# Uradni list C 277/10.

| | ISSN 1725-5244 |
| --- | --- |
| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 277 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Zvezek 4810. november 2005 |

ISSN 1725-5244

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 277

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Zvezek 4810. november 2005

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| Obvestilo št. | Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Informacije |
| | Svet |
| 2005/C 277/1 | Uradno obvestilo Danske glede vizumske vzajemnosti | 1 |
| 2005/C 277/2 | Uradno obvestilo Švedske glede vizumske vzajemnosti | 1 |
| 2005/C 277/3 | Uradno obvestilo Republike Avstrije glede vizumske vzajemnosti | 2 |
| | Komisija |
| 2005/C 277/4 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 3 |
| 2005/C 277/5 | Povzetek podatkov, ki ga države članice predložijo o državni pomoči, dodeljeni na podlagi Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženjem kmetijskih proizvodov | 4 |
| 2005/C 277/6 | Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Št. primera COMP/M.3997 – Sun Capital/Sara Lee) — Primer za poenostavljeni postopek (
  1
  ) | 11 |
| 2005/C 277/7 | Upravna komisija evropskih skupnosti za socialno varnost delavcev migrantov — Menjalni tečaj za valute po Uredbi Sveta (EGS) št. 574/72 | 12 |
| | EVROPSKI GOSPODARSKI PROSTOR |
| | Nadzorni organ EFTA |
| 2005/C 277/8 | Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o državni pomoči v zvezi z islandskim projektom, ki zadeva podmorski kabel (Farice), na podlagi člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču | 14 |
| 2005/C 277/9 | Državna pomoč — Islandija — Sporočilo Nadzornega organa EFTA državam EFTA, državam članicam EU in drugim zainteresiranim strankam — Ukrep državne pomoči 47901 (prejšnji SAM 030.02.006) — Načrtovana pomoč v obliki državne garancije v korist deCODE Genetics v zvezi z ustanovitvijo oddelka za pripravo zdravil | 29 |
| | Evropska centralna banka |
| 2005/C 277/0 | Priporočilo Evropske centralne banke z dne 26. oktobra 2005 — Svetu Evropske unije o zunanjih revizorjih centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (ECB/2005/10) | 30 |

Obvestilo št.

Vsebina

Stran

I   Informacije

Svet

2005/C 277/1

Uradno obvestilo Danske glede vizumske vzajemnosti

1

2005/C 277/2

Uradno obvestilo Švedske glede vizumske vzajemnosti

1

2005/C 277/3

Uradno obvestilo Republike Avstrije glede vizumske vzajemnosti

2

Komisija

2005/C 277/4

Menjalni tečaji eura

3

2005/C 277/5

Povzetek podatkov, ki ga države članice predložijo o državni pomoči, dodeljeni na podlagi Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženjem kmetijskih proizvodov

4

2005/C 277/6

Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Št. primera COMP/M.3997 – Sun Capital/Sara Lee) — Primer za poenostavljeni postopek (
  1
  )

1

11

2005/C 277/7

Upravna komisija evropskih skupnosti za socialno varnost delavcev migrantov — Menjalni tečaj za valute po Uredbi Sveta (EGS) št. 574/72

12

EVROPSKI GOSPODARSKI PROSTOR

Nadzorni organ EFTA

2005/C 277/8

Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o državni pomoči v zvezi z islandskim projektom, ki zadeva podmorski kabel (Farice), na podlagi člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču

14

2005/C 277/9

Državna pomoč — Islandija — Sporočilo Nadzornega organa EFTA državam EFTA, državam članicam EU in drugim zainteresiranim strankam — Ukrep državne pomoči 47901 (prejšnji SAM 030.02.006) — Načrtovana pomoč v obliki državne garancije v korist deCODE Genetics v zvezi z ustanovitvijo oddelka za pripravo zdravil

29

Evropska centralna banka

2005/C 277/0

Priporočilo Evropske centralne banke z dne 26. oktobra 2005 — Svetu Evropske unije o zunanjih revizorjih centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (ECB/2005/10)

30

| | |
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| | (1)   Besedilo velja za EGP. |

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(1)   Besedilo velja za EGP.

1

| SL | |
| --- | --- |

SL

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I Informacije

Svet

| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/1

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Uradno obvestilo Danske glede vizumske vzajemnosti (1)

(2005/C 277/01)

Danska vas v skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 o seznamu tretjih držav, katerih državljani morajo pri prehodu zunanjih meja imeti vizume, in držav, katerih državljani so oproščeni te zahteve glede mehanizma vzajemnosti, obvešča, da za državljane Danske velja vizumska obveznost ob vstopu v Avstralijo.

Izvod tega pisma je bil poslan generalnemu direktoratu za svobodo, varnost in pravico pri Komisiji.

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(1)  To uradno obvestilo je objavljeno v skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 (UL L 141, 4.6.2005, str. 3) o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 z dne 15. marca 2001 (UL L 81, 21.3.2001, str. 1).

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| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/1

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Uradno obvestilo Švedske glede vizumske vzajemnosti (1)

(2005/C 277/02)

V skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 vas želim obvestiti, da od danes za državljane Kraljevine Švedske velja vizumska obveznost v naslednjih tretjih državah iz Priloge II Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001:

| — | Avstralija; |
| --- | --- |

—

Avstralija;

| — | Brunej Darusalam (za bivanje, daljše od 14 dni; v primeru krajšega bivanja se vizum izda na vstopnem mestu); |
| --- | --- |

—

Brunej Darusalam (za bivanje, daljše od 14 dni; v primeru krajšega bivanja se vizum izda na vstopnem mestu);

| — | Venezuela (zahteva se turistična izkaznica, ki jo izda venezuelsko konzularno predstavništvo v tujini in ki velja 90 dni). |
| --- | --- |

—

Venezuela (zahteva se turistična izkaznica, ki jo izda venezuelsko konzularno predstavništvo v tujini in ki velja 90 dni).

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(1)  To uradno obvestilo je objavljeno v skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 (UL L 141, 4.6.2005, str. 3) o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 z dne 15. marca 2001 (UL L 81, 21.3.2001, str. 1).

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| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/2 |
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10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/2

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Uradno obvestilo Republike Avstrije glede vizumske vzajemnosti (1)

(2005/C 277/03)

Na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 o seznamu tretjih držav, katerih državljani morajo pri prehodu zunanjih meja imeti vizume, in držav, katerih državljani so oproščeni te zahteve glede mehanizma vzajemnosti (UL L 141 z dne 4.6.2005), obvešča Republika Avstrija, da velja za avstrijske državljane vizumska obveznost v naslednjih tretjih državah:

| — | Avstralija; |
| --- | --- |

—

Avstralija;

| — | Brazilija (potovanje brez vizuma samo v turistične namene; vizumska obveznost za poslovna potovanja); |
| --- | --- |

—

Brazilija (potovanje brez vizuma samo v turistične namene; vizumska obveznost za poslovna potovanja);

| — | Brunej (potovanje brez vizuma samo do 30 dni); |
| --- | --- |

—

Brunej (potovanje brez vizuma samo do 30 dni);

| — | Nikaragva (potovanje brez vizuma samo do enega meseca); |
| --- | --- |

—

Nikaragva (potovanje brez vizuma samo do enega meseca);

| — | Venezuela (potovanje brez vizuma samo do 60 dni). |
| --- | --- |

—

Venezuela (potovanje brez vizuma samo do 60 dni).

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(1)  To uradno obvestilo je objavljeno v skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 851/2005 z dne 2. junija 2005 (UL L 141, 4.6.2005, str. 3) o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 539/2001 z dne 15. marca 2001 (UL L 81, 21.3.2001, str. 1).

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Komisija

| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/3

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Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

9. novembra 2005

(2005/C 277/04)

1 euro=

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,1738 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 137,68 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4613 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,67530 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 9,5645 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,5431 |
| ISK | islandska krona | 72,47 |
| NOK | norveška krona | 7,7485 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9557 |
| CYP | ciprski funt | 0,5734 |
| CZK | češka krona | 29,278 |
| EEK | estonska krona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 248,85 |
| LTL | litovski litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | latvijski lats | 0,6964 |
| MTL | malteška lira | 0,4293 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 3,9978 |
| RON | romunski leu | 3,6660 |
| SIT | slovenski tolar | 239,48 |
| SKK | slovaška krona | 38,921 |
| TRY | turška lira | 1,5990 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,5995 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,3951 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 9,1054 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,7167 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,9968 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 227,91 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 7,9217 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 9,4910 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,3645 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 11 667,57 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,434 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 64,242 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 33,8630 |
| THB | tajski bat | 48,366 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,1738

JPY

japonski jen

137,68

DKK

danska krona

7,4613

GBP

funt šterling

0,67530

SEK

švedska krona

9,5645

CHF

švicarski frank

1,5431

ISK

islandska krona

72,47

NOK

norveška krona

7,7485

BGN

lev

1,9557

CYP

ciprski funt

0,5734

CZK

češka krona

29,278

EEK

estonska krona

15,6466

HUF

madžarski forint

248,85

LTL

litovski litas

3,4528

LVL

latvijski lats

0,6964

MTL

malteška lira

0,4293

PLN

poljski zlot

3,9978

RON

romunski leu

3,6660

SIT

slovenski tolar

239,48

SKK

slovaška krona

38,921

TRY

turška lira

1,5990

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,5995

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,3951

HKD

hongkonški dolar

9,1054

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,7167

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,9968

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 227,91

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

7,9217

CNY

kitajski juan

9,4910

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,3645

IDR

indonezijska rupija

11 667,57

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,434

PHP

filipinski peso

64,242

RUB

ruski rubelj

33,8630

THB

tajski bat

48,366

---

(1)

Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

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| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/4 |
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10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/4

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Povzetek podatkov, ki ga države članice predložijo o državni pomoči, dodeljeni na podlagi Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženjem kmetijskih proizvodov

(2005/C 277/05)

Številka pomoči: XA 63/05

Država članica: Francija

Regija: Provansa — Alpe — Azurna obala (PACA)

Naziv sheme pomoči: Pomoč za naložbe, ki so namenjene varovanju okolja

Pravna podlaga:

| — | Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 de la Commission européenne |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 de la Commission européenne

| — | Articles L 1511-1 et suivants du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles L 1511-1 et suivants du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Délibérations no 03-177 du 17/10/2003, no 03-250 du 5/12/2003 et no 04-44 du 24/06/2004 du Conseil régional de la région PACA |
| --- | --- |

—

Délibérations no 03-177 du 17/10/2003, no 03-250 du 5/12/2003 et no 04-44 du 24/06/2004 du Conseil régional de la région PACA

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi: 400 000 EUR

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Pomoč je v obliki dotacije v višini 20–27,5 % upravičene naložbe pred obdavčitvijo, v odvisnosti od narave upravičencev in zadevnih področij. Pomoč ne sme presegati 7 700 EUR na upravičenca

Datum začetka izvajanja: Po priglasitvi pomoči in prejemu odobritve Evropske komisije

Trajanje sheme pomoči: Do 31. decembra 2006

Cilj pomoči: Ta ukrep spada v področje uporabe člena 4(3)(b), (c) in (d) Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003. S spodbujanjem naložb v okolju prijazne tehnike kmetovanja ta program izpolnjuje zahteve po ohranjanju kmetijskih dejavnosti, in sicer z izboljšanjem njihove kakovosti, varnosti hrane in varovanja narave

Pomoč bo omogočila naložbe glede:

| — | navijalniki plastičnih materialov za mulčenje in pokrival za tople grede, |
| --- | --- |

—

navijalniki plastičnih materialov za mulčenje in pokrival za tople grede,

| — | drobilniki odpadkov, |
| --- | --- |

—

drobilniki odpadkov,

| — | drobilniki rastlinskih odpadkov, |
| --- | --- |

—

drobilniki rastlinskih odpadkov,

| — | obračalniki komposta; |
| --- | --- |

—

obračalniki komposta;

| — | fiksni sistemi za odvajanje odplak, |
| --- | --- |

—

fiksni sistemi za odvajanje odplak,

| — | oprema in naložbe za obdelave ali reciklažo tekočih odpadkov; |
| --- | --- |

—

oprema in naložbe za obdelave ali reciklažo tekočih odpadkov;

| — | oprema za uničevanje plevela brez kemičnih sredstev, |
| --- | --- |

—

oprema za uničevanje plevela brez kemičnih sredstev,

| — | razprševalci nove generacije s posodo za vodo za izpiranje in nadzorom pretoka, |
| --- | --- |

—

razprševalci nove generacije s posodo za vodo za izpiranje in nadzorom pretoka,

| — | parno razkuževanje zemljišča, |
| --- | --- |

—

parno razkuževanje zemljišča,

| — | oprema za odstranjevanje pesticidov in zatiralcev plevela z dna razprševalcev, |
| --- | --- |

—

oprema za odstranjevanje pesticidov in zatiralcev plevela z dna razprševalcev,

| — | plošče za zbiranje-odstranjevanje fitofarmacevtskih izdelkov, |
| --- | --- |

—

plošče za zbiranje-odstranjevanje fitofarmacevtskih izdelkov,

| — | okrepljeno varovanje skladišč z nevarnimi snovmi, |
| --- | --- |

—

okrepljeno varovanje skladišč z nevarnimi snovmi,

| — | zagotavljanje električne energije objektom na oddaljenih področjih z akumulatorji, ki se polnijo z energijo sonca ali vetra; |
| --- | --- |

—

zagotavljanje električne energije objektom na oddaljenih področjih z akumulatorji, ki se polnijo z energijo sonca ali vetra;

| — | trosilniki komposta, |
| --- | --- |

—

trosilniki komposta,

| — | zbiralniki za gnojnico. |
| --- | --- |

—

zbiralniki za gnojnico.

