force readiness purposes. These sortie generation measures would afford the Joint
Staff/CINC's staffs the opportunity to more effectively evaluate War Plans and pursue the
resultant planning and programming requirements.

Other systems, which exist or are being developed, such as the Army's system to
forecast personnel levels, offer likely candidates for upgrade to achieve the level of
comprehensiveness needed to give useful predictions of future readiness in the other
measurement areas. However, there is, at present, no requirement for reporting and
review of this projected data at OSD, JCS, or CINC levels. Efforts are underway to
develop such capabilities through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and
the Readiness Working Group (RWG).

D. Joint (and Combined) Forces Readiness

Our Task Force assessed the current state of the Department's ability to measure
joint readiness as poorly defined. Specifically, there is no clear definition of areas of
joint readiness (analogous to the elements of unit readiness) that incorporates the
following (as well as other) essential elements:

e Unit readiness;

e The C4I system;

¢ Deployability of forces;

¢ Theater or JTF logistics support;

¢ Enroute and theater infrastructure support;

¢ Joint and combined training and exercises;

¢ Theater-allied relationships; and

e Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), command and control.

For "unit" readiness, the elements of readiness, responsibility, measures, reporting
and reviews are well defined. Responsibility for all elements of readiness is assigned to a
single organization (a military department). In contrast, such a clear assignment seems
impractical for joint force readiness. Instead, it is likely to be more useful to define
separate responsibility, measures, reporting, and review for each element of joint forces
readiness.

For example, there is general agreement that CINCs who are Commanders of
Combatant Commands are largely responsible for the elements of joint forces readiness.
There is a requirement that these Commanders report periodically to the Chairman, JCS
on a range of subjects that pertain to joint forces readiness. However, there is no defined,
comprehensive approach to assigning responsibilities and matching control of resources
to these responsibilities. Further, for most elements of joint forces readiness, the
measures are not specific nor are there requirements to validate the measurements


28

Tl. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Department should:

1.

Aggressively pursue the C4I for the Warrior Initiative as a first step in correcting
long-standing information system deficiencies.

Conduct an extensive review of satellite readiness. Specific issues should include
the asymmetry between collection and distribution capabilities, database security
requirements, and satellite launch capabilities.

Conduct an in-depth review of C4I Doctrine. Two major concerns are the
responsibility for tasking space assets to support theater operations and the role of
the CINCs in determining future space capabilities.

Accelerate efforts to exploit commercial and other open systems and integrate
intelligence systems into overall C4I architecture.

Sustain continuing involvement of leadership to ensure the continued fielding of the
Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

Fund the JCATE initiative, with SROC oversight, to enhance joint C4I readiness.


24

TI. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS

Current

While improvement in developing a Joint/Combined training environment has been noted
Some areas continue to require additional attention. Actions are needed to:

1.

Enhance momentum in developing jointness in the Department - accelerate efforts to
define joint training objectives and readiness criteria and increase Service
commitment to joint training (e.g.- sharing of training facilities).

2. Determine whether a separate training requirement be established for OOTW.

3. Assign responsibility for joint training of all CONUS-based conventional combatant
forces to USACOM and provide resources to support that responsibility.

4. Review Title X to ensure that it does not unnecessarily constrain joint training.

5. Review the roles and functions of CINCs as they relate to joint training.

6. Broaden the BUR force structure analysis and the CINCs' readiness evaluation to
more fully account for contributions (and in some cases, needs) of traditional allies,
treaty signatory nations, and or ad hoc coalitions participating in the MRC scenario.

7. Provide OSD oversight in coordination of programs, funds and milestones for top-
down modeling and simulation.

8. Protect the capability of Reserve joint training requirements to meet short and mid-
term surges.

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

Sustaining jointness momentum in the Department in the face of declining budgets
and the emergence of other priority concerns.

Planning for the involvement of allied/coalition forces and the increased demands
for interoperability and integration.

Ensuring that Service training programs and individual and unit proficiency do not
get degraded as a result of increased emphasis on joint training.

Exploiting the potential for distributed simulations for large scale interactive
training to enhance joint and combined training realism and relevancy.


32

the common architecture and data requirements to meet "plug and play: criteria for
interface with other Service and joint simulations. The goal should be for all
simulations intended for network connections to meet a joint "plug and play"
standard. The DMSO should function as the Executive Council secretariat in
communicating and carrying out policy guidance. The Joint Simulation System
(JSIMS) undertaking to ensure common architecture and connectivity standards
between Service simulations should be a subset of the Executive Council effort.
DDRQ&E should chair the enterprise to ensure harmonization with larger DoD - JCS
common architecture and connectivity goals and to make sure that technology
efforts support JSIM efforts.

USACOM should be assigned specific responsibilities and resources to represent
CINC’s interests in development of simulations that contribute to joint force
training. Consideration should be given to making USACOM a member of the
EXCIM.


timely action, rather than wait for formal reports. In addition, we met with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as we developed our findings and
recommendations. We also have maintained a dialog with the GAO as they conduct a
Congressionally directed effort to define key military readiness factors. As a result of
these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in this
report already are underway.

The points below establish the context to help understand the observations,
concerns and recommendations in this Final Report.

Current Status of Military Readiness. Although there are some downward

indicators, we found the general readiness posture of our military forces to be
acceptable. Many of our current readiness concerns are a direct result of
turbulence associated with the drawdown in our force structure, complications
associated with changes in strategy, and changes in resource allocations
stemming from budget reductions. We would expect such turbulence to
subside as we adjust to the new defense environment. Civilian and military
leaders are concemed, however, that, unless we take preventive or corrective
actions, continuing force reductions, strategy changes, and budget reductions
could cause serious readiness degradations. We think these are legitimate
concerns.

Current Readiness Reporting Systems. Current readiness assessment systems,
while having shortcomings addressed in this report, were designed to focus on

specific readiness resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, training, supplies)
that are critical to achieving unit readiness. Other systems provide general
information identifying major shortfalls in resources that would inhibit
responses to contingencies. This information, coupled with our commanders'
experienced judgments, provides a useful assessment of current unit readiness.

Readiness Task Force Focus. Taken in the aggregate, our recommendations
should serve as a basis for adjustments in the way the Department of Defense
oversees and manages the readiness of its military forces. While the military
Services should continue to exercise the readiness responsibilities they have
today, they should take steps that will help the Department to:

1. Bring a greater joint forces perspective to readiness, in addition to the
largely single-service unit perspective we have today;

2. Develop ways to project the future readiness implications of our policy
and budgetary decisions, rather than waiting until such decisions have

been implemented in order to determine whether the readiness of our
forces has been degraded;

3. Develop better ways to link readiness concerns to our policy development
and resource allocation processes; and


58

2. Defining Readiness to Do What. A prerequisite for ensuring that forces are ready
is to have a definition of what missions the forces need to be ready to perform. The

Bottom-Up Review provided the framework for our assessment. It defined the overall
classes of military operations in which U.S. forces should be prepared to engage, and in
the case of major regional conflicts, rough timing for the engagement of major combat
units. Still to be fully defined, however, are the readiness requirements for many other
essential parts of the force, including support units, elements such as C4] and strategic lift
needed to integrate units to make them effective in joint operations, and a variety of
supporting infrastructure. Further, such detailed definition has yet to take place for
operations below the scale of major regional conflicts (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian
aid, disaster relief) or for operations involving weapons of mass destruction.

3. Current Readiness Status. The general readiness posture of our military units
today appears to be acceptable. For several years to come, however, turbulence
associated with the drawdown in force structure, changes in strategy, and budget
reductions will likely result in many anecdotal reports of readiness problems. A specific
unit, for example, may experience a temporary shortage in personnel during transition. In
this case, what is important for readiness overall is that such a temporary shortfall is of
short duration and/or compensated for elsewhere in the force. The Department should,
however, take careful notice of anecdotal readiness problems which collectively may
foretell broad trends toward hollowness within units that will require corrective actions.

4. Focusing on Joint Readiness. The Department's focus for readiness assessments
and resource allocation traditionally has been on military units within each of the
services. Virtually every military operation envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review,
however, will involve joint operations where units of several services need to operate in
concert to accomplish overall objectives. Thus a force whose individual Service units are
ready may not necessarily be a force ready for such joint operations. This suggests
broadening the focus beyond near exclusive attention to units within the Services to
include the readiness of multi-service forces to engage successfully in military
operations.

5. Reporting and Projecting Unit and Joint Readiness. As indicated above, the

Department has in place a very extensive system to report on the current readiness of
military units within each of the Services. There does not exist, however, an effective
system to project the future readiness of these units -- to estimate whether they will be
ready to carry out tasks in the future, given funds allocated for readiness in DoD
programs and budgets. As for readiness to conduct multi-service joint operations, there
do not exist effective systems either to assess the current state of joint readiness, or to
estimate future joint readiness resulting from a given funding allocation.


42

Il. NUCLEAR

Backgrow

The Department of Defense has traditionally placed the highest emphasis on
nuclear readiness as evidenced by high-level studies such as the JCS Nuclear Command
and Control Study (1984-86), the Nuclear Fail-safe and Risk Reduction Review (1991-
92), and the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). These studies support the view that
nuclear forces, albeit at lower numbers, will continue to play a critical role in the
evolving security environment characterized by continuing capabilities in the established
nuclear powers as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced
delivery technologies.

There are three principal challenges to maintaining the required readiness
standards for these forces: the first arises from initiatives (e.g. reduced alert rates,
weapons dismantlements) undertaken to promote risk reduction. The second arises from
budgetary pressures with attendant reductions in operating resources and structures.
Together these challenges can result in a mismatch between assigned missions and actual
capabilities. Finally, focus on other priorities with reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons
matters by senior decision makers can reduce the constant attention required to ensure the
highest required standards of nuclear weapons safety, security, and control.

Pressures associated with risk reduction, budgetary pressures, and shifting
priorities of senior leaders are affecting nuclear readiness in three broad areas: strategic
forces, non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) and the command and control (C2) structure
that supports them. In the strategic area, the forces remain capable of performing their
missions although force structure, mission priorities, and posture changes are reducing
experience levels in certain areas. Due to political sensitivities and economic constraints,
there have been very few national-level nuclear C2 exercises to assure that nuclear
weapons could be employed in a timely, responsive and effective way when authorized
by the President. For instance, there has been only one such exercise (in 1989) since
1986 and none since the start-up of USSTRATCOM. Furthermore, there has been little
participation by senior political leaders and their senior staffs. This lack of exercises
reduces the familiarity of senior leaders with their complex nuclear C2 responsibilities,
reduces staff expertise as well as opportunities for intra- and inter-staff coordination, and
reduces opportunities to evaluate system performance (especially important in the system
of new command relationships) and to disseminate "lessons learned" force-wide. Further,
the lack of exercises may undermine a potential adversary's perceptions of deterrence
should a country conclude that the U.S. cannot or will not employ nuclear forces it does
not fully exercise. Initiatives are being identified by the office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff to address this deficiency.

NSNF force structure and deployments have changed significantly as a result of
various Presidential directives and arms negotiations initiatives. Because of the inherent


40

TRANSCOM participate in all major Service and Joint Staff exercises and war
games.

Develop seaport on west coast capable of handling containerized ammunition.
Assign TRANSCOM as central manager of worldwide seaport operations.

Ensure adequate capability to move tanks and similar equipment from inland bases
to seaports.

Pursue SecDef 25,000 early reserve call-up authority to sustain TRANSCOM's
concept of a ready mobility force. (During Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, USSTRATCOM was dependent on volunteers to function effectively at the
outset), Reserve Component personnel require adequate levels of operating tempo
to ensure their readiness when called.

Give more visibility to impact of operational limitations and availability of CRAF.

Continued support for planned sealift enhancements is critical to the overall success
of the strategic lift program and must be maintained.


support wartime requirements. They include: (1) the dual use of many biological
materials; (2) dual use of equipment; (3) sensitivity and selectivity of instruments; and (4)
the myriad of possible solutions versus time.

While the incubation period for BW agents varies, most produce extremely high
mortality without treatment. Antibiotics and antitoxins can be effective treatments if
administered early. Vaccines against known agents are effective, but at the present time,
are agent specific. The most effective measure is prevention... and wearing protective
masks becomes the most useful prevention measure.

While coordination on BW and CW matters within the intelligence community is
good, current collection capabilities are extremely limited and there are no magic quick
fixes. It is important to include the Regional CINCs in the collection plan.

In response to lessons learned from Desert Storm the Department has established
a Joint Program Manager for Biological Defense, and designated the U.S. Army as the
Executive Agent for Biological Warfare Defense for the Department. The two top
priority activities are: (1) type classify a fieldable system to identify BW agents (a point
detector and a standoff detector); and (2) produce sufficient vaccines to accommodate the
forces.

A number of policy issues related to population protection need to be addressed to
include: equipping, training, and inoculation of indigenous population; local governments
and infrastructure; allied forces; and U.S. civilians, civil servants, and contractor
personnel. The answer(s) impact on acquisition of BW (and CW) defense equipment.
Currently the vaccine development and production base are extremely limited. The U.S.
Army, through the Joint Program Office, is studying alternatives for managing future
vaccine production. It should be noted that by Congressional mandate, vaccines can be
produced only for validated threat agents. Other issues requiring review include
protection and decontamination of logistical infrastructure.

Congress also mandated the consolidation of CBW defense programs into one
centrally managed program at the OSD level. The action office is the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense/Atomic Energy-Chemical Matters (OATSD/AE-

CM). While the details have not been completely worked out, the plan is to task the
Army to act as the coordinating and integrating agent.

VATI IN!

Current
1. Need a fieldable BW detection and identification capability.

2. A shortfall in vaccines exists and there is a limited vaccine production capability.


50

E. The TF supports efforts to identify and retain needed nuclear complex capabilities
as well as nuclear weapons/systems industrial base.

F. Development and implementation of consistent survivability policies and
standards for fielded systems must be continued.

G. The Department should initiate action to resolve response procedures to nuclear
weapon use in a conflict where U.S. forces are not involved.

H. The Department must ensure that pursuit of risk reduction does not have
deleterious impacts on assured use.

3. Biological W: efen:
The Department should:

A. Conduct major assessment of BW policies including such issues as population
protection.

B. Support aggressive pursuit of a fieldable BW agent detection and identification
capability.

C. Support efforts to develop and maintain a viable vaccine production capability.
D. Establish procedures to ensure the involvement of Regional CINCs in the
collection plan.
4. Chemical Warfare Defense

A. The Department must support priority efforts to develop both a long-range
standoff detection capability and a non-aqueous decontamination capability.


38

Execution of the most demanding transportation scenarios will require extensive
utilization of CRAF upon which we are almost totally dependent for passenger transport.
It is uncertain whether CRAF would be fully available given other national demands on
commercial aviation. Even if we assume full participation, CRAF aircraft have
substantial limitations relative to short and unimproved airfields, outsized and hazardous
cargo, drive on/drive off capability, air refueling and ground support. In the longer-term,
the willingness of commercial aviation to continue to participate at the required levels in
the CRAF program will be dependent upon adequate incentives.

TRANSCOM has the responsibility for operating seaports in certain parts of the
world. In other situations, the regional CINC is responsible. The absence of a
standardized, coordinated approach to seaport operations under a single manager reduces
the overall effectiveness in the movement of cargo by sealift.

There is a need for continued assessment and implementation of initiatives to
enhance mobility readiness. Consideration of the potential contributions of allies and
host nation support are acknowledged as essential in assessing contingency plans.
Finally, planned improvements in sealift - including the Ready Reserve Force surge
enhancement, and prepositioning remain major contributors in reducing early demands
for strategic lift.

As noted in the Mobility Requirements Study, there is a critical shortage of heavy
duty railcars to move tanks and similar equipment from inland bases to seaports. This
capability is critical to meeting deployment timelines.

Increased participation in simulations and war gaming at all levels is critical for
staff development and overall integration of mobility planning. This is a key mobility

readiness issue. TRANSCOM needs to be involved in all Service and Joint Staff
exercises and major war games.

Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS
Current

1. TRANSCOM does not participate in most joint/combined exercises and major war
games.

id

Need to replace the aging C-141 aircraft.

3. Development of a seaport on the west coast capable of handling containerized
ammunition is needed to address a long-standing ammunition shipment requirement


12

Cost Index (ECT) receives a great deal of press, the fact that recruit quality and retention
levels remain at near all-time highs contradicts the "gap's" credibility. The "Defense"
ECI, a recently introduced alternative index developed by RAND, shows a gap closer to
zero. Most likely the truth lies somewhere in between. However, this uncertainty needs
speedy resolution for it is clear that sustained caps on military and civilian pay could
significantly damage our ability to properly recruit and retain quality personnel in the
future.

PERSTEMPO, or the amount of time units (and by inference individuals) are
gone from home location, has been impacted by the rapid force drawdown. This
downsizing accompanied by the withdrawal of our forces from overseas bases back to
CONUS and a higher level of contingency operations has increased deployment
frequency and placed new strains on our personnel. All Services have been impacted, but
the Army and Air Force, whose forces have been traditionally forward-deployed, are
experiencing the greatest shock from this phenomenon. Family separation has always
been a major, if not the number one retention variable, and the Navy learned long ago the
necessity for explicit PERSTEMPO standards. The Marine Corps has recently completed
a study of the issue and is considering the applicability of a similar policy. The Army
and Air Force should take heed and follow suit.

Emerging data indicates an increased suicide rate and a potential increase in
family violence among military members. The ongoing downsizing, resultant turbulence,
and increased PERSTEMPO rates are certainly contributing factors and this situation
requires the continued vigilance of the Department.

Another critical personnel area which requires continued vigilance is equal
opportunity - that is the prevention of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age or disability. While the Department's efforts have led the way for our
nation, equal opportunity is a fragile area and one in which commanders must pay
continued attention if they intend to be successful in carrying out any mission. We must
never allow ourselves to take equal opportunity for granted.

Finally, a major factor in ensuring the Department's continued ability to recruit
and retain quality personnel is the support and cooperation of national leadership. The
morale of our personnel and their subsequent retention decisions will be negatively
impacted without the continued positive reinforcement of national support which must
start with the Commander-in-Chief.

Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS
Current

1. Managing the force level transition/downsizing needs to be accomplished with the
Jeast adverse impact on current readiness.


THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


37

VI. OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This section contains the observations and recommendations of the Readiness
Task Force. As indicated by the preceding sections of this report, the Task Force
reviewed a broad range of readiness issues and looked in-depth at numerous specific
aspects of readiness. Based on the many briefings, extensive consultations with senior
military and civilian leadership, and internal deliberations the following observations and
recommendations are offered. While all of the observations, concerns, and
tecommendations identified in the individual functional assessments are not repeated, the
essence of the specific issues is addressed. Future Readiness Task Force activities are
also identified.

A. Observations

The Readiness Task Force offers the following observations concerning
Teadiness:

1. Recognizing the Challenge. The Defense Department has recognized the potential
threats to readiness. It has taken early steps to address these threats, including:

* Setting readiness as the first priority for the Department.

¢ Issuing guidance to the Services to construct their programs and budgets so that
readiness will be funded at a level sufficient to carry out the tasks prescribed in
the Bottom-Up Review.

¢ Inviting the combatant commanders in the field -- the CINCs -- to express their
readiness concerns to the Secretary at a specially convened Defense Resources
Board meeting during the program and budget review process.

¢ Creating the position of Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness,
supported by a Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness, to serve as the focal
point for DoD readiness activities.

¢ Forming the Senior Readiness Oversight Council supported by the Readiness
Working Group to act as the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and
oversight.

¢ Conducting a defense issues conference that included a major addressal of the
relationship of resources to readiness.


OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

21 June 1994

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS,

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness

Attached is the final report of the DSB study on readiness. The Terms of Reference

asked us to provide advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the areas
below.

¢ Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for

providing early warning of potential readiness problems, including assessments
of:

- How the Department deals with readiness concerns; and
- The adequacy of existing readiness reporting systems.

¢ Other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as: structure, lift,
sustainability, active-reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of civilians and
coalition personnel support.

During the past year the Readiness Task Force reviewed a broad range of readiness topics
and looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness, particularly the readiness
management and oversight process. In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force met as
a group frequently, and its members visited numerous sites to gather information. Significantly,
the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense met with us at many of our group meetings so that
they could take timely action, rather than wait for the results of our reports. In addition, we met
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs and available consultant
CINCs as we developed our observations and recommendations. As a result of these

collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in this report
already are underway.

The Task Force concluded that the readiness of today's conventional and unconventional
forces is acceptable in most measurable areas. That does not mean that the Task Force did not
find "pockets" of unreadiness. Most of these "pockets" are a result of changes taking place in the
armed forces and the turbulence created by these changes. However, we observed enough
concers that we are convinced that unless the Department of Defense and the Congress focus on
readiness, the armed forces could slip back into a "hollow" status.

To prevent such back-sliding, the Task Force identified specific recommendations we
believe will pay significant dividends in future readiness, and particularly in future joint and
combined readiness. These recommendations are summarized in the Executive Summary and
provided in more detail in the body of the report.

o


Better define impact of contingency operations on training and readiness.
Fully fund OPTEMPO requirements within O&M.

Allow Services sufficient management flexibility.

Establish Army, Marine Corps and Air Force OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO
criteria. Consider Marine OPTEMPO study applicability to other

Services.

Further investigate tiered readiness as it relates to OPTEMPO.

3, Sustainment. Ensure that sustainment readiness is pursued with equal vigor as unit
combat readiness. Develop measurement systems that better equate readiness to
resources - present and future.

Leverage Service models to assist in Development of a DoD-wide set of
models that relate operational readiness to funding and manpower.

Evaluate maintenance backlogs’ impact on readiness.
Ensure adequacy of modern weapons to support needs of CINCs.
Assess adequacy of CS/CSS units to support two MRC Scenarios.

Establish pilot programs with USACOM and CENTCOM to involve
CINC's more thoroughly in the development of joint requirements.

4, Joint/Combined Training and Doctrine. Place increased emphasis on Joint and

Combined readiness and requirements.

Develop joint mission essential task lists.

Define joint training objectives and readiness criteria so that joint
readiness status is accurately presented.

Ensure that Service constructive models interface to permit effective
exercising of joint task forces.

Establish and fund the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center
under USACOM.

Joint Staff refine joint training doctrine for Operations Other Than War.


59

6. Carrying Out the National Military Strategy. The Readiness Task Force did not

assess directly whether our forces have sufficient readiness or capability to carry out our
National Military Strategy, or rather its proxy - the Bottom-Up Review. The Task Force
did note that the analysis conducted during the Bottom-Up Review did not consider all of
the essential elements of strategic readiness. For example, it did not analyze in sufficient
depth the needs for C4I to integrate forces, nor did it sufficiently account for readiness to
deal with threats from weapons of mass destruction. Additional analysis in these and
other areas is being conducted by OSD, the Chairman, and the CINCs. Therefore,
judgments on the adequacy and readiness of forces to carry out the guidance in the
Bottom-Up Review must be deferred until such efforts have matured. It is anticipated
that the follow-on analyses will address these additional elements. It is imperative that
the National Security Strategy be promulgated by the NSC so that all agencies of
government can cooperatively assess our readiness; and, so that the Defense Department
can refine its Defense and Military Strategy to be responsive to the National Security
Strategy.

B. Recommendations:

Given our observations we recommend that the Department give consideration to
pursuing the readiness activities listed below. We recommend that the Senior Readiness
Oversight Council propose to the Secretary of Defense the responsibilities for the
appropriate offices within OSD who in conjunction with the Services and the OJCS will
ensure that the recommendations proposed are implemented.

1. Personnel. Maintaining quality personnel should continue to be the Departments’ top
priority.

* Resources to access, train, educate, and retain high quality personnel must
be provided.

¢ Personnel planning models should be enhanced to ensure strengths are
adequate to meet required force structure.

¢ Develop PERSTEMPO standards consistent with missions.
¢ Rationalize military pay and an appropriate civilian pay index.

¢ Emphasize personnel issues with the national leadership and American
public.

2. Funding/OPTEMPO. Develop in concert with the Congress and implement a system
that responds adequately to contingency funding requirements.

¢ Investigate funding alternatives which permit contract authority for certain
contingency operations (e.g. sealift).


62

© Provide simulation systems to offset reduced training tempo.

e Fund the Reserve Component Automation System and such other systems
as required to automate the Guard and Reserve.

« Enhance timely access to Reserve Components needed for contingency
operations.

8. Mobility. Ensure that adequate strategic mobility resources are made available to
support the military strategy.

¢ Modernize strategic airlift, support sealift enhancement, and ensure
adequate intra-US transport in support of natural military strategy.

e Reassess prepositioning as it relates to lift requirements.

e Use TRANSCOM as central manager of transportation resources in
contingency operations, exercises and wargames.

e Pursue SecDef 25,000 early reserve call up authority.

9. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Department must ensure that US forces

are prepared to conduct operations (offensive and defensive) in a nuclear, biological
and/or chemical environment. Of the NBC triad, biological readiness needs the most
attention. WMD considerations must be included in training, wargames and simulations.

Nuclear:
¢ Conduct national level Command and Control exercises regularly.

¢ Maintain strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities.
e Ensure programs to meet long-term training and security needs.
¢ Continue necessary nuclear complex and industrial base.
Biological:
© Conduct major assessment of BW policies including such issues as
population protection.

¢ Support pursuit of fieldable detection identification capability.

e Support efforts to develop a vaccine production capability.


22

I. INTRODUCTION

The Task Force strongly Supports the ongoing efforts to develop the Joint and
Combined Task Force environments. The new world setting of uncertain geopolitical
circumstance requires that "real" readiness be measured by a unit's ability to operate as
part of a joint or combined task force. However, proportionately, resources for joint and
combined exercises have not been significantly increased.

The Services have been quick to recognize the continued need for highly trained
forces to be responsive to the myriad of missions possible in an uncertain pol-mil
environment and wide ranging US Strategic interests. Training OPTEMPO has been
protected throughout the FYDP even at the expense of other important functions. With
new challenges and declining budgets, there is a need to maximize the potential for
training realism as well as training relevancy. Attention is needed to ensure that the
potential for use of distributed simulations to enhance training is exploited. High priority
must also be given to protecting the capability to meet short and mid-term surge Reserve
joint training requirements.

While improvements have been noted since Desert Storm, the Services'
commitment to the joint and combined training environments require greater emphasis.
Significant focus has been placed on Service unique training activities, where
Tesponsibilities are clearly defined. However, jointness must prevail in the future. To be
Teady to participate more effectively with short notice in joint operations, the Services
should be forward looking and create opportunities to incorporate jointness in their
training and doctrine. Service training facilities must also serve joint forces.

Caution must be exercised to ensure that joint training is compatible with Service
Title X training requirements and individual or unit proficiency needs. It is also critically
important to review the roles and functions of Services and CINCs as they relate to joint
training. With the advent of USACOM and the JWFC, the prerogatives and
responsibilities of all concerned have been fundamentally changed and are now less well
defined. In addition to the impact on Service/CINC roles, relationships of the CINCs to
each other have also changed. CINCs have long been widely divergent in operating
procedures. The rating system for joint forces readiness must be standardized among all
CINCs. As USACOM executes its mission of providing forces that are integrated and
trained as joint units capable of carrying out their assigned tasks (in a resources
Constrained environment), Service cooperation to leverage training opportunities will
play a major role.

The emerging focus on operations-other-than-war (OOTW) - peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations, humanitarian assistance operations, etc. - requires attention to
Service training programs (scope and level) to determine requirements for modification or


through assessments comparable to unit readiness inspections. There are general
requirements for Combatant Commanders to report on a wide range of readiness issues to
the Chairman and Secretary of Defense, and for the Chairman to provide a separate
readiness assessment to the Secretary of Defense. The current system, however, is not
well designed to assess current joint force readiness.

We also reviewed the ability to evaluate joint readiness over time. The Service
systems are in the nascent stage of developing predictive means for measuring future
readiness, and that predictive capability is limited predominantly to the weapons systems
area. Translating these means into useful methods for predictive joint readiness will
require an all out effort by the entire defense establishment.

E. Readiness to Support the National Military Strategy

In order to determine how capable our joint forces are to carry out specific
contingencies, simulated war games must be conducted which stress the entire range of
military capabilities - (combat, mobility, support, space, etc.). CINCs have run exercises
of this nature in the past; however, the adequacy and readiness of the support systems has
not been exercised for some time.

When the National Security Strategy and the resultant National Military Strategy
are developed and when there is general agreement on standards for joint readiness, it
will be essential to conduct several simulation assisted war games to aid in determining
the adequacy of the resources to carry out the strategy.


15

ING/OPTE)

I. INTRODUCTION

Funding for operations related to training and military engagements (operational
tempo - OPTEMPO) supports such things as aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days and
tank/vehicle miles. Overall this funding has generally been adequate, although partly
financed at the expense of modernization and force infrastructure. However, two major
factors can impact the adequacy of this OPTEMPO funding: 1) unplanned contingencies
toward which additional flying hour, steaming day, or tank miles must be expended, and
2) increasing competition from other Operations and Maintenance Account (O&M)
requirements.

Unplanned contingency operations drive up costs and require resources, both
financial and people, to be realigned. The expenditure of O&M funds for contingencies
simply means that they are not available for their intended use. Those O&M dependent
functions that are most easily deferred or canceled include training, regularly scheduled
preventive maintenance, and real property maintenance. While the disruptive nature of
contingencies cannot be overcome, the funding issue can be ameliorated. In FY 94, a
timely Congressional Supplemental provided the funding required to fully support
projected operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Haiti. Had this action not been taken
Services would have been forced to curtail OPTEMPO and/or other required O&M
planned expenditures. Had the Supplemental been delayed to late in the fiscal year
required training opportunities would have been missed altogether directly reducing
readiness. A standard operating procedure needs to be developed to ensure timely
funding for emergent contingency operations. One of many possible financing options
might be the use of contract authority for certain contingency operations such as sealift.
This potential needs to be explored.

An additional facet of contingency operations funding is the reimbursement for
performance of United Nations operations. While problematic in the past, this issue
currently appears on the way to proper resolution, thanks to the combined efforts of the
Comptroller, Joint Staff, and State Department.

As the force drawdown progresses and pressure to reduce the Department's
Budget continues, both the size and resiliency of the O&M Account have been
significantly reduced. To the extent that unrealized "efficiencies" (e.g..DMRDs, BRAC
closing delays, etc.) occur, funds must be shifted from other O&M areas to pay fact-of-
life bills. OPTEMPO dollars can readily be, and routinely are, shifted to cover utility
bills, port operations, etc.. Fencing OPTEMPO, while a potential solution, is considered
unacceptable due to the limits it would place on Commanders who must deal with an
imperfect marketplace and constantly changing fiscal environment.


11

PERSON!

I. IN TION

Throughout the past year there has been one theme which consistently cut across
all of the various readiness functional areas: Quality Personnel. Without question,
maintaining the quality of our people should be the Department's top priority. As the size
of our Armed Forces declines, it is imperative that the quality of the force be sustained.
The rapid downsizing has had several deleterious effects on our personnel system, from
potential recruit to the career service members. Overall, the propensity of America's
youth to serve in the Armed Forces, as measured by the Youth Attitude Tracking Study
(YATS) has declined in the past three years. Likewise, the propensity of parents and
other influencers to recommend military service to young people is decreasing. These
reductions occur at a time when the relevant - enlistment eligible - cohort is at its lowest
point in the decade. The improving economy and increasing employment will also
increase competition for quality youth. Recruiting resources, particularly advertising
resources, have been significantly reduced over the past several years. As accession
requirements, suppressed during the drawdown, increase it will be imperative to properly
resource recruitment efforts (e.g. advertising, recruiters, etc.) to sustain the input of
quality personnel to an All-Volunteer Force. Toward that end, in April of this year, a
Senior Panel on Recruiting was formed, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
comprised of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and with the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness as executive
secretary. The efforts of this panel will be pivotal in continuing a successful recruiting
program.

Personnel turbulence resulting from the rapid force reduction has placed a
tremendous burden on the Department's personnel management system. As each unit is
reorganized or eliminated, personnel must be retained, reassigned, retrained, or separated.
Based on personnel inventories relative to grade and skill requirements, we are paying
some people to leave the military and others to stay. These actions have clouded the
Department's ability to accurately project retention. RAND's ongoing Enlisted Career
Retention Indicator Project at the tasking of the OUSD P&R's Military Personnel Policy
Office should provide added insight.

Added turbulence in personnel management due to the rapid down sizing makes it
imperative that we be able to more accurately forecast manpower and personnel
inventories. The Services are all pursuing enhancements to their models for personnel
planning. It would be appropriate for OSD to take the lead in coordination/integration in
this area analogous to efforts underway in the logistics modeling world. The Air Force's
ULTRA model development offers an excellent initial focus for this action.

Key to maintaining a viable All-Volunteer Force are equitable pay and a stable
retirement system. While the widening gap between military pay and the Employment


23

expansion. There might be a need to consider OOTW as a capability warranting an
expanded rating system. For example, the mission of providing humanitarian aid to a
civil authority can be difficult for a joint task force to accomplish; there is likely to be
very little warning time prior to deployment; they are most unlike the wartime mission;
and they require coordination with more agencies. Lack of interagency training could be
a major inhibitor to readiness. United Nations/United States "leadership" exposure to
simulations training capabilities should be a priority for DoD. Further, undertaking these
missions while drawing down our forces may require new planning assumptions with
respect to the BUR's two nearly simultaneous MRC foundation. A step in the right
direction is the ongoing JCS effort to develop doctrine for OOTW.

As demonstrated during Desert Storm, future U.S. involvement in conflict
scenarios will likely include coalition and combined activities. Combined/coalition
activities imply jointness with its innate requirements for interoperability and integration
of effort. The force structure analysis for the BUR should be expanded to more fully
account for the role of traditional allies, treaty signatory nations, or ad hoc coalitions
participating in the MRC scenarios. This aspect must be thoroughly integrated into the
CINCs' evaluation of readiness, particularly when considering nations with whom the
United States has little or no combined operations experience. Finally, joint training
doctrine should include provisions for integrating combined/coalition forces.

Progress has been made toward defining responsibilities for Joint training since
the release of the interim Task Force's report in February 1994. Examples of such are: (1)
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CICS), responsible for Joint Training policy has
declared joint training a priority for his office; (2) The J-7 organization within the Joint
Staff has defined a Universal Joint Task List and is currently working on defining Joint
Mission Essential Task Lists with each CINC; (3) USACOM has defined a three tier
structure for joint training and identified, at least initially, the resources required to carry
out USACOM's joint training responsibilities; (4) There is a growing understanding of
the potential for use of simulation to enhance joint training - the Synthetic Theater of War
(STOW) demonstration now has operational sponsors; CINCEUR for the proof of
principle Exercise ATLANTIC RESOLVE in November 1994, and USACOM for a full-
scale STOW demonstration in 1997; the Joint Warfighting Center is maturing in its
concept and capability to provide support for joint training and exercises; and USACOM
has defined the need for a Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center in the
Tidewater area to support joint training and evaluation; (5) A Peacekeeping Task Force
has been established with DoD-wide participation; and (6) Some progress has been made
in identifying the shortfall in quantitative joint readiness evaluation and reporting.


IV. LEVELS OF READINESS

Based on U.S. security requirements posed by the Major Regional Conflicts
(MRCs), small contingencies, and special capabilities noted in Section III above, the
Readiness Task Force, drawing on JCS definitions, discussions with senior civilian and
military defense leaders, and our members' own experiences, found it useful to consider
the three readiness levels defined below:

1.

Unit readiness -- the level of preparedness of units to execute assigned
missions with available weapon systems or support systems. The Task Force
specifically addressed both current unit readiness and indicators of future unit
readiness. —

Joint (and combined) force readiness _-- the level of preparedness of
Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces to integrate ready combat and
support units into an effective joint and combined operating force.

National readiness -- the level of preparedness to support the national
military strategy is the broadest level of readiness, which includes the
traditional four pillars of military capability: readiness of military units (and
joint and combined forces readiness), sustainability in combat, modernization
of forces, and force structure.

A. Elements of a Readiness System

The Task Force determined that managing and assessing the first ("unit") and
second ("joint force") levels of readiness requires a system that contains at least the
following five elements:

Defined areas of readiness (e.g., equipment, personnel, training, C4I, etc.);
Clearly assigned responsibility and criteria for those areas of readiness;
Measures of readiness in each of the defined areas;

A reporting and verification system; and

A system of review by the various levels of authority responsible for
allocating resources to achieve readiness and/or decisions to employ ready
forces.

Our Task Force assessed existing readiness systems as defined by the above five
elements. Further, we made judgments about how well the current readiness system
works. In this Final Report we have made some specific comments on the state of
readiness as defined, reported, and reviewed by the existing system.


e

61

USACOM conduct joint training exercises for all CONUS-based
conventional combatant forces.

Include combined/coalition forces in joint training doctrine.

5. Joint C4V/Space. Develop an OSD C4I architecture and involve CINCs in the
readiness of space assets that influence their combat capabilities.

Pursue C4I for the Warrior as a first step in correcting long-standing
information system deficiencies.

Review Satellite readiness. Include asymmetry between collection and
distribution capabilities, data base security and satellite launch
capabilities.

Conduct an in-depth review of C4 doctrine.

Accelerate efforts to exploit commercial and other open systems.

Integrate intelligence systems in overall C4 architecture.

Fund the JCATE initiative with SROC oversight.

6. Modeling and Simulation. Technology should be exploited to enhance joint and
combined training and doctrine.

DoD support synthetic theater of war integrating live, virtual and
constructive simulations.

DDR&E direct development of a Modeling and Simulation Master Plan.

DDR&E ensure that new simulations and upgrades meet "plug and play"
standard.

USACOM represent CINC's interests in simulation development.

7. Reserves. Turn statement of "increased reliance on the Reserves in the future" into
reality. The Reserve Components must be an integral part of contingency plans.

Rationalize roles and missions for the Reserve Components.

Resource Reserve forces based on contingency roles.


48

IV. CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE

Background

A variety of delivery systems are available for dissemination of chemical warfare
(CW) agents. Militarily significant quantities can be delivered anywhere in a theater of
operations/area of conflict by ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft bombs and spray tanks,
multiple rocket launchers, unmanned autonomous vehicles, aerosol generators, artillery,
and special operating forces. Fill options include submunitions and payload.

Substantial efforts have been accomplished to improve survivability of military
assets against chemical threats. Modeling and simulations have demonstrated that: (1)
warning and aim point of impending attack has high payoff (but we need a capability to
provide warming only to vulnerable forces at risk); (2) most fielded forces have good
passive protection capability (camouflage, cover, concealment, mobility, dispersion, etc);
(3) reduction of logistical operations vulnerability is needed; and, (4) the asymmetries
between CW protection capabilities of U.S. forces and those of civilian workers,
stevedores, and some allied military could be critical vulnerabilities. The current
generation of protective equipment requires replacement (degrades individual
performance, cumbersome, interferes with visual and aural communications, subjects
wearer to heat stress). The U.S. decontamination capability is manpower intensive,
logistically burdensome, and quantitatively insufficient. We currently have a limited
patient decontamination capability and no means to safely decontaminate sensitive
equipment.

OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS,

Current

1. There is an urgent need for the development of a long-range standoff detection
capability.

2. — Protection/decontamination of out-of-CONUS infrastructure to support
reinforcing/power projection forces should be a priority.

3. Timely distribution of warning and reporting information, to include Merchant
Marine and CRAF assets, is essential in a WMD environment.

4. Plans for response to CW use when the U.S. has no CW retaliatory capability must
be developed.

5. R&D efforts for a multi-agent CW detector must be continued.


ii

To prevent such back-sliding we believe that the following actions, some ongoing
and planned, need to be supported:

1, Resources to access, train, educate, retain high quality personnel.
Maintaining the quality of our people should continue to be the Department's
top priority.

2. A system that adequately funds contingency operations. The Department
should work with Congress in developing and institutionalizing a contingency
funding system which adequately funds contingencies and does not divert, delay
or disrupt the flow of funds needed to maintain readiness of forces not engaged
in such operations.

3. Development of measurement systems that better equate readiness to
resources - present and future. The Department should take actions to develop
and improve the set of analytical models and other means that can be used to
help better understand the relationship between funding allocation decisions and
future force readiness.

4. Sustainment readiness addressed with efforts equal to those involved in
assessing unit combat readiness. The Department should develop and
implement procedures and practices to address sustainment readiness issues at
the same level of detail and with the same emphasis normally used when
addressing combat readiness. (To include rationalization of the role of Reserve
Components and the criticality of strategic mobility.)

5. Increased emphasis on Joint and Combined readiness and requirements,
including development of joint mission essential task lists. This is one of the
actions the Department should pursue to provide greater emphasis on the joint
forces perspective of readiness.

6. Development of an OSD C4] architecture and greater involvement by
theater CINCs in the readiness of space assets that influence their combat
capabilities. There is a need for rapid development and implementation of a
joint C4I architecture and doctrine. It should include readiness of satellite
components of the C4I system to ensure it can support joint contingency
operations. The theater CINCs should be involved throughout the process.

7. Enhanced use of modeling and simulation. Modeling and simulation
technology should be exploited to enhance joint and combined training and
doctrine. It offers a tremendous opportunity to leverage our existing training at
all levels through enhancement or even replacement where appropriate after
thorough review.


20

6. Measurement of the maintenance backlog during the drawdown and what that
backlog means with respect to readiness are not readily understood.

7. CINCs and Commanders can use Air Force and/or Navy modeled sortie generation
data to determine adequacy of air support for combat operations.

8. Existing Service analysis models offer the potential to better understand the linkage
between resource allocation in peacetime and wartime readiness.

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

2.

CS/CSS units' equipment availability for two nearly simultaneous MRCs?

CS/CSS units' spare parts availability/-mismatch for two nearly simultaneous
MRCs?

Continued growth of maintenance backlog over the POM years - validation of its
impact.

Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Department should:

1,

Leverage existing Air Force and other Service resource/readiness models as
appropriate to develop a DoD-wide set of models that measures fleet operational
availability for air, ground and sea systems within each Service as a function of
funding and labor allocation.

Evaluate historic, current, and projected maintenance backlogs to determine their
true value in forecasting readiness. Include the impacts of the following major
variables in the analyses:

¢ unscheduled OPTEMPO

* availability of spare parts

¢ availability of properly trained maintenance personnel to include Full Time
Support personnel in reserve component units

Expedite emplacement of prepositioned stocks.

Ensure sufficient quantities of smart weapons exist to support the prospective MRCs
and meet the needs of the warfighting CINCs.


54

MEDICAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Desert Shield/Storm has been considered a medical success story. It was the
largest deployment of medical assets since the Korean War and was the greatest medical
technical capability ever deployed. However, numerous medical readiness problems have
been identified as a result of after action reports and analyses. Some common themes
were identified.

1. Combat medical training for health care providers is deficient.

2. Medical personnel mobilization and deployment systems are inadequate.
3. Army medical units lack sufficient mobility.

4. Problems with the medical supply system.

5. Equipment modernization/sustainment problems.

6. Unfamiliarity of medical personnel with their deployment platforms.

In October 1993, the ASD for Health Affairs organized a Medical Readiness Task
Force to prepare a Medical Readiness Strategic Plan (MRSP), prepare defense medical
guidance to accomplish the DoD medical mission, design POM formats to identify and
monitor resources needed, and to devise a process to monitor readiness. The MRSP
provides a long-term systematic, multi-disciplined approach to remedy the concerns
identified. To date, the Task Force has defined medical teadiness, designed medical
POM formats, and developed the defense medical guidance. Other tasks are ongoing to
include a study to achieve better visibility of true joint medical capability for theater
CINC use. The MRSP should also include considerations for DoD support of domestic
manmade disasters to include identifying funding requirements (we do not currently
budget for this support).

The Task Force noted that there is a need to develop a game or simulation to
validate the medical strategy and policies. Of particular concerns are: deployment plans,
communications requirements, and in-theater evacuation needs/capabilities. Additionally,
the theater medical evacuation policy requires review and validation. Theater medical
plans should consider medical demands in a combined/allied theater (contributions from
allied medical assets to support U.S. forces as well as demands on U.S. medical assets for
support to the allies).


56

Support Medical Readiness Task Force efforts to prepare defense medical guidance
to accomplish the DoD medical mission and monitor medical readiness. Place
greater emphasis on achieving better visibility of true joint medical capability for
theater CINC use and DoD support of domestic manmade disasters.

Develop a game or simulation to validate the medical strategy and policy. Include
medical planners and emphasize deployment plans, communications requirements
and in-theater evacuation needs/capabilities. Incorporate medical functions and
medical planners in Service and joint war games.

Conduct an assessment to determine coalition warfare impacts on US medical
readiness. Identify allies' medical readiness, strengths, weaknesses.

Develop and implement a disciplined medical technology modernization program.


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provide funding to support the activities of the Readiness Task
Force. The Readiness Task Force will meet at least quarterly,
and will provide interim reports and respond to inquiries from
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other senior officials of
the Department of Defense. The,Readiness Task Force will submit,
on or before January 31, 1994, an initial report which will
include recommendations for the next phase of activities as well
as a proposed deadline for the final report. It is not
anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any
"particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title
18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the
position of acting as a procurement official.


DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
READINESS

FINAL REPORT

Chairman

General Edward C. Meyer
(US. Army, Retired)


We propose that, in the future, the Readiness Task Force meet quarterly, or on call of the
Secretary of Defense, to review the status of the recommendations and/or address other readiness
issues as directed.

General Edward C. Meyer
Chairm:

. Army, Retired)

Attachment


B. Current Unit Readiness

There currently exists a well-defined reporting system to evaluate the current
readiness of combat and support units. It embraces the five elements of a readiness
system as defined above. For example, the elements of unit readiness include personnel
readiness, training readiness, and equipment and supply readiness. Responsibility for
each of these areas is clearly defined within the military Services’ statutory responsibility
to organize, train, and equip forces. The Services have mature measurement and
reporting systems for units, and results are evaluated and validated through readiness
inspections, exercises, and contingency after-action reviews. Unit readiness reporting is
reviewed at multiple levels, including the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. While shortfalls exist in current readiness, generally
stemming from having to make choices among limited resources, the current unit
readiness system is mature and well understood at multiple levels of command,
management, assessment and review.

C. Future Unit Readiness

The Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness are significantly
less mature and less comprehensive than those for reporting current unit readiness. For
example, current reporting systems include the unit commander's forecasts of near-term
changes in each of the readiness measurement areas. Commanders often base these
forecasts on short-term and anecdotal considerations with little benefit of analyses of
quantified data. While there are some mature, validated systems in use within the
Services for assessing the impact of current budget allocations on future readiness, there
is no comprehensive, aggregated system of assessment, reporting, and reviews useful to
senior OSD, JCS and CINC decision makers.

Early in our effort, we attempted to identify key indicators that could serve as
useful "red flags" for senior defense managers to signal potential problems affecting
future readiness. While such warnings could be identified in each readiness measurement
area, some problems may not be evident until it is too late to take preventive actions.
Therefore, we believe it is more useful to the decision maker to have valid longer-range
predictions of impacts expressed in terms similar to those used to assess current
readiness. Initial successes in this area give us high confidence this can be done.

For example, the Air Force uses a mature, calibrated system that forecasts future
equipment readiness in terms similar to those used to describe current equipment
readiness -- weapons system mission-capable rates and sortie-generation capability.
This Air Force system to forecast equipment readiness uses input variables such as:
dollars available to buy spare parts, depot and unit logistics, manpower, systems
reliability, and maintenance practices. The outputs are mission-capable rates and sortie-
generation capability by system. While this system does not predict readiness by unit,
predicting readiness by weapons system is useful for both budget allocation and future


DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS

FINAL REPORT

EXE SUMMARY

In the late 1970's and early 1980's we had "hollow" forces. Compared with
today's troops, the service member who served during that period was, on average:

- less well educated;

- more involved with drugs;

- less well trained;

- less well equipped;

- less well sustained;

- less strategically mobile;

- and, less highly regarded by the population.

The armed forces then were not ready to meet most of the major contingencies
called for by the National Security Strategy without a considerable period of warning
time to permit our conventional forces to mobilize and equip themselves. Absent ready
conventional forces, greater reliance was placed on nuclear deterrence; and, our nuclear
forces were maintained at a higher state of readiness than most of our conventional
forces.

The Readiness Task Force concludes that the readiness of today's conventional
and unconventional forces by contrast is acceptable in most measurable areas. However,
our group was asked to do more than merely assess the readiness of today's armed forces
compared with those of two decades ago. We were charged with providing advice on
how to avoid future unreadiness - future "hollow armed forces."

When we state that the readiness of today's forces is acceptable, that does not
mean that we did not find "pockets" of unreadiness. Most of these "pockets" are a result
of changes taking place in the armed forces and the turbulence created by these changes.
However, we observed enough concerns that we are convinced that unless the
Department of Defense and the Congress focus on readiness, the armed forces could slip
back into a "hollow" status.


PROPOSED MEMBERS
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
READINESS
Chairman

GEN Edward (Shy) Meyer, USA (Ret) #
Private Consultant

Task Force Members

LTG Julius Becton, USA (Ret) #
Prairie View A&M University

ADM Huntington Hardisty, USN (Ret) #
Private Consultant

ADM Bob Long, USN (Ret) #
Private Consultant

LTG Herbert Temple, USA (Ret) #
Private Consultant

GEN Max Thurman, USA (Ret)
Association of the US Army

GEN Larry Welch, USAF (Ret)
Institute for Defense Analysis

GEN Joe Went, USMC (Ret) #
Private Consultant

Executive Secretary
Mr. Michael A Parmentier

ASD (FM&P)

DSB Secretariat Representative

LTC John H. Dertzbaugh
USA Military Assistant

* DSB Member

\ a # Not an Approved Consultan
\

USD vs Appr SASD Coordination
\ a) =

ate! WV Date


13

© Relief from DOPMA and senior enlisted grade caps during drawdown is
necessary.

¢ Borrowed military manpower results in a loss of unit cohesiveness, reduced
training efficiency, and lowered readiness.

Adequate resources for recruiting and training base support are critical element in
personnel readiness and must be maintained.

Competitive and equitable compensation packages are essential to retain quality
personnel. Bonus/incentive program adjustments for critical skills, will likely have
to increase after the drawdown.

Demonstration of a real commitment to "people first" programs including continued
emphasis on retention of quality of life programs for service members and their
families (e.g. adequate military housing/housing allowance system, retention of
commissary/exchanges, no decrease in type - or increase in cost - of medical service
offered) is key toward easing concerns over job security and stability.

Careful management of OPTEMPO and the related PERSTEMPO, especially for
critical skills and units is necessary. Excessive family separation results in lower
morale, poor retention, and reduced readiness.

¢ Development of a PERSTEMPO policy by the Army, Marine Corps and Air
Force could enhance personnel readiness.

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

Developing and implementing methods to reverse the propensity-to-serve trends or
developing adaptive techniques to permit coping with the trends.

Conducting analytical studies, using historical personnel databases, to develop a
better understanding of the implications of the trends and necessary actions.

Developing a mechanism to ensure appropriate pay and a stable retirement system.
Sustainment of national support for the changing DoD mission.

Continuing emphasis on retention of quality of life programs for Service members
and their families (e.g. adequate military housing/housing allowance system,

retention of commissary/exchanges, no decrease in type or increase in cost official
service offered).


REPORT
OF THE

“DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

TASK FORCE
ON

READINESS

JUNE 1994

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140


34

skilled maintenance manpower is being decremented which further exacerbates readiness
problems (especially in the Army Reserve). Delays have been reported in the return to
service of equipment requiring higher-level maintenance. In a resource constrained
environment this could be expected, but in the case of equipment related to active force
contingency missions, the absence of this equipment could affect deployment schedules
and Reserve component ability to support these missions.

The opportunity for Reserve participation in the active Service institutional
training programs must be protected as those programs are downsized and individual
course lengths are increased. Active Service educational standards and programs must be
tailored to satisfy the unique needs of Reserve forces. In addition, educational programs
to develop joint proficiency should include Reserve component personnel. Reserve units
should be fully integrated in Joint and Combined training, exercises, and educational
opportunities.

There is a need to protect against skill erosion in the face of reduced opportunities
for hands-on training. It is in this area that simulations appears to offer significant
promise as a means of replicating realistic training environments. Because of the
dispersion of Guard and Reserve units throughout the nation, simulation devices and
equipment must be cheap and provided in large quantities.

As Reserve Components are more fully integrated with the Active forces, their
accessibility will become paramount. This will be especially true where functions are
performed largely or wholly by Reserve units (e.g.- cargo handling teams, medical
evacuation, water purification, etc.). Based on the experience of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm and future plans for greater Reserve Component utilization, two actions are
necessary to ensure their timely and appropriate mobilization, training, deployment,
employment, and re deployment. First, the current Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up
(PSRC) authority of 90 days with a possible 90 day extension should be increased to a
call-up of 180 days with an 180 day extension. Second, authority to call-up a maximum
of 25,000 reservists by the Secretary of Defense would enable the earliest access possible
for a limited number of reservists (approximately half would support TRANSCOM's
transportation/mobility requirements). Limited Reserve activations could also serve as a
deterring function or limited response to those considering initiating or increasing hostile
actions.

BSERVATI! IN is
Current

1. Reduced readiness is occurring due to personnel and force structure turbulence and
reduction in training operating tempo.


iv

has been provided. The effect of this void is the inability to answer the question "to do
what?" about certain elements of the armed forces. We used the defense strategy that
served as a basis for the Defense Department's Bottom-Up Review to evaluate
conventional force readiness. We did not attempt to evaluate the adequacy of those
forces. Such evaluation needs to be done in conjunction with future simulated and real
war games.

In addition, we concluded that the key indicators that measure readiness and
provide early warning of potential readiness problems are strongest as they relate to a
unit's current readiness within its Service and weakest as they address future and joint
readiness.

It's well to remind those interested in military readiness that this matter has always
been the near exclusive responsibility of the uniformed military - with the Services
playing the dominant role. This process is changing. Now, the SECDEF, CJCS, and
CINCs are all more involved in not only evaluating, but resourcing, joint and combined
readiness. This Task Force has had unprecedented freedom to review readiness matters.
Secretaries Aspin and Perry, General Shalikasvili, and the leadership of the individual
Services have been most supportive in this area.

The nation celebrated the 50th Anniversary of D-Day during the preparation of
this report. It is well to remember that five years before D-Day the United States had
very hollow forces. Many servicemen died as a result of our unreadiness. Readiness can
not be taken for granted. History has shown how "pockets" of unreadiness rapidly grow
and create "hollow" forces. We believe that attention to the issues raised in this report,
and the continued support of Congress for a ready responsive force will give us a chance
to prevent the shortcomings of the past from happening again as the military force
evolves in response to the demands of our unsettled world.


iii

8. Emphasize offensive and defensive measures relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Nuclear readiness requirements should be based on evolving
nuclear policy guidance. The Department must ensure that U.S. forces are
prepared to conduct operations (offensive and defensive) in a nuclear,
biological, and/or chemical environment. That includes the conduct of national-
level command and control exercises involving joint military and civilian
leadership and their staffs to ensure the ability of military and civilian leadership
to carry out their roles and provide confidence in the continued effectiveness of
nuclear control and security means. Of the triad, the area that Tequires greatest
attention is biological.

9. Continued refinement of the roles of SECDEF/CJCS/SVCS/CINCS in
readiness matters. The environment and processes are changing. The
Department should re-examine the readiness oversight and management roles of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the CINCs. In many areas of readiness,
responsibilities are clear. However, in the case of resource allocations to
support joint readiness, and planning for readiness to conduct joint operations,
these responsibilities are less clear.

10. A system to ensure that BRAC 95 has top down guidance regarding
ultimate basing, depots, etc., as well as a funding system to permit rapid write-
off by the Defense Department of selected bases. Guidance should be
applicable to all Services with a focus on expediting elimination of excess
infrastructure.

11. Implementation of ongoing Defense Science Board proposals that have an
impact on readiness - Acquisition, Depot Maintenance, Defense Manufacturing,
and the special Study for the USD (P&R) on Training Readiness. These
specific reports address issues and provide recommendations which directly
impacts on readiness today and in the future.

12. We have a special concern about future readiness. The reduction of
tesources for acquisition raises serious questions about the capabilities of our
forces to respond to the challenges of the 21st Century.

The above list does not include all of our recommendations. However, it
highlights the areas that we believe will pay significant dividends in future readiness, and
particularly in future joint and combined readiness.

There are several policy areas that will affect future readiness which need
immediate clarification. The Department of Defense and the Congress need formal
publication of a National Security Strategy from the White House that defines the
administration's security policies in this changed world. We found it difficult to evaluate
the adequacy of the readiness of certain forces when no specific National Security Policy


47

Intelligence collection capabilities are extremely limited.
CINCs must be more involved in determining collection requirements.
Response to BW use must be determined.

While coordination on BW matters within the intelligence community is good, there
is little coordination between the various agencies and laboratories.

Individual and crew performance after exposure to biological weapons requires
quantification.

Limited knowledge of proliferator biological agent production makes development
of appropriate vaccines problematic.

Biological weapons normally not included in major war games and planning
models.

10. A joint operational Biological defense doctrine needs to be developed and

implemented.

Future

Future concerns include:

1,

The need to resolve policy issues relating to population protection (e.g. inoculation
of indigenous population, local governments and infrastructure, allied forces, and
US. citizens, civil servants, and contractor personnel).

The need to maintain a viable vaccine production capability.

Measures for assessment of the BW threat and force readiness must be developed.

Procedures and the capability to protect and decontaminate ports of embarkation
must be put in place.

The need to continue the R&D effort for a multi-agent vaccine.

Continued Congressional constraint on production of BW vaccines will preclude
timely availability of appropriate vaccines.


30

During a recent M&S symposium, the RTF looked at modeling and simulations in
use today and also those currently under development. The Task Force noted that there
are a lot of useful, albeit disparate, M&S aimed at the joint environment, but that they
suffer from a lack of central policy guidance. There is a need for better structure for both
investment management and technical management. For example, the confederation of
models linked together under a Joint-Service initiative called Aggregate Level Simulation
Protocol (ALSP) will require significant investment coordination in implementing
software changes. At the same time, there is an initiative underway to begin the next
generation of constructive models. The Department's efforts must include finding ways
to overcome the reticence of proponents to work together in developing cost-effective
and compatible applications of simulation. Integration of all forms of simulations (i.e.-
live, virtual, and constructive) must also be pursued to better represent the scope and.
complexity of joint and combined operations.

M&S can also be used as training tools to achieve low-cost skill retention by
Reserve Component forces. With reduced training resources and opportunities, and
lowered training OPTEMPO, modeling and simulation offer a cost-effective contribution
to sustain individual and unit skills and capability. Reserve Components need high
fidelity/low cost systems that can be employed at the unit level.

Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS

Current and re

1. The Department needs a central common M&S architecture and connectivity policy
guidance to harmonize Service training needs with joint training and exercise
requirements.

2. A more active structure and approach to bring added coherence to investments in
modeling and simulation technologies is required. This structure and approach
should emphasize integrating, as appropriate and based on requirements and
demonstrated value, the three forms of simulation (live operations, virtual
simulation systems and war games and models) into seamless simulations of larger
scale operations designed to exercise various levels of joint forces. This does not
mean to imply that all models and simulations need to be developed by joint
agencies, rather they must be able to interact appropriately to represent the way the
several Services fight in joint operations.

3. There should be an increase in the development and use of simulations for CINCs
and Services to develop joint and combined doctrine.

4. Performance measures for the effectiveness of modeling and simulations for both
individual and collective training are required.


19

Using data provided by the Air Force, Commanders and CINCs could evaluate
contingency plans against the forecasted sortie generation rates to determine adequacy of
air support for combat operations. This concept would then forge the links between
resource allocation (spaces, repairables, DBOF funding percentages, and maintenance
rates) in peacetime and wartime sortie availability to support military operations.

Use of the models by the other Services is being investigated by the Service
DCSLOGs and monitored by the DUSD for Logistics. All Services have agreed to
examine relevance of the models (using Service aircraft) to the Service's logistical
procedures. Navy has a model for aircraft which also shows excellent potential.

After the aircraft trial runs have been completed, the Army has agreed to use the
models to evaluate sixteen land combat systems including the Abrams Tank and Bradley
Fighting Vehicle. The Marine Corps will coordinate their efforts for land systems with
the Army.

This approach offers the potential for the development of a DoD-wide set of
models that measures fleet operational availability for both air and ground systems within
each Service as a direct function of the allocation of funds and labor. This same
information can be used by the Commanders and CINCs to evaluate war plans and
contingency operations.

1. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS

‘urrent

1. Increased CINC participation in the requirements determination and resource
allocation process is warranted.

2. Stocks of PGMs are inadequate.

3.  Prepositioned stocks' disarray due to Desert Shield/Desert Storm adversely impacts
current readiness.

4. The availability of Combat Service (CS)/Combat Service Support (CSS) equipment
to support two nearly simultaneous MRCs requires assessment.

5. The CS/CSS units’ spare parts availability/-mismatch to support two nearly
simultaneous MRCs (turbulence issue)must be resolved.

6. The maintenance backlog is growing due to "operations other than war" OPTEMPO,
and turbulence (drawdown of civilian workforce, shortage of civilian workforce,
shortage of reservists maintenance personnel, etc.).


10.

35

There is inadequate definition of Reserve Components roles and missions -
specifically for the Army Naticnal Guard and Army Reserve.

A Bottom Up Review-based strategy exists that rationalizes MRC's being terminated
rapidly without need for extended combat operations and utilization of Reserve
Component combat maneuver forces.

There is a lack of call-up flexibility to support enhanced utilization of Reserve
Component forces.

Mobilization plans relating forces to missions are needed.

Guard and Reserve needs are not consistently considered an essential part of base
closure and realignment decisions.

Full-time support personnel are inadequate and ineffectively distributed.

Depot maintenance delays, untimely issue of spare parts, consolidation of
maintenance at higher levels and reduction in manning levels of skilled maintenance
personnel are contributing to reduced Reserve Component readiness.

Lack of full automation of Guard and Reserve data management functions creates
inefficiency and untimely actions that exacerbate day-to-day management of
Reserve forces and inhibit the mobilization process.

,
There is a lack of simulation systems for the Guard and Reserve to compensate for
teduced operating tempo. Active forces develop large simulation systems that
satisfy Active component needs where forces are heavily concentrated without
provision for systems and devices at Reserve sites widely distributed across the
country.

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

Reserve Component forces will require extensive post mobilization training,
equipment maintenance, modemization and reorganization before they can be
employed effectively.

Reliance on Reserve Component combat maneuver forces could erode to the extent
that the nation will be nearly totally reliant on Active forces for ground combat.

Fundamental changes in national defense policies could jeopardize citizen support
for a predominantly professional military establishment.


18

SUSTAINMENT.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sustainment of warfighting capability depends on modernization, reliability,
maintenance and logistics. Upgrades or incremental improvements to proven systems
endow them with greater reliability, and hones their technological advantage. This
increases preparedness by allowing DoD to avoid costly and long lead-time
modernization programs. Upgrades fill key deficiencies until next generation systems,
currently in various stages of R&D reach fruition.

Some equipment and weapons require replacement rather than upgrade either due
to modernization or reliability issues. Maintenance requirements become a key indicator
of preparedness of weapons and systems. Once maintenance becomes prohibitively
expensive or too frequent, readiness suffers and replacements are required.

The Task Force noted the growing backlog in deferred maintenance and the
efforts of the Services to manage it. All Services indicated the presence of a maintenance
backlog and only the Navy thought it was manageable. The Air Force is watching it
closely and the Army and Marine Corps expressed concerns about the impact of the
maintenance backlog, especially on their Reserve components. A number of factors serve
as catalysts for the maintenance backlog (unscheduled OPTEMPO, availability of spare
parts, availability of properly trained maintenance personnel to include Full Time Support
personnel in Reserve component units). Of particular concer is the projected growth of
the backlog over the POM years.

Among other logistics sustainment issues, the Task Force expressed concern
about the status of prepositioned stocks and the availability of sufficient quantities of
smart weapons to support future contingencies. Opportunities to practice "Just in time"
inventories should be pursued. There is also concern that Combat Support/Combat
Service Support units will run out of equipment in the two nearly simultaneous MRC
scenario. It was noted that sustainment of Reserve component forces pre and post-
mobilization requires attention.

The Task Force focused on identifying analysis methods/models to better
understand the relationship between logistical funding allocation decisions and future
force readiness. Three systems (FAMMAS, TLAM, ALAM) used by the Air Force to
link resources with readiness appear to hold promise for DoD-wide application. These
models have been used by Air Force Logisticians to forecast peacetime mission capable
rates and wartime sustainability estimates for each aircraft in the Air Force inventory with
an accuracy of +/- 2% over a three year time line and +/- 5% forecasting the six year
program.


THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


TABLE OF CONTENTS

L

APPENDICES

A. TERMS OF REFERNCE .

B TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP LIST .......csssssssssssssssssssssssesssneesse sesesessseenses B-1


10

Vv. A TS

In addition to the broad readiness areas of interest already addressed, the Task
Force assessed specific functional areas affecting individual and collective readiness to
include:

Personnel

e Funding OPTEMPO

« Sustainment

¢ Joint/Combined Training Doctrine
¢ Joint C4I/Space

¢ Modeling and Simulation

« Reserves

* Mobility

« Weapons of Mass Destruction
« Infrastructure/Facilities

« Medical

The assessments for these functional areas, to include specific observations,
concerns, and recommendations, are provided in this section starting with "Personnel".


45

« Need to review and validate adequacy of current training and security
requirements (including frequency and number of participating units) to ensure
crew familiarity and experience with nuclear alert procedures;

¢ Maintaining emphasis on training and inspection for all nuclear weapons systems
and NC2-telated activities is essential;

* Itis critical that U.S. continue to maintain the highest levels of nuclear weapon
safety, security, and control.

4. Reduced base for experienced nuclear trained personnel.

5. Maintenance of non-strategic nuclear force regeneration and reconstitution
capability.

6. Continued funding support for C2 enhancements that provide validated capabilities.

7. Retention of needed nuclear complex capabilities as well as nuclear
weapons/systems industrial base to protect future options.

8. Development and implementation of consistent survivability policies and standards
for fielded systems to ensure survivability.

9. Need to assess adequacy of civilian disaster response for nuclear disasters.

Il. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE
Background

Biological Warfare (BW) agent uncertainty is a major concern. They are
telatively easy and cheap to produce and it is extremely difficult to verify treaty
compliance (no production or possession). BW agents include toxins, bioregulators, and
pathogens. Toxins and bioregulators, which occur naturally, can be readily synthesized
in quantity by means of biotechnology. Genetically manipulated BW agents as well as
substances produced naturally in the human body, when introduced in an unnatural way,
can induce abnormal effects which may result in death. Advances in biotechnology
continue to make possible a larger number of agents. Normally harmless, non-disease
producing microorganisms can be modified to become highly toxic or produce diseases
for which an opponent has no known treatment or vaccine. Other disease agents, now
considered too unstable for storage or warfare applications, can be modified using genetic
engineering to be effective BW agents.

Early detection and identification of BW agents are critical for the theater CINC.
A number of factors complicate the peacetime collection of information that would


DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

TASK FORCE
ON
READINESS
ERSHIP
GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA (RET)* GEN Joseph J. Went, USMC (RET)
GEN Larry D. Welch, USAF (RET) ADM Huntington Hardisty, USN, (RET)
ADM Robert L. Long, USN (RET) GEN Maxwell R. Thurman, USA (RET)
LTGEN Julius W. Becton, Jr., USA LTGEN Herbert R. Temple, USA (RET)
(RET)
Executive Secretary DSB Secretariat
Mr. Michael A. Parmentier Mr. John Ello
LTCOL John Dertzbaugh
Advisors/Support
Mr. Dan Gardner
CDR Gretchen Helwig

Mr. Dudley Tademy

* Chairman

B-1


52

It has been noted that environmental costs are not properly sized, leaving field
commanders with the burden of absorbing the costs. Therefore, there is a need for a more
realistic, "environmentally correct", cost estimate for closing bases.

The DoD approach to base closure management has focused principally on
seeking alternative uses for the excess infrastructure, which has extended the timeline for
tumover. Delays or failure to implement BRAC decisions in the face of the myriad of
other transition decisions exacerbates excess infrastructure concerns and the drain on
O&M dollars available to the field commanders.

There are potential savings associated with further consolidations from many sites
to major sites and/or interservice sites if the Department elects to move in that direction.
What is needed is a coordinated DoD approach with standardized guidelines that would
be applicable to all Services. This coordinated DoD approach would put BRAC activities
in a viable program that would allow decisions to be executed in a timely manner. We
understand that such an initiative is underway.

