UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSEPH MARION RYWELSKI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., President; 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 

MERRICK GARLAND, United 

States Attorney General; BUREAU 

OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, 

FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 23-5099 

(D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00217-CVE-SH) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

The district court dismissed a complaint against President Biden, the 

Department of Justice, Attorney General Garland, and the Bureau of 

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have 

decided the appeal based on the briefing and the record. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 1, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The plaintiff, Mr. Joseph 

Marion Rywelski, appeals; and we affirm. 

I. Mr. Rywelski bases his claim on the Declaration of Independence. 

In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski challenged the validity of an 

administrative rule addressing registration requirements on firearms. For 

this challenge, he relied on the Declaration of Independence. The district 

court sua sponte concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction didn’t exist. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

II. Standard of Review 

We conduct de novo review of the dismissal. Blue Valley Hosp., Inc. 

v. Azar, 919 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019). 

If a district court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

Courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any 

party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). So the district 

court appropriately considered whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed 

even though no one had questioned it. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & 

Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006). 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “it is to be 

presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Becker v. Ute 

Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 770 F.3d 944, 946–47 

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(10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). As the 

party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, Mr. Rywelski had to establish 

jurisdiction. See id. at 947. So Mr. Rywelski needed to allege a basis for 

 diversity jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1332) or 

 federal-question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 

See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 

1746 (2019).1

In determining whether Mr. Rywelski met this burden, we credit all 

“well-pled factual allegations.” Blue Valley Hosp., 919 F.3d at 1283. 

Conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough. Peterson v. 

Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013). 

III. Diversity Jurisdiction 

Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction if (1) the parties are 

citizens of different states or a foreign country and (2) the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The United States 

is not a citizen for diversity purposes, and federal agencies and 

administrators cannot be sued in diversity. See Texas v. Interstate Comm. 

1

 In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski also invoked supplemental 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But supplemental jurisdiction exists 

only when the district court has diversity or federal-question jurisdiction 

over at least one claim. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Because the district court correctly determined 

that it lacked both diversity and federal-question jurisdiction, no basis 

existed for supplemental jurisdiction. See id. at 726–27. 

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Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (concluding that diversity jurisdiction 

didn’t exist over the ICC and Railroad Labor Board because they “are not 

citizens of any State”); Gen. Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 

703–05 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that no diversity jurisdiction existed 

over the United States, a federal agency, and an agency administrator); 

Com. Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 

1993) (concluding that the Secret Service lacks citizenship for purposes of 

diversity jurisdiction).

Because the defendants are not citizens of a state for diversity 

purposes, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked diversity 

jurisdiction. 

IV. Federal-Question Jurisdiction 

A plaintiff properly invokes federal-question jurisdiction when he 

pleads “a colorable claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the 

United States.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship 

& Immigration Servs., Dist. Dir., 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(“[J]urisdiction under § 1331 exists only where there is a colorable claim 

arising under federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Mr. Rywelski alleged that the rule violates the Declaration of 

Independence. The district court concluded that these allegations did not 

confer federal-question jurisdiction because “the Declaration of 

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Independence does not create a private right of action enforceable against 

the federal government.” R. at 48–49. 

Mr. Rywelski disagrees, arguing that the Declaration of 

Independence is the foremost of the country’s “Organic Laws,” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 2, and that “[n]o other founding document, or federal law, 

of the United States [can] amend, repeal, or replace the Declaration or the 

rights recited therein,” id. at 3; see also id. at 6. He insists that 

 the Declaration of Independence is “substantive law” creating 

“a legal basis for relief” and 

 any “judicial opinions denying the Declaration as law should be 

made null and void.” 

Id. at 6, 15. But his arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the purpose of 

the Declaration of Independence. 

The Declaration of Independence states the principles on which our 

government was founded. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 

553 (1875). The purpose was to guarantee the right of American colonies 

to seek independence from England, not to establish a government. 

See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 158–59 (1830). 

The Declaration of Independence is thus a statement of principles and 

ideas, not of law, and does not grant enforceable rights. See Schifanelli v. 

U.S. Gov’t, 865 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished; per curiam) (“The 

Declaration of Independence is a statement of ideals, not law.”); see also 

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 680 (1838) (“[U]nder the 

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constitution [the court] is bound by events subsequent to the declaration of 

independence . . . .”). Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded 

that Mr. Rywelski’s allegations didn’t confer federal-question jurisdiction. 

Affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge 

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