UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION

CASE NO.:

PAETRAZE LOPEZ,

Plaintiff, 

v.

CONDUENT STATE & LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC

A Foreign Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, PAETRAZE LOPEZ (“Ms. Lopez or Plaintiff”) files this Complaint against 

Defendant, CONDUENT STATE & LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC (“Conduent or Defendant”), and 

states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act, as 

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“the FMLA”), Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

12101 et seq, (“ADA”), and Chapter 760 of the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) to recover 

from Defendant back pay, an equal amount as liquidated damages, other monetary damages, 

equitable relief, front pay, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND FMLA COVERAGE

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2. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and 

the FMLA and the authority to grant declaratory relief under the FMLA, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201 et seq.

3. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1331 as they arise under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

4. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claim, as it 

arises out of the same operative facts and circumstances as her FMLA/ADA claims.

5. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant.

6. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Palm Beach County, Florida, and this venue, 

therefore is proper.

7. Defendant is a Florida nonprofit corporation that provides process services for 

business and governments in, among others, Palm Beach County, Florida, and is therefore within 

the jurisdiction of the Court.

8. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an employer covered by the FMLA, 

because it was engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce that employed 50 or 

more employees within 75 miles of where Plaintiff worked, for each working day during each of 

20 or more calendar workweeks, prior to seeking leave under the FMLA.

9. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an employee entitled to leave under the 

FMLA, based on the fact that she: (a) suffered from a serious health condition as defined by the 

FMLA which necessitated FMLA leave; and (b) was employed by Defendant for at least 12 months 

and worked at least 1,250 hours during the relevant 12-month period prior to her seeking to 

exercise her rights to FMLA leave.

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10. Plaintiff is a disabled female. At all times material, Plaintiff was protected during 

her employment with Defendant by the FCRA and ADA because:

a. Plaintiff was a disabled or “perceived as disabled” employee who suffered 

discrimination and harassment because of her disability or “perceived disability” by 

Defendant; and

b. Plaintiff suffered adverse employment action and was subjected to an 

increasingly hostile work environment as a result of her disability or “perceived 

disability.”

11. Defendant was at all times an “employer” as envisioned by the ADA as well as 

§760.02(7), Fla. Stat.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

12. On or around September 30, 2019, Plaintiff dual filed a Charge of Discrimination 

with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Florida Commission 

on Human Relations (“FCHR”) alleging disability discrimination and retaliation against 

Defendant.

13. More than 180 days have passed since the filing of the Charge of Discrimination.

14. On March 12, 2020, the EEOC mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue against 

Defendant, giving Plaintiff the right to bring a civil action on her claims within 90 days of her receipt 

of the same.

15. Plaintiff timely files this action within the applicable period of limitations against 

Defendant.

16. All conditions precedent to this action have been satisfied and/or waived. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

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17. Plaintiff worked as a Team Lead for the Defendant from September 12, 2016 until 

her wrongful termination on December 6, 2018.

18. Ms. Lopez was an excellent employee with no significant history of performance, 

attendance or disciplinary issues, and who constantly received praise for her performance 

throughout her tenure.

19. Unfortunately, on October 30, 2018, while at work, Ms. Lopez discovered a lump 

on the side of her neck.

20. Worried that the growth might be cancerous, Ms. Lopez immediately informed 

Operations Manager, Jennifer Tong (“Ms. Tong”), of her serious medical condition and drove to 

the Emergency Room to seek treatment.

21. Ms. Lopez uncontrolled growth on her neck is protected disability under the 

FCRA/ADA, and a serious health condition under the FMLA.

22. Ms. Lopez’ physicians performed a CT scan and bloodwork but were unsure about 

the nature of the growth and were unable to provide a diagnosis at that time. As a result, her 

medical team referred her to an Ear, Nose, and Throat Specialist for further treatment.

23. Upon learning this, Ms. Lopez sent Ms. Diaz a text message explaining same and 

advised her that she would need time off in the future for follow-up medical procedures relating 

to same.