It is apparent that BRAC 95 will not resolve all excess facilities/infrastructure
issues and outyear BRAC provisions will be required. There are no current plans for a
"follow-on" to BRAC 95. Efforts to ensure a "follow-on" should be pursued. The
Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS, endorsed this position in May. It should be
pursued with Congress.

Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS
Current

1. BRAC 95 Cross-Service Consolidation and Closure Initiative should be expanded
to cover all DoD facilities.

2. Retention of excess infrastructure is undermining readiness.

3. More realistic cost estimates for base closings (especially environmental clean-up
costs) are required.

4. The impact of underfunding Real Property Maintenance and deterioration of
essential infrastructure must be demonstrated in meaningful ways (e.g.-
comparison to commercial practices, the resultant increased cost of "must do"
repairs, etc.).

5. A DoD coordinated BRAC approach covering all facilities with standardized
guidelines applicable to all Services is required.


26

OINT P,

I. INTRODUCTION

US military force reductions and the abandonment of many overseas
bases/facilities arguably increase the value of C4I and space capabilities. The Bottom-Up
Review made cost the driving measure of effectiveness in choosing which improvement
programs to perform DoD's projected space launch needs at the “lowest cost over the next
decade." Flexibility or reliability that might be realized by more ambitious measures did
not outweigh the potential costs.

The Task Force supports the Joint Staff C4I For the Warrior initiative as an
important first step in correcting long-standing information system deficiencies.
Additional progress in fielding and implementation of open systems for joint use will
significantly strengthen the current tenuous C4I posture. Global Command and Control
Systems (GCCS) can be a quantum leap forward for joint operations. GCCS will require
continued active senior OSD, Joint Staff, and CINC involvement if it is to avoid the
pitfalls of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

Intelligence systems, including surveillance assets (€.g.- reconnaissance satellites,
long endurance UAV's, etc.), are particularly fragmented and need accelerated efforts to
ensure inclusion in the overall C4I architecture. These assets should be routinely
incorporated into exercises to provide realistic evaluation and feedback, identify needed
improvements, and develop user familiarity with and confidence in the availability of "all
source" information to support planning and operations. Additionally, the responsibility
for the database multi-level security of these systems needs to be clearly defined and
understood.

The complete dependence on SATCOM for high data rate long haul transmission,
and the increasing demands on satellites for surveillance/intelligence gathering, together
demand a comprehensive review of satellite readiness. Of particular concern is the
asymmetry between satellite intelligence collection and distribution capability. The
ability to launch additional platforms as needed must be addressed as integral to satellite
Teadiness. With regard to the use of space assets, the role of the theater CINCs in
determining future space capabilities needs to be taken into account. These CINCs also
need to consider space assets' readiness, just as they do combat and sustainment
readiness.

In response to CINC requests to improve Joint Task Force capabilities for crisis
tesponse, the Department established the Joint Crisis Action Test and Evaluation
(ICATE) Joint Test Force. In addition to being tasked with introducing and assessing
innovative technologies and concepts for command and control of Joint Task Forces,
JCATE has developed a methodology to conduct assessments for the enhancement of
CITF C4I and other operational information processes for joint warfighters. This


63

Chemical:
¢ Support efforts a long-range standoff detection capability and a non-
aqueous decontamination capability.

10. Infrastructure/Facilities. This represents a major capital investment for the
Department. As the force is reduced in size and as resources decline, it is imperative that
excess infrastructure and facilities be quickly eliminated.

e Develop better cost estimates for base closures and fund for them.
¢ Ensure that there are standardized guidelines for BRAC input.

¢ Provide adequate maintenance and modernization programs for facilities
that will remain operational.

© Maximize reductions in BRAC 95 and pursue a follow-on if necessary.

11. Medical. Many medical readiness problems have been identified from Dessert
Storm. Efforts should continue to ensure that medical support for future operations is
adequate and ready.

¢ Support Medical Readiness Task Force efforts.

¢ Develop medical guidance to monitor medical readiness.

¢ Assess impact of coalition warfare on US medical readiness.
¢ Implement a medical technology modernization program.

12. Organizing for Readiness. One area that cuts across all of the functional readiness
areas that have been highlighted above is organizing for readiness. The Department
should reexamine the readiness oversight and management roles of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services,
and the CINCs. In many areas of readiness, responsibilities are clear. The Title X
responsibilities of the Services to organize, train and equip units is a notable example. In
the case of resource allocations to support readiness, and planning for readiness to
conduct joint operations, responsibilities are less clear. Such responsibilities should be
delineated to ensure an effective overall program for readiness is carried out. In addition,
where there are ongoing efforts within the Department concerning functional areas (e.g.
Defense Science Board Task Force on Gulf War Health Effects, Nuclear Posture Review,
Facilities (BRAC '95), etc.), readiness matters should be included in their terms of
reference, and their outputs should include an assessment of the impact of the proposals
on readiness.


27

methodology has applicability for assessing current joint readiness in most of the
essential functional areas of space/joint C41. It should continue to be aggressively
pursued. JCATE should be fully funded and manned in accordance with their approved
charter and program test design.

Il. ERVA TIONS/CONCE!

‘urrent

1. Need to assess contribution of non-US military satellite assets in support of
contingency operations.

2. Theater CINC's ability to directly task space assets needs to be ensured.

3. The adequacy of satellites for communications and intelligence collection readiness
must be constantly monitored.

4, Intelligence systems are predominantly stand-alone and lack required interface.

5. Need to address database security issues (e.g. the need for a clearly
defined/understood responsibility for Information Security).

6. Procedures must be established to ensure DoD's ability to interface effectively with
industry on C3] issues.

7. Need to respond to CINC's request for an agent independent of
developers/requirement generators to assess enhancements to Joint C4I readiness.

‘uture
Future concerns include:
1. Continuing progress in fielding and implementing of open joint systems.

2. Resolution of database security issues, due to increased reliance on non-US military
satellites.

3. Ensuring adequate capabilities to provide appropriate intelligence collection means.


4l

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

I. INTRODUCTI

The continuing world-wide trends toward increased proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and acquisition of long-range delivery systems (1) makes it
imperative that U.S (and coalition) forces be prepared to conduct operations in a nuclear,
biological, and/or chemical (NBC) environment, (2) highlights the increased reliance on
intelligence for early warning, and (3) heightens the importance of theater and global
defenses.

As long as nuclear weapons remain in the stockpile, readiness must be maintained
to ensure the highest standards of safety, security, control and reliability in all facets of
nuclear operations. These standards are necessary to maintain an appropriate balance
between the requirement to assure the authorized use of nuclear weapons in a timely,
responsive and effective manner when authorized by the President with the requirement
to assure against their unauthorized or inadvertent use.

In order to maintain this balance and the high standards mentioned above, we
must take a broad range of actions including those to:

. Institutionalize and enhance individual, unit and joint training for WMD-related
activities to include conducting operations in an NBC environment.

. Ensure the continued viability of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex to ensure
that it can discharge the full range of its required responsibilities.

. Acquire selected overhead intelligence systems and other capabilities to improve
our potential to locate, track and target mobile missiles and other
mobile/transportable assets that could affect our ability to conduct world-wide
operations.

While only a few nuclear weapons can have substantial political and military
impact, the mere possession of these weapons has significant force structure, force
deployment and operational implications. Among the major shortfalls in our ability to
meet the total threat postulated in the WMD proliferation environment are the:

. Survivability of selected National command and control critical equipment and
key facilities;

. The infrequency of national-level exercises involving senior DoD political as well
as military officials;

. Our capability to detect a nuclear weapon smuggled into the United States.


16

Finally, there are two additional issues directly tied to OPTEMPO, which can
significantly effect the readiness of our forces. First, OPTEMPO intensity levels, if
sustained beyond normal for extended periods, can actually reduce the ability of our
forces to train for all assigned missions. For example, while air dropping supplies in
Bosnia would seem to provide excellent training opportunities, if done to the extent it
precludes performance of other required mission training will negatively impact
readiness. Secondly, too much OPTEMPO means excessive time away from both home
Station and family. Family separation is cited as one of the major detriments to personnel
morale. It is imperative that the Department properly manage this aspect of OPTEMPO.

Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS
Current/Future

1. Implications of a more CONUS-based force on OPTEMPO requires increased
analysis and careful management.

2. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO for unique skills and units must be carefully studied.

3. A long-term funding plan is needed for unscheduled operations outside of the
Service's O&M Accounts (to include United Nations operations).

4. Unrealized "efficiencies" (e.g.- DMRs, BRAC delayed closings, etc.) result in
OPTEMPO funding being shifted to pay fact-of-life bills.

5. Fully funding OPTEMPO at some expense to modernization and force structure
accounts is appropriate at least as a temporary measure.

TI. RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the concerns and observations the Department should:

1. Develop in concert with the Congress and implement a system that adequately
responds to Contingency funding requirements. Investigate funding alternatives
such as the potential use of contract authority for certain contingency operations
such as sealift.

2. Fully fund OPTEMPO requirements within O&M account but continue to allow
each service current management flexibility.

3. Retain flexibility in expenditure of OPTEMPO funds. Avoid fencing OPTEMPO
which would degrade commanders' ability to deal with the dynamic fiscal


44

responsive and effective manner when authorized by the President with the requirement
to assure against their unauthorized or inadvertent use.
OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS

Current

1. The potential for unconstrained WMD proliferation (development, purchase, theft,
etc.).

2. Need to enhance ability to detect a nuclear weapon smuggled into the U.S. and to
locate a lost or stolen nuclear weapon.

3. Absence of national-level exercises with senior level participation reduces nuclear
command and control readiness.

4. Shortfall in U.S. preparedness to conduct operations in an NBC environment.
5. Potential for risk reduction initiatives to have deleterious impact on requirements to
assure timely and effective use of nuclear weapons when authorized by the

President.

6. Continued support for secure, survivable, anti-jam satellite communications is
critical.

7. There is an increased need for an effective theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD).

8. Procedures and practices must be enhanced to ensure the capability for a fully
informed response to nuclear use in a timely and integrated manner.

9. — It is critical that the U.S. continue to maintain the highest levels of nuclear weapons
safety, security, and control.

Future
Future concerns include:
1. Long-term training and security requirements:

¢ Continuing need for political as well as military senior-level decision-maker and
staff participation in regular and realistic nuclear exercises;


33

Future

1. Further consolidation potential beyond that achieved in BRAC 95 should be
evaluated and a follow-on to BRAC 95 pursued if required.

2. Assess implications of continued growth in Real Property Maintenance Backlog
on retained infrastructure.

3. Underfunding of Real Property Maintenance/Modemization.

Ti. RECOMMENDATION:

The Department should pursue the following recommendations:
1, Expedite elimination of excess infrastructure.
2. Develop realistic cost estimates for base closures.

3. Develop a DoD coordinated BRAC approach with standardized guidelines which
are applicable to all Services.

4. Ensure adequate maintenance and modernization programs for those facilities that
will remain operational for the long-term.

5. Pursue a follow-on to BRAC 95 if required.


elements in strategic readiness. For example, it did not analyze in sufficient depth the C4]
needed to integrate forces. Additional analysis is being conducted by OSD, the Chairman, and
the CINCs. The Task Force deferred judgment on this level of readiness.

Recommendations in the final report include the need to: provide adequate resources to
access, train, and educate high quality personnel; work with Congress in developing a
contingency funding system which does not harm readiness; improve analytical tools to help
project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions; bring a greater
joint forces perspective to readiness; develop an OSD C4I architecture; provide greater
involvement by theater CINCs in the readiness matters; enhanced use of simulations: place
emphasis on weapons of mass destruction readiness; and reexamine the readiness oversight and
management roles of OSD, JCS, the Services, and the CINCs.

Taken in the aggregate, the report's recommendations could serve to support the broad
policy adjustments the Department of Defense is taking in overseeing and managing readiness. I
concur with the observations and recommendations of the Task Force, and recommend that you
approve the report for appropriate dissemination by signing the attached memorandum.

Paul G. Kaminski
Chairman


33

L_ INTRODUCTION

The statement regarding "increased reliance on the Reserves in the future" has
been attributed to the Department's senior leadership. Specific plans have not yet been
developed to clarify the exact role intended. While it may be policy, there is a need to
clearly define the implementation. National Guardsmen and Reservists continue to
demonstrate commitment to their military responsibilities. There is a need to maximize
the potential of this commitment by (1) defining the roles they will be called upon to
perform, (2) developing clearly identified deployment plans, and (3) providing resources
to ensure their readiness. Actions are needed to make the Reserve forces involvement
apparent. That includes ensuring that the necessary investment in their equipping and
training is maintained. While all Guard and Reserve units may not be required to
maintain extremely high levels of readiness, degradation of individual and unit readiness
must be frequently monitored and tested to assure the reliability of the force in whole or
in part to respond to rapidly escalating and often unplanned requirements.

A number of factors will continue to impact positively on Reserve readiness
posture including: (1) Congressional support for Reserve component forces; (2) influx of
new equipment from active drawdown; (3) Active force support; and (4) the fact that
Reserve components are fully focused on readiness. Component initiatives to prioritize
Tesources and cross-level assets have permitted levels of reported readiness higher than
expected during a period of resource constraints and considerable personnel and force
structure turbulence.

However, behind these displayed readiness levels are clear signs of declining
readiness and sustainability. The expected cascading of equipment from Active force
drawdowns has not been uniformly felt throughout the Reserve Components. The lack of
equipment remains a major inhibitor to Guard and Reserve readiness. Of particular
concern is the Army Reserve, which, because of the nature of its role, has many high
Priority support units that suffer readiness decrements because they lack low visibility
equipment (water purification, medical, laundry equipment, decontamination, etc.) on
which to train and operate.

