U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

A Review of ICITAP’s Screening 

Procedures for Contractors Sent to 

Iraq as Correctional Advisors

Office of the Inspector General

February 2005

DRAFT
 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP) is an office within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice 

(DOJ) that provides training for foreign law enforcement agencies in new and 

emerging democracies and assists in the development of police forces relating 

to international peacekeeping operations. Since its creation in 1986, ICITAP 

has conducted training programs in numerous countries throughout the world, 

including Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In 2003, after the fall of Saddam 

Hussein, ICITAP, at the behest of the Department of Defense’s Office of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, established a program through 

which it provided subcontractor advisors and trainers to assist with the 

reconstruction and development of the Iraqi police and prison systems. The 

program was paid for with funds supplied by the Department of State. 

Following public reports of allegations of prisoner abuse by military 

personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Senator Charles Schumer wrote a 

letter to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), dated June 2, 2004, in which 

he raised concerns that four of the corrections advisors ICITAP had sent to 

Iraq – Lane McCotter, Terry Stewart, Gary DeLand, and John Armstrong – were 

unqualified because of allegations of serious misconduct when they served as 

high-level, state corrections officials in the United States. In particular, 

Senator Schumer noted that allegations had been made against the men in 

several civil lawsuits relating to the treatment of prisoners or their 

management of prison systems during their U.S. corrections careers. Senator 

Schumer requested that the OIG investigate and report on “the criteria used to 

select [these individuals as corrections advisors in Iraq], the vetting process to 

which they were subjected, the identities of the officials who selected them, the 

extent to which concerns about their backgrounds were known by the officials 

who vetted and selected them, and the reasons such concerns were 

disregarded when these individuals were appointed.” The DOJ joined in 

Senator Schumer’s request that the OIG examine the matter. 

In response to these requests, we reviewed the recruitment, screening, 

and selection of the four ICITAP corrections advisors identified by Senator 

Schumer, as well as the four other corrections advisors who served with them 

in Iraq. In addition, we examined the policies and procedures for conducting 

background investigations on ICITAP subcontractors. 

This report details the results of the OIG’s review. During this review, 

the OIG interviewed more than 25 individuals, including McCotter, Stewart, 
2

DeLand, and Armstrong, as well as their four fellow corrections advisors. In 

addition, we reviewed hundreds of pages of documents provided by ICITAP, the 

Criminal Division’s Office of Administration (Office of Administration), and the 

subcontractors themselves regarding these individuals and the clearance 

process. 

In sum, our review concluded that although ICITAP conducted limited 

background checks on these individuals prior to their deployment to Iraq, 

these checks were not designed to and did not reveal information about the 

civil lawsuits cited in Senator Schumer’s letter. Accordingly, because ICITAP 

was unaware of the allegations made in these lawsuits, it did not consider 

them when making the decision to hire these individuals as advisors. We also 

determined, however, that even had ICITAP been aware of these lawsuits prior 

to retaining the advisors, it would not have viewed them as sufficient to 

disqualify any of the men from serving in Iraq. We also reviewed whether any 

of these advisors were connected to abuse of prisoners housed at the Abu 

Ghraib prison and found no evidence to suggest that they played any role in 

the abuses. Finally, our review found broader problems related to the policies 

and procedures for conducting background investigations on ICITAP 

subcontractors. While ICITAP has made various improvements to its clearance 

process since our review was initiated, we make several recommendations to 

improve the process further. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Although ICITAP is part of the DOJ, ICITAP programs may be instituted 

at the request of the National Security Council and the Department of State 

(State). ICITAP does not appear as a “line item” in the DOJ budget. Rather, 

the majority of ICITAP funds come from project-specific funding provided by 

State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

ICITAP describes its mission as supporting “U.S. criminal justice and 

foreign policy goals by assisting foreign government[s] in developing the 

capacity to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic 

principles and respect for human rights.”1 ICITAP accomplishes this mission 

through a combination of DOJ employees and subcontractors. Most ICITAP 

subcontractors act as advisors and instructors in the various foreign countries 

in which ICITAP is operating programs. ICITAP employees oversee the 

subcontractors’ work, both from ICITAP headquarters in Washington, D.C. and 

as Program Managers in the field. Many ICITAP subcontractors, as well as 

many ICITAP managers, are former federal, state, and local law enforcement 

officials. 

 1 www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap (December 2004). 
3

At the time ICITAP’s Iraq program began, ICITAP retained 

subcontractors through a contract with Science Applications International 

Corporation (SAIC).2 Although the subcontractors are ostensibly SAIC 

employees, many, including the Iraq corrections advisors at issue here, are 

recruited directly by ICITAP. ICITAP has final approval over all hiring 

decisions.3 

In order to hire a subcontractor for one of its programs, ICITAP 

completes a document called a Statement of Work. The Statement of Work 

details the work activities, term of employment, travel itinerary, and travel and 

allowance expenses for a subcontractor position. It also identifies by name the 

individual ICITAP has chosen to fill the position. In order for a Statement of 

Work to be valid, it must be signed by the Contracting Officer Technical 

Representative (COTR) for the ICITAP/SAIC contract.4 The signed Statement of 

Work, together with a delivery order, is provided to SAIC and authorizes SAIC 

to hire and pay the specified individual. 

Pursuant to Criminal Division policy, all ICITAP subcontractors must 

undergo a pre-employment background check. The nature and extent of the 

background check required depends upon the risk level that is assigned to the 

position the subcontractor will fill. The policy identifies three risk levels – high, 

moderate, and low – and places the initial responsibility for designating the risk 

level associated with a particular position on ICITAP. The actual background 

checks themselves are performed by Personnel Security Specialists (Security 

Specialists). The Security Specialists are employed by the Criminal Division 

Security Program Staff (SPS), which is part of the Office of Administration. As 

discussed in more detail below, historically ICITAP has designated virtually all 

its subcontractor positions as low risk. This was the designation assigned to 

the subcontractor positions for the Iraq program. 

The Criminal Division also trains prosecutors and judges in foreign 

countries through its Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 

Training (OPDAT) programs. In contrast to ICITAP, OPDAT programs employ 

few subcontractors, relying primarily on federal prosecutors who are detailed 

for particular assignments. 

 2 The SAIC contract is scheduled to expire in March 2005. Bids for the new contract 

were submitted in November 2004, and the DOJ is in the process of reviewing them. 

3 In general, ICITAP fills subcontractor positions by identifying at least three candidates 

and then writing a letter of justification for the individual it considers to be the best qualified. 

4 The COTR is not an ICITAP employee. Rather, he is part of the International Training 

and Financial Management Section of the Office of Administration. 
4

ICITAP and OPDAT programs are managed by the Chief of International 

Development and Training. Serving under the Chief is a Director of each 

program. Under the ICITAP Director are a Deputy Director and five Assistant 

Directors, four of whom share responsibility for particular geographic areas of 

the world and one of whom oversees operations support. Program managers 

and program analysts work under the direction of the Assistant Directors.5 

During the relevant time period, Joseph Jones served both as the Chief 

of International Development and Training and as the Acting Director of 

ICITAP. At the inception of the Iraq program, Richard Mayer was the Acting 

Deputy Director of ICITAP. When Mayer retired in February 2004, Gary Barr 

became the Acting Deputy Director while continuing to serve as the Assistant 

Director for Asia programs. Because the Iraq program was part of the Asia 

portfolio, it fell within Barr’s area of responsibility. 

Two program analysts at ICITAP headquarters were assigned to the Iraq 

program and worked under Barr's direction: one a long-time employee and one 

a subcontractor who was hired specifically for the Iraq program. These 

analysts had primary responsibility for compiling the paperwork necessary to 

perform background checks on subcontractors and for ensuring that this 

paperwork was delivered to the SPS. In addition, the program analysts were 

also responsible for preparing the Statements of Work and for providing them 

to the COTR for his signature. Both the security paperwork and the 

Statements of Work were also reviewed and signed by an ICITAP manager. 

At the SPS, one Security Specialist had primary responsibility for 

conducting the background checks on ICITAP subcontractors. She was hired 

in May 2002, and until approximately January 2004, was supervised by Rob 

Haufe, Chief of Security Programs Staff. Haufe’s supervisor was Linda 

Cantilena, Assistant Director for Security, Procurement & Property 

Management. From January 2004 to May 2004, Cantilena acted as the 

Security Specialist’s direct supervisor until Gary Llewellyn was hired to replace 

Haufe. Overall management of the Office of Administration, including the SPS 

staff, is entrusted to the Executive Officer. Sandra Bright was the Executive 

Officer until she retired in August 2003. In September 2003, Steven Parent 

became the Executive Officer.6 

 5 Deputy Assistant Directors work under each of the Assistant Directors except for the 

Assistant Director for Operations. Deputy Assistant Directors act as lead program analysts 

and provide guidance to other program analysts, but do not have supervisory authority. 

6 For organization charts of ICITAP and the Office of Administration, see Exhibit 1. 
5

III. THE ORIGIN OF THE ICITAP IRAQ PROGRAM 

On January 20, 2003, a post-war planning office for Iraq was established 

in the Department of Defense called the Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). ORHA was staffed by officials detailed from 

departments and agencies throughout the federal government, including DOJ 

and State. 

Both ICITAP and OPDAT sent representatives to ORHA. Richard Mayer 

was the ICITAP representative, while OPDAT was represented by William Lantz. 

Mayer and Lantz reported to ORHA on or about January 28, 2003. 

Mayer told the OIG that upon their arrival at ORHA, he and Lantz began 

drafting plans for a post-war system of justice in Iraq, including police, courts, 

and corrections. He said that he took primary responsibility for police 

planning, while Lantz focused on the courts. According to Mayer, prison 

planning was initially assigned to Clifford Aims, a State Department 

representative to the ORHA. 

In March 2003, ORHA officials decided that a multidiscipline team 

should be assembled and sent to Iraq to assess and make recommendations 

regarding the Iraqi police, corrections, and judicial systems (the Assessment 

Team). The Assessment Team, which traveled to Iraq in May 2003, ultimately 

numbered 25 individuals and included police and corrections advisors, judges, 

prosecutors, and a court clerk. ICITAP was given responsibility for staffing 

both the police and corrections positions on the Assessment Team. In 

addition, although the exact number of positions and amount of funding that 

would be available was not known at that time, it also was understood that 

following the departure of the Assessment Team from Iraq, ICITAP would 

continue to recruit and hire police and corrections advisors for the Iraq 

program via the SAIC contract. 

 Although the task of assembling the needed police expertise was familiar 

to ICITAP from its previous overseas programs, it had limited experience in 

staffing corrections programs. Accordingly, neither ICITAP nor SAIC had an 

existing pool of qualified corrections candidates from which to staff the 

Assessment Team. Nor could ICITAP managers – whose prior experience was 

primarily in policing – draw on their usual contacts for recommendations. 

ICITAP therefore undertook a search to locate qualified individuals for the 

corrections positions. 

After conducting a search, which is described in greater detail below, 

ICITAP selected four former state and federal corrections officials to serve as 

corrections advisors on the Assessment Team: Lane McCotter, Terry Stewart, 

Larry DuBois, and Gary DeLand. McCotter, Stewart, and DuBois traveled to 

Iraq with the other members of the Assessment Team in May 2003. DeLand, 
6

whose departure was delayed due to difficulties in securing his passport and 

visa, arrived in Iraq on or about June 25. For ease of reference, we will refer to 

this group of men as the “McCotter Team.” By September 3, 2003, all four 

members of the McCotter Team had left Iraq.7 

After the members of the McCotter Team had left Iraq, ICITAP deployed 

four new corrections advisors to Iraq: John Armstrong, Charles Ryan, Joseph 

(Terry) Bartlett, and Richard Billings. We will refer to this group of men as the 

“Bartlett Team.” Like the McCotter Team, all the men on the Bartlett Team 

were former, high-level corrections officials. Bartlett, Ryan, and Armstrong 

arrived in Iraq on September 10, 2003. Billings joined them on October 15. 

Billings left Iraq to return to the United States on April 18. Armstrong soon 

followed, arriving back in the United States on May 4. Ryan and Bartlett 

continued to serve as ICITAP subcontractors in Iraq until December 2004. 

Following placement of the Bartlett Team in Iraq, ICITAP, with help from 

SAIC, continued to recruit and retain under the SAIC contract both police and 

corrections subcontractors for the Iraq program. As of January 1, 2005, there 

were 275 ICITAP subcontractors in Iraq and Jordan: 151 police trainers in Iraq, 

54 corrections advisers and trainers in Iraq, and 70 police trainers at the 

ICITAP-founded Jordan International Police Training College, which exclusively 

trains Iraqi law enforcement personnel. 

IV. THE SELECTION OF THE MCCOTTER TEAM 

As noted above, while Mayer and Lantz were focused on police and court 

planning at ORHA, State Department representative Clifford Aims had begun to 

address Iraqi prison needs. Accordingly, on or about April 1, 2003, Gary Barr 

contacted Aims regarding staffing the corrections positions on the Assessment 

Team. In response, Aims sent to Barr, via electronic mail (e-mail), a two-page 

list of potential candidates (the Aims List). According to Aims’s e-mail to Barr, 

the Aims List had been compiled at his request by officials of the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the American Correctional Association (ACA).8 

The first page of the Aims List contained the names of ten individuals 

recommended by the BOP, including McCotter, DuBois, and Armstrong. The 

second page contained the names of eight others recommended by the ACA. 

 7 Another individual, who also traveled to Iraq as part of the Assessment Team, is 

described in some ICITAP documents as a corrections consultant. However, this individual’s 

background was in city management and public administration, not corrections, and in Iraq 

his role was limited to administration and logistics. 

 

8 The ACA was founded in 1870 and is the oldest association for the correctional 

profession. The ACA publishes guidelines for corrections, provides certifications and 

professional development opportunities, conducts research, and hosts annual conferences. 
7

In his e-mail, Aims stated that he had “no preferences” among the candidates 

and considered them all to be “top recommendations.”9 

Because he was about to depart on a business trip, Barr gave the list to 

William Baker, then the ICITAP Assistant Director for Latin America and the 

Caribbean, and asked Baker to begin recruiting both police and corrections 

candidates for the Assessment Team. Baker told the OIG that upon reviewing 

the Aims List, he immediately focused on the name Larry DuBois. Baker 

explained that he and DuBois had worked together in Massachusetts in the 

1990s – Baker as the Massachusetts Commissioner of Public Safety and 

DuBois as the Director of Corrections. Baker said he called DuBois and 

inquired whether he would be interested in serving on the Assessment Team. 

Baker said he also asked DuBois to help recruit other qualified candidates. 

 DuBois told the OIG that he called Baker back the next day and told 

him he was interested in joining the Assessment Team and that he would 

assist Baker in recruiting additional candidates. Baker therefore sent to 

DuBois via facsimile a copy of the Aims List on April 2, 2003. 

DuBois told the OIG that he knew many of the people on the Aims List 

and that he selected several of them to contact. He said he also contacted 

other individuals whose names were not on the Aims List but whom he knew 

either from his professional associations or were recommended to him by other 

individuals. DuBois said that he contacted about ten people in total. 

Among the individuals DuBois contacted who were willing and able to go 

to Iraq were McCotter, DeLand, and Stewart. As noted above, McCotter and 

Armstrong had been recommended by the BOP. Neither Stewart nor DeLand 

were on the Aims List. DuBois told the OIG that DeLand was recommended to 

him by McCotter, and Stewart was recommended by George Camp, Executive 

Director of the Association of State Correctional Administrators, and one of the 

individuals named on the BOP portion of the Aims List. Like DuBois, who in 

addition to his six years of service as the Director in Massachusetts had 

worked for the BOP for 26 years serving as both a warden and a Regional 

Director, McCotter, Stewart, and DeLand all were former, high-level corrections 

officials, with significant experience in the corrections field. 

McCotter began his corrections career in the military, where he served for 

three years as the Colonel-Commandant of the United States Disciplinary 

Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After leaving the military, he served as 

director of three different state corrections departments: Texas from June 

1985 – March 1987; New Mexico from March 1987 – December 1990; and Utah 

from January 1992 – July 1997. Following his retirement from the Utah 

system in 1997, McCotter worked briefly with DeLand in DeLand’s corrections 

 9 E-mail from Clifford Aims to Gary Barr, April 1, 2003. 
8

consulting business. McCotter thereafter accepted a position as Director of 

Business Development for Management and Training Corporation (MTC), a 

private company that manages and operates juvenile and adult correctional 

facilities for federal, state, and local governments. He was employed at the 

MTC at the time he was retained by ICITAP. 

Stewart was employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections for 17 

years. During his career, he served as Assistant Director, Deputy Director, and 

finally, from December 1995 until his retirement in November of 2002, as 

Director of the Department. After Stewart left the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, he established Advanced Correctional Management, a consulting 

and prison management firm. In addition, following his return from Iraq, 

Stewart served as a correctional advisor in Haiti for the Department of State. 

DeLand was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office for more 

than 20 years, 7 of which he spent as the administrator of the County’s jail. 

From 1985 to 1992, he served as the Executive Director of the Utah 

Department of Corrections. Since leaving the Utah Department, DeLand has 

continued to run a corrections consulting business he began early in his 

career. He has served as a litigation consultant or expert witness in more than 

100 prison litigation cases. 

According to DuBois, McCotter, DeLand, and Stewart all agreed to be 

considered for the Assessment Team, and he therefore forwarded their 

resumes, together with his own, to Baker at ICITAP. DuBois said that during 

this period he also spoke to Armstrong, who was interested but not available at 

that time due to other commitments. Armstrong did, however, forward his 

resume to ICITAP for future consideration and ultimately was chosen to be part 

of the Bartlett Team. 

Shortly after Baker began to identify possible candidates for the 

corrections positions, the newly hired ICITAP Program Manager arrived at 

ICITAP headquarters in Washington, D.C. Prior to his selection as the Iraq 

Program Manager, he had been working as the Chief of Staff for the Kosovo 

Police Service School. He left the Iraq program in September 2003 and served 

as the ICITAP Senior Technical Advisor in the Phillippines until November 

2004. 

The Program Manager told the OIG that when he arrived at 

headquarters, Baker briefed him on his recruitment efforts for the Assessment 

Team. Baker told the OIG that he provided the Program Manager with two 

stacks of resumes, one for police candidates and one for corrections 

candidates. Included in the corrections stack were the resumes of McCotter, 

Stewart, DuBois, and DeLand. 
9

The Program Manager told the OIG that based on his conversations with 

Baker, he believed that ICITAP had already essentially selected McCotter, 

Stewart, and DuBois for the corrections team by the time he became involved 

in the hiring process. He said that he nevertheless called all three men and 

spoke with them about their backgrounds and experience. Then, after 

conferring with Baker and Mayer, he confirmed their selection for the 

Assessment Team. 

 Although the Program Manager did not recall DeLand as part of this 

"pre-selected" group, according to Baker, DeLand's resume was among those 

he provided to the Program Manager. Moreover, DeLand recalled being 

contacted by someone at ICITAP about the Assessment Team during this 

period. In any event, DeLand also was selected to become part of the 

Assessment Team, but he was unable to leave in May with the others due to a 

delay in obtaining his passport and visa. 

On April 23, 2003, McCotter, Stewart, and DuBois attended an 

orientation session at ICITAP headquarters. There they met in person the 

Program Manager and Mayer and were given additional information about the 

Iraq assignment. On or about May 4, the three men traveled together with the 

other members of the Assessment Team to Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, where 

they received training, equipment, and medical clearance. They departed for 

Iraq, by way of Kuwait, on Sunday, May 11, and after several days of travel, 

arrived in Baghdad on May 15. As noted above, DeLand joined them in Iraq on 

June 25, 2003. 

DuBois left Iraq to return to the United States on June 27, 2003. 

Stewart soon followed, leaving Iraq on July 3. DeLand and McCotter stayed in 

Iraq until September 2 and 3 respectively. McCotter returned to the United 

States temporarily for about a two-week period starting July 27 to attend a 

family funeral. Before returning to Iraq on or about August 12, McCotter 

attended an ACA meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, where he made a 

presentation regarding the ICITAP Iraq program and actively recruited 

replacements for himself and the other members of the McCotter Team. 

V. THE SELECTION OF THE BARTLETT TEAM 

Several days after the last member of the McCotter Team left Iraq, 

Bartlett, Ryan, and Armstrong arrived in Baghdad. Billings joined them in 

October. As previously mentioned, the members of the Bartlett Team were 

former corrections officials with many years of corrections experience. 

During his 20-year military career, Bartlett served in several managerial 

positions in military prisons, including as the Deputy Commandant for the 

United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following 

retirement from the military, he served as the Deputy Director and the Director 
10

of Operations for the Utah Department of Corrections for almost four years. 

After leaving the Utah Department of Corrections, Bartlett was employed by the 

MTC as an Accreditation Manager, and later as a Senior Warden for a medium 

security prison. In 2000, Bartlett left the MTC and began his own consulting 

company. 

Armstrong was employed by the Connecticut Department of Corrections 

for over 26 years, where he rose through the ranks from corrections officer to 

Commissioner. After serving two four-year terms as Commissioner, he retired 

from the Connecticut Department in April 2003. 

Billings began his career as a correctional officer for the Utah 

Department of Corrections in 1974. At the time of his retirement in 1998, he 

was the Special Operations Unit Commander for the Department, a position he 

had held for nine years. Since his retirement, he has been employed by the 

Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office. 

Ryan was employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections for over 25 

years. He served as the Deputy Director of Prison Operations for seven years 

and then as the Acting Director of the Department for the six months prior to 

his retirement in June 2003. 

Armstrong first came to ICITAP’s attention as one of the individuals 

recommended by the BOP on the Aims List. DuBois had contacted Armstrong 

in April 2003, and although he was not available to go to Iraq at that time, he 

sent his resume to ICITAP for later consideration. Bartlett and Ryan became 

candidates for the Iraq program after being recruited by McCotter at the ACA 

conference in August 2003. 

Although it is not entirely clear who at ICITAP officially made the decision 

to select Bartlett, Ryan, and Armstrong, Ryan told the OIG that he recalled 

speaking with Mayer shortly after returning from the ACA conference and 

accepting the Iraq assignment from Mayer. Armstrong also told the OIG that 

he recalled speaking with Mayer and believed that Mayer was involved in the 

decision to select him. 

Ryan, Bartlett, and Armstrong reported to ICITAP headquarters on 

September 3, 2003, for an orientation session. McCotter told the OIG that he 

stopped in Washington, D.C. on his way home from Iraq to attend this session 

and to brief the three men on the situation in Iraq and on the efforts he and the 

others had made during their time there. Following this orientation session, 

Ryan, Bartlett, and Armstrong spent about a week at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and 

then traveled to Iraq, arriving in Baghdad on September 15, 2003. Armstrong 

returned to the United States on May 4, 2004, ending his association with 

ICITAP at that time. Bartlett and Ryan continued to serve in Iraq until 

December 2004. 
11

Billings told the OIG that he was first contacted about the possibility of 

going to Iraq on behalf of ICITAP by DeLand in April 2003. Billings and 

DeLand had known each other for many years and had worked together in 

Utah. Billings said he told DeLand he was interested in being considered and 

that DeLand said he would have someone from ICITAP contact him. Billings 

said that for reasons unknown to him, no one from ICITAP contacted him for 

months. It was not until October 2003 that Billings was placed under contract 

with SAIC to work on the ICITAP Iraq program. On October 4, he attended an 

orientation session at ICITAP’s headquarters, where he was briefed by 

McCotter. Billings arrived in Baghdad on October 14, 2003, and left Iraq on 

April 18, 2004. 

VI. BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR THE MCCOTTER AND BARTLETT TEAMS 

As noted above, DOJ Criminal Division policy requires that all 

subcontractor candidates undergo a pre-employment background check 

commensurate with the level of risk associated with the position in which they 

will serve. In accordance with this policy, some form of background check was 

performed on seven of the eight members of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams 

prior to their deployment to Iraq. The exception was Billings who, either 

because ICITAP never submitted his file to the SPS or because the file was 

misplaced by the SPS, did not undergo any pre-deployment background check. 

ICITAP conducted further research into the backgrounds of all eight men in 

May and June 2004, after Senator Schumer raised concerns about the 

qualifications of some of them. 

Below we first discuss the Criminal Division policy regarding background 

checks for subcontractors and how it was applied to the McCotter and Bartlett 

Teams prior to their deployment to Iraq. We then discuss the post-deployment 

checks ICITAP conducted. 

A. Pre-Deployment Checks 

1. Criminal Division Policy Relating to Subcontractor Background 

Checks 

At the time the McCotter and Bartlett Teams were hired, Criminal 

Division policy regarding subcontractor background checks was contained in a 

July 2002 policy memorandum, Criminal Division Administrative Policy 

Memorandum No. 60-3 (Policy 60-3) (July 29, 2002) (Exhibit 2). In short, Policy 

60-3 requires that all subcontractors who will not require access to classified 

information in the performance of their duties be subject to a background 

check commensurate with the level of risk associated with the position they will 

fill. The policy places the responsibility for determining that risk level on the 

hiring section. In making this assessment, the hiring section is supposed to 

consider “the damage that an untrustworthy contractor could cause to the 
12

efficiency or the integrity of Criminal Division operations” and compare “the 

contractor’s duties, responsibility, and access with those of Department 

employees in similar positions.” 

Policy 60-3 identifies three levels of risk for subcontractor positions – 

high, moderate, and low – and defines these risk levels as follows: 

High Risk: Those sensitive positions with the potential for 

exceptionally serious impact involving duties especially 

critical to the mission of the Criminal Division with broad 

scope of policy or program authority, such as policy 

development or implementation; higher-level management 

assignments; independent spokespersons or nonmanagement positions with authority for independent 

action; law enforcement, or significant fiduciary and 

procurement authority and responsibilities. 

Moderate Risk: Those sensitive positions that have the 

potential for moderate to serious impact involving duties very 

important to the mission of the Criminal Division with 

significant program responsibilities and delivery of customer 

services to the public, such as an assistant to policy 

development and implementation; mid-level management 

assignments; non-management positions with authority for 

independent or semi-independent action; or delivery of 

service positions that demand public confidence or trust. 

Low Risk: Those non-sensitive positions that do not fall into 

any of the above categories. 

Policy 60-3 also spells out the background checks required for each level 

of risk. Subcontractor candidates identified as high risk are required to 

undergo a limited background investigation, which includes a personal subject 

interview, national agency check with inquiries (NACI),10 credit check, written 

inquiries, record searches, and personal interviews covering specific areas, plus 

vouchering of their previous two employers or their employers for the last two 

years, whichever is greater. Candidates for positions identified as moderate 

risk are required to undergo an NACI and the same vouchering done for those 

designated high risk. Candidates for positions identified as low risk are 

required to undergo a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name and 

fingerprint check. For the name check, the FBI reviews its investigative files to 

 10 An NACI includes searches of government investigative databases and written 

inquiries to current and past employers, schools attended, references, and local law 

enforcement authorities. 
13

see if the individual is named in other FBI investigations. For the fingerprint 

check, the FBI Criminal Justice Information Service checks its files to ensure 

that the individual does not have a prior arrest history. 

To facilitate the hiring of subcontractors, Policy 60-3 provides that the 

hiring section may request authority to hire a subcontractor pending the 

completion of the full background check. This process, which is referred to as 

a waiver, may be requested in “unusual or emergency circumstances” and “will 

not be considered if the security papers [concerning the subcontractor] contain 

unresolved derogatory information.” To seek a waiver, the hiring section 

completes Form USA 237, “Request for Waiver of Preappointment Investigation 

Requirements of the U.S. Department of Justice Personnel Security 

Regulations” (Waiver Form). The Waiver Form is to be signed by the Section 

Security Officer or senior-level management official for the hiring section and 

“must include a detailed explanation why [the section] cannot wait for 

completed investigation.”

As with full background checks, Policy 60-3 sets forth different waiver 

requirements depending upon the risk level assigned to the position. For highrisk positions, a waiver may be granted upon completion of an FBI fingerprint 

check, vouchering of previous employers, and a favorable review of security 

paperwork, including a credit check. Moderate-risk positions require either an 

FBI fingerprint check or National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check, and a 

favorable review of security paperwork, including a credit check.11 Finally, a 

waiver may be granted for low-risk positions upon completion of an NCIC 

check. 

2. ICITAP Procedures for Clearing Subcontractors 

In this section, we describe the general process ICITAP used for obtaining 

clearances for subcontractors at the time that the McCotter and Bartlett Teams 

were retained. 

Once ICITAP selected a candidate for a program, the responsible program 

analyst, or in some cases SAIC personnel, would send the candidate a packet 

of paperwork to be completed and returned. The forms sent to the candidate 

included the following: 

 11 NCIC is a computerized index of criminal justice information (such as criminal 

record history information, fugitives, stolen properties, missing persons) run by the FBI. It is 

available to federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies and is 

operational 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. 
14

• Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, SF-85 P (Questionnaire); 

• Supplemental Questionnaire for Selected Positions, SF-85 S 

(Supplemental Questionnaire); and 

• Two FBI fingerprint cards. 

A copy of each of these forms is attached as Exhibit 3. 

On the Questionnaire, the candidate was asked to provide basic 

identifying information (e.g., name, address, height, weight), as well as 

information about previous addresses, educational background, marital status, 

relatives, employment activities, references, military history, foreign countries 

visited, police record, use of illegal drugs, and financial history. On the 

Supplemental Questionnaire, the candidate was asked to provide information 

regarding use of illegal drugs and drug activity, use of alcohol, and mental 

health. On the fingerprint cards, the candidate was asked to supply the prints 

necessary to run the FBI fingerprint check. 

In addition to handling the candidate paperwork described above, the 

ICITAP program analyst also would prepare the internal forms necessary to 

secure the background check. These included a memorandum requesting 

clearance (Request for Clearance), a copy of the Statement of Work, and in 

some cases, a Waiver Form. 

The Request for Clearance is a standardized form that, according to the 

SPS’s Assistant Director for Security, Procurement & Property Management, 

Linda Cantilena, was prepared by the SPS for ICITAP’s use. Cantilena told the 

OIG that the form was created approximately six or seven years ago, prior to 

the issuance of Policy 60-3 in 2002, and was not updated to reflect the Policy’s 

guidance regarding classification of risk until June 2004. A copy of the version 

of the form that was in use at the time the Iraq program commenced is 

attached as Exhibit 4. 

On the Request for Clearance, ICITAP provided basic identifying 

information about the candidate and requested that the SPS “process” the 

candidate “in accordance with agreed upon standards.” The form contained 

signature blocks for both the ICITAP Deputy Director and a Program Manager. 

In addition, it contained a series of statements to which ICITAP was to respond 

true or false. These questions were: 
15

• This individual will not have access to National Security 

Information. 

• This individual will not have access to Sensitive 

Information. 

• This individual will not require unescorted access to the 

U.S. Embassy. 

• This individual will not interact with senior U.S. Embassy 

officials in the course of routine work assignments. 

If ICITAP indicated “true” in response to all four statements, the position would 

be labeled low risk and the SPS would process the candidate accordingly. 

As discussed above, Policy 60-3 allows a hiring section to request a 

waiver of the full background check. Under this policy, such requests 

were supposed to be the exception rather than the rule and made in 

writing. ICITAP program analysts sometimes completed and sent to the 

SPS the Waiver Form. However, both ICITAP and SPS employees told the 

OIG that whether or not a Waiver Form was included in a particular 

security packet, the SPS assumed that ICITAP wanted to deploy 

candidates overseas as soon as possible and therefore processed all 

packets received from ICITAP as if a written waiver request had been 

made. 

Once the ICITAP program analysts collected and completed all of 

the necessary paperwork, they would create a “security packet” for each 

candidate. This packet would then be delivered to the SPS, either 

directly by the program analyst who had prepared it or through 

interoffice mail, so that the SPS could conduct the necessary background 

check. ICITAP generally did not maintain a copy of the security packets 

it delivered to the SPS or a log of which packets were delivered. 

Policy 60-3 assigns certain responsibilities regarding subcontractor 

background checks, including reviewing the paperwork submitted by 

candidates for completeness, to Section Security Officers or their 

designees. During the relevant period, ICITAP assigned Section Security 

Officer duties to one employee on a collateral basis. There was, however, 

frequent turnover in the position. Moreover, the position description for 

the ICITAP Section Security Officer did not include among its duties any 

responsibility for the subcontractor clearance process. Indeed, the 

ICITAP employee who served as the Section Security Officer during the 

relevant period told the OIG that he viewed the clearance process as 
16

primarily the responsibility of the program analysts. Nevertheless, as 

discussed in more detail below, the SPS clearly treated the ICITAP 

Section Security Officer as its primary contact regarding subcontractor 

clearances, and he was therefore inevitably drawn into the process. 

3. Subcontractor Clearance Procedures in the SPS 

During the relevant period, one Security Specialist processed virtually all 

security packets received by the SPS from ICITAP. The Security Specialist told 

the OIG she would first review the Questionnaire and Supplemental 

Questionnaire for completeness. If information was missing, she would notify 

the ICITAP Section Security Officer. It would then be ICITAP’s responsibility to 

see that the missing information was supplied, and processing would not 

proceed until it had done so. 

If a packet was complete, the Security Specialist would determine the 

level of background investigation required by referring to the Request for 

Clearance. Specifically, she would turn to ICITAP’s responses to the true/false 

statements on the form. She explained that ICITAP routinely marked all four 

statements as true, and that she therefore processed virtually all ICITAP 

subcontractor candidates at the low risk level. She said that until May 2004, 

when Gary Llewellyn became the Chief of Security Programs Staff, neither she 

nor, to her knowledge, anyone else at the SPS ever questioned the designation 

of virtually all ICITAP subcontractor positions as low risk. 

The Security Specialist also told the OIG that whether or not a Waiver 

Form was included in the security packet, she processed all ICITAP 

subcontractor candidates as if a waiver had been requested. The practical 

effect of this was that virtually all ICITAP subcontractors were cleared for hire 

based solely on an NCIC check. 

The Security Specialist said that at the time the Iraq program 

commenced, it was her general practice to complete promptly the full 

background check on all ICITAP subcontractors who had been granted a 

waiver. Under Policy 60-3, this entailed requesting that the FBI run a name 

and fingerprint check on the candidate. The Security Specialist indicated that 

this practice changed, however, in March 2004 as the Iraq program grew and 

the number of clearance requests she was receiving increased. She said that at 

that time she was instructed not to process clearance requests beyond the 

waiver stage. In other words, she was to complete the NCIC check and grant 

the waiver if the check was clear, but she was not to request the FBI name and 

fingerprint check necessary to complete the full check. She said the decision 

not to perform full background checks was made by her superiors at the SPS 

and was an effort to free up more of her time to process waivers for ICITAP 

subcontractor candidates. According to Gary Llewellyn, the SPS returned to 

performing full background checks on all candidates in August 2004 and also 
17

has gone back and completed full checks on all subcontractors who were 

previously cleared solely on the basis of a waiver. 

The Security Specialist told the OIG that if the NCIC check turned up no 

derogatory information on a subcontractor candidate, she would notify ICITAP 

that a waiver had been granted. She said that at the time the Iraq program 

commenced, she notified ICITAP either verbally or by e-mail. Generally, she 

sent e-mail notification to the ICITAP Section Security Officer, sometimes with 

a copy to the program analysts from whom she had received the packet. The 

Security Specialist said she did not keep a log of security packets delivered by 

ICITAP or of the waivers or full clearances she granted. 

4. Application of ICITAP and SPS Background Check 

Procedures to the McCotter and Bartlett Teams 

The SPS provided the OIG with a copy of the security packet for each 

member of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams except for Billings. These files 

contained the security paperwork completed by the team members, the internal 

forms generated by the ICITAP program analysts, as well as the paperwork 

generated by the Security Specialist in connection with the background checks 

she performed. The discussion below is based on the OIG’s review of these files 

and our interviews of the Security Specialist and Iraq program analysts 

concerning these documents. 

a. The McCotter Team 

 On May 8, 2003, the Security Specialist performed NCIC checks on all 

four members of the McCotter Team. Because all four checks were clear, the 

Security Specialist granted waivers on each of the men. There is no indication 

in the file of how or if the waiver determination was communicated to ICITAP. 

The Security Specialist could not locate an e-mail notification and did not 

specifically recall notifying ICITAP orally. 

The files also indicate that on the same date, the Security Specialist 

requested an FBI fingerprint check on each of the team members and that the 

FBI performed the checks and responded to the Security Specialist on May 9. 

The FBI checks revealed no disqualifying information. 

Finally, the files for all four team members contain a memorandum dated 

May 23, 2003, from the Security Specialist to the FBI requesting a name check. 

However, the files do not contain any response from the FBI to the SPS inquiry. 

The Security Specialist told the OIG that it was not unusual for the FBI to take 

many weeks to respond to a name check request, but she had no specific 

explanation for why these files did not contain a response. Based on our 

review, it does not appear that FBI name checks were performed on the team 

members in response to the SPS requests. 
18

In sum, the records show that the SPS granted all four team members a 

waiver on the basis of a clear NCIC check prior to the dates on which they were 

deployed to Iraq as ICITAP subcontractors (May 10 for McCotter, DuBois, and 

Stewart, and June 25 for DeLand). However, because the men traveled to Fort 

Bliss on May 2, it appears that they were placed on the SAIC payroll before the 

SPS officially granted the waivers. This appears to be inconsistent with the 

requirement in Policy 60-3 that all subcontractors receive appropriate 

clearance prior to being retained by ICITAP. With regard to the full background 

checks required by Policy 60-3 for low risk subcontractors, the records show 

that the SPS requested both the required name and fingerprint checks from the 

FBI, but that only the fingerprint checks appear to actually have been 

performed by the FBI in response to the SPS requests. 

b. The Bartlett Team 

The SPS provided the OIG with security packets for all members of the 

Bartlett Team except Billings. Neither the SPS nor ICITAP could locate a 

security packet for Billings. Moreover, the Security Specialist told the OIG that 

her records indicate that the SPS never conducted an NCIC check on Billings. 

Accordingly, it appears that Billings was deployed to Iraq without any predeployment background check. Because the SPS has no record of having 

conducted an NCIC on Billings, we believe the most likely explanation for this 

lapse was that the SPS never received a security packet for Billings from 

ICITAP. As discussed in more detail below, ICITAP requested and the FBI 

performed a name check on Billings after he had returned from Iraq, but it 

does not appear that either an NCIC or fingerprint check were ever conducted 

on Billings. 

 

With regard to the other three members of the Bartlett Team, the files 

indicate that the Security Specialist performed an NCIC check on each 

individual on September 2, 2003. The checks were clear for two of the men 

and revealed a “hit” on one involving 30-year-old criminal charges. The 

Security Specialist told the OIG that she consulted with her supervisors 

regarding the criminal charges, and that they determined that the charges were 

not disqualifying based on Office of Personnel Management guidance that 

instructs agencies to consider the nature, extent, and seriousness of a charge, 

as well as the individual’s age and maturity at the time it was committed. 

Therefore, the SPS granted waivers to all three team members. As with the 

McCotter Team, the SPS’s files contain no indication regarding how or if the 

Security Specialist notified ICITAP that the waivers had been granted. 

In addition, there is no indication in the files of Bartlett, Ryan, or 

Armstrong that the Security Specialist requested that the FBI run a fingerprint 

check on them. Moreover, although the Ryan and Armstrong files contain 

copies of memoranda from the Security Specialist to the FBI requesting name 
19

checks on the men, no similar memorandum was contained in the Bartlett file. 

There is no indication in the files that the FBI replied to the Ryan and 

Armstrong name check requests. As a result, based on our review it does not 

appear that FBI fingerprint checks or name checks were performed on any of 

the team members as a result of requests by the SPS. 

Finally, the files indicate that although employment vouchering was not 

required for the team members because they were designated “low-risk,” 

ICITAP staff members contacted previous employers of Bartlett, Ryan, and 

Armstrong and confirmed their employment. They indicated they had 

performed this vouchering on the Waiver Forms they provided to the SPS. 

Thus, the records concerning the Bartlett Team indicate that prior to 

their deployment to Iraq, the SPS granted three members of the team – Bartlett, 

Ryan, and Armstrong – a waiver in accordance with Policy 60-3, but did not 

complete all the steps necessary for a full background check on the men. 

Specifically, no fingerprint checks were requested on any of the men, and a 

name check was requested but apparently not conducted on two of the three. 

With regard to Billings, no pre-deployment background checks were done at 

all. 

B. Post-Deployment Checks 

Prompted by Senator Schumer’s concerns, ICITAP conducted further 

research into the backgrounds of the members of the McCotter and Bartlett 

Teams in May and June 2004. Specifically, ICITAP, SAIC, and Office of 

Administration personnel conducted name searches in three electronic 

databases – Google, LexisNexis, and PACER. In addition, the DOJ Civil Rights 

Division (CRD) searched its records for any indication that the men had been 

the subject of a federal civil rights investigation. The FBI also ran a name 

check on each of the men. With the exception of the FBI name check, which 

was part of the standard background check required under Policy 60-3 to be 

performed on all low-risk subcontractor candidates, all of these postdeployment checks exceeded what was required at the time by Criminal 

Division policy. Below we discuss these checks and their results. 

1. FBI Name Checks 

ICITAP requested that the FBI run name checks on all eight members of 

the Bartlett and McCotter Teams. Although ICITAP personnel were not aware 

of this at the time they requested the checks, the SPS had already requested 

the checks be run on six of the men because FBI name checks are a standard 

part of the background check for subcontractors designated as “low risk.”12 

 12 As discussed above, the SPS did not request FBI name checks on Billings or Bartlett. 

 
20

There is no indication, however, that the FBI actually completed the checks 

until they were requested by ICITAP for the second time. In any event, the 

checks revealed that the FBI had no information in its files regarding any of the 

eight men.

2. CRD Checks 

ICITAP requested that the CRD check its records for any indication that 

the men had been the subject of a federal civil rights investigation. CRD had 

no information to report to ICITAP regarding Armstrong, Bartlett, Billings, or 

DuBois. 

With regard to McCotter, the CRD informed ICITAP that in March 2003 it 

had issued a findings letter listing deficiencies in one adult detention facility 

run by MTC, the private company with which McCotter was employed at the 

time he was retained by ICITAP.13 The CRD stated, however, that to its 

knowledge McCotter was not involved in the operation of the facility and had no 

direct responsibility for its management. The CRD’s information on DeLand 

was limited to the fact that he had served as an outside expert for opposing 

counsel in two cases prosecuted by the CRD. CRD did not indicate that it 

viewed DeLand’s participation in these cases as reflecting negatively on his 

commitment to civil rights. 

With regard to Stewart, the CRD informed ICITAP that in 1997 it had 

sued the Arizona Department of Corrections for allegedly failing to prevent 

sexual misconduct by correctional officers and staff toward female inmates. 

According to the CRD, the investigation that led to the lawsuit had begun while 

Stewart was employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections, but before he 

became its Director. The CRD indicated that the case was settled after Stewart 

became Director, that no pattern or practice of misconduct by the Arizona 

Department of Corrections had been established, and that Stewart was active 

in implementing the settlement agreement. With regard to Ryan, the CRD said 

only that it had deposed him in connection with its suit against the Arizona 

Department of Corrections. CRD did not indicate that any derogatory 

information about Ryan was obtained as a result of this deposition. 

 13 A findings letter notifies the jurisdiction of the results of a CRD investigation. 

Findings letters, including the one concerning the MTC facility, are available online at: 

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#FindingsLetters. 
21

3. Google Searches 

ICITAP, with help from SAIC, ran Google searches on all eight men. The 

searches produced references to news articles reporting on Senator Schumer’s 

allegations. Some of these articles suggested a possible link between the men 

and the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The searches also produced articles that 

referenced some of the controversies and lawsuits involving the men that are 

discussed in Senator Schumer’s letter to the OIG.

4. LexisNexis and PACER Searches 

ICITAP and Office of Administrative personnel conducted name searches 

in three different LexisNexis databases: law enforcement records; lawsuit 

records; and news articles. The law enforcement search produced primarily 

generic information such as addresses, the names of associates and neighbors, 

vehicles owned, and similar information. In addition, it produced some 

information regarding small claims judgments.14 The news article checks 

produced information similar to that retrieved by the Google searches. 

The lawsuit records check disclosed information regarding various 

lawsuits that had been filed against some of the team members during their 

tenures as prison administrators, including the suits discussed by Senator 

Schumer. The information regarding these lawsuits was printed out in hard 

copy and later reviewed by ICITAP managers, including Acting Director Jones, 

who holds a law degree. 

In addition to the LexisNexis searches, ICITAP and SAIC also conducted 

PACER searches. PACER is an electronic public access service that allows 

users to obtain case and docket information for federal court cases. 

Accordingly, the PACER searches produced information similar to that 

retrieved by the LexisNexis case searches – information regarding civil suits in 

which the team members had been named as parties. As with the LexisNexis 

searches, the personnel conducting the searches printed out hard copies of 

each case that listed one of the team members as a defendant. These results 

were then reviewed by ICITAP management. 

Although the PACER and LexisNexis searches enabled ICITAP to locate 

civil lawsuits in which the men had been named, because of the limited nature 

of the information contained in the databases it was not always possible to 

ascertain the exact nature of the suits or their outcome. Nevertheless, based 

on the information gleaned from the searches and on additional inquiries made 

both by ICITAP and the OIG, several facts are clear. First, the men were named 

 14 For example, the search relating to one team member revealed that a judgment for 

$54 had been entered against him in 2002. 
22

as defendants in many of the cases because of the high-level positions they 

held and not because of their personal conduct. Many of the suits were habeas 

corpus actions filed by inmates challenging the validity of their convictions. 

Prison administrators are often named in such suits simply because they have 

physical custody of the inmate. Second, many of the cases had been dismissed 

or otherwise resolved in favor of the defendants, while others had been settled 

with no admission of liability. Third, out of the hundreds of cases reviewed, 

only a small handful alleged there had been serious or systematic problems 

regarding the treatment of inmates during the men’s tenures, and none of 

these had resulted in a finding of liability against any of the men. 

3. Analysis of the Information Revealed as a Result of the PostDeployment Checks 

As discussed above, the post-deployment checks produced two types of 

information that may have raised questions regarding the men’s qualifications 

to serve as corrections advisors in Iraq. First, they revealed that seven of the 

eight men had been named as defendants in civil lawsuits stemming from their 

tenures as high-level prison administrators. Second, they revealed that some 

of these lawsuits questioned management decisions the men had made or the 

conditions of confinement in the institutions which they had run or helped 

run. 

 The OIG asked ICITAP Acting Director Jones whether ICITAP would have 

acted differently in its selection of the members of the McCotter and Bartlett 

Teams had it been aware of this information at the time it selected them for the 

Iraq assignment. Jones told the OIG that, in his view, none of this information 

would have caused ICITAP to forego retaining the men. He pointed out that the 

FBI and CRD checks revealed no derogatory information about any of the men. 

He also said that he did not believe it would have been appropriate to disqualify 

the men from ICITAP service simply based on the fact that they have been the 

subject of lawsuits and related controversies. Rather, in his view, one must 

consider the nature of the allegations made, the level of the individual’s 

personal involvement, and how the matters were ultimately resolved. Jones 

told the OIG that he believes that taking these considerations into account, 

none of the information revealed by the post-deployment searches would have 

been disqualifying. 

 The OIG agrees that in judging the team members’ qualifications it is 

important to consider the factors cited by Acting Director Jones. Accordingly, 

we examine below the information revealed by the post-deployment searches 

involving McCotter, Stewart, Armstrong, and DeLand. 
23

 a. McCotter 

The most serious allegation concerning McCotter focused on his 

culpability for an inmate death that occurred during his tenure as the Director 

of the Utah Department of Corrections. The inmate in question died as the 

result of a blood clot that formed after he was confined to a restraint chair for 

many hours. The inmate’s family later sued the Utah Department of 

Corrections for the death, naming McCotter as a defendant. The suit was 

eventually settled by the State with no admission of liability. Some news 

stories reported that McCotter’s resignation from the Utah Director’s post 

resulted from pressure generated by the inmate’s death. In addition to the 

Utah incident, McCotter’s qualifications also were questioned on the basis of 

the CRD investigation of the MTC-run facility discussed above. 

The OIG spoke with the former Utah Assistant Attorney General who 

defended the State in the lawsuit stemming from the inmate’s death. He told 

the OIG that he had successfully defended the State in an earlier lawsuit 

challenging the State’s use of restraint boards, and that the restraint chair in 

which the deceased inmate had been placed was generally viewed as a less 

onerous alternative to the board.15 As to the suit stemming from the inmate’s 

death, he said it had been settled by McCotter’s successor with no admission of 

liability. The former Utah Assistant Attorney General also told the OIG that the 

inmate had been confined to the restraint chair at the direction of a prison 

medical doctor and in conformity with the regulations in effect at the time. He 

said that McCotter was not involved in the decision to use the chair and did not 

know the inmate had been placed in the chair until he was notified of the 

death. 

When interviewed by the OIG, McCotter said that he had no input into 

the decision to place the inmate in the restraint chair and was unaware of it 

until after the death occurred. He said that the decision was made in 

accordance with prison policy by a medical doctor and that the prisoner had 

been monitored in accordance with that policy. McCotter also denied that his 

resignation from the Director’s post had any connection to the inmate’s death. 

He said that his decision to resign was wholly voluntary and motivated by a 

desire to take a position in the private sector after many years of government 

service. 

In short, even if the restraint device was not used appropriately in the 

inmate’s case – a judgment ICITAP would not be in a position to make given the 

outcome of the litigation – there is no indication that McCotter was involved in 

 15 We understand that both the BOP and the United States Marshals Service use 

similar devices in some circumstances. 
24

the decision to use it in this case. Similarly, as discussed above, McCotter was 

not involved in the management of the MTC-run facility cited by the CRD. 

b. Stewart 

The focus of the criticism regarding ICITAP’s selection of Stewart was on 

the CRD lawsuit discussed above and on several other lawsuits in which 

inmates had alleged improper conduct by the Arizona Department of 

Corrections and named Stewart as a defendant. Two lawsuits alleged that 

inmates had been made to stand outside for long periods of time without 

proper sanitation, drinking water, or protection from the elements. Another 

lawsuit alleged that the Arizona Department of Corrections had failed to use 

protective custody to shield certain at-risk inmates from harm. 

As noted above, the CRD lawsuit was filed based on events that occurred 

prior to Stewart’s term as head of the Arizona Department of Corrections. 

Moreover, the case was settled during Stewart’s tenure, and the CRD stated 

that there was no evidence of a pattern or practice of misconduct by the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. 

With regard to the lawsuits alleging inhumane conditions, the incidents 

that formed the basis for one of the suits also occurred before Stewart became 

Director and, for the other, a matter of days after Stewart became Director. 

Moreover, the lawsuits were ultimately tried before a federal district court judge 

and decided in favor of the defendants.16 

Finally, the lawsuit concerning protective custody also originated with a 

policy imposed by Stewart’s predecessor and was ultimately settled during 

Stewart’s tenure as Director through the collaborative efforts of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections and the plaintiffs’ counsel. According to a law 

review article written by two of the plaintiffs’ counsel, an Arizona Assistant 

Attorney General who represented the State, the court-appointed monitor in 

the case, and a Department of Corrections administrator, as result of reforms 

undertaken during Stewart’s tenure, Arizona now has a protective custody 

system “that is among the most enlightened in the nation.”17

 16 Johnson v. Lewis, et al., Civ. No. 96-463 (Feb. 11, 2003). 

17 Hill, Hammond, Skolnik, Martin, & Clement, Effective Post-PLRA Settlement Models: 

A Case Study of Arizona’s Protective Segregation Lawsuit, 23 Pace Law Review 749 (2004). 
25

c. Armstrong 

The information regarding Armstrong focused on two different 

controversies arising from his tenure as Director of the Connecticut 

Department of Corrections. First, several female employees alleged that sexual 

harassment was pervasive at the Connecticut Department of Corrections. 

Second, the Connecticut Department of Corrections transferred some 

Connecticut inmates to a Virginia state prison, where two of the inmates later 

died. There were allegations that the transferred inmates were mistreated, and 

the inmates’ deaths led to two lawsuits against the Connecticut Department of 

Corrections alleging liability based on the transfers. 

The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunity 

(Commission) investigated the allegations of pervasive sexual harassment of 

female employees at the Department of Corrections, and in July 2002 held a 

public fact-finding hearing at which Armstrong testified. On March 6, 2003, 

the Commission released a report containing its findings.18 The Commission 

found that sexual harassment of female employees was a problem at the 

Connecticut Department of Corrections and made recommendations designed 

to improve the Department’s complaint process, but it made no specific 

findings against Armstrong or any other individual. 

In addition to the Commission investigation, two lawsuits currently are 

pending in federal court that allege that sexual harassment at the Connecticut 

Department of Corrections was widespread and that Armstrong and other 

members of management failed to take appropriate steps to prevent it. 

Armstrong is named as a defendant in the suits along with dozens of other 

Department managers. The allegations against Armstrong pertain primarily to 

his management of the Department of Corrections’ system for collecting and 

investigating sexual harassment complaints and do not assert that Armstrong 

himself sexually harassed any employee.19 

 18 Fact Finding Report into Allegations of Sexual Harassment within the Department of 

Correction (March 2003), available at www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/whatsnew.htm. 

19 The complaint in one of the lawsuits contains several paragraphs that restate 

charges made in a complaint filed with the Commission in 2000 by a former Deputy 

Commissioner who was fired by Armstrong. The pending lawsuit describes the Deputy 

Commissioner’s complaint as having charged Armstrong himself with making inappropriate 

comments of a sexual nature at senior-level staff meetings. The OIG reviewed a copy of the 

Deputy Commissioner’s 2000 complaint and determined that the current complaint 

mischaracterizes its allegations regarding Armstrong. Although the Deputy Commissioner’s 

complaint alleges that inappropriate comments were made at some meetings, it does not 

attribute those comments to Armstrong. According to the Connecticut Assistant Attorney 

General who handled the Deputy Commissioner’s complaint and is defending the current suits, 

the Deputy Commissioner’s complaint was settled with no admission of liability, and she is not 

a party to the current suit. 
26

The Commission also investigated and issued a report concerning the 

transfer of inmates to Virginia.20 As discussed in the Commission report, the 

majority of the transferred inmates were minorities from urban areas, and the 

Virginia prison to which they were sent was located in a rural, predominantly 

white community. The Commission reported a number of incidents of racial 

harassment against some transferred inmates and recommended that the State 

of Connecticut not renew the contract to house inmates at the Virginia prison. 

The lawsuits stemming from the deaths of two of the transferred prisoners were 

settled with no findings against Armstrong or the State of Connecticut. 

d. DeLand 

The charges surrounding DeLand were somewhat vague, and focused 

primarily on statements made to the media by the Mayor of Salt Lake City, who 

had formerly represented inmates in lawsuits filed against the Utah 

Department of Corrections. After the controversy regarding the ICITAP 

contractors arose in June 2004, the Mayor alleged to the media that DeLand 

had run the Utah prisons in a “sadistic” manner. DeLand denied this 

allegation and told the OIG that he and the Mayor had often clashed during the 

time that DeLand served as head of the Utah Department of Corrections and 

the Mayor represented inmate plaintiffs. He also pointed out that although he 

had been named in inmate lawsuits in his capacity as Director of the Utah 

prison system, there are no court judgments against him for violating the 

rights of any inmate. 

In sum, had ICITAP checked public databases for information about the 

members of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams prior to hiring the men it would 

have found that some of them had been named in lawsuits related to their 

work as high-level state corrections officials. However, many of the lawsuits 

were standard complaints filed by inmates against correctional officials, and 

none of the lawsuits we identified resulted in findings of misconduct against 

the individual corrections officials. When we asked the ICITAP Acting Director 

whether ICITAP would have acted differently in its selection of these 

subcontractors had it been aware at the time of this information, he said that 

none of the information would have caused ICITAP to forego retaining the men. 

In light of the facts we have described above, we cannot conclude that such a 

postion was unreasonable. 

 20 Report on the Connecticut Department of Correction Inmate Transfer to Virginia

(February 2001). 
27

 

VII. THE MCCOTTER AND BARTLETT TEAMS ROLES AT ABU GHRAIB 

 As noted above, several news articles have suggested that the members 

of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams were somehow involved in or shared 

responsibility for the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Accordingly, the 

OIG attempted to assess whether evidence supported such a view. 

 With regard to the McCotter Team, all four members had left Iraq before 

inmates were placed in the Abu Ghraib cell blocks where the abuse took place. 

Moreover, the services they performed in Iraq were limited to conducting and 

writing an assessment of the state of Iraqi prisons, overseeing the renovation of 

a limited number of prison facilities, and recruiting, training, and advising a 

small number of Iraqis who would eventually serve as staff in the newly reopened prisons. The men had no role in or responsibility for training or 

supervising the military personnel who worked at Abu Ghraib and who 

perpetrated abuse. 

 Similarly, while in Iraq the members of the Bartlett Team continued to 

oversee the renovation of Iraqi prisons and to train and advise the Iraqi staff 

and management of those prisons. They too did not supervise or train the 

military personnel stationed at Abu Ghraib. Moreover, although the members 

of the Bartlett Team were in Iraq and visited Abu Ghraib during the period the 

abuse occurred, their visits were sporadic and took place during daylight 

hours, and their access to the portion of the prison in which the abuse took 

place was greatly restricted. 

 A. The McCotter Team 

 As discussed above, McCotter, DuBois, and Stewart arrived in Iraq in 

May 2003 to conduct an assessment of the Iraqi prison system. All three men 

told the OIG that soon after their arrival they met with officials from the 

Coalition Provisional Authority, under whose authority they operated while in 

Iraq. They said that these officials told them that the majority of Iraqi prisons 

had been heavily damaged and looted, and that therefore there was a severe 

shortage of space in which to place the growing number of civilians being 

arrested for looting and other crimes. Accordingly, in addition to conducting 

the planned assessment, the men were asked to identify facilities that were 

suitable for immediate renovation and to begin those renovations with the goal 

of re-opening the facilities as soon as possible. 

The men told the OIG that they thereafter divided into teams, with 

McCotter and Stewart taking responsibility for the immediate Baghdad area, 

and DuBois and a Canadian advisor for other parts of the country. They said 

that they traveled in their teams to former Iraqi prison sites in their respective 

areas of jurisdiction with the dual purpose of preparing the assessment report 
28

and identifying possible sites for renovation. On June 15, 2003, they produced 

a report entitled Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and 

Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society (Report). In the Report, they 

described 21 facilities they had visited and divided those facilities into 4 

categories based on how soon each could be renovated. Among the facilities 

identified as suitable for immediate renovation was Abu Ghraib. 

Because Abu Ghraib was located near Baghdad, it fell within McCotter’s 

and Stewart’s jurisdiction. Both men told the OIG that they visited the facility 

soon after their arrival in Iraq and described it as having been heavily 

damaged. They said that when they first visited the site, no prisoners were 

being held there, but that within a few weeks of their arrival the military had 

erected tents on the site and was housing some prisoners in these tents. They 

both said that they did not tour the tent facility or view the prisoners inside. 

DuBois told the OIG that he too visited the site early on in his stay, and 

confirmed McCotter’s and Stewart’s description of it. 

 In the Report, McCotter and Stewart described Abu Ghraib as having 

consisted of 4 separate and distinct compounds, each of which had housed 

approximately 7,000 to 8,000 prisoners during Saddam Hussein’s regime. 

They wrote that two of the compounds had been almost totally destroyed, one 

was repairable with “extensive work,” and one was “structurally sound.” They 

further stated that two cellblocks in the structurally sound compound were 

suitable for immediate renovation, and noted that as of the date of the Report, 

$172,000 had been approved for the project and renovations had begun. 

McCotter told the OIG that he personally oversaw the renovation of the 

two Abu Ghraib cell blocks. He said that he prepared the funding request, 

shepherded it through the Coalition Provisional Authority, and hired the 

engineers and construction workers who performed the construction work. 

DeLand told the OIG that when he arrived in Iraq in June, the renovation 

efforts already had begun. He said that he focused on the task of locating and 

training Iraqis who could staff and manage the facility when it opened. 

According to McCotter and DeLand, the renovation of the two cell blocks 

at Abu Ghraib was completed in late August, and they arranged and held a 

dedication ceremony for the facility shortly before they left Iraq. McCotter 

provided the OIG with photographs of Abu Ghraib, including “before” and 

“after” shots of the renovated cell blocks. Two of these photographs are 

attached as Exhibit 5. McCotter and DeLand said that when they left Iraq in 

early September, no prisoners had yet been placed in the newly renovated cell 

blocks. 

Richard Mayer told the OIG that he traveled to Iraq in July 2003 and 

that he visited Abu Ghraib during this trip. He confirmed that at that time 

renovations were ongoing and that there were no prisoners in the cell blocks. 
29

B. The Bartlett Team 

Bartlett, Armstrong, and Ryan told the OIG that when they first arrived 

in Iraq in September 2003, prisoners were just beginning to be transferred into 

the newly renovated cell blocks at Abu Ghraib. They recalled first visiting the 

facility toward the end of the month and finding some prisoners housed there 

at that time. They said that during this visit, they discovered that the control 

of the cell blocks, and thus of the prisoners being housed there, had been 

divided between the military and civilian authorities. As they described it, one 

cell block and part of the second was being used to house civilian prisoners 

and the newly trained Iraqi guards and managers were stationed in these 

areas. However, according to the men, the military had taken exclusive control 

of the remainder of the second cell block, cordoning it off from the rest of the 

facility with temporary walls and plywood over the windows. All three men 

reported that civilian access to the military’s section of the cell block was 

severely restricted. 

Bartlett said that in December 2003, the military increased the area of 

the prison under its exclusive control to encompass the remainder of the 

second cell block. Once again, physical barriers were erected and civilians 

were not permitted unescorted access. According to Bartlett, the military did 

not vacate the Abu Ghraib cells until June 2004. 

Bartlett, Armstrong, and Ryan told the OIG that they acted as advisors to 

the Iraqi staff stationed at Abu Ghraib, and that in this role they visited the 

civilian-controlled area of the prison several times between September and 

December 2003. The men said that travel in Iraq was extremely difficult and 

dangerous and that they therefore traveled in pairs, with military escort, and 

during daylight hours. They also said that it was not until January 2004, 

when additional ICITAP correctional advisors arrived in Iraq, that they were 

able to station advisors at Abu Ghraib and other prison facilities on a more 

regular basis. 

Bartlett, Armstrong, and Ryan told the OIG that during their visits to 

Abu Ghraib, they generally steered clear of the portion of the prison that was 

under exclusive military control. They said that because they were not 

responsible for either the prisoners housed there or the military staff guarding 

them, they were not involved with that section of the facility. All three men 

denied witnessing any acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib and said they were unaware 

of the abuse until it became public. They also said that had they witnessed 

any such abuse, they immediately would have reported it to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority and ICITAP managers. They pointed out that throughout 

this period they were sending reports to ICITAP managers on a regular basis 

regarding the Iraq corrections program. 
30

Billings told the OIG that he also visited Abu Ghraib several times after 

he arrived in Iraq in October 2003. Like the others, he described a facility that 

had been divided into military and civilian sectors. Billings said that he had 

been permitted access into the military side of the prison on several occasions, 

but always in the presence of military personnel. He denied witnessing any 

mistreatment of prisoners or knowing about the abuse until it became public. 

He also said he would have reported the abuse had he been aware of it. 

All four members of the Bartlett Team told the OIG that they had no role 

in or responsibility for training or supervising the military personnel who 

staffed the section of the prison under military control. Rather, their role was 

limited to training and advising the Iraqi managers and staff stationed there. 

Mayer told the OIG that he visited Iraq in September 2003 and that he 

met with Bartlett, Ryan, and Armstrong at that time. He said that none of the 

three reported witnessing or being aware of any allegations of prisoner abuse at 

Abu Ghraib. He also said that he believed the men would have told him about 

abuse allegations had they been aware of them. 

 VIII. OIG CONCLUSIONS 

As detailed above, ICITAP recruited the members of the McCotter and 

Bartlett Teams by relying on recommendations provided by the BOP and the 

ACA, and on recommendations received in turn from individuals who had been 

recommended by those organizations. ICITAP managers then selected from 

among this group eight individuals with extensive, high-level corrections 

experience who were willing and available to go to Iraq on relatively short 

notice. Before instructing SAIC to hire these individuals, ICITAP reviewed the 

candidates’ resumes, spoke with them by phone, and eventually met with all of 

them in person during orientation sessions held at ICITAP headquarters. 

In addition, in accordance with Criminal Division policy in effect at the 

time, ICITAP submitted the names of seven of the eight team members to the 

SPS for the required pre-deployment background check. As it routinely did 

with all of its subcontractor positions, ICITAP labeled the positions the men 

would be filling as “low risk” because they would not have access to sensitive 

information or to a government embassy while overseas. Accordingly, the SPS 

conducted an NCIC search on the seven men and granted each a waiver based 

on the results of that check. As discussed above, the only member of the two 

teams who did not undergo any of the required pre-deployment checks was 

Billings. The most likely explanation for this oversight was that ICITAP failed 

to submit Billings’ paperwork to the SPS. However, because a post-deployment 

FBI name check on Billings revealed no disqualifying information, he too likely 

would have received a pre-deployment waiver. 
31

These pre-deployment background checks did not, and were not 

designed to, reveal information such as the allegations contained in the civil 

lawsuits discussed above. Accordingly, ICITAP managers were not aware of 

this information prior to the men’s deployment to Iraq and therefore did not 

take it into account when considering hiring the men for the Iraq program. 

However, it also is unlikely that ICITAP managers would have learned of 

the civil lawsuits even if ICITAP had assigned a higher risk level to the men’s 

positions. Because of time constraints, all subcontractors for the Iraq program 

likely would have been cleared on the basis of a waiver. And, under the 

Criminal Division policy in effect at the time, a waiver could be granted even for 

high-risk positions upon completion of an FBI fingerprint check, employment 

vouchering, a favorable review of security paperwork, and a credit check, none 

of which was likely to reveal the civil lawsuits. 

In May and June 2004, after Senator Schumer raised concerns about 

certain of these individuals, ICITAP conducted a series of post-deployment 

checks on all eight members of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams. Although 

these searches revealed that many of the men had been the subject of civil 

lawsuits resulting from their high-level and long-time service as prison 

administrators, they did not produce information that ICITAP believes was 

sufficient to conclude that any of the men were not qualified to serve as 

subcontractors in Iraq.

The OIG’s review uncovered no connection between any of the men and 

the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Four of the men were not present in the country 

when the abuse took place. And, although the other four visited Abu Ghraib 

periodically during the period the abuse occurred, their visits were sporadic, 

occurred during daylight hours, and were confined primarily to the part of the 

prison under civilian, rather than military, control. None of the men had any 

role in or responsibility for training or supervising the military personnel who 

allegedly perpetrated the abuse. 

Finally, our review found broader weaknesses in the way ICITAP 

conducted background checks on its subcontractors. For example, 

during the course of our review, the OIG learned that ICITAP’s failure to 

subject Billings to the required pre-deployment clearance was not an 

isolated incident. An internal ICITAP review, undertaken during the 

course of the OIG’s review, revealed that during the period September 

2003 through June 2004, ICITAP hired and placed under contract with 

SAIC for the Iraq program dozens of subcontractors who did not have the 

required clearances. Twenty-two of these subcontractors were actually 

deployed to Iraq without clearances. When the OIG learned of this 

problem, we expanded our review to include a broader examination of the 

ICITAP subcontractor clearance process. In the following section, we 

discuss our findings regarding weaknesses in that process. 
32

A. ICITAP Failed to Adequately Train Its Employees Regarding the 

Subcontractor Clearance Process 

As discussed above, a number of ICITAP employees played prominent 

roles in the subcontractor clearance process. ICITAP program analysts had 

primary responsibility for ensuring that the security paperwork was completed 

and provided to the SPS. In addition, they also made the initial determination 

regarding subcontractor risk levels. ICITAP managers were charged with 

overseeing the analysts’ work, and all Requests for Clearances required 

managers’ signatures. Although ICITAP did not formally assign responsibility 

for the subcontractor clearance process to its Section Security Officer, both 

Policy 60-3 and SPS practice gave the Section Security Officer a role in the 

process. 

Despite the vital role played by ICITAP employees in the clearance 

process, neither ICITAP nor the SPS had a formal program in place to train 

ICITAP employees regarding their roles and responsibilities. Instead, new 

program analysts were trained on the job by co-workers who themselves had 

never received formal training. For example, the program analyst hired in May 

2003 for the Iraq program told the OIG that the only instruction he received 

regarding the clearance process came in the form of on-the-job training from 

his fellow analysts. Several other ICITAP program analysts we spoke to 

confirmed that they too had received no formal training regarding 

subcontractor background checks. 

Similarly, ICITAP employees who were assigned the collateral duty of 

Section Security Officer also were expected to learn on the job. The individual 

who served as ICITAP Section Security Officer during much of the Iraq program 

told the OIG that when he began the position in October 2003, he was handed 

a briefing packet that made no mention of subcontractor clearances and had a 

short conversation with his predecessor regarding her understanding of the 

Section Security Officer duties. 

The lack of training also meant that ICITAP employees generally were 

unfamiliar with Policy 60-3 and unaware of its guidance regarding how to 

assess the risk associated with subcontractor positions. Both Iraq program 

analysts and the ICITAP Section Security Officer told the OIG that they were 

unaware of Policy 60-3 until June 2004, when the SPS held a briefing on the 

policy for all ICITAP staff. Consequently, ICITAP inappropriately relied solely 

on the Request for Clearance to make risk determinations. But because the 

form only asked about the access the subcontractor would have to national 

security information and to embassies, it did not result in an adequate 

consideration of the risk associated with ICITAP subcontractor positions. For 

example, ICITAP did not consider the level of authority and responsibility the 

corrections subcontractors would be exercising in Iraq. Had it done so, we 
33

believe that ICITAP would have concluded that the risk level associated with 

many subcontractor positions – such as those filled by the McCotter and 

Bartlett Teams – was more than minimal. We believe that the subcontractors 

should not have been universally labeled “low risk,” but instead should have 

received a risk assessment commensurate with their duties. 

We also fault the SPS for not updating the Request for Clearance when 

Policy 60-3 was issued in 2002. Its failure to do so left users of the form with 

the mistaken impression that the factors listed in it were the only ones relevant 

to proper risk determination. We also believe that given their familiarity with 

Policy 60-3, SPS managers should have questioned ICITAP’s universal low-risk 

designation for all its subcontractors much earlier. 

Finally, we also believe that the practice of allowing universal waivers for 

all ICITAP subcontractors without written requests or justification from ICITAP 

was inconsistent with Policy 60-3. We understand that the nature of ICITAP’s 

operations may require that waivers frequently be granted in order to ensure 

that overseas programs are staffed on a timely basis. Nevertheless, we believe 

that in such circumstances, ICITAP should be required to submit written 

justification in accordance with the requirements of 60-3. 

B. ICITAP Lacked Written Standard Operating Procedures For the 

Clearance Process 

Compounding the lack of training was an absence of standard written 

procedures regarding the background check process. Without written 

guidance, each ICITAP program analyst was left to develop his or her own 

processes and procedures for handling security packets; for delivering the 

packets to the SPS; and for communicating with the SPS about the status of 

the packets, with no standardization among the various ICITAP programs. 

Thus, some ICITAP analysts carefully handled and tracked the security packets 

of the subcontractor candidates for their programs, while others were less 

diligent about the process. 

The lack of written procedures also meant there was nothing in writing 

instructing the analysts not to deploy subcontractors unless and until they had 

received affirmative clearance from the SPS. In the absence of such a written 

instruction, some analysts incorrectly concluded that once they delivered a 

security packet to the SPS, their responsibility for the clearance process was 

complete. These analysts operated under the view that no news was good news 

and, if they did not hear from the SPS regarding a particular subcontractor, 

they assumed clearance had been granted and therefore allowed the individual 

to be deployed. Because, as discussed below, the recordkeeping and 

communication practices between ICITAP and the SPS were deficient, this 

assumption inevitably led to the deployment of subcontractors whom the SPS 

had not cleared. 
34

Indeed, in January 2004, the COTR for the SAIC contract recognized that 

ICITAP was apparently allowing subcontractors to deploy without the 

appropriate clearances and sent a series of e-mails to over 30 ICITAP program 

analysts and managers reminding them of ICITAP’s responsibility to ensure 

that all subcontractors were cleared by the SPS prior to deployment. In one of 

these e-mails, the COTR explicitly stated that “the [subcontractors] must be 

cleared by our security BEFORE they begin their travel/work – just turning the 

paperwork in is not sufficient. This means you need affirmative confirmation 

from security of the individual’s clearance before sending them out and before

they engage in any work activity for us.” The COTR’s message was reiterated in 

a follow-up e-mail from Steven Parent, the Criminal Division’s Executive 

Officer, who wrote “I cannot overstate how important it is to have all security 

clearances in place before subcontractors undertake any work for us. I am 

asking all involved to ensure strict adherence to this requirement.” 

Unfortunately, despite these e-mails, subcontractors without proper 

clearances once again were deployed to Iraq in the spring of 2004. 

Consequently, on May 28, 2004, the COTR again e-mailed ICITAP analysts and 

managers, this time imposing a requirement he hoped would prevent further 

improper deployments. He wrote: “To install a single check point for ensuring 

subcontractors are fully cleared before beginning work, COTR approval now 

requires [Statements of Work]/Delivery Orders be submitted with physical 

documentation from security indicating the individual designated in the 

[Statement of Work] has been cleared at the sensitivity level required for tasks 

associated with that [Statement of Work]. This documentation must be an 

attachment to each [Delivery Order] package when submitted to the COTR in 

order for it to be a complete package and can not be processed for SAIC action 

without [it].” 

The OIG asked the COTR about his May 2004 e-mail and the 

requirement it imposed that written proof of clearance accompany each 

Statement of Work. He said that he believed the procedure was working to 

prevent further improper deployments but also indicated that he viewed it as 

an interim measure that should be followed by the adoption of a more formal 

procedure. As of the date of this report, ICITAP has yet to incorporate this 

requirement into any formal procedure. 

C. Both ICITAP and the SPS Failed to Maintain Adequate Records 

Regarding Subcontractor Clearances 

Because Policy 60-3 divides responsibility for subcontractor background 

checks between the SPS and ICITAP, a certain amount of communication 

between the two entities is required. ICITAP must deliver security packets to 

the SPS for each candidate; the SPS must then perform the required check and 
35

notify ICITAP of the results. The OIG’s review revealed that recordkeeping 

regarding these transfers and communications in both ICITAP and the SPS 

were deficient. 

ICITAP program analysts and the Security Specialist told the OIG that 

large numbers of security packets often were delivered to the SPS at one time. 

The Security Specialist said that at times she would return to her office to find 

stacks of security packets sitting on her desk. In one e-mail, she jokingly told 

a co-worker that she thought one ICITAP analyst had “been crawling through 

the overhead pipes and dropping [files] on [her] desk when [she was] not 

looking.” On more than one occasion we saw e-mail traffic between ICITAP 

program analysts and the Security Specialist indicating that the analysts 

believed that packets had been delivered to the SPS (and that therefore 

clearances were being processed) when the Security Specialist had no 

knowledge or record of having received the packets. 

Moreover, ICITAP program analysts often would deliver to the SPS 

security packets just before the subcontractors to whom the packets pertained 

were scheduled to deploy overseas and would request that the Security 

Specialist conduct the necessary checks very quickly. For example, on 

January 7, 2004, an ICITAP program analyst notified the Security Specialist via 

e-mail that he was about to deliver to her 19 security packets for subcontractor 

candidates ICITAP intended to deploy in less than a week. Similarly, in March 

2004, the Security Specialist sent an e-mail to her supervisor stating that 

ICITAP analysts had delivered over 40 packets for a deployment date that was 

to occur in less than a week, and expected her to be able to process the 

packets in no more than 2 days. The Security Specialist told her supervisor 

that she believed it was “imperative that ICITAP be informed of the proper 

procedures and expected turnaround time” for such a large number of packets. 

Such requests not only ensured that there would rarely if ever be time for full 

background checks to be completed before candidates were deployed overseas, 

but also placed pressure on the Security Specialist to work quickly and 

increased the likelihood that mistakes and miscommunications would occur. 

Despite the constant exchange of information between the two offices 

and the obvious need to keep track of the status of individual files, neither 

ICITAP nor the SPS maintained logs tracking packet delivery or clearance 

status. Accordingly, there was no reliable way to track the transfer of security 

packets between the two offices or to check the status of clearance requests. 

Further compounding the problem was the lack of a concrete procedure 

in the SPS for notifying ICITAP when a particular candidate had been cleared. 

As discussed above, the Security Specialist said at the time the Iraq program 

commenced, she notified the ICITAP Section Security Officer of clearances 

either verbally and by e-mail. But even when she began to regularly send 
36

e-mail notifications in May 2004, there did not appear to be a consistent policy 

regarding the personnel to whom the e-mail notification was sent. Sometimes 

notification was sent only to the Section Security Officer, who in turn would 

have to notify the responsible program analyst. Other times, the Security 

Specialist would include the responsible program analyst on her 

communication to ICITAP. Some ICITAP program analysts attempted to make 

up for the uncertainty regarding when and whether they would be notified by 

the SPS by repeatedly e-mailing or otherwise contacting the Security Specialist 

about the status of particular candidates. The need to respond to the regular 

stream of such inquiries often diverted the Security Specialist from the task of 

conducting background checks and further slowed the process. 

 

 D. Steps Taken by ICITAP and the SPS to Improve the 

 Subcontractor Clearance Process 

As noted above, during the course of the OIG’s review, ICITAP learned 

that dozens of subcontractors without the proper clearances had been hired for 

the Iraq program. Following this discovery, ICITAP and SPS managers focused 

their full attention on the subcontractor clearance process and began to 

implement and plan procedures intended to address the weaknesses discussed 

above. In addition, to improve the recruitment and oversight process in the 

corrections area specifically, ICITAP has retained the services of three former 

BOP officials – a former general counsel and a former Assistant Director of the 

Correctional Programs Division, both of whom were hired in the fall of 2004, 

and a former warden, who has been working at ICITAP since February 2004. 

These individuals are currently working at ICITAP headquarters and were hired 

to provide ICITAP with the corrections expertise it lacked at the inception of the 

Iraq program. 

Below we discuss ICITAP’s and the SPS’s actions and plans. We then 

provide our own recommendations for further improvements. 

1. Focus on Policy 60-3 

In June 2004, the SPS re-drafted the Request for Clearance to reflect 

Policy 60-3’s full guidance regarding evaluation of risk, including a recitation of 

the applicable considerations for distinguishing between low-, moderate-, and 

high-risk positions. A copy of the revised form is attached as Exhibit 6. In 

addition, on June 15, 2004, the SPS held a briefing session at ICITAP on Policy 

60-3 and the associated procedures for obtaining subcontractor clearances. 

More than 30 ICITAP managers and staff attended this session. 

As a result of the focus on Policy 60-3 and the ensuing discussions 

between ICITAP and SPS managers, ICITAP is now considering the full panoply 

of criteria contained in Policy 60-3 when making risk determinations for 

subcontractor positions. Consequently, corrections positions generally are 
37

being designated as “moderate risk,” while police positions receive either a 

moderate- or low-risk designation, depending upon the responsibilities 

involved.21 

2. New Procedures within ICITAP 

ICITAP has converted the Section Security Officer position into a full-time 

job with formal responsibility for the subcontractor clearance process and has 

hired an individual for the position who has a background in both military and 

civilian security operations. He began work on February 7, 2005. 

ICITAP recently has taken steps to ensure better tracking and recordkeeping with regard to the status of clearance requests. All ICITAP programs 

are now using some type of computerized database to track clearance requests 

sent to the SPS and to record the SPS’s response. Most ICITAP programs are 

entering data into a new tracking database that was developed specifically for 

this function and that is described in more detail below. The Iraq program had 

been keeping its data in a separate database, but now that a full-time Section 

Security Officer has been hired, ICITAP plans to consolidate all programs into 

one tracking system, which the Section Security Officer will be responsible for 

maintaining. 

At ICITAP’s request, SAIC modified the questionnaire it requires all 

subcontractor candidates to complete to include an inquiry regarding civil 

lawsuits. Candidates are now asked “Have you ever had a civil suit brought 

against you or been party to any civil rights litigation?” and, if they respond 

affirmatively, to provide information regarding the circumstances, dates, and 

results of the litigation. 

ICITAP personnel also are conducting Google searches on all 

subcontractor candidates. Any “hits” are printed out and reviewed by ICITAP 

managers for a determination as to whether the information should be 

considered disqualifying. It is anticipated that responsibility for conducting 

these Google searches will be shifted to the contractor once a new contract is in 

place. ICITAP also requests that the CRD check its records for any pertinent 

information regarding corrections candidates. 

 

ICITAP also has drafted a set of Standard Operating Procedures for the 

subcontractor clearance process. The new Standard Operating Procedures 

contain an explicit statement that no subcontractor may be deployed without 

affirmative clearance from the SPS. The Standard Operating Procedures also 

clearly delineate the role of ICITAP staff in ensuring that appropriate clearances 

 21 Generally, police classroom trainers who will have no managerial, fiscal, or field 

mentoring responsibilities are receiving low-risk designations. 
38

are obtained. We summarize the new Standard Operating Procedures in the 

paragraphs below. 

According to the Standard Operating Procedures, all security paperwork 

completed by a subcontractor candidate (i.e., the Questionnaire, Supplemental 

Questionnaire, and fingerprint cards) will be sent directly to the ICITAP Section 

Security Officer. The Section Security Officer will verify that the security 

packet is complete, assign it a tracking number, and enter it into the 

computerized tracking system. If the paperwork is complete, the Section 

Security Officer will e-mail the program analyst responsible for coordinating the 

subcontractor’s deployment. If it is not complete, the Section Security Officer 

will notify the contractor by memorandum that the packet will not be processed 

until the missing information has been supplied. 

Once the program analyst has been notified by the Section Security 

Officer that the candidate’s paperwork is complete, the program analyst will 

prepare a Request for Clearance and a draft Statement of Work, and provide 

both documents to the Section Security Officer. The Section Security Officer 

will log the receipt of the documents into the tracking system, and route them, 

with the completed security paperwork, to the appropriate Deputy Assistant 

Director or Assistant Director for approval. That individual will review the 

security packet, sign the Request for Clearance, and return the packet to the 

Section Security Officer. 

After confirming that the packet is complete, the Section Security Officer 

will update the tracking system, prepare a transmittal memo, and deliver the 

packet to the SPS. SPS personnel will sign the transmittal memo, maintain a 

copy, and return the original to the Section Security Officer. 

If the necessary background checks are satisfactory, the SPS will send an 

e-mail to the ICITAP Section Security Officer stating that the subcontractor has 

been cleared for deployment. The Section Security Officer then will forward a 

copy of that e-mail to the appropriate program analyst and Deputy Assistant 

Director or Assistant Director, log the date of the e-mail into the tracking 

system, and retain a printed copy. The analyst then will prepare for the 

subcontractor’s deployment. 

If, however, the SPS discovers information that prevents the granting of a 

clearance, it will notify the Section Security Officer of the issue and inform the 

Section Security Officer whether the issue can be resolved and, if so, what 

information is necessary to resolve it. If the SPS determines that an issue 

cannot be resolved with additional information, clearance will not be granted 

and the process will end there. In either case, the Section Security Officer will 

log the information received from the SPS into the tracking system and notify 

the appropriate Assistant Director of the problem. 
39

For potentially resolvable issues, the Section Security Officer will attempt 

to obtain the required information from the candidate and will share the 

information received with the relevant Assistant Director. If the Assistant 

Director believes the additional information adequately resolves the issue and 

wishes to proceed with the clearance and hiring process, the Section Security 

Officer will prepare a letter of support for the Assistant Director’s signature, 

and transmit it to the SPS for review. The SPS then makes a determination to 

either grant or deny clearance, and notifies the Section Security Officer, who in 

turn notifies the Assistant Director. If clearance is denied, ICITAP will look for 

a new candidate for the position. 

3. New Procedures in the SPS 

The SPS has also instituted new procedures pursuant to which it now 

records in a written log all security packets delivered by ICITAP. In addition, in 

October 2004, the SPS’s staff was expanded to include two new Personal 

Security Assistants who are employed on a contract basis, paid for with ICITAP 

funds, and dedicated to working on ICITAP clearance requests. Along with 

performing the background checks required by Policy 60-3, the Personal 

Security Assistants also are running searches on all subcontractor candidates 

in the LexisNexis case and news databases, as well as conducting PACER 

searches on one in every 50 candidates.22 In addition, on a test basis, the SPS 

is conducting searches using a new LexisNexis product called Accurint. 

According to Accurint’s website, this database provides users with access to 

information concerning bankruptcy, criminal records, and civil court cases. 

According to Gary Llewellyn, a decision may be made to replace the other 

LexisNexis and the PACER searches with this tool, depending on how it 

performs. As with the Google searches mentioned above, the SPS expects to 

shift the burden of performing these searches to the new contractor. 

Finally, like ICITAP, the SPS has developed a computerized database to 

track clearance requests.23 The database fields include basic demographic 

information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, as well as 

the clearance access level, employee type (contractor or federal), company, and 

country of assignment. The database also tracks the type of investigation 

conducted (e.g., NCIC, name, fingerprint) and the dates on which clearance 

requests are initiated and completed. 

 22 SPS personnel told the OIG that PACER searches are not be conducted on all 

candidates because the information the searches produce is highly duplicative of that produced 

by the LexisNexis case searches. The periodic searches are being done as a check on the 

LexisNexis process. 

23 Before the new database was up and running, the SPS began tracking clearance 

requests using an Excel spreadsheet. Gary Llewellyn told the OIG that for the time being, he 

has instructed the Personal Security Assistants to continue to enter data regarding security 

packets on the spreadsheet as a backup to the new database. 
40

 

VIIII. OIG RECOMMENDATIONS 

 While we trust that the new processes and procedures discussed above 

will help improve the ICITAP subcontractor clearance process, we believe 

ICITAP should take additional steps regarding its clearance process. 

1. In consultation with SPS, develop and implement a training 

program on the clearance process for all newly hired analysts and 

managers. 

2. In consultation with the SPS, provide annual, mandatory briefings 

for current staff similar to the June 2004 SPS presentation. 

3. In consultation with the SPS, develop and distribute to ICITAP 

managers periodic reports on security packet processing, including 

status and time for completion, as well as percentage incomplete, 

accepted, and rejected. 

4. Ensure that all requests for waivers are made in writing and include 

the reasons justifying the request. In addition, amend the newly 

adopted Standard Operating Procedures to include this 

requirement. 

5. Incorporate the current SAIC inquiry regarding civil lawsuits into an 

ICITAP-required form or otherwise take adequate steps to ensure 

that the question is asked of all candidates, whether they are 

recruited by the contractor or by ICITAP directly, and that the 

inquiry continues to be part of the process once a new contract is 

awarded. 

6. Require the new contractor to develop a web page for subcontractor 

candidates that details the risk assessment and security approval 

process and makes available for downloading the required security 

paperwork. 

7. Formalize the requirement that written documentation of clearance 

status accompany all Statements of Work submitted for the COTR’s 

signature and ensure that this requirement is referenced and 

explained in the new Standard Operating Procedures. 

8. In cooperation with the SPS, track and review for a 6-month period 

the type of information that is being produced as a result of the 

Google, LexisNexis, PACER, and Accurint searches, and thereafter 

conduct a cost-benefit analysis of continuing to conduct the various 

searches. As part of this assessment, ICITAP should consider 
41

whether distinctions should be made among candidates based both 

on their backgrounds and on the type of position they will fill. For 

example, it may be appropriate to more closely scrutinize the 

backgrounds of candidates who are being considered for high-profile 

or longer-term assignments like those undertaken by the members 

of the McCotter and Bartlett Teams, as well as those candidates 

who have served as high-level administrators during their careers. 

9. Ensure that all candidates are informed about which searches will 

be performed as part of the background clearance process. 

10. Draft and adopt clear guidance regarding how the searches are to 

be performed and what types of information will be considered 

disqualifying. 

11. In order to create a pool of readily available candidates for ICITAP 

programs and to simplify the clearance process, create and 

maintain, or require the contractor to create and maintain, a 

database of subcontractors who have received security clearances. 
42

Exhibit 1a: ICITAP Organizational Chart 
43

Exhibit 1b: Office of Administration Organizational Chart 
44

Exhibit 2: Criminal Division Administrative Policy Memorandum 60-3 
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Exhibit 3: Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions 
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

 Supplemental Questionnaire for Selected Positions 
67

FBI Fingerprint Cards, FD-258 
68

Exhibit 4: Request for Subcontractor Clearance (1998) 
69

Exhibit 5a: Photograph of Abu Ghraib Cell Block Prior to Reconstruction
70

Exhibit 5b: Photograph of Abu Ghraib Cell Block After Reconstruction 

 
71

Exhibit 6: Request for Subcontractor Clearance (2004) 
72