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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ANDRES REY, CASE NO.: 

Plaintiff,

v. 

CHAD F. WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, ANDRES REY, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby sues the Defendant, 

CHAD F. WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”) (“Defendant), and alleges the following:

JURISDICTION, VENUE, PARTIES AND JURY DEMAND

1. This Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s claims herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1343(a)(4), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 

29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

2. This action involves claims which are, individually, in excess of Seventy-Five Thousand 

Dollars ($75,000.00). Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal 

question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights claim jurisdiction).

3. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction 

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division.

4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e)(1) because the Defendant is a Federal 

Agency and/or Officer or Employee of the United States.

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5. Plaintiff, at all times material to this lawsuit, was and is a resident of the State of Florida 

and was employed by the Defendant United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

6. Plaintiff is a person who is disabled under the Rehabilitation act because he “(i) has a

physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial 

impediment to employment; and (ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from 

vocational rehabilitation services...” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A) and is a qualified individual under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 12111(8).

7. Chad F. Wolf, who is sued in his official capacity only, is the Acting Secretary of 

Defendant DHS. Defendant DHS is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and

42 U.S.C. 12111(7), and an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 42 U.S.C. 

12111(5). Defendant DHS hired Plaintiff as an employee and is subject to the laws preventing 

discrimination in employment as set forth more fully in the Counts that follow. At all times 

pertinent to this action, Defendant DHS has been an "employer" as that term is used under the 

applicable laws identified above. Defendant DHS is Plaintiff’s employer as it relates to these

claims.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

8. For those counts that so require, all administrative requirements to filing this lawsuit have 

been satisfied: to wit, Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint based on reasonable 

accommodation discrimination with the Agency’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) on January 29, 2015. The Administrative Judge issued a decision by summary judgment 

in favor of the Agency. Following this decision, Plaintiff filed a timely appeal on September 28, 

2018. Plaintiff received a Final Agency Decision from the Agency/Equal Employment 

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Opportunity Commission on March 3, 2020, providing for a ninety (90) day right to sue deadline 

for civil actions in federal court. 

9. Plaintiff timely files the instant complaint prior to the 90-day deadline.

JURY DEMAND

10. JURY DEMAND: Plaintiff demands that all issues in this case be tried by a jury in 

accordance with the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule 38(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Plaintiff, Customs Border Patrol Officer Andres Rey (“Plaintiff” or “Officer Rey”), has 

served as a Customs and Border Protection Officer (“CBPO”) since February 24, 2003 and 

currently is stationed for duty at the Miami Port of Entry, Miami, FL. 

12. A CBPO is “an employee in the DHS occupying a position within the Customs and Border 

Protection Officer (GS-1895) job series (determined applying the criteria in effect as of September 

1, 2007) or any successor position, and whose duties include activities relating to the arrival and 

departure of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at ports of entry.” 5 C.F.R. § 831.1602. 

13. Officer Rey’s duties as a CBPO include detecting and preventing terrorists and instruments 

of terror from entering/exiting the United States; enforcing the laws that protect America’s 

homeland through the detection, interdiction and apprehension of those who attempt to illegally 

enter or smuggle any person or contraband at the ports of entries or are found unlawfully present 

within their respective jurisdiction; and facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate 

trade and lawful travelers. 

14. CBPO duties also include performing inspection, intelligence analysis, examination and 

law enforcement activities including apprehension, detention and arrest relating to arrival and 

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departure of persons, conveyances and merchandise at the port of entries. Officer Rey works on 

the Anti- Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (A-TCET). 

15. In September 2007, Officer Rey sustained a total colon removal and reversal, with the 

installation of a "J" pouch, and he has had this condition since that time. Officer Rey also suffers 

from an immune system disorder as result of his medical condition and his major life activities are 

affected by the same which additionally exposes him to dehydration. Officer Rey’s disability is 

not visible. Plaintiff describes his disabilities as suffering from ulcerative colitis and irritable bowel 

disorder.

16. Approximately in September, 2007, Plaintiff was placed on the Voluntary Leave Transfer 

Program, where he provided medical documentation that was reviewed and approved by 

Christopher Maston, Executive Director of Operations, ES-1895-00, assigned to CBP Head 

Quarters (who at the time was the Port Director assigned to the Miami Point of Entry). 

17. From 2010-2013, Plaintiff had been assigned to Cargo (by way of bid and rotation). During 

this time, Plaintiff’s chain of command was able to accommodate his needs after his surgery; 

therefore, he never requested an official reasonable accommodation.

18. In or about early 2012, Plaintiff recorded his medical requirements within the SAIMS 

system wherein he indicated that due to his “J” pouch, he could not be confined to small spaces. 

19. In 2013, during the bid and rotation period, Plaintiff was assigned to the Anti-terrorism 

Contraband Enforcement Team. Plaintiff identifies his first- and second-line supervisors as SCBP 

Antonio Lozada, GS-1895-13 and Chief Henry Aponte (retired) (“Chief Aponte”), GS-1895-13, 

assigned to Miami Point of Entry. 

20. On or about March 9, 2013, Plaintiff’s Passport Certification had expired, and he was 

required to attend the training again. On May 9, 2013, he once again provided medical 

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documentation to Chief Aponte, requesting to be exempt from the training. Chief Aponte stated to 

Plaintiff that he would take care of it; however, he kept coming back asking for additional 

information.

21. In October 2014, Plaintiff received an email informing him that he was scheduled to attend 

the Passport Training that month. Chief Aponte advised Plaintiff that he needed to provide 

additional medical documentation that presented more details outlining his restrictions in order for 

him to be exempt from the training.

22. On November 5, 2014, Plaintiff submitted correspondence from his treating physician, a 

specialist, to Chief Henry Aponte, advising of his medical condition and of his immediate need for 

a reasonable accommodation as Plaintiff was required to avoid exposure to the traveling public, in 

order to safeguard his immune system; and therefore, Plaintiff needed to avoid passport control 

duties and associated training for this job function.

23. On November 18, 2014, Supervisory Customs and Border Protection Officer Leo Atkinson 

("Atkinson”), who is not within the Plaintiff's chain of command, summoned him to an 

investigatory meeting, making reference to the physician' s previously submitted correspondence, 

which apparently had been passed along to Chief Aponte, from Station Chief Pacheco. Atkinson 

began the meeting in a demeaning and hostile manner, claiming that the medical letter was "too 

general," in order to warrant further consideration. In addition, Atkinson further erroneously stated 

that the medical letter would disqualify the Plaintiff from further employment with DHS. Atkinson

also stated that if the "appropriate letter," was not promptly produced, the Plaintiff would be 

scheduled for immigration training. Finally, two days later, on November 20, 2014, Atkinson was 

overheard discussing details of the Plaintiff' s medical condition with Supervisory Customs and 

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Border Protection Officer Dawn Humes, commenting that the Plaintiff was purportedly 

"scamming," in order to be relieved of training requirements. 

24. Plaintiff maintains that his medical note was provided to Chief Pacheco, in good faith; and 

only this manager had the need to know of the applicable medical condition. Instead, the medical 

note found its way to Chief Aponte; as well as to Supervisory Customs and Border Protection 

Officer Leo Atkinson. DHS should have some internal process for restricting the confidential 

information only to those management employees with a need to know; instead the information 

was disseminated outside of Plaintiff' s chain of command.

25. Atkinson is not a medical review officer, nor was he within Plaintiff’s chain of command; 

and he had no authorization and or role to review the Plaintiff' s medical records, however Atkinson 

claimed to have the authority to determine whether or not the medical letter was sufficient; and 

whether Plaintiff would be required to attend passport training.

26. Passport training was scheduled for Plaintiff on at least two occasions; however, the 

requirement was placed in a “stand-by” status. The stand-by status has remained in effect, based 

upon the medical letter, provided by the Plaintiff to management. 

27. Although passport training was never formally scheduled, on May 27, 2015, DFO Vernon 

Foret ("Foret") basically rejected the contentions contained in Plaintiff’s reasonable 

accommodation request. DHS maintained that if Plaintiff wore a mask and gloves, he could be 

properly assigned to passport training, however this alleged reasonable accommodation was 

rejected by Plaintiff’s treating physician.

28. Rather than provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation in keeping with the 

recommendations of his treating physician, Defendant DHS primarily sought to piece together its 

own ad hoc solution which was wholly insufficient as it required Plaintiff to be exposed to an 

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environment which was hazardous to his health i.e. to physically attend the passport training at the 

Airport. 

29. More specifically, Plaintiff's treating physician clearly indicated that the Plaintiff was in 

need of accommodations, namely, frequent bathroom breaks, due to flare ups in his condition, and 

avoidance of airborne pathogens. With regard to the latter, Plaintiff’s treating physician indicated 

it was not advisable for him to have frequent contact with the traveling public. Further, Plaintiff’s 

treating physician indicated that the wearing of gloves or a mask would not sufficiently protect 

and/or accommodate the Plaintiff.

30. On or about June of 2015, a medical review officer became involved in the reasonable 

accommodation process. Prior to this juncture, non-medical DHS personnel were making 

determinations on Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation.

31. DHS failed to make a definitive and final ruling on Plaintiff's Request for a Reasonable 

Accommodation until December 21, 2015, wherein Plaintiff was left with an uncertain 

employment status for over one year wherein he continuously suffered from stress and anxiety

awaiting a response from DHS regarding his request and leaving Plaintiff at risk.

32. Plaintiff has been subjected to disparate treatment, different terms and conditions of 

employment, and held to a different standard because of his actual or perceived disability and 

record of impairment.

33. All of this mistreatment as described hereinabove, is contrary to DHS’s own policies 

regarding both harassment and discrimination.

34. Specifically, Defendant’s Anti-Discrimination Policy (Program Statement 3713.25) states, 

“Management at all levels will take effective actions to eliminate any internal policy, practice, or 

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procedure that results in discrimination on the basis of race, color... physical or mental disability... 

or status as a parent.” This is precisely the type of discrimination Plaintiff has been subjected to.

35. Plaintiff has satisfied all conditions precedent to bringing this action, if any.

36. Plaintiff has retained the undersigned law firm as his attorney in this action and is obligated 

to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and all costs incurred in this action.

COUNT I – VIOLATION OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et 

seq. AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111

37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 36 as if fully set 

forth herein.

38. This is an action against Defendant for violation of the Rehabilitation Act (“the 

Rehabilitation Act” of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. and the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111.

39. § 794(a) of the Rehabilitation Act provides in relevant part that “[n]o otherwise qualified 

individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in § 705(20) of this title, shall, solely 

by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency...”

40. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff has been a disabled person as defined by § 705(20) 

of the Rehabilitation Act and regarded as being disabled under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).

At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff has been an “otherwise qualified individual” for purposes of

the Rehabilitation Act.

41. Defendant DHS is liable for its failures as related to its denial of accommodations to 

Plaintiff, as its refusal to accommodate Plaintiff’s needs constitutes a violation of the Act.

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42. Defendant DHS discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of disability. Specifically but 

not limited to, Defendant DHS subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work environment and refused to 

provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff. Such conduct by Defendant DHS has exacerbated 

Plaintiff’s medical condition.

43. Defendant DHS’s conduct constitutes an intentional violation of the prohibitions against 

discrimination, including failure to make reasonable accommodations contained in the 

Rehabilitation Act and ADA.

44. Plaintiff’s disabilities have prevented him from participating in and benefitting from 

programs and services which, but for Defendant DHS’s denial of a reasonable accommodation, 

could have been provided by Defendant to address Plaintiff’s disabilities.

45. As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the violations set forth above, Plaintiff has 

suffered an exacerbation of his physical and mental impairments, pain and suffering, loss of the 

enjoyment of life and other tangible and intangible damages. 

46. These damages have occurred in the past, are occurring at present and will occur in the 

future. Defendant should be ordered to pay any attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this count. 

Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive/equitable relief.

COUNT II – UNLAWFUL RETALIATION PURSUANT TO THE REHABILITATOIN 

ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 504 AND PURSUANT TO ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12203

47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 36 as if fully set 

forth herein.

48. Defendant DHS is an employer as that term is used under the applicable statutes referenced

above.

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49. The foregoing allegations establish a cause of action for unlawful retaliation after Plaintiff 

reported unlawful employment practices which adversely affected him under the statutes 

referenced above.

50. The foregoing unlawful actions by Defendant DHS were purposeful.

51. Plaintiff voiced opposition to unlawful employment practices during his employment with 

Defendant DHS and was the victim of unlawful retaliation, thereafter, as related in part above. The 

events set forth herein led, at least in part, to adverse employment actions against Plaintiff.

52. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because he reported unlawful employment 

practices and was the victim of retaliation thereafter. There is thus a causal connection between 

the reporting of the unlawful employment practices and the adverse employment action taken

thereafter.

53. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant DHS’s conduct described above, Plaintiff 

has suffered emotional distress, mental pain and suffering, past and future pecuniary losses, 

inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and other non-pecuniary losses, lost wages, along with 

lost back and front pay, interest on pay, bonuses, and other benefits. These damages have occurred 

in the past, are permanent and continuing. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive/equitable relief.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for the following:

(a) that process issue and this Court take jurisdiction over this case;

(b) that this Court grant equitable relief against Defendant under the applicable counts 

set forth above, mandating Defendant’s obedience to the laws enumerated herein 

and providing other equitable relief to Plaintiff;

(c) enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff awarding all legally- available 

general and compensatory damages and economic loss to Plaintiff from Defendant 

for Defendant’s violations of law enumerated herein;

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(d) enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff permanently enjoining 

Defendant from future violations of law enumerated herein;

(e) enter judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff awarding Plaintiff attorneys’

fees and costs;

(f) award Plaintiff interest where appropriate; and

(g) grant such other further relief as being just and proper under the circumstances.

Dated June 1, 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

FARROW LAW, P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

4801 S. University Drive

Suite 132

Davie, Florida 33328

Telephone: (954) 252-9818

Facsimile: (954) 252-9821

jay@farrowlawfirm.com

meera@farrowlawfirm.com

BY: /S/JAY LEWIS FARROW____ 

 JAY LEWIS FARROW, ESQ.

 Florida Bar Number: 625213

 MEERA K. KOODIE, ESQ.

 Florida Bar Number: 1020242

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