Because of instability in the force (e.g. limited training opportunities, relocation
of units resulting from BRAC actions, perceived decrease in intensity and relevance of
training, and for Army forces, the inability to provide definitive basic and advanced
training schedules and seat allocations) Tecruiting and retention are becoming greater
challenges. As more modern equipment enters the inventory, the requirement for skilled
maintenance personnel and spare parts will increase. It should be noted that BRAC could
have a particularly severe impact on Reserve forces when an installation is closed since
Reservists tend to perform their duties near their home towns. Some units are
experiencing a shortage of repair parts to rapidly repair equipment. In addition, full-time


10.

11.

31

Expanded development and use of modeling and simulations to support mission
rehearsal and deployment planning and execution requires coordination.

Reserve Component forces require enhanced modeling and simulation support for
individual skill and collective training.

The use of virtual and constructive simulations to leverage and enhance (rather than
replace in toto) live training at the unit, combat element and individual levels
Tequires greater emphasis.

Simulations which model new world missions to include operations other than war
(OOTW) should be developed as feasible.

Multi-dimensional "seamless" simulations should include combat, combat service,
combat service support, logistics, medical, intelligence and all levels of command --
joint and combined.

Simulations should mimic operational communications systems that are sufficiently
integrated with operational equipment or are capable of "going to war."

Development of international simulation standards to support interoperability
including increased modeling and simulation training and coordination with the UN
and coalition forces are necessary.

TI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

DoD should continue to provide vigorous support to developing a full synthetic
theater of war capability integrating live, virtual and constructive simulations.
Continuing CINCEUR support of the Synthetic Theater of War-95 (STOW-95)
demonstration in Europe is essential to both its success and relevance. Similarly,
CINCUSACOM sponsorship of STOW-97 promises to provide the focus of an
operational customer needed to help ensure the right direction and results of that
effort. The STOW effort should be coordinated with parallel efforts to develop a
common architecture.

DDR&E should charge the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) with
the responsibility to lead the development of a DoD M&S Master Plan. To support
execution of this plan, DMSO should have a sufficiently robust staff with the
authority to coordinate milestones and budgets for complimentary M&S program
efforts. They should also act as the information clearing house on ongoing
advanced distribution simulation technology development, demonstration and policy
information.

DDR&E should revitalize the work of the Executive Council on Modeling and
Simulation to ensure that new simulation developments and major upgrades meet


Il. OBSERVATIONS/CONCERNS,

Current

1.

2.

Need a game or simulation to validate medical strategy and policy.

Need a medical R&D program to ensure a disciplined infusion of medical
technology into the force.

Need medical planners participation in joint and combined exercises to address
deployment, communications, and evacuation needs.

Need to review/evaluate/validate theater medical support.

¢ Medical evacuation policy.

© Deployment plans, communications requirements.

« Evacuation capabilities needed.

« Medical demands in a combined/allied theater (what medical support can be

provided to U.S. forces as well as what medical support would be required from
US. forces).

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

The need to develop a plan to address domestic medical demands resulting from
man-made disasters; and

A disciplined medical technology modernization plan is needed to institutionalize
the infusion of medical technology.

Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

Support Medical Readiness Task Force efforts to remedy medical readiness
problems identified in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm; including combat
medical training for health care providers, medical personnel mobilization and
deployment, mobility of Army medical units, medical supply system, equipment
modernization and sustainment, and unfamiliarity of medical personnel with their
deployment platform.

55


ite the readiness oversight mana: nt roles of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the CINCs and the Services.

This Final Report addresses our concerns in each of these areas and suggests
approaches for dealing with them.

Il. SCOPE -- READY TO DO WHAT?

The Readiness Task Force focused on the readiness management and oversight
process. We did not look in detail into: acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues
related to readiness (which are being examined by separate Task Forces of the Defense
Science Board); the adequacy of forces to carry out the tasks required in the Bottom-Up
Review; or the readiness of the nuclear forces to carry out the nuclear forces strategy
pending the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.

A major challenge has been to answer the question -- "Ready to do what?" This is
largely due to the absence of a current National Security Strategy and its follow-on the
National Military Strategy. The question was temporarily answered in September 1993
with the release of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which addressed the needs for
conventional and unconventional forces. Our Task Force has evaluated the conventional
and unconventional forces based on their readiness to respond to the three functional
areas defined in the Bottom-Up Review:

* Rapid response to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts anywhere
in the world with major land, sea, air, and space forces.

¢ Rapid response to small contingencies, sometimes Tequiring highly precise
operations, with a very high probability of success from the outset of the
operation.

¢ Special capabilities demanded by special situations in peacekeeping,
peacemaking, humanitarian missions, etc.

The Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a continuing
process of evaluating the adequacy of the forces necessary to carry out the requirements
identified through the Bottom-Up Review. A recent observation by General Luck
indicating a need for 400 thousand troops reinforces the need for a reappraisal of the
requirements defined in the BUR. The Chairman is planning a major war game to
evaluate the BUR this Fall. This war game should afford the opportunity to validate
CINC requirements. Moreover, in light of the importance of joint and combined
operations in the protection of U.S. and allied security interests, both the FY 1995-99 and
FY 1996-01 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed the CINCs to assess joint
readiness in the context of the Bottom-Up Review and to provide advice on readiness
matters in the Program and Budget process.


43

flexibility of these forces, the Department of Defense maintains the capability to
regenerate or reconstitute NSNF should conditions warrant. While regeneration
procedures have been developed and successfully exercised, there are concerns about
whether the DoD can maintain this capability into the future as the frequency of
operational inspections is reduced and the personnel experience base declines.
Additionally, the current emphasis on conventional vice nuclear missions has the
potential to further undermine NSNF readiness. In order to improve NSNF readiness,
the CJCS and the Services must ensure vigorous exercise and inspection programs,
appropriate procurements and protection of selected programs to maintain NSNF
capabilities.

Financial pressures jeopardize several critical Nuclear C2 programs that were
developed to address validated deficiencies. Programs that will provide secure,
survivable, anti-jam satellite communications must be preserved. Similarly, programs
and systems that ensure that our tactical warning and attack assessment system remains
survivable and capable of providing unambiguous warning and assessment of nuclear
attack against the U.S. or our forces and allies abroad as well as accurate identification of
the aggressor continue to merit priority support. Finally, programmed enhancements,
upon which the substantial consolidation of numerous airborne C2 aircraft was predicted,
must be completed to avoid unnecessary costs in preserving our ability to control U.S.
nuclear forces.

The likelihood of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the next several decades
is a threat of great importance. Notwithstanding the active efforts of the U.S. and its
Allies to discourage proliferation entirely and retard the capability of those states that
acquire these weapons, future conflicts may involve the use of nuclear weapons. The
extraordinary destructiveness of these weapons and their ability to generate the most
profound environmental, political, and other effects far beyond the immediate theater of
employment make nuclear weapons a crucial security consideration for the U.S. and its
Allies. Such importance underscores the need for an adequate nuclear warning and
notification system supported by effective and timely intelligence. The unambiguous
determination of the origin of a missile launch or unexplained nuclear explosion world-
wide requires a range of capabilities including prompt tactical warming, launch point
identification, aim point prediction, and attack assessment for accurate characterization of
and response to missile attacks. Consequently the U.S. must ensure the existence of
procedures and capabilities that can address the full range of potential contingencies in
the evolving security environment to include a nuclear explosion that occurs without
warning, (e.g., first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict where U.S. forces are not directly
involved), the detection of covertly delivered nuclear weapons, etc. The DoD is currently
undertaking initiatives to ensure these important capabilities.

As long as nuclear weapons remain in the stockpile, readiness must be maintained
to ensure the highest standards of safety, security, control and reliability in all facets of
nuclear operations. These standards are necessary to maintain an appropriate balance
between the requirement to assure the authorized use of nuclear weapons in a timely,


49

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

Sustaining training and readiness to operate in a NBC contaminated environment.
Development of a non-aqueous decontamination capability.

Resolution of policy issues relating to population protection.

Fielding of an effective cruise missile defense.

The level of operational degradation associated with current generation chemical
defense equipment.

Vv. NDATIONS

1. General

A. The CJCS and the Services must take actions to sustain training and readiness to
operate in a NBC contaminated environment.

B. WMD considerations must be incorporated into training and planning simulations
and wargames.

2. Nuclear

A. The Department must conduct realistic national-level nuclear C2 exercises on a
regular basis. Participation by senior political as well as military decision makers
in these exercises is necessary to assure that nuclear weapons could be employed
in a timely, responsive, and effective way when authorized by the President.

B. The CICS and the Services must ensure vigorous exercise and inspection
programs, appropriate procurements, and protection of selected programs to
maintain strategic as well as non-strategic nuclear force (NSNF) capabilities.

C. The Department must continue to support C2 enhancements that provide validated
requirements.

D. The Department must ensure continued development and implementation of
programs to meet long-term training and security requirements (i.e., survivable,
secure and jam-resistance communications) to ensure the positive control by the
President over U.S. nuclear forces in all scenarios and contingencies.


There are several changes which should have a positive impact on readiness. In
addition to the creation of our Task Force, the Department has undertaken additional
initiatives to ensure the continuing readiness of U.S. military forces, consistent with our
national security requirements:

Made readiness the Department of Defense's top priority and included
readiness reporting requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance;

Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. This council, chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and co-chaired by the Vice-Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and
oversight.

Created the Readiness Working Group. This group, co-chaired by the Deputy
Under Secretary for Readiness and the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-
3), provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force
Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated
to Under-Secretary status.

Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness.
This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness
issues and, as previously noted, co-chairman of the Readiness Working
Group.

Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities.

Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three-days of meetings chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical
tools that relate resources to readiness.

The Chairman, JCS, has taken the initiative and responsibility for assessing
readiness of US forces to execute assigned missions.

The Vice-Chairman, JCS has expanded the focus of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) beyond it's normal acquisition review function to
include readiness issues. The JROC is comprised of the Vice-Chairman and
Service Vice-Chiefs; and

The Vice-Chairman, JCS, also initiated the Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment process, which will assess readiness operationally and
programatically, current and future, with a focus on mission accomplishment.

Additionally, Congress has demonstrated continuing support for readiness in the budget

process.


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

June 22, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION &
TECHNOLOGY)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness

This memorandum provides for your review and comment the final report of the DSB
Task Force on Readiness, and recommends that you forward the report to the Secretary of
Defense. The report focuses on the Department's readiness management and oversight processes,
especially key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing
early warning of potential readiness problems, and on other matters affecting individual and
collective readiness, such as structure, lift, and sustainability.

In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met as a group frequently, and
its members have visited numerous sites to gather information. They also met with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services Chiefs and available CINCs. The Task Force did not look
in detail into acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues related to readiness; the adequacy
of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review; or nuclear forces strategy and requirements.

Regarding the current status of military readiness, the Task Force concluded that although
there are some downward indicators, the general readiness posture of today's conventional and
unconventional forces is acceptable in most measurable areas. However, the Task Force reported
that it observed enough concerns that they were convinced that unless the Department of Defense
and the Congress focus on readiness, the armed forces could slip into a "hollow" status.

For analytical purposes, the Task Force divided readiness into three levels: unit, joint
(and combined) force, and national. The Task Force found that there currently exists a well-
defined reporting system to evaluate the current readiness of combat and support units. On the

other hand, it found the Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness significantly
less mature and less comprehensive.

The Task Force assessed the current state of the Department's ability to measure joint

readiness as poorly defined. Specifically, there is neither a clear definition of joint readiness nor
of a system to measure it.

At the highest level, national readiness is important to ensure that our forces have
sufficient readiness to carry out our National Military Strategy. The analysis conducted under
the Bottom-Up Review provided the basis for addressing the strategic readiness of our forces in
some areas, notably in force structure. This analysis, however, did not consider all essential


25

i. 0 DATION:

1,

The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider
making USACOM responsible for joint training for all CONUS-based conventional
combatant forces. Additionally, USACOM must be provided the resources to
support this responsibility.

The Joint Staff and USACOM, in coordination with the CINCs, should define joint
training objectives and readiness criteria to such a degree that the joint readiness
status of forces will be as clear and compelling as the unit readiness status that is the
responsibility of the Services. Development of JMETL standards should be
accelerated to support this effort.

OSD should issue firm guidance to ensure that individual Service constructive
models used for training and evaluation interface in order to provide for effective
exercising of joint task force staffs that is coherent from both Service and joint view
points.

The Department should ensure that resources are available to support establishing
and operating the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center under USACOM.

The CICS exercise funds used for transportation to overseas exercises should be
reexamined, particularly in light of the need for more attention being given to ensure
effective joint training of deployable forces in the CONUS.

The Joint Staff should continue ongoing efforts to refine joint training doctrine for
OOTW.

Combined/coalition forces should be incorporated in development of joint training
doctrine.


13, Future Readiness: We were unable to assess the impact of a focus on current
readiness on our future forces. Acquisition continues to take an unprecedented smaller
share of the defense budget. The uncertainty attendant to that phenomenon is how well
the armed forces will be able to modernize to respond to the changing nature of warfare.
This is an issue which requires considerable follow-on study and evaluation. It is our
Judgment that our technological superiority and the nature of the threat today provides us
a small cushion of time. However, focusing solely on today's readiness without concern
for tomorrow's capabilities and readiness could create some vestiges of the "hollow" days
(i.e. poorly equipped forces).

C. Future Work.
The Readiness Task Force will continue to meet quarterly, or on call of the

Secretary of Defense, to review the status of the recommendations and/or address other
readiness issues as directed.


14

TI. RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the observations and concerns, the Department should:

1.

2.

Ensure personnel inventories/strengths are stabilized to meet requirements.
Provide adequate resources to recruit and retain quality personnel.

¢ Support the Senior Panel on Recruiting's efforts to effectively resource
recruitment activities.

¢ Support ongoing efforts to improve DoD's ability to accurately project
retention.

OSD should support continued efforts to coordinate/integrate the Services’ attempts
to enhance their personnel planning models.

Accurately determine the difference between military pay and the appropriate
civilian pay index.

Direct the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force to follow the Navy's lead and
develop PERSTEMPO standards consistent with their projected missions.

Develop means to ensure DoD continues stressing and implementing all facets of
equal opportunity.

Emphasize importance of personnel issues in future dialog with national leadership
and the American public in general.


This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The
DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide
independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements,
opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report do not
necessarily represent the official position of the Department of
Defense.

This document is UNCLASSIFIED
Security review completed by OASD (Public Affairs),
Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review

Reference # 94~S-2378, June 15, 1994


36

4. Post drawdown, the prior-service pool from which some reserve units recruit heavily
will be much smaller.

5. Reserve component force modernization will be affected adversely by budget
reductions.

6. As base realignment and closure expands, Guard and Reserve units and individuals
will be either displaced or denied training opportunities depending on Active
component resources.

If. REC AT

The Reserve Components must be an integral part of warfighting contingency
plans and peacetime operations. To maximize this potential the Department should:

1. Determine realistic roles and missions for the Reserve components - especially for
the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

2. Stratify Reserve forces to meet short term contingencies and mid length and
extended operations, and resource accordingly.

3. Provide adequate simulation systems to compensate for reduced training operating
tempo. Consider expanding the concept and joint use of consolidated systems such
as those at the Fort Dix High Technology Training Center to accommodate high
densities of Guard and Reserve personnel.

4, Make substantial investment in automation of the Guard and Reserve. The Reserve
Component Automation System (RCAS) will provide a means to accomplish this for
the Army Reserve components.

5. Continue efforts to enhance both timely access to and increased call-up of Reserve
Component forces in consonance with their increased integration in contingency
plans.

6. Articulate more clearly the need for Reserve Component forces.


21

Assess status of CS/CSS units' equipment, and ability to support the two nearly
simultaneous MRC scenario.

Establish pilot programs which involve CINCs in the development of joint
requirements to improve Joint and Combined readiness. Consideration should be
given to USACOM and CENTCOM as the pilot entities. They should be provided a
small technical capability to assist in evaluating new technologies that might have
an effect upon their Joint and Combined war fighting capability. As appropriate,
these CINCs might be involved in a JROC process that looks broadly across
functional capabilities with the greatest impact on joint operations.


29

ODELIN if A &:

I. INTRODUCTI

At the heart of joint readiness is the need for joint force commanders and their
Staffs to practice frequently the joint skills of war. Today, modeling and simulation
offers great potential as an affordable and effective means by which joint forces can
achieve and maintain expertise in operational and tactical tasks, such as employing
operational firepower, conducting Strategic deployment, employing forces, developing
theater intelligence, conducting mission rehearsal, and operational movement and
maneuver. In the future, technologies of the "Information Age" offer the prospect of
making M&S increasingly more useful in enhancing joint force readiness.

Both prudence and economy dictate that DoD capitalize on Advanced Distributed
Simulation (ADS) technology to prepare for joint/combined warfare in an uncertain
world. ADS can provide the wherewithal for joint task forces, and in particular joint task
force staffs, to practice more often and build confidence. Simulations offer the potential
for markedly improving joint requirements definition and refinement; joint doctrine
development and acquisition; test and evaluation; planning and courses-of-action
assessments or rehearsals; and military education.

Live exercises and training, particularly that conducted on instrumented ranges
(e.g.- National Training Center, 29 Palms, Fallon, Nellis, etc.), will continue to provide
the critical component of unit training. In recent years, however, the Services have
exploited modeling and simulation technology to enhance individual and unit readiness
while reducing overall training costs. M&S has also been used to assist in determining
acquisition requirements. More recently, the Department has taken a number of steps to
improve the technologies that enable modeling and simulation for support of joint
teadiness. The Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) has been established,
under the DDR&E, to facilitate cooperation among the Services. The DDR&E and Vice
Chairman have signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to provide joint direction
and sponsorship to focus and leverage the potential of ADS. The MOA commits them to
pursue, with the Services and Commanders-in-Chiefs of the Combatant commands,
demonstration programs to find practical ways in which ADS can improve development
and assessment of joint doctrine, plans, operations, training, and education, and to exploit
ADS for support of research development, tests, and evaluations throughout the
Department. A mechanism for reviewing and coordinating M&S programs through the
DoD Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation (EXCIMS) has been established
and the development of a DoD Modeling and Simulation Master Plan initiated. The
Joint Warfighting Center was established and is fully supported by the Joint Staff.
Finally, ARPA's Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) program has been redirected to
support USEUCOM Exercise ATLANTIC RESOLVE in November 1994, as a proof of
concept, and to meet USACOM's joint training-simulation needs in 1997.


17

environment. Appropriate accounting feedback procedures should be developed
and implemented.

Give greater visibility to the impact of contingency operations on quality training
and a ready force.

Investigate tiered readiness as a means of managing OPTEMPO.

Establish Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO criteria,
which with OSD support, would give visibility to management implications of a
more CONUS based force to include unique skills and units.

Investigate 1993 Marine Corps OPTEMPO study for its applicability in principle to
Army and Air Force.


DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS

FINAL REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task
Force on Readiness, known as the "Readiness Task Force" (RTF), to provide him with
advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the following areas:!

¢ Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for
providing early warning of potential readiness problems, including
assessments of:

-- How the Department deals with readiness concerns; and
-- The adequacy of existing readiness reporting systems.

¢ Other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as: structure,
lift, sustainability, active-reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of
civilians and coalition personnel support.

Members of the Readiness Task Force are:

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Retired), Chairman
General Maxwell R. Thurman, USA (Retired)

General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired)

Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (Retired)

Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Retired)

General Joseph J. Went, USMC (Retired)

Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., USA (Retired)
Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., ARNG (Retired)

The Readiness Task Force reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and looked
in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness. This Final Report of the Readiness
Task Force highlights areas that we believe the Department of Defense should focus on to
provide the ready forces needed, today and tomorrow, to respond to likely challenges in
the changing world environment.

Over the past year, in conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met
as a group frequently, and its members have visited numerous sites, individually as well
as in groups, to gather information for this report. Significantly, the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of Defense met with us at most of our group meetings so that they could take

\The Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness was established on May 19, 1993 in Terms of
Reference signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.


51

STRI LITIE,

I, INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, DoD occupied almost 3,900 major and minor properties in
50 states and US territories, plus 1,700 abroad. US forces already have abandoned about
870 sites overseas. So far, through BRAC 93, of 495 major installations in the United
States, 108 have been scheduled to close (70) or be realigned (38). Providing a well
maintained and modernized infrastructure, and balancing it with other readiness
requirements is a central issue. Insufficient infrastructure undermines readiness. Excess
infrastructure that requires costly resources and care has the same effect.

A deliberate decision was made in developing FY 95 Defense Planning Guidance
that infrastructure and acquisition were to be "bill payers" for readiness and sustainment.
As such, it is reasonable to expect that underfunding of maintenance of real property is an
issue.

The Department's real property is seriously deteriorated. This is true not only for
facilities to be eliminated through base closures but for facilities to remain operational for
the long term. DoD is investing in maintenance, repair and modernization of its facilities
at a rate that is far lower than the robust period of the mid-1980s and will soon equal the
rates of "hollow force" era of the late-1970s.

All Services report a growth in the real property maintenance backlog over the
POM years. This concern is exacerbated by the need to maintain excess infrastructure
while the Department seeks civilian transfer solutions. Funds used to maintain the excess
property are sorely needed to support other critical needs. The Navy, for instance,
reported that while infrastructure is balanced in the near term, there is a period between
FY95 and FY99 when there is a funding-infrastructure mismatch prior to being balanced
again in FY99. During this period, infrastructure reduction will free dollars for
procurement once a steady state is reached. Some officials believe that modernizing
facilities is a critical need and dollars recovered from infrastructure reduction should be
used for maintaining, repairing and modemizing those facilities that will remain
operational for the long-term. There needs to be a solution that emphasizes rapid
disposition of excess facilities and does not force the Services to use already stretched
O&M funds to maintain infrastructure no longer needed.

The Services have expended considerable and productive efforts in preparing
BRAC plans. However, the agonizing slowdown in the actual ability of the Services to
drawdown excess infrastructure resulting from BRAC decisions and force structure
reductions has become a major problem. Responsive BRAC execution is needed to
maximize resources needed to maintain essential infrastructure.


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

19 MAY 993
ACQUISITION,

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Task Force

on Readiness

You are requested to organize a Defense Science Board (DSB)
Task Force to advise the Secretary of Defense on the components
of a Readiness Early Warning System to insure that our forces do
not become "hollow," and, where deficiencies may begin to emerge,
to suggest corrective actions.

The Readiness Task Force will provide advice, recommenda-
tions, and supporting rationale which address the items below.
~ Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate

methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness
problems, including:

~~ An assessment of how well the Department can deal
with readiness concerns; and

~- An assessment of the adequacy of existing readiness
reporting systems. :

- Other matters affecting individual and collective
readiness, such as: structure, lift, sustainability, active-
reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of civilians and
coalition personnel Support.

While the primary focus of the Readiness Task Force is on
Management and oversight processes, it will also report to the
Secretary findings with regard to the state of readiness of the
armed forces. Where deficiencies are noted, the report will .
Suggest corrective actions.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and
Personnel, ASD(FM&P) will sponsor this Task Force. General
Edward C, Meyer, USA (Ret.) will serve as Chairman of the Task
Force. Mr. Michael A. Parmentier, Director (Readiness &
Training) will serve as Executive Secretary. Mr. John V. Ello
will be the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) will


37

MOBILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of mobility readiness, while the subject of considerable debate, appears
to be a long way from satisfactory resolution. With regard to supporting the BUR
strategy, overall, a MRC-West or a MRC-East are mobility (transportation) supportable
but lift remains a limiting factor. While either will require careful management of
transportation assets, there do not appear to be any show stoppers. The transportation
Supportability of two MRC's simultaneously or near simultaneously is far less certain.
Issues that address that uncertainty, in the long-term, require resolution. Those issues
include: the need to find a suitable replacement for the aging C-141; full asset visibility;
development of a West Coast ammunition port; Access to Reserve personnel early;
availability of Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF); and development of standard seaport
operations under a single manager.

Logistics reliability, annual operating costs, short and unimproved airfield
limitations, and inability of the C-141 to efficiently carry current Army and Marine
equipment degrades the C-141's ability to support current and future requirements. The
Current programmed purchase of only 40 C-17s, without additional wide-body, outsize
cargo-capable aircraft augmentation, would probably permit not more than half of the air
delivered combat forces required in the first 30 days to close on time. The Department
has established a comprehensive program for selecting a C-141 replacement to include
evaluating the full range of military and commercial transport aircraft that could replace
the capacity lost through the C-141 retirement.

Full asset visibility is essential for optimum application of limited transportation
resources. Continued development and full implementation of the Global Transportation
Network (GTN) is needed.

There is no seaport on the west coast of the United States capable of handling
containerized ammunition. This is a serious constraint ina MRC-West contingency and
could be a show stopper in a nearly simultaneous 2- MRC scenario. This is a long-
standing problem which is being addressed in the FY95 budget. Attention needs to be
paid to the resolution of this problem to make sure that the funding stays in place.

Efficient utilization of current transportation assets is highly dependent upon the
contribution of Reserve personnel. Early availability of sufficient numbers of Reserve
component personnel to operate aircraft, and to man the transportation infrastructure is
critical to effective lift. TRANSCOM's concept of a READY MOBILITY FORCE
comprised of about 10,500 personnel, as part of a SECDEF call-up of 25,000 reservists
was developed to ameliorate this concern.


39

Nearly half of the 25,000 Presidential Reserve Call-Up authority is ear marked for
TRANSCOM's mobility needs. Early access to these Reserve personnel is crucial to
the success of TRANSCOM's mission.

The operational limitations and availability of CRAF must be considered in
planning airlift requirements.

A standardized, coordinated approach to seaport operations under one central
manager would enhance sealift efficiency.

Assessment of prepositioning trade-off for sealift and airlift should be performed on
a continuing basis.

Future

Future concerns include:

1.

Continued strong support of peacetime operations (operations other than war) by
Reserve component personnel provided a valuable service and should be
aggressively pursued.

Adequacy of strategic lift must be assessed.

* Need to procure an adequate number of aircraft to replace the aging C-141.

¢ Willingness of commercial aviation to continue to participate in CRAF.

* Continued improvement of sealift capability.

Early access to sufficient numbers of Reserve personnel will remain critical for
mobility readiness.

Adequate capability to move tanks and similar equipment from inland bases to
seaports must be reassessed.

TI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

Procure an adequate number of aircraft to modernize the force and execute the
tequirements of the BUR and unified commanders war plans.

Reassess prepositioning potential to overcome some of existing and future Lift
shortfalls.


Ill. NT FACTORS AFFE! iG READINESS

The Readiness Task Force's review took into account the impacts on readiness of
the following changes:

¢ The world situation and threat perception;

¢ National military strategy;

¢ Funding levels;

¢ Roles and missions;

¢ End strengths - military, active, reserve, civilian;

¢ Organization of force structure;

e Production, availability and access to strategic resources;
« Personnel quality of life and morale;

e Basing (overseas and CONUS); and

e Supporting infrastructure.

Many of these changes have had a negative impact on near-term readiness, and
affect each of the Services differently. Examples are:

e Army -- Increasing the practice of borrowing military manpower to conduct
tasks unrelated to their military missions, and increasing numbers of
mismatches between job requirements and service-member skills ("MOS
mismatches") due to personnel turbulence;

« Navy -- Providing operating funds for bases that did not close as scheduled,
even though O&M funds for those bases were removed from the budget;

« Air Force -- Shortfall in availability of critical spare parts due to turbulence
associated with the rapid drawdown.

« Marine Corps: Lengthy or frequent contingency deployments ("high
OPTEMPO") that prevent units from participating in required training
activities.

Until this change-related turbulence declines, units in the field will inevitably be
subject to some degraded readiness. Turbulence is the number-one enemy of
cohesiveness in units and concomitant readiness. During this period of change, there will
be various instances of degraded readiness and anecdotal evidence of readiness problems
from the field will be common.