Service Assessment

Southern California Wildfires 

October 20 to November 3, 2003 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service 

Silver Spring, Maryland
Service Assessment

 Southern California Wildfires 

October 20 to November 3, 2003 

 

July 2004

National Weather Service 

Brigadier General (Retired) David L. Johnson, Assistant Administrator 
ii

Preface

 Hot, dry offshore winds, known as Santa Ana Winds in southern California, 

coupled with long-term abnormally dry conditions across the area, set the stage for one of 

the more costly natural disasters in California history. During late October into early 

November 2003, fourteen wind driven wildfires swept across Southern California. These 

wildfires killed 22 people, destroyed 3,600 homes, charred nearly 740,000 acres of land, 

and caused more than $2 billion in property damage. Casualties and property loss were 

highest in the San Diego metropolitan area. These losses were a result of the Cedar Fire 

moving into urban areas on Sunday, October 26, 2003. 

 Due to the magnitude of this event, we formed a service assessment team to 

examine the forecast and warning services provided to land managers, fire control 

personnel, emergency planners, media and the public. Service assessments provide a 

valuable contribution to ongoing efforts by the National Weather Service (NWS) to 

improve the quality, timeliness, and value of our products and services. Findings and 

recommendations from this assessment will improve techniques, products, services, and 

information provided to our partners and the American Public. 

 

 

David L. Johnson 

 Assistant Administrator 

 for Weather Services 

 July 2004

 
iii

Table of Contents

Page

Preface............................................................................................................................................. ii 

Service Assessment Team.............................................................................................................. iv 

Acronyms.........................................................................................................................................v 

Service Assessment Report..............................................................................................................1 

 Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1 

 Event Overview ...................................................................................................................3 

 Warning and Forecast Services 

 A. Storm Prediction Center......................................................................................6 

 B. Weather Forecast Office (WFO) San Diego, California.....................................7 

 C. Weather Forecast Office (WFO) Los Angeles, California................................13 

 D. Incident Meteorologists (IMETS).....................................................................16 

 E. NWS Equipment Outage and Recovery............................................................19 

 F. Media/Dissemination.........................................................................................22 

Best Practices.................................................................................................................................26 

Appendix A Map of Southern California County Warning and Forecast Areas.................... A-1 

Appendix B Location Map of Wildfires.................................................................................. B-1 

Appendix C Event Statistics ....................................................................................................C-1 

Appendix D WFO San Diego Chronological Product Highlights .......................................... D-1 

Appendix E WFO Los Angeles Chronological Product Highlights .......................................E-1 

Appendix F Fire Regime Condition Class Map ......................................................................F-1 

Appendix G Southern California Media Demographics ........................................................ G-1 
iv

Service Assessment Team

 This Service Assessment Team was activated on November 6, 2003. The team 

assembled at the Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in San Diego, California on Tuesday, 

November 11, to begin their work. Team members visited WFOs San Diego and Los 

Angeles, California, various land management agencies, and media outlets. Numerous 

telephone interviews were conducted with emergency management officials, local, state, 

and federal government officials, broadcast media, and the public. 

 The team consisted of the following persons: 

Greg Harmon Team Leader, Meteorologist in Charge (MIC), 

 WFO Sioux Falls, SD 

John Dragomir MIC, WFO Fairbanks, AK 

Mike Vescio MIC, WFO Pendleton, OR 

Pat Vesper Warning Coordination Meteorologist, 

 WFO Midland, TX 

Rusty Billingsley NWS National Fire Weather Program Leader, 

Boise, ID 

Heath Hockenberry Assistant National Program Manager for Predictive 

Services, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 

Boise, ID

Marilu Trainor National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), Public Affairs Specialist, NWS Western 

Region Headquarters, Salt Lake City, Utah 

 Other valuable contributors 

Wayne Presnell Office of Climate, Water and Weather Services 

 (OCWWS), NWS, Silver Spring, MD 

William Lerner OCWWS, NWS, Silver Spring, MD 
v

Acronyms 

AFD Area Forecast Discussion 

AMRS All Hazards Meteorological Response System 

AWIPS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System 

AWS Automated Weather Source (Convergence Technologies) 

BI Burning Indices 

CDF California Department of Forestry 

CDT Central Daylight Time 

CEM Civil Emergency Message 

CNRFC California-Nevada River Forecast Center 

COMET Cooperative Program for Operational Meteorology, Education, and 

Training 

CWA County Warning Area 

EM Emergency Manager 

ESA Electronics Systems Analyst 

F Degrees Fahrenheit 

FBAN Fire Behavior Analyst 

FFG Flash Flood Guidance 

FMO Fuels Management Officer 

FWF Fire Weather Forecast 

GACC Geographic Area Coordination Center 

HMT Hydro-meteorological Technician 

HWO Hazardous Weather Outlook 

IMET Incident Meteorologist 

MIC Meteorologist in Charge 

NCEP National Centers for Environmental Prediction 

NIFC National Interagency Fire Center 

NFDRS National Fire Danger Rating System 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NPW Non-Precipitation Weather Watch/Advisory 

NWR NOAA Weather Radio 

NWS National Weather Service 

NWSH National Weather Service Headquarters 

OCWWS Office of Climate, Water, and Weather Services 

PDT Pacific Daylight Time 

PST Pacific Standard Time 

RAWS Remote Automated Weather Station 

RFC River Forecast Center 

ROC Radar Operations Center 

ROMAN Real-time Observations Monitoring and Analysis Network 

SDM Station Duty Manual 

SPC Storm Prediction Center 

SPS Special Weather Statement 
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UGC Universal Generic Code 

URL Uniform Resource Locator 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

WES Weather Event Simulator 

WFO Weather Forecast Office 

WSR-88D Weather Surveillance Radar - 1988 Doppler 

ZFP Zone Forecast Product 
 

Cover: Cedar Fire approaching the Scripps Ranch area October 26, 2003. Courtesy of 

John Gibbins of the San Diego Union Tribune. 
1

Service Assessment Report 

Executive Summary 

Land management agencies and fire control personnel battled fourteen wind-driven 

wildfires across southern California in late October and early November 2003. These fires killed 

22 people, destroyed 3,600 homes, blackened nearly 740,000 acres, and will end up as one of the 

more costly natural disasters in California history, according to then Governor Gray Davis. 

We assessed the two southern California Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) and services 

provided by the NWS Incident Meteorologists (IMETs) deployed to several of the wildfires. We 

also reviewed the performance of NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Prediction’s 

(NCEP) Storm Prediction Center (SPC), which issues national Fire Weather Outlook products. 

The service assessment focused on the period October 20 through November 3, 2003. The 

assessment team found consistent, high quality products, services, and information were 

provided by the NWS during this time period. 

Wildfires can leave large areas devoid of vegetation and vulnerable to producing large 

volumes of runoff leading to flash floods, floods, or mudslides. To accommodate the change in 

conditions after a wildfire, River Forecast Centers (RFC) often reassess their modeling 

procedures and work with the WFOs they service to understand the changes and better monitor 

the recovering areas. The team did not assess the California-Nevada RFC but felt some of their 

actions during the aftermath of these wildfires were noteworthy. A list of these actions can be 

seen in the Best Practices section on page 27. 

The NWS dispatched seven IMETs directly to the southern California fires. IMETs are 

meteorologists who are specially trained to provide onsite weather support to fire fighting teams. 

The majority of IMETs serving the southern California wildfire made us of the ROMAN (Realtime Observations Monitoring and Analysis Network) system developed by the University of 

Utah and Bureau of Land Management to monitor surface weather observations. This system, 

with roots in the NWS funded project called MesoWest, helped IMETs to identify surface 

stations closest to the fires, and set alerts for critical weather parameter thresholds (Best 

Practices 1). The staffs at WFO San Diego and WFO Los Angeles provided critical services to 

the IMETs, as well as the various firefighting agencies, and emergency response personnel. 

Leading up to the wildfire emergency and throughout the event, the SPC issued one-day and 

two-day outlooks focused on critical fire danger. The two southern California WFOs issued Fire 

Weather Watches, Red Flag Warnings, and related high wind warnings and advisories well in 

advance of the wildfire conflagration. The combination of these NWS products resulted in 

excellent advance notification of a critical fire weather situation before the onset of the wildfire 

emergency. The assessment team interviewed a variety of NWS customers in southern 

California. Feedback was overwhelmingly positive toward the quality and reliability of products 

and services provided by the NWS prior to and during the wildfire crisis. 
2

It must be noted WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles recently assumed full NWS fire 

weather forecast and warning responsibility for their respective County Warning Areas (CWA) 

(Appendix A). After a three year period of WFO staff training and customer awareness, this 

program transfer was completed on January 2, 2003. Prior to this time, fire weather services 

were provided by forecasters located at the interagency Southern California Geographic Area 

Coordination Center (GACC), located in Riverside, California. Despite some initial concerns, 

land managers are pleased with the fire weather products and services from the southern 

California WFOs, and were especially complimentary of these WFO services during this wildfire 

siege. WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles have created comprehensive Products and Services 

Guides. These guides are distributed to a variety of customers, including media, land managers, 

emergency planners, and general public (Best Practices 2). The U.S. Forest Service battalion 

chief at the Monte Vista Interagency Communications Center stated, “WFO San Diego has bent 

over backwards to support our needs.” Similar comments were made about WFO Los Angeles. 

