UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 0:20-CV-61007-SINGHAL/VALLE

SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a

MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, on behalf of 

itself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELAP SERVICES, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited 

liability company, and GROUP & PENSION 

ADMINISTRATORS, INC., a Texas corporation,

 Defendants.

______________________________________________/

PLAINTIFF SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 

CLASS CERTIFICATION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

The Florida Emergent Class........................................................................................................ 3

The Florida Nonemergent Class ................................................................................................. 3

The Nationwide Issue Class........................................................................................................ 4

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 4

.................... 4

ELAP Automatically Reprices All Claims at Issue .................................................................... 5

Every Step of ELAP’s Claims Administration Is Similarly Uniform and Automated ............... 6

ELAP Uniformly Protects Patients from “Balance Billing”....................................................... 7

ELAP Deceives Hospitals for Both Emergency and Non-Emergency Services ........................ 7

............... 9

ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 9

I. MEMORIAL SATISFIES THE FOUR PREREQUISITES OF RULE 23(A)................. 10

A. The Putative Classes Satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s Numerosity Requirement.............. 10

B. Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes Satisfy the Commonality Requirement.................... 10

C. Memorial’s Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class................................................... 14

D. Memorial and Its Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class Interests. .. 14

1. Memorial Does Not Have Interests Antagonistic to the Rest of the Class. ................ 15

2. Memorial’s Counsel Are Exceedingly Qualified and Capable................................... 15

II. MEMORIAL SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(b)............................. 16

A. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate Because Legal and Factual Questions 

Will Be Resolved with Proof Common to Memorial and the Classes. ........................... 17

 FDUTPA................................................................................................................................... 18

Unjust Enrichment .................................................................................................................... 19

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B. A Class Action Would Be Superior to the Adjudication of Individual Claims. ............. 21

1. Individual class members’ interest in separate actions and the extent and nature of 

litigation already commenced ..................................................................................... 21

2. Difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action................. 22

C. The Court Should Certify a Rule 23(b)(2) Class for Injunctive Relief. .......................... 23

III. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY A NATIONWIDE ISSUE CLASS ON 

MEMORIAL’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM. ....................................................... 24

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,

521 U.S. 591 (1997)............................................................................................................ 10, 17

Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc.,

302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. 2014)............................................................................................... 17

Baycare Health Sys., Inc. v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co.,

2008 WL 792061 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2008) ........................................................................... 18

Begley v. Acad. Life Ins. Co.,

200 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ga. 2001)............................................................................................... 24

Belin v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc.,

337 F.R.D. 544 (S.D. Fla. 2021)......................................................................................... 11, 14

Bowe v. Pub. Storage,

318 F.R.D. 160 (S.D. Fla. 2015)............................................................................................... 19

Brown v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.,

817 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 20

Carriuolo v. General Motors Co.,

23 F.3d 977 (2016).............................................................................................................. 18, 21

CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Broad & Cassel,

773 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................ 21

Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp.,

213 F.R.D. 484 (S.D. Fla. 2003)................................................................................... 10, 14, 16

Fam. Heritage Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,

319 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)......................................................................................... 18

Green v. Wolf Corp.,

406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968)...................................................................................................... 23

Herrera v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship,

648 F. App’x 930 (11th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 17

Holzman v. Malcolm S. Gerald & Assocs., Inc.,

334 F.R.D. 326 (S.D. Fla. 2020)............................................................................................... 14

IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. ELAP Servs., LLC,

2018 WL 4688358 (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2018)............................................................................ 21

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In re 1 Glob. Cap. LLC,

2020 WL 1486791 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2020)............................................................... 14

In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig.,

286 F.R.D. 645 (S.D. Fla. 2012)............................................................................................... 19

In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig.,

275 F.R.D 666 (S.D. Fla. 2011).................................................................................... 11, 17, 18

In re Deepwater Horizon,

739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 25

In re Managed Care Litigation,

209 F.R.D. 678 (2002). ............................................................................................................. 22

In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases,

461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)................................................................................................ 24, 25

In re Subpoena of S. Broward Hosp. Dist., No.,

2022 WL 17583433 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2022) ........................................................................ 16

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Litig.,

220 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla. 2004)............................................................................................... 17

James D. Hinson Elec. Contracting Co. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,

275 F.R.D. 638 (M.D. Fla. 2011)........................................................................................ 14, 20

Klay v. Humana, Inc.,

382 F.3d 1241 (2004)................................................................................................................ 22

Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc.,

2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013)......................................................................... 11

Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc.,

17 F.4th 1084 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................. 18

Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prod. LLC,

896 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................. 23, 25

Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co.,

244 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2017)..................................................................................... 25

Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris,

311 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla. 2015)............................................................................................... 11

Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,

211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 17

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Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Mil. Healthcare Servs., Inc.,

601 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 22

Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,

307 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Va. 2015)............................................................................................... 22

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthapaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC,

315 F. Supp. 3d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2018) ..................................................................................... 19

State, Off. of Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affs. v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc.,

869 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ........................................................................................ 19

Tefel v. Reno,

972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ............................................................................................ 15

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,

577 U.S. 442 (2016).................................................................................................................. 17

Veal v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc.,

236 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Fla. 2006).............................................................................................. 19

Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen,

68 F.R.D. 315 (1996).......................................................................................................... 14, 21

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

564 U.S. 338 (2011)............................................................................................................ 11, 13

Webber v. Bactes Imaging Sols., Inc.,

295 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)......................................................................................... 18

Weidman v. Ford Motor Co.,

2022 WL 1071289 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2022).................................................................... 24, 25

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

280 F.R.D. 665 (S.D. Fla. 2012)......................................................................................... 19, 21

Statutes

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd............................................................................................................... 6, 13

§ 501.211(1), Fla. Stat................................................................................................................... 23

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ........................................................................................................... 9, 10, 16

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)................................................................................................................. 10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)..................................................................................................... 10, 11, 14

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)................................................................................................................. 14

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)........................................................................................................... 14, 15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)................................................................................................................. 9, 16

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)........................................................................................... 9, 10, 16, 23, 25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)..................................................................................... 9, 10, 16, 17, 24, 25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)..................................................................................................... 20, 24, 25

Other Authorities

1 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.24 at 3-133 ................ 16

2 NEWBERG § 4:70 ........................................................................................................................ 21

2 NEWBERG § 4:72 ........................................................................................................................ 22

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INTRODUCTION

This case centers around one issue: ELAP’s uniform and unfair application of a healthcare 

repricing formula that slashes payments to hospitals well below the reasonable value of the 

services provided. ELAP applies its formula, which it calls “Reference-Based Pricing” (“RBP”), 

uniformly across all hospital claims at issue regardless of the nature of the service provided or the 

circumstances of a patient’s treatment. Uniformly and without exception, ELAP reprices all

hospitals’ charges at the greater of 120% of Medicare’s allowed amount or 112% of ELAP’s 

estimated cost for the services and ELAP’s application of RBP results in underpayment to all 

hospitals. Plaintiff South Broward Hospital District (“Memorial”) seeks to recover its own losses 

and pursue relief for other hospitals injured by ELAP’s scheme.

ELAP repriced every claim at issue applying its RBP formula automatically and in the same 

way. Every appeal was subject to identical standard operating procedures resulting in first-level 

denial. ELAP processed second-level appeals in an identical manner and with the same result. 

Third-party claims administrators that contract with ELAP received training to handle hospital

questions and concerns according to a script; ELAP plan members are identically coached not to 

pay bills from hospitals invoicing the unpaid portion of their original bills. When hospitals

continue to pursue payment, ELAP provides members with legal counsel who apply common 

tactics to ensure that the hospital is never paid. Everything about ELAP’s repricing process is 

consistent and unfair and has uniformly impacted every claim at issue in this case.

The arbitrariness of ELAP’s pricing is beyond dispute.

1

See Waters Dep. 29:16-30:10 (Ex. B). An exhibit index is attached as Exhibit A.

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Ultimately, ELAP tailored both formulae to produce equivalent underpayments and 

ensure that hospitals were not fairly compensated. 

No reasonable hospital would voluntarily accept ELAP’s repricing. 

And of course, it never is. For emergency room (“ER”) claims, including those at issue here, 

hospitals are required to treat all patients regardless of insurance, no questions asked. In nonemergent cases, ELAP members present hospitals with identification cards that omit any mention 

of ELAP or RBP. This omission is intentional. 

Finally, classwide damages are readily calculated. In support of damages, Memorial offers 

the opinion of renowned healthcare expert Mark Abernathy, a forensic accountant with more than 

forty years of professional experience in the healthcare field. Mr. Abernathy has not only devised 

a uniform methodology to assess damages across the class, but also calculated the damages owed 

to each class member. No further inquiry—individual or otherwise—will be required at trial.

Memorial seeks certification of three classes with Claims4against ELAP and its cooperating 

third-party administrator (“TPA”), GPA. The first includes Florida hospitals that had ER Claims 

repriced by ELAP, the Florida Emergent Class. These hospitals were required by law to treat ELAP 

members regardless of insurance coverage. ELAP repriced these Claims post-treatment, and 

2

See id. at 32:15-25.

3 Ex. C.

4

“Claims” refers to the claims at issue as identified in Appendix E to the Expert Report of Mark 

Abernathy.

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Memorial alleges that in all instances, these Claims were underpaid. While this first class includes 

Claims administered by Defendant GPA, ELAP’s largest TPA partner by claim volume, it also 

includes Claims administered by every other TPA that worked with ELAP. The class is defined as 

follows:

The Florida Emergent Class:

All hospitals in Florida with emergent Claims for healthcare services 

provided to ELAP plan members within the applicable statute of limitations.

The second class involves non-ER Claims repriced by ELAP and includes all Florida 

hospitals that provided treatment to ELAP members outside the ER during the class period—the 

Florida Nonemergent Class. All members of this class provided services to ELAP members who 

went through the hospital pre-service registration process and received care from the hospital. 

Here, unlike the ER Claims, ELAP’s deceptive admission tactics are at issue because hospitals 

engaged with ELAP members and, if ELAP’s use of RBP had been adequately disclosed, hospitals 

would have denied those members care. Like the first class, this second class includes Claims 

administered by GPA and every other TPA that worked with ELAP. This class is defined as 

follows:

The Florida Nonemergent Class:

All hospitals in Florida with non-emergent Claims for healthcare services 

provided to ELAP plan members within the applicable statute of limitations.

Finally, Memorial seeks certification under Rule 23(c)(4) of a nationwide issue class on its 

unjust enrichment claim, certifying the issue of whether ELAP and GPA have unjustly retained 

benefits realized due to the RBP scheme. Certification of an issue class would resolve the central 

question of Memorial’s and the class’s unjust enrichment claims—whether Defendants’ profits 

arising from the subject business practices were, in fact, unjustly secured—while creating 

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efficiencies for the judiciary and the parties alike. The nationwide issue class is defined as follows:

The Nationwide Issue Class:

On the issue of whether ELAP and GPA unjustly retained benefits realized 

due to their application of RBP, all hospitals nationwide that have Claims 

for providing healthcare services to ELAP plan members within the 

applicable statute of limitations.

This case is ideally suited for class certification. The Court should grant Memorial’s motion.

BACKGROUND

ELAP promotes itself as a company that helps employers with self-funded health insurance 

plans save up to 30% of the healthcare costs that would be imposed by a traditional PPO.5 What 

ELAP does not explain, however—on its website or elsewhere—is that it achieves these savings 

by slashing hospitals’ medical bills far below the reasonable value of the services provided without 

a standing agreement with, prior notice to, or the consent of the hospitals involved. 

See Kelly Dep. 

38:4:18 (Ex. D); Waters Dep. 172: 3-8.

See Expert Report of J. Mark Abernathy (“Abernathy Report”) (Ex. ZZ), at 

Opinion #3 & ¶¶ A-C.

See 

Greenberg Dep. 62:16-19, 83:11-15 (Ex. E). ELAP did not come to this formula through due 

diligence or any manner of research or careful review. 

5 Home page, elapservices.com (last visited on 1/13/2023).

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See Waters Dep. 29:16-30:10.

See id. at 32:15-25.

ELAP designed these arbitrary formulae to undercompensate hospitals. Medicare rates are 

set below the costs of care, resulting in hospital underpayment.6In 2017, for example, Medicare 

paid only 87 cents for every dollar spent by hospitals caring for Medicare patients.7

See Abernathy Report, at § V(A) & 

n.11.

See id. at Opinion 1 & 1(A). 

See id. at § IV pp. 6-7.

ELAP Automatically Reprices All Claims at Issue

See Exs. F-O.8 When a plan member visits the 

6 UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, Am. Hosp. Ass’n (Jan. 2019), 

https://www.aha.org/system/files/2019-01/underpayment-by-medicare-medicaid-fact-sheet-jan2019.pdf. Underpayment occurs when the payment received is less than the reasonable value of 

the healthcare services provided.

7

See id.

8 Exhibits F-O are spreadsheets that ELAP produced to Memorial in native format. These exhibits 

are too large (collectively over 3 GB) to e-file via CM/ECF. Accordingly, Memorial has attached 

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ER for medical treatment, the law requires the hospital to treat the patient without first inquiring 

about insurance coverage or ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd. Accordingly, under these 

circumstances, hospitals have no opportunity pre-service to discover ELAP’s involvement or 

repricing policy.

See Ex. P; Ex. Q at ELAP0117574

See 

Greenberg Dep. 58-60, 62:16-19, 83:11-15.

See id. at 106:22-108:5; Straughan Dep. 

55 (Ex. R); O’Leary Dep. 76:15-21, 174-175, 177:22-178:2 (Ex. S); Exs. Q, T. 

Every Step of ELAP’s Claims Administration Is Similarly Uniform and Automated

See Exs. Q, U-X; O’Leary Dep. 174-175; 177:15-24; 178-183; 296:21-24; 297:1-6. 

See O’Leary 

Dep. 174-175; 177:15-24; 178-183; 296:21-24; 297:1-6.

See id at 199:1-11, 203:7-13; Exs. 

Y, Z. 

See Ex. Y. 

excerpts from each spreadsheet to this Motion as Exhibits F-O, and will file the spreadsheets 

conventionally if required by the Court. 

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See 

Ex. AA; O’Leary Dep. 203:14-205:6; 214:10-220:30; 206:4-7 

See id. at 221:21-222:2; Ex. BB. 

ELAP Uniformly Protects Patients from “Balance Billing”

ELAP policy also prevents hospitals from recovering the balance of the amounts owed them 

from plan members.

See Exs. U, CC, DD.

See Exs. EE, FF. 

See Waters Dep. 180:17-183:11.

See Greenberg Dep. 89:24-90:8.

ELAP Deceives Hospitals for Both Emergency and Non-Emergency Services

ELAP applies the same policies and procedures to ER and non-ER Claims. The only 

distinction is that where plan members present insurance identification cards to hospitals for nonER Claims prior to treatment, ELAP takes additional steps to conceal its involvement in the 

patient’s insurance plan. 

See Ex. Q 

at ELAP0117585; Exs. GG, HH, II.

See Exs. GG at ELAP0088191; HH 

at ELAP0255402, II. See Ex. Q at ELAP0117585. 

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Exs. GG, HH. 

See O’Leary Dep. 131:9-19; Exs. JJ-MM. 

To combat this inevitable hospital pushback, ELAP takes further steps to ensure that no 

reference to ELAP ever appears on a member ID card

Ex. C. This was not an anomaly.

See Ex. LL

 Ex. NN at ELAP0156585 

Ex. OO

 Ex. PP at ELAP0145237 (same); Ex. QQ

See Ex. RR at 

GPA0132520-24 

; Ex. X.

See Leh Dep. (Ex. SS) 22:7-23:21; Ex. TT at ELAP00075549-50; Ex. UU at 

ELAP017038. See Leh Dep. 

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19:10-21 ee Ex. VV

Ex. WW.

See Kelly Dep. 38:10-18. 

See Abernathy Report, at Opinion #3 ¶ A.

See id. ¶ B. 

See id. Tables 10 & 11; Burnett Depo. (Ex. XX) 35:6-15.

See Ex. CCC

See Ex. DDD. Ultimately, Defendants’ profits increase exponentially as 

more members are enrolled, while hospitals like Memorial are paid less.

ARGUMENT

The court may certify a class when (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 

is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the representative 

parties’ claims or defenses are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the class’s interests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 

A representative party must also demonstrate that the class satisfies at least one element of 

Rule 23(b). Here, Memorial seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) and (b)(2). See Am. 

9

See Abernathy Report at n. 47.

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Compl. ¶¶ 146, 181. Rule 23(b)(3) requires a plaintiff to prove that “[c]ommon questions 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and class resolution [is] 

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 

controversy.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997). Rule 23(b)(2) 

certification is appropriate if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 

that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 

is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

I. MEMORIAL SATISFIES THE FOUR PREREQUISITES OF RULE 23(A).

Memorial satisfies Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites—numerosity, commonality, typicality, 

and adequacy of representation—as set forth below. 

A. The Putative Classes Satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s Numerosity Requirement.

Rule 23(a)(1) requires plaintiffs to show that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder 

of all members would be impracticable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class size of “more than 

forty [is] adequate.” Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D. 484, 489-90 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 

Memorial defines two Florida classes and a third, nationwide issue class above. See pp. 3-

4, supra.

See Abernathy Report at 21.

See Exs. F-O.

See id. Plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1).

B. Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes Satisfy the Commonality Requirement.

Rule 23(a)(2) requires class action plaintiffs to identify questions of law or fact common to 

the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “The threshold for commonality is not high[,]” Cheney, 213 

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F.R.D at 490, and the plaintiff’s burden is “light.” Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 311 

F.R.D. 688, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2015). All class members need not have identical legal claims, see Belin

v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., 337 F.R.D. 544, 556 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (Singhal, J.), nor must all

questions of law or fact be common. See Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 2013 WL 5177865, at *2 

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013). “For purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will 

do,” though the question must generate answers that resolve a central issue of each claim in “one 

stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 359 (2011) (cleaned up). 

“Commonality is generally satisfied when a plaintiff alleges that defendants have engaged 

in a standardized course of conduct that affects all class members.” Belin, 337 F.R.D. at 557 

(cleaned up). “[W]here a common scheme of conduct has been alleged, the commonality 

requirement should be satisfied.” In re Checking Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. 666, 673-74 (S.D. 

Fla. 2011).

This litigation gives rise to clear and straightforward common questions because all class 

members’ claims arise from a common scheme

See pp. 5-6, supra.

See Ex. P; Ex. Q at ELAP0117574. 

See 

Greenberg Dep. 58-60, 62:16-19, 83:11-15.

See Abernathy Report at Opinion 1.

See O’Leary Dep. 174:2-7. 

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See id. at 76:15-21, 174-175, 177:22-178:2; Greenberg 

Dep. 89:19-90:11; Ex. W.

Hospitals are not afforded the opportunity to persuade ELAP that they have been underpaid, 

even though they are afforded first- and second-level appeals

See O’Leary Dep. 223:4-224:8; Ex. Y.

See Ex. Y; O’Leary Dep. 202:1-206:7.

See O’Leary Dep. 

204:12-205:6, 206:4-7. 

See id. at 221:21-222:2; Ex. BB. 

ELAP blocks any attempt by a hospital to recover from the plan member the difference 

between the amount charged and the amount paid

see Waters Dep. 142:6-16; O’Leary Dep. 269:5-12—

See Exs. U, CC, DD; Ex. CC; Ex. DD.

See Exs. EE, FF

See Waters Dep. 180:17-183:11. 

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See Greenberg Dep. 89:24-90:8.

When plan members appear at hospitals for emergency treatment, the hospitals do not 

process their insurance information prior to treatment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd. As a result, in 

an emergency setting, hospitals lack any opportunity to check coverage, pricing, or any other plan 

information. See id.

See Ex. II; Am. 

Compl. ¶ 96

See Exs. GG-II, YY.

ee Ex. 

C; Exs. JJ, KK; O’Leary Dep. 131:9-19. 

See Leh Dep. 22:7-23:21; Ex. X.

See Ex. RR at GPA0132520-24.

See Leh Dep. 19:10-21.

Common questions arise from Memorial’s claims challenging Defendants’ uniform scheme, 

including whether Defendants’ practices around RBP are objectively unfair or deceptive; whether 

the same practices were likely to deceive a reasonable hospital; whether these practices injured 

Memorial and similarly situated hospitals; and whether Defendants were unjustly enriched by their 

policies and practices. See Am. Compl. ¶ 156. These questions are capable of resolution in “one 

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stroke,” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350; the jury will answer them with a simple “yes” or “no” as for all 

class members. Memorial has satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. 

C. Memorial’s Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.

The central inquiry for typicality is whether the class representative has 

“the same interest and the same injury as the class members.” Holzman v. Malcolm S. Gerald &

Assocs., Inc., 334 F.R.D. 326, 331 (S.D. Fla. 2020). Typicality is satisfied where, as here, the 

plaintiff’s claims “stem from the same event, practice, or course of conduct that forms the basis of 

the class claims and are based upon the same legal or remedial theory.” Walco, 168 F.R.D. at 326; 

see, e.g., Belin, 337 F.R.D. at 557 (typicality satisfied where plaintiffs established that their claims 

“ar[o]se ‘squarely’ from the same pattern or practice and rest[ed] upon the same legal theory.”).

Memorial and the class seek redress through common claims for violations of FDUTPA and 

unjust enrichment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 165-92. These claims arise from Defendants’ common 

scheme to underpay hospitals accessed by ELAP’s members. Thus, Memorial’s claims and those 

belonging to the putative class arise from the same course of conduct and are based on the same 

legal theories, thereby satisfying Rule 23(a)(3). See, e.g., James D. Hinson Elec. Contracting Co. 

v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 638, 643 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (plaintiffs satisfied typicality

with claims arising from same practices and legal theories and were merely required to show that 

they “share the issues common to other class members”).

D. Memorial and Its Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class Interests.

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(4), the representative parties must “fairly and adequately represent the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requirement is satisfied when the class 

representatives have (1) no interests antagonistic to the rest of the class and (2) counsel who are 

“qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” Cheney, 213 F.R.D. 

Case 0:20-cv-61007-AHS Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2023 Page 21 of 33
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at 495. “Adequate representation is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence.” In re 1 Glob.

Cap. LLC, 2020 WL 1486791, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2020).

1. Memorial Does Not Have Interests Antagonistic to the Rest of the Class.

“Where the named plaintiffs in a class action are seeking the same type of relief for 

themselves as they seek for class members, the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 

23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is satisfied.” Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 617 

(S.D. Fla. 1997). Memorial has no interests antagonistic to the rest of the class. Memorial and all 

class members were underpaid because of Defendants’ RBP scheme and subjected to the same 

unfair practices. See pp. 4-9, supra. Thus, the critical issues presented—Defendants’ unfair 

application of RBP and ELAP’s deception and failure to disclose critical, material facts as to how 

ELAP members’ Claims would be paid—are common across the class. “If the Plaintiff[]

succeed[s], the benefits will inure to all class members.” Tefel, 972 F. Supp. at 617. Win or lose, 

Memorial’s claims will turn on the same common proof as those of every other class member. 

Memorial has actively participated in this litigation from the beginning. It has responded to 

all document requests and interrogatories, sat for multiple depositions—including four separate 

corporate representative depositions spanning thirty-six topics, as well as five individual Memorial 

employee depositions—and assisted its counsel’s investigation of the facts underlying its claims. 

Memorial has suffered losses due to Defendants’ RBP scheme and is prepared to fulfill its duties 

on behalf of the putative class. Memorial has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). 

2. Memorial’s Counsel Are Exceedingly Qualified and Capable. 

The second prong of the adequate representation test is also satisfied. Memorial’s counsel, 

the firms of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP and Wolfe Pincavage LLP, together have 

extensive knowledge of and experience in complex class action litigation and cases involving 

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healthcare systems and consumer deception. See Exs. AAA, BBB (Firm Resumes). 

The above-named firms are also well respected in the communities that they serve. “[T]he 

single most important factor considered by the courts in determining the quality of the 

representative’s ability and willingness to advocate the cause of the class has been the caliber of 

the plaintiff’s attorney.” 1 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 

3.24 at 3-133 n.353 (3d ed. 1992). Memorial’s counsel has overseen litigation strategy, the briefing 

and argument of motions, and the vigorous pursuit of discovery.

10 The efforts of Memorial’s 

counsel to date confirm that they are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and 

possess the skills necessary to represent the proposed classes. 

II. MEMORIAL SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(b). 

In addition to meeting the four requirements of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff seeking class 

certification must satisfy one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 489. 

Memorial seeks certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), addressed 

in sections II.A and II.B below, certification is appropriate if (1) common questions of law or fact 

predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and (2) class treatment is 

superior to other methods of adjudication. To satisfy Rule 23(b)(2), addressed in Section II.C, 

Memorial must establish that the Defendants “ha[ve] acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 

generally to the class so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 

respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Memorial satisfies both subsections. 

10 This vigorous pursuit of discovery included motion practice across the country relating to 

subpoenas that Memorial served on several of ELAP’s TPA partners. Specifically, Memorial was 

forced to litigate a motion to quash from each of these TPAs (represented by the same counsel, 

including ELAP’s affiliate TPA) in five different district courts and subsequent appeals in three 

circuit courts of appeals. This Court rejected one of the TPA’s attempts to stay proceedings 

transferred from the Eastern District of New York. In re Subpoena of S. Broward Hosp. Dist., No. 

21-mc-62550, 2022 WL 17583433 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2022). It took nearly a year of litigation to 

secure the TPAs’ compliance with Memorial’s subpoenas. 

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A. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate Because Legal and Factual 

Questions Will Be Resolved with Proof Common to Memorial and the Classes.

For common questions of law or fact to predominate over individualized questions, “the 

issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and [are] thus applicable to the class 

as a whole, must predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof.” In 

re Terazosin Hydrochloride Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 694 (S.D. Fla. 2004). “Common questions 

need only predominate; they need not be dispositive of the litigation.” Id. “When common 

questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the 

class in a single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative 

rather than on an individual basis.” Checking Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. at 676. Indeed, “when 

one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to 

predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other 

important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses 

peculiar to individual class members.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) 

(cleaned up). This standard is “readily met” in consumer fraud cases. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594.

Courts focus on liability in determining predominance. Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners

Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 667 (S.D. Fla. 2014); see Herrera v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 648 F. App’x 

930, 936 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Typically, even if courts must confront 

some individualized damages issues, common issues predominate if liability can be determined on 

a class-wide basis.”). “In order to determine whether common questions predominate, the court is 

called upon to examine the causes of action asserted in the complaint on behalf of the putative 

class.” Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). 

Here, irrespective of any individual issues that may arise, the litigation will focus on

Defendants’ common course of conduct in underpaying hospitals based on RBP; systematically 

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denying all substantive hospital appeals; failing to disclose (and concealing) ELAP’s involvement 

in its members’ plans and the use of RBP to underpay Claims; discouraging ELAP plan members 

from paying their outstanding balances to hospitals; and threatening litigation against hospitals

that sought to pursue payment of those balances. See Checking Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D at 675-

76. That is to say, the key issues at trial will be Defendants’ uniform actions and playbook; whether 

Defendants’ application of RBP was deceptive, arbitrary, and unjust; whether the class-member 

hospitals were, in fact, underpaid; whether Defendants’ actions and omissions were objectively 

deceptive or unfair; and whether Defendants’ practices injured Memorial and the class. 

FDUTPA

As to Memorial’s and the Florida classes’ FDUTPA claims, individual questions of reliance 

and causation will not arise because Florida courts apply an objective standard to deceptive acts 

under FDUTPA, asking whether a defendant’s misrepresentations or omissions would deceive a 

reasonable consumer. See, e.g., Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1098 (11th Cir. 

2021) (“An objective test is used to determine whether an act is deceptive under FDUTPA, and 

‘the plaintiff must show that ‘the alleged practice was likely to deceive a consumer acting 

reasonably in the same circumstances.’”) (quoting Carriuolo, 823 F.3d at 983-84). Florida courts 

also apply an objective standard to unfair practices, Carriuolo, 823 F.3d at 986-87, asking whether 

a defendant’s practice “offends established public policy” and is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, 

unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Webber v. Bactes Imaging Sols., Inc., 295 

So. 3d 841, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).11 FDUTPA does not require individualized showings of 

11 Florida has a public policy of protecting and enforcing contractual rights. See Fam. Heritage 

Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 319 So. 3d 680, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). And 

under Florida law, hospitals have a contractual right to be compensated the reasonable value of 

their healthcare services. See Baycare Health Sys., Inc. v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 792061, at 

*7–8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2008).

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reliance. See, e.g., State, Off. of Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affs. v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 869 So. 2d 

592, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“[U]nlike fraud, a party asserting a deceptive trade practice claim 

need not show actual reliance on the representation or omission at issue.”).

For these reasons, it is immaterial whether Memorial or the putative class members had 

knowledge of Defendants’ application of RBP. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance 

Orthapaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1309–10 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (rejecting 

defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s knowledge of their allegedly deceptive acts and unfair 

practices foreclosed its FDUTPA claim). Because Memorial’s claims focus on a standardized 

course of conduct—and particularly because ELAP does not audit Claims on a case-by-case 

basis—the circumstances of individual plan members’ Claims will not come into play. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 280 F.R.D. 665, 672, 674 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (individual issues 

did not predominate where plaintiffs alleged common scheme and individual borrowers’ 

circumstances did not affect legal analysis); Veal v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 

572, 580-82 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (certifying unjust enrichment and FDUTPA class where plaintiffs 

alleged common scheme and course of conduct).

Unjust Enrichment

Individual questions will not arise from certification of a Florida unjust enrichment claim 

because Memorial’s allegations focus on Defendants’ common scheme rather than individual 

transactions. See, e.g., Bowe v. Pub. Storage, 318 F.R.D. 160, 184 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (certifying 

class and observing that “[o]ther courts in this district commonly certify claims of unjust 

enrichment for class treatment in cases like this one where defendant acted in the same manner 

toward every class member”) (citations omitted); In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D.

645, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (predominance satisfied on unjust enrichment claim where plaintiffs

showed that defendant’s “course of conduