39–006 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–120 

HENRY J. HYDE UNITED NATIONS REFORM ACT OF 2005 

JUNE 10, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HYDE, from the Committee on International Relations, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 2745] 

[Includes cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2745) to reform the United Nations, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Background and Purpose ........................................................................................ 21 

Summary .................................................................................................................. 22 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 24 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 25 

Roll Call Votes ......................................................................................................... 26 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 26 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 27 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 27 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 28 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 28 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 28 

Federal Mandates .................................................................................................... 47 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 47 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 53 

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THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United Nations 

Reform Act of 2005’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Statement of Congress. 

TITLE I—MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 101. United States financial contributions to the United Nations. 

Sec. 102. Weighted voting. 

Sec. 103. Budget certification requirements. 

Sec. 104. Accountability. 

Sec. 105. Terrorism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 106. United Nations treaty bodies. 

Sec. 107. Equality at the United Nations. 

Sec. 108. Report on United Nations reform. 

Sec. 109. Report on United Nations personnel. 

TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC) 

Sec. 201. Human rights. 

Sec. 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 

TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

Sec. 301. International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Sec. 302. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA. 

TITLE IV—PEACEKEEPING 

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 402. Statement of policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 403. Certification. 

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Sec. 501. Positions for United States citizens at international organizations. 

Sec. 502. Budget justification for regular assessed budget of the United Nations. 

Sec. 503. Review and report. 

Sec. 504. Government Accountability Office. 

TITLE VI—CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS 

Sec. 601. Certifications and withholding of contributions. 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act: 

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee on International Relations of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

(2) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘employee’’ means an individual who is employed 

in the general services, professional staff, or senior management of the United 

Nations, including contractors and consultants. 

(3) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term ‘‘General Assembly’’ means the General 

Assembly of the United Nations. 

(4) MEMBER STATE.—The term ‘‘Member State’’ means a Member State of 

the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the term ‘‘country’’. 

(5) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of State. 

(6) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term ‘‘Secretary General’’ means the Secretary General of the United Nations. 

(7) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Security Council’’ means the Security 

Council of the United Nations. 

(8) SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.—The terms ‘‘specialized agencies’’ and ‘‘specialized agencies of the 

United Nations’’ mean— 

(A) the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); 

(B) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); 

(C) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); 

(D) the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); 

(E) the International Labor Organization (ILO); 

(F) the International Maritime Organization (IMO); 

(G) the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); 

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(H) the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); 

(I) the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); 

(J) the Universal Postal Union (UPU); 

(K) the World Health Organization (WHO) and its regional agencies; 

(L) the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and 

(M) the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS. 

Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is incumbent upon the 

United Nations to enact significant reform measures if it is to restore the public 

trust and confidence necessary for it to achieve the laudable goals set forth in its 

Charter. To this end, the following Act seeks to reform the United Nations. 

TITLE I—MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

SEC. 101. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) STATEMENTS OF POLICY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—It shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice, 

vote, and influence at the United Nations to— 

(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and accountable regular assessed 

budget of the United Nations; and 

(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain organizational programs of the 

United Nations specified under paragraph (4) from the regular assessed 

budget to voluntarily funded programs. 

(2) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—It shall be the policy of the United 

States to— 

(A) redirect United States contributions to the United Nations to 

achieve the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(B); and 

(B) redirect a portion of funds from the following organizational programs to pursue the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(A): 

(i) Public Information. 

(ii) General Assembly affairs and conference services. 

(3) FUTURE BIENNIUM BUDGETS.—It shall be the policy of the United States 

to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that future 

biennial budgets of the United Nations, as agreed to by the General Assembly, 

reflect the shift in funding mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(B) and the 

redirection of funds described in paragraph (2). 

(4) CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRAMS.—The organizational programs referred to in paragraph (1)(B) are the following: 

(A) Economic and social affairs. 

(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries and 

small island developing States. 

(C) United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. 

(D) Trade and development. 

(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO. 

(F) Environment. 

(G) Human settlements. 

(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice. 

(I) International drug control. 

(J) Economic and social development in Africa. 

(K) Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific. 

(L) Economic development in Europe. 

(M) Economic and social development in in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

(N) Economic and social development in Western Asia. 

(O) Regular program of technical cooperation. 

(P) Development account. 

(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees. 

(R) Palestine refugees. 

(b) AUTHORIZATION WITH RESPECT TO THE REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE

UNITED NATIONS.—Subject to the amendment made by subsection (c), the Secretary 

of State is authorized to make contributions toward the amount assessed to the 

United States by the United Nations for the purpose of funding the regular assessed 

budget of the United Nations. 

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(c) UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.—Section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287e-3) is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

‘‘(a) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the United Nations to— 

‘‘(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and accountable regular assessed 

budget of the United Nations; and 

‘‘(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain organizational programs of the 

United Nations specified under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. 

‘‘(2) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—It shall be the policy of the United 

States to— 

‘‘(A) redirect United States contributions to the United Nations to 

achieve the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(B); and 

‘‘(B) redirect a portion of funds from the following organizational programs to pursue the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(A): 

‘‘(i) Public Information. 

‘‘(ii) General Assembly affairs and conferences services. 

‘‘(3) FUTURE BIENNIUM BUDGETS.— The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 

and influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the 

shifting of funding mechanisms under paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of contributions under paragraph (2) be reflected in future resolutions agreed to by 

the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for 

the period of a current biennium. To achieve the policies described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the United States Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations shall withhold the support of the United States for a consensus for such 

budget until such time as such budget is reflective of such policies. 

‘‘(b) 22 PERCENT LIMITATION.—In accordance with section 601 of the Henry J. 

Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the Secretary may not make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations in an amount 

greater than 22 percent of the amount calculable under subsection (c). 

‘‘(c) ANNUAL DUES.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—For annual dues paid by the United States to the United 

Nations each fiscal year, the percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly assessed budget of the United 

Nations for a current biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the General 

Assembly. 

‘‘(2) CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRAMS

FOR REDIRECTION.—The percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted by resolution of the General 

Assembly for a current biennial period for the following certain organizational 

programs: 

‘‘(A) Economic and social affairs. 

‘‘(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries and 

small island developing States. 

‘‘(C) United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. 

‘‘(D) Trade and development. 

‘‘(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO. 

‘‘(F) Environment. 

‘‘(G) Human settlements. 

‘‘(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice. 

‘‘(I) International drug control. 

‘‘(J) Economic and social development in Africa. 

‘‘(K) Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific. 

‘‘(L) Economic development in Europe. 

‘‘(M) Economic and social development in in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. 

‘‘(N) Economic and social development in Western Asia. 

‘‘(O) Regular program of technical cooperation. 

‘‘(P) Development account. 

‘‘(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees. 

‘‘(R) Palestine refugees. 

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‘‘(3) REDIRECTION OF FUNDS.—Of amounts appropriated for contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues to the United Nations for 2008 and 

each subsequent year, if the funding mechanisms of one or more of the organizational programs of the United Nations specified in paragraph (2) have not 

been shifted from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs 

in accordance with subsection (a)(1), the Secretary shall ensure that such 

amounts in each such fiscal year that are specified for each such organizational 

program pursuant to the resolution agreed to by the General Assembly for the 

regular assessed budget of the United Nations for the period of a current biennium are redirected from payment of the assessed amount for the regular assessed budget as follows: 

‘‘(A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior notification to Congress, the 

Secretary shall expend an amount, not to exceed 40 percent of the amount 

specified for each such organizational program pursuant to the resolution 

agreed to by the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the 

United Nations for the period of a current biennium, as a contribution to 

an eligible organizational program specified in paragraph (4). 

‘‘(B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior notification to Congress, the 

Secretary shall expend the remaining amounts under this paragraph to voluntarily funded United Nations specialized agencies, funds, or programs. 

‘‘(4) ELIGIBLE ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRAMS.—The eligible organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A) for redirection of funds under such paragraph are the following: 

‘‘(A) Internal oversight. 

‘‘(B) Human rights. 

‘‘(C) Humanitarian assistance. 

‘‘(D) An organizational program specified in subparagraphs (A) through 

(P) of paragraph (2), subject to paragraph (5). 

‘‘(5) EXPENDITURE OF REMAINING AMOUNTS TO CERTAIN ORGANIZATION PROGRAMS.— 

‘‘(A) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION.—Subject to not less than 30 days prior 

notification to Congress and the limitation specified under subparagraph 

(B), the Secretary is authorized to make a voluntary contribution to an organizational program of the United Nations specified in subparagraphs (A) 

through (P) of paragraph (2) of any amounts not contributed in a fiscal year 

to an eligible organizational program specified in subparagraphs (A) 

through (C) of paragraph (4). 

‘‘(B) 10 PERCENT LIMITATION.—A voluntary contribution under subparagraph (A) to an organizational program of the United Nations specified in 

subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2) may not exceed 10 percent 

of the total contribution made under paragraph (3)(A). 

‘‘(d) FURTHER CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO BUDGETS FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS AND CONFERENCE SERVICES.— 

‘‘(1) 22 PERCENT LIMITATION.—The Secretary may not make a contribution 

to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations in an amount 

greater than 22 percent of the amount calculable under paragraph (2). 

‘‘(2) ANNUAL DUES EACH FISCAL YEAR.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—For annual dues paid by the United States to the 

United Nations each fiscal year, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) 

shall be multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly assessed 

budget of the United Nations for a current biennial period, as agreed to by 

resolution of the General Assembly. 

‘‘(B) CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION AND GENERAL

ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS AND CONFERENCE SERVICES.—With respect to such 

United States annual dues, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall 

be multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted by resolution of 

the General Assembly for the 2004–2005 biennial period for the following 

organizational programs: 

‘‘(i) Public Information. 

‘‘(ii) General Assembly affairs and conferences services. 

‘‘(C) REDIRECTION OF FUNDS.— 

‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make every effort, including the withholding of United States support for a consensus budget of the United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the organizational 

programs specified in subparagraph (B) for 2007 by ten percent against 

the budgets of such organizational programs for the 2004–2005 biennial 

period. If the budgets of such organizational programs are not so reduced, 20 percent the amount determined under subparagraph (B) for 

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contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues for 2007 shall 

be redirected from payment for the amount assessed for United States 

annual contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations. 

‘‘(ii) SPECIFIC AMOUNTS.—The Secretary shall make the amount determined under clause (i) available as a contribution to an eligible organizational program specified in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (4) of subsection (c). 

‘‘(3) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO 2008–2009 BIENNIAL PERIOD AND SUBSEQUENT

BIENNIAL PERIODS.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make every effort, including 

the withholding of United States support for a consensus budget of the 

United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the organizational programs specified in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) for the 2008–2009 biennial period 

and each subsequent biennial period by 20 percent against the budgets of 

such organizational programs for the 2004–2005 biennial period. 

‘‘(B) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a certification 

shall be required that certifies that the reduction in budgets described in 

subparagraph (A) has been implemented.’’. 

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (c) shall take effect 

and apply beginning on October 1, 2006. 

SEC. 102. WEIGHTED VOTING. 

It shall be the policy of the United States to actively pursue weighted voting 

with respect to all budgetary and financial matters in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and in the General Assembly in accordance with the level of the 

financial contribution of a Member State to the regular assessed budget of the 

United Nations. 

SEC. 103. BUDGET CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. 

(a) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the conditions described in subsection (b) have been satisfied. 

(b) CONDITIONS.—The conditions under this subsection are the following: 

(1) NEW BUDGET PRACTICES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.—The United Nations 

is implementing budget practices that— 

(A) require the maintenance of a budget not in excess of the level 

agreed to by the General Assembly at the beginning of each United Nations 

budgetary biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus and do 

not exceed ten percent; and 

(B) require the identification of expenditures by the United Nations by 

functional categories such as personnel, travel, and equipment. 

(2) PROGRAM EVALUATION.— 

(A) EXISTING AUTHORITY.—The Secretary General and the Director 

General of each specialized agency have used their existing authorities to 

require program managers within the United Nations Secretariat and the 

Secretariats of the specialized agencies to conduct evaluations in accordance 

with the standardized methodology referred to in subparagraph (B) of— 

(i) United Nations programs approved by the General Assembly; 

and 

(ii) programs of the specialized agencies. 

(B) DEVELOPMENT OF EVALUATION CRITERIA.— 

(i) UNITED NATIONS.—The Office of Internal Oversight Services has 

developed a standardized methodology for the evaluation of United Nations programs approved by the General Assembly, including specific 

criteria for determining the continuing relevance and effectiveness of 

the programs. 

(ii) SPECIALIZED AGENCIES.—Patterned on the work of the Office of 

Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations, each specialized 

agency has developed a standardized methodology for the evaluation of 

the programs of the agency, including specific criteria for determining 

the continuing relevance and effectiveness of the programs. 

(C) REPORT.—The Secretary General is assessing budget requests and, 

on the basis of evaluations conducted under subparagraph (B) for the relevant preceding year, submits to the General Assembly a report containing 

the results of such evaluations, identifying programs that have satisfied the 

criteria for continuing relevance and effectiveness, and an identification of 

programs that have not satisfied such criteria and should be terminated. 

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(D) SUNSET OF PROGRAMS.—Consistent with the July 16, 1997, recommendations of the Secretary General regarding a sunset policy and results-based budgeting for United Nations programs, the United Nations and 

each specialized agency has established and is implementing procedures to 

require all new programs approved by the General Assembly to have a specific sunset date. 

SEC. 104. ACCOUNTABILITY. 

(a) CERTIFICATION OF CREATION OF INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT BOARD.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the following reforms related to the establishment of an Independent Oversight Board 

(IOB) have been adopted by the United Nations: 

(1) An IOB is established from existing United Nations budgetary and personnel resources. Except as provided in this subsection, the IOB shall be an 

independent entity within the United Nations and shall not be subject to budget 

authority or organizational authority of any entity within the United Nations. 

(2) The head of the IOB shall be a Director, who shall be nominated by the 

Secretary General and who shall be subject to Security Council approval by a 

majority vote. The IOB shall also consist of four other board members who shall 

be nominated by the Secretary General and subject to Security Council approval 

by a majority vote. The IOB shall be responsible to the Security Council and 

the Director and board members shall each serve terms of six years, except that 

the terms of the initial board shall be staggered so that no more than two board 

members’ terms will expire in any one year. No board member may serve more 

than two terms. An IOB board member may be removed for cause by a majority 

vote of the Security Council. The Director shall appoint a professional staff 

headed by a Chief of Staff and may employ contract staff as needed. 

(3) The IOB shall receive operational and budgetary funding through appropriations by the General Assembly from existing levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources, and shall not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, division, department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for 

such funding. 

(4) While the IOB shall have the authority to evaluate all operations of the 

United Nations, the primary mission of the IOB is to oversee the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of External Auditors. The IOB may direct 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services or the Board of External Auditors to 

initiate, abandon, or modify the scope of an investigation. Every three months 

or more frequently when appropriate, the IOB shall submit, as appropriate, to 

the Secretary General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the Economic and Social Council a report on its activities, relevant observations, and 

recommendations relating to its audit operations, including information relating 

to the inventory and status of investigations by the Office of Internal Oversight 

Services. 

(5) In extraordinary circumstances and with the concurrence of the Secretary General or the Security Council by majority vote, the IOB may augment 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services with a special investigator and staff 

consisting of individuals who are not employees of the United Nations, to investigate matters involving senior officials of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies when allegations of serious misconduct have been made and such 

a special investigation is necessary to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the investigation. A special investigator and staff shall comply with all 

United Nations financial disclosure and conflict of interest rules, including the 

filing of an individual Annual Financial Disclosure Form in accordance with 

subsection (c). 

(6) The IOB shall recommend annual budgets for the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services and the Board of External Auditors. 

(b) CERTIFICATION OF UNITED NATIONS REFORMS OF THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL

OVERSIGHT SERVICES.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the following reforms related to the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services (OIOS) have been adopted by the United Nations: 

(1) The OIOS is designated as an independent entity within the United Nations. The OIOS shall not be subject to budget authority or organizational authority of any entity within the United Nations except as provided in this section. 

(2) The regular assessed budget of the United Nations shall fully fund the 

Internal Oversight Budget from existing levels of United Nations budgetary and 

personnel resources and shall not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, 

division, department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for such funding. 

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(3) All United Nations officials, including officials from any entity, bureau, 

division, department, or specialized agency of the United Nations, may— 

(A) make a recommendation to the OIOS to initiate an investigation of 

any aspect of the United Nations; or 

(B) report to the OIOS information or allegations of misconduct or inefficiencies within the United Nations. 

(4) The OIOS may, sua sponte, initiate and conduct an investigation or 

audit of any entity, bureau, division, department, specialized agency, employee 

(including the Secretary General) of the United Nations, including any employee of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, or contractor or consultant for the United Nations or its specialized agencies. 

(5) At least every three months and more frequently when appropriate, the 

OIOS shall submit to the IOB a report containing an inventory and status of 

its investigations. 

(6) The OIOS shall establish procedures for providing ‘‘whistle-blower’’ status and employment protections for all employees of the United Nations, including employees of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, who provide 

informational leads and testimony related to allegations of wrongdoing. Such 

procedures shall be adopted throughout the United Nations. Such status and 

protection may not be conferred on the Secretary General. 

(7) The OIOS shall annually publish a public report determining the proper 

number, distribution, and expertise of auditors within the OIOS necessary to 

carry out present and future duties of the OIOS, including assessing the staffing requirements needed to audit United Nations contracting activities throughout the contract cycle from the bid process to contract performance. 

(8) Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Director shall establish a position of Associate Director of OIOS for Specialized Agencies and Funds and Programs who shall be responsible for supervising 

the OIOS liaison or oversight duties for each of the specialized agencies and 

funds and programs of the United Nations. With the concurrence of the Director, the Associate Director of OIOS for Specialized Agencies and Funds and Programs may, from existing levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources, hire and appoint necessary OIOS staff, including staff serving within 

and located at specialized agencies and funds and programs permanently or as 

needed to liaison with existing audit functions within each specialized agency 

and fund and program. 

(9) Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Director shall establish a position of Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, who shall be responsible for the oversight and auditing of 

the field offices attached to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations shall receive informational 

leads and testimony from any person regarding allegations of wrongdoing by 

United Nations officials or peacekeeping troops or regarding inefficiencies associated with United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Associate Director of 

OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations shall be responsible for initiating, conducting, and overseeing investigations within peacekeeping operations. 

(10) Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Director shall establish a position of Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity, who shall be responsible for auditing and inspecting procurement and contracting win the United Nations, including within the 

specialized agencies. The Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity shall receive informational leads and testimony from any person 

regarding allegations of wrongdoing by United Nations officials or regarding inefficiencies associated with United Nations procurement or contracting activities. The Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity 

shall be responsible for initiating, conducting, and overseeing investigations of 

procurement and contract activities. Not later than 12 months after the establishment of the position of Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity, the Director, with the assistance of the Associate Director of 

OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity, shall undertake a review of contract procedures to ensure that practices and policies are in place to ensure 

that— 

(A) the United Nations has ceased issuing single bid contracts except 

for such contracts issued during an emergency situation that is justified by 

the Under Secretary General for Management; 

(B) the United Nations has established effective controls to prevent 

conflicts of interest in the award of contracts; and 

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(C) the United Nations has established effective procedures and policies 

to ensure effective and comprehensive oversight and monitoring of United 

Nations contract performance. 

(c) CERTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF ETHICS.— In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that 

the following reforms related to the establishment of a United Nations Office of Ethics have been adopted by the United Nations: 

(1) A United Nations Office of Ethics (UNOE) is established. The UNOE 

shall be an independent entity within the United Nations and shall not be subject to budget authority or organizational authority of any entity within the 

United Nations. The UNEO shall be responsible for establishing, managing, and 

enforcing a code of ethics for all employees of United Nations and its specialized 

agencies. The UNEO shall also be responsible for providing such employees 

with annual training related to such code. The head of the UNEO shall be a 

Director who shall be nominated by the Secretary General and who shall be 

subject to Security Council approval by majority vote. 

(2) The UNEO shall receive operational and budgetary funding through appropriations by the General Assembly from existing levels of United Nations 

budgetary and personnel resources and shall not be dependent upon any other 

entity, bureau, division, department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for such funding. 

(3) The Director of the UNEO shall, not later than six months after the 

date of its establishment, publish a report containing proposals for implementing a system for the filing and review of individual Annual Financial Disclosure Forms by each employee of the United Nations, including by each employee of its specialized agencies, at the P–5 level and above and by all contractors and consultants compensated at any salary level. Such system shall be in 

place and operational not later than six months after the date of the publication 

of the report. Such completed forms shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services at the request of the Director of the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services. Such system shall seek to identify and prevent conflicts of 

interest by United Nations employees and shall be comparable to the system 

used for such purposes by the United States Government. Such report shall also 

address broader reforms of the ethics program for the United Nations, including— 

(A) the effect of the establishment of ethics officers throughout all organizations within the United Nations; 

(B) the effect of retention by the UNEO of Annual Financial Disclosure 

Forms; 

(C) proposals for making completed Annual Financial Disclosure Forms 

available to the public on request through their Member State’s mission to 

the United Nations; 

(D) proposals for annual disclosure to the public of information related 

to the annual salaries and payments, including pension payments and 

buyouts, of employees of the United Nations, including employees of its specialized agencies, and of consultants; 

(E) proposals for annual disclosure to the public of information related 

to per diem rates for all bureaus, divisions, departments, or specialized 

agencies within the United Nations; 

(F) proposals for disclosure upon request by the Ambassador of a Member State of information related to travel and per diem payments made 

from United Nations funds to any person; and 

(G) proposals for annual disclosure to the public of information related 

to travel and per diem rates and payments made from United Nations 

funds to any person. 

(d) CERTIFICATION OF UNITED NATIONS ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION OF CHIEF

OPERATING OFFICER.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the following reforms related to the establishment of the 

position of a Chief Operating Officer have been adopted by the United Nations: 

(1) There is established the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO). The 

COO shall report to the Secretary General. 

(2) The COO shall be responsible for formulating general policies and programs for the United Nations in coordination with the Secretary General and 

in consultation with the Security Council and the General Assembly. The COO 

shall be responsible for the daily administration, operation and supervision, and 

the direction and control of the business of the United Nations. The Chief Operating Officer shall also perform such other duties and may exercise such other 

powers as from time to time may be assigned to the COO by the Secretary General. 

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(e) CERTIFICATION OF ACCESS BY MEMBER STATES TO REPORTS AND AUDITS BY

BOARD OF EXTERNAL AUDITORS.—In accordance with section 601, a certification 

shall be required that certifies that Member States may, upon request, have access 

to all reports and audits completed by the Board of External Auditors. 

SEC. 105. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to work toward adoption by the General Assembly of— 

(1) a definition of terrorism that builds upon the recommendations of the 

Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and 

includes as an essential component of such definition any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of 

intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing, any act; and 

(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the definition described in paragraph (1). 

SEC. 106. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES. 

The United States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 

proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended with respect to a 

United Nations human rights treaty monitoring body or committee that was established by— 

(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an international covenant (without any protocols) to which the United States is not party; or 

(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United States is a party 

to neither. 

SEC. 107. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) INCLUSION OF ISRAEL IN WEOG.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in 

the United Nations to include Israel as a permanent member with full rights 

and privileges. 

(2) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than six months after the date 

of the enactment of this Act and every six months thereafter for the next two 

years, the Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees concerning the treatment of Israel in the United Nations and the expansion 

of WEOG to include Israel as a permanent member. 

(b) DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AND REPORT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts and funding with respect to 

Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli–Palestinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 60 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act— 

(A) conduct an audit of the functions of the entities listed in paragraph 

(2); and 

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing recommendations for the elimination of such duplicative entities 

and efforts. 

(2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: 

(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights. 

(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 

(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 

Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. 

(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine. 

(c) IMPLEMENTATION BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the United Nations to seek the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report required under subsection (b)(1). 

(2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such recommendations have been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United States contributions 

to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period 

amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended for such entities. 

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(d) GAO AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the United States of the Government Accountability Office shall conduct an audit of— 

(1) the status of the implementation of the recommendations contained in 

the report required under subsection (b)(1); and 

(2) United States actions and achievements under subsection (c). 

SEC. 108. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, and one year thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United Nations reform since 1990. 

(b) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall describe— 

(1) the status of the implementation of management reforms within the 

United Nations and its specialized agencies; 

(2) the number of outputs, reports, or other items generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been eliminated; 

(3) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the 

committee structure and its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General 

entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 

all’’; 

(4) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all mandates older 

than five years and how resources have been redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 report of the Secretary General; and 

(5) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of the 

duplicative agendas of those committees and the Economic and Social Council. 

SEC. 109. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report— 

(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to modernize human 

resource practices, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 

rights for all’’; and 

(2) containing the information described in subsection (b). 

(b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include— 

(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at the United 

Nations, including an evaluation of— 

(A) tenure; 

(B) performance reviews; 

(C) the promotion system; 

(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced regulations concerning 

termination of employment of employees; and 

(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and ethics training. 

(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing complaints and 

protective measures for work-place harassment, including sexual harassment; 

(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions; 

(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a prohibition 

preventing personnel and officials assigned to the mission of a Member State 

to the United Nations from transferring to a position within the United Nations 

Secretariat that is compensated at the P–5 level and above; 

(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in travel allowances and 

attendant oversight with respect to accommodations and airline flights; and 

(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary General relating 

to greater flexibility for the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing priorities. 

TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC) 

SEC. 201. HUMAN RIGHTS. 

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to use 

its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that a credible and 

respectable Human Rights Council or other human rights body is established within 

the United Nations whose participating Member States uphold the values embodied 

in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

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(b) HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to ensure 

that the following human rights reforms have been adopted by the United Nations: 

(1) A Member State that fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be ineligible for membership on any 

United Nations human rights body. 

(2) A Member State shall be ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights body if such Member State is— 

(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; or 

(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights 

abuses. 

(3) A Member State that is currently subject to an adopted country specific 

resolution, in the principal body in the United Nations for the promotion and 

protection of human rights, relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the 

government of such country in such country, or has been the subject of such 

an adopted country specific resolution in such principal body within the previous three years, shall be ineligible for membership on any United Nations 

human rights body. For purposes of this subsection, an adopted country specific 

resolution shall not include consensus resolutions on advisory services. 

(4) A Member State that violates the principles of a United Nations human 

rights body to which it aspires to join shall be ineligible for membership on such 

body. 

(5) No human rights body has a standing agenda item that relates only to 

one country or region. 

(c) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the human rights reforms described under subsection (b) 

have been adopted by the United Nations. 

(d) PREVENTION OF ABUSE OF ‘‘NO ACTION’’ MOTIONS.—The United States Permanent Representative shall work to prevent abuse of ‘‘no action’’ motions, particularly as such motions relate to country specific resolutions. 

(e) OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.— 

(1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to 

continue to strongly support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

(2) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be 

required that certifies that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Human Rights has been given greater authority in field operation activities, 

such as in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, in furtherance of the purpose and mission of the United Nations. 

SEC. 202. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC). 

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to use 

its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to— 

(1) abolish secret voting in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); 

(2) ensure that, until such time as the Commission on Human Rights of the 

United Nations is abolished, only countries that are not ineligible for membership on a human rights body in accordance with paragraph (1) through (4) of 

section 201(b) shall be considered for membership on the Commission on 

Human Rights; and 

(3) ensure that after candidate countries are nominated for membership on 

the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council conducts 

a recorded vote to determine such membership. 

(b) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that certifies that the policies described in subsection (a) have been implemented by the Economic and Social Council. 

TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY 

SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. 

(a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 

(1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 

use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA. 

(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compliance shall— 

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(i) function as an independent body composed of technical experts 

who shall work in consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess compliance by IAEA Member States and provide recommendations to the 

IAEA Board of Governors concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 

Member States that fail to fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board 

resolutions; 

(ii) base its assessments and recommendations on IAEA inspection 

reports; and 

(iii) shall take into consideration information provided by IAEA 

Board Members that are one of the five nuclear weapons states as recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 

UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’). 

(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance shall be staffed from existing 

personnel in the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department 

of Nuclear Safety and Security of the IAEA. 

(2) SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION.— (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of 

the United States at the IAEA to establish a Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification. 

(B) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Committee shall— 

(i) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 

(ii) consider which additional measures are necessary to enhance 

the ability of the IAEA, beyond the verification mechanisms and authorities contained in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to detect 

with a high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities by a 

Member State. 

(3) PENALTIES.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that 

is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 

has its privileges suspended, including— 

(i) limiting its ability to vote on its case; 

(ii) being prevented from receiving any technical assistance; and 

(iii) being prevented from hosting meetings. 

(B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated when such investigation is concluded 

and such Member State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance. 

(b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

(1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary contributions of the United 

States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nuclear Verification. 

(2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to— 

(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized for 

countries that have newly established nuclear programs or are initiating 

nuclear programs; and 

(B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country— 

(i) the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, 

for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 

section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the 

Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 

that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism 

and the government of which the Secretary has determined has not dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass destruction programs 

under international verification; 

(ii) that is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 

with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter 

of the United Nations; or 

(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and 

principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 

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(3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President shall direct the United States 

Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of 

the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by 

country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and nuclear security activities. 

(c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

States at the IAEA to block the membership on the Board of Governors of the 

IAEA for a Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Additional Protocol and— 

(A) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its 

IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 

United Nations; or 

(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 

(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA 

shall make every effort to modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect 

the principles described in paragraph (1). 

(d) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 

Act and annually for two years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section. 

SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE 

IAEA. 

It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of the United 

States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board 

of Governors should recommend, and the General Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the 

IAEA. 

TITLE IV—PEACEKEEPING 

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 

OPERATIONS. 

It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed 

greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability for the past 57 years and 

the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations 

peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct; and 

(2) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in 

the areas of planning, management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 

implemented without delay. 

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of United Nations 

peacekeeping operations in the following areas: 

(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 

(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and number of United Nations 

peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade, 

an independent audit of each such operation, with a view toward ‘‘rightsizing’’ operations and ensuring that such operations are cost effective, 

should be conducted and its findings reported to the Security Council. 

(B) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING OPERATIONS.—In conjunction 

with the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review 

of all United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward 

identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the 

following: 

(i) Activities that fall beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping 

activities should be delegated to a new Peacebuilding Commission, described in paragraph (3). 

15 

(ii) Long-standing operations that are static and cannot fulfill their 

mandate should be downsized or closed. 

(iii) Where there is legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a 

country of an otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping operation 

would result in the resumption of major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed contributions, similar to 

that currently supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 

Cyprus, should be explored and instituted. 

(C) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should adopt a minimum standard of 

qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 

specific skills and experience, and current senior leaders and managers who 

do not meet those standards should be removed or reassigned. 

(D) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of 

force, civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/ 

AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has 

received and understands such training as a condition of participation in 

the operation. 

(2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 

(A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CONDUCT.—A single, uniform 

Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally 

to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, should be promulgated, adopted, and enforced. 

(B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CONDUCT.—All personnel, regardless 

of category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior 

to deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic followon training. In particular— 

(i) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided 

with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated 

into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether 

such language is an official language of the United Nations; 

(ii) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an 

oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 

pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the 

consequences of violating the Code of Conduct, including immediate 

termination of the participation of such personnel in the peacekeeping 

operation to which such personnel is assigned as a condition of appointment to such operation; and 

(iii) peacekeeping operations should conduct educational outreach 

programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of 

such operations are based, including explaining prohibited acts on the 

part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct. 

(C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, 

such as the Personnel Conduct Units already deployed to support United 

Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each operation to monitor 

compliance with the Code of Conduct, and— 

(i) should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the United 

Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations (established under section 

104(b)(10)); and 

(ii) should be tasked with designing and implementing mission-specific measures to prevent misconduct, conduct follow-on training for 

personnel, coordinate community outreach programs, and assist in investigations, as OIOS determines necessary and appropriate. 

(D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, professional, and independent investigative body should be established and introduced into United Nations 

peacekeeping operations. In particular— 

(i) the investigative body should include professionals with experience in investigating sex crimes, as well as experts who can provide 

guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements necessary 

for any subsequent legal action; 

(ii) provisions should be included in a Model Memorandum of Understanding that obligate Member States that contribute troops to a 

peacekeeping operation to designate a military prosecutor who will parVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
16 

ticipate in any investigation into an allegation of misconduct brought 

against an individual of such Member State, so that evidence is collected and preserved in a manner consistent with the military law of 

such Member State; 

(iii) the investigative body should be regionally based to ensure 

rapid deployment and should be equipped with modern forensics equipment for the purpose of positively identifying perpetrators and, where 

necessary, for determining paternity; and 

(iv) the investigative body should report directly to the Associate 

Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 

of any reports to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head 

of Mission, and the Member State concerned. 

(E) FOLLOW-UP.—A dedicated unit, similar to the Personnel Conduct 

Units, staffed and funded through existing resources, should be established 

within the headquarters of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations and tasked with— 

(i) promulgating measures to prevent misconduct; 

(ii) coordinating allegations of misconduct, and reports received by 

field personnel; and 

(iii) gathering follow-up information on completed investigations, 

particularly by focusing on disciplinary actions against the individual 

concerned taken by the United Nations or by the Member State that 

is contributing troops to which such individual belongs, and sharing 

such information with the Security Council, the Head of Mission, and 

the community hosting the peacekeeping operation. 

(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations should provide immediate medical assistance to victims 

of sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term 

treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty 

of the misconduct. In particular, the following reforms should be implemented: 

(i) The United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing long-term treatment or compensation by creating a ‘‘Victims 

Trust Fund’’, or any other such similar fund, financed through assessed 

contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, thereby 

shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity. 

(ii) If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that contributed the troops to which such 

individual belonged or to the manager concerned. 

(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing 

country concerned. 

(iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor 

of the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such 

individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent 

with existing United Nations Staff Rules. 

(G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The manner in which managers 

and commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them 

should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that 

managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address 

misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment 

or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate. 

(H) DATA BASE.—A centralized data base should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and 

subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged in 

misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, are 

permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

(I) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations should assume responsibility 

for maintaining a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to 

ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities. 

(3) PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION.— 

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—Consistent with the recommendations of the 

High Level Panel Report, the United Nations should establish a 

17 

Peacebuilding Commission, supported by a Peacebuilding Support Office, to 

marshal the efforts of the United Nations, international financial institutions, donors, and non-governmental organizations to assist countries in 

transition from war to peace. 

(B) STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP.—The Commission should— 

(i) be a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council, 

limited in size to ensure efficiency; 

(ii) include members of the United Nations Security Council, major 

donors, major troop contributing countries, appropriate United Nations 

organizations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; 

and 

(iii) invite the President of ECOSOC, regional actors, Member 

States that contribute troops, regional development banks, and other 

concerned parties that are not already members, as determined appropriate, to consult or participate in meetings as observers. 

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Commission should seek to ease the demands currently placed upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

to undertake tasks that fall beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping, 

by— 

(i) developing and integrating country-specific and system-wide 

conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term development policies and strategies; and 

(ii) serving as the key coordinating body for the design and implementation of military, humanitarian, and civil administration aspects 

of complex missions. 

(D) RESOURCES.—The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission 

and the related Peacebuilding Support Office, should be staffed within existing resources. 

SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION. 

(a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CONTINGENT UPON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 

(1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.— 

(A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), until the 

Secretary of State certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 

(2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose the creation of 

new, or expansion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

(B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The requirements described under 

subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph (2) may be waived until January 

1, 2007, if the President determines that such is in the national interest 

of the United States. If the President makes such a determination, the 

President shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, 

notify the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and 

resulting waiver. 

(2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to 

the appropriate congressional committees that the following reforms, or an 

equivalent set of reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted 

by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General 

Assembly, as appropriate: 

(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding 

rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, has been adopted by the 

General Assembly and mechanisms have been established for training such 

personnel concerning the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the 

Code. 

(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the requirements of the 

Code of Conduct and each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 

translated into the national language of such personnel. 

(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are required to sign 

an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 

pledges to abide by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 

of violating the Code, including the immediate termination of the participation of such personnel in the peacekeeping operation to which such personnel is assigned as a condition of the appointment to such operation. 

18 

(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping 

personnel of such operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 

part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct. 

(E) A centralized data base has been created and is being maintained 

in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks 

cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of category or 

rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and each Member State that contributes troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically obligates each such Member State to— 

(i) designate a competent legal authority, preferably a prosecutor 

with expertise in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse, to participate in any investigation into an allegation of misconduct brought 

against an individual of such Member State; 

(ii) refer to its competent national or military authority for possible 

prosecution, if warranted, any investigation of a violation of the Code 

of Conduct or other criminal activity by an individual of such Member 

State; 

(iii) report to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the 

outcome of any such investigation; 

(iv) undertake to conduct on-site court martial proceedings relating 

to allegations of misconduct alleged against an individual of such Member State; and 

(v) assume responsibility for the provision of appropriate assistance 

to a victim of misconduct committed by an individual of such Member 

State. 

(G) A professional and independent investigative and audit function 

has been established within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the OIOS to monitor United Nations peacekeeping 

operations. 

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

The Secretary of State shall make every effort to recruit United States citizens 

for positions within international organizations. 

SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congressional budget justification shall 

include a detailed itemized request in support of the assessed contribution of the 

United States to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations. 

(b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The detailed itemization required 

under subsection (a) shall— 

(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested in support of 

each of the various sections and titles of the regular assessed budget of the 

United Nations; and 

(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with the actual or 

estimated amounts contributed by the United States in previous fiscal years for 

the same sections and titles. 

(c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time such 

adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and consult with the appropriate congressional 

committees. 

SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT. 

Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a review of programs of the United Nations that are 

funded through assessed contributions and submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report containing— 

19 

(1) the findings of such review; and 

(2) recommendations relating to— 

(A) the continuation of such programs; and 

(B) which of such programs should be voluntarily funded, other than 

those specified in subparagraphs (A) through (R) of subsection (c)(2) of section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended by section 101(c) of this Act. 

SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. 

(a) REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORMS.—Not later than 12 months after the 

date of the enactment of this Act and again 12 months thereafter, the Comptroller 

General of the United States of the Government Accountability Office shall submit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the status of the 1997, 

2002, and 2005 management reforms initiated by the Secretary General and on the 

reforms mandated by this Act. 

(b) REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF STATE CERTIFICATIONS.—Not later than six 

months after each certification submitted by the Secretary of State to the appropriate congressional committees under this Act and subsection (d)(3) of section 11 

of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of 

this Act), the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on each such certification. The Secretary shall provide the 

Comptroller General with any information required by the Comptroller General to 

submit any such report. 

TITLE VI—CERTIFICATIONS AND 

WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS 

SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS. 

(a) CERTIFICATIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), the certifications required under subsection (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participation 

Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act) and section 103, sections 

104(a) through 104(e), sections 201(c) and 201(e), and section 202 of this Act are 

certifications submitted to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State that the requirements of each such section have been satisfied 

with respect to reform of the United Nations. 

(2) ALTERNATE CERTIFICATION MECHANISM.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), in the event 

that the Secretary is unable to submit a certification in accordance with 

paragraph (1), the Secretary may submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees, in accordance with subparagraph (B), an alternate certification 

that certifies that the requirements of the section to which the original certification applies have been implemented through reforms that are substantially similar to the requirements of such section or accomplish the same 

purposes as the requirements of such section. 

(B) EQUIVALENCY.—Reforms are substantially similar or accomplish the 

same purposes if— 

(i) such reforms are formally adopted in written form by the entity 

or committee of the United Nations or of its specialized agency that has 

authority to enact or implement such reforms or are issued by the Secretariat or the appropriate entity or committee in written form; and 

(ii) such reforms are not identical to the reforms required by a particular certification but in the determination of the Secretary will have 

the same, or nearly the same effect, as such reforms. 

(C) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION.— 

(i) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days before submitting an alternate certification in accordance with subparagraph (A), the 

Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

written justification explaining in detail the basis for such alternate 

certification. 

(ii) CONSULTATION.—After the Secretary has submitted the written 

justification under clause (i), but no later than 15 days before the Secretary exercises the alternate certification mechanism described under 

subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding such exercise. 

(3) LIMITED EXCEPTION FOR SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.— 

20 

(A) SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.—Subject to subparagraph (B), if at least 

32 of the 39 reforms represented by the ten certifications specified under 

paragraph (1) have been implemented, all such reforms (including the 

unimplemented reforms) so represented shall be deemed to have been implemented for the year in which the Secretary submits such certifications. 

(B) MANDATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN REFORMS.— (i) IN GENERAL.—The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not 

apply unless the reforms under the following sections have been implemented for the year to which subparagraph (A) applies: 

(I) Subsection (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act). 

(II) Section 103(b)(1)(A). 

(III) Section 103(b)(2)(D). 

(IV) Section 104(a)(1). 

(V) Section 104(a)(6). 

(VI) Section 104(b)(1). 

(VII) Section 104(b)(2). 

(VIII) Section 104(c)(1). 

(IX) Section 201(b)(1). 

(X) Section 201(b)(2). 

(XI) Section 201(b)(3). 

(XII) Section 201(b)(5). 

(XIII) Section 202(a)(1). 

(XIV) Section 202(a)(2). 

(ii) FULL COMPLIANCE IN SUCCEEDING YEAR.—If the unimplemented 

reforms under subparagraph (A) are not implemented in the year succeeding the year to which subparagraph (A) applies, the provisions of 

subsection (b) shall apply for such succeeding year. 

(b) WITHHOLDING OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGULAR ASSESSED

BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (4) and in accordance 

with paragraph (2), until such time as all certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in accordance with subsection (a), the United States 

shall appropriate, but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the contributions of the United States to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations 

for a biennial period. 

(2) AVAILABLE UNTIL EXPENDED.—The contributions appropriated but withheld from expenditure under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available 

until expended. 

(3) APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 11(B) OF THE UNITED NATION PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945.—Until such time as all certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in accordance with subsection (a), subsection (b) of 

section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act) shall be administered as though such section reads as 

follows: ‘‘The Secretary may not make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than 11 percent of 

the amount calculable under subsection (c).’’. 

(4) SECTION 11(D)(3) OF UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945.— 

(A) SPECIAL RULE.—A certification under subsection (d)(3) of section 11 

of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 

101(c) of this Act) (relating to the 2008–2009 biennial period and subsequent biennial periods) shall not be required until such time as the United 

Nations makes its formal budget presentation for the 2008–2009 biennial 

period. 

(B) APPLICATION.—If the Secretary does not submit a certification 

under such section, the 50 percent withholding described under paragraph 

(1) shall apply. 

(c) RELEASE OF FUNDS.—At such time as all certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in accordance with subsection (a), the United States shall 

transfer to the United Nations amounts appropriated but withheld from expenditure 

under subsection (b). 

(d) ANNUAL REVIEWS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall conduct annual reviews, beginning 

one year after the date on which the Secretary submits the final certification 

(or alternate certification) in accordance with subsection (a), to determine if the 

United Nations continues to remain in compliance with all such certifications 

(or alternate certifications). Not later than 30 days after the completion of each 

such review, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the findings of each such review. 

21 

(2) ACTION.—If during the course of any such review the Secretary determines that the United Nations has failed to remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate certification) that was submitted in accordance with subsection (a), the 50 percent withholding described under subsection (b) shall reapply with respect to United States contributions each fiscal year to the regular 

assessed budget of the United Nations beginning with the fiscal year immediately following such review and subsequent fiscal years until such time as all 

certifications (or alternate certifications) under subsection (a) have been submitted. 

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The certifications (or alternate certifications) specified 

under subsection (a) shall be required with respect to United States contributions 

towards payment of regular assessed dues of the United Nations for 2007 and subsequent years. 

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 provides 

a comprehensive framework for implementing crucial reforms in 

the United Nations. Scandals involving the United Nations Oil-forFood Program and United Nations specialized agencies such as the 

World Meteorological Society and the World Intellectual Property 

Organization, as well as alleged wrongdoing by high-level United 

Nations staff, have illustrated systemic weaknesses in the United 

Nations. Despite budgetary reform initiatives by the SecretaryGeneral in 1997 and 2002, the regular assessed budget of the 

United Nations remains replete with outdated, obsolete programmatic mandates that continue to be funded, with little regard 

for prioritization of mandated initiatives by the General Assembly. 

Additionally, many programs currently funded through regular assessed dues would be better suited for voluntary funding, thereby 

increasing transparency, efficiency, and engendering a more results-oriented approach in implementation. Further, the undisputed deplorable state of the Commission on Human Rights, which 

allows countries such as Cuba and Sudan to act as arbiters of 

human rights, must no longer continue unchecked. Moreover, it is 

undeniable that the record of United Nations peacekeeping since 

the end of the Cold War has been tainted by disastrous operational 

failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct. Allegations of sexual exploitation, abuse, and rape by United Nations peacekeepers 

cannot go unaddressed. The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform 

Act of 2005 seeks to address these and other areas that are long 

overdue for serious, meaningful and practical reform. 

History has evidenced that the United States Congress can 

prompt meaningful change at the United Nations by applying the 

power of the purse. Through the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment 

in 1985, Congress was able to use the power of the purse to promote budget accountability, as evidenced by the eventual implementation of consensus-based budgeting procedures. A Congressional directive in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY94 

and FY95, to withhold contributions unless an internal oversight 

structure was created, loomed when the United Nations established 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services. The Helms-Biden legislation in 1999 provided for the payment of arrearages to the United 

Nations if certain conditions, including reforms, were met. Here, 

once again, the United Nations was prompted into action by the 

United States Congress, the outstanding conditions were met, and 

arrearages were paid. 

22 

Reform, however, should not be a periodic event undertaken because of the threat of financial penalty. Rather, it should be an integral part of the culture of the United Nations, a body that was 

founded: ‘‘(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to 

that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 

and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts 

of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 

peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 

international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (2) 

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 

the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 

to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 

(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international 

problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 

and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 

sex, language, or religion; and (4) To be a centre for harmonizing 

the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.’’ 

(Excerpt from the United Nations Charter.) With such crucial and 

laudable goals, it is incumbent upon the United Nations to continue to raise its own standards of performance and expectations 

of excellence for the world community that it serves. Yet, as recent 

history evidences, not only has it failed too often to meet the expectations of the world community, but it also lacks the political will 

and ability to enact the changes necessary to reform itself from 

within. When these unfortunate circumstances occur, the United 

States Congress must act. It must act, not only in the interest of 

the United States, but also in the interest of the betterment of the 

United Nations for the world community. 

The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 is designed with these goals in mind. The Act contains six titles: Mission and Budget of the United Nations, Human Rights and the 

Economic and Social Council, International Atomic Energy Agency, 

Peacekeeping, Department of State and Government Accountability 

Office, and Certifications and Withholding of Contributions. 

SUMMARY

In the first title, the bill highlights the need to pursue a streamlined, efficient, effective and accountable regular assessed budget of 

the United Nations and to shift the funding mechanisms of certain 

organizational programs from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. It specifies eighteen programs for shifting 

from assessed to voluntary funding and calls for the budgets of two 

additional programs, ‘‘Public Information’’ and ‘‘General Assembly 

Affairs and Conference Services,’’ to be streamlined. It also seeks 

to implement budget practices that would instill results-oriented 

methodologies upon which to measure effectiveness and relevance 

of programs, as well as to call for procedures to provide specific 

sunset dates for new programs. 

Accountability is an overriding theme throughout the Act. The 

bill establishes an Independent Oversight Board and designates 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services as an independent entity, 

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23 

er protection to United Nations employees offering information of 

wrongdoing. It also creates a United Nations Office of Ethics, 

which is responsible for establishing, and enforcing a code of ethics 

for all United Nations employees, and which requires much greater 

financial disclosure than that which presently exists. It establishes 

the position of Chief Operating Officer, and requires that Member 

States have access to all reports and audits by the Board of External Auditors. 

It also addresses the withholding of financial support to those 

human rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees that the 

United States is a party to neither the underlying convention or 

international covenant, nor protocol. 

Finally, Title I seeks equality at the United Nations by calling 

for the expansion of the Western European and Others Group 

(WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in this group with 

full rights and privileges. It calls for a Department of State review 

and assessment of the work performed by the various United Nations commissions, committees, and offices focusing exclusively on 

the Palestinian agenda, followed by the submission of a report to 

Congress recommending areas for reform, including proposals for 

the elimination by the United Nations of such duplicative entities 

and efforts. It also calls for withholding proportional U.S. contributions until such time as the recommendations are implemented. 

Title II mandates that the United Nations adopt criteria for 

membership in current and future human rights bodies. Under 

these criteria, countries that fail to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be ineligible for membership. Likewise, countries that are subject to sanctions by the Security Council, or are under a Security Council-mandated investigation for 

human rights abuses, or are the subject of country-specific human 

rights resolutions, would be ineligible for membership. In addition 

to other criteria, the bill mandates that no human rights body have 

a standing agenda item that relates only to one country or region. 

Title II also mandates that the membership criteria be adhered to 

in the Economic and Social Council, which is the body that selects 

the Commission on Human Rights’ members, and that a recorded 

transparent vote take place on membership. 

Title III seeks to strengthen the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) by calling for the establishment of an Office of Compliance and a Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification. It 

also directs that U.S. voluntary contributions should primarily be 

used to fund activities relating to nuclear safety and security, or 

activities relating to nuclear verification. In addition, it directs the 

U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to pursue membership 

reform of the Board of Governors that would bar countries that 

have not signed and ratified the Additional Protocol, or that are 

under investigation for a breach of, or noncompliance with, their 

IAEA obligations, or that are in violation of their IAEA obligations. 

Title IV calls for peacekeeping reforms and mandates the withholding of U.S. support for new or expanded peacekeeping missions 

until the most critical, but immediately achievable, of those reforms are instituted. These reforms include the adoption of and 

training in a uniform Code of Conduct, and the creation of a database to track cases of misconduct to ensure that violators of the 

Code are permanently barred from peacekeeping operations. Two 

24 

additional reforms, the adoption of a Model Memorandum of Understanding and the establishment of independent investigative 

and audit functions for peacekeeping, must be certified by January 

1, 2007. 

Title V sets forth ways to improve budget practices by requiring 

budget justifications, consultations with Congress on budget 

changes, a review of new budgeting options and a review by the 

Government Accountability Office of the progress the United Nations is making on implementing reforms identified in various 

United Nations management reports. 

Title VI provides various levers to encourage the United Nations 

to enact reforms, including the withholding of 50 percent of U.S. 

assessed dues if the Secretary of State cannot make certifications 

that the United Nations has accomplished certain reforms in key 

areas. The title also mandates annual reviews by the Secretary of 

State to ensure that the United Nations remains in compliance 

with the mandated reforms and to require the withholding of 50 

percent of U.S. assessed dues if the United Nations fails to maintain compliance with the reform provisions in the Henry J. Hyde 

United Nations Reform Act of 2005. 

HEARINGS

The Committee and its Subcommittees has held numerous hearings on United Nations issues. Last year, the Full Committee held 

two hearings on the Oil-for-Food Program. The first, on April 28, 

2004, ‘‘The United Nations Oil-for-Food Program: Issues of Accountability and Transparency,’’ had six private witnesses giving 

testimony: Howar Zaid, United Nations Liaison Office; Danielle 

Pletka, American Enterprise Institute; Claudia Rosett, Foundation 

for the Defense of Democracies; Dr. John G. Ruggie, Harvard University; Michael Soussan, former coordinator of the Oil-for-Food 

Program; and Joseph A. Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The other hearing, entitled, ‘‘The Oil-for-Food Program: Tracking the Funds,’ was held on November 17, 2004. Testimony was received from: Charles A. Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of 

Central Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Central Intelligence Agency; and Everett Schenk, Chief Executive Officer, BNP-Paribas, North America. 

The Full Committee held two hearings earlier this year. The first 

was held on March 15, 2005, and was entitled, ‘‘U.N. Reform: Challenges and Prospects.’’ Testimony was received from: Richard C. 

Holbrooke, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Richard S. Williamson, former U.S. 

Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United 

Nations. The second hearing, ‘‘Reforming the United Nations: 

Budget and Management Perspectives’’ was held on May 19, 2005. 

Testimony was heard from: Dr. Mark Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Catherine Bertini, Former Under-Secretary General 

for Management, United Nations; and the President of the United 

Nations Foundation, former Senator Tim Wirth. 

The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations held three hearings on issues related to the 

United Nations Reform Act. The first was held on March 1, 2005, 

25 

and entitled, ‘‘United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform.’’ Testimony was received from: Hon. Kim Holmes, Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of 

State; Hon. Princeton N. Lyman, Former Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Organization Affairs; Dr. Nile Gardiner, 

The Heritage Foundation; and Anneke Van Woudenberg, Human 

Rights Watch. On April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing 

entitled, ‘‘The United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Protector or Accomplice?’’ with Assistant Secretary-General Danilo 

Turk of the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations 

testifying. On May 18, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ‘‘U.N. Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater Accountability 

and Integrity.’’ Testimony was received from: Philo L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Organization Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State; Eric Schwartz of the Council on Foreign 

Relations; and Victoria Holt of the Henry L. Stimson Center. 

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held numerous hearings on United Nations-related issues. The first, on February 9, 2005, was entitled, ‘‘The Volcker Interim Report on United 

Nations Oil-for-Food Program.’’ Testimony was received from: 

former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; former Ambassador 

Dennis Ross; Dr. Zaid Asali, of the American Task Force on Palestine; and Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute. 

The second hearing, entitled, ‘‘United Nations Operations: Integrity 

and Accountability,’’ was held on March 2, 2005. Testimony was 

heard from the following witnesses: Patrick F. Kennedy, Ambassador to the United Nations for Management and Reform, U.S. 

Mission to the U.N.; and Joseph A. Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The Subcommittee held another U.N.-related hearing, ‘‘The United Nations Oil-for-Food Program: The Cotecna and 

Saybolt Inspection Firms’’ on March 17, 2005. Testimony was received from three private witnesses: John Denson of the Saybolt 

Group, Houston Texas; Dr. Rehan Mullick, Former Research Officer for the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator 

in Iraq; and Evelyn Suarez, an attorney representing Cotecna S.A. 

The final U.N.-related hearing held by the Subcommittee, ‘‘The 

Role of BNP-Paribas SA in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program,’’ was held on April 28, 2005. Testimony was heard from several officials of BNP-Paribas SA: Everett Schenck, Patricia Herbert, William Vassallo, and Harold Lehmann. 

The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation held a hearing on March 17, 2005, on terrorism issues related 

to the U.N. Testimony at this hearing, ‘‘The United Nations and 

the Fight Against Terrorism,’’ was heard from the following: Victor 

Comras, former member of the United Nations al-Qaeda monitoring group; and Anne Bayefsky, The Hudson Institute. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On June 8, 2005, the International Relations Committee marked 

up the bill, H.R. 2745, pursuant to notice, in open session. The 

Committee agreed to a motion offered by Chairman Hyde to favorably report the bill, as amended, to the House of Representatives, 

by a record vote of 25 ayes to 22 nays, a quorum being present. 

During the markup, three amendments were offered. The first, ofVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
26 

fered by Mr. Lantos, was an amendment in the nature of a substitute. It was defeated by a record vote of 23 ayes to 24 noes. The 

second amendment, offered by Mr. Leach, regarding expansion of 

the United Nations Security Council, was withdrawn. The third 

amendment, offered by Mr. Paul, to terminate U.S. participation in 

the United Nations, was defeated by a record vote of 3 ayes to 39 

nays, with one voting ‘‘present.’’ A unanimous consent request was 

made to change the title of the bill to ‘‘The Henry J. Hyde United 

Nations Reform Act of 2005.’’ There was no objection. 

ROLL CALL VOTES

Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires that the results of each record vote on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of those voting 

for or against, be printed in the committee report. The following 

record votes occurred during consideration of H.R. 2745: 

Vote #1—Lantos Substitute Amendment 

Voting aye: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, 

Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, 

Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, 

Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza 

Voting no: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis, Green, 

Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, Barrett, Mack, 

Fortenberry, McCaul and Poe 

Ayes 23. Noes 24. 

Vote #2—Paul Amendment—U.S. Out of the United Nations 

Voting aye: Paul, Wilson, Barrett 

Voting no: Leach, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, King, 

Chabot, Issa, Flake, Davis, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, 

Boozman, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, 

Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, 

Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza 

Voting ‘‘Present’’: Rohrabacher 

Ayes 3. Noes 39. Present 1. 

Vote #3—Report favorably H.R. 2745 to the House, as Amended 

Voting aye: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis, Green, 

Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, Barrett, Mack, 

Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Berkley 

Voting no: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, 

Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, 

Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, 

Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza 

Ayes 25. Noes 22. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activiVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
27 

ties under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 

expenditures. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, June 9, 2005. 

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE, Chairman, 

Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2745, the Henry J. Hyde 

United Nations Reform Act of 2005. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita D’Monte, who can 

be reached at 226-2840. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable Tom Lantos, 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 2745—Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005. 

H.R. 2745 would require the Secretary of State to press for many 

changes at the United Nations. The bill also would require the Secretary to withhold 50 percent of the U.S. assessed contributions to 

the regular budget of the United Nations, starting in 2007, if the 

Secretary is unable to certify that certain conditions have been 

met. The bill would not authorize appropriations for assessed contributions to the United Nations’ budget. In 2005, CBO estimates 

that $362 million will be spent on such assessments from current 

appropriations; for 2006, the President has requested that Congress appropriate $439 million for those costs. 

CBO has no basis for predicting whether or when all the necessary certifications would be made. If the Secretary is able to 

make all certifications in a timely manner, assessments would not 

be withheld, and implementation of the bill would have no impact 

on spending subject to appropriation. Alternatively, if certifications 

cannot be made and 50 percent of assessments are withheld, such 

discretionary spending would be about $187 million lower in 2007 

and about $769 million lower over the 2007–2010 period—relative 

to expected scheduled payments under the current-law baseline. 

The bill would not affect direct spending or revenues. 

Among the many changes specified by the bill, it would require 

the Secretary of State to press the United Nations to: 

• Reduce and streamline its regular budget, 

28 

• Increase internal oversight and auditing, • Establish a position of Chief Operating Officer, • Create an Office of Ethics, • Prohibit membership in any United Nations human rights 

body to countries that violate human rights, • Adopt a uniform and enforceable code of conduct for United 

Nations peacekeepers, and • Strengthen the compliance and enforcement capabilities at 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

H.R. 2745 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goals and objectives of this legislation are to provide fundamental reforms for the United Nations across a broad set of issues, 

including the areas of budget, oversight, accountability and human 

rights. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Section 1. Short Title and Table of Contents 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005.’’ 

Section 2. Definitions 

Section 2 defines terms used in the Act. 

Section 3. Statement of Congress 

Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is incumbent 

upon the United Nations to enact significant reform measures if it 

is to restore the public trust and confidence necessary for it to 

achieve the laudable goals set forth in its Charter. To this end, the 

following Act seeks to reform the United Nations. 

TITLE I—MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 101. United States Financial Contributions to the United 

Nations 

Section 101 (a) Statements of Policy. This subsection states that 

it shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice, vote and 

influence at the United Nations to pursue a streamlined, efficient, 

and accountable regular assessed budget of the United Nations; 

and to shift funding mechanisms of eighteen organizational programs of the United Nations from the regular assessed budget to 

voluntarily funded programs. In order to pursue a more streamlined, efficient accountable regular assessed budget, it also states 

that it shall be the policy of the United States to redirect contributions to achieve certain policy objectives and to redirect a portion 

of funds from two United Nations organizational programs: 1) PubVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
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lic Information; and 2) General Assembly affairs and conference 

services. In addition, this provision states that it shall be the policy 

of the United States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the 

United Nations to ensure that future biennial budgets of the 

United Nations reflect the shift in funding mechanisms described 

above. 

The eighteen organizational programs identified for shifting include: (1) Economic and Social Affairs; (2) Least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing 

States; (3) United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; (4) Trade and development; (5) International 

trade Center UNCTAD/WTO; (6) Environment; (7) Human Settlements; (8) Crime prevention and criminal justice; (9) International 

drug control; (10) Economic and social development in Africa; (11) 

Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific; (12) Economic development in Europe; (13) Economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean; (14) Economic and social development in Western Asia; (15) Regular program of technical cooperation; (16) Development account; (17) Protection of and 

assistance to refugees; and (18) Palestine refugees. 

It is imperative for the United Nations to produce a streamlined, 

efficient accountable United Nations regular assessed budget. Steps 

can and must be taken by the United Nations to achieve such a 

budget. To assist the United Nations in achieving this goal, the 

Committee has identified programs to be streamlined (Public Information and General Assembly affairs and conference services) and 

eighteen programs to be shifted from the regular assessed budget 

to voluntarily funded programs. Voluntarily funded programs are 

known to be more results-oriented, efficient, and transparent. Further, by shifting programs from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs, the United Nations regular assessed 

budget decreases for all Member States, while allowing Member 

States more control over where contributions are directed. 

Section 101 (b) Authorization with Respect to the Regular Assessed Budget of the United Nations. This subsection authorizes the 

Secretary of State (‘‘Secretary ’’) to make contributions toward the 

amount assessed to the United States by the United Nations for 

purposes of funding the regular assessed budget subject to the 

amendment made by subsection (c). 

Section 101 (c) United States Financial Contributions to the 

United Nations. This subsection amends Section 11 of the United 

Nations Participation Act of 1945 to implement the policies stated 

in subsection (a). It provides the mechanism to implement the 

shifting of programs from the assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs; addresses the budget issues of two United Nations organizational programs (Public Information and General Assembly 

affairs and conference services), and bars the Secretary from contributing to the United Nations regular assessed budget for annual 

United States assessed contributions an amount greater than 22 

percent of the United Nations regular assessed budget. 