24. While Conduent’s Human Resources team subsequently advised Ms. Lopez that an 

FMLA claim had been “opened” on her behalf at that time, it failed to provide her with any further 

guidance or paperwork on how to avail herself of her rights under the FMLA.

25. Pursuant to the FMLA, Ms. Lopez timely notified Conduent managers of her 

medical situation and request for time away from work for treatment regarding same.

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26. Despite this, Conduent neglected to advise Ms. Lopez of her rights under FMLA or 

provide her with FMLA documentation to protect her absence at that time, or continued anticipated 

absences, thereafter.

27. This failure alone is tantamount to actionable interference under the FMLA. See 

Patterson v. Browning’s Pharm. & Healthcare, Inc., 961 So. 2d 982, 986 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

28. In the subsequent weeks, Ms. Lopez continued have numerous doctor’s 

appointments as her medical team struggled to properly diagnose her serious health condition.

29. As a result, on November 2018, Ms. Lopez, with Conduent’s consent and approval, 

took several days off work in order to manage the barrage of medical appointments she attended 

for the sole purpose of diagnosing her medical condition.

30. Shockingly, when Ms. Lopez returned to work, she discovered that Ms. Diaz had 

transferred most of her essential duties to her subordinate, “Annie.”

31. Specifically, Ms. Diaz placed Annie in charge of leading team meetings and 

ensuring the quality of Conduent’s Boca Raton operations - tasks Ms. Lopez had managed for 

years prior to confronting medical issues.

32. Whenever Ms. Lopez attempted to give her input as a Team Lead in any of these 

situations, moving forward, Ms. Diaz verified that Annie would be taking certain duties from Ms. 

Lopez’ as Conduent’s new “interim lead.”

33. It is clear that Conduent unfairly “regarded” Ms. Lopez’ medical condition as a 

substantial impairment and elected to relinquish her duties to a subordinate while she was out on 

what should have been protected FMLA leave and protected by the ADA/FCRA.

34. An employer is required to provide its disabled with a reasonable accommodation, 

if that reasonable accommodation would allow that employee to perform the essential functions of 

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her job, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. Smith v. Avatar Properties, Inc., 714 

So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

35. Ms. Lopez is an individual with a disability who, with minimal reasonable 

accommodation, was fully capable of performing the essential functions of her job as a Team Lead.

36. Allowing Ms. Lopez to attend her doctors’ appointments without penalty or 

negative repercussions, such as a reduction of her duties, would have been a reasonable 

accommodation.

37. This accommodation would have imposed no undue hardship on Defendant.

38. On November 29, 2018, Ms. Lopez underwent an ultrasound test which also failed 

to give her doctors enough information to diagnose her medical condition. As a result, her medical 

team scheduled her for biopsy procedure on December 20, 2018.

39. As a diligent employee, Ms. Lopez immediately informed Ms. Diaz of same.

40. Due to Ms. Diaz’ previous harassment and discrimination, however, Ms. Lopez was 

anxious that she was being pushed out of her position because of her medical condition and need 

for further time off.

41. To make matters worse, Conduent’s failure/refusal to appraise our client of her 

FMLA rights left her unsure as to whether her absences would be protected or not.

42. Afraid to lose her job, Ms. Lopez objected to Human Resources Representative, 

Damaris Smith (“Ms. Smith”), regarding Ms. Diaz’ brazen discriminatory conduct and the failure 

of Conduent to comply with the FMLA notice requirements.

43. Shockingly, Ms. Smith dismissed our client’s concerns and refused to initiate a 

formal investigation/inquiry into Conduent’s hostile and discriminatory environment.

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44. Instead of curtailing Ms. Diaz’ brazenly unlawful conduct, Conduent elected to 

terminate Ms. Lopez in anticipation of her scheduled medical procedure.

45. Specifically, on December 6, 2018, when Ms. Lopez came in to work her scheduled 

shift, Ms. Smith called her and fired her, effective immediately.

