IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20657

CAROLYN R. DAWSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, formerly doing business as The Bank 

of New York, as Trustee for the Benefit of the Certificate Holders of the 

CWABS, Inc., Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-SD1; SHELLPOINT 

MORTGAGE, L.L.C., 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-2846 

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carolyn Dawson filed suit challenging Defendants’ foreclosure of her

property, in violation of a March 5, 2014 district court dismissal and preclusion 

order prohibiting her from filing further actions regarding the property.

Dawson sought leave to amend her complaint, which the court denied in a 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 5, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-20657

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management order on September 13, 2018. On September 24, 2018, Dawson 

filed a notice of appeal from this management order. Dawson additionally 

moves this court for an emergency stay of the district court’s order to vacate 

the property.

“Federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals only from (1) a 

final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) a decision that is deemed final due to 

jurisprudential exception or that has been properly certified as final pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); and (3) interlocutory orders that fall into specific 

classes, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), or that have been properly certified for appeal by 

the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” Askanase v. Livingwell, Inc., 981 F.2d

807, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The September 13, 2018 management order denying Dawson’s motion to 

amend her complaint is not a final judgment, an interlocutory order appealable 

under § 1292(a), nor was it certified as final under Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b). See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Wells v. S. Main Bank, 

532 F.2d 1005, 1006 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Denial of leave to amend pleadings is 

ordinarily not final for purposes of appeal.”). Dawson contends that the court 

can review the management order under the collateral order doctrine, which 

allows the appeal of certain other interlocutory matters under § 1291. To be 

appealable under the collateral order doctrine, an “order must (1) conclusively 

determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely 

separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from a final judgment.” Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 

F.3d 164, 171 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 

463, 468 (1978)). Contrary to Dawson’s argument, the collateral order doctrine 

does not permit appeal of a management order denying a motion to amend a 

complaint because such an order is reviewable by this court following a final 

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judgment. See Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 

1986) (“[T]he major characteristic of collateral orders [is] that unless it can be 

reviewed before the proceedings terminate, it can never be reviewed at all.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Crown Enterprises Inc., 

178 F. App’x 393, 394 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that orders granting or denying 

motions to add parties are not appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 

Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of 

Dawson’s motion to amend her complaint. See Askanase, 981 F.2d at 809-10. 

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a “notice of 

appeal . . . must designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from.”

FED. R. APP. P. 3(c). Dawson’s notice of appeal designates only the September 

13, 2018 management order. We are therefore deprived of appellate 

jurisdiction to consider any other orders Dawson discusses in her brief. See

Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a 

party designates in the notice of appeal particular orders only (and not the 

final judgment), we are without jurisdiction to hear challenges to other rulings

or orders not specified in the notice of appeal.”). 

Dawson’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,

because there is no appeal pending, her motion for stay is DENIED. See In re 

Barrier, 776 F.2d 1298, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985) (providing that Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 8(a) “only authorizes stays pending appeals to this court”). 

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