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INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER

THE US—VISIT PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND BORDER SECURITY

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 28, 2004

Serial No. 108–34

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG,T1 ARIZONA

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, MississPpi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director 

STEVEN CASH, Democrat Staff Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY

DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman 

KAY GRANGER, Texas, Vice Chairwoman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST ISTOOK, Oklahoma 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK SOUDER, Indiana 

JOHN SWEENEY, New York 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Ex Officio 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Ranking 

Member

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ex Officio

(II) 
(III)

CONTENTS 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Vice Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and 

Border Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Committee on Infrastructure 

and Border Security ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepapred Statement ........................................................................................... 9

The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Florida ......................................................................................................... 13

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 47

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 10

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of 

Prepapred Statement ........................................................................................... 14

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey ............................................................................................. 12

The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona .................................................................................................... 43

The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York ................................................................................................ 11 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security 

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19

The Honorable Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 

Department of State 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30

Mr. James May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 57

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 58

Ms. Kathleen Campbell Walker, Testifying on Behalf of American 

Immigration Lawyers Association and Foreign Trade Association, Inc. 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61
Page

IV

Mr. Dennis Carlton, Director of Washington Operations, International 

Biometric Group, LLC 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 71

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 73

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Questions and Responses of The Honorable Maura Harty .................................. 85

Questions and Responses of The Honorable Asa Hutchinson .............................. 93

Questions and Responses of Air Transport Association of America.Inc. ............. 110

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Questions and Responses of Mr. Dennis A. Carlton ............................................. 111

Prepared Statement of Mr. Edward K. Pultorak .................................................. 112

Prepared Statement of Mr. J. Clark Robinson, President, International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions .................................................... 114

Prepared Statement of The Travel Industry Association of America .................. 116
(1)

INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER 

THE US—VISIT PROGRAM 

Wednesday, January 28, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:04 a.m., in Room 

345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Kay Granger [vice-chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Granger, Dunn, Diaz–Balart, Shadegg, 

Sweeney, Cox, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Pascrell, Turner and 

Christensen. 

Ms. GRANGER. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Infrastructure 

and Border Security hearing will come to order. 

As vice chair of the subcommittee, I am sitting in for Chairman 

Dave Camp who is prevented from attending by a Michigan snow 

storm. I know we will all understand that. 

I would like to welcome and thank you for attending today’s 

hearing. 

I see that the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands is here. 

The chair asks for unanimous consent that Ms. Christensen be 

allowed to sit and question the panel. 

Today’s business is to receive testimony regarding the new border management system to record the arrival and departure of foreign nationals into the U.S.—the United States Visitor and Immigrants Status Indicator Technology program, which we call US–

VISIT. 

This hearing will have two panels. The subcommittee will hear 

first from Border and Transportation Security Undersecretary Asa 

Hutchinson from the Department of Homeland Security, and Consular Affairs Assistant Secretary Maura Harty from the Department of State. 

We will then hear from a second panel comprised of James May, 

the president and CEO of the Air Transport Association; Kathleen 

Campbell Walker, a member of the board of directors of the El 

Paso Foreign Trade Association and a member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association; and Dennis Carlton, the director of 

Washington operations for the International Biometric Group. 

Thank you all for your participation. 

The subcommittee is also expecting several additional statements 

from outside groups that will be included in the hearing record. 
2

The chair would like to remind members that we have two very 

qualified panels here with a great deal to contribute to the discussion of the US–VISIT program. 

In order to allow sufficient time for their testimony and questions, the chair will urge members to give short statements and to 

submit their full opening statements for the record. The record will 

remain open for ten days after the close of the hearing. Members 

are advised that they will receive an additional three minutes during the question time if they waive their opening statement. 

The chair will begin with a short opening statement. 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the need 

to improve our national security by improving integrity in the U.S. 

immigration system. 

As a nation, we must have reliable methods for identifying aliens 

who are inadmissible to the country as well as those who overstay 

their lawful admission period. 

At the same time, we cannot create policies or programs that discourage or delay or prevent legitimate travel, commerce and tourism. 

The US–VISIT is an extensive border management system developed to monitor the arrival and departure of foreign nationals within the United States and to improve the reliability and security of 

their travel documents. 

The US–VISIT program will be implemented in phases over the 

next several years to comply with congressional mandate. 

As envisioned, foreign nationals traveling to the United States 

will have their fingerprints captured and authenticated at U.S. 

ports of entry. This biometric information we enter into and compare with prints already in the automated biometric identification 

system called IDENT. 

Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the individual 

exits the country to confirm identity. 

The alien’s biographic information, including name and place of 

birth, are checked through the Interagency Border Inspection Systems, IBIS, which includes law enforcement, immigration and intelligence databases to determine whether the individual is a threat 

to national security, public safety or is otherwise inadmissible. 

Travelers entering the U.S. through the visa waiver program will 

not be affected by the biometrical requirements of US–VISIT. This 

program allows nationals from 27 countries to enter the U.S. as 

temporary visitors without first obtaining a visa. 

Travelers entering through this program are still screened 

through the IBIS database. However, under current law, by October 26, 2004, visa-waiver countries have to issue biometric passports. Under this mandate, the biometric requirement for visawaiver travelers will be similar under US–VISIT. 

The State Department plays a complementary role in the US–

VISIT program. State is in the process of equipping overseas embassies and consular posts with the ability to capture biometrics at 

the time of interview. 

The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the visa 

information from State with that taken at primary inspection, Customs and Border Protection inspectors will have additional assurance that an alien’s visa is reliable. 
3

Currently 50 consular posts are equipped to capture fingerprints 

and photographs, and the remaining facilities are on schedule to 

begin capturing biometrics by the congressional deadline of October 

26, 2004. 

In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the implementation 

of phase one at Hartsville-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta. 

During the voluntary pilot, over 20,000 individuals were screened 

through US–VISIT. And the system turned up over 20 hits on inadmissible or wanted people. 

DHS estimates that capturing the biometric information adds approximately 15 to 18 extra seconds to an individual’s processing 

time. 

On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for all arriving visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports. 

Two pilot programs for the exit component are under way at Baltimore–Washington National Airport and the Port of Miami. 

A persistent issue in all border security programs is finding the 

right balance between security and legitimate travel for tourism 

and commerce. There is concern from several stakeholders about 

the impact US–VISIT will have on travel and trade, particularly at 

the land borders. Some fear that the program will create massive 

delays at border crossings. 

The United States has more than 300 land, air and sea ports of 

entry where international travelers are inspected and permitted to 

enter the United States. Each year, more than 500 million people 

enter the United States. This hearing will provide an opportunity 

to explore the implementation at the land border and the different 

options under considerations for the rollout. 

Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in different plans and proposals for the ports of entry. Any additional 

delays will have serious consequence for communities on both sides 

of the border. 

Over time, US–VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of the 

border security system. 

The US–VISIT will improve the accuracy and consistency of detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity and 

determining traveler admissibility. 

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. I will 

conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the record.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KAY GRANGER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND VICE CHAIR, INFRASTRUCTURE

AND BORDER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need to improve national security by improving integrity in the U.S. immigration system. As a nation, 

we must have reliable methods for identifying aliens who are inadmissible to the 

country as well as those who overstay their lawful admission periods. At the same 

time, we can not create policies or programs that discourage, delay or prevent legitimate travel, commerce, and tourism. 

The US–VISIT Program is an extensive border management system developed to 

monitor the arrival and departure of foreign nationals within the United States and 

to improve the reliability and security of their travel documents. 

The US–VISIT Program will be implemented in phases over the next several 

years to comply with Congressional mandates. As envisioned, foreign nationals traveling to the United States will have their fingerprints captured and authenticated 

at US ports of entry. This biometric information will be entered into and compared 

with prints already in the Automated Biometric Identification System called 
4

IDENT. Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the individual exits the 

country to confirm identity. 

The alien’s biographic information, including name and place of birth, are checked 

through the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), which includes law enforcement, immigration and intelligence databases to determine whether the individual is a threat to national security, public safety, or is otherwise inadmissible. 

Travelers entering the U.S. through the Visa Waiver Program will not be affected 

by the biometric requirements of US–VISIT. This program allows nations from 27 

countries to enter the U.S. as temporary visitors without first obtaining a visa. 

Travelers entering through this program are still screened through the IBIS database. However, under current law, by October 26, 2004 Visa Waiver countries have 

to issue biometric passports. Under this mandate, the biometric requirements for 

Visa Waiver travelers will be similar to those under US–VISIT. 

The State Department plays a complementary role in the US–VISIT Program. 

State is in the process of equipping overseas embassies and consular posts with the 

ability to capture biometrics at the time of the interview. 

The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the visa information from 

State with that taken at primary inspection, Customs and Border Protection Inspectors will have additional assurance that an alien’s visa is reliable. Currently, 50 consulate posts are equipped to capture fingerprints and photographs and the remaining facilities are on schedule to begin capturing biometrics by the Congressional 

deadline of October 26, 2004. 

In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the implementation of Phase One at 

Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta. During the voluntary pilot over 

20,000 individuals were screened through US–VISIT and the system turned up over 

20 hits on inadmissible or wanted people. DHS estimates that capturing the biometric information adds approximately 15–18 extra seconds to an individual’s processing time. On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for all arriving 

visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports. Two pilot programs for the Exit component are underway at Baltimore Washington International (BWI) Airport and the 

Port of Miami. 

A persistent issue in all border security programs is finding the right balancing 

between security and legitimate travel for tourism and commerce. There is concern 

from several stakeholders about the impact US–VISIT will have on travel and trade, 

particularly at the land borders. Some fear that the program will create massive 

delays at border crossings. The United States has more than 300 land, air, and sea 

ports of entry where international travelers are inspected and permitted to enter the 

United States. Each year, more than 500 million people enter the U.S. This hearing 

will provide an opportunity to explore the implementation at the land border and 

the different options under consideration for the roll-out. 

Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in different plans and 

proposals for land ports of entry. Any additional delays will have serious consequences for communities on both sides of the border. 

Over time, US–VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of the border security 

system. The US–VISIT Program will improve the accuracy and consistency of detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining 

traveler admissibility. 

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the record.

The chair now recognizes Ms. Sanchez, the ranking member of 

the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security for any 

statement she may have. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you Madam Chair. 

And it is a shame that Chairman Camp could not be here, but we 

will slog on, as they say. 

I appreciate all of you here today also. 

Welcome back to our former colleague. 

Because this US–VISIT program is very important to us, I doubt 

that there is one member on this subcommittee who disagrees how 

important and with the aims of this program. 

But I have to admit that some of us on this subcommittee wonder if the US–VISIT program, as it currently operates, is really the 

most effective tool to deter potential terrorism for the United 

States. 
5

Also, Customs and Border Protection officers are already being 

stretched thin under the new US–VISIT entry system. And we still 

have not really added the exit system and implementing phase two 

and phase three. 

I think we will only strain them further. 

A true entry-exit system makes a lot more sense than the system 

that US–VISIT is in the process of checking people as they arrive 

in the country but having no idea when they have left. 

I also think that most of us believe it is a good idea to have more 

sophisticated visas and passports that contain more information 

about these people, including the biometric information that can 

give us a better verification of a person’s identity. 

And I know that others share them, are with the efficiency of the 

US–VISIT as a security tool, and also with the implementation of 

this program. 

I know that the program will enhance security to some degree, 

but I am wonder how much. If the visa-waiver countries are not 

required to participation in the US–VISIT, then isn’t that a big security hole? 

I know that there are also plans for secure passports from these 

visa-waiver countries. We were just in Europe discussing some of 

these issues with some of those countries, some of which, to tell 

you the truth, are having some difficulty trying to figure how they 

are really going to comply with this by the deadline that we set. 

I guess I don’t understand the relationship between the US–

VISIT program and this issue of the biometrics involved in the 

passports of these visa-waiving countries. For example, will there 

be different databases used? 

And my number one concern is simply the overextension of the 

people that we have doing this work. Are we making enough investment in personnel and the infrastructure necessary to ensure 

that all these components come together and that in fact we have 

a system that is going to work for entry and exit into this country? 

Because the implementation of phase one of the US–VISIT 

means that the entry and exit data from airplane passenger manifests at the 115 airports and the cruise-ship passenger manifests 

at the 14 seaports must be reconciled, thereby being able to tell us 

if people are actually overstaying their visas. 

It is a very complicated issue. And so I hope that today you can 

shed some light on this. 

I would just give one example that I just see as being a major 

problem. Because right now, the checkouts that we have is this 

pilot program with the kiosk at the airport, for example. What if 

somebody forgets to do that or does not do that? 

And then they are a legitimate good person, they are coming 

back into the country the next time, and now we have all these 

false positives and we have got to pull these people aside, and it 

requires more resources and more of our time. 

And in talking to some of my customs and border people, they 

are already feeling like they are being pulled off of cargo inspections in order to do green card holders and others to try to get the 

entry portion of this US–VISIT going. 
6

So maybe what we are doing is, possibly making ourselves safer 

in one aspect, but really taking the eye off another area that might 

be of concern to us, that of checking the cargo. 

So I look forward to hearing from our panels and getting some 

answers to these question. 

And, again, thank you, Madam Chairman, for the time and for 

having this hearing. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

The chairman now recognizes Representative Cox, chairman of 

the Homeland Security Select Committee for any statement he may 

have. 

Mr. COX. Thank you Madam Vice Chairman. 

Let me begin by commending our absent Subcommittee Chairman Camp, who as you heard is bogged down in a Michigan snowstorm, for scheduling this important hearing today. I know he did 

a lot of work on this and looked for to being here, and he would 

be very pleased to welcome our witnesses himself. 

This is important to him and to all of us because our country 

faces no greater challenge today than monitoring over 300 U.S. 

ports of entry for potential terrorist crossings, while at the same 

time facilitating the legitimate trade and travel and tourism that 

are the hallmarks of our free society. 

The US–VISIT program is designed to meet this challenge. And 

our witnesses today will give us an update on the progress we are 

making. 

I am especially pleased to welcome back Undersecretary Asa 

Hutchinson to this committee. I, along with many on this committee, know him as an esteemed former colleague and a friend, 

and most importantly, as an extraordinarily capable leader who is 

well equipped to lead the Department of Homeland Security on border transportation and security issues. 

Since assuming his position, Undersecretary Hutchinson has supervised one of the largest reorganizations of our government in 

history. 

Among other accomplishments, his tenure has seen the successful implementation of the first phase of the US–VISIT program on 

schedule and indeed ahead of schedule with respect to the use of 

biometric identifiers. 

The department should be commended for meeting the statutory 

requirement and deadline for an automated entry and exit system. 

And all air-and sea-port passenger arrival and departure information is now collected and processed through the US–VISIT program. This gives us the ability for the first time in our history to 

create a list of those overstay their visas. 

Undersecretary Hutchinson, we look forward to hearing from you 

today on how DHS is implementing this program at our air and sea 

ports of entry. We were especially interested in your plan for the 

eventual rollout of the program to all of our border points of entry, 

including land ports, and the handshake that US–VISIT will make 

with interior enforcement. 

I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Harty on the State Department’s efforts to ensure greater security with respect to visa 

applicants. The State Department can also inform us of the status 
7

of the 27 visa-waiver countries we have asked to add biometric 

identifiers to their passports. 

The role of the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs 

has been vital to the effective implementation of US–VISIT. Consular officials at 211 visa processing posts are the frontline in our 

efforts to prevent would-be terrorists from entering the United 

States. 

When precise biometric data is captured overseas and linked in 

real time to the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies, we will be able to screen each visa applicant against 

federal law enforcement databases and terrorist watch lists. 

We will also be able to ensure that a person arriving at one of 

our ports of entry is the same person who obtained a visa at our 

overseas consulate. 

The US–VISIT program is a work in progress. But it is a work 

that is moving ahead very rapidly. 

During the recently concluded pilot phase at Atlanta’s Hartsville 

International Airport, US–VISIT stopped several dangerous criminals and others using false information from entering the United 

States. 

The biometric enter-exit system contemplated by US–VISIT will 

add integrity to our immigration progress. Just as importantly, it 

is consistent with maintaining a defining American tradition: opening our nation to legitimate travel, business and tourism. 

In just 15 seconds per visit, US–VISIT adds a layer of protection 

to our border security system and permits our Border Protection officers to focus their efforts on those that warrant closer scrutiny. 

But as I say, this is a work in progress and we have a lot more 

hard work to do. 

The US–VISIT program has not yet integrated all of the existing 

law enforcement and terrorist databases into its search capabilities. This is a complex task, and it needs additional attention. 

And while the rollout of the entry portion of the solution has 

achieved great success, the exit portion of the program is not yet 

fully delved with respect to the capture of biometric data. This, too, 

is an important element because it allows the system to verify that 

the person leaving our country is the same person who entered. 

We also need additional procedural guidance for travelers trying 

to comply with the biometric exit requirements of the US–VISIT 

program. 

There are many questions about how this exit system actually 

will be implemented. 

There are also many questions about the eventual rollout of the 

US–VISIT program at all of our land ports of entry. 

Current law requires that DHS expand the entry-exit program to 

the top 50 high-traffic land border ports by December 31st of this 

year and the remaining entry points by December 31, 2005. 

Is this a realistic goal? Do we have the technology? Do we have 

the other essential infrastructure in place to accommodate this 

plan without severely compromising the free flow of goods and people. 

Finally, under the visa-waiver program, citizens of 27 nations are 

not required to obtain visas to enter the United States and thus 

are not part of the US–VISIT program. But under current law, 
8

these countries will have to encode all of their newly issued passports with biometric data beginning on October 26th of this year. 

Reports indicate that the majority of the 27 visa-waiver countries 

will not be able to meet this deadline. As a result, current law 

could be interpreted to require that the citizens of these countries 

obtain visas. This would cause a dramatic increase in visa applications to our consulates and strain relations with our closest allies. 

It is also uncertain whether we would be able to accommodate 

any such increase in applications. 

Next month, members of this committee will visit Miami, the 

U.S. Virgin Islands and Guantanamo Bay as part of our homeland 

security oversight responsibilities. We will examine security at air 

and sea ports in those locations, and we will witness the US–VISIT 

program in practice. 

This visit will be another expression of the committee’s interest 

in this important program and of our intention to exercise responsible and effective oversight in this area. 

Again, I want to thank our witnesses for coming to today’s hearing. 

I want to thank our vice chairman for your consideration during 

this opening statement, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair will now recognize Ranking Member Turner for any 

statements he may have. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I am very pleased that the subcommittee has taken up the issue 

of US–VISIT. Over the past two days I have been watching some 

of the hearings before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks and the witnesses that have appeared before the commission. 

And those hearings remind us once again of the gravity of the responsibility that we have before us. 

This Select Committee on Homeland Security is very much the 

place where this issue must be vigorously examined and where we 

must exercise strong oversight. 

We all have a duty to make America safer. 

And I thank the chairman and the ranking member of this subcommittee for calling this hearing. 

One month into the launch of US–VISIT is certainly the time to 

ensure that we begin rigorous oversight. 

Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of the program as a 

counterterrorism tool. And while I believe that US–VISIT has potential, there are many questions that we must all be willing to address. 

First, will the US–VISIT program be implemented with a comprehensive terrorist watch list so as to be most effective in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected terrorists. 

Secondly, do the program’s current exemptions as to who must 

participate create vulnerabilities that diminish the effectiveness of 

US–VISIT as a counterterrorism tool? 

And thirdly, can it be implemented effectively at all of our air, 

sea and land ports of entry? 

Obviously, much of the success of US–VISIT depends upon intelligence information. I am a strong believer that border security systems and programs are only as good as the intelligence they are 
9

able to access. The information must be reliable and provided to 

those who make decisions allowing the entry of foreign visitors to 

our country in a time frame that is meaningful. And I look forward 

to hearing testimony that addresses these issues. 

I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we must 

not change the vision of America as a welcoming nation. We are 

enriched by the cultural, political and social contributions of those 

who visit our country. 

As a Texan, I am also very much aware of the economic need to 

ensure that our borders function smoothly, that our homeland and 

economic security are closely linked, and that if we are to succeed 

in securing our homeland, facilitating cross-border trade and travel 

must be a part of the equation. 

We can achieve all of these goals—homeland security and growth 

and trade and travel—if our vision includes the willingness to 

make the necessary investments in ports of entry in our border and 

border communities. 

We know that implementing US–VISIT is not going to be easy. 

The challenges are greatest at our land borders. Land border crossings are fundamentally different from airports and seaports. You 

don’t receive much advanced data on people or cargo coming to a 

land border crossing. At many border crossings, you have to deal 

with both passenger and cargo inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving the United States, our border communities 

pay a high price. 

Lastly, US–VISIT implementation at our land borders must involve the full participation of our neighbors to the north and the 

south. If US–VISIT is going to be effective, we must work with 

Mexico and Canada to ensure that implementation does not result 

in a gridlocked border that benefits no one. If we can secure the 

full cooperation of our neighbors, implementing US–VISIT will be 

much more likely. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today. 

And again I thank the chairman of the full committee and the 

chairman of this subcommittee for holdings this hearing at this 

time. 

I thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

I am very pleased that this subcommittee has taken up the issue of US–VISIT. 

Over the past two days I have been paying careful attention to the hearings before 

the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks and the testimony of witnesses before that Commission. The hearings once again remind us of the gravity of the responsibility before us—that this Select Committee on Homeland Security has the 

very great obligation to find existing holes in homeland security and address those 

vulnerabilities. 

We have a duty to make America safer. 

I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member in calling for this hearing. One 

month into the launch of US–VISIT it is certainly time to ensure that we have rigorous oversight of the program. 

Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of this program as a counter-terrorism 

tool. While I believe US–VISIT has potential, there are many issues that need to 

be addressed:

• Will the US–VISIT program be implemented with a comprehensive terrorist 

watch list, so as to be most effective in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected terrorists? 
10

• Do the program’s current exemptions as to who must participate create 

vulnerabilities that diminish the effectiveness of US–VISIT as a counter-terrorism tool? 

• Can it be implemented effectively at all of our air, sea and land ports of 

entry? 

Much of the success of US–VISIT depends on intelligence information. 

I am a strong believer that border security systems and programs are only as good 

as the intelligence they are able to access. The information must be reliable, and 

provided to those who make decisions allowing the entry of foreign visitors to our 

country. 

I look forward to hearing testimony that addresses these issues. 

I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we must not change the 

vision of America as a welcoming nation. We are enriched by the cultural, political 

and social contributions of those who visit our country. 

As a Texan, I also understand the economic need to ensure that our borders function smoothly, that our homeland and economic security are closely linked and that 

if we are to succeed in securing our homeland, facilitating cross border trade and 

travel must be a part of the equation. 

We can achieve all of these goals- homeland security and economic security—if 

our vision includes investing in ports of entry and in the border and border communities. 

We know that US–VISIT implementation is not going to be easy. The challenge 

is greatest at our land borders. Land border crossings are fundamentally different 

from air ports and sea ports. You do not receive much advance data on the people 

or cargo coming across the border. At many border crossings you have to deal with 

both passenger and cargo inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving 

the US, our border communities pay the price. 

Lastly, US–VISIT implementation at our land borders must involve the full participation of our neighbors to the north and the south. If US–VISIT is going to be 

effective, we must work with Mexico and Canada to ensure that implementation 

does not result in a gridlocked border that benefits no one. If we cannot secure the 

cooperation of our neighbors in implementing the US–VISIT system, it simply will 

not succeed. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Dunn, who serves as 

vice chair of the full committee. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

I am glad we have a full house today because it is important that 

we all understand exactly how this program came into being and 

where it is going. 

The US–VISIT program has been the focus of much attention in 

the last few months. And I look forward to learning about the 

progress, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security 

is making in implementing the new system at airports and seaports. 

I also look forward to discussing the challenges that are certain 

to come along with the starting of such a program at our land border crossings. 

This program is of particular interest to this committee because 

it is an example of federal partnership that were envisioned during 

the actual creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The US–VISIT program is a result of the pooled resources of and 

the open communication among the State Department, TSA, the 

Department of Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement—or 

ICE as we now know it—and Customs and Border Protection. 

The program is of particular interest to me because I come from 

Washington State, a border state, where residents and businesses 

depend on open lanes at the border to get themselves or their goods 

to or from a Canadian destination on time. 
11

We are committed to maintaining American strong trade partnerships while continuing to be innovative with programs at the 

borders to track the movement of people and goods. 

The Department of Homeland Security will turn one year old in 

just about a month. In that time, it has developed and implemented ground breaking programs at the borders. 

The One Face at the Border Initiative is one example that comes 

to my mind, and another, of course, is US–VISIT. 

For the first time, we will be able to track foreign visitors. We 

will be able to cut down on identification document fraud. And we 

will make use of numerous databases to identify terrorist suspects 

before they enter this country. 

I will have questions that relate to a number of areas. 

For example, as we move toward the more complex exit portion 

of the system, I will be curious about your strategy, Director 

Hutchinson, for collaborating with airport operators such as those 

at Sea–Tac and others in my state but, also, all over the country. 

I would like to know if the new US–VISIT database links up 

with and interfaces with others, for example, as Congressman 

Turner suggested, the terrorist watch list. 

I know you agree we must not forget about commerce as it moves 

across our borders: What specific steps is the US–VISIT team taking to make sure that we don’t stop traffic at our ports of entry and 

slow the movement of commerce? 

And lastly, I realize that upgrading all United States passports 

will need to include biometric data and that that is a huge undertaking. 

And I will be curious, Ms. Harty, to see how you see this new 

priority changing the daily operations of the United States embassies and consulates around the world. 

I yield back. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chairman now recognizes Representative Dicks for any statement he may have. 

Mr. DICKS. I want to welcome our witnesses, but I am going to 

keep my time for questions. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Sweeney for any statements he may have. 

Mr. SWEENEY. I thank the vice chairwoman. I am going to submit for the record. I think it is important that we hear from our 

witnesses. I, as you know, Vice Chairwoman, I have to leave at 12 

o’clock for a meeting, but I will come back. 

I just want to make two brief statements and thank the witnesses for being here. 

Yesterday I, too, watched the testimony of the 9/11 commission. 

Customs Inspector Jose Melendez–Perez testified. It is widely believed that that inspector kept the 20th hijacker out. However, unfortunately 19 others were let in. 

I most particularly—this may be a rehash for some—really would 

like to hear the witnesses expound on how this system will have 

the desired effect of changing that process within the nation. 

And I also want to congratulate the Secretary, because as I understand it, the department is some nine months ahead of schedule 
12

on a number of directives. And it is at a time when there is waning 

confidence. Because of all the confusion it is nice. I think that is 

an important point that we stress so the American people understand we are moving in the right direction. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for any statements he may have. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

I want to welcome good friend, Asa Hutchinson, who did a terrific job at the DEA and is doing a great job at Homeland Security. 

Richard Reid was a British citizen—better known as the ‘‘shoe 

bomber.’’ And Zacarias Moussaoui—I believe I am pronouncing that 

correctly—was a French citizen. They arrived here legally, as far 

as know—as far as I have been able to ascertain—from exempt 

countries. 

And I hope that we keep this in mind as we, Madam Chair, look 

through this very important effort to implement the Patriot Act. 

After all, this comes out of the Patriot Act. 

And everything that comes out of the Patriot Act is under careful 

scrutiny by this Congress—and should be. 

When our rights are reviewed, substantiated, supported I think, 

Mr. Hutchinson, you would agree that—and this is my opening 

statement, I realize that—that that is the main business of why we 

are in the Congress in the first place. 

The attacks of September the 11, 2001, emphasize the urgent 

need to secure the visa-issuance process at our consulates and the 

inspections process at our ports of entry. 

We all know the grim truth: All 19 hijackers entered United 

States ports easily. 

This can simply never happen again. 

Yet our country is still vulnerable. That is why we are discussing 

this. Our borders are still arguably too porous, too penetrable. 

This, of course, is the uncomfortable reality of homeland security. 

While we need to act with absolutely urgency to improve our security levels, to do so in a truly effective manner often takes time. 

We see this with the US–VISIT program. In concept, security our 

borders to protect our nation by identifying every person who enters the country is an ideal solution. I think the government, we 

all agree, has a right to know who is coming into this country and 

who is leaving. We have a right to know that as a very basic tenet 

of securing our neighborhoods and our streets. 

In reality, this is an enormous undertaking. It will be costly. And 

many times it will be inconvenient. It will take time. And as we 

have already seen, it can be ineffective as well as being effective. 

There are big holes in the program’s ability to work. Among 

other shortfalls, it does not compare the foreign nationals entering 

this country against a list that we have waited for a long time: the 

integrated terrorist watch list. You have heard that mentioned before I bring it up. That is critical. 

It would seem to me that that should be the main priority that 

will help our law enforcement agencies, both national and local, 

now that we have opened up the process of communication, for the 

first time in a long time. 
13

Individuals from 27 countries participating in the visa waiver are 

currently exempt from the US–VISIT. In an age where terrorism 

can strike any place, this to me is non-sensical. 

Additionally, there are still serious questions about the general 

ability of biometric identifiers. We know that we have used the biographic identifiers in the past. We will continue to use that. 

And I am interested to find out whether you are going to add 

fees to the biographic ones that already exist. 

To say the least, while we need to secure our ports is critical, we 

have a long way to go before we effectively accomplish this goal. 

This hearing will give us an exemplary opportunity to discuss 

where we are in this difficult process, where we are expected to be 

in the future, how we can help, because that is what we are all 

about. We are all on the same page. 

I look forward to the remarks. 

And I thank you, Madam Chair, for your courtesy. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Lincoln Balart for any 

statement he may have. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And I join in welcoming our distinguished guests this morning. 

It is important, I think, to put a spotlight on the issue of US–

VISIT. It is a critical issue. Protecting our citizens from future terrorist attack is of the highest priority, not only for me as a representative from southern Florida, but as a member of this committee. 

Our physical land borders and ports of entry must remain a critically important line of defense. And I believe the department, with 

the leadership of Undersecretary Hutchinson, is doing just that. 

I look forward to monitoring the progress of US–VISIT to ensure 

that it is an effective tool in protecting the homeland and not just 

a hindrance for travel and a deterrence to tourism into the United 

States. 

We must find the appropriate balance that allows the department to utilize the most effective tools to combat terrorism and allows commerce and transit to flow. 

I would like to use this opportunity to raise another issue that 

is critical to South Florida: the international transit program, ITI. 

The ITI program allows certain international air passengers to 

travel through the United States for transit purposes without first 

obtaining a visa. These are international passengers whose final 

destination is not the United States, but transfer at the airport on 

to another international flight. 

The suspension of ITI, and in particular the suspension of the 

Miami International Airport’s use of its secure transit lounges, 

could have an adverse impact on South Florida. 

MIA receives more ITI passengers than any other U.S. airport. 

America Airlines alone carries approximately 700,000 ITI passengers annually into Miami International Airport. 

Iberia Airlines of Spain carries approximately 250,000 ITI passengers annually. 

Iberia Airlines, which uses MIA as hub for in-transit passengers, 

reacted by initiated very serious plans to move their hub to foreign 

airports. This airline alone generates approximately 2,000 jobs and 
14

almost $200 million in business revenue in South Florida’s economy. 

I commend Undersecretary Hutchinson for his attentive response 

by authorizing Miami International Airport’s temporary use of its 

satellite transit lounge. This matter is critical for the well-being of 

South Florida’s economy. 

I look forward to working with Undersecretary Hutchinson to 

find a permanent solution that will protect our homeland and allow 

Miami International Airport to continue as a hub for flights to and 

from Latin America. 

And again, I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Seeing no additional requests for time, we will proceed. 

I would like to again thank our witnesses for being here. 

I am sorry, you are not a member. You are not allowed to make 

an opening statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

The Department of Homeland Security launched US–VISIT at 115 airports and 

14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for US–VISIT is to enhance 

the nation’s security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade through our borders. 

The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at the U.S. consular offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are taken at these offices and used 

to determine whether the applicant is on a database of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. When a foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks 

admission into the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify that the person 

seeking admission is the same person who received the visa. And, another check is 

made for information about any involvement in terrorism or crime. 

US–VISIT also will include departure confirmation systems, including an automated, self-service kiosk where visitors with visas will scan their travel documents 

and repeat the digital finger scanning process. The exit confirmation will be added 

to the visitor’s travel records to demonstrate compliance and record the individual’s 

status for future visits to the United States. 

US–VISIT already has systems in place at airports and cruise ship terminals. In 

addition, Congress has mandated that an automated entry-exit program be implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at all land 

ports of entry by December 31, 2005. 

I am very much in favor of improving security at our borders. I support the efforts 

of the Homeland Security Department to implement new programs that will achieve 

that objective without impeding legitimate travel and trade through our borders. I 

am concerned, however, about whether the US–VISIT program ultimately will be 

successful. 

The difficult challenges that this program faces are set forth in a report issued 

on September 2003, by the General Accounting Office (GAO). According to GAO, the 

scope of US–VISIT is large and complex; it must meet a demanding implementation 

schedule; and its potential cost is enormous. GAO observes in the report that many 

of the difficulties are inherent to the program and cannot easily be changed. However, GAO says, compounding these inherent problems are a number of others that 

are attributable to the program’s current, inadequate state of governance and management. GAO questions whether US–VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland Security Department’s goal of enhancing national security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 

Implementation of the program is not my only concern. Even if the Department 

of Homeland Security is successful in implementing US–VISIT, the program may 

not make our country more secure in any significant way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report (No. 105–197) found that, ‘‘implementing an automated 

entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, with halting the entry of terrorists into the United States, or with any other 

illegal activity at or near the borders. An automated entry-exit control system will 

at best provide information only on those who have overstayed their visas.’’ I am 

not convinced that the Senate Judiciary Committee was wrong. 
15

In its present form, US–VISIT only will apply to foreign visitors seeking admission on the basis of non-immigrant visas. It will not include aliens presenting lawful 

permanent resident documents. It will not include visitors from the 27 countries 

participating in the Visa Waiver Program. Most Canadians are not subject to US–

VISIT. And, it will be years before the system is fully operational at all of the land 

borders. I do not believe that we can rely on this program to secure our borders. 

Thank you.

We will begin with Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security at DHS, Asa Hutchinson. 

We have received your written testimony. I ask you to briefly 

summarize in five minutes your statement. 

I want to add: All the accolades that have been heaped your way 

are certainly deserved. I enjoyed coming into Congress and serving 

with you. And you have done an excellent job in all the ways you 

have served us.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER 

SECRETARY, BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is good to be 

with you and the committee, Ranking Member Sanchez, Chairman 

Cox, Ranking Member of the Full Committee Turner—thank you 

for leadership and your partnership in the development of US–

VISIT. 

And it is a pleasure to be before you today to discuss this important program of the Department of Homeland Security. 

US–VISIT represents the greatest advance in border technology 

in three decades. It is an historic achievement in which we, for the 

first time in history, can use a biometric ability to confirm the identity of those traveling to our country with visas. 

The Department of Homeland Security deployed the first increment of US–VISIT on time, within budget, and has exceeded the 

mandate established by Congress. 

We also met the challenge that was given by Secretary Ridge to 

include biometrics ahead of schedule. 

This US–VISIT is in response to a congressional mandate—the 

leadership of Congress long before the attack on America of September 11 set the stage to develop a comprehensive entry-exit system. 

And some people would like to measure the effectiveness of US–

VISIT simply as a counterterrorism tool. But it is more than that. 

That is an important measuring stick. But also, as Congress well 

knew when it was first mandated, they would also build the integrity of an immigration system to know who overstays a visa, and 

that is also a measuring stick. 

The deterrent value, the reduction of reliance upon fraudulent 

documents and the security of our country all are important goals 

of US–VISIT. 

On January 5, US–VISIT entry procedures were operational at 

115 airports and 14 seaports. 

Our exit procedures, which fully comply with the requirements of 

law, we based upon passenger departure information that will 

allow the Department of Homeland Security to identify visa 

overstays. 
16

In addition, we have begun pilot testing biometric exit procedure 

at one airport and one seaport. 

As of today, more than 600,000 foreign visitors have been processed through US–VISIT entry procedures without increasing wait 

times. And more than 30 known criminals have been prevented 

from entering our country. 

Let me take a few minutes to explain how US–VISIT works. 

Many of you have seen it at our airports already. 

But currently, prior to US–VISIT, at a port of entry many of the 

same procedures were still applicable today as was previously. For 

example, a Customs and Border Protection inspector still reviews 

each visitor’s travel documents, such as a visa and a passport, still 

asks the question about the visitor’s stay in the United States. 

What is new under US–VISIT is that the inspector now uses an 

inkless digital finger scanner to capture two finger scans of arriving, non-immigrant visitors holding visas. The visitor puts the left 

index finger and the right index finger on the scan, and it very 

quickly checks it against the operable databases. This check takes 

a matter of seconds. 

The officer also takes a digital photograph of the visitor. 

The biographic and biometric data are used to verify the identity 

of the visitor against the data captured by the State Department 

to ensure that the person entering the country is the same person 

that receives a visa. 

Those biometrics are also compared against a watch list. 

In addition, the digital picture was taken at the visa issuing post 

that is displayed to the CBP officer allows for a visual comparison. 

These are important tools for Customs and Border Protection officers in their decision whether to admit a visitor to the country or 

not. 

Since the US–VISIT entry procedures were implemented, we 

have significantly increased our capability to uncover criminals, to 

enhance security and to increase the integrity of our visa system. 

A few examples, I think, would be appropriate. And these are all 

since January 5. 

A citizen of Colombia convicted of statutory rape was intercepted 

on January 6 at the Miami International Airport after he failed to 

appear for sentencing in New York City and fled the country. He 

was arrested when he attempted to re-enter the country and 

turned over to New York for sentencing. 

One day later, on January 7, a citizen of El Salvador was caught 

at JFK International Airport in New York City through the use of 

the US–VISIT biometrics. This individual had previously managed 

to leave and re-enter the U.S. 12 times over the past year until he 

was caught by the US–VISIT. He had been convicted of numerous 

driving offenses. 

A citizen of El Salvador was intercept in New York on January 

10th who had previously been convicted of a DUI hit-and-run death 

under another identity. This individual had been able to successfully leave and re-enter the United States despite outstanding warrants for his arrest, including a visit as recently as December 12. 

US–VISIT caught that individual. 

On January 14th, officers in Miami encountered a Peruvian national attempting to enter the United States. He had previously 
17

visited the United States in May of 2003, but his name did not appear on any biographic watch list. A biometric check under US–

VISIT disclosed that he was in fact a convicted cocaine trafficker 

wanted for escaping from a federal prison in 1984. He had previously entered the United States under a fraudulent identity. He 

was caught under US–VISIT. 

The same day in New York City, an officer intercepted a female 

citizen of Trinidad after she had attempted to enter the United 

States under a false identity. She admitted to officers that she had 

paid $2,000 in Trinidad for a new passport and visa under an alternate identity—only caught through the biometrics. 

One day later in Los Angeles, US–VISIT biometric checks resulted in the interception of a Chinese national wanted for probation violations following convictions for wire fraud, conspiracy, food 

stamp trafficking and use of false Social Security numbers. He had 

been attempting to enter the United States through use of a false 

identity. He was successfully caught by US–VISIT. 

A citizen of Russia, on January 16th, attempted to enter New 

York City after he had attempted to enter the United States on an 

alternate identity. He was arrested for an assault case—captured 

by US–VISIT. 

In Tampa, Florida, on January 17th, a citizen of Jamaica attempted to enter the United States but was caught by US–VISIT. 

Officers learned that previously he had been arrested and convicted 

in both federal and state courts on cocaine trafficking charges. He 

had been able to successfully evade detection and enter the United 

States over 40 times in the last year prior to the implementation 

of US–VISIT. 

On January 17th, officers in Miami intercepted a citizen of Honduras after the biometric check disclosed that he had been previously deported from the United States following drug convictions. 

January 18th, officers caught a Colombian national who had 

used five different identities and three different dates of birth as 

he attempted to enter the United States. Because of the US–VISIT 

biometrics, that individual was apprehended. 

In Atlanta, on January 19th, we intercepted a citizen of Mexico 

after she attempted to enter the United States by using false documents. The biometric checks discovered that she had previously attempted to enter the United States in 1996 through the use of false 

documents. 

The illustrations go on and on and on. 

One instance they had used eight different aliases and three different dates of birth, and they were intercepted by US–VISIT. 

And so it is important to note that these important security 

measures currently are capturing those that are attempting to 

enter our country under false identity and with previous convictions, many times under orders to be expelled from the country. 

But it also serves as a deferent as the word goes out that we 

have this capability and you cannot underestimate the importance 

of that deterrent. 

It has not a negative impact on our wait times, which is a commitment that we engaged in from the very beginning as we developed this. 
18

We have respected the privacy of our foreign visitors, and the 

privacy assessment was published prior to the implementation of 

US–VISIT. 

Our partners have been very important in this endeavor. I am 

delighted to be with Maura Harty, assistant secretary at the Department of State. We could not have engaged and had the success 

of US–VISIT without their partnership. That is an ongoing effort, 

and I applaud the efforts of the Department of State in working in 

partnership with us. 

I also appreciate the private sector. James May will be testifying 

later, who has done a terrific job with the ATA in working with us, 

giving us their advice on what are the proper solutions that we 

look to. 

The airlines and airports have all been very valuable partners as 

we have developed this. 

As we look to the future, I know that the job is not finished. And 

clearly, you can look at what has been accomplished and say there 

is much more to be done, and that is absolutely correct. 

I am pleased to advise the committee that today we are submitting to Congress the 2004 spend plan, which gives Congress adequate time to review that in conjunction with the GAO. 

We are pleased with the 2004 spend plan that will outline in a 

little bit more detail what we will be doing as we try to accomplish 

the 2004 deadlines of US–VISIT of implementing this at the 50 

busiest land border ports of entry. And as has been indicated, that 

is a huge list and challenge for us. 

Another part of the 2004 spend plan will be to complete the exit 

portion for our airports. 

We currently have, let me emphasize, the biographic data that 

will allow us to determine visa overstays. We want to be able to 

enhance this with the biometric feature. We are testing this with 

various pilots, one of them being at Baltimore International Airport. We will test it in other arenas to determine what is the best 

exit solution with a biometric that we can work to implement as 

we continue to work with our partners to see what is the best solution. 

We have done this with the 2003 budget of $367 million to 

achieve this successful deployment. In 2004 we have $330 million 

that has been allocated and appropriated by Congress for this purpose. 

The biggest challenges is to do this in the 50 busiest land ports 

by the deadline of December of 2004. 

I wanted to recognize the tremendous work of the program director, Jim Williams, who is behind me, as well as his deputy director, 

Bob Mockney and the entire Homeland Security team that has 

worked together to meet the current goal and will be working with 

the partners on the border to implement the 50 busiest land borders requirement in a way that does not compromise the commerce 

that flows through the border each and every day. 

We are committed to building a program that enhances the integrity of our immigration system by catching the few and expediting the many. And we recognize that the U.S. is leading the way 

internationally in this effort, but we will continue to work with our 

international partners. 
19

[The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON

Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez and other distinguished Members, it 

is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s US–VISIT program and how this fits in with our commitment to protect 

the homeland. 

US–VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our nation’s security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a major step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border enforcement systems. 

US–VISIT procedures are clear, simple, and fast for foreign nationals. Upon arrival at the air or seaport, visitors will see signage that clearly explains the US–

VISIT procedures. This signage, as well as explanatory boarding cards that many 

airlines are distributing to their passengers, is translated into multiple languages 

and features the campaign iconography to ensure people understand what to do 

when they get to the primary inspection booth. 

For foreign visitors traveling with visas, the additional US–VISIT steps are simple. First, the officer directs the visitor to place his or her left index finger on the 

small red window of the digital fingerscanning device. Next, the visitor places his 

or her right index finger on the scanning device. Finally, the officer takes a digital 

photograph of the visitor. These procedures add, on average, 15 seconds to the overall inspection process. There is no ink involved in the digital fingerscanning process. 

The officer will then ask the visitor standard, routine questions about his or her 

visit. The biometric data and biographic information are compared to a series of 

watchlists and databases, and within seconds the officer has the information he or 

she needs to admit the visitor into the country or refer the visitor to secondary inspection for further review. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deployed US–VISIT on time, on 

budget, and has met the mandates established by Congress as well as the challenge 

by the Secretary of Homeland Security to include biometrics (fingerprints) ahead of 

schedule. Senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection management has hailed it as 

the biggest improvement to border inspection in more than three decades. By January 5, 2004, US–VISIT entry procedures were operational at 115 airports (covering 

99 percent of all foreign visitors entering the country by air) and 14 seaports, and 

we began pilot testing biometric exit procedures at one airport and one seaport. As 

of January 23rd, more than 600,000 foreign visitors have been processed under the 

new US–VISIT entry procedures. 

Our border management system impacts the security of our citizens and our visitors, affects billions of dollars in trade and travel, and helps define relations with 

our international partners. There is a need to improve this system and bring it into 

the 21st century with a new integrated system of technological processes that will 

keep our country’s economic and national security strong. This 21st century technology will provide an important step toward achieving the President’s goal of secure U.S. borders. 

In just a few short weeks the first release of US–VISIT has improved the security 

of our citizens and visitors. Our Customs and Border Protection Officers are saying 

that the new tools we have put in place truly help them do their jobs more effectively. They say it’s a major advancement in border control. US–VISIT integrates 

multiple sources of information spanning multiple agencies and departments in 

order to identify visitors who may pose a threat to the security of this country. A 

primary source of information supporting the identification of foreign-born criminal 

violators is the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

(IAFIS) To facilitate the inspectors’ job at the border, the entrants’ screening results 

are processed and displayed on one screen in less than 15 seconds. Included in this 

processing time is the collection of the entrants’ fingerprints and photograph and 

matching certain information with that collected by the Department of State at the 

time of visa issuance. We intercepted a fugitive who had escaped from prison over 

20 years ago. We caught and extradited a felon wanted for manslaughter in San 

Diego. We finally stopped one drug dealer who had entered the U.S. more than 60 

times in the past four years using different names and dates of birth. We continue 

to identify criminals every day at our borders, and on January 19, we supplied crucial biometric information to our partners at the Department of State and prevented 

an individual from ever obtaining a visa. 

The increase in security has not had negative effect on our wait times or our commitment to service. But you don’t have to take my word for it. Albert Park, a Korean visiting his sister and arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport, told 
20

the New York Sun (January 6th edition): ‘‘I expected a lot more delays, but it was 

all pretty smooth,’’ and said, ‘‘It definitely makes me feel safer.’’ 

‘‘We at the airport believe that this is a true enhancement,’’ said Bruce Drum, associate director of the Miami-Dade County Aviation Department.’’ (The Associated 

Press, January 5th) 

And, there was this excerpt from the Washington Post (January 6th): Some travelers who were fingerprinted and photographed at airports across the country yesterday said the security procedures were swift, and most said they were resigned 

to the new rules. ‘‘‘I don’t really mind,’’ said D.C. resident Salome Nnanga, a native 

of Ethiopia. ‘‘I think it’s a very, very good idea to protect the country.’’

We want to ensure that we continue to be a welcoming nation, a nation that invites visitors to study, do business, and relax in our country. We also owe it to our 

citizens and visitors to deny entry to persons wishing to do harm, or who are inadmissible to the U.S. . Few would dispute that these steps are necessary. 

As we evaluate the first month of the program, it seems clear that visitors appreciate the effort we are making to deliver security while simultaneously facilitating 

the process for law-abiding, legitimate travelers. We must continue to respect our 

visitors’ privacy, treat them fairly, and enable them to pass through inspection 

quickly so they can enjoy their visit in our country. As people attempt to enter our 

country, we must know who they are and whether they have committed a crime that 

would make them inadmissible to the U.S. Moreover, as they leave, we must know 

that they have not overstayed the duration of their visa. This ability to verify identity means we can have security and control without impeding legitimate travelers, 

and we can also help protect our welcomed visitors by drastically reducing the possibility of identity theft. 

But we are not finished. This is a complicated job that will take time to complete. 

In fact, US–VISIT is designed to be rolled out in increments to ensure that the foundation is strong and the building blocks are effective. With the deployment of the 

entry components at air and sea ports, we have made a strong beginning, and going 

into 2004, we are on track to meet the December 31, 2004 deadline to integrate 

entry-exit databases at the 50 busiest land border ports of entry and to deploy biometric capabilities to verify certain visa holders. We are seeing that we can accomplish what we set out to do: keep out criminals and terrorists, enhance the integrity 

of our immigration system, facilitate legitimate travel and trade and help protect 

the privacy and identity of our visitors.

A Brief Overview 

The US–VISIT program is a high-priority initiative of DHS. Working with the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other federal agencies, we have 

made great strides in improving overall border management through the collection 

of pre-arrival, arrival, and departure information on foreign visitors and immigrants 

who apply for visas and travel through our nation’s air and seaports. The program 

will ultimately record the entry and exit of certain visa holders at our land ports 

of entry as well. The information will be used to report on the numbers of aliens 

who have overstayed their periods of admission. Ultimately these reports will enable 

DHS to seek aliens who have not departed. 

By recording more complete arrival and departure information, the US–VISIT 

program will meet various Congressional mandates for an integrated, interoperable, 

and automated entry exit system for foreign visitors. More than that, it will also 

enhance the security and safety of citizens, residents, and visitors by verifying foreign national travelers’ identities through the comparison of biometric identifiers, by 

authenticating their travel documents, and by checking their data against appropriate law enforcement and intelligence systems.

The goals of US–VISIT are to:

Enhance the security of our citizens and visitors. 

US–VISIT is a history-making achievement that begins overseas with our partners 

at the Department of State’s visa-issuing posts, and continues upon entry at Customs and Border Protection inspection booths. Already US–VISIT has prevented 30 

people who matched criminal databases from entering the U.S.—one even before the 

visa was issued overseas. And, just by implementing US–VISIT procedures, we have 

sent a warning to those who believe they can skirt the system, to not even try.

Facilitate legitimate travel and trade. 

The Department believes that, over time, US–VISIT will actually speed up the 

processing times. Reports indicate that capturing biometrics (two fingerscans and a 

digital photo) takes less then 15 seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification 

System (IDENT) system takes only seconds to capture the person’s information. The 

CBP Officers often can ask fewer questions once the identity of the visitor has been 
21

captured. Fewer people are being sent for secondary inspection, and the overall time 

to ‘clear’ a plane has not been significantly impacted. We have also developed responsible mitigation strategies if circumstances dictate that wait times have become 

unacceptable at a port of entry. All of these improvements help to keep trade booming and contribute to the economy of our nation.

Ensure the integrity of the immigration system. 

Inherent in the US–VISIT program is its ability to identify fraudulent documents. 

This tool aids in bolstering the integrity of the immigration system. As we test various exit components, we further strengthen the immigration system by identifying 

people who do not comply with the terms of their admission. 

US–VISIT also allows DHS to identify those visitors who have overstayed their 

allotted time in the U.S. and will be available to determine the future admissibility 

of such visitors. Through the use of airline and ship manifests, US–VISIT already 

tracks who has arrived to, and departed from, the U.S. Those departures are 

matched with US–VISIT databases against the recorded entries. Information received from other DHS databases, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or SEVIS, will be used to confirm a visitor’s compliance with U.S. 

immigration policy. Individuals for whom an entry exists, but for whom there is no 

record of departure, are referred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for 

further investigation. If these overstays are located, they may be placed in removal 

proceedings in accordance with applicable immigration laws. 

By providing vital data and assisting in the enforcement of immigration laws, 

US–VISIT strengthens the overall immigration process and ensures the integrity of 

our immigration system.

Safeguard the personal privacy of our visitors. 

Biometric identifiers make it harder to steal someone’s identity even if their travel documents are lost or stolen. This is a significant benefit US–VISIT delivers for 

the millions of legitimate travelers we welcome each year. In addition, we must continue to respect our visitors’ privacy. We have a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 

being reviewed by external audiences and DHS has the first statutorily created 

Chief Privacy Officer, Nuala O’Connor Kelly. Ms. O’Connor Kelly along with the 

US–VISIT privacy officer has worked closely with privacy experts at the Office of 

Management and Budget, and with independent privacy consultants to prepare a 

PIA that addresses the beginning increments of this program.

The Identity Verification Continuum 

The Department of Homeland Security and Department of State together have 

created an entire continuum of identity verification measures that begins overseas, 

when a traveler applies for a visa, and continues upon entry and exit from this 

country. Today, more than 50 visa-issuing posts have begun to capture fingerscans 

and photographs of foreign nationals when they apply for visas, regardless of their 

country of origin. This process will be in place at all 211 visa-issuing posts worldwide by October 2004. 

US–VISIT supports pre-entry processes by using information from the Advance 

Passenger Information system (biographic, biometric, and previous travel and visa 

information) to match information to watchlists. This pre-entry processing establishes a single identity for each foreign national that will be used in all interactions 

with US–VISIT. 

Program Implementation 

The program is being implemented in increments. The first increment was implemented on December 31 of last year. The other increments will be deployed over 

the coming years with the ultimate goal of having a robust system that can deliver 

all of the US–VISIT goals. The steps to this program include:

Increment 1—12/31/03: 

• Collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals arriving with nonimmigrant 

visas at air and seaports of entry 

• Check admissibility against watchlists using biographic and biometric data 

• Establish exit pilots

Increment 2A—10/26/04: 

• Issue U.S. biometric travel documents following International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) standards (all countries) 

• Visa Waiver Program applicants must have machine readable passports with 

biometric indicators in compliance with ICAO standards 

• Deploy capability to read biometric travel documents at air and sea POEs

Increment 2B—12/31/04: 

• Extend Increment 1 capability to 50 highest volume land POEs

Increment 3—12/31/05: 
22

• Extend Increment 2B to remaining land POEs

Increment 4: 

• Launch initial roll-out of US–VISIT envisioned system

US–VISIT’s Budget 

We deployed US–VISIT on budget. During Fiscal Year 2003 we used appropriated funds of $367 million to achieve successful deployment to 115 airports and 14 seaports. Specifically we have: • Implemented/interfaced systems to reduce redundancy and make more information available 

• Upgraded our infrastructure to support added biometrics • Deployed the US–VISIT system to 115 airports and 14 seaports on January 

5, 2004

• Initiated the exit pilot at one airport and one seaport • Established the US–VISIT program office During fiscal year 2004, we have a total of $330 million plus an additional $10 

million in no-year funds that we intend to use to continue meeting our goals. Currently, our fiscal year 2004 Expenditure Plan is in review; when these funds are 

released, we plan to: • Analyze, field test, and initiate deployment of alternative approaches for 

verifying identity on exit at air and sea ports of entry 

• Implement US–VISIT Increment 1 capabilities at the 50 busiest land border 

ports of entry by December 2004

• Install biometric readers at all air, sea, and land ports of entry 

• Continue building our program management capabilities 

In addition, we plan to award a contract to a prime contractor for further development of our end vision. This long-term vision will cover foreign nationals and their 

interactions with U.S. officials before they enter, when they enter, and when they 

exit. This comprehensive approach to border management will lead to the creation 

of a virtual border and will set the course for improved processes for management 

of data on foreign visitors. 

We have also requested that $25 million be released in the interim, while the current year expenditure plan is in review. This will allow us to continue our efforts 

without interruption and avoid impact to the program that delays in schedule may 

cause.

Entry Procedures 

US–VISIT procedures are already in place at more than 50 visa-issuing posts, and 

all 211 visa-issuing posts will be deploying US–VISIT technology by October, 2004. 

By capturing biometrics overseas, before visas are issued, we are working together 

to strengthen national security. 

Once at the port of entry, visitors will find that many of the procedures remain 

unchanged and are familiar to international travelers. For example, a U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Officer still reviews each visitor’s travel documents, such as 

a visa and passport. The officer still asks questions about the visitor’s stay in the 

U.S. 

What’s new under US–VISIT is that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer now uses the inkless, digital ‘‘fingerscanner’’ to capture two ‘‘fingerscans’’ of arriving nonimmigrant visitors holding visas. The visitor puts the left index finger and 

then the right index finger on the scanner. The officer also takes a digital photograph of the visitor. 

The biographic and biometric data are used to check the identity of the visitor 

against the data captured by the State Department to ensure that the person entering the country is the same person who received the visa. Biometrics are also are 

compared against watchlists. At that point, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Officer will either admit the visitor or conduct additional inquiries based on the 

verification results. These procedures reduce fraud, identity theft, and the risk that 

terrorists and criminals will enter the U.S. undetected.

A True Partnership 

The Department is not doing this alone. We are collaborating with other government agencies, most notably the Department of State, to implement US–VISIT and 

inform the traveling public. We are working closely with the air and sea travel industry regarding the requirements of the US–VISIT program, as well as speaking 

with constituencies along the land borders. We see our relationship with these 

groups as a partnership. 

We are also partnering with private industry to develop the best technological solutions. In accordance with our published schedule, a Request For Proposals (RFP) 

was issued in November 2003. The RFP incorporates an acquisition strategy to en-
23

sure that the latest available technologies will be incorporated into US–VISIT. The 

contract for this technology is expected to be awarded in May 2004. 

An important part of the program is public education. Travelers are getting educated about the program before they arrive at the port of entry. We are engaged 

in a worldwide campaign to inform them. This campaign includes public service announcements, signage at ports of entry, explanatory cards on airplanes and cruise 

ships, news media coverage, and on-board explanatory videos.

Statutory Mandates 

The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry exit system 

that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA),

Pub. Law No. 106–215 (2000), 114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 

1365a. 

But there are many other laws that also impact this program. In order to handle 

all of the legal requirements and be able to best monitor the progress, meet the requirements, and measure the success, Secretary Ridge established US–VISIT.

(See Appendix I for details of these statutory mandates.)

We have prepared a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), which is being reviewed 

by external audiences including several privacy advocacy groups. This process is 

being spearheaded by DHS’s Chief Privacy Officer, Ms. O’Connor Kelly, the first 

statutorily mandated privacy officer, to ensure that US–VISIT is in compliance with 

the appropriate privacy rules and regulations. The PIA has been developed and published in the Federal Register, and DHS is currently considering all comments received. 

The Chief Privacy Officer (Ms. Nuala O’Connor Kelly) and the US–VISIT Privacy 

Officer (Steve Yonkers) have met with numerous advocacy, privacy and immigration 

groups to solicit input and hear concerns, which have been taken into account in 

the development of the program. 

The US–VISIT PIA was hailed by many in the privacy community as an excellent 

model of transparency, including detailed information about the program, the technology and the privacy protections.

A copy of the PIA is attached as Appendix II.

Success Stories on Violators and Deployment of US–VISIT 

Since US–VISIT entry procedures were implemented, it has resulted in the interception of dozens of individuals who matched various criminal databases. These included rapists, drug traffickers, credit card and visa fraud criminals, and a convicted armed robber.

Here are details of a few examples. 

(1) Interception of Drug Trafficker who Escaped from Prison 

On January 14, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from Peru was 

traveling to the U.S. When he arrived at the CBP Officer’s booth for admittance, he was enrolled in US–VISIT. His fingerprints matched the ones already 

in a federal criminal database. This man was wanted by the U.S. Marshals for 

escaping from Latuna Federal Correction Facility where he had been serving a 

sentence for a conviction of dealing cocaine. After his escape, an arrest warrant 

was issued. In May of 2003 he re-entered the U.S. without incident. Now, with 

the help of US–VISIT biometric processes, this man was caught and extradited 

by U.S. Marshals for the warrant. US–VISIT prevented a drug trafficker from 

roaming the streets of Miami.

(2) Closing a Deportation Loop Hole 

On January 18, 2004, a man who has had four aliases tried to enter the U.S., 

even with a ‘‘failure to appear’’ warrant for him. DHS/ICE issued the warrant 

on August 8, 2003, and since then this man had entered the U.S. at least five 

times. Now, with the ability to match fingerscans with those in a criminal database, this man’s luck ran out. He was extradited from the U.S. and put on the 

next flight back to Columbia.

(3) Passport Fraud Uncovered 

On January 14, 2004, a British West Indies Airways flight arrived at JFK 

International Airport in New York carrying a woman from Trinidad. Because 

US–VISIT begins at the visa-issuing post, a photo of the visitor was on file and 

accessible by the Customs and Border Protection Officer, who determined that 

she had used a false name. In reality, the traveler was a woman who had been 

arrested in April 2000 in New Orleans and convicted of passport fraud. The 

woman was placed on five years’ probation and ordered not to enter the U.S. 

without the attorney general’s written permission. The woman, whose husband 
24

lives in the U.S., had obtained a passport and U.S. visa by fraud in Trinidad 

for $2,000. She was removed from the U.S.

A CBP Trainee Rises to the Occasion 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Trainee Rafal Izycki was working at 

primary inspection at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. An Albanian national 

seeking admission into the U.S. appeared before him and presented an Albanian 

passport. When Inspector Izycki compared the State Department photo image provided by US–VISIT against the photographs on the passport and visa, he realized 

that the person in front of him was not the person who had obtained the visa. He 

immediately referred the Albanian national for a secondary inspection where it was 

determined that the passport had been photo-substituted and the non-immigrant 

visa had been altered. The capability to access the State Department photographs 

of visa applicants provides a powerful tool for inspectors working to protect the U.S.

Land Issues 

US–VISIT Increment 1 capabilities will be in place at the 50 busiest land ports 

of entry (POEs) by December 31, 2004, with processes in place at the remaining 

land borders by December 31, 2005. Land borders present a unique challenge in and 

of themselves, and each of the 165 land ports of entry is different and challenging. 

We do know that an inspection conducted at an air or sea entry point and one conducted at a land border will be different. 

We are currently developing the best solution for a technology to be used at land 

borders to leverage biographic and biometric data.

US–VISIT Program Office Update 

Secretary Ridge approved the creation of a US–VISIT program office, and positions have been approved to fill the organization and manage the program. The US–

VISIT program team consists of representatives from the various components of 

DHS responsible for border security, including the U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security 

Administration. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is also represented. 

Other DHS components that assist the US–VISIT team include the Directorate for 

Management and the Science and Technology Division. In addition, outside DHS, 

the team consists of representatives from the Departments of Transportation, State, 

Commerce, Justice, and General Services Administration.

Conclusion 

US–VISIT is critical to our national security as well as our economic security, and 

its introduction has been successful. But US–VISIT can not be left unfinished. We 

must build upon the initial framework and solid foundation to ensure that we continue to meet our goals to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors while 

facilitating travel for the millions of visitors we welcome each year. We are committed to building a system that enhances the integrity of our immigration system 

by catching the few and expediting the many, and we recognize that the U.S. is 

leading the way in helping other countries around the world keep their borders secure and their doors open. 

APPENDIX I 

STATUTORY MANDATES: 

The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry exit system 

that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA),

Pub. Law No. 10.6–215 (2000), 114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1365a. DMIA amended previous legislative requirements for an entry exit system that would record the arrival and departure of every alien who crosses the U.S. 

borders. See section 110. of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Div. C, Pub. Law No.104–208 (1996), 110. Stat. 3009–558, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (later amended by DMIA). DMIA requires that 

the entry exit system consist of the integration of all authorized or required alien 

arrival and departure data that is maintained in electronic format in Department 

of Justice (DOJ) (now DHS) or Department of State (DOS) databases. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a. This integrated entry exit system must be implemented at all air and 

sea ports of entry by December 31, 2003 using available air and sea alien arrival 

and departure data as described in the statute. DMIA also states that the system 

must be implemented at the 50. most highly trafficked land border ports of entry 

by December 31, 2004, and at all ports of entry by December 31, 2005, with all 

available electronic alien arrival and departure information. DMIA also requires 
25

DHS to use the entry exit system to match the available arrival and departure data 

on aliens and to prepare and submit to Congress various reports on the numbers 

of aliens who have overstayed their periods of admission and on implementation of 

the system. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(e). DMIA authorizes the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, in his discretion, to permit other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

officials to have access to the entry exit system for law enforcement purposes. 8 

U.S.C. section 1365a(f). 

In addition, section 217(h) of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000. 

(VWPPA), Pub. Law No. 106–396 (2000), 114 Stat. 1637, codified as amended at 8 

U.S.C. section 1187(h), requires the creation of a system that contains a record of 

the arrival and departure of every alien admitted under the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP) who arrives and departs by air or sea. The requirements of DMIA effectively 

result in the integration of this VWP arrival/departure information into the primary 

entry exit system component of the US–VISIT program. 

In late 2001 and 2002, Congress passed two additional laws affecting the development of the entry exit system, partly in response to the events of September 11, 

2001. Section 40.3(c) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act). Pub. 

Law No. 107–56 (2001),115 Stat. 353, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1379, 

required the Attorney General and the Secretary of State jointly, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and in consultation with the 

Secretary of Treasury and other appropriate Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and in consultation with Congress, to develop and certify a technology standard, including appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be 

used to verify the identity of visa applicants and persons seeking to enter the 

United States pursuant to a visa and to do background checks on such aliens. In 

developing the entry exit system required by DMIA, section 414(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to ‘‘particularly 

focus on the utilization of biometric technology; and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry.’’ 8 V.S.C. section 1365a note. 

The legislative requirements for biometric identifiers to be utilized in the context 

of the entry exit system were significantly strengthened with passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 ‘‘Border Security Act’’ 

or EBSVERA) Pub. Law No. 107–173 (2002), 116 Stat. 553, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. Section 302(a)(1) of the Border Security Act states that the entry 

exit system must use the technology and biometric standards required to be certified 

by section 403( c) of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 303(b)(1) requires that ‘‘[n]o 

later than October 26, 2004,’’ only machine-readable, tamper resistant visas and 

other travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers may be issued to 

aliens by DHS and DOS. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(b)(1). This section, however, does not 

invalidate unexpired travel documents that have been issued by the U.S. government that do not use biometrics. Section 303(b)(1) further states that the Secretaries 

of Homeland Security and State must jointly establish document authentication and 

biometric identifier standards for alien travel documents from among those recognized by domestic and international standards organizations. Id.

Section 303(b)(2) requires that ‘‘[n]o later than October 26, 2004,’’ all ports of 

entry must have equipment and software installed ‘‘to allow biometric comparison 

and authentication of all United States visas and other travel and entry documents 

issued to aliens, and passports’’ that are required to be issued by VWP countries. 

8 U.S.C. section 1732(b)(2). The current statutory language also requires that by 

that same date, VWP countries must have a program in place to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable, biometric passports that comply with biometric and document identifying standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 8 U.S.C. section 1732(c)(1). The statute also states that on or after 

October 26, 2004, any alien applying for admission under the VWP must present 

a passport that is machine readable, tamper-resistant and that uses ICAO-compliant biometric identifiers, unless the unexpired passport was issued prior to that 

date. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(c)(2). The entry exit system must include a database 

that contains alien arrival and departure data from the machine readable visas, 

passports, and other travel and entry documents. 8 U.S.C. section 1731 (a)(2). In 

developing the entry exit system, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State 

must also make interoperable all security databases relevant to making determinations of alien admissibility. 8 U.S.C. section 1731(a)(3). 

In addition, the entry exit system component must share information with other 

systems required by the Border Security Act. Section 202 of the Border Security Act

addresses requirements for an interoperable law enforcement and intelligence data 

system and requires the integration of all databases and data systems that process 

or contain information on aliens. 
26

1 Nonimmigrant visa entrants comprise a small percentage of the 330 million non-citizens admitted annually through ports of entry. Establishing US–VISIT incrementally with this population will allow DHS to test implementation of the system and to make revisions as needed 

for future increments. 

The US–VISIT program requirements that foreign nationals provide biometric 

identifiers when they seek admission to the United States are further supported by 

the Department’s broad authority to inspect aliens contained in section 235 of the 

INA, 8 U.S.C. section 1225. Pursuant to section 215(a) of the INA, the President 

also has the authority to regulate the departure of aliens, as well as their arrival. 

President Bush has issued Executive Order titled Assignment of Functions Relating 

to Arrivals In and Departures From the United States delegating his authority to 

promulgate regulations governing the departure of aliens from the United States. 

In accordance with section 215 and with this new Executive Order, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, has the authority to issue this rule which requires certain aliens to provide requested biometric identifiers and other relevant identifying information as they depart the United 

States. For nonimmigrant aliens, the Department may also make compliance with 

the departure procedures a condition of their admission and maintenance of status 

while in the country under INA, section 214. 

Many other provisions within the INA also support the implementation of the 

US–VISIT program, such as the grounds of inadmissibility in section 212, the 

grounds of removability in section 237, the requirements for the VWP program in 

section 217, the electronic passenger manifest requirements in section 231, and the 

authority for alternative inspection services in sections 286(q) and 235 of the INA 

and section 404 of the Border Security Act. These are but a few of the most significant provisions that support US–VISIT from among numerous other immigration 

and customs statutes. 

US–VISIT PROGRAM, INCREMENT 1 

PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DECEMBER 18, 2003

Overview 

US–VISIT, the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, 

is a legislatively-mandated DHS program that is designed to:

• Enhance the security of American citizens, permanent residents, and visitors 

• Expedite legitimate travel and trade 

• Ensure the integrity of the immigration system 

• Safeguard the personal privacy of visitors

When fully implemented, US–VISIT will provide a dynamic, interoperable system 

involving numerous stakeholders across the government. Increment 1, as the name 

suggests, is the first step in the implementation process. Increment 1 proposes to 

integrate and modify the capabilities of several information systems in order to accomplish the mission of US–VISIT. 

This Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) focuses on Increment 1 of this entry exit system. 

What Information is Collected 

The US–VISIT program will collect and retain biographic, travel, and biometric 

information (i.e., photograph and fingerprints) pertaining to visitors. 

Individuals covered by Increment 1 (‘‘covered individuals’’) are nonimmigrant visa 

holders traveling through air and sea ports.1 The DHS regulations and related Federal Register notice for US–VISIT Increment 1 will fully detail coverage of the program. Information is in the Committee file. 

Why the Information is Being Collected and Intended Use of the Information 

In accordance with Congressional mandates for an entry exit system, information 

is collected from and used to verify the identity of covered individuals who enter 

or leave the United States. This enables U.S. authorities to enhance the security 

of the United States by more effectively identifying covered individuals who are:

• Known to pose a threat or are suspected of posing a threat to the security 

of the United States; 
27

2 A copy of the Privacy Policy is appended to the full report. 

3The legacy systems on which Increment 1 is built include privacy sensitivity training requirements. This training will be made mandatory for US–VISIT operators. 

• Known to have violated the terms of their admission to the United States; or 

• Wanted for commission of a criminal act in the United States or elsewhere.

Information Access and Sharing 

Information collected and retained by US–VISIT will be accessed by employees of 

DHS components—Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Transportation Security 

Administration—and by consular officers of the Department of State. Strict security 

controls will be put in place to ensure that only those personnel with a need for 

the information in the performance of their official duties will be able to access information in the system. 

If necessary, the information that is collected will be shared with other law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, foreign, or tribal level, who are lawfully engaged in collecting law enforcement intelligence information and who need 

access to the information in order to carry out their law enforcement duties.

Consent Mechanisms 

The admission into the United States of an individual subject to US–VISIT requirements will be contingent upon submission of the information required by US–

VISIT, including biometric identifiers. A covered individual who declines to provide 

biometrics is inadmissible to the United States, unless a discretionary waiver is 

granted under section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Such an individual may withdraw his or her application for admission, or be subject to removal 

proceedings.

Security 

Information accessible to US–VISIT will be protected through multi-layer security 

mechanisms that are physical, technical, administrative and environmental and 

that are in compliance with the DHS IT Security Program Handbook and DHS 

Baseline Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems. These security 

mechanisms provide access control to sensitive data, physical access control to DHS 

facilities, confidentiality of communications, authentication of sending parties, and 

careful screening to ensure that all personnel with access to data are screened 

through background investigations commensurate with the level of access required 

to perform their duties.

System of Records 

A system of records notice (SORN)—normally required under the Privacy Act—

is not necessary for US–VISIT because no new system is being developed for Increment 1. However, the ADIS and IDENT SORNs have been revised to reflect US–

VISIT usage. 

Although US–VISIT derives its capability from the integration and modification 

of existing systems, it nevertheless represents a new business process that involves 

new uses of existing data and the collection of new data items. As a result, there 

is a potential for new privacy risks, which are addressed in the PIA.

Privacy Controls 

US–VISIT collects, integrates, and shares personal information of covered individuals. Covered individuals must consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of this 

personal information if they wish to enter or leave the U.S. 

To address the privacy concerns associated with the program, US–VISIT will implement comprehensive privacy controls, which will be modified and updated as the 

system is revised and expanded. These controls consist of: 

• Public education through transparency of the program, including development and 

publication of a Privacy Policy that will be disseminated prior to the time information is collected from potential visitors; 2

• Establishment of privacy sensitivity awareness programs for US–VISIT operators; 3

• Establishment of a Privacy Officer for US–VISIT and implementation of an accountability program for those responsible for compliance with the US–VISIT Privacy Policy; 

• Periodic strategic reviews of US–VISIT data to ascertain that the collection is limited to that which is necessary for US–VISIT stated purposes; 

• Usage agreements between US–VISIT and other agencies authorized to have access to US–VISIT data; 
28

• To the extent permitted by law, regulations, or policy, establishment of opportunity for covered individuals to have access to their information and/or allow them 

to challenge its completeness; 

• Maintenance of security safeguards (physical, electronic and procedural) consistent with federal law and policy to limit access to personal information only to 

those with appropriate rights, and to protect information from unauthorized disclosure, modification, misuse, and disposal, whether intentional or unintentional; and 

• Establishment of administrative controls to prevent improper actions due to data 

inconsistencies from multiple information sources.

Contact Point and Reviewing Official 

Contact Point: Steve Yonkers, US–VISIT Privacy Officer, (202) 298–5200

Reviewing Official: Nuala O’Connor Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, DHS, 

(202) 772–9848

Comments 

We welcome your comments on this privacy impact assessment. Please write to: 

Privacy Office, Attn.: US–VISIT PIA, U.S. Department Of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528, or email privacyl@dhs.gov. Please include US–VISIT PIA in 

the subject line of the email.
29
30

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that very 

much. We will be back with some questions in just awhile. 

The chair now recognizes Assistant Secretary Maura Harty for 

her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAURA HARTY, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you very much for inviting me here to testify before 

you today on the role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in implementing biometrics programs in U.S. visas and passports. 

The inclusion of biometrics in international travel documents is 

an important step in enhancing the security of our nation’s borders. 

The Department of State’s visa work abroad constitutes a vital 

element in providing for our national security. We have no higher 

responsibility than the protection of our citizens and safeguarding 

our country’s borders through the visa process. 

The consular officers of the foreign service who adjudicate visas 

at our embassies and consulates abroad truly are the first line of 

defense. Through them, our goal in fact is to push the borders of 

the United States out as far from our shores as possible to stop 

questionable or problematic travelers overseas long before they 

ever reach our shores. 

The biometric visa program will allow us to do just that by helping consular officers identify visa applicants already known to U.S. 

law enforcement. 

The Border Security Act requires that no later than October 26, 

2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas that use biometric identifiers. To comply with this requirement, the State Department began deployment of the biometric visa program last September. 

I am pleased to report that 55 posts now are already enrolling 

fingerprints, and with a very aggressive rollout schedule, the program will be in effect at all visa adjudicating posts by the congressionally mandated October 26 deadline. 

We will start issuing immigrant visas with the same biometric 

features next month and have this program operational at all immigrant-visa-issuing posts on the same date. 

Under the biometric visa program, consular officers abroad will 

enroll applicants’ fingerprints with electronic scanners at the visa 

interview windows, which will then be matched against the fingerprint files of DHS’s IDENT system. 

Our scanner looks almost exactly like the scanner that Undersecretary Hutchinson has already shown to you. 

We are currently doing the match procedure at four pilot posts 

and are experiencing a return time of approximately seven to eight 

minutes at all four posts. 

If the fingerprints match fingerprints in the IDENT database, no 

action is taken until the derogatory information is reviewed by a 

consular officer overseas. 

We are currently discussing with the FBI the means to readily 

access these files so that consular officers in the field will have the 
31

necessary information to efficiently adjudicate the visa application 

to conclusion. 

The most important here that I would like to underscore is that 

an IDENT hit overseas will freeze the visa application process until 

that hit is resolved, meeting that very first goal of pushing that 

border out as far from our own physical borders as a nation as possible. 

Now moving on to cases with no hits, once the visa has been 

issued, our non-immigrant visa system sends the issued visa data, 

including the visa applicant’s photo and the fingerprint identification number, to DHS. When the traveler arrives at a port of entry, 

the US–VISIT system will use the fingerprint identification number to match the visa with the file in IDENT and compare the visa 

holder’s fingerprints with those on file. 

This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that the person 

presenting the visa at the port of entry is in fact the same person 

to whom the visa was issued. 

To guard against impostors and forged or counterfeit visas, our 

visa data-share program has been upgraded for us with US–VISIT 

so that CBP officers at ports of entry have complete access to the 

travelers’ visa files from the consular consolidated database at 

their primary stations. 

CBP officers at ports of entry sees the same photo and the same 

bio data that the consular officer entered into the consular consolidated database at posts overseas at the time of the interview. This 

is a seamless operation. 

The Border Security Act also established October 26, 2004, as the 

date by which visa waiver program countries must issue to their 

nationals only machine-readable passports, incorporating biometric 

identifiers that comply with the standards established by ICAO. 

ICAO’s decision to make facial-recognition technology the standard passport biometric was not made until May of 2003, leaving 

visa-waiver countries approximately 17 months to bring a biometric 

passport from design to production—a process that normally takes 

several years. 

Although VWP governments share a commitment to making this 

change—and all are making varying degrees of progress toward 

complying with the biometric requirement—they have indicated at 

this point that they will be unable to meet the deadline. 

The legislative requirements of the Border Security Act apply 

only to passports issued by visa-waiver program countries, but not 

the U.S. passport, which I firmly believe is the world’s single most 

valuable travel document. 

Although the law does not require of us what we are requiring 

of the VWP countries, the Department of State has a program that 

will produce the first biometric U.S. passport, using the ICAO 

standard official recognition, in October of this year. 

We have planned to complete the transition to biometric passports by the end of 2005. 

Embedding biometrics into U.S. passports to establish a clear 

link between the person issued the passport and the user is an important step forward in the international effort to strengthen border security. The Department of State is working hand in hand 

with our colleagues and friends at the Department of Homeland 
32

Security to ensure that we have a system that continues to facilitate legitimate international travel and properly identifies those 

who pose or could pose a threat to prevent them from entering our 

country. 

I think I speak for all of us here today when I say that the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security of our 

borders and our nation is our number one priority. 

I am happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. Harty follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. MAURA HARTY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the role of the Bureau 

of Consular Affairs in implementing Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security 

and Visa Entry Reform Act (Border Security Act). The inclusion of biometrics, in addition to the photograph that has always been collected, in international travel documents is an important step in continuing to improve our ability to verify the identity of prospective travelers to the United States. In the process of screening visas 

and passports domestically and abroad, additional biometrics can serve as a useful 

adjunct to existing screening processes that identify individuals who might be terrorists, criminals, or other aliens who might represent a security risk to the United 

States. The Department of State has invested substantial time, money, and effort 

to implement the additional biometrics and ensure that international visitors are 

aware of changes to the visa application process and admission procedures in the 

United States. In so doing, we have worked, and will continue to work, closely with 

our colleagues at the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice (including the 

FBI). 

As you know, the Border Security Act requires that no later than October 26, 

2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas that use biometric identifiers. 

To comply with this requirement with respect to nonimmigrant visas, the State Department began deployment of the Biometric Visa Program on September 22, 2003, 

at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, and quickly followed suit at the U.S. 

Consulate General in Frankfurt and Embassies in San Salvador and Guatemala 

City. I am pleased to report that the program is now operational at 55 visa-issuing 

posts and with our aggressive rollout schedule the program will be in effect at all 

visa-issuing posts by October 26 of this year. With regard to immigrant visas, we 

will start issuing biometric visas in February and have this program operational at 

all immigrant visa-issuing posts by October 26, 2004. 

The success we are having with the rollout of the Biometric Visa Program should 

not detract from the accomplishments of the process itself. I would like to walk you 

through the nonimmigrant visa process from visa applicant enrollment to the traveler’s arrival at the U.S. port of entry. 

Consular officers abroad oversee the fingerprint enrollment of the visa applicants 

with fingerprint scanners at the visa interview windows. Enrollment time averages 

about 30 seconds. As soon as the fingerprints are enrolled they are sent electronically, along with the photo of the applicant and biographic data, to the Consular 

Consolidated Database (CCD) in Washington. The CCD relays the fingerprint files 

to DHS’s IDENT system in Rockville over a reliable, direct transmission line, which 

sends the results back to the CCD for relay back to the post. The current return 

time is approximately seven to eight minutes at three pilot posts. 

No visa can be issued until a response of no derogatory information found is returned from the IDENT system. Until such information from IDENT is received, the 

visa system is locked with regard to that visa application. If the fingerprints match 

fingerprints provided by the FBI in the IDENT lookout database, the IDENT system 

returns to the post an FBI file number. 

At present, Consular officers at posts overseas do not have desktop access to the 

FBI record associated with that file number. As an interim procedure, we are processing such cases through our National Visa Center, where an FBI official receives 

and analyzes the FBI’s records and then forwards the information to post. We are 

discussing means to enhance the efficiency of the process with the FBI, so that consular officers in the field will have more direct access to National Crime Information 

Center (NCIC) information that will be of use in adjudicating the visa to conclusion. 

If there is no match against the IDENT lookout database, then the visa applicant’s fingerprints are stored in the US–VISIT database in IDENT, and a finger-
33

print identification number (FIN) is returned to the post. Once the visa has been 

issued, our nonimmigrant visa system sends to the DHS Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) the issued visa data, including the visa applicant’s photo and the 

fingerprint identification number. 

When the visa applicant arrives at a port of entry, the US–VISIT system will use 

the fingerprint identification number to match the visa with the file in IDENT, and 

will compare the visa holder’s fingerprints with those on file. This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that the person presenting the visa at the port of entry 

is the same person to whom the visa was issued. 

As I mentioned before, biometrics (including photos and fingerprints) are a useful 

adjunct to the existing screening procedures. Even though fingerprint data has only 

recently begun to be incorporated into the U.S. visa issuing process, through our 

visa datashare program, which has been upgraded for use at primary inspection 

under US–VISIT, we are able to ensure the integrity of valid visas that do not have 

associated fingerprint data captured at visa issuance. 

I will quickly outline the process by which visa datashare helps us accomplish our 

goal of securing further the integrity of the U.S. visa. Under visa datashare, the biographic data and current biometric data (i.e. photo) from the issued nonimmigrant 

visa are stored on the IBIS computer. When the DHS officer scans the visa at primary inspection, the photo and biographic data of the applicant are extracted from 

the database and projected on the screen. If the traveler has altered the photo on 

the visa, the DHS officer will be able to make a comparison with the original photo. 