46. Stunned, Ms. Lopez asked why she was being terminated, and Ms. Smith informed 

her that Ms. Diaz had commanded the termination based on “performance issues.”

47. In reality, Defendant’s termination of Ms. Lopez stemmed from its discriminatory 

animus toward her use of FMLA leave and need for accommodation under the ADA/FCRA.

48. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant’s actions, and non-actions, affected the 

“terms, conditions or privileges” of Plaintiff’s employment as envisioned by the ADA and the 

Florida Civil Rights Act. 

49. The timing of her termination makes the causal connection between her use of 

FMLA, her request for reasonable accommodations under the ADA/FCRA, and her termination 

sufficiently clear.

50. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights.

51. Defendant also retaliated against Plaintiff for attempting to utilize and/or utilizing 

proper and authorized FMLA leave.

52. Any other reason given for Plaintiff’s termination is a pretext, designed to cover up 

FMLA interference and retaliation and disability discrimination and retaliation.

53. Defendant did not have a good faith basis for its actions.

54. Defendant’s actions are the exact type of unfair and retaliatory employment 

practices the ADA, FCRA, and FMLA were intended to prevent. 

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55. The facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination also create a strong inference of 

disability discrimination/retaliation in violation of the ADA/FCRA.

56. The Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s ADA/FCRA-protected disability/handicap

and need for accommodation.

57. “Reasonable accommodation” under the ADA may include “job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification 

of equipment or devices . . .and other similar accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

58. Defendant, however, being well-aware of Plaintiff’s condition, discriminated 

against Plaintiff for taking FMLA leave, or what should have been FMLA leave, to seek treatment 

and for requesting reasonable accommodations. 

59. In short, despite the availability of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and 

FCRA, Defendant discriminated against Ms. Lopez based solely upon her disability/handicap. 

60. At all material times hereto, Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform her job 

duties and otherwise qualified for her position, with “reasonable accommodation.”

61. Defendant perceived Plaintiff as being “disabled,” and therefore, unable to perform 

the essential functions of her position, despite the fact that Plaintiff could perform same with 

reasonable accommodation.

62. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s impairment did not substantially limit a major 

life activity but was treated by Defendant as if it did.

63. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s medical condition constituted an impairment 

that limited a major life activity only because of Defendant’s attitude toward the impairment.

64. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff had no impairment, whatsoever, but was treated 

by Defendant as having a disability as recognized by the ADA/FCRA.

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65. Plaintiff was a disabled individual, or otherwise perceived as disabled by 

Defendant, during her employment. Therefore, she is protected class member as envisioned by 

the ADA and the Florida Civil Rights Act. 

66. Plaintiff suffered sufficiently severe and pervasive treatment, and ultimate 

termination, because of her disability and/or “perceived disability.”

67. As a result of this illegal conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages, including loss of 

employment, wages, benefits, and other remuneration to which she is entitled.

COUNT I

UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE UNDER THE FMLA

68. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1, 

2, 5-9, 17-33, 38-47, 49-54, 58 and 67 above.

69. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected by the FMLA.

70. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant interfered with Plaintiff by refusing to 

advise Plaintiff of her rights and obligations pursuant to the FMLA in response to Plaintiff’s 

request for FMLA.

71. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected from interference under the 

FMLA.

72. As a result of Defendant’s willful and unlawful acts by interfering with Plaintiff for 

exercising her rights pursuant to the FMLA, Plaintiff has suffered damages and incurred 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

73. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled to 

liquidated damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for back pay, an equal 

amount as liquidated damages, other monetary damages, equitable relief, declaratory relief, 

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reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any and all further relief that this Court determines to be 

just and appropriate. 

COUNT II

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION UNDER THE FMLA

74. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1, 

2, 5-9, 17-33, 38-47, 49-54, 58 and 67 above.

75. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected by the FMLA.

76. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by firing her for 

her attempted use and/or use of FMLA protected leave.

77. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected from retaliation under the 

FMLA.

78. At all times relevant hereto, and for purposes of the FMLA retaliation claim, 

Defendant acted with the intent to retaliate against Plaintiff, because Plaintiff exercised her rights 

to take approved leave pursuant to the FMLA.

79. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful and unlawful acts by retaliating 

against, Plaintiff for exercising her rights pursuant to the FMLA, Plaintiff has suffered damages 

and incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

80. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled to 

liquidated damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for back pay, an equal 

amount as liquidated damages, other monetary damages, equitable relief, declaratory relief, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any and all further relief that this Court determines to be 

just and appropriate.

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COUNT III

DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADA BASED ON DISABILITY

81. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 5-7, 10-

23, 25, 28-40, 42-49, and 52-67 above. 

82. The acts of Defendant, by and through its agents and employees, violated Plaintiff’s 

rights against disability discrimination under the ADA. 

83. The discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on her disability

and/or “perceived disability.”

84. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct toward her.

85. The conduct of Defendant was so willful, wanton, and in reckless disregard of the 

statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle her to an award of punitive damages against Defendant, to 

deter it, and others, from such conduct in the future. 

86. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in her favor and against Defendant for her

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as her costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

COUNT IV

RETALIATION UNDER THE ADA BASED ON DISABILITY

87. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 5-7, 10-

23, 25, 28-40, 42-49, and 52-67 above. 

88. Plaintiff was terminated within close temporal proximity of her objection to 

Defendant that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her disability.

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89. Plaintiff’s objections constituted protected activity under the ADA.

90. Plaintiff was terminated as a direct result of her objections to what she reasonably 

believed to be disability discrimination.

91. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s illegal conduct, and her termination, are 

causally related.

92. Defendant’s stated reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are a pretext.

93. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, directly, and 

foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary 

losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 

enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.

94. The conduct of Defendant was so willful and wanton, and in such reckless disregard 

of the statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle her to an award of punitive damages against 

Defendant, to deter it and others from such conduct in the future.

95. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in her favor and against Defendant for her

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as her costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

COUNT V

DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT BASED ON 

DISABILITY

96. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 4-7, 10-23, 

25, 28-40, 42-49, and 52-67 above. 

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97. The acts of Defendant, by and through its agents and employees, violated Plaintiff’s 

rights against disability discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida 

Statutes. 

98. The discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on her

disability/handicap, or “perceived disability.”

99. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, directly, and 

foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary 

losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 

enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. 

100. The conduct of Defendant was willful, wanton, and in reckless disregard of the 

statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle her to an award of punitive damages against Defendant, to 

deter it, and others, from such conduct in the future. 

101. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses 

pursuant to section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes.

102. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant, which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in her favor and against Defendant for her 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as her costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

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COUNT VI

RETALIATION UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT BASED ON 

DISABILITY

103. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 4-7, 10-23, 

25, 28-40, 42-49, and 52-67 above. 

104. Plaintiff was terminated within close temporal proximity of her objection to 

Defendant that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her disability/handicap. 

105. Plaintiff’s objections constituted protected activity under the FCRA.

106. Plaintiff was terminated as a direct result of her objections to what she reasonably 

believed to be disability discrimination.

107. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s illegal conduct, and her termination, are 

causally related.

108. Defendant’s stated reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are a pretext.

109. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, directly, and 

foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary 

losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 

enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.

110. The conduct of Defendant was so willful and wanton, and in such reckless disregard 

of the statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle her to an award of punitive damages against 

Defendant, to deter it and others from such conduct in the future.

111. Plaintiff is entitled to recover her reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses 

pursuant to Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes.

112. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in her favor and against Defendant for her 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as her costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 

DATED this 5th day of June 2020.

Respectfully Submitted, 

By: /s/ Noah Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476

 RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. SR 84, Suite 103

Davie, Florida 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail: noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

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