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i 

25–093 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–27] 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF 

THE SECURITY CHALLENGES 

IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 29, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNIFER BIRD, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command .................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 37 

Votel, GEN Joseph L. ....................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Abraham ..................................................................................................... 107 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 107 

(1) 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY 

CHALLENGES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 29, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Today, we turn our attention to the Central Command area of 

operations, where much of the Nation’s military power has been engaged since 1991. While we are rightfully focusing attention on 

other threats, such as a resurgent Russia and a newly assertive 

China, the threat of terrorism has not gone away. In fact, as we 

discussed at our hearing a few weeks ago, it is difficult to see how 

ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is totally eliminated from 

Syria, and Al Qaeda, with its various branches, has not disappeared either. 

And while terrorists have physically spread out to more locations, some of them have become quite adept at operating online 

as well, instigating terrorist incidents in the West. 

Of course, Iran poses a significant threat to regional stability, 

and none of us will forget about the essential fight to prevent Afghanistan from returning to be a base for terrorism. So there is 

much to occupy our witness today, and I appreciate his being with 

us to answer our questions. 

I also want to mention one additional issue, which has been in 

the news lately. There have been a number of press reports about 

civilian casualties in Mosul related to U.S. aerial support of the 

Iraqi efforts to reclaim that city from ISIS. I would just suggest 

that everyone be cautious. In a dense urban environment, there 

may well be civilian casualties, and even the finest military in the 

world can make mistakes. But we also know for certain that ISIS 

uses innocent civilians as human shields, and that they can arrange civilian deaths to further their misguided narratives. ISIS 

uses such narratives to try to advance their cause and to curtail 

the effectiveness of our military campaign against them. I think we 

should always give the benefit of the doubt to the professionals who 

are working every day to keep us safe. 

Let me turn to Mr. Smith for any comments he would like to 

make before turning to our witness. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief opening 

statement, which I will simply submit for the record. I echo the 

chairman’s comments about how important this region is to our national security interests, and the challenges there are great. 

The only issue I want to highlight, and hopefully have the general discuss a little bit, as we continue in Iraq, the problem, to my 

mind, continues to be that the Baghdad government is not inclusive enough of the Sunni population. I met with the Sunni tribal 

leader yesterday. You know, certainly Prime Minister Abadi is trying, whereas Prime Minister al-Maliki did not, but there has not 

been much improvement. There is still a feeling amongst the Sunni 

population that Baghdad is more—is closer to Iran than it is to 

their own Sunni population. And until we fix that problem, whatever happens in Mosul, whatever happens elsewhere, if you have 

a—you know, disgruntled, dissatisfied, pushed-aside Sunni population in Iraq, you are going to have fertile ground for ISIS or Al 

Qaeda or whatever extremist groups want to exploit it. So I am curious to hear what we are doing to try and reintegrate the Sunnis 

into the Baghdad government so that it is not a sectarian Shia government, but a government for Iraq. I think that will be a great 

challenge going forward. 

And with that, I thank the general for his service and his leadership and look forward to the testimony. 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, without objection, your full written 

statement will be made part of the record. And you are recognized 

for any oral comments you would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking 

Member Smith. For the members of the committee, before I do get 

into my short statement here, I do want to highlight for you, we 

have put a map at your—each of your spaces here. There is coverage on both sides. You will see the back side really focuses a little bit on the Iraq and Syria piece there, and the red kind of 

blotches kind of highlight where we think ISIS is located currently. 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished 

members of the committee, good morning and thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current posture and 

state of readiness of the United States Central Command 

[CENTCOM]. I come before you today on behalf of the outstanding 

men and women of the command; military, civilians, and contractors along with our coalition partners from nearly 60 nations. Our 

people are the very best in the world at what they do, and I could 

not be more proud of them and their families. Without question, 

they are the strength of our Central Command team. 

I have been in command at CENTCOM for about a year now. It 

has been an incredibly busy and productive period. Over the past 
3 

12 months, we have dealt with a number of significant challenges 

in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt and the 

Sinai, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and elsewhere throughout our 

area of responsibility. 

We are making progress in many areas, but much, much work 

remains. We are also dealing with a range of malign activities perpetrated by Iran and its proxies operating in the region. It is my 

view that Iran poses the greatest long-term threat to stability in 

this part of the world. 

Generally speaking, the Central Region remains a highly complex area, widely characterized by pervasive instability and conflict. The fragile security environments, which reflect a variety of 

contributing factors including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, 

economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt governance, civil wars, and 

humanitarian crisis, are exploited by violent extremist organizations and terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. These 

groups have clearly indicated their desire and intent to attack the 

U.S. homeland, our interests abroad, and the interests of our partners and allies. At the same time, the Central Region is increasingly crowded with external nation-states, such as Russia and 

China, who are pursuing their own interests in attempting to shift 

alliances within the region. 

The point that I would emphasize to you is that while there may 

be other more strategic or consequential threats or regions around 

our world, today, the Central Region has come to represent the 

nexus for many of the security challenges our Nation faces. 

And most importantly, the threats in this region continue to pose 

the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland and the global economy. Thus, it must remain a priority and be resourced accordingly. 

We sincerely appreciate this committee’s continued strong support 

and particularly as it pertains to our budget requests and the funding provided, not only to be CENTCOM, but across the Department 

of Defense. We could not do what we do on a daily basis without 

that support. 

Meanwhile, the team at U.S. Central Command remains appropriately focused on doing what is necessary to protect our national 

interests and those of our partners. Our strategic approach is very 

straightforward: Prepare, pursue, and prevail. And I will explain 

what I mean by that. We prepare the environment to ensure an effective posture and strong relationships across the region. We actively pursue opportunities to strengthen relationships and support 

our interests. And when we do put our forces into action, we prevail in our assigned missions. 

I would also point out to you that today, to the credit and professionalism of our Armed Forces and coalition partners, we are executing campaigns in the Central Region with significantly fewer 

U.S. forces on the ground than in previous years. As you are seeing 

clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and 

elsewhere throughout our area of responsibility, we have adopted 

a ‘‘by, with, and through’’ approach that places a heavy reliance on 

indigenous forces. While this approach does present some challenges, and can be more time-consuming, it is proving effective and 

is likely to pay significant dividends going forward. 
4 

Indigenous force partners continue to build needed capability and 

capacity, and they are personally invested in the conduct of operations and, thus, inclined to do what is necessary to preserve the 

gains they have achieved going forward. We also have a vested interest in insuring increased stability and security in the strategically important Central Region. To this end, I will close by highlighting three areas where I do believe if we apply the appropriate 

amount of energy and effort, we can and will have a lasting positive impact in this part of the world. 

First, we must restore trust with our partners in the region, 

while at the same time maintaining the strong trust of our leadership back here in Washington. The fact is, we cannot surge trust 

in times of crisis, and we must do what is necessary now to assure 

our partners of our commitment and our staying power. 

Second, we must link our military objectives and campaigns as 

closely as possible to policy objectives, and to our other instruments 

of national power. In other words, we must align our military objectives and soft power capabilities with desired national and regional 

strategic end states, recognizing that if we don’t do this, we risk 

creating space for our adversaries to achieve their strategic aims. 

Finally, we must make sure that we are postured for purpose in 

this region. We must have credible, ready, and present force coupled with foreign military sales and foreign military financing programs that serve to build and shape partner nations capability in 

a timely and effective fashion. 

Ours is a challenging and very important mission. Much is at 

stake today in the Central Region. We recognize this fact, and I assure you that the CENTCOM team stands ready and willing to do 

whatever is necessary to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies and partners. 

Let me close by thanking this committee once again for the 

strong support that you continue to provide to the world-class team 

at United States Central Command, and particularly to our forces 

located forward in the region. 

As I said at the outset, the 80,000-plus soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians that make up the command are truly the very best in the world at what they do, and I 

could not be more proud of them and their families. And I know 

that you are proud of them as well. 

Thank you, once again, and I look forward to answering your 

questions this morning. 

[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. And you are right, we share 

your pride in them and in what they do. 

As we chatted just briefly before the hearing, you expressed interest in addressing some of the press stories regarding civilian 

casualties, especially in Mosul. Let me invite you to do that at this 

point. 

General VOTEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the opportunity to talk a little bit about this right up front. 

First off, I want to emphasize to everybody here, all the members, that these are absolutely tragic and heartbreaking situations, 
5 

and our hearts go out to the people of Mosul, and of Iraq, and other 

places where we are operating. 

We acknowledge our responsibility to operate at a higher standard. It is my responsibility, as a combatant commander, to ensure 

that our forces operate in accordance with those goals and standards. We take every allegation seriously, and we are executing a— 

what we have and are executing a well-developed process to assess 

and, if necessary, investigate each of these allegations. 

How we do things is as important as the things we actually do, 

and we are doing everything humanly possible to prevent these 

types of events and incidents from occurring as a result of our operations. 

I do agree with Lieutenant General Townsend’s comments yesterday—he is our commander on the ground in Iraq—when he said 

that there is a fair chance that our operations may have contributed to civilian casualties, but I would highlight to each of you that 

this investigation continues, and there is still much to learn from 

this. 

We have a general officer assigned as the investigating officer to 

help us address and understand and discover the facts of this case. 

We were able to visit the actual site yesterday, and gathered 

both additional evidence and perspective on this situation. In addition, we are reviewing over 700 weapons systems videos over a 10- 

day period to ensure—over a 10-day period that followed this alleged incident, to ensure that we understand the effects of the munitions we dropped in this vicinity. This should be an indicator to 

you of how intensive a combat situation this is. 

The investigation will look at command and control; will look at 

the munitions we employed and the fusing for those munitions; it 

will look at intelligence; importantly, it will look at the behavior of 

the enemy; and it will look at how our actions may have played a 

role in any civilian casualties. 

The investigation will confirm or deny our initial impressions 

and highlight the lessons learned. And while we consider and establish accountability over our actions in this incident, I think it 

is also important to clearly recognize that the enemy does use 

human shields, has little regard for human life, and does attempt 

to use civilian casualty allegations as a tool to hinder our operations. And so they bear responsibility for this as well. 

The nature of this fight has evolved over the course of the operation, and on this 21⁄2-year campaign. And our approach has 

evolved as well. One example of how we have evolved has been our 

effort to enable and entrust our leaders at the tactical edge with 

the authorities they need to help our partners win. 

We have not relaxed the rules of engagement. I have authorized 

Lieutenant General Townsend to delegate the employment of rules 

of engagement to the appropriate level due to the tough urban fight 

that we knew was coming in Mosul. To be clear, there were no 

changes to the types of targets and the rules of engagement that 

allows us to engage. We are aware of all of the reporting, especially 

by organizations like Amnesty International, Airwars, the Center 

for Civilians in Conflict, and the Syrian Observatory for Human 

Rights, and we have developed relationships with a number of 
6 

these organizations, and we look forward to working with them as 

we complete this investigation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask about a couple of the things you 

just said, because as you recognized, there is widespread reporting 

that the rules of engagement have changed, and the implication is 

now we are carelessly dropping bombs and killing civilians. But as 

I thought I heard you pretty clearly, the rules of engagement have 

not changed. Is that correct? 

General VOTEL. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you have a long experience in Iraq and dealing with this enemy. How would you describe their ability to create 

and further narratives that they see is in their interest? 

One example that stuck in my mind, I remember in Iraq that 

after a raid or something, the enemy came and deposited dead bodies, and then brought cameras in to make it look like they had 

been killed as a part of the raid, when, in fact, they hadn’t. They 

were brought in after the fact. So just describe the sophistication 

of their efforts. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would—I 

would agree with you, that the enemy that we have faced in Afghanistan, in Iraq, Syria, and other places here is particularly 

savvy in how they use information operations. ISIS, in particular, 

is well-skilled in this. They have professionals, if you will, who 

have expertise in this particular area, and so they know how to 

manipulate the information environment and create situations that 

they know will cause concern for us in Western countries. 

And as I mentioned in my comments to you, I do believe they do 

attempt to use our concern to operate at higher standards and to 

prevent civilian casualties as a way to distract our campaign. So 

I think it is important that we recognize that. That has not 

changed how we approach things. It doesn’t change our values. It 

doesn’t change our adherence to the law of armed conflict and the 

fact that we do operate at a higher standard. But I think it is an 

important thing to recognize about our enemy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will just conclude by saying, we want to 

be informed of the results of the investigation. We share your commitment to make sure we do things the right way. And so—but the 

investigation needs to occur, and then you see what it finds. 

So I will trust you and your folks to keep us fully informed once 

you are able to reach conclusions on that. 

Let me yield to the ranking member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If you could answer the question I raised in my opening statement about, you know, where the Sunni population in Iraq is at 

right now, because it sounds like it is still a very deep divide. And 

while I, you know, concur with the chairman’s comments about the 

civilian casualties in Mosul, I know that the Sunni population is 

concerned about the fight that is going on there and the loss of life 

that is happening from both sides. 

They are also concerned about the presence of Shia militias, Iranian-backed militias, and basically, the general feeling that this 

continues to be a Shia-run country that is not making room for the 

Sunnis, and that, you know, undermines our entire effort, I think, 
7 

to defeat these groups. Is that an inaccurate portrait? Is it better 

than that? And what are we doing to try to fix what problems remain? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, the way that I would characterize 

it is, I think in the near term here, as Iraq and assisted by the coalition confronts the ISIS enemy that they are dealing with, there 

has been some level of local accommodation, some cooperation, 

some collaboration between different groups, really focused on 

doing this. I would cite to you our continued efforts to raise tribal 

forces to bring hold forces into these areas, particularly Sunni 

areas as—after they had been cleared, we have seen some success 

with that. 

But I would agree with you that long term, there is still much 

work to be done. I know in my interactions with the prime minister, we frequently talk about this. I know he is very concerned 

about it, and—but also, I think recognizes the balance that will 

have to be achieved here in the region with a variety of different 

interests that are ongoing. And so, I think he clearly recognizes 

that. 

But I would agree with you, more will need to be done to ensure 

that the Sunni population feels engaged, empowered, and a part 

of—part of the Government of Iraq and of the Iraqi people. 

Mr. SMITH. Quick question on that. The issue of arming the 

Kurds or other Sunni tribesmen, there was, you know, frustration 

expressed, they weren’t able to get those arms directly, and it is 

our position, our country’s position, that all of that has to go 

through Baghdad, basically. Then I—I understand that to a certain 

degree. 

Is that accurate? And how is that impacting the ability to arm 

the Kurds and the Sunni tribesmen that we want to fight with us? 

General VOTEL. I believe we have made some—we have made 

good progress on that over the last year. There certainly were some 

issues with that in the past in terms of how that was done, but 

particularly as we got focused on the operation for Mosul, I think 

we saw a high level of collaboration and coordination between the 

Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq, particularly as they prepared their plans and prepared their forces for 

that operation. 

And I would highlight to you that I think one of the—one of the 

key successes here, and I think this has influenced the Government 

of Iraq, is the—is a high level of coordination that took place at the 

military level and security levels as that operation gets underway, 

and that continues to this day. And I do believe that is a basis for 

moving forward. That said, it is something that we continue to 

keep our—keep our eye on. 

Mr. SMITH. And then looking up to Syria, as we—you know, people prepare for the attack on Raqqa, there is the great question of, 

you know, you have got the Turks involved there, you have got the 

Kurds involved there, but they don’t get along. When we are trying 

to figure out what our coalition is in Syria, particularly going after 

Raqqa, how are we currently deciding the issue between the Turks 

and the Kurds? 

General VOTEL. Well, there is engagement at the high political 

level that is taking place. And as you are well aware, the chairman 
8 

has been a champion for us in working at the chief of defense level 

and back and forth. We have, from a CENTCOM standpoint, working in conjunction with European Command, we have increased our 

interaction in Ankara to ensure there is good visibility on the 

things that we are doing. 

And we certainly recognize Turkey’s interests and concerns with 

us. They are a great partner here. We couldn’t do many of the 

things we are doing without them. 

That said, the most effective force that we have right now in 

Syria is the Syrian Democratic Forces that consists of both Kurds 

and Arabs, Turkmen, and, in some cases, some Christian organizations. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Votel, thanks so much for joining us today. I want to get 

your perspective on what might happen in the future. We see today 

success happening in Mosul, with pushing out and defeating ISIS 

forces, both with our forces and with Iraqi forces. The question 

then becomes, I believe, in the future is what happens after that? 

And while ISIS is a concern, I believe that Iranian-backed Shia 

militant groups are an even greater concern. We don’t hear a lot 

about that today, but I do believe that they are a significant issue. 

The IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] commander, 

Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Shia militant groups in that 

region, I believe, with Iranian backing, has visions about what 

would be happening in the future as ISIS has moved out. 

Today, as we speak, Iran and the U.S. have common interests in 

defeating ISIS. The question, then, becomes once ISIS is defeated, 

Iran has in mind to recreate the Shia Crescent through that region. 

So by pushing out ISIS, and with the question about how governance takes place after that with the existing government in Iraq, 

what do you see as the future with us ultimately defeating ISIS, 

and what happens with these Iranian-backed Shia militant groups, 

and what happens there, too, with the Iraqi Government in trying 

to reestablish some kind of governance and control in those regions 

sans ISIS? 

General VOTEL. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. I share in 

your concern about Iran and their long-term intentions here. Certainly, with 100,000-plus Shia militia members on the ground 

there, this is an extraordinarily—it is an extraordinarily concern, 

big concern as we move forward. 

I—we are engaged, and I know the embassy is well engaged with 

the Government of Iraq as they look to implement a paramilitary 

force law in their country. The prime minister, I know, has appointed a committee that is working through this aspect of it. We 

certainly have provided advice into that. We have given examples 

of how we employ national guards and other things here and how 

we would look at that. 

Our concern, I think, with that particular aspect is that the PMF 

[Popular Mobilization Forces], the paramilitary forces that remain 

behind, don’t become duplicative to the counterterrorism service or 

to the Iraqi army and those types of things, and that there is a 

valid role for them, and that they do answer to the government, 
9 

and that they remain, like the other security services, an apolitical 

entity, and, so, our very strong focus is in that particular—particularly with respect to the Shia PMF. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Staying on the theme of Iran, looking there in the 

Arabian Gulf, and more specifically, recently in the Straits of 

Hormuz, where we had four Iranian mass-attack vessels swarm the 

USS Mahan, there is a concern about that continued effort, and 

what they are trying to achieve with that, and what our actions 

are, or reactions to that might be. 

Give me your perspective, first of all, about the frequency of 

those attacks. What is Iran trying to achieve with that? Those 

probing maneuvers as I see them, I think, are very indicative of 

what Iran, I believe, is likely to try to achieve in that area, and 

that is to harass our ships just enough to stand us off. 

Give me your perspective on what you think the Iranians are trying to achieve there and what our reaction to that is, or what we 

are doing to try to prevent that. 

General VOTEL. Yes. Direct to your question, I think Iran’s objective here is to be the regional hegemon. They want to be the predominant power in the region. There is no doubt about that, and 

I think that is what they are pursuing. 

One of the very first things I did after becoming the commander 

at CENTCOM was to get on a ship and go through the Straits of 

Hormuz. As an Army guy, I wanted to understand what this was. 

And, frankly, the Iranians did not disappoint. Within 30 minutes 

of being on there, we had boats surround us in the area. I had a 

chance to observe our ship captain and crew and how they respond 

to that, and since I have had a chance to see that on a number of 

different occasions and I get normal reports on it. 

I will tell you, Congressman, I am extraordinarily confident in 

our leaders and in the processes, procedures, and capabilities they 

have to properly defend themselves. 

The presence of these types of boats out there very seldom, if 

ever, prevent us from accomplishing our missions. I think what 

they are out there to do is to demonstrate their presence, to, in 

some cases, potentially be provocative. I think as we—you know, if 

you look over a course of a year, I think you see probably 300-plus 

incidents of this kind of nature. About 10 to 15 percent of those we 

would classify as being abnormal, meaning outside of their normal 

pattern of life; unprofessional, meaning they are not following proper maritime procedures; or unsafe, meaning that they put themselves or they potentially put our vessel and our crews at risk. 

And so, we are paying extraordinarily close attention to this, but 

I feel very confident in our ability to protect ourselves and continue 

to pursue our missions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for your service. I want to turn to Afghanistan. What kinds of support are the Russians sending to the Taliban, and how direct is their involvement? What does that mean 

about our ongoing conflict there? 
10 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, I think there is a lot that we 

don’t know about what Russia is doing. I think it is fair to assume 

they may be providing some kind of support to them in terms of 

weapons or other things that may be there. Again, I think that is 

the possibility. 

I believe what Russia is attempting to do is they are attempting 

to be an influential party in this part of the world. Obviously, they 

do have some concerns, because it is in—it is close to former Soviet 

states that they consider to be within their sphere, so there is some 

concern about that. But, in general, I don’t consider their outreach 

and linkage to the Taliban to be helpful to what we have been— 

what the coalition has been trying to accomplish for some time now 

in Afghanistan. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you share with us in your—the state of that 

accomplishment that you could talk about in this setting? 

General VOTEL. In Afghanistan? Well, I think—I think we have 

pretty well established, we are at a stalemate right now. Right 

now, I would say that it is in—generally, in favor of the Government of Afghanistan, but stalemates have a tendency to decline 

over time. So I think we do have to—we have to continue to support this. 

We have two missions in Afghanistan. One is our counterterrorism mission, fully resourced. That is going pretty well. I feel very 

confident in that. The other one is the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission, the train, advise, and assist. That is one 

where I think we ought to consider looking at our objectives here 

and how we—how we continue to support that mission going forward and ensure that the Government of Afghanistan has the time 

and the capabilities to accomplish what they need to. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Clearly, I think the governance piece is important. We have, obviously, been working on that as well for some 

time. But there is a great deal of concern that it hasn’t been as robust as is needed in that setting, and I am not sure that I would 

believe that that is going to increase. I think, if anything, it is 

probably going to decrease. 

Can you comment on that and the importance of that mission? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think that—that, certainly, is a topic 

under discussion now with the Secretary of Defense and General 

Nicholson and myself and the chairman right now. So we are in the 

process of going through a review of our posture in Afghanistan 

and how we ought to—how we ought to look at that going forward. 

I think it is still kind of predecisional at this point, so I am not 

sure I want to get out in front of the Secretary in announcing anything in particular. But it is a key topic here and one that Secretary Mattis has been very engaged with us on. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. One of the concerns as well is that the 

administration now has not been filling all the positions for that 

region, both—military, perhaps, is more covered than in other departments. But I wonder if you feel that these gaps are becoming 

problematic, and what should we be doing about it? 

General VOTEL. Well, Congresswoman, I have the benefit of having a Cabinet Secretary who previously held my job, and so he understands the region that I—that I am operating in right now. And 

I—and we have a very open and communicative relationship here, 
11 

and so I feel I am getting everything that I need from the Department at this particular juncture. 

So I can’t tell you that I have—I have been disadvantaged while 

the transition completes and gets in place. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And just following up on my colleague’s 

question earlier about how we are planning for what comes next 

in Iraq. What is it going to look like? And what is the extent of 

that planning? You know, how would you see that right now? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, I think this has to be—it has to involve more than just 

the military. And in my advice to the Secretary and the chairman 

as we began to look at how we move forward in these areas, my 

principal piece of advice was we have to look at the political preparation of these particular—of these areas and make sure that we 

are addressing some of these long-term issues, like we talked about 

a few moments ago, how we accommodate the different parts of the 

population; how we have a plan for governance. 

There is a lot that the military can do, but it is extraordinarily 

important that our diplomats, our Department of State, our other 

development agencies, others are involved in this particular process 

as well, and that we have a very—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. My question—— 

General VOTEL [continuing]. Smooth process. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Is are they? 

General VOTEL. I believe they are. I feel very confident we are 

working with our partners on this. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, thank 

you so much for your long service to this country. 

I think it was raised earlier about the concerns about the Sunni 

Arab population. I mean, the fact is that after we left the country 

in 2011, that the Shia-dominated government reverted to their 

worst sectarian tendencies, and I believe pushed out the Sunni 

Arabs from the government and created an opening for ISIS to spill 

across the border from Syria and to capture those areas with little 

to no resistance, because it was simply no loyalty to the government of Baghdad. 

In the Iraqi constitution, there is a provision that was insisted 

by the Kurds—insisted by the Kurds that allows provinces to band 

together and to create semi-autonomous regions. Should, in fact, 

the Sunni Arabs look at that, and should we encourage that? It just 

seems like without a path where they have some say in—they are 

only 20 percent of the population—in their future—essentially, 

right now, all the revenue, basically, is from oil, most of the revenue, and so—and that is distributed by the central government 

out of Baghdad. So it is a tough position that they are in. And so 

do you have a view on that particular issue? 

General VOTEL. Look, Congressman, as you know, our policy is 

one—one Iraq right now. And so that is—as we apply our military 

operations, that is the context in which we—which we do that. 

I would agree with you, though, that there has to be a very serious look at this, and there has—we have to ensure that the different parts of Iraq are represented in their government, in other 
12 

things that are in their military and other security apparatuses, 

and other aspects and they have an opportunity to take advantage 

of the economic opportunity that is available in Iraq. So I certainly 

think there has to be much—a broader discussion about how we do 

that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Yeah. I would hope that would be something that 

our government would look at from your standpoint, from a diplomatic standpoint, in terms of encouraging the government. Because 

the fact is, it is still the vertically integrated government that we 

had left—that was in place, you know, prior to the fall of Saddam 

Hussein, where, really, all decisions are centralized out of Baghdad. I mean, there is no system of taxation at the provincial level. 

And so, I just think that a decentralization of authority that the 

Kurds now enjoy would be great for the Sunni Arabs, and I would 

just like that to be something that we look at. 

And I would express my same concerns, having served there in 

2005, 2006 for the Marine Corps, that the ranking member expressed in that this is a tough situation for the Sunni Arabs in that 

region, and the friction between the Shia militias that are Iranianbacked and that local population is not to be discounted. And, 

again, it is alienation from ever feeling that they are a part of the 

Iraqi Government. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for coming today. Initially, in your answer 

to your first question about the Mosul incident, you said that you 

are going to assess, and if necessary, investigate. Can you help me 

understand that distinction from your perspective, what that 

means for us? 

General VOTEL. Absolutely. So, you know, this is, unfortunately, 

not the first time we have had allegations of civilian casualties in 

CENTCOM. And so what we do have is a process in place for how 

we—how we have standardized process for how we look at this. 

When we get—it starts off with the receipt of an allegation. We get 

allegations from all over the place. We get it from the news. We 

get it from social media. We might get it from people on the street. 

We might get it—we may—much of it is self-reported if we see 

something, so we get an allegation. 

What we do then is we do what we call a credibility assessment. 

And the intention there is to do an initial review of the facts and 

circumstances to merit, make a determination about whether we 

need to move to a more fulsome investigation. 

And so what we have—in this particular—and then if we make 

that determination, then we move to an investigation. And so for 

the incident that I was talking about here in Mosul, we have taken 

that step. We have decided, hey, there is—as you heard General 

Townsend acknowledge yesterday, there might be something here. 

We might—there is a fair chance that we may have contributed to 

this, and so now we have moved to the investigation phase. 

So it will be a more formalized approach to really look into the 

details of this as much as we can to establish what happened, establish what the facts are, identify accountability, and then certainly identify the lessons learned out of that. 
13 

Mr. LARSEN. And you mentioned on the criteria that you are 

looking at, there is command and control, there was a few others. 

What were those? 

General VOTEL. Thank you. So, you know, we will look at command and control. We will look at the intelligence that we had. 

This was a very dynamic situation. This wasn’t a deliberate target 

or anything else. This was an evolving combat situation. So we will 

take a look at the intelligence that was provided to us by the Iraqis 

that we had. We will look at the enemy’s reactions here, and we 

will try and understand exactly their role in this. We will look at 

the munitions that we employed here, and we will look at the fusing options. You know, you—we do have the technology, largely 

supported by Congress here, to have munitions that can be very 

specific. 

I think as you heard General Townsend say yesterday, the munition that was employed here should not have created the effects 

that we—that have been observed. So that causes us to look at that 

to see if there are other things that may have contributed to that 

as well. 

So what we do is try to be more—very complete in the investigation. It takes a little bit of time, but we usually have a pretty good 

answer at the end of it. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Thanks. 

I am going to switch gears here to Yemen. And could you just 

briefly describe the U.S. security objectives in Yemen for us? 

General VOTEL. Well, thanks. I think there are two principal interests that we are concerned about in Yemen right now. One is 

that Yemen is not used as a platform or a sanctuary for attacks 

on the homeland. And that gets to our focus on Al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in Yemen. 

This is the franchise of Al Qaeda that has demonstrated in the 

past the ability to try to attack our homeland, and some of those 

people are still—exist there. So that is a key aspect of our interests 

here. And so our operations are focused on disrupting Al Qaeda 

there. 

The other key interest that we have in this particular area is 

freedom of navigation. On the western coast of Yemen, between it 

and the Horn of Africa, is the Bab-el-Mandeb. It is an extraordinarily restrictive strait. It is a chokepoint. It is a major transit area 

for commerce, not only ours, but for international ships. About 60 

to 70 ships go through there a day. 

What we have seen is we have seen, I believe, at the—with the 

support of Iran, we have seen the migration of capabilities that we 

previously observed in the Straits of Hormuz, a layered defense, 

consists of coastal defense missiles, radar systems, mines, explosive 

boats that have been migrated from the Straits of Hormuz to this 

particular area right here threatening commerce and ships and our 

security operations in that particular area. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just can you—do you assess that we will be able to 

stay with those objectives, and we won’t be dragged into other— 

other people’s goals? 

General VOTEL. Well, of course, as you know, there is a civil war 

ongoing right there, that is playing out between a Saudi-led coalition and an Iranian-supported element. And so, there—you know, 
14 

we provide some indirect support to that. Obviously, this is something we are paying very, very close attention to. While that rages, 

it does have—it does have some impact on our other—on our principal interests in this area, so I think we do have to pay some attention to that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is going to—next month or so, it is going to be very intense 

here in Washington. Obviously, there has been a lot of talk about 

health care. But there is also something looming, at least in my 

mind, that is going to have direct implication on you, and that is 

the continuing resolution. That is the budget that we have got to 

pass to support you. 

And I am going to be very candid. You don’t have to answer totally. I think you can kind of see this one coming, but a number 

of us are very, very worried about the readiness indicators, about— 

we had folks in talking about maintenance. You have got a large 

area, a large military, and everything else. And if we don’t do this 

correctly, to the best—can you give us an evaluation, the impact in 

terms of readiness, tempo of ops, and the ability to conduct your 

mission? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. And so, first off, you 

know, I—the support that I get from the services is extraordinary. 

They give me everything that I ask for, and I have been well taken 

care of by that. But I share your concern on the impacts of a continuing resolution on the services and on SOCOM [Special Operations Command] that really provide the capabilities that a combatant commander like I need to have. And so, I am concerned 

when we are not able to pursue long-term programs and fund them 

and approach them over time, I am concerned with the impacts 

that continuing resolutions and other instruments here have had 

on readiness. 

For example, I just—I look at the MEU/ARGs [Marine expeditionary units/amphibious ready groups] that the Marine Corps provides into my area as well as into the AFRICOM [Africa Command] 

and EUCOM [European Command] area. They don’t come with all 

of the same number of helicopters that we have had in the past. 

I believe that is a readiness issue, and it impacts my ability to 

have flexibility and agility and react to things in the area. So I am 

very concerned about this. 

And while, you know, I—the money won’t necessarily come to 

me, it goes to the people that provide me the capabilities that I 

need to pursue our objectives, and so I am very concerned about 

this. 

Mr. COOK. I want to switch gears a little bit. I am also on Foreign Affairs. And, you know, we have the issue that continually 

pops up about the foreign military sales, and last year, looked at 

the replacement for the Saudis, the number of M–1 battle tanks 

that they had lost. And sometimes—you have alluded to it, there 

was a question about Yemen and everything else and the toll that 

that has taken there. 
15 

Do you influence at all with the State Department foreign military sales, particularly for some of our allies that would obviously 

contribute to your ability to conduct your mission? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, we absolutely do. We do that 

through our security cooperation offices that are located in many 

of these countries, almost all of the countries that we have here. 

And I would share your—share your concern about this. FMF [foreign military financing] and FMS [foreign military sales] are extraordinarily important programs for us. 

From my perspective as combatant commander, what I want to 

try to do is build capability for our partners to do the things—to 

provide their own security and then to be integrated with us. And 

I am concerned when we choose not to sell our systems, provide 

them to them. They will go somewhere else to get them, and they 

will get lesser systems. They won’t get the sustainment, they won’t 

get the training, and we won’t be integrated. And it doesn’t help 

us. So I think we have to recognize that this is an important part 

of our security cooperation aspect, and we can’t completely define 

our FMF, our FMS systems as something to try to change people’s 

behavior. 

That is certainly an aspect of it, but it has got to be focused on 

building capability, in my mind. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, again, for your service and for your candidness. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General, for your testimony this morning. I just 

wonder if you could help clarify what is going on right now in 

terms of increased deployments in Syria. Again, this month, again, 

from a whole variety of news outlets, it was reported about 4- or 

500 marines were deployed, new marines, new contingent of marines this month. You know, why was that decision made, and 

what is their mission? 

General VOTEL. Thank you. So, Congressman, what we are constantly doing is this is an evolving campaign, and we are—you 

know, the enemy changes, we change, and the situation changes a 

lot on the ground. What we are constantly trying to do is assess 

what our requirements are and how we best support our partners 

through our, kind of ‘‘by, with, and through’’ approach, and make 

sure we have the capabilities to fully enable them and to help them 

win. So there is a constant process of assessing what we need. 

I demand that our leaders forward—General Townsend, in this 

particular case, provides rationale for the additional capabilities 

that he needs, and that we have very, very clear roles and missions 

for the things that we are bringing forward. 

And so what we—we do have a very deliberate process. What you 

have seen here most recently are not things that just came up relatively quickly. These have been things that we have anticipated 

for some time, the—you cited, for example, the marines, and some 

of the artillery organizations. We have recognized that as we continue to pursue our military objectives in Syria, we are going to 

need more direct, all-weather fire support capability for our Syrian 

Democratic Force partners. And so this—that is what you are seeing. So they have deployed. They are helping us with that par-
16 

ticular aspect. They are also helping us with some of our logistics 

capability in Syria. 

Syria is a fairly immature area for us in terms of that, so we 

don’t have a big infrastructure like we have in Iraq or some other 

places here, so we do need some help in those particular areas. 

So I—what I can assure you is that there is a rationale, and 

there are specific roles and missions for all of these capabilities 

that we are bringing. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So—well, thank you for that answer. Again, I 

don’t actually want to second guess your sort of military judgment, 

but what I would—it sounds like, you know, they are starting to 

get much, sort of deeper involved in the fight in Raqqa. And I 

guess—you know, we voted a couple of years ago in this committee 

in defense authorization bills have been extending title 10 authorization, which, in my opinion, as someone who supported that, it 

was not about troops—you know, boots on the ground, direct military involvement, but this sounds like we are sort of creeping in 

that direction. 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I think what I would tell you is 

that we have not taken our eye off of what our principal mission 

is, which is advise and assist and enable—enable our partners. 

And, so, I think that is what you continue to see with all of these 

deployments right here. 

We are not—we have—one of our key principles here with our 

folks forward is to help our partners fight but not fight for them. 

And so, as we continue to bring these additional capabilities in, 

these are things that we emphasize. So they do fit into our continuing mission of advise, assist, and enable our partners. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Again, I mean, there is a larger question here about the fact that 

I think the authorization of use of force is long overdue for a revisit, but that is our problem, not on your side. 

During the time you have been at Central Command, the carrier 

gap phenomenon has been occurring, again, from, I think, 2007 to 

2015, we had continuous presence of carriers and air strikes 

against ISIS. I mean, how are you coping with that? 

General VOTEL. Thank you for bringing it up. I think this is another example of some potentially readiness concerns here. 

So the way that we do that is, what we have done is we have 

worked with—through our air and maritime commanders in theater. So we have, on occasion, brought in additional air force organizations to help fill in the gap in those particular cases. We just 

completed that with a squadron from the United States that came 

in and did an exceptional job for us for about 90 days. And we also 

look to our allies, our partners, to do this. The U.K. [United Kingdom], the French, have surged some of their ships down in this 

particular area to help make up for this gap as well. 

So this is a constant management process for us. We expect to 

do this now. It has been vital to our operating here. We are always 

looking for ways we can kind of balance out what our requirements 

are with the whole joint force, whole joint and combined force that 

is available to us. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 
17 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for being with us today. We appreciate it 

very much. 

You know, we perceive that we are in the process of increasing 

our—and/or our allies’ capacity and capabilities in the fight against 

ISIS right now. 

I am curious, what is the conduit for this committee to get some 

knowledge on number of personnel needed? And I don’t need exact 

number, and I don’t like when we have caps, because we end up 

using contractors instead of our troops, sometimes cost more. But 

just trying to get some understanding of what you need as far as 

personnel and what we need to execute the mission so that we can 

somewhat justify the expenditures that may be involved with that. 

General VOTEL. Well, Congressman, I think we have a closed session right after this, and I would be happy to talk with you in great 

detail about the advice that I provide and what we think we—what 

we need and what we have talked about with our leadership. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I appreciate that. 

Another question is General Scaparrotti the other day mentioned 

something about Russia’s influence in Afghanistan increasing. 

What is your understanding of their influence, and how does it 

change your efforts? 

General VOTEL. I—it hasn’t significantly altered our approach 

here at this particular point, but I think what they are attempting 

to do is they are attempting to be an influential third party here 

in Afghanistan. I think they are reaching out to the Taliban, and 

they have made the decision under their own determination that 

the Government of Afghanistan and the coalition that supports 

them is unable to solve the concern about ISIS, and I think they 

are much more concerned about ISIS and the potential that has to 

move into the Central Asian states, and potentially have an impact 

on them. And so, they have created a narrative that we really have 

to partner more with the Taliban to address this particular threat. 

And they are trying to leverage that into a bigger role in terms 

of, I think, trying to pursue peace agreements and other things 

with the Taliban. 

Frankly, I don’t consider it to be particularly helpful at this particular point to what we have been doing and the process that we 

have been using. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So does that change your behavior in any way 

with their presence? 

General VOTEL. I don’t think it has changed our behavior. We 

have been working with our Afghan partners. We have been extraordinarily focused on the Islamic State as it has emerged in Afghanistan. It has, I believe, had a significant amount of success 

against them. We have reduced them from about 15 districts that 

they are operating in to about 2. We are targeting a lot of their 

leaders right now. We have persistent pressure on them all the 

time. So it has not—it has not impacted our approach. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. Thank you, General. I appreciate it. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is good to have 

you with us today, General. 
18 

I appreciate very much you taking the time here. I want to thank 

you for your service to our Nation, as well as the remarkable 

women and men who are serving in some of the most contested 

parts in the world. We are forever grateful. 

And I appreciated listening to your opening statement as well as 

reading your written remarks, which I think illustrate so clearly 

the threat posed by ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], Al 

Qaeda, and other affiliated groups in the region, and certainly 

make clear that there are no easy answers given the seriousness 

and complexity of the challenge to reverse ISIS’ gain. 

But I am also concerned about the steady buildup of U.S. forces 

in the region, most especially in Syria, absent a robust debate in 

Congress on an authorization for the use of military force, something Secretary Mattis called for last week before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, and I was glad to see that. 

I am concerned that additive deployment may lead to an expansive, open-ended commitment. I think you have referenced an 

evolving campaign, that could have long-term consequences raising 

substantial and unpredictable risks that haven’t been fully considered or endorsed by Congress as a whole. 

I am also mindful of the human toll in the countries where we 

are waging the fight against ISIL and how mounting civilian casualties, tragic in and of themselves, as you yourself said, can ultimately work against our long-term interest in setting the conditions for stability. 

And I appreciate your redressing—addressing it in your open remarks, but I also appreciate the important work that international 

groups are playing in monitoring civilian casualties. 

As reported in The Washington Post yesterday, quote, ‘‘According 

to Airwars,’’ a group that you are familiar with, which is a British 

monitoring group, ‘‘the frequency of civilian deaths alleged to be 

linked to U.S. strikes in Iraq and Syria has now outpaced those 

linked to Russia. The scrutiny has been compounded by a string of 

high-profile reported U.S. attacks in both countries, including assaults on a mosque, a school, and, most recently, a building apparently used as a shelter in the Iraqi city of Mosul’’ that is currently 

being investigated appropriately so. 

These reports come alongside indications that the administration 

is considering relaxing the rules of engagement put in place by the 

Obama administration, which made a concerted effort at avoiding 

civilian deaths, and you have said today that there has not been 

such a change. 

And I have read that you have said that the coalition will, quote, 

‘‘take extraordinary measures to avoid harming civilians,’’ unquote. 

So can you tell us how you balanced a pursuit, a very important 

military objective, with those extraordinary measures? And, in particular, when fighting an enemy that intentionally places civilians 

in harm’s way, we all know that, how much risk should the U.S. 

and its civilian coalition partners accept in limiting air or artillery 

strikes where it may be difficult to confirm civilian presence, especially in Mosul, where civilians have been directed to shelter in 

place? So there are so many still there. It seems to be an extraordinary challenge, and I am curious as to how you are thinking this 

through in order to minimize civilian casualties. 
19 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congresswoman, for your question 

there. 

First off, you know, we have provided, I think, very clear and 

concise guidance to our commanders in the field. I think the principal way that we are addressing this is by entrusting and enabling 

our very well experienced and trained leaders on the ground. They 

are the best guard against this. We have seen that in the past. We 

will see it in the future here. Their judgment, their experience is 

the best thing to ensure with this. 