In one such case under US–VISIT, a woman’s photo appeared on the screen, but 

the traveler presenting the visa was a man. 

If the visa is a complete counterfeit, nothing will appear on the DHS officer’s 

screen. In this way, US–VISIT is combating fraud and protecting the integrity of 

the U.S. visa. At the same time, this system facilitates travel for the legitimate traveler because the DHS officer need not spend time examining the visa to ensure its 

authenticity—the US–VISIT system is ensuring the visa authenticity. 

The process for the biometric immigrant visa that includes a fingerprint will be 

very similar. The visa itself will be printed on a tamper-resistant document. There 

will be reliable datashare with DHS so that the DHS inspector at the port of entry 

can verify the identity of the traveler and the authenticity of that individual’s status 

as a new immigrant. 

Let me now turn to the issue of the U.S. passport, which I firmly believe is the 

world’s most valuable identity and travel document. First, I think it is important 

to note that improving passport security is not a one-time effort. Instead, we are 

involved in a process of continuous improvement that affects not just the physical 

passport carried by an American citizen, but also the adjudication process that determines whether an applicant is in fact a U.S. citizen. 

Our latest efforts to improve the U.S. passport began in the late 1990’s with the 

introduction of photodigitization technology to support passport printing. Instead of 

gluing a physical photograph of the applicant into a passport and protecting that 

photo with a laminate, we introduced an entirely new technique that takes advantage of the many improvements in digital technology during the last decade. 

Photodigitization has been an unqualified success. Any passport with a physical 

photograph is inherently susceptible to photo substitution. We have now produced 

over 25 million passports using photodigitization and the number of credible alterations we have encountered still number in the single digits. I should add that domestic photodigitization has been so successful that we have, in turn, returned the 

production of passports issued abroad to our U.S. domestic production facilities so 

that we can take advantage of the significant security improvements embodied in 

the photodigitization process. 

But, as good as photodigitization is, it is not the end of our efforts. We are currently undertaking a total redesign of our passport book to introduce the latest generation of security features as well as a total update of the physical appearance of 

the inside of the book. More significantly, we are also undertaking a massive effort 

to introduce embedded biometrics into the U.S. passport through the insertion of a 

contact-less chip, which will store biometric and biographic data including digital 

photos. I think it is important to note, however, that the legislative requirements 

in that section do not apply to U.S. passports, only to passports issued by our partner nations in the Visa Waiver Program. 

Embedding enhanced biometrics into passports so that a clear link can be established between the authorized bearer of that passport and the user is an important 

step forward in the international effort to strengthen border security. We recognize 

that convincing other nations to change and improve their passport requires U.S. 

leadership both at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and practically by introducing these changes into the U.S. passport. Thus, the Department 
34

of State has underway a program that should result in the production of our first 

enhanced biometric passports using the ICAO standard of facial recognition techniques in October of this year and we plan to complete the transition to this new 

biometric passport by the end of calendar year 2005. 

In addition to our enhanced biometric initiatives, we are moving forward aggressively on two other programs to further improve further the U.S. passport. The first 

of those programs is to redesign the passport itself. We are well advanced on this 

project and expect to have these new books in large-scale production later this year. 

We have also implemented and expanded our data base which immediately alerts 

ports of entry to any passports reported lost or stolen. 

The second is to strengthen further our passport adjudication process. We are negotiating new datasharing agreements with agencies such as the Social Security Administration (SSA) so that we can gain access to SSA data, which when combined 

with data from other sources, will help to identify possible irregularities in passport 

applications. We are also receiving additional data from the law enforcement community to help prevent issuance of passports to persons who may be flight risks. 

We are examining the possible uses of decision based software techniques and commercial database searches as part of a longer range effort to give passport adjudicators every possible tool to ensure the accuracy of their decisions. We will complete 

the scanning of applications with images for all currently valid passports by April, 

making them available at the desktop level worldwide to assist in adjudication. Finally, we should soon sign an agreement with DHS that will allow border inspectors 

access to these electronic copies of passport applications as a way to help strengthen 

our processing systems for returning American citizens. 

Now that I have addressed the accomplishments that we are making towards improving the biometrics currently in our passports, I would like to focus on other 

countries efforts towards the same end. The Border Security Act set October 26, 

2004 as the date when VWP travelers with passports issued on or after that date 

must also have biometrics (digital photos) incorporated in those passports that meet 

the ICAO standard for use in visa-free travel to the United States. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) governments have indicated that they will be unable to meet the legislatively mandated deadline to issue to their nationals only machine-readable passports (MRP) incorporating this enhanced biometric identifier that complies with the 

standards established by the ICAO. 

ICAO’s decision to make facial recognition technology the standard passport biometric was not made until May, 2003, leaving countries only 17 months to bring 

a biometric passport that meets that standard from design to production, a process 

that normally takes years. 

Moreover, while the VWP country governments share a commitment to make this 

change, many of them are encountering the same problems being experienced by the 

Department of State in our effort to introduce embedded enhanced biometrics into 

the U.S. passport. These issues include needing final decisions through the ICAO 

process on security matters, resolution of interoperability matters, as well as comprehensive testing to ensure that the chips work successfully and that they will continue to do so through the validity of the passport, which is 10 years in most cases. 

We have vigorously encouraged VWP countries to issue biometric passports that 

meet the ICAO standard by the October 26, 2004, deadline. The U.S. has played 

a leadership role in ICAO working groups to advocate the successful inclusion of biometrics in travel documents. In the G8 we strongly advocated support for ICAO 

leadership in biometrics and participated fully in a special working group on biometrics established by the G8 ministers of Home and Justice Affairs. We are fully 

engaged in the group of 5 (US, UK, New Zealand, Australia, Canada) in which there 

are continuing discussions on progress regarding each country’s efforts to produce 

the passport. 

On the margins of international conferences, we have had repeated meetings with 

VWP representatives to explain the process; at trade conferences, State Department 

officials have made many public appearances to educate VWP government representatives about the requirements and deadlines. Many VWP countries have sent 

representatives to Washington to meet with U.S. government representatives and 

had full and open discussions on the issue. In December, the Secretary of State sent 

a diplomatic note to the VWP Embassies in Washington that conveyed the criteria 

for certification of a biometric passport program and also noted that there is no 

waiver available for the production deadline. The State Department followed up by 

sending the text of the note to U.S. Embassies in the VWP countries and requested 

the Embassies deliver the information to the host government and have them reply 

by January 10. We are still receiving responses from those countries. 

In testament to our efforts, all VWP countries are making varying degrees of 

progress toward complying with the requirement to have a program in place to issue 
35

biometric passports; however, only one or two countries may have production capability in place by October 26, 2004. None of the larger countries (Japan, the U.K., 

France, Germany, Ireland, Italy or Spain, for example) will begin issuing passports 

with the ICAO biometric by October 26, 2004. Japan and the United Kingdom say 

they will begin in late 2005; others may not come on-line until a year after that. 

Since travelers from VWP countries with non-biometric passports issued on or 

after October 26, 2004 will need visas to travel to the U.S., we estimate that the 

demand for nonimmigrant visas will increase significantly over fiscal year 2005 to 

over five million applications, nearly double last year’s workload. However, once 

VWP countries begin issuing passports with biometrics, the increased workload will 

disappear. For example, in fiscal year 2003, mission Japan (Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe and 

Naha) processed approximately 111,000 nonimmigrant visa cases. The Japanese estimate that between October 26, 2004, and the introduction of their biometrics-bearing passport projected for November 2005, between 1.2 to 1.5 million Japanese 

would need visas. In fiscal year 2006, the number would likely drop back to current 

levels. 

The Department of State is working hand in hand with our colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that we have a system that continues to 

facilitate legitimate international travelers and properly identifies those who pose 

a threat to prevent them from entering our country. I think I speak for all of us 

here today when I say that the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and 

security of our borders and our nation is the number one priority. I am happy to 

answer any questions you may have. Thank you very much.

Ms. GRANGER. And I thank you very much. 

I have a couple of questions. But, first, Undersecretary Hutchinson, you gave some excellent examples of people we have stopped 

from coming into this country because of this system. 

But can you tell me specifically if someone gets to the airport, 

what databases exactly does the biographical and biometric information run through? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The check goes through the Interagency Border Inspection System, the IBIS system, which is a database that 

includes information from 26 other databases, including the Department of State’s CLASS, the TIPOFF databases. 

And so the various interagency databases that would give you 

the necessary information to trigger a hit would be included in the 

IBIS. 

In addition, we are linked to the TSC, the Terrorist Screening 

Center, for their list that they put together for strictly the terrorist 

watch list. 

Ms. GRANGER. Very good. And when the traveler is screened 

through US–VISIT, does the IDENT start to take place in the primary inspection? Does it go through the primary inspection? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, this is all done in the primary inspection. 

Ms. GRANGER. And you told us, again, how long does that take 

and how much does that add to the time? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Actually we are measuring it very carefully, 

and the time for the system to do the check is on average eight seconds. And that would be from when the finger scan is taken, running through the system and back, eight seconds. 

We have not noticed any appreciable difference in any wait 

times, which we have been monitoring. And one of the reasons is, 

the inspectors obviously are conducting other business as these 

checks are going on and asking other routine questions. 

The eight seconds is actually cutting in half the response time 

under the previous system because of the upgrades in the system 

that we have been able to implement through US–VISIT. 

Ms. GRANGER. Oh, very good, thank you. 
36

Secretary Harty, there have been press reports criticizing US–

VISIT because the 27 visa-waiver countries will not be processed 

through the system. But can you tell me what the State Department is doing to enhance the security in those passports? 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you for the question, ma’am. 

The visa-waiver program administered by DHS with State Department concurrence in various aspects of it is a congressionally 

mandated program by which the meets and bounds are defined. 

The 27 countries in the program now have been judged to be lowrisk countries, travelers presenting less of a risk than others out 

there. That implies, to a degree, a face in the issuance ability and 

the integrity of the documents as issued by their own respective 

countries. 

We are always eager to continue to work together. We have very, 

very good relationships with the 27 countries in the program. We 

have been very communicative with them about the deadline that 

Congress has set for next October 26, 2004. 

This does give us pause and I am glad that you raise it. It gives 

us pause because this is a challenge for us that has a rather finite 

sort of beginning and end to it. 

All of the countries in the program, about 80 percent of visawaiver travelers, come from Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, 

France, Italy and The Netherlands. All of the countries in the program are striving to make the deadline. 

As they do make that deadline, the problem in their countries of 

our having to issue visas to their nationals will in fact wane. 

If I were to have to begin to issue visas to all visa-waiver countries right now, it would, we estimate, be upwards of 5 million additional visas we would have to adjudicate. That would cause me 

to think about having to hire hundreds of more consular officers 

and even foreign service national employees—again, for a challenge 

that is somewhat finite in nature—as the visa-waiver countries 

come into compliance with the October 26 deadline, at whatever 

point they are able to do that. 

As a manager, I cannot, in all honesty, justify hiring so many 

more people, perhaps even looking at constructing some sort of additional space at consular sections or consulates around the world 

to handle that workload. 

So what we are doing is making sure the countries understand 

the deadline. 

We are making sure that our own procedures will call for us to 

be as agile as possible, being concerned with what another member 

of the committee spoke about earlier, a facilitation of travel, also 

important to us. 

The visa-waiver countries in the last five years have accounted 

for some 68 percent of people who have come into this country—

exclusive of those who come in from Mexico and Canada. This is 

a huge number of people. We do not want to deter that travel. 

What we do at all of our consulates and embassies is make sure 

that the emergencies are taken care of, that students who have a 

need to be here at a certain date will go to the front of the line, 

that medical cases will go to the front of the line, that business 

people who have a precipitous meeting of which they were previously unaware go to the front of the line. 
37

We will handle it just as efficiently as we possibly can. We have 

asked for 161 new officers for this fiscal year, and 123 for next fiscal year. 

We will do the very best we can to facilitate legitimate travel to 

this country, but always keeping security as job one, ma’am. 

Ms. GRANGER. I am still a little unsure about what specific security procedures they will go through, then. I understand putting 

emergencies at the front—. 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you for that question, ma’am. I should have 

added that visa-waiver-country travelers at the ports of entry go 

through exactly—their names are checked through exactly the 

same procedures as a namecheck is done overseas, simply done by 

an inspector at a port of entry rather than at an embassy overseas. 

Ms. GRANGER. One last question for you, Secretary Harty: Do you 

know if primary inspectors have access to the State Department 

consular consolidated databases? And how does this improve their 

screening ability? 

Ms. HARTY. Oh, yes, they do, and we are very proud of that partnership. 

I think that there is nothing better than an inspector at a port 

of entry being able to know that he or she is in fact absolutely and 

without a shadow of a doubt looking at the same person who a consular officer has already looked at overseas. And they do that by 

being able to pull up the photo that we capture overseas. And that 

is done very, very quickly. 

So if you were to apply for a visa this morning in Buenos Aires, 

Argentina, and show up at Miami airport this afternoon, that inspector would have that. 

It is refreshed every seven or minutes around the world, so it is 

very real time access to data that I think is very useful to both 

sides. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you. 

Ms. GRANGER. And, Secretary Hutchinson, you talked about how 

important US–VISIT is because it checks the people that are coming in and all the security. But, then, the other thing is, as they 

leave to make sure that they have left and who is leaving was the 

same person that came in. 

So what mechanisms are used to ensure that those people go 

through the US–VISIT exit process and actually leave the country? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. First of all, the exit procedure would be information-base at our airports, and seaports, in which we would get 

the departure passenger information from the airlines or the cruise 

lines which would indicate that they left. 

So biographically we can determine visa overstays who leaves. 

Your question is, how can you confirm their identity? That’s what 

we are testing at the Baltimore airport in a kiosk-type solution, 

that we would have assistance provided to the passenger as they 

check out. 

The question would be: What mandates them to do that? How 

can you guarantee that they do that? 

We are looking at different solutions. There are significant issues 

there, whether we put a gate solution, whether we put it near the 

TSA screening counter. 
38

But it is a mandatory requirement for the visitor to check out. 

And if they fail to do that, we can monitor that with the passenger 

information that is provided by the airlines. 

And then there obviously would be a penalty attached to it in the 

sense that they would have a more difficult time re-entering if they 

did not exit in a proper fashion. 

Ms. GRANGER. And what is the date that you are looking at to 

have that completely operational? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, as soon as we can. But that is a part of 

the goal that we would have for calendar year 2004, would be to 

formalize the exit system and to have the final exit solution determined for our air and sea ports. 

As to the full implementation date, we have not set that yet. 

Ms. GRANGER. One of the concerns that has come up so many 

times is, people who come in the country, whether they are students, whatever, a particular period of time, and there was no 

tracking and so they actually didn’t either return to school or go 

to school. That will be a part of what you are doing also, will issue 

a report to say who has overstayed their visit also, isn’t it? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, first of all is to have the information. 

And we do. You mention the foreign students, of course, would be 

under our SEVIS, student exchange visitor information system, 

which is tied into US–VISIT, in which we would have the information when they left the university and also left the country. 

We are setting up and have set up an office of compliance in ICE, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which will be responsible 

for handling this information for visa overstays. It will be a vast 

amount of information that is created from US–VISIT, the SEVIS 

system. We are building that capacity, but that will be the enforcement responsibility of ICE. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Sanchez may inquire now. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And once again, thank both of you for being here. 

Madam Chair, before I ask my questions, I would like to submit 

for the record some testimony from Ed Petrarch, who is a senior 

Customs and Border Protection Officer at LAX, which respect to 

what is going on with U.S. visa. 

In his testimony, Assistant Secretary, that I just submitted, one 

of the things that this senior Customs and Protection officer says 

is that they are pulling off of cargo screening to process low-risk 

U.S. citizens and green-card holders so that there is an acceptable 

flow of passengers in the international terminals under this US–

VISIT. 

In other words, they are getting pulled off cargo inspection to 

process people. 

So my question is: What have you asked for with respect to personnel needs for this coming year? How many more people do you 

need if you are pulling people off of one situation to try to work 

on another situation? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, and that should not be the case. 

The same individuals prior to January 1 of this year that did the 

inspection at our ports of entry in terms of processing people are 

still doing it. There has not been a shift in resources. 
39

There may be emergency circumstances. But I do not believe 

there has been any significant shift of resources to implement US–

VISIT. It is the same people that were there before to do it. 

In terms of new resources, that will be a part of the budget submission in our testimony this year. We have enhanced, thanks to 

the help of Congress, our inspection resources. And we, with monitoring the wait times and not adding additional resources for the 

US–VISIT implementation, I think we have been successful with 

our existing resources. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California.That is nice. Again, the testimony says that this is just not the case at LAX. So I would ask 

that you might follow upon that and that you get back to us about 

just what resources are required. 

[Copy maintained in the Committee files.] 

Now, there is also an internal memo that was done by Assistant 

Commission Ahearn that outlined some mitigation strategies when 

US–VISIT wait times exceed one hour. 

The strategy simply is a series of fall-backs where you collect biometric fingerprints from fewer and fewer people. 

First, if it is over an hour, don’t do those who are under 17. 

Then if the wait is still too long, don’t do those that have biographical and photo data from the State Department. 

Next, if there is a family traveling together, only do the head of 

household. 

And finally, move to sampling from certain types of visa holders. 

Why is your mitigation strategy to just keep letting more people 

go through without doing what you just told us is the intent of this 

program rather than to assess high-peak times, or suggestive highpeak times, and figure out how much personnel you really need to 

do that? 

Can you explain why this memo and? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you. This is a new system. And so as 

it was rolled out on January 5th, even though we had great faith 

in it, we didn’t know exactly how it would progress, whether there 

would be difficulties. 

We wanted to have some flexibility in the early stages of this implementation that we didn’t clog up our airports. 

Well, it wasn’t an hour tied to mitigation strategy; it was if the 

wait times exceeded 10 percent over the normal wait times, then 

they could implement a mitigation strategy. 

But the good news is that there has been no instance in which 

that mitigation strategy has had to be implemented, because the 

wait times have not increased to that level. And we have no reason 

to expect that it will. 

So it was a precautionary step at the initial phases of the implementation of US–VISIT. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. So you are saying that this 

memo in effect has no relationship to what is really going on. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, it had a very important foundation of 

starting this rollout on the first day. But it was a backup plan in 

the event that there was delays caused, or unforeseen circumstances, as we processed US–VISIT visitors. 

That has not been the case. I do not anticipate it being the case 

in the future. 
40

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. But if you had longer waits, 

what was stated in this memo is the way that things would be implemented currently. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Correct. That was a memo that we did send 

out. What you recited was not precisely what the plan was. But 

there was a mitigation strategy. 

You know, we have electrical outages from time to time. Well, 

there is a mitigation strategy. When the system goes down, you do 

things in the old way. 

And in the same the US–VISIT, if we had to go to orange, we 

might increase and broaden the requirements in a time of heightened alert. 

That is one of the benefits of this system is, there is some flexibility in it. 

And if from whether a power outage or other problems, it can be 

adjusted in other ways. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. I just find that not collecting 

the information when really that is the main reason for having this 

program is certainly a very strange way to mitigate, not having 

enough resources. 

I have some other questions, Madam Chair, but I see that my 

time is over. So I don’t know if we are coming back for a second 

round, or I will submit—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Then we can. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. —to be answered by both the 

undersecretary and the assistant secretary. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

The chair now recognizes Chairman Cox for five minutes. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman. 

Again, welcome Undersecretary Hutchinson, Ambassador Harty. 

There has been a bit of news recently from the 9/11 commission. 

The 9/11 commission reported that more than one, at least a few, 

of the 9/11 terrorists, possibly as many as eight, forged their passports. 

We also know that when they filled out their visa applications, 

they either lied or in other cases just did it differently than they 

were supposed to. 

If US–VISIT is in place in the future and that pattern were to 

repeat itself, what difference would it make? 

And, Undersecretary Hutchinson, if could begin with you. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It would make a significant difference. That is 

one of the benefits is that there is less reliance on fraudulent documents. 

Usually a false passport has a false identity. 

First—and I am sure Maura Harty would want to comment on 

this—that would probably be prevented at the consular post when 

the biometric is taken there. We will not have an assurance that 

the person passing through the port of inspection is the same person that they actually gave the visa to. 

And then secondly, we will be relying upon their biometric to 

confirm that identity rather than simply the passport. 

Mr. COX. Ambassador Harty, do you want to address that as 

well? 
41

Ms. HARTY. Certainly, thank you, sir. 

I agree completely with what Undersecretary Hutchinson said, 

that it would be our very strong belief, and our experience even, 

in the information base of this new program that the inspector at 

a port of entry is going to know, flat out know, if the person in 

front of them is the person who was seen at the embassy. They 

have a photo right there in front of them. 

And they also have what we have done. Using our reader, we 

have taken a biometric, we have taken their fingerprint at our embassy or consulate. We have run that name against the IDENT system so we will know if there is any previous information on a person already in the system. 

Should we then move to the next step of issuing a visa, then that 

same process will in fact occur at the port of entry. 

So it is really a second check on the identity of a person and 

something that knits up and marries up the bearer of the passport 

with the face, with the person we have seen at a port of entry. 

So that in fact would be a little bit different than the scenario 

in the past. 

Mr. COX. Now, this recent news from the 9/11 commission also 

informs us that at least one of the 9/11 planners applied for a visa 

using an alias in Saudi Arabia. Would this program have stood in 

the way of that? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Two things would happen there. 

You mentioned Saudi Arabia, that the consular offices there 

would receive the application for a visa. We also have a visa security officer of the Department of Homeland Security in Saudi Arabia that would add a security perspective on that visa check. 

So that is something that is new that we did not have two years 

ago. 

And then that name, if it is an alias, would be checked against 

all of the watch lists. 

I believe that we have an enhanced capability to determine that 

that is an alias to the checks that we have if it is not a legitimate 

name. That is the purpose of the background check. 

Mr. COX. Ambassador Harty? 

Ms. HARTY. Sir, if someone were to come into a consular or an 

embassy overseas, and have a completely clean background, such 

that they had never been in the United States before, or had never 

come to the attention of any of the various entities who contribute 

to the watch list that we have as a nation, it is in fact possible that 

we would not know it were an alias, if they had never come to our 

attention before. 

But we do have another thing that we are working now. 

One is, if they have ever come to our attention before in that we 

have previously seen them and issued or refused a visa, now that 

US–VISIT is up and running, now that we are enrolling people 

overseas, we have their fingerprint, so that if we have ever seen 

them before, despite the fact that they have used an alias, we have 

their print and we will know that. 

While that is one program as we have described up and running 

now and getting better every day, we do have another thing that 

we are looking at, and that is facial recognition. It is a technology 

that is maturing. 
42

However, we have a program at 13 different posts overseas as 

well as what we are exercising in conjunction with the diversity 

visa lottery to begin to explore yet another technology beyond the 

fingerprint that we already have. 

So we have technology we are using as well as technology that 

we are experimenting with. We are always trying to push the envelope, sir. 

Mr. COX. Just lastly on this watch-list question, I want to ask 

you about the testimony that the 9/11 commission received yesterday, that apparently having your name on a list of suspected terrorists does not guarantee you a place on the FAA’s no-fly list. 

And as I understood the testimony, that may still be the case. 

Is this correct? And what impact would a suspected terrorist presence, or non-presence, on FAA’s no-fly list have in the contest of 

the US–VISIT program? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, the no-fly list, of course, would certainly—one, they would not be flying on the airplane to enter our 

airports, if they were on the no-fly list. They should not be on there 

to begin with. 

And so as part of our security measures, that should be caught 

before they would get on that aircraft. And then in the event that 

the system failed in a foreign country, we would know about that 

before they landed by checking the biographical data. 

Your question is about whether everybody on other watch lists, 

FBI’s and so on, is on the TSA no-fly list. And the answer there 

is that any agency can submit a name for the no-fly list—CIA, 

FBI—but it has to be more than just a name. 

We obviously want to have the biographical data, either an address, a date of birth, because if you submit just a name, it might 

hit against 200 different people that would be flying, particularly 

if you used a very common name, ‘‘John Smith in the United 

States,’’ or a very common name in the Arab world, then it is not 

really accomplishing anything by putting that on the no-fly list. 

And so that is part of the distinction and discussion. We are obviously wanting any information that would help us identify those 

people that would be at risk. But we also want as much information from the agencies as we can get. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman. 

And I thank our witnesses once again. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Just some quick—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Can I stop you? I am sorry, I didn’t see Mr. Turner come in. I apologize. 

I recognize Mr. Turner now for five minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Hutchinson, I understand Ms. Sanchez was asking you about 

the problem of wait time, particularly at the airports. And I have 

taken a look at this memo that was issued by the department to 

field operations on January 2nd. And that was the memo that lowered the wait time—or stated that if the wait times exceeded one 
43

hour, then you could waive the US–VISIT process, and prior to 

that, your regulation was that if the wait time exceeded two hours. 

Now, it is strange to me that during a period of orange alert, you 

changed the rules and you told field operations that if there is a 

wait time that exceeds an hour, you can just waive all these requirements, when previously at least you had a two-hour rule. 

So it seems like you sent a terrible signal to field operations with 

regard to the meaning of US–VISIT. 

Because—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Representative Turner? 

Mr. TURNER. If I read this—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Would the gentleman yield, please—. 

Can the witness have a copy, please—. 

Mr. TURNER. Sure. 

Ms. GRANGER. —before you question him about that. He does not 

have a copy of that memo. 

Mr. TURNER. Asa, would you like a copy of this? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would be happy to look at it, but go ahead 

and ask me questions. 

Mr. TURNER. There was an article that I read on a Web site, 

World Daily Net, where several of the frontline screeners were 

quite upset with this change, because they felt very strongly—and 

I could quote a couple of them to you. 

But the bottom line is, we know that the intent of US–VISIT, according to Secretary Ridge, is to add about 15 seconds to the wait 

time of an average passenger. That is what we are told anyway. 

And so to me it seems like at the very point in time when you 

are implementing the system to say that if the lines get so long 

and the backup such that we are going to have an hour wait, then 

you can just waive the program and bring people in. 

Not only is it a significant security risk?because as you know, 

you are building a system that obviously will do what you said in 

your opening statement. It will catch a lot more criminals and a 

lot more immigrations violations than we have ever caught before 

just because we are creating the system. 

But that is not the standard. 

You know, this system, unfortunately, has got to be airtight. And 

if we already are loosening the rules, then I think we are moving 

in the wrong direction. And more important, I think it sends a terrible signal to those frontline workers who are out there dedicated 

to making this work and knowing the importance of what they are 

doing, and then to say, well, if the wait lines are too long, just 

waive all this stuff and let everybody on in. 

So I would urge you to take a look at that, to make hopefully a 

reassessment of that, and certainly make it clear to those who are 

out there on the frontlines, working for your agency, that we want 

this system to work and be implemented, and that this is not a system that just because the lines are long we will waive it. 

Now, I recognize that we are going to have a lot of pressure?and 

I am sure you felt it—from those who are concerned about backlogs 

and the effect on travel. 

But the way we have to deal with that is reallocation of resources to be sure that we move people on through in a timely way. 
44

And to send a message this early that we are going to loosen the 

rules, I think is a bad signal for us. 

The other area that I have concern about is one I have expressed 

on numerous occasions, is about your linkage to the Terrorist 

Screening Center. 

We all know that the Terrorist Screening Center is not yet collecting on a real-time basis the information from other databases. 

In fact, in many cases the information on many government watchlist databases haven’t yet been incorporated into the unified terrorist watch list. 

But in terms of the way it is working for you now, I want you 

to describe for me, if you will, whether the data used by US–VISIT 

is adequately comprehensive and up to date? And describe the relationship between US–VISIT and the Terrorist Screening Center. 

My impression is, that is not a real-time linkage. And even when 

you submit information to the Terrorist Screening Center, they 

have to manually check all these other databases. 

And even on the important FBI list that they maintain, that you 

utilize, through the IDENT program, the FBI doesn’t update that 

list but once every two weeks. 

So what I am interested in is, what is the state of achieving what 

I hope some day we will be able to say is a real-time system of 

screening for terrorists that will be available to your frontline inspectors so that when somebody walks through and enters our 

country and walks through the inspection station, they can get the 

information back in real time to know whether that person is a 

dangerous person. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, the check is first against the Interagency 

Border Inspections System, our IBIS database, that has 26 different databases, including the State Department’s, including the 

Department of Justice, other databases that make that up, including Treasury, with our tech system, including the Justice Department. 

And then it is also checked against the terrorist list from the 

Terrorist Screening Center. 

Now is it real time? 

If a name is added by the Terrorist Screening Center to the 

watch list, it is in real time communicated and refreshed with our 

databases so it can be an immediate hit if that passenger would 

try to come through. 

Now can the system be improved? Absolutely. This is a new system. We are building the capacity. The TSC is strengthening its 

ability as well. This is being refined every day. 

But I believe that with the technology that we have, being ahead 

of the schedule, the biometrics, that we have enhanced the ability 

of increasing our security at our ports of entry with US–VISIT even 

over and above what the congressional mandate was. 

If I might go back to your first question about the memo that 

was sent out, it was not a change—it had nothing to do with 

whether it was two hours at our land borders during orange, because there was different wait times if it was at a heightened alert 

level. 

As we implemented US–VISIT, we specifically looked at what 

happens if the system does not work right or it takes longer. And 
45

on the first initial phases of it, this memo was sent out. For example, we are not including in the regulation people who are older 

than 79. Well, I think that is a reasonable exclusion from those 

that we would have finger scans on. But if we saw excessive problems, we would reduce that to age 69. 

Now, I think that is a reasonable step in the initial phases as 

we implement US–VISIT. It has not been used. But if it was necessary, it would not be by a line inspector, it would be by a supervisor that would have to make that decision. 

And we have not had to use that. I do not expect we will have 

to use that. But I think it was a prudent step to take as we rolled 

this out in 150 airports on the first day. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, I just want you know, I have talked—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Turner, your time has expired. We will have 

a second round. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five minutes. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to follow up on a question both by Mr. Cox and by Mr. 

Turner and have you clarify for me. 

I recognize that biometrics do a great job of ensuring that the 

person who showed up to obtain the visa at the consulate outside 

this country is the same person who then shows up at the port of 

entry coming into the country. 

But Mr. Cox asked I think what is the critical question and that 

is, what if that person, intent on deceit from the get-go, and they 

show up with the intent of using a false name to apply in the first 

place. 

Mr. Under Secretary, you indicated that they check at I think 

you call it—is that interagency border data system? Is that right? 

And is that checked when they show up at the port of entry? Or 

is that checked when they show and apply for the visa at the consulate outside the United States, I guess is my first question. 

And second question would be: Is that the only database that is 

checked, or are there other databases that are checked as well at 

that initial stage to try to find out if the person presenting himself 

or herself is who they claim to be? 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you for the question, sir. 

With reference to what happens at a consular section overseas 

the consular officer runs what we call a CLASS namecheck, that 

is what we call our system. There are other systems of the government that feed into that. 

CLASS is built, and in fact the U.S. government’s 

counterterrorism watch list at this point, is built on a system started by the State Department in 1987 called TIPOFF. 

Recently, over the last several months, TIPOFF’s database has 

migrated over to TTIC and TSC. 

TIPOFF had 120,00 names in it. It is being augmented every day 

per Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6, so that all 

agencies are beginning to feed as TIPOFF did. But TIPOFF formed 

the very spine of the new single database that we are all working 

towards. 
46

The consular officers cannot, as they adjudicate a visa, hit the 

print key on a visa until they have run that namecheck, first and 

foremost. 

Now, with US–VISIT, what we have done in the 55 posts where 

we are already up and running is, we are adding to that, the biometric collection. So, in addition to running our CLASS namecheck, 

based on the TIPOFF watch list, we also now run the biometric 

namecheck in four posts, at this point: Riyadh, Jeddah, Sanaa and 

San Salvador. 

We are waiting until we get the namecheck back from the 

IDENT system, DHS’s IDENT system, before we actually go ahead 

and issue the visa. 

We will, of course—it is brand new; this is a pilot—but we will 

be bringing each of those online in the days, weeks and months 

ahead. 

The time that it takes from the time that we ask IDENT, ‘‘What 

about this fingerprint? What do you know?’’ and by the time we get 

an answer back, it has been about seven to eight minutes; again, 

not adding too much. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I think you have just told me what you told Mr. 

Cox, which is that if they haven’t encountered the system already 

and if they are not in our database as having an issue as to whoever they are, that person, they can get by the system. 

And I guess my question would be: How do we go beyond our 

own database to look at the individual? Is there a way that we coordinate with host countries to find out some verification that this 

person is who they say they are? 

Ms. HARTY. Thank you, sir. 

One of the things that changed dramatically in the post–September 11 world is our strong, strong emphasis on interviewing 

techniques and on using the visa interview as a genuine tool to 

spot people who might or might not be exactly what they say they 

are. 

So we have at the consular officer training at the Foreign Service 

Institute added additional courses on detecting deception, added 

additional courses taught by other agencies of the government who 

give us up-to-date information on trends out in the field of a 

counterterrorist nature. 

We have taken a detecting deception course and added it to the 

basic officer training course. We have also taken it on the road so 

that mid-grade and more senior officers can also get this training. 

In addition to that, several years ago we formed what is called 

a VISAS VIPER Committee meeting at post. That is where, on at 

least a monthly basis, all officers at an embassy in law enforcement—I am sorry. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I am running out of time and I wanted to get in 

one more question, but go ahead. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There is layered protections from the interviews and to the checks that are done. But certainly, theoretically 

someone could come in with a clean record, with an alias name, 

and if they are not in the system before, if we don’t have their fingerprints, the first time through it would not be a catch. 
47

Mr. SHADEGG. I appreciate your candor on that. And I think you 

will never build a system where that cannot happen. I just wanted 

to know if they were working at it. 

Let me ask the last question: When I go home to Arizona and 

I describe all the work of your department and the efforts that are 

being made to deal with people that present themselves at a border 

checkpoint, or a port of entry, to tighten down and US–VISIT and 

all these other efforts, they kind of tilt their heads and look at me 

as if to say, ‘‘Congressman, you are crazy. Have you ever looked at 

the border?’’

What difference does it make if we do all these things at our 

ports of entry when, on the southern border of my state, there literally is not even a three-strand barbed wire fence for the majority 

of the border? 

And I guess I would be interested in how you would respond to 

that question from a constituent. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. They are related. And obviously you have got 

to have two tracks going in the same direction. One is tightening 

it up at the ports of entry, which we are doing. That, in essence, 

could force illegal entrants to come across the land borders. And so, 

you have got to tighten that up as well. We are addressing that 

through technology in the same way, but they are related, and we 

have to do both. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five minute. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have some quick questions, and then I have 

some ones that perhaps you can elaborate on, Mr. Secretary. 

Have we tested and come to the conclusion as the reason why we 

are concentrating on fingerprints in this biometric quest, here, has 

it proven to be more conclusive than facial identification, hand geometry, handwriting, retinal tests and voice? Is that the conclusion 

you came to? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The conclusion is that it is more widely accepted in the international community, and we have obviously the 

added feature with finger scans that you have databases of criminals and terrorists that are taken in that fashion. You don’t have 

the same databases of retina scans, for example. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Is it more accepted than it is accurate? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, I think it is both accepted and accurate. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay, my next question is, if I may: Approximately how many photographs do we have of suspected terrorists 

that we can compare to the digital facial photographs we now take 

of foreign visitors, approximately? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I don’t have that exact number for you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Could you get that to us, please? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would be happy to. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Is there a database of fingerprints that we have 

of suspected terror? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We do have that database? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You have that database? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, it is accessed through? 
48

Mr. PASCRELL. No, I don’t mean you personally, but your department? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay, my next question is this: You referred to 

the history of security in terms of trying to see who is coming in 

and out of this country. 

I want to go back to 1998, in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 

In fact, a few people mention this in their testimony. And in that 

report to the Congress of the United States on border improvement 

and immigration, it is interesting. You go back to see, you know, 

where we have come in four years due to the tragedy of 2001. 

‘‘The committee is keenly aware that implementing an automated entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with 

countering drug trafficking, halting the entry of terrorists into the 

United State or with any other illegal activity near the borders. An 

automated entry-exit control system will at best provide information only on those who have overstayed their visas. 

‘‘Even if a vast database of millions of visa overstayers could be 

developed, this database will in no way provide information as to 

which individuals might be engaging in other unlawful activity. It 

will accordingly provide no assistance in identifying terrorists, drug 

traffickers or other criminals.’’

I would like your brief comment on that, if I may. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, again, you point out that one of the original focuses was that you would be able to identify visa overstays 

to add integrity to our immigration system. As that was in 1998, 

that changed somewhat after the attack on America, and there was 

a renewed focus by Congress that not only is it important for the 

integrity, but also for security purposes. 

And so, there was additional features and requirements that 

were made and probably a little bit different perspective was added 

after that. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And my final question is this?and I thank you for 

your candidness. We can go back over this again at another time. 

I think it is important enough. 

Once the visa holder is enrolled in US–VISIT, his or her arrival 

information will be stored in the automated fingerprint identification system, better known as IDENT. It is a biometric database. 

That is correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is correct. That is correct. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Am I right in thinking that the information for 

applicants for admission under the US–VISIT with no criminal 

record are contained in the same database as individuals for whom 

DHS is on the lookout for? Is that accurate? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, they are contained in the same IDENT 

system, but there would be an individual file, really, for each individual traveler, and it is separated from the criminal databases 

that would be associated with that. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Secretary, in conclusion, let me say this: I 

think that is unacceptable. I think to include within the same database of criminals or those that have been identified with criminal 

activity. All immigrants is an insult to every immigrant that comes 

into this country under this particular program. 
49

I would suggest through the chair that you examine that situation, separate these folks out, because they are not criminals. You 

know that just as well as I do. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Representative Dicks is now called on for eight minutes. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam Chairman, could I respond to this—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Yes, you may. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. —very appropriate question by Mr. Pascrell? 

And I thank you for that comment. And we certainly would not 

want to do anything that would denigrate or be offensive to our immigrant population. 

I would just emphasize that, for example, IDENT has the FBI 

database as part of that. And there are separate databases within 

that, so it would be a separate system for those people that would 

be coming in, myself—or not myself—but any foreign visitor that 

would be traveling. That is held in there for facilitating their travel 

and the second time around. 

So I appreciate your point, and we certainly want to make that 

distinction. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Representative Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

The first increment of the US–VISIT program relies on two fingerprints, isn’t that correct? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. One from each index finger for the purpose of checking that individual’s identity against the various databases. 

As we have discussed before, two prints are not always reliable 

for finding a person’s records in some of our databases. For example, the FBI’s IAFIS system uses all ten prints and will often not 

return a match when only two prints are used. 

GAO and some of the biometric industry have said that more 

prints may be necessary for US–VISIT to work as well as it needs 

to. 

Now, you and I had this discussion, but to hear the discussion 

today, 600,000 people have come in and, through this system, used 

their two index fingers. 

Now, if we had done this right and had them do either eight or 

ten, we would have a much more reliable system. We are going to 

have to go to that at some point in order to make this thing work 

properly, as you and I have discussed—and I know there is very 

strong feeling, both in the House and Senate, that two fingers are 

inadequate. 

I would just like to have your comment here on the record for 

why we did it that way. I know we were trying to rush and do it, 

but now it looks to me like we are going to have to go back and 

redo this. And we missed the opportunity to get these 600,000 people the first time. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you. 

And the two fingerprints are sufficient for identification purposes, that you confirm their identity, which is the first responsibility. If there is an identity question, they are referred to secondary, where the multiple prints can be taken to have a more ac-
50

curate check against the FBI databases, to make sure there is not 

any confusion. 

And so it is a limited purpose of identity with the two fingerprints. 

And the State Department is a key in this, that they have invested in the fingerprint scans that they are deploying as to whether down the road there has to be additional fingerprints that are 

added. But that is a question of our systems development, a question of resources with the State Department. 

But this is an immediate added security value for a very low-cost 

amount. I think it was like $1 million for these and all of our ports 

of entry. We were immediately able to get the security benefit, and 

then we will see where the system has to gravitate down the road. 

Mr. DICKS. Ambassador Harty, what do you think? I mean, 

would we be better off to do all ten or eight fingerprints at first 

and get this thing right? 

Ms. HARTY. Sir, thank you for the question. 

I would like to agree with Under Secretary Hutchinson that in 

the first instance, we were in fact very much consumed with getting the identity right, identifying a traveler, getting to the issue 

of document fraud and making sure that the people who showed up 

at ports of entry were the people we had seen overseas. 

I am not an expert on this subject, but I know that there have 

been a number of studies done, and not all conclusive, that you can 

find a number of different entities out there, some who say eight 

or ten are better. Let me just say maybe that is not the case. I 

think what we have is a very strong desire at the beginning of the 

program to meet the congressional deadlines to get the identification in place. 

Mr. DICKS. I think the deadlines are somewhat more created by 

the administration. The secretary said, ‘‘We will do it by a certain 

date.’’

I think we ought to make sure we are doing it right by a specific 

date. Because if we go to a two-finger system, and then we have 

to go back to a ten-finger system because we didn’t get it right, 

that is a waste of a lot of money and effort, it seems to me. My 

view is we should have done it the more comprehensive way at first 

if there was any question about it. 

And the issue is that you have got the IAFIS database at the FBI 

that is a ten-finger system. So, you are not going to have this relationship, according to the experts that I talked to. 

I just wanted to bring that up, and hope you will take another 

look at it. 

Ms. HARTY. Certainly, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. We have talked about the southern border. The 

northern border is of concern to me, being from Washington State. 

