J-A30034-18

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

TYLER COOPER MCQUAID,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 

 No. 372 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 15, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002539-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2019

Tyler Cooper McQuaid (Appellant) appeals from the February 15, 2018

judgment of sentence of three to six days of incarceration following his 

nonjury convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) of a controlled 

substance and DUI of a controlled substance - impaired ability. Specifically, 

Appellant challenges the denial of his pretrial suppression motion. Upon 

review, we reverse.

At 3:08 p.m. on November 25, 2016, Officer Joseph Daransky of the 

Leetsdale Borough Police Department received a 911 dispatch for an 

unconscious male in the driver’s seat of a red Toyota Corolla, with a 

specified license plate number, in the Wendy’s parking lot at the Quaker 

Valley Village Shopping Center. N.T., 10/13/2017, at 5-7. When Officer 

Daransky arrived at the Wendy’s parking lot approximately two minutes 
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later, he did not find any vehicle matching the 911 dispatch. Id. at 9-10. 

However, as Officer Daransky was leaving the Wendy’s parking lot, he 

observed a male driving a red Corolla, with a license plate matching the 

dispatch description, making a right-hand turn out of the GetGo gas station

across the street. Id. at 10-11, 17. At that point, Officer Daransky 

activated his overhead lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop for the 

purpose of checking on the well-being of the driver based on the 911 

dispatch. Id. at 12-13, 18. 

Appellant complied with the traffic stop. At no point while Appellant 

was driving did Officer Daransky observe Appellant commit any motor 

vehicle violations. Id. at 13-15. After backup arrived, Officer Daransky

approached Appellant as he sat in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Id. at 14. 

Appellant’s eyes were glassy, red, and the pupils were dilated. Id. at 15. 

Based on these observations, Officer Daransky believed that Appellant may 

have been under the influence of a controlled substance and asked him to 

perform three field sobriety tests. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 2.1 

Based on his performance of the tests and Officer Daransky’s observations, 

Appellant was placed under arrest for DUI of an unknown controlled 

 

1 At the nonjury trial, counsel for both parties stipulated to the entry of the

affidavit of probable cause, Officer Daransky’s suppression hearing 

testimony, the incident report, the lab report for Appellant’s blood draw, and

photographs from the scene, to establish the elements of the crimes 

charged. N.T., 2/15/2018, at 2-3.
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substance. Id. Thereafter, Appellant was subjected to a blood draw, which 

revealed the presence of cannabinoids and fentanyl in his blood. N.T., 

2/15/2018, at 3. 

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress. A hearing was held 

where the aforementioned facts were developed. The trial court took the 

matter under advisement, and denied the motion on January 18, 2018.2 

N.T., 1/18/2018, at 2. Thereafter, Appellant was convicted following a 

stipulated nonjury trial and sentenced as indicated above. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.3 Appellant presents one 

question for this Court’s consideration: “Whether the trial court erred in 

denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic 

stop that was predicated entirely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, and 

thus was not supported by reasonable suspicion, in violation of the federal 

 

2 The trial court did not issue its suppression findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, as mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), until after Appellant filed this 

appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/2018. See also N.T., 1/18/2018, at 

2; N.T., 2/15/2018, at 3. “[T]he filing of a 1925(a) opinion is no substitute 

for the failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record 

at the conclusion of a suppression hearing in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 

581(I).” Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 n.1 (Pa. Super. 

2003). See also Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 688–89 (Pa. 

2005) (explaining the important purposes served by Rule 581(I)). However, 

in light of our disposition, this error is moot.

3 Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial 

court filed its previously written but unfiled findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, see supra n.2, to satisfy the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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and Pennsylvania constitutions.” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

We consider Appellant’s question mindful of the following.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 

Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied 

the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[] 

below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)). 

Our jurisprudence delineates interactions between police and citizens

into three levels. 

The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of 

suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The 

second, an “investigative detention,” permits the temporary 

detention of an individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. 

The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which must be 

supported by probable cause.

In evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an 

objective examination of the totality of the surrounding 

circumstances. ...
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Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

In denying Appellant’s suppression motion, the trial court concluded 

that Officer Daransky’s activation of his lights and siren to conduct a traffic 

stop constituted a mere encounter to check on Appellant’s well-being based 

on the 911 dispatch, and therefore Officer Daransky did not need reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the stop. Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/2018, at 3 

(unnumbered). On appeal, Appellant argues that the traffic stop amounted 

to an investigative detention, requiring reasonable suspicion to justify the 

stop. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 

174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017))

4

. The Commonwealth defers to this Court as to 

whether the trial court committed legal error in concluding that the traffic 

stop was a mere encounter. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. 