A four-year period of abnormally dry weather across southern California, combined with 

a week-long stretch of 100 F + maximum temperatures, very low relative humidity, and record 

low fuel moisture in the vegetation throughout the area, set the stage for a potential wildfire 

outbreak. As high pressure strengthened over the Great Basin on October 24, winds blowing 

from inland desert areas became established. These offshore winds, known as Santa Ana winds 

in southern California, reached peak intensity on Sunday, October 26. It was on this day the 

Cedar Fire raced into heavily populated areas on the north side of San Diego, destroying homes 

and closing freeways. The Cedar Fire became the largest and most deadly of the southern 

California fires, consuming more than 270,000 acres and causing 14 deaths. 

 

This late October Santa Ana wind episode, considered moderate by historical standards, 

was forecast well in advance. A consistent message was provided by NWS forecasters and 

meteorologists located at the interagency Southern California GACC. Five days prior to the 

onset of down-slope winds on Sunday, October 19, fire control agencies, emergency planners, 

and the public were made aware of potential Santa Ana wind conditions and high fire danger for 

the following weekend. 

 

The wildfires burned several NWS facilities in the San Diego area, including 

communication links to the WFO San Diego WSR-88D and a NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) 

transmitter. Portions of the upper air facility, located within urban San Diego, were either 

severely damaged or destroyed by the Cedar Fire. NWS electronics and equipment experts from 

WFO San Diego and a variety of other NWS offices teamed to return these critical systems back 

to service within a week of the fire storm, a remarkable accomplishment. 

A Pacific storm brought valley rain and mountain snow to southern California on October 

31, 2003. Additional precipitation and cooler temperatures in early November allowed 

firefighters to gain the upper hand on the fire situation, with mop up and resource demobilization 

continuing into mid-November. 
3

Event Overview 

Antecedent conditions across southern California leading up to the firestorms were 

favorable for the development and rapid spread of wildfires. Fuel moisture in wildland 

vegetation throughout the area was extremely low due to a prolonged period of dry conditions. 

San Diego was in the midst of a record dry period with the last measurable rain occurring at 

Lindbergh Airfield on April 22, 2003. Similar conditions were experienced in the Los Angeles 

area. The downtown Los Angeles reporting station had not received measurable rain since June 

10, 2003. Record heat also began impacting the area in the days leading up to the wildfire 

outbreak, with a week of 100 F + maximum temperatures in mid-October. Downtown Los 

Angeles recorded a high temperature of 97 F as late as October 21. 

The first major fire in southern California, the Grand Prix-Padua Fire, began on Tuesday, 

October 21, in San Bernardino County (for fire locations see Appendix B). This fire burned 

nearly 60,000 acres in San Bernardino County and more than 10,000 acres in Los Angeles 

County, destroying 135 homes. Other fire starts occurred between October 21 and October 24 

with light winds and low, daytime relative humidity. 

High pressure began to build southward from the Pacific Northwest to the Great Basin 

region on Friday, October 24. In response to the building high, an easterly, offshore pressure 

gradient became established over southern California. This contributed to the onset of a 

moderate Santa Ana wind episode, initially at the mountain canyon and pass level on October 24 

and early October 25, before spreading to the lower elevations on October 25 through the 

afternoon of October 27. The Santa Ana wind condition reached peak intensity during the 

midday hours on Sunday, October 26. 

The largest and deadliest fire, the Cedar Fire, started Saturday afternoon, October 25, at 

approximately 5:37 p.m. PDT, east of Ramona, 35 miles northeast of downtown San Diego. 

This fire was accidentally set by a flare from a lost hiker. Increasing Santa Ana winds, with 

gusts locally exceeding 60 mph, and minimum relative humidity of less than 10 percent, 

combined with the very dry fuels to create extreme fire behavior and rapid fire spread. Between 

midnight and 10 a.m. on Sunday, October 26, the Cedar Fire expanded 30 miles to the west and 

south, spreading into heavily populated areas on the north side of San Diego. There were 

thirteen fatalities during this phase of the fire, with more than 2,000 residential structures 

destroyed. The Cedar Fire claimed its last victim, a firefighter, on Thursday, October 30. 

Particularly hard hit was the Scripps Ranch community where more than 150 homes were 

completely destroyed. 

Other major fires ignited and raged uncontrolled on October 25 and October 26. The 

Simi Fire grew to more than 100,000 acres before containment. The Old Fire burned more than 

90,000 acres, destroyed 990 homes and killed six people. The Paradise Fire burned 57,000 acres, 

and destroyed more than 200 residences, killing two people (Appendices B and C). 
4

By late Monday, October 27, the large scale weather pattern began to change. The 

easterly pressure gradient relaxed and the Santa Ana winds diminished. On Tuesday, October 

28, an onshore flow became established across southern California. Despite the associated 

cooling trend and recovering relative humidity, strong westerly winds caused the fires to spread 

eastward up the mountain slopes. 

A Pacific storm brought valley rain and mountain snow to southern California on Friday, 

October 31. Additional precipitation and more seasonable early November temperatures allowed 

firefighters to gain the upper hand on the wildfire situation. In total, this event was the second 

deadliest fire disaster in California history with 22 killed and 225 injured (East Bay Hills Fire, 

October 1991; 25 dead, 150 injured). Nearly 740,000 acres of forest and urban area burned, 

most of which occurred in just a few days. The cost to fight these fires is estimated at $121 

million dollars, with structural losses well in excess of $2 billion dollars. More than 3,600 

residences, 36 commercial buildings, and 1,169 outbuildings were destroyed, exceeding the 

damage caused by the East Bay Hills Fire of October, 1991. 

WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles began highlighting the potential for a Santa Ana wind 

event several days prior to the onset of strong winds. Fire Weather Watches, Red Flag 

Warnings, High Wind Warnings, and Wind Advisories were issued with long lead times. Both 

offices issued Special Weather Statements (SPS) on Friday, October 24, emphasizing the strong 

wind potential. The long lead time allowed land management and emergency management 

officials to allocate resources and plan for the extreme fire weather conditions. 

Fact: Antecedent conditions across southern California leading up to the firestorms were 

favorable for the development and rapid spread of wildfires. Fuel moisture in wildland 

vegetation throughout the area was extremely low due to a prolonged period of dry conditions.

Fact: The largest and deadliest fire, the Cedar Fire, started Saturday afternoon, October 25, at 

5:37 p.m. PDT, east of Ramona, 35 miles northeast of downtown San Diego. This fire was 

accidentally set by a flare from a lost hiker. 

Fact: The Santa Ana wind conditions reached peak intensity during the midday hours on 

Sunday, October 26. 

Fact: This event was the second deadliest fire disaster in California history with 22 killed and 

225 injured (East Bay Hills Fire, October 1991; 25 dead.) 

Fact: WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles began highlighting the potential for a Santa Ana wind 

event several days prior to the onset of strong winds. 
5

Picture 1. The aftermath of the firestorm as it went through the Scripps Ranch area. Courtesy of John 

Gibbins of the San Diego Union Tribune. 

Figure 1. Cedar Fire Progression. Fire began in northeast (upper right) portion of map and moved 

westward toward San Diego (left side with yellow shading) on October 26. The fire then spread eastward 

through October 30 due to a wind-shift. Courtesy of the California Department of Forestry (CDF). 
6

Warning and Forecast Services

A. Storm Prediction Center 

Overview 

SPC issues Day 1 and Day 2 Fire Weather Outlooks for areas where high to extreme fire 

danger exists and meteorological conditions favor either the development or spread of wildfires. 

Critical Fire Weather Areas are issued when relative humidity values are expected to be less than 

15 percent and sustained winds are forecast to exceed 20 mph. Extremely Critical Fire Weather 

Areas are delineated with the same humidity criteria but for sustained wind speeds of 30 mph or 

greater. SPC also issues Critical Area forecasts for dry lightning, when numerous cloud to 

ground lightning strikes are anticipated, but little or no measurable rainfall is expected. 

The SPC’s Fire Weather Outlooks for the late October Santa Ana wind event were 

accurate and consistent with the Fire Weather Forecasts (FWF) issued from WFOs Los Angeles 

and San Diego. 

SPC began to focus on southern California in the Day 2 Outlook issued at 3:16 a.m. CDT 

Thursday, October 23. Although an outlook area was not issued, the discussion highlighted the 

anticipated development of nightly down-slope winds with poor overnight relative humidity 

recovery for late Friday into Saturday morning. The Day 1 Outlook issued on Friday, October 

24 at 4:09 a.m. CDT incorporated portions of southern California, including the Los Angeles 

area and locations just north of San Diego, in a “Critical Area” forecast. The text of the 

discussion included the wording, 

“Moderate Santa Ana winds will continue/increase late today as high pressure builds into 

the Great Basin. Down-slope northeast winds 15-25 mph with 30 mph gusts possible will 

be strongest in favored areas adjacent to canyons and passes.” 

The Day 2 outlook issued at 5:27 a.m. CDT Friday, October 24, valid for Saturday maintained a 

Critical Fire Weather Area for southern California and extended the threat into the San Diego 

vicinity. 

During the weekend of October 25 and 26, the SPC continued to focus on the critical fire 

weather conditions setting up over southern California. “Critical Areas” were indicated each day 

in the Fire Weather Outlooks, with the Day 1 Outlook text on Saturday, October 25, stating, 

 

“Culmination of down-slope winds will likely arrive later Tonight/early Sunday given 

marked increase of mid level wind speeds amidst nearly unidirectional flow.” 

On Sunday, October 26, the day the Cedar firestorm raced into the urban San Diego area, 

“Critical Areas” were again indicated across the entire threat region (Figure 2). The Day 1 

Outlook included the discussion, 
7

“Northeast winds of 25-35 mph are expected to peak this morning with localized gusts in 

excess of 50 mph possible...record or near record warmth, steep atmospheric lapse rates, 

and extremely dry air-mass/fuels will foster critical fire conditions and erratic fire 

behaviors.”

Figure 2. SPC Day 1 Fire Weather Outlook issued at 2:30 a.m. PST Sunday October 26, 2003, valid for the 

period 4 a.m. PST October 26 through 4 a.m. PST October 27. Note the "Critical Area" depicted for much of 

southern California. (SPC, NOAA). 

Fact: The SPC’s Fire Weather Outlooks for the late October Santa Ana wind event were 

accurate and consistent with the Fire Weather Forecasts (FWF) issued from WFOs Los Angeles 

and San Diego. 

B. WFO San Diego, California

Overview

WFO San Diego provided excellent lead time to the Santa Ana wind event in both their 

FWF and public forecast products. They first mentioned the potential for a Santa Ana wind 
8

event in their Area Forecast Discussion (AFD) issued at 2:00 p.m. PDT Sunday October 19, five 

days prior to the onset of the down-slope winds. The text of the discussion stated, 

“Strong offshore flow developing Friday through the weekend.” The FWF, issued later at 2:30 

p.m. PDT included the wording, “moderate offshore flow with very low humidities will be 

possible next weekend.” These early messages generated an immediate response as the media 

picked up on the Santa Ana wind potential, and land managers took note. The Incident 

Commander on the Grand Prix Fire stated that the long lead time on the Santa Ana wind 

forecasts “... caused us (land and fire management agencies) to increase our staffing and be 

more vigilant.” Subsequent AFDs and FWFs issued Monday, October 20, through Wednesday, 

October 23, mentioned the potential for a Santa Ana wind event for late in the week through the 

weekend. 

At 9:00 a.m. PDT Thursday, October 23, a Fire Weather Watch was issued for much of 

the WFO San Diego CWA for Saturday through Sunday afternoon, “for sustained relative 

humidities less than 10 percent...and for northeast winds 25 to 35 mph and gusty.” The watch 

was upgraded to a Red Flag Warning at 9:00 a.m. PDT Friday, October 24, valid through 

Monday afternoon, October 27, covering the peak of the wildfire activity. The warning included 

all of the mountains, inland valleys, and Orange County and was issued for, “sustained relative 

humidities less than 10 percent and for northeast winds of 25 to 35 mph with gusts to 45 mph.” 

The Red Flag Warning was updated four times from the initial issuance Friday morning until 

Monday morning, October 27. Maximum wind gusts were increased to 50 to 60 mph in the Red 

Flag Statements issued on Saturday and Sunday. While the Red Flag Warning may have been 

issued somewhat early for some locations, overall, wind and humidity forecasts correlated very 

well with observed data, especially over the weekend when conditions were most critical. At 

4:00 p.m. PST Monday, October 27, the Red Flag Warning expired. In southern California, a 

Red Flag event occurs when high to extreme fire danger exists due to dry fuels, and dry lightning 

or strong dry winds and low humidity are observed. Sustained winds greater than 25 mph for at 

least 8 hours and relative humidity less than 15 percent for much of that time are needed to verify 

a Red Flag Warning. The Red Flag Warnings were supported by appropriate wind advisories in 

the public forecast products. 

On Wednesday, October 29, at 9:00 a.m. PST, a new Red Flag Warning was issued for 

strong onshore winds and low relative humidity downwind of the wildfires. This warning caused 

confusion because many people in southern California, including some fire fighters and the 

media, only associate Red Flag Warnings with strong northeast Santa Ana, or offshore winds for 

southern California (Finding 1). Also, San Diego County air pollution meteorologists felt the 

wind speeds in the Wednesday afternoon FWF were not representative of observed conditions 

that evening, yet the FWF product was not updated. Routine FWFs are issued twice daily during 

the fire season, and are not typically updated after the 3:30 p.m. local issuance time. FWFs are 

available to the public from many WFO web sites (Finding 2). 

The first public forecast product to indicate a threat for a Santa Ana wind event was the 

Hazardous Weather Outlook (HWO) issued at 6:00 a.m. PDT Thursday, October 23. The 

extended forecast portion of the product valid Friday through the following Wednesday 

indicated, “Possible fire weather danger due to strong winds and low humidity.” The public 
9

Zone Forecast Product (ZFP) issued at 1:31 a.m. PDT Friday, October 24, called for wind gusts 

of 40 to 60 mph in most areas away from the coast for Saturday through Sunday. 

Wind Advisories were posted at 2:30 p.m. PDT on Friday, October 24, valid through 2:00 

p.m. PDT Saturday for much of the San Diego CWA. At 9:30 p.m. PDT Friday, a High Wind 

Watch was issued for portions of the area while the Wind Advisory was extended until 2 p.m. 

PST Sunday. At 2:00 p.m. Saturday, the High Wind Watch was upgraded to a High Wind 

Warning through 9:00 p.m. Sunday evening, with the Wind Advisory extended at that time for 

locations outside the warning area. 

An SPS was issued by WFO San Diego at 11:30 a.m. on Friday, October 24, to alert the 

public to the increasing potential for strong Santa Ana winds, especially for Saturday and 

Sunday. The statement headline read, “fire danger and strong winds increasing through 

Sunday...near record heat to continue.” The text of the product also included the statement, “fire 

danger is high and will be increasing as warm temperatures and low humidities continue...and 

winds increase.” Follow-up SPSs were not issued regarding the anticipated critical weather 

situation prior to or during the firestorms (See Recommendation 3). 

At the height of the Cedar firestorm, WFO San Diego issued, on their initiative, a Civil 

Emergency Message (CEM) to raise public awareness to the severity of the unfolding disaster, 

declaring a “fire emergency across northern San Diego County.” The first paragraph of the 

message stated “a serious and potentially life-threatening fire situation continues across 

northern and eastern portions of the San Diego metro area this afternoon.” (Finding 3). 

Ten Spot Forecasts were issued from WFO San Diego from Tuesday, October 21 through 

Thursday, October 30, in support of fire suppression efforts. On Monday, October 27, a request 

for a Spot Forecast via email was received by WFO San Diego at 2:31 a.m. PST for the 

Mountain Fire, but the request went unfilled until 6:55 a.m. PST. At least one follow-up call 

was made to WFO San Diego by land management officials inquiring about the completion of 

the Spot request. The Battalion Chief at the Riverside California Department of Forestry (CDF) 

indicated the Spot Forecast information was needed in a more timely manner (Finding 4). 

WFO San Diego benefited greatly from additional wind information from Automated 

Weather Source (AWS) Convergence Technologies WeatherNet weather stations located across 

southern California. These additional observations, normally located at schools, allowed WFO 

San Diego forecasters to more effectively monitor Santa Ana wind conditions during the event 

(Best Practices 3). 

WFO San Diego does not conduct routine formal staff weather discussions. However, as 

the fire danger threat increased, “significant event briefings,” involving the operational staff and 

office management, were held around 11 a.m. on Wednesday, October 22 and again on Friday, 

October 24. These special briefings helped elevate the situational awareness of the staff to the 

increasing wildfire potential for the coming weekend (Best Practices 4). 
10

During the height of the wildfire crisis on Sunday, October 26, WFO San Diego was 

staffed with three forecasters, an HMT, and the MIC. The MIC was called at approximately 

9:30 a.m., and arrived at the office around 10:30 a.m. With an increased emphasis on 

maintaining critical information flow during extreme wildfire episodes in urban areas 

(recommendation 3), this staffing level may prove insufficient for future events (Finding 5). 

 

 Overall, the land management and emergency service organizations are satisfied with the 

services provided by WFO San Diego, and all of the individuals interviewed indicated a good 

working relationship with the office. A Special Projects Officer for the San Diego Fire 

Department said of this event, “... the information was so correct and accurate and in our 

business we cannot ask for more than that.” The Battalion Chief of the Cleveland National 

Forest indicated that this event “... took no one by surprise. It was well forecasted.” The 

Deputy Fuel management Officer (FMO) from the Cleveland National Forest said, (there is) “... 

good interagency coordination on weather information.” 

WFO San Diego Fire Weather Training

WFO San Diego began preparing to assume fire weather forecast responsibility in 1999. 

All forecasters completed the S290 “Intermediate Wildland Fire Behavior” course as a first step. 

Office staff also routinely compiled practice Fire Weather and Spot Forecasts from 1999 until 

forecast responsibility was transferred to the WFO from the Southern California GACC in 

January 2003. When a new forecaster arrives in San Diego, they are required to successfully 

complete S290 and on-the-job training. This training includes familiarization with the office’s 

Fire Weather Station Duty Manual (SDM), completing a fire weather case study on the Weather 

Event Simulator (WES), and working several fire weather training shifts under the direct 

supervision of a Senior Forecaster. The office routinely conducts off season fire weather 

seminars to help the staff prepare for the upcoming fire season. 

WFO San Diego Warning Coordination and Outreach 

WFO San Diego maintains an effective warning coordination and public awareness 

program. They have hosted a number of workshops for their partners in emergency 

management and the media. 

During the workshops held in the fall of 2002 and 2003, emergency planners, fire 

personnel, law enforcement, and the media were provided a WFO “San Diego Products and 

Resources Guide.” This guide contains important information about wildfires and proclaims 

weather as, “one of the most significant factors in determining the severity of wild land fires.” 

The guide reinforces the value of NWS fire weather products and services stating, “An accurate 

weather forecast can mean life or death to a fire fighter and is also critical in protecting forest 

and range lands as well as the increasing number of homes built in remote areas.” A summary 

of the office Fire Weather Program and a list of Fire Weather Definitions are contained in the 

guide. 
11

WFO San Diego maintains a network of approximately 650 volunteer weather spotters 

who provide critical real-time weather information to the office through an online spotter report 

log, with reports then automatically alarmed on the office Advanced Weather Interactive 

Processing System (AWIPS). WFO San Diego maintains a good relationship with the amateur 

radio community and uses amateur radio packet software to acquire weather observation data for 

the office. 

During the last fiscal year, WFO San Diego conducted numerous weather safety 

presentations for schools, civic clubs, service organizations, and conducted numerous office 

tours, including some involving local public officials. Overall, WFO San Diego’s coordination 

and public awareness outreach were effective prior to the October 2003 southern California 

wildfire crisis. 

Fact: WFO San Diego provided excellent lead time to the Santa Ana wind event in both their 

FWF and ZFP. 

Fact: An SPS was issued by WFO San Diego at 11:30 a.m. Friday October 24 to alert the public 

to the increasing potential for strong Santa Ana winds, especially for Saturday and Sunday. 

Fact: At the height of the Cedar firestorm, WFO San Diego issued, on their initiative, a CEM to 

raise public awareness to the severity of the unfolding disaster. 

Fact: The land management and emergency service organizations are satisfied with the services 

provided by WFO San Diego, and all of the individuals interviewed indicated a good working 

relationship with the office. 

Finding 1: On Wednesday, October 29 at 9:00 a.m. PST, a new Red Flag Warning was 

issued for strong onshore winds and low relative humidity downwind of the wildfires. This 

warning caused confusion because many people in southern California, including some fire 

fighters and the media, only associate red flag events with strong northeast Santa Ana, or 

offshore winds for southern California. 

Recommendation 1a: In partnership with Southern California land management agencies, 

and the Southern California GACC meteorologists, WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles 

should review Red Flag Warning criteria to ensure the proper customer response for 

southern California. 

Recommendation 1b: WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles should then provide outreach and 

educational opportunities to the local media and public to ensure Red Flag Warning 

criteria are well understood. 

 

Recommendation 1c: All WFOs should review their Red Flag Warning criteria with their 

land management agencies prior to the start of the next fire season to ensure the criteria 

meet customer needs. 
12

Finding 2: Routine FWFs are issued twice daily during the fire season, and are not 

typically updated after the 3:30 p.m. local issuance time. FWFs are available to the public 

from many WFO web sites. 

Recommendation 2: FWFs should be updated when observational and/or short term 

model guidance suggests the current forecast is or will be substantially in error. This is 

especially important in critical fire situations. 

 

Finding 3: At the height of the Cedar firestorm, WFO San Diego issued, on their initiative, 

a CEM to raise public awareness to the severity of the unfolding disaster. 

Recommendation 3: Emergency statements should be issued in coordination with fire 

management officials when rapidly spreading wildfires are encroaching upon a major 

metropolitan area. However, WFOs should use the SPS as the primary vehicle for 

conveying such information, unless directed by a government agency to issue a CEM. 

Updated SPSs should be issued as new and credible information becomes available from 

fire management personnel. The Short Term Forecast should be used to update weather 

conditions within the threatened area.

Finding 4: On Monday, October 27, a request via e-mail for a Spot Forecast was received 

by WFO San Diego at 2:31 a.m. PST for the Mountain Fire, but the request went unfilled 

until 6:55 a.m. PST. The Battalion Chief at the Riverside CDF indicated the Spot Forecast 

information was needed in a more timely manner.

 

Recommendation 4: WFOs with Fire Weather responsibility should coordinate with fire 

control agencies to ensure Spot Forecast turnaround times defined in Annual Operating 

Plans meet customer needs, especially during critical wildfire events and fire start initial 

attack. 

Finding 5: During the height of the wildfire crisis on Sunday, October 26, WFO San Diego 

was staffed with three forecasters, an HMT, and the MIC. With an increased emphasis on 

maintaining critical information flow during extreme wildfire episodes in urban areas, this 

staffing level may prove insufficient for future events. 

Recommendation 5: Regional Directors should augment WFO operational staffing during 

critical weather events, including major wildfires impacting urban areas, to ensure timely 

delivery of routine products, emergency services, and enhanced information flow into and 

out of the office. This staffing level should be in place before the onset of the critical event 

if at all possible. 

 

 
13

C. WFO Los Angeles, California 

Overview 

WFO Los Angeles also recognized the Santa Ana wind potential and communicated this 

information well in advance of the wildfire outbreak. The WFO Los Angeles forecasters 

routinely run a set of locally developed applications that allow forecasters to conveniently view 

RAWS observations in a meteogram plot on AWIPS (Best Practices 5). The first mention of 

possible Santa Ana winds occurred on Tuesday, October 21. The afternoon FWF that day 

contained the headline, “possible Santa Ana winds this weekend.” This was three days prior to 

the onset of the event and was a key product in alerting the fire community of a potentially 

hazardous situation. Subsequent Fire Weather Forecasts headlined the possibility of Santa Ana 

winds so a consistent message was communicated. 

Public forecast products also conveyed a consistent message. Forecasters introduced, 

“locally breezy” and, “breezy below passes and canyons” wording in the Friday through Sunday 

periods of their ZFP as early as Wednesday, October 22. The early morning HWO of October 

22 also brought attention to, “northeast winds 20 to 30 mph with locally stronger gusts possible 

through and below passes and canyons” valid during the same period. 

On Thursday, October 23, at 9:50 a.m. PDT, a Fire Weather Watch was issued after 

coordination with appropriate fire management agencies. The watch was valid for Friday 

through Sunday and focused on strong Santa Ana winds with gusts over 40 mph accompanied by 

single digit relative humidity. The watch area included mountains and valleys of Santa Barbara, 

Ventura, and Los Angeles Counties. Lead times on this watch ranged from 28 to 32 hours 

depending on the area. This provided excellent advance notice to local emergency management 

and fire control agencies. 

The Fire Weather Watch was upgraded to a Red Flag Warning on Thursday, October 23 

at 3:30 p.m. PDT, providing more than 20 hours lead time before the onset of Red Flag 

conditions. A total of six Red Flag Warnings, and 13 fire weather Spot Forecasts were issued by 

WFO Los Angeles for this event. While WFO Los Angeles provided a quality service during 

this event, a review of issued products revealed the Red Flag Warning was not headlined in 

several Spot Forecast products where a Red Flag Warning existed. Also, public and fire weather 

Universal Generic Code (UGC) zone numbers were used interchangeably in the Red Flag 

Warning products (Finding 6). During this event, single digit humidity and winds gusting over 

35 mph were observed on Saturday morning, October 25. Winds continued to increase through 

Sunday morning, October 26, the height of the strong winds, with gusts from 35 to 68 mph 

observed. 

All Red Flag Warnings were allowed to expire Monday afternoon, October 27, as Santa 

Ana wind conditions transitioned to an onshore flow, eventually bringing increased humidity and 

cooler temperatures to the region. Despite the cooling trend and recovering humidity, gusty 

onshore winds were forecast to peak on Wednesday, October 28, through Thursday, October 29 
14

depending on the location. The strong onshore winds produced a continued threat of critical fire 

weather across the forecast area, and this was adequately reflected in issued products. 

The 2003 fire weather season was the first full season the WFO Los Angeles provided 

fire weather services to customers in their CWA. Interviews with the Los Angeles County Fire 

Weather Coordinator, the Ventura County Program Administrator of Emergency Services, and 

the Ventura County Fire Department indicated WFO Los Angeles products and services are 

routinely used to make fire suppression resource decisions. The Los Angeles County Fire 

Weather Coordinator praised the office’s forecasts, stating, “I thought they were great synoptics, 

right on, and the BI’s (burning indices) trended well.” Customer interviews also revealed the 

AFD is a well liked and frequently used product. It frequently conveys additional 

meteorological information and forecaster reasoning not routinely found in other NWS products. 

WFO Los Angeles recognized the potential for hazardous fire weather conditions early, 

coordinated this information with agencies in a timely manner, communicated a consistent 

forecast over time and between products, and managed the extra work load very well. The fire 

weather community indicated sufficient lead time was received to activate local emergency 

plans. 

WFO Los Angeles Fire Weather Training

WFO Los Angeles implemented a detailed five-phase plan as the office began preparing 

to assume fire weather forecast responsibility in May 2000. As a part of this plan, practice FWF 

products were routinely made available for review by WFO Hanford, CA and the Southern 

California GACC. In January 2003, forecast responsibility was officially transferred to WFO 

Los Angeles from the Southern California GACC. All forecast staff completed fire weather 

training per NWS Instruction 10-401 prior to the 2003 fire weather season. This training 

consisted of the S290 course “Intermediate Wildland Fire Behavior” and the COMET 

(Cooperative Program for Operational Meteorology, Education, and Training) Computer Based 

Learning module “Fire Weather Wildland Fire Behavior.” The office elevated its fire weather 

service potential through the implementation of an aggressive local training effort. Forecasters 

were required to complete the following: an exercise using the web-based NWS Spot Forecast 

Request procedure; two WES exercises pertaining to “Santa Ana” wind events and dry lightning; 

and training related to Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS) and the National Fire 

Danger Rating System, used by many land management agencies. This training also included 

familiarization with the office’s SDM section on fire weather. New WFO Los Angeles 

forecasters complete a proficiency program for each of the forecast desks, including fire weather, 

prior to assuming operational forecaster responsibility. 

WFO Los Angeles Warning Coordination and Outreach

WFO Los Angeles maintains an effective warning coordination and public outreach 

program. The office actively participates in workshops with their partners in emergency services 

and the media. Office tours are conducted upon request. WFO Los Angeles is around 50 miles 

from the primary Los Angeles-based media. While this distance does not deter the WFO staff 
15

from visiting media partners in the Los Angeles market, it does result in about half of all 

scheduled television station visits to the WFO being cancelled (Finding 7). 

 

During the week preceding the October wildfire outbreak, WFO Los Angeles was 

promoting an office Open House scheduled for October 24 and 25. While promoting the Open 

House with radio and newspaper affiliates, the staff took the opportunity to speak of the near 

term fire weather threat regarding the dry and windy conditions forecast to occur over the 

weekend. More than 1,000 people toured the office during the Open House and all were 

provided an opportunity to learn about the immediate fire weather danger. 

In the three months prior to the October wildfire outbreak, WFO Los Angeles conducted 

numerous coordination meetings with key fire weather customers. Presentations concerning the 

fire weather program included; demonstrations of the WFO Los Angeles fire weather website, 

spot forecast page, and website access of weather observations, Red Flag Warning criteria, data 

sharing programs, National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS), and local climatological 

effects. 

Over the last year, presentations highlighting the fire weather threat across southern 

California were also provided at the Southern California Edison Risk and Resource Symposium, 

the Los Angeles County Communities at Risk Workshop, the Emergency Network of Los 

Angeles, the Santa Barbara County Storm Summit, and the Santa Barbara County Emergency 

Services Coordinator’s Meeting. The office also conducted a series of coordination meetings 

with 10 major TV stations and eight radio stations, focusing on local fire weather threats, and 

other weather issues important to the area. 

Fire control representatives indicated this pre-season outreach helped foster a positive 

relationship with WFO Los Angeles. The Program Administrator of the Ventura County Office 

of Emergency Services stated, “I have an excellent relationship with this (WFO Los Angeles) 

office.” Overall, WFO Los Angeles achieved a significant level of customer coordination and 

public outreach prior to the October 2003 southern California wildfire crisis. 

Fact: WFO Los Angeles recognized the Santa Ana wind potential and communicated this 

information well in advance of the wildfire outbreak. 

Fact: On Thursday, October 23 at 9:50 a.m. PDT, a Fire Weather Watch was issued after 

coordination with appropriate fire management agencies. 

Fact: The Fire Weather Watch was upgraded to a Red Flag Warning on Thursday, October 23, 

at 3:30 p.m. PDT, providing more than 20 hours lead time before the onset of Red Flag 

conditions. 

Fact: The WFO Los Angeles recognized the potential for hazardous fire weather conditions 

early, coordinated this information with agencies in a timely manner, communicated a consistent 

forecast over time and between products, and managed the extra work load very well. 
16

Finding 6: While WFO Los Angeles provided a quality service during this event, a review 

of issued products revealed the Red Flag Warning was not headlined in several Spot 

Forecast products where a Red Flag Warning existed. Also, public and fire weather UGC 

zone numbers were used interchangeably in the Red Flag Warning products. 

Recommendation 6: WFOs should review NWS Instruction 10-401 to ensure spot and fire 

weather forecast formats are followed. Fire weather policy should provide clear guidance 

concerning proper use of UGC types in fire weather products.

 

Finding 7: WFO Los Angeles is around 50 miles from the primary Los Angeles-based 

media. While this distance does not deter the WFO staff from visiting media partners in 

the Los Angeles market, it does result in about half of all scheduled television station visits 

to the WFO being cancelled. 

Recommendation 7: In all major metropolitan cities across the Nation where the WFO is 

located a significant distance from its major media partners, the NWS should explore the 

creation of media coordination studios located close to its media partners. Private partners 

could be a source of facilities for media coordination. This will allow WFOs to efficiently 

schedule and conduct multiple media interviews and meetings with media partners, 

increasing the visibility of the NWS and enhancing outreach opportunities. 

D. Incident Meteorologists 

 

Overview 

NWS Incident Meteorologists (IMETs) are dispatched to wildfires upon request of 

federal and state land management agencies. The IMETs provide on-site weather services to the 

incident in support of firefighter safety and to supply meteorological input into fire behavior 

models for tactical and planning purposes. 

The 2003 fire season marked the first year the NWS acquired full responsibility for all 

IMET services in California. In previous seasons, land management agency IMETs provided 

much of the service to California per a separate agreement between the NWS and the California 

agencies. During the southern California wildfires, the NWS dispatched seven IMETs to support 

six major wildfires from October 22 to November 11. Incidents supported include the Old, 

Grand Prix, Padua, Piru, Paradise, and Cedar Fires. 

IMET Ordering and Dispatch

Lengthy delays in the ordering process occurred with two of the seven IMET dispatches. 

A delay of approximately two days occurred on the Cedar Fire and a one and a half day delay 

occurred on the Old Fire due to unfamiliarity with request procedures. These delays took place 

before the NWS received the IMET orders (Finding 8). 
17

Once the NWS received an IMET order, the Staff Meteorologist to the National 

Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) and the WFOs did an excellent job of dispatching qualified 

forecasters to the southern California wildfires. The average time from receipt of IMET orders 

by the NWS to IMET arrival on-site was approximately 13 hours. This was well within the 

interagency goal of 24 hour forecaster arrival once the NWS receives an IMET request. The 

land management agencies have also expressed a desire for the closest available IMET resource. 

Three of the dispatched IMETs in this event were from California WFOs, and four were from 

WFOs in neighboring states. The average distance from the IMET’s home office to the 

supported incident is approximately 300 miles, equivalent to the typical distance between 

forecast offices in the Western Region. Based on this evidence, the NWS did a good job of 

providing the closest IMET resource. 

IMET Services

IMETs provided superior service during the southern California wildfire crisis. 

Favorable comments on the IMETs performance were received from every Incident Commander 

and Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) interviewed or surveyed. The Incident Commander on the 

Grand Prix fire said of the IMETs’ performance, “Timing was impeccable within an hour or so. 

The IMETs experience and expertise are going up. I’m pleased with how the program has come 

along.” 

Fire Behavior Analysts, with whom the IMETs work closely on-site, were polled to rate 

IMET services on the six major wildfires. Five FBANs returned the survey; and one sent email 

comments. Surveyed FBANs rated IMET services as very good to excellent, with an average 

rating of 4.6 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being excellent. 

Equipment and Data Acquisition

The year 2003 marked the first season for operational deployment of the NWS All 

Hazards Meteorological Response System (AMRS), a communications and meteorological 

display system for use on wildfires and other hazard incidents. All IMETs were trained on the 

set-up and use of the AMRS at the annual IMET Workshop at NIFC in the spring of 2003. The 

AMRS consists of two-way satellite internet connectivity, a laptop computer, and the FX-Net 

meteorological display software. FX-Net is a web-based tool with similar, but more limited 

capabilities of the forecast office AWIPS. FX-Net servers located at the NWS Western and 

Southern Region Headquarters supply the meteorological data. 

Despite the challenges associated with remote operations, the new AMRS performed very 

well and was a significant improvement for on-site meteorological support. “The two-way 

satellite AMRS and FX-Net are great additions! It makes our job 10 times easier and better!” 

said Mark Stubblefield, IMET on the Paradise fire. All seven IMETs indicated little or no 

problems, and all were very happy with the improved system. Minor problems with short losses 

of Internet connectivity were not significant enough to affect on-site support. 
18

Another aid in data acquisition was the Real-time Observation Monitoring and Analysis 

Network (ROMAN) system developed by the University of Utah. This web-based application 

delivers surface weather observations from numerous platforms across the Western United States 

using the MesoWest network. Four of the seven IMETs on the southern California wildfires 

found the ROMAN system quite helpful, and used the application to set alerts and/or monitor 

RAWS and other surface stations near the wildfires. According to IMET Frederic Bunnag on the 

Old Fire, “I used ROMAN extensively. Excellent tool, especially the Weather Near Fire feature.” 

Conference Calls

During the wildfires, coordination conference calls were initiated each day at 8:30 a.m. 

by the Southern California GACC meteorologists, and included WFOs Los Angeles and San 

Diego, and the IMETs. IMETs dispatched to the fires from outside of the local forecast area 

were more likely to favor the utility of the coordination calls. These IMETs were less familiar 

with the local topography and weather regimes, and found the information from the GACC 

meteorologists and the local WFOs to be beneficial. Comments from local IMETs already 

familiar with the area were less supportive of the calls, but they still felt the calls had value. 

The timing of the coordination calls were a concern to some IMETs. For the most part, 

the IMETs preferred the call a little later in the morning for various reasons. One reason is 

8:30 a.m. is too close to their morning briefings. There is not enough time to look at extended 

guidance, or conflicts with planning meetings. 

Fact: During the southern California wildfires, the NWS dispatched seven IMETs to support six 

major wildfires from October 22 to November 11. 

Fact: IMETs provided superior service during the southern California wildfire crisis. Favorable 

comments on the IMETs performance were received from every Incident Commander and Fire 

Behavior Analyst interviewed or surveyed. 

Finding 8: Lengthy delays in the ordering process occurred with two of the seven IMET 

dispatches. These delays took place before the NWS received the IMET orders. 

Recommendation 8: The NWS needs to work with the land management agencies to 

ensure IMET ordering and dispatch instructions are consistent from the local to the 

national level. These consistent instructions need to be clearly documented in all land 

management mobilization guides, and included in NWS fire weather policy directives. 

Fact: Once the NWS received an IMET order, the Staff Meteorologist to the NIFC and the 

WFOs did an excellent job of dispatching qualified forecasters to the southern California 

wildfires. The average time from receipt of IMET orders by the NWS to IMET arrival on-site 

was approximately 13 hours. This was well within the interagency goal of 24 hour forecaster 

arrival once the NWS receives an IMET request. 
19

Fact: Surveyed FBANs rated IMET services as very good to excellent, with an average rating of 

4.6 on scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being excellent. 

Fact: Despite the challenges associated with remote operations, the new AMRS performed very 

well and was a significant improvement for on-site meteorological support. All seven IMETs 

indicated little or no problems, and all were very happy with the improved system. 

Fact: During the wildfires, coordination conference calls were initiated each day at 8:30 a.m. by 

the Southern California GACC meteorologists, and included WFOs Los Angeles and San Diego, 

and the IMETs. 

E. NWS Equipment Outage and Recovery 

Overview 

The wildfires burned several NWS facilities in the San Diego area, including 

communication links to WFO San Diego’s WSR-88D and a NWR transmitter. Portions of the 

upper air facility, located within urban San Diego, were destroyed by the Cedar Fire. 

The San Diego WSR-88D outage began around 9:00 a.m. PST on Sunday, October 26. 

Telecommunication and power lines to the radar site were destroyed as the Cedar Fire burned 

over the facility. While the immediate radar grounds were well maintained, dry fuels were in 

close proximity of the radar (Finding 9). An on-site inspection the next day determined the 

radar equipment had escaped significant damage. The WFO San Diego Electronics Systems 

Analyst (ESA) initiated action with the NWS Radar Operations Center (ROC) in Norman, 

Oklahoma. The plan called for a wireless solution to restore communications between the 

remote radar site and WFO San Diego. The ROC engineers completed installation of wireless 

equipment on Friday, October 31, but data delivery proved to be sporadic. After nearly two days 

of tireless troubleshooting, a reliable wireless connection was established on Sunday, November 

2, and radar data began flowing again. The radar was being powered by the backup generator at 

that time. Commercial power was restored to the remote site on Friday, November 7. It was not 

until Monday, November 10, that new telecommunications lines were completed and the WSR88D was returned to normal operation. The creative actions of the WFO ESA as well as NWS 

Western Region Headquarters and ROC personnel clearly enabled a return to service much 

sooner than would have otherwise occurred. 

The Cedar Fire also heavily damaged the NWS upper air facility, located within urban 

San Diego. The office and storage trailers were completely destroyed, and the weather balloon 

inflation building severely damaged. Up to 20 tanks of compressed hydrogen, stored at the site, 

remained intact, but posed an explosion threat as the wildfire approached the facility. Aware of 

this hazard, the WFO San Diego ESA called the Incident Command Post of the Cedar Fire on 

Sunday, October 26, to alert fire fighting personnel to this potentially explosive situation. After 

the fire passed, clean up personnel were not allowed to enter the inflation building until the 

hydrogen tanks were inspected and removed by the vendor, again demonstrating excellent 
20

“safety first” procedures by the WFO ESA. Environmental clean up at the upper air facility was 

achieved on Tuesday, October 28, in less than eight hours. In the meantime, a plan of action for 

the restoration of upper air services was jointly developed by personnel from WFO San Diego, 

the NWS Western Region Headquarters, and NWS National Headquarters. Generator power and 

temporary trailers were made available on Thursday, October 30 and a portable upper air system, 

the W9000 system, was installed and tested on Friday, October 31. The first balloon release 

occurred late that afternoon. All upper air contract personnel were trained on the new equipment 

and data transfer procedures, allowing for the first official release, using the W9000 system, on 

Saturday afternoon, November 1. A total of 13 upper air flights were missed. 

Finally, the San Bernardino NWR was logged out on October 29. The reason for the 

system outage was determined to be a failed battery on the emergency power generator at the 

transmitter site (Finding 10). Battery replacement and generator check was achieved and the 

weather radio restored to full service on Monday, November 3. Electronics and equipment 

experts from WFO San Diego and a variety of other offices teamed to return these critical 

systems back to service within a week of the fire storm, judged to be a truly remarkable 

accomplishment by the assessment team. 

Fact: The wildfires burned several NWS facilities in the San Diego area, including 

communication links to the WFO San Diego WSR-88D Doppler radar and a NWR transmitter. 

Portions of the upper air facility, located within urban San Diego, were destroyed by the Cedar 

Fire. 

Fact: Telecommunication and power lines to the radar site were destroyed as the Cedar Fire 

burned over the facility. 

Finding 9: While the immediate radar grounds were well maintained, dry fuels were in 

close proximity to the radar. 

 

Recommendation 9: NWSH, the Regions and the ROC should work with land 

management agencies to identify high wildfire risk areas in proximity to WSR-88D sites. 

A starting point to identify the main risk areas may be the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) Fire Lab’s Fire Regime Condition Classes (See Appendix F). In the identified 

high risk areas, the appropriate site maintenance organization (DOD, FAA, NWS) should 

remove dry fuels more frequently from the land it owns than for sites in non high risk 

areas. 

Finding 10: The San Bernardino NWR was logged out on October 29. The reason for the 

system outage was determined to be a failed battery on the emergency power generator at 

the transmitter site. 

Recommendation 10: Regions should reiterate and emphasize preventive maintenance 

requirements for NWR emergency power systems. 
21

Picture 4. WFO San Diego's WSR-88D facility after the firestorm. Courtesy of WFO San Diego.

Picture 2. Destroyed office and storage trailers at 

Upper Air Facility. Courtesy of WFO San Diego. 

Picture 3. Severely damaged inflation shelter at 

Upper Air Facility. Courtesy of WFO San

Diego.
22

F. Media/Dissemination 

Overview 

During the wildfires, the public’s primary source for attaining weather information was 

through the multiple English-speaking and foreign language media outlets operating throughout 

southern California. Appendix G provides a breakdown of the demographics and media 

coverage for the WFO San Diego and WFO Los Angeles CWAs. 

National, regional and local media representatives from southern California confirmed 

their staffs were keenly aware of the extreme fire danger prior to the late October wildfire 

outbreak. News stories frequently touched on the threat. Stories ranged from drought 

information, to the decaying forest conditions caused by a beetle infestation, to the potential 

effects of hot fall temperatures and Santa Ana wind conditions across the area. The media 

conveyed safety information, urging residents to use caution while enjoying the outdoors, and 

suggested residents clear potential fire fuels from their property. Broadcast meteorologists 

regularly briefed station management and staff on the potential wildfire conditions, and were 

featured guests on local radio shows, where they were frequently asked about the wildfire threat. 

The media served by WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles stated they have good to 

excellent working relations with the NWS staffs. Their contact with the NWS ranged from daily 

calls to occasionally requesting information during severe weather. The majority of radio and 

television stations and numerous newspapers throughout the area used the WFO San Diego and 

Los Angeles websites as a primary way to access NWS weather information. Broadcast media 

said they incorporated critical weather information from these sites into their daily programming, 

and specifically mentioned the value of being able to access hourly graphical and tabular wind 

observation data, Fire Weather Watch, Red Flag Warning, ZFP and satellite imagery. 

 NWS website data greatly aided the media in their ability to relay critical real-time 

weather information and forecasts to the public during the wildfire outbreak. However, some 

media customers suggested the NWS should simplify the WFO web addresses as the current 

address string is too long, and difficult to remember (Finding 11). Media throughout the area 

commented on the graphical observation maps on the WFO San Diego homepage to be the 

easiest, most efficient way to monitor current wind information during the fires (Best Practice 

6). Similar maps were not readily available from the WFO Los Angeles web site. However, in 

reference to the WFO Los Angeles website, a key KCBS Los Angeles correspondent said, “all 

the weather information I needed was there.” Similar support was voiced from the San Diego 

Union Tribune who stated, “The wind was the weather story. We accessed the NWS (San Diego) 

website daily.” The Chief Meteorologist on KUSI Channel 9 in San Diego added, “The NWS 

has made huge advancements in recent years. They are leading the charge and setting the pace.” 

Further he said, “Automated observations on the San Diego graphical map were highly reliable. 

I used the data to compare wind trends.” While NWS websites were heavily used, NWR was 

not widely used by local or national media as a weather source during the fires. 
23

 When the Cedar Fire began on October 25, San Diego TV and radio stations carried 

crawler messages and break-ins. By the next morning, all San Diego news stations curtailed 

most of their regular programming and featured reporters interviewing firefighters and victims in 

an effort to keep viewers and listeners abreast of the unfolding events. News coverage ranged 

from stations adding a few extra hours of programming to nearly wall-to-wall coverage for 

several days. Local newspapers devoted as much as 80 percent of their available space to stories 

about the wildfires, while several networks and other media organizations, including many 

international news organizations, increased their staff devoted to telling this story. 

 The California wildfires received constant media attention for more than two weeks. As 

events worsened, stories that began as local or regional news became national and international 

news, as networks brought in key personalities or feature writers to submit reports from southern 

California locations. 

Overall, the response from the southern California media about the NWS performance of 

WFO San Diego and Los Angeles was overwhelmingly positive. KCBS in Los Angeles said, 

“They (NWS) all do a great job.” The meteorologist for FOX TV 11 in Los Angeles, said, “The 

forecasters out of the San Diego and Los Angeles offices did an excellent job with forecasting 

and letting us know so we could disseminate accurate information to the public.” The Science 

Editor for the Los Angeles Times said, “The NWS did a great job with this event.” NBC TV 

7/39 in San Diego added, “I was very pleased with the San Diego office and there is nothing I 

would have changed.” Finally, the meteorologist from FOX TV 6 in San Diego concluded, “As 

a result of NWS forecasts, we are able to tailor our products for the public.” He went on to 

state, “When the San Diego NWS issues a Red Flag Warning, I take notice and often build 

stories around it. We see it as good public service to educate our viewers. We use the 

information and get it out to the people.” While the southern California media were pleased 

with the products and services provided by WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles, they did express 

a desire for additional methods of getting a “heads up” when new NWS products are issued 

during major events (Finding 12). 

Fact: National, regional and local media representatives from southern California confirmed 

their staffs were keenly aware of the extreme fire danger prior to the late October wildfire 

outbreak. 

Fact: The media served by WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles stated they have good to 

excellent working relations with the NWS staffs. 

Finding 11: Some media customers suggested the NWS should simplify the WFO web 

addresses as the current address string is too long, and difficult to remember. 

Recommendation 11: NWSH should explore the possibility of changing the Uniform 

Resource Locator (URL) for WFOs to a national standard incorporating the NWS 

“weather.gov” domain name and the WFO city name; e.g. 

http://www.weather.gov/sandiego. 
24

Fact: While NWS websites were heavily used, NWR was not used by local or national media to 

access weather information during the fires. 

Finding 12: While the southern California media were pleased with the products and 

services provided by WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles, they did express a desire for 

additional methods of getting a “heads up” when new NWS products are issued during 

major events. 

Recommendation 12a: NWS offices are encouraged to coordinate with media partners and 

explore new methods of enhancing information flow during critical events. Instant 

messaging software, which can provide timely, ongoing communication with the media, 

should be used if possible. 

Recommendation 12b: NWSH should explore adding date-time stamps to the headline 

legend of WFO homepages so customers can quickly see when the most current products 

were issued (Figure 4). 

 
25

Figure 3. Current format of valid NWS web display of Watches, Warnings, and Advisories. 

Figure 4. Proposed change to NWS Web display of Watches, Warnings and Advisories. 
26

Best Practices 

1. The majority of IMETs serving the southern California wildfire made use of the ROMAN 

(Real-time Observations Monitoring and Analysis Network) system developed by the 

University of Utah and Bureau of Land Management to monitor surface weather 

observations. This system, with roots in the NWS funded project called MesoWest, 

helped IMETs to identify surface stations closest to the fires, and set alerts for critical 

weather parameter thresholds. 

2. WFOs San Diego and Los Angeles have created comprehensive Products and Services 

Guides. These guides are distributed to a variety of customers, including media, land 

managers, emergency planners, and general public. 

3. WFO San Diego benefited greatly from additional wind information from local mesonets 

located across southern California. These additional observations, some located at 

schools, allowed WFO San Diego forecasters to more effectively monitor Santa Ana 

wind conditions during the event. 

4. As the fire danger threat increased, WFO San Diego conducted “significant event 

briefings,” involving the operational staff and office management, were held around 11 

a.m. on Wednesday, October 22, and again on Friday, October 24. These special 

briefings helped elevate the situational awareness of the staff to the increasing wildfire 

potential for the coming weekend. 

5. The WFO Los Angeles forecasters routinely run a set of locally developed applications 

that allow forecasters to conveniently view RAWS observations in a meteogram plot on 

AWIPS. 

6. Media throughout the area commented on the graphical observation maps on the WFO 

San Diego homepage to be the easiest, most efficient way to monitor current wind 

information during the fires. 

 
27

Best Practices 

California-Nevada River Forecast Center 

 The following are some of the actions taken by the California-Nevada River Forecast 

Center (CNRFC) in the aftermath of the southern California wildfires of October 20 - 

November 3, 2003. 

1. Before the wildfires were completely out, the CNRFC had developed an alternative 

watershed model configuration to address the affects of the burn on the drainage below 

San Vicente and El Capitan reservoirs. They were then able to run multiple models to 

assess which gave the best representation of the situation. 

2. CNRFC lowered their Flash Flood Guidance (FFG) for the burn areas. 

3. WFO San Diego hosted a meeting shortly after the event where a CNRFC hydrologist 

gave WFO San Diego staff and a group of their partners an overview of CNRFC fireadjusted operations, products, and services. 

4. CNRFC developed a web site which collects the specific hydro-meteorological 

information for southern California to help state and local officials monitoring the burn 

area to find information quickly and easily. This web site features graphics with 

precipitation observations and forecast estimates and FFG with the burn areas clearly 

delineated. The site is at: http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/cnrfc/srncaburn.html
Appendix A 

Southern California County Warning and Forecast Areas 

A-1
Appendix B

Location Map of Wildfires 

Location of southern California wildfires, indicated by red circles, during October 2003. 

Courtesy of Tom Rolinski, Bureau of Land Management. 

B-1 
Appendix C

Event Statistics

START DATE 

NAME 

COUNTY WARNING AREA 

TIME FIRST REPORTED 

ACRES 

DATE CONTAINED 

DECLARED 

CONTROLLED 

STRUCTURE LOSS – 

RESIDENTIAL 

STRUCTURE LOSS –

COMMERCIAL 

STRUCTURE LOSS- OTHER 

FATALITIES 

INJURIES 

• CAUSE 

10/21 ROBLAR 2 San Diego 1201 8,592 N/A 0 0 00 8 UI

10/21 PADUA Los Angeles 1359 10,446 11/2 0 0 00 0 H

10/21 GRAND PRIX Los Angeles 1422 59,448 11/8 11/12 135 1 60 0 35 H

10/21 PASS San Diego 1611 2,387 10/23 10/24 5 0 21 0 3 H

10/23 PIRU Los Angeles 1330 63,991 11/14 1 1 60 0 UI

10/24 VERDALE Los Angeles 1307 8,650 10/28 10/29 0 10 0 UI

10/24 HAPPY Los Angeles 1505 250 10/25 10/27 0 0 00 0 UI

10/25 OLD San Diego 0917 91,281 11/5 993 10 0 6 12 H

10/25 SIMI Los Angeles 1450 108,204 11/2 11/11 22 0 278 0 21 UI

10/25 CEDAR San Diego 1737 273,246 11/4 2,232 22 566 14 113 H

10/26 PARADISE San Diego 0130 56,700 11/6 221 2 192 2 24 H

10/26 MOUNTAIN San Diego 1145 10,331 10/29 11/2 21 0 40 0 7 UI

10/26 OTAY (MINE) San Diego 1300 45,971 10/28 10/30 1 0 50 1 UI

10/26 WELLMAN San Diego 1305 100 10/27 10/28 0 0 00 1 UI

TOTAL 739,597 3,631 36 1,169 22 225 

*H = Human caused, UI = Under Investigation as of 11/14/03 

C-1 
Appendix D

WFO San Diego Chronological Product Highlights 

Valid Time (local) Product 

Type

Remarks

2:00 p.m. Sun 10/19/03 AFD “Strong offshore flow developing Friday through the 

weekend.” 

2:30 p.m. Sun 10/19/03 ZFP “Breezy” wording added to forecast for Friday 

through Sunday. 

2:30 p.m. Sun 10/19/03 FWF “Moderate offshore flow with very low humidity will 

be possible next weekend.” 

3:30 a.m. Tue 10/21/03 AFD “1040 mb surface high will build into the Great Basin 

for moderate to strong offshore flow Friday night into 

Saturday.” 

9:00 a.m. Thu 10/23/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Fire Weather Watch Saturday through Sunday 

afternoon “for sustained relative humidity less than 

10 percent...and for northeast winds 25 to 35 mph and 

gusty.” 

2:30 p.m. Thu 10/23/03 AFD “Will probably have local advisory to strengthen 

winds Saturday a.m.” 

9:10 p.m. Thu 10/23/03 AFD “Red Flag Warning will likely be issued tomorrow 

 morning.” 

1:31 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 ZFP Wind gusts of 40-60 mph in forecast for Saturday and 

Sunday except for San Diego County coastal zone. 

6:00 a.m. Fri 10/24/03 HWO “Fire Weather Watch...for very low humidity and for 

Santa Ana winds...Saturday and Sunday.” 

9:00 a.m. Fri 10/24/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Red Flag Warning through Monday afternoon “for 

sustained relative humidity less than 10 percent... 

and for northeast winds from 25 to 35 mph with gusts 

to 45 mph.” 

11:30 a.m. Fri 10/24/03 SPS Headline- “Fire danger and strong winds increasing 

through Sunday.” 

D-1
2:30 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 AFD “Strong pressure gradients Saturday will tighten up 

even more Sunday...more fully including San Diego 

County.” 

2:30 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 NPW “Wind advisory until 2 p.m. Saturday” for portions of 

Orange, San Diego, Riverside, and San Bernardino 

Counties, “A High Wind Warning may be needed 

Saturday night and Sunday.” 

9:30 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 NPW High Wind Watch for Saturday night through Sunday 

for the Orange County coastal areas, San Bernardino 

and Riverside County valleys, and the Santa Ana 

mountains and foothills. Wind Advisory until 2 p.m. 

Sunday “for portions of Orange, San Diego, 

Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties. 

3:00 a.m. Sat 10/25/03 AFD “Very low humidity will be widespread.” 

10:45 a.m. Sat 10/25/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Red Flag Warning through Monday afternoon for 

“strong northeast winds that will gradually increase 

to 25 to 35 mph and gust up to 50 to 60 mph.” “In 

addition...sustained relative humidity will be less 

than 10 percent.” 

2:00 p.m. Sat 10/25/03 NPW High Wind Watch upgraded to a High Wind Warning 

until 9 p.m. Sunday, Wind Advisory extended until 9 

p.m. Sunday. 

2:30 p.m. Sat 10/25/03 AFD “Fire danger will be extreme with this event.” 

8:20 a.m. Sun 10/26/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Red Flag Warning remains in effect through Monday 

afternoon. “Northeast winds will be at their peak 

levels this morning and through about 1 p.m.” 

8:30 a.m. Sun 10/26/03 NPW High Wind Warning and Wind Advisory continue 

through 9 p.m. tonight. 

2:00 p.m. Sun 10/26/03 CEM “Fire emergency across northern San Diego County” 

2:00 p.m. Sun 10/26/03 NPW High wind warning canceled, wind advisory extended 

through 2 p.m. Monday. 

8:25 p.m. Sun 10/26/03 NPW Wind Advisory through 2 p.m. Monday for 

mountains, inland valleys, and Orange County coastal 

areas. 

D-2
12:00 p.m. Mon 10/27/03 NPW “Wind Advisory Cancelled at 12 p.m. today” 

4:00 p.m. Mon 10/27/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

“The Red Flag Warning for the area has expired as 

of 4 p.m.” 

2:30 p.m. Wed 10/29/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Red Flag Warning San Bernardino, Riverside, San 

Diego County mountains for “Strong gusty winds and 

low relative humidity downwind of wildfires this 

evening through Thursday...” 

6:00 a.m. Thu 10/30/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

“Red Flag Warning Cancelled” 

D-3 
Appendix E

WFO Los Angeles Chronological Product Highlights 

Valid Time (PDT/PST) Product 

Type

Remarks

3:00 p.m. Tue 10/21/03 FWF "Santa Ana winds possible this weekend" 

9:30 a.m. Wed 10/22/03 FWF "Santa Ana winds possible this weekend" 

2:30 p.m. Wed 10/22/03 ZFP "Locally breezy" wording added Friday through 

Monday in many zones. 

3:30 p.m. Wed 10/22/03 FWF "Santa Ana winds possible this weekend" 

6:00 a.m. Thu 10/23/03 HWO "Northeast winds 20 to 30 mph, locally stronger gusts 

Friday through Sunday"..."combination of gusty winds 

and extremely low humidity will create dangerous fire 

weather conditions". 

9:50 a.m. Thu 10/23/03 Fire 

Weather 

Watch 

Friday through Sunday below and through the passes 

and canyons of the mountains and valleys of Los 

Angeles, Ventura, and Santa Barbara counties. 

3:30 p.m. Thu 10/23/03

 

FWF Tonight through Friday...below and through the passes 

and canyons of the mountains of San Luis Obispo and 

Santa Barbara counties., as well as the Santa Ynez 

Valley. 

Friday through Sunday...below and through the 

canyons of the mountains and valleys of the Los 

Angeles and Ventura Counties northeast winds 25 to 35 

mph, local gusts to 40 mph. Single digit humidity 

expected. 

3:45 p.m. Thu 10/23/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Upgraded FWW added zone 251 of the Santa Ynez 

Valley. 

6:00 a.m. Fri 10/24/03 HWO Highlighted "gusty northeast winds and very low 

humidity" 

9:10 a.m. Fri 10/24/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Extended through Monday afternoon and added zones 

237, 238, 239, 240, and 241 

 

E-1
2:30 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 NPW Wind Advisory issued for Los Angeles and Ventura 

Counties. 

3:20 p.m. Fri 10/24/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Extended and added zone 259. 

6:00 a.m. Sat 10/25/03 HWO Highlighted gusty northeast winds...highlighted Red 

Flag Warning and Wind Advisories. 

9:15 a.m. Sat 10/25/03 NPW Additional zones included in the Wind Advisory. 

12:30 p.m. Sat 10/25/03 NPW Additional zones included in the Wind Advisory. 

3:15 a.m. Sun 10/26/03 NPW Additional zone included in the Wind Advisory. 

3:54 a.m. Sun 10/26/03 FWS VERDALE/SIMI - Requested time 1:38 a.m. 

9:30 a.m. Sun 10/26/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Today through Monday afternoon...Los Angeles 

County, Ventura County and Santa Barbara Mountains. 

Cancelled for Santa Barbara County South Coast, 

Antelope Valley, San Luis Obispo County 

3:30 p.m. Sun 10/26/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Continued...local wind gusts 40 to 60 mph...otherwise 

no changes. 

2:30 a.m. Mon 10/27/03 NPW Cancelled Wind Advisories for Los Angeles and 

Ventura Counties. 

6:00 a.m. Mon 10/27/03 HWO Mentioned winds will be on the decrease in the 

afternoon. 

9:30 a.m. Mon 10/27/03 NPW Remaining Wind Advisories cancelled. 

9:30 a.m. Mon 10/27/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Extended through the afternoon. 

5:30 p.m. Mon 10/27/03 Red Flag 

Warning 

Expired... 

E-2 
Appendix F

Fire Regime Condition Class Map 

Areas shaded in yellow are Condition Class 2 indicating a moderate risk of losing 

key ecosystem components to wildfire. 

Areas shaded in red are Condition Class 3 indicating fire regimes significantly 

altered from their historical range and the risk of losing key ecosystem components 

is high. 

F-1 
Appendix G 

Southern California Media Demographics 

Demographics WFO Los Angeles WFO San Diego

County Warning Areas (see maps) Counties: Los Angeles, 

Orange6, San Luis Obispo, 

Santa Barbara and Ventura. 

Counties: Riverside, 

Orange6, San Diego 

and San Bernardino. 

Population1 Approx. 12.3 million Approx. 4 million 

Households1 Approx. 7.5 million Approx. 2.5 million 

TV Market Ranking2 2 26 

TV Stations within CWA3 25 19 

Radio Market Ranking4 2 17 

Radio Stations within CWA3 80 50 

Daily Newspapers within CWA5 18 9 

Weekly Newspapers within CWA5 75 83 

Total Media Outlets 198 161

Notes: 

1. Information from the California Secretary of State, Bureau of Vital 

Statistics. 

2. Obtained from Nielsen Ratings. 

3. Information provided by the California Broadcasters Association, 

Sacramento, CA. 

4. Obtained from Arbitron. 

5. Newspaper demographics compiled from Gebbie Press Media information. 

6. Media from Orange County serves audiences within the County Warning 

Areas of WFO Los Angeles and WFO San Diego 

G-1