______________ 

 

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

John Christopher Milton, Petitioner, 

v. 

Richland County, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2014-000580 

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-046 

Heard May 20, 2015 – Filed August 5, 2015 

DISMISSED 

Constantine George Pournaras, Kris Hines and Elizabeth 

Fielding Pringle, all of Richland County Public 

Defender's Office, of Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., 

of Columbia, for Respondent. 
 

PER CURIAM: We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction1 to 

determine: (1) whether prolonged detention of persons incarcerated upon the 

issuance of a uniform traffic ticket violates the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution2

 where the county has failed to provide a mechanism for 

prompt judicial determination of probable cause within a 48-hour period following 

arrest; and (2) whether, absent a prompt probable cause determination, detention 

centers may detain persons arrested without a warrant longer than reasonably 

necessary for booking and processing. Because there is nothing in the record to 

indicate that John Christopher Milton did not receive a probable cause 

determination within 48 hours of his arrest, we find Milton has failed to 

demonstrate a justiciable controversy that is appropriate for our review. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction. 

I. Factual / Procedural History 

On January 23, 2014, a deputy with the Richland County Sheriff's 

Department arrested Milton for trespassing at a business after notice and issued a 

Uniform Traffic Ticket ("UTT").3

 Milton was committed to the Alvin S. Glenn 

1

 S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ("The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or 

orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas 

corpus, and other original and remedial writs."); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-310 (1977) 

(granting the Supreme Court authority to issue original writs); Rule 245(a), 

SCACR ("The Supreme Court will not entertain matters in its original jurisdiction 

when the matter can be determined in a lower court in the first instance, without 

material prejudice to the rights of the parties. If the public interest is involved, or 

if special grounds of emergency or other good reasons exist why the original 

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be exercised, the facts showing the 

reasons must be stated in the petition with supporting affidavits."). 

2

 U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized."). 

3

 S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 (Supp. 2014) (authorizing law enforcement officers to 

use a uniform traffic ticket to arrest for all traffic offenses and for certain specified 

offenses). Section 56-7-10 was amended effective June 4, 2015; however, this 
 

 

 

 

Detention Center because he could not post the $470 bond set by Richland County 

Magistrate Metts. On February 18, 2014, Magistrate Howard converted the bond 

from a cash or surety bond to a personal recognizance bond. As a result, Milton 

was released from custody and ordered to appear in magistrate's court on March 

12, 2014.4 

On March 19, 2014, the Chief Public Defender for Richland County 

("Petitioner"), on behalf of Milton and other similarly situated detainees, petitioned 

this Court to accept a Complaint within its original jurisdiction. Petitioner 

maintained that Milton and other individuals, who were arrested in Richland 

County pursuant to a UTT and not a warrant, have been subjected to prolonged 

detention without a prompt judicial determination of probable cause in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner sought for the Court to issue an order declaring 

that: (1) a criminal defendant, who is detained as a result of a warrantless arrest, 

must receive a Gerstein5 probable cause determination within 48 hours of his or 

her arrest; and (2) a criminal defendant, who does not receive a judicial 

determination of probable cause, may not be held by a detention center "longer 

than reasonably necessary" for booking and processing. This Court, despite 

mootness,6

 granted the petition. 

amendment does not affect the disposition of the instant case as it was amended to 

include additional offenses for which a UTT may be issued. 

4

 On April 17, 2014, Magistrate Maurer dismissed the trespassing charge after the 

business dropped the charge on the condition that Milton would not return to the 

property. 

5 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires 

a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of 

liberty following arrest."); see Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 

(1991) (interpreting Gerstein and holding that an arrestee is entitled to a probable 

cause determination within 48 hours of arrest absent "a bona fide emergency or 

other extraordinary circumstance"). 

6 See Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001) ("[A]n 

appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue raised is capable 

of repetition but evading review."). 
 

 

II. Standard of Review 

Petitioner seeks a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction. 

Thus, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the Act") is implicated. S.C. 

Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005). Section 15-53-20 of the South Carolina 

Code identifies the purpose of the Act and provides that courts "shall have power 

to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or 

could be claimed." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005); see Rule 57, SCRCP ("The 

procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code §§ 15–53–10 

through 15–53–140, shall be in accordance with these rules, and . . . [t]he existence 

of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in 

cases where it is appropriate."). The Act is to be liberally construed and 

administered to achieve its intended purpose "to settle and to afford relief from 

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations." 

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005). 

To state a cause of action under the Act, a party must demonstrate a 

justiciable controversy. Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177 S.E.2d 551 (1970). 

"A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate 

for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute or difference of a 

contingent, hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at 154, 177 S.E.2d at 553. 

III. Discussion 

Milton acknowledges that the Richland County deputy was statutorily 

authorized to arrest him using a UTT rather than a warrant.7 However, because he 

was detained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, Milton asserts that he was entitled to 

a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. Although 

Milton admits that he received a bond hearing within 24 hours of arrest, as required 

7 Section 22-3-710 of the South Carolina Code states, "All proceedings before 

magistrates in criminal cases shall be commenced on information under oath, 

plainly and substantially setting forth the offenses charged, upon which, and only 

which, shall a warrant of arrest issue." S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-710 (2007). 

However, this Court has held that "[s]ection 56-7-10 provides an exception to the 

warrant requirement by allowing the issuance of a uniform traffic ticket to initiate 

proceedings before the magistrate for specified offenses." State v. Ramsey, 409 

S.C. 206, 210, 762 S.E.2d 15, 17 (2014). 
 

by section 22-5-510 of the South Carolina Code,8 he claims that at no point during 

the "bail proceedings" was there a determination of probable cause. In the absence 

of this determination, Milton argues he was detained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

We find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a justiciable controversy. 

Other than Milton's own assertions, the record contains no evidence that he was 

denied a probable cause determination. Because Petitioner failed to submit a 

sufficient record, this case presents nothing more than a dispute of a hypothetical 

character. See Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 

S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005) (noting that appellant has the burden of establishing a 

sufficient record and declining to address the merits of a claim when facts 

underlying the claim are not included in the record); Rule 210(h), SCACR 

("Except as provided by Rule 212 and Rule 208(b)(1)(C) and (2), the appellate 

court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."). 

Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction as it is not 

appropriate for our review. 

DISMISSED. 

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice 

James E. Moore, concur. 

8

 S.C. Code Ann. § 22-5-510(B) (Supp. 2014) ("A person charged with a bailable 

offense must have a bond hearing within twenty-four hours of his arrest and must 

be released within a reasonable time, not to exceed four hours, after the bond is 

delivered to the incarcerating facility." (emphasis added)). Section 22-5-510 was 

amended effective June 4, 2015 regarding matters to be considered when 

determining conditions of release on bond. Subsection (B) of section 22-5-510 

remained unchanged.