UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20-22439-SCOLA/TORRES

WILLIAM CHRISTIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL AND SANCTIONS

This matter is before the Court on William Christie’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to 

compel and sanctions against AGA Service Company d/b/a Allianz Global Assistance 

(“AGA”) and Jefferson Insurance Company (“Jefferson Insurance”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”). [D.E. 75]. Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion on June 15, 

2021 [D.E. 78] to which Plaintiff replied on July 2, 2021. [D.E. 79]. Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s motion is now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the 

motion, response, reply, relevant authorities, and for the reasons discussed below, 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel and sanctions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 

part.

1 

1 On June 11, 2021, the Honorable Robert N. Scola referred Plaintiff’s motion to 

the undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 77]. Although the Order 

Setting Discovery Procedures would ordinarily preclude the filing of discovery 

motions, the undersigned allowed the parties to file a paper motion given that the 

deadline to complete fact discovery passed on June 14, 2021, and the filing of 

dispositive motions is due on August 2, 2021.

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I. ANALYSIS

This is a negligence action where Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to 

diagnose, treat, and coordinate his medical care while as a passenger onboard a 

maritime vessel. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the negligence and the failure to 

receive timely medical care, he suffers from severe bodily injuries including paralysis 

from the waist down. He now uses a wheelchair for transportation, but he can walk 

short distances using assistive devices.

On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff deposed three witnesses serving as Defendants’

corporate representatives. These individuals include Jeff Rolander (“Mr. Rolander”), 

Dr. Melissa Castro (“Dr. Castro”), and Lashanta Sullivan (“Ms. Sullivan”). 

Throughout the deposition, Plaintiff says that Defendants directed these witnesses 

not to answer certain questions, made numerous speaking objections, and otherwise 

violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. When Plaintiff questioned Defendants on their

instructions not to answer, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to provide a

justifiable reason or otherwise seek a protective order. 

First, Plaintiff takes issue with the way in which Defendants interrupted the 

testimony of Dr. Castro. Plaintiff says that “it became clear that Dr. Castro was 

uncomfortable with the corporate position taken by AGA and JIC regarding whether 

RCCL was negligent,” and that the vessel’s medical doctor should have provided 

Defendants with critical information on Plaintiff’s medical condition. [D.E. 75 at 3]. 

However, as soon as Dr. Castro began to testify in her individual capacity to show her 

displeasure with Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff claims that Defendants instructed her 

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not to answer. Plaintiff views this as improper because a lawyer is prohibited from 

instructing a witness not to answer a question for the sole purpose of preventing

unfavorable deposition testimony: 

Second, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of engaging in numerous speaking 

objections that interrupted the flow of Dr. Castro’s examination:

MR. RENDA: Just to be clear, are you going to continue to ask her, as 

an individual, questions about her opinion, as an individual, because 

that is demonstrably outside the scope of this deposition? So I am trying 

to speak as low as possible so as not to be framed as whatever it was. 

But I object, I can’t have this witness testify as herself about medical 

opinions and expert opinions. So I gave you a lot of leeway, but that’s it. 

MR. FLANAGAN: I -- I have to tell you, I hate the -- the long speaking 

on the record. And I don't like having to answer lawyer's questions on 

the record. The rules are the rules. I can ask a witness in their 

individual capacity how they view things. I can view -- ask the 

corporation. You’ve made it clear that you don’t want this to be the 

representation of the corporation. I understand that. She is the CMO 

now. I am asking her questions. So she can answer in her individual 

capacity. 

MR. RENDA: I disagree with your representations of the rule, and I 

have a notice of deposition with 65 topics that I prepared her and two 

other witnesses to answer on behalf of AGA, which is whose deposition 

is being taken this afternoon, and you're going outside the scope, so –

MR. FLANAGAN: Okay. I understand your objection. Judge Torres’

rule is that we ask the questions. The questions get answered, and then 

we deal with it afterwards. So that is what I would like to do. 

MR. RENDA: So just reasserting my objection to your -- to this line of 

questioning. 

MR. FLANAGAN: I understand. So could our court reporter please read back 

the question. 

(Thereupon, the question was read back.) 

[D.E. 75-1 at 178:25-180:18]. 

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When Plaintiff attempted to continue with the deposition, Defendants 

instructed Dr. Castro not to answer certain questions2:

BY MR. FLANAGAN:

Q. Doctor, do you need the context for the one prior to answer?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So then the question is: Why would that information have been 

helpful?

MR. RENDA: All right. So I am going to instruct the witness to no longer 

answer questions posed to her as herself. I will take my chances with the 

magistrate, because I think this is inappropriate. So, Doctor, don't answer 

questions as yourself anymore.

MR. FLANAGAN: Could our court reporter please mark that. 

Id. at 180:23-181:8.

Plaintiff views this conduct as evidence of bad faith because Defendants had 

no legitimate reason to instruct Dr. Castro or any other witness not to answer certain 

questions. The only explanation that Plaintiff can contemplate is that the goal here 

was to disrupt the examination as much as possible so that witnesses could not 

provide unfavorable deposition testimony. Because this conduct violates the Federal 

2 The same conduct occurred in connection with Mr. Rolander’s deposition:

MR. FLANAGAN: Q. Were you provided with any information about 

when MRI and neurosurgery would have been expected to be provided 

to Mr. Christie, had he stayed at Centro Medico de Puerto Rico, prior to 

today’s deposition?

MR. RENDA: So, Mr. Rolander, to the extent you were provided 

information from my office, myself, my partner, that is responsive to Mr. 

Flanagan's question, I am going to instruct you not to answer the 

question on the basis of attorney-client privilege. If you can answer the 

question relying on information that you have not received from us, then 

go ahead and answer it. If you feel like you cannot, then I am instructing 

you -- instructing you not to answer the question. 

WITNESS ROLANDER: I can’t answer the question.

[D.E. 78-2 at 242:1-243:2].

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Rules, Plaintiff asks that the Court impose monetary sanctions, compel Defendants

to produce Dr. Castro for a continued examination, allow any future deposition to 

take place without disruption, and otherwise enter default judgment.

Defendants’ response is that their objections were proper because Plaintiff’s 

counsel asked irrelevant questions, and otherwise sought testimony that was 

protected under the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. 

Defendants say that this forced them to object and to instruct their witnesses not to 

answer “because of privilege or witness badgering.” [D.E. 78 at 3]. Defendants also 

claim that Plaintiff’s counsel violated the Federal Rules because he noticed the 

30(b)(6) deposition on 65 topics, but he attempted to ambush them through 

misdirection and questions on irrelevant subjects. Defendants say that Plaintiff’s 

tactics forced them into an impossible dilemma where they had to choose between 

allowing their corporate representatives to be ambushed with irrelevant questions

and risk the disclosure of privileged information, or otherwise be the recipient of a 

motion for sanctions. Defendants chose the latter.

Defendants also push back against the assertion that they took part in 

improper speaking objections. Defendants say that they objected to the form of a

question and gave commentary only when necessary. Defendants claim, for example, 

that they spoke in detail only when it was needed to clarify that the testimony 

provided was in an individual capacity as opposed to a corporate representative:

Q. Okay. So let’s go back to my question. Have you spoken to any 

medical doctors about the care Mr. Christie received in this case?

MR. RENDA: Objection to form of the question. Again, are you asking 

this individual, or you're asking AGA? 

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MR. FLANAGAN: I’m asking him.

MR. RENDA: No, I am not going to let that happen. He's not here as 

him. He’s here as the corporate entity. I mean, you went through this 

with Mr. Drahos the last time. 

[D.E. 78-2 at 69:20-70:8].

Q. So do you as the CMO [Chief Medical Officer of AGA/JIC] now think 

it’s important to know, when someone is having an emergent medical 

condition, how much time you have to get them to a facility that can 

provide definitive care? 

MR. RENDA: Just a minute. Again, Mr. Flanagan, I am just saying she 

is testifying as AGA, not a chief medical officer of a company. So 

objection to the form. 

Id. at 176:16-25. So, given that Plaintiff “posed questions to elicit inappropriate 

testimony that was irrelevant, already asked and answered, called for expert 

opinions, and was far beyond the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition notice,” [D.E. 78 at 

16], Defendants conclude that their speaking objections were appropriate.

Instructions not to answer are generally improper with the exception of

questions seeking information in the form of trade secrets or privileged information. 

When an attorney properly instructs a deponent not to answer, an attorney must 

immediately seek a protective order because otherwise arguments to the 

objectionable questions are often waived. See, e.g., Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v.

QBE Ins. Corp., 2008 WL 2645680, at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2008) (“Even in the 

case of an instruction not to answer based on privilege, the party who instructs the 

witness not to answer should immediately seek a protective order . . . The record here 

shows that counsel violated Rule 30(d)(4) by not immediately filing a motion for 

protection following the deposition. On this basis alone, any otherwise meritorious 

arguments to the questions posed during the deposition were thus waived.”) 

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(emphasis in original) (quoting Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling A Div. of

Equifax Servs., Inc., 120 F.R.D. 504, 508 (W.D. La. 1988)). 

Rule 30 also makes clear the types of objections an attorney may make and 

when counsel may instruct a deponent not to answer:

An objection at the time of the examination--whether to evidence, to a 

party’s conduct, to the officer's qualifications, to the manner of taking 

the deposition, or to any other aspect of the deposition--must be noted 

on the record, but the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken 

subject to any objection. An objection must be stated concisely in a 

nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. A person may instruct a 

deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to 

enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under 

Rule 30(d)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). The rule further clarifies that testimony taken during a 

deposition is to be completely that of the deponent, not a version of the testimony 

which has been edited or glossed by the deponent’s lawyer. See Hall v. Clifton

Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993). That is, a witness must be allowed to 

provide an answer to the best of his or her ability, free from any influence by the 

attorney. If a witness is confused about a question, or if a question seems awkward 

or vague to the witness, the witness may ask the deposing counsel to clarify the 

question. Ultimately, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not permit attorneys 

representing deponents to (1) coach the client by raising rhetoric-filled objections 

designed to feed the deponent information or advice; (2) answer the substantive 

questions themselves, before the deponent has provided an under-oath substantive 

response; and (3) instruct the deponent to not answer questions in the absence of a 

legitimate privilege objection or a Court-ordered limitation on the subject matter.” 

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United States v. Tardon, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (citing United

States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Here, the focus is on the deposition of Dr. Castro because – while Plaintiff 

references the testimony of Mr. Rolander and Ms. Sullivan and complains about how 

Defendants treated them – Plaintiff does not claim any prejudice with respect to 

either deponent. Defendants say that they did nothing wrong with respect to Dr. 

Castro because Plaintiff asked her questions in her individual capacity and outside 

the scope of the deposition notice. Defendants claim, for example, that they prepared 

Dr. Castro in advance of the deposition, but that Plaintiff asked questions beyond the 

scope of the notice. Defendants also add that Plaintiff’s questions were improper 

because they sought medical expert testimony despite the fact that Dr. Castro was 

not the chief medical officer at the time of the alleged negligence. Thus, given that 

Plaintiff failed to notice Dr. Castro for a deposition in her individual capacity and 

should have limited the questions asked of her, Defendants conclude that they had 

every right to instruct her not to answer. 

Based on these circumstances, both parties violated the Federal Rules. 

Plaintiff failed, on one hand, to give proper notice to Defendants’ corporate 

representatives on the topics available for questioning. Plaintiff requested, for 

example, that Defendants prepare their corporate representatives on 65 different 

topics. But, Plaintiff asked Dr. Castro many questions that failed to focus on his role 

as a corporate representative. That is not proper because a deposition pursuant 

to Rule 30(b)(6) is materially different than a witness deposition as an individual. “A 

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30(b)(6) witness testifies as a representative of the entity, his answers bind the entity 

and he is responsible for providing all the relevant information known or reasonably 

available to the entity.” Sabre v. First Dominion Capital, L.L.C., 2001 WL 1590544

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2001) (citing 8A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Richard L. 

Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2103 (2d ed. 1994)). 

If Plaintiff wanted to depose Dr. Castro in her individual capacity, he should

have made that clearer in his notice or otherwise set a deposition pursuant to 30(b)(1). 

See, e.g., LendingTree, Inc. v. LowerMyBills, Inc., 2006 WL 2443685 (W.D.N.C. Aug.

22, 2006) (granting motion to compel Rule 30(b)(6) deposition even though 30(b)(6) 

designee had previously testified in his individual capacity on topics similar to those 

identified in the 30(b)(6) notice); Smith v. General Mills, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

19093, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2006) (“Courts have soundly rejected [the] argument 

that prior deposition testimony from individual fact witnesses relieves a corporation 

from designating a corporate spokesperson in response to a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of 

deposition.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Midland Rare Coin Exchange,

Inc., 1999 WL 35148749, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 1999) (ruling that party could depose 

witness in his individual capacity for six-hours and also depose the same witness 

as Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative for an additional six hours as “the 

depositions serve distinct purposes, impose different obligations . . . and involve 

different ramifications.”). Yet, Plaintiff did neither and, in some respects, blind-sided 

Defendants with questions that Dr. Castro was never prepared to answer. Plaintiff 

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is therefore partially at fault for the motion presented because the questions here 

exceeded the scope of a 30(b)(6) deponent.

But Defendants are even more culpable. If a 30(b)(6) deponent is asked a 

question thought to be outside the scope of a notice, Defendants should have briefly 

asserted their objection and allowed the deposition to proceed.

3 See Siegmund v.

Xuelian Bian, 2018 WL 4293148, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018) (“While the Court is 

mindful of Defendant’s predicament at Mr. Chan’s deposition, none of the 

circumstances that permit an attorney to instruct his or her client not to answer were 

present here. Defendant’s counsel should have therefore noted his objection on the 

record, and allowed Mr. Chan to answer these questions.”). Defendants did so at 

various points but went much further by crossing the line into instructing the witness 

not to answer on relevance and form grounds. By doing so, they violated Rule 30 

because there are only three circumstances where an attorney can instruct a 

witness not to answer a question and none of them apply to many of the questions at 

issue: (1) if the information contained in the answer is protected by a privilege, (2) to 

enforce a court order, or (3) to suspend a deposition for the purposes of filing a Rule 

30(d)(3) motion related to improper harassing conduct. 

Defendants claim that their actions were nonetheless justified because the 

questions that Plaintiff asked were repetitive, outside the scope of a 30(b)(6) 

deposition, and tantamount to witness badgering. But, “[i]t is improper to instruct a 

3 This assumes, of course, that there are no additional objections that may 

preclude a deponent’s response such a privilege or a court-ordered limitation. 

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witness not to answer based on relevance, that the question has been asked and 

answered or because the question is outside the scope of inquiry identified in the 

notice of deposition of a Rule 30(b)(6) representative.” Provide Com., Inc. v. Preferred

Com., Inc., 2008 WL 360591, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2008) (citing Vipre Systems LLC

v. NITV LLC, 2007 WL 3202439 *1, n. 2 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Goober v. City of

Leesburg, 197 F.R.D. 519, 520 (M.D. Fla. 2000)). And while Defendants complain 

that Plaintiff badgered Dr. Castro, they never filed a motion seeking any relief. 

Instead, Defendants only raised this argument in response to Plaintiff’s motion for 

sanctions. It is not therefore compelling to suggest that Plaintiff badgered the 

witness without seeking any relief to that effect. And indeed the Court’s own review 

of the deposition shows that there was no badgering. Defendants’ counsel, instead, 

was the one interjecting himself into the questioning and answering process far 

beyond what was necessary to preserve an objection.

Moreover, it is well established in the Eleventh Circuit that the scope of a Rule

30(b)(6) deposition is not strictly confined to the topics set forth in the notice. Instead, 

courts have found that, while Rule 30(b)(6) was intended to give notice of the subject 

matter that the corporate representative must be prepared to discuss, any relevant 

question may still be asked of the deponent, who must answer if he or she knows the 

answer. See, e.g., King v. Pratt & Whitney, a Div. of United Techs. Corp., 161 F.R.D. 

475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (“Rule [30(b)(6)] is not one of limitation but rather of 

specification within the broad parameters of the discovery rules.”); see also Santos v.

Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 WL 3391330, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2018) (“Rule

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30(b)(6) itself does not limit what can be asked at a deposition . . . The scope of 

discovery is defined instead by Rule 26(b)(1).”) (citing King); Bowers v. Am. Heart

Ass’n, Inc., 2007 WL 9702160, at *2-4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2007) (discussing King and 

collecting cases). Although there is out-of-circuit authority that runs contrary to this 

view, see, e.g., Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co., 108 F.R.D. 727 (D. Mass. 1985), we

find this exceptional line of cases to be highly unpersuasive. Judge Gonzalez’s 

analysis of the proper application of the Rule continues to govern proceedings in this 

District, especially where the Court placed all parties in this case on notice of its 

applicability in the Order Setting Discovery Procedures. So, subject to Defendants’

objections (which preserved the entire matter for later resolution before or during 

trial) the witness should simply have been permitted to answer. And to protect 

Defendants’ position counsel properly instructed that the witness should carefully 

distinguish between his own personal opinions or conclusions (which may not be 

admissible in any event) as opposed to what is known to the corporation that he was 

representing. Having done that, counsel had no basis to summarily cut off the entire 

line of questioning, at least without not strictly following the requirements of Rule 

30. Defendants thus violated Rule 30.

The only question now is what relief should be provided given both parties’ 

violations of the Federal Rules. Defendants say that they complied with their 

obligations in all material respects because they produced three well-prepared 

witnesses to testify on 65 deposition topics. Defendants also claim that, following the 

deposition, they supplemented their answers to Plaintiff’s interrogatories in an effort 

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to provide much of the information that Plaintiff requested. [D.E. 78 at 18 (“Christie’s 

counsel was also already provided with much of the information he is now attempting 

to compel through supplemental answers to interrogatories and earlier 

depositions.”)]. 

Defendants’ supplemental discovery responses is a good starting point for

remedying the violation that took place. It is not, however, an entirely adequate 

substitute without giving Plaintiff the opportunity to resume Dr. Castro’s deposition 

subject to the Federal Rules. See Larweth v. Magellan Health, Inc., 2019 WL 

11866498, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2019) (“Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is 

entitled to re-depose the corporate representative pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) for the

limited purpose of asking the questions counsel instructed the

deponent not to answer.”). As for the remaining relief requested, none of the 

proposed sanctions are appropriate to remedy the violation that took place including 

the request for a monetary award or default judgment. Id. (“The Court is not inclined 

to grant Plaintiff's request for attorney fees because Defendant’s position at the 

deposition was substantially justified.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is 

GRANTED in part but only to the extent that Plaintiff has a total of two additional 

hours (if desired) to resume and complete Dr. Castro’s deposition as the Defendant’s 

corporate representative. The witness shall be made available for completion of the 

deposition by July 23, 2021. To the extent similar opinion-related questions are again 

asked of the witness, defending counsel may summarily preserve the form objection 

on the record and seek to exclude those opinions at trial.

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In all other respects, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel and sanctions is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:

A. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED but only to the extent that he is given 

2 hours to resume and complete Dr. Castro’s deposition.

B. In all other respects, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 13th day of July

2021. 

/s/ Edwin G. Torres 

EDWIN G. TORRES

United States Magistrate Judge

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