In Livingstone, which was decided approximately two months before 

the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s suppression motion, our Supreme Court 

held that the activation of a police vehicle’s lights and sirens to initiate a 

traffic stop constitutes an investigative detention. In so holding, our 

Supreme Court explained as follows.

It is undeniable that emergency lights on police vehicles in this 

Commonwealth serve important safety purposes, including 

ensuring that the police vehicle is visible to traffic, and signaling 

to a stopped motorist that it is a police officer, as opposed to a 

 

4 “While each section of the opinion garnered different votes, we note that 

all sections of Livingstone obtained a majority.” Commonwealth v. 

Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. Super. 2018).
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potentially dangerous stranger, who is approaching. Moreover, 

we do not doubt that a reasonable person may recognize that a 

police officer might activate his vehicle’s emergency lights for 

safety purposes, as opposed to a command to stop. 

Nevertheless, upon consideration of the realities of everyday life, 

particularly the relationship between ordinary citizens and law 

enforcement, we simply cannot pretend that a reasonable 

person, innocent of any crime, would not interpret the activation 

of emergency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he or she 

is not free to leave.

174 A.3d at 621 (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, pursuant to Livingstone, once Officer Daransky activated 

his vehicle’s lights and siren to initiate the traffic stop, Appellant was 

subjected to an investigatory detention. Therefore, the trial court erred in 

finding the interaction was a mere encounter. However, our inquiry does not 

end there. We must now determine whether Officer Daransky possessed 

reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Appellant’s vehicle.

An investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop 

and a period of detention but does not involve such coercive 

conditions as to constitute an arrest, requires a reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion 

depends upon both the content of the information possessed by 

the police and its degree of reliability. Thus, quantity and quality 

of information are considered when assessing the totality of the 

circumstances. If information has a low degree of reliability, 

then more information is required to establish reasonable 

suspicion.

Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807, 811 (Pa. 2000) (citations 

omitted). “When the police receive unverified information that a person is 

engaged in illegal activity, the police may observe the suspect and conduct 

an investigation. If police surveillance produces a reasonable suspicion of 
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criminal conduct, the suspect may be stopped and questioned.” Id. at 811-

12. 

Here, it is undisputed that Officer Daransky did not observe Appellant 

commit any motor vehicle violations prior to activating his lights and siren

for a traffic stop. Rather, the traffic stop was initiated for a well-being check 

based solely on the 911 dispatch. Namely, the anonymous5 call to 911 

alleged that a male was unconscious behind the steering wheel of a specific 

red Corolla in a specific Wendy’s parking lot. Upon arriving on scene, Officer 

Daransky did not find any evidence to corroborate this anonymous tip. 

Rather, he observed the driver of the identified Corolla to be conscious and 

making a right-hand turn out of a GetGo gas station. Thus, there was no 

corroboration of the anonymous tipster’s allegations; Officer Daransky’s brief 

surveillance in fact refuted the allegations. 

Although essentially abandoned on appeal, the Commonwealth argued 

at the suppression hearing that the stop could be justified by Officer 

Daransky’s acting pursuant to the public servant exception of the community 

caretaking doctrine. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (citing N.T., 10/13/2017, 

at 13-14). The community caretaking doctrine encompasses three 

 

5 The Commonwealth did not establish at the suppression hearing that the 

caller was identified, and on appeal it concedes that “Appellant succinctly 

explains in his brief and supplemental brief why the anonymous 911 call 

alone was insufficient and that Officer Daransky observed nothing to support 

the information from the call.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (emphasis 

added; unnecessary capitalization omitted). 
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exceptions: “the emergency aid exception; the automobile 

impoundment/inventory exception; and the public servant exception[.]” 

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 627-28. In Livingstone, our Supreme Court 

recognized that “police officers engage in a myriad of activities that ensure 

the safety and welfare of our Commonwealth’s citizens. Indeed, we want to 

encourage such laudable activity. However, even community caretaking 

activity must be performed in accordance with Fourth Amendment 

protections.” 174 A.3d at 629. As such, the Court held that “in order for the 

public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine to apply, 

police officers must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable 

facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen 

is in need of assistance.” Id. at 634. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any perceived reason to 

check on the well-being of an unconscious individual was nullified upon 

Officer Daransky observing that Appellant was conscious and driving without 

committing any motor vehicle violations. Simply stated, there were no facts 

that Officer Daransky could point to suggesting that Appellant was in need of 

assistance. 

As well-intentioned as Officer Daransky’s motives may have been, 

based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there is no evidence 

to support a finding that he possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to 

stop Appellant’s vehicle. Because he did not possess such reasonable 
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suspicion, the investigatory detention was illegal, and the trial court erred in 

concluding otherwise. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence and reverse the order denying the suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Order reversed. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2019