Testimony 

Before the Subcommittees on the Prevention of 

Nuclear and Biological Attack and on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee 

on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, June 21, 2005 COMBATING NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING 

Efforts to Deploy Radiation 

Detection Equipment in the 

United States and in Other 

Countries 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO-05-840T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-840T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittees on the 

Prevention of Nuclear and Biological 

Attack and on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science, and Technology, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

June 21, 2005

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection 

Equipment in the United States and in 

Other Countries 

Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, 

and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear 

smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border 

security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress 

has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 

million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million 

to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The 

first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying 

radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet 

Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense 

program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the 

end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on 

the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has 

completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, 

the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation 

detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale 

radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is 

continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more 

than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border 

crossings, and seaports. 

A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the 

lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For 

example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to 

guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among 

U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence 

of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of 

State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those 

countries’ borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where 

DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the 

agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. 

Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that 

DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE 

national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve 

the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered 

coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the 

emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. 

The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is 

limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is 

shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation 

detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is 

important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way 

that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of 

radiation detection equipment—regardless of how well such equipment works—

is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating 

nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, 

proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection 

equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.

According to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, between 

1993 and 2004, there were 650 

confirmed cases of illicit trafficking 

in nuclear and radiological 

materials worldwide. A significant 

number of the cases involved 

material that could be used to 

produce either a nuclear weapon or 

a device that uses conventional 

explosives with radioactive 

material (known as a “dirty 

bomb”). Over the past decade, the 

United States has become 

increasingly concerned about the 

danger that unsecured weaponsusable nuclear material could fall 

into the hands of terrorists or 

countries of concern. In the 

aftermath of September 11, 2001, 

there is heightened concern that 

terrorists may try to smuggle 

nuclear materials or a nuclear 

weapon into the United States. 

My testimony today summarizes 

the results of our previous reports 

on various U.S. efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling both in the 

United States and abroad. 

Specifically, I will discuss (1) the 

different U.S. federal agencies 

tasked with installing radiation 

detection equipment both 

domestically and in other 

countries, (2) problems with 

coordination among these agencies 

and programs, and (3) the 

effectiveness of radiation detection 

equipment deployed in the United 

States and other countries. 
Page 1 GAO-05-840T 

Messers. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work assessing U.S. 

government efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both at home and in 

other countries through the deployment of radiation detection equipment 

at border crossings and other points of entry.1

 According to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 

650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological 

materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material 

that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that 

uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty 

bomb”). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly 

concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear 

material2

 from the former Soviet Union or other countries could fall into 

the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of 

September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to 

smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This 

could happen in several ways: nuclear materials could be hidden in a car, 

train, or ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked 

across an unprotected border. If terrorists were to smuggle a nuclear 

weapon or dirty bomb into the United States, the consequences could be 

devastating to our national and economic interests. 

My testimony today summarizes the results of our previous reports on 

various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States 

and in other countries. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the activities of the 

various U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection 

equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with 

coordination and planning among these agencies and programs, and 

 1

See GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing 

Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375

(Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005); Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of 

Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002); 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 16, 2002); and related GAO products cited at the end of this testimony. 

2

Weapons-usable nuclear material is (1) uranium that has been enriched to consist of 20 

percent or more of uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and (2) any plutonium containing 

less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent of the isotopes 

plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These types of materials are of the quality used to make 

nuclear weapons. 
Page 2 GAO-05-840T 

(3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the 

United States and other countries. 

Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), 

State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to 

combat nuclear smuggling in the United States and other countries by 

providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security 

personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress 

has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 

million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 

million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points 

of entry. Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling 

were focused on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. 

As a result, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling 

concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in 

countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. 

In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense 

program, which, through the end of fiscal year 2004, had installed 

equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia. In 2003, DOE implemented a 

second program, the Megaports Initiative, to focus on the threat posed by 

nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports. The Megaports Initiative has 

completed installations at two foreign seaports and is currently working to 

equip five others with radiation detection equipment. Regarding efforts to 

combat nuclear smuggling at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service 

(now called the Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol) began providing its 

inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998, and 

expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment 

after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS. In May 

2005, DHS reported that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal 

monitors nationwide at sites including international mail and package 

handling facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. 

A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling 

both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning 

and coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these 

programs. For example, regarding U.S. efforts to deploy radiation 

detection equipment in other countries, we reported in 2002 that there was 

no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were 

duplicative, and coordination among the various U.S. agencies involved 

with these efforts was not effective. We found that the most troubling 

consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that 

different agencies had pursued separate approaches to installing radiation 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-840T 

detection equipment at other countries’ borders, and some agencies were 

installing better equipment than others. As a result, some countries’ border 

crossings were more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Since 

the issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. 

international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling has been developed; 

duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the 

agencies, although still a concern, has improved. Regarding the 

deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had 

not coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories 

on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation 

detection technology used in portal monitors. We found that a number of 

factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE 

national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal 

agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed with our 

assessment and told us that it is taking corrective actions to address these 

concerns. 

The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection 

equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear 

material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. In addition, the 

manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed, operated, and 

maintained can also limit its effectiveness. For example, in October 2002, 

we testified that radiation pagers—small radiation detection devices worn 

by inspectors on their belts—have severe limitations and are inappropriate 

for some tasks. DOE officials told us that radiation pagers have a limited 

range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material. 

Given the inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation detection 

equipment and difficulties in detecting certain dangerous nuclear 

materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and 

maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. We reported that the 

manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection equipment at 

some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness. For example, at one 

site we visited, DHS was allowing trucks to pass through portal monitors 

at speeds higher than what experts consider optimal for detecting nuclear 

material. Regarding U.S. assistance to help other countries combat nuclear 

smuggling, we found that serious problems with the installation, 

operation, and maintenance of equipment had undermined U.S. efforts. 

For example, we reported in 2002 that about half of the radiation portal 

monitors provided to one country in the former Soviet Union were never 

installed or were not operational. Additionally, we reported in March 2005, 

that DOE’s Megaports Initiative faces technical challenges related to 

deploying radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports. For example, 

environmental conditions at many ports, such as the existence of high 
Page 4 GAO-05-840T 

winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection equipment’s 

performance and sustainability. 

It is important to note that the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment—regardless of how well the equipment performs—is not a 

panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, as we have noted in 

our past work, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated 

approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security 

personnel in the effective use of radiation detection equipment, and 

intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations. 

Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in 

medicine and industry; in commodities that are sources of naturally 

occurring radiation, such as kitty litter; and in nuclear materials that could 

be used in a nuclear weapon. The capability of the equipment to detect 

nuclear material depends on many factors, including the amount of 

material, the size and capacity of the detection device, the distance from 

the detection device to the nuclear material, and whether the material is 

shielded from detection. Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in 

weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the 

materials that is of greatest concern—highly enriched uranium—is among 

the most difficult materials to detect because of its relatively low level of 

radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources, 

which could be used in a radiological dispersion device (or “dirty bomb”), 

are highly radioactive and easier to detect. Because of the complexities of 

detecting and identifying nuclear material, customs officers and border 

guards who are responsible for operating detection equipment must also 

be trained in using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of 

an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of nuclear smuggling. 

Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear 

smuggling both domestically and in other countries by providing radiation 

detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal 

year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about 

$800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, 

and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for 

installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial 

concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on 

nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the 

first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s 

concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in 

Background 

Several U.S. Agencies 

Have Programs to 

Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling 
Page 5 GAO-05-840T 

countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. 

Assistance included providing these countries with commercially available 

radiation detection equipment such as portal monitors (stationary 

equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians 

or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors. In addition, U.S. 

agencies provided technical support to promote the development and 

enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of nuclearrelated technology and other equipment and training to generally improve 

these countries’ ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. 

One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to 

foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which 

began installing equipment at key border crossing sites in Russia in 1998. 

According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second Line of 

Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly in Russia. 

Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to 

install radiation detection equipment at major foreign seaports to enable 

foreign government personnel to screen shipping containers entering and 

leaving these ports for nuclear and other radioactive material. In March 

2005, we reported that the Megaports Initiative had completed installations 

at two foreign ports and is currently working to equip five others with 

radiation detection equipment. Other U.S. agencies also have programs to 

provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign 

governments, including two programs at the Department of State—the 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and Export Control and Related 

Border Security program—and two programs at DOD—the International 

Counterproliferation Program and the Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation Prevention Initiative. 

In addition to these efforts at foreign borders, the U.S. Customs Service 

began providing its inspectors at U.S. borders and points of entry with 

small handheld radiation detection devices, known as radiation pagers, in 

fiscal year 1998. After September 11, 2001, this effort was expanded by 

DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In the spring of 2002, DHS 

conducted a pilot project to test the use of radiation portal monitorslarger-scale radiation detection equipment that can be used to screen 

vehicles and cargo. In October 2002, DHS began its deployment of portal 

monitors at U.S. points of entry. In May 2005, DHS reported that it has 

installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at sites 

including international mail and package handling facilities, land border 

crossings, and seaports. 
Page 6 GAO-05-840T 

A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling 

both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning 

and coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these 

programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries, we reported in 2002 

that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some 

programs were duplicative, and coordination among the U.S. agencies was 

not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of 

effective planning and coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were 

pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border 

crossings. Specifically, radiation portal monitors installed in more than 20 

countries by State are less sophisticated than those installed by DOE and 

DOD. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies have 

installed radiation detection equipment are more vulnerable to nuclear 

smuggling than others.3

 We found that there were two offices within DOE 

that were providing radiation detection equipment and two offices within 

State that have funded similar types of equipment for various countries. 

We made several recommendations to correct these problems and, since 

the issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. 

efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries has been 

developed; some duplicative programs have been consolidated; and 

coordination among the agencies, although still a concern, has improved. 

Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of 

entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other federal 

agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives such as 

attempting to improve the radiation detection technology used in portal 

monitors. We also noted that DHS was not sharing data generated by 

portal monitors installed at U.S. points of entry with DOE national 

laboratories other than Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which is 

DHS’s primary contractor for deploying radiation detection equipment at 

U.S. points of entry. Experts from DOE’s national laboratories told us that 

achieving improvements to existing radiation detection technologies 

largely depends on analyzing data on the types of radioactive cargo 

passing through deployed portal monitors. We found that a number of 

factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE 

national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal 

 3

Portal monitors installed by the Department of State do not have the ability to detect 

neutron radiation, which translates into a decreased ability of those monitors to be able to 

detect plutonium, one of the nuclear materials of greatest proliferation concern. 

U.S. Programs to 

Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling in the 

United States and 

Other Countries Have 

Lacked Effective 

Planning and 

Coordination 
Page 7 GAO-05-840T 

agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed with our 

assessment and told us that it would be taking corrective actions. 

Additionally, other DOE national laboratories and federal agencies are 

independently testing numerous different radiation portal monitors using a 

variety of nuclear and radiological materials and simulating possible 

smuggling scenarios. However, they are not sharing lessons learned or the 

results of these tests with other federal agencies. For example, DOD’s 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a large testing facility near Sandia 

National Laboratories in New Mexico and has pilot tested radiation 

detection equipment at entrances to certain military bases. However, it is 

unclear how and with whom the results of such testing are shared to 

facilitate the development of improved radiation detection technologies. In 

April 2005, DHS announced its intent to create the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate U.S. efforts to develop improved 

radiation detection technologies. DHS has requested over $227 million in 

fiscal year 2006 to initiate this effort. Through DNDO, DHS plans to lead 

the development of a national test bed for radiation detection technologies 

at the Nevada Test Site. 

Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation 

detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. As we 

have reported in the past, certain factors can affect the general capability 

of radiation detection equipment. In particular, nuclear materials are more 

difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used to shield them. For 

example, we reported in March 2005 that a cargo container containing a 

radioactive source passed through radiation detection equipment that 

DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without being detected because of 

the presence of large amounts of scrap metal in the container. 

Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable 

nuclear material is complicated because one of the materials of greatest 

concern in terms of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the 

most difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of 

radioactivity. 

The manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed, operated, 

and maintained can also limit its effectiveness. Given the inherent 

limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and 

difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it is important that it be 

installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’ 

ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. In our past reports, we have 

noted many problems with the radiation detection equipment currently 

Currently Deployed 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment Has 

Limitations 
Page 8 GAO-05-840T 

deployed at U.S. and foreign borders. Specifically, in October 2002, we 

testified that radiation detection pagers have severe limitations and are 

inappropriate for some tasks. DOE officials told us that the pagers have a 

limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear 

material. According to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE national 

laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction 

with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors. 

In addition, the manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection 

equipment at some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness. 

Specifically, we identified a wide range of problems, such as (1) allowing 

trucks to pass through portal monitors at speeds higher than what experts 

consider optimal for detecting nuclear material, (2) reducing the 

sensitivity of the portal monitors in an attempt to limit the number of 

nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as 

kitty litter and ceramics, and (3) not deploying enough handheld radiation 

detection equipment to certain border sites, which limited the ability of 

inspectors to perform secondary inspections on suspicious cargo or 

vehicles. 

Regarding problems with the U.S. programs to deploy radiation detection 

equipment in other countries, we reported that: 

• About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the former 

Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational. Officials from 

this country told us that they were given more equipment than they could 

use. 

• A radiation portal monitor provided to Bulgaria by the Department of State 

was installed on an unused road that was not expected to be completed 

for 1-1/2 years. 

• Mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by the 

Department of State have limited utility because they cannot operate 

effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in 

some countries. 

• DOE has found that environmental conditions at many seaports, such as 

the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection 

equipment’s performance and sustainability. 
Page 9 GAO-05-840T 

Environmental conditions are not the only challenge facing DOE and DHS 

in installing radiation detection equipment at seaports in the United States 

and other countries. One of the biggest challenges at seaports is adapting 

the equipment to the port environment while minimizing the impact on the 

flow of commerce and people. DOE’s Megaports Initiative had made 

limited progress in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign 

seaports it had identified as highest priority largely due to concerns of 

some countries about the impact of radiation detection equipment on the 

flow of commerce through their ports. DHS has faced similar concerns 

from port operators in the United States. 

It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of the 

tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards must use 

to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an 

integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and 

intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. In the past, most known 

interdictions of weapons-usable nuclear materials have resulted from 

police investigations rather than from detection by radiation detection 

equipment installed at border crossings. However, there have been recent 

reports of incidents where radioactive materials were discovered and 

seized as a result of alarms raised by radiation detection equipment. 

Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs 

officers or border guards who are responsible for operating radiation 

detection equipment must also be well-trained in using handheld radiation 

detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identifying false alarms, and 

responding to cases of nuclear smuggling. Without a clear understanding 

of how radiation detection equipment works and its limitations, inspectors 

may not be using the equipment as effectively as possible. 

Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of 

radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not 

and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at foreign or U.S. 

borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear 

warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a 

broad approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple 

initiatives that are designed to complement each other. For example, DOE 

is securing nuclear material at its source through the Material Protection, 

Control, and Accounting program, which seeks to improve the physical 

security of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. In addition, DHS 

has other initiatives to identify containers at foreign seaports that are 

considered high risk for containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear 

material and other dangerous materials. Supporting all of these programs 

is intelligence information that can give us advanced notice of nuclear 
Page 10 GAO-05-840T 

material smuggling and is a critical component to prevent dangerous 

materials from entering the United States. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to 

any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, 

Nancy Crothers, Christopher Ferencik, Emily Gupta, Jennifer Harman, 

Winston Le, Glen Levis, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Gene Wisnoski made key 

contributions to this statement. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Page 11 GAO-05-840T 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. 

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection 

Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002. 

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. 

GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. 

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