### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 5, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LA WREN Z O ME NTO N

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 00-02081, 82, 83, 84 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-00350-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Janu ary 13, 2005

A Sh e lb y Co u n ty ju r y c o n v ic te d th e d e f

e n d a n t, L a w r e n zo M e n to n , o f tw o c o u n ts o f

a g g r a v a te d robbery an d two counts of kidnapping , and the tria l court sentenc ed him to twelve y ear s for e ach robbery with the second c ount to be serve d consec utively to the first and six y ear s for e ach kidnapping with both counts to be serve d concur rently with e ach other and with the second r obbery count for a n eff

ective total se ntence of twenty -four y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. On direc t appea l, the defe ndant contende d, among other thing s, that the trial court erre d in ordering

consec utive sentenc ing. T his co u rt agreed a nd rema nded the c ase to the tria l court for a determination of the basis for the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es. State v. L awr enzo Menton, No. W2002-00267-CCA-R3-CD, Shelby County
, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. J uly 2, 2003), app. denied ( Tenn. De c. 15, 2003). At the rese ntencing hearing, the trial court onc e ag ain orde red tha t the defe ndant serve his r obbery sentenc es consec utively

. The de fenda nt appea ls, claiming tha t the trial court a

bused its discretion in ordering c onsecutive se ntencing and that the t ri al court’s imp os iti on of

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s vio la te s th e ru le a nn ou nc e d in B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. __, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004). We hol d t h at t h e re cord is insuffic ient to justi fy the trial court’s imp os iti on of

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s a nd that bec a us e the de fe nd a nt’ s c a se is s til l on dir e c t app e a l, pla in e rr or re qu ir e s us to mod if y the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e s in lig ht o f B lake ly to e ig ht y e ars a ndsix months for ea ch ag g ravated robbe ry conviction and three y ear s and six months for ea ch kidnapping conviction.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d, Se nt e nc e s M odi fie d

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J
., joined. D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., filed a c oncurring opinion.

Br ett B. Stein, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, L awr enzo Menton.

Pa ul G

. S u m m e r s , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wi ll ia m L

. G ib b o n s , D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; a n d B e ts y

L y n n Ca

r n e s a le
, A s s is ta n t D istrict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Th is c a se re la te s to the de fe nd a nt’ s kidn app ing a nd ro bb ing tw o vic tim s n e ar M e mph is St a te University

in the fall of 1999. The evidenc e at the trial showed that the de fendant and an a ccomplice approa ched both victims claiming that they wer e armed. They told the victims t o acc ompany them to the ir c ar if the y did no t wa nt to be hu rt

. Th e de fe nd a nt a nd his a c c omp lic e the n r ob be d th e vic tim s by putting them in the bac kseat of their car and taking them to various establishments in an attempt to o bta in c a sh fr om the vic tim s’ AT M a ndc re dit c ard s. Whil e ne ith e r v ic tim was in jure d, bo th testified that they

fea red f or their lives.

I n imposing the same sentenc e at the r esente ncing hearing, the trial court state d,

[This ] of fense involved more than one victim. The defe ndant po sse sse d, or e mpl oy e d a fir e arm , explo siv e de vis e , o r o the r d e a dly

wea pon during the commission of the offe nse. The de fenda nt had no hesitation about committing a crime. The c ri m e wa s committed under cir cumstance s under whic h the potential for bodily injury to the vi ctim was gre at. And the def endant

c o m m i t t e d t h e o f

f e n s e w h i l e o n s c h o o l p r o p e r t y. All of those fac tors, plus the fac t that I thought that this was an extremely

horrible c rime, in the sense t h at these men w ere
abd uc te d off the Un ive rs ity of Me mph is’ s - - o n o r n e ar the Un ive rs ity of Memphis’s ca mpus and kidnapped a nd put in a vehicle and driven

a w a y. I tho ug ht tha t the de te rr e nt fa c tor of thi s kindof c ri me wa s so g reat that this C ourt nee ded to make a statement about that. This was

a te rribl e situa tio n th a t in vo lve d g ra ve da ng e r t o th e vic tim

. And I thought that the Court’ s fin d ing of a conse cutive sentenc e, under

those circ umstances, w as rig ht and prope r and tha t the Court imposed the corr ect se ntence

. O f c o u r s e , I d i d n ’ t- - I t h o u g h tI e l ab o r a t e d o n i t , q u i t e f r a n k l y, and ma d e a

p r e tt y g o o d s tate me n t a s to w h y I th o u g h t th a t the sentenc e should be c onsecutive. B ut, mor e imp orta ntl y , th e ma nn e r i n w hic h th e de fe nd a nts in t h i s ca s e w er e l y i n g i n w a i t , aw ai t i n g fo r av i ct i m , ap p ro ac h i n g a
v ic ti m, ab d u c ti n g th e v ic ti m, a ll o f th o s e f a c to r s , in my

[j u d g me n t]
, indicated that ther e should be a sever e pena lty

involved. Mr . M e nto n is a ve ry y ou ng ma n a ndI lis te ne d to a ll o f tha t. B ut, I tho ug ht tha t th e de te rr e nt [e ff e c t] f ar o utw e ig he d hi s ag e , h is y ou thf uln e ss a ndla c k o f a

re c or d a nd

a ll o f tha t.-3- And I thought that t h ere wer e two spec ific victims. And I thought that ther e we re two separate incidents and it dema nded

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.

AN AL YSI S

The de fenda nt claims that the trial court erre d by ordering him to serve his robbery sentenc es
consec utively

beca use it failed to addr ess whether consecutive sentencing was ne cessa ry to protect the public from the defe ndant and that the trial court’s imposit ion of consec utive s en t en ce s after

makin g fi nd ing s of fa c t, wh ic h w e re no t in he re nt i n th e jury ’s de c isi on or a dmi tte d b y

the de fe nd a nt, vio la te d th e de fe nd a nt’ s Sixth Am e nd me nt rig ht t o ju ry tr ia l. S e e B lake ly , 5 42 U. S. at __ , 1 24 S. Ct. a t 2536. The state c ontends that the trial court properly imposed consec utive sentenc ing a nd that Blakely does not apply

to consec utive sentenc ing de terminations. We ag ree with t h e s tate that Blakely does not aff

ect Te nnessee ’s conse cutive sentencing scheme

. Howeve r, bec ause the rec ord does not support the imposition o f co n secutive se ntencing under the Sentencing Act of 1989, w e
r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r ta n d o r d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s s e n t e n c e s t o ru n c o n c u r r e n t l y

. A l s o , u n d e r

pla in

err or re view, we reduc e the leng t h o f t h e d efendant’s sente nces f rom twelve y ear s for e ach ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction to eig ht y ear s and six months and from six y ear s for e ach kidna pping

c on vic tio n to thr e e y e a

rs a ndsix mo nth s.
Appella t e revie w of sente ncing is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial court’s determinations a re corr ect. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d). As the Sentencing C ommissi on Com me nts to this se c tio n n ote , th e burden is no w on the de fe nd a nt t o s ho w tha t th e se nte nc e is improper. This mea ns that if the trial court followed the stat u t o ry sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fac t that a

re adequately supported in the rec ord, and g ave due consideration and proper

we ig ht t o th e fa c tor s a ndpr inc ipl e s th a t are re le va nt t o s e nte nc ing un de r the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t, we may not disturb the sentence even if a diffe rent re sult were pr efe rre d. State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.

Ho we ve r, “ the pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss w hic h a c c omp a nie s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s act ion is conditioned upon the af

firmative showing in the re cord that the trial court c onsidered the sentenc ing principles and a ll rele vant facts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I n this respec t, for the pur pose of mea ningf

ul appellate r eview,

[T] he trial c ourt must place on the r ecor d its reasons for ar ri v i ng at the f in a l s e n te n c in g d e c ision, identify the mitigating and enha nceme nt fac tors found, state the spe cific f acts supporting ea ch enha nceme nt fac tor found, and a

rticul ate how the mitigating and enha nceme nt fac tors have be en eva luated and b a la n c e d in d etermining the se ntence

. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( f) ( 1990).

State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994).-4-

Unless enha nceme nt f

ac t o rs are pre sent, the pre sumptive sentence to be imposed is the minimum in the rang e for a Class B or Class C felony

. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c). O ur sentenc ing a ct provides that, proc edura lly , the trial court is to i ncre ase the sentenc e within the ra ng e base d on the

ex i s t en ce of enha nceme nt fac tors and, then, r educe the sentenc e as a ppropriate for a ny

mitigating fac tors. I d. § 40-35-210( d), (e ). The w eig ht to b e af fo rded an exist ing f

actor is left to the trial court’s discr etion so long a s it complies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and its finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. I d. § 40-35-210, Sentenc ing Commission Comments; S tate v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 237 (Tenn. 1986) ; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n conducting our de novo revie w, we must c onsider (1) the evidenc e, if a ny , rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hearing, (2 ) t he pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of se ntencing and

arg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s, (4 ) the na tur e a ndc ha ra c te ri sti c s o f the c ri min a l c on du c t, (5) a ny mitigating or statutory enhanc ement fac tors, (6) any statement that the de fenda nt made on his own behalf, a nd (7) the pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, - 210; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168; Moss, 727 S.W .2d at 236-37.

Consecutive sente ncing is g uided by T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b), which states i n pertinent pa rt that the court ma y order sentenc es to run consec utively if it finds by

a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e that the def

endant is a “ dang erous of fende r whose behavior indicates li ttle or no reg ard f or human life, and no he sitation about committ ing a crime in whic h the risk to human life is hig h.” F or da ng e ro us of

fe nd e rs , th ou g h, “ c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s c a nn ot be imp os e d un le ss the te rm s r e a so na bly rela te to the seve rity

of the off enses c ommitt ed and a

re ne cessa

ry in order to protec t the public from further serious criminal conduct by the def endant.” State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995); see State v. L ane, 3 S.W .3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999). Rule 32(c) (1), Te nn. R. Crim. P ., require s that the trial court “spec ifically rec ite the reasons” behind its imposit ion of a c onsecutive se ntence

. See State v. Donnie Thompson, No. M 2002-01499-CCA-R3-CD, Maury County (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2003)

.

I n its opini on rema nding this ca se to the trial court, this court stated,

I t appea rs, based u p o n sever al of the c ourt’s comments at the [original] sentencing hearing, that the court may have determined tha t the Def endant is a

dang erous of

fende r, see [T.C .A.] § 40-35-115(4),

a lth ou g h t he tria l c ou rt

fa ile d to ma

ke a ny sp e c if ic fi nd ing to this eff ect in the r ecor d. Howeve r, eve n assuming tha t the tri al court intended to base the i mpositi on of conse cutive sente nces on a finding that th e De fe nd a nt i s a

da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, the tr ia l c ou rt

fa ile d to make the a

ppropriate finding s supporting the use of this fac tor.

“ [T]he imp os iti on of

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o n a n off e nd e r f ou ndto be a d a n g e r o u s o f

f e n d e r r e q u ir e s , in a d d itio n to th e ap p li c a ti o n of g ener al prin c ip le s o f

s e n te ncing , the finding that an extended sente nce is nece ssary

to pr otect the public ag ainst further criminal conduct by the de fe nd a nt a ndthat th e c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s mu st r e a so na bly-5- rela te to the severity of the offe nses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995) ; see a lso St ate v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999 ). We theref ore must re mand this case to the trial court to make finding s conce rning the i mpositi on of conse cutive

or c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s.
Menton, slip op. at 18.

At the re sentenc ing he aring , the trial c o u rt d id indeed make finding s, but they wer e not applicable to T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) (4). I nstead, its findings we re c onsistent with T.C.A. § 40-35- 114, the sec tion of the code conce rning sentenc e enha nceme nt. The trial court specifica lly noted that the defe ndant had no hesitation about committing a crime wher e the risk to human life is high. See i d

. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4

. Be ca u s e t h e t ri al co u rt d i d n o t co m p l y wi t h S ec t i o n 1 1 5 at t h e r es en t en ci n g h ea ri n g,
we re vie w the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e s d e no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss.

Th e on ly app lic able fa c tor

that ma y su pp ort the imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s in thi s
case is T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) (4), that “ the def endant is a da ng erous of fende r whose be havior indicates little or no reg ard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the ris k to h u ma n li f

e is h ig h

. . . . ” H o w e v e r , e v e n if w e w e r e to ap p ly th is f a c to r , the rec ord is not sufficie nt for us to conclude that consec utive sentenc es are reasonably rela ted t o the seve rity of the

c r im e s and neededto p r o te c t s o c ie ty f r o m f u r th e r s e r io u s c r im in a l c o n d u c t b y th e d e f e n d a n t. We note from the rec ord t hat neither victim in this case was phy sically harme d. We further note from the pre sentenc e re port that the def endant ha d no juvenile re cord, tha t the defe ndant g raduated from high sc hool and was attending colleg e befor e committing the offe nses but that the def endant ha d a misdemeanor c onviction for marijuana possession. This evidence is simpl y not sufficient unde r the Wil kerson test to supp o rt co n secutive se ntencing . We reve rse the trial court a nd order that the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e fo r the se c on d c ou nt o f a g g ra va te d ro bb e ry sh a ll be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th h i s s e n t e n c e f

o r t h e f i r s tc o u n to f

a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y.

The de fenda nt next contends that the r ule announc ed in Blakely prohibits the t rial court from finding certain fac ts neede d to impose consecutive se ntencing . Howeve r, we ag ree wit h previous de c isi on s o f this c ou rt

ho ldi ng that B lake ly

do e s n ot a

pp ly to c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing de te rm inatio ns

. See State v. Ea

riceRobe rt s , No

. W 2 0 0 3 -0 2 6 6 8 -C C A- R 3 -C D, S h el b y C o u nty (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2004); see a lso St ate v. Roderick Davis, W2002-02338-CCA-R3-CD, Shelby County , (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2004) . The de fenda nt does not arg ue, howeve r, that the trial c ourt’s

e n h a n c e me n t o f h is s e n te n c e s f o r a g g r a v a te d r o b b e r y f

r o m e ig h t y e ar s , th e mi n im u m w ith in the rang e , to tw e lv e y e ar s , th e ma xim u m w ith in th e r a n g e , a n d f o r k id n ap p in g f

r o m th r e e y e ar s , the minimum within the rang e, to six y ear s, the maxi mum within t he ra ng e, violated B lakely

.

F a ilu re to ra ise a n iss ue on app e a l c on sti tut e s wa ive r. Se e T. R.A .P. 13 (b ). Ho we ve r, be c a us e the trial court’s application of c erta in enhanc ement factors, which wer e neither found by the j ury nor admitted by

the def endant, violated the defe ndant’s right t o trial by jury and bec ause the defe ndant’s

case is stil l on direct a

ppeal, we revie w the trial c ourt’s enhanc ement of the defe ndant’s sente nces-6-

under Rule 52( b), Tenn. R. Crim. P. See State v. Chester Way ne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCAR3-CD, Whi te County , slip op. at 15-25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004)

. Rule 52(b), Te nn. R. Crim. P ., provides

(b) Plain Er

ror. An err or which ha s aff ecte d the substantial rig hts of

an ac cused may

be noticed at any

time, even thoug h not raised in the motion for a new trial or assig ned as e rror on appea l, in the discretion of the a ppellate c ourt wher e nec essary to do substantial just ice.

See also T.R.A.P. 36(b). Our supreme court “has developed five factors t o consider when dec iding wh e the r a n e rr or

c on sti tut e s ‘ pla in e rr or ’ i n th e abs e nc e of a n ob je c tio n a t tr ia l: ‘( a ) the re c or d mu st clea rly establish what occurre d in the t rial court; (b) a c lear and unequivoc al rule of

law must have been br eac hed; (c ) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the

acc used did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e ) consider ation of the e rror is nece ssary to do substantial just ice. ’” S t at e v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). I n order for this c ourt to reve rse the judgme nt of a trial court, the error must be “of such a g reat mag nitude that it probably chang ed the

ou tc ome of

the [pr oc e e din g s],” a nd “reco g nit ion sh ou ld b e lim ite d to e rr or s th a t ha d a n u nf a ir prejudicia l impact which undermined the fundame ntal fairne ss of t he trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642.

Whil e no witnesses te stified at the orig inal sentenc ing he aring
, t h e s t at e int roduce d the defe ndant’s pre sentenc e re port into evidence

. The pre sentenc e re port indicated tha t the defe ndant was twe nty

y ear s old at the time of the off ense, tha t he did not have a prior juvenile r ecor d, but that he had a prior convic tion as an adult for misdemeanor marijuana possession. After considering the prese ntence report and the ar g uments of counsel, the trial court applied enha nceme nt fac tors listed in T.C.A. § 40-35-114 as the following : (2), that the de fenda nt has a prior history of criminal convictions; (3), that the de fenda nt was a leade r in the commission of an offe nse involving two or

more c riminal ac t o rs ; (4), that the of fense involved more than one victim; (6), that the def endant trea ted or a llowed the victim to be treated with exceptional crue lty ; (11), that the de fenda nt had no he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me wh e n th e ri sk to h uma n li fe wa s h ig h; a nd(1 7) , th a t th e of fe ns e
wa s c omm itt e d u nd e r c ir c ums ta nc e s w he re the po te nti a l f or bo dil y inj ury to a vic tim wa s g re a t. Pursuant to Rule 52(b), Tenn. R. Crim. P. a nd Rule 36(b), T.R.A.P., we hold that the trial court erre d in apply ing f

actor s (3), (4) , (6), ( 11), and ( 17) to enha nce the defe ndant’s sente nces.

I n Blakely , the United States Supreme Co u rt ex tended the r ule announc ed in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. C t. 2348 (2000), and held that the Six th Amendment g uara ntee to jury tr ia l e n c o mp a s s e d th e r ig h t to h a v e a ju r y d e te r mi n e a ll e s s e n ti a l f a c ts n e c e s s ar y f

o r the imposit ion of sentenc ing. See Blakely , 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct . at 2537. The Court e x plained,

Ou r p re c e de nts make c le ar, ho we ve r, that the “ statut ory ma ximum ” fo r A pp re nd i pu rp os e s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a

jud g e ma y

imp os e-7- solely on the basis of the f

acts re flec ted in the jury

verdic t or admitted by the de fe nd a nt. I n oth e r wo rd s, the re le va nt “ statut ory ma ximum ” is not the max imum sentence a judge may

impose after

finding additio n al fa cts , but the maxi mum he may impose without any additional finding s. When a judg e inflicts punishment tha t the jury ’s

ve rd ic t a lon e do e s n ot a llo w, the jury ha s n ot fou nd a ll the fa c ts “w h i ch t h e l aw m ak es es s en t i al t o t h e p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d ge
e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r

a u t h o r i t y.

I d.

When the trial court a pplied enhanc ement fa ctors (3) , (4), ( 6), (11)
, and (17) to increa se the leng th of the defe ndant’s sentenc es, it violated his right to ha ve a jury determine al l t h e e s sential fa c ts n e c e ssa

ry to the imp os iti on of

pu nis hme nt. We ho ld tha t in so do ing , th e tr ia l c ou rt a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d a substantial rig ht of the defe ndant–the rig ht to trial by jury and that “conside ration of the

err or is nece ssary

to do substantial just ice.” Smit h, 24 S.W .3d at 282 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 641-42). There fore
, we revie w the def endant’ s sentence s de novo with no presumption of c or re c tne ss. I n th is r e g ard , “ we c a nn ot v iol a te B lake ly in o ur de te rm inatio n o f a

pp ro pr ia te enhanc ement fa ctors.” Walter s, slip op. at 26.

We b e g in b y

no tin g that th e tr ia l c ou rt app lie d e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor (3 ), that th e of

fe ns e involved more than one victim. Bec ause the defe ndant was c onvicted sepa rate ly for the c rimes he committed ag ainst eac h victim, the trial court err ed in a pply ing this fa ctor. See State v. Wil liamson, 919 S.W .2d 69, 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (holding “this fac tor may not be applied to enha nce a sentenc e whe n the appe llant is separa tely convicted of the offe nses committed ag ainst eac h victim”);

acc ord State v. F ree man, 943 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. McKnig ht, 900 S.W .2d 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.
The trial co u rt also applied f actor s (11), that the de fenda nt had no hesitation about committing a crime where the risk to life wa s high a nd (17), that the c rime had the potential for g reat bodily injury

. This court has previously held that bec ause the se fa ctors ar e inher ent in the crime of ag g ravated rob b er y , they

may not be used to enha nce a defe ndant’s sente nce f

or that crime. See State v. Clay

brooks, 910 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1994) (holding that conviction for ag g ravated robbe ry

prec ludes application of factor s (11) a nd (17)) . We hold the trial court er red by enhanc ing the defe ndant’s se n t ences for a g g ravated robbe ry based upon the application of f actor s (11) a nd (17).
The onlyrema ining f

actor which we may

consider w ithout offending Blakely is factor (2) based upon the defe ndant’s prior conviction for posse ssion of marijuana. See Blakely , 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct . at 2537. We decline to aff o rd t h e pre sence of this fac tor much we ight, howe ver, based upon the nature of the off ense. We be lieve that the de fen d an t ’s s en t ence s must be reduc ed from twelve y ear s for e ach a g g ravated robbe ry convicti on to eig ht y ear s and six months and from six y ear s for e ach kidna

pping c onviction to three y ear s and six months.-8-

Ba sed on the for eg oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, we rever se t he trial court’s imposition of

consec utive sentenc ing, and we modify the defendant’s sentence s to eig ht y ear s and si x months for

eac h ag g ravated robbe ry and thre e y ear s and six mont h s for e ach kidna pping to be serve d

concur rently with eac h other.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE