UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4900

NERIKA JENKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4963

CHERYL APPERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4964

MIKE THOMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.

James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-95-66)

Submitted: May 19, 1998

Decided: July 1, 1998

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William J. Rogers, Sr., Staunton, Virginia, for Appellant Thompson;

Liezelle Agustin Dugger, JENKINS & CARMEL, P.L.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant Apperson; Bruce Karl Tyler, Afton, Virginia, for Appellant Jenkins. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States

Attorney, Ray B. Fitzgerald, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Nerika Lakisha Jenkins, Cheryl

Apperson and Mike Thompson each appeal their jury convictions of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a mixture or substance containing cocaine base or "crack," in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). All three defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. Jenkins and

Apperson challenge sentencing determinations made under the Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Jenkins, Apperson and Thompson were charged for their roles in

a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in the Culpeper, Virginia

area. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, we find there was sufficient evidence to sustain the

jury verdicts. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

Evidence at trial consisted mainly of testimony from Appellants' coconspirators. According to trial testimony, Paul Jones, a New York

drug dealer, supplied cocaine to various members of the conspiracy

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by either mailing it by way of UPS or having it personally delivered.

On some occasions, the delivery was made personally by Jenkins.

Jenkins was also responsible for shipping some of the packages to

Culpeper and she also received the money raised from the sale of the

crack by way of wire transfers. At least on one occasion, Jenkins

attempted to collect money owed Jones from one of the Culpeper

drug dealers.

Apperson allowed her residence to be used as a meeting place for

Jones and other members of the conspiracy. She was also the named

recipient of some of the UPS packages, which she would turn over to

other members of conspiracy. Apperson also permitted other members of the conspiracy to use her residence to cook the cocaine into

crack cocaine. A scale used to weigh the cocaine was recovered from

her home.

Thompson received a package of cocaine which he agreed to turn

over to another member of the conspiracy in exchange for an eighthof-an-ounce of cocaine. Thompson informed the intended recipient

when the package arrived and hid the package at a relative's home

until it was picked up. After the package was picked up, Thompson

attempted to collect the cocaine he was to receive.

"To sustain a conviction[,] the evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the government, must be sufficient for a rational

trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt." United States v. Brewer , 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th

Cir. 1993); see also Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80. Circumstantial as well

as direct evidence is considered, and the government is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought

to be established. See United States v. Tresvant , 677 F.2d 1018, 1021

(4th Cir. 1982). "[A]n appellate court's reversal of a conviction on

grounds of insufficient evidence should be `confined to cases where

the prosecution's failure is clear.'" United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d

785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,

17 (1978)). During this inquiry, this Court neither weighs evidence

nor reviews witness credibility. See United States v. Saunders, 886

F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).

To support the convictions under § 846, the Government was

required to prove that there was an agreement between two or more

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persons to violate the federal drug laws, that the defendants knew of

it, and that they voluntarily joined it. See United States v. Burgos, 94

F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,

65 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1997) (No. 96-6868). By its very

nature, a conspiracy is clandestine and covert, thereby frequently

resulting in little direct evidence of such an agreement. See

Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); United States

v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1983). Hence, a conspiracy

generally is proved by circumstantial evidence and the context in

which the circumstantial evidence is adduced. See Iannelli v. United

States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975); United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d

95, 97 (4th Cir. 1994). Clearly, in this instance, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conspiracy convictions.

Both Jenkins and Apperson assert that the uncorroborated testimony of numerous co-conspirators is insufficient. However, "this circuit recognizes that the testimony of a defendant's accomplices,

standing alone and uncorroborated, can provide an adequate basis for

conviction." United States v. Burns, 990 F.2d 1426, 1439 (4th Cir.

1993) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "it is for the jury and not the

appellate court to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the

witnesses." Tresvant, 677 F.2d at 1021. In addition, although the evidence may lead to different conclusions and interpretations, the jury

decides which interpretation to believe. See United States v. Garcia,

868 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1989).

Thompson asserts that there was no direct evidence that he knew

the contents of the package. Quite the contrary, one witness testified

that Thompson told him that he knew what was in the package. Furthermore, Thompson also made an effort to hide the package at

another person's home and expected to be paid in crack cocaine.

Because the evidence was sufficient to support Thompson's conviction, the court properly denied Thompson's motion to dismiss.

Jenkins also contends that the sentencing court erred in attributing

1120 grams of crack cocaine to Jenkins to arrive at an offense level

of 36. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)

(1995). We review the district court's determination of the relevant

quantity of drugs for clear error. See United States v. Fletcher, 74

F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.

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3260 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-9447). We find that the court conducted a thorough and detailed review of the evidence to arrive at its

finding. In addition to the presentence report, the court relied largely

on trial testimony and the demeanor of witnesses."While this court

is generally reluctant to overturn factual findings of the trial court,

this is doubly so where the question goes to the demeanor and credibility of witnesses at trial, since the district court is so much better situated to evaluate these matters." United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d

604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994).

The court found trial testimony established over 500 grams of

crack directly linked to Jenkins, which, disregarding the remaining

amount which the court found was reasonably foreseeable given Jenkins's role in the conspiracy, still leaves Jenkins with a base offense

level of 36. In sum, we do not find that the court erred in this instance.

Nor did the court err in concluding that the object of the conspiracy

was crack cocaine, even though in some instances it was delivered as

powder cocaine and later converted into crack cocaine.

Apperson contends that the court erred in imposing a two-level

enhancement to the offense level for obstruction of justice based upon

the finding that she gave false material testimony at trial. See USSG

§ 3C1.1 (1995). A witness commits perjury if she: (1) gives false testimony; (2) concerning a material matter; (3) with the willful intent

to deceive, rather than as a result of confusion or mistake. See United

States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995). Once the defendant

objects to an adjustment based upon perjury, the district court "must

review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to

establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice, or an

attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition." See United

States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). Here, the court found that

Apperson gave false testimony concerning a material matter in that

she denied receiving packages of cocaine. The court further found

that such testimony was intended to deceive in order to rebut the substantial testimony linking her to the conspiracy. Thus, the court's

finding encompassed all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. See id.; see also United States v. Keith, 42 F.3d 234, 240-41 (4th

Cir. 1994).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-

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tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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