IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-01476-SCT TRACY MARIE MILES WILLIAMS

v. BRENT REID WILLIAMS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/01/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. VICKI B. DANIELS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: L. ANNE JACKSON LEIGH ANN DARBY JERRY W ESLEY HISAW LUTHER PUTNAM CRULL, JR. VANESSA W I NKLER PRICE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: DeSOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JERRY W ESLEY HISAW VANESSA W I NKLER PRICE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LUTHER PUTNAM CRULL, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/17/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., MAX W ELL AND BEAM, JJ. BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This appeal and cross-appeal arise f rom a judgm e nt o f d ivorce in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. At the trial of this m atter, the chancellor granted Brent and Tracy W illiam s

an irrecon c ilable-dif

f erences divorce and resolved the issues upon which the parties could

not agree. At issue in the d irect appeal is (1) whether the chancellor erred by not p roviding Tracy a s e t v i s i t a tion schedule with their teenage son, (2) whether the chancellor erred in requiring Tracy t o pay child support, (3) whether the c h ancellor erred in t he v aluation of theW i lliam s’s business interests, and (4) whether the chancellor erred in f inding an a irplane and

a boat to be m arital property

. On cross-appeal, the issue i s whether t he chancellor erred by

not ordering Tracy to m a ke m onthly pay m e n ts to Brent on his $1 m illion judgm ent award. Finding n o m erit to the a ssignme n t s o f error on appeal o r cross-appeal, we af f irm the judgm ent of

the chancery

court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Brent a nd T racy m arried on March 5, 1 993, and s eparated on Septem ber 1, 2013. The parties had three children, two of wh o m a r e e ma n cipated. The y oungest c hild, Kendall
W i lliam s, was f

o urteen y ears old at the beginning of this m atter and s eventeen y ears old by the tim e the chancellor r

uled. A t present, he is eighteen y ears old, attending IMG Academ y ,

an advanced m

ulti-sport and educational i nstitution in Bradenton, F lorida, and is not living with either parent. ¶3. On October 3, 2013, Brent f iled his c om

plaint f o r divorce. Discovery ensued, and the

m atter was u ltim ately tried over the course o f f ive day s on January 9, 2015, May 8, 2015, July 2, 2015, August 31, 2015, and October 15, 2015. The chancellor r uled f rom the bench on January

9, 2017, and entered the judgm ent of divorce on February

1, 2017. ¶4. On February 9, 2017, Tracy f iled a m otion to alter or am end the judgm ent, and Brent f iled a response and counter-m otion the f ollowing day

. On October 2, 2017, the chancellor denied the post-trial m o tions. Aggrieved, Tracy now appeals to t his Court, and B r ent crossappeals. LAW AND ANALYSIS

2I. Standard of Review

¶5. “This Court will not disturb a chancellor’s judgm ent when supported by substantial evidence unless the c hancellor abused his discretion, w as m anif estly wrong, clearly

erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Chapel v. C h apel , 876 So. 2d 290, 292 ( Miss. 2004) ( quoting Townsend v. Townsend , 859 So. 2d 370, 3 71-72 (Miss. 2003)). Under this standard of review, our purpose i s t o d eterm ine whether t he chancellor’s ruling

was supported b y credible e vidence, not whether w e a g ree with that ruling. Lee v . Lee , 798 So. 2d 1284, 1290 (Miss. 2001). “However, we review the chancellor’s interpretation and application of the law de novo.” Marshall v. Gipson Steel, Inc. , 806 So. 2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2002) (citing In re Will of Carney , 758 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (Miss. 2000)).
II. Whether the chancellor erred by not providin g T racy a set visitation schedule. ¶6. “The chancellor has b road discretion when determ ining a ppropriate visitation and the lim itations thereon.” Harrington v. Harrington , 648 So. 2d 543, 545 (Miss. 1994) (citing White v . Thom pson , 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990)). “W h en the c h a ncellor determ ines visitation, he m

ust k eep the b est interest of the child as his p aram ount concern while alway s being attentive t o the rights of the non-custodial p arent, recognizing the need t o m aintain a healthy , loving relationship b etween the n on-custodial p arent and his child.” Id. A t the trial of this m atter, the chancellor ruled,
Mom c an have visitation with the c h ild to be agreed upon between Mom and the child. The Dad i s ordered not to interf ere with the visitation, b u t, a s I stated earlier, M om ’s actions and her continued actions and interf erence with th i s c h i l d h a v e c aused this alienation. It is n ot Dad’s f ault, and so, I a m not

3placing a b u r d e n – I’m not giving y ou a specif ic visitation s chedule because I’m not placing a burden on Dad to m ake this child visit. ¶7. Tracy argues that the chanc e l l o r e r r e d by allowing a child to set visitation at his discretion. W hile the chancellor acknowledged t hat h e r r u l i ng on visitation was dif f erent f rom her norm al practice, she f ound that K endall’s desires a nd wishes s hould be taken into consideration. Trial r evealed that Tracy had r em oved Kendall’s possessions, f urniture, and rif le f rom the m arital hom e, as well as h is m oney jug containing $800. The court f ound that Kendall had viewed his m other’s actions as a p ersonal af f ront. T r acy ref

used to provide Kendall the necessary docum entation to com plete driver’s education, to receive a passport

so h e could travel outside the United States with the USA baseball t eam , or to transf er f rom Magnolia Heights School to a DeSoto County school f o r better baseball opportunities. The chancellor stated, “Quite honestly , I think she’s done som e things that I think indicate that she’s m uch m ore i nterested i n getting her own way t han in thinking about what’s in the best interest of

her child.” ¶8. Tracy correctly s tated that this Court has m ade it clear that the objective of visitation is that “the non-custodial p arent

. . . and child should have as close a nd loving a relationship

as possible, despite the f

act that they

m ay not live in the sam e house.” D unn v. Dunn , 609 So. 2 d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1 992) ( citing C lark v. Myrick , 5 23 S o. 2 d 79, 8 3 ( M i ss. 1999)). However, this C ourt h a s also f ound that, while a non-custodial parent is presum ptively entitled to visitation a s stated i n Griffin v. Griffin , that presum ption can be overcom e when “substantial evidence” j ustif ies doing so. Griffin v

. Griffin , 237 So. 3d 743, 7 47 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Cox v. Mounds , 490 So. 2d 8 66, 8 70 (Miss. 1986)). Cf

. N ewsom v. Newsom , 557

4So. 2d 511, 517 (Miss. 1990) (em phasis rem oved) ( holding “that the chancery court has the
power to restrict visitation in circum stances which present an a p preciable danger of hazard cognizable in our law”). ¶9. In G

riffin , the chancellor denied a m other visitation with her f our daughters because visitation was not in the c hildren’s best interests. Griffin , 237 So. 3d at 745-46. T he m other

was i ncarcerated in the W ashington County C orrectional Facility in Greenville, M ississippi, f our h ours away f

rom where the daughters lived. Id. In order to exercise visita t i o n , the daughters would have to be searched and exposed to the prison e n v i r o n me nt. Id. The chancery court held that the presum ption of visitation h ad b een overcom e. I d. at 746. “The chancellor considered N olana’s circum stances and deem ed phone visitation, f o r now , and possible f

uture in-person visitatio n at Chad’s discretion was the best possible balance b etween recognizing N olana’s constitutionally protected rights, encoura g i n g t h e p a r e n t

- c h i l d relationships, and protecting the girls’ best interest.” Id. a t 7 49 (citing Harrington , 648 So. 2d at 545). On appeal, this Court af f i rm ed the chancellor’s ruling. ¶10. Although the f

acts of this case d if

f er, the principle that a p resum ption of v isitation can be overcom e with suf

f i cient evidence rem ains t he sam e. Kendall is eighteen y e a rs old and is living i n Florida to pursue his baseball career. Although the chancellor had only becom e

aware of Kendall’s new schooling in Florida just b e f o re her ruling, the knowledge did not change her m ind about visitation. She stated, And there is a huge big rif t to heal. And I know f

orcing him to com e to y o ur house every other weekend – which y ou ca n ’ t d o because he’s living in Florida, any

way – is not going to f

ix t hat situation. And I w ant y ’all to f igure

5out som e way – y ou know, as I said, m ay be this tim e and distance will help f ix it. ¶11. Based on the f

acts presented at trial, this Court f inds that the chancellor did not err in declining to set a visitation schedule under t hese unique circum stances. G i v e n t he broad def erence af f orded chancellors in visitation m atters, we af f irm the chancellor’s ruling. Tracy and Brent can travel to Florida any tim e to support and to visit K endall while he pursues his baseball dream s. III. Whether the chancellor erred in requiring Tracy to p ay child support. ¶12. “This Court has said that an award of child support is a m atter within the discretion of the chancellor a nd that determ inati o n w i l l not be reversed u nless the chancellor was

m anif estly wrong i n his f

inding of f

act or m anif

estly abused h is discretion.” C l a u sel v. Clausel , 714 So. 2d 265, 266 (Miss. 1998) (quoting G illespie v. Gillespie , 594 So. 2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1 992)). Fur t h e r mo r e , “[ t]he process of w eighing e vidence and arriving a t an award of c h i ld s upport is essentially an exercise in f a ct-f inding, which custom arily signif icantly restrains this Court’s review.” Id. at 266-67. ¶13. At the trial of this m atter, Tracy alleged her adjusted gross incom e w as $1,010.87 in her Unif orm Chancery Court Rule 8.05 f inancial statem ent, so $1,000 in child support would

consum e all of her incom e . T r a c y owns a day c are, K aco’s Kids, and, according to the tax

r e t urns adm itted into e vidence at the trial, Tracy ’s 2 013 self -em ploy m ent earnings w e r e $152,090; her gross earnings were $242,763 per y ear, or $20,230.25 per m onth, in 2013. She testif i ed that she p aid over $15,000 to pay of f the not e on Tennessee property that she and

6Brent owned. She purchased a new hom e in October 2015. S he ref used to allow Brent to sell tim ber on the Tennessee property in order to pay the Tennessee’s property ’s rem aining debt and instead paid the note herself

. Tracy ’s daughter Kaitly

n t estif ied that Tracy told her she had purchased an airplane and a boat. ¶14. W h ile the s tandard f or child support f

or one c h ild is 14 percent of the adjusted gross inc o m e, pursuant to Mississippi C ode Section 43-19-101 (Rev. 2015), a court m ay im pute incom e to a pay o r whose reported incom e is clearly inadequate to support his or her actual lif esty le. S ee Deborah H. Bell, D eborah H

. Bell on Family Law § 10.04[ 4][ c] (1st ed. 2005).
In Dunn v Dunn , on rem and, a chancellor f ound that a f

a ther was not being honest about his ability t o p ay child support. Dunn v Dunn , 695 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (Miss. 1 997). “The record ref lects circum stances w hich do substantiate doubts a bout Michael’s inability to pay . . . his willingness to partake i n various e ntertainm ent activities

. . . .” Id. This Court af f irm ed the ruling of the chancellor, b ecause the child support am ount e xceeded the statutory guidelines. Id. ¶15. The Court in Dunn analogized Grogan v. Grogan , in which this Court had held that

a c h ild-support a ward i n excess of the statutory g uidelines is appropriate when the chancellor is unsure about the f

ather’s true earning potential. Dunn , 695 So. 2d at 1 157 ( citing Grogan

v. Grogan , 641 So. 2d 734, 741 (Miss. 1994)). The G r ogan Court had f

ound t h a t the chancellor did not err in im p uting incom e t o the f

ather when evidence showed that he was not being truthf

ul about his f

inances. Id.

7¶16. Here, the chancellor f ound that “Mom is obviously

. . . s he is m aking quite a great deal of m oney .” Based on the evidence, t he record does not support her c l aim t hat her adjustedgross incom e is $ 1 ,010.87; theref ore, the chancellor p roperly im p uted additional incom e to Tracy

. ¶17. Tracy m akes other a rgum ents t o contest the child-support award, but this Court f inds these are without m erit. Tracy argues that Kendall h as no e xpenses. Although Kendall has

a f ull s cholarship to a ttend I MG Academ y , which costs $ 78,000 a y ea r , B r e nt is still responsible f

or $4,600 of K endall’s other expenses, and the court f o u n d t h a t Tracy should contribute. From

the date Brent and Tracy separated, Tracy has not paid any child support f or Kendall. Tracy argues that child support can b e suspended during college a nd/or f orf eited due t o the child’s conduct; however, the chancellor already determ i ned that Tracy would not be required to pay half of the college expenses if t he child does not have a viable relationship with her. The Court is unpersuaded by Tracy ’s a ttem pt t o argue that she needs

a v isitation schedule while sim ultaneously arguing she s h ould not have to support the child who does not want t o visit her. Accordingly , the chancellor did not e r r in requiring Tracy to
pay child support in the am ount of $1,000 per m onth.
IV. Whether t he chancellor erred in the valuation o f t h e W i lliam s ’s business interests. ¶18. Tracy a rgues that the chancellor erred in t h e v a l u a t ion of the W illiam s’s business interests by using Brent’s subm itted docum ents; however, she f a i led to of

f e r any evidence

at trial related to the valuations. The chancellor requested that the parties subm i t a list of the assets, values, and d ebts on two separate occasions. At trial, Tracy f a iled to list or value the

8a s s e t s of the businesses, while Brent subm itted a detailed list. Tracy ’s f inancial statem ent listed the value of h er day care, Kaco’s Kids, a s u n known. Further, Tracy argues that the chancellor erred by n o t appointing an expert to opine about the true current valuations of the propert y d u e t o d epreciation, although Tracy never requested that the Court appoint an expert. ¶19. W h ile we note that “ expert testim ony m ay be essential to e stablish valuation suf f icient

to equitably divide property , p articularly when t h e a s s e t s a re diverse

. . . ,” Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994), we also recognize and “reiterate the principle that f indings on valuation do not re q u i r e e x p ert testim ony and m ay be accom plished by adopting the values c ited in the parties’ 8.05 f inancial d isclosures, i n t he t estim ony , or in other evidence.” Horn v

. Horn , 909 So. 2d 1 151, 1165 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Ward v. Ward , 825 So. 2d 713, 719 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). ¶20. Here, the record r ef lects tha t o n l y B rent a ttem p ted to provide t he c hancellor with evidence regarding the valuations of the parties’ business interests, and the chancellor used those valuations as ref

lected in her opinion. Tracy ’s argum ent t hat the chancellor com m itted reversible error by n o t a p p ointing experts to appraise the current v aluations due to depreciation is without m erit. T his Court ref u ses to blam e the chancellor f or a p arty ’s f

ailure to present suf

f icient evidence of property v aluation. Faced with sim ilar circum stances, we stated the f

ollowing in Dunaway v. Dunaway : It is our conclusion that the chancellor, f aced with proof f

rom b oth parties t hat was som ething less than ideal, m ade valuation judgm ents that f ind som e evidentiary support in the record. To the extent that the evidence on which the chancellor based his opinion was l ess i nf orm ative than it could have been, we
9lay tha t a t t h e f eet of the litigants and not the chancellor. T he chancellor appears t o have f

ully explore d t h e available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could, and we can discover no abuse o f discretion in those ef f orts that would require us to reverse his valuation determ inations.
D u naway v. D unaway , 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). As explained i n Dunaway , the c hancellor’ s duty is not to obtain appraisals of the m arital property

. Id. Further, the Dunawa

y court f ound that, while expert testim ony about property v aluations

m ight be helpf

ul in som e cases, it is not r e q u i r e d , a n d t he chancellor m ay consider other evidence presented by the parties. Id. ¶21. T r a c y d i d n o t com e f orth with e xpert testim ony o r any o ther valuat i o n s o f t h e businesses; theref

ore, the chancellor used the available proof , including Brent’s valuations,

a n d a r r i ved at the best conclusion that she could. Accordingly , this Court f ind s t h e chancellor did not err in the valuation of the W i lliam s’s business interests.
V. Whether the chancellor erred in finding the boat and airplane to be m arital property . ¶22. “W hen the parties request that the chancellor resolve the issue of property division, the c hancellor m

ust do three things: (1) classif y the parties’ assets as m arital or separate, (2) value t hose assets, a nd (3) divide the m arital assets equitably .” Burnham v . B urnham , 185 So. 3d 3 58, 361 (Miss. 2015) ( citing Wheat v. Wheat , 37 So. 3d 632, 637 ( Miss. 2010)). In Hem sley v. Hem sley , this Court held that “ [a ] s s e t s acquired o r accum ulated during the course of a m arriage are s ubject to equita b l e division u nless i t can be shown by proof that such

assets are attributable to one of the parties’ separate estates prior to the m arriage or outside the m arriage.” Hem sley v. H em sley , 6 39 So. 2 d 909, 9 14 (Miss. 1994). Ferguson

1 0established that gif ts and inheritances received d uring m a rriage are separate property

. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 929. ¶23. Tracy argued that the chancellor erred in ruling t hat the boat and airplane are m arital property because her m other gave her a g if t o f m o ney in the f

o rm of a Certif

icate of Deposit that she later c ashed t o purchase the boat and airplane; theref ore, Tracy claim s the boat and airplane were gif

ts o r inheritances. The chancellor was unconvinced. At t rial, Tracy testif ied that her m other wanted to leave her som ething b ef o re she died, s o she used her m other’s cash

to buy the airplane. However, Tracy ’s daughter Kaitly n testif i ed that Tracy

originally

told her that she had purchased the p lane and the boat but that s h e t h e n “changed her tune and said that the plane w as bought by her m other and that it was really her m other’s.” Kaitly n f urther testif

ied that her grandm other does not h ave a lot o f m oney . Tracy did not call her

m other to testif

y to verif y her testim ony or to introduce any s upporting docum ents. A chancellor’s f

indings of f

act will not be disturbed unless m anif estly wrong o r c l e a rly

erroneous. Sanderson v . Sanderson , 824 So. 2d 623, 6 25-626 (Miss. 2 0 0 2 ) (citations

om itted). This Court holds that the chancellor’s f i ndings of

f act are not erroneous. VI. W h e t h er the chancellor erred in failing to order Tracy to m ak e m onthly pay m e nts on the $1 m illion judgm ent. ¶24. During the m arriage, Tracy ran a day care, and Brent ran a construction com pany . The chancellor, in distributing the assets, awarded each party their individual b usinesses. Due
to an inequality in the value of the assets, h owever, the chancellor granted Brent a j udgm ent and l ien against Tracy ’ s b usiness f or $1 m ill i o n a t 2 p e rcent interest that would not be executed upon f

or ten y ears.

1 1¶25. On appeal, Brent argues t h a t h a v i ng to wait t en y ears to execute on the judgm ent

places him in the position of having a right w ithout a rem edy , thus his chances o f ever receiving the judgm ent are nonexistent without a p resent right to collect or enf orce pay m ent. The chancellor, considering the im m e nse debt and absence o f liquid assets i n Kaco’s Kids, f ound that Tracy could not b egin pay i ng on the judgm ent. F u r t her, allowing Brent to im m ediately

execute on the judgm ent would f orce Kaco’s Kids into liquidation. ¶26. For a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y on the $1 m illion judgm ent in t he interim , the chancellor ordered that Tracy m aintain Brent as t he nam ed benef iciary on her $1 m illion l if e-insurance policy

. The chancellor stated, “If she pay s som ething d own on the judgm ent that h e has, then

as the b a l a n c e r e d u c es owed to Brent then, l ikewise, the am ount of lif e insurance that y ou have to keep on y our lif

e will go down.” W ithout an abuse of discretion, m a n if est error, or application of a n erroneous legal standard, t his Court will n ot disturb the chancellor’s f indings and, as such, af

f irm s the chancellor’s ruling.

CONCLUSION ¶27. This Court holds that the c hancellor’s ruling o n all f ive issues in the a

ppeal and crossappeal a re supported by credible evide n c e a nd, given the broad def e r ence af f orded chancellors, this Court af f irm s the chancellor’s ruling. ¶28. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, C OLEMA N , MAX W ELL, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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