## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ N o . 02

- 19

- 00077

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 323rd D istrict Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323

- 107645

- 18
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wom ack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wo mack 

### I N THE 

### M ATTER OF 

### A.M., A J UVENILE2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. I NTRODUCTION
A jury adjudicated A.M. delinquent after finding that she had en g a g ed in
d elinquent conduct by committing the offense of murder when she stabbed and
caused the death of N.L

. 1 The jury found that A.M

. was in need o f rehab ilitation or that the protec t

i on of t he public or A.M. required a disposition and did not f ind that
A.M. had caused the death of N.L. un der the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. The jur y sentenc ed A.M. to commitm ent for twenty

five years

. The j uvenile court adjudicated A.M. delinquent and sentenced her to
commitment in ac cordance with the jury ’ s disposition. The juvenile court also made an affirmative finding that A.M. had used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a kn ife,
du ring the commission of the offense or during the immediate flight therefrom.
In a sin gle issue, A.M. appeals the juvenile cou rt ’ s denial of her request that the jury be charged on the lesser

- included offense of manslaughter. We will affirm the ju venile court ’ s judgment and commitment.

1 The petitioner ( “ the State ” ) wa i v ed pros ecution under paragraph one of the petition, w

h ich alleged that A.M. intentionally and kno wingly caused the death of N.L. and proceeded to seek adjudication under paragraph two, which alleged that A.M. “did intentionally, with the intent to cause s e rious b odily injury to [N.L.], commit an act clearly d angerous to huma n life, namely, stabbing [ N

. L

. ] with a k n ife, and thereby caused the death of [N.L.].” The jury did not find that A.M. committed the offen se of aggravated a s s ault ag ainst a different complainant, J.D. , as alleged in paragraph three of the petition.3 II. B ACKG ROUND
A. Witness Testimony
These events invol v e four g irls. At the time of trial , S.B and J.D. were fourteen
year s old. On May 28, 2018, S.B., J.D., and A.M. went to N.L. ’ s house and planned to spend th e night with her. A.M. , N.L. , and J.D

. lived near each other, and it was a one

to two

- minute walk between A.M. ’ s and N.L. ’ s apartments. Earlier in the day, the girls went swimming in Fort Wort h and returned to
N.L. ’ s apartment where they listened to mu sic and dan c e d. In the evening, A.M. and N.L. had a petty argument

. J.D. went ho me with A.M. , and later they went to a nearby store for A.M. ’ s m other

. During that time, S.B. and N.L. c o n tinued dancing and listening to music at N.L. ’ s apartment
. A.M. an d N.L

. messaged each other, and S.B. observed that N.L. appeared to be angry. After delivering grocerie s to her mother, A.M. and J.D. walked back to N

. L. ’ s ho use for t he purpose of retrieving A.M. ’ s clothes

. J.D. stayed outside. A.M. was
ang ry when she left N.L. ’ s apartment . She slammed the do or as she left and declared to J.D. tha t she was going to fight N.L. J.D. and A.M. walked back to A.M. ’ s

a partment and arrived after midnight. J.D. tried to sleep , but A.M. was angry and continued using her phon e to message someone. A.M. ev entually told J.D. to get up
and stated that N

. L . was c oming over. A.M. and J.D. began waiting outside A.M. ’ s apartment at about 2:30 a.m.4

After N.L. informed S.B. that she had to exchange som e clothes with A.M. , they walke d to A.M. ’ s apart ment and arrived at abou t 3:00 a. m. A.M. walked up to
N.L. S.B. was worried, and J.D. stay ed on the sidewalk

. According to S.B., N.L.
handed A.M. ’ s bag of clothes to her

. A.M. set the bag on th e ground behin d her and threw a bag of N.L

. ’ s clothes at N.L. ’ s feet. S.B. observed that w hen N.L. attempted to pick up the bag, A.M. “ ran up on her and hit [N.L. ] ” about her face

. N.L. st arted to fight back. J.D. did not recall who starte d the fig ht. The two girls fought for about
two minutes be fore S.B. and J.D. broke up the fight and pu lled A.M. and N.L. off
each other.
A.M . and N.L. remained angry a nd cussed at each other a fter the fight

. J.D. told N.L. to go home. S.B. thought A.M. had finished fighting , but as A.M. wal ked
back to her apa rtment, S.B heard A.M. say, “I ’ m going to kill t his bitch.” S.B. did not
think A.M. wa s serious . As she a n d N.L. b egan to walk a wa y , N.L. returned to retrieve her blanket from J.D. J.D. had stayed outside because she was worried about
N.L. She retur ned the blanket to N.L. but then told S.B. and N .L. to run. S.B. saw
A.M. r u n ning wi th a kitchen knife

. J.D. was worried that A.M. was going to hurt N.L. J .D. struggle d with A.M. for about thir ty seconds and attempted to grab the k nife
from A.M. ’ s hand or make A.M. drop the knife

. A.M. said, “Let go,” b egan sw inging
the knife , and got away. During this time, J.D. heard N.L. say, “Let her kill me,” “Let her stab me. I want to die any ways [sic],” and N.L. did not appear to be afra id. J.D. , who was s ca red t hat A.M. was going to try to hurt her too, backed up an d told S.B.5

and N.L. to run. S.B. als o told N.L. to run . A lthough N.L. ran, she tripped over the
curb. S.B. saw N.L. f

a ll and saw A.M. stab N.L. in the neck

. J.D. saw A. M. walk up
to N.L. , hea rd N.L scream, “[My] neck,” and then saw blood. 2 J

. D. admitted that she
had se en A.M. walk up to N.L. but had not seen the stabbing and expl ained that she
had guessed that A.M. h a d stabb ed N.L

. According to S.B., w hen A.M. went to stab N.L., A.M. did not tr ip, was not playing around, joking, or trying to scare N.L

. S.B. testified, “It was intentional. ” J.D. stated that A.M. w as the only person with a knife
and declared that A.M. ’ s act of stabbing was no accident, “[b]ecause the way she
walked up on [N.L .] , that ’ s not no accident

. ” S.B. ran over to N.L., took her hand, and stood her up, but A.M. returned to
he r apar tme nt. J.D. and s ome boys who were walking from the grocery store tried to help N.L., and one of the boys r an to alert police. J.D. did no t know where A.M. was
at the ti me. S.B. ran to A. M

. ’ s hous e and told A.M. ’ s mother to get a towel because
N.L. had been stabbed

. A.M. ’ s mother came outside with a towel , place d it around
N.L. ’ s neck , and attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation

. S. B. an d J.D. ran to N.L. ’ s apartment t o get h er older brother , K.J

. S.B.
observed that A.M. follo wed them for a while but then noticed that A. M. ran to another location

. While A.M. was following them , J.D. heard A.M. te ll them “not to
tell nobo d y . ” J.D . did n ot know where A.M. went.

2 J.D. testified that N.L. was sta nding at th e time.6

When S.B. and J .D. returned , emergency personnel were placing N.L. in an
ambula nce. S.B. later learned that N.L. had died

. N.L. was fourtee n years o ld at the
time of her death. A.M. was not present when detectives first arriv ed at h er apartment, b ut her
mother a nd stepfather were. A.M. ’ s stepfather eventually brought A.M. to the police
station where she was inte r v iewed

. After the interview, A.M. t ook police to the
location where she had d eposited the knife. Police located t he twel ve

- inch knife , which had a seve n and one

- half inch blade , with a blanket on the patio of a vacant apartment 235 f

e e t away from the area where the incident oc curred

. Testing confirmed the presence of N. L. ’ s DNA on the knife han dle and blade

. Based on his training and exp erience, Detective Matthew Barron opi n e d that a knife like the one
that w as recovered could be a deadly weapon in the manner of its use or intended use
and that the knife wa s a deadly weapon in this case. Deputy medical examiner Ma rc Krou se performed N.L. ’ s autopsy. N .L. had several small injuries and a cou ple of hidden bruises under her scalp

. Krouse
concluded that the do wnward three

- and

- on e

- half or four

- inch stab wound to the neck
and chest had caused N.L. ’ s death and th at the m anner o f her death was homici d e . The autopsy revealed that the knife had cut through N.L. ’ s jugular vein and had penetrated her lung

. Kr ouse opined th at a stab wound to the neck like the one N.L.

su ffered was clearly da ngerous to human life and that the in j u ry to N .L. ’ s jugular vein
was not survivable.7

B
. Respondent ’ s T estimony
A.M. testified at trial and admitte d that she had returned to her apartment after fighting N.L. , had retrieved a knif e, and had run back outside. A.M . explained that
she did th is to s care N.L. and claimed , “My intent was to never harm her.” According

to A.M. , N .L. tur ned around ; said, “You real bold ” ; and then walked up to A.M. and said, “St ick me, stick me. I ain ’ t scared to d i e . I wa nt to die any ways.” A.M. claimed
that s he told N.L. to go home , and N.L. approached and s wung at her . A.M. sai d she “reacted” by stabbing N.L. A.M. testified, “I made t he most horrible mistake of my
life an d I wish I was thinking at the time but emotions were so high and we both [had] not ful l y calm ed dow n yet.” A fter A .M. wi thdrew the knife , she tried to stop
N.L. , who was panicking, from running

. N.L. collapsed.
A.M. claime d that sh e went into her house and came back with towels to put
on N.L. ’ s neck but did not te ll her mother about the stabbi ng because sh e was only thinking of helping N.L. A.M. also claimed that after her mother ran outside to help
N

. L., she instructed A.M. to run

. A.M. ran back to the apartment , grabbed N.L. ’ s blanket, wrapped the knif e in it, and ran to another a rea of the apartment complex. A.M. placed the knife and the bla nket “over [a] balcony.” At abou t 4 a.m., A.M. ’ s mother informed her by message t hat N.L. was dead. Event ually, A.M. provided her
location to he r father , and he transported her to the police st ation.
A.M. admitt ed that she was not truthful when she f irst sp oke with the
detectives and had falsely told them that N.L. had a knife too. A.M. test ified that s he8

had harmed N.L. “unintent ionally ” and had walked outside with the knife with the
intenti on o f s caring N.L. so that she would run ho m e . A.M. and N.L. ’ s phones were
examined , and the messages on them indicated that they had intended to fight each
oth er . How ever , in o ne of her messages , A.M. wrote to N.L., “[B]itch I ’ l l kill you on my . . . li fe.” A

. M . testi fied that she “ didn ’ t mean ” what she had written. In her

res pons e , N.L. had written , “OMG is this a threat, am I supposed [to] be s cared?” A.M. agr eed that she could have stayed insi de after the fight or could ha v e droppe d the knife when J.D. g rabbed her wrist but dec lared that she had never stated after the fight that she was “going to kill this bitch.” T he following colloquy th en occurred: [ The State ]: I mean, you were already s u per mad when you came outside that night, right? [A.M.] : Yes. [ The State ]: You were already super mad when you pulled away from [J .D.] even though she was ask ing you not to do it? [A.M.]: Yes. [ The State ]: And t hen [N.L.] is not running away, s he ’ s no t showing fear of you, she ’ s being defiant to you, ri ght? [ A.M.]: Yes. [ The State ]: So if that ’ s the situation, if you ’ re jus t trying to sc are her, why would you stab her in the neck of all places? [A.M.]: S he ran up on me.9

[ The State ]: Okay. M y qu e stion is though why would you stab her in the neck o f all p laces on her body? [A.M.]: I mean, I don ’ t know. She ran up on me

. She swung a t me. [ The State ]: Did you not think there was a danger to stabbing her in any way? [A.M.]: No

- - [ The State ]: Is there ever a good stab, I guess, I should ask you ? [A.M .]: No. [ The State ]: Okay. So when you

-- do you think it ’ s g oing to b e more than just s caring somebody to plunge a knife into th e inside of their body? [A.M.] : Yeah [, ] but I thought she would at least run or go home. [ The State ]: Well, b ut she was n ’ t and that made you mad, didn ’ t it? [A.M.]: No. [ The State ]: Mad enou gh to do something that you could never imagine doing? [A. M.]: It was unintentionally

. [ The State ]: Well, did you trip? [A.M.]: No. [ The State ]: Did you fall into her with t hat knife? [A.M.]: No. [ The State ]: Now, you did intenti onally stab

. . . her with it, right? [A.M.]: No.10

[ The State ]: I gues s my question is you weren ’ t j ust try ing t o wave the knife in front of her, right, you were actually trying to hi t h er with it ? [A.M.]: It was just a reaction. [ The State ]: B ut if it was just a reaction, why did you run? [A.M.]: What you mean? [ T he State ]: Why did you run a way and not talk to the police officers there? [A.M.]: I was scared. [ The State ]: Ok ay. Why di d you go hide the knife if it was just a re action? [A. M.]: I mean, where the knife was, that ’ s where I was. [ The State ]: You knew you had d one som ething wrong; is that

-- is that fair to say or do you disagree with me on that? [A.M.]: Y eah. [ The Sta te ]: You did something that was illega l. Did you un derstand that when you did it? [A.M.]: Yes. [ The State ] : You knew the cops were go i n g to be coming, didn ’ t you? [A.M.]: Yes.
A.M. claimed that she did not recall wiping the knife wit h th e blanket

. Barron
was recalled dur

ing the State ’ s rebuttal and testified that A.M. ’ s “I will kill you”

mes sage had been found o n N.L. ’ s phone b ut had been deleted from the messages on11

A.M. ’ s phone

. He also testified that during her police interview, A.M. had descr ibed wipi ng the blood off of the knife with a blanket.
III. D ISC USSION
A. Requested Instruct i o n on Ma nslaughter The second paragraph of the peti tion alleged that A.M. had engaged in delinquent conduct on or about May 29, 2018 , in Tarrant Coun ty wh en sh e intentionally, with the inte nt to cause serious b odily injury to N .L., commit ted an act clear l y danger ous t o human life, namely, stabbing N .L. with a knife, and t hereby

cause d N.L. ’ s death, thus violating P enal C ode S ection 19.02. Tex. Pen al C ode Ann. § 19.02 (b)(2) (Murder) (establishing that a p erson commits the offense o f murder if
she intends to cause serious bodil y injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual). A perso n commits mansl augh ter if he reckle ssly causes the death of an
individual

. Id. § 1 9

. 04(a) ( Manslaughter) . “ A person acts reckle ssly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he is aware of but consciousl y d isre gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstance s exist o r the result will occur. ” Id. § 6.03( c). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the

st andard of care that an ordina ry pers on would exercise under all the circu mstances as viewed from the a ctor ’ s standpoint. Id.12

During the char ge confe rence, A.M. requested that the juvenile court ’ s charge instruct the jury on manslaughter. See Saunders v. State , 840 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Te x. C rim. App. 1992) (ex plaining that regardless of t he stre ngth or weakne ss of the evidence, if any e vidence raises the issue that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense, a charge on the les ser offense must be given). The juvenile court

re c al led th at no evidence was p resented establishing that A

. M. “ was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded the risk ” as would satisfy the reckless element of manslaughter and denied the requested mansl aughter instruction. In her sole issue,
A.M. cont end s th at the juvenile court harmfully erred w h e n it de nied her request ed
instruction on ma nslaughte r. We disagree.
B
. Standard of Review Juvenile delinquenc y proceedings are “quasi

- criminal” in nature

. In re L.D.C. , 400 S.W.3d 572, 574 (

Tex. 2013)

. Exc ept as othe r w ise pro vided by the juvenile justice code, j uvenile proceedings are governed by the r ules of e vidence applicable to
criminal cases and by article s 33.03 and 37.07 and Chapter 38 of the C ode of C riminal
P rocedure. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51. 17 ( c)

. Sta n d ards of review applicable to
criminal cases also may apply to a juvenile adjudication. In re A.J.G. , 131 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Chris ti

– Edinburg 2004, pet. denied). Article 36.14 requires that the trial court charge the jur y on the “ law ap plicable to t he case .” Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 ; In re J.R.C.S

. , 393 S.W.3d 903, 913 ( Tex. App.

— El Paso
2012 , no pet. ).13

In determining whether a defendant wa s entitled to have an instruction on a lesser offense included in the trial cou rt ’ s c harge to th e jury , we employ the two

- s t e p Aguil ar/Rousseau test
. See T ex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 37.08 (Conviction of lesser included offense) , 37.09 (L esser included offense); Ritcherson v. State , 568 S.W.3d 667,
670

– 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (ci ti ng Rousseau v. State , 855 S.W.2d 666, 6 7 2

– 73 (T ex. Crim. App. 1993) ) ; see Cavazos v. State , 382 S.W.3 d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

. First, we compare the statutory elements of the alleged lesser offense and the statutory elements and any descrip tive a verments in the indictment. Ritcherso n , 568 S. W.3d at 670

– 71 ; Cav azos , 382 S.W.3d at 382 (explaining that the first step of the test is a question of law tha t may be performed pre

- trial or on appeal)

. Second, there
must be evidence from which a rat iona l jury could find the defendant guilty o f only
th e lesser offense. Ritcherson , 568 S.W.3d at 671. This eviden tiary requi rement is met if there is (1) evidence that directly refutes or negates other evidence establishing the greater offense and raises the l esser

- included offense or (2) evid ence t hat is susceptible to different interpretatio ns, one of which refutes or negates an element of the greater offense and raises the lesser offense. Id . (citing Saunders v. State , 840 S.W.2d 390, 391

– 92 (Tex. Cri m. A pp . 1992) )

. The evidence raising th e le s s er offe nse must be affirmatively in the recor d. Ritcherson , 568 S.W. 3d at 6 71

. In other
words , a defendant is not en titled to a lesser

- included offense instruction based on the absence of evidence, and the ev iden ce must be “directly germane to the less e r

includ ed offense [.] ” Skinner v. State , 956 S .W.2d 532, 543 (Tex. Cri m. App. 199 7). In14

performing this analysis, w e c onsider not just the evidence presented by the defendant, but all the evidence admitted at tria l, and if there is more than a scinti lla o f
eviden ce raising the lesser offense and nega ting or rebutting an ele ment of the greater offense, the defendant is ent itled to a lesser

- offense instruction. Ritcherson , 568 S.W.3d
at 6 71 (citing Roy v. State , 509 S .W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017 ) )

. T h e evide nce need not be controverted or even credible. Banda v. State , 890 S.W.2 d 42, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
C. A nalysis The court of criminal appeals has concluded that manslaughter is a lesser

included offe ns e of murder. See Cavazo s , 382 S.W.3d at 3 84

. We therefore proceed to
the se cond step of the test and determine whether the requested instruction on manslaugh ter was warranted based on the evidence. Ritcherson , 568 S.W.3d at 671

. 1. A.M. ’ s contenti ons
R el ying on evidence of the knife length a n d the de puty medical examiner ’ s testimony that a sharp object that penetrates the skin without striking bone “tends to go right through everything else,” along with the inferences that may be drawn from
that e vide nc e , A.M. asserts that her act s and cond uc t provide more than a scintilla of
evidence to show that her act ions were reckless rather than intentional. A.M. also
asserts that her testimony that she “reacted” in response to N.L. ’ s approa c h ing and swingin g at h er allowed the jury to infer t hat A.M. was aware of the risk the knife posed and disregarded the risk by defending herself while holding the knife . A.M.15

asserts that this evidence also show s th at she acted recklessly rather than int e n tionall y. Acco rdin g to A.M., th is inference is further supported by her testi mony that she
“un intentionally” stabbed N.L. and did not intend to harm N.L. She asserts that th e

e vidence negates and refutes the “intentional” culpable m ental s tate required for the
offense of m ur der and that if believed, this evidence permitted the jury to determine
th at she engaged in delinquen t conduct only by committing manslaughter

. A.M. argues that this inference is fu r t her but tressed by additional inferences tha t the jury may have dra wn f

ro m the evidence of the knife length and soft ti ssue injuries and
establishes that she did not intend to cause N.L. serious bodily injury “becau se [ if she
had so intended,] the knife w o u ld have continued to penetrate further into N.L. ’ s chest cavity.” She c oncludes that the mansla ughter instruction should have been given be cause the evidence negates or refutes an intent to c ause serious bodily injury
and su pports a finding that she was aware of the r isk of N.L. ’ s death but consciously disregarded the r isk by attempting to defend he rself with a knife.
2. The evidence does not warrant a manslaughter instruction In determining whether evid e n c e exist s to support a charge on recklessn ess, we cannot pluck from the record and examine in a vacuum the defenda nt ’ s s tatement that she did not intend to kill

. See Martinez v. State , 16 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Tex. App

. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet ref ’ d). H aving r eviewed all of the evidence, inclu ding all
of A.M. ’ s testimony, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err w hen it denied
A.M. ’ s requested manslaughter instruction because there is no affirmative evidence16

from which a rational juror could infer t h at A.M. was aware of but consciously
disr egarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would occur as a r es ult of
A.M. ’ s conduct. See Tex. Penal Code An n. §§ 6.03(c), 19.04(a) ; Ritcherson , 568 S.W.3d

at 671

. We also disagree with A.M. ’ s asser t i on that because N.L. did not suffer other injuries beyond the injuries to her jugular v ein and lung , a rational jur o r could infer
that she did not intend to cause N. L

. serious bodily injury. Although there is some
evidence that A

. M. did not intend to kill N.L., there must also be some affirmative
evidence in the record that would permit a rat i onal juror to infer t hat A. M. was aware
of but con sciously disregarded a substantial and unjustif iable risk that death would

occur as a res u l t of he r conduct and that evidence must be su fficient to establish manslaughter as a valid, rational alternative t o murder. See Ritcher son , 5 68 S.W.3d at 671; Cavazos

, 382 S.W.3d at 385.
In th is case, t here i s no evidence that A.M. was aware of a sub s t a ntial a nd unjustifiable risk that N.L. ’ s death would occur as a result of her condu ct and that she
had consciously disregarded that risk

. A t trial, t he State ’ s prosecutor explicitly asked A.M. whether she thought there was a danger to stabbing N.L., and she an s w e red,
“N o.” When A.M. was asked whether she had thought “ [it was] going to be mor e than just scaring somebody to plunge a knife” int o th at person ’ s body, A.M. answered, “Yeah,” but she explained th at she had thought N.L. would run or go hom e . This is not evidence that A.M. was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
th at N.L. would die as a result of her conduct

— A.M. specifi call y stated that she17

thought her conduct would result in N.L. running or going home

. See Nevarez v. S tate , 270 S

. W.3d 69 1 , 694 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2008, no pet.) ( holding that trial court di d not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offense of mans laug ht er ; defendant ’ s testimony that he panicked, was scared, swung a knife while trying to protect himself , and a c cidenta lly stabbed the victim in the neck was not evidence that the def endant
had been reckless ). T h e evidence in this case sh ows that A.M. did no t act recklessly. Moreover, to be entitled to the manslaughter instruction, th e evidence must be “directly g e rmane” to the off ense of manslaughter and must rise to a level to per mit a ju r y to find that if A.M. is guilty, she is gui lty only of manslau ghte r . Id. at 693.
Evidence that A.M. first physically fought with N.L., left to obtain a knife, returned to
scare N.L. , and the n stabbed N.L., and A.M. ’ s later declaration that she did not intend

t o harm N.L. but intended only to scare N.L. and thought N.L. would run or go home , is not evi dence directly germane to recklessness, and in the absence of additional evidence, t h e eviden ce in this case does not rise to a level that would permi t a juro r to f

ind that, if guilty, A.M. is guilty only of the lesser offe nse of man slaughter.
T he State relies on Ritcherson for the proposition that we should reject A.M. ’ s “reaction” tes t

i mony be cause it fails to satisfy the second prong of our analys i s. See
568 S.W.3d at 677

. In Ritcherson , the court of criminal appe als considered test imony
that the defendant had stabbed the victim “as a reflexive reaction to being struck on

t h e head by a shoe.” Id

. at 677. The court concluded that even if t h e “reflexive” testimony me ant that the defendant had been unable to phys ica lly con trol her act of18

stabbing the victim in response to being attacked, the jury could not have reason a b ly
infe rred that the defendant had stabbed the victim “only reck l essly” b e cause a jury
cannot infer i ntent from a reflexive action

— a person can onl y c ommit a crim inal offense if she voluntarily engages in the conduct, and a reflexive reaction does not

co n s titute a voluntary act

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.01(a); Ritc h erson , 5 6 8 S.W.3d
at 677. In this c ase, there is no evidence that A.M. ’ s “ reactio n ” was “re flexi ve” such that she was unable to physically control her stabbing action in response to an att a c k.
We have determined that the evidence, including evid ence that A.M. “ r e acted ,” does
not pe rmit a rational juror to find that if A.M. is gu ilty, sh e is gui lty only of manslaughter

. Thus, the juvenile court did not err by denying the requested
instruction o n the l esser offense of manslaughte r , and we ov errule A.M. ’ s sole i ssu e . IV. C ONCLUSION
Havi ng overruled A.M. ’ s sole issue on appeal, we affir m the juve nile court ’ s adjudication and disposition orders.

/s/ Dana Womack
D ana Womack Justice
Delivered: August 29 , 20 19