UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4345

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DANIEL LEE SUGGS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.

(4:06-cr-00474-RBH)

Submitted: October 29, 2007 Decided: November 15, 2007

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Aileen Clare, Assistant Federal Public

Defenders, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I.

Lloyd, United States Attorney, Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United

States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Daniel Lee Suggs appeals his sentence following a guilty

plea to two counts of use and possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) (2000). Suggs was sentenced to thirty-two years of

imprisonment. On appeal, Suggs’ attorney has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding

there are no meritorious issues for appeal but raising as potential

issues whether the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11, whether the Government breached the plea agreement by not

moving for downward departure, and whether Suggs’ sentence was

reasonable. Although advised of his right to do so, Suggs has not

filed a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we

affirm.

Counsel first raises the issue of whether the district

court fully complied with Rule 11, but identifies no error in the

Rule 11 proceeding. After a thorough review of the record, we find

the district court fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11.

Counsel next asserts that Suggs provided substantial

assistance to the Government and thus the Government was required

to move for a downward departure. The Government was not obligated

under its plea agreement to file such a motion, see United States

v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2000), and there is no

indication that it refused to make the motion based on an
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unconstitutional motive such as race or religion. Wade v. United

States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). Rather, Suggs failed a

polygraph test, thereby failing “to be fully truthful and

forthright” as required under the terms of the plea agreement.

Thus, Suggs failed to fully cooperate under the provisions of the

plea agreement as required for the Government to consider filing a

motion for downward departure. We therefore find the Government

did not breach the plea agreement.

Suggs next questions whether his sentence was reasonable.

This court will affirm a sentence if it “is within the statutorily

prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States v. Moreland,

437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).

“[A] sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is

presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339,

341 (4th Cir. 2006); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2462-69 (2007) (upholding application of rebuttable presumption of

reasonableness to within-guidelines sentence). We find the

district court’s imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum

sentences on each count, which were statutorily required to be

served consecutively, after considering and examining the

sentencing guidelines and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)

factors, was reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED