Filed 1/15/14 P. v. Macadory CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. MIKHAEL ANDREW MACADORY, Defendant and Appellant. D063575

(Super. Ct. No. SCD243800)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sa n Diego County, Honorable Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.

Sarah A. Stockwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Mikhael Andrew Macadory pleaded guilty to one count of second degree burglary of a middle school. (Pen. Code, 1 § 459.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on proba tion for three years, includi ng conditions he serve 120 days in custody and pay restitu tion of $6,300.36, the cost of installing security bars on five bungalows at the school. Macadory cont ends the court erred in setting the amount of restitution. Specifically, he contends re stitution for commercial property security upgrades is not authorized by section 1202.4, su bdivision (f)(3); his conduct was not the proximate cause of the school's decision to u pgrade security; the amount would result in a windfall to the school; and the restitution or der is excessive and unreasonable because it serves no rehabilitative purpose. 2 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 On October 8, 2012, police officers re sponded to an alarm at Millennial Tech Middle School. On arrival, the officers conducted a perimeter check and apprehended
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 In his reply brief, Macadory contends th e People implicitly conceded that the award is a windfall and serves no rehabilitati ve purpose by not addre ssing those issues in their respondent's brief. Macadory relies on People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, a case in which the court inferred the People's concession of a statutory interpretation theory because "although they respond to each of defend ant's other arguments, they simply ignored this [theory] in their brief and at oral argument." ( Bouzas , at p. 480.) However, Macadory's argument fails to apprecia te that the burden to show prejudicial error in the face of prima facie evidence of loss, as was presented here, rests on the appellant. ( People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539,1543.) 3 Because there was no preliminary heari ng or trial, all facts are drawn from the probation officer's report, which incorporat ed certain exhibits Macadory presented in opposition to the Peopl e's restitution motion.3 three suspects, including Macado ry. Officers discovered that the boys' locker room had been broken into and several of the locks on individual lo ckers had been cut off. One classroom window had been taken off its hi nges and pried open, and the classroom door was propped open with a duffel bag that co ntained a computer monitor. The officers found damage to two adjacent classrooms. One had pry marks on its window frame and the other's window was shattered. Millennial Tech Middle Scho ol had been burglarized f our times since September 2012, but the school had not planned on putting bars on the cl assrooms because they were bungalows scheduled to be moved early the fo llowing year. The school decided to put security bars on the classrooms as a result of the burglary involving Macadory and the other break-ins. After Macadory's guilty plea, the court held a restitution hearing. Though the People were prepared to present testimony fro m the school's vice principal, the court saw no need for it and heard only the parties' arguments. The People argued Macadory's burglary was one of the causes for the school's lo ss, and the installation of security bars to a commercial building was a type of restitu tion recoverable under section 1202.4, making Macadory liable for the full amount of restituti on. Macadory, on the other hand, argued there was no connection between all of the burglaries and the sc hool's security upgrades, which therefore were not the direct result of hi s crime. He maintained that awarding the school the full cost of the upgrades woul d amount to a windfall, and section 1202.4 precluded an award for the cost of installi ng security measures on a commercial building4 after a burglary, despite its use of the phrase "including, but not limited to" when enumerating allowable losses. The cour t took the matter under submission. The court eventually awarded the sc hool the full amount of its requested restitution. It relied on People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, which allows imposition of restitution as a cond ition of probation, even when the victim's loss was not caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, if the court finds the restitution will serve one of the purposes set out in sec tion 1203.1, subdivision (j). ( Carbajal , at p. 1122.) The court ruled that "while there may be other fact ors that led to the eventual decision of the school to add security bars to classroom wi ndows, it is clear that the conduct of the defendant was a direct cause of the final decisi on to install enhanced security measures in the school to not only protect future theft of school assets, but also to provide an added measure of security and comfort for the school due to the breach caused by the defendant's burglary and felonious conduct. " It awarded the school $6,300.36 in restitution to be paid jointly and seve rally by Macadory a nd his codefendant. DISCUSSION I. Legal Principles Regarding Res titution and Standard of Review Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in California. (Cal. Const., art I., § 28, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 1202.4.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes restitution for the "victim of a crime who in curs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime." Subdi vision (f) of section 1202.4 stat es: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an5 amount established by court order, based on th e amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. . . . The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary r easons for not doing so and states them on the record." Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) further provides: "To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar am ount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined ec onomic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following." The statute then proceeds to list 12 items. Subdi vision (f)(3)(J) of secti on 1202.4 authorizes restitution for "[e]xpenses to install or increa se residential security incurred related to a violent felony." "A restitution order is inte nded to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not intended to provide the vi ctim with a windfall." ( People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.) But, "[t]here is no requirement th e restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the lo ss in which the defendant is actually found culpable." ( People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121; Chappelone , at p. 1172.) The court need only use a rational method th at is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. ( Chappelone , at p. 1172.) Further, in determining whether ther e is a causal connection between the defendant's act and the victim's loss, the trial court may apply tort principles of causation. ( People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425 [there is "no reason why the various principles involved in determining proximate causation under California tort law should not also apply in awarding victim restitu tion under California cr iminal law"].) In6 California, courts apply the substantial fact or test in determin ing proximate cause. ( People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1321.) This test requires " ' "that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical." ' " ( Ibid. ) A force that has " ' "only an 'inf initesimal' or 'theoretical' pa rt in bringing about injury, damage or loss is not a substantial factor" [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor.' " ( Id. at p. 1322.)
We evaluate the court's restitu tion order for abuse of discretion. 4 ( People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) " ' "A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and libera lly construed." [Citation.] " 'When there is a factual a nd rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the re viewing court.' " [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, a restitution order 'resti ng upon a " 'demonstrable error of law' " constitutes an abuse of the cour t's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual finding], the " 'power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determinati on as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or un contradicted,' to support th e trial court's findings." [Citations.] . . . "If the circumstances reasona bly justify the [trial court's] findings," the judgment may not be overturned when the ci rcumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding.' " ( Millard , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) "However, when the

4 Macadory argues a de novo standard of review applies to th is case because the court's findings "were based on the record, and not on any testimony presented at the hearing." However, he cites no authority su pporting this contention in the restitution context.7 propriety of a restitution order tu rns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal." ( People v. Garcia (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 612, 617.) II. The Court Did Not Commit Legal Error by Awarding Restitution for Commercial Security Upgrades Under Section 1202.4, Subdivision (f)(3) Macadory contends the tr ial court committed "legal error" when it ordered restitution to reimburse expenses for installi ng a security system to the school. He reasons that despite the Legislature's use of the phrase "including, but not limited to" in section 1202.4, restitution for security upgrades is limited to residential security after a violent felony because by being specific in its categories, the Legislature necessarily limited the types of restitution allowed to those listed. Macadory's argument turns on an interpretation of section 12 02.4, subdivision (f)(3). The California Supreme Court in People v. Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th 644 rejected an argument similar to that made by Macadory. In Giordano , the court explained that the statutory scheme set fort h in section 1202.4 implements the broad constitutional mandate that res titution be imposed in every case where a crime victim suffers " ' any economic loss .' " ( Id . at pp. 655-656.) Revi ewing the history of California's direct restitution scheme, it obs erved that in 1996, the Legislature amended the list of categories of compensable loss to sp ecify that it is nonexclusive: "The relevant clause now states: 'including, but not limited to , all of the following.' " ( Id. at pp. 654, 655.) Giordano read the phrase "including, but not limite d to," to be one of enlargement. ( Id

. at pp. 660-661; see also People v. Western Air Lines (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 638 ["The8 statutory definition of a thi ng as 'including' certain thin gs does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions."].) In Giordano , the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol when he hit and killed a man on a motorcycle. ( People v. Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 650.) The decedent's spouse requested victim re stitution under section 1202.4 for future economic losses—the amount of a life insurance policy based on the decedent's earnings per year—attributable to her husband's death. ( Ibid. ) The defendant argued that section 1202.4 did not authorize restitution fo r prospective economic losses. ( Id . at p. 657.) The court found such an interpretation in conf lict with the statute's plain meaning and purpose, emphasizing that "[m]any, if not a ll, of the categories of loss compensable as direct restitution include losses that are incurre d after the occurrence of the crime . . . ." ( Id . at pp. 657-658.) Thus, "r estitution orders must not be limited to the amount of money that has been paid or lost prior to the restitution hearing." ( Id . at p. 658.) The defendant also argued that because the Legi slature had expressly permitted awards for loss of support to derivative victims from the restitution fu nd, but did not specifically provide for such an award fro m the direct restitution statute, the Legislature did not intend direct restitution to include such losses. ( Id. at pp. 657, 659-660.) The Giordano court rejected that argument: "Given the co nstitutional and legislative intent to provide restitution for all crime victim losses, and the expressly nonexclusive list of categories of loss included in the direct restitution statute, we decline to read into that statute an implied limitation on restitution to surviving spouses based on a failure to enumerate that type of loss explicitly." ( Id. at p. 660; see also People v. Keichler (2005) 1299 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046 ["Becaus e [section 1204.4] uses the language 'including, but not limited to' these enumerated losses, a tria l court may compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be the direct result of the defendant's criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumer ated in the statute."].) The Giordano court acknowledged that use of the phrase "including but not limit ed to" was not without limits in that a court could not award restitution that is "different in kind" from the categories of loss, but it concluded "the loss of support incurred by a sp ouse is, like the enumerated categories of loss, an economic loss incurred as th e result of a criminal act." ( People v. Giordano , at pp. 660-661.) Section 1202.4 identifies security upgr ades in a residence as a category of restitution in subdivision (f)(3)(J), but makes no mention of security upgrades for commercial property. People v. Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th 644, however, compels us to conclude that where a vic tim incurs the economic loss of installing security measures in a commercial establishment as a result of defendant's criminal conduct, the trial court may include that amount in a victim restituti on award regardless of whether the defendant was convicted of a violent felony, and regardle ss of the fact that the upgrades were not for residential security. The list in the statute is not intended to tie the hands of the trial courts, and instead courts must determine whether the victim of a crime incurred an economic loss. (See People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 994.) Thus, if a trial court properly determines that installa tion of a business security upgrade was an "economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct" ( Thygesen , at p. 992, italics omitted), then a restitution aw ard for that loss cannot be challenged on the10 basis that the restitution statute does not specifi cally list this type of loss. We therefore reject Macadory's claim that a restitution award for the cost of secur ity upgrades to the school was legal error under the statute. III. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding Ma cadory's Conduct Was a Direct Cause of the School's Loss Macadory contends his ac tions were not the proximate cause of the school's decision to install security ba rs; that because his contribution was negligible or "purely theoretical," the circumstances do not support the restitution aw ard. He suggests that the award is a windfall, as the upgrades were not a result of the crime underlying his conviction but stemmed from the actions of others who were not apprehended. We disagree. Here, the People presented uncontradicted evidence that while the school had not originally planned on installi ng security bars on the classrooms, it was required to do so due to Macadory's October 8, 2012 burglary , as well as the other break-ins. Thus, Macadory's contribution was not at all theoreti cal or negligible. And, based on this evidence, the court made an express finding th at Macadory's conduct was a "direct cause" of the school's expenses to install enhanc ed security measures, and awarded the full amount of installation costs. In People v. Holmberg , a business's computer equipment and credit cards were damaged and stolen. ( People v. Holmberg , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1313-1314.) The defendant appeared in a store's video surveillance using one of the stolen credit cards, and mu ltiple hard drives from the business were recovered in his home. ( Id. at pp. 1314, 1322.) After defendant pl eaded no contest to concealing stolen11 property, the court ordered hi m to pay $18,072 in victim restitution, incl uding $10,000 for lost business. ( Id. at pp. 1315, 1316, 1318.) On ap peal, the defendant argued he was not liable for restitution because his conduct wa s not a substantial factor in causing the victim's losses. ( Id. at p. 1318.) Specifically, he claimed the losses were due to a burglary of which he was not convicted, a nd therefore the losses would have occurred even without his conduct. ( Ibid. ) In rejecting this argument , the court noted that there "can be more than one cause of injury and that multiple causes can combine to cause harm." ( Id. at p. 1322.) Because he received th e stolen property, thereby depriving the business of its use, the defendant's conduct "was a concurrent cause of the victims' losses." ( Ibid. ) We conclude the evidence amply supports the conclusion that there was a causal connection between Macadory's actions and the school's economic losses. Because there can be more than one cause of injury, Macadory's actions were at least a concurrent cause of the losses and therefore a substantial factor in the school's decision to install security bars to the classrooms. Accordingly, the restitution award did not amount to a windfall. 5
The school was awarded restitution for the exac t amount they paid for the installation of security bars on the classrooms, a decisi on finally triggered by Macadory's burglary

5 Rather than awarding the full amount of the business's loss ($27,269.12), the Holmberg court awarded $18,07 2 in restitution. ( People v. Holmberg , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1324.) The court determ ined which of the bus iness's losses resulted from the burglary and which re sulted from the defendant's conc ealing of stolen property. ( Ibid. ) Macadory does not contend that the cour t here should have reduced the amount of restitution; he only argues the en tire restitution award was improper.12 following the other burglaries. The trial cour t did not abuse its disc retion in ordering him to pay the entire cost of the school's security upgrades. IV. The Restitution Award is Not Excessive Macadory contends the rest itution award is excessive and unreasonable because it serves no rehabilitative purpose. He asserts that a restitution probation condition that is ordered " 'without regard to the defend ant's possible ability to comply is a futile exercise,' " and thus, because he has no financial resources to pay the award, it will not "teach him a lesson." "[I]n addition to providing compensation to specific victims of crime under . . . section 1202.4, restitution of victims as a condition of probation is also separately authorized under . . . section 1203.1, subdivision (a)." ( People v. Watson (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 313, 322.) The restitution provi ded by that statute may be imposed when a trial court determines it is " 'fitting and proper to the end th at justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breac h of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer .' " ( Ibid ., quoting § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Courts have broad discretion to prescribe the specif ic conditions, but th e condition "must be reasonably related either to the crime of which the defendant is convicted or to the goal of deterring future criminality." ( People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1120, 1123;

see People v. Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 664, fn. 7 ["scope of a trial court's13 discretion is broader when restitution is imposed as a condition of probation"].) 6 The amount of restitution to be pa id by the defendant may exce ed the losses for which they are held culpable, as long as the restitution is " 'narrowly tailored to serve a purpose described in section 1203.1.' " ( People v. Carbajal , at p. 1126.) We reject Macadory's argum ent that the restitution aw ard in this case lacks any rehabilitative purpose. The court here coul d properly determine such an award would serve a salutary rehabilitative purpose by di recting Macadory to accept the responsibility for his actions and make amends to the sc hool, which sought to protect its students' learning tools and supplies from theft. Furt her, the rehabilitative purpose of a restitution award does not rest on the c ourt's finding of the defendant's ability to pay, but on the direct relation between the harm and the punishment. (See People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) " 'Restitution is an e ffective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty will affect the de fendant differently than a traditiona l fine, paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often ca lculated without regard to the harm the defendant has caused.' " ( Ibid .) It was well within the trial court's broad discretion to condition Macadory's probation on his payment of restitution for the school's security upgrades; the restitution conditio n in this case is reasonabl y related to the underlying

6 Macadory makes no argument that his restitution probation condition was not reasonably related to his criminal conduct or the goal of deterrence. Nor can he. The trial court reasonably concluded that the se curity upgrades were necessary because Millenial Tech Middle School's existing wi ndows were insufficient to protect it from defendant's criminal conduct, and the upgrad es were reasonably related to defendant's criminal conduct.14 offense, and serves the purpose of "reh abilitating the offender and deterring future criminality." ( Id. at p. 1119.) In any event, the premise of Macadory's challenge is hi s inability to pay the large award. To the extent Maca dory's arguments are directed at restitution authorized by section 1202.4, his ability to pay the award is irrelevant. (§ 1202.4, subd. (g) ["A defendant's inability to pay shall not be cons idered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution order, nor shall inability to pay be a consideration in determining the amount of a restitution or der."].) To the extent his arguments are directed at the award as a condition of pr obation, we conclude he has forfeited the challenge because he did not raise any issu e as to his financial condition during the restitution hearing or in his mo tion opposing restitution. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [def endant forfeited challenge to reas onableness of probation condition because he failed to ra ise it when sentenced]; People v. Quiroz (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1127 ["As a general rule, a defendant must first raise th e issue in the trial court to challenge a probation cond ition on appeal."].)15 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

McINTYRE, J.