PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1215

CHAZZ J. ROBERTS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

GLENN INDUSTRIAL GROUP, INC.; GLENN UNDERWATER SERVICES, 

INC.; GLENN UNDERWATER SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants – Appellees.

--------------------------------------

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:17-cv-00745-GCM)

Argued: December 10, 2020 Decided: May 21, 2021

Amended: May 24, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Keenan concurred.
2

ARGUED: Geraldine Sumter, FERGUSON CHAMBER & SUMTER, P.A., Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Jeremy Daniel Horowitz, UNITED STATES EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus 

Curiae. Frederick Martin Thurman, Jr., SHUMAKER LOOP & KENDRICK, PLLC, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James L. Lee, Deputy General 

Counsel, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate General Counsel, Sydney A.R. Foster, Assistant 

General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, UNITED STATES EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus 

Curiae.
3

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

This appeal arises out of a former employee’s allegations of same-sex sexual 

harassment by his supervisor and retaliatory termination. Chazz Roberts (“Roberts”) 

appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of his former 

employer, Glenn Industrial Group, Inc. (“Glenn Industrial” or “the company”), on claims 

of sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. We affirm the district court’s summary judgment as to 

Roberts’ retaliation claim, but vacate summary judgment as to his sexual harassment claim 

and remand for further proceedings.

I.

In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judgment, we state the facts and 

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Roberts, the nonmoving party.

Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2020). Glenn Industrial is a Charlotte, North 

Carolina-based corporation that provides underwater inspection and repair services to 

utility companies. Because underwater inspections and repairs are high-risk activities, 

Glenn Industrial prioritizes workplace safety. All of Glenn Industrial’s non-office 

employees are male.

In July 2015, Glenn Industrial hired Appellant Roberts as a “dive tender,” or diver’s 

assistant. At the time, Roberts received and signed for a copy of the company handbook, 

which included a “no harassment” policy. The policy required that all complaints of sexual 

harassment be reported to the company’s CEO, Richard Glenn (“Glenn”).
4

From the beginning of Roberts’ employment, his supervisor, Andrew Rhyner 

(“Rhyner”) repeatedly called Roberts “gay” and made sexually explicit and derogatory 

remarks towards him, including statements referring to him as a “fucking retard” or having 

“retard strength,” and asking him “how much dicks [he] would suck for money.” J.A. 48–

49. Roberts stated that “pretty much every time I’m around Andrew I was getting harassed by 

him.” J.A. 41. Rhyner also physically assaulted Roberts at least twice. On one occasion, Rhyner 

slapped Roberts’ safety glasses off his face, pushed him, and put him in a chokehold. On another 

occasion, Rhyner slapped Roberts, knocking his helmet off his head, when he, in Rhyner’s 

estimation, “said something stupid.” J.A. 53. Roberts complained to Rhyner’s supervisor, Bruce 

Evans, at least four times over the course of his employment. Evans told Robertsto “suck it up.”

J.A. 48. Roberts also complained to another supervisor, Brandon Neal, who witnessed some of 

Rhyner’s conduct.

Finally, Roberts voiced his concerns to Ana Glenn (“Mrs. Glenn”), Vice President 

of Glenn Industrial, the company’s Human Resources Manager, and wife of the company’s 

CEO. His complaints, made in November 2015 and January 2016, described Rhyner’s 

conduct in detail. Roberts did not, however, complain directly to Glenn. Rhyner was not 

disciplined or counseled, and his harassment of Roberts continued.

According to Roberts, Glenn Industrial often failed to address workplace safety 

issues. He reported a variety of safety violations related to the lack of necessary safety 

equipment and noted that the company failed to report safety issues as required.

Roberts was involved in a work-related accident on March 16, 2016 at a job site in 

Eden, North Carolina. A piece of equipment caught fire while Roberts was fueling it and 
5

he suffered burns to his hands and face. Roberts contends he was burned despite wearing 

his safety gloves, but Glenn attests that he was told Roberts was not wearing them at the 

time of the incident. After receiving first aid, Roberts drove himself back to Charlotte

where he met with Glenn. Glenn explained to Roberts that what he had done was very 

unsafe and that Glenn would have to release him if he had another safety incident. Roberts 

did not tell Glenn he was being mistreated, harassed, or discriminated against while at 

work. Roberts returned to the job site in Eden the next day.

On April 11, 2016, Roberts was on an assignment in Eden when Neal, the job-site 

supervisor, removed him from the site. According to Neal, Roberts was “disruptive and 

acting erratic all morning,” “appeared confused,” “was working in the wrong area,” and 

was wearing earbuds, which was strictly forbidden. J.A. 214. Roberts was later found in 

a fall hazard area, “swaying and unsure of his footing, without his hardhat, safety glasses, 

or gloves, and without [his] fall protection connected.” J.A. 214-15. Neal sent Roberts 

back to their hotel after noting that his eyes were “glassed over” and his speech was slurred.

J.A. 215.

Upon learning of Roberts’ removal from the job site, Glenn directed Glenn 

Industrial’s safety manager, Thomas Grice, to return Roberts to Charlotte. Grice described 

Roberts as incoherent, with slurred speech and “dazed” eyes. J.A. 215, 326-27. On the 

way, they stopped in Greensboro, where Roberts was administered a drug test. He 

ultimately tested negative for drugs. Glenn met with Roberts later that day. Roberts denied

using drugs or being intoxicated at work. He again made no mention that he was being 

mistreated, harassed, or discriminated against at work. According to Roberts, Glenn told 
6

him that he was not fit for duty and directed him to take a few days off, and then never 

called him back to work. Glenn contends that he terminated Roberts based on the two 

safety incidents, particularly the second one, which he considered to be very serious.

Roberts filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC in June 2016 alleging sex 

discrimination and retaliation.1

 The EEOC Charge stated that his supervisor called him 

“gay,” made “numerous sexually explicit negative comments toward” him, and assaulted 

him. Id. Following an investigation, the EEOC dismissed the Charge and issued Roberts 

a “right-to-sue” letter.

Roberts sued Glenn Industrial in February 2018, alleging, among other claims, 

same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (“Title VII”). The district court, relying on Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), rejected Roberts’ claim that his 

supervisor harassed him on the basis of sex and granted summary judgment to the 

employer. The court found that Oncale identified three situations that support a claim of 

same-sex sexual harassment based on gender, but none of those “Oncale situations” applied 

in Roberts’ case. J.A. 447.

Further, the court found that Roberts had not established a claim of retaliation under

Title VII because he did not proffer evidence that Glenn, the decisionmaker, was aware of 

1 According to Glenn, he first learned of Roberts’ sexual harassment claims when 

he received the EEOC Charge. J.A. 216. In response to the Charge, Glenn claimed that 

Roberts received multiple safety warnings for not wearing personal protective equipment 

that were “placed on file by his supervisors,” J.A. 303, but there is no formal documentation 

of safety violations in Roberts’ file.
7

his sexual harassment complaints before he fired him. The court held that even if Glenn 

had been aware of Roberts’ protected activity, a “‘months’[-]long delay between protected

conduct and an adverse action is too long” to support a causal relationship. J.A. 448. 

Finally, the district court held that Glenn Industrial set forth a legitimate non-retaliatory 

reason for his termination—his violation of company safety policies. Thus, Roberts could 

not prove that his alleged protected activity was the “but-for” cause of the adverse 

employment action. This appeal of Roberts’ Title VII claims followed.2

Roberts appeals the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Glenn 

Industrial. He contends the court erred in concluding that Roberts (1) could not establish 

a claim of same-sex sexual harassment where he failed to prove his harasser identifies as 

gay; and (2) could not prove a claim of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker 

had actual knowledge of Roberts’ protected activity.

II.

This Court reviews an order of summary judgment de novo. Carnell Constr. Corp. 

v. Danville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 716 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material act and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. 

2 Roberts also sued for violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, and for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress pursuant to North Carolina common law. Roberts did not pursue his 

overtime claims and has not appealed the district court’s dismissal of his other state law 

claim.
8

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The court “consider[s] the evidence and all 

inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to” the non-moving 

party. Carnell Constr. Corp., 745 F.3d at 716.

Addressing each of Roberts’ arguments, we turn first to his claim that Glenn Industrial 

is liable under Title VII for harassment his supervisor inflicted upon him because of his sex. 

He contends he established a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on a hostile work 

environment, and the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale when 

it failed to recognize his claim on the ground that his harasser did not identify as gay.

A.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 

of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII is violated “[w]hen 

the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims’ employment and 

create an abusive work environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)

(internal citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on 

a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) based on 

the plaintiff’s sex; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of 

employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) that is imputable to the 

employer. Okoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011). “Conduct is 

‘unwelcome’ when it continues after the employee sufficiently communicates that it is 

unwelcome.” Albero v. City of Salisbury, 422 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557–58 (D. Md. 2006) 
9

(citing Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (D.S.C. 1999)). “Establishing the 

third element requires that the plaintiff show that the work environment was not only 

subjectively hostile, but also objectively so.” Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 

2011). To determine whether an environment is hostile, the Court must look at all the 

circumstances, which “may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 

and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 

510 U.S. at 23. And as to the fourth element, an employer may be found vicariously liable 

to an employee when a supervisor “with immediate (or successively higher) authority” over 

him creates an “actionable hostile environment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 

775, 807–08 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). The 

employer “may be liable in negligence if it knew or should have known about the 

harassment and failed to take effective action to stop it.” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 

F.3d 321, 335 (4th Cir. 2011). “Knowledge of harassment can be imputed to an employer 

if a reasonable person, intent on complying with Title VII, would have known about the 

harassment.” Ocheltree v. Scollon Prod., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 334 (4th Cir. 2003). Once 

the employer has notice, it must respond with remedial action reasonably calculated to stop 

the harassment. See Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (4th Cir. 

1995).

B.

Roberts argues that he has proved a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on 

a hostile work environment due to Rhyner’s sufficiently severe or pervasive unwelcome 
10

conduct based on Roberts’ sex. See Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220. The district court’s decision 

addressed only a single prong of his prima face case—whether the harassment was “based 

on sex.” Roberts contends that the district court misconstrued and misapplied the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, when it 

rejected Roberts’ claim that his supervisor harassed him on the basis of sex in violation of 

Title VII. We agree.

In Oncale, the Supreme Court held that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim 

of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or 

the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.” 523 U.S. 

at 79. The Court then identified three evidentiary routes by which a plaintiff could prove 

that he was the victim of same-sex harassment based on his sex: (1) when there is “credible 

evidence that the harasser [is] homosexual” and the harassing conduct involves “explicit 

or implicit proposals of sexual activity;” (2) when the “sex-specific and derogatory terms” 

of the harassment indicate “general hostility to the presence of [the victim’s sex] in the 

workplace”; and (3) when comparative evidence shows that the harasser treated members 

of one sex worse than members of the other sex in a “mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 80–81. 

“Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow . . . he or she must always prove 

that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but 

actually constituted ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” Id. at 81.

Here, the district court found that the second and third “Oncale situations” were not 

applicable, as there was “no evidence that Rhyner was motivated by a general hostility 

towards men in the workplace, and Glenn’s worksites are not mixed-sex workplaces—they 
11

are all male—so there is no possibility of comparative evidence.” J.A. 447. As to the first

“Oncale situation,” the district court concluded that Oncale “requires not just evidence, but 

‘credible evidence,’” that the offending supervisor is gay,” but “[t]he only evidence in the 

record is that Rhyner is straight,” and “there is no evidence that Rhyner made ‘explicit or 

implicit proposals of sexual activity.’” J.A. 447. In the district court’s view, none of 

Rhyner’s comments could be characterized as such, and so did not establish discrimination 

based on sex. The court also held that Rhyner’s physical assaults were “not of a sexual 

nature.” J.A. 447. Finding that none of the “Oncale situations” applied in Roberts’ case, 

the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Glenn Industrial on the sexual 

harassment claim. J.A. 447. In so doing, the district court treated the three Oncale

examples as the only routes by which a plaintiff could prove a sexual harassment claim.

C.

The district court erred in its interpretation of Oncale. Nothing in Oncale indicates 

the Supreme Court intended the three examples it cited to be the only ways to prove that 

same-sex sexual harassment is sex-based discrimination. This conclusion—that the three 

circumstances the Supreme Court described are not exclusive—is best illustrated by 

examining the facts underlying Oncale’s claim.

Oncale, a male oil platform roustabout, was repeatedly and “forcibly subjected to 

sex-related, humiliating actions” by male supervisors and a co-worker “in the presence of 

the rest of the crew,” was “physically assaulted . . . in a sexual manner,” and was threatened 

with rape. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. Notably, Oncale’s sexual harassment claim did not fall 

under any of the three examples the Supreme Court cited as ways a plaintiff could establish 
12

that same-sex harassment was “based on sex.” The evidence did not indicate the harassers 

identified as gay, were hostile to the presence of other men on the platform, or that they 

treated women differently (because there were no women on the platform). See id. at 80–

81. Yet the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the employer and 

remanded the case to permit Oncale to argue that the same-sex harassment he suffered 

constituted discrimination “because of . . . sex.” Id. at 81–82.

D.

Since Oncale, this Court has not addressed how a plaintiff may prove a same-sex 

sexual harassment claim in a published opinion. Here, the district court relied on an 

unpublished district court decision, McDowell v. Nucor Building Systems, No. 3:10-cv172, 2012 WL 714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 462 (4th Cir. 2012). 

But McDowell does not compel the conclusion the district court reached. The McDowell

court did not hold that proof of same-sex harassment is limited to the three routes described 

in Oncale. The court noted the three examples and that the magistrate judge appeared to 

rely on the first one. Id. at *6. It then affirmed the magistrate judge’s determination that 

the plaintiff’s evidence of the harasser’s homosexuality, or that he proposed sexual activity,

was insufficient to support a claim of same-sex sexual harassment.

3 Id.

More recently, in Dooley v. Capstone Logistics, LLC, 764 F. App’x 389 (4th Cir. 

2019), another unpublished, per curiam opinion, this Court appears to suggest that the 

Oncale examples are the exclusive means to establish that same-sex harassment was based 

3 This Court affirmed the district court, but in an unpublished, nonbinding decision 

that did not address this issue.
13

on sex. The Court identified the three Oncale examples, and then held that the plaintiff 

had not produced evidence beyond mere speculation that the harasser was homosexual, or

that he treated the plaintiff harshly because he was hostile to men, or that the harasser “had 

any interactions with women in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 390.

But other circuits have considered the question presented here and stated 

conclusively that Oncale’s three examples were not intended to serve as an exhaustive list 

of the ways to prove that same-sex harassment was based on sex.

4

 These courts have noted 

that the Supreme Court used the language “for example” and “[w]hatever evidentiary route 

the plaintiff chooses to follow,” to indicate the list is not exclusive. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. 

Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Oncale, 523 

U.S. at 80–81). Further they have acknowledged that “nothing in Oncale overturns or 

otherwise upsets the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)

4 See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–63; 264 (3d 

Cir. 2001) (recognizing potential cause of action when same sex harassment is based on 

failure to conform to sex stereotypes, and noting that “other ways in which to prove that 

harassment occurred because of sex may be available”); E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 

731 F.3d 444, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[E]very circuit to squarely consider the 

issue has held that the Oncale categories are illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature”); 

Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that Oncale’s 

examples were illustrative, not exhaustive); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., 397 F.3d 1063, 1068 

(8th Cir. 2005) (Oncale sets forth non-exhaustive list including three possible evidentiary 

routes to show harassment was based on sex); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 

1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (Oncale’s three evidentiary routes not exhaustive). See also

Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–66 (6th Cir. 2006) (acknowledged the 

availability of another form of proof based on sex stereotyping); but see Wasek v. Arrow 

Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2012) (court treated the Oncale

categories as exclusive, but did not expressly consider the issue because the plaintiff’s 

claim fell into Oncale’s first category). To the extent that Wasek is inconsistent with 

Vickers, the earlier case binds that court. See Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 455 n.6.
14

that] a plaintiff may establish a sexual harassment claim with evidence of sexstereotyping.” Id. at 456. We adopt this well-reasoned view and recognize that additional 

forms of proof beyond those identified in Oncale are available to plaintiffs to demonstrate 

that the same-sex harassment they suffered was based on sex, including proof of 

discrimination based on a plaintiff’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes. In so doing, we 

reject Glenn Industrial’s arguments that Roberts’ claim is limited to the evidentiary routes 

described in Oncale, and that Roberts cannot show that the harassment was based on sex

because Rhyner is not gay and did not make explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity.

Glenn Industrial also attempts to reframe Roberts’ claim that he was discriminated 

against because of his sex as a claim he was discriminated against because of his perceived 

sexual orientation. This argument, however, is based on a belief that Title VII affords 

Roberts no protection for such a claim. See Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 

751–52 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Title VII does not prohibit conduct based on the employee’s 

sexual orientation.”). But this Court’s decision in Hopkins presents no barrier to Roberts’ 

claim. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), the Supreme Court held that 

discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender status violates Title VII “because 

to discriminate on these grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual 

employees differently because of their sex.” Id. at 1742. The Court also applied its 

reasoning broadly to employees who fail to conform to traditional sex stereotypes. Id. at 

1741–43 (explaining that an employer who fires a man for being “insufficiently masculine”

does so “because of sex,” and where an employer intentionally penalizes a man for traits 
15

or actions it tolerates in a female, “the employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and 

impermissible role in the discharge decision”).

Thus, we follow the majority of our sister circuits in concluding that Oncale does 

not limit the evidentiary routes by which a plaintiff may prove same-sex sexual harassment 

to those the Court described. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock makes 

clear that a plaintiff may prove that same-sex harassment is based on sex where the plaintiff 

was perceived as not conforming to traditional male stereotypes. See id. Thus, the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment to Glenn Industrial on Roberts’ same-sex sexual 

harassment claim.

E.

Further, the district court erred by disregarding entirely the evidence of Rhyner’s 

physical assaults on Roberts because they were “not of a sexual nature.” J.A. 447. This 

Court has held that “[a]ctionable discrimination includes conduct ‘because of’ the victim’s 

gender, which is broader than conduct of a ‘sexual nature.’” Conner v. SchraderBridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 n.16 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 

79–81); see also Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533–34 (7th Cir. 1999) (physical assault 

on coworker resulting in injured wrist was evidence of hostile environment based on sex). 

While Rhyner’s actions in choking and slapping Roberts were not overtly sexual, there is 

no requirement that they be so to be considered as evidence in support of a claim of a 

hostile environment based on sex. The district court erred in failing to examine more 

broadly whether Rhyner’s physical assaults on Roberts were part of a pattern of 

objectionable, sex-based discriminatory behavior.
16

F.

In light of the district court’s errors, we vacate its entry of summary judgment as to 

Roberts’ sexual harassment claim and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the 

district court must reexamine, based on a proper application of Oncale and with due 

consideration given to the evidence of Rhyner’s physical assaults, whether Roberts 

established that the harassment he suffered was based on his sex. Further, the district court 

must examine whether the remaining elements of a prima facie case of sexual harassment 

have been satisfied as well. See Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220. We therefore remand for the district 

court to determine whether the record could permit a reasonable jury to conclude not only 

that Roberts was subjected to conduct based on his sex, but that the conduct was also 

unwelcome, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and 

create a hostile work environment, and imputable to Glenn Industrial. See Bostock, 140 S. 

Ct. 1741–43; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79; Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Bonds, 629 F.3d at 385 (4th Cir. 2011); Hoyle, 650 F.3d at 

335; Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 334; Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1131–32; Albero, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 

557–58.

III.

Next, we turn to Roberts’ claim that Glenn fired him in retaliation for his complaints 

of sexual harassment. We find that Roberts has failed to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliatory termination. He has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal 

relationship between his protected activity and his employer’s adverse action. Glenn did 
17

not have actual knowledge of Roberts’ complaints of sexual harassment when he 

terminated him, and there was a lack of temporal proximity between Roberts’ last 

complaint and his termination.

A.

Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for 

complaining about prior discrimination. Foster v. Univ. of Md. – Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 

243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a)). A plaintiff may 

prove a Title VII retaliation claim either through direct evidence of retaliatory animus or 

via the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id.; 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Johnson v. United 

Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 20-1313, 2021 WL 31914, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (citing Laing 

v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff may demonstrate 

retaliation through either direct evidence of retaliation or through the McDonnell Douglas

framework)).

To prevail under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish 

a prima facie case by showing that he “engaged in protected activity,” that his employer 

“took an adverse action against [him],” and that “a causal relationship existed between the 

protected activity and the adverse employment activity.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (internal 

citation omitted); Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747 (4th Cir. 2006). After a prima facie

case is made, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it took adverse action for a 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason. Foster, 787 F.3d at 250. If the employer makes this 

showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the employer’s evidence by 
18

demonstrating the employer’s purported non-retaliatory reasons were pretext for 

discrimination. Id.

B.

Roberts does not allege any direct evidence of retaliation; he relies instead on the 

application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove his claim. He has satisfied the 

first and second prongs of a prima facie case of retaliation. “Protected activity under Title 

VII includes complaints of discrimination based upon ‘race, color, religion, sex or national 

origin.’” Landino v. Sapp, 520 F. App’x 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balazs v. 

Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 1994)). Complaints raised through internal company 

procedures are recognized as protected activity. Roberts certainly engaged in protected 

activity when he complained of the harassment—first to Rhyner’s supervisor, Brandon 

Neal, then to another supervisor, Bruce Evans, and ultimately to Mrs. Glenn in her role as 

the company’s manager of Human Resources.

Further, Roberts’ termination was an adverse employment action. “An adverse 

employment action is a discriminatory act that ‘adversely affect[s] the terms, conditions, 

or benefits of the plaintiff’s employment.’” Chang Lim v. Azar, 310 F. Supp. 3d 588, 601 

(D. Md. 2018) (quoting Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 

2007)). “Discharge” from employment is one form of adverse employment action. See id.

at 601 (citing Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also Dowe v. Total 

Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 656–57 (4th Cir. 1998)

(recognizing discharge is an adverse employment action). There is no dispute that Glenn 
19

fired Roberts approximately three months after he last complained about the alleged 

mistreatment.

C.

Glenn Industrial contends that Roberts cannot establish the third element of a prima 

facie case of retaliation, which requires a showing that “a causal relationship existed 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment activity.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 

250, 253. Stated differently, a plaintiff must show that his employer “took the adverse 

action because of the protected activity.” Bryant v. Aiken Regional Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 

F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 190 

(4th Cir.2001)) (emphasis added).

“A plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate that a protected activity caused an adverse 

action through two routes.” Johnson, 2021 WL 31914, at *2. A plaintiff may establish the 

existence of facts that “suggest[] that the adverse action occurred because of the protected 

activity.” Id. (citing Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 

that “relevant evidence may be used to establish causation”)). A plaintiff may also 

establish that “the adverse act bears sufficient temporal proximity to the protected activity.”

Id. (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)). The existence 

of relevant facts alone, or together with temporal proximity, may be used to establish a 

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See id.

Glenn Industrial argues that Roberts cannot satisfy the causation prong of a prima 

facie case of retaliation for two reasons. First, it argues that no causal connection between 

the protected activity and the adverse action can be established where Glenn, as sole 
20

decisionmaker, fired Roberts without actual knowledge of the harassment or of any 

complaints of harassment made to the company’s employees. Second, Glenn Industrial

argues that Roberts’ termination occurred too long after his last complaint—approximately 

three months—to raise a causal inference. We agree on both grounds and conclude that 

the district court did not err in finding that Roberts failed to establish the requisite causal 

connection between his protected activity and the adverse action taken against him.

1.

Roberts disagrees on both points. He first argues that constructive knowledge of 

protected activity based on complaints made to supervisory employees is enough to support 

a causal link between that activity and a decisionmaker’s adverse employment action. He 

insists Glenn is liable for retaliation despite his denial that he had any prior knowledge of 

the alleged harassment or the complaints. Glenn Industrial, Roberts contends, was

repeatedly “put on notice” of the sexual harassment through its employees but failed to 

remediate it, and thus, as CEO of the company, and as the husband of the company’s 

Human Resources manager to whom Roberts complained, Glenn had constructive 

knowledge of the harassment and Glenn Industrial may be held liable for retaliatory

termination.

Glenn Industrial does not deny that Roberts reported Rhyner’s harassing conduct on 

multiple occasions to three different supervisory employees, or that Roberts was fired. It 

contends, and Roberts concedes, that Roberts never told Glenn directly of the harassment 

despite having met with him personally on two occasions. Further, Glenn asserts that he 
21

did not learn about the harassment or the complaints until months after Roberts’ 

termination when he received notice of the EEOC Charge.

In this Circuit, we have consistently required proof of a decisionmaker’s knowledge

of protected activity to support a Title VII retaliation claim. To establish a causal 

relationship between the protected activity and the termination, a plaintiff must show that 

the decisionmaker was aware of the protected activity at the time the alleged retaliation 

occurred. Baqir, 434 F.3d at 748; see also Johnson, 2021 WL 31914, at *2 (citing Dowe, 

145 F.3d at 657 (plaintiff cannot establish the causation element of her prima facie case 

where the relevant decisionmaker was unaware of her protected activity); Landino, 520 F. 

App’x at 198 (no causal connection established where plaintiff failed to present evidence 

that any of his supervisors responsible for the alleged discrimination knew he was claiming 

discrimination based on a protected status)).

In Dowe, this Court held

To satisfy the third element, the employer must have taken the adverse 

employment action because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. 

Since, by definition, an employer cannot take action because of a factor of 

which it is unaware, the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in 

a protected activity is absolutely necessary to establish the third element of 

the prima facie case.

145 F.3d at 657 (citing Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 267 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (dismissing claim because no evidence that relevant decisionmaker knew 

plaintiff had complained of discrimination); Hudson v. S. Ductile Casting Corp., 849 F.2d 

1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 1988) (dismissing claim because relevant decisionmaker was 

unaware plaintiff had filed an EEOC complaint); Talley v. U.S. Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 
22

508 (8th Cir.1983) (dismissing claim because no evidence that supervisor who made 

adverse personnel decision was aware that plaintiff had engaged in a protected activity)).

Thus, where a relevant decisionmaker is unaware of any prior complaints, a plaintiff 

“cannot establish the necessary causal connection between [his] filing a complaint . . . and 

[his] termination. It necessarily follows, therefore, that [the plaintiff] cannot establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. In reaching this conclusion in Dowe and in other cases, 

our Court’s analysis has centered on what the relevant decisionmaker knew at the time of 

the adverse employment action, not on any knowledge other employees may have had that 

could be imputed to the employer.

In support of his argument that he need only establish constructive knowledge of 

the protected activity, Roberts relies on a series of Fourth Circuit Title VII cases which he 

contends stand for the proposition that a defendant is liable for retaliation if it has actual or 

constructive knowledge of the harassment. See Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 

335 (4th Cir. 2018); Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2014); see 

also Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 2006) (employer liable for co-worker’s 

harassing conduct where employer “was negligent in failing, after actual or constructive

knowledge, to take prompt and adequate action to stop it”); Ocheltree, Inc., 335 F.3d at

334 (knowledge of harassment can be imputed to an employer if a reasonable person, intent 

on complying with Title VII, would have known about the harassment). Based on these 

cases, Roberts argues that Glenn Industrial may be held liable for retaliation even if Glenn 

did not receive Roberts’ sexual harassment complaints personally. In Roberts’ view, his 

retaliation claim should proceed under the theory that Glenn, as CEO, had constructive 
23

knowledge of Roberts’ complaints when he terminated his employment because the 

repeated complaints to his supervisory employees put the company on notice of the 

harassment.

All of these cases, however, miss the legal mark. While each adjudicates one or 

more Title VII harassment claims, only one of them, Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 

at 317, also involves a Title VII retaliation claim. In relying upon these cases, Roberts 

conflates the requirements to prove the fourth element of a Title VII harassment claim, 

which requires a finding that the harassment was “imputable to the employer,”5 with what 

is required to prove the causation element of a prima facie case of a Title VII retaliation 

claim. Thus, the cited authority does not, as Roberts claims, establish that a Title VII 

retaliation defendant may be held liable if it has constructive knowledge of alleged 

harassment.

Further, as both a factual and procedural matter, this Court’s decision in Strothers

is not instructive here. In that case, the Court considered whether the decisionmaker 

understood or should have understood the plaintiff’s complaint to be a complaint of racial 

discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Id. at 336. Whether the decisionmaker had 

knowledge of the plaintiff’s harassment complaints was simply not at issue. In fact, the 

decisionmaker was fully aware of plaintiff’s complaints; he had engaged in multiple 

conversations with the plaintiff regarding the harassment and had received from her an 

5 See Freeman, 750 F.3d at 420; Howard, 446 F.3d at 565; Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 331.
24

informal memorandum documenting the harasser’s behavior.6 When the plaintiff 

requested the necessary forms to formalize her complaint, the decisionmaker fired her the 

next day. Id. at 325–26. Finding none of Roberts’ cited authority persuasive, we conclude 

that Fourth Circuit precedent addressing the causation prong of a prima facie case of 

retaliation requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the decisionmaker imposing the adverse 

action have actual knowledge of the protected activity.

Having established that actual knowledge is required to establish a Title VII 

retaliation claim, we find that Roberts cannot meet this burden. He has not presented 

evidence, either direct or circumstantial, sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether

Glenn knew he had been subjected to or had complained of harassment when Glenn

decided to terminate his employment. Glenn disclaims any knowledge of the harassment, 

and no evidence in the record contradicts his denial. Roberts acknowledges he did not tell 

Glenn despite having met with him twice. Further, there is no evidence that those who 

received the complaints reported them to Glenn or were later involved in the termination 

decision. Nor is there any evidence based on any individual’s behavior, actions, or 

comments that Glenn knew of the protected activity. Roberts’ burden here requires “more 

evidence than mere curious timing coupled with speculative theories” about “discussions 

between a decisionmaker and someone with knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activity” 

6 Although the plaintiff did not specifically describe her supervisor’s harassment as 

being racially motivated, the decisionmaker had previously volunteered during one of their 

conversations that her supervisor had wanted to hire someone of a “different race” for her 

position. Strothers, 895 F.3d at 325. This Court found it was not necessary for the plaintiff 

to inform the decisionmaker of what he already knew—“that Strothers’ race was relevant 

to the harassment.” Id. at 336.
25

that “create[] only a speculative inference regarding the decisionmaker’s awareness.” 

E.E.O.C. v. EmCare, Inc., 857 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). 

In fact, the evidence leads to the opposite conclusion—that Glenn, as sole decisionmaker, 

terminated Roberts, and that his decision to do so was not causally related to protected 

activity of which he was not aware. Roberts has failed to produce evidence sufficient for

a factfinder to conclude that Glenn was personally aware of any sexual harassment or that 

he knew Roberts had reported incidents of sexual harassment to his employees. And a 

plaintiff cannot establish the causation element of a prima facie case where “the relevant 

decisionmaker was unaware that the plaintiff had engaged in a protected activity.” Dowe, 

145 F.3d at 655.

2.

Roberts’ causation arguments are further undermined by the lapse in time between 

his complaints and his termination. “[A] causal connection for purposes of demonstrating 

a prima facie case exists where the employer takes adverse employment action against an 

employee shortly after learning of the protected activity.” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 

209, 213 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th 

Cir.1989)), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 

338, 360 (2013). An adverse action that bears sufficient temporal proximity to a protected 

activity may, along with the existence of other facts, suggest that the adverse employment 

action occurred because of the protected activity. See Johnson, 2021 WL 31914, at *2 

(citing Lettieri, 478 F.3d at 650 (employer’s post-complaint retaliatory conduct prior to 

termination may be used to establish causation where temporal proximity is lacking)); 
26

Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 273 (absent other facts, temporal proximity between an 

employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action must be 

“very close” to establish the causation prong). But here, Glenn Industrial argues that 

Roberts’ evidence regarding the timing of his firing does not support his retaliation claim. 

We agree.

In Dowe, the plaintiff alleged Title VII retaliation when she was terminated three 

years after filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC. 145 F.3d at 653. We held that

evidence that [an] alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer 

became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to “satisf[y] the less 

onerous burden of making a prima facie case of causa[tion].” Williams v. 

Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989). We believe the 

opposite to be equally true. A lengthy time lapse between the employer 

becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse 

employment action, as was the case here, negates any inference that a causal 

connection exists between the two. See Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 

339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that three years between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment action was too long to establish the third 

element); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 930 (7th Cir. 1982)

(holding that two-year time lapse negated any inference of causal 

connection).

Id. at 657 (emphasis in original); see also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 273 (“The 

cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected 

activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish 

a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’”); 

Pascual v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 193 F. App’x 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).

Although there is no “bright-line rule” for temporal proximity, courts within our 

Circuit have found that shorter lapses of time similar to the three-month period at issue in 

the case before us are insufficient to infer a causal relationship without other evidence of a 
27

causal link. See King v. Pulaski Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F. Supp. 3d 873, 886 (W.D. Va. 2016). 

For example, this Court has held that a lapse of three to four months between the 

employer’s knowledge of protected activity and the alleged retaliation “is too long to 

establish a causal connection by temporary proximity alone.” Pascual, 193 F. App’x at

233. This Court has also found that, absent other evidence of a causal relationship, “a lapse 

of two months between the protected activity and the adverse action is ‘sufficiently long 

so as to weaken significantly the inference of causation.’” Horne v. Reznick Fedder & 

Silverman, 154 F. App’x 361, 364 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 

151 n. 5 (4th Cir. 2003)).

Roberts’ termination—three months after his last report of harassment—did not 

“closely follow” a protected activity, and thus does not present a circumstance that courts 

have characterized as creating a strong inference of retaliation. Nor is it a years-long gap 

that would tend to prove the opposite. But we conclude that under these facts, a threemonth period between the protected activity and the adverse action does not support a 

finding that there is a causal link, particularly in the absence of any concrete, nonspeculative evidence that Glenn had any knowledge of the harassment allegations.

“As this Court has held, establishing a ‘causal relationship’ at the prima facie stage 

is not an onerous burden.” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 335 (citing Foster, 787 F.3d at 251;

Burgess v. Bowen, 466 F. App’x 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[V]ery little evidence of a 

causal connection is required to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.”) (citation 

omitted)). But what little evidence we have here, taken in the light most favorable to 

Roberts, is simply not enough to support his retaliation claim. Glenn disavows any prior 
28

knowledge of Roberts’ harassment or complaints, and in the absence of evidence to the 

contrary, or of any retaliatory animus, the lack of temporal proximity only serves to 

undercut what was already a speculative causal connection. We conclude therefore that no 

reasonable jury could find a causal link between Roberts’ harassment complaints and his 

termination three months later where Glenn knew nothing of the complaints when he fired 

him.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm summary judgment as to Roberts’ Title VII 

retaliation claim but vacate summary judgment as to his claim of same-sex sexual 

harassment and remand this claim to the district court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART