Number 156, January 1999

The Current NuclearDialogue
by Leon Sloss

Conclusions- There is no consensus among U.S. experts    about the future role of nuclear weapons. As a result, clear policy to guide the future    direction of nuclear programs is lacking. 
- One view emphasizes the dangers of    nuclear weapons to the United States and seeks further reductions and other measures to    make nuclear weapons less legitimate. However, only the most extreme wing of this view    believes that abolition is practical in the foreseeable future. 
- Another view emphasizes the continuing    salience of nuclear weapons in deterrence and emphasizes the importance of maintaining an    infrastructure and competent personnel that would permit reconstitution of nuclear forces    in the future if necessary. 
- Future U.S. nuclear policy and posture    are likely to be shaped more by budget constraints than arms control as in the past.    Barring any major change in the international scene, a gradual erosion of the U.S. nuclear    posture seems likely. This will be welcomed by some, decried by others, and ignored by    most. 
**Official U.S. Policy and Programs

At the end of the Cold War the Sovietmilitary threat to Western Europe disappeared, and with it the principal rationale forU.S. nuclear policy. Since then the United States has been searching for a coherent policyas a basis for planning future nuclear forces. This search involving a small circle ofexperts received little public attention until the recent nuclear tests by India andPakistan dramatized the emergence of a new nuclear order with implications far beyondSouth Asia. However, the U.S. policy community remains deeply divided over the future roleof nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear weapons policy has tried torecognize new realities while preserving many Cold War era principles. The nuclear postureretains thousands of nuclear weapons, many on a high state of alert. A multibillion dollarresearch program continues to develop a ballistic missile defense system for U.S.territory, but technical uncertainties about the feasibility and cost persist.

The new realities are reflected in aseries of concrete actions: sharply lower budgets for nuclear missions; substantialreductions in deployed nuclear forces; reductions in the alert status of strategic bombersand theater nuclear weapons; and reorganization and reorientation (and renaming) ofseveral Cold War agencies such as the former Strategic Air Command. The United States hasalso ceased nuclear testing and the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The nuclearrelationship with Russia has undergone a metamorphosis from confrontation to cooperation,although elements of distrust and suspicion remain. Under the so-called Nunn-Lugarlegislation, a series of measures have been taken to reduce the possibility that Russiawill export nuclear weapons and knowledge, while improving the safety of those weaponsthat still remain in its stockpile

The legacy of the Cold War is a stockpileof more than 5,000 strategic weapons, deployed on missiles and bombers. Such high levelsremain because the Russian Duma (parliament) has failed to ratify the START II Treaty,which would reduce strategic forces further, and the United States has been unwilling tomake reductions without reciprocity from the Russians. Future acquisition planning isdirected at extending the life of current weapons systems as far as possible into thefuture. Declaratory policy also retains a Cold War flavor. Official descriptions of theroles and missions of nuclear weapons have changed little. In public statements nuclearweapons remain an important element in deterrence, not just against old threats fromRussia and China but new threats from potential proliferators. While current policyfocuses on deterring nuclear attacks and threats, a window has been left open to deterchemical and biological threats. The administration has resisted pressures from manynon-nuclear states and the arms control community to declare an unambiguous policy of"no first use," and it has been cool to ideas for further de-alerting of nuclearforces.
**View Alpha: Nuclear Weapons are a Threat

As for unofficial views, there is oneperspective (View Alpha) which sees the continued existence of large inventories ofnuclear weapons primarily as a threat to U.S. security. In this view there are fewstrategic benefits to the United States in retaining nuclear weapons and many risks in aworld in which nuclear weapons are proliferating to states that have little experience inthe management of such a dangerous military tool. 

Alphas are also gravely concerned aboutthe possibility of an accident or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon as themanagement and control of Russian nuclear forces erode. They believe that U.S. interestsare best served if we can lead the world as rapidly as possible toward lower and lessready-to-use nuclear postures. Abolitionism, the extreme expression of this view, isconsidered impractical, even embarrassing, by those who hold more moderate views. ModerateAlphas acknowledge that nuclear weapons still have a role to play in deterrence of othernuclear weapons, and expect the process of dismantling nuclear forces to take many years.Alphas seek to exert steady pressure along this path, primarily through arms control.Adherents of this view include the traditional arms control community, some moderatepoliticians (e.g., Sam Nunn) and many military officers who subscribe to parts of thisagenda. There is a widespread military view that maintaining nuclear weapons is anoperational headache and a fiscal albatross. As the Defense Department faces the growingcosts of maintaining START I forces, as mandated by Congress, the pressure to movepromptly toward START II levels grows.
**View Beta: Nuclear Weapons Have ContinuingUtility

The second perspective (View Beta) seescontinuing utility for nuclear weapons and a broader deterrent role. Betas are concernedabout what they perceive as the long-term erosion of U.S. nuclear capabilities. This viewhas been articulated in some detail in a recent study jointly sponsored by the NationalDefense University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (*U.S. Nuclear Policy inthe 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements*, Center forCounterproliferation Research, Washington, DC, 1998*)*. The study contains severalnew perspectives on the future role of and requirements for nuclear weapons. In contrastto the Alpha view, the authors of this study believe that nuclear weapons will retainutility, principally as a deterrent to weapons of mass destruction (not just nuclearweapons) for the indefinite future. The study emphasizes the need for a robust nuclearinfrastructure in the long term. Infrastructure includes production facilities, a researchand development establishment, and a cadre of skilled personnel, both military andcivilian. It also proposes to focus arms control efforts on dialogues between the nuclearstates designed to increase transparency and develop specific stabilizing measures, ratherthan on broad international treaties and massive reductions. This perspective includessome who voice extreme views against the CTB and the ABM Treaty.
**Specific Issues

These two broad perspectives divide onseveral issues that constitute the heart of the current nuclear dialogue:

1. The size of the future stockpile
- While there are several variants,    generally the Alphas advocate reductions in the total nuclear stockpile to a few hundred    weapons over 10-15 years 
- The Betas would retain deployed    strategic weapons at START III levels (i.e., 2,000-2,500 deployed weapons) for at least    some time. 

There is a significant difference betweenthe two views on what to limit. The Alphas would attempt to reduce and limit totalweapons, while acknowledging that verification and control would be extremely difficult.The Betas believe that, for the foreseeable future, limits on total inventories, whiledesirable, are probably not practical due to verification difficulties. Furthermore, theBetas are more concerned about the dangers of de-militarizing large stocks of fissilematerial in Russia with limited accountability.

2. The importance of nuclearinfrastructure
- Alphas believe that infrastructure    should be reduced as the stockpile is reduced so as to leave no temptation or capability    for rearmament. They see no requirement for production facilities or design capabilities    for weapons the nation should not design or build. 
- Betas place high priority on a robust    infrastructure. The NDU/LLNL study talks about a total force posture that includes    infrastructures. In this view the total posture becomes more important as forces are    reduced. Infrastructure is seen as both an element of deterrence and as a necessary hedge    for a very uncertain future. The view recognizes that maintaining hedges can lead to    unwanted competition. It advocates discussions among nuclear states to develop mutual    understandings as to what might be an appropriate hedge posture. 

3. How best to promote strategic stability
- The Alpha View is driven by the    conviction that the United States and Russia must set an example by reducing their nuclear    arms and de-legitimizing nuclear weapons to the extent possible. Alphas place emphasis on    traditional arms control. In addition, they are strong supporters of less traditional    measures, such as cooperative threat reduction and de-alerting of strategic forces. 
- The Beta View is skeptical of    traditional arms control as a means for enhancing strategic stability. It emphasizes the    development of a strengthened strategic dialogue among nuclear states and the sharing of    warning data with Russia. The Betas strongly oppose de-alerting, doubting that it solves    any strategic problem and fearing reductions in the readiness of U.S. nuclear forces. 

4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- The Alphas view the CTBT as an essential    element in curbing proliferation and urge early U.S. ratification of the Treaty and strong    support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
- The Beta View sees the CTBT as a    potential threat to a viable long-term nuclear posture as current weapons age. However,    all but the most extreme fringes of the Beta View accept the CTBT as a "done    deal." 

5. Maintaining nuclear competence
- The Alphas do not see the maintenance of    nuclear competence as a major problem if most nuclear forces are going to be phased out    over 15-20 years. 
- For Betas, maintaining nuclear    competence in the military services, the laboratories, and industry is a serious concern    for the long term, particularly given the importance they place on nuclear infrastructure.     

6. Deterring chemical and biologicalweapons (CBW)
- The Alphas strongly oppose a role for    nuclear forces in deterring use of CBW. Restricting the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is    central to their approach. Furthermore, they believe that current U.S. superiority in    conventional forces is an adequate deterrent to CBW. 
- The Betas believe that deterring the use    of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, particularly by so-called "rogue    states," is an important continuing role for nuclear forces, although most who hold    this view see nuclear weapons as an adjunct to other capabilities. 

7. Stockpile stewardship
- Alphas view the Stockpile Stewardship    Program as an important assurance that the United States can maintain a reliable stockpile    under a CTBT. However, Alphas believe the United States should be able to reduce its    effort as the nuclear posture declines. 
- Betas support stockpile stewardship, but    are concerned that the program has not yet proven that it can continue to provide high    confidence in stockpile reliability and safety over the long term without testing. 

8. Modernization of the stockpile
- For Alphas, modernization of the    stockpile is inconsistent with reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. 
- Betas contend that modernization is    inevitable if the role of nuclear weapons has an indefinite future. 

9. Ballistic missile defense (The ABMTreaty)
- The Alphas believe that stability    requires maintenance of the ABM Treaty for the indefinite future. They tend to see the    Treaty as more important than improving missile defenses. 
- The Betas are convinced that the growth    of new threats requires expansion and modernization of missile defenses. The extreme Beta    View favors ending U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty. The more moderate view supports an    attempt to negotiate changes to accommodate new missile defense programs. 
**Some Hidden Issues

1. Non-strategic nuclear forces(NSNF)—The Russians retain thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons which are asource of concern to both Alphas and Betas. These concerns center on the adequacy ofRussian controls over their non-strategic stockpile, the resultant risk of accidents, andthe leakage of nuclear capabilities to third parties. They are not covered by any existingarms control agreement, although in 1991 Gorbachev undertook to reduce Russian theaternuclear weapons and withdrew all those in Eastern Europe as Soviet troops withdrew. At theHelsinki Summit in 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that NSNF should beconsidered in START III. However, how tactical nuclear weapons should be dealt withremains a major issue. One view, often supported by Betas, is that NSNF should beaddressed in numerical terms. But, the United States has little to offer to induce theRussians to reduce their significant stockpile, and in recent years a number of Russianleaders have announced that the Russians were placing more importance on NSNF in theirstrategy. Another position, which tends to be favored by Alphas, would emphasizetransparency—trying to generate more information on the size and location of theRussian stockpile. But the Russians seem likely to resist transparency and want to linklimits on U.S. sea-based cruise missiles and advanced conventional munitions to anyagreement on NSNF.

2. Non-nuclear strategic forces—Someexperts, particularly Betas, believe that there will be a continuing role for long-rangebombers and missiles in non-nuclear missions. For example, technology will permitstand-off delivery of bombs and missiles with considerable precision, and the desire toavoid risk to friendly forces makes such tactics attractive. Advocates for preserving arole for long-range non-nuclear systems are concerned about the impact of strategic armscontrol agreements on that role. For example, numerical limits on bombers and cruisemissiles, proposed in order to limit nuclear forces, also could limit non-nuclear systemsunless those limits are carefully drawn. However, arms control provisions that provide a"loophole" for U.S. non-nuclear systems also provide similar opportunities forothers. There are difficult tradeoffs.
**Future Prospects

The prospects, at least for the nextseveral years, are for a U.S. nuclear posture and policy that lie somewhere between theAlpha and the Beta views. However, we expect budget considerations to replace arms controlas the major driver of the nuclear posture. With strong pressures to increase the U.S.defense budget, it seems unlikely that DOD officials or Congress will continue to spendfunds to support strategic forces that seem likely to exceed Russian forces that arerapidly deteriorating.

Nevertheless, the U.S. administrationshows no inclination to adopt radical reductions or de-alerting of nuclear forces orchanges in nuclear doctrine as advocated in the Alpha View. It seems to have adopted theview of the Betas that nuclear weapons will be around indefinitely. However, it isunlikely to take aggressive steps to shore up nuclear infrastructure and protect areconstitution capability, as Betas advocate. The future of the stockpile stewardshipprogram remains uncertain. There is no longer a strong nuclear program constituency in theDefense Department, and in Congress only a handful of members show an active interest. Inthe absence of a major new threat from abroad, future administrations will likely pursuethe current path of maintaining a nuclear deterrent while minimizing the cost. This pathseems destined to lead to a gradual erosion of nuclear competence, which could make itmore costly and more time-consuming to reconstitute nuclear forces should that need arisein the future.

Some events could alter this prognosis.Neither Russia nor China seems capable of becoming a "peer competitor" in thetraditional sense for several decades. That is, they are unlikely to have the militarytechnology and global reach that characterizes U.S. forces today. However, either Russiaor China or several rogue states could adopt asymmetric strategies to deter or discourageU.S. involvement in their neighborhood. Such strategies could involve the use orthreatened use of weapons of mass destruction. Military operations against the UnitedStates, utilizing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, cannot be ruled out in thefuture, and any such use could change the strategic landscape radically. A major newexternal challenge could dramatize the need for a modernized nuclear deterrent.  

Leon Sloss was a senior official in theDepartment of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1966 to 1978 and hasbeen a consultant on national security policy since that time.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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