I noticed in the statistics that the CBP has assigned 9,539 border 

agents to the southern border compared with 990 on the 4,121-mile 

northern border. How do we explain the difference, here? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, we have added 1,000 agents to the northern border, which is 1,000 increase. And obviously the northern 

border has not been a focus prior to the security lessons that we 

learned from 9/11. 
51

So we are continuing to enhance that, but it is a challenge on 

both the northern and the southern border. 

Mr. DICKS. You know, I usually don’t quote from The Washington 

Times, but The Washington Times, in December, did a very comprehensive article about the problems and challenges we face in 

Canada. One thing it said was that since 1995, at least 15 persons 

identified to federal authorities as known terrorists have been 

caught crossing the border from Canada. Two in Blaine, in Washington State. 

And also that there are Al Qaida sleeper cells, even today, in 

Canada. 

Are we talking to the Canadians about trying to get them to 

strengthen their system? We may make this enormous effort here 

in the United States, but if these people can enter into Canada, be 

in sleeper cells, come across the border, that this may become—we 

have already seen with Ressam that this has happened once before. 

Thank goodness for a great agent who found this person up in 

Port Angeles in my district, or we may have had a major incident 

at the Los Angeles airport or in Seattle. 

What are we doing with the Canadians to try to get them to cooperate with us on this? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. You are absolutely correct that there are 

vulnerabilities in the northern border that have to be addressed. 

We are working with the Canadian counterparts. We have our 

integrated border enforcement teams, which the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police and our Border Patrol are working together. We 

have moved air assets to the northern border, including the building of new facilities to accommodate those air assets. We have put 

new technology there, surveillance equipment, sensors. 

It is a vast, open border. There is a tradition of openness there 

that we have had to take a much closer look at and enhance the 

security on since 9/11. 

We will continue to do that, but we are working closely with the 

Canadian government. 

Mr. DICKS. Are they doing a better job of trying to screen people—do what we are trying to do in terms of keeping these terrorists out of their country? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. They are. We are wanting them to do some additional things, working with them. Obviously if you get to North 

America, whether it is Canada or the United States, and you have 

an open border, you can traverse back and forth. 

And so, we need to on the front end have a common policy on 

who gets into North America. That would enhance our security. 

And we are working with them and with the State Department to 

accomplish. 

Mr. DICKS. I urge you to keep that up. 

Now, let me ask you one more thing: When they go across the 

border, you have trucks, you have cars. I know if you slowed it 

down, you would have a backup for miles and miles and miles. 

What kind of equipment are we using to scan these trucks and 

cars? Do you know what we are using? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Each inspector has their personal radiation 

equipment. We also have non-intrusive inspection equipment, and 
52

then we have radiation portals for the larger vehicles that go 

through. 

So a variety of different technologies that will accomplish the inspection, both radiation detection as well as X-ray examination to 

detect any anomalies in the shipment. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

I have no additional questions. 

I will call on Chairman Cox. 

Do you have additional questions? 

Mr. COX. Madam Vice Chairman, I have a great many further 

questions for our panel. I know we have another panel. And I 

would yield to the vice chairwoman to excuse our witnesses, provided that we might have the opportunity to follow up with written 

questions. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Representative Turner, do you have additional questions? 

Five minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. I just have one follow up. 

Mr. Secretary, you made the comment about the inspections 

going on at our land borders. You mentioned that we have radiation detection portals. You mentioned the hand-held devices. 

Where do we have radiation portals that you were referring to 

on our land borders? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, if you are looking at the cargo shipments, the trucks, we have portals in a whole host of places on the 

northern and the southern border. I would be happy to provide you 

with a precise list as to where they are. 

Mr. TURNER. And what is the criteria for utilizing them? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, if, for example, a personal radiation detector triggered, indicating there was some radiation being admitted, then if it was a truck, it would be brought through for closer 

examination in the larger portal. 

In other places, where we have perhaps more equipment in place, 

they are automatically run through the portal. 

I was at a land point of entry on the northern border in which 

every truck vehicle was being passed through the radiation portal. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, in regard to radiation portals, I know you 

have deployed some of those at seaports. And we don’t yet have 

enough at our seaports to really screen all the cargo containers. 

And I was wondering if you have a plan and a cost estimate of 

what it is going to take to have radiation portals at all of our border crossings, including the seaports and the land crossings? 

Is this a goal of the department? Could you provide us with a 

number as to what it would cost to have that kind of capability? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It is a goal. And I would be happy to provide 

you with where they are deployed at the present time and the 

schedule this year for deploying additional portals at our land-and 

our sea-ports. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, do you consider it an appropriate, pressing, 

and urgent need to have the capability at both seaports and land 

crossings, to be able to have sufficient radiation detection portals 

so that all cargo containers coming across the land borders and into 

our seaports could be screened for radiation? 
53

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would underscore the word ‘‘could be 

screened.’’ It is important. And we consider it a high priority to 

make sure this equipment is deployed. Obviously, we are not deploying it in sufficient quantity, nor do I think we should, that 

every container coming through the seaport would go through that 

portal. 

Those that we identify for further inspection or at risk should go 

through there, and do go through there. And sufficient portals 

should be deployed for that purpose. 

Mr. TURNER. How much money is requested in your most recent 

budget request for radiation portals? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The budget will be announced on I believe next 

Monday. And we will be able to provide that figure for 2005. 

Mr. TURNER. You won’t give me a little advance briefing here, 

then? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. No, but I will go back and look it up. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me say this: I heard you state that you 

weren’t—and I understand this is the department’s position, that 

we do not need to screen all cargo containers for radiation. And I 

really think you ought to rethink that position. 

I have been told—and I would invite you to check it out—that 

we could have sufficient radiation detection portals at all seaports, 

sufficient to allow all cargo containers coming in on ships to be run 

through them and checked for radiation for $75 million. Not a big 

price tag, if accurate. 

And if you go down to the port of Norfolk, you can see where 

they on their own, with their own money, have purchased sufficient 

radiation portals to check for radiation. And as you know, these 

hand-held devices that these folks have, they are not really so 

much for screening as for really measuring the dosage that they 

may be exposed to. 

So I would urge you to reconsider that and to look at your budget 

request and see if perhaps we couldn’t get that taken care of. 

Are there deployed at any of our ports, particularly our land 

crossings—. 

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Turner, you have gone over your five minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. All right, I am sorry. 

I will ask you again. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you for those comments. And we will 

continue to evaluate. As the technology improves, it might be more 

cost-effective, and we can do more. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five minutes. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Madam Chairman, I know you want to move on 

to the next panel, so I will try to be as brief as I can. 

Undersecretary Hutchinson, I know the deadline for the 50 highest volume land borders is at the end of this year. As I understand 

it, your goal is to have contracts in place with the private sector 

by May 1 to meet that deadline, is that correct? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That’s correct. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I will just ask one question with two parts to it: 

One, can you briefly describe the challenges you face to implementing this program at those land borders? In my State of Ari-
54

zona, we have a number that will fall into that category, but some 

are very high volume crossings. Nogales is a hub of commerce on 

the southern border of Arizona. 

What challenges do you face, number one? 

And number two, what are you doing to work with the community to give them advance knowledge and kind of prepare them for 

the shock of the new program, so that there is not a negative reaction? 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Challenges and what we are doing to prepare. 

First of all, a good communication plan. We want to spend a lot 

of time on the border, working with the communities and bringing 

them in the process as we develop these solutions. 

And I hope that there is some level of confidence—the fact that 

we are trying to do this in the air and sea ports without backlogs 

will indicate we have the same intent on the land borders. 

This illustrates some of the vastness of the problem. We have the 

traveler population, air, sea and land, and you see the land categories which we will face on the borders, you have citizens, 120 

million; permanent residents, 75 million; visa exempt, which are 

primarily Canadians, 52 million; visa waiver, 1.8 million; regular 

visas, 4.5 million, but the border crossing card, 104 million. And 

you compare that to the airports and seaports, you are looking at 

79 million versus 358 million. 

So the challenge is multifold, compared to what we have just 

done. 

And with great respect to Congressman Turner who asked about 

the mitigation strategy, we almost have to have a mitigation strategy when it comes to land borders. 

You know, we cannot just simply clog it. And so, we have to implement this in a way that gives us a measure of security, that has 

some flexibility to it but still is consistent with the commerce that 

needs to flow through. 

That is our challenge. We are looking at new technology. First 

of all, in the 2004 spin plan, we are looking at having the same 

solution that we have at our airports at our land borders for regular visa holders that travel through. 

And so, they would go to secondary inspection, be enrolled in 

US–VISIT, just as they are now, but it doesn’t clog the border. 

That’s 4.5 million visitors. 

Visa waiver, obviously they go to our secondary inspection now 

as well. 

The big challenge is the border crossing card, which, if they are 

used as a visa, would go to secondary inspection, can be enrolled, 

but if they are just used for the crossing card purposes, you are 

looking at 104 million people going through. 

We are looking at R.F.-technology. We are looking at different 

technologies that can accomplish some objectives of what we want 

to do, consistent with the congressional mandate. We are looking 

forward to working with this committee to meet that challenge that 

we have. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I wish you luck. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I yield back, Madam Chairman. 
55

Ms. GRANGER. The Chair now recognizes Representative Sanchez 

for five minutes. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just have a couple of questions—more that I will put in—but 

I am really concerned about the accuracy and the lack of connectedness of the different databases that we are searching to find 

these people to check against them, to see if they are bad people 

or good people. 

I have been told that the databases contain a lot of errors, conflicting information. And I guess my question is to the policy or 

lack of policy that allows these problems to be addressed, the erroneous data to be changed. 

For example, let’s say that I am mistaken for another Loretta 

Sanchez who has a warrant out for her arrest. And I go through 

the airport. And I have to sit down. I have to talk to the CBP officer. I prove to him that in fact I am the congresswoman that is Loretta Sanchez, not the fugitive. And he sees that. 

But there is no procedure in place right now from what I am told 

to be able to change that in the database. 

Which means that the next time I come to the airport, I get 

treated in the same way, I get pulled aside as the bad Loretta 

Sanchez. I have to sit down. I have to explain to this guy or lady 

that, you know, that is just not the case. 

So I guess my question goes to how are we integrating these 

databases? What kind of policies do we have to ensure accuracy 

and to eliminate mistaken identity problems, for example, because, 

you know, it is not only a waste of my time, but it is a waste of 

valuable resources in these officers on the front line. 

Ms. HARTY. While I hesitate to speak for my colleague of the Terrorist Screening Center, I did sit with her two days ago at another 

hearing, so I would just like to give you in part her answer and 

in part my own. 

On the overseas side, we do often have that, as Undersecretary 

Hutchinson alluded to earlier, where there might be another person with your same name out there. We see that somewhat regularly. That is why we have a very strong emphasis on getting not 

only the name of the person, but a date and place of birth, so that 

we can make sure that we are talking about the right person. 

We have procedures at State to remove somebody from the system if in fact that information is erroneous. 

On the part of my colleague from TSC, she mentioned exactly the 

same thing, that one of the things of course they are very interested in is facilitating legitimate travel by legitimate people. That, 

in fact, she said, they do have a procedure and have employed it—

they haven’t been up and running very long, but have employed it 

on a number of occasions already, specifically to make sure that 

honest, decent people who are not the subject of a hit should not 

in fact have to fear traveling through a U.S. port of entry. 

You might want to add something to that, but that is, in fact, 

what I heard her say just the other day. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. We have processes in place as well that someone who is mistakenly identified can be removed. 

But the problem you have expressed very well: If we have information—intelligence that is received—that Asa Hutchinson is plan-
56

ning a terrorist attack. And that is intelligence that we get, perhaps it is electronic, maybe it is a human source. And that is all 

we have. What do we do with that one name? 

Now, I think the public would expect that that name would be 

entered so we can be on the lookout for an Asa Hutchinson. But 

there is not a date of birth with it. There is not an address with 

it. 

And so, sometimes you have bits of information. Sometimes it is 

more limited. And so, we have—you are right—policy questions. 

But we also have some huge responsibilities when we have little 

bits of information to share it with the right people. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. You know, it really is a problem. And even when you have the date of birth, for example, because there is, in fact, another Lorena Sanchez that was born on 

the same day, that lives in the same city that I live in. So, you 

know, constantly confused. 

And so, if we do it there, I can just imagine doing it at the airport. 

But more importantly, I represent the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam in the world. They all have the same 

name, practically. And I don’t know how that happens. Maybe it 

was when everybody was being processed, it was easier to give 

them Tranh or Wen, rather than, you know, what their name was. 

Or maybe it is all the same family. 

But they have the same names over and over and over again. 

And this is one of the issues that they bring up to me. 

As well as a very large Arab–American community in my area, 

largest in California, that, you know, their names are butchered all 

over the place. 

So if it even looks close to something, they are being stopped at 

LAX or other airports. 

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And you are right. And so that is why we want 

to have identifying information for the passengers who fly that can 

distinguish them from just simply a name on a terrorist list. And 

that is why we are developing our CAPS II system, working with 

the airlines and the European Commission to get the passenger 

name record data that will eliminate—help reduce—the problem 

that you articulated. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. And the other problem, I 

would say, is just that the—just because one data base has the new 

Loretta Sanchez or don’t get this Loretta Sanchez, it doesn’t seem 

that a lot of the databases are also being updated at the same time. 

Thank you, Madam. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. That concludes the testimony and questions for this panel. We thank both of our witnesses 

very much. And the second panel can come to the witness table 

now. 

We are expecting a vote, probably between 1:45 and 2:00, we understand. 

Let me clarify, for the record, there was a question from Mr. 

Dicks concerning the two prints in the IAFIS system that comes 

from the FBI. And when the two prints are made, they can still 

match with two points on the IAFIS system. If that is true, after 

that match is made, that there is an indication that there could be 
57

a match because there are only two prints compared to 10 prints, 

there still could be a match on the two prints. 

Thank you. 

I thank you for being here. We will now begin testimony from 

Mr. May, from the Air Transport Association; followed by Ms. 

Campbell Walker from the El Paso Foreign Trade Association; and 

then by Mr. Carlton with the International Biometrics Group. 

Mr. May, we have received your written testimony, and ask that 

you briefly summarize in five minutes your statement.

STATEMENT OF JAMES MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR 

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And since over the 

years I have learned not to put you to sleep by trying to read, I 

will just do that very thing. 

Number one, we think the US–VISIT program is working well. 

It is something that we had the pleasure of doing a test based on 

at the Atlanta Hartsfield airport with Delta Air Lines, as you are 

well aware. 

We were very concerned that it would in the final analysis significantly delay the process of passengers coming into the United 

States. We were concerned that it would delay connecting flights 

and so forth. 

To date, it has worked well. The capture of the biometric information has worked well. We are looking at probably 10 to 15 minutes on average on waits in there and 20 at the outside. There are 

certain longer periods of time, but for the most part the system is 

working well as it gets rolled out across the country, with 115-some 

odd points of capture. 

We have roughly 17.5 million passengers that we carry that are 

arguably subject to the US–VISIT program, so it has a real potential impact on us. So far, the entry program is working well. 

Exit, as you are well aware, is being tested at BWI. It is a far 

more challenging environment going out than it is coming in. To 

date, we are using DHS is using kiosks. They are set up inside the 

security perimeter. 

I think there are a couple of issues that we have raised with 

DHS on the workability of those projects. The first is, I think they 

need to do a little bit better job of signage. The second is that they 

probably need to think about having sort of an audio component to 

those kiosks, conceivable even multi-lingual. 

I think they are using one employee per five right now, and they 

may have to kick that up a little bit along the way. 

The goal for us on the exit is to make sure, as was the case on 

the entrance, that we don’t turn airline personnel into immigration 

agents, number one; number two, we don’t have a system that ends 

up costing the airlines an additional millions of dollars in security 

costs which we can ill afford—we are already spending $3 billion 

a year on unreimbursed security costs; and to have it be a process 

that works through quickly, so as not to delay unduly our passengers and to have the facilitation process work well. 

To date, we are pleased with the cooperation we are getting from 

DHS and the State Department. We think the program is working 
58

well from our perspective. I am happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The statement of Mr. May follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is James C. May and 

I am President and CEO of the Air Transport Association of America (ATA). ATA 

is the trade association for leading U.S. airlines. Our members transport over 95 

percent of all the passenger and cargo traffic in the United States. Thank you for 

inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the United States’ Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program—more commonly known as ‘‘US–

VISIT’’. 

Congress mandated the US–VISIT program in the Enhanced Border Security and 

Visa Reform Act of 2002. This statute established the requirement that all foreign 

national visa holders be photographed and fingerprinted upon arrival and prior to 

departure from the United States. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

broad Congressional mandate to create an integrated, automated entry/exit system, 

recording the arrival and departure of travelers is both ambitious and important. 

Because the airline industry transports 51 million international passengers each 

year, it is essential to our industry, and our passengers, that this program improve 

overall border management while further enhancing our Nation’s security. We support DHS in its efforts to create and implement US–VISIT. 

While the airline industry is pleased to work with DHS and our national security 

leaders to participate in these programs, we believe it is critical that DHS adhere 

to the planned schedule for deploying US–VISIT at the northern and southern land 

borders. This is especially important since airline passengers make up only 4 percent of all U.S. entrants subject to US–VISIT requirements while land borders make 

up 37 percent of such visitors. Until US–VISIT is deployed nationwide at all border 

crossings, the system will not be effective in enhancing our national security 

We compliment the Department of Homeland Security, and specifically, Undersecretary Hutchinson and the Office of Border and Transportation Security, the US–

VISIT Program Office, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for 

working together to carefully and completely plan for a successful implementation. 

Their attention to careful planning, in full consultation with all interested parties 

has been first rate. We look forward to continuing this cooperative approach. 

First, I will offer some lessons learned and observations about the entry portion 

of US–VISIT. Second, I will address on-going concerns with the exit pilot program. 

Finally, I will briefly mention some overarching screening program concerns. 

US–VISIT—ENTRY 

As you know, the pilot for entry was conducted at Atlanta’s Hartsfield/Jackson 

International Airport, in partnership with Delta Air Lines. We believe it was an excellent opportunity to test the process both from the government and the industry 

perspective. The pilot allowed everyone involved to become familiar with the newly 

deployed equipment and to provide input at the implementation phase. 

In the short time that the US–VISIT entry process has been operational, the airlines have been very pleased with its smooth operation. Airlines believe that a key 

to the initial success of the US–VISIT entry process can be attributed to the increased federal inspectors associated with the program. 

We initially were wary of the decision to place the entry process at the primary 

immigration inspection stanchions due to concerns over staffing levels. Ensuring an 

adequate number of federal inspectors, whether legacy INS or legacy Customs, has 

been a longstanding and significant concern of the airline industry. If not adequately staffed, such placement in the current configuration of most airports could 

not accommodate the inevitable long lines due to the US–VISIT processing requirements. In addition, these long lines not only delay our customers and but also could 

possibly delay airport operations. 

This DHS worked with us to address this staffing level issue; therefore, we are 

satisfied that the US–VISIT entry process has not inhibited or lengthened the overall passenger processing times as we had feared.

US–VISIT—EXIT 

As with the entry process, we appreciate the open communications we have had, 

and are having, with DHS on the development of the exit portion of the program. 

As you are aware, a kiosk approach is being piloted at Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI). This approach versus other possibilities—for example, processing eligible US–VISIT passengers at the TSA checkpoint—remains an open question. 
59

Given the opportunity to evaluate the exit pilot thus far, we have some remaining 

issues we would like to see addressed. First, due to the voluntary nature of the current pilot, we are concerned that the underlying purpose of US–VISIT, monitoring 

both the entry and exit of foreign nationals will not be met. Without government 

enforcement, the airline industry could be put in a position of transporting an ineligible passenger to the United States only to have to absorb the expense of returning 

that passenger back to his originating airport. 

Second, at the BWI pilot, the kiosks are located immediately beyond the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) checkpoint. US–VISIT has placed signage 

both within the TSA checkpoint and immediately beyond the checkpoint, directing 

passengers to the kiosks. We believe that the signage is insufficient. At the TSA 

checkpoint, passengers are too busy concentrating on keeping on eye on their belongings—coats, shoes, jewelry, etc. to notice the signage. 

Third, the kiosks are silent. Currently, the system relies on a touch screen with 

icons to direct the passenger through the process. From our observation, this is inadequate. More work remains to be done to make the process easily understood and 

user friendly, particularly for non-English speaking travelers. 

As we continue through this pilot program, we understand that the Office of Management and Budget has directed DHS to explore alternatives to the kiosk system 

in capturing the biometric data. The airline industry asks to participate in any discussions on this topic. As you are aware, ATA opposes any requirement that airline 

staff collect the biometric data, either at the check-in counters or at the departure 

gates. Airline personnel should not be used as quasi-immigration officers.

OTHER SCREENING ISSUES 

We are aware that DHS is developing other passenger screening capabilities, most 

specifically the CAPPS II program that may be adapted to also readily identify US–

VISIT exiting passengers. We would urge that, as these programs develop, consideration be given to combining screening and exit processing to better meet the needs 

of the traveling public and continue to enhance vital security needs. We believe that 

the nation’s interests will best be served by a seamless, fully integrated approach 

to passenger processing and screening. When fully implemented the US–VISIT 

entry/exit program must be enforceable and integrated into any new technologies 

and programs under development at the DHS. 

In conclusion, I want to reiterate our support for the comprehensive and efficient 

implementation of the US–VISIT entry program. We look forward to working with 

both the Congress and the DHS to fine tune the processes and develop an exit policy 

that meets the requirements of the law, but does not discourage travel to the United 

States. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify on a very important 

component to the nation’s overall security policy. I will be happy to answer any 

questions that you may have.

Ms. GRANGER. Ms. Campbell Walker? 

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN CAMPBELL WALKER, A MEMBER 

OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE EL PASO FOREIGN 

TRADE ASSOCIATION AND A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. Madam Chairperson and distinguished 

members of this subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be presenting testimony before you today. 

I am currently on the executive committee of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, an association of over 8,500 lawyers representing thousands of individuals who are trying to comply with our immigration laws. 

And in addition to that, since 1985, I have been a member of the 

board of the El Paso Foreign Trade Association, now known as the 

foreign trade association, on which we worked for four years on establishing the first dedicated commuter lane in the State of Texas. 

And in addition to that, we also worked on the project, just recently 

implemented and introduced by Secretary Ridge, the new FAST 

lane, concerning commercial traffic. 
60

The history that I am trying to bring is one of cooperation and 

work with federal, state and local officials, trying to create realistic 

solutions when we are talking about where the rubber hits the 

road. And that is where I am down in El Paso for the past 18 

years. 

I have got to say that we are extremely concerned that unless a 

deadline is pushed regarding implementation of the 50 busiest land 

ports, which will include El Paso and many others in the State of 

Texas and elsewhere, that we will have total gridlock. 

And I find it interesting in the analysis of the success so far of 

US–VISIT. I would like to just make a few points. But I am trying 

to make constructive comments, because if we don’t understand the 

reality of the process, we cannot give the process the attributes and 

enhancements that it needs to accomplish its objectives. 

So I hope that these comments are taken in that light. 

US–VISIT is supposed to be an exit and an entry system. Obviously, as of January 5th, we don’t have the exit part. And if we did 

have the exit part, we would have a serious problem. 

On the entry segment, as well, the Ahern memo you referenced 

earlier is a logical memo, based on the realities that we have economic trade interdependence here, and our trade is paying for our 

security. So we have got to manage that balance. 

I think that it is an indicator that the memo was issued that indeed additional resources are necessary to properly implement. 

And that is all it states, a truism that needs to be addressed. 

From the perspective of land ports, for me the easiest way for me 

to take a quick snapshot of what we are dealing with is for hopefully those who haven’t visited our land borders down South, we 

hope that you will come visit and be our guests. 

But on a different note, where do we stand right now on our land 

borders, at our land ports? 

First of all, we are not addressing that obvious point that was 

raised earlier in testimony, that we don’t have control of our borders. We still have migration flows between our ports. 

That is an issue that hopefully we will address with comprehensive immigration reform legislation. 

But on a different note about what are we dealing with right 

now, we have pedestrians, a huge volume, coming through our 

ports. In addition to that, commercial vehicles and passengers vehicles. 

We don’t even have a basis IBIS check that takes a few seconds 

being conducted on 100 percent of our pedestrians. There is a 40 

percent minimum requirement. 

We don’t have mandatory checks at all at that level being conducted at our passenger vehicle lanes. The reason is that they are 

lucky to have these mobile tech units in which they are able to access IBIS if they type it in. 

We don’t have time to be able to actually get people through and 

indeed access that information on everybody with what we have in 

place right now. 

And we cannot get it there by December 31st. 

Another point is just flat infrastructure, land and people. We 

don’t have a spot for exit control at all of our ports. And recently 

someone talked about they are going to buy 1,000 scanners. And 
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1,000 scanners to scan these biometric documents, I am sorry, 

doesn’t even begin to address the situation. 

At one point in time they were saying if we got one scanner a 

port, we would be doing great. Well, at one of our ports, we have 

like 10 passenger vehicle lanes, 10 pedestrian, and five or six commercial. So that is just at one port. How does one scanner deal with 

that issue? 

So what I am concerned about is, if we are going to make the 

system work, let’s assess it realistically and give it the tools that 

it needs to be a success. 

And I am not going to sit here and denigrate the efforts made 

by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 

State. Laudable efforts. Amazing work so far. 

But there is a reality check that needs to be made before we end 

up lulling ourselves into a false sense of security. And I think that 

is the path we are going upon. 

As far as the biometric check issue, I hope that someone will ask 

me a really hard question later on, really about that IDENT point, 

because if you look at your normal inspector—and I have got to 

shut up very quickly, the normal inspector does not have access to 

something called CLAIMS 3 regarding immigration status. The 

normal inspector doesn’t have access to the CCD database they 

were talking about on the primary inspection line. 

So I would just like those issues described and discussed later. 

Thank you for the opportunity. 

[The statement of Ms. Campbell Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN CAMPBELL WALKER

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am Kathleen 

Campbell Walker, Treasurer of the American Immigration Lawyers Association 

(AILA). I am honored to be here today representing two organizations, AILA and 

the Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del Norte region. 

AILA is the immigration bar association with more than 8,500 members who practice immigration law. Founded in 1946, the association is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 

organization and is an affiliated organization of the American Bar Association 

(ABA). AILA members represent tens of thousands of: U.S. families who have applied for permanent residence for their spouses, children, and other close relatives 

to lawfully enter and reside in the United States; U.S. businesses, universities, colleges, and industries that sponsor highly skilled foreign professionals seeking to 

enter the United States on a temporary basis or, having proved the unavailability 

of U.S. workers when required, on a permanent basis; and healthcare workers, asylum seekers, often on a pro bono basis, as well as athletes, entertainers, exchange 

visitors, artists, and foreign students. AILA members have assisted in contributing 

ideas for increased port of entry inspection efficiencies and continue to work through 

their national liaison activities with federal agencies engaged in the administration 

and enforcement of our immigration laws to identify ways to improve adjudicative 

processes and procedures. 

The Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del Norte region was originally incorporated in 1985 as the El Paso Foreign Trade Association. The mission of the Foreign Trade Association is to enhance and advance bilateral trade in the Paso del 

Norte region, which includes El Paso, Texas, southern New Mexico, and the northern part of the State of Chihuahua in Mexico, which includes Ciudad Juarez. The 

Association’s membership includes maquiladora executives and service industry 

leaders from both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The Association has a history of 

working with federal, state, and local officials on both sides of the border to implement projects for the improvement of cross-border trade and commerce. For example, the Association spearheaded a four-year project partially funded by the El Paso 

community to construct the first dedicated commuter lane in Texas using Secure 

Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) technology. It also 

helped to implement the first FAST lane on the southern border for commercial traffic in the past few months. 
62

Both organizations appreciate the opportunity to testify today on ‘‘Integrity and 

Security at the Border: The US–VISIT Program.’’ While our organizations differ in 

many respects, we both strongly hold the view that it is vitally important to enhance our nation’s security in a way which balances our need for enhanced security 

with our economic dependence on the international and the cross-border flow of people and goods, which helps to pay for our national security. 

I am here today to testify on the US–VISIT program and to offer suggestions to 

help potentially ensure that this program works efficiently and effectively, so that 

we can achieve a viable inspection process and enhance security at our borders. Living in a post September 11 environment demands that we develop new programs 

that balance a recognition of the fact that our nation is inextricably linked to the 

world around us with the need to protect ourselves from those who would do us 

harm. We all have much to learn from our past mistakes as well as our past successes. I hope this testimony contributes to a productive discussion. 

What is US–VISIT? The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology program (US–VISIT) is the new automated entry/exit system that is 

being implemented at our nation’s ports of entry. It is designed to collect and share 

information on foreign nationals traveling to the United States (including travel details and biometric identifiers), confirm identity, measure security risks, and assess 

the legitimacy of travel in an effort to determine who is welcome and who is not, 

and help speed traffic flow. The overall plan for the implementation of US–VISIT 

calls for the collection of personal data, photos and fingerprints, at U.S. consular 

offices abroad and at our ports of entry, as well as broad database and information 

sharing. The system also is intended to track changes in foreign nationals’ immigration status and make updates and adjustments accordingly. Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to make available information captured 

through US–VISIT at all ports of entry and throughout the entire immigration enforcement system. 

US–VISIT is the latest manifestation of an earlier program, Section 110 of the 

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104–

208) (IIRAIRA). The concept of an entry/exit system to monitor entries at and exits 

from our nation’s ports of entry was first articulated in Section 110, which created 

an entry/exit system that would have applied to all non-U.S. citizens who entered 

or exited the United States at any port of entry to identify visa overstayers. Although subsequent laws altered both the deadline and the parameters of the Section 

110 entry/exit program, the general framework of Section 110 entry/exit remains the 

same today. [The Congressional deadline for the entry/exit system was delayed by 

P.L 105–259 to October 15, 1998. In P.L. 105–277, the deadline was pushed back 

to March 30, 2001, for land ports of entry and seaports. This law did not affect the 

deadline for implementation at airports.] 

The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–215) (DMIA) amended 

Section 110 to require that the entry/exit system use data that already was being 

collected from foreign nationals and prohibited the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS) from imposing additional entry or exit documentary or data collection 

requirements for purposes of the entry/exit system. The act mandated the development of a searchable centralized database and staggered the entry/exit implementation deadlines into three very difficult to achieve time frames as follows:

• Airports and Seaports—December 31, 2003

• Top 50 high traffic land border ports—December 31, 2004

• Remaining implementation for all other ports—December 31, 2005

While the system set forth by Section 110, and amended by the DMIA, must 

record entry and exit for foreign nationals without establishing additional documentary or data collection requirements for the purposes of the entry/exit system, the 

laws do not prohibit DHS from developing new documentary or data collection requirements to implement provisions contained in other laws. Certainly, the mandate 

of US–VISIT—to enroll applicants for visas and admission to the U.S. via the collection of two print fingerprints and a digitized photograph—is beyond current procedures. The potential remains for DHS to include within US–VISIT categories of foreign nationals now exempt from program participation, including legal permanent 

residents, Canadian citizens, and Visa Waiver Program participants. 

In the post-9/11 environment, Congress took another look at the Section 110 

entry/exit system in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107–56) (PATRIOT Act). 

The law encouraged the development of the entry/exit system with ‘‘all deliberate 

speed’’ and as ‘‘expeditiously as practicable,’’ and established a taskforce made up 

of governmental and private industry representatives to review the establishment 

of an entry/exit system. The law also mandated that the entry/exit system use bio-
63

metric technology and requires tamper-resistant documents readable at all ports of 

entry. 

With the passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 

of 2002 (P.L. 107–173) (Enhanced Border Security Act), Congress addressed the 

entry/exit system as a program that balances security with the economic realities 

of our busy ports. To strike this balance, the act mandated that the entry/exit program utilize technologies that facilitate the efficient flow of commerce and travel, 

including interoperable data bases that aid in the determination of who should be 

allowed entry into the U.S. Congress here clearly recognized the need to balance improved border security with our nation’s economic security as it relates to the flow 

of people and goods through our nation’s ports of entry.

The First Phase of US–VISIT 

Testing for the first phase of the US–VISIT program’s implementation at airports 

and seaports began in the Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta during November 2003. DHS reported that during the pilot testing phase, over 140,000 individuals were enrolled in US–VISIT and 21 individuals were intercepted upon entry. 

DHS has not indicated whether these individuals would have been admitted to the 

U.S. if the typical pre-VISIT inspections process had been used. 

On January 5th, the first phase of US–VISIT became operational at 14 seaports 

and 115 airports nationwide. DHS explained the five-day delay in implementation 

(the program was originally set to begin on December 31, 2003) as an effort to avoid 

disrupting holiday travel. This delay, however, was more than a magnanimous overture, because the first part of the year is traditionally a slow travel season. Implementing US–VISIT while travel is light has led to reports that US–VISIT’s procedures do not cause appreciable delays. US–VISIT, as currently implemented at our 

ports of entry, does not involve any biometric security check prior to admission. 

And, subsequent applications for admission by US–VISIT enrollees will only require 

a biometric check to verify the identity of the enrolled foreign national. 

US–VISIT currently is set-up so that nonimmigrant visa holders applying for admission to the U.S. through one of the US–VISIT designated airports or seaports 

will undergo the standard inspection process and simultaneously will be enrolled in 

the US–VISIT system. If these individuals leave through a port with US–VISIT exit 

capabilities (of which there currently is only one airport and one seaport), these 

travelers must comply with US–VISIT exit procedures upon their departure from 

the U.S. Unfortunately, such procedures are still sketchy at best and the consequences for failure to comply can be severe, according to the US–VISIT interim 

final implementing regulations published at 69 Fed. Reg. 467–481.

Enrollment at the Ports of Entry under US–VISIT 

During the first phase of US–VISIT’s implementation, only nonimmigrant visa 

holders who enter the U.S. through an air or seaport that has US–VISIT capability 

will be enrolled in the program. The first time DHS enrolls a traveler into US–

VISIT at a port, the individual’s travel documents will be scanned, a digital photo 

and inkless fingerprints of both index fingers will be taken, and the individual’s 

name will be checked against the Interagency Border Inspection Service (IBIS) database and the wants and warrants section of the National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) database. Both of these checks are text (not biometric) checks. IBIS contains 

certain terrorist watch list information from the TIPOFF database maintained by 

the Department of State (DOS). 

The enrollment process is supposed to take about 10 to 15 seconds. The primary 

reason for the speed of this process is that the security check against the applicable 

biometric database, Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), occurs 

after the visa holder is admitted to the U.S. If DHS inspectors ran the IDENT 

checks during the admissions process, it would add about five minutes to every US–

VISIT enrollment, thus generating such lengthy backlogs that the ports of entry 

would essentially shut down. 

The IDENT database, is a legacy INS database based on the same two index 

prints as US–VISIT as well as a digitized photograph. The system was created in 

1994 and widely deployed from 1997 to 1998. It originally contained a recidivist 

database and a lookout database including all foreign nationals apprehended by the 

INS. The DOS also maintains such a biometric database of all Mexican laser visa 

holders (formerly known as border crossing cardholders). These laser visa holders 

all were vetted through an IDENT check. Except for in the US–VISIT context, the 

IDENT checks at ports of entry currently always occur during secondary and not 

primary inspection, where the time required to process information through IDENT 

is less of a concern. 

Once the visa holder is enrolled in US–VISIT, his or her arrival information will 

be stored in the IDENT biometric database. Therefore, the information for appli-
64

cants for admission under US–VISIT with no criminal record or apprehension record 

with legacy INS or DHS are contained in the same database as the individuals for 

whom DHS is on the lookout. Such proximity between two distinct classes of foreign 

nationals will lead to confusion as inspectors will have to determine which individuals in IDENT are inadmissible to the U.S. and which have merely been enrolled 

in US–VISIT. 

After visa holders enroll in US–VISIT, they still will have to provide fingerprints 

and have a digital photograph taken upon each application for entry to the U.S. 

Ideally, future enrollees will be able to swipe their biometric passport or visa, provide index fingerprints and photo, and be checked for identity against the US–VISIT 

database without further delay. This system would rely on US–VISIT to identify the 

enrollee and the usual text-based IBIS database check. Again, this procedure will 

not provide for a rapid biometric check against any criminal or other biometric 

watch list database.

Departure from the U.S. under US–VISIT 

Nonimmigrant visa holders are required to document their departure from the 

United States with US–VISIT only if they depart the U.S. through an air or seaport 

that has US–VISIT exit capability. Since January 5, 2004, US–VISIT only has exit 

capability at the Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) airport in Baltimore, 

Maryland and at the Miami seaport. However, DHS plans to expand US–VISIT exit 

capabilities to other ports of entry throughout 2004. At the moment, the exit stations for US–VISIT are self-service kiosks that closely resemble automated teller 

machines (ATMs). DHS has indicated that the kiosks will be located within the secure area of air and seaports. The Department also has stated that attendants will 

be assigned to monitor the kiosk area and offer assistance. In addition, DHS has 

announced that during 2004, it will test various exit methods, possibly including a 

hand-held device that will permit DHS personnel to register the departure of nonimmigrant visa holders. One of the problems with such mobile units in the past has 

been lack of database connectivity. For example, at land ports, passenger vehicle 

lanes are usually not equipped with machine readable document scanners and mobile units with access to the TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communications System) 

database are used. Information has to be typed into the system and database access 

is limited. Upon departure, database review is again limited and not conducted 

against a criminal biometric database such as IDENT. 

DHS considers exit registration mandatory for visa holders who depart from an 

air or seaport with US–VISIT exit capability. According to DHS, entry/exit information is constantly updated, and if a visitor overstays his or her authorized period 

of stay, US–VISIT will record the failure to depart. However, prior experience with 

databases designed to display the status of a foreign national indicated that inspectors are not often given access to these resources. Legacy INS experimented with 

the CLAIMS III database, which indicated the immigration status of foreign nationals. Unfortunately, the use of that database was frustrated by the fact that it was 

often down and not accessible. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services also 

maintains an internet-based on-line case status inquiry system which is not hooked 

up to inspection lanes, and inspectors have a difficult time utilizing this resource. 

In addition to concerns about the usability of the US–VISIT database, there are 

serious concerns regarding the accuracy of the entry/exit information it contains. Inaccurate entry/exit data can have a serious impact on visa holders in a variety of 

ways since presence in or out of the U.S. is a critical issue for certain immigration 

benefits such as: eligibility in terms of overstays and removals; physical presence 

requirements for substantial presence determinations under our tax laws; legal permanent residence abandonment issues; time spent in the U.S. for naturalization 

purposes; etc. 

Statements made by the DHS indicate that the Department appreciates the potential negative effects of recording exit information before the exit systems are fully 

operational and is considering a grace period regarding exit requirements. However, 

there has not been any confirmation of whether such a grace period exists, or 

whether failure to exit properly will result in a case-by-case review similar to the 

review permitted under Special Registration/National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS).

U.S. Consulates’ Role in US–VISIT 

Certain U.S. consulates have begun enrolling nonimmigrant and immigrant visa 

applicants into the US–VISIT system when processing the new biometric visa. Individuals enrolled at the consulates will still be ‘‘visited’’ upon their entry to the U.S., 

in that they will have their entry recorded via a biometric identity review. Currently, only certain consular posts are issuing biometric visas. However, the State 

Department is required to start issuing these visas at all 211 consular posts by Oc-
65

tober 26, 2004—an extremely ambitious deadline. As with port VISIT enrollment, 

two digital index finger prints and a photo are taken of visa applicants. Such biometric information, however, is checked against the IDENT database before visa 

issuance. Recently, at the U.S. Consulate in Vancouver, visa issuance times were 

increased from same day processing to 3-day processing due to the IDENT clearance. This delay is marking the end of same-day visa issuance and results in additional processing burdens on consular officers without the necessary staff increases 

to attend to such demands in a more timely manner. In addition, insufficient additional resources are apparently being allocated to address these database check 

delays at the source. 

This IDENT requirement subsumes the personal appearance waiver policy announced in 2003 by DOS that required interviews of applicants between the ages 

of 16 and 60. Note that the IDENT check done by DOS applies in both the nonimmigrant and immigrant visa application process. Currently, US–VISIT only applies to nonimmigrant visa holders. 

In addition to these delays, consulates in Visa Waiver countries will likely suffer 

from additional delays due to an increased number of visa applicants. A congressional mandate in the PATRIOT Act requires Visa Waiver countries to issue tamper-proof machine-readable passports (MRPs) that include biometric identifiers by 

October 26, 2004. Individuals without a biometric MRP will have to apply for a visa 

at a U.S. consulate and will be subject to US–VISIT enrollment at the post. Their 

admission will then be recorded under US–VISIT procedures at the port of entry.

The Relationship between NSEERS and US–VISIT 

Special Registration/NSEERS at the ports of entry continues even after the 

launch of US–VISIT this January. Registration for NSEERS and enrollment for US–

VISIT will continue to be separate processes until US–VISIT incorporates NSEERS. 

(Such incorporation is not anticipated until US–VISIT is fully developed.) Also, the 

two processes involve the intake of different levels of data. Thus, it is difficult to 

conceptualize an NSEERS process without a secondary inspection component, which 

is typically not involved in most US–VISIT admissions. 