As we go through this, you know, and with our on-scene commanders that are very, very close to this, I think the key thing that 

we do emphasize to them is we go to war with our values, we hold 

ourselves to a higher accountability, a higher standard with respect 

to this, and, of course, we always operate in accordance with the 

law of armed conflict and we do everything that we can to prevent 

this. 

And what we try to do is we try to work that through our leadership and ensure they understand the obligation that we all expect, 

and that as they carry out these obligations in what are extraordinary, complex, and difficult situations, that they are making the 

best judgments, the best decisions that they can based on the information that they have. And I will tell you that in many, many, 

many cases, they are making the right calls. I have visited—I visit 

Iraq every month and I talk to our advise and assist teams and I 

hear about operations that we support, but I will tell you at the 

same pace, I hear about operations where we choose not to strike, 

where we choose not to do something because it didn’t look right, 

we couldn’t confirm what was going on, we didn’t have a good situational awareness. 

So I think, from my perspective, we are going to trust our processes and we are going to trust our people and we are going to continue to put emphasis on that throughout the process. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Trust but verify your processes. 

General VOTEL. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. It is good to see you again. 

And I guess my own take on it is that we are not seeing a neverending increase; we are recovering from a massive decrease in disengagement in the region. It has not been that many years ago, six, 

and because of that decrease, we now see Iraq in the throes of a 

civil war, Syria in the throes of a civil war, Yemen in the throes 

of a civil war, the complete area destabilized, making a whole number of things even harder to deal with, plus distancing to our allies 

in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, not to mention other coalition partners on 

a whole number of other affairs. And so I tend to disagree with 

some of my colleagues here in that view. 

With regard to collateral damage, no one cares more about civilian casualties than the United States military, no one. No one 

takes more pain or more effort to prevent the needless loss of life. 

No one has the systems in place to prevent the things that we do 

in our targeting systems and everything else. And we know about 

our own errors, because it is us who expose them, who discover 

them, and who try to refine them. 
20 

So before we get in a bashing of those that are in uniform and 

needless loss of civilian casualties or somehow suggesting that we 

are causing more civilian deaths than the Russians, I challenge 

that, I defy that, I reject that, I don’t think that it reflects anything 

to our practices as a nation or certainly our men and women in 

uniform. 

General Votel, you spoke of the need to use the other instruments of national power. There are a number of areas that we obviously see a need to do that, you have spoken to a lot of them, but 

I guess one of the most troubling things that gets the least amount 

of attention is Yemen. And as we would see the Gulf of Aden now 

slip into a possible future Hormuz Strait, there is serious implication with that. We have got 60 percent of the Yemen population 

now that is malnourished. We have got opportunities to do a lot of 

good things with President Hadi and other efforts. 

The foreign military sales being crucial, the foreign engagement 

being crucial, if you could design it where you engage the other instruments of national power to support the coalition efforts as well 

as the CENTCOM efforts, what would it look like? What would you 

want that other engagement to be other than just the military? 

General VOTEL. Thanks, Congressman. I think that, you know, 

certainly one of the things that has to be addressed, as you kind 

of highlighted here, is we have to resolve the civil conflict that is 

taking place there, right. That creates an environment that makes 

it extraordinarily difficult for us to be—has made it difficult for us 

to be persistent in our efforts against Al Qaeda. It has caused us 

to break relationships we had with the Yemeni forces we developed 

over a course of years, and it has given rise to the threat that we 

have already talked about this morning in the Bab-el-Mandeb in 

the Red Sea, an area where we have 60 to 70 ships go through 

every day, not just U.S., but international ships go through there. 

So I think that is important. 

So I think the thing that we have to continue to press on, is we 

have to press in our diplomatic efforts to resolve that conflict as 

quickly as we can. I think that will help, I think, set the table. 

There are perhaps some things that we can assist with on the military side to bring that forward without becoming enmeshed into a 

civil conflict here. We should consider those things. 

I will tell you, I have talked with our ambassador there on a regular basis. He is excellent. He is extraordinarily engaged here. And 

I just think we have to continue to press in this particular area. 

And this is an area where we will need the Department of State 

and others to help us move through. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you still see a base of support? A lot of relationship has been developed for decades, and much is lost if we see the 

things tip toward the Houthi rebels and, as you had mentioned, Al 

Qaeda gaining leverage with engagement with the population and 

assisting in feeding them and other things. Could you speak to 

some of that? 

General VOTEL. I do. And I would highlight to you that we have 

some very good partners in the area, certainly Saudi Arabia on the 

edges here, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE] have been extraordinary partners for us and they have good relationships here. 
21 

So I do see the ability to reestablish some of these partnerships 

again. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Votel, for your very great insights today. 

I want to switch back to Iran for a moment. You know, you said 

you believe that Iran is one of the greatest threats to the U.S. 

today. So if that is true and your assessment is true that their 

overall objective is to be the most powerful in the region, then to 

pursue this end, do you believe Iran has increased destabilizing activities since the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], and 

if they have, how should we react to these alleged activities without risking escalation and other conflicts in the region? 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, I do believe they have. And I 

believe that Iran is operating in what I call a gray zone, and it is 

an area between normal competition between states and just short 

of open conflict, and they are exploiting this area in a variety of 

different ways. They do it through raising surrogate forces, they do 

it through lethal aid facilitation, they do it through their own cyber 

activities, and they do it through their influence operations. And I 

think they are clearly focused in this particular area, and I think 

they have—their efforts have increased in this particular area. 

I think the things that we need to do is—I think there are three 

broad things, and I have had an opportunity to talk to some of our 

regional partners about it. I think we need to look at opportunities 

where we can disrupt through military means or other means their 

activities, particularly their facilitation aspects here. I think we 

need to look at opportunities where we can expose and hold them 

accountable for the things that they are doing. That has to be done. 

They have to account for their destabilize—the destabilizing role 

that they are playing in the region right now. And, finally, I think 

we do have to address their revolutionary ideology, and what has 

to be addressed. And certainly we play a role in that, but others 

in the region do as well. Iran has a role in the region. There is no 

doubt about that. 

And I want to be clear that we think differently about the people 

of Iran than we think about the leadership of Iran, the revolutionary council that runs Iran. In my mind, those are two very distinct things. And our concern is not with the people of Iran, but 

it is with their revolutionary government. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

And I would just like to switch a little bit to the greater geopolitical tensions in the region. Is terrorism really the most pressing threats emanating from the Middle East, and what is our best 

way to exert our influence, if that is true, against those threats? 

General VOTEL. Well, Congresswoman, I think terrorism is what 

is being manifested out of what are really deep underlying issues 

that pervade this region. There are some serious sectarian issues 

across the region that have to be addressed. There are disenfranchised populations, there is economic disparity between governments and the people that they lead. And so these deep underlying 

issues in many cases still remain across the region. Those have to 

be addressed. 
22 

And I think the way that we see this being manifested is in violent extremism, that we see the rise of ISIS. When you go back and 

look at why that came up, the desire for young men and in some 

cases young women to join organizations like Al Qaeda or ISIS, 

they are looking for a job, they are looking for money, they are 

looking for relationships, they are looking for economic opportunity 

that may not exist in their local communities. 

So there are deep underlying issues that have to be addressed in 

this region that give rise to these threats that we are focused on. 

So I don’t want to give the impression that beating ISIS will—it 

will remove a threat, but it won’t solve many of the underlying 

challenges in this particular region. That will take more work. 

Ms. ROSEN. So considering that we are going to be creating a bill 

fairly soon, where do we best put our resources to fight this? What 

do you need? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think this—Congresswoman, I think we 

have identified, from a military standpoint, I need to build and sustain the operations that we have ongoing in places like Iraq and 

Syria, and really across the region. I need to ensure that the services, that Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and SOCOM, that provide me capabilities, have the resources they need to develop the 

capabilities and the resiliency within their formations to continue 

to provide me things. 

So, you know, those are the key things that I am thinking about 

right now in terms of the resources that I need moving forward. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Votel. Do you know how many civilians have 

been killed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria? 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, I do not know that number. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I mean, there are media reports. I would love to 

hear back from you on what the number is, but it is in the tens 

of thousands. Is that probably fair? 

General VOTEL. I think that is fair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. And having spent a lot of time in the 

targeting process both shooting 30-millimeter out of an A–10 all 

the way up to, you know, working at the COCOM [combatant command] level, I just want to agree with my colleagues here and with 

your statements that we go through great pains in our targeting 

cycle to make sure that we are compliant with the laws of armed 

conflict and that we are avoiding civilian casualties. 

More for my colleagues, I want to make sure you understand 

what the laws of armed conflict [LOAC] are. That if we have a legitimate target, we do everything we can to minimize civilian casualties, but we are not allowed to target civilians. We never target 

civilians. 

Is ISIS targeting civilians? 

General VOTEL. I believe they are. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. Is it a violation of the law of armed 

conflict to have human shields? 

General VOTEL. Yes, it is. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So ISIS is violating the laws of armed conflict. 
23 

Again for my colleagues, the standard for the LOAC is that we 

make feasible precautions towards limiting civilian casualties while 

we are hitting legitimate military targets. The last administration 

went above and beyond this, far higher than I have ever seen before in my 26 years in the military, using near certainty that no 

civilians will be killed. 

I agree with some retired generals, General Deptula, and most 

recently, General Dunlap published something a few days ago on 

this, that if we are not hitting legitimate military targets and allowing these terrorists to continue to live, then we are actually allowing them to continue to kill civilians. I mean, this actually enables them to continue their terrorist activities, to include exporting it to other places. 

So this is what General Dunlap calls a moral hazard of inaction, 

of us doing nothing on legitimate targets because of this near certainty standard, from my view, actually allows the terrorists free 

rein to continue to kill civilians, tens of thousands. 

And also, I now believe that what we are seeing in the change 

here is that ISIS knows that they can use human shields to avoid 

being hit. It is their air defense system. Additionally, it is my view 

that as we move closer into the urban conflict into Mosul and they 

are using human shields, civilian casualties are going to go up. 

This is a horrible element of war, that ISIS started this war. 

So do you agree that some of the high level of, I think, ridiculous 

standard that we had previously has now created this behavior by 

ISIS, that they now realize if they take human shields, they are 

going to avoid being struck, and that actually this is adding to the 

problem? 

General VOTEL. Congresswoman, I do believe they understand 

our sensitivity to civilian casualties and they are exploiting that, 

and I do agree that as we move into these urban environments, it 

is going to become more and more difficult to apply extraordinarily 

high standards for the things that we are doing, although we will 

try. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

Again, I look forward to continuing to talk with you in the classified realm, but, look, this whole line of thinking that somehow because we are engaging the enemy and, unfortunately, again, the investigation is ongoing on this latest attack, somehow it is our fault 

that as we are engaging the enemy, that perhaps civilians are 

being killed either by mistake or because the enemy is using a tactic that actually has them become part of the target. That is on 

them, not on us. 

And if we then move back further and allow more terrorists to 

live to fight another day because of this narrative, then we are 

going to actually open up more civilians to be killed by these terrorists. Is that a fair line of thinking? 

General VOTEL. I share your concern, Congresswoman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

I also want to ask, and maybe this is more for the classified setting, when we are identifying combatants and noncombatants, this 

used be a pet peeve of mine, sometimes I would be in VTCs [video 

teleconferences] where we were getting ready to schwack some bad 

guys in Somalia, and I would hear the terminology of whether 
24 

there is women and children versus men. There are combatants 

and noncombatants. And what we saw in Yemen is we had a bunch 

of women that were actually shooting at our troops. That has been 

reported in the media. 

So can you confirm with me that we are still using the terms in 

our analysis of combatants and noncombatants, and we are not 

making assumptions that just because you are a woman, you are 

not a combatant? That is not the law of armed conflict. 

General VOTEL. We do think of it as that and look at it that way. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Votel, welcome back before the committee. I want to thank you for your testimony, but most especially for your service and the men and women 

who serve under you. We are grateful for all you do to defend the 

Nation. 

As our cyber capabilities are maturing, particularly with U.S. 

Cyber Command now being stood up and the training and deploying of our cyber mission teams, can you please discuss with us your 

views on the impact of our cyber operations against ISIL, how effective they have been and what more can be done to enhance 

them? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

And I look forward to an opportunity to talk about this in a classified setting as well, but what I can tell you here is that I think, 

with the great support of Admiral Rogers and the team at Cyber 

Command [CYBERCOM], we have forged a very close relationship 

between CENTCOM, Cyber Command and their subordinate elements, and I would throw SOCOM in there as well, that has allowed us to use this capability to have effects against this particular enemy. And I do think we are starting from an area where 

we didn’t have much experience in this. We are actually creating 

effects on the ground. 

I would share with you that this is an extraordinarily, extraordinarily savvy enemy, and so they have capabilities in this area, 

and we will need to continue to evolve in this. I would also add 

that some of our partners, some of our coalition partners have 

unique capabilities in this area, and they have been well integrated 

into this as well. So I do think we are beginning to have good effects with this, but there certainly is more that we need to do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. And I look forward to following up and getting some more details when we get into the classified session. 

Let me ask you this. In your opinion, is the current joint task 

force areas command and control construct effective, efficient, synchronized, and deconflicted with other operations taking place in 

the CENTCOM area of responsibility? And, also, how would you 

characterize support and integration with teams from U.S. 

CYBERCOM? 

General VOTEL. I think they are excellent in both cases. In fact, 

when we recently hosted a congressional delegation down at 

CENTCOM to talk about things we are doing, we actually invited 

JTF [joint task force] areas to come in and be part of that because 

we consider them to be that close of a team member. 
25 

So I think the integration has been exceptional with JTF areas, 

and the leadership there at Cyber Command and in that particular 

organization have been extraordinarily well engaged with us. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Another topic. We obviously rely heavily on special operations 

forces [SOF] for operations around the globe. The authorities and 

capabilities of SOCOM allow us, obviously, to keep the footprint 

small and carry out unique activities. However, that utility may 

have led to an overreliance on SOF. 

As the former SOCOM commander and current CENTCOM commander, what are your concerns in this regard? And what actions 

can we take to decrease the high demand for SOF around the 

globe, such as increasing conventional forces training capability? 

General VOTEL. Well, as the former SOCOM commander, obviously, you know, we wanted to do everything we could to support 

the other combatant commanders here. And, you know, General 

Thomas and I have, I think, a very strong relationship, we talk frequently, and I think we have been able to figure out ways that we 

can manage the force moving forward here. So I do support the— 

you know, obviously the very continued support of them. 

I will tell you, one of the things that does concern me a little bit 

about SOCOM and some of the very unique capabilities that they 

have is that many of them are heavily leveraged in OCO [Overseas 

Contingency Operations budget line]. Some of the very unique capabilities, and, again, we can talk about this in a classified session, 

are very heavily leveraged in OCO, and that concerns me about the 

sustainability. 

It concerned me as the SOCOM commander and now concerns 

me as the CENTCOM commander, who are very dependent on 

that. I am very concerned about that. I think we need to stabilize 

that and I think we need to make the commitment to give SOCOM 

the things they need to serve the Nation. 

Beyond that, Congressman, I would tell you one of the things I 

am most proud of being the SOCOM commander—or being the 

CENTCOM commander is the very close relationship between our 

SOF forces and our conventional forces. It is almost indistinguishable how they are able to operate, and that comes for a variety of 

reasons; certainly our experience over the last 15 or 16 years working together and the fact that a lot of our leaders know each other, 

not just professionally. 

But personally, but I want to assure the committee and I want 

to assure the American people that we are fighting the enemy together, we are not fighting each other here, and that was not always the case in the military, but I am very pleased with how our 

conventional and SOF forces are working very, very closely together, with our interagency partners as well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, General. Well, as a former SOCOM 

commander, I have great confidence that you are going to balance 

that force just right and you are in a unique position. So thank you 

for you are doing, and I look forward to the classified session. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26 

And I want to thank General Votel for your leadership, and your 

team. So many challenging problems in your AOR [area of responsibility], and it is not just one, two, three, it is just hard. So I know 

you and your team work very hard at that, and we appreciate it. 

I associate with the comments too of some of our colleagues here 

that say that we need to get a congressional authorization for force. 

I think we do. I think what we did in 2001 and 2003 are applicable 

and I feel like we have got to work towards that in Congress. 

And I also want to say that I agree with your comments on Iran. 

I think you are right on target. My fourth deployment there, I 

think, when I was in there 2007 and 2008, I believe roughly half 

of our service men and women were killed due to actions from Iran 

with the explosive—or the EFPs [explosively formed penetrators] 

and the very support they were giving to the Shia militias, and I 

dare say it would probably be about a thousand of our service men 

and women over time were killed due to the Iranian actions. 

My question to you today is, we can do kinetic operations indefinitely with ISIS or Al Qaeda, but I don’t think in the end that wins 

the fight. How do you see a grand strategy, or how do you see our 

grand strategy to defeat these enemies? It has got to be—we have 

got to go after their ideology, their financing, their recruiting. Do 

you think we have the right strategy? 

General VOTEL. I do, Congressman. I think we do have the outline of a good strategy to address the things that you are highlighting here. As you are aware, one of the first things that the new 

administration did was direct the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to come up with a plan to address and defeat ISIS 

more completely. And I think the acknowledgement that that is 

both the Department of Defense, Department of State, and many 

others in the government here, I think, is an acknowledgement 

that we need—that we do need to do that. We certainly need to go 

after their finances, we need to go after where they are physically, 

we need to go after the conditions that give rise to these particular 

organizations. 

But I would also add that we need to go after this ideology. And 

there are things that we can do, but there are certainly things that 

our partners in the region can do. There are just some things that 

as a western country, as the United States, will not resonate as 

fully as it will from people in the region with respect to that. 

So the ideology, in my view, is very, very important. And then 

getting after the underlying issues that we talked about here, I 

think, is ultimately what we really have to focus on. 

Mr. BACON. One follow-on. In 2007 and 2008, we had great success largely because the Sunni tribes came over and started helping us against the fight—against Al Qaeda. I think on a grander 

level, we need to have that Sunni help, like you are alluding to, but 

our agreement with Iran, I believe, undermined the trust of many 

of the Sunni countries, I have heard that from some of our Sunni 

friends, because I think they fear Iran just as much as they do ISIS 

in many cases. 

Have you seen that same trend when you have talked to our 

Sunni friends? Is there concerns with what we did the past 2 years, 

3 years with Iran, and have you seen that undermine that ability 

to work with our Sunni friends? 
27 

General VOTEL. Truthfully, Congressman, I have. I have had 

Sunni leaders and other Arab leaders tell me that same thing. And 

so I know there certainly is a perception out there about that, and 

as you know, oftentimes perception is truth in many quarters here. 

So that is why I think one of the key things that we have continued to emphasize with our people and with our leadership is the 

importance of building and rebuilding trust with our partners in 

the region. These are difficult situations here. And they are not all 

perfect, but we have to—I think it is better to be engaged with 

them and to be their confirmed partner. 

And, frankly, the impression I get when I talk to all of our partners in the region is they do prefer the United States. They want 

to have a relationship with us. And so I think we ought to look at 

ways that we can take advantage of that moving forward. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you for the job that you are doing. And I 

am so glad you are there now, especially given your past track 

record. 

When it comes to Yemen, I am really glad that we are taking 

steps now to support our allies in the area and our friends in the 

area. When I have talked to people from the Emirates, for instance, 

their concern isn’t ISIS, I mean, that is a concern, but they are concerned about Yemen and the Iranian proxy war that is going on 

there. 

How do you evaluate what is going on in Yemen? I know we had 

a tragic loss of life with the recent raid, and that was regrettable, 

but I think it is very important that we are supporting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and I think it is overdue that we are doing 

that. What are your perspectives on Yemen? 

General VOTEL. Well, Congressman, you know, as I mentioned a 

little bit earlier, I mean, I think there are some vital U.S. interests 

that are at stake here. Certainly we don’t want Yemen to be used 

as a platform for attacks in our homeland or against our allies or 

partners around the globe or in the region, and so we have to—we 

have to be focused on that. 

I am extraordinarily concerned about another contested maritime 

chokepoint in the region. And so that directly impacts our national 

interests, the freedom of navigation, freedom of commerce, and supports our global economic objectives here, and so I think we have 

to be very, very concerned about that. So I do think there are some 

vital aspects of that. All of that is against the backdrop of this civil 

war that you talked about here. 

And, you know, certainly we all understand the implications of 

becoming involved in those types of activities. And if we don’t 

choose to do it militarily, then we have to look at ways that we can 

try to move forward and try to resolve that situation. I do believe 

that as long as that continues to boil, that it will impact the ability 

for us to really focus on other principal interests that we have in 

that part of the world. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, and obviously everyone wants peace in the 

area and the fighting to stop, but until that happens, I think we 
28 

have to take the side of our friends and allies, and they are so concerned that Iran is using the Houthi rebels as a proxy to destabilize and ultimately come after them. That is their perspective. 

And while I don’t think we need to consider any kind of boots on 

the ground or anything like that, I think as much as we can do 

with ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and things 

like that to support our friends and allies is critical. If you want 

to better address this in the closed section of the hearing, tell me 

that, but is there more that we can be doing? 

General VOTEL. Yeah, there is. And I think this would be a really 

good topic in a closed session, Congressman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for being here. 

A quick follow-up on Yemen. To what extent has the ongoing 

fighting there enhanced or undermined AQAP’s [Al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula’s] power and reach? And do you envision a longterm presence for the Emirates and the Saudis in Yemen, and if 

so, do their long-term objectives in Yemen align with our own? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think we had—you know, before the civil 

war started, it was my estimate that we had a very good focus on 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The civil war changed our posture there. And in the—underneath the ongoing civil war right 

there, I do believe Al Qaeda had an opportunity to prosper and to 

become stronger and to be resilient and continue to pursue their 

objectives. 

So what you have seen us do here most recently is renew our 

focus on that. And we are doing that with a variety of our partners 

in the region, the UAE and Saudi Arabia certainly among the principal partners that we are working with with respect to that. 

With respect to their long-term presence, that is probably a better question for them. I don’t know. I don’t have any insight into 

what their strategic calculations might be there, but, you know, I 

think, as we see in most of these areas, a long-term commitment 

is usually necessary to really change conditions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. In Syria, Russia has seemingly doubled 

down on a long-term commitment going back to the 1950s with its 

client state there. It seems to me that Russia and Iran are in a tactical alliance in Syria, they sort of share the same organs, Russia 

provides air power, the Iranians, particularly through Hezbollah, 

provide a lot of the ground forces. Do you see evidence of a broader 

regional alliance between Russia and Iran, and if so, what are its 

manifestations? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think there perhaps could be. I am not 

sure I see specific indications of that in other areas, but certainly 

they are cooperating together. I think the implications of this are 

things that we have seen. We have seen Russian jets operating out 

of Iranian bases. And certainly their cooperation together to prop 

up the regime and give them new life here is certainly an implication of that relationship right there. 

So I am very, very—I am concerned about that. I think we 

should be concerned about it. I don’t know that we have great in-
29 

sight into what their—what the Russian long-term perspective is 

on that relationship. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I too am concerned. I think the rise of the Russian-Iranian axis has been the biggest development in the region 

the last couple of years related to the Iran deal. 

One strange bit of continuity in the region has been a return in 

Egypt to some form of authoritarianism. Can you comment—and it 

has caused a great debate within foreign policy circles within the 

left and the right. 

Can you comment on whether you are getting the cooperation 

you need from a military perspective from the Sisi government in 

Egypt? 

General VOTEL. I think Egypt is an extraordinarily important 

partner to us. We kind of consider them to be the gateway into the 

region. They have had historical long-term relationships there. 

They are an extraordinarily important country to them. They have 

been very helpful in the Sinai, helping address threats to the multinational force there. They were particularly responsive to our request for assistance there. And they have been very, very good— 

very, very good partners there. And, you know, while we have had 

perhaps some differences politically with them, one of the things 

we have been able to maintain, I think, is a good military-to-military contact. 

And I think—and from a CENTCOM commander standpoint, I 

look forward to continuing to build on that as we move forward. I 

think it is a vital relationship for us. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. So would it be fair to say, General, that from 

your perspective, the FMF program and the broader relationship 

we have with Egypt is achieving its objectives? 

General VOTEL. Well, I don’t know, because right now we do see 

some instances where countries like Egypt and others are reaching 

out and buying their military hardware from other countries. 

So, again, I think this kind of goes back to the discussion we had 

earlier about FMF. I think our FMS program accomplishes a lot of 

purposes out there. One of the principal ones, from my perspective 

as the CENTCOM commander, is building capability with our partners, especially capability that can be integrated with our capabilities so that we can operate together. 

When we choose not to allow them to buy our systems or to 

buy—they will look other places for this. This doesn’t necessarily 

help them, because they get lesser systems, they don’t get the 

sustainment, they don’t always get the training with that, they are 

stuck with stuff that they can’t fully use, and it is not integrated 

with us. 

And so I think FMF and FMS are extraordinarily important programs that fit into our security equation across the region. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, General. I am out of time, but—and 

I know it is something that adds to your AOR, but maybe afterwards, we could talk about to what extent our involvement with 

the YPG [Kurdish People’s Defense Unit] in Syria has affected our 

relationship with Turkey and sort of, more broadly, how our relationship with Turkey affects your efforts. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 
30 

The CHAIRMAN. General, I will just add two points on the FMF 

discussion. 

Number one, all our allies—I would say virtually all, if not all, 

our allies are very frustrated with the process. 

So you talked about decisions, absolutely, that is one thing, but 

then the process being so sluggish, even if we ultimately decide 

that it is in our interest to sell or provide equipment, has even— 

even then it is a subject of frustration. 

So our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee is looking into 

this issue from our standpoint. I am hopeful that a number of 

members, who are also on the Foreign Affairs Committee, will look 

at it from the State Department standpoint, because I think one of 

your early points was reestablishing trust, and this is an important 

thing to reestablish trust. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Votel, it is a great honor to be with you. Every 

time I am with you, it is just so reassuring. And I am also so grateful for the American people to hear your service. I appreciate it as 

a Member of Congress, and also I appreciate it as a fellow veteran, 

but I particularly appreciate your service as a military dad. I always like to recognize your service has meant so much to our family. 

My oldest son served for a year, field artillery, in Iraq; my second 

son was a Navy doctor serving with the Rangers and the SEALs 

in Iraq; my third son, a signal officer, served in Egypt; and I am 

grateful that our youngest son was an engineer in Afghanistan. 

And so we certainly cover the CENTCOM area of jurisdiction, and 

at all times we appreciate your leadership. And I give credit to my 

wife for training these guys. But thank you. 

As the Iraqi Security Forces continue to make progress toward 

liberating Mosul, what is the latest on the operation and what have 

been the keys to the Iraqi army’s success? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman. And let me just say on 

behalf of CENTCOM, we appreciate all the contributions of Team 

Wilson there and we are very, very grateful for it. 

Turning to Mosul, the Iraqi Security Forces are making, I think, 

good progress. This has been an extraordinarily challenging fight. 

It took them about 100 days to secure the eastern side of the city. 

They did that at a cost of 490 killed and just about over 3,000 

wounded. So it is an extraordinary price that they paid for that. 

They very quickly were able to get themselves focused on the western part of the city. And they are now engaged in what we are seeing as a very, very difficult fight there. 

Some of their elements are engaged in what is known as the old 

city here, a very dense urban area, much, much more complex and 

much more favors the defender than it does the attacker, and so 

they have got their hands full as they are doing this. 

I would just note that the Iraqi Security Forces just so far in 

about 37 days have sustained about 284 killed and a little over 

1,600 wounded in the western part of the city. 

The keys to success here have been, I think, the very close relationship they had with both U.S. and coalition advise and assist 

teams, and the ability for the Iraqi Security Forces to come to-
31 

gether. As you know, institutionally they have got some challenges 

here. They have got federal police that answer to the ministry of 

interior, they have got Iraqi army that answers to the ministry of 

defense, and they have got counterterrorism forces that answer to 

the counterterrorism directorate, and so these are all separate ministries. 

But what they have been able to do successfully is get a common 

commander in place among all of those different pillars of security 

here, who really performs a very good integrating fashion, and so 

they are operating much better in conjunction and in synchronization with each other, and I think that has really paid off in what 

has been a very, very difficult, and will continue to be a very difficult fight in the weeks and perhaps months ahead. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is so important. And the American people 

need to know the city is over a million persons, it is the second 

largest city in the country of Iraq, and how important it is that it 

be liberated, and the subjugation and oppression that the people 

must have faced in the last year, 2 years. 

And it was so encouraging for all of us last week on the Foreign 

Affairs Committee to have the opportunity to be with Prime Minister Abadi. I had met him in Baghdad last month, and it is just 

so impressive. And also the minister of defense, Hiyali, again, it is 

just—that country, I think, has very positive leadership for you to 

work with. 

Additionally, you testified about Russia’s entry into the Syrian 

conflict and that it has negatively impacted the balance of power. 

What is the latest on Russia’s intrusion into Syria? 

General VOTEL. Well, as you know, they have been focused on— 

I think, mostly focused on helping the regime accomplish some of 

their objectives in the western part of the country, and they, I 

think, have been successful at that. 

I think Russia has achieved probably many of the objectives that 

they set out to pursue as they got in there. They have got a government that is favorable to them, access to ports, access to airfields, 

influence in the region, so I think they have accomplished that. 

They have, I think, begun to—they are continuing to support regime forces now in this case as they fight ISIS. So to the extent 

that they are doing that, that is, I would admit, helpful to what 

we are doing. 

I would share with you, Congressman, that we do share a very 

congested airspace with the Russians. We have a deconfliction 

mechanism in place. It is generally a very professional interchange. 

We talk with them very frequently to coordinate—not to coordinate, but to deconflict our operations in what is a very compressed 

airspace over northern Syria. That generally goes pretty well. 

We are looking to make that a little bit more robust to ensure 

that we continue our freedom of action here as we continue to pursue the campaign. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you. 

As you can tell, members are interested in some further discussions in a classified session, which will start in just a few moments 

upstairs, but for now, this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 29, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 29, 2017 

(37) 

Ranking Member Smith Opening Remarks 

Full Committee Hearing 

Military Assessment of Security Challenges 

in the Greater Middle East 

March 29,2017 

I thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing, and I thank 

General Vote! for appearing today. I value the General's professional military 

insights, as they pertain to a complex and wide-ranging array of issues, and I 

very much appreciate his commitment to keeping the Congress well informed 

of the constantly evolving dynamics within U.S. Central Command's area of 

responsibility. 

Recent reports of military progress in the counter-lSIS campaign are 

encouraging. ISIS is on the defensive, as Iraqi Security Forces push to liberate 

Mosul and as the Syrian Democratic Forces simultaneously pressure Raqqa. lt 

appears that the persistent, cooperative methodology implemented by 

Operation Inherent Resolve is succeeding, largely due to the efforts of our 

partners in the region. Clearly, much still needs to be accomplished militarily 

in the fight against ISIS, but I wish to emphasize that military achievements 

alone will not guaranty an acceptable end state. The United States must work 

within the international community and employ a whole-of-government 

approach to foster and sustain political, economic, and social conditions that 

are conducive to long-term stability. Residual discontent will once again 

metastasize into violent extremism. Moreover, as the military campaign 

against ISIS continues to unfold, we must make every effort to minimize the 

risk of civilian casualties and to address the serious humanitarian situation 

resultant of years of conflict. As we strive to decisively win the military fight 

against ISIS, we must be just as careful, just as prepared, and just as 

determined to secure a prosperous and durable peace. 

We have long endeavored to reach a similar end state in Afghanistan. 

For over fifteen years, the United States has focused on eliminating AI Qaeda 

and other dangerous international terrorist groups and on preventing 

Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven for terrorist activities. We have 

also worked diligently with our allies and partners to train, advise, and assist 

the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (the ANDSF). Without a 

doubt, the ANDSF are embroiled in a difficult struggle to stabilize 

Afghanistan. However, the ANDSF have responded to setbacks and 

challenges and their capabilities continue to improve. Despite significant 

progress, the ANDSF still needs help in building indigenous leadership and 

institutional capacities. We also need to continue to assist the ANDSF in 

establishing and maintaining a capable air force and in developing other key 

enablers. In short, the Afghans are not yet ready to secure their own country 

without our assistance and that of our coalition partners. We should continue 
38 

to evaluate, and to adapt as needed to, evolving conditions, as we empower 

the ANDSF to secure Afghanistan. In doing so, we need to stay mindful of 

the fragile security situation in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state that is also 

vulnerable to extremist threats. We need to ensure that our cooperative 

counterterrorism efforts with Pakistan yield actual, enduring results that will 

bolster sustainable stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Although our military commitments in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan 

consume a lot of attention, we must also be alert to other regional security 

implications. Core AI Qaeda has not been entirely eliminated, and some AI 

Qaeda affiliates continue to pose threats to the United States. Iran poses 

another significant challenge. While The United States and other key 

members of the international community concluded an agreement with Iran 

regarding its nuclear program, Iran remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and 

it exerts influence over the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and 

the Houthis in Yemen. We must deter Iran from precipitating conflicts and 

dissuade it from engaging in malign activities. Russia too is becoming more 

regionally involved. The Russian military is operating in Syria, and Russia 

may be establishing ties to the Afghan Taliban. These regional considerations 

should factor in broader U.S. policy on Russia. 

Other regional threats also abound. Ulicit trafficking, cyber threats, and 

threats to freedom of navigation are just a few examples taken from a diverse 

spectrum. 

It is, therefore, critical that we receive a comprehensive military 

assessment from the combatant commander. A thorough understanding of our 

posture in the Middle East is fundamental to this committee's work in shaping 

the defense budget and in providing the resources necessary for U.S. Central 

Command to perform its duties effectively. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving the General's 

testimony. 
39 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL 

COMMANDER 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

15 MARCH 2017 
40 

Introduction. The outstanding men and women who make up the U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) Team are the very best in the world at what they do. The incredibly dynamic, 

volatile and tumultuous Central Region presents a complex convergence of compounding multifaceted security challenges. Such an environment generates ncar continuous crisis action 

planning and response. These conditions demand a highly capable, vigilant capability at 

USCENTCOM Headquarters and our Service Component Headquarters, as well as forward 

throughout our area of responsibility (AOR). The exceptional individuals on the USCENTCOM 

Team expertly navigate this challenging environment. In doing so, they effectively protect and 

promote our Nation's interests and they represent our values wherever they go around the world. 

They work selflessly each day in support of our mission and the exceptional men and women 

serving in harm's way around the globe. We could not be more proud of them and proud of their 

families. They truly are the strength of our USCENTCOM Team. 

The Central Region is a fascinating area of the world. Spanning over four million square miles 

it is populated by 550+ million people from more than 20 ethnic groups representing multiple 

religions and speaking eighteen languages with hundreds of dialects. The region lies at the 

intersection of three continents and important commercial sea lanes, flight con·idors, pipelines, 

and overland routes run across it supporting regional and global economic networks. 

Tt is also a highly-complex area, widely characterized by pervasive instability and conflict. The 

20 nations that make up the Central Region have various forms of government, ranging from 

absolute and constitutional monarchies to theocratic, parliamentary, and presidential republics. 

The economic and social-political landscape is diverse, volatile at times, and rivalries often 

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41 

create tensions that affect security and stability. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs), such as 

the terrorist organizations al Qaeda and the Islamic Stale of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), exploit 

these conditions to foment unrest, challenge or destabilize governments, and threaten the global 

economy and U.S. national interests. 

The turbulence across the region reflects a number of contributing factors or "drivers of 

instability,'' including ethnic and sectarian hostilities between Shia and Sunnis, and Arabs and 

Persians; economic uncertainty and sustained low oil prices that severely strain energy-based 

economics across the region, contributing to reduced government services and weakened 

prospects for economic growth; a disproportionately large youth population facing increasing 

povetiy and unemployment, which may make them susceptible to unrest, radical ideologies, and 

YEO recruitment; expanding ungoverned or under-govemed spaces, exploited by VEOs; civil 

wars, which are "engines of instability" all by themselves; worsening humanitarian crises, 

contributing to growing refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) populations; and, 

competition among outside actors, including Russia and China, seeking to promote their interests 

and supplant U.S. influence in the region. While we must take the necessary actions to counter 

immediate threats, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, we also need to find ways to address these and 

other root causes of instability if we hope to achieve lasting positive effects in that part of the 

world. This cannot be accomplished solely through military means. The military can help to 

create the necessary conditions; however, there must be concomitant progress in other 

complementary areas (e.g., reconstruction, humanitarian aid, stabilization, political 

reconciliation). There are a variety of interagency programs and efforts underway that are 

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42 

essential to translating militmy gains into actual achievement of stated goals and objectives. 

Support for these endeavors is vital to our success. 

The current evolving security environment in the Central Region is J\.uiher complicated by the 

fact that most challenges transcend borders; they are trans-regional (cutting across multiple 

combatant commands (CCMD)), all-domain (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace), and multifunctional (e.g., conventional, special operations, ballistic missile defense, cyber). Of note, the 

Middle East remains the global epicenter for terrorism and violent lslamist extremism. 

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace's 2016 Global Terrorism Index, the U.S. 

Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR accounted for 78% of all terrorism incidents 

worldwide, and the turmoil stretches across CCMD seams into Africa, Europe, South Asia, and 

beyond. 

The security environment is fmiher challenged by the emergence of a "virtual caliphate" and 

increased access and activity in the cyber domain. Ready access to the Internet, social media, 

and other messaging platforms has enabled a new generation of extremists to spread their radical 

Islamist views, incite widespread violence, and recruit new followers to their cause. As we have 

seen with the ongoing campaign to defeat ISIS, diminishment of the physical organization does 

not equate to the dismantlement of their virtual presence. To the contrm·y, terrorist 

organizations' activities in cyberspace enable them to remain relevant despite setbacks on the 

battlefield, while reaching out to direct, enable, and/or inspire audiences well beyond the 

region's geographic borders. Countering the "virtual caliphate" will require a concerted 'whole 

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43 

of government' effort led by the people of the region. We can support our partners' activities, 

but their voices and in11uence will be required to achieve enduring positive results. 

We also acknowledge, particularly in the current resource-constrained environment, the need 

to find additional means for countering existing and emerging threats and deterring potential 

adversaries. No other country in the world has a military with a greater ability than the U.S. to 

achieve kinetic and non-kinetic efTects and sustain those effects. Through the application of 

"hard" and "soft" power capabilities, including kinetic strikes, raids, and information operations, 

we have been very efTective at degrading and disrupting violent extremist networks in the 

USCENTCOM AOR and elsewhere around the world. It is an important and a necessary 

competency. However, a solely military response is not sufficient. We must continue to look for 

ways to further enhance our effectiveness through the application of military and non-military 

activities. Ultimately, we want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S. Government 

and the International Community, recognizing that it is only through a combination of 

capabilities that we will achieve and sustain our strongest deterrence posture. 

This is especially true today given the changing character of warfare. For much of the past 

15+ years our Nation has increasingly operated in the "gray zone" of military confrontationthat range of activities short of conventional con11ict; a dangerous space in which miscalculation 

can easily occur, leading to escalatory con11ict and misunderstanding. In the "gray zone," 

adversaries employ unconventional methods that include cyber warfare, propaganda, and support 

to proxy elements in an effort to achieve their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of 

actual fighting. At the same time, these unconventional methods increase tensions between 

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44 

partners by emphasizing competing priorities that detract from support for our common 

objectives (e.g., Turks and Syrian Kurds). To be successful in this ambiguous environment, we 

must find alternate ways to compete against our adversaries in the "gray zone" short of conflict, 

while collaborating with our pminers to achieve our desired end-states. 

We must and will- continue to pursue the many opportunities that exist today throughout the 

Central Region, recognizing that by pursuing these oppmiunities we will achieve improved 

stability and security in that challenged part of the world. As Sir Winston Churchill wisely 

stated, "Difficulties mastered are opportunities won." The key to success is ensuring that we 

remain ready and capable of effectively countering all threats. We need to make sure that we 

have an accurate understanding of the situation. We must take care to build and cultivate strong 

relationships, here at home and abroad. We need to be responsive to our partners and always 

listen and strive to understand their points of view and priorities. We also need to be properly 

postured with the necessary capabilities, resources, and appropriate authorities to protect and 

promote U.S. and partner nations' interests. 

In recent years, we have been encouraged to see many of our regional partners take a more 

active role in providing for the security of their soverei~o,rn spaces. Ultimately, we want to 

empower our partners and allies by helping them build additional capability and capacity 

while strengthening relationships and improving cooperation and interoperability among nations. 

This is- and will remain a top priority for the USCENTCOM Team at our hcadqumiers in 

Tampa, Florida, as well as among our Component Commands, combined~joint task forces, and 

forward in the region. 

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U.S. Central Command's Mission. "USCENTCOM directs and enables military operations 

and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of' 

enduring U.S. interests. " 

Our Strategic Approach. Our strategic approach is focused on protecting our national interests 

and those of our partners. lt is designed to reflect our values, align our behaviors, and support 

the National Military Strategy. It is proactive in nature and endeavors to set in motion tangible 

actions in a purposeful, consistent, and continuous manner. Each aspect of our approachPrepare- Pursue- Prevail- enables the next and collectively contributes to the successful 

achievement of our goals, objectives, and overall mission. 

Prepare the Environment- The volatile nature of the Central Region requires that we be wellpostured to protect our enduring national interests. "Well-postured" means that we are ready to 

execute military tasks; physically and virtually present in the AOR; integrated in all our actions; 

responsive to the needs of our partners; and, able to provide options for our leadership. Proper 

preparation in advance of crises creates decision space for leaders and allows for the responsible 

and effective employment of available resources and forces. Well-prepared and motivated 

personnel with shared values provide a comparative advantage over our adversaries and 

competitors. Preparation of the environment including agreements for assured access, basing, 

and overflight and the ability to adapt our expeditionary and enduring footprint- ultimately 

ensures a high level of readiness, increased responsiveness, and strong and productive 

relationships with partners and allies, all of which serve to enable our success in our various 

endeavors. 

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46 

Pursue Opportunities -In a region beset by myriad challenges we must always be on the lookout for opportunities to seize the initiative to support our objectives and goals. Pursuing 

opportunities means that we are proactive we don't wait for problems to be presented; we look 

for ways to get ahead of them. It also means that we have to become comfortable with 

transparency and flat communications- our ability to understand our AOR better than anyone 

else gives us the advantage of knowing where opportunities exist. Pursuing opportunities also 

means we have to take risk- by delegating authority and responsibility to the right level, by 

trusting our partners, and being willing to trust our best instincts in order to move faster than our 

adversaries. 

Prevail in Conflict There are no easy victories or quick wins in the USCENTCOM AORours is an area of protracted struggles and conilicts. Our overriding objective, despite these 

challenges, is to prevail. Prevailing means winning; coming out on top of our adversaries. We 

prevail when our national interests and objectives are preserved; when we maintain decision 

space for our leaders; and, when we maintain and sustain our access, posture, and relationships 

with our vital partners. We choose to prevail "by, with, and through" our partners. Prevailing in 

this AOR requires resolve and resiliency and continued momentum. 

U.S. Central Command Priorities. 

Ensure an Effective Posture- An effective posture with trained and ready forward-stationed 

forces and equipment demonstrates our tremendous capability and enduring commitment to our 

partners and allies in the region. It reassures them; it enables access and influence; and, it 

positions us to secure our enduring national interests. An effective posture also optimizes 

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47 

t!·eedom of movement, deters state aggressors, and provides decision space and flexible response 

options for national-level decision makers. 

Strengthen Allies and Partnerships A coalition approach at home and abroad- expands 

our ability to operate on multiple fronts. Strong relationships based upon shared values create 

greater cohesion and enhance the effectiveness of available resources and capabilities. 

Integration with partners, within the region and beyond, enriches the benefit of our presence, 

mitigates resource constraints, and expands the reach of the force. By building the capacity of 

regional partners, we enable them to assume a larger share of the responsibility for securing their 

sovereign spaces. 

Deter and Connter State Aggressors- Effectively posturing to maintain freedom of 

movement, freedom of action, and freedom of navigation is essential to securing our enduring 

national interests and the interests of our partners and allies. We must also actively counter 

malign influence, and be prepared to confront aggression, while reducing the freedom of action 

of smTogates and proxies operating in the region. 

Disrnpt and Counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their Networks- We must 

protect our Homeland from terrorist threats that emanate t!·om the Central Region. We will 

accomplish this by degrading and defeating VEOs and their networks, including ISIS and al 

Qaeda and their associated forces, and by preventing the further spread of sectarian-fueled 

conflict and VEOs. 

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48 

Ultimately, our goal is to achieve a Central Region where improved security leads to greater 

stability, and where regional cooperation counters actors that threaten U.S. interests. 

Desired End States. Our efTorts in support of partners throughout the USCENTCOM AOR arc 

designed to achieve our desired end states. These end states include: USCENTCOM properly 

postured to protect U.S. interests; free flow of commerce and access to areas in accordance with 

international law; strong and supportive allies and partners; state aggressors deterred or 

countered; WMD safeguarded and use prevented; VEOs degraded and their influence eroded; 

and, lasting increased regional stability and security. The key to achieving these ends is the 

effective use of available ways and means to address challenges and pursue opportunities in 

the region. 

Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Region. Many conditions exist in the 

strategically-important Central Region that threaten stability, access to the region, and transit via 

maritime chokepoints. The resulting challenges to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and 

Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, rising tensions with Iran, and increased provocative behavior by 

Iranian-backed elements in and around the Bab a! Mandeb (BAM) Strait- clearly demand our 

attention and directed efforts. Among the dynamics contributing to the complexity of the current 

security environment are the same socio-political factors that caused the Arab Awakening, 

fomenting social unrest and creating conditions for sectarianism, violence, and extremism. In 

parts of the region, reforms have fallen short, politics remain exclusive, economic growth 

stagnates, education systems under-deliver, and/or social contracts are falling out of balance. 

Opportunities for youth remain limited. Concurrently, large-scale displaced populations stress 

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49 

already fragile economies, social welfare systems and security architectures. The resulting 

instability provides opportunities for VEOs and insurgents and those who actively provide 

support and sanctuary to them. Competition for water, oil, and other natural resources are other 

drivers of instability and conf1ict. Resurgent geopolitics and the continuation of national 

rivalries fuels inter-state hostility and may potentially hasten the pursuit of nuclear 

weapons. As we look to address the multitude of challenges present today across the 

USCENTCOM AOR, it is absolutely essential that we understand the conditions and root causes 

of the instability and turmoil. If not, our efforts are likely to be insufficient or even misdirected 

and any gains achieved, temporary. 

In addition to addressing challenges, we must pursue the many opportunities present today 

throughout the Central Region. Doing so will enable us, working together with our partners, 

to shape the security environment and increase stability across our AOR. Opportunities manifest 

in a variety of ways, including bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises and training programs, 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, information 

operations and messaging, and other cooperative endeavors in support of common objectives. 

Most notably, by supporting and enabling partner-led operations we achieve shared goals 

while limiting U.S. investment and troop presence and increasing regional partners' 

capability, confidence, and overall stake in providing for the security of their sovereign 

spaces. For example, we continue to support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Syrian 

Democratic Forces in their efforts to counter ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Also, in recent months we 

supported successful United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led operations in Yemen against the al Qaeda 

affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In terms of future opportunities, we need 

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to find ways to increase information sharing with key partners, like the UAE, to further enable 

their efforts. Enhanced information sharing with regional partners can also advance efforts 

against ISIS and other terrorist facilitation networks. We should pursue increasing our support 

for the Lebanese Atmed Forces (LAF), which have demonstrated tremendous return on 

investment in recent years. The need for improved communication between and among 

elements, particularly regarding common regional disputes (e.g., Sunni-Shia tensions, Kurdish 

expansionism) also presents opportunities and should be pursued by relevant elements of the 

U.S. Government (USG). The key outcomes achieved through the pursuit of these and other 

opportunities present in the Central Region are improved awareness and informationsharing, enhanced capability, and increased trust and confidence among partner nations, 

all of which are key components underpinning our mission in pursuit of our national interests. 

Thus, it is essential that we view all challenges with an eye for corresponding opportunities that 

provide the best means for addressing those challenges and achieving desired end-states. 

Given the trans-regional nature of the cun·ent security environment coupled with the competing 

demands for limited resources and capabilities, it is essential that we find efficiencies and 

alternative means for accomplishing stated objectives. This includes building and enabling 

coalitions comprised of willing partners, recognizing that collaboration enhances overall 

capability while providing a stronger, united front against potential adversaries; the sum of the 

parts is greater than the whole. The initial building blocks for strong coalitions are 

relationships. The cornerstone for effective enduring collaboration among coalition 

members is information-sharing which enables coalition compliant planning, resulting in 

successful execution of campaign goals and objectives. One quick-yield way to enhance the 

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capability and effectiveness of our partners is by expanding our intelligence sharing with them. 

To date, we have seen significant return on investment each time we have made such allowances 

in support of our partners. 

Key Focus Areas. While the USCENTCOM Team manages a broad range of difficult 

challenges on a daily basis, a significant portion of our efforts and t·esources are necessarily 

focused in five priority areas. These five areas are: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE 

(Iraq and Syria), Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL and Resolute Support Mission 

(Afghanistan), Iran, Yemen, and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Below are 

summaries, highlighting substantial challenges and efforts underway aimed at improving 

stability and security in each ofthese critical areas. 

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (Iraq and Syria). The Counter-ISIS (C-ISIS) Campaign 

has entered its third year and we are on track with the military plan to defeat the terrorist 

organization in Iraq and Syria. Our "by, with, and through" approach and operational level 

simultaneity strategy are working, and our partner forces continue to build momentum across 

the battlespace as we pressure the enemy on multiple fronts and across all domains. 

Together we are forcing the enemy to deal with multiple simultaneous dilemmas (e.g., 

ground operations, airstrikes, cyber activities, information operations, and discrete interdictions 

of resource flows). This is putting increased pressure on their operations and command and 

control capability while stretching their limited resources. 

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The strength of the C-ISIS Campaign is the C-IS IS Coalition consisting of all branches of service 

and our Interagency and international partners, and the many contributions they willingly make 

to the fight against our common enemy- "The whole is greater than the sum 1?{ its parts. " 

Without the support of the Coalition, our "by, with, and through" approach would not be doable. 

Our stand-off fires, including Coalition air and artillery, remain another Iynchpin ofthe CISIS Campaign. Improved intelligence has enabled the Combined Air Operations Center 

(CAOC) to increase the number of deliberate strikes conducted in recent months, targeting ISIS's 

infi·astructure, oil revenue sources, etc. Over the past year, the Coalition's precision effects 

campaign has removed dozens more ISIS senior leaders from the battlefield, attrited large 

portions of the organization's forces, further disrupted its command and control capability, 

and greatly degraded its pool of resources and access to replacements and personnel 

reinforcements. As the campaign progresses, and as ISIS shifts actions and behaves 

increasingly like a terrorist organization, hiding amongst civilians as a force protection measure, 

we will continue to make the necessary adjustments to our air operations. We want to target the 

enemy effectively, while also ensuring that we minimize collateral dan1age. International law 

requires it; and, when America's sons and daughters go to war, they go with our values. 

Thus, it is imperative that when we conduct operations we do so in such a way that we limit 

the loss of innocent lives. 

Over the past year, ISIS lost a significant amount of capability and large swaths of territory. 

The Iraqis are now in control of eastern Mosul, although clearing operations continue in several 

areas. In Syria, operations are ongoing in three key geographic areas·-Raqqa, Manbij, and al 

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53 

Bab; it remains a very complex fight given multiple simultaneous activities and the management 

of partners and battlefield effects. In Iraq, in the coming weeks and months we will continue to 

support the Iraqi Security Forces as they complete the seizure of western Mosul. After Mosul 

operations are complete, we expect the Government of Iraq to prioritize military operations to 

recapture Tal Afar, Sinjar, and Hawija, and to secure the border in order to diminish ISIS' 

freedom of movement and ability to target major population centers. In Syria, the Syrian 

Democratic Forces have almost completed the isolation phase ofRaqqa operations and will, in 

the coming months, begin operations to seize Raqqa, dismantling a key node in ISIS' external 

operations network. Additionally, we would look to continue our security operations along the 

Jordanian border to prevent re-infiltration ofiSIS remnants. 

The cumulative effect of operations in Iraq and Syria has cut off key lines of communication 

for ISIS, while restricting their ability to bring in additional fighters and curbing their flow of 

financial resources. The terrorist organization is struggling financially and is experiencing low 

morale in its ranks and steady leadership attrition due to coalition airstrikes. There has also been 

a nearly 75 percent decline in ISIS's media and propaganda as compared to a year ago. 

Our efforts, in conjunction with our interagency and international partners' efforts, to stem the 

flow offoreign terrorist fighters both into Syria and Iraq and also those attempting to return 

to their countries of origin- continue to bear fruit. The U.S. and Coalition member nations are 

highly concerned about the threat these experienced fighters present to our respective homelands. 

We have made considerable progress identifying and targeting fighters and insurgent networks, 

principally through our Joint and Interagency targeting processes, and this will remain a priority. 

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These processes will also help to combat the evolving hybrid threat (conventional and irregular 

warfare). U.S. Special Operations Command has been designated lead for external operations 

(EXOPs) for the U.S. military efforts and this has contributed greatly to organizing the broader 

eftorts against this threat. Whole of government efforts and collaboration with partners have 

also played a key role in stemming the t1ow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Spurred by the 

adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, more than 60 nations have 

enacted laws to restrict FTF travel. The U.S. now collaborates through infonnation-sharing 

agreements with 59 international partners to identifY and track travel of suspected terrorists in 

real time. 

While we continue to make great strides towards countering ISIS trans-regionally, we recognize 

that we are dealing with a highly adaptive enemy. In particular, ISIS' use of chemical 

weapons and its evolving application of available off-the-shelf technologies that include 

unmanned aerial systems now used for both observation and to achieve lethal effects, poses a 

growing threat. For example, ISIS has reportedly used chemicals, including sulfur mustard and 

toxic industrial chemicals, in attacks more than 50 times in Iraq and Syria since 2014. Although 

the threat of chemical weapons has not slowed the Counter-ISIS Campaign, ISIS could further 

develop its chemical weapons capability. We are committed to working with partners to locate, 

secure, render harmless, eliminate or destroy any chemical and biological weapon materials 

found during the course of operations in Iraq and Syria, and to effectively remove this threat 

from our troops and civilian populations. 

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We will defeat ISIS militarily; however, a lasting defeat of this enemy will not be achieved 

unless similar progress is made on the political front. Instability all but guarantees a 

resurgence of ISIS or the emergence of other terrorist groups seeking to exploit conditions to 

advance their own aims. W c remain fully committed to the "whole of government" approach 

and continue to ensure our actions are synchronized with and supportive of the efforts of our 

partners across the Interagency and the International Community. 

This also holds true on the humanitarian front. UN-led efforts to date are having positive 

impacts and thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have already returned to their 

homes. However, tough work remains, given the enormity of the humanitarian crises in Iraq 

and Syria and in neighboring countries. The growing number of displaced persons presents a 

unique set of challenges that include protection and assistance to civilians caught in the various 

conflicts, as well as assistance to those seeking asylum in neighboring countries. 

Regional actors- There is a significant number of players currently operating in Iraq and Syria 

with both common and competing interests. While they have been present for many years, 

several of them have become emboldened and have taken a more active role in addressing 

regional issues. 

In Iraq, we have seen encouraging progress made in the relationship between the leadership of 

the Government of Iraq (Go I) and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). This past 

year, for the tirst time since 2013, Prime Minister al-Abadi met with President Barzani in 

Baghdad to discuss expanded cooperation between the ISF and the Kurdish Peshmerga. We also 

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sec increased collaboration between the !SF and elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces 

(PMF). In November 2016, Iraq's parliament voted to fully legalize elements of the PMF, 

including but not limited to Shia militias. While they are achieving some positive effects, their 

participation does present challenges, particularly post-Mosul offensive, as Iranian-backed 

elements of the PMF seek to increase their influence in the country through both military and 

political channels. 

Turkey remains an important NATO ally and Counter-ISIS Coalition member that 

supports the campaign through its operations and by providing access, basing, and 

overflight permissions. Some Turkish activities and rhetoric, however, have the potential 

to impact campaign momentum. Turkey's actions in northern Iraq continue to strain relations 

between the Go I and the KRG, which serves to further complicate the C-ISIS Campaign. 

Likewise, in Syria, Turkey has helped clear ISIS from its border, but Turkish-backed forces have 

also clashed with the Syrian Democratic Forces near Manbij and al Bab and we continue efforts 

to resolve tensions. 

Since Russia's entry into the Syrian conflict en masse in 2015, they have negatively 

impacted the regional balance of power. Russia's primary goal is to maintain Syria as a client 

state in the future and they have propped up the Assad Regime to support this overarching 

objective. Also very concerning is the fact that Russia's air operations have targeted civilians 

and U.S.-supported opposition groups. Without effective de-confliction measures, we see 

increasing opportunity for miscalculation and potential for unintended, counter-productive 

engagement between nation states. We are not currently coordinating or cooperating with the 

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Russians; we are simply de-conflicting our air operations. This has become increasingly difficult 

in the crowded airspace as our operations come into closer proximity. In recent months, the 

Russians also introduced a number of new surface-to-air systems which can be employed to 

impact our freedom of maneuver. While our de-confEction efforts have been effective to date, as 

the fight expands in northem Syria and the battlespace becomes more congested, we should 

consider enhancing our de-confliction mechanisms with the Russians. 

We continue to see Iranian malign influence across Iraq and Syria. While they currently are 

focused on countering ISIS in Iraq, we remain concerned about Iran's efforts to prop up the 

Syrian regime against the opposition and its desire to exploit Shia population centers to increase 

their malign influence, not just in Syria, but also in Arab states across the region. This supports 

their long-term aspiration to achieve regional hegemony. Moreover, we are watching closely lor 

indications and warnings of decreasing Iranian concern regarding the threat posed by ISIS, 

leading to a potential shift to targeting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure in an eflort 

to influence a potential long-term U.S. security presence. Furthermore, we must take care to 

ensure that our actions do not unintentionally strengthen the Iranian position within the region. 

The military campaign plan to defeat ISIS is on track in both Iraq and Syria. The 

coalition's "by, with and through" approach is proving effective. Recognizing that ISIS will 

be defeated militarily, we want to ensure tbat we have an enduring posture in the region to 

support and enable partners' efforts to preserve security and stability. Iraq remains an 

anchor in the region and we would be wise to continue to support their efforts going forward. 

We have a willing partner in Iraq and Prime Minister al-Abadi has clearly articulated a desire for 

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continued U.S. support post-ISIS. We are working with the Gol to finalize a Five-Year Plan to 

ensure enhanced cooperation. This presents an opportunity to preserve gains achieved to date, 

while strengthening key relationships and countering malign influence in the region. 

Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL and Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan). The 

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are beginning their third year with full 

responsibility for security with limited U.S. or coalition support. They continue to take the fight 

to the Tali ban and, despite some territorial losses, have retained control of major population 

areas and key lines of communication. While the Taliban made gains in 2016, namely in the 

north and south, in most cases, the ANDSF quickly responded to and reversed some of those 

gains over the past year. While the balance of power favors the government, neither side is 

cun·ently able to achieve its stated objectives. Looking ahead, it is essential that we continue to 

assist the ANDSF in addressing their capability gaps, particularly in the areas of aviation, 

casualty evacuation (CASEY AC), personnel management and development, logistics, and 

sustainment. Our sustained force presence, over 8,400 U.S. military personnel, will allow us to 

conduct counter-terrorism operations and meet our requirements for staffing the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NA TO)-led Resolute Support (RS) Mission. However, the RS Mission still 

has a shortfall of a few thousand personnel needed to conduct the complementary mission 

of training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF. 

In 2015, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) worked with the Afghans to develop a 

Sustainable Security Strategy based upon three key tenets: "Fight, Hold, Disrupt." The 

strategy identifies areas the Afghans will hold, areas they will fight to retain, and areas where 

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they will conduct an economy of force effoii and disrupt the enemy if they appear, Afghan 

resources permitting. The ANDSF continues to make progress in implementing this strategy, 

thereby assuming a more proactive stance in addressing multiple threats while securing the 

population and denying terrorist safe havens. As General Nicholson, the commander of the RS 

Mission and USFOR-A stated, "[The Afghans'] ability to deal with simultaneous crises ... is a 

sign of an army that's growing in capability, rand] that's maturing in terms of its ability to handle 

simultaneity and complexity on the battlefield." 

While the ANDSF continues to make progress, they do face a number of significant 

challenges. Poor leadership and corruption are two key factors that need further improvement 

and President Ashraf Ghani has made addressing these issues a top priority for the Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (G!RoA). The GIRoA established the Anti-Corruption 

Justice Center in 2016 with the help of the international community and has already tried, 

convicted, and sentenced senior Afghan officials for corruption. Below are other challenges and 

critical capability gaps must be addressed. 

ANDSF casualty rates- High ANDSF casualties remain a concern. This can be attributed to 

several factors, including poor leadership, corruption, tactics, and training. Deficiencies in 

ANDSF leadership occur primarily because of patronage vice merit-based appointments. The 

extensive use of static checkpoints and the lack of training on how to defend them, as well as a 

more aggressive posture which has resulted in the ANDSF more frequently taking the lead and 

actively taking the light to the enemy have also conlTibuted to an increased number of 

casualties. The ANDSF also experienced an increase in the number of insurgent attacks on 

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inadequately protected fixed positions, and poor and corrupt leadership also may have 

contributed to higher casualty rates. The ANDSF lacked an operational readiness cycle (ORC) 

to ensure forces are well-rested and well-trained before returning to the fight. During the Winter 

Campaign this year, many ANDSF units successfully established ORCs, and our advisors have 

fostered an increased focus on company-level training and leadership development. 

Afghan Air Force- The Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) continue 

to build capability. Their ability to provide airlift, casualty evacuation, and aerial fires has 

steadily improved as the U.S. provides more aircraft to the AAF and as its pilots and crew gain 

additional operational experience. The Afghans are proving effective at integrating their AAF 

aviation assets as evidenced by a number of successful operations conducted over the past year. 

However, significant capability gaps remain. The current rotary wing fleet consisting 

primarily of the Russian-made Mi-17 is both undersized and proving to be more expensive 

and difficult to sustain than originally envisioned and is experiencing a higher than 

expected attrition rate. Going forward, transitioning from Russian to U.S. airframes will ensure 

Afghan forces have a more sustainable fleet that is interoperable with U.S. forces and will 

enhance the Afghans' ability to operate independently of coalition forces. The U.S. government 

is considering a critical AAF initiative to replace the unsustainable Russian-manufactured 

aircraft fleet and make up for combat losses in Afghan transport helicopters by providing U.S. 

UH-60s. The DoD-request of$814.5M for FY17 for the first year of our plan to recapitalize the 

Afghan fleet provides funding to procure 53 UH-60s, with refurbishment and modification ofthe 

first 18; 30 additional armed MD-530F helicopters; 6 additional A-29 attack aircraft; and five 

AC-208s. The requested FY2017 Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget, including the 

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additional funds for the first yem· of this proposed aviation initiative, went to Congress on I 0 

Nov 2016. The FY17 proposal is pending approval and we appreciate your support in reaching 

resolution as soon as possible to mitigate the gaps in Afghan aerial fires and lift 

capabilities. Transition from Mi-17 to UH-60 airfrmnes will eventually eliminate reliance on 

Russian sourced parts for maintenance requirements. With our support, we can expect the AAF 

will continue to build needed capability over the next few years and into the future. 

Influence of external actors Stability in Afghanistan is further challenged by the malign 

int1uence of external actors. The cnablcment of violent extremist groups operating inside of 

Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, receiving sanctuary or support 

from outside governments, is of particular concern. So long as these elements remain, they 

will threaten our hard-earned gains and regional stability writ large. 

Pakistan's shared border with Afghanistan remains a safe haven for terrorist and violent 

extremist elements. There are 20 U.S.-designated terrorist organizations present today in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban serves as a facilitator to some of these groups' 

operations. The death of Tali ban Supreme Leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a U.S. strike on 21 

May 2016 had a disruptive impact on the Taliban and gave a psychological boost to the Afghans. 

However, the group still presents a formidable threat to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) sub-region. The convergence of these groups and, in particular, the convergence of the 

Afghan Tali ban and its component, the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, is of 

particular concern given the direct threat posed to U.S. and Coalition personnel and the Afghan 

government. Key to improving the security environment in Afghanistan is eliminating sanctuary 

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of militant groups in Pakistan's territory. The U.S. maintains consistent diplomatic pressure on 

Pakistan to take appropriate steps to deny safe haven and work to improve the security of the 

tumultuous Af-Pak border region. 

Illicit narcotics production and trafficking fllicit narcotics production and trafficking 

continue to flourish in Afghanistan, particularly in areas where state institutions arc weak. The 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated 2016 Afghanistan poppy cultivation to be 

20 I ,000 hectares with a net opium yield of 4,800 metric tons and a farm gate value of $900M, 

which is a 57 percent increase in revenue generated from the opium trade. In Afghanistan, a 

symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking where traffickers 

provide weapons, funding, and material support to the insurgency in exchange for protection. 

Additionally, some insurgent commanders traftic drugs to finance operations. However, 

trafficking is not limited to insurgent-controlled areas. The narcotics trade undermines 

governance and rule of law throughout Afghanistan and plays a critical role in underwriting 

corruption and a loss of confidence by the Afghan people in the GIRoA. 

Regionally, USCENTCOM supports law enforcement counterdrug and border security 

training, equipping of regional partners, construction activities, and information sharing 

initiatives to build the capacity of our security force partners that aid in the regional 

response to illicit drugs trafficking. Counterdrug activities are a critical component of 

USCENTCOM's theater security cooperation strategy; provide for regional engagement and 

comprise a significant source of security assistance funding in Central Asia. These efforts 

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improve regional illicit drug detection and interdiction and improve overall border security for 

tbe detection of other forms of contraband, including weapons and JED materials. 

Amidst the challenges confronting Afghanistan today arc many opportunities. Most notably, 

we have willing partners in the GIRoA and ANDSF and our collaboration iu support of 

common objectives continues to pay significant dividends. Following are three areas in 

particular where potential "game-changing" opportunities exist and merit our sustained 

commitment. 

Government of National Unity The Government ofNational Unity (GNU) survived several 

political crises in 2016. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah 

provided the leadership that has enabled progress to be made in a number of areas, as well as the 

development of the framework for enduring partnerships with NATO and the United States. 

Nevertheless, significant challenges still exist and must be addressed. While the NUG provides 

needed structure and a source of stability for Afghanistan, it remains fragile. Although the 

ANDSF has remained apolitical so far, failure ofthe NUG could threaten ANDSF cohesion and 

the progress achieved throughout the country. Our message to the political elites of Afghanistan 

has been that "we respect your political progress, but please do not allow political tensions to 

undo the hard fought gains you have made." 

The International Community's Demonstrated Commitment to Afghanistan- Thirty-nine 

NATO allies and partner nations committed more than 13,500 troops to sustain the Resolute 

Support Mission beyond 2016. Thirty nations have also pledged more than $800 million 

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annually to sustain Afghan security forces through 2020. Combined with the requested U.S. 

commitment of$3.5 billion for FY2017 and additional funding from Afghanistan, a total of more 

than $4.3 billion has been pledged for the ANDSF for 2017. Additionally, seventy-five 

countries and 26 international organizations confirmed their intention in 2016 at the 

Brussels Conference on Afghanistan to provide $15.28 for Afghan development during the 

2017-2020 period. The International Community's strong showing, coupled with the continued 

commitment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016, has bolstered Afghan confidence and 

resolve and will surely pay dividends going forward. 

Counter-terrorism (CT) Platform The existence of violent extremist groups in Afghanistan 

requires a U.S. presence in the region that can monitor and address threats, even as the United 

States helps to build the Afghans' capability to deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory. 

As we adjust the U.S. CT mission, our support to the NATO T AA mission will also evolve in the 

coming year. Currently, advisory cflorts arc at four of the six corps and police zone levels, in 

addition to the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the AAF. In 2017, we will advise all 

six corps and police zones to provide critical support where needed to capitalize on the success 

and continued implementation of the sustainable security strategy. 

Although we see encouraging progress being made in Afghanistan, it remains a very challenging 

environment. While the ANDSF confronts difficulties in a number of areas, they are providing 

for the security of their country, achieving good effects against the Tali ban, and building muchneeded capacity and momentum while gaining increasing confidence in what is still a tough 

tight. Additionally, although it does face significant challenges, the GIRoA, under the leadership 

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of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, has proven to be a reliable 

and willing partner. The U.S. and our coalition partners have invested greatly in 

Afghanistan over the last 15+ years. The country merits our continued demonstrated 

commitment given our national security interests in the sub-region, namely protection of 

the U.S. Homeland. By strengthening our partners and weakening our enemies we will achieve 

increased stability in that strategically important part of the world. 

Iran. Iran poses the most significant threat to the Central Region and to our national 

interests and the interests of onr partners and allies. We have not seen any improvement in 

fran's behavior since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addressing fran's 

nuclear program, was finalized in July 2015. Iran aspires to be a regional hegemon and its 

forces and proxies oppose U.S. interests in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and seek to 

hinder achievement of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and some Central Asian States. They also 

arc working to subvert the Gol by establishing a long-term presence within Iraq's security forces. 

Of note, Iran exerts influence and a degree of control over the majority of the nearly I 00,000 

Shia militias within the PMF. Furthermore, Iran has expanded cooperation with Russia in 

Syria in ways that threaten U.S. interests in the region. 

The JCPOA removed a key threat posed by Iran tor at least a number of years. Unfoiiunately, 

the agreement has led some to believe that we have largely addressed the Iranian problem set and 

that is not the case. In addition to its nuclear weapons potential, Iran presents several 

credible threats. They have a robust theater ballistic missile program, and we remain concerned 

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about their cyber and maritime activities, as well as the activities of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps- Qods Forces (IRGC-QF) and their network of affiliates. 

Iran implements its strategy primarily within the "gray zone," the space short of conventional 

conflict where miscalculation can easily occur, leading to escalatory conflict and 

misunderstanding. Iran fosters instability by funding and promoting a threat network that 

employs provocation, violence, and covert arms transfers that serve as the stimulants for a range 

of conflicts across the region. It complements this subversive arm with conventional military 

provocation and overt threats to close key maritime sea lanes, especially at critical international 

economic chokepoints, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the BAM Strait, which puts global 

political stability and economic prosperity at risk. 

Recognizing that [ran poses the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests in the Central 

Region, we must seize opportunities to both reassure our allies and shape Iran's behavior. In 

order to contain Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and blunt its asymmetric 

advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the "gray zone" through means that 

include a strong deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and by building 

partner nations' capacity. Through both messaging and actions, we must also be clear in our 

communications and ensure the credibility of U.S. intentions. Iran must believe there will be 

prohibitive consequences if it chooses to continue its malign activities designed to foment 

instability in the region. The U.S. Government should also consider communicating directly 

with Iran's leadership to improve transparency and lessen the potential for miscalculation. 

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To further strengthen deterrence against Iran, we must also take the necessary proactive 

measures to build the capacity of partners and allies in the region. Ideally we want to improve 

interoperability, expand communication, and enhance security mechanisms. Stronger, more 

capable partners, able and willing to assn me a greater role in countering Iran, will serve to 

fnrther enhance deterrence and improve stability in the region. 

In addition to ready military actions, we must support the broader USG strategy with regard to 

Iran which should include new diplomatic initiatives that provide Iran with viable alternatives to 

its present course. While Iran continues to pose the most significant threat to regional security, 

we remain optimistic and believe that by taking proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve 

we can lessen Iran's ability to negatively influence outcomes in the future. 

Yemen. Yemen remains a critically unstable state engrossed in a civil war that has produced 

a significant humanitarian crisis and growing instability ripe for exploitation by VEOs, most 

notably al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ISIS affiliate, IS-Yemen. The lack of 

a comprehensive peace agreement that leads to a durable resolution of the conflict under a 

unified Yemeni government further contributes to continued uncertainty in the country. 

The civil war between the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) and the alliance of Former 

President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh- and Huthis has entered its third year with little progress 

made towards achieving an enduring resolution despite concerted efforts by the United Nations, 

the broader International Community, and regional stakeholders. While the United States is 

not directly involved in the civil Wat', we are providing limited assistance to the Kingdom of 

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Saudi Arabia (KSA)-led coalition in an effort to help protect their territorial integrity and 

sovereign borders. Huthi forces have seized and attacked military border outposts inside KSA 

territory and continue to occupy Saudi lands. Ballistic missile attacks launched from Yemen have 

struck deep into the country causing casualties and potentially threatening the Islamic holy sites 

in Mecca. We will continue to work to resolve the conflict as an ending to the war through a 

comprehensive political agreement provides the surest security of Saudi's Arabia's border and 

territorial integrity , enables us to conduct counter-ten·orism operations, allows the population to 

receive food and medicine, and blocks Iranian malign activities. Until the war is over, we will 

assist Saudi Arabia in its efforts to defend against these attacks and restore the tenitorial integrity 

of their country. 

Our primary focus in Yemen remains protecting the U.S. homeland from threats posed by 

VEOs operating within Yemen's ungoverned spaces, while ensuring freedom of navigation 

and commerce through the southern Red Sea and the Bab at Mandeb (BAM) Strait. AI Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula has indicated clear desire and ability to conduct attacks on the U.S. 

Homeland. Ongoing U.S. unilateral counter-terrorism operations and determined efforts by UAE 

in leading Ro YG andY emeni tribal forces, as demonstrated during the Mukalla o!Tensive in 

April2016, have degraded and disrupted AQAP's operational networks and reduced their access 

to sources of financial support. Despite the complexity of the environment, our efforts aimed at 

degrading AQAP remain critical to protecting our national security interests in the region and 

must continue. 

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In October 2016, the Iranian-supported BAM Maritime Threat Network (BMTN) 

demonstrated the ability to threaten freedom of navigation by successfully attacking a UAE 

vessel and a Saudi warship, and attempting to attack U.S. Navy warships in the southern Red 

Sea. We responded swiftly and decisively, destroying several Huthi coastal defense radar sites. 

While the origin of these attacks is found in the ROYG-Huthi conflict, the threats posed by the 

BMTN to the safe passage of vessels, either through deliberate action or unintentional acts, has 

the potential for significant strategic and economic impacts throughout the region. We continue 

to closely monitor the BMTN and remain prepared to promptly and decisively respond to any 

threats. 

Going forward, our efforts against violent, non-state actors and support for similar efforts by our 

regional partners will remain our primary focus in Yemen. At the same time, we continue to do 

what we can to enable ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a resolution to the 

hostilities that pose an enduring threat to stability in the country and the region writ large. 

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The Central Region remains the global 

epicenter for terrorism and violent Islamist extremism and the resulting turmoil continues to 

bleed across geographic combatant command "seams." Terrorism and violent extremism 

represent trans-regional threats, where malign actors seek to exploit ungoverned and 

under-governed spaces and vulnerable, disenfranchised populations worldwide. 

One aspect of this threat that makes it particularly challenging is the terrorists' and VEOs' 

ability to operate across multiple domains and in both physical and virtual spaces. Today, 

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the unprecedented global access achieved through the use of the Internet and various social 

media platforms enables ten·orist and violent extremist groups to promulgate their radicalized 

ideologies while reaching a vast pool of potential recruits, many willing to conduct lone wolfstyle attacks on behalfofthese groups. Also, as we have seen with ISIS, the ability of violent 

extremist groups to operate effectively in the virtual battlespace, makes them more 

challenging to defeat due to the nature of that domain. As we degrade their physical 

capability, groups often shift focus to the virtual battlespace while their forces consolidate and 

regroup. We must continue to identify attributable and non-attributable methods and techniques 

for combatting groups in the virtual domain. 

We must also find ways to address the drivers of instability that create the conditions that 

allow these groups to nourish. The root causes of instability must be dealt with if we hope to 

achieve a lasting defeat of terrorist and violent extremist fo'I"Oups operating in the USCENTCOM 

AOR. The people of the region must lead this effort; we cannot do it for them. However, 

we can and will continue to support and promote their efforts wherever possible. 

We cannot allow terrorist groups and violent extremist organizations to operate uncontested, 

enabling them to grow stronger and expand their global reach. By working together with our 

Interagency Partners aud the International Community, operating from multiple strategic 

platforms around the globe and across all domains, we will reduce the gaps and "seams" 

exploited by these groups and better protect our interests against this common threat. 

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Our Partner Nations in the Central Region. Below are synopses of the current state of affairs, 

including challenges, opportunities, and status of our military-to-military (mil-to-mil) 

relationships with partner nations, except Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Yemen which were 

addressed in the previous section, "Key Focus Areas" (see pages 13-31). 

The Gulf States The Gulf States are among our best partners in the region. The Gulf 

Cooperation Council's (GCC) willingness to provide basing and access for U.S. forces is crucial 

to our ability to operate militarily in the USCENTCOM AOR. The GCC countries provide 

critical nodes for achieving operational objectives and continued success against ISIS. Their 

troops and aircraft continue to play a key role in the ongoing fight against this terrorist 

organization. At leader-level summits in 2015 and 2015, the GCC countries committed to pursue 

collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-terrorism and ballistic missile defense; 

however, progress towards those ends has been relatively slow. Nevertheless, the GCC's desire 

to create a unified military command and more closely coordinated economic policy could create 

opportunities for greater interoperability between GCC and coalition forces over the medium- to 

long-term. While individual GCC nations' sometimes divergent foreign policies present an 

obstacle to achieving a unified defense posture, we remain committed to helping them achieve 

this desired end state through senior leader engagements, combined exercises, and more 

standardized equipment and training. As agreed upon at the May 2015 Camp David Summit, 

we have increased cooperation on maritime security, military preparedness, arms transfers, 

cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and logistics interoperability. Our total GCC FMS open case 

portfolio is valued at over $150B and continues to help our partners defend their sovereignty and 

economic interests against emerging threats. As Gulf countries look to the United States for 

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military equipment, training, and assistance, it is essential that we reinforce efforts to include 

them in our joint endeavors to defeat regional threats posed by violent extremism and Iran's 

malign influence. Through our continued support for and collaboration with our GCC partners 

we will positively impact stability and security in the strategically important Central Region. 

Bahrain is an important partner in the region, hosting USCENTCOM's naval component, U.S. 

Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) and U.S. Fillh Fleet Headquarters and Combined 

Maritime Forces in Manama at the Naval Support Activity Bahrain and !sa Air Base, 

respectively. The Bahrainis have actively supported coalition operations against ISIS in Syria 

since the start of the C-ISIS Campaign in September 2014, primarily by allowing us continued 

use and access to these facilities. They also continue to supp01i Saudi-led operations in Yemen. 

We are making strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the Bahraini Coast Guard's 

capacity, which aim to enable Bahrain to expand its role in countering piracy and violent 

extremism in the region's maritime domain. Internally, the Bahrainis arc dealing with a tough 

domestic economic hit by low oil prices and a persistent, low-level threat from Iranian-backed 

militant groups, and we continue to provide appropriate assistance to help them address the 

security threat. While we have historically enjoyed a strong mil-to-mil relationship with our 

Bahraini counterparts, the slow progress on key FMS cases, specifically additional F-16 aircraft 

and upgrades to Bahrain's existing F-16 fleet, due to concerns of potential human rights abuses 

in the country, continues to strain our relationship. We continue to urge the Government of 

Bahrain to reverse steps it has taken over the past year to reduce the space for peaceful political 

expression in its Shia population and have encouraged the Bahrainis to implement needed 

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political reforms in the country while reassuring them of our strong commitment to our valued 

partnership. 

The Kingdom of Sandi Arabia (KSA) is undertaking potentially far-reaching economic and 

related reforms under the banner of Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan. The goal 

of these measures is to diversify the Saudi economy and generate increased economic growth in 

the wake of low oil prices, as well as expanded opportunities for the nation's burgeoning youth 

population. The Kingdom is a key regional leader, calling upon partner nations to join them in 

addressing regional challenges, including Iranian malign ini1uence. Having actively supported 

the fight against ISIS in the early stages of the campaign, KSA shifted its priority of effort to 

Yemen in 2015 where it leads the coalition against the Saleh- and Iranian-backed Huthis, who 

continue to pose a threat to Yemen's internal stability, security in KSA's southern border region, 

and the How of commerce through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Saudis also are concerned 

about the threat posed by VEOs operating in Y cmcn, including the a! Qaeda affiliate, AQAP, and 

the ISIS affiliate, IS-Y. We are principally focused on helping KSA to improve its target 

development and accountability processes in order to reduce incidence of civilian casualties, 

while also providing them with focused logistics and intelligence sharing support. Our longstanding partnership with KSA remains critical to maintaining stability in the region given their 

ini1uence in the GCC and among many Muslim-majority countries. Our mil-to-mil relationship 

represents the strongest component of that partnership and continues to serve as the foundation 

for productive collaboration. By continuing to provide opportunities for the Saudis to enhance 

their defense capabilities, mainly through our substantive training and exercise program and 

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robust FMS valued at $1 09B in open cases, we aim to improve interoperability while effectively 

addressing challenges in pursuit of our shared security goals and objectives. 

Kuwait continues to be one of our strongest allies in the Central Region. Owing to the generous 

provisions of the Defense Cooperation Agreement, the Kuwaitis provide one of the most 

permissive environments in the USCENTCOM AOR with respect to access, basing, and 

overflight in support of U.S. and coalition presence in theater. Kuwait hosts the forward 

headquarters ofUSCENTCOM's army component, U.S. A1my Central Command (ARCENT). 

Kuwait is also the most active combat support logistics hub globally and plays a critical role in 

support of ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria, andY emen. Kuwait utilizes its leadership role in 

the GCC to help mediate internal GCC rifts while promoting a regional response to crises. 

Kuwait has also led the GCC in helping to address the regional refugee crisis emanating from 

Syria and been an invaluable partner in supporting the Iraqi government's C-IS IS efforts. Our 

mil-to-mil relationship with the Kuwaitis remains strong. Going forward we will look to pursue 

additional opportunities for joint training and further collaboration in support of common 

objectives. 

The relationship between the United States and Oman remains strong, strengthened by our 

shared interests in the region and expanding access to Omani bases and ports. Oman is 

consistently viewed as a source of stability in the Gulf Region, and its neutral stance has enabled 

it to serve as a key interlocutor, most notably with Yemen and Iran. Of note, in October 2016, 

Oman's leadership facilitated the release of two U.S. citizens held by the Huthis in Sanaa, 

Yemen. Additionally, Oman's strategic location on the Arabian Sea, outside of the Babel 

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Mandeb Strait and the Strait ofHormuz provides USCENTCOM with access to key logistical, 

operational, and contingency capabilities that are crucial to maintaining open sea lines of 

communication. While Oman does face significant challenges, namely a growing threat from 

VEOs in neighboring Yemen and a declining economy that could potentially impact its youth 

population, the leadership of the country is taking appropriate steps to address these and other 

issues. We enjoy a good relationship with the Omani military and will continue to work closely 

with them in support of shared interests. 

Qatar remains a highly valued partner, providing critical access and basing in support of 

coalition forces and operations being conducted in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the 

Central Region. The country hosts more than I 0,000 U.S. and Coalition service members at AIUdeid Air Base, home ofUSCENTCOM's Forward Headquarters, our air component, U.S. Air 

Forces Central Command (AFCENT), and its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). 

Qatar's Armed Forces also continue to support external operations in Syria and Yemen. In 

Syria, given their relationships with a wide range of actors, including more moderate elements, 

the Qataris are well-positioned to play an influential role in facilitating a political resolution to 

the conflict. Like most GCC countries, they continue to demand the removal of Bashar al-Assad 

as part of any resolution. Qatar has indicated a strong desire to enhance its partnership with the 

United States, both in terms of training engagements with U.S. forces and procurement of U.S. 

military equipment. Our continued role in their military modernization and development 

presents an invaluable opportunity to help expand their capability while strenl:,'lhening our mil-tomil relationship with a key and critical partner in the region. 

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of our most steadfast and capable partners in the 

USCENTCOM AOR. The Emirates have clearly demonstrated a willingness and ability to take 

an active role in shaping outcomes in the Central Region. The country hosts more than 4,000 

U.S. service members and provides critical support for U.S. operations, goals, and objectives. 

The UAE was among the first countries to join the Counter-ISIS Coalition in 2014. While their 

primary focus has since shifted to support the ongoing KSA-Ied military campaign in Yemen, 

UAE continues to provide support to several of the C-JSIS Coalition's key lines of effort, 

including counter-messaging, counter-financing, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. In 

Yemen, the UAE serves as the leading ground element in ongoing operations against the Salehand Iranian-backed Huthis. The Emirates are also supporting our efforts to counter the al Qaeda 

affiliate, AQAP. In April, using local fighters and tribal militias, the Emirates played a critical 

role in liberating Mukalla, driving AQAP elements out of the port city and thereby denying them 

a key source of revenue. In conjunction with its military efforts, the UAE is heavily focused on 

providing humanitarian assistance to ease the crisis facing Yemen's population. We value our 

strong relationship with the Emirates and seek to build upon our robust mil-to-mil relationship, 

including by concluding a new Defense Cooperation Agreement that could serve as a foundation 

for expanded, mutually beneficial defense cooperation. We will work to expand our 

collaboration, specifically in the areas of security cooperation and foreign military sales. 

Additionally, we will work with the Emirates to promote their leadership role among partner 

nations in the region. 

The Levant- The Levant represents the epicenter of ethno-sectarian tension and conflict in the 

USCENTCOM AOR. Partner nations in this sub-region continue to struggle with the impacts of 

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the fight against ISIS, as well as the ongoing civil war in Syria, which is an "engine of 

instability" in and of itself The persistent conflict and resulting widespread unrest have caused 

an expanding humanitarian crisis with ramifications that reach far beyond the USCENTCOM 

AOR. Stability in the Levant is further complicated by competition for influence therein from 

outside actors, principally Iran and Russia. Many of the challenges present today in the Levant 

originate from or affect neighboring countries and thus are trans-regional in nature and require 

cross-COCOM coordination. We routinely work closely with our colleagues in U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Africa Command, and other USG agencies and organizations to ensure that our 

various efforts arc complementary and well-synchronized. 

With its strategic location, control of the Suez Canal, enduring peace treaty with Israel coupled 

with a religious and cultural Pan-Arab inHuence, Egypt remains a stalwart partner in pursuit of 

shared Middle East policy objectives that include counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism, 

and improved regional stability. Of particular concern is the threat posed by the ISIS affiliate, 

IS-Sinai which conducts frequent attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and security 

services. While the EAF has managed to contain violence in the Sinai Peninsula without a 

comprehensive strategy to defeat IS-Sinai, we have a vested interest in helping them to 

effectively address this threat to ensure that the Sinai does not become a safe haven for extremist 

elements, including by providing additional bilateral military and security training. Egypt is 

further challenged by a weak economy and widespread unemployment or under-employment, as 

well as an aggressive approach to countering internal threats which makes its population highly 

susceptible to radicalization by extremist elements. Continued U.S. support to Egypt is cmcialto 

our strategic partnership, and our long-standing, resilient mil-to-mil relationship represents a key 

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pillar of that partnership. Over the past several months, we have expanded our collaboration 

while taking steps to bolster our force protection measures and rebalance the Multinational Force 

Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai. In the coming months, we will continue to work closely 

with the EAF to further enhance their counter-terrorism capabilities and improve the security of 

their borders through continued engagement and our robust assistance and security cooperation 

programs. 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of our strongest and most reliable partners in the 

Levant sub-region. Jordan provides access, basing, and overflight equal to or greater than that 

provided by any other partner in the USCENTCOM AOR. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) 

and the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) continue to make key contributions in supp01i of the 

Counter-ISIS Campaign. With U.S. and coalition assistance, the JAF have fortified Jordan's 

borders with Iraq and Syria, while enabling the International Community's ongoing efforts to 

address the burgeoning humanitarian crisis manifesting inside of Jordan ( -650,000 refugees) and 

in two camps located along the border in southern Syria (-55,000-65,000 !DPs). It is imperative 

that we remain actively engaged with our Jordanian partners. Jordan provides a much-needed 

moderate Islamic voice in the region and is a trusted intermediary in efforts to advance progress 

between the Israelis and Palestinians. Our strong mil-to-mil relationship and continued 

demonstrated support for the Government of Jordan, the JAF, and the RJAF remains critical to 

ensuring that Jordan is able to effectively manage the broad range of challenges facing the 

country and the region now and in the future. 

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Lebanon remains a key partner in our eftorts to counter violent extremism in the Central Region, 

and their ground forces offer one of the greatest returns on investment in the region. They are 

routinely countering groups that include ISIS and AI Nusra Front, denying them freedom of 

movement, and strengthening the country's border defenses with our continued support. U.S. 

security assistance to Lebanon has enhanced the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) ability to 

counter malign influences and terrorist clements operating within the country. A strong and 

capable LAF acts as a counterweight to the militant arm of Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), while 

diminishing LH's claim as the sole "resistance" in Lebanon. While LH has been preoccupied 

with its involvement in the tight in Syria in support of the Assad Regime, the LAF has gained 

increasing credibility among the Lebanese populace as the most respected institution in the 

country. On 31 October 2016, the Lebanese parliament ended the over two-year presidential 

vacancy with the appointment of President Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian and leader of the 

Free Patriotic Movement Party. While this positive development ended political gridlock and 

restored government fimctions, significant challenges remain, exacerbated by the civil war in 

neighboring Syria. Of particular concern are the approximately I+ mill ion Syrian refugees in 

Lebanon. This population presents political, economic, and security challenges to Prime 

Minister Hariri and his newly formed government. In addition to straining national resources, 

the Syrian refugee population is mostly Sunni and thus could threaten the fragile sectarian 

balance of power in the country. The humanitarian burden facing Lebanon will require 

significant international assistance to bolster limited local resources. Our continued support for 

this valued partner is both merited and has proven to pay tremendous dividends as the LAF has 

routinely demonstrated the ability to make best usc of U.S. assistance to increase its capability 

and capacity and bring about positive, measurable results. 

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Central and South Asia- Our primary interests in the Central and South Asia (CASA) subregion are to prevent the establishment of ten·orist safe havens, assure continued U.S. access, and 

support the sovereil,'llty and independence of partner nations. Our engagement strategy is 

focused on these three interests and strengthening our bilateral relationships with the seven 

partner nations. We also encourage multi-lateral cooperation amongst these same seven nations, 

and our annual CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference serves as a mechanism for facilitating 

expanded dialogue and increased cooperation. This past year, we also held the highly successful 

inaugural CASA Directors of Military Intelligence Conference. The increased participation and 

elevated levels of mil-to-mil discussions clearly convey increased appetite for further U.S.-led 

engagement. 

Despite increasing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian pressure designed to limit U.S. influence in the 

sub-region, the U.S. maintains its regional position by focusing on security cooperation areas 

where we have a comparative advantage such as counter-terrorism, border security, defense 

institution building, and professional development. Several CASA governments support transit 

of supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. We 

anticipate a continued need for these access routes. In this regard, our CASA partners have been 

and continue to be strong partners in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Other areas of shared 

interest include countering violent extremism and counter-narcotics. Our training and exercise 

programs in the CASA sub-region clearly demonstrate our strong commitment to addressing 

these and other common challenges. For example, Exercise STEPPE EAGLE, traditionally a 

trilateral exercise with the U.S., U.K., and Kazakhstan, has become more regional in scope with 

Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also now taking part. Additionally, we are increasing 

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multilateral collaboration with our CASA-wide annual USCENTCOM Exercise REGIONAL 

COOPERATION. 

We share two primary concerns with our CASA pmtners regarding stability and security in the 

region: I) persistent won·ies about the long-term stability and viability of Afghanistan and 2) the 

threat posed by returning foreign fighters. The United States and NATO's continued 

commitment to the ongoing Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan is helping to assuage these 

concerns, primarily by bolstering the Afghan security forces' ability to defend their security 

interests. At the same time, we continue to pursue opportunities that would allow for increased 

information sharing, improved border security, and enhanced training and multi-lateral 

collaboration to support our shared interests. 

While our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to require significant investment, 

elsewhere in the CASA sub-region we have clearly demonstrated the ability to achieve good 

effects with modest investments in terms of building pmtner nations' capabilities, improving 

multi-lateral cooperation, and addressing common security threats. Going forward, we intend to 

strengthen relationships and build on previous accomplishments while working together with our 

Interagency Partners to explore and pursue new opportunities in this strategically important part 

of the world. 

The U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced military relationship in Central Asia. 

We are making notable progress as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense continues to focus on 

institutional reform of its NCO corps, training management. human resources administration, and 

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professional military education system. This progress continues despite enduring Russian 

int1uence and a Kazakhstani economy that is still recovering from the recent downturn in oil and 

gas prices. Kazakhstan remains the most significant regional contributor to Afghan stability, 

donating money to the ANA Trust Fund, continuing to provide educational opportunities to 

Afghans, and offering technical support services. Kazakhstan is also moving closer to a United 

Nations peace-keeping operations deployment with a unit that has been trained with U.S. 

assistance. Looking at future opportunities to strengthen our partnership, Kazakhstan has 

expressed interest in working with the U.S. to improve its logistical, medical, and engineering 

military branches. Kazakhstan also partnered with the Arizona National Guard through our State 

Partnership program, providing us the ability to assist in this effort. 

The Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asia's sole democracy, faces a number of challenges including 

economic and border security issues. The Kyrgyz Republic sees political pressure from its 

larger, more powertulncighbors, including Russia, hosting a small Russian airbase outside the 

capital, Bishkek. Despite ongoing challenges in our bilateral and security cooperation, we 

continue to seek opportunities to improve our mil-to-mil relationship. After a len£,'lhy period of 

time during which few bilateral activities occurred, the Kyrgyz military may be increasingly 

receptive to higher level military engagements and expanded cooperation in the areas of border 

security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and countering violent extremism. Furthermore, 

we continue to assist the Kyrgyz in building a deployable peace-keeping (PK) hospital capability 

that should be ready to support United Nations PK operations in the near future. Looking ahead, 

we intend to pursue opportunities for increased cooperation while taking steps to strengthen our 

relationships with the Kyrgyz. 

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Pakistan remains a critical partner in the counter-terrorism tight. Twenty U.S-designated 

terrorist organizations operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region; seven of the 20 

organizations are in Pakistan. So long as these groups maintain safe haven inside of Pakistan 

they will threaten long-term stability in Afghanistan. Of particular concern to us is the Haqqani 

Network (HQN) which poses the greatest threat to coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. To 

date, the Pakistan military and security services have not taken lasting actions against HQN. We 

have consistently called upon the Pakistanis to lake the necessary actions to deny terrorists safe 

haven and improve security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FAT A) along the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. We have seen some promising coordination between the 

Pakistan and Afghanistan militaries aimed at addressing instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border region. The Pakistan military in particular continues to conduct counter-terrorism and 

counter-insurgency operations in the FATA and facilitate, via ground and air lines of 

communication, the sustainment of coalition operations in Afghanistan. 

This past year we became increasingly concerned about the growing threat posed by the ISIS 

affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). Although their operational capacity has diminished as a 

result of U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan military operations, we remain focused on defeating the 

group in both countries. Of note, we were encouraged to see the Pakistani military plan and 

execute a recent named operation in which they set up simultaneous multiple blocking positions 

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in order to reinforce ANDSF efforts to disrupt IS-K 

activities. 

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We also continue to see ongoing tensions between Pakistan and neighboring India. India remains 

concerned about the lack of action against India-focused militants based in Pakistan and even 

responded militarily to terrorist attacks in India-held territory earlier this year. We assess that 

these types of attacks and the potential reactions, increase the likelihood for miscalculation by 

both countries. Furthermore, India's public policy to "diplomatically isolate" Pakistan hinders 

any prospects for improved relations. This is especially troubling as a significant conventional 

conflict between Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear exchange, given that both are 

nuclear powers. Additionally, Pakistan's increased focus on its eastern border detracts from its 

eHorts to secure the western border with Afghanistan from incursion by Taliban and al-Qaida 

fighters. Security along the western border will nevertheless remain a priority for Islamabad, as 

the Pakistani military seeks to expand border control and improve paramilitary security. 

While there are challenges with respect to the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, we have endeavored to 

maintain a substantial level of engagement with our Pakistani military counterparts. We 

continue to execute a robust joint exercise program. Most recently, the Pakistani Air Force sent 

airmen and aircraft to participate in Exercise RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG at Nellis Air Force 

Base in Nevada this past summer. The Pakistani military also continues to support our eflorts 

elsewhere in the region; most notably, the Pakistani Navy is the most consistent and 

longstanding participant, second only to the United States, in Combined Task Force (CTF)-150 

(counter-terrorism operations) and CTF-151 (counter-piracy operations) led by U.S. Naval 

Forces Central (USNA VCENT). Our relationship with Pakistan remains a very important one. 

We look forward to continuing our engagement with the Pakistani military leadership, to include 

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the new Chief of the Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, in the days ahead as we work 

together in pursuit of shared interests. 

Our mil-to-mil relationship with Tajikistan is deepening despite Moscow's enduring tics and the 

presence of the 20lst Military Base near Tajikistan's capital of Dushanbe, Russia's largest 

military base outside of its borders. China has also initiated a much stronger military 

cooperation partnership with Tajikistan, adding further complexity to Tajikistan's multi-faceted 

approach to security cooperation. Tajikistan's long border with Afghanistan remains the nation's 

top concern, as the Tali ban intermittently fights for control of Afghanistan's Kunduz province, 

which is less than 160 miles from Dushanbe. These border concerns remain a focus area for U.S. 

security cooperation as we continue to develop the Tajiks' capacity to address violent extremism, 

terrorism, and narco-trafficking; enhance border security; and, conll·ont other trans-regional 

threats. 

Turkmenistan's UN-recognized policy of"positive neutrality" presents a challenge with respect 

to U.S. engagement. Our efforts to date have focused primarily on training, including in the 

areas of counter-narcotics and medical services. Due to Turkmenistan's shared border with 

Afghanistan, the Turkmen remain concerned about the continuing instability in Afghanistan and, 

separately, the potential for the return of foreign fighters. We arc encouraged somewhat by 

Turkmenistan's expressed interest in increased mil-to-mil engagement with the U.S. within the 

limits oftheir "positive neutrality" policy. 

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We are cautiously optimistic about the possibility of Uzbekistan's improved relations with its 

neighbors in the region following the first presidential succession in the nation's 25-year history. 

This is a promising development given Uzbekistan's central and strategic geographic location, in 

the heart of Central Asia and bordering Afghanistan. President Mirziyoyev has reaffirmed the 

country's unwillingness to allow other nations to establish military bases in Uzbekistan, its 

restriction against aligning with foreign military or political blocs, and its self: imposed 

restriction against any type of expeditionary military operations. Despite these limitations, our 

bilateral mil-to-mil efforts are focused on helping the Uzbeks improve border security, enhance 

their counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and prevent the return of foreign 

lighters into the country, whicb are shared U.S. interests in the region. We remain committed to 

these security assistance efforts. We also are helping the Uzbek military, which is the largest 

military in Central Asia, to professionalize its forces through advisory support and assistance to 

its professional military institutions. 

Required Programs, Capabilities and Resources. The security environment in the Central 

Region remains complex and highly volatile. To ensure we are able to effectively achieve our 

mandate to protect our national interests, we must be properly postured with the necessary 

capabilities and resources to pursue opportunities in support of our goals and objectives, and to 

prevail in our various endeavors throughout USCENTCOM's 20-country area of responsibility. 

Below are the programs, capabilities, and resources most critical to our success. 

Building Partner Capacity. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is essential to achieving our 

objectives in the Central Region. To improve stability in the USCENTCOM AOR and mitigate 

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the need for costly U.S. military intervention. we must be forward-leaning and empower our 

partners to meet internal security challenges and work collectively to counter common threats. 

BPC is a lower-cost alternative to U.S. boots on the ground, has longer-term sustainability, and is 

necessary for interoperable, combined coalition operations. As such it represents a high return 

investment in the future of the Central Region. By building capacity and enabling partners to 

assume a larger role in providing for the stability and security of their sovereign spaces, we 

will enhance regional stability while still maintaining our critical access and influence in 

the region. Other tangible by-products achieved through our BPC efforts include enhanced 

intcropcrability, improved security for forward deployed forces and diplomatic sites, continued 

access and influence, and more professional regional militaries comprised of forces learning the 

importance of rule of law and compliance with human rights nonns. Continued support of key 

partners engaged in the ongoing military campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria is 

particularly important. As important as long-term regional stability is BPC's focus on the 

threat environment and shaping the region is critical to better prepare and deter and counter state 

and non-state aggression. Our key partners' ability to procure U.S. weapons and equipment and 

increase interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces is critical to our success. Any reduction 

of U.S. assistance risks undermining our allies and creating a security vacuum for exploitation by 

state and non-state actors with counter-U.S. or violent intentions. 

Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales. For decades, U.S. security assistance 

provided to countries including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait and Egypt, has helped 

create lasting partnerships and improve regional stability. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

assistance and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program enable countries to meet their defense 

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needs, while also promoting U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions and 

enhancing interoperability between and among U.S. and coalition forces. When we provide 

defense systems through U.S. security assistance, we are not just providing our partners 

with capabilities, we are committing to a long-term relationship that includes sustainment 

of those capabilities. The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often 

require continuous collaboration between countries. This may include training and support in the 

use of the equipment, maintenance assistance, and, in some cases, continuing help to update and 

modernize the equipment throughout its life-cycle. 

Nevertheless, we must better anticipate our partners' requirements and find ways to 

improve our FMF and FMS programs' processes to better meet demand in today's highpaced global security environment. Delays in procurement and delivery can, over time, 

jeopardize relationships with buyer nations and the potential for future FMS and FMF 

transactions. It is imperative that we make the FMF and FMS processes more responsive to 

partner needs. 

In recent years we have seen an increase in restrictions placed on assistance provided to partner 

nations, limiting their ability to acquire U.S. equipment based on human rights and/or political 

oppression of minority groups. While these are significant challenges that must be addressed, 

the use of FMF and FMS as a mechanism to achieve changes in behavior has questionable 

effectiveness and can have unintended consequences. We need to carefully balance these 

concerns against our desired outcomes for U.S. security assistance programs- both DoD and 

State-funded to build and shape partner nations' capability, interoperability, and self-reliance in 

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support of broader U.S. foreign policy. We should avoid using the programs as a lever of 

intluence or denial to our own detriment. 

USCENTCOM Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Exercise Engagement 

Training Transformation (CE2T2) program enhances U.S. capability to support contingency 

operations while improving readiness and maintaining presence and access to the region. At the 

same time, the program indirectly increases partner nations' operational capability; demonstrates 

mutual commitment to regional security; ensures an effective coalition posture; strent,>ihens 

relationships; and, improves combined command, control, and communications interoperability 

(C3f). More importantly, in light of the fact that today's conflicts are increasingly trans-regional, 

all-domain, and multi-functional in nature, bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises support the unity 

of effort requirement for coalition operations. 

The USCENTCOM CE2T2 program continues to grow in complexity and relevance with 

expanded participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR during FY20 16 and into FY20 17. 

Last year, the command conducted 45 USCENTCOM- and/or Component-sponsored 

bilateral and multi-lateral exercises with 41 partner nations and spanning seven 

Geographic and Functional Commands. These exercises shape the perceptions of key 

audiences in the USCENTCOM AOR to support U.S. strategic goals of reassuring partners and 

deterring aggressive and malign behavior. Exercise objectives and outcomes include 

maintaining key relationships while demonstrating multilateral, as well as unilateral, 

capabilities. They also enable increased cooperation and interoperability with our partners and 

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help to reinforce a strong military posture in the region. This helps counter any false perception 

of the U.S. "abandoning" the region. 

Continued, robust, and reliable funding is necessary to fully support exercises as planned. For 

example, insufficient resourcing of component requirements can result in curtailment or even 

cancellation of efforts like Exercise EAGER LION, an annual multi-lateral training event in 

Jordan. This sub-optimization of the USCENTCOM exercise and training program ultimately 

will affect U.S. Joint and Combined Force readiness and create a perceived lack of commitment 

to our coalition partners. Combined with BPC, FMS, and FMF, the OSCENTCOM CE2T2 

program also actively promotes and supports regional stability through increased partner action 

and capability. These engagements not only build interoperability at the highest levels of 

command, but the benefits derived at the lowest, tactical levels of command and logistics 

manifest in long-term professional and personal relationships among participating country staffs. 

Information Operations. Information Operations (IO) will continue to serve as a key element 

in shaping the environment to reduce or avoid conflict and as a force multiplier in the 

information space during and alter major combat and counter-insurgency operations. We have 

an enduring responsibility to employ 10 to counter trans-regional threats. By utilizing 10 

as a comprehensive, long-term capability to degrade VEOs' effectiveness and counter statesponsored destabilizing activities across the USCENTCOM AOR, the USG helps to improve 

regional stability while reducing the requirement for deployed U.S. forces. The Department of 

Defense (DoD), in concert with other USG agencies, has developed several TO campaigns, 

leveraging the latest technologies, which operate in the infonnation domain. These campaigns 

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include counter-propaganda messaging in print media, radio, television, short message service, 

Internet, and social media, and take a proactive approach to coordinating these activities with the 

country teams and embassies in our AOR. The nature and scope of threats prevalent today in the 

USCENTCOM AOR necessitates a robust response, and 10 is a cost-effective application of 

DoD resources to deter aggression, counter destabilizing behavior, and decrease the 

potential for kinetic operations in order to protect USG and partner nation interests in the 

Central Region. 

Cyberspace Operations. USCENTCOM cyberspace operations arc built on the foundation of 

cyber readiness and include both Department of Defense Information Network (DO DIN) 

Operations and command-centric Defensive Cyberspace Operations. Our top cyberspace 

priority is mission assurance; the goal is to preserve freedom of maneuver in cyberspace to 

assure access to both U.S. and foreign assets critical to military operations. Effotis include, 

but arc not limited to, helping to set priorities and contributing to the desired end-state of 

denying adversaries the ability to operate on our networks and impact our missions. We 

recognize the importance of maintaining a holistic approach to this evolving capability that 

emphasizes the need for a synchronized effort across the whole of government. While the full 

and proper implementation of all available USG/DoD technical defenses plays a vital role, the 

human element is the most important factor to protect and defend from malicious cyber activity. 

Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will continue to adapt our network defenses to detect, deter, and 

better react to known or anticipated threats. 

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Anti-Access At·ea Denial. Potential adversaries are actively investing in competitive responses 

that include anti-access/area denial (A2AD) systems to minimize U.S. intluence and 

abilities. Adversaries are also pursuing "layered defenses" to directly challenge U.S. diplomacy 

and presence. An enemy may usc combinations of kinetic (e.g., ballistic/cruise missiles, 

moored/Hoating mines, small boat swarms, submarines, aircraft, drones, iJTegular warfare using 

proxies, teJTorism, WMD) and non-kinetic (e.g., GPS jamming, spoofing, cyber hacking, EMP, 

underground facilities, dispersal/camoul1age of weapons/assets, shielding from aerial/satellite 

surveillance, decoys) capabilities to inhibit projection of force and/or precision strikes. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Assets. USCENTCOM holds daily requirements 

for over 2,800 hours of full-motion video, thousands of still images, thousands of hours of signal 

intelligence, and other key intelligence collection sources. These requirements do not reside 

ouly iu Afghanistan, Iraq, aud Syria, but span the entirety of the USCENTCOM AOR. It 

is the layering, synchronization, and prioritization of national, theater, and tactical ISR 

capabilities that enable USCENTCOM force protection oftransition, stability, and combat 

forces. This critical capability also performs several key functions including: battlespace 

awareness for partner and U.S. operational commanders, as well as indications and warning to 

guard against strategic threats and miscalculation; identification of fixed ground networks and 

facilities; location and tracking of adversary operational elements and units; mapping and 

development of adversary command and control; interdictions of facilitation entities, suppliers, 

and supply routes; and, characterization and targeting of funding centers and other support 

nodes. Our greatest difficulties in this Jight remain in the development of enemy networks, 

groups, cells, and nodes that Jight from within the populace. There are critical airborne ISR 

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functions that must be present to map this unconventional threat. In priority order they are: I) 

full-motion video, 2) signals intelligence, and 3) geospatial intelligence. USCENTCOM's 

requirements consistently outpace theater airborne ISR capacity and capability and the 

demand will continue to grow. We arc able to address some of the shortfall through crossCCMD and partner-nation coordination and capacity development. We also need to explore 

innovative ways to develop capabilities for persistent lSR through experimentation and 

technology maturation and demonstration projects. Additionally, we need to address the 

shortfalls associated with processing, exploitation, and dissemination of collected 

intelligence. For the foreseeable future, in the absence of additional much-needed ISR assets, 

maintaining operational awareness on threats, risks, regional stability, and humanitarian crises 

will require constant attention, creative application of ISR, hard choices on the prioritization of 

resources, and the determination of acceptable risk to mission and forces. 

Precision Munitions. Highly accurate munitions arc vital components of our kinetic strike and 

integrated air and missile defense capabilities, to dominate and counter our adversaries' 

increasingly sophisticated networks of coastal and air defenses coupled with precision ballistic 

missiles. Missile interceptors, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, precision air-to-ground and 

air-to-air missiles, and long-range precision ground-to-ground missiles work in concert to 

counter the growing threats we face today. We appreciate Congress' continued support for 

the procurement/replenishment, development, and forward positioning of precision and 

specific purpose munitions that are critical to the way we currently fight in urban areas, 

with very specific rules of engagement designed to protect civilians and limit damage to 

infrastructure. \ 

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Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS). The enemy Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 

threat and employment in the USCENTCOM AOR is rapidly evolving. Numerous non-state 

actors including ISIS, a! Qaida, Taliban, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Fatah al-Sham are using both 

commercial-otl~the-shclf and military drones to conduct operations against U.S. and coalition 

forces. This threat has evolved from reconnaissance and surveillance missions to weaponized 

drone attacks resulting in battlefield casualties. State actors continue to increase the 

sophistication of their UAS with all countries in the USCENTCOM AOR utilizing various 

classes ofUAS for operations. Given the evolving threat, the need for an effective CounterVAS capability that can defeat all classes of UAS remains a top priority. To address this 

problem, USCENTCOM is working with various Defense agencies and Industry through the 

Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process to develop and acquire an effective system to 

employ against UAS. The ability to rapidly respond to this emerging threat is critical to mission 

success and requires increased funding to promote innovative solutions with expedited testing 

and rapid acquisition. 

Joint and Interagency Partners. To ensure success in the pursuit of shared goals and 

objectives, our Joint and Interagency Partners must also be properly postured with the necessary 

capabilities and resources. Below are two key partners that play a significant role in support of 

USCENTCOM's mission and merit continued Congressional backing. 

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) JIDO, an element of the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, is an invaluable organization that is even more important as we 

fight by, with and through our partners with fewer resources, but more exposed U.S. 

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personnel and equipment in the fight. Their ability to rapidly respond to emerging threats is 

essential to enabling our efforts to counter improvised threats (e.g., counter-facilitation, countertunneling, counter-UAS) and build partner capacity in support of our deployed warfighters. The 

expert JIDO personnel embedded within our formations at USCENTCOM's headquarters in 

Tampa, forward deployed, and across the globe, provide mission-critical analytical, planning, 

and rapid acquisition support. Having this invaluable joint organization that can expose the 

broader counter-JED network, identify future disruptive threats, stay in front of technological 

changes, and integrate our efforts across the Interagency to rapidly implement solutions is 

essential to our ability to protect our forces, defeat threat networks and build partner national 

capacity. 

Global Engagement Center The best way to defeat an idea is to present a better, more 

appealing idea to vulnerable and undecided audiences. The State Department's Global 

Engagement Center (GEC) effectively coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes messaging 

to foreign audiences designed to undermine the disinformation espoused by violent 

extremist groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, while offering positive alternatives. The Center 

is focused on empowering and enabling partners, governmental and non-governmental, who are 

able to speak out against these groups and provide an alternative to ISIS's nihilist vision. To that 

end, the Center offers services ranging from planning thematic social media campaigns to 

providing factual information that counters disinformation to building capacity for third parties 

to effectively uti! ize social media to research and evaluation. 

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Required Authorities and Appropriations. Fluid environments require flexible authorities 

with sustained and timely funding to respond to changes in conditions and maintain momentum 

of operational forces. We sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for key 

authorities and appropriations needed for current and future operations and response to 

unforeseen contingencies. The required authorities and resources listed below enable 

USCENTCOM to accomplish its mission and stated objectives in support of U.S. national 

interests and the interests of our partners in the Central Region. 

Iraq Train & Equip Fund (ITEF). Iraq's ability to defeat ISIS requires professionalizing and 

building the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (IS F), including military or other security 

forces associated with the Government of Iraq, such as Kurdish and tribal security forces or other 

local forces with a national security mission. Most notably, the ongoing Coalition Military 

Campaign to defeat ISIS relies on indigenous Iraqi Security Forces to conduct ground operations 

against the enemy and liberate ISIS controlled territory. They have risen to the task and arc 

making progress in this ongoing endeavor. While the initial training and equipping of the ISF 

focused heavily on developing Iraqi Army (lA) Brigades to conduct offensive operations, future 

efforts will shift to sustainment of combat capability and hold forces to ensure that liberated 

areas remain under the control of the Gol and that these forces are able to counter 

remaining ISIS pockets and any other VEOs which may emerge and attempt to fill the void 

created by the defeat of ISIS. These hold forces will be a combination of local tribal fighters 

and police forces. 

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Syria Train & Equip Program. Protecting the United States from terrorists operating in 

Syria and setting the ultimate conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in 

that country will require the continued training and equipping of Vetted Syria Opposition 

(VSO) forces. Additional recruitment, retention, resupply, and support arc central to our 

strategy to defeat ISIS in Syria. Our revised training approach is proving successful, improving 

the effectiveness and lethality of the force on path to a projected strength of up to 35,000 by the 

end of fiscal year 2017 and growing to 40,000 in 2018. Procurement and manufacturing lead 

times for non-standard weapons and ammunition and delivery from various foreign 

vendors complicates the already complex train and equip mission, so we appreciate as 

much flexibility as possible in authorizing and appropriating funds for this effort. The SDF 

and VSOs continues to advance in defeating ISIS and holding and defending liberated areas, 

while also assisting local authorities in providing humanitarian and security assistance to the 

populace. 

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fnnd (ASFF). Since 2005, U.S. provision of funds executed 

through ASFF has provided training, equipment, infrastructure, sustainment and salaries for a 

generated force of up to 352,000 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and 

30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). ASFF plays a critical role in enabling the ANDSF to 

secure Afghanistan with an effective and sustainable force that is central to the U.S. strategy 

to prevent a Taliban oral Qaeda resurgence, defeat VEOs, and deny safe haven for external 

plotting against the U.S. Homeland and U.S. and partner nation interests in the region. 

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Afghanistan Aviation Transition Funding- The proposed Afghan Air Force (AAF) and 

Special Mission Wing (SMW) aviation transition program is critical to addressing capability 

gaps in Close Air Support (CAS) and lift for the ANDSF. The program is designed to address 

the shortfall in available aircraft and trained pilots to ensure Afghan forces have the 

required aviation support and maintenance pipeline to move toward self-sustainment and 

increased independent operations. DoD plans to achieve these results by transitioning the 

AAF and SMW to U.S.-manufactured rotary wing platforms. Although the availability of 

trained pilots remains a particular challenge for the ANDSF, recent successes are producing 

capable pilots and the recap plan is designed to ease the human capital burden over time. The 

additional capability that would be gained through the aviation transition program will provide 

the Afghans needed overmatch against insurgents and terrorists while improving ground forces' 

effectiveness and reducing ANDSF's casualty rates. 

Coalition Support. The authorities and f\mding that underpin our ability to effectively conduct 

Coalition operations, including in support of partners whose contributions are critical, but who 

lack the resources to participate without our assistance, are key to our continued success. The 

Coalition Support Fund (CSF) provides lhe authority to reimburse certain Coalition partners for 

logistical and military support provided by that nation in connection with Iraq, Syria, and 

Afghanistan operations. The CSF also funds the Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) 

which authorizes supplies, the loaning of equipment, and specialized training assistance to 

coalition forces. The CSF relieves the operational burden on U.S. forces and enhances the 

visibility of Coalition presence. This authority remains critical to our strategic approach to 

Coalition operations, including, but not limited to, the ongoing military campaign to defeat 

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the terrorist ot·ganization, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and our transition in Afghanistan. The 

capability and interoperability that CSF funding facilitates is crucial to our bilateral relations, 

Coalition operations and training with partner nations, and to the success of our broader strategic 

and trans-regional objectives. The Global Lift and Sustain and successor authority further 

complements this approach by enabling us to provide transportation and life support to select 

Coalition partners. 

Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP is authorized for local 

commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in 

Afghanistan, and may be used to make condolence payments for the loss of life, injury, or 

property damage resulting from U.S., coalition, or supp01ting military operations. The NDAA 

for FY20 17 provides authority for ex gratia payments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria for 

damage, personal injury, or death that is incident to U.S. combat operations. CERP funded 

projects directly benefit the indigenous civilian populations in Afghanistan and demonstrate the 

positive effects of our presence, while also providing tangible, quick mitigation when coalition 

actions result in casualties or property damage to civilians during the course of military 

operations. CERP is a proven force multiplier and a key enabler in responding to urgent 

humanitarian needs and promoting security. Going forward, we want to ensure commanders 

engaged in the Counter-ISIS missions can provide immediate, but limited, small scale 

humanitarian assistance to ISIS liberated areas, until national and international relief agencies 

can provide that support. Our responsiveness is critical to quickly stabilizing those areas in order 

to begin the holding phase of the campaign and to counter ISIS messaging. 

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Military Construction (MILCON). USCENTCOM stewards constrained resources and 

maintains an expeditionary approach to posturing capabilities in theater. We leverage existing 

infrastructure and host nation support and funding where possible, as well as maritime posture 

and reach back capabilities to meet steady state and surge requirements. In some instances, 

MILCON is required to establish infrastructure to support forces and equipment in the execution 

of their missions. Of note, USCENTCOM requires support for development at MuwaffaqSalti Air Base (MSAB), Jordan and construction of the new Consolidated Squadron 

Operations Facility at AI Udeid, Qatar. These two projects are essential to our contingency 

and steady state operations and support the Defense Strategic Guidance. The projects will 

support executing our priority war plans by providing critical dispersed, resilient and flexible 

capacity to accept both steady state and enduring joint forces, multiple aircraft types and provide 

critical air C41 (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) for current and 

future contingencies, theater and strategic surge and maritime operations within the 

USCENTCOM AOR. MILCON development is critical to support the realignment of U.S. 

forces operating from an expeditionary approach at various contingency bases scattered across 

the AOR to the required enduring posture approach necessary to protect U.S. interests and to 

sustain key bilateral relationships. 

Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM). Service Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel 

and capability sets remain critical force multipliers required to execute USCENTCOM's most 

dangerous and critical contingency plans. The Services and Defense Agency prepositioned 

capacity provides a shock absorber in rapidly emerging contingencies, buys critical decision 

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space for our national leadership, and mitigates the risk associated with the tyranny of distance 

when we are called upon to rapidly aggregate and reintroduce forces into the region. 

The U.S. Central Command Team. The outstanding men and women who comprise the 

USCENTCOM Team truly are our most important assets. They continue to make 

tremendous contributions on behalf of our Nation and our partners and allies around the globe. 

We must ensure they have everything they need to do their jobs effectively, efficiently, and 

as safely as possible. 

We also continue to benefit from the unique capability provided by our Coalition 

Coordination Center, which consists of more than 200 foreign military officers from nearly 

60 partner nations. They, too, are important members of our USCENTOM Temn and play a 

critical role in strengthening the partnerships between our nations. 

We remain mindful of the fact that success requires that we work together, not just within the 

command, but also with our teammates from other Combatant Commands, our 

Component Commands, established combined/joint task forces, the Central Region's 18 

county teams, and various agencies and organizations throughout the USG and the 

Interagency. Our close collaboration with counterparts at the U.S. State Department, the U.S. 

Treasury, CIA, FBI, and JIDO, for example, has paid enormous dividends in the pursuit of 

shared national goals and objectives. We look forward to continuing to work with them and 

others on behalf of our Nation. 

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We also are incredibly grateful for the support of our families. They are highly valued 

members of our USCENTCOM Team and we could not do what we do without them. They 

make important contributions and tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support of us and 

on behalf of the command and a grateful Nation. 

The upcoming year promises to be a busy and challenging one in the Central Region. You can 

be assured that the world-class team at U.S. Central Command- which includes more than 

80,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguard~men, and Civilians stationed today 

throughout the USCENTCOM area ofresponsibility- is up to the task, and is highly-skilled, 

motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission: defend our 

Nation and our interests, the interests of partners and allies, and improve stability and security in 

that strategically important part of the world. 

USCENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail! 

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General Joseph L. Vote! 

Commander, United States Central Command 

GEN Vote! attended the United States Military Academy and was commissioned in 1980 

as an Infantry Officer. His initial assignments were to the 3d Infantry Division in Germany 

where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, Battalion Adjutant and Rifle 

Company Commander. Following this he served as a Small Group Tactics Instructor at the 

Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia before being assigned to the 75th Ranger 

Regiment as a Plans I Liaison Officer where he participated in Operation JUST CAUSE. 

He was next posted to the I st Ranger Battalion where he served as the Battalion Liaison 

Officer, Operations Officer and Executive Officer. 

Following this he was assigned to HQs, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy and 

the NATO Peace Implementation Force (!FOR) in Sarajevo. He commanded the 2d 

Battalion, 22d Infantry (Light) at Fort Drum, New York and was subsequently selected to 

command the 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. Following 

attendance at the Army War College GEN Vote! commanded the 75th Ranger Regiment 

and participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, Iraq. 

As a general officer he served in the Pentagon as the Director of the Army and Joint JED 

Defeat Task Force and subsequently as the Deputy Director of the Joint JED Defeat 

Organization established under the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He served as the Deputy 

Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division/ CJTF-82, Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and was subsequently assigned as the Deputy 

Commanding General then Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations 

Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He most recently served as the Commanding 

General of U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

GEN Vote! is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, United 

States Army Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War 

College. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 29, 2017 

(107) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. STEFANIK. In terms of information operations and countering ISIL propaganda efforts—we have seen some tactical success in Iraq and Syria, but I am concerned with about what I perceive to be a larger strategic gap across our government. Can you talk about ways to improve CENTCOM information operations requirements, and how we can improve our ability to counter ISIL’s global and strategic propaganda efforts? Is the State Department’s Global Engagement Center the 

right place for DOD to interface for these types of efforts as we try to counter ISIL 

and state-sponsored actors, and if so, how can we strengthen that relationship? Are 

you seeing any troubling propaganda efforts within your AOR from state-sponsored 

actors such as Russia, and if so how are you dealing with this? 

General VOTEL. USCENTCOM is part of a much larger effort which includes not 

only USG departments and agencies, but the governments of our Coalition partners, 

non-government organizations, and various entities from the private sector. If we 

are serious about defeating ISIS in the information environment, we must match 

ISIS’ level of intensity, volume and effectiveness in the information environment. 

We must do the same in response to all adversaries choosing to compete in the information battlespace. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center provides 

a very effective functional mechanism through which we can mass the effects necessary to counter and ultimately defeat ISIS. As the Global Engagement Center continues to mature its capability, USCENTCOM will work through the Joint Staff and 

OSD to help expand and improve coordination across the Department of Defense 

and the Interagency. Russia and Iran both are using information operations (e.g., 

propaganda) to achieve their desired effects in the USCENTCOM AOR. Both have 

established large, well-resourced information warfare capabilities. Within our authorities and resources, USCENTCOM counters this propaganda. CENTCOM WebOps specifically counters allegations of U.S. assistance to ISIS and exposes Russian 

and PMF violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict, among other activities. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Can you provide us with more of your thoughts and concerns about 

Russian influence within your AOR, beyond what is talked about in Syria? There 

have been recent reports about Russian collaboration with the Taliban, and Russia 

increasing their presence and influence in Egypt, as just two examples. 

General VOTEL. [The information provided is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Describe the threat posed by Al Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan 

Province, and the Haqqani network. What, if any, limitations exist on your ability 

to effectively target these threats? 

General VOTEL. [The information provided is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. According to some news reports, Iran has supported the Houthi militia in Yemen. Other reports suggested that there is not a strong link between the 

two. What is your assessment of the nature of Iranian support to the Houthis in 

Yemen? How does this impact our strategy? Can we achieve our objectives in Yemen 

absent a political solution? 

General VOTEL. [The information provided is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Can you discuss the long-term threat Hezbollah presents to U.S. 

interests, and apart from increased sanctions, how can Congress further help in the 

fight against Hezbollah? 

General VOTEL. [The information provided is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Dr. ABRAHAM. With regard to Turkey: With last year’s coup attempt and the potential for political instability ahead of this year’s April presidential referendum, 

what are some of the challenges you have faced and expect to face with U.S. and 

coalition air support for CENTCOM missions flying out of Incirlik Air Base? 

General VOTEL. [The information provided is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

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