This subsection restates the eighteen regular assessed programs 

identified for shifting to voluntarily funded programs. It states that 

if one or more of these programs have not been shifted by 2008, 

the amount of funds assessed to the United States for unshifted 

programs shall be redirected to priority areas as follows: subject to 

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Congressional notification, not more than 40 percent of the funds 

shall be redirected to Internal Oversight programs, Human Rights 

programs (particularly to assist in strengthening field operation activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

to enable human rights monitors to have a greater presence in 

areas such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 

and Humanitarian Assistance programs. In addition, the Secretary 

is afforded the flexibility to make voluntary contributions to sixteen 

of the eighteen identified programs, not to exceed 10 percent of the 

40 percent total. (This exception excludes ‘‘Protection of and assistance to refugees,’’ and ‘‘Palestine refugees,’’ because funding for refugee programs is drawn from a separate funding account, the Migration and Refugee Assistance account.) The remaining amounts 

are to be expended as contributions to voluntarily funded United 

Nations specialized agencies, funds, or programs, such as the 

United Nations Development Program, refugee programs administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 

World Food Programme, and any recently shifted programs. 

This subsection allows a reasonable amount of time, more than 

2 years, for the United Nations to act on the shifting of programs 

from regular assessed to voluntarily funded programs. If there are 

programs that have not been shifted, the remaining programs 

would be subject to the funding parameters set out in this subsection. It should be noted that, of the identified programs, the 

Committee believes that certain programs, such as ‘‘International 

Drug Control’’ should continue to be strongly supported as voluntarily funded programs. 

This subsection also mandates that if the budgets for the two 

United Nations organizational programs (Public Information and 

General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services) are not each reduced by 10 percent in 2007, the United States shall redirect 20 

percent of its assessed contributions for these programs to Internal 

Oversight programs, Human Rights programs, and Humanitarian 

Assistance programs. Further, in accordance with section 601, in 

2008 a certification is required by the Secretary that the United 

Nations Public Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services budgets are each reduced by 20 percent. 

The Committee notes that General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services accounts for approximately 20 percent of the assessed regular budget ($280 million per year). Some conferences 

cost upwards of $7,000–$8,000 per hour because of, among other 

things, interpreter, translation and documentation costs. Calls for 

streamlining and scaling back conferences have been heard 

throughout the years, but the United Nations has done little to address this issue. Likewise, the Committee notes that the Department of Public Information could better utilize available technologies and continue to consolidate United Nations Information 

Centers around the world to achieve greater efficiency and decreased operational costs. 

Section 101 (d) Effective Date. This subsection states that the 

amendment made by subsection (c) shall take effect and apply beginning in October 1, 2006. 

The Committee intends that this provision come into effect October 1, 2006. However, per the provision, funding implications do 

not arise until funding requests are made for payment toward the 

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United States assessed dues for the 2007 United Nations regular 

assessed budget. 

Section 102. Weighted Voting 

This section states that it shall be the policy of the United States 

to actively pursue weighted voting with respect to all budgetary 

and financial matters in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (5th Committee) and in the General Assembly in accordance 

with the level of financial contributions of Member States to the 

regular assessed budget of the United Nations. 

Section 103. Budget Certifications Requirements 

In accordance with section 601, this section requires the Secretary to certify that the United Nation’s biennial budget is maintained at the approved level, and should increases be necessary, 

they may not exceed 10 percent. It also requires the United Nations budget to be more transparent by requiring more details on 

the budget categories such as travel or equipment. The provision 

also requires managers to follow rules of performance-based budgeting and program evaluation. This certification also verifies that 

the Secretary General is assessing budget requests on the basis of 

evaluations on the programs’ relevance and effectiveness and is reporting to the General Assembly programs that meet the criteria 

for continued support or termination. The final required certification is that the United Nations is following a procedure in which 

all new programs approved by the General Assembly have a specific sunset date. 

While these ideas are not new, they are important and warrant 

inclusion in this bill. By including this provision, the Committee 

seeks to strengthen the resolve of the General Assembly and the 

Secretariat to incorporate modern budget practices and systems 

that allow for subjective assessments of the organizations’ performance. Incorporating such practices will over time, vastly improve 

the accountability and effectiveness of the United Nations. 

Section 104. Accountability 

Section 104 (a) Certification of Creation of Independent Oversight 

Board. In accordance with section 601, certification is required by 

the Secretary that the United Nations has created an Independent 

Oversight Board (IOB). The IOB must be an independent entity 

within the United Nations and not subject to budget or organizational authority of any United Nations entity other than the General Assembly, which will include in its budget all funds for the 

IOB. The Director of the IOB will be nominated by the Secretary 

General and approved by a majority vote of the Security Council. 

The IOB will consist of a total of five members (four others in addition to the Director), and all shall be appointed in the same manner as the Director. The IOB will be responsible for overseeing the 

audit plans and recommending the annual budgets of the Office of 

Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of External 

Auditors. In special circumstances, the IOB may appoint a special 

investigator and staff to investigate matters involving senior 

United Nations officials. 

Section 104 (b) Certification of United Nations Reforms of the 

OIOS. In accordance with section 601, certification is required by 

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the Secretary that the United Nations has designated the OIOS as 

an independent entity within the United Nations, with the exception of the OIOS’ relationship with the IOB and the General Assembly. The OIOS will receive all of its operating funds through 

the United Nations regular budget and shall not be dependent on 

any other entity within the United Nations for such funding. The 

OIOS may initiate and conduct an investigation or audit of any entity or employee of the United Nations. OIOS must establish whistle-blower protection for all employees of the United Nations. The 

Director of the OIOS must establish three Associate Directors of 

the OIOS: Associate Director for Specialized Agencies; Associate 

Director for Peacekeeping Operations; and Associate Director for 

Procurement and Contract Integrity. Each Associate Director will 

be responsible for specialized review of each of their areas of concern. 

As defined in Section 2 (8), for the purposes of the Act, Specialized Agencies of the United Nations shall include the: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Fund for Agricultural Development 

(IFAD); International Labor Organization (ILO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Telecommunication Union 

(ITU); United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Health Organization (WHO); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and 

the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 

Section 104 (c) Certification of Establishment of United Nations 

Office of Ethics. In accordance with section 601, certification is required by the Secretary that the United Nations has created an Office of Ethics (UNEO) which shall be responsible for creating and 

managing a Code of Ethics for all United Nations employees, including making policy, providing education and annual training, 

and overseeing and enforcing the implantation of the Code. The 

UNEO will receive all of its operating funds through appropriations 

from the General Assembly and shall not be dependent on any 

other entity within the United Nations for such funding. The Director of the UNEO must report on proposals for implementing a system for the filing and review of annual financial disclosure forms 

for all United Nations employees at the P–5 level and above, as 

well as for all consultants compensated at any salary level. This 

system for filing financial disclosure forms must be in place and 

operational not later than 6 months after the date of the publication of the report by the Director of the UNEO. 

The Director will also include in his report the following proposals for making public: all salaries for, and payments to, United 

Nations employees—including, but not limited to, pensions and 

buyouts; annual payments to consultants; and travel and per diem 

rates and payments for all United Nations employees. The ethics 

system will also seek to identify and prevent conflicts of interest 

by United Nations employees and shall be comparable to the system used for such purposes by the United States Government. 

Section 104 (d) Certification of Establishment of Position of Chief 

Operating Officer. In accordance with section 601, certification is 

required by the Secretary that the United Nations has created the 

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position of Chief Operating Officer (COO). The COO shall report to 

the Secretary General, and will be responsible for the daily administration, operation and supervision, as well as the direction and 

control of the business of the United Nations. 

Section 104 (e) Certification of Access by Member States to Reports and Audits by Board of External Auditors. In accordance with 

section 601, certification is required by the Secretary that Member 

States, upon request, are granted access to all reports and audits 

of the Board of External Auditors. 

The Committee has been investigating the United Nations Oilfor-Food program (OFFP) since March 2004. To date, the Full Committee has held two public hearings, and the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations has held four public hearings into the 

OFFP. The Committee investigations into the OFFP in particular, 

and United Nations mismanagement in general, are ongoing. During the course of this investigation, it has become apparent that operations at the United Nations were not well-managed, and were 

subject to serious ethical lapses. 

Specifically, the oversight of the OFFP was undercut by weak institutional oversight organization and management structures 

within the United Nations. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was denied adequate funding, manpower, and access 

needed to properly audit the OFFP. To be effective, OIOS and auditing functions in general need greater independence within the 

United Nations management structure. Increased oversight and accountability is needed throughout the United Nations, ranging 

from contracting to employee financial disclosure statements as 

part of the establishment of a broader ethics Code of Conduct for 

United Nations employees and contractors. 

Section 105. Terrorism and the United Nations 

This section translates into an actionable item based on the recommendations of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on 

Threats, Challenges, and Change regarding the need for a comprehensive universal definition of terrorism. It establishes a directive for the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 

(‘‘Permanent Representative ’’) to work toward the adoption by the 

United Nations General Assembly of: (1) a terrorism definition that 

includes any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 

to civilians for the purpose of intimidation or coercion of populations, governments, or international organizations; and (2) a convention on terrorism that includes such a definition. 

Section 106. United Nations Treaty Bodies 

This section states that the United States shall withhold contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for 

amounts proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended for support of United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees to which the United States is a party 

to neither a convention or international covenant nor a subsequent 

protocol of a particular monitoring body or committee. 

The purpose of this section is to withhold financial support to 

those human rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees that 

the United States is a party to neither the underlying convention 

nor international covenant, nor to the protocol. The withholding of 

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funds is not to be interpreted as barring United States participation in discussions and negotiations in such committees. 

Section 107. Equality at the United Nations 

This section seeks to end the discrimination of Israel in the 

United Nations system and ensure fairness and objectivity in the 

United Nations handling of Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

Section 107 (a) Inclusion of Israel in WEOG. This subsection calls 

for the expansion of the Western European and Others Group 

(WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in this group with 

full rights and privileges. At the United Nations, regional groups 

nominate members for election to United Nations bodies. Asian 

countries have declined to admit Israel into their natural geographic group due to objections by Arab countries, depriving Israel 

of the possibility of representation in U.N. bodies. In 2000, Israel 

was admitted to the Western and Others Group in New York, on 

condition that it not stand for election to the Security Council and 

continue to seek membership in the Asian group. Israel’s membership to the WEOG is severely limited. Every 4 years Israel has to 

reapply for membership, since its status is only temporary. Israel 

is not allowed to present candidacies for open seats in any United 

Nations body and is not able to compete for seats in major U.N. 

bodies. Israel is only allowed to participate in WEOG activities in 

the New York office of the United Nations, and is excluded from 

WEOG discussion and consultations at the United Nations offices 

in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. Therefore, Israel cannot 

participate in United Nations conferences on human rights, racism 

and a number of other issues handled in these offices. 

Section 107 (b) Department of State Review and Report. This subsection calls for a Department of State review and assessment of 

the work performed by the various United Nations commissions, 

committees, and offices focusing exclusively on the Palestinian 

agenda, followed by the submission of a report to the appropriate 

congressional committees recommending areas for reform, including proposals for the elimination by the United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. The General Assembly has created 

two committees which focus negatively on Israeli actions and protectively on the Palestinians: the Special Committee to Investigate 

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian 

People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 

People. These are in addition to the several organizations within 

the United Nations framework that deal with the West Bank and 

Gaza Strip. 

Section 107 (c) Implementation by Permanent Representative. 

This subsection calls for the Permanent Representative to seek the 

implementation of the recommendations made by the Department 

of State in subsection (b) and to withhold proportional U.S. contributions to the United Nations until such time as the recommendations are implemented. The objective of this section is to 

ensure United Nations compliance with U.S. efforts to improve the 

efficiency of that body. 

Section 107 (d) GAO Audit. This subsection calls for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the implementation of 

such reform proposals to ensure a third-party audit of these efforts. 

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In every session, the General Assembly devotes more condemnatory resolutions to Israel than to any other country or issue. 

Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the subject of more 

Emergency Special Sessions of the Assembly than any other issue, 

with these often marred by one-sided denunciations of Israel. 

Severe limitations have been increasingly placed on Israel’s 

membership at the United Nations. Israel is denied the ability to 

serve or run for leadership positions in multiple United Nations 

bodies and affiliated agencies. While Israel was accepted as a temporary member of the Western European and Others Group, it is 

not allowed to present candidacies for open seats in any United Nations body, or able to compete for major United Nations bodies. 

Israel is excluded from consultations at United Nations offices in 

Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. As long as the United Nations 

institutionalized reliance on the regional system continues, its 

members are obliged—by the principles of its charter—to find a solution to the discrimination against Israel. The WEOG states can 

do so without sacrificing their vital interests. 

There are several United Nations groups devoted to ’’Palestinian 

Rights,’’ and there is disproportionate representation of Palestinian 

issues through committees and commissions such as: the ‘‘U.N. Division for Palestinian Rights’’; a ‘‘Committee on the Exercise of the 

Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People’’; ‘‘U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian 

Authority’’; and the ‘‘NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.’’ 

In response to this disparity, this section requires that the Secretary of State report to Congress on the elimination by the United 

Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. It also requires 

that the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations implement the recommendations of that report, and requires the 

withholding of proportional U.S. contributions to the United Nations until such time as the recommendations are implemented. 

TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

(ECOSOC)

Section 201. Human Rights 

Section 201 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states that 

it shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice, vote, and 

influence at the United Nations to ensure that a credible and respectable Human Rights Council or other human rights body is established within the United Nations whose participating Member 

States uphold the values embodied in the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights. 

Section 201 (b) Human Rights Reforms at the United Nations. 

This subsection states that the President shall direct the Permanent Representative to ensure that the following human rights reforms have been adopted by the United Nations: (1) a Member 

State that fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights shall be ineligible for membership on 

any United Nations human rights body; (2) a Member State that 

is subject to sanctions by the Security Council or under a Security 

Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses shall be 

ineligible for membership in any United Nations human rights 

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body; (3) a Member State that is currently subject to an adopted 

country-specific resolution relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the government of such country in such country, or has 

been the subject of such an adopted country-specific resolution 

within the past 3 years shall be ineligible for membership in any 

United Nations human rights body; (4) a Member State that violates the principles of a United Nations human rights body to 

which it aspires to join shall be ineligible for membership in such 

body; and (5) no human rights body has a standing agenda item 

that relates only to one country or one region. 

The purpose of this section is to address the deplorable state of 

the current Commission on Human Rights. Violator countries such 

as Cuba and Sudan, who are current members, should not be arbitrators of human rights. This provision addresses minimum standards for membership in any current or future human rights body 

at the United Nations. Regarding the first criterion, ‘‘A Member 

State that fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights shall be ineligible for membership on 

any United Nations human rights body,’’ the Committee intends 

that such statement be adopted by the United Nations, as a 

foundational principle. The adoption of such a statement allows 

United States representatives to the United Nations a basis upon 

which to challenge a proposed candidate for membership on a 

human rights body that does not uphold the values embodied in 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

Section 201(c) Certification. In accordance with section 601, a certification is required by the Secretary that the human rights reforms in subsection (b) have been adopted by the United Nations. 

Section 201 (d) Prevention of Abuse of ‘‘No Action’’ Motions. This 

subsection states that the Permanent Representative shall work to 

prevent abuse of ‘‘no action’’ motions, particularly as such motions 

relate to country specific resolutions. 

The purpose of this provision is to address the rising abuse of ‘‘no 

action’’ motions in the Commission on Human Rights. A successful 

no action motion prevents debate on the merits of resolutions, and 

prevents a vote on a resolution. In 2004, there were successful no 

action motions on resolutions relating to China and Zimbabwe. In 

2004 and 2005 no action motions on the human rights situation in 

Belarus were considered, but defeated. The Committee maintains 

that human rights resolutions, particularly country-specific resolutions deserve a full debate on the merits and a vote on final adoption. 

Section 201 (e) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Human Rights. This subsection states that the United States 

shall continue to strongly support the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Additionally, in accordance with section 

601, a certification by the Secretary is required that the Office of 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 

been given greater authority in field operation activities, such as 

in the Darfur region, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Section 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 

Section 202 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states that 

is shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice, vote, and 

influence at the United Nations to: (1) abolish secret voting in the 

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Economic and Social Council; (2) ensure that, until such time as 

the Commission on Human Rights is abolished, only countries that 

are not ineligible for membership, per section 201(b), shall be considered for membership; and (3) ensure that after candidate countries are nominated for membership on the Commission on Human 

Rights, the Economic and Social Council conducts a recorded vote 

to determine such membership. 

Section 202 (b) Certification. In accordance with section 601, the 

Secretary shall certify that the policies described in subsection (a) 

have been implemented. 

ECOSOC is the United Nations body in which members of the 

Commission on Human Rights are selected. Therefore, condemnable membership selection must be addressed in ECOSOC, long 

before the Commission on Human Rights convenes for its annual 

meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. This provision seeks to ensure 

that membership criteria addressed in the human rights provision 

(201(b)) are adhered to in the body of selection, and that there is 

transparency in the selection process. 

TITLE III—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Section 301. International Atomic Energy Agency 

Section 301 (a) Enforcement and Compliance. This subsection establishes a directive for the U.S. to seek the establishment of: (1) 

an Office of Compliance and Enforcement within the Secretariat of 

the IAEA to function as an independent body of technical experts 

that will assess the activities of Member States and recommend 

specific penalties for those that are in breach or violation of their 

obligations; and (2) a Special Committee on Safeguards and 

Verification to advise the IAEA Board of Governors on additional 

measures necessary to enhance the agency’s ability to detect 

undeclared activities by Member States. Consideration should be 

given to the creation of individual enforcement mechanisms within 

the IAEA. This subsection also calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to seek the suspension of privileges for 

Member States that are under investigation, or are in breach or 

non-compliance of their obligations. The IAEA must prevent countries that are in noncompliance from serving on the Board. 

Section 301 (b) United States Contributions. This subsection reinforces U.S. priorities concerning the safety of nuclear materials and 

counterproliferation by: (1) calling for U.S. voluntary contributions 

to the IAEA to exclusively fund activities relating to Nuclear Security or Nuclear Verification; (2) directing the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized to focus on countries of proliferation concern, 

and to prevent state sponsors of terrorism, proliferators, and countries under IAEA investigation from benefiting from certain IAEA 

assistance programs; and (3) ensuring transparency in the IAEA 

budget process by calling for a detailed breakdown of expenditures 

for safeguards inspections and nuclear security activities. U.S. contributions to the IAEA should focus on enhancing safeguards and 

inspections, as well as efforts relating to nuclear safety and security, rather than providing technical assistance in the agricultural, 

medical, and other sectors. 

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Section 301 (c) Membership. This subsection calls on the U.S. 

Permanent Representative to the IAEA to: (1) block membership on 

the Board of Governors to countries that are under investigation or 

in violation of their obligations and have not signed or ratified the 

Additional Protocol; and (2) work toward the establishment of 

Board membership criteria that reflect such priorities. Countries 

that are in non-compliance of their obligations under international 

agreements and in violation of the rules that serve as the basis for 

individual United Nations bodies cannot and must not be entrusted 

with the enforcement of those very rules and obligations. They 

should be held accountable through suspension of privileges and 

denial of certain assistance. 

Section 301 (d) Report. This subsection calls for a report on the 

status of implementation of this section 6 months after enactment 

and annually for 2 years thereafter. 

Section 302. Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA 

This section expresses the sense of Congress that the national security interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 

Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Governors 

should recommend, and the General Conference should adopt, a 

resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security Action Plan into the 

regular budget of the IAEA. 

In recent years, several developments have highlighted the dual 

dangers posed by terrorism and proliferation of deadly unconventional weapons and the confluence of the two. This has been articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), 

in which President Bush summarized: ‘‘The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our 

enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of 

mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so 

with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts 

to succeed.’’ 

In addition, the discovery of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market 

network, Iran’s unreported nuclear activities (including secret uranium enrichment facilities), the withdrawal of North Korea from 

the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in April 2003, and the discovery 

of Libya’s covert nuclear weapons program, renounced in December 

2003, have heightened concerns. These concerns focus on the propensity for rogue states to develop a nuclear weapons capability 

and the potential for non-state actors participating in the global 

terrorism network to attain technology, expertise, and nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear-related terrorism. 

The United States has repeatedly viewed the IAEA as a vital 

component of U.S. strategies to address these threats. This title 

translates policy recommendations into concrete actions to achieve 

U.S. proliferation and terrorism goals. 

TITLE IV—PEACEKEEPING

Section 401. Sense of Congress Regarding Reform of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations 

This section expresses the Sense of Congress that although 

United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly 

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toward the promotion of peace and stability, the credibility of 

United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct. To restore 

that credibility, fundamental and far-reaching reforms must be implemented without delay. 

Section 402. Statement of Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 

This section states that it shall be the policy of the United States 

to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 

following areas: (1) planning and management; (2) conduct and discipline; and (3) peacebuilding. 

Subsection (1)(A) recognizes that the size, cost and number of 

United Nations peacekeeping missions have increased substantially 

over the past decade and calls for a global audit of such missions 

with a view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ and ensuring that they are cost 

effective. The Committee recommends that this audit should be 

conducted in conjunction with a comprehensive review of all mandates, as described in subsection (B). 

Subsection (1)(B) calls for a comprehensive review of all mandates to identify objectives which are practical and achievable. Duties which fall beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping, including the conduct of elections and post-conflict reconstruction, should 

be tasked to a new Peacebuilding Commission. Long-standing missions which are static and cannot fulfill their mandate, such as the 

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 

(MINURSO), should be closed. Where the complete withdrawal of 

peacekeepers is likely to result in the resumption of major conflict, 

the budgeting principle utilized by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)—which draws, in part, upon 

voluntary contributions—should be applied. 

Subsection (1)(C) calls for the adoption of a minimum standard 

of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with a particular 

emphasis on specific skills and experience. In response to the August 2000 ‘‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,’’ also known as the ‘‘Brahimi Report,’’ the Secretary General 

formed a Senior Appointments Group to establish a leadership profile and generate a list of ‘‘eminent persons’’ and senior United Nations personnel available for rapid deployment. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping, however, rejected Brahimi’s emphasis on 

managerial skills and experience, alternatively favoring ‘‘political 

considerations.’’ The Committee finds that as missions become larger and increasingly complex, the need for real talent in management positions becomes critical. A minimum standard of qualifications, including diplomatic, managerial, and decision-making skill 

in complex emergencies, should be established, and Special Representatives, Senior Managers, and Force Commanders who do not 

meet those standards should be removed. 

Subsection (1)(D) calls for mandatory pre-deployment training on 

interpretation of the mandate of an operation—particularly in the 

areas of use of force, civilian protection and field conditions—the 

Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS and human rights. It also stipulates 

that all personnel should be required to sign an oath that they 

have received such training and understand that violating the Code 

of Conduct may result in immediate termination of their United 

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Nations assignment. The Committee acknowledges that the conduct of ‘‘pre-deployment training’’ for peacekeepers already serving 

in the field clearly would not be possible. To this end, such training 

should be conducted prior to any new deployments or redeployments. Further, training should be conducted for those who already 

have been deployed but not trained. Both current and future peacekeeping personnel should sign the oath required under this subsection. 

Subsection (2)(A) calls for the adoption of a single uniform Code 

of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally 

to all personnel regardless of category or rank. The Committee recognizes that a major contributing factor to the problem in addressing misconduct is compounded by the fact that it currently is governed by 14 different bulletins, directives, guidelines, and undertakings which apply to up to five distinct categories of personnel. 

To this end, and consistent with the recommendations contained in 

the ‘‘Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’’ (A/ 

59/710, hereinafter cited the Prince Zeid Report), the Committee 

asserts that the General Assembly should formally adopt a single, 

uniform Code of Conduct, based on the principles contained in the 

Secretary General’s bulletin on special measures for protection 

from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13), ‘‘Ten 

Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets,’’ and ‘‘We Are 

United Nations Peacekeepers,’’ which applies to all categories of 

personnel. The Committee recommends that this Code of Conduct 

serve as a baseline, or a minimum standard of conduct, while recognizing that such rules may be augmented to meet the needs of 

particular missions. 

Section 2(B) asserts that all personnel, regardless of category or 

rank, should receive pre-deployment and periodic follow-on training 

on the Code of Conduct, be provided with a personal copy of the 

Code of Conduct translated into their national language, and sign 

an oath that they will abide by the Code of Conduct. The Committee notes the recommendation in the Prince Zeid report that 

translations could be provided by Member States. This subsection 

also calls for the conduct of educational outreach programs such 

that local communities may understand prohibited acts on the part 

of peacekeepers and identify the individual to whom they may direct complaints or allegations. 

Section (2)(C) calls for the presence of dedicated monitoring 

mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units (PCUs) currently deployed in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in each peacekeeping mission to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct. Such units should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations, and the Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping 

Operations (established under section 104(b)(10)), to ensure that 

their reports are not effectively obstructed. 

Section (2)(D) calls for the establishment of a permanent, professional and investigative body under OIOS dedicated to United Nations peacekeeping, which would include professionals with experience in investigating sex crimes. Though OIOS should maintain responsibility for the conduct of transparent and impartial investigations, the Committee recognizes that ultimate responsibility for 

41 

pursuing justice lies with Member States. To this end, provisions 

should be included in a Model Memorandum of Understanding that 

obligate troop contributing countries to designate professional prosecutors, who will be available on short notice, to participate in any 

investigation into the conduct of one of their nationals and provide 

guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements for 

subsequent legal action. The Personnel Conduct Units deployed in 

the field, as discussed in Section (2)(C), may also provide support 

to any OIOS investigation, as deemed appropriate. 

Section (2)(E) calls for the establishment of a dedicated unit 

within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, staffed and 

funded through existing resources, to compile and coordinate reports of misconduct, outcomes of investigations, and subsequent 

legal actions taken. The Committee recommends that such a unit 

function as the coordinating body of the Personnel Conduct Units 

deployed in the field, and that it be tasked with following up on 

completed investigations, particularly focusing on disciplinary actions taken by troop contributing countries. Information on subsequent actions should be shared with the Head of Mission concerned. The Committee believes that demonstrating that there are 

consequences for misconduct will promote confidence in peacekeeping missions and act as a deterrent to other potential violators. 

The Committee notes that substantial progress on this recommendation already has been made, and encourages the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide this unit with appropriate staff and funding through existing resources. 

Section (2)(F) states that while peacekeeping operations should 

provide immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse or 

exploitation, the responsibility for providing long-term treatment, 

care or restitution lies solely with the individual guilty of misconduct. The Committee rejects proposals for the creation of a Victim’s Trust Fund, or any similar fund, financed through assessed 

contributions. Such funds would only shield individuals from personal liability and reinforce an atmosphere of impunity. Alternatively, personal liability may act as a deterrent to misconduct. In 

the event that an individual responsible for misconduct has been 

repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide restitution, responsibility for providing victims’ assistance 

should be assigned to the troop contributing country or the manager concerned. In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, funds must be withheld from the payments made 

by the United Nations to the troop-contributing country concerned. 

(The Committee notes that each troop-contributing country receives 

a payment of $1080 per peacekeeper per month). In the case of 

misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor, the United Nations must garnish wages and/or impose appropriate fines. 

Section (2)(G) recognizes the role which Managers and Commanders play in creating an atmosphere of either compliance or 

impunity, and suggests that such information be included in their 

personal performance evaluations. To this end, Managers and Commanders who take decisive action to deter and address misconduct 

should be commended and rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment or impede investigations into misconduct 

should be relieved of duty. 

42 

Section (2)(H) calls for the establishment of a centralized database within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to track 

the cases of misconduct, particularly to ensure that those guilty of 

violations are permanently barred from participation in future missions. The Committee notes that such a data base already is being 

created, and urges the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to 

move quickly and decisively to ensure this undertaking is completed without delay and the data base is used as an effective management tool. 

Section (2)(I) calls for the adjustment of discretionary ‘‘welfare 

payments’’ currently provided to troop-contributing countries to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities. The Committee recognizes that conditions in a peacekeeping mission undoubtedly are difficult for military contingents and civilians alike, 

and it is incumbent upon the United Nations to take effective 

measures to ameliorate conditions of service. The Committee notes 

that troop contributing countries currently are provided with $1080 

per month per peacekeeper to maintain their contingents. Of that 

$1080, eight dollars has been designated for recreational funds. 

Unfortunately, the manner in which troop contributing countries 

disburse these funds is not transparent. This seems to be particularly true of the funds designated for recreational purposes. To this 

end, the Committee finds that funds designated for recreation 

should be deducted from the standard allowance disbursed to troop 

contributing countries and, alternatively, redirected toward the 

mission itself. The Head of Mission would then assume responsibility for ensuring that recreational dollars are spent in a manner 

consistent with their purpose. 

Section (3) calls for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, 

and a related Peace Support Office, to ease the demands placed 

upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and marshal the 

efforts of the United Nations, international financial institutions, 

donors and nongovernmental organizations to assist countries in 

transition from war to peace. The Committee notes that this proposal was included in the U.N.’s High-Level Panel Report, although 

details about the Commission’s membership and areas of specific 

areas of responsibility were not provided. The Committee asserts 

that the Commission should be a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council, limited in membership to ensure efficiency, 

and staffed through existing resources. 

Section 403. Certification 

This section requires the President to direct the U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations to oppose the creation of any 

new, or expansion of any existing, United Nations peacekeeping operation until the Secretary can certify to the Congress that the 

most immediate reforms outlined in Section 402 above have been 

implemented, including: (1) the adoption of a single, uniform Code 

of Conduct and establishment of training mechanisms to educate 

personnel on requirements and enforcement of the Code; (2) the 

provision to all personnel of a personal copy of the Code, translated 

into their national language; (3) the signature of an oath that they 

will abide by the Code and understand the consequences of violating the Code as a condition of their appointment; (4) the design 

and conduct of educational outreach programs within local commuVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
43 

nities to explain prohibited acts and identify the individual to 

whom the local population may direct complaints or allegations of 

exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct; (5) the creation of 

a centralized database to track cases of misconduct; (6) the establishment of an independent investigative and audit function within 

DPKO and OIOS; and (7) the adoption of a Model Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU), which obligates troop contributing countries 

to: (a) designate legal authorities to participate in any investigation 

into allegations of misconduct by an individual of such Member 

State; (b) refer investigations into violations of the Code of Conduct 

by an individual of such Member State to its competent national 

or military authority for possible prosecution; (c) report to DPKO 

on the outcome of any such investigations; (d) undertake to conduct 

on-site court martial proceedings where appropriate; and (e) assume responsibility for the provision of assistance to a victim of 

misconduct committed by an individual of such Member State. 

As the last two reforms (the establishment of an independent investigative and audit function and the adoption of a Model MOU) 

may not be immediately achievable, the respective certifications on 

implementation are required no later than January 1, 2007. The 

preceding five reforms, however, must be certified immediately. 

The Committee determines that such a withholding should not 

affect the United Nations’ ability to take decisive action in Darfur, 

Sudan. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1590 (March 24, 2005), 10,000 peacekeepers already have been authorized to be deployed to support implementation of the peace 

agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan. This resolution also authorizes the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 

to ‘‘closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with 

the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view toward expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur,’’ and to 

reinforce AMIS by providing logistical support, technical assistance, and reserve capacity. The deployment plan for UNMIS includes a presence in Darfur toward this end. 

When the State Department notified the Congress of the Administration’s intent to support UNMIS, it stated that the troop ceiling 

of 10,000 assumed a ‘‘re-hatting’’ of AMIS, such that it eventually 

would be folded into the United Nations mission. The Committee 

supports a stronger United Nations role in Darfur and, therefore, 

does not interpret the withholding of support for an expanded mission to include that re-hatting of AMIS under the current troop 

ceiling of 10,000. The Committee thus finds that the resources and 

personnel required to support, or even immediately take over, the 

AMIS mission already exist. 

The Committee further notes that all but one of the reforms 

linked to the certification required under this section already have 

been endorsed by the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping. The Committee commends the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping’s 

prompt response to the recommendations contained in the Prince 

Zeid report, but urges the United Nations to move expeditiously to 

ensure that these reforms are not merely endorsed, but immediately implemented. 

44 

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE. 

Section 501. Positions for United States Citizens at International 

Organizations 

This section requires the Secretary to make every effort to recruit U.S. citizens for positions within international organizations. 

Historically, the U.S. has been underserved in international organizations. In general, there has not been growth in the number of 

Americans taking positions in international organizations. The 

Committee encourages the Department to continue efforts to attract Americans to such jobs by utilizing all available means to do 

so. 

Section 502. Budget Justification for Regular Assessed Budget of 

the United Nations 

This section requires that the annual budget for assessed contributions to the United Nations include an itemization of the 

budget. It also requires that, at the earliest possible time, Congress 

is consulted about any changes under consideration to the regular 

assessed budget. The United Nations adopts a 2-year budget. In recent years, for the second year of the budget, the General Assembly 

has approved increases to cover new activities, such as coordinating 

the elections in Iraq, or to properly improve security of United Nations facilities. In 2005, the United Nations budget increased by 

$447 million. The increase was for: security of United Nations 

premises and personnel ($118 million); special political missions 

($192 million); exchange rate losses ($79 million); inflation and salary-related adjustments ($45 million); and other miscellaneous increases ($13 million). However, there is little effort to offset increases. 

With respect to budget adjustments, Committees of Congress are 

unaware of considerations of budget increases until such time as 

the U.S. has already made a commitment. The consequence is an 

increase in the U.S. assessment that Congress is obligated to fund. 

Congressional participation at an earlier stage is important in 

order to control unjustified budgetary commitments of the United 

Nations and to provide the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations with a better understanding of Congressional expectations. 

Section 503. Review and Report 

This section requires the Secretary to conduct a review of programs of the United Nations that are funded through the assessed 

budget and provide recommendations to the Congress on the continuation of such programs and which programs should no longer 

be part of the assessed budget, but should be voluntarily funded. 

This report should serve as an important baseline for pursuit of 

a more rational approach to United Nations budgeting. Furthermore, such an effort to identify core programs and those that truly 

should be supported by the interested countries will restore and 

refocus the United Nations with regard to its core mandate. 

45 

Section 504. Government Accountability Office 

This section requires the GAO to report on the status of the management reforms recommended by the Secretary General in 1997, 

2002 and 2005. As an oversight tool for Congress, this section also 

requires the GAO to report on each certification issued by the Secretary. 

TITLE VI—CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHOLDINGS OF CONTRIBUTIONS

Section 601. Certifications and Withholding of Contributions 

Section 601 (a) Certifications. The Secretary must certify to appropriate congressional committees that the United Nations has 

made certain reforms included in this Act. In the event the Secretary is unable to make such certifications, and only after providing the Congress with written justification and consultation, the 

Secretary may certify that the United Nations has made reforms 

that are substantially similar to the requirements or accomplish 

the same purposes as the requirements in this Act. In addition, if 

at least 32 of the 39 reforms mandated under the Act are in fact 

accomplished in this manner, all 39 certifiable reforms shall be 

deemed to have been implemented for the year in which the Secretary submits such certifications. However, the remaining seven 

reforms must be certified the following year. 

Additionally, 14 of the 32 certifications which the Secretary 

makes must include the following certifications: Subsection (d)(3) of 

Section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as 

amended by Section 101(c) of this Act, requiring the United Nations regular assessed 2008–2009 biennium budget for Public Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services be 

reduced by 20 percent against the budgets of such organizational 

programs for the 2004–2005 biennial period; Section 103(b)(1)(A), 

requiring the maintenance of a budget not in excess of the level 

agreed to by the General Assembly at the beginning of each United 

Nations budgetary biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus and do not exceed 10 percent; Section 103(b)(2)(D), the 

United Nations and each specialized agency has reestablished and 

are implementing sunset provisions for all new programs; Section 

104(a)(1), establishing an Independent Oversight Board (IOB); Section 104(a)(6), requiring the IOB to recommend annual budgets for 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of 

External Auditors; Section 104(b)(1), designating the OIOS as an 

independent entity within the United Nations; Section 104(b)(2), 

making the OIOS’s budget more independent and less subject to 

manipulation by including the OIOS in the General Assembly’s 

budget process; Section 104(c)(1), establishing a United Nations Office of Ethics; Section 201(b)(1), adopting measures to ensure that 

if a Member State fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it shall be ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights body; Section 

201(b)(2), adopting measures preventing Member States that are 

subject to sanctions by the Security Council, or under a Security 

Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses, be eligible for membership on any United Nations human rights body; Section 201(b)(3), adopting measures prohibiting Member States that 

are currently, or within the past 3 years, subject to an adopted 

46 

country-specific resolution relating to human rights abuses in the 

principal body within the United Nations, for the promotion and 

protection of human rights relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by a government of such country in such country, are ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights body; 

Section 201(b)(5), barring any United Nations human rights body 

from having a standing agenda item that relates only to one country or region; Section 202(a)(1), abolishing secret voting in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and Section 202(a)(2), adopting measures to ensure that until the Commission on Human 

Rights of the United Nations is abolished, only countries that are 

eligible for membership on a United Nations human rights body 

under this Act can be considered for membership on the Commission on Human Rights. 

The Committee intends to effect the 2007 United Nations regular 

assessed budget through this provision. Accordingly, certifications 

would implicate those contributions which the United States makes 

toward the United Nations 2007 budget, and subsequent budgets. 

Section 601 (b) Withholding of United States Contributions to the 

Regular Assessed Budget of the United Nations. Until the Secretary 

certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has made the reforms mandated by this Act, the United States shall appropriate, 

but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the contributions of 

the United States to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period, which shall be authorized to remain 

available until expended. 

Section 601 (c) Release of Funds. This subsection states that 

when all certifications (or alternative certifications) are submitted, 

the U.S. shall transfer to the United Nations amounts appropriated 

but withheld from expenditure under subsection (b). 

Section 601 (d) Annual Reviews. The Secretary is required to: (1) 

conduct annual reviews of compliance, beginning 1 year after the 

date on which the Secretary submits the final certification; and (2) 

forward a report to the appropriate congressional committees of the 

findings of such review. If the Secretary determines that the 

United Nations has failed to remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate certification), the 50 percent withholdings 

described in subsection (b) shall re-apply and take effect in the subsequent fiscal year(s) until all certifications (or alternative certifications) under subsection (a) have been submitted. 

Section 601 (e) Effective Date. This section states that the certifications (or alternate certifications) specified under subsection (a) 

shall be required with respect to U.S. contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues of the United Nations for 2007 and 

subsequent years. Accordingly, certifications would implicate those 

contributions which the United States makes toward the United 

Nations 2007 budget and subsequent budgets. 

The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 provides 

strong but necessary measures to prompt the United Nations to undertake such fundamental reforms. 

This bill provides the new U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations with a reasonable amount of time to work through 

diplomatic channels with other countries which also want to see 

the United Nations reform and restore its credibility. It gives the 

United Nations until 2007 to adopt the bulk of these reforms and 

47 

until 2008 for the remainder. However, if the United Nations fails 

to implement what are widely seen as reasonable reforms, financial 

penalties will ensue. Should withholdings occur, the United States 

will appropriate the 50 percent of contributions but withhold them 

from expenditure until such time as the certifications are made. 

As explained above in detail, the Act mandates that 39 reforms 

be tied to certifications in the areas of budgeting, oversight and accountability, and human rights. It also provides the United Nations 

flexibility for implementation by requiring only 32 of 39 reforms be 

enacted no later than 2007, with the remaining seven to be acted 

upon within the next year. 

It should be noted that if the United Nations makes the necessary reforms promptly, no arrearages will result from this Act. 

If the United Nations fails to act, however, the US taxpayers 

should not be expected to continue to pay for programs that operate 

with essentially a blank check—with no accountability for producing results, no check on outdated, inefficient, duplicative initiatives, no effective oversight of management of programs, and a 

human rights body that allows violator countries to sit as arbitrators of human rights. 

Some have asked whether the United States has a legal obligation to pay its United Nations dues even in the event the United 

Nations continues to resist fundamental reform as set forth in this 

Act. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration and some Members 

of Congress came to the conclusion that the U.S. obligation to pay 

assessed U.N. payments as limited and not absolute. Jeane Kirkpatrick, while serving as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations stated: ‘‘It is sometimes argued that as signatories to the 

treaty, we assume an absolute legal obligation to pay the assessed 

share of the budget, it seems to me, after consultation and reflection, that this obligations is real, substantial, and serious, but also 

that it is not absolute. . . I do not suggest the United States should 

take lightly the obligation to pay its assessed share of the budget. 

This is a serious, but not, in my opinion, an absolute obligation. To 

be sure, article 17 of the U.N. Charter requires Member States to 

pay their share of the U.N. budget as assessed by the General Assembly. We should not assume, however, that any expense apportioned by the General Assembly is absolutely valid.’’ 

The United States was the originator of the concept of having a 

United Nations organization. Americans have invested heavily in 

the principles and ideals that form the foundation of the United 

Nations—this Committee intends to, once again, look to history as 

a guide, and by providing constructive direction, commitment, and 

leverage of the power of the purse, the U.S. can remain part of the 

process to work toward meaningful reform. These actions will ultimately revitalize and strengthen the U.N. 

FEDERAL MANDATES

H.R. 2745 provides no Federal mandates. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
48 

ted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

SECTION 11 OF THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION 

ACT OF 1945 

øSEC. 11. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET. 

øNone of the funds available to the Department of State shall 

be used to pay the United States share of assessed contributions 

for the regular budget of the United Nations in an amount greater 

than 22 percent of the total of all assessed contributions for that 

budget.¿ 

SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 

NATIONS. 

(a) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE REGULAR

ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 

the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United 

Nations to— 

(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and accountable 

regular assessed budget of the United Nations; and 

(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain organizational 

programs of the United Nations specified under paragraph 

(2) of subsection (c) from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. 

(2) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—It shall be the policy 

of the United States to— 

(A) redirect United States contributions to the United 

Nations to achieve the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(B); and 

(B) redirect a portion of funds from the following organizational programs to pursue the policy objectives described in paragraph (1)(A): 

(i) Public Information. 

(ii) General Assembly affairs and conferences services. 

(3) FUTURE BIENNIUM BUDGETS.— The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

States at the United Nations to ensure that the shifting of funding mechanisms under paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of contributions under paragraph (2) be reflected in future resolutions 

agreed to by the General Assembly for the regular assessed 

budget of the United Nations for the period of a current biennium. To achieve the policies described in paragraphs (1) and 

(2), the United States Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations shall withhold the support of the United States for a 

consensus for such budget until such time as such budget is reflective of such policies. 

(b) 22 PERCENT LIMITATION.—In accordance with section 601 of 

the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the Secretary may not make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial 

49 

budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent 

of the amount calculable under subsection (c). 

(c) ANNUAL DUES.— (1) IN GENERAL.—For annual dues paid by the United 

States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the percentage 

specified in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the 

amount of the regularly assessed budget of the United Nations 

for a current biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the 

General Assembly. 

(2) CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ORGANIZA- TIONAL PROGRAMS FOR REDIRECTION.—The percentage specified 

in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the sum of 

amounts budgeted by resolution of the General Assembly for a 

current biennial period for the following certain organizational 

programs: 

(A) Economic and social affairs. 

(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked developing 

countries and small island developing States. 

(C) United Nations support for the New Partnership 

for Africa’s Development. 

(D) Trade and development. 

(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO. 

(F) Environment. 

(G) Human settlements. 

(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice. 

(I) International drug control. 

(J) Economic and social development in Africa. 

(K) Economic and social development in Asia and the 

Pacific. 

(L) Economic development in Europe. 

(M) Economic and social development in in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. 

(N) Economic and social development in Western Asia. 

(O) Regular program of technical cooperation. 

(P) Development account. 

(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees. 

(R) Palestine refugees. 

(3) REDIRECTION OF FUNDS.—Of amounts appropriated for 

contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues to the 

United Nations for 2008 and each subsequent year, if the funding mechanisms of one or more of the organizational programs 

of the United Nations specified in paragraph (2) have not been 

shifted from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded 

programs in accordance with subsection (a)(1), the Secretary 

shall ensure that such amounts in each such fiscal year that are 

specified for each such organizational program pursuant to the 

resolution agreed to by the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for the period of a current 

biennium are redirected from payment of the assessed amount 

for the regular assessed budget as follows: 

(A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior notification 

to Congress, the Secretary shall expend an amount, not to 

exceed 40 percent of the amount specified for each such organizational program pursuant to the resolution agreed to 

by the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of 

50 

the United Nations for the period of a current biennium, as 

a contribution to an eligible organizational program specified in paragraph (4). 

(B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior notification 

to Congress, the Secretary shall expend the remaining 

amounts under this paragraph to voluntarily funded 

United Nations specialized agencies, funds, or programs. 

(4) ELIGIBLE ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRAMS.—The eligible organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A) for redirection of funds under such paragraph are the following: 

(A) Internal oversight. 

(B) Human rights. 

(C) Humanitarian assistance. 

(D) An organizational program specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2), subject to paragraph (5). 

(5) EXPENDITURE OF REMAINING AMOUNTS TO CERTAIN ORGANIZATION PROGRAMS.— 

(A) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION.—Subject to not less 

than 30 days prior notification to Congress and the limitation specified under subparagraph (B), the Secretary is authorized to make a voluntary contribution to an organizational program of the United Nations specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2) of any amounts not 

contributed in a fiscal year to an eligible organizational 

program specified in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of 

paragraph (4). 

(B) 10 PERCENT LIMITATION.—A voluntary contribution 

under subparagraph (A) to an organizational program of 

the United Nations specified in subparagraphs (A) through 

(P) of paragraph (2) may not exceed 10 percent of the total 

contribution made under paragraph (3)(A). 

(d) FURTHER CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO BUDGETS FOR

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS AND CONFERENCE SERVICES.— 

(1) 22 PERCENT LIMITATION.—The Secretary may not make 

a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the 

United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent of the 

amount calculable under paragraph (2). 

(2) ANNUAL DUES EACH FISCAL YEAR.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—For annual dues paid by the United 

States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall be multiplied by onehalf of the amount of the regularly assessed budget of the 

United Nations for a current biennial period, as agreed to 

by resolution of the General Assembly. 

(B) CALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS AND CONFERENCE

SERVICES.—With respect to such United States annual 

dues, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall be 

multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted by 

resolution of the General Assembly for the 2004–2005 biennial period for the following organizational programs: 

(i) Public Information. 

51 

(ii) General Assembly affairs and conferences services. 

(C) REDIRECTION OF FUNDS.— (i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

United States Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations to make every effort, including the withholding 

of United States support for a consensus budget of the 

United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the organizational programs specified in subparagraph (B) for 2007 

by ten percent against the budgets of such organizational programs for the 2004–2005 biennial period. If 

the budgets of such organizational programs are not so 

reduced, 20 percent the amount determined under subparagraph (B) for contributions towards payment of 

regular assessed dues for 2007 shall be redirected from 

payment for the amount assessed for United States annual contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 

United Nations. 

(ii) SPECIFIC AMOUNTS.—The Secretary shall make 

the amount determined under clause (i) available as a 

contribution to an eligible organizational program 

specified in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (4) of subsection (c). 

(3) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO 2008–2009 BIENNIAL PERIOD

AND SUBSEQUENT BIENNIAL PERIODS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to 

make every effort, including the withholding of United 

States support for a consensus budget of the United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the organizational programs 

specified in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) for the 

2008–2009 biennial period and each subsequent biennial 

period by 20 percent against the budgets of such organizational programs for the 2004–2005 biennial period. 

(B) CERTIFICATION.—In accordance with section 601, a 

certification shall be required that certifies that the reduction in budgets described in subparagraph (A) has been implemented. 

(53) 

DISSENTING VIEWS

SUMMARY

We express our profound disagreement with the Republican 

members of the Committee who are sending this deeply flawed legislation to the whole House. While we share their commitment to 

meaningful and thorough reforms at the United Nations, this legislation may do more to undermine the current efforts at reform underway in New York rather than bolster them. By declaring our 

unilateral intention to withhold 50% of the dues we owe to the 

U.N. in a automatic and mechanical way, by mandating withholding of dues from programs that do not get moved from the 

U.N.’s assessed budget to a system of voluntary contribution and 

by requiring that the President immediately start vetoing U.N. security Council Resolutions establishing new or expanded peacekeeping missions if certain reforms are not met, this legislation will 

undermine our efforts at cooperation with like minded countries in 

New York, will lead to isolating us on the U.N. and budgetary reforms in a way that will undermine our own efforts to focus the 

U.N. on real transnational threats, and will hamper our ability to 

foster greater stability in the world, including even requiring more 

deployments of U.S. troops at a time when we are so fully committed in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. We need reforms at the U.N., but this legislation represents a bludgeon that 

could well undermine both it and our influence there. The Democratic alternative provides for comprehensive reforms at the U.N. 

similar to those in the Republican bill but provides sufficient flexibility to allow the United States to cooperate with like-minded 

countries at the U.N. to achieve the reforms we all seek. 

THE U.N. TODAY

The U.N. system composed of the U.N. itself and its specialized 

agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program, the 

World Health Organization, and the World Food Program, are a remarkable set of institutions that would need to be invented if they 

did not exist. Through actions and programs of these institutions, 

we have eliminated the scourge of deadly infectious diseases, responded to famines of huge proportions, and settled international 

disputes of extraordinary scope. 

And the U.N. frequently serves critical U.S. interests. Just to 

point out some recent cases, U.N. officials helped organize the successful Presidential elections in Afghanistan, trained thousands of 

workers for the critical Iraqi Parliamentary elections earlier this 

year, and helped mediate the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces 

from Lebanon. Often the U.N. can take action that would not be 

acceptable if proposed by another country, particularly in an environment of hostility and suspicion that can often exist in the develVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
54 

oping world towards former colonial powers or countries that are 

perceived as a threat. 

However, the U.N. has faults as well as virtues. It is not a fully 

independent actor with its own separate personality. Rather, it reflects less-than-perfect member states in a deeply flawed world. 

The U.N. is an organization composed of 191 member states that, 

in varying degrees, have their own shortcomings, injustices, flaws 

and hypocrisies of all types which are reflected, to some degree, in 

the institution itself. Any organization that has as its Board of Directors, which is in effect what the U.N. General Assembly is, so 

many disparate and numerous members will inevitably show dysfunction. 

The abuses of the Oil-For-Food scandal and the repeated transgressions of U.N. peacekeeping forces, so fundamentally inconsistent with the basic tenets of the U.N. itself, demonstrate that 

there is much wrong with the U.N.. This global institution must 

become more transparent and open, its employees must be held to 

the highest ethical and moral standards, and new structures must 

be created to prevent U.N. peacekeepers from exploiting their station and punishing those who do. 

And the United Nations must put an end to its persecution of the 

democratic state of Israel, which has become the whipping boy for 

totalitarian regimes around the globe. Serial human rights abusers 

must also be kept off the U.N. institutions explicitly designed to 

speak for the cause of human rights and democracy globally. 

These scandals and self-evident problems have created a crisis at 

the U.N. and have created a unique moment for reform. The Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Panel Report, the Secretary 

General’s own report ‘‘In Larger Freedom’’ and the Volker Commission’s investigation of the Oil-For-Food scandal have all created a 

consensus for profound change at the organization, much of which 

may culminate in a new vision for the U.N. to come out of the Millennium Summit scheduled for September 2005. 

It is in this context that the Committee considered U.N. reform 

legislation. Indeed, it is ironic that just when there is more momentum for reform than ever before, the legislation that has been approved by this Committee may undercut the U.S. ability to press 

effectively for the very reforms we all seek. 

THE HYDE LEGISLATION

Over the past several weeks, we have attempted to work with 

our Republican colleagues on the Committee to work out a compromise agreement on U.N. reform legislation. Despite our best efforts, we have been unable to reach an agreement. Given the normally bipartisan work of this committee, this is truly unfortunate. 

The legislation before us has features are very troubling. While 

we agree with the goal of the legislation and believe that many of 

the specific provisions are essentially correct, we believe the legislation itself is flawed. 

First, the Republican bill would require the U.S. to go into arrears with the U.N. by withholding its proportionate share of U.N. 

dues for nearly 20 organizational programs, including crime control, environment and refugees if the U.N. does not agree to allow 

55 

us to opt-out of our obligation to fund them as part of the U.N. regular budget. 

Second Republican bill would require even larger arrears by requiring the withholding of 50 percent of U.N. dues if two relatively 

small programs, public information and conferences, are not cut by 

20% in the next 2 years. 

Third, the Republican bill would require the same 50 percent 

withholding of our U.N. dues if any one of some 15 affiliated agencies, which are wholly outside of the U.N.’s direct management authority, do not implement difficult reforms. 

Fourth, the Republican bill has a number of very detailed management benchmarks which must be fulfilled in order to avoid the 

same automatic 50 percent withholding. Of the 39 such benchmarks, 14 have to be met without change. Thus, if the U.N. were 

to carry out 38 of 39 reforms, but failed to implement one of the 

mandatory reforms in the exact form conceptualized by Republican 

majority, the United States would STILL need to withhold 50 percent of its annual dues. 

Fifth, the Republican bill would require the United States to veto 

any new or expanded U.N. peacekeeping mission, even if such a 

mission supported vital U.S. interests, until certain peacekeeping 

reforms are implemented. 

Sixth, the Republican bill has only sticks, and no carrots. There 

are no incentives to convince Member States that we want to 

strengthen the institution. Indeed, the bill is full of unfunded mandates for new offices, positions and mechanisms. Indeed, some 

would argue that this is more bureaucracy to cure too much bureaucracy. 

Finally, the Republican bill would put us into peacekeeping arrears. Current law left over from the 1990s forces the U.S. contribution to the U.N. for peacekeeping operations to be capped at 

25 percent. When, in accordance with the Helm-Biden legislation, 

former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke obtained 

agreement to reduce the U.S. contribution to 27.1 percent from 

slightly over 30 percent, Congress agreed on a bipartisan basis to 

increase the cap from 25 percent to 27.1 percent on a temporary 

basis. The failure to extend this authority to pay at 27.1 percent 

will cause us to immediately go into arrears for operations that are 

designed to help those in conflict-ridden areas. 

The automatic nature of these cutoffs is troubling. Three weeks 

ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Lagon told this 

Committee that our annual dues to the United Nations is ‘‘an obligation we have signed onto’’ and that the Executive Branch ‘‘stands 

by . . . its request for appropriations for our dues for both the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.’’ 

High-ranking officials at the State Department later conveyed to 

us the Department’s strong opposition to the legislation currently 

before the Committee. State Department officials told us that the 

legislation would undoubtedly create new arrears at the United 

Nations because the U.N. reform benchmarks contained in the bill 

are not achievable. While many of the U.N. reforms being sought 

in this legislation are worthy goals, many of them, particularly in 

the budget area, require unanimous agreement by all 191 U.N. 

member states, including the likes of Iran and Syria. We believe 

56 

that this legislation, as crafted, is akin to threatening to blow up 

the universe because we find that the planets have refused to 

align. Planets are stubborn. Once in a while, they WILL line up— 

but not on demand, and certainly not under an imminent threat. 

On one of the bill’s central proposals to move some programs 

from the ‘‘assessed’’ budget to the ‘‘voluntary’’ budget—these same 

senior officials said that they ‘‘can’t possibly see a way’’ to accomplish this task, and that even our closest reform-minded allies at 

the U.N. would also oppose this initiative. This approach may lead 

to the adoption of a U.N. budget over our objections; to the detriment of financial support for initiatives that are in our interest, 

such as support for elections in Afghanistan and Iraq or the disruption of terrorism financing. 

We also note that another provision of the bill would require the 

United States to withhold its proportionate share of its contribution 

to the U.N. assessed budget for the costs of any treaty-based commission if the United States is not a party to the treaty. This provision is clearly aimed at the commission that reviews implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Although the views of the majority on this 

treaty are well known, trying to prevent other countries from discussing the crucial issue of discrimination against women around 

the world simply weakens human rights mechanisms instead of 

strengthening them. 

In addition, the restrictions on new and expanded peacekeeping 

missions are particularly troubling. As mentioned, under the legislation, if five conditions are not met, upon enactment of the legislation, the President would be required to veto new or expanded 

peacekeeping missions, including missions that are critical to U.S. 

interests. These reforms include adopting a code of conduct and 

then training 68,000 military personnel and 10,000 civilian personnel on this code. Given the U.N.’s small training staff, this will 

take months if not years. Thus, the President would be forced to 

veto peacekeeping missions, even if they were to stop the genocide 

in Darfur or take over our mission in Afghanistan. Such a requirement with no flexibility is simply not in our national interest. Indeed, by forcing the veto of needed U.N. peacekeeping missions, 

this legislation may well force the United States to take on greater 

global responsibilities at a moment when our troops and our diplomats are already spread thin. 

In addition, this provision may raise serious constitutional concerns. The decision to vote for a new or expanded peacekeeping 

mission at the U.N. is a decision of the President that ultimately 

may rest fully within his constitutional responsibilities. Not giving 

him a waiver is inviting a Presidential veto of this legislation that 

will suggest to those who do not know better that our government 

is divided on U.N. reform, which is not the case. 

In short, while the majority’s U.N. reform bill may have been 

written with the best of intentions, it will immediately cause our 

nation to go back into arrears at the United Nations without 

achieving the desired outcomes. It is simply incomprehensible that 

the Republican majority is prepared to tie the hands of our distinguished Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as she pursues reform 

at the United Nations. The legislation before the Committee microVerDate Aug 04 2004 21:05 Jun 10, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR120.XXX HR120
57 

manages every possible reform at the United Nations, creates mechanical and automatic withholdings, and gives Secretary Rice no 

flexibility to get the job done. 

THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

For these reasons, we offered a substitute amendment to bring 

about U.N. reform but which is a modulated and carefully crafted, 

flexible tool rather than a massive bludgeon and which gives Secretary of State Rice the flexibility she needs and deserves from 

Congress. 

With this substitute amendment, the Democrats on the Committee align ourselves strongly with those, including those in our 

Administration, who are fighting to ensure that the United States 

is better armed to promote serious U.N. reform, and not forced to 

cut off funds to the United Nations in a manner that is counterproductive to our national interest. 

The substitute amendment addresses all of the primary deficiencies with the majority bill before the committee. 

First, the substitute does not sever the link between achieving 

U.N. reform benchmarks and the possibility of withholding half of 

our U.N. dues. Rather, the tough benchmarks are largely the same 

as in the majority’s bill. But our substitute would give Secretary 

Rice the authority to withhold up to 50% of our U.N. dues, but 

would not mandate such a cut. While it is possible that the threat 

of withholding funds may help Secretary Rice achieve reforms at 

the U.N., the United States must not be forced to cut off funds according to some mechanical withholding formula. 

Second, the substitute changes the provision in the majority’s bill 

under which the United States would unilaterally withhold a portion of our dues to the U.N. if its member states refuse to change 

certain programs from the ‘‘assessed’’ to the ‘‘voluntary’’ budget. 

The amendment keeps this reform as a goal, but does not link it 

to a mandatory $100 million deduction in U.S. contributions. It is 

clear that this reform is largely unachievable in the foreseeable future, and Secretary Rice should not be forced to withhold U.S. dues 

from the U.N. for this reason. As a budgetary matter, this proposal 

would have to be agreed to by consensus at the U.N., giving the 

likes of Syria, Iran, Sudan and Burma a veto over this proposal. 

Indeed, this amendment hands a weapon to those who want to embarrass the United States and who do not really care about reform 

efforts there. 

Third, the substitute addresses the inflexibility of the majority’s 

bill on peacekeeping. The substitute keeps the far-reaching peacekeeping reforms, but provides Secretary Rice with a waiver in the 

event that a new mission is essential to America’s national interest. 

Fourth, the Democratic substitute also ensures that we do not 

withhold funds from the U.N. when it is separate specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization or the World Intellectual Property Organization, that have failed to make necessary reforms. It is fundamentally flawed reasoning to hold the U.N. accountable for the mistakes of U.N. affiliated organizations that do 

not operate under the authority of U.N. management. Rather then 

let these organizations proceed without any reform, the substitute 

58 

would give the Secretary the flexibility to target the withholding of 

U.S. funds from each specialized agency that fails to undertake reforms, instead of automatically withholding money from the U.N.. 

Fifth, the substitute provides for an extension of the authority to 

pay our peacekeeping dues at 27.1 percent for the next 2 years. 

Finally, the amendment includes incentives by supporting an effort to pay our dues on time (we now pay in the last quarter of the 

calendar year), supports an increased U.N. budget for the large 

number of new offices that will be needed to implement the reforms, supports a well structured buyout of unneeded U.N. personnel and supports a contribution to the U.N. Democracy Fund. 

We believe the amendment demonstrates the need for U.N. reform, lays out benchmarks that are at least as tough as those of 

the majority bill, provides for a flexible tool to carry out these reforms, and protects our national interest. We believe it is a superior approach and we are gratified that it engendered bipartisan 

support. 

TOM LANTOS. 

HOWARD L. BERMAN. 

GARY L. ACKERMAN. 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA. 

ROBERT MENENDEZ. 

SHERROD BROWN. 

BRAD SHERMAN. 

ROBERT WEXLER. 

ELIOT L. ENGEL. 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT. 

JOSEPH CROWLEY. 

EARL BLUMENAUER. 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO. 

ADAM B. SCHIFF. 

DIANE E. WATSON. 

ADAM SMITH. 

BETTY MCCOLLUM. 

BEN CHANDLER. 

Æ