Persons subjected to call-in or port of entry Special Registration still must register 

their departure via NSEERS and must leave the U.S. through a designated 

NSEERS port of departure. According to preliminary reports, if US–VISIT has an 

operational exit kiosk at this port, and an individual already has registered his or 

her departure at that airport via NSEERS, the visa holder is not obligated to document his departure with US–VISIT. Thus, someone subject to NSEERS departure 

control will not need to register departure via both methodologies. There is, however, no written confirmation of this procedure. Considering that those who fail to 

comply with departure control rules under NSEERS may be subject to inadmissibility under INA section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), many foreign nationals subject to both 

US–VISIT and NSEERS exit requirements (as well as their counsel) are not clear 

on how to ensure that their compliance is well documented in both systems. A public information program is critical to help those wishing to comply to do so.

Expansion of US–VISIT to Land Ports of Entry 

Although DHS has not announced a timeframe for the implementation of new exit 

capabilities at our nation’s airports and seaports, DHS plans on deploying biometric 

document readers to all air, sea, and land ports of entry by October 26, 2004. (Of 

course, the Mexican biometric laser visa for business and tourist admissions has 

been in existence for years, and yet such scanners have not been deployed to all 

ports.) 

Implementing US–VISIT at our land ports of entry must take into account the 

complex realities of these ports. For instance, after September 11, 2001, when port 

officers attempted to subject all applicants for admission to IBIS (text based) database reviews, the resulting delays led to a modification of the policy. Such checks 

were not conducted at passenger and commercial vehicle lanes due to infrastructure 

limitations. 

Unless Congress acts to delay the implementation of US–VISIT deadlines, DHS 

will be required to expand the entry/exit program to the top 50 high traffic land border ports by December 31, 2004 and to the remaining ports of entry by December 

31, 2005. Expanding US–VISIT to land ports of entry raises a multitude of issues 

beyond those that arise at airports, and presents a host of infrastructure, staffing, 

and database challenges. 

Border communities depend on the cross border flow of goods and people for their 

economic survival. For example, in 2001, $22.7 billion in imports and $16.1 billion 

in exports passed through El Paso’s international bridges, constituting 19 percent 

of total trade through southern U.S. Customs Districts. Local El Paso economists 

estimate that between 15 and 30 percent of El Paso’s retail sales are derived from 
66

Mexican nationals. Just in time inventory management in cross-border manufacturing operations requires that Mexican and Canadian suppliers make their deliveries to the U.S. in predictable intervals. Delays in these cases can translate into 

disasters for these communities. 

A June 1998 Senate Judiciary Committee report offers a compelling example of 

the challenges faced at our land border ports of entry. The report cites information 

from Dan Stamper, President of the Detroit International Bridge Co. Mr. Stamper 

noted that the Ambassador Bridge handles approximately 30,000 vehicle crossings 

per day. He calculated that, ‘‘assum[ing] the most efficient and remarkable entry 

and exit procedures in the world [that] will take only 30 seconds per vehicle, and 

making the equally optimistic assumption that only half of the vehicles have to go 

through procedures, that would amount to an extra 3,750 minutes of additional 

processing time each day.’’ As he sagely pointed out, ‘‘There are only 1,440 minutes 

a day.’’ Thus, the implementation of Section 110 would effectively close the border. 

Unique infrastructure concerns also arise. The DMIA Task Force’s Second Annual 

Report to Congress notes that in fiscal year 2002, there were 358 million land border entry inspections of people and 11 million inspections of commercial vehicles. 

There are over 300 ports of entry to the U.S. The report further states that as to 

current port infrastructure: 64 ports have less than 25 percent of the required space; 

40 ports have between 25 and 50 percent of the required space; 13 ports have between 50 and 75 percent of the required space; and some existing ports lack ‘‘any 

land for expansion.’’ 

In addition, the high cost involved in developing an appropriate infrastructure 

also must be recognized. Along with the physical exits, these ports need adequate 

lanes, technologies, and trained officials, all of which costs, according to experts, 

more than $10 billion dollars. Furthermore, in contrast to airport ports of entry, 

land ports must deal with pedestrians, passenger vehicle occupants, and commercial 

vehicle occupants. Our current admissions procedures at land ports sheds some light 

on the complex environment in which US–VISIT will supposedly be implemented. 

Pedestrians: Currently, most pedestrian admissions are not recorded. When randomly checked, pedestrians are checked against IBIS (text-based) and the person 

and document are ‘‘eye-balled’’ for a match. The current minimum mandated IBIS 

check is 40 percent. The inspector may ask about the purpose of entry, where the 

person is from, or why he or she has been outside the U.S. This process often takes 

less than 5 seconds. 

Occasionally, inspectors may check the person’s visa against the DOS Consular 

Consolidated Database (CCD), which houses a copy of the visa the U.S. Consulate 

issued to that person. This additional check helps to target those who use other’s 

documentation or fraudulent visas. Unfortunately, CCD access is not typically available in primary inspection. Currently, no review done at the primary inspection 

area verifies the identity of the person through a biometric check other than via the 

human eye. 

In order for a biometric check to be done, the person is taken to a secondary inspection area where two fingerprints and a photograph are taken. The person’s biographical and biometric information is run through the IDENT database, which 

then determines if this individual has violated immigration status. If merited, some 

applicants for admission may also be checked against the Integrated Automated 

Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which is maintained by the FBI. This 

database compares all ten fingerprints of the person against its records. The IDENT 

checks typically take 5 minutes or less, and the IAFIS checks can take 15 to 30 minutes or more depending on a variety of factors. 

Most foreign nationals are required to apply for an I-94 admission document and 

pay a $6 fee upon application for entry to the U.S. The procedures surrounding 

issuing the I–94 card often result in delays. For example, there are often wait times 

of 30 minutes or more to be interviewed to obtain the I–94. After the interview process, the foreign national must go a separate location to pay the $6 fee and receive 

the I–94. Too often, the official taking the fees is unavailable and applicants must 

wait for more than 15 minutes for an I–94 admission document to be issued. Currently, there is no exit inspection for pedestrians and usually no space or personnel 

to perform such an inspection. 

Passenger Vehicle Occupants: Most passenger vehicle lane checks do not involve checking databases against the applicant’s visa. Often, passenger vehicle inspectors will have access to Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), 

which is a database managed by legacy Customs. It is possible to access IBIS via 

a mobile TECS unit, but the system is not amenable to scanning documents, so data 

must be typed in manually. In addition, to access CLAIMS III for immigration status information, the person must be sent to secondary inspection for further review. 

Therefore, if vehicle inspectors want to conduct further checks on applicants, the ap-
67

plicants for entry must park their car and walk in front of oncoming lanes of vehicles to get to the secondary inspection area. 

Exit lanes are usually not available to allow for exit inspection. This fact is confirmed in the DMIA Task Force’s First and Second Annual Report to Congress. Obviously, in the passenger vehicle context, even fewer IBIS checks are conducted than 

of pedestrians. 

Commercial Vehicle Occupants: Commercial vehicle occupants basically go 

through the same process as passenger vehicle occupants. However, the commercial 

parking lot often is far away from the secondary inspection area and commercial vehicle occupants must be escorted to secondary by a port employee. Due to inadequate staffing, often no staff is available to perform this function and foreign nationals are often left waiting for long periods of time for further review. 

The DHS has indicated that enrollment in US–VISIT at land ports of entry would 

occur in secondary inspection. [What DHS terms ‘‘secondary inspection’’ in this context, is the point at which foreign nationals obtain the I–94 admission card.] In 

order to speed processing of automobile traffic at the land ports, DHS is investigating the use of a radio frequency (RF) technology, which would transmit biographical information to the inspections officer. This technology would be similar to 

the SENTRI or NEXUS commuter programs implemented along the southern and 

northern border, respectively. However, RF technology does not resolve identity—

and security-related database issues without either pre-clearance review of the applicant or at least text-based checks, as in airports upon admission. As noted by 

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Director—Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task 

Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, in her March 12, 2003 testimony before 

the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security, Citizenship, and Immigration, ‘‘There will never be enough inspection resources and it would prove self-defeating to subject every person, conveyance, and cargo to the same inspection regime.’’

She further notes that the, ‘‘inspections processes at a port of entry must be an exercise in risk management.’’

DHS issued a request for proposal (RFP) on November 30, 2003 for US–VISIT, 

and is now considering three primary bidders: Accenture, CSC and Lockheed-Martin. Award of a contract is expected by May 31, 2004.

US–VISIT—A Tool to Enhance Our Security? 

Will US–VISIT help to enhance our security? While the jury is still out, serious 

questions need to be addressed as to the achievable mission of US–VISIT. A June 

1998 Senate Judiciary Committee Report (Senate Judiciary Report 105•197 on S. 

1360, Border Improvement and Immigration Act of 1998, June 1, 1998) makes the 

following apt comment: 

The Committee is keenly aware that implementing an automated entry/exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, 

and halting the entry of terrorists into the United States, or with any other illegal activity near the borders. An automated entry/exit control system will at best 

provide information only on those who have overstayed their visas. Even if a vast 

database of millions of visa overstayers could be developed, this database will 

in no way provide information as to which individuals might be engaging in 

other unlawful activity. It will accordingly provide no assistance in identifying terrorists, drug traffickers, or other criminals. (emphasis added)

With regard to tracking visa overstayers, the report further states:

Even if a list of names and passport numbers of visa overstayers would be available, there would be no information as to where the individuals could be located. 

Even if there was information at the time of entry as to where an alien was expecting to go in the United States, it cannot be expected that 6 or more months 

later the alien would be at the same location. Particularly, if an alien were intending to overstay, it is likely that the alien would have provided only a temporary or false location as to where the alien was intending to go. 

AILA has previously testified that immigration can best contribute to our national 

security by enhancing our intelligence capacities. To that end, AILA strongly supported the Enhanced Border Security Act. The goal of this law is to make our borders the last line of defense. To that end, it includes the following provisions: authorizes increased funding for the DOS and INS, requires federal agencies to coordinate and share information needed to identify and intercept terrorists; encourages 

the use of new technologies by authorizing funds to improve technology and infrastructure at INS, the Customs Service, and DOS, targeting much of this effort at 

strengthening our nation’s borders; mandates the transmittal of advance passenger 

lists; and implements a study to determine the feasibility of a North American Perimeter Safety Zone. (This study includes a review of the feasibility of expanding 

and developing pre-clearance and pre-inspections programs). 
68

Given this law’s ambitious provisions, Congress needs to step up to the plate and 

provide the federal agencies impacted with the staffing and funding levels they need 

to implement this measure’s provisions, as well as perform adequate oversight. It 

is simply unacceptable for Congress to pass this bill and not give the federal agencies the funding they need to do a good job. It is also unacceptable for the agencies 

not to implement the mandates of this law.

Recommendations: Based on the above discussion and in order to implement 

feasible security objectives without seriously harming the international and cross 

border flow of trade and people, we submit the following recommendations:

Realistic Assessment of the US–VISIT Program’s Capabilities 

1. Determine the limits of US–VISIT: Congress and the DHS must step-back and 

determine the program’s true capabilities and assess the feasibility of every aspect 

of the program while US–VISIT is still in its infancy. The 1998 Senate report on 

the entry/exit program challenges the notion that an entry/exit system can be used 

as a tool to prevent terrorism. If that is true, Congress must determine it now rather than after billions of US tax dollars have been spent. If the mission of US–VISIT 

is instead to catch visa overstayers and those with a criminal record, the mission 

should be clarified. On the issue of national security, a false sense of security is a 

failure. 

2. Develop a comprehensive plan for US–VISIT: The Administration and Congress 

should use the above assessments to develop a comprehensive plan for US–VISIT 

that takes into account the achievable goals of the program, necessary funding levels, infrastructure needs, and appropriate deadlines. 

3. Do not use US–VISIT as a substitute for increasing our intelligence capacity:

Security experts agree that our national security is best enhanced by increasing intelligence and database security checks performed outside the country. DHS should 

examine ways to expand the use of pre-inspection stations and authorize pre-clearances for low-risk travelers. By clearing travelers before their voyage to the United 

States, inspectors will have more face time with applicants and could better scrutinize each applicant for entry. Such practices would reduce delays at the border and 

allow inspectors more time to do their job. Pre-clearances also would provide international travelers with a sense of certainty that they will be admitted into the U.S. 

4. Ensure US–VISIT receives the billions of dollars necessary for adequate implementation: Congress must be prepared to spend the money necessary to properly implement US–VISIT to achieve its mission. In addition, Congress must conduct continual oversight to determine if US–VISIT objectives are being met due to the alleged security importance of the project. According to the DMIA Task Force’s first 

report to Congress, the U.S. government needs to appropriate billions of dollars to 

purchase real estate, upgrade facilities, develop infrastructure and technological capabilities, and hire inspectors to manage the entry/exit program. With a preliminary 

estimated price tag of billions of dollars, the $380 million appropriated in FY 2003 

was grossly insufficient to fund even the beginnings of this system. Without sufficient funding, US–VISIT will not operate properly and will impede the flow of the 

people and trade essential to our economic well being.

Database Recommendations 

1. Make enforcement databases accurate: The concept of a watch list database is 

dependent on accurate information. There must be accountability to ensure accuracy. In addition, all public inquiries concerning enforcement-related database entries should be consolidated. The general public should be able to contact a central 

office to timely remove inaccurate information so as to avoid the continuation of injustices tied to the dissemination and provision of any inaccurate information. 

2. Increase the interoperability of database systems: DHS should prioritize its efforts to increase the interoperability of the database systems to give inspectors a 

more thorough and streamlined review of each applicant requesting entry into the 

U.S. Currently, the separate databases from the three immigration bureaus have 

not been fully integrated into US–VISIT. Due to this lack of information transfer, 

visitors who have applied for visa extensions might be detained for overstaying their 

visas, when in reality; they had maintained proper visa status. Having complete and 

correct information will make the difference between having a workable secure system or a discredited inefficient one. 

3. Increase funding and oversight for IDENT to ensure that it is efficient, reliable 

and accurate: Currently IDENT checks are being run at the time of US–VISIT enrollment at the U.S. Consulates (thereby delaying visa processing for each applicant 

by roughly three days in some cases) and are run at the ports of entry after the 

foreign national has entered the U.S. With the current IDENT processing times and 

infrastructure capacities at the ports of entry, it would be impossible to conduct 
69

IDENT checks upon admission without shutting down the borders. Congress and 

DHS must determine if IDENT can be modified so that checks can be done at the 

time of admission and then commit funding to making that happen. If it is not possible, Congress must understand that US–VISIT does not enhance our security 

checks through the use of a biometric security database check upon admission. Instead, US–VISIT runs a text-based security database check at the time of admission 

and creates a catalog of established identities for foreign nationals who have enrolled in the program. 

4. Develop a biometric US–VISIT database: Currently, the biometrics and biographical data of foreign nationals enrolled into US–VISIT is warehoused within the 

IDENT biometric database. By lumping US–VISIT enrollees in with criminals, we 

are sending the message that immigrants are criminals. Furthermore, commingling 

these two groups makes it more likely that errors will occur within the database 

and innocent travelers will be denied entry into the U.S.

Infrastructure & Staffing Needs 

1. Don’t implement US–VISIT until an adequate infrastructure assessment is done 

and put into place: The procedures for port enrollment in VISIT versus consular 

post enrollment do not mirror one another from a security review perspective. The 

reason for this dichotomy is based on logistical limitations. Reassess the use of 

IDENT checks and consider applying them only to higher risk segments of the population. Currently, the only ‘‘low-risk’’ populations identified are those under 14 or 

over 79. This method of exemption appears overbroad. Exemption from the IDENT 

check and US–VISIT enrollment should be based on intelligence, not stereotypes. 

2. Realistically assess the staffing and infrastructure necessary to implement US–

VISIT: Such an assessment would involve answering many questions including: 

How many ports have scanners, which read passports, laser visas, etc. at commercial, passenger vehicle and pedestrian lanes? What is the current level of overtime 

at the ports? What are the processing times for I–94, immigrant visa processing, 

and other adjudications before deciding the impact on our tourism and trade of US–

VISIT requirements? 

3. Delay implementation at land border until an adequate infrastructure is in 

place: The Border Security Act requires that DHS not impede the flow of goods and 

people across our nation’s borders. Considering that the U.S. has over 300 ports of 

entry and, in 2001, over 510 million people entered the U.S. (63 percent of whom 

were foreign nationals) and over $1.35 trillion in imports entered the U.S., the potential devastating effect of delay at the land ports of entry becomes clear. Furthermore, such delays would undermine the entire effort to maintain an efficient border, 

and efficiency is a vital component in increasing security. 

4. Clearly define what constitutes an exit and allow for flexibility in compliance 

with the exit requirements in the early stages of US–VISIT: At this time, the airport 

and seaport exit functions of US–VISIT are being piloted. DHS is testing an exit 

kiosk, but it has also indicated that it will test handheld exit devices. DHS must 

clearly define what constitutes an exit and ensure that the exit function is clearly 

marked and cannot be ignored by an oblivious foreign national. In addition, the government should clarify that the negative consequences of those failing to properly 

exit during the first few years of US–VISIT will only be applied to willful violators. 

At land ports the lack of infrastructure makes it necessary to think creatively about 

exit control (such as allowing frequent travelers to skip the exit requirements since 

their multiple entries will verify that they previously departed the U.S. in a timely 

fashion) or possibly abandon exit controls there all together unless funding is allocated to the infrastructure and personnel investment required.

Operational Assistance 

1. DHS must increase its outreach to the public concerning US–VISIT: DHS must 

inform US–VISIT enrollees of the program’s requirements, and information must be 

widely disseminated and presented in a timely manner. Without adequate public notice on how to comply with these new US–VISIT requirements, the program will not 

operate properly and will impede the flow of people who are essential to our economic well being. 

2. Give US–VISIT enrollees a receipt and issue regulations allowing leeway during 

the program’s infancy: Without giving US–VISIT enrollees physical proof of their 

entry and exit into US–VISIT, enrollees will have no way to rebut system errors 

or to identify informational mistakes inputted into the system. Additionally, during 

US–VISIT’s infancy, enrollees are facing much uncertainty regarding their responsibilities under this program. A grace period for exit control compliance and alternative methods by which visa holders may comply with exit control without penalty 

are necessary to ensure that innocent travelers are not unfairly penalized by US–

VISIT. 
70

3. Limit the US–VISIT process for our Mexican neighbors who hold laser visas:

Only require US–VISIT compliance for laser visa holders when they would need an 

I–94 for admission. Do not require these frequent travelers to enroll or be tracked 

by US–VISIT when they do not go beyond 25 miles from the border (75 miles in 

Arizona) or remain in the U.S. over 72 hours. The laser visa biometric database 

maintained by State should be integrated into the US–VISIT biometric database. 

This merger would update the US–VISIT database for all laser visa holders without 

subjecting each laser visa holder to an initial US–VISIT enrollment. Still apply random IBIS checks for security updates.

General Recommendations 

Our nation’s ports of entry are complex environments into which US–VISIT has 

been thrust. The following recommendations will help provide order and accountability to that complex environment, thereby creating a more stable foundation upon 

which US–VISIT can be built. 

1. Establish an immigration specialist position at the ports of entry: It is important 

that immigration specialists be designated and accessible to apply our immigration 

laws. For consistency and accurate applications of our complex immigration laws, 

the decisions of these specialists should be directed and coordinated by immigration 

counsel within the office of the DHS General Counsel. Such legal counsel must be 

coordinated with benefit-related adjudications housed in United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) and enforcement policy and procedures applied 

by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

2. Don’t conduct redundant security checks: Many border residents cross the international border several times per day. It is critical to integrate existing voluntary 

frequent traveler programs so that enrollment in one provides a uniform access 

process at all our ports of entry. There should be one consistent enrollment process 

for air, land, and sea admissions. The Application Support Centers in the U.S. could 

help facilitate the process for those already here to enroll in such programs by providing biometrics. The former U.S. Customs Service created the C–TPAT program, 

which is a joint government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships 

that strengthen overall supply chain and border security. Why not allow and encourage employees of qualifying employers to enroll in frequent traveler programs as 

well? In addition, the NEXUS and SENTRI programs should merge and become the 

same uniform process. Why not allow such enrollment eventually at consular posts 

overseas as well? These actions require major funding and staffing, and yet they improve security and reduce congestion at our ports. 

3. Access to counsel: Title 8 to the Code of Federal Regulations was modified to 

restrict access to counsel at ports of entry based on the law in existence at the time, 

which did not provide for expedited removal at ports of entry with no right to any 

administrative review. One of the bases cited for the ability to restrict such access 

was administrative remedy. When the law was changed to allow expedited removal 

from the U.S., no correction was made to the regulations. Legacy Customs has long 

allowed access to legal representation at ports of entry to deal with issues arising 

concerning the admission of goods. For example, the ability to contact a fines, penalties, and forfeitures officer to work on the release of goods held for some reason 

from import to the U.S. Such a practice should be extended to foreign nationals visiting our country. Just put yourself in their place applying for admission to a foreign 

country. Would a U.S. citizen want to be denied access to counsel or even an embassy representative due to some misunderstanding or error at a foreign port of 

entry? If the Golden Rule was ever needed, it is at our ports. 

4. Place cameras at the ports of entry: Cameras have been used successfully at 

many ports to record the behavior and statements of the applicant and the officer. 

Inspections supervisors have praised the tool from a personnel perspective and embassies and applicants for admission have benefited from the recordings of this silent and objective witness. In addition, in some cases, these cameras could also implement cutting edge facial recognition technology to assist inspectors. These cameras should be installed at least in all secondary inspection areas. 

5. Equal benefits and treatment and the development of a DHS culture: In order 

to ensure that CBP functions properly, it must develop its own unique culture in 

which immigration, agriculture, and customs functions are treated with equal respect. In addition, a continuing education component focusing on security and legal 

issues must be linked to pay increases and advancement to improve the quality of 

those guarding and applying the laws at our ports. 

6. Rethink the I–94 card: I–94 cards and I–94W cards for visa waiver applicants 

have never been secure documents, and there are a myriad of ways to make these 

documents both more secure and more efficiently distributed: issue I–94 cards with 

the approval notices for initial grants of nonimmigrant work related visas; for busi-
71

ness visitor or tourists (B–1/B–2), tie the admission date stamped in the passport 

to a default admission period (such precedent already exists in the 90-day admission 

period under the Visa Waiver Program, and the prior typical default admission period of six months for tourist admissions); allow business visitors and tourists to 

apply for their admission document via the internet before their travel and confirm 

identity upon admission. In addition to these possibilities for issuing the I–94 card, 

fees for the card should never have to be collected by personnel. Instead, metro/subway type toll collection machines could be utilized, which would also result in decreased need for personnel oversight on collection issues.

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Carlton?

STATEMENT OF DENNIS CARLTON, DIRECTOR OF WASHINGTON OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC GROUP, 

LLC 

Mr. CARLTON. I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to address you. I am Dennis Carlton. I am the director of 

Washington operations for International Biometric Group. On behalf of our company, I would like to talk to you today about biometrics in the U.S. border management system. 

Let me begin with a brief description of International Biometric 

Group, so you better understand who we are and our unique position in the world of biometrics. 

IBG provides independent consulting services to government and 

private industry customers interested in implementing biometric 

technologies. We take a practical, hands-on approach toward biometrics, having tested more than 50 different biometric solutions 

over the past five years, so we know how they are likely to perform 

in the real world. 

IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which enables us to 

maintain close relationships with biometrics vendors while ensuring our clients receive accurate and independent advice on which 

biometric systems can best meet their needs. 

One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House Office 

of Science and Technology Policy entitled ‘‘The Use of Biometric 

Technologies in the United States Visa Issuance and Border Entry–

Exit Systems.’’ I was the principal investigator and author of this 

report. 

In conducting research for this study, we visited several U.S. consulates around the world, as well as American sea, air and land 

ports of entry. 

The OSTP report is a no-holds-barred look at the practical challenges of implementing biometrics in the field, both at consulates 

and at ports of entry. 

IBG’s report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related to integrating biometrics within US–VISIT that are worthy of re-emphasis before this committee. Biometrics should be implemented in 

a manner that augments, rather than replaces, existing border 

management I.T. systems. Biometrics alone cannot replace the professional judgment of experienced border management personnel. 

The system also must be designed with an eye toward continuing 

technology refreshment. The life cycle of biometric products turns 

over at least as fast as other I.T. components. 

The government must invest in continuing research and development into improving biometric products. In the past few years, 

there has been an explosion in new biometric technologies being in-
72

troduced into the marketplace, many of which warrant the nurture 

of federal government. 

The success of any biometric solution depends in great measure 

on its stakeholders establishing realistic performance expectations 

for the system. And given its unprecedented scale and visibility, 

this will be especially true of US–VISIT. 

Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to the performance of biometric technologies. The current generation of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate, but biometrics don’t 

need to be perfect in order to enhance border security. 

The mere presence of a device can positively link an individual 

with the documentation that they carry. And this will serve as a 

deterrent to many impostors. 

In addition, the system design must incorporate a comprehensive 

security and privacy architecture. Good security and privacy practices are not antithetical and can both be accommodated in US–

VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy neutral. It is the way 

they are employed and the protections put in place to limit misuse 

that makes biometrics either privacy invasive or privacy protective. 

What is essential is that individuals are fully informed on how 

their biometric data is collected, used, shared and secured. 

The advent of US–VISIT and biometric technologies at U.S. ports 

of entry need not result in delay and inefficiency. There are several 

means for mitigating the impacts of these changes. 

First, border management solutions must be prepared to accommodate multiple forms of biometric technologies. Although the 

International Civil Aviation Organization has specified facial recognition as the universal biometric for securing machine-readable 

travel documentation, the U.S. will continue to leverage its investment in fingerprint databases to identify travelers who might pose 

a security threat. 

A universal biometric solution is not necessary in order to 

achieve a secure border management solution, so long as countries 

agree to provide one another with the ability to decode and match 

the specific biometric data associated with the travel document. 

Secondly, although the challenge of implementing biometric identification at land ports of entry is daunting, it is not insurmountable. IBG believes that portable fingerprint reading devices can be 

employed to match the index fingers of passengers in a vehicle with 

the travel documents that they carry. 

The capture of fingerprints must take place upstream from the 

primary inspection station, so that a biometric search can be completed before the vehicle reaches the primary inspection position. 

In this way, the biometric search does not impact the overall primary inspection time, and the primary inspector is not distracted 

from conducting a thorough assessment of the vehicle, its occupants and its contents. 

At exit points from the U.S., the government should provide a 

self-service kiosk type of solution that would allow an exiting U.S. 

citizen a means for self-enrollment of their travel-related documentation and biometrics. 

In exchange for taking the time to scan an identity document 

and provide a biometric sample, the citizen would be entitled to use 
73

a type of blue lane that would offer expedited processing upon their 

return to the U.S. 

And finally, we should expect that most problems associated with 

biometrically secured travel documents would be of an innocent or 

inadvertent nature, rather than a fraud attempt. 

The U.S. should provide travelers with a real-time problem resolution solution, such as a phone number or e-mail address, where 

they can immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like role 

who can begin the process of resolving the travel documentation 

problem. 

I will finish my remarks here and answer your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Carlton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DENNIS CARLTON

My name is Dennis Carlton and I am the Director of Washington Operations for 

International Biometric Group of New York City. On behalf of our company, I’d like 

to thank the committee for the opportunity to talk to you about the technology 

called biometrics and some of the likely the issues associated with introducing biometrics into the border management system. 

Let me begin with a brief description of International Biometric Group so that you 

better understand who we are and our unique position in the world of biometrics. 

International Biometric Group, or IBG, provides independent consulting services to 

government and private industry customers interested in implementing biometric 

technologies. Our organization focuses on three primary functions: (1) evaluating 

and reporting on biometric products and vendors, as well as the markets in which 

they compete, (2) advising clients on how to implement biometric systems, and (3) 

integrating a wide range of biometric hardware and software to meet the security 

needs of our customers. We take a practical, hands-on approach toward biometrics. 

We have conducted extensive comparative performance testing of more than fifty 

different biometric solutions so that we know how they’re likely to perform in the 

real world. IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which enables us to maintain 

close relationships with biometrics vendors while ensuring that our clients receive 

accurate and independent advice on which biometric systems can best meet their 

needs. 

I’d like to take a moment to review some of the basics of biometrics. A technical 

definition of biometrics is the automated measurement of behavioral or physiological 

characteristics of a human being to determine or authenticate their identity. In 

other words, it’s the use of computers to confirm who a person is by matching a behavior or a permanent physical characteristic with similar records in a database. 

Biometrics alone can’t determine an individual’s identity but they can effectively 

distinguish one person from another. There is a wide range of products in the market that can acquire and match a person’s biometric data to perform a quick and 

accurate identification. With respect to border management, the U.S. has focused its 

attention on fingerprint matching and facial recognition biometrics, although other 

biometrics such as iris recognition, hand geometry, and speaker authentication technologies are also being assessed. 

One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House Office of Science and 

Technology Policy entitled ‘‘Use of Biometric Technologies in the United States Visa 

Issuance and Border Entry/Exit Systems’’. I was the principal investigator and author of this report, a summary of which has been included in the material provided 

to committee members. In conducting research for this study we visited several U.S. 

consulates around the world as well as American sea, air and land ports of entry. 

The OSTP sought a no-holds-barred look at the practical challenges of implementing 

biometrics in the field both at consulates and ports of entry—I like to think we accomplished that goal. From the OSTP research and our subsequent participation in 

several ongoing initiatives involving biometrics and international travel security, 

IBG has gained significant insight into the integration, performance, and workflow 

challenges associated with implementing biometrics within US–VISIT and our border management system. 

IBG’s report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related to integrating biometrics within US–VISIT worthy of reemphasis before this committee:

• Biometrics should be implemented in a manner that augments rather than 

replaces existing border management IT systems. The fact that an individual 

matches the biometric associated with a travel document does not ensure that 
74

the individual qualifies for admission to the United States. Biometrics alone 

cannot replace the professional judgment of experienced border management 

personnel. 

• Since the current generation of biometric technologies is not 100 percent accurate, a seamless exception handling process must be incorporated throughout 

the design of the system. 

• The system also must be designed with an eye toward continuing technology 

refreshment. The lifecycle of biometric products turns over at least as fast as 

other IT components—US–VISIT should be designed with seamless transitions 

to newer, more accurate solutions in mind. 

• The government must invest in continuing research and development into improving biometric products. The centennial of the Wright Brothers first powered 

flight serves as a reminder that significant innovations may come from unlikely 

sources. In the past few years there has been an explosion of new biometric 

technologies being introduced into the marketplace, many of which warrant the 

nurture of the federal government. In addition to financial support, the federal 

government may need to approve regulatory and legislative changes to authorize the development of databases that can be used to test the effectiveness of 

new biometric solutions. 

The success of any biometric solution depends in great measure on its stakeholders establishing realistic performance expectations for the system; given its unprecedented scale and visibility, this will be especially true of the US–VISIT system. 

Among the key performance considerations are:

• Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to the performance of biometric technologies. The current generation of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate but biometrics don’t need to be perfect in order to enhance border 

security. The mere presence of a device that can positively link an individual 

with the documentation they carry will serve as a deterrent to many impostors. 

Border inspection personnel use their professional judgment to resolve exception 

situations every day; biometrics problems can be resolved in much the same 

manner as any other identification document discrepancy. 

• The system design must incorporate a comprehensive security and privacy architecture. Good security and privacy practices are not antithetical and can both 

be accommodated in US–VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy neutral—it’s 

the way they are employed, and the protections put in place to limit misuse, 

that make biometrics either privacy-invasive or privacy-protective. What is essential is that individuals are fully informed on how their data is collected, 

used, shared, and secured. For more information about biometrics and privacy 

I commend to you an IBG-sponsored website dedicated exclusively to the subject, www.BioPrivacy.org.

• Reaching a consensus with our international partners on privacy policy will 

be difficult because of significant differences in our privacy expectations. In general, while Americans often don’t hesitate to provide personal data in exchange 

for commercial benefits but frequently oppose sharing such data with government, their counterparts in Europe and Asia view cooperation with their government as a duty of citizens in a civil society but don’t feel similarly compelled 

to provide personal data to commercial concerns. For the time being, some parties have staked out extreme positions. Compromise will mostly likely be 

achieved when views converge toward a standard that defines a minimal exchange of a traveler’s personal or biometric data to effect efficient commerce between governments. 

The advent of US–VISIT and biometric technologies will certainly alter the primary and secondary inspections processes at U.S. ports of entry but these changes 

need not result in delay and inefficiency. Some of the measures that can be taken 

to reduce the impacts caused by these changes include:

• U.S. border management solutions must be designed to accommodate multiple 

forms of biometric technologies. Although the International Civil Aviation Organization has specified that facial recognition is the universal biometric to secure 

machine-readable travel documentation, the U.S. will continue to leverage its 

investment in fingerprint databases to identify travelers who might pose a security threat. A universal biometric solution is not necessary in order to achieve 

a secure border management solution so long as countries agree to provide one 

another with the software necessary to decode and match the specific biometric 

data associated with a travel document—this approach would allow Visa Waiver 

Program participating countries to confirm the identity of one another’s citizens. 

A travel document that is secured by multiple forms of biometric technologies 

would significantly complicate the job of a forger or impostor. Eventually the 
75

U.S. will need to employ biometrics to secure the travel documents it issues its 

own citizens or risk having a U.S. passport become the document of choice for 

fraudsters or terrorists seeking to avoid being exposed by biometric identification. 

• The challenge of implementing biometric identification at land ports of entry 

is daunting but not insurmountable. IBG believes that portable fingerprint 

reading devices can be employed to capture images of the index fingers of all 

passengers in a vehicle in order to authenticate them with the travel documentation they carry and to check against watch lists of undesirable individuals. The capture of fingerprints must take place ‘upstream’ from the primary 

inspection station so that a biometric search can be conducted before the vehicle 

reaches the primary inspection position. In this way, the biometric search does 

not impact the overall primary inspection time and the primary inspector is not 

distracted from conducting a thorough assessment of the vehicle, its occupants, 

and its contents. 

• At exit points or other U.S. government service centers such as post offices, 

the government should provide a self-service kiosk that will allow exiting U.S. 

citizens a means for self-enrollment of their travel-related documentation and 

biometrics. In exchange for taking the time to scan their identity documentation 

(e.g., driver’s license, passport, etc.) and providing a biometric sample, the U.S. 

citizen could use a ‘Blue Lane’ that would offer expedited processing when returning. The success of solutions like the SENTRI system on the U.S.-Mexico 

border and the U.S.-Canadian cooperative program called NEXUS shows that 

both U.S. and foreign citizens are willing to provide personal and biometric data 

to the government in exchange for the very tangible benefit of expedited border 

crossing. If they become widely used, these solutions could help make a dent 

in the rise in identity theft crimes by making it much more difficult for an identity thief to travel internationally on a stolen U.S. identity document. 

• We should expect that most problems associated with biometrically secured 

travel documents would be of an innocent or inadvertent nature rather than a 

fraud attempt. It won’t be a sufficient solution to just turn away at an airline 

counter or border post a traveler who has a problem matching a biometric sample with a travel document. The U.S. should provide travelers with a real-time 

problem resolution solution—a phone number or email address where they can 

immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like role who can begin the process of resolving their travel documentation problems. 

In summary, biometrics will play an increasingly important role in enhancing the 

integrity of U.S. border management systems. With clear guidelines and careful 

compliance with the rules of how, when, and where biometrics will be collected and 

employed, these tools can improve border security while at the same time protect 

the privacy and dignity of the legitimate traveler. 

I look forward to responding to the committee’s questions.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

We will now go to questions. We will adhere to the five-minute 

rule, including my questions. 

I will start with Mr. Carlton first. 

You talked about the concern about mistaken or inadvertent biometric identity mismatches. How would you propose to best address those occurrences, especially from the perspective of safeguarding privacy? 

Mr. CARLTON. Right now, the current border processes handle 

that on a daily basis. There was earlier discussion about common 

names—if a name of John Smith is entered into a text database, 

you get all kinds of John Smith responses back. Some of them may 

be wanted criminals. But it doesn’t mean that you push the button 

to bring in the SWAT team immediately because there is a 

namecheck match. 

The same thing would happen with a biometric search. From the 

data I have heard so far from the folks at DHS, they have been 

able to clear false matches of their current system in about a 

minute—just over a minute right now. So they have actually been 
76

able to resolve problems very quickly, even when there is a biometric mismatch. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Ms. Campbell Walker, in your written testimony, you mention 

that travelers going through primary don’t have their biometric 

data checked through IDENT prior to their admittance to the country. That is in your written testimony. 

But the panel that we had made it very clear that the US–VISIT 

has provided primary inspectors with the new mission capabilities 

allowing them to do immediate IDENT verifications. 

Do you have an inside question about that? 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. Thank you. 

Yes, I do, and thank you for the opportunity to address it, because it is a very—well, to me it is—a very complex issue in trying 

to figure out how to relay this information to the panel. 

The IDENT check pre–US–VISIT is a check of legacy INS database. And it is a database of recidivist people who were caught by 

Border Patrol and then brought back, trying to make sure that you 

had a record so if they came back again, you would know that they 

did this before, and then a look-out database. 

And what happens right now, is that if you are going to be 

checked in IDENT, at where we are, you go into secondary and 

they have an average of a three to five minute response time. That 

is a full IDENT check, where it is a biometric check against the 

full IDENT biometric database. 

My understanding is that that same full biometric database is 

being conducted by the Department of State in US–VISIT enrollment abroad at our consular post. And Ms. Harty just mentioned 

that it was seven to eight minute time frame for the Department 

of State. 

And now, let’s compare it to the story about the enrollment process for US–VISIT at our ports of entry, and here is where I have 

a basic disconnect. Three to five minutes, seven to eight minutes, 

15 seconds. 

When I asked the question to various port directors in different 

states, what I am being told is that, yes, there is an IDENT check, 

because, remember that when they are enrolled, they go into the 

US–VISIT database as a part of IDENT, so the identity is being 

confirmed. But the full IDENT check that we all know and respect 

is not able to be conducted in a timely manner, in 10 to 15 seconds. 

So there is a modified version of it that they run the data 

against, so that the time frame is shorter. 

So, yes, I see in some ways that we have got an identity check 

being conducted. But they are still basing the primary watch list 

on the text check, so it is not the same thing. We are not comparing it apple to an apple. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

That is all the questions I have. 

They are going to the IDENT in the State Department, overseas, 

that is right. The question is the 15 seconds and what that—it is 

confirming the identity, is that right? 

We will have more information on that in the report. 

Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
77

Ms. Walker, I have several questions for you. 

First of all, how would you characterize the US–VISIT program? 

What I mean by that, we conceived it to be an entry-exit system, 

predominantly to catch people with overstayed visas, et cetera. 

Now it is more of a security tool. 

What do you think are its positives and its negatives as an immigration tool and as a security tool, given the years of experience 

you have had in El Paso in particular? 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. From a positive perspective, it definitely—if you are able to confirm someone’s identity timely, that is 

a positive thing. Definitely, if one is able to run theoretically these 

IBIS text-based checks. The litany of examples given by Undersecretary Hutchinson were very instructive, and also the examples regarding Assistant Secretary Harty. 

But the class check, when it was being done, before US–VISIT, 

would have brought up these examples that we are talking about. 

Also the IBIS check would have brought up some of these examples 

that we are talking about, if they were in the database. 

The patina being placed on this scenario by US–VISIT is the possibility of identity verification, a great positive. 

But let’s face the situation: Once they are admitted and they are 

in overstay, we don’t have sufficient interior enforcement to deal 

with it as it stands, to be able to follow up on this. 

There are several facets of this that we need to address to make 

US–VISIT even have a possibility of success. 

From a terrorist perspective, I am sorry, I still think we have a 

very limited number of terrorist fingerprints that we can run 

against, and we are not able to do that quick biometric check 

against the full IDENT database now. 

And I wanted to address a very quick point that Madam Chair, 

Ms. Granger, mentioned earlier, on this IDENT issue and IAFIS. 

And I hope that our biometric expert will speak in a moment about 

that point. 

IDENT and IAFIS, they are not fully integrated. There have 

been several reports to that effect and the fact that we don’t have 

sufficient funding to allow said integration. That is a critical component to eventually allow for further database review. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you. 

You know, looking at this Phase 1, it has been pretty successful, 

the implementation and the agencies getting this all up. I think it 

is a decent start of where we are. 

But I am really taking a look at the fact that we are strained 

with respect to personnel and the resources just to get that first 

phase. Now we are looking at Phase 2, Phase 3, we are talking 

about land borders. What are your concerns, knowing what you do, 

especially on the land border situation, at the enormity—I mean, 

what are the lessons learned or what do we have to watch out for, 

in particular with respect to resources, to get this implemented 

elsewhere? 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. There is a great provision in the second 

annual report of the Data Management Improvement Act task 

force, report to the Congress, reflecting right now the challenges at 

land borders, just in infrastructure and physical facility alone. 
78

I will try to remember this off the top of my head, they indicate 

that there are several ports that have absolutely no additional infrastructure to allow for expansion. This is important if we are 

going to try to deal with exit at all and for that matter increase 

the level of staffing necessary to do these biometric checks of people coming in. 

They have a chart showing that maybe 60 of them only have a 

20 percent expansion capacity. 

And already I believe Jim Williams has been quoted in the paper 

indicating that he is concerned about the ability to implement US–

VISIT timely at land borders. 

We don’t have people for exit; we don’t have land and infrastructure; we don’t have scanners; we don’t have—people right now, if 

you want to look at overtime that is being logged in and paid by 

the government right now, just implementing our current systems, 

it is out the window. 

Plus people are leaving in droves because of the level of stress 

they are put under and the demands placed upon them right now. 

These are incredibly difficult jobs these people are carrying out, 

and they need support. And we just don’t have the capacity to do 

this in the time frame necessary. 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Only 5 percent of the people 

who are crossing our land borders actually are using some type of 

visa. I know when I cross and they just kind of look at me and they 

wave me on or what have you. I mean, what does that signify with 

respect to trying to really figure out who is coming in and who is 

going out under these phased implementations to the program? 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. Well, let’s face it, right now, I mean, 

U.S. citizens are one of the least well documented, and Mexican 

citizens are one of the best documented. Mexican citizens—those 

who have laser visas—have a document that has a biometric embedded in it with two prints and the digitized photograph that is 

the basis for US–VISIT going forward. 

We are not even able to merge that database with the IDENT 

database right now, so that we don’t have to enroll Mexican citizens as they come across. The idea that every Mexican citizen, 

when right now it is less than 5 second coming in, is going to be 

two-printed and it is going to be 10 to 15 seconds, it is quick to 

see what we are going to deal with as far as time frames and 

backups on doing it. 

It makes sense to deal with risk management at this point. And 

why can’t we go ahead and merge those databases and give some 

relief to at least our Mexican neighbors as we are doing to our Canadian neighbors to the north? 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. Thank you. 

Ms. GRANGER. I now recognize Representative Turner for five 

minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Walker, I want to thank you for sounding the 

alarm for us, because I completely agree with you. I think we are 

ill-equipped and ill-prepared to be able to efficiently and effectively 

implement US–VISIT at our land borders. And I hope that this 

committee in a bipartisan way will call upon the Department of 

Homeland Security to do the necessary analysis to submit to the 

Congress what the needs are in terms of personnel, infrastructure, 
79

data integration, in order to be able to successfully implement US–

VISIT at our land border crossings without creating a crisis. 

And it will be a crisis for many of our border communities if we 

fail to provide the necessary support. And to my knowledge, to date 

I have not seen—and I don’t think the department has prepared—

a plan that would lay out for us what the true cost of effective implementation of US–VISIT less than one year from now should be 

in order to carry it out in an effective way. 

And so, we have got to do that. As you said, it is a reality check. 

And I was interested, you made mention of the deployment of 

1,000 biometric scanners, and I don’t know that you got to expand 

upon that, about how inadequate that actually is. But I would invite you to kind of talk about that, as one example of how far we 

have to go. 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. Well, for me it is easiest just to take a 

home example, so if you will indulge me, let me just try to do that. 

One of our major ports of entry is the Bridge of the Americas. 

We have anywhere between four to six pedestrian lanes there and 

then we have the Paso del Norte Bridge, where there is maybe five 

to six pedestrian. And then you have maybe 10—and they are trying to up it to 24 lanes—of passenger vehicle traffic. And then we 

have at just the one, Bridge of the Americas, and then there is the 

other 10 at the Paso del Norte Bridge. 

So there is no way that 1,000 is going to cut it. And so, right 

now, the only thing they have right now at a passenger vehicle 

lane is that I have a mobile text unit, which is that legacy Customs-based system in which I type in to hook into the IBIS check 

on someone. 

But you don’t IBIS check everyone in a passenger vehicle lane. 

And in fact, post–9/11, what happened was that they pushed 

IBIS inspection percentages higher on pedestrians. So as our pedestrian lanes bumped back because of the slowdown, people got in 

cars. 

Well, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist, if you are a really savvy 

terrorist, indeed if we are talking terrorism here, to say, well, okay, 

if get on wheels versus walk across, then, okay, the percentage is 

going to be less that I may get caught. It is just mindboggling. 

So what I am just hoping is that there is a realistic assessment 

of where we are. The questions need to be asked: How many lanes 

do you have? How much overtime do you have? How long does it 

take you to get the checks? 

Right now, in mobile text, what information can you get?which 

I am pretty clear about that right now. And how long is it going 

to take you and what is the implementation schedule necessary to 

be able to accomplish ‘‘X’’ goals? 

And I think we just had a recent GAO report stating that Department of Homeland Security doesn’t know how much it is going 

to take to get some of these things done. 

So it is a logical response. 

It is a hard time frame to get this done. Heck, it has been going 

on for seven years, trying to figure out how to implement this. How 

are they supposed to do it in a matter of a few months? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Ms. Walker. 

Ms. GRANGER. The chair recognizes Mr. Dicks. 
80

Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the panel on their testimony. 

Mr. Carlton, tell us about 10 fingers versus two fingers—and I 

know you know the answer. Explain this. I think with the IDENT 

system and the IAFIS system there is an example of flat 

fingerprinting versus rolled. And because of the difference in the 

two, there was a 40 percent discrepancy. Is that not correct? 

Mr. CARLTON. I don’t have the exact data, but let me try and? 

Mr. DICKS. Explain it for us. I think it is important. 

Mr. CARLTON. —discuss the general topic. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. CARLTON. The issue with only capturing two flat fingers from 

everyone is going to become a problem later on down the road. As 

the size of the database gets bigger, the limited amount of data 

that can be acquired from the two fingerprints means that the system is going to start returning more and more false matches, because there just isn’t sufficient data to find the matching record in 

the database. 

So the issue you raised earlier is, you are pushing out into the 

future a challenge of either re-enrolling everyone to get eight or 10 

fingers or some interim policy there. 

But, yes, sir, eventually you are going to start running into problems there. 

Now, the data I have so far, that I heard just today from my 

DHS colleagues, is that the performance of the fingerprint systems 

they are using is actually very, very good. Their false match rate 

is significantly lower than they had expected. And that would be 

consistent with this initial rollout, when the database is relatively 

small. It is a problem that will be manifest later on. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, why not do it right from the start? I mean this 

idea that 600,000 people have come in, we have done it with two 

when we could have very easily done it with 10. How much longer 

does that take? 

Mr. CARLTON. See, I think the challenge right now is, in part, 

that the technology is much better understood for the single finger 

matching, both the hardware and the process of using a single finger match. There is still work to be done in the human flow of work 

from the employee side and let’s say the customer-client side in actually capturing all 10 fingerprints. 

So there is the human element of being able to use the technologies. It is just easier to use the flat finger, single finger capture 

right now. 

Mr. DICKS. Why were they doing it with flat fingers in one situation and then rolled fingers in the other, which causes 40 percent 

discrepancy? 

Mr. CARLTON. The distinction is the requirements for law enforcement versus a civil identification system. A law enforcement 

system is typically based on fingernail to fingernail roll of the fingerprint. And that is, as my colleague is here, reaching for cup, 

that often from a crime scene standpoint, it is not actually the flat 

part of the fingerprint that is left behind. And so for forensic research, you really need the whole fingerprint. 

The other thing you have to understand is those fingerprints that 

are captured in a rolled process, that takes a long time and almost 
81

always requires a human being to help guide the process of capturing those 10 fingers. 

That is going to be very complex for people in consulates overseas, because often they operate on the opposite side of a hardened 

wall and glass from the public that they are trying to serve, so you 

cannot actually even help someone if you wanted to roll fingerprints. 

So the practicality is, the capturing of fingerprints overseas is 

going to have to be flat fingers. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

I just would mention in the GAO report, currently FBI IAFIS is 

only 40 percent accurate in matching their database of rolled fingerprints to the flat prints in the IDENT system. Does that make 

sense? 

Mr. CARLTON. It is entirely possible, yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. So we have a problem here. The Appropriations Committee is certainly trying to take steps to push them to do the right 

thing here and at least to know that they have a problem. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. May, I appreciate your comments on the US–VISIT program 

and I am certainly pleased to hear about the cooperation between 

DHS and the private sector. 

You had a concern about airline personnel playing a role in collecting exit information from passengers. This is a little information sheet that has been prepared by Homeland Security. This is 

in English and Spanish and also visual. Do you think the airlines 

would be willing to hand out these small information cards to help 

people understand better? 

Mr. MAY. Madam Chairman, we do hand out cards of that sort 

in the one test area that exit is under way today. And so, I mean, 

there are a number of areas where we can be helpful to DHS in 

helping implement this program. 

What we are not interested in doing, I would like to re-emphasize, is having the exit program executed, if you will, at the ticket 

counter or at the gate, which in effect turns my agent into immigration’s agents. And that is a non-starter from our perspective. 

Ms. GRANGER. I understand. 

Ms. Sanchez, do you have further questions? 

Ms. Loretta SANCHEZ of California. I just wanted, very quickly, 

to ask Mr. May, you had some testimony about exit fees and charging some exit fees in order to pay for some of this. And I wondered 

if you had any comments you wanted to give to this committee? 

And lastly, Ms. Walker, I just wanted to make sure that the initial question that you wanted to pose from your beginning testimony about the IDENT system, if you had gotten everything out 

that you think this committee should know about. 

Mr. MAY. I think the key that this committee should know about 

is, first of all, the fee issue: The airlines industry, which already 

lost about $5 billion last year, is currently spending today, now, 

probably $3 billion annually to comply with federally mandated security measures. 

We believe very strongly that federal security is a function of the 

federal government, soup to nuts, start to finish. That is point one. 
82

Point two, vis-a-vis this exit program, we are concerned about 

making sure that you capture information. It is voluntary today. I 

agree with everything that has been said about the magnitude of 

the problem when you expand to a land-based environment, because you are only capturing a very, very small percentage of the 

total traffic when you look at airlines, for example. 

I think they are doing a great job of putting it in place for entry. 

They need to figure out how to better require people to do this on 

exit, because the other unfortunate byproduct is, you could sent 

somebody, when this becomes a regular part of the process, somebody didn’t check out as they left the United States, they come 

back to the United States, they are inadmissible, to use a term of 

art I have learned, and at that point, we are responsible for returning them to their point of origin at our cost. 

And I am not exactly excited about the prospect of having thousands of people being returned to their point of origin, for any good 

reason. But if it is simply because they didn’t go through that exit 

process, that is going to further complicate it. 

So I am not suggesting there are any issues here that DHS is 

not aware of. I am not suggesting that there aren’t people of great 

faith that are working on all of these issues. But I think, as some 

of my colleagues on this panel have pointed out, the magnitude of 

the effort is huge and I am not sure fully understood by everybody 

to date. 

Ms. CAMPBELL WALKER. In trying to shed myself of all of my 

IDENT issues, just one more point. There was a comment regarding the eight prints, why didn’t we do the 10 prints from the beginning, a very cogent response on that. 

In 2005, though, the Department of State has already indicated 

that they are planning on moving to eight prints as a part of their 

process. And a part of it is due to the fact that they expect the 

database to be so overloaded and unresponsive that they are going 

to have to do that and in addition to that provide additional documentation to help separate people. 

So that is already a part of the issue. 

But again, on the IDENT check, let us assume that they have 

done something incredible, and that is great, if they have managed 

to do a full IDENT check in 15 seconds, what a marvelous thing 

if that has been accomplished. 

But even if it has been accomplished, that 15 seconds, and doing 

that check for every single person trying to be admitted in a land 

border—because you cannot separate them out. There is no place 

to say U.S. citizens go here, legal permanent residents go here, 

those other people go here—will back us up so far into Mexico on 

the southern border that we might as well go back into negotiations regarding treaty acquisition of land, which I don’t think 

President Fox is going to appreciate. 

So we need to really think this through before saying we have 

got to meet that December 31st deadline. 

Thank you. 

Ms. GRANGER. I appreciate both panels, your testimony, your attendance. The chair notes that some members may have additional 

questions for this panel which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 10 days 
83

for members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to 

place their responses in the record. 

There being no further business, I again thank the subcommittee 

members and our witnesses today, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(85)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES OF THE HONORABLE MAURA HARTY, SUBMITTED BY THE

HONORABLE DAVE CAMP

Question: Could you provide us with an implementation schedule for posts 

as to biometric visa processing in the nonimmigrant and immigrant visa 

context? 

Answer: The implementation schedule is attached. The schedule indicates the post 

name, type of biometric installation, start and finish dates of the trip, and whether 

the post has gone live with biometrics. Each trip includes biometric installation as 

well as general training and hardware maintenance objectives. Before October 26, 

2004 we will install and go live with biometrics at all nonimmigrant and immigrant 

visa issuing posts. As of March 10, 91 posts are processing biometric nonimmigrant 

visas, and one post is processing biometric immigrant visas.

CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV 

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

FRANKFURT ......... 2-print NIV ................... 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed 

BRUSSELS ............. 2-print NIV ................... 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed 

SAN SALVADOR ... 2-print NIV ................... 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed 

MONTREAL ........... 2-print NIV ................... 10/6/03 1022/03 Completed 

CAIRO ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/8/03 1016/03 Completed 

OTTAWA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 10/14/03 1022/03 Completed 

KAMPALA .............. 2-print NIV ................... 10/15/03 1030/03 Completed 

LAGOS .................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed 

DOHA ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed 

TALLINN ................ 2-print NIV ................... 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed 

RIGA ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed 

HALIFAX ................ 2-print NIV ................... 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed 

VANCOUVER ......... 2-print NIV ................... 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed 

ABU DHABI ........... 2-print NIV ................... 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed 

FLORENCE ............ 2-print NIV ................... 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed 

BANGKOK .............. 2-print NIV ................... 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed 

COPENHAGEN ...... 2-print NIV ................... 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed 

RIYADH .................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed 

KUALA LUMPUR .. 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed 

JERUSALEM .......... 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed 

TEL AVIV ............... 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed 

ANKARA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed 

DUBAI ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed 

PORT LOUIS .......... 2-print NIV ................... 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed 

KUWAIT ................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed 

MAPUTO ................ 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed 

KOLONIA ............... 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed 

MASERU ................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed 

SAN JOSE .............. 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed 

DAMASCUS ........... 2-print NIV ................... 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed 

BILISI ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed 

ORONTO ................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed 

CALGARY ............... 2-print NIV ................... 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed 

CHIANG MAl ......... 2-print NIV ................... 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed 
86

CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

MOSCOW ................ 2-print NIV ................... 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed 

JEDDAH ................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed 

ASMARA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed 

B.S. BEGAWAN ..... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed 

MUSCAT ................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed 

PANAMA CITY ...... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed 

ISLAMABAD .......... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed 

ISTANBUL ............. 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed 

MINSK .................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed 

TASHKENT ............ 2-print NIV ................... 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed 

AMMAN .................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed 

CHISINAU .............. 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed 

KOROR ................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed 

SANAA .................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed 

QUEBEC ................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed 

BELIZE CITY ......... 2-print NIV ................... 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed 

BRATISLAVA ......... 2-print NIV ................... 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed 

WINDHOEK ........... 2-print NIV ................... 1/7/04 1/22/04 Completed 

CAPE TOWN .......... 2-print NIV ................... 1/7/04 1/20/04 Completed 

BISHKEK ............... 2-print NIV ................... 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed 

SURABAYA ............ 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed 

YEKATERINBURG 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed 

DUBLIN .................. 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed 

MILAN .................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed 

BAKU ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

DURBAN ................ 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed 

MELBOURNE ........ 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

RECIFE ................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

VALLETTA ............. 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

JAKARTA ............... 2-print NIV ................... 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed 

BANJUL ................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed 

HONG KONG ......... 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed 

SAO PAULO ........... 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed 

ST PETERSBURG 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed 

VLADIVOSTOK ..... 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed 

YAOUNDE .............. 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed 

ALMA TY ................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed 

JOHANNESBURG 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed 

N’DJAMENA .......... 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed 

PERTH .................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed 

SUVA ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed 

HAMIL TON ........... 2-print NIV ................... 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed 

LUXEMBOURG ..... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed 

PORT OF SPAIN ... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed 

ASUNCION ............ 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed 

AUCKLAND ........... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed 

CASABLANCA ....... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed 

HONG KONG ......... 2-print IV ...................... 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed 

NIAMEY ................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed 

SYDNEY ................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed 

ASHGABAT ............ 2-print NIV ................... 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed 

NICOSIA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed 

SANTO DOMINGO 2-print NIV and IV ...... 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed 

MANAMA ............... 2-print NIV ................... 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed 

BEIRUT .................. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed 

OUAGADOUGOU .. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed 

PHNOM PENH ...... 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed 

RANGOON ............. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed 

HANOI .................... 2-print NIV ................... 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed 

FRANKFURT ......... 2-print IV ...................... 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed 

BEIJING ................. 2-print NIV ................... 3/11/04 4/2/04 

BRIDGETOWN ...... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/11/04 4/2/04
87

CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

GABORONE ........... 2-print NIV ................... 3/15/04 3/30/04

ALGIERS ................ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/17/04 3/31/04

LJUBLJANA .......... 2-print NIV ................... 3/17/04 3/31/04

NOUAKCHOTT ...... 2-print NIV ................... 3/17/04 3/31/04

SKOPJE .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/17/04 3/31/04

SAN SALVADOR ... 2-print IV ...................... 3/22/04 4/1/04

BAMAKO ................ 2-print NIV ................... 3/24/04 4/7/04

SARAJEVO ............. 2-print NIV ................... 3/24/04 4/9/04

YEREVAN .............. 2-print NIV ................... 3/24/04 4/8/04

PRAGUE ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/24/04 4/9/04

PRAIA ..................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/29/04 4/12/04

ACCRA .................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/31/04 4/20/04

GUAYAQUIL .......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/31/04 4/16/04

QUITO ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 3/31/04 4/16/04

HO CHI MINH 

CITY ........................ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/1/04 4/27/04

KIEV ....................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/7/04 4/21/04

DUBLIN .................. 2-print IV ...................... 417/04 4/16/04

ISLAMABAD .......... 2-print IV ...................... 4/7/04 4/21/04 

TEL AVIV ............... 2-print IV ...................... 4/17/04 4/13/04

BELIZE CITY ......... 2-print IV ...................... 4/12/04 4/20/04

MADRID ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/12/04 5/5/04

MSTERDAM ........... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/12/04 4/30/04

HELSINKI .............. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/13/04 4/26/04

JERUSALEM .......... 2-print IV ...................... 4/14/04 4/20/04

GUANGZHOU ........ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/19/04 5/7/04 

ANTANANARIVO .. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/21/04 5/6/04

BANGKOK .............. 2-print IV ...................... 4/21/04 4/30/04

LAGOS .................... 2-print IV ...................... 4/21/04 4/30/04

SINGAPORE .......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/21/04 15/6/04

RIO DE JANEIRO 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/22/04 5/20/04 

ABU DHABI ........... 2-print IV ...................... 4/23/04 5/4/04 

TUNIS ..................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/26/04 5/12/04 

ULAANBAATAR .... 2-print NIV ................... 4/26/04 5/7/04 

TEGUCIGALPA ..... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/28/04 5/14/04 

BELFAST ................ 2-print NIV ................... 4/28/04 5/12/04 

CARACAS ............... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 4/28/04 5/19/04 

DOHA ...................... 2-print IV ...................... 4/28/04 5/4/04 

LONDON ................ 2-print IV ...................... 4/28/04 5/25/04 

MANAMA ............... 2-print IV ...................... 5/3/04 5/12/04

TBILISI ................... 2-print IV ...................... 5/3/04 5/12/04

YAOUNDE .............. 2-print IV ...................... 5/3/04 5/12/04

PORT MORESBY ... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/4/04 5/18/04

BOGOTA ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/5/04 5/28/04

BUENOS AIRES .... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/5/04 5/28/04

ALMA TV ................ 2-print IV ...................... 5/5/04 5/11/04

SANAA .................... 2-print IV ...................... 5/6/04 5/13/04

COLOMBO .............. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/7/04 5/24/04

HARARE ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/10/04 5/24/04

SHANGHAI ............ 2-print NIV ................... 5/10/04 5/21/04

PARAMARIBO ....... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/11/04 5/26/04

JAKARTA ............... 2-print IV ...................... 5/12/04 5/21/04

NAIROBI ................ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/12/04 5/28/04

NASSAU ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/12/04 5/28/04

LISBON .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/13/04 6/4/04

VIENTIANE ........... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/13/04 5/28/04

CAIRO ..................... 2-print IV ...................... 5/18/04 5/27/04

DAR ES SALAAM .. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/19/04 6/1/04

LOME ...................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/19/04 6/2/04

ZAGREB .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/19/04 6/3/04

CHENGDU ............. 2-print NIV ................... 5/20/04 6/4/04

KINGSTON ............. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/20/04 6/18/04
88

CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

KUWAIT ................. 2-print IV ...................... 5/24/04 6/11/04

NAPLES .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/24/04 6/16/04

JOHANNESBURG 2-print IV ...................... 5/26/04 6/4/04

STOCKHOLM ........ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/26/04 6/10/04

BELGRADE ............ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/31/04 6/18/04

MONTEVIDEO ....... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 5/31/04 6/16/04

PANAMA CITY ...... 2-print IV ...................... 5/31/04 6/9/04

ANKARA ................. 2-print IV ...................... 6/1/04 6/11/04

ATHENS ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/2/04 6/25/04

BUCHAREST ......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/2/04 6/18/04

SANTIAGO ............. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/2/04 6/18/04

MAJURO ................. 2-print NIV ................... 6/2/04 6/16/04

BIDJAN ................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/3/04 6/18/04

BRASILIA ............... 2-print NIV ................... 6/7/04 6/30/04

SOFIA ..................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/7/04 6/24/04

LA PAZ .................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/9/04 6/24/04

DDIS ABABA ......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/10/04 6/30/04

SHENYANG ........... 2-print NIV ................... 6/10/04 6/23/04

BUDAPEST ............ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/16/04 7/2/04

DAMASCUS ........... 2-print IV ...................... 6/16/04 6/25/04

LILONGWE ............ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/16/04 6/28/04

GUATEMALA CITY 2-print IV ...................... 6/16/04 6/22/04

MANAGUA ............. 2-print IV ...................... 6/16/04 6/25/04

MANILA .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/16/04 7/13/04

KIGALI ................... 2-print NIV ................... 6/21/04 7/2/04

MONROVIA ............ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/21/04 7/6/04

TIRANA .................. 2-print NIV ................... 6/21/04 7/2/04

LUSAKA ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/23/04 7/7/04

CONAKRY .............. 2-print NIV ................... 6/23/04 7/7/04

GEORGETOWN ..... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/23/04 7/14/04

REYKJAVIK ........... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 6/23/04 7/6/04

SAN JOSE .............. 2-print IV ...................... 6/23/04 7/2/04

AMMAN .................. 2-print IV ...................... 6/28/04 7/7/04

LUANDA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 6/30/04 7/14/04

DAKAR .................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/7/04 7/22/04

MATAMOROS ........ 2-print NIV ................... 7/7/04 7/30/04 BCC 

TOKYO .................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/7/04 7/30/04

ASUNCION ............ 2-print IV ...................... 7/7/04 7/13/04

MBABANE .............. 2-print NIV ................... 7/7/04 7/13/04

DJIBOUTI .............. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/8/04 7/23/04

HAVANA ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/8/04 7/30/04

SYDNEY ................. 2-print IV ...................... 7/8/04 7/30/04

NOGALES CONS/

TPF .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 7/12/04 7/30/04 BCC 

HAMILTON ............ 2-print IV ...................... 7/14/04 7/20/04

MUMBAI ................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/14/04 8/6/04

NEW DELHI .......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/14/04 7/30/04

AUCKLAND ........... 2-print IV ...................... 7/14/04 7/23/04

BRUSSELS ............. 2-print IV ...................... 7/14/04 7/23/04

PORT-AU-PRINCE 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/14/04 8/4/04

LIBREVILLE .......... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/15/04 8/2/04

CHENNAI ............... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/21/04 8/6/04

OSAKA-KOBE ........ 2-print NIV ................... 7/21/04 8/6/04

BAGHDAD .............. 2-print NIV ................... 7/26/04 8/6/04 Tentative 

dates 

WARSAW ................ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/26/04 8/11/04

CALCUTTA ............ 2-print NIV and IV ...... 7/28/04 8/11/04

VANCOUVER ......... 2-print IV ...................... 7/28/04 8/3/04

MERIDA ................. 2-print NIV ................... 8/2/04 8/20/04 BCC 

SEOUL .................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/2/04 8/20/04

KRAKOW ................ 2-print NIV ................... 8/2/04 8/17/04

OSLO ....................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/4/04 8/20/04
89

CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

PARIS ...................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/4/04 8/27/04

BANGUI .................. 2-print NIV ................... 8/4/04 8/20/04

LONDON ................ 2-print NIV ................... 8/4/04 8/17/04

MEXICO CITY ....... 2-print NIV ................... 8/4/04 8/24/04 BCC 

MONTERREY ........ 2-print NIV ................... 8/4/04 8/25/04 BCC 

RANGOON ............. 2-print IV ...................... 8/4/04 8/10/04

VILNIUS ................. 2-print NIV ................... 8/5/04 8/20/04

VIENNA .................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/11/04 8/26/04

COTONOU .............. 2-print IV ...................... 8/11/04 8/17/04

GUADALAJARA .... 2-print NIV ................... 8/11/04 9/1/04 BCC 

NUEVO LAREDO 

CONSITPF .............. 2-print NIV ................... 8/11/04 8/31/04 BCC 

ROME ...................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/12/04 8/25/04

KATHMANDU ....... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/16/04 8/27/04

PONTA DELGADA 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/16/04 9/1/04 BCC 

TIJUANA CONS .... 2-print NIV ................... 8/16/04 8/20/04 BCC 

NAHA ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 8/18/04 9/2/04

KINSHASA ............. 2-print IV ...................... 8/18/04 8/25/04

TIJUANA TPF ........ 2-print NIV ................... 8/23/04 8/27/04 BCC 

COPENHAGEN ...... 2-Print IV ..................... 8/25/04 9/10/04

MUSCAT ................. 2-print IV ...................... 8/25/04 9/3/04

CASABLANCA ....... 2-print IV ...................... 8/25/04 9/3/04

PHNOM PENH ...... 2-print IV ...................... 8/25/04 9/1/04

IAIPEI ..................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 8/30/04 9/24/04

CIUDAD JUAREZ 

CONS ...................... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 9/1/04 9/21/04

HERMOSILLO ....... 2-print NIV ................... 9/1/04 9/17/04 BCC 

DHAKA ................... 2-print IV ...................... 9/1/04 9/7/04

CIUDAD JUAREZ 

TPF .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 9/6/04 9/15/04 BCC 

NIAMEY ................. 2-print IV ...................... 9/8/04 9/17/04

OUAGADOUGOU .. 2-print IV ...................... 9/8/04 9/14/04

SUVA ....................... 2-print IV ...................... 9/8/04 9/17/04

MOSCOW ................ 2-print IV ...................... 9/15/04 9/24/04

PORT OF SPAIN ... 2-print IV ...................... 9/15/04 9/24/04

NICOSIA ................. 2-print IV ...................... 9/17/04 9/28/04

MONTREAL ........... 2-print IV ...................... 9/21/04 9/30/04

KUALA LUMPUR .. 2-print IV ...................... 9/22/04 10/1/04

Question: 2. At how many of these posts will you assign additional personnel 

to assist in this processing? 

Answer: For Fiscal year 2004, The Bureau of Consular Affairs created 80 additional 

overseas positions to meet both increased workload and overseas biometrics requirements. In addition, CA will have established 186 new officer positions over a threeyear period ending in fiscal year 2005 to replace consular associates as adjudicators.

Question: 3. Is there sufficient staffing in State Department consular offices 

to carry out the visa issuance process, including interviews, US-VISIT enrollment and relevant security checks without causing delays in the visa 

issuance process. 

a. If not, how many additional consular officers are necessary? 

b. Is there a need for additional facilities or a change in the facility? 

If so, where and what facilities are required? 

c. What is the impact on customer service? 

Answer: a. The Bureau of Consular Affairs recently created additional consular positions in order to compensate for the expanded workload brought about by enhanced security procedures and biometric collection. These positions will allow efficient visa processing in most cases with few significant delays. 

b. Many of our consular sections overseas operate without adequate space. To 

ensure continued efficient and secure visa processing, the State Department will 

require additional funding for the construction of new overseas facilities with 

sufficient consular workspace to meet existing demand and growth. 
90

c. Without adequate secure consular workspace, it is not possible to deploy sufficient numbers of additional staff in future to meet increased demand for visa 

services. The result will inevitably be longer wait times for visas, decreased 

waiting room space for visa applicants and inconvenience to business travelers, 

students and tourists.

Question: 4. Please provide the Committee with a list of consulates currently 

collecting biometric information and the types of data being collected, how 

the information is collected and the time required to collect the information. 

Answer: The attachment indicates the consulates that are currently (as of March 

10) collecting biometric information for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas. The biometrics collected are two index fingerprints and a digitized photo. We also collect 

biographic data such as name, gender, and birth date that must be associated with 

this biometric information. 

We collect biometric data during an in-person interview process at the consulate. 

The process begins by the applicant supplying biographic data and a photo. The biographic data is entered into a database and the photo is captured electronically and 

added to the applicant’s record. The applicant’s biographic information is sent to the 

CLASS database to determine whether a lookout exists. 

The applicant then goes to the interview window where a Foreign Service Officer 

(FSO) or a cleared and trained Eligible Family Member (EFM) verifies the photo 

image. Next, the applicant is directed to supply two index fingerprints using an electronic fingerprint scanner located on the other side of the window in full view of 

the FSO or EFM. The fingerprints and photo are then sent electronically to DHS’ 

IDENT database to determine whether they match existing lookouts. 

An FSO then verifies the biographic data, and interviews the applicant. CLASS 

results are nearly always available before the interview begins. 

Following a review of IDE NT and CLASS records, the applicant’s documentation, 

and the interview responses the FSO then decides whether to issue a vIsa. 

Based on field experience to date the time required to collect fingerprint data 

averages about 30 seconds per applicant.

Biometric Installations Completed as of 17 March 2004

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

FRANKFURT .................... 2-print NIV ................... 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed 

BRUSSELS ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed 

SAN SALVADOR .............. 2-print NIV ................... 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed 

MONTREAL ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/6/03 10/22/03 Completed 

CAIRO ................................ 2-print NIV ................... 10/8/03 10/16/03 Completed 

OTTAWA ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/14/03 10/22/03 Completed 

KAMPALA ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/15/03 10/30/03 Completed 

LAGOS ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed 

DOHA ................................. 2-print NIV ................... 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed 

ITALLINN ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/20/03 11/3103 Completed 

RIGA .................................. 2-print NIV ................... 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed 

HALIFAX ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed 

ANCOUVER ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed 

lA.BU DHABI .................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed 

FLORENCE ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed 

BANGKOK ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed 

COPENHAGEN ................ 2-print NIV ................... 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed 

RIYADH ............................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed 

KUALA LUMPUR ............. 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed 

JERUSALEM .................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed 

ITEL AVIV ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed 

lA.NKARA ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed 

DUBAI ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed 

PORT LOUIS .................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed 

KUWAIT ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed 

MAPUTO ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed 

KOLONIA .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed 

MASERU ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed 

SAN JOSE ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed 

DAMASCUS ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed 
91

Biometric Installations Completed as of 17 March 2004—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

TBILISI .............................. 2-print NIV ................... 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed 

TORONTO ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed 

CALGARY .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed 

CHIANG MAl .................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed 

MOSCOW .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed 

JEDDAH ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed 

ASMARA ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed 

B.S. BEGAWAN ................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed 

MUSCAT ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed 

PANAMA CITY ................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed 

ISLAMABAD ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed 

ISTANBUL ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed 

MINSK ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed 

TASHKENT ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed 

MMAN ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed 

CHISINAU ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed 

KOROR .............................. 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed 

SANAA ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed 

QUEBEC ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed 

BELIZE CITY .................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed 

BRATISLAVA .................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed 

WINDHOEK ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/7/04, 1/22/04 Completed 

CAPE TOWN ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 1n/04 1/20/04 Completed 

BISHKEK .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed 

SURABAYA ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed 

YEKA TERINBURG ......... 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed 

DUBLIN ............................. 2-print NIV ................... 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed 

MILAN ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed 

BAKU ................................. 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

DURBAN ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed 

MELBOURNE ................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

RECIFE ............................. 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

VALLETTA ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed 

JAKARTA .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed 

BANJUL ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed 

HONG KONG .................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed 

SAO PAULO ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed 

ST PETERSBURG ............ 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed 

VLADIVOSTOK ................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed 

YAOUNDE ......................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed 

ALMA TY ........................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed 

JOHANNESBURG ............ 2-print NIV ................... 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed 

N’DJAMENA ..................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed 

PERTH ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed 

SUVA ................................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed 

HAMILTON ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed 

LUXEMBOURG ................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed 

PORT OF SPAIN .............. 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed 

ASUNCION ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed 

AUCKLAND ...................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed 

CASABLANCA .................. 2-print NIV ................... 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed 

HONG KONG .................... 2-print IV ...................... 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed 

NIAMEY ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed 

SYDNEY ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed 

ASHGABAT ....................... 2-print NIV ................... 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed 

NICOSIA ............................ 2-print NIV ................... 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed 

SANTO DOMINGO ........... 2-print NIV and IV ...... 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed 

MANAMA .......................... 2-print NIV ................... 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed 

BEIRUT ............................. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed 

BERN ................................. 2-print NIV and IV ...... 3/3/04 3/19/04 Completed 

OUAGADOUGOU ............. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed 

PHNOM PENH ................. 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed 
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Biometric Installations Completed as of 17 March 2004—Continued

Post Biometric

Implementation Start Finish Comment 

RANGOON ........................ 2-print NIV ................... 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed 

HANOI ............................... 2-print NIV ................... 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed 

FRANKFURT .................... 2-print IV ...................... 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed 

Question: 5. To date, how many fingerprints and photographs have been collected in consulates? 

Answer: As of March 10 we had 34,748,844 NIV photographs and 8,137,267 fingerprints in the Consular Consolidated Database. Of these fingerprints, 7,866,251 were 

collected from applicants in Mexico, primarily for Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), 

and 271,016 from applicants at posts where we began collecting fingerprints starting in September 2003.

Question: 6. Are there any technical problems consulates encountered in implementing this technology? 

Answer: We believe that all problems are being effectively addressed and that there 

are no major issues. As with any new system, areas for improvements and refinements have been identified. For example, the quality of some of the fingerprints captured by consulates had been identified as an issue by DHS. The Department is addressing this issue through improvements both in training and technology. Technical improvements include replacing the fingerprint scoring software, the software 

that determines the quality of the captured fingerprint, to use the same software 

that is being used by DHS. We believe that this will significantly reduce or eliminate the fingerprint quality problem. We are also making other modifications to the 

system to streamline the fingerprint capture process. Training is another significant 

issue, and we are taking steps to emphasize the fingerprint quality in our training, 

and developing detailed monitoring reports to identify posts that have low quality. 

Early in the startup process, the Department encountered several instances of 

communications/data exchange problems with DHS’ systems. These problems appear to have been resolved by DHS and the current workload is being processed in 

an expeditious manner. As workload begins to increase as more consulates come online, the Department will continue to monitor the situation and coordinate resolution of any communications and/or data exchange problems with DHS.

Question: 7. What is the makeup of the State Department team implementing biometric equipment at consular posts? How much interaction and 

guidance does this team receive from US–VISIT in DHS? 

Answer: Implementation ofbiometric equipment at all consular posts is done with 

the on-site assistance of a team of contractors supplemented by Foreign Service Officers and other State Department employees. The same contractor carrying out the 

installations also produces the software used for biometric collection. 

Interaction with DHS takes place daily, primarily regarding software development 

and data exchange. As installation teams identify problems and possible improvements, we discuss these with DHS to ensure that any changes we make will not 

interfere with the efficient operation of the IDENT database. As more posts are 

brought on-line, we also coordinate closely with DHS on data exchange issues to ensure IDENT response times remain within agreed limits.

Question: 8. Please advise us of which posts have stopped issuing same day 

visas either in the immigrant of nonimmigrant context due to this requirement. Please advise us if each post is experiencing a turn around time of 

seven to eight minutes for IDENT checks and of any time frames over or 

under this estimate. 

Answer: Most posts have been able to continue same day visa issuance despite the 

new biometric requirements. CA is pleased with the performance of the IDENT 

check, and the majority of the responses are within our time budget. However we 

are still in the early stages of this project and are at less that 25 percent of the 

anticipated volume. We are monitoring this very closely and overall are cautiously 

optimistic.

Question: 9. Please provide us with any case examples of potential terrorists 

refused visas since January of 2004 under these procedures. In specific, 

please advise us of the number of visa refusals/denials under section 

212(a)(3)(B) or 212(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
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Answer: So far there have been no examples of potential terrorists refused visas 

since January of 2004 because they were identified as potential terrorists under the 

new biometric procedures. 

From January 2001 through March 07, 2004, there were 18 visa applicants denied 

visas under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, and 12 applicants denied under section 

212(a)(3)(A)(ii). They were initially identified as potential terrorists by name-based 

terrorist watchlist information that is included in the visa lookout system known 

as CLASS.

Queston: 10. Will the state Department be able to meet the congressional 

deadline of issuance of biometric visas? 

Answer: Yes, we will be able to meet the October 26, 2004 deadline.

Question: What action will the State Department take if Visa Waiver Program participants are unable to meet congressional deadlines for machinereadable and biometric passports? 

Answer: By October 26, 2004, VWP countries must: 

• Be producing machine readable passports (original deadline of 2003 

waived by Secretary Powell and extended to October 2004); 

• Have a ‘‘program in place’’ to produce biometric passports (mandated 

by Border Security Act); 

• Be producing biometric passports(mandated by Border Security Act). 

All VWP countries are now producing machine-readable passports. We expect that 

all but a few of the current VWP states will have a ‘‘program in place’’ to produce 

biometric passports. However, it is unlikely that any government participating in 

the VWP program will be in large-scale production ofbiometric passports by the 

deadline. ICAO’s decision to make facial recognition technology the standard passport biometric was not made until May 2003, leaving countries only 17 months to 

bring a biometric passport from design to production. While the VWP country governments share a commitment to make this change, many of them are encountering 

the same problems being experienced by the Department of State in our efforts to 

embed biometrics into the US passport. The need to resolve these significant technical problems to embed biometrics is the cause of these delays, not lack of will on 

the part of the VWP countries. Most governments are likely to reach full production 

of passports with embedded biometrics by late 2005 or early 2006. 

The US has played a leadership role in ICAO. We have had repeated meetings 

with VWP representatives to educate VWP governments about the requirements 

and deadlines. In December Secretary Powell sent a diplomatic note to the VWP 

countries regarding the criteria for certification of a biometric passport program and 

noting that there was no waiver for the production deadline. We are still receiving 

responses from those countries. 

Travelers from VWP countries with passports issued on or after October 26, 2004 

that do not contain biometrics will need visas to travel to the States. This means 

that the Department of State could be faced with an increase in demand of some 

5.3 million visa applications in fiscal year 2005 and a somewhat smaller increase 

in fiscal year 2006 as VWP countries come into compliance with the legislative requirement. We estimate that we will be able to process only a fraction of that additional workload with current resources and that the surge in applications will result 

in long processing backlogs. 

Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge recently wrote Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner to advocate the need for prompt action to get a legislative fix 

to the deadline and to advise him that they welcome the invitation to testify before 

the Committee on April 21 on the subject. If legislative relief does not occur, State 

has prepared aggressive contingency plans to mitigate partially the impact of the 

deadline. However, the Department will not be able to identify, and mobilize resources to meet 100 percent of the demand before the problem will be resolved by 

the production of biometric passports by the VWP nations. The economic costs to 

the U.S. economy could be substantial. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON

Question: 1. Will you be able to meet the DMIA statutory requirements to 

collect arrival and departure information at the top fifty land ports of 

entry by December 2004? 

Answer: The US–VISIT strategy to meet the statutory guidelines of DMIA and 

other legislation is an incremental approach to implementation. On 5 January 2004, 

DHS implemented the first phase to collect biographic arrival data and biometric 

data upon entry in the air/sea environments. This functionality was successfully expanded to capture arrival biographic and biometric information during US–VISIT 
94

processing in the passport control area in secondary of the 50 busiest land ports of 

entry by the DMIA mandated deadline of 31 December 2004. Please note, however, 

that the December 2004 deadlines imposed by DMIA require only the integration 

of arrival and departure information. To that end, US–VISIT is currently conducting 

exit pilot projects at several international airports and will expand exit data collection capabilities at land ports via additional pilot programs beginning no later than 

July 31, 2005.

Question: 2. Please provide the Select Committee with an official list of 

ports of entry at which US–VISIT is operational and not operational. At 

ports where US–VISIT is not operational please provide a time line for full 

implementation of US–VISIT. 

Answer: The following lists all air and sea ports of entry at which US–VISIT is 

operational as of December 2004. On November 9, 2004, US–VISIT published a notice in the Federal Register (69 FR 64964) that lists the 50 largest land ports of 

entry where biometric screening at entry was implemented by December 31, 2004. 

A copy of that notice is attached. 

Airports

Agana, Guam (Agana International Airport) 

Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (Rafael Hernandez Airport) 

Albuquerque, New Mexico (Albuquerque International Airport) 

Anchorage, Alaska (Anchorage International Airport) 

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland 

Albany, New York (Albany International Airport) 

Aruba (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Atlanta, Georgia (William B. Hartsfield International Airport) 

Austin, Texas (Austin Bergstrom International Airport) 

Baltimore, Maryland (Baltimore/Washington International Airport) 

Bangor, Maine (Bangor International Airport) 

Bellingham, Washington (Bellingham International Airport) 

Boston, Massachusetts (General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport) 

Brownsville, Texas (Brownsville/South Padre Island Airport) 

Buffalo, New York (Greater Buffalo International Airport) 

Calgary, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Chantilly, Virginia (Washington Dulles International Airport) 

Charleston, South Carolina (Charleston International Airport) 

Charlotte, North Carolina (CharlottelDouglas International Airport) 

Chicago, Illinois (Chicago Midway Airport) 

Chicago, Illinois (Chicago O’Hare International Airport) 

Cincinnati, Ohio (Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport) 

Cleveland, Ohio (Cleveland Hopkins International Airport) 

Columbus, Ohio (Rickenbacker International Airport) 

Columbus, Ohio (Port Columbus International Airport) 

Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport) 

Del Rio, Texas (Del Rio International Airport) 

Denver, Colorado (Denver International Airport) 

Detroit, Michigan (Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport) 

Dover/Cheswold, Delaware (Delaware Airpark) 

Dublin, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Edmonton, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

El Paso, Texas (El Paso International Airport) 

Erie, Pennsylvania (Erie International Airport) 

Fairbanks, Alaska (Fairbanks International Airport) 

Fajardo, Puerto Rico (Diego Jimenez Torres Airport) 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport) 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport) 

Fort Myers, Florida (Fort Myers International Airport) 

Freeport, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Greenville, South Carolina (Donaldson Center Airport) 

Hamilton, Bermuda (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Hartford/Springfield, Connecticut (Bradley International Airport) 

Honolulu, Hawaii (Honolulu International Airport) 

Houston, Texas (Houston International Airport) 

Indianapolis, Indiana (Indianapolis International Airport) 

International Falls, Minnesota (Falls International Airport) 

Isla Grande, Puerto Rico (Isla Grande Airport) 

Jacksonville, Florida (Jacksonville International Airport) 

Juneau, Alaska (Juneau International Airport) 
95

Kansas City, Kansas (Kansas City International Airport) 

Kenmore, Washington (Kenmore Air Harbor) 

Key West, Florida (Key West International Airport) 

King County, Washington (King County International Airport) 

Kona, Hawaii (Kona International Airport) 

Laredo, Texas (Laredo International Airport and Laredo Private Airport) 

Las Vegas, Nevada (McCarren International Airport) 

Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles International Airport) 

Manchester, New Hampshire (Manchester Airport) 

Mayaguez, Puerto Rico (Eugenio Maria de Hostos Airport) 

McAllen, Texas (McAllen Miller International Airport) 

Memphis, Tennessee (Memphis International Airport) 

Miami, Florida (Kendall/Tamiami Executive Airport) 

Miami, Florida (Miami International Airport) 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell International Airport) 

Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota (Montreal, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Nashville, Tennessee (Nashville International Airport) 

Nassau, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

New Orleans, Louisiana (New Orleans International Airport) 

New York, New York (John F. Kennedy International Airport) 

Newark, New Jersey (Newark International Airport) 

Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk International Airport and Norfolk Naval Air Station) 

Oakland, California (Metropolitan Oakland International Airport) 

Ontario, California (Ontario International Airport) 

Opa Locka/Miami, Florida (Opa Locka Airport) 

Orlando, Florida (Orlando International Airport) 

Orlando/Sanford, Florida (Orlando/Sanford Airport) 

Ottawa, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia International Airport) 

Phoenix, Arizona (Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport) 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh International Airport) 

Ponce, Puerto Rico (Mercedita Airport) 

Portland, Maine (Portland International Jetport Airport) 

Portland, Oregon (Portland International Airport) 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Pease International Tradeport Airport) 

Providence, Rhode Island (Theodore Francis Green State Airport) 

Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina (Raleigh/Durham International Airport) 

Reno, Arizona (Reno/Tahoe International Airport) 

Richmond, Virginia (Richmond International Airport) 

Sacramento, California (Sacramento International Airport) 

Salt Lake City, Utah (Salt Lake City International Airport) 

San Antonio, Texas (San Antonio International Airport) 

San Diego, California (San Diego International Airport) 

San Francisco, California (San Francisco International Airport) 

San Jose, California (San Jose International Airport) 

San Juan, Puerto Rico (Luis Munoz Marin International Airport) 

Sandusky, Ohio (Griffing Sandusky Airport) 

Sarasota/Bradenton, Florida (Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport) 

Seattle, Washington (Seattle/Tacoma International Airport) 

Shannon, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Spokane, Washington (Spokane International Airport) 

St. Croix, Virgin Island (Alexander Hamilton International Airport) 

St. Louis, Missouri (St. Louis International Airport) 

St. Lucie, Florida (St. Lucie County International Airport) 

St. Petersburg, Florida (St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport) 

St. Thomas, Virgin Island (Cyril E. King International Airport) 

Tampa, Florida (Tampa International Airport) 

Teterboro, New Jersey (Teterboro Airport) 

Toronto, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Tucson, Arizona (Tucson International Airport) 

Vancouver, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Victoria, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

West Palm Beach, Florida (Palm Beach International Airport) 

Wilmington, North Carolina (Wilmington International Airport) 

Winnipeg, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection) 

Yuma, Arizona (Yuma International Airport) 

Seaports

Long Beach, California 
96

Miami, Florida 

New York City 

Port Everglades, Florida 

Port Canaveral, Florida 

Port Canaveral, Florida (Terminal 10) 

San Juan, Puerto Rico 

San Pedro, California 

Seattle, Washington (Cruise Terminal) 

Seattle, Washington 

Tampa, Florida (Terminal 3) 

Tampa, Florida (Terminal 7) 

Vancouver, Canada (Ballantyne Pier) 

Vancouver, Canada (Canada Place) 

Victoria, Canada (Pre Inspection) 

West Palm Beach, Florida

3. We understand that entry and exit enhancements at land borders will be 

phased in throughout 2005 and 2006. Provide a description of what enhancements are planned at land borders, including whether enhancements 

are new construction or renovation of existing land border facilities. 

Answer: By 31 December 2004, US–VISIT entry processing will be implemented at 

the 50 busiest land ports of entry and to all 165 land ports of entry (POEs) by 31 

December 2005 in secondary inspection. 

Modification to entry and exit facilities is needed to accommodate the technology 

required to implement the US–VISIT process. These modifications may best be described as upgrades where new equipment, power, conduit, and data connectivity 

are required to support the mission. These upgrades will include facility renovations 

and alterations to support the technology integration that will occur as the processes and technologies mature. These enhancements are focused on providing 

functionality to interior locations (typically secondary, or passport control, areas). 

Following this initial operating capability, modification to vehicle entry and exit 

lanes will be needed to expedite legitimate travel and trade. In addition, US–VISIT 

will begin pilot programs at 5 ports of entry by July 31, 2005, utilizing radio frequency identification technology in order to document the exits and any subsequent 

re-entries of persons both on foot and in vehicles. 

The US–VISIT program does not anticipate that the implementation of the new 

process will result in additional delays at land borders, but is mindful of the concerns expressed by various individuals and organizations. The US–VISIT program 

has been meeting with various community groups along the border to discuss their 

concerns. The US–VISIT program anticipates utilizing advanced technology to meet 

statutory requirements as we move into the future in order to facilitate travel.

Question: 4. In your testimony you stated that US–VISIT was ‘‘linked’’ to the 

Terrorist Screening Center. Please provide a detailed description of this 

‘‘link’’. It is our understanding that while US–VISIT uses data from the TSC 

which is resident in the NCIC, there is no actual real time link to the TSC 

as the TSC has not yet set up its own database. What is the eventual operational relationship you envision between US–VISIT and the TSC? 

Answer: It is correct that any TSC biographic record in NCIC queries TECS for 

every traveler coming into country. TSC terrorist prints from FBI IAFIS are also 

available if the FBI has provided said prints via the link to IDENT. We note, however, that currently there does not exist a real time link to the TSC. Our technical 

team is currently working with the TSC in order to further refine our mutual data 

sharing.

Question: 5. What checks are being conducted against passenger manifests 

for arriving passengers at air and seaports? 

Answer: Prior to arrival, information on passengers (including name, date of birth, 

and document (passport/visa type and number) is checked using the TECS/IBIS system

Question: 5.1. Who conducts these checks and how long do they take? 

Answer: The TECS/IBIS checks are performed after departure from the foreign port 

and prior to arrival at the U.S. port of entry by the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) passenger analysis units located at each port of entry. The exact time needed 

to conduct these checks will depend upon the number of passengers, the number of 

officers to perform the checks, and the results of each check. However, since they 

are performed after departure and prior to arrival, they have no effect on passenger 

wait times. If a potential hit is made, the traveler will be flagged for further review. 

This same protocol is followed for passengers arriving on cruise ships.
97

Question: 5.2. What specific checks do these include? 

Answer: TECS/IBIS contains data derived from a variety of sources. These include, 

but are not limited to, the following: 

— DHS immigration lookout data—NAILS; 

— Department of State terrorist and visa refusal data (CLASS and TIPOFF); 

— DHS alien detention and removal information (DACS); 

— Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data; and 

— Provides a conduit to the FBI’s wants and warrants and criminal information 

database (NCIC).

Question: 5.3. What specific databases, systems and watch lists does IBIS 

interface or integrate? 

Answer: See the answer for Q01537(2) above.

Question: 6. What checks are being conducted against passenger manifests 

for arriving passengers at air and seaports? 

Answer: See answer to Q01537.

7. We understand that the self-service, automatic kiosks allowing a departing foreign visitor to automatically register their departure by scanning their visa and capturing a fingerprint. In scanning the visa, we understand that the proposed system 

will only read the information on the visa that is within the machine-readable zone. 

This is despite the fact that Congress has appropriated funds to increase the security of the U.S. visa by impeding security features (ink, laminate. etc.) so as to make 

the visa more tamper resistant.

Question: 7.1. Is it indeed the case that the kiosks are not yet scanning and 

authenticating the special security features that are imbedded in the U.S. 

visa? 

Answer: At this time, yes. However, the scan of a U.S. nonimmigrant visa is for 

the collection of biographic information in order to provide a specific identifier to 

the biometric also collected at the kiosk. The machine-readable zone of a visa or a 

passport can be used. The biometric and biographic information from exit are then 

matched to the information collected at entry, confirming the identity of the individual.

Question: 7.2. If the kiosks are not scanning and authenticating the special 

security features, does the Department plan to eventually do so? If so, 

when? 

Answer: There are no specific plans to incorporate authentication of the U.S. nonimmigrant visa into the exit process, as the use of the visa for departure is only 

needed to speed up the biometric matching of a person’s identity to the biographic 

and biometric information collected during entry. DHS confirms the identity of the 

visa holder against government held records, through the biometric match of the individual.

Question: 8. What are the current alternatives for exit control being considered at air and seaports? 

Question 8.1. What is the schedule for such exit controls being put in place 

at our air and seaports beyond the current one air and one sea port? 

Answer: A pilot test of alternative exit biometric collection devices began in the 

summer of 2004 at 15 locations (13 air and 2 seaports) and will continue until the 

end of March 2005. Once the device(s) is selected, deployment to the remaining departure locations will be completed. DHS anticipates that, depending on the receipt 

of funding and necessary approvals, this deployment will be completed in 2005.

Question: 8.2. What are the staffing and infrastructure needs for such implementation? 

Answer: The staffing and infrastructure needs will be assessed as part of the pilot 

evaluation. Depending on the device or devices chosen, the needs may vary.

Question: 8.3. What database checks will occur upon exit in this system? 

Answer: As with the entry process, checks will be made against systems in the US–

VISIT environment. These include the Automated Biometric Identification System 

(IDENT), a fingerprint biometric database and against extracts provided through 

the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IF AIS). (Note 

however that the IFAIS checks are currently not run in real time.) Additionally, the 

information will be transmitted to the Arrival Departure Information System (AD 

IS) to confirm the exit of an individual.

Question: 8.4. How will the public be educated on the measures to take to 

comply with this system? 
98

Answer: The US–VISIT program has a robust outreach effort in place to educate 

visitors and explain US–VISIT procedures for both entry and exit. In addition to 

providing information to our international stakeholders in the travel and tourism 

industry and the business community, we are working with the media in the visa 

waiver countries to have them help us educate foreign visitors. We have provided 

information to our colleagues in the Department of State Consular Affairs Offices 

overseas so that they, too, can explain the required exit process. 

We have also produced print materials. When foreign visitors arrive in the United 

States, they receive a card (exit card) that explains the requirement to check out 

upon departing the country. When the visitor leaves the country, he or she goes to 

the airline ticket counter to check in for the flight and the ticket agent hands him 

or her an exit card that explains the process and directs the traveler to an exit station to check out. There will be directional signs visible to lead the way once a visitor is through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security check 

point, and educational signs will be located near the exit stations to explain what 

to do to check out. And finally, an announcement will be made at the departure 

gates to remind visitors to check out before boarding the plane.

Question: 8.5. What efforts have you made so far for this public information 

campaign? 

Answer: The public education campaign for exit has been coordinated with stakeholders through speaking events, e-mails, trade shows, and meetings. We have provided these valuable stakeholders with the information they need to tell their customers what to expect when they arrive in and depart from the United States. We 

have produced exit cards, educational signs, and directional signs. 

Additionally, the entry and exit requirements are incorporated into the general 

US–VISIT materials, which include brochures, airport signage, and on-board handouts in multiple languages; in-flight videos in 15 languages; and public service announcements (PSA) being aired in airport lounges. 

Finally, a growing group of more than 500 stakeholders receive US–VISIT information on a regular basis through our e-newsletter.

Question: 8.6. Has a policy been established to determine penalties for those 

who are determined to have violated the terms of their visa through US–

VISIT? 

Answer: An alien who fails to comply with the departure requirements may be 

found in violation of the terms of his or her admission, parole, or other immigration 

status. This rule states that an alien who is covered by the requirements to provide 

biometrics on departure at new 8 CFR 215.8 may be found to have overstayed the 

period of his or her last admission if the available evidence indicates that he or she 

did not leave the United States when required to do so. A determination that the 

alien previously overstayed may result in a finding of inadmissibility for accruing 

prior unlawful presence in the United States under section 212(a)(9) of the INA, 

provided that the accrued unlawful time and other prerequisites of that statute are 

met, or that the alien is otherwise ineligible for a visa or other authorization to reenter the United States. An overstay finding could also trigger consequences for a 

nonimmigrant visa holder under section 222(g) of the INA. If the person is deemed 

to have overstayed his authorized period of admission, his visa (including a multiple 

entry visa) would be deemed void under section 222(g). Section 222(g) further states 

that where a visa is void because the alien overstayed, he or she is ineligible to be 

readmitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant except on another visa issued 

in the consular office located in the country of the alien’s nationality, or where there 

is no DOS office in the country, in such other consular office as the Secretary of 

State shall specify. The requirement of obtaining a new visa from the consular office 

in the country of the alien’s nationality may be waived where extraordinary circumstances are found. 8 U.S.C. 1202(g). The Department intends to focus its enforcement of departure requirements in this rule on cases where the alien willfully 

and unreasonably fails to comply with this regulation. The rule provides that an 

alien’s failure to follow the departure procedures may be considered by an immigration or consular officer in making a discretionary decision on whether to approve 

or deny the alien’s application for a future immigration benefit. The rule does not, 

however, state that an alien’s failure to comply with departure procedures in every 

instance will necessarily result in a denial of a future visa, admission or other immigration benefit. For example, no alien will be penalized for failing to provide biometrics on departure where the Department has not yet implemented the departure 

facilities or procedures at the specific port where the person chooses to depart. 

There may well be instances where a consular officer or inspector, in his or her discretion and after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, determines that an 
99

alien’s previous failure to comply with the departure procedures does not result in 

a finding of inadmissibility or the denial of an immigration benefit.

Question: 9. Is any integration or discussion going on with TSA to possibly 

coordinate the Exit component with their plans to use electronic boarding 

passes during security checks? Is it possible to unite this process with the 

US–VISIT Exit to ensure that visa holders are ‘‘checked-out?’’

Answer: US–VISIT is collaborating among multiple government agencies, notably 

among the components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Transportation to take positive steps toward greater information sharing. These partnerships are leveraging resources to 

improve data availability to all agencies. Specifically, DHS is looking for ways to 

partner with TSA to meet joint objectives and analyze current business processes. 

The award of the prime integration contract to the Smart Border Alliance will 

allow the US–VISIT program to look at all aspects of a traveler’s entry and exit 

process and determine integration points from operational and technical positions, 

which could include TSA’s processes. TSA is an integral partner in the ongoing exit 

evaluations.

10. Ms. Harty testified that IDENT checks at the consulate were taking seven to 

eight minutes. A 001 Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General IG report indicates that an IDENT check takes an average of two minutes. US–VISIT 

enrollment takes ten to fifteen seconds. The US–VISIT office has indicated that certain biometric checks are conducted of US–VISIT enrollees after admission.

10.1. Please advise what improvement has been made on the IDENT 

checks at ports of entry to allow a full IDENT check to occur in ten to fifteen seconds. 

Answer: The IDENT system is designed to be flexible and scalable. It is tuned to 

provide different response times for different operational requirements. For example, the system is sized to provide full lookout checks against a fingerprint database 

for every traveler entering an air and sea port of entry within 10 seconds. (In fact, 

the actual response time is nearer 5 seconds). Because the time constraints at the 

consular posts are different, IDENT is tuned to provide a response against the lookout database and the US–VISIT (all individuals enrolled) database in less than 15 

minutes. Finally, IDENT is tuned to check newly enrolled individuals within a set 

period of time after admission. For future admissions, the individual is checked ‘‘one 

to one’’ against a previously established unique record. At this time, we do not believe it is necessary or feasible to run new enrollments against all IDENT records, 

including those previously enrolled, within the primary inspection process.

10.2. Please clarify the nature of the actual check if a less than full 

IDENT biometric check is conducted at enrollment. 

Answer: Upon enrollment into US–VISIT, resulting either from a Department of 

State visa application or at a port of entry, a full check is performed against the 

lookout database and the US–VISIT database of enrolled travelers. When the individual arrives at the port of entry, her/his identity is confirmed against a previously 

enrolled identity, and a full lookout check is performed.

10.3. What actual portion of the IDENT database is checked within this ten 

to fifteen second period? 

Answer: Please note that it is the time it takes to collect the two index prints from 

a traveler that is 10 to 15 seconds. This action is performed anytime IDENT is 

queried, regardless of which business process is being performed. Once the fingers 

are scanned, the IDENT system will return a one-to-one match instantaneously, and 

a lookout check in less than 10 seconds at primary.

Question: 11. A May 2003 report the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector general indicated that the IDENT and IAFIS integration was ‘‘at 

least two years behind schedule’’ and that staff focused on the integration 

were redirected to the NSEERS project. What is the current status of 

IDENT and IAFIS integration? What is needed to expedite the integration? 

Answer: DHS has begun the deployment of the integrated IDENT/IAFIS 

workstations. This provides for rapid identification of individuals with outstanding 

criminal warrants through electronic comparison of ten-print digital finger scans 

against a vast nationwide database of previously captured fingerprints. The newly 

advanced capability allows simultaneously search the FBI’s fingerprint database—

the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)—and DHS’s 

Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). As of September 2004, integrated IDENT/IAFIS terminals with ten-print biometric identification technology 

was operational in every U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol 
100

station throughout the country. This deployment was completed months ahead of 

schedule, and was expanded to include secondary inspection locations at all 115 air 

and sea ports of entry and the 50 busiest land ports of entry. The secondary inspection air, sea, and land port deployment was completed in November 2004. 

In addition, in FY 2005 appropriations language, Congress directed the US–VISIT 

Program Office to report on the status of achieving real time interoperability between IDENT and IAFIS, including steps DHS will take to integrate IAFIS into 

IDENT, funds needed, and a time table for full integration. While the integrated 

workstations will permit a simultaneous search of IAFIS and IDENT, they will not 

allow local, state and other IAFIS users to access DHS repositories. The language 

also directs DHS to address recommendations in the Department of Justice Inspector General report. US–VISIT expects to submit this report in spring 2005.

The current biometrics being used at selected air and sea ports of entry 

call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the foreign national. While 

the Administration has maintained that it is currently in ‘‘increment one’’ 

in a four stage process and it may likely move towards using a ten-print 

system, will using two-prints impact the agency’s ability to capture individuals who are listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s database, 

which uses ten-prints? 

Answer: US–VISIT is currently able to perform checks against FBI provided data 

utilizing the two fingerscan system. This ability has already resulted in the identification of individuals, who were wanted or had past criminal violations. As of 1/

26/2005, approximately 2,300 persons have been flagged at ports of entry as having 

a hit against a lookout system. Note however that the presence of a hit does not 

automatically render the person ineligible for admission. The Department of State 

has also flagged over 5,000 persons as hits when the individuals were applying for 

a nonimmigrant visa oversea. 

Although there was some early concern about false positives in a two-print scenario, a recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) study of the 

US–VISIT IDENT system showed that the false positive or False Acceptance Rate 

(FAR) appears to rise in a consistent manner with the rise in the size of the fingerprint database. This has been born out empirically. The FAR has proved to be measurable and consistent. To deal with this, US–VISIT has developed processes to efficiently manage the false positives as they occur. For example, of the roughly 35,000 

travelers who are processed through the US–VISIT IDENT system every day, about 

30 of travelers are identified with a false positive against the lookout list and are 

sent to secondary. The average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a lookout 

false positive is about three and a half minutes. 

The NIST report cited here (C. L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson. Matching performance for the US–VISIT IDENT system using flat fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) 

provides the justification for the statements give about FAR. The answer neglects 

to cite the results from another NIST report (R.A. Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. 

Zoepfl, M. Bone, P. Grother, R. Micheals, S. Otto, C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor 

Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) which clearly found that increasing the number of fingerprints used in matching from two to eight would substantially improve TAR (True Accept Rate) and substantially reduce FRR (False Reject Rate). 

The performance of the US–VISIT IDENT system is monitored very closely. As 

the FAR rises with the size of the database, the US–VISIT program office will make 

the necessary adjustments in the numbers of fingerprint examiners and in the technology (which mayor may not include adding additional fingers) to manage this. 

The current two-print capture provides the ability to match against appropriate 

records that are maintained by the FBI and provided daily to US–VISIT. This is 

done on a routine basis. There is no difficulty matching the two prints collected by 

US–VISIT against the 10 prints provided by the FBI.

12. Please advise us of when and if you anticipate that an accurate Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) check could 

be conducted at time of US–VISIT enrollment. 

Answer: 12. At this time there are no plans to conduct such a check. Checking 

every traveler against all the fingerprints available is not operationally feasible, 

both because of the time it takes to capture 10 prints and the time it takes for the 

FBI to respond to the queries. The capture of two prints takes between 10 to 15 

seconds. Results are returned to an inspector within two to 10 seconds - well within 

the current time it takes to do an inspection. Even in a controlled environment with 

a willing subject, experience has shown that the capture time for taking 10 prints 

is anywhere from six to 10 minutes. Currently, the results take two to 10 minutes. 
101

DHS modeling has shown that even a few seconds can have a catastrophic effect 

upon wait times. 

The answer that ‘‘capture time for taking 10 prints is anywhere from six to 10 

minutes’’ would be correct for ten rolled fingerprints. NIST has never recommended 

the capture of rolled fingerprint as part of the US–VISIT system. The NIST recommendation is ‘‘To perform background identifications, ten plain image impressions should be used for enrollment and retention.’’ The collection often plain impressions has been demonstrated at NIST in approximately 20 seconds. Pilot tests 

by the Department of State in Mexico have collected ten plain impressions in one 

minute or less. Collection of ten plain prints does not require physical contact with 

the operator of the collection system.

Question: 12.1. What are the current rates of false positives in this scenario? 

Answer: According to the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) 

both two prints and 10 prints have a very high degree of accuracy. Both have a True 

Acceptance Rate (TAR) of over 95 percent (a measure of false negative). The US–

VISIT IDENT system has TAR of 96 percent. What this means in practical terms 

is that if an individual wishes to enter the country under a new name using a fraudulent document, she/he would have to pass the Department of State visa issuance 

and pre-entry processes, including checks against lookout databases, the normal inspections process, and then that person would only have a 3.5 percent chance of 

avoiding identification through biometric means. (Overseas, a person would first be 

measured against TAR as part of the DOS nonimmigrant visa issuance process, 

then again when applying for admission to the United States.) 

The NIST report cited here (C.L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson. Matching performance for the US–VISIT IDENT system using flat fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) 

provides the justification for the statements give about TAR of 96 percent. As with 

question 11, the answer neglects to cite the results from another NIST report (R.A. 

Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. Zoepfl, M. Bone, P. Grother, R. Micheals, S. Otto, 

C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) 

which clearly found that increasing the number of fingerprints used in matching 

from two to eight would substantially improve TAR and reduce the chance of avoiding identification through biometric means. 

False positives or the False Acceptance Rates (FAR) for the US–VISIT IDENT 

system have proved to be measurable and consistent. To deal with this issue, US–

VISIT has developed processes to efficiently manage the false positives as they 

occur. For example, of the roughly 35,000 travelers who are processed through the 

US–VISIT IDENT system every day, about 30 of them are false positives against 

the lookout list and are sent to secondary. On the rare occasion that there is a false 

positive, the average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a lookout false positive 

is only 3 minutes and 40 seconds. And as already noted in answer to question 1548, 

the expanded deployment of the IDENT/IAFIS program to all secondary inspection 

and Border Parole stations allows our agents to simultaneously search both these 

data bases in instances where we suspect that people are attempting to enter the 

United States illegally.

Question: 12.2. What is the current timeline and cost for such integration? 

Answer: As there is no operational need, and because the cost would prove prohibitive (in systems, facilities, and personnel), there is no plan to perform 10-print 

IAFIS checks for US–VISIT. However, NIST cannot comment on the projected cost 

of this integration but NIST studies of both the IDENT and IAFIS systems show 

that this integration would reduce the chance of avoiding identification through biometric means. 

Question: 14. How can inaccurate data in databases which US–VISIT is 

interfacing and integrating be collected by a member of the public subject 

to such errors?

Question: 14.1. Will you consider a contact through which such corrections 

could be made? 

Question: 14.2. Has there been any thought to establishing a contact point 

at all field operation offices to correct erroneous admission documents 

issued at ports of entry? 

Answer: US–VISIT has established a redress process, giving travelers processed 

through US–VISIT a fast and easy way to have their US–VISIT records accessed 

and checked for accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or completeness. The first stage in 

the process occurs at the primary inspection lane at the port of entry and provides 

immediate data correction by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. 

The CBP officer can correct the traveler’s name, date of birth, flight information, 
102

and country-specific document number and document type errors. Biometric errors 

are sent to US–VISIT for correction.Travelers no longer at the POE can contact the 

US–VISIT privacy officer, who has set a goal of processing redress requests within 

20 business days. With almost six million travelers processed through US–VISIT, 

only 33 individuals have contacted the Privacy Officer about their records. The US–

VISIT redress process is available at www.dhs/us–visit.gov and the US–VISIT privacy officer can be contacted by telephone, fax or a new email address at 

usvisitprivacy@dhs.gov.

Question: 15. How is CLAIMS III being accessed during US–VISIT? 

Answer: DHS has created an interface between CLAIMS 3 and a component of the 

US–VISIT environment. This ensures that information about pending immigration 

benefit applications, approved or denied, is available to make determinations about 

whether someone is lawfully in the country or has overstayed her/his admission.

Question: 16. Will Mexican biometric border crossing card holders be subject to enrollment in US–VISIT? 

Answer: Mexican nationals who present a Form DSP–150, B–1/B–2 visa and border 

crossing card (BCC) upon arrival in, or departure from, the United States, and who 

are not required to be issued a Form 1–94 Arrival Departure Record at the time 

of admission, are exempt from the US–VISIT biometric data collection requirements. 

This means that Mexican nationals who will travel beyond 25 miles of the border 

(75 miles if admitted in Arizona) or who will remain longer than 30 days are subject 

to the US–VISIT biometric data requirements. This exemption may change when 

the Department explores a longterm solution to record the entry and exit of visitors 

crossing our land ports of entry.

Question: 17. Is it possible to integrate data that the State Department has 

on biometric border crossing card users into the US–VISIT database? 

Answer: Yes. We have included this task in the FY 2005 US–VISIT Expenditure 

Plan.

Question: 18. How many land ports of entry have scanners to read biometric 

passports and visas? 

Answer: All ports of entry have optical character recognition (OCR) scanners to 

read machine-readable passports, visas, and other travel documents. In addition, 51 

land border ports of entry have scanners to read the optical memory stripe of border 

crossing cards and alien registration cards. While the standards governing biometric 

passports have been developed, issues surrounding global interoperability, durability, skimming, and eavesdropping on personal data are in the process of being 

resolved. The Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with US–VISIT, 

ICAO, NIST, ISO, and others, tested chips and readers for e-passports/visas in July 

2004 at the National Biometrics Security Project Laboratory in Morgantown, West 

Virginia. This was followed by a mock test at BWI airport in November 2004. Based 

on the findings of these tests, plans are now being developed for a live test, most 

likely at Los Angeles International Airport in June 2005.

Question: 19. How many inspection lanes (passenger, mass transit, commercial, pedestrian) currently exist at our land ports at each crossing? Please 

provide a list of this data? 

Answer: There are 165 land ports of entry, of which there are 490 inbound primary 

noncommercial lanes, 176 primary commercial lanes, and 118 primary pedestrian 

lanes. Attached is a spreadsheet with a breakdown by port of entry.

20. How many of the above inspection lanes have the capacity to take fingerprints, which will be read against any portion of IDENT or any other 

biometric database? Please advise of which ones have this capacity. 

Answer: This function is not performed at primary lanes, but at all 165 land ports, 

this function can be performed in secondary inspection in support of primary/enforcement activities.

21. We understand that the State Department has refused to collect the Student 

and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) fee on behalf of the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS).

Question: 21.1. Have negotiations continued with the State Department on 

fee collection? 

Answer: The Department of State (DoS) and DHS have been working on fee collection methods. Specifically, DHS proposed a pilot project to have DoS collect the fee 

for DHS in China and India, where access to credit cards and local postal services 

may be limited. Both the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, 

Asa Hutchinson and Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Maura Harty agreed 
103

to investigate the viability of the proposal. The proposal suggested leveraging the 

DoS relationship with local financial institutions to establish a collection process in 

China and to use the same collection process as the visa fee for the SEVIS fee at 

the embassies and consulates in India. This collection process would include allowing the student or exchange visitor to pay in local currency. DHS and DoS have 

formed a working group to evaluate this option and identify points of concern for 

further consideration. Discussions are ongoing on this issue.

Question: 21.2. Because the proposed rule has no convenient way in which 

to pay the SEVIS fee, what has DHS done in order to make this easier for 

the student? 

Answer: There is, in fact, a convenient way to pay the SEVIS fee. SEVIS fee payment statistics illustrate that the students and exchange visitors are not having 

problems paying the fee. Of the SEVIS fees collected to date, 96 percent have been 

made via credit card. The Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) established 

several fee payment options that were available beginning on September 1 for fee 

collection. Students and exchange visitors have the option to pay with a check by 

mail, with a credit card or debit card via the Internet, or by third-party payment, 

such as through batch payment whereby sponsors pay for an entire group of individuals, or where the student selects a friend or relative to pay the fee on his or her 

behalf. SEVP continued to review alternate payment methods that would allow the 

student or exchange visitor to pay in local currency. Through no additional cost to 

the program, on November 1 SEVP instituted a new fee payment option with Western Union. This payment method allows applicants to pay the fee in local currency 

in over 130 countries where Western Union offers their QuickPayTM option. SEVP’s 

relationship with the DoS Office of Consular Affairs—who quickly alerted overseas 

Posts to accept Western Union receipts as proof of payment—made this option possible. These payment methods are working well. However, when problems with fee 

payment do arise, SEVP has established the SEVIS fee Case Resolution Unit (CRU) 

to provide individual assistance. SEVP is aware of fee payment problems in Nigeria 

and Ghana, but those cases only represent approximately 1 percent of the total student/exchange visitor population. Western Union is expected to expand to Nigeria, 

resolving fee payment problems there by the end of 2005. SEVP is committed to ensuring that all students and exchange visitors are able to pay the fee, and will resolve these cases individually.

Question: 21.3. Why isn’t DHS collecting this fee once a foreign student enters into the United States and has access to a United States bank? Would 

this be a viable option for DHS? 

Answer: Congress mandated that the SEVIS fee be paid prior to visa issuance. The 

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) requires the collection of information relating to nonimmigrant foreign students and 

exchange visitors and provides for the collection of the required fee to defray the 

costs. The initial 1999 proposed fee rule required that educational institutions and 

exchange visitor program sponsors collect the fee, based upon then-existing law, and 

mandated that the fee be collected prior to visa issuance. Congress subsequently 

amended the law to permit DHS to collect the fee directly from the F–l, F–3, J–

l, M–l, or M–3 nonimmigrants, but did not change the requirement that the fee be 

collected prior to visa issuance. Based upon these amendments to the law, the Final 

Rule provided for fee collection by DHS and required that proof of payment be presented during the visa application process, as was intended by Congress. SEVP recognizes that fee payment prior to visa issuance can be a hardship for those students 

and exchange visitors who are denied a visa; therefore, SEVP established a policy 

to honor the initial fee payment for those students and exchange visitors who reapply for a visa within a period of 12 months.

Question: 21.4. If this requires a change in the law would DHS be receptive 

to a legislative fix? 

Answer: In principle, DHS does not object to exploring the possibility of changing 

the law to allow for fee payment after the nonimmigrant enters the United States. 

However such change may generate unique and unforeseen problems for fee collection and processing, such as how to guarantee fee payment. This issue would need 

to be fully analyzed to determine the impacts on the program. If the student or exchange visitor is given the option to pay the fee upon entry to the United States, 

currently there is no mechanism that would enforce the payment requirement.

Question: 21.5. Is it true that the SEVIS fee has been lowered for a group 

of students (summer work travel/au pairs) to $35.00, and not any other 

group that may spend a limited amount of time in the United States such 

as a student participating in a six week Intensive English Program? 
104

Answer: Yes. Congress specified that the fee be reduced for only three categories 

of exchange visitors (Camp Counselors, Summer-work/Travel, and Au Pairs). Further, IIRIRA section 641 provides that an alien seeking J–l status to participate in 

an exchange visitor program that is sponsored by the Federal government is exempt 

from paying a fee. DHS has clarified that those potential J–1 exchange visitors exempt from the fee as participants in a Federal government sponsored exchange visitor program are those participating in an exchange visitor program with a program 

identification designator prefix of G–l, G–2, or G–3. Some comments received on the 

proposed fee rule suggested that other students and exchange visitors should be exempt from the fee. Similarly, a number of comments suggested that the fee for other 

programs be reduced below $100 to mirror the reduction that Congress expressly 

provided to certain J–l participants, including lower fees for short-term English language programs, for all English language programs, for some or all short-term programs, for commuter students, and for secondary school students. As noted in the 

Final Rule, Congress specifically exempted from the SEVIS fee only J–l nonimmigrants who are participating in an exchange visitor program sponsored by the 

Federal government, and explicitly reduced it only for certain other J–l nonimmigrants. DHS interpreted the Congressional mandate such that no other groups 

of nonimmigrants should be exempt from the SEVIS fee or have a reduced SEVIS 

fee based upon the principle of expressio unius est exclusion alterius: when one or 

more things of a class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class are necessarily excluded.

Question: 21.6. Is this $100 fee not a disincentive for short-term study 

abroad in the United States when other countries not only have much less 

stringent visa requirements, less denial rates but also much lower fees? 

Answer: A number of comments received on the proposed rule suggested that the 

fee would deter participation of foreign students and exchange visitors in United 

States programs. However, the statistical evidence on the number of foreign students and exchange visitors recorded in SEVIS does not support the argument that 

the $100 fee is a disincentive to study in the United States. Between 2003 and 2004, 

SEVIS has seen a slight increase in the number of students and exchange visitors 

in the United States. The SEVIS fee was implemented on September 1, 2004. If it 

were a disincentive to students and exchange visitors we would potentially see a decline in the number of students and exchange visitors coming to the United States. 

Additionally, compared with the overall cost of a U.S. education or participation in 

an exchange visitor program, the SEVIS fee does not significantly increase the financial burden on foreign students and exchange visitor program participants. It is 

possible, however, that the fee might deter the participation of students and exchange visitors with the most limited resources, particularly those from the least 

developed countries. While DHS acknowledges this reality, the statute mandating 

the implementation of the fee allows for no specific fee reductions, exemptions, or 

delayed payments based upon a nonimmigrant’s available resources or the infrastructure limitations of his or her country. Further, intending F, M, and J nonimmigrants are required by DHS and DoS regulations to provide evidence of sufficient financial resources to support themselves throughout their program. When 

considering the average cost of a temporary stay in the United States, including all 

related program costs, DHS does not believe that the SEVIS fee presents a burden 

sufficient to act as a deterrent to F, M, or J program participation. DHS notes that 

many schools and exchange visitor program sponsors, as well as other interested 

third party organizations (such as advocacy groups), already make special efforts to 

assist these nonimmigrants. DHS commends and encourages this assistance and, to 

facilitate such assistance, DHS will accept fee payments from third parties.

Question: 21.7. Why has this not been implemented for all short term study 

groups, and not just the summer work-study group? 

Answer: Same answer as in Question 5 (QO1562).

Question: 21.8. Could a blanket rule of three months study or less be implemented for reducing the fee to $35? 

Answer: DHS does not believe that this is a viable option, for two reasons. First, 

Congress mandated that SEVP be a fully fee-funded program and that the SEVIS 

fee be collected specifically to defray the costs associated with the program. Reducing the fee for a significant number of nonimmigrants would force DHS to increase 

the fee amount for other nonimmigrants in order to offset the reduction. Second, 

costs for administration of the program and the processing of non immigrants occur 

mostly up-front in the process and do not vary based on the length of time that the 

nonimmigrant is in the United States. Consequently, it is appropriate to spread the 

cost of the program as equally as possible among all of the participants.
105

Question: 22. What is the current make up of the US–VISIT staff? Is current 

staffing sufficient to manage, implement and oversee the US–VISIT program? 

Answer: The current staffing level for US–VISIT is 115 federal positions. Weare 

currently in process of hiring up to the 115 positions.

Question: 23. We understand that US–VISIT may collect a different biometric for future use. Is this correct and which type ofbiometric does DHS expects to use in the long term. 

Answer: Currently, US–VISIT uses fingerscans and digital photographs. Other biometrics are being assessed, not only by US–VISIT but also by other DHS components, for potential use.

Question: 24. Who will have access to US–VISIT biometric information? 

Answer: By collecting the appropriate biographic, biometric, and other immigration 

related information at the first contact with an individual, and sharing the information in a timely manner with appropriate decision makers, those charged with ensuring the integrity of our immigration system can make better decisions. These decision makers include consular officials from the Department of State, Customs and 

Border Protection officers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, and U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services officers from the Department of Homeland Security. 

This critical information on foreign nationals must be shared, , with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies as they, too, bear responsibility for protecting 

our country. This information is shared appropriately with law enforcement and intelligence agencIes.

Question: 25. Will information be removed from US–VISIT when an individual becomes a US-citizen? How will removal of that information be accomplished? 

Answer: US–VISIT currently retains the information collected for a defined duration (100 years for ADIS and 75 years for IDENT), even if the individual later becomes a United States citizen. However, as US–VISIT matures and decisions are 

made regarding whether the existing systems will be integrated, modernized, and/

or retired, the data retention periods for US–VISIT data will be reviewed and adjusted to reflect the redefined needs of the Department. One of US–VISIT’s primary 

goals is to safeguard the personal information that is being collected in a way that 

is responsible and respectful of privacy concerns. The Department is achieving this 

goal by implementing a comprehensive privacy program that ensures personal information is protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and is destroyed when no 

longer needed for its stated purpose. DHS is committed to updating the US–VISIT 

database when a person becomes a U.S. citizen. DHS is currently working with 

USCIS.’’

Question: 26. What has DHS done to promote information and educate travelers about US–VISIT? I agree that we need to keep track of who is coming 

into our country, but I am not sure that US–VISIT program will help us significantly in our effort to keep terrorists out of the country. When do you 

estimate that US–VISIT will be deemed ‘‘in place and fully functional?’’ Can 

you enlighten me on the benefits that we can expect in our war against terrorism when US–VISIT is ‘‘in place and fully functional?’’ (Jackson-Lee) 

Answer: US–VISIT has a robust outreach effort in place to educate visitors and to 

explain US–VISIT procedures for both entry and exit. In addition to providing information to international stakeholders in the travel and tourism industry and the 

business community, US–VISIT personnel are working with the media in visa waiver countries to educate foreign visitors. Information has been provided to the Department of State Consular Affairs offices overseas so that they can explain the required exit process as well. The campaign has identified the basic points of contact 

(touch points) to help ensure that foreign visitors are fully aware of US- VISIT’s 

goals and procedures. The continuum begins overseas, with outreach to media and 

stakeholders, and collaboration with the State Department and visa-issuing posts. 

The outreach touch points continue through the journey to the U.S., arrival at the 

port of entry, and departure. Campaign materials are itemized and described below. 

US–VISIT is enhancing the integrity of all aspects of immigration and border 

management processes while also providing a significant law enforcement benefit. 

The system has already begun to demonstrate its value as a law enforcement and 

national security tool. For example, through September 30, 2004:

• The system validated the identity and the authenticated documents of 

1,931,550 aliens. 
106

• Matches against biometric watch list records at entry resulted in 333 adverse 

actions, including matches for individuals convicted of rape, drug trafficking, 

manslaughter, federal prison escape, visa fraud and immigration violations. 

• Recurrent biometric checks after entry identified 104 individuals who committed crimes, most notably rape, or otherwise violated their immigration status, generating leads to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for possible removal from the United States.

Question: 27. It will be enormously expensive to establish and fully implement US–VISIT. What security measures would you recommend if Congress 

provided the Department of Homeland Security with a matching amount of 

money to use for other purposes?(Jackson-Lee) 

Answer: The Administration is convinced that the money spent on US–VISIT is an 

extremely important investment in our nation’s security. Congress should continue 

its support of US–VISIT. US–VISIT remains a top priority for DHS because it enhances security for our citizens and visitors while facilitating legitimate travel and 

trade across the borders. DHS deployed the first increment on time and within 

budget. During FY 2003, US–VISIT continued to make progress in achieving its 

mission by maintaining an aggressive implementation schedule. As a result, the 

US–VISIT program is reaching out to stakeholders in an organized fashion, complying with capital investment planning guidelines, and managing day-to-day activities in a controlled and effective manner.

Question: 28. If US–VISIT had been ‘‘in place and fully functional’’ when the 

9–11 terrorists entered the United States, would it have made any difference? Why or on what basis? (Jackson-Lee) 

Answer: It is always difficult to predict what might have happened. However, the 

USVISIT system, when fully implemented, will provide a comprehensive picture of 

most foreign nationals, and will be able to identify those who—like three of the September 11 th hijackers—have overstayed the terms of their visas. In addition, US–

VISIT has already enhanced the integrity of the immigration system by identifying 

imposters. To the extent that this acts as a deterrent for others who may intend 

harm to our citizens and visitors, US–VISIT may have already dissuaded terrorists 

from exploiting our system.

Attachment for answer to Q01556: 

Count LOCY—

NEW LPOE NAME 

ENTRY—

Non—

Commercial 

Entry—

Commercial 

Entry—

Pedestrian 

1 SLU ..... San Luis ................ 5 1 2

2 AND .... Andrade ................. 2 0 2

3 DOU .... Douglas ................. 7 0 2 

4 LUK .... Lukeville ............... 3 0 1

5 MAP .... Marisposa—

Nogales West ........ 4 2 1

6 NAC .... Naco ....................... 2 1 1

7 NOG .... Nogales East ......... 6 0 6

8 SAS ..... Sasabe ................... 1 0 1

9 PNH .... Pittsburg ............... 2 0 0

10 ABG .... Alburg ................... 1 0 0

11 ABS ..... Alburg Springs ..... 1 0 0

12 BEB ..... Beebe Plain ........... 1 0 0

13 BEE ..... Beecher Falls ........ 2 1 0

14 CNA .... Canaan .................. 1 1 0

15 DER .... Derby Line BS—1–

91 ........................... 4 1 0

16 DLV ..... Derby Line BS—

Rte. 5 ..................... 2 0 0

17 ERC ..... East Richford—

Richford Rte 105 ... 2 0 0

18 HIG ..... Highgate Springs 5 1 0

19 MOR .... Morses Line—

Franklin ................ 1 0 0

20 NRN .... Norton ................... 2 1 0

21 NRT ..... North Troy ............ 1 0 0
107

Attachment for answer to Q01556:—Continued

Count LOCY—

NEW LPOE NAME 

ENTRY—

Non—

Commercial 

Entry—

Commercial 

Entry—

Pedestrian 

22 PIV ...... Pinnacle Road—

Richford ................. 2 0 0

23 DRIF ... Richford Rte 139 ... 2 0 0

24 WBE .... West Berkshire ..... 2 0 0

25 BUR .... Burke—Jamisons 

Line ....................... 1 0 0

26 CHM ... Champlain ............ 7 3 0

27 CHT .... Chateaugay ........... 2 0 0

28 CHU .... Churubusco ........... 1 0 0

29 CNN .... Cannon Corners ... 1 0 0

30 FTC ..... Fort Covington ...... 2 0 0

31 MAS .... Massena ................ 4 1 0

32 MOO ... Mooers ................... 2 0 0

33 OGD .... Ogdensburg ........... 3 0 0

34 OVE .... Overton Corners ... 4 0 0 

35 ROU .... Rouses Point—St. 

Johns Hwy ............ 3 0 0 

36 TRO ..... Trout River ........... 3 0 0 

37 EPI ...... Eastport ................ 3 1 0 

38 PTL ..... Porthill .................. 2 1 0 

39 BWA .... Boundary ............... 1 0 0 

40 DVL ..... Danville ................. 1 0 0 

41 FER ..... Curlew—Ferry ...... 1 0 1 

42 FWA .... Frontier ................. 1 0 0 

43 LAU ..... Laurier .................. 2 0 0 

44 MET .... Metaline Falls ....... 2 0 0 

45 NIG ..... Nighthawk ............ 1 0 1 

46 ORO .... Oroville .................. 2 0 0 

47 ROO .... Roosville ................ 2 1 0 

48 OTM .... Otay Mesa—San 

Diego ..................... 13 6 6 

49 SYS ..... San Ysidro—San 

Diego ..................... 24 0 16 

50 TEC ..... Tecate .................... 2 1 1 

51 VAS ..... Virginia Avenue—

San Diego .............. 0 0 0 

52 BBM .... B&M—Brownsville 4 2 2 

53 BRO .... Gateway—Brownsville ........................ 5 4 4 

54 FAL ..... Falcon Heights ..... 1 0 1 

55 HID ..... Hidalgo .................. 11 1 4 

56 LOI ...... Los Indios .............. 4 4 2 

57 LSE ..... Los Ebanos ............ 1 0 1 

58 PGR ..... Progreso ................ 4 2 2 

59 PHR .... Pharr ..................... 4 4 1 

60 RIO ...... Rio Grande City ... 3 3 1 

61 ROM .... Roma ..................... 4 1 1 

62 VIB ...... Los Tomates—

Brownsville ........... 4 4 2 

63 PRE ..... Presidio ................. 3 2 1 

64 LAR ..... Laredo AF—Convent Street ............ 4 0 3 

65 LCB ..... Laredo—Columbia 4 3 1 

66 LLB ..... Laredo-Lincoln—

Juarez .................... 12 0 0 

67 LWT .... World Trade 

Bridge—Laredo IV 0 8 1 

68 BWM ... Bridgewater .......... 1 0 1 

69 CAM .... Calais—Milltown .. 1 0 0 

70 CLS ..... Calais—Ferry 

Point ...................... 2 1 0 
108

Attachment for answer to Q01556:—Continued

Count LOCY—

NEW LPOE NAME 

ENTRY—

Non—

Commercial 

Entry—

Commercial 

Entry—

Pedestrian 

71 COB .... Coburn Gore ......... 2 1 0 

72 EAS ..... Easton ................... 1 0 0 

73 EPT ..... Eastport ................ 1 0 0 

74 EST ..... St. Francis—Est 

Court ..................... 1 1 2 

75 FOR ..... Forest City ............ 1 0 1 

76 FTF ..... Fort Fairfield ........ 2 1 0 

77 FTK ..... Fort Kent .............. 2 1 0 

78 HML .... Hamlin .................. 1 0 0 

79 HTM .... Houlton ................. 6 2 0 

80 JKM .... Jackman ................ 2 1 0 

81 LlM ...... Limestone .............. 1 1 0 

82 LUB ..... Lubec ..................... 2 0 0 

83 MAD .... Madawaska ........... 1 1 1 

84 MTC .... Monticello .............. 1 0 1 

85 ORI ...... Orient .................... 1 0 1 

86 SPA ..... St. Francis—St. 

Pamphille .............. 1 1 2 

87 SRL ..... Jackman—St. 

Aurelie ................... 1 0 0 

88 STD ..... St. Francis—

Daaquam ............... 1 1 0 

89 VCB ..... Vanceboro .............. 2 0 0 

90 VNB .... Van Buren ............. 2 1 0 

91 CHF .... Chief Mountain .... 2 1 0 

92 DLB ..... Del Bonita ............. 1 1 0 

93 GOA .... Goat Haunt ........... 0 0 1 

94 MGM ... Morgan .................. 1 1 0 

95 OPH .... Opheim .................. 1 1 0 

96 PIE ...... Piegan ................... 2 1 0 

97 RAY ..... Raymond ............... 1 1 0 

98 SCO ..... Scobey .................... 1 1 0 

99 SWE .... Sweetgrass ............ 2 1 0 

100 WCM ... Willow Creek ........ 1 0 0 

101 WHI .... Whitetail ............... 1 1 0 

102 WHM ... Wild Horse ............ 1 1 0 

103 WHT .... Whitlash ................ 1 1 0 

104 AMB .... Ambrose ................ 3 1 0 

105 ANT ..... Antler .................... 1 1 0 

106 BAU .... Baudette ................ 2 1 0 

07 CRA ..... Crane lake ............ 1 1 0 

108 CRY ..... Carbury ................. 1 1 0 

109 DNS .... Dunseith ................ 2 1 0 

110 ElY ...... Ely ......................... 1 0 0 

111 FRT ..... Fortuna ................. 1 1 0 

112 GPM .... Grand Portage ...... 2 1 0 

113 HNN .... Hannah ................. 1 1 0 

114 HNS .... Hansboro ............... 1 1 0 

115 INT ...... International Falls 2 1 1 

116 LAN ..... Lancaster .............. 1 1 0 

117 MAl ..... Maida .................... 1 1 0 

118 NEC .... Neche ..................... 1 1 0 

119 NOO .... Noonan .................. 1 1 0 

120 NOY .... Noyes ..................... 2 1 0 

121 NRG .... Northgate .............. 1 1 0 

122 PEM .... Pembina ................ 6 3 0 

123 PIN ...... Pine Creek—

Roseau ................... 1 1 0 

124 POR ..... Portal ..................... 1 3 0 

125 ROS ..... Roseau ................... 1 2 0 

126 SAR ..... Sarles .................... 1 1 0 
109

Attachment for answer to Q01556:—Continued

Count LOCY—

NEW LPOE NAME 

ENTRY—

Non—

Commercial 

Entry—

Commercial 

Entry—

Pedestrian 

127 SHR ..... Sherwood ............... 1 1 0 

128 SJO ..... St. John ................. 3 2 0 

129 WAl ..... Walhalla ................ 1 1 0 

130 WAR .... Warroad ................ 1 1 0 

131 WHO ... Westhope ............... 1 1 1 

132 ANP ..... Antelope Wells ...... 1 0 0 

133 BOA .... Bridge of the 

Americas (BOTA) 

El Paso .................. 10 4 4 

134 COL ..... Columbus .............. 2 1 1 

135 FAB ..... Fabens ................... 2 0 1 

136 FTH ..... Fort Hancock ........ 1 0 1 

137 PDN .... Paso Del Norte—

El Paso .................. 10 0 8 

138 SEL ..... Stanton Street 

Bridge .................... 3 0 0 

139 STR ..... Santa Teresa ......... 2 2 1 

140 YSl ....... Ysleta—El Paso .... 12 6 4 

141 TUR ..... Turner ................... 1 2 0 

142 CAl ...... Calexico ................. 10 0 4 

143 IVP ...... Calexico East—Imperial Valley ......... 8 3 2 

144 DCB .... Detroit Ambassador Bridge ......... 10 7 0 

145 DCT ..... Detroit Tunnel ...... 9 0 0 

146 PHU .... Port Huron—Blue 

Water Bridge ........ 8 6 0 

147 SSM ..... Sault Ste. Marie ... 2 1 1 

148 ADT ..... Amistad Dam ........ 1 0 0 

149 DLR ..... Del Rio .................. 4 2 1 

150 EGP ..... Eagle Pass ............. 5 0 1 

151 FDE ..... Eagle Pass II ........ 6 2 1 

152 LEW .... LewistonQueenston Bridge 7 3 0 

153 PBB ..... Peace Bridge—

Buffalo ................... 7 4 1 

154 RAI ...... Rainbow Bridge—

Niagara Falls ........ 19 0 4 

155 WHL .... Whirlpool Rapids——Niagara 

Falls ....................... 3 0 1 

156 THO .... Alexandria Bay—

Thousand Island ... 6 2 0 

157 ALC ..... Alcan ..................... 2 1 0 

158 DAC .... Haines—Dalton 

Cache ..................... 1 1 0 

159 SKA ..... Skagway ................ 1 1 0 

160 BLA ..... Peace Arch—

Blaine .................... 7 1 0 

161 LYN ..... Lynden .................. 3 2 0 

162 PHY ..... Pacific Highway—

Blaine .................... 6 3 0 

163 SUM .... Sumas .................... 4 2 0 

164 PTR ..... Point Roberts ........ 4 1 1 

165 PKC ..... Poker Creek .......... 1 0 1

Total ...................... 490 176 118
110

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA. INC. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS

Question: 1. The US–VISIT Program is an extensive border management system that requires participation and cooperation from a wide variety of 

stakeholders. How has the Air Transport Association participated in the 

discussions leading up to the implementation of phase one of US-VISIT? 

Answer: ATA has participated extensively in discussions with DHS leading up to 

the implementation of phase one of US–VISIT. ATA’s involvement dates back to 

working with and providing input to legacy-INS staff on the original ‘‘entry/exit’’ 

program. Coordination has continued with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the announcement of US–VISIT in early 2003. US–VISIT staff 

have availed themselves to ATA and our carriers for advice and to answer questions. During the Atlanta pilot, US–VISIT staff conducted weekly conference calls 

with stakeholders. In addition, US. VISIT worked very closely with Delta Air Lines 

and ATA for the Entry pilot that was conducted at Atlanta’s Hartsfield/Jackson 

International Airport late last fall. ATA continues to work with US–VISIT on the 

Exit phase. Coordination on the Exit phase includes bi-monthly conference calls to 

discuss.

Question: 2. In an effort to better prepare passengers for Exit requirements, 

would airlines be willing to hand-out the small information card with a 

passenger’s boarding pass? 

Answer: Yes, ATA carriers would be willing to assist the government in whatever 

means possible to better prepare passengers for the Exit requirements. We would 

ask that an adequate, ongoing supply of the information card be provided to the carriers at the full expense of the government. The information cards also need to be 

printed in multiple languages to better serve our passengers.

Question: 3. What are your recommendations for additional public outreach 

and education for US–VISIT? 

Answer: US–VISIT has done an effective job of putting together a public outreach 

and education effort for US–VISIT. Their efforts have included updating U.S. government websites (DHS, CBP, ICE, and the State Department) to include information on US–VISIT; working with the State Department to provide the embassies and 

consulates abroad the necessary materials and information; issuing press releases 

and providing material to the news media. 

ATA recommends that DHS consider creating a link on their homepage specifically for US-VISIT that could have timely updates on entry/exit; the where’s, what’s 

and how’s of the program; Exit locations (both cities and airports); and user friendly 

airport maps detailing the location’s of the Exit kiosks and how to use them. There 

could also be information directed to passengers who are coming to the United 

States about what to expect when they go to U.S. embassies and consulates for their 

visas. 

ATA also recommends that US-VISIT consider posting signs at departure gates 

in foreign airports informing passengers what to expect upon arrival into the United 

States. We would hope that DHS would work with foreign governments and/or the 

foreign airport authorities to provide signage as a customer service notification.

Question: 4. Has ATA membership noticed additional passenger wait times 

during immigration and customs processing due to new US–VISIT data collection? 

Answer: ATA member airlines have not noticed significant increases in wait times 

during immigration and customs processing due to new US–VISIT data collection. 

We have been impressed with the coordination between US–VISIT and Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) to ensure a careful and successful implementation of phase 

one. However, we will continue to monitor the issue as we move into the summer 

peak travel season which begins in April. Adequate levels of CBP inspectors on the 

primary lines are paramount to avoiding long lines in the FIS facilities which delay 

our passengers and could cause disruptions for airport operations.

Question: 5. Current Federal law requires that by October 26, 2004, all Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP) countries must have capabilities to produce biometric passports in order to remain in the program. Concern has been expressed that many of the 27 VWP countries will be able to meet this deadline. Has ATA done any studies looking into the impact this deadline may 

have on the travel industry? 

Answer: No, ATA has not done any specific studies on how the October 26, 2004, 

deadline will affect the travel industry. However, in 2003, ATA was a strong advocate for delaying the October 1, 2003, requirement for all Visa Waiver Program travelers to have a valid Machine Readable Passport (MRP) for visa-free entry into the 

U.S. ATA was concerned that insufficient preparatory work had been completed and 
111

that serious disruptions of the processing of visitors into the United States could 

occur. As you know, Secretary Powell exercised his waiver authority and extended 

the deadline to October 26, 2004—which now coincides with the requirement for 

VWP countries to begin producing biometric passports. 

Many of the same issues surrounding the October 1, 2003, requirement for MRPs 

also apply to the upcoming October 26th date. State Department Assistant Secretary Maura Harty has testified several times that most VWP countries will not 

be capable of issuing passports with biometrics by the deadline. Premature implementation of the requirement will cause a great deal of confusion for the traveling 

public and will contribute to a world-view that travel to the United States is an unpleasant hassle. That will greatly discourage travel to the United States, which will 

significantly harm the national economy as well as the airline and travel and tourism industry. 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES OF DENNIS A. CARLTON, DIRECTOR WASHINGTON

OPERATIONS INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC GROUP

Question: 1. The current biometrics being used at selected air and sea 

ports of entry call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the foreign national. While the Administration has maintained that it is currently in ‘‘increment one’’ in a four stage process and it may likely move towards using 

a ten-print system, will using two-prints impact the agency’s ability to capture individuals who are listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

database, which uses ten prints? 

Answer: In the near term, the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to 

capture and match the flat impressions of the two index fingers of foreign nationals 

seems a practical compromise. To comply with the aggressive deadlines imposed by 

federal legislation and to achieve the programmatic milestones set by the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, the US-VISIT Program Office chose to implement technologies the department had successfully deployed in the recent past. Since it is an 

extension of the existing IDENT system, the two flat finger capture/matching solution being employed in US-VISIT Increment One is fully compatible with the twoprint database format of IDENT. However, this means that the two flat fingers captured for US-VISIT will be subject to the same matching accuracy and throughput 

infirmities when searching against the rolled fingerprints contained in the Department of Justice’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 

as all other two-finger inquiries sent from IDENT. 

Studies have shown that matching flat fingerprints against a database comprised 

of rolled fingerprints is not as accurate as matching rolled prints against rolled 

prints. The ‘disconnect’ between rolled and flat prints is not likely to be resolved 

by US–VISIT—forensics specialists will continue to prefer the additional data available from rolled prints while civil government applications like US–VISIT will use 

flat prints because they are much easier to capture. 

Over the longer term, as the US-VISIT database grows to comprise tens of millions of records, two fingers will not provide sufficiently unique data to consistently 

return only one matching database record. As a consequence, queries are likely to 

begin returning several potential matching records, necessitating additional research to distinguish true from false matches. IBG and others in the biometrics industry believe that at least four or more fingers will need to be captured from each 

subject in order to maintain adequate matching accuracy and throughput. Individuals originally enrolled with just two fingerprints will need to be reenrolled using 

four or more fingers; this reenrollment could be accomplished when an individual 

appears for a visa renewal.

Question: 2. You characterized the challenge of implementing biometric 

identifier at land ports of entry as ‘‘daunting,’’ yet surmountable. Could you 

elaborate on how this challenge could be overcome, both at the ports and 

‘‘upstream,’’ keeping in mind that the largest ports are extremely busy, 

handling millions of entrants year-round? 

Answer: The key to successfully implementing biometric identification at land 

ports of entry is to provide multiple means by which travelers can be ‘pre-identified’ 

before they reach the point of primary inspection. IBG believes the vast majority 

of travelers will readily cooperate with ‘pre-identification’ programs so long as the 

enrollment process is considered reasonable and the enrolled traveler is provided expedited transit across the border. For instance, at the Peace Arch port of entry in 

Blaine, Washington almost 25% of annual border crossings are by enrollees in the 

joint U.S.-Canadian NEXUS alternative inspection program. Though NEXUS pro-
112

gram participants must submit to an extensive background investigation by both 

American and Canadian customs and immigration authorities, their reward is being 

able to cross the border using a dedicated lane that can reduce what sometimes can 

be an hour+ wait in regular lanes to just a few minutes. 

Travelers should have several options for identifying themselves prior to reaching 

the land port primary inspection point. Biometric matching need not and, in fact, 

should not be performed for the first time at the point of inspection—the inspecting 

officer must not be distracted from conducting a thorough evaluation of the demeanor and behavior of the traveler. In pedestrian lanes, biometrics could be 

matched through a combination of active (fingerprint capture) and passive (facial 

image capture) methods as travelers pass through pre-inspection choke points. In 

vehicle lanes, fingerprint samples could be captured prior to the inspection position, 

using portable devices that can both read data from travel documents and match 

fingerprints from inside the vehicle. 

U.S. citizens could be encouraged to register their travel documents (e.g., their 

drivers license, passport, or other form of ID) and biometric samples prior to their 

departure at kiosks located at the land ports and other government offices, such as 

post offices, throughout the border region. Upon their return to the U.S., registered 

travelers would be afforded the privilege of using expedited processing lanes. 

Question: 3. Based on what you have observed, to what extent has the US–

VISIT program office given consideration to overcoming the challenge of 

implementing a biometric identifier at land ports of entry? 

Answer: The US–VISIT program office has evaluated several alternatives for employing biometrics at land ports of entry. The Departments of State and Homeland 

Security have accumulated extensive experience capturing and matching biometrics 

as part of the Border Crossing Card enrollment process. This past year, DHS conducted a pilot program to assess the practical issues associated with matching the 

biometric data recorded on the BCC with a live biometric sample provided by the 

cardholder. In addition, DHS has been acquiring biometric samples from and conducting background investigations of thousands of NEXUS and SENTRI cardholders. Biometric identification procedures will have to be both flexible and creative in order to accommodate the wide range of port configurations and environmental conditions at U.S. land ports of entry. 

Question: 4. How do you propose to best address the inevitable occurrences of ‘‘mistaken’’ or inadvertent biometric identity mismatches, especially from the perspective of safeguarding privacy? 

Answer: Experience acquired from Increment One of the US-VISIT program has 

shown that DHS already has implemented effective methods for quickly resolving 

biometric identity mismatches. As part of the Increment One technology upgrades 

at the primary inspection positions, inspection personnel now have access to significantly more traveler-related data from both DHS and DOS databases. For instance, 

primary inspectors can now access records from the Department of State’s Consolidated Consular Database to review the information upon which the DOS Foreign 

Service Officer adjudicated a visa application. When a biometric mismatch occurs, 

an inspector has real-time access to text data that can be used to quickly determine 

that the traveler’s documentation doesn’t match the record returned by the biometric search. Initial indications have shown that biometric mismatches have occurred 

at a rate far lower than had been predicted and that the primary inspector has resolved mismatch errors and sent the traveler on their way in an average of about 

one minute. Thus, travelers are subjected to minimal inconvenience and their privacy and dignity are protected. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD K. PULTORAK, SENIOR CBP OFFICER, NTEU 

CHAPTER 111—LOSE ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the Subcommittee; I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on 

one of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) newest programs—The 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology U.S. VISIT) program. 

I am proud to have been part of Customs for over 32 years. In 1971, I started 

with Customs as one of the original sky marshals. In my capacity as a sky marshal 

I flew over 1 million miles on TWA Airlines over the course of three years. In 1974, 

I became a United States Customs Inspector at JFK International Airport in New 

York until 1976 when I then began working Customs pre-clearance in Bermuda for 

six years. In 1983, I started working as a Customs Inspector at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) where I have worked during the past 21 years. In addition 

to my job as a Senior legacy Customs Inspector and now Senior CBP Officer, I have 
113

been an employee representative for NTEU, proudly representing over 400 Customs 

personnel at LAX for over 10 years. 

U.S. VISIT PROGRAM AND CBP OFFICER TRAINING: 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act 

of 2000 (DMIA) P.L. 106–215 mandated the creation of an entry/exit system for nonU.S. citizens into and out of the United States that would record all arrival and departure information of every alien who crosses the U.S. border. This system is now 

known as U.S. VISIT. 

While the official roll out of the U.S. VISIT program is only 3 weeks old, I would 

like to bring the subcommittee’s attention a few concerns that legacy Customs and 

INS inspectors, such as my self, would like the subcommittee to be aware of with 

regard to the implementation and future use of the U.S. VISIT program. 

On January 5, 2004 the U.S. VISIT program was introduced at 115 U.S. international airports and at 14 seaports of entry across the country, including my port 

of entry, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), one of three busiest international 

airports in the country with approximately 8 million international passengers annually. 

As has been stated by previous members on the panel, the U.S. VISIT program 

is intended to process visitors holding visas as they enter the United States. The 

U.S. VISIT technology uses scanning equipment to collect ‘‘biometric identifiers,’’ 

such as fingerprints, in an inkless process, along with a digital photograph of the 

visitor. Together with the standard information gathered from a visitor about their 

identity and travel, the program is intended to verify the visitor’s identity and compliance with visa and immigration policies. All data obtained from the visitor is then 

stored as part of the visitor’s travel record. At exit points, visitors will check out 

at kiosks by scanning their visa or passport and repeating the simple inkless 

fingerprinting process. The exit confirmation will be added to the visitor’s travel 

records to ensure compliance. It is my understanding that the U.S VISIT program 

will be expanded to include the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, 

and all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005. 

As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the ‘‘One Face at the Border’’ 

initiative. Under this plan, a new position, the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) Officer would combine the duties of legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and 

APHIS into a single front- line border security position at the 307 official ports-ofentry across the United States. 

As some of my fellow Customs inspectors have testified at previous hearings, I 

and the legacy Customs employees I work with believe that combining the border 

protection responsibilities that were held by three highly-skilled specialists into a 

single front line inspector position continues to raise some serious concerns. Each 

of the job responsibilities from the three legacy inspection agencies is highly specialized and distinct. By utilizing one employee to perform all primary and secondary 

inspection function programs, including the new US–VISIT program, the agency is 

diluting the expertise that has made the United States border inspection personnel 

second to none. 

Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position, legacy Customs inspectors received 9 to 12 weeks of intensive basic training on Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP officer training guidelines legacy inspectors, such 

as myself, will be transitioning into the new CBP officer position in the spring of 

this year by way of classroom training, CD–ROM computer teaching and on-the-job 

training for programs such as US–VISIT. While the new training will lead to a 

broader knowledge of the INS rules and regulations of entry for passengers entering 

the United States, there remains a concern among the employees I represent as to 

whether it will provide the specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful 

accomplishment of the other traditional legacy Customs and INS anti-terrorism missions that are now part of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Currently, legacy Customs and INS inspectors are ‘‘cross-trained’’ as to the most 

basic Customs and INS procedures for entry into the U.S. for passengers and goods. 

Traditionally, if a legacy Customs inspector was faced with a complicated visa entry 

situation at an airport or land border primary inspection station they had the ability 

to send the passenger to a more intensive secondary inspection where an experienced legacy INS inspector could make a determination as to the validity of a particular visa. It remains unclear as to whether experts in visa issues or other specific 

Customs and INS border protection matters will continue to be available for secondary inspection once the full implementation of the CBP officer training is completed for all legacy Customs personnel and new CBP Officers. I feel strongly that 
114

specific expertise must be maintained, especially in light of the ramping up of the 

US–VISIT program to all 317 official ports of entry by the end of 2005. 

With the recent introduction of the U.S. VISIT program the issue of staffing continues to be a concern. For example, at a number of airports across the country 

since the introduction of U.S. VISIT, legacy Customs inspectors who are highly 

trained in cargo inspection have been pulled from their current anti-terrorism cargo 

and passenger assignments to assist legacy INS inspectors by processing only low 

risk U.S. citizens and green card holders at airport immigration processing stations 

in order to maintain an acceptable flow of passengers in the international terminals. 

The CBP officers I represent hope that Congress will continue to provide additional 

CBP Officer staffing to enable legacy CBP Officers such as myself the ability to continue working in our areas of expertise to continue our traditional missions of facilitating legitimate trade and preventing terrorism. 

Other issues of concern that have been raised by both the legacy Customs and 

INS personnel that I work with involve the current exemption of international travelers from countries who are part of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and how it 

relates to the U.S. VISIT program. In addition, there are also concerns about the 

use of only selected databases by the U.S. VISIT program. 

Currently, the U.S. VISIT program applies only to foreign visitors seeking admission on non-immigrant visas but does not apply to visitors seeking admission from 

Canada and Mexico or countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 

or lawful permanent residents (green card holders). Also at this time, the U.S. 

VISIT program will not apply to foreign visitors seeking entry at land border ports 

of entry where over 81 percent of international passengers are processed. Currently, 

only 19 percent of international passengers are processed at air and sea ports of 

entry. 

The fact that travelers from 27 countries who participate in the VWP and travelers entering through Canada and Mexico are currently exempt from U.S. VISIT 

should raise serious concerns with the members of this subcommittee. Future terrorists with no criminal or terrorism history could possibly exploit the waiver program 

that currently exempts such countries as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 

Japan, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom to name a few. 

In addition, front line legacy Customs and INS inspectors I have talked with have 

serious concerns with regard to the lack of federal watch list and criminal databases 

currently being used by the U.S. VISIT program. It in my understanding that currently the U.S. VISIT program uses the traditional Customs (TECS), INS and TSA 

databases, but does not fully utilize other terrorist and criminal watch lists maintained by other federal agencies such as the State Department and U.S. Marshal’s 

Service. The success or failure of entry/exit programs, such as U.S. VISIT, rely entirely on the quality of information available to the DHS personnel using it. If U.S. 

VISIT is to be truly successful as a terrorist fighting tool the DHS must lead the 

effort to consolidate and standardize the federal government’s watch list structures 

and sharing policies to enable front line CBP Officers to successfully accomplish 

their anti-terrorism missions. 

The men and women I work with, as well as the thousands of other CBP Officers 

across the country are deeply committed to their mission of protecting our borders 

from terrorism. In order to do that, we must continue to provide these men and 

women with the resources they need to effectively do their job. Again, I want to 

thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to share my thoughts on the very important issues concerning the CBP’s U.S. VISIT program. I would be happy to answer any questions that subcommittee members may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. CLARK ROBINSON, PRESIDENT INTERNATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF AMUSEMENT PARKS AND ATTRACTIONS

As president of the International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions, and on behalf the board of directors and our general membership, I appreciate 

the opportunity to submit testimony for the hearing record on this very important 

subject.

Introduction 

Founded in 1918, the International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA) is the largest international trade association for permanently situated 

amusement facilities worldwide. Headquartered in Alexandria, VA, IAAPA represents over 5,000 member companies from more than 85 countries, including virtually all multi-park companies such as Disney, Universal, Busch Entertainment, 

Paramount and Six Flags. Our membership includes amusement/theme parks, 

waterparks, amusement manufacturers and suppliers, family entertainment centers, 

arcades, zoos, aquariums, museums, and miniature golf venues. 
115

According to Amusement Business magazine and other industry analysts, America’s 600-plus parks and attractions hosted approximately 322 million visitors in 

2003, generating over $10 billion in revenue. An annual compilation of the world’s 

‘‘Most Visited Amusement/Theme Parks’’ indicated that the United States had 16 

of the top 25 most attended parks globally during the past year. American amusement facilities take great pride in their commitment to providing quality family entertainment to visitors from our own country and countries around the world.

The Need for Safe, Open Borders 

The amusement industry supports enhanced border security measures, understanding that seamlessly safe travel helps to bolster consumer confidence in our 

product. However, the industry is concerned about the implementation schedule of 

security measures and the adverse impact it might have on travel by foreign visitors. 

Since 9/11, the travel and tourism industry has seen significant decreases in 

international travel to the United States. Over a two-year period following September 11, 2001, international travel to the U.S. declined twenty percent, resulting 

in a loss of $15 billion in visitor spending. Over 300,000 jobs in the travel industry 

were lost as a product of the decrease in international travel. 

While the need to enhance physical safety is paramount, the United States must 

also be vigilant in ensuring enhanced economic security during that process. As a 

result, the amusement industry, in conjunction with the entire United States travel 

industry, cannot support the current congressionally mandated deadline of October 

26, 2004 for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries to begin issuance of biometric 

passports to their citizens. We request that VWP countries be provided extra time 

to phase in these new, more secure documents.

Amusement Industry Supports Biometric Passports, Phase-In Needed 

Both the United States and the international theme park community support implementation of a biometric passport program for Visa Waiver countries. Biometric 

identification will undoubtedly enhance security by allowing more vigorous screening of visitors. The further development and issuance of machine-readable, tamperresistant, biometric passports will reduce the number of fraudulent and suspicious 

passports used to gain illegal entry into this country. 

While illegal entry must be prohibited, legitimate travel into the United States 

must be permitted to continue without significant disruption. The State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs has indicated that VWP governments will be unable to meet the legislatively mandated deadline to issue biometric passports. It is 

currently believed that at best, only three of the twenty-seven Visa Waiver countries 

will be able to meet this deadline, and that none of the larger countries (United 

Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy or Spain) will be able to issue biometric 

passports by October 26, 2004. Officials have indicated that these VWP governments 

will not be capable of producing biometric passports until late 2005 or 2006. 

Visa Waiver travelers with non-biometric passports issued on or after October 26, 

2004 will be required to obtain a visa for travel to the United States. As governments in Visa Waiver countries will be unable to issue passports with biometric 

identifiers, the demand for nonimmigrant visas for travel to the United States will 

overload the processing abilities of U.S. consulates overseas. The State Department 

has indicated that the demand for non-immigrant visas would at least double, leaving them unable to process requests in a timely manner. 

We fear that these requirements will serve as a disincentive for tourist travel to 

the United States. The biometric passport deadline for Visa Waiver countries will 

create an actual barrier for some international travelers and a perceived barrier for 

others. Fewer international visitors to the U.S. will result in less spending and job 

loss in the amusement industry across the country. 

We suggest that at least a one-year extension of the October 26, 2004 deadline 

for biometric passports be considered to allow Visa Waiver countries the necessary 

time to begin issuing biometric passports to their citizens. Extension of this deadline 

would give VWP governments the opportunity to complete development of these 

more secure documents while maintaining the flow of Visa Waiver travelers to the 

United States.

Conclusion 

As U.S. theme parks are just now beginning to recover from the events of the last 

two years, another barrier to inbound travel would be detrimental to the industry. 

In 2002, Visa Waiver travelers spent approximately $38 billion in the United States. 

Over 10 million international visitors traveled to the United States from VWP countries last year. Congress has recently recognized the importance of international inbound travel, appropriating millions of dollars last year to the Department of Com-
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merce to establish programs that will promote travel to the United States in foreign 

markets. 

Extending the biometric passport deadline for Visa Waiver travelers by at least 

one year would allow the seamless flow of legitimate travel into the United States 

to continue, while providing VWP governments with the opportunity to successfully 

meet and comply with requirements mandated by the Border Security Act. Homeland security must be defined as more than a mere protection of the physical. The 

implementation of security measures must account for the economic health of the 

nation as well. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to submit this testimony for the official 

record. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE TRAVEL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) submits the following comments 

for the record. 

TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all components of the $528 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA’s mission is to represent the 

whole of the travel industry to promote and facilitate increased travel to and within 

the United States. Our more than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry throughout the country. 

International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital component of our national economy. In 2002, over 42 million international visitors generated $83.5 

billion in expenditures, $12 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S. 

is a service export, and in 2002, generated a positive balance of trade of $5.5 billion. 

International visitation has continually declined over the past three years. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8 percent in 2003 compared to 2000 levels. This 

decline has drastically reduced the flow of tax revenue to all levels of government 

and reduced our international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international 

travel to the US. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures. 

The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy and confusion over new US. 

visa and border security procedures. While some of the causes are beyond the reach 

of an individual country, actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or 

harm our nation’s ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and 

create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities across the country. 

For this reason, the US–VISIT program must be implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals. Otherwise, international travelers might not wish 

to return to the U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place. 

TIA supports the US–VISIT program as envisioned for airports and seaports. TIA 

believes that the program meets the Department of Homeland Security’s dual missions of protecting the nation’s security and economy. By developing a system that 

verifies the identity of travelers quickly and efficiently, US–VISIT adds to the protection of the homeland while ensuring the continuous flow of legitimate international travelers entering and exiting the country. 

However, TIA does have several concerns about the implementation of the US–

VISIT program. Congress should seriously consider these issues as the program 

moves forward.

Postpone Deadline for Biometrics Passports 

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 introduced a 

new security element to traveler documentation: biometric identifiers. Capturing a 

person’s biometric and using it as part of the entry process will allow inspection officials to know the person before them is the same person to whom the passport or 

visa was issued. Biometrics are just now being incorporated into newly-issued U.S. 

visas. They will also be required in all new passports issued by the 27 countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program beginning on October 26, 2004. 

TIA supports the use of biometrics in travel documents. However, most of the Visa 

Waiver Program countries will not be ready to issue these newer biometric passports until late 2005 at the earliest. Missing the deadline would mean that many 

tourist and business travelers from those countries would have to obtain visas for 

entry into the U.S. The State Department estimates that as many as 5 million VWP 

travelers would be affected by this deadline. 

Forcing Visa Waiver Program travelers to get visas will deal a crippling blow to 

an already ailing travel industry. Approximately two-thirds of all overseas (excluding Canadian and Mexican) business and leisure travelers, or nearly 13.5 million 

visitors, enter the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program. Overseas travel to our nation is already down 32 percent over the past three years. Additional losses will 
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send even more workers from the travel and tourism industry to the unemployment 

line. It is unrealistic to expect travelers accustomed to visa-free travel to spend the 

money and time to obtain a U.S. visa to visit our country. Especially when these 

travelers have many other appealing intemationa1 destinations that are visa-free. 

Additionally, the State Department lacks the capacity to meet this potential increase in demand. A loss of those 5 million travelers would cost the U.S. economy 

$15 billion in sales and thousands of jobs. 

It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State will not be able to start 

issuing biometric passports until well after the October deadline. While the State 

Department is not required by law to do so, it is hypocritical for the U.S. to require 

other countries to do what we cannot. 

The October 26 deadline is a Congressional mandate. The Administration does not 

have the authority to extend the deadline. Therefore, TIA calls on the House Select 

Committee on Homeland Security to support at least a one-year extension of the October 26 deadline. By doing this, Congress will provide the time necessary to allow 

these important trade and political allies to begin producing passports in a way that 

will not discourage inbound international travel to the U.S.

Concern Over Delays 

TIA is very pleased that enrollment in the program has only added an average 

of 15 seconds to the normal inspection process. We commend Homeland Security for 

their efficiency. 

It is critical that this level of performance be maintained during peak travel periods and also when the U.S. travel and tourism industry recovers its lost market 

share. As stated above, overseas travel to the U.S. has dropped by approximately 

one-third over the past three years. TIA is concerned that Homeland Security will 

not have sufficient personnel to maintain a 15second US–VISIT inspection time 

when international visitation returns to 2000 levels. TIA urges Congress to provide 

adequate funding so that Homeland Security will have sufficient inspectors available to immediately meet the demands peak travel periods. 

While TIA is pleased with the efficiency by which individuals are processed, TIA 

also believes it is important to process entire flights in a timely manner. The time 

an individual spends at primary inspection is not the only time issue. There is also 

the concern over how long an individual waits to finally reach a primary inspection 

booth. TIA supports the original Congressionally mandated goal of a maximum wait 

of 45 minutes per individual. Although this mandate was repealed in the Enhanced 

Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107–173), TIA believes it 

is still a useful and important goal for Customs and Border Protection inspectors 

to meet. TIA urges Congress to allocate funding to provide sufficient inspectors for 

the US–VISIT program both to meet the IS-second individual inspection time and 

to keep the wait in line to under 45 minutes. 

If primary inspection is perceived to be too much of a hassle, many visitors will 

be discouraged from returning to the U.S. in the future. It is critical that the US–

VISIT program have the requisite staff to keep wait times and inspection times to 

a minimum. Otherwise, both our security and our economy will suffer. 

Outreach to Traveling Public 

TIA urges Homeland Security to increase efforts to educate the international traveling public about the US-VISIT program. International travelers coming to the U.S. 

for business and pleasure should be told who is impacted, and who is not impacted, 

by this new program. Visitors need to understand in advance what to expect in the 

process, and what they can do to make the process go more smoothly. 

The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the myriad of new 

security rules is creating a ‘‘Fortress America.’’ International travelers do not just 

consider the impact of a single rule, but view all rules and programs in total. They 

have noted the increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing 

visa denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines, the future 

use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver passports, collection and 

use of advance passenger information, or API, along with US–VISIT. 

By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a homeland security perspective, and TIA supports these efforts to enhance national security. But 

for many prospective international visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a ‘‘big picture’’ that the United States is becoming a destination that 

is too difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the effort. In 

their opinion, the ‘‘welcome mat’’ has been pulled. TIA has heard accounts of how 

this negative perception has resulted in lost business. While the Department of 

Homeland Security cannot respond to every misperception and rumor, the opportunity exists to set the record straight on the US–VISIT program and tell international travelers exactly what the program is and who it affects. 
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In conclusion, Congress must act in two areas to ensure the continued success of 

the US–VISIT program and allow the U.S. to remain a viable destination for international travelers. Congress must act immediately to extend the October 26 deadline on biometric passports by a minimum of one year. Congress also must ensure 

that the US–VISIT program has sufficient funds and personnel to meet security and 

efficiency objectives. TIA also urges the Department of Homeland Security to increase outreach and education efforts to the international traveling public.

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