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Vsa podjetja, zavezanci za DDV, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo in jih upravlja kmet ter so registrirana pri organu za socialno zavarovanje „Mutualité sociale agricole (MSA)“ in organu za zdravstveno zavarovanje „Assurance maladie des exploitants agricoles (AMEXA)“

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Monsieur le Président du Conseil régional de la région PACA |
| --- |
| Hôtel de région |
| 27, place Jules Guesde |
| FR-13481 Marseille Cedex 20 |

Monsieur le Président du Conseil régional de la région PACA

Hôtel de région

27, place Jules Guesde

FR-13481 Marseille Cedex 20

Spletna stran: www.cr-paca.fr

Številka pomoči: XA 23/05

Država članica: Združeno kraljestvo

Regija: Cheshire (vključno z okrožjem Cheshire in okrajema Halton in Warrington)

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč: Program obnove podeželja v regiji Cheshire — P & M pobuda za donacijo (revidirana)

Pravna podlaga: Section 5 of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju: Skupna sredstva, dodeljena za shemo v času njenega trajanja, bodo znašala 190 000 GBP. Znesek je porazdeljen, kot sledi:

leto 1 2005/6 — 70 000 GBP,

leto 2 2006/7 — 70 000 GBP,

leto 3 (1. april do 30. junij 2007) — 50 000 GBP

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Največja intenzivnost pomoči bo znašala 40 % z dodatno omejitvijo 62 500 GBP na posamično donacijo

Datum začetka izvajanja:

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Shema bo za nove prijave odprta do 31. decembra 2006, vendar se bodo plačila (ki se izvedejo le ob zaključku del) nadaljevala še do 30. junija 2007

Cilj pomoči: Shema je namenjena pomoči za dolgoročni razvoj podeželskega gospodarstva regije Cheshire. To bo doseženo s pomočjo kmetijskim gospodarstvom, da bodo postala konkurenčnejša z izboljšanjem poslovne učinkovitosti, odzivanjem na povpraševanje porabnikov in dodajanjem vrednosti njihovim proizvodom.

Pomoč bo izplačana v skladu s členom 7 Uredbe Komisije (ES) 1/2004. Med upravičene stroške se bodo šteli a) gradnja, nakup ali izboljšanje nepremičnin, b) nakup novih ali rabljenih osnovnih delovnih sredstev in c) splošni stroški, kot so plačila, namenjena arhitektom, inženirjem in svetovalcem, študijam izvedljivosti ter pridobitvi patentov in licenc (do 12 % izdatkov iz točk a) in b))

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Shema predvideva subvencije le za dejavnosti predelave in trženja, vendar je odprta za vse vrste proizvodov iz Priloge 1 razen proizvodov gozdarstva in ribištva ter proizvodov iz sladkorja. Pomoči za proizvodnjo in trženje proizvodov, ki so podobni ali nadomeščajo mleko in mlečne izdelke, so prav tako izvzete

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Cheshire Rural Recovery |
| --- |
| Philip Leverhulme Centre |
| Reaseheath College |
| UK-Nantwich |
| CW5 6DF |

Cheshire Rural Recovery

Philip Leverhulme Centre

Reaseheath College

UK-Nantwich

CW5 6DF

Spletni naslov: www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm.

Kliknite „Cheshire Rural Recovery Programme — P& M Grant Initiative“. Prav tako si lahko ogledate http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/cheshire-pandm.pdf.

Drugi podatki: Ta shema je bila v skladu z Uredbo 1/2004 najprej vzpostavljena kot pomoč XA 34/2004. Ta dokument spreminja XA 34/2004 tako, da med upravičene stroške vključi gradnjo, nakup in izboljšanje nepremičnin ter splošne stroške. Revidirana shema nadomešča XA 34/2004, proračun za XA 34/2004 pa se prenese na to shemo

Številka pomoči: XA 34/05

Država članica: Združeno kraljestvo

Regija: Severna Irska

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč: Shema finančne pomoči za mlade kmete za Severno Irsko (znana tudi kot „New Entrants Scheme“).

Pravna podlaga: Financial Assistance for Young Farmers Scheme Order (Northern Ireland) 2005.

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju:

| Leto | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Udeleženci sheme | 100 | 200 | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Skupaj | 100 | 300 | 600 | 600 | 600 | 500 | 400 | 300 |
| Povprečne subvencionirane obresti v GBP | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 |
| Proračun v GBP | 680 000 | 2 040 000 | 4 080 000 | 4 080 000 | 4 080 000 | 3 400 000 | 2 720 000 | 2 040 000 |

Leto

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Udeleženci sheme

100

200

300

0

0

0

0

0

Skupaj

100

300

600

600

600

500

400

300

Povprečne subvencionirane obresti v GBP

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

Proračun v GBP

680 000

2 040 000

4 080 000

4 080 000

4 080 000

3 400 000

2 720 000

2 040 000

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Shema dopušča subvencionirane obrestne mere posojil, ki so jih vzeli mladi kmetje. Največji znesek pomoči znaša 17 000 GBP za 5 let. Obrestna mera, za katero se plača subvencija, je omejena na 3,5 % nad osnovno stopnjo Bank of England (približno 2,5 % nad osnovno stopnjo lokalnih posojilnih ustanov). Vlagatelji, ki vzamejo posojila po višji obrestni meri, morajo plačati razliko presežka obrestne mere

Datum začetka izvajanja: Shema bo novim vlagateljem na voljo od 6. junija 2005

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Shema bo na voljo tri leta, tj. od junija 2005 do 31. maja 2008. Najdaljše trajanje plačevanja subvencionirane obrestne mere je pet let, tako da bodo končna plačila izvršena najkasneje do 31. maja 2013. Znesek in pogoji posojila niso omejeni, vendar bo shema na voljo do 31. maja 2008 ali manj časa, če se bojo vsa razpoložljiva sredstva razdelila prej. Ker Uredba št. 1/2004 predvideva izjeme za sheme pomoči le do 30. junija 2007, bo treba za nadaljnjo državno pomoč za preostalo obdobje veljavnosti sheme poskrbeti, ko se bo približeval ta datum

Cilj pomoči: Sektorski razvoj. V skladu s členom 8 Uredbe št. 1/2004 bodo upravičeni stroški tisti za subvencionirane obrestne mere posojil za mlade kmete pod 40 let starosti, ki prvič prevzemajo vlogo vodje kmetijskega gospodarstva. To bo spodbudilo dodatne naložbe v kmetijska gospodarstva, ki bodo ustvarile nove dejavnosti ali dodatno korist Severni Irski

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Shema je na voljo mladim kmetom, ki se bodo pretežno ukvarjali s proizvodnjo, čeprav lahko predelava in trženje predstavljata del dejavnosti kmetijskega gospodarstva. Shema je na voljo za vse vrste proizvodnje

Naziv in naslov organa, ki odobri pomoč:

| Department of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| --- |
| Dundonald House |
| Upper Newtownards Road |
| UK-Belfast |
| BT4 3SB |

Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

Dundonald House

Upper Newtownards Road

UK-Belfast

BT4 3SB

Spletni naslov: www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm.

Kliknite na „Financial Assistance for Young Farmers Scheme for Northern Ireland“. Namesto tega lahko greste neposredno na www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/financialassist-farmersni.pdf.

Št. pomoči: XA 43/05

Država članica: Združeno kraljestvo

Regija: „Kent Downs Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty“ (Kent Downs, področje izredne naravne lepote)

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč Služba: „The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service“

Pravna podlaga: Sections 84 and 85 of The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju: 1. september 2005 — 31. julij 2006: 15 000 GBP

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: 100 % plačila se izvajajo samo eno leto, vendar se to obdobje lahko podaljša zaradi nepredvidenih okoliščin. Plačila se ne bodo izvajala po 30. septembru 2006 in ne bodo povečala izdatkov

Datum začetka izvajanja:

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Shema bo novim vlagateljem na voljo od 31 julija. Pomoč se bo plačevala do 30. septembra 2006

Cilj pomoči: Sektorski razvoj

Cilj pomoči je zagotavljanje pravočasnega svetovanja, ki bo povzročilo spremembe na področju raznovrstnosti dejavnosti. Te spremembe bodo finančno izvedljive, okolju primerne in sprejemljive v smislu načrtovanja. Pomoč se izvaja v skladu s členom 14 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2004. Upravičeni stroški so stroški svetovalnih storitev

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Kmetje in podeželska podjetja so opredeljeni kot osebe ali podjetja, ki gojijo in spravljajo združljive kulture, zelenjadnice na njivah, različne solate, okrasne rastline (vključno z drevesi iz drevesnic, cvetjem in čebulicami), semena za travnike in trate, ki gojijo govedo, ovce, koze in prašiče, proizvajajo mlečne izdelke, ki gojijo perutnino in pridobivajo jajca, ki ponujajo prenočišča z drugimi storitvami na kmetijah (prenočišča z zajtrkom), prenočišča apartmajskega tipa, oskrbo konj in jahalne konje ali turistične zanimivosti na kmetiji

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Kent County Council |
| --- |
| Invicta House |
| County Hall |
| Maidstone |
| UK-Kent ME 14 1XX |

Kent County Council

Invicta House

County Hall

Maidstone

UK-Kent ME 14 1XX

Ustanova, ki upravlja shemo:

| The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service (KDAS) |
| --- |
| Kent Downs Unit |
| West Barn |
| Penstock Hall Farm |
| Canterbury Road |
| East Brabourne |
| Ashford |
| UK-Kent TN25 5LL |

The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service (KDAS)

Kent Downs Unit

West Barn

Penstock Hall Farm

Canterbury Road

East Brabourne

Ashford

UK-Kent TN25 5LL

Spletni naslov: http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm.

Kliknite „The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service“. Lahko pa neposredno obiščete www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes (the Kent Downs Rural Advice Service)

Drugi podatki: Shema bo na voljo vsem upravljalcem zemljišč in ne le kmetom. Pomoč za nekmetijske dejavnosti se plača v skladu z Uredbo Komisije 69/2001 o pomoči de minimis. Pomoč bo na voljo tudi za spremembe dejavnosti iz kmetovanja v nekmetijske dejavnosti.

Upravičeni ne bodo sami izbrali ponudnika storitev. Ponudnik storitev je služba „The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service (KDAS)“ ki bo zagotovila svetovalce, izbrane na razpisu

Št. Pomoči: XA 44/05

Država članica: Francija

Naziv sheme pomoči: Pomoč za tehnično podporo sektorskim načrtom v sektorju reje klavnega goveda in ovac

Pravna podlaga: Code rural, partie législative: articles L 621-1 à 621-11

Arrêté du ministre de l'agriculture, de l'alimentation, de la pêche et de la ruralité du 25 mai 2005

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi: V letu 2005 je za pomoči predviden proračun 1 500 000 EUR.

Ob upoštevanju proračunskih sredstev se podaljša še za dve leti, v posameznih primerih pa tudi več, vendar ne sme preseči petih let

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Do 40 % upravičenih stroškov, ob upoštevanju obeh naslednjih omejitev:

100 000 EUR na upravičenca v obdobju treh let,

100 000 EUR na program, ki ga izvaja organizacija proizvajalcev, ali 150 000 EUR na organizacijo proizvajalcev, če program izvaja več organizacij proizvajalcev

Datum začetka izvajanja: Shema pomoči se bo začela izvajati od datuma potrdila o prejemu ukrepa s strani Komisije ob upoštevanju ustreznih sredstev in objave na internetni strani službe OFIVAL

Trajanje sheme pomoči: Tri leta ob upoštevanju razporeditve ustreznih sredstev, v posameznih primerih podaljšano na pet let

Cilj pomoči: Shema pomoči spada v okvir členov 13 in 14 Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003.

Ustrezala bo trem glavnim ciljem:

opredeliti in določiti trge za kakovostne sektorje na specifičnih delih trga z dobro možnostjo za prodajo,

učvrstiti pogodbene odnose med rejci in izvajalci, vključno s klavnicami, na področju govedoreje in ovčjereje v skrbi za ovrednotenje mesa in prilagoditev razvoju povpraševanja,

vzdrževati tehnično podporo, potrebno za prilagoditev proizvodnje ugotovljenemu povpraševanju.

Omogočila bo financiranje stroškov tehnične podpore in svetovanja (raziskave, stroški oživljanja in sledenja projektom), ki bodo omogočili uspešno izvedbo sektorskih načrtov v skladu s temi cilji, financiranje nadzornih stroškov in stroškov revizije kakovosti kot tudi promocijskih in komunikacijskih ukrepov ter raziskav trga in anketiranja.

Področja, na katera se nanaša: Reja klavnega goveda in ovac

Ime in naslov pristojnega organa:

| Office national interprofessionnel des viandes, de l'élevage et de l'aviculture (OFIVAL), katerega sedež je na: 80, avenue des terroirs de France |
| --- |
| FR-75607 Paris Cedex 12 |

Office national interprofessionnel des viandes, de l'élevage et de l'aviculture (OFIVAL), katerega sedež je na: 80, avenue des terroirs de France

FR-75607 Paris Cedex 12

Spletna stran: www.legifrance.gouv.fr

Rubrika „droit français“, „les autres textes législatifs“, „rechercher“, „JO 124, 29 mai 2005“, besedilo št. 72.

www.ofival.fr

Št. pomoči: XA 46/05

Država članica: Združeno kraljestvo

Regija: North West England

Ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč: Homebred Limited

Pravna podlaga: Section 5 of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998.

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju: 1. avgust 2005 — 31. marec 2006. 20 000 GBP

1. april 2006 — 31. julij 2006: 45 000 GBP

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: 100 % plačila se izvajajo samo eno leto, vendar se to obdobje lahko podaljša zaradi nepredvidenih okoliščin. Plačila se ne bodo izvajala po marcu 2007 in ne bodo povečala izdatkov

Datum začetka izvajanja: Prvo plačilo bo opravljeno po 1. avgustu 2005 (glej „Največja intenzivnost pomoči“)

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Do 30. junija 2006

Cilj pomoči: Sektorski in regionalni razvoj

Agencija „Northwest Regional Development Agency“ zagotavlja finančna sredstva za ustanovitev regionalne zadruge za trženje rdečega mesa. Navedeno je namenjeno ustvarjanju dodane vrednosti in priložnosti za vzpostavitev bolj optimalne dobavne verige, ki bi kmetijsko proizvodnjo bolj učinkovito povezala s trgom. Posledično naj bi prišlo do trajnostnega razvoja v prihodnosti

Pomoč sestoji iz

pomoči za ustanovitev skupine proizvajalcev v skladu s členom 10 Uredbe 1/2004. Upravičeni stroški so administrativni stroški ter sodne in upravne takse

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Proizvodnja in trženje rdečega mesa

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Northwest Regional Development Agency |
| --- |
| Renaissance House |
| Centre Park |
| UK-Warrington |
| WA1 1HA |

Northwest Regional Development Agency

Renaissance House

Centre Park

UK-Warrington

WA1 1HA

Spletni naslov: http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm.

Kliknite „Homebred Programme“. Lahko pa neposredno obiščete www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/(Homebred Programme.pdf)

Št. pomoči: XA 49/05

Država članica: Grčija

Regija: Vse regije

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč: Investicijski projekti v zvezi s proizvodnjo in predelavo kmetijskih proizvodov, ki jih ureja zakon št. 3299/2004 o spodbudah za zasebne naložbe v gospodarski razvoj in približevanje regij.

Pravna podlaga: α) Νόμος 3299/2004 „Κίνητρα Ιδιωτικών επενδύσεων για την Οικονομική Ανάπτυξη και την Περιφερειακή Σύγκλιση“ και β) Κοινή Υπουργική Απόφαση των Υπουργών Οικονομίας και Οικονομικών και Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων 24935/30.6.2005 (υπό δημοσίευση)

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju (zneske je treba navesti v eurih ali, če je to primerno, v nacionalni valuti).: Letni znesek proračunskih sredstev (obveznosti): 150 milijonov EUR

Ocenjena letna davčna izguba: 20 milijonov EUR (neobdavčeni rezervni sklad se lahko vzpostavi v desetih letih po izvedbi naložbe)

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: V skladu z zgornjimi mejami, določenimi v Uredbi (ES) 1/2004 (člena 4 in 7)

Datum začetka izvajanja: Po objavi skupne ministrske odločbe v uradnem listu.

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Trajanje sheme: do 31. decembra 2006

Cilj pomoči: Pomoč se dodeli v skladu s členom 4 (naložbe v kmetijska gospodarstva) in členom 7 (naložbe v predelavo in trženje) Uredbe (ES) 1/2004.

Med upravičene stroške spadajo: (a) gradnja, nakup ali izboljšanje nepremičnin, (b) nakup ali zakup strojev in opreme, vključno z računalniškimi programi do tržne vrednosti blaga, (c) splošni nematerialni izdatki za amortizacijska sredstva (izdatki za uvoz, razvoj, prenos tehnologije, nakup patentov in licenc, študij v zvezi z naložbenimi projekti ter honorarji arhitektov, gradbenih inženirjev in svetovalcev) do 8 % skupnih stroškov investicijskega načrta

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Shema pomoči zadeva proizvodnjo in predelavo živali in rastlin, če so v skladu z zakonodajo Skupnosti in zlasti če izpolnjujejo omejitve skupne ureditve trga

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finance) |
| --- |
| Nikis 5, |
| ΤΚ EL-10180, Athens |

Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finance)

Nikis 5,

ΤΚ EL-10180, Athens

| Ministry of Development (Ministrstvo za razvoj podeželja in prehrano) |
| --- |
| Mesogion 119 |
| TK EL-10192, Athens |

Ministry of Development (Ministrstvo za razvoj podeželja in prehrano)

Mesogion 119

TK EL-10192, Athens

Razvojno-načrtovalni direktorati 13 regij

Spletni naslov: http://www.mnec.gr/anaptyksiakos_nomos_3299_2004_main.aspx

Drugi podatki: Skupna ministrska odločba ministra za gospodarstvo in finance ter ministra za razvoj podeželja in prehrano št. 24935/30.7.2005 bo tudi na voljo po spletu po njeni objavi v uradnem listu, ko začne tudi veljati.

Številka pomoči: XA 53/05

Država članica: Francija

Regija: Pikardija

Naziv sheme pomoči: Pomoči za investicije v povečanje kmetijske raznovrstnosti

Pravna podlaga:

| — | Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission

| — | Article L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Article L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Délibération no ECO 103-2 de la commission permanente du conseil régional du 29 octobre 2004 |
| --- | --- |

—

Délibération no ECO 103-2 de la commission permanente du conseil régional du 29 octobre 2004

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi: 300 000 EUR

Največja intenzivnost pomoči:

| — | 25 % za splošne primere, |
| --- | --- |

—

25 % za splošne primere,

| — | 35 % za kmetovalce, ki se z dejavnostjo ukvarjajo manj kot 5 let. |
| --- | --- |

—

35 % za kmetovalce, ki se z dejavnostjo ukvarjajo manj kot 5 let.

Zgornja meja odobrenih investicij: 40 000 EUR na projekt ali zgornja meja pomoči v višini 10 000 EUR za splošne primere in 14 000 EUR za kmetovalce, ki so se z dejavnostjo ukvarjajo maj kot 5 let.

Te stopnje se po potrebi lahko zvišajo za 40 %, zgornje meje odobrenih pomoči pa se v primeru dogovorov z drugimi skupnostmi (departmaji, medobčinske organizacije, občine) za podporo projektom posebnim geografskim območjem (npr. kmetovanje v primestnem okolju) podvojijo

V primeru združenj z več kmetovalci se zgornje meje odobrenih investicij in posledično najvišjih stopenj navedenih pomoči podvojijo

Datum začetka izvajanja: Po prejemu potrdila o prejemu s strani Evropske komisije

Trajanje sheme pomoči: Neomejeno, glede na proračunska sredstva

Cilj pomoči: Spodbujati razvoj delavnic za raznovrstnost proizvodne dejavnosti, ki bodo na kmetijskih gospodarstvih ustvarjale dodano vrednost

Področja, na katera se nanaša: Vsa področja proizvodnje, predelave in trženja kmetijskih proizvodov.

Pomoč se bo nanašala na vsa kmetijska gospodarstva, ki želijo uresničiti investicije, povezane s projekti raznovrstnosti pri predelavi in trženju kmetijskih proizvodov, razvoju storitev za prebivalstvo in skupnosti, sprejem na kmetiji, uvajanju ali razvijanju novih proizvodnih dejavnosti ali razvoju konjeništva

Naziv in naslov pristojnega organa:

| Conseil régional de Picardie |
| --- |
| 11, mail Albert 1er |
| BP 2616 |
| FR-80026 Amiens Cedex 1 |

Conseil régional de Picardie

11, mail Albert 1er

BP 2616

FR-80026 Amiens Cedex 1

Naslov internetne strani: http://www.picardie.fr/fr/page.cfm?pageref=guidedesaidesagri

Številka pomoči: XA 54/05

Država članica: Francija

Regija: Limousin

Naziv sheme pomoči: Pomoč za ohranitev certificiranja „ekološko kmetijstvo“

Pravna podlaga:

| — | Article 13 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 13 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission

| — | Articles L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Décision du Conseil régional du Limousin du 23 juin 2005 |
| --- | --- |

—

Décision du Conseil régional du Limousin du 23 juin 2005

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi: 85 000 EUR

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Neopredmetene investicije. Regionalni svet prevzame del stroškov certificiranja, in sicer podporo v višini 80 % stroškov certificiranja brez DDV, ki za leto 2005 znaša med 200 EUR in 800 EUR

Datum začetka izvajanja: Po prejemu potrdila o prejemu s strani Evropske komisije

Trajanje sheme: Do 31. decembra 2005

Cilj pomoči: Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 2092/91 vse proizvajalce s področja ekološkega kmetijstva obvezuje k nadzoru in certificiranju s strani certifikacijskih organov, ki jih v skladu s standardi (EN 45011) odobri kmetijsko ministrstvo. Namen te pomoči je podpora razvoju ekološkega kmetijstva s prevzemom stroškov certificiranja kmetijskih gospodarstev

Področja, na katera se nanaša: Vsi kmetovalci, ki uporabljajo postopke ekološke proizvodnje, katerih sedež je v Limousinu in ki so v letu 2005 uradno prijavili dejavnost (1)„ekološkega kmetijstva“ ali „preusmeritve“, pa na dan 1. julija 2005 niso bili upravičenci pomoči za preusmeritev (CTE-CAB (2) ali CAD (3)-CAB) oziroma za katere skupni znesek pomoči CTE ali CAD/CAB (v petih letih) (4) in zaprošene pomoči za certificiranje ni presegel 15 000 EUR

Naziv in naslov pristojnega organa:

| Monsieur le Président du Conseil Régional du Limousin. |
| --- |
| 27 boulevard de la Corderie |
| FR-87031 Limoges cedex |

Monsieur le Président du Conseil Régional du Limousin.

27 boulevard de la Corderie

FR-87031 Limoges cedex

Naslov internetne strani: http://www.cr-limousin.fr — rubrika „guide des aides“

Številka pomoči: XA 56/05

Država članica: Zvezna republika Nemčija

Regija: Bavarska

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč:

Pravna podlaga: Richtlinie zur Durchführung der bayerischen regionalen Förderungsprogramme für die gewerbliche Wirtschaft (veröffentlicht im Allgemeinen Ministerialblatt AllMBl. 2002 S. 168; Beihilfe Nr. XS 29/02)

Im Rahmen des Programms können Investitionen von KMU branchenunabhängig und ohne Beschränkung auf bestimmte Produkte gefördert werden. Zweck dieser Beihilferegelungen ist die Stärkung der Wettbewerbs- und Anpassungsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft und die Schaffung bzw. Sicherung von Arbeitsplätzen insbesondere in strukturschwachen und ländlichen Räumen. Gefördert werden Investitionen von förderungswürdigen Unternehmen der Industrie, des Handwerks, des Handels, des Fremdenverkehrsgewerbes und des sonstigen Dienstleistungsgewerbes.

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek individualne pomoči, dodeljene podjetju: 330 000 EUR

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Delež subvencije: 14,96 %

Datum začetka izvajanja: Predvidoma 1.9.2005

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Pomoč bo izplačana predvidoma konec leta 2005

Cilj pomoči: Subvencioniranje investicij v smislu Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženjem kmetijskih proizvodov. Pomoč obsega načrtovane ukrepe za širitev podjetij (gradnjo skladišč in proizvodnje, nakup novih strojev in opreme). Shema pomoči zagotavlja 38 stalnih delovnih mest in dodatnih 19 stalnih delovnih mest - od tega 10 mest za pripravnike

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Tu: predelava in trženje; proizvodnja čaja

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Regierung von Oberfranken |
| --- |
| Ludwigstraße 20 |
| DE-95444 Bayreuth |

Regierung von Oberfranken

Ludwigstraße 20

DE-95444 Bayreuth

Spletna stran: Merila in pogoji za dodelitev pomoči po sprejetju odločbe o dodelitvi pomoči so na voljo na spletni strani www.regierung.oberfranken.bayern.de\brf.

Št. pomoči: XA 58/05

Država članica: Italija

Regija: Benečija

Naziv sheme pomoči ali ime podjetja, ki prejme individualno pomoč: Letni načrt usposabljanja za 2005. izobraževalni programi v primarnem sektorju. „Deliberazione di Giunta della Regione Veneto n. 1101 del 18.3.2005“

Pravna podlaga: L. 845/1978 „Legge quadro in materia di formazione professionale“

L.R. n. 10 del 30.1.1990. „Ordinamento del sistema della formazione professionale e organizzazione delle politiche regionali del lavoro“

Načrtovani letni izdatki po shemi ali skupni znesek: Po shemi se lahko dodeli največ 2 000 000 EUR izobraževalnim ustanovam, ki jih odobri izobraževalni oddelek dežele Benečije, za zagotavljanje izobraževalnih programov v primarnem sektorju.

Upravičene sheme so izobraževalni programi, ki so namenjeni obstoječim zaposlenim, kot to opredeljuje pravna podlaga.

V skladu s členom 17(1)(a) Uredbe 1/2004 ustrezna finančna sredstva, ki so na voljo v deželnem proračunu za izvedbo sheme, znašajo:

Poglavje 72040 — finančni prispevek v znesku 2 000 000 EUR

Največja intenzivnost pomoči: Pomoč se odobri glede na ceno ene ure izobraževanja. Pomoč je enaka 110,00 EUR x ura izobraževanja

Datum začetka izvajanja: Pomoč se dodeli, ko bo potrjena shema z aktom „Decreto del Dirigente Regionale“, ki bo objavljena v uradnem listu dežele Benečije

Trajanje sheme ali individualne pomoči: Shema pomoči se preneha izvajati po izplačilu pomoči vsaki od izobraževalnih ustanov ter po opravljenem preverjanju in potrditvi poročila

Cilj pomoči: Dežela Benečija vsako leto nameni sredstva za izvajanje programov stalnega strokovnega izobraževanja, ki zagotavljajo podporo kmetom in njihovim pomočnikom, tehničnemu osebju in drugim subjektom v kmetijskem sektorju (deželni zakon št. 32 z dne 9. avgusta 2003). Cilji pomoči so:

spodbujanje podjetniške kulture,

zvišanje strokovne usposobljenosti zaposlenih v kmetijstvu,

povečanje ozaveščenosti o tehnoloških inovacijah.

Deželni zakon št. 1101/2005 se sklicuje na člen 14 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2004. Po shemi so upravičeni zlasti tisti stroški, ki zadevajo organizacijo izobraževalnih programov.

Zadevni gospodarski sektorji: Shema se uporablja za strokovno izobraževanje posameznikov, ki so upravičeni do strokovnega izobraževanja v skladu z zakonom št. 53/2003

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč:

| Regione Veneto |
| --- |
| Segreteria Formazione e Lavoro |
| Direzione regionale Formazione |
| Via G. Allegri n. 29 |
| IT-30174 Mestre — Venezia (Italia) |

Regione Veneto

Segreteria Formazione e Lavoro

Direzione regionale Formazione

Via G. Allegri n. 29

IT-30174 Mestre — Venezia (Italia)

Spletna stran: www.regione.veneto.it Glej rubrike „servizi alla persona“, „formazione e lavoro“ in „formazione continua e permanente“.

Drugi podatki: Dodatne informacije:

Direzione Formazione

Telefon: (39-41) 279 50 30 — 50 29

Telefaks: (39-41) 279 50 85

---

(1)  Prijava ekološkega kmetijstva se opravi pri agenciji za ekološko kmetijstvo (Agenec Bio) in je obvezna.

(2)  CTE: Contrat Territorial d'Exploitation, CAB: Conversion Agriculture Biologique

(3)  CAD: Contrat Agriculture Durable.

(4)  Znesek bo preverjen na podlagi kopije pogodbe CTE/CAD/CAB.

---

| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/11

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Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije

(Št. primera COMP/M.3997 – Sun Capital/Sara Lee)

Primer za poenostavljeni postopek

(2005/C 277/06)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

| 1. | Dne 26. oktobra 2005 je Komisija prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije po členu 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, del skupine Sun Group („Sun“, ZDA) prevzema v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta nadzor nad oddelkom European Branded Apparel („The Business“) podjetja Sara Lee Corporation (ZDA) na podlagi nakupa delnic. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dne 26. oktobra 2005 je Komisija prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije po členu 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, del skupine Sun Group („Sun“, ZDA) prevzema v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta nadzor nad oddelkom European Branded Apparel („The Business“) podjetja Sara Lee Corporation (ZDA) na podlagi nakupa delnic.

| 2. | Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:






  — | za podjetje Sun: skupina naložbenih skladov zasebnega kapitala; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:

—

za podjetje Sun: skupina naložbenih skladov zasebnega kapitala;

| — | za oddelek The Business: oblikovanje, proizvodnja, distribucija in prodaja modnih dodatkov z blagovnimi znamkami, vključno z ženskim in moškim spodnjim perilom, hlačnimi nogavicami in nogavicami. |
| --- | --- |

—

za oddelek The Business: oblikovanje, proizvodnja, distribucija in prodaja modnih dodatkov z blagovnimi znamkami, vključno z ženskim in moškim spodnjim perilom, hlačnimi nogavicami in nogavicami.

| 3. | Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi priglašena transakcija lahko spadala v obseg Uredbe (ES) št. 139/2004, vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni podana. Na podlagi obvestila Komisije o poenostavljenem postopku obravnave nekaterih koncentracij po Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (2) je treba opozoriti, da je ta primer primeren za obravnavo po postopku, določenem v obvestilu. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi priglašena transakcija lahko spadala v obseg Uredbe (ES) št. 139/2004, vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni podana. Na podlagi obvestila Komisije o poenostavljenem postopku obravnave nekaterih koncentracij po Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (2) je treba opozoriti, da je ta primer primeren za obravnavo po postopku, določenem v obvestilu.

| 4. | Komisija vabi zainteresirane tretje osebe, da Komisiji predložijo svoje pripombe glede predlaganega postopka.
  Komisija mora prejeti pripombe najkasneje v 10 dneh po dnevu te objave. Pripombe pošljite Komisiji po faksu (št. faksa: (32-2) 296 43 01 ali 296 72 44) ali pošti pod sklicno številko COMP/M.3997 – Sun Capital/Sara Lee na naslednji naslov:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition, |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| BE-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |

4.

Komisija vabi zainteresirane tretje osebe, da Komisiji predložijo svoje pripombe glede predlaganega postopka.

Komisija mora prejeti pripombe najkasneje v 10 dneh po dnevu te objave. Pripombe pošljite Komisiji po faksu (št. faksa: (32-2) 296 43 01 ali 296 72 44) ali pošti pod sklicno številko COMP/M.3997 – Sun Capital/Sara Lee na naslednji naslov:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition,

Merger Registry

J-70

BE-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

---

(1)  UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1.

(2)  UL C 56, 5.3.2005, str. 32.

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| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/12

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UPRAVNA KOMISIJA EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI ZA SOCIALNO VARNOST DELAVCEV MIGRANTOV

Menjalni tečaj za valute po Uredbi Sveta (EGS) št. 574/72

(2005/C 277/07)

Člen 107 (1), (2), (3) in (4) Uredbe (EGS) št. 574/72

Referenčno obdobje: oktober 2005

Obdobje veljavnosti: januar, februar, marec 2006

| | EUR | CZK | DKK | EEK | CYP | LVL | LTL | HUF | MTL | PLN | SIT | SKK | SEK | GBP | NOK | ISK | CHF |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 EUR = | 1 | 29,6747 | 7,46196 | 15,6466 | 0,573186 | 0,696519 | 3,45280 | 251,847 | 0,429300 | 3,92287 | 239,525 | 38,9233 | 9,42225 | 0,681367 | 7,83471 | 73,2914 | 1,54897 |
| 1 CZK = | 0,0336987 | 1 | 0,251459 | 0,527270 | 0,0193156 | 0,0234718 | 0,116355 | 8,48691 | 0,0144669 | 0,132196 | 8,07169 | 1,31167 | 0,317518 | 0,0229612 | 0,264020 | 2,46983 | 0,0521984 |
| 1 DKK = | 0,134013 | 3,97680 | 1 | 2,09685 | 0,0768143 | 0,0933426 | 0,462720 | 33,7507 | 0,0575318 | 0,525715 | 32,0995 | 5,21623 | 1,26270 | 0,0913120 | 1,04995 | 9,82201 | 0,207582 |
| 1 EEK = | 0,0639116 | 1,89656 | 0,476906 | 1 | 0,0366332 | 0,0445157 | 0,220674 | 16,0959 | 0,0274373 | 0,250717 | 15,3085 | 2,48765 | 0,602192 | 0,0435473 | 0,500730 | 4,68418 | 0,0989973 |
| 1 CYP = | 1,74464 | 51,7716 | 13,0184 | 27,2976 | 1 | 1,21517 | 6,02388 | 439,381 | 0,748972 | 6,84397 | 417,884 | 67,9069 | 16,4384 | 1,18874 | 13,6687 | 127,867 | 2,70239 |
| 1 LVL = | 1,43571 | 42,6043 | 10,7132 | 22,4640 | 0,822929 | 1 | 4,95722 | 361,579 | 0,616351 | 5,63210 | 343,889 | 55,8826 | 13,5276 | 0,978246 | 11,2484 | 105,225 | 2,22388 |
| 1 LTL = | 0,289620 | 8,59439 | 2,16113 | 4,53157 | 0,166006 | 0,201726 | 1 | 72,9398 | 0,124334 | 1,13614 | 69,3713 | 11,2730 | 2,72887 | 0,197337 | 2,26909 | 21,2267 | 0,448613 |
| 1 HUF = | 0,00397067 | 0,117828 | 0,0296290 | 0,0621275 | 0,00227593 | 0,00276565 | 0,0137099 | 1 | 0,00170461 | 0,0155764 | 0,951076 | 0,154552 | 0,0374127 | 0,00270548 | 0,0311091 | 0,291016 | 0,00615045 |
| 1 MTL = | 2,32937 | 69,1235 | 17,3817 | 36,4468 | 1,33516 | 1,62245 | 8,04286 | 586,645 | 1 | 9,13782 | 557,944 | 90,6669 | 21,9479 | 1,58716 | 18,2500 | 170,723 | 3,60813 |
| 1 PLN = | 0,254916 | 7,56455 | 1,90217 | 3,98856 | 0,146114 | 0,177554 | 0,880173 | 64,1996 | 0,109435 | 1 | 61,0587 | 9,92215 | 2,40188 | 0,173691 | 1,99719 | 18,6831 | 0,394857 |
| 1 SIT = | 0,00417493 | 0,123890 | 0,0311531 | 0,0653234 | 0,00239301 | 0,00290792 | 0,0144152 | 1,05144 | 0,0017923 | 0,0163777 | 1 | 0,162502 | 0,0393372 | 0,00284466 | 0,0327093 | 0,305986 | 0,00646684 |
| 1 SKK = | 0,0256916 | 0,762390 | 0,191709 | 0,401986 | 0,0147260 | 0,0178947 | 0,0887078 | 6,47033 | 0,0110294 | 0,100785 | 6,15378 | 1 | 0,242072 | 0,0175054 | 0,201286 | 1,88297 | 0,0397955 |
| 1 SEK = | 0,106132 | 3,14943 | 0,791951 | 1,66060 | 0,0608332 | 0,0739228 | 0,366452 | 26,7289 | 0,0455624 | 0,416341 | 25,4212 | 4,13100 | 1 | 0,0723146 | 0,831512 | 7,77855 | 0,164395 |
| 1 GBP = | 1,46764 | 43,5518 | 10,9515 | 22,9636 | 0,841229 | 1,022240 | 5,06746 | 369,620 | 0,630057 | 5,75735 | 351,536 | 57,1253 | 13,8285 | 1 | 11,4985 | 107,565 | 2,27333 |
| 1 NOK = | 0,127637 | 3,78759 | 0,952423 | 1,99709 | 0,0731597 | 0,0889017 | 0,440705 | 32,1450 | 0,0547946 | 0,500703 | 30,5723 | 4,96805 | 1,20263 | 0,0869676 | 1 | 9,35470 | 0,197706 |
| 1 ISK = | 0,0136442 | 0,404887 | 0,101812 | 0,213485 | 0,00782064 | 0,00950342 | 0,0471106 | 3,43624 | 0,00585744 | 0,0535242 | 3,26812 | 0,531076 | 0,128559 | 0,00929668 | 0,106898 | 1 | 0,0211344 |
| 1 CHF = | 0,645590 | 19,1577 | 4,81737 | 10,1013 | 0,370043 | 0,449666 | 2,22909 | 162,590 | 0,277152 | 2,53256 | 154,635 | 25,1285 | 6,08291 | 0,439883 | 5,05801 | 47,3162 | 1 |

EUR

CZK

DKK

EEK

CYP

LVL

LTL

HUF

MTL

PLN

SIT

SKK

SEK

GBP

NOK

ISK

CHF

1 EUR =

1

29,6747

7,46196

15,6466

0,573186

0,696519

3,45280

251,847

0,429300

3,92287

239,525

38,9233

9,42225

0,681367

7,83471

73,2914

1,54897

1 CZK =

0,0336987

1

0,251459

0,527270

0,0193156

0,0234718

0,116355

8,48691

0,0144669

0,132196

8,07169

1,31167

0,317518

0,0229612

0,264020

2,46983

0,0521984

1 DKK =

0,134013

3,97680

1

2,09685

0,0768143

0,0933426

0,462720

33,7507

0,0575318

0,525715

32,0995

5,21623

1,26270

0,0913120

1,04995

9,82201

0,207582

1 EEK =

0,0639116

1,89656

0,476906

1

0,0366332

0,0445157

0,220674

16,0959

0,0274373

0,250717

15,3085

2,48765

0,602192

0,0435473

0,500730

4,68418

0,0989973

1 CYP =

1,74464

51,7716

13,0184

27,2976

1

1,21517

6,02388

439,381

0,748972

6,84397

417,884

67,9069

16,4384

1,18874

13,6687

127,867

2,70239

1 LVL =

1,43571

42,6043

10,7132

22,4640

0,822929

1

4,95722

361,579

0,616351

5,63210

343,889

55,8826

13,5276

0,978246

11,2484

105,225

2,22388

1 LTL =

0,289620

8,59439

2,16113

4,53157

0,166006

0,201726

1

72,9398

0,124334

1,13614

69,3713

11,2730

2,72887

0,197337

2,26909

21,2267

0,448613

1 HUF =

0,00397067

0,117828

0,0296290

0,0621275

0,00227593

0,00276565

0,0137099

1

0,00170461

0,0155764

0,951076

0,154552

0,0374127

0,00270548

0,0311091

0,291016

0,00615045

1 MTL =

2,32937

69,1235

17,3817

36,4468

1,33516

1,62245

8,04286

586,645

1

9,13782

557,944

90,6669

21,9479

1,58716

18,2500

170,723

3,60813

1 PLN =

0,254916

7,56455

1,90217

3,98856

0,146114

0,177554

0,880173

64,1996

0,109435

1

61,0587

9,92215

2,40188

0,173691

1,99719

18,6831

0,394857

1 SIT =

0,00417493

0,123890

0,0311531

0,0653234

0,00239301

0,00290792

0,0144152

1,05144

0,0017923

0,0163777

1

0,162502

0,0393372

0,00284466

0,0327093

0,305986

0,00646684

1 SKK =

0,0256916

0,762390

0,191709

0,401986

0,0147260

0,0178947

0,0887078

6,47033

0,0110294

0,100785

6,15378

1

0,242072

0,0175054

0,201286

1,88297

0,0397955

1 SEK =

0,106132

3,14943

0,791951

1,66060

0,0608332

0,0739228

0,366452

26,7289

0,0455624

0,416341

25,4212

4,13100

1

0,0723146

0,831512

7,77855

0,164395

1 GBP =

1,46764

43,5518

10,9515

22,9636

0,841229

1,022240

5,06746

369,620

0,630057

5,75735

351,536

57,1253

13,8285

1

11,4985

107,565

2,27333

1 NOK =

0,127637

3,78759

0,952423

1,99709

0,0731597

0,0889017

0,440705

32,1450

0,0547946

0,500703

30,5723

4,96805

1,20263

0,0869676

1

9,35470

0,197706

1 ISK =

0,0136442

0,404887

0,101812

0,213485

0,00782064

0,00950342

0,0471106

3,43624

0,00585744

0,0535242

3,26812

0,531076

0,128559

0,00929668

0,106898

1

0,0211344

1 CHF =

0,645590

19,1577

4,81737

10,1013

0,370043

0,449666

2,22909

162,590

0,277152

2,53256

154,635

25,1285

6,08291

0,439883

5,05801

47,3162

1

| 1. | Uredba (EGS) št. 574/72 določa, da količnik pretvorbe zneska v valuto, ki je izražena v drugi valuti, Komisija izračuna na podlagi mesečnega poprečja količnikov konverzije valut med referenčnim obdobjem iz 2. odstavka, ki jih objavi Evropska centralna banka. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Uredba (EGS) št. 574/72 določa, da količnik pretvorbe zneska v valuto, ki je izražena v drugi valuti, Komisija izračuna na podlagi mesečnega poprečja količnikov konverzije valut med referenčnim obdobjem iz 2. odstavka, ki jih objavi Evropska centralna banka.

| 2. | Referenčna obdobja so:






  — | mesec januar za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. aprila naprej, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Referenčna obdobja so:

—

mesec januar za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. aprila naprej,

| — | mesec april za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. julija naprej, |
| --- | --- |

—

mesec april za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. julija naprej,

| — | mesec julij za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. oktobra naprej, |
| --- | --- |

—

mesec julij za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. oktobra naprej,

| — | mesec oktober za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. januarja naprej. |
| --- | --- |

—

mesec oktober za menjalne tečaje, veljavne od 1. januarja naprej.

Menjalni tečaji za valute so objavljeni v drugem Uradnem listu Evropske unije (serije C) v mesecu februarju, maju, avgustu in novembru.

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EVROPSKI GOSPODARSKI PROSTOR

Nadzorni organ EFTA

| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 277/14

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Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o državni pomoči v zvezi z islandskim projektom, ki zadeva podmorski kabel (Farice), na podlagi člena 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču

(2005/C 277/08)

S Sklepom 125/05/COL z dne 26. maja 2005, objavljenem v verodostojnem jeziku na straneh, ki sledijo temu povzetku, je Nadzorni organ Efte začel postopek v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi Nadzornega organa in Sodišča (Sporazum o nadzoru in sodišču). Islandska vlada je bila obveščena na podlagi izvoda Sklepa.

Nadzorni organ Efte poziva države Efte, države članice EU in zainteresirane stranke, da v enem mesecu od objave tega obvestila predložijo svoje pripombe o zadevnem ukrepu na:

| Efta Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| BE-1040 Brussels |

Efta Surveillance Authority

35, Rue Belliard

BE-1040 Brussels

Pripombe se posredujejo islandski vladi. Zainteresirana stranka, ki predloži pripombe, lahko v pisni obliki zahteva zaupno obravnavo svojih podatkov, pri čemer navede razloge za to zahtevo.

POVZETEK

Postopek

Z dopisom z dne 27. februarja 2004 so islandski organi obvestili Nadzorni organ Efte (v nadaljevanju „Organ“) o državnem jamstvu v korist projekta, ki zadeva podmorski kabel na Islandiji. Vendar se je projekt izvajal, preden je imel Organ priložnost posredovati svoje pripombe. Organ je v okviru ločenih postopkov na področju konkurence od Farice hf. zahteval podatke, da se lahko opravi analiza v skladu s členom 53 in/ali 54 Sporazuma EGP.

Opis ukrepa pomoči

Projekt Farice zadeva konstrukcijo in upravljanje podmorskih telekomunikacijskih kablov, ki povezujejo Islandijo in Ferske otoke s Škotsko.

Od leta 1994 so bili Islandija in Ferski otoki mednarodno povezani s podmorskim telekomunikacijskim kablom CANTAT-3. CANTAT-3 so vzpostavile kot konzorcijski kabel mednarodne in islandske pogodbene stranke (Og Vodafone in Landssími Islands hf — v nadaljevanju Síminn). Noben drug kabelski sistem iz steklenih vlaken ni doslej segal do Islandije. Ker je imel CANTAT-3 tehnične omejitve, sateliti pa niso bili gospodarsko uspešni, so se iskale druge možnosti prenosa, ki zagotavljajo zanesljivo povezljivost.

Projekt Farice se je začel na pobudo islandskega telekomunikacijskega operaterja Síminn, ki je v skoraj 100-odstotni državni lasti, in prvotnega telekomunikacijskega operaterja na Ferskih otokih, Føroya Tele. V letu 2002 je postalo jasno, da projekt Farice ne bi pridobil zagona zgolj na gospodarski osnovi. Zato je bilo odločeno, da islandska država aktivno sodeluje pri projektu. Poleg tega naj bi se projekta udeležil Og Vodafone. Holdinška družba E-Farice, ki ima ves islandski delež v Farice hf (E-Farice ima 80-odstotni delež v Farice hf), je pri CANTAT-3 kupila delnice Og Vodafone in Síminn. Nadaljnja pogajanja so bila predvidena za zakup dodatne kapacitete CANTAT-3 od člana konzorcija Telegoble CANTAT-3. V skladu s priglasitvijo mora E-Farice poskrbeti za vso mednarodno povezljivost za Islandijo.

Priglasitev zadeva državno jamstvo za posojilo v višini 9,4 milijona EUR v korist Farice hf. To posojilo je del širšega dolgoročnega paketa posojil (zajema tri druga posojila, ki so jih odobrile različne banke) za največji znesek v višini 34,5 milijona EUR. Farice hf. je vnaprej plačal tržno premijo, ki se letno obračunava. Síminn in Føroya Tele sta jamčila za dve od drugih posojil; četrto posojilo ni imelo jamstva. Posojilo, zavarovano z jamstvom islandske države, je imelo najboljše tržne pogoje, tj. Euribor [...] (1) p.a. (v primerjavi z Euriborjem [...] p.a. za nezavarovano posojilo).

Islandska država je januarja 2003, med povečanjem skupnega delniškega kapitala Farice hf., delež svojih delnic zvišala s prvotnih 27 % na 46,5 %. Kakor navajajo islandski organi, zasebni operaterji niso hoteli več zagotoviti delniškega kapitala. Síminn, ki je imel prej 47 % delnic, je svoj delniški kapital zmanjšal na 33,33 %.

Državna pomoč v skladu s členom 61(1) Sporazuma EGP

Organ ugotavlja, da islandski organi s tem, da so Organu prepozno priglasili dva podporna ukrepa, niso spoštovali zastoja obveznosti, tako da bi ukrepi, ki pomenijo državno pomoč v skladu s členom 61(1) Sporazuma EGP, pomenili „novo pomoč“ v skladu s členom 1(f) dela II Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču.

Organ jamstva za posojilo in povečanja delniškega kapitala islandske države v korist projekta Farice ne obravnava kot podporo splošnemu infrastrukturnemu projektu, ki bi lahko bil uvrščen med državno pomoč. V nasprotju z infrastrukturnim projektom, ki je na nediskriminatorni osnovi odprt vsem uporabnikom, Organ upošteva, da projekt koristi določenim ciljnim poslovnim operaterjem, tj. ponudnikom telekomunikacijskih storitev. Ti operaterji so oblikovali zasebno pobudo, na katero se je država odzvala. Poleg tega Farice hf. kot organ, ki upravlja infrastrukturo, ponuja storitev proti plačilu. V skladu s prakso Komisije se v takšnem primeru ne more zanikati prednost posamezne družbe.

Organ je oblikoval svojo oceno državne pomoči o jamstvu za posojilo na podlagi poglavja 17.4(2) smernic o državni pomoči Organa, ki navajajo pogoje, pod katerimi lahko člen 61(1) Sporazuma EGP jamstev ne zajema. Organ ugotavlja, da je posredovanje države vodilo do boljših obrestnih mer. Islandski organi tega ne zanikajo, ampak menijo, da so posledica državnega jamstva vedno boljši pogoji na trgu in da je pomembna le obravnava, ali je plačana zadostna premija. Organ dvomi, da bi Farice hf. brez državnega jamstva sploh prejel posojilo v višini 9,4 milijona EUR glede na to, da je za financiranje tega projekta že najel druga posojila. Organ meni, da se morajo štiri posojila obravnavati posamično, ker so jih odobrile različne banke, ki imajo različen način odplačevanja in obrestne mere, ter jih jamčijo različni poroki. Organ v zvezi s tem tudi upošteva, da islandska država 100-odstotno jamči za posojilo v višini 9,4 milijona EUR. Organ nadalje meni, da plačana premija ne odstrani nobene prednosti, ki bi izhajala iz posredovanja države. Farice hf. glede na začetno stališče Organa ne bi smel imeti koristi iz finančnih pogojev, ki bi jih brez posredovanja države ne bil sposoben doseči na trgu. Po njegovem mnenju ima Farice hf., predvsem v primerjavi s posojilom, ki ni zavarovano z jamstvom, boljše pogoje financiranja, ki jih ni zadostno poplačal.

Organ je ocenil, da je islandska država povečala delniški kapital v skladu s poglavjem 19 smernic o državni pomoči Organa. Ugotavlja, da se je, medtem ko se je skupni delniški kapital Farice hf. bistveno povečal in tudi vključil povečanja delniškega kapitala zasebnih operatorjev, udeležba islandske države, v primerjavi z udeležbami zasebnih delničarjev, nesorazmerno dvignila za 20 odstotnih točk. Ker so islandski organi navajali, da je Síminn gledal na projekt kot na finančno tvegano podjetje, je Organ zavzel predhodno stališče, da so se zasebni operaterji zaradi slabih obetov glede dobička do določene stopnje umaknili od projekta.

V skladu s predhodnim stališčem Organa so ukrepi okrepili Farice hf. v povezavi s tekmeci, ki se ne morejo zanesti na udeležbo države ali na jamstva za posojilo, in s tem izkrivljajo ali bi lahko izkrivljali konkurenco. Telekomunikacijske storitve zagotavljajo dejavnost trgovanja, to pa vpliva na trgovino med pogodbenicami.

Združljivost v skladu s členom 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP

Organ je ocenil ukrepe neposredno v skladu s členom 61(3)(c) Sporazuma EGP, ker ne obstajajo smernice ali skupinske izjeme, v okviru katerih so ukrepi lahko upravičeni.

V zvezi s potrebnostjo ukrepov pomoči Organ priznava, da ima nov podmorski kabel, ki naj bi postal glavna povezava do Islandije, več kapacitet, je bolj zanesljiv in skupaj z rezervnim CANTAT-3 sposoben zagotoviti telekomunikacijske storitve do Islandije. Razpoložljivost širokopasovnega dostopa je zakonit cilj in vrsta storitve, ki je po naravi sposobna pozitivno vplivati na produktivnost in rast velikega števila sektorjev in dejavnosti. Brez udeležbe države bi projekt ali zamujal ali se sploh ne bi izpeljal, ker projekt kot tak ni bil donosen.

V okviru ocene sorazmernosti mora Organ pretehtati prednosti, da se jamči zanesljiva ponudba telekomunikacijskih storitev do Islandije, in pomanjkljivosti, da se izkrivlja konkurenca v primerjavi s tekmeci, ki nimajo dostopa do javnih sredstev pri uresničevanju podobnih projektov. V zvezi s tem bo Organ med drugim preveril naslednje točke v uradnem postopku preiskave:

| — | Organ najprej ugotavlja, da Farice hf. Na podlagi javnega razpisa ni prejel niti konstrukcije niti upravljanja kabla. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organ najprej ugotavlja, da Farice hf. Na podlagi javnega razpisa ni prejel niti konstrukcije niti upravljanja kabla.

| — | Organ ugotavlja, da sporazum delničarjev določa nediskriminatorne, pregledne cene tržnih pogojev. Medtem ko je sporazum o delničarjih na splošno dostopen vsem novim ponudnikom, bo Organ upošteval, da sporazum delničarjev določa, da imajo ustanovne stranke vedno možnost obdržati svoj nepristranski položaj, kar jih postavi v boljši položaj od novih ponudnikov. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organ ugotavlja, da sporazum delničarjev določa nediskriminatorne, pregledne cene tržnih pogojev. Medtem ko je sporazum o delničarjih na splošno dostopen vsem novim ponudnikom, bo Organ upošteval, da sporazum delničarjev določa, da imajo ustanovne stranke vedno možnost obdržati svoj nepristranski položaj, kar jih postavi v boljši položaj od novih ponudnikov.

| — | Organ bo upošteval skupni znesek pomoči, ki je omejen, v kolikor zadeva jamstvo. V zvezi s povečanjem vrednosti delnic države Organ ugotavlja, da se je junija 2003 delniški kapital že zmanjšal na 41 %, medtem ko se je udeležba Síminn dvignila na 29 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organ bo upošteval skupni znesek pomoči, ki je omejen, v kolikor zadeva jamstvo. V zvezi s povečanjem vrednosti delnic države Organ ugotavlja, da se je junija 2003 delniški kapital že zmanjšal na 41 %, medtem ko se je udeležba Síminn dvignila na 29 %.

| — | Organ ima določene pomisleke v zvezi s konkurenco. Evropsko sodišče je ugotovilo, da presoja skladnosti na podlagi določb o državni pomoči ne sme doseči rezultata, nasprotnega drugim določbam pogodbe, vključno s členom 53 in/ali 54 Sporazuma EGP. V zvezi s tem Organ med drugim ugotavlja, da četudi obstoječa infrastruktura CANTAT-3 še vedno obratuje, obstaja zaskrbljenost, da bo v prihodnosti vse povezljivosti CANTAT-3 do Islandije vodil E-Farice hf, ki ima večino delnic v Farice hf. Zato tukaj obstaja tveganje, da bi bila konkurenca na področju povezljivosti do Islandije izločena, ker bi na trgu ostal le en dobavitelj. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organ ima določene pomisleke v zvezi s konkurenco. Evropsko sodišče je ugotovilo, da presoja skladnosti na podlagi določb o državni pomoči ne sme doseči rezultata, nasprotnega drugim določbam pogodbe, vključno s členom 53 in/ali 54 Sporazuma EGP. V zvezi s tem Organ med drugim ugotavlja, da četudi obstoječa infrastruktura CANTAT-3 še vedno obratuje, obstaja zaskrbljenost, da bo v prihodnosti vse povezljivosti CANTAT-3 do Islandije vodil E-Farice hf, ki ima večino delnic v Farice hf. Zato tukaj obstaja tveganje, da bi bila konkurenca na področju povezljivosti do Islandije izločena, ker bi na trgu ostal le en dobavitelj.

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(1)  Oklepaji navajajo številke, ki so bile izbrisane, ker zajemajo podatke, uvrščene med poslovne skrivnosti.

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EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 125/05/COL

of 26 May 2005

to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to State aid in favour of Farice hf.

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26 thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (2), in particular to Article 24 as well as Article 1(2) in Part I and Articles 4(4) and 10 in Part II of Protocol 3 thereof,

Having regard to the Authority's Guidelines (3) on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, and in particular Chapter 17 on State guarantees and Chapter 19 on public authorities' holdings,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

By letter dated 27 February 2004 of the Icelandic Mission to the European Union, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 26 February 2004, the Icelandic authorities notified the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter ‘the Authority’) of a State guarantee in favour of a submarine cable project in Iceland, i.e. the Farice project. The letter was received and registered on 1 March 2004 (Event No: 257593).

Supplementary information was submitted by letter from the Icelandic Mission dated 14 May 2004, forwarding a letter by the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated 13 May 2004. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 May 2004 (Event No: 281472).

The Authority requested further information on the notification by letter dated 22 April 2004 (Event No: 261084). The Icelandic authorities responded by letter dated 25 June from the Icelandic Mission, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 28 June 2004 (Event No: 285971).

The Authority requested further information by letter dated 10 August (Event No: 286427), to which the Icelandic Mission responded by letter dated 8 September 2004, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 7 September 2004 (Event No: 291944).

By letter dated 16 December 2004, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities about its doubts concerning the compatibility with the EEA Agreement of the notified guarantee and of the increase of the Icelandic State's share capital in Farice hf. (Event No: 299813). The Icelandic authorities reacted to that by letter dated 21 January 2005 from the Icelandic Mission, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 21 January 2005. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 24 January 2004 (Event No: 306 312).

In addition, under separate competition proceedings, the Authority had, by letter to Farice hf. dated 31 January 2003, expressed certain competition concerns and requested information concerning the FARICE project in order to enable the Authority to facilitate the assessment of the project's competitive impact. By letter dated 6 May 2004 the Authority addressed a formal request for information to Farice hf. (4). Farice hf.'s reply was received by the Authority on 21 October 2004.

2.   Description of the Farice project

The Farice project concerns the construction and management of an undersea telecommunications cable connecting Iceland and the Faeroe Islands with Scotland.

Since 1994, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were internationally connected with the undersea telecommunication cable CANTAT-3. CANTAT-3 was set up as a consortium cable. Access to CANTAT-3 was secured via membership of the consortium (5), by defeasible rights of use and by leasing capacity from the consortium member Teleglobe. CANTAT-3 has connection points in Canada, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany. With the build-up of trans-Atlantic cable systems competing with CANTAT-3, the founders of CANTAT-3 had access to other, more economical connections. The Icelandic and the Faeroe parties, however, still had to rely on the CANTAT-3 connection. That was one consideration for these parties to consider the development of a new connectivity. Besides, the CANTAT-3 cable had certain technical limitations, as it was an older generation cable which is not always reliable and has limited capacity. No other single international fibre network project has reached these two countries since 1994, despite a general capacity growth of international and interregional telecommunications routes. According to information by the Icelandic authorities, the geographically isolated location of the two countries and the limited market size prevented this.

Satellite connections which serve as a second connectivity are expected to rise in costs and are, in any event, not considered appropriate for transmitting delay sensitive internet traffic. In order to handle the increased telecommunication traffic, an alternative had to be developed.

The Farice project came about from an initiative by the almost 100 % State owned Icelandic telecom operator Landssími Íslands hf (hereinafter Síminn) and the incumbent telecom operator in the Faeroe Islands, Føroya Tele, which were considering the development of a submarine cable linking Reykjavík, Tórshavn and Edinburgh. However, in 2002 it became clear that the FARICE project seemed unable to gain momentum as a purely commercial business case (6). A feasibility study conducted in March 2002 concluded that it would not be possible to fund the project through conventional project financing. A broad alliance behind the project was sought in order to secure its realisation. This resulted in two decisions:

Firstly, the communication authorities of Iceland and the Faeroe Islands became involved in the preparation of the project. In particular the largest sponsors, Síminn and Føroya Tele, made it clear that they were not interested in providing the necessary loan guarantees on behalf of the whole telecom market (7). The State would therefore have to participate and contribute actively in the project.

Secondly, it was considered important that Og Vodafone, a major player in the Icelandic telecom market, should participate actively in the project. It was decided that besides the establishment of Farice hf, a holding company Eignarhaldsfélagið Farice ehf. (hereinafter ‘E-Farice’) (8) should be established. This company, while holding all the Icelandic shares in Farice, should buy Og Vodafone's capacity in CANTAT-3. A similar offer was made to Síminn which, according to the IBM report submitted by the Icelandic authorities, resulted in E-Farice handling all international connectivity for Iceland. As stated in the notification, CANTAT-3 capacity will consequently be operated and sold by E-Farice (9).

In 2002 the new limited company, Farice hf, was established with the purpose of preparing, constructing and operating a submarine communication cable system to transfer telecommunications and internet traffic between Iceland, the Faeroe Islands and the UK. The shareholders of this company were Síminn (47,33 %), Og Vodafone (1,33 %), the Government of Iceland (27,33 %), three other Icelandic operators which held together 3,99 %, Føroya Tele (17,33 %), and two other Faeroe telecom operators, which each held 1,33 % (10). The new Farice cable includes an Iceland backhaul (Reykjavík to Seyðisfjörður), a submarine section (Seyðisfjörður to Dunnet Bay), a Faeroese backhaul (from Funningsfjörður to Tórshavn) and a UK backhaul (Dunnet Bay to Edinburgh). No public tender was carried out to entrust the management of the cable, which was granted to Farice hf.

A shareholders' agreement dated 12 September 2002 provided that the pricing policy of Farice should be based on the principles of cost orientation, transparency and non-discrimination.

The Icelandic authorities have further pointed out that the use of the Farice cable is open to foreign and domestic operators alike, on equal terms and prices. The shareholders' agreement is also open to new shareholders. It stipulates, however, that the existing shareholders will always be offered the possibility of maintaining their equity position in the company if the share capital is increased.

The formal opening of the Farice submarine transmission cable was in February 2004. While it will constitute the primary transmission line for Iceland's telecommunications, the CANTAT-3 capacities will be used as a back-up.

3.   Description of the aid measure

a.   The loan guarantee

The object of the notification concerns the grant by the State of a guarantee for a loan of EUR 9,4 million in favour of Farice (hereinafter: the A Term Loan). This loan forms part of a broader long-term loan package for a maximum amount of EUR 34,5 million.

According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, in particular the Agreement between Farice hf, Íslandsbanki hf, other financial institutions and other guarantors, on 27 February 2004 signed loans (hereinafter: the loan agreement) for a maximum amount of EUR 34,5 million, break down as follows:

| Loan | Million EUR | Lender | Interest rate (11) | Interest periods | Repayment | Guarantor |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of instalments | Start of repayment |
| A | 9,4 | The Nordic Investment Bank | [...] (12) | 6 months | 8 semi-annual payments | Sept. 2011 | Government of Iceland |
| B | 4,7 | The Nordic Investment Bank | [...] | 6 months | 5 semi-annual payments | Sept. 2009 | Landssími Íslands hf (Síminn) |
| 4,7 | Íslandsbanki hf |
| C | 4,7 | Føroya banki | [...] | 3 months | 10 quarterly payments | Sept. 2009 | Telefon verkið P/F |
| D | 11 | Íslandsbanki hf | [...] | 1 month | 48 monthly payments | Sept. 2005 | None |

Loan

Million EUR

Lender

Interest rate (11)

Interest periods

Repayment

Guarantor

Number of instalments

Start of repayment

A

9,4

The Nordic Investment Bank

[...] (12)

6 months

8 semi-annual payments

Sept. 2011

Government of Iceland

B

4,7

The Nordic Investment Bank

[...]

6 months

5 semi-annual payments

Sept. 2009

Landssími Íslands hf (Síminn)

4,7

Íslandsbanki hf

C

4,7

Føroya banki

[...]

3 months

10 quarterly payments

Sept. 2009

Telefon verkið P/F

D

11

Íslandsbanki hf

[...]

1 month

48 monthly payments

Sept. 2005

None

The State guarantee for the A term loan is a guarantee of collection, i.e. Farice hf.will be fully liable for payment of the loan and the creditor will need to exhaust the recourses for collection from the company before the State guarantee can take effect. Farice hf. was obliged to pay an annual market premium of [...] (established by the Icelandic National Debt Management) and a fee of [...] ISK. The payment was done in advance [...].

An earlier guarantee of collection was signed in July 2003 in relation to a bridge loan of EUR 16 million. The guarantee of collection covered EUR 6,4 million, i.e. 40 % of that loan. The bridge loan was paid up upon the release of the long-term loan of EUR 34,5 million and the guarantee of collection for the bridge loan ceased to exist the same day. Farice hf. paid a [...] guarantee fee and a guarantee charge of [...] ISK for that guarantee.

b.   The Icelandic government's increase in share capital

In the beginning of January 2003, the State participation in Farice hf increased from an initial share of 27 % up to 46,5 %. Following the explanation given by the Icelandic authorities in their reply of June 2004,

‘As the business plan evolved, the funding needs of the company became clearer and it was decided to increase the company's share capital. All operators in Iceland and Faeroe Islands were invited to buy shares in the share capital increase. As Síminn made it clear that the company would not want to provide more than 33,33 % of the share capital, Telefonverkið would provide necessary share capital from the Faroese site (19,93 %), the Icelandic government had to provide 46,53 % of the necessary share capital as other operators in Iceland did not have the financial capacity to buy more than 1,2 % of the share capital.’

As stated by the Icelandic authorities, the total share capital of Farice hf was increased from EUR 337 000 to EUR 14 million. Details on the share capital contribution of the different shareholders can be seen from the table below:

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4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

The Icelandic government first states that the measures cannot constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, as the Farice project constitutes infrastructure, which is open to all potential users on a non-discriminatory basis.

Further, the Icelandic authorities argue that the State guarantee fulfils all the conditions set out in Chapter 17.4 of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines. The Icelandic authorities point out that — as can be seen from the three other tranches of the loan — Farice would have been able to secure a loan on market conditions. It is, however, clear that interest rates will always be more favourable in the case of a State guaranteed loan and that, therefore, these conditions should not be expected to be the same as normal conditions on the financial market. As long as the market price paid for the guarantee is correct, there is no room for State aid. The banks were asked to provide a non indicative bid for a loan up to EUR 32 million. Four offers varying in form and cost offered interest rates ranging from [...].

The authorities further point out that the EUR 34,5 million loan should be seen as one loan subdivided into four tranches. In that respect, the Farice project is financed to a large extent independently of the State guarantee, which only covers 27,25 % of the full loan.

one

As to the share capital increase, the Icelandic authorities point out that the increase in share capital took place in January 2003, i.e. only four months after the establishment of Farice hf. The Icelandic State's share increase should therefore not be seen as an injection of fresh capital, but rather as the initial setting up of a company. In this respect it should be noted that the private investors provided for almost 60 % of the total share capital increase or EUR 8,1 million compared to the government share of EUR 5,5 million (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this does not only show that the private share holders were willing to participate in the company, but also that they were willing to participate to a significant degree.

13

In any event, given the size of the Farice project, the project would qualify as aid to small and medium sized undertakings.

In any event, given its significant importance for securing the necessary connectivity of Iceland to the world, the support should be allowed under Article 61(3)(b) or (c) of the EEA Agreement.

II.   APPRECIATION

1.   Obligation to notify

According to Article 2(1) read together with Article 3 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘any plans to grant new aid shall be notified to the Authority in sufficient time by the EFTA State concerned and shall not be put into effect before the Authority has taken, or is deemed to have taken, a decision authorising such aid.’

any plans to grant new aid shall be notified to the Authority in sufficient time by the EFTA State concerned and shall not be put into effect before the Authority has taken, or is deemed to have taken, a decision authorising such aid.

Farice hf. was established in 2002 and the construction work started already in June 2003. The cable was officially opened in February 2004 (14). The share capital increase took place in January 2003 and the guarantee of collection by the Icelandic authorities dates to 27 February 2004, i.e. before the Authority had a chance to express a view on the notification of the measures on 27 February 2004.

14

The Authority therefore notes that the Icelandic government has not respected the stand-still obligation, with the consequence that if the measures were found to be State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, they would constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(f) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, subject to potential recovery, if declared incompatible with the EEA Agreement.

2.   State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘...any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.

The Authority will therefore assess whether:

| — | there is an intervention by the State or through State resources; |
| --- | --- |

—

there is an intervention by the State or through State resources;

| — | which confers an advantage on the recipient; |
| --- | --- |

—

which confers an advantage on the recipient;

| — | distorts or threatens to distort competition; and |
| --- | --- |

—

distorts or threatens to distort competition; and

| — | which is liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

—

which is liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

2.1   The Farice project as an infrastructure project

The Icelandic authorities argue that the support to the Farice project does not comprise any State aid, given that the submarine cable qualifies as infrastructure and support in its favour therefore constitutes a ‘general’ and not a selective measure. As stated in the European Commission Communication COM (2001) 35 final, ‘Reinforcing quality service in sea ports: a key for European transport’ (15), the criterion of selectivity is an important benchmark for deciding whether a concrete financing measure constitutes State aid.

15

In Commission practice State funding for the construction or management of infrastructure is not to be regarded as aid, if the infrastructure is directly managed by the State (which is not the case in the present project) or if there is a public tender for the selection of the manager and if access to the infrastructure is open to all potential users on a non-discriminatory basis (16).

16

The Authority notes that while wide participation might have been sought within the project, neither the construction nor the management of the company was organised by a public tender. The government participation rather responded to a private initiative, started by the two incumbent telecommunication operators (17).

17

The Authority also has doubts concerning the non-discriminatory access. While the participation in the company according to the shareholders' agreement is not restricted, the Authority notes that the founding shareholders keep certain pre-emptive rights (see section I.2 of this Decision), which seems to place them in a better position than new shareholders.

Regardless of this, in line with Commission practice, a measure in any event constitutes aid and not a general measure, if the body managing the infrastructure is pursuing an economic activity, as this may provide a potential advantage to the beneficiary (18) in relation to competing operators. In this respect it suffices to note that the State support benefits Farice hf. which manages the cable and sells users' rights to interested parties against remuneration. According to the case law of the European Court of First Instance, the management of infrastructure constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (19). Farice hf. is able to profit from an infrastructure construction secured with a State guarantee and with government participation in a situation in which private parties were not willing to ensure the full financing of the project, whereas other operators might have to finance 100 % of it on their own.

18

19

In addition, for State aid purposes, it should be noted that the participation in the company is mainly geared towards telecommunication operators. Connectivity via the Farice cable is currently only sold in large units to business operators who resell the service on the downstream market to end users. It was these business operators who took the initiative to which the State responded. The type of service is therefore targeted at commercial operators and not at the general public. The Authority therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, considers that the project should be looked at rather as being a dedicated facility for undertakings, which is within the scope of State aid control, rather than a general infrastructure (20).

20

2.2.   The loan guarantee by the Icelandic State

In general, a State guarantee enables its beneficiary to obtain better financial terms for a loan than those normally available on the financial markets. Therefore, guarantees given by the State may fall within the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

However, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter 17.4 (2) of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines on State Guarantees (hereinafter: the Guidelines), the Authority considers that an individual State guarantee does not constitute State aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils all the following conditions:

| (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The borrower would, in principle, be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The borrower would, in principle, be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State;

| (c) | The guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended;

| (d) | The market price for the guarantee is paid (which reflects, amongst other things, the amount and duration of the guarantee, the security given by the borrower, the borrower's financial position, the sector of activity and the prospects, the rates of default, and other economic conditions). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

The market price for the guarantee is paid (which reflects, amongst other things, the amount and duration of the guarantee, the security given by the borrower, the borrower's financial position, the sector of activity and the prospects, the rates of default, and other economic conditions).

According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, the project could not gain momentum as a purely commercial business case and required the involvement of the State. Although the borrower was not technically in financial difficulty, the fact that the banks did not only require a guarantee of the State for the A Term Loan but also of the two former State telecommunication monopolists (Síminn for the B Term Loan and Telefonverkið P/F for the C Term Loan), which are still owned by the respective States, shows that Farice was not in the position to obtain a loan on market conditions without any intervention by the State. For this reason, it is questionable whether the second condition is fulfilled.

The Icelandic authorities however argue that the second condition should be understood to be that the borrower was able to obtain ‘a’ loan, not necessarily ‘the loan on the same conditions’. In particular the D tranche loan shows that it was possible for Farice hf. to obtain a loan ‘as such’. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities argue that it is evident that, backed up with the State guarantee, the loan would be granted at more favourable conditions. The decisive factor therefore is only whether the price for the guarantee is a market price.

The Authority agrees that the first condition only states that the borrower would ‘in principle’ be able to obtain a loan on market conditions. However, it still needs to be considered that point 17.1(1) of the Guidelines describes State guarantees as normally enabling the borrower to obtain better financial terms than those normally available on the financial markets, which leads to distortions of competition and the potential classification as ‘aid’. It is exactly that advantage resulting from the State intervention which raises a State aid concern. Against this background, there would be no aid element involved if the State backed-up loan did not lead to any advantages in the interest rate. However, if the State intervention leads to ‘better’ market conditions, this must be taken into account for the assessment under the State aid provisions. The Authority does not exclude, at this stage of the proceedings, that the distortive effect resulting from better market conditions can be adequately — but then also would have to be — considered in the assessment of the adequacy of the market premium (fourth condition), and will investigate that further in the formal investigation procedure.

better

However, the Authority notes, that while Farice hf. was able to secure an EUR 11 million loan on market conditions (D loan), it is not clear whether the banks would have granted any further loans to the project without any intervention from the State. This aspect would have to be assessed under the first condition. The Authority is therefore not entirely certain about the relevance of the argument that Farice hf. was able to negotiate the EUR 11 million loan.

further

This

The overall loan package is made up of four (or five) different loan amounts with different borrowing conditions, different lenders and different guarantees. Therefore, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that each part of the overall loan amount constitutes an independent loan as such. For this reason, the Authority initially considers that the guarantee of the State covers 100 % of the guaranteed A Term Loan for a maximum amount of EUR 9,4 million. Hence, the third condition laid down in Chapter 17.4(2) of the Guidelines to exclude the existence of State aid does not seem to be fulfilled.

The Icelandic authorities argue that there is only one loan at stake, at EUR 34,5 million. However, as can be seen from the loan agreement, while granted for the same collateral, the four loans are granted by different banks which assume the responsibility for their loan amount only. None of the banks would take over — in case of a failure of Farice hf. — the liability for any of the other loans. The different loans do not only have different repayment periods and a different number of instalments, but also different guarantors. Against this background, the combination of the loans in one joint document does not appear to be of significant relevance.

their

It should further be noted that the 80 % rule should ensure that the creditor still has an incentive to reflect on the risk which he is willing to assume. Against this background, it does not seem correct to take into account — in relation to the business decision made by the Nordic Investment bank and in order to establish the loan basis to which the 80 % rule applies — that other loans are granted by Íslandsbanki. The Nordic investment bank has not assumed any responsibility for these loans and would not consider them in its decision to support Farice.

If anything, the A loan could be considered together with the second loan granted by the Nordic Investment bank, i.e. the first part of the B loan. However, the Authority still has doubts on this perspective, as the B loan is secured by the 100 % State owned company Síminn. The incentive for Nordic investment bank to assume an ordinary risk assessment, the same as it would undertake for a borrower who cannot rely on the State or State owned companies, is therefore considerably reduced.

Regarding the fourth condition, the Authority notes that the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund assessed the appropriate guarantee fee and guarantee charge for a State guarantee in relation to the A Term Loan. It charged a fee of ISK [...] plus a proportional fee of [...] p.a. on the balance of the loan at the beginning of each period. The total charge amounted to [...] and was already paid in advance.

Assuming only that the State Guarantee Fund took into account, in the assessment of the premium, the concrete characteristics of the guaranteed loan, in particular the conditions for repayment (21) and that it followed for its assessment the so-called market investor principle, would the fourth condition laid down in Chapter 17.4(2) of the Guidelines be fulfilled. However, despite being invited to prove that this is a market rate, the Icelandic authorities have not substantiated this point, but mainly limited themselves to repeat the relevant provisions of the State Guarantee Fund Act. The Authority notes that while taking into account that the guarantee in question is a guarantee of collection with a lesser risk, the premium charged to Farice is at the very low end of the spectrum of interest rates to be fixed by the National Debt Management Agency [...], which has not been reasoned by the Icelandic authorities.

21

Further indication of the appropriate market rate can be derived from point 17.1(2) of the Guidelines which identifies the amount of aid, i.e. the cash grant equivalent, for an individual guarantee, as the difference between the market rate and the rate obtained thanks to the State guarantee after any premiums have been deducted. This is based on the understanding that if the borrower profits from a favourable interest rate, which he would not have gotten without State intervention, the aid element is the amount which remains in comparison to the market rate and after the premium has been deducted. If the premium does not fully remove this advantage, the State guarantee would still benefit the recipient and thus distort the market. In such circumstances the advantage resulting from the guarantee has not been clawed away by the premium and would have to be classified as aid (22).

after

22

The Authority notes that the difference between the A tranche loan of [...] points compared to [...] of the B loan, is [...], which is not fully compensated by the [...] premium paid by the State. However, the Authority still considers comparing the interest rate of the A tranche with the D tranche of the loan, which is the only tranche not backed up by the State or a State owned company, which results in a remaining aid element of [...]. Firstly, the Authority assumes that the guarantee given by the 100 % owned telecom operators Síminn is also imputable to the State, but will investigate that point further during the investigation. In any event, operators in similar projects might not be able to secure such guarantees — and the favourable market conditions resulting therefrom — so that in the Authority's preliminary view the comparison with the D loan seems to be the valid comparison (23).

23

The intervention of the State strengthens the position of Farice hf. in securing the project financing versus competitors who do not profit from such a guarantee and would have to make the investment solely on market terms. The guarantee is given for a project which is carried out by multinational business operators and constitutes an activity which is subject to trade between the Contracting Parties.

2.3   The increase in the participation of the State as shareholder of Farice hf.

Between the time of the establishment of the company in September 2002 and the time of the notification at the beginning of 2004, the State participation in Farice hf increased from an initial share of 27 % up to 46,5 %. Following the explanation given by the Icelandic authorities in their reply of June 2004, Síminn made it clear that it did not intend to provide more than 33,33 % of the share capital (24).

24

For State aid purposes, it has to be established whether the capital increase at Farice engaged by the State is directly in conformity with the market investor principle. Chapter 19 of the Guidelines establishes the general approach of the Authority with regard to the acquisition of share holdings by public authorities.

According to Chapter 19.6.(b) of the Guidelines, no State aid is involved where fresh capital is contributed to an undertaking in circumstances that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions. This can apply when public holdings in a company are to be increased, provided that the capital injected is proportionate to the number of shares held by the authorities and goes together with the injection of capital by a private shareholder. The private investor's holding must have real economic significance.

On the other hand, there is State aid where fresh capital is contributed in circumstances that would not be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions. Following Chapter 19.6.(c) of the Guidelines, this is, amongst others, the case where the injection of capital into companies whose capital is divided between private and public shareholders makes the public holding reach a significantly higher level than it was originally and the relative disengagement of private shareholders is largely due to the companies' poor profit outlook.

The Icelandic authorities point out that the Icelandic's State share capital increase should not be looked at as an injection of fresh capital, but rather as the initial setting up of the company. The Authority points out that the State Aid Guidelines consider the share capital increase, regardless of at what point in time it takes place, as a subcategory of the injection of fresh capital. As the Guidelines reflect the general principle of private market investor behaviour, the share capital increase must be analysed on its merits. Even if the Government had assumed the higher share already during the preparation phase, this still would have made the increase subject to an analysis under the State aid provisions. For that assessment it is therefore only relevant whether the share capital increase reflects the rationale of a private market investor.

The Authority does not deny that in real terms the private operators' holdings occurred at the same time of the capital increase by the State. However, the Authority takes the (preliminary view) that the share increase of the private operators was not proportionate to the share capital increase by the State.

As can be seen from the table above (see section I.3.b. of this Decision) Farice hf.'s capital rose from EUR 337 000 to EUR 14 646 000 in January 2003. The share of the Icelandic State grew from 27,33 % (EUR 92 000) to 46,5 % (EUR 6 206 000), i.e. by almost 20 percentage points. While it is correctly stated by the Icelandic authorities that the share of Síminn grew from EUR 160 000 to EUR 4 446 000, in relative terms the share of Síminn fell from 47,33 % to 33,33 % (14 percentage points). Except for Telefonverkið, the shares of all other participants also fell (from 1,33 % to 0,33 %), which shows that in relative terms the private operators disengaged from the project.

This is likely to result from the poor outlook of the company's profit. In their letter of September 2004, the Icelandic authorities have submitted that:

‘Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet foreseeable demand, as well as providing an alternate route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment (especially for a limited company in line for privatisation). In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by the demand, the Government stepped in.’

The Icelandic authorities further state that the market's reluctance towards the project was indicated in the preparatory phase when Síminn and Telefonverkið engaged IBM Consulting to advise them on the economic viability of the project and its financing possibilities. The findings strongly suggested that the funding could not be done via traditional means (25).

market's reluctance

25

It seems from this that the initial lack of engagement from private investors was the reason for the subscription of the necessary capital increase by the Government in early 2003 (26), which raised the State participation in Farice hf.

26

The increase in the State's share of Farice was further accompanied by the grant of a State guarantee to cover the A Term Loan of EUR 9,4 million. It is thus the preliminary opinion of the Authority that State aid can be presumed in the capital injection subscribed by the Icelandic authorities in Farice which led to an increase in the State share in the company from 27 % to up to 46,5 %. Additionally, according to Chapter 19.6(d) of the Guidelines, there is a presumption that there is State aid where the authorities' intervention takes the form of acquisition of a holding combined with other types of interventions which need to be notified pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

The intervention of the State strengthens the position of Farice hf. in securing the project financing versus competitors who do not profit from such a State participation in a situation in which private operators are not willing to raise additional funds. The share increase concerns a project which is carried out by multinational business operators and constitutes an activity which is subject to trade between the Contracting Parties.

a.   Conclusion

In the Authority's preliminary view, the State guarantee and the capital share increase by the Icelandic State constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Compatibility

In the Authority's view, the aid measures do not comply with any of the exemptions provided for under Article 59(2) (27) and Article 61(2) or (3)(a) and (d) of the EEA Agreement. In the Authority's preliminary view, the State support also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement. Despite the fact that the project is transnational, the aid in question presents itself in the form of sector aid, benefiting an individual company (Farice hf) and brought about by a private initiative of a group of business operators. It is therefore questionable that this can be regarded as a project which is of common European interest.

27

It needs to be assessed whether the aid could be justified under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. Under this provision aid may be declared compatible if ‘it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’.

it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest

However, the Authority finds that none of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines can be applied to assess aid measures that target this objective. The Authority in particular does not share the Icelandic authorities' view that the measure falls under the Act mentioned in point 1 f) of the EEA Agreement concerning aid to small and medium sized undertakings (28). In order to fall under the block exemption, Farice would have to be an independent enterprise in the meaning of Article 1(3) in conjunction with Article 1(1) in Annex I of the Act. However, more than 25 % of the capital is owned by operators which fall outside the SME definition (this goes both for the State owned Síminn and the share ownership of the Icelandic State).

28

The Authority therefore considers that the compatibility assessment is to be based directly on Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

In this respect, the Authority will have to investigate the necessity and the proportionality of the measure. The Authority, however, notes that the Icelandic authorities have not yet provided sufficient information to enable the Authority to carry out a full analysis of this issue. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has come to the preliminary conclusions below.

3.1   The necessity of the aid measures

The Authority notes that the project intends to secure internet connectivity to Iceland by having a reliable transmission method to which the former CANTAT-3 connection will serve as a back-up. Because of its geographic location, Iceland is particularly dependent on having access to economic and reliable telecom connectivity. As can be seen from section I.2 of this Decision, alternatives in the form of the existing CANTAT-3 cable or satellites were no longer options, either because of their technical limitations or dependencies on other consortium shareholders (CANTAT-3 (29)) or their rising costs (satellites). The new submarine cable, which is to become the primary transmission connection to Iceland, has greater capacities, is more reliable and — together with the backup by CANTAT-3 — is able to secure the provision of telecommunication services to Iceland. The availability of broadband (30) has been acknowledged in Commission policy and State aid decisions (31) as a legitimate objective and type of service which is by its nature capable of positively affecting the productivity and growth of a large number of sectors and activities.

29

30

31

As can be seem from its history (in particular the feasibility study of March 2002), the Farice project was not able to emerge as a purely private initiative. Both, State guarantees and share capital increases resulted from the need of a greater State participation to make the project economically viable. Without State participation, the project would either have been delayed or not undertaken at all, so that the Authority takes the preliminary view that the State support was necessary.

3.2   The proportionality of the aid measures

In order for the aid measures to be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, it must be proportionate to the objective and not distort competition to an extent contrary to the common interest. The trade-off between the advantages in terms of guaranteeing a reliable provision of telecommunication services to Iceland must be weighed against the disadvantages of the distortion of competition in comparison to competitors, which do not have access to public funding when realising similar projects.

The Authority cannot yet make a final assessment of that question on the basis of the available information. However, it will — in the formal investigation procedure — consider the following aspects:

| — | The Authority first notes that neither the construction nor the management of the cable were given to Farice hf. after an open tender. The Authority is not yet convinced that the widespread information on this project as claimed by the Icelandic authorities can replace a formal tender procedure, in particular as the desirable widespread participation was limited to Icelandic and Faeroe parties (32). The Authority points out that the open tender was considered a positive, although not necessarily mandatory, element for the approval of broadband projects in Commission practice (33). In these decisions it was, in particular, stressed that the tendering out of the management of the cable to an independent asset manager secured the neutrality of the infrastructure manager better than in a situation in which the service provider has control over the infrastructure, as is the case here. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority first notes that neither the construction nor the management of the cable were given to Farice hf. after an open tender. The Authority is not yet convinced that the widespread information on this project as claimed by the Icelandic authorities can replace a formal tender procedure, in particular as the desirable widespread participation was limited to Icelandic and Faeroe parties (32). The Authority points out that the open tender was considered a positive, although not necessarily mandatory, element for the approval of broadband projects in Commission practice (33). In these decisions it was, in particular, stressed that the tendering out of the management of the cable to an independent asset manager secured the neutrality of the infrastructure manager better than in a situation in which the service provider has control over the infrastructure, as is the case here.

32

33

| — | The Authority notes that the shareholders' agreement provides for a non-discriminatory, transparent pricing on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority notes that the shareholders' agreement provides for a non-discriminatory, transparent pricing on market terms.

| — | The Authority will also consider that the shareholders' agreement is in principle open to new entrants. The Authority has however doubts on the position of new entrants in relation to the founding parties, as section 7 of the Shareholders agreements protects the founders' position by giving them the possibility to maintain their equity position. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority will also consider that the shareholders' agreement is in principle open to new entrants. The Authority has however doubts on the position of new entrants in relation to the founding parties, as section 7 of the Shareholders agreements protects the founders' position by giving them the possibility to maintain their equity position.

| — | The total amount of aid is, with regard to the State guarantee, rather limited. As to the State's share increase, the Authority notes that in June 2003 the State's share capital has already decreased to 41 %, whereas Síminn's participation rose to 29 %. The Authority also notes that while the State disproportionately increased its share capital in January 2003, the private operators showed willingness to multiply their support. |
| --- | --- |

—

The total amount of aid is, with regard to the State guarantee, rather limited. As to the State's share increase, the Authority notes that in June 2003 the State's share capital has already decreased to 41 %, whereas Síminn's participation rose to 29 %. The Authority also notes that while the State disproportionately increased its share capital in January 2003, the private operators showed willingness to multiply their support.

| — | The Authority has, in its correspondence with Farice hf. under the competition proceedings, raised certain competition concerns. The European Court of Justice has established that a compatibility assessment under the State aid provisions should not produce a result which is contrary to other treaty provisions. Consequently, for the assessment under the State aid provisions, it is also relevant whether State support is given to a project which might raise competition concerns under the application of Article 53 and/or 54 of the EEA Agreement (34). In this regard, the Authority inter alia notes that although the existing infrastructure CANTAT-3 still remains in place (35), there is a concern that in the future, all CANTAT-3 connectivity to Iceland will be channelled through E-Farice hf, which holds the majority of shares in Farice hf. (36). Hence, there is a risk that competition in connectivity to Iceland would be eliminated, as only one supplier would remain on the market. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority has, in its correspondence with Farice hf. under the competition proceedings, raised certain competition concerns. The European Court of Justice has established that a compatibility assessment under the State aid provisions should not produce a result which is contrary to other treaty provisions. Consequently, for the assessment under the State aid provisions, it is also relevant whether State support is given to a project which might raise competition concerns under the application of Article 53 and/or 54 of the EEA Agreement (34). In this regard, the Authority inter alia notes that although the existing infrastructure CANTAT-3 still remains in place (35), there is a concern that in the future, all CANTAT-3 connectivity to Iceland will be channelled through E-Farice hf, which holds the majority of shares in Farice hf. (36). Hence, there is a risk that competition in connectivity to Iceland would be eliminated, as only one supplier would remain on the market.

34

inter alia

35

36

4.   Conclusion

The Authority therefore concludes that it has doubts as to whether the support in favour of Farice hf. is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in particular with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority. The Authority may conclude that the measures in question would be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, if they were necessary and proportionate and thus would fulfil the requirements for being exempted from the prohibition against State aid as laid down in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, requests the Icelandic authorities to submit its comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requires the Icelandic government, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the support measures in favour of Farice hf.,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

| 1. | The Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the support measures in favour of Farice hf. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the support measures in favour of Farice hf.

| 2. | The Icelandic government is requested, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, to submit its comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measure. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Icelandic government is requested, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, to submit its comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measure.

one month

| 3. | The Icelandic government shall be informed by means of a letter containing a copy of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Icelandic government shall be informed by means of a letter containing a copy of this Decision.

| 4. | The Icelandic Government is invited to notify without delay the potential aid beneficiary of the initiation of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Icelandic Government is invited to notify without delay the potential aid beneficiary of the initiation of the proceedings.

| 5. | The EC Commission shall be informed, in accordance with Protocol 27(d) of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The EC Commission shall be informed, in accordance with Protocol 27(d) of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of this Decision.

| 6. | Other EFTA States, EU Member States, and interested parties shall be informed by the publishing of this Decision in its authentic language version, accompanied by a meaningful summary in languages other than the authentic language version, in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto, inviting them to submit comments within one month from the date of publication. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Other EFTA States, EU Member States, and interested parties shall be informed by the publishing of this Decision in its authentic language version, accompanied by a meaningful summary in languages other than the authentic language version, in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto, inviting them to submit comments within one month from the date of publication.

Official Journal of the European Union

| 7. | This Decision is authentic in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

7.

This Decision is authentic in the English language.

Done at Brussels, 26 May 2005.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Einar M. BULL

Acting President

Bernd HAMMERMANN

College Member

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(1)  Hereinafter referred to as the EEA Agreement.

1

(2)  Hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

2

(3)  Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, adopted and issued by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 January 1994, published in OJ 1994 L 231, EEA Supplement 3.9.1994 No 32. The Guidelines were last amended on 15.12.2004.

3

(4)  In accordance with the provisions of Protocol 21 to the EEA Agreement and Article 11 of Chapter II, Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

4

(5)  The consortium included inter alia the Icelandic telecom operator Landssími Íslands hf., Teleglobe and Deutsche Telekom.

5

inter alia

(6)  See Summary Report, provided as Annex 1 to the notification.

6

(7)  See also the following comment by the Icelandic authorities: „Although the designated universal service provider, and as such required to provide secure long-distance communication, Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet demand, as well as providing an alternative route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment. In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by demand, the government stepped in.“

7

Although the designated universal service provider, and as such required to provide secure long-distance communication, Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet demand, as well as providing an alternative route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment. In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by demand, the government stepped in

(8)  In 2003, E-Farice ehf held 80 % of the shares in Farice hf, with the 20 % remaining shares held by Føroya Tele (17,3 %) and other Faeroe parties (together 2,7 %).

8

(9)  The IBM report stresses the business possibility that E-Farice's purchase of CANTAT-3 connectivity gives the possibility to ring-connect the two cable systems in such a way that Farice hf. can offer its customers secured connectivity. The report further describes negotiations of E-Farice with Teleglobe to further lease CANTAT-3. It has been discussed whether Farice hf. or E-Farice should lease all available capacity to Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.

9

all

(10)  Initial capital contributions, which were later changed. The holding company E-Farice holds all the shares of the Icelandic parties in Farice hf.

10

(11)  Although in the letter accompanying the notification reference is made to Libor as the basis for establishing the rate of interest to the Loan for each tranche, clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement refers to Euribor. For this reason, the Authority considers the Euribor rate to be the valid reference for the determination of the rate of interest applicable to the Loan for each interest period.

11

(12)  Brackets throughout the text indicate figures which have been deleted because they are covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

12

(13)  It seems however, that this statement by the Icelandic authorities rather refers to the share capital split between the capital holder in June 2003. In January 2003, the Icelandic government had a share of EUR 6,2 million.

13

(14)  Press release of 3 February 2004.

14

(15)  Communication of 13.2.2001, COM (2001) 35 final.

15

(16)  Commission decision N 527/02 — Greece Financial support of a private company for the design, construction, testing and commissioning of the aviation fuel pipelines for supply of the new Athens International Airport.

16

(17)  See Commission decision C 67-69/2003 concerning aid for the construction of a propylene pipeline between Rotterdam, Antwerp and the Ruhr-area, paragraph 48. The Authority will further look at the argument of the Icelandic authorities that according to Directive 2002/20/EC the license can only be granted by way of authorisation and that therefore the requirement of a public tender cannot be relevant. The Authority takes the preliminary view that, given all the other circumstances in this case, even if the argument was found valid, it is not likely to make a difference for the assessment.

17

(18)  See Commission decision N 527/02 with further references in footnote 8. Also Commission decision N 860/01 — Austria on the ski resort Mutterer Alm where the running of ski lifts was considered to be an economic activity benefiting the operator of the ski lift and therefore not constituting an infrastructure measure. See Commission decision C 67-69/2003, paragraph 48.

18

(19)  See Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. European Commission, [2000] ECR II-3929.

19

Aéroports de Paris

European Commission

(20)  See Commission decision N 213/2003 — Project Atlas, broadband infrastructure for business parks.

20

(21)  The provisions of the loan agreement foresee the possibility of prepaying the whole or part of the loan, except for the A term loan, without any prepayment fee.

21

(22)  The Icelandic authorities do not consider that aspect, but look at the adequacy of the market price as such. The result is that the fact that the State guarantee has led to better loan conditions than market conditions, is neither considered under the first condition (see above) nor under the fourth condition.

22

(23)  According to Clause 7.4 of the Loan Agreement, solely the margin for the A Term Loan can be modified after signature of the agreement. Such an amendment may take place on 18 March 2011 and will be effective until the loan maturity. As this is depending on the future negotiations, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether such a modified margin would constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement or whether such aid could be authorised. However, the Icelandic authorities would be able to identify the existence of an aid element for any future modification by applying the calculation parameters laid down in the previous paragraph and, in case of the existence of an aid element, would have to notify the aid measure to the Authority.

23

(24)  See section I 3.b of this Decision.

24

(25)  See letter by the Icelandic authorities dated 25 June 2004, page 3.

25

(26)  The Authority is aware of the reference of the Icelandic authorities to the speech of the chairman on 24 January 2004. However, this speech only states that there is a ‘modestly profitable business case’ and that the private operators also provided securities. The latter point has never been denied by the Authority; the question whether the share increase by the State is proportionate is, however, not answered.

26

modestly profitable business case

(27)  The Icelandic authorities have not provided information which enables the Authority to make an assessment under that provision.

27

(28)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 33), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 364/2004 of 25 February 2004 (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 22). The point ‘Aid to small and medium enterprises’ was inserted by Joint Committee Decision No 88/2002 (OJ L 266, 3.10.2002, p. 56 and EEA Supplement No 49, 3.10.2002, p. 42), e.i.f. 1.2.2003. The amendment was inserted by Decision No 131/2004 (OJ No L 64, 10.3.2005, p. 67 and EEA Supplement No 12, 10.3.2005, p. 49), e.i.f. 25.9.2004.

28

(29)  As stated in the summary report submitted by the Icelandic authorities in the notification dated 27 February 2004, the consortium member Teleglobe, in particular, was faced with business difficulties.

29

(30)  Data transmission in which a single medium can carry several channels at once. The term is also used to compare frequency bandwidth greater than 3 MHz narrowband frequencies. Broadband can transmit more data at a higher speed.

30

(31)  See e-Europe 2004 Action Plan, Communication from the Commission, An information society for all, 28.5.2002, COM (2002) 263 final, see Commission Decision N 231/2003 Project Atlas — broadband infrastructure for business parks and N 307/2004 Broadband in Scotland — remote and rural areas.

31

(32)  The Icelandic authorities state: ‘Widespread participation was sought in Iceland and the Faeroe Islands for shareholders in the Farice project and all telecoms operators were invited to participate in the foundation of the company.’

32

Widespread participation was sought in Iceland and the Faeroe Islands for shareholders in the Farice project and all telecoms operators were invited to participate in the foundation of the company

(33)  Commission Decision N 307/2004, N 199/2004 and N 213/2003.

33

(34)  Cf. Case C-225/91, Matra SA v Commission, [1993] ECR-3203, paragraph 41.

34

Matra SA

Commission

(35)  On the co-existence of existing infrastructure, see Commission Decision N 307/2004, paragraph 45, where it is positively outlined that this minimises the risk of unnecessary duplication and limits the economic impact for operators that already have infrastructure in place. See also Commission Decision N 199/2004, paragraph 41, N 213/2003, paragraph 47.

35

(36)  See footnote 8 of this Decision.

36

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10.11.2005

SL

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DRŽAVNA POMOČ — ISLANDIJA

Sporočilo Nadzornega organa EFTA državam EFTA, državam članicam EU in drugim zainteresiranim strankam

Ukrep državne pomoči 47901 (prejšnji SAM 030.02.006) — Načrtovana pomoč v obliki državne garancije v korist deCODE Genetics v zvezi z ustanovitvijo oddelka za pripravo zdravil

(2005/C 277/09)

V pismu z dne 27. maja 2002 je islandska vlada uradno obvestila Nadzorni organ EFTA o predlogu odobritve državne garancije za deCODE Genetics Inc. (ZDA) v zvezi z raziskovalnim in razvojnim projektom, s katerim namerava začeti podjetje na področju biotehnologije v Islandiji.

Maja 2002 je islandska vlada pooblastila ministrstvo za finance, da odobri garancijo deCODE Genetics Inc. (ZDA) v obliki obveznice, ki znaša 200 milijonov USD. Prihodki obveznice bi se uporabili za ustanovitev novega oddelka za pripravo zdravil na Islandiji in za financiranje več programov za razvoj zdravil.

16. julija 2003 je Nadzorni organ začel postopek uradne preiskave, določene v členu 1(2) Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču o tej pomoči. Odločba je bila objavljena v Oddelku EGS in v Dodatku EGS Uradnega lista Evropske unije
   (1).

V pismu z dne 14. aprila 2004 je Islandija to uradno obvestilo preklicala .

Ker so islandski organi oblasti preklicali svoje uradno obvestilo in ne nameravajo dodeliti napovedane pomoči, se je Nadzorni organ odločil, da zaključi postopek, začet v skladu s členom 1(2) Protokola 3 k Sporazumu o nadzoru in sodišču.

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(1)  UL C 308, 18.12.2003, str.22, in Dopolnila EGS k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije št. 63, str. 10 z istega dne.

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Evropska centralna banka

| 10.11.2005 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 277/30 |
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10.11.2005

SL

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C 277/30

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PRIPOROČILO EVROPSKE CENTRALNE BANKE

z dne 26. oktobra 2005

Svetu Evropske unije o zunanjih revizorjih centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland

(ECB/2005/10)

(2005/C 277/10)

SVET EVROPSKE CENTRALNE BANKE JE —

ob upoštevanju Statuta Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke ter zlasti člena 27.1 Statuta,

ob upoštevanju naslednjega:

| (1) | Revizijo računovodskih izkazov Evropske centralne banke (ECB) in nacionalnih centralnih bank Eurosistema opravljajo neodvisni zunanji revizorji, ki jih priporoči Svet ECB in potrdi Svet Evropske unije. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Revizijo računovodskih izkazov Evropske centralne banke (ECB) in nacionalnih centralnih bank Eurosistema opravljajo neodvisni zunanji revizorji, ki jih priporoči Svet ECB in potrdi Svet Evropske unije.

| (2) | Mandat sedanjih zunanjih revizorjev centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland je potekel in ne bo podaljšan. Zaradi tega je treba imenovati zunanje revizorje od poslovnega leta 2005. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Mandat sedanjih zunanjih revizorjev centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland je potekel in ne bo podaljšan. Zaradi tega je treba imenovati zunanje revizorje od poslovnega leta 2005.

| (3) | Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland je izbrala Deloitte & Touche za svoje zunanje revizorje od poslovnega leta 2005 dalje in ECB meni, da ti izpolnjujejo zahtevane pogoje za imenovanje. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland je izbrala Deloitte & Touche za svoje zunanje revizorje od poslovnega leta 2005 dalje in ECB meni, da ti izpolnjujejo zahtevane pogoje za imenovanje.

| (4) | Mandat zunanjih revizorjev bo tri leta in se lahko podaljša — |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Mandat zunanjih revizorjev bo tri leta in se lahko podaljša —

SPREJEL NASLEDNJE PRIPOROČILO:

Priporoči se, da se Deloitte & Touche imenujejo za zunanje revizorje centralne banke Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland od poslovnega leta 2005 dalje za dobo treh let z možnostjo podaljšanja.

V Frankfurtu na Majni, dne 26. oktobra 2005

Predsednik ECB

Jean-Claude TRICHET

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