first spiral should demonstrate meaningful capabilities for FCS. In 

particular, we believe that the first spiral of FCS should demonstrate 

critical networking capabilities, and that its schedule be predicated on 

demonstrating core capabilities, such as the JTRS Wideband Networking 

Waveform. Progress made on these capabilities should guide the future 

investments, such as on ground vehicles that depend on network 

performance. In addition, reliance on surrogate applications has the 

potential to result in costly replacement of the surrogate applications once 

the target applications are fully mature. 

Regarding our third recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense 

develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an 

evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production 

decisions—DOD concurred, stating that FCS will initially field a mix of 

both new and legacy communications and network capabilities, and that 

iterative operational test and evaluation will be stressed to ensure strong 

capability verification and validation. DOD also noted that network 

maturity will be assessed at each spiral’s production decision. While it is 

appropriate to assess network maturity at each spiral’s production 

decision, to measure progress in developing the FCS communications 

network, these assessments will need to culminate in a full demonstration 

that the network will perform as intended before committing to produce 

equipment for FCS units of action. 

Finally, regarding our fourth recommendation—that the Secretary of 

Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on 

demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio 

prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the Cluster 

1 development program—DOD concurred, noting that the newly 

established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS 

Cluster 1 development path and that the development of the Wideband 

Networking Waveform will be included in the assessment. 

As agreed with your office, unless you announce its contents, we will not 

distribute this report further until 30 days after the date of this letter. At 

that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority 

Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that 

have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send 

copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the 
Page 35 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available 

at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff 

have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2811, 

or Assistant Director John Oppenheim at (202) 512-3111. Major 

contributors to this report were Ridge Bowman, Subrata Ghoshroy, Karen 

Sloan, Hai Tran, Paul Williams, and Candice Wright. 

Sincerely yours, 

Paul L. Francis, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 36 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical 

Radio System-Tactical (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T 

programs, we obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed documents 

describing the maturity of critical technologies, and interviewed project 

and product officials from the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

(WIN-T) Program Management Office, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. To 

determine the status of JTRS waveforms, we obtained briefings on 

wideband waveform development efforts and interviewed officials from 

the JTRS Joint Program Office, Arlington, Virginia. We also reviewed 

selected acquisition reports, technology readiness assessments, test and 

evaluation plans, defense acquisition executive summaries, and acquisition 

decision memorandums for individual programs. To obtain information 

related to the planned use of JTRS Cluster 1 radios in rotary wing 

platforms, we interviewed officials from the Program Executive Office, 

Aviation, Arlington, Virginia. To obtain information related to JTRS 

Cluster 1 contract performance data, we interviewed Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials in Anaheim, California, and obtained cost 

performance reports and other cost analysis documentation. 

To assess cost and schedule performance for JTRS Cluster 1 and 

waveform development for the period between August 2003 and January 

2005, we used cost and schedule variances reported in contractor cost 

performance reports. Results were presented in graphical form to 

determine the period’s trends. We also obtained likely cost at the 

completion of the prime contract from the reports. We confirmed that the 

prime contractor’s earned value management system had been validated 

by the Defense Contract Management Agency. The cost and schedule 

results include both prime and subcontractors. The development of the 

waveforms was included in our analysis of Cluster 1 because, although the 

effort is managed separately under the Joint Program Office, it is being 

executed under the same contract. 

To determine the development risks associated with the System of 

Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained 

briefings on fielding plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE 

software availability and maturity, and interviewed project officials from 

the Project Manager for FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey. We also attended FCS in-process reviews and a 

board of directors meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, organized by the 

Program Manager, Unit of Action. 

To obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance, 

oversight, and technology support for the JTRS, WIN-T, and Future 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 37 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Combat Systems (FCS) programs, we interviewed officials from the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, 

Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the Army’s 

Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering 

Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 

Our review was conducted from January 2004 through May 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and 

Schedule Variance 

Page 38 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Since Cluster 1 entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor has 

overrun cost estimates by almost $93 million-–nearly 28 percent above 

what was planned. We used contractor cost performance reports to assess 

the prime contractor’s progress toward meeting the Army’s cost and 

schedule goals during the period August 2003-January 2005. The 

government routinely uses such reports to independently evaluate the 

prime contractor’s performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in 

cost and schedule relative to expectations established under the contract. 

Deviations are referred to as variances. Positive variances—activities 

costing less or completed ahead of schedule—are considered as good 

news, and negative variances—activities costing more or falling behind 

schedule—as bad news. 

Although the program attempted to stabilize cost growth by adding 

approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, the cost 

variance continued to decline steadily thereafter.1

 Key issues driving the 

cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated with developing the 

hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other software. As a 

result, the unit costs for early prototypes have increased from the prime 

contractor’s original proposal. In January 2005, the prime contractor 

estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and waveform 

development would be $531 million more than was originally budgeted, 

reaching about $898 million at completion (see fig. 8). However, the 

program office noted that, since contract award, the prime contractor has 

not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management techniques. 

 1

The program attempted to stabilize the contractor cost variance by initiating an over-thetarget baseline (OTB) in January 2004. An OTB is a reprogramming effort or “recovery 

plan” that adds budget to a contract for either future work or in-process work when the 

original objectives cannot be met. The primary purpose of an OTB is to improve managerial 

control over the execution of the remaining work in a project. A project manager may 

conclude that the baseline is no longer adequate to provide valid performance 

measurement information relative to the remaining work and therefore consider initiating 

an OTB. 

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and 

Schedule Variance 
Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and 

Schedule Variance 

Page 39 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development from 

August 2003 to January 2005 

Cluster 1 has also experienced unfavorable schedule variance. Figure 9 

indicates that the contractor increasingly fell behind schedule during the 

period August 2003-January 2005. If a program is not only overrun in costs, 

but is also behind schedule, additional costs can be expected because of 

potential schedule slippage or from acceleration of the effort to finish on 

time. The schedule variance stabilized briefly after the program 

rebaselined in January 2004, but then it continued to increase again. 2

 By 

January 2005, the value of planned work that the contractor was behind 

schedule was about $25 million. Delays in software build completions, 

software/hardware integration, and the delivery of key technologies to the 

waveform developers have contributed to schedule problems. 

 2

The OTB added 4 months to the acquisition schedule. 

-100,000

-90,000

-80,000

-70,000

-60,000

-50,000

-40,000

-30,000

-20,000

-10,000

0

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

.

Oct.

Aug

Sept.

.

July

May

June

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

.

Oct.

Aug.

Sept.

Dollars in thousands

Source: GAO analysis based on data provided by Defense Contract Management Agency.

2003 2004 2005

Over target baseline
Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and 

Schedule Variance 

Page 40 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development 

from August 2003 to January 2005 

-100,000

-90,000

-80,000

-70,000

-60,000

-50,000

-40,000

-30,000

-20,000

-10,000

0

10,000

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

Aug.

Sept.

Dollars in thousands

Source: GAO analysis based on data provided by Defense Contract Management Agency.

2003 2004 2005

Over target baseline
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-05-669 Defense Acquisitions (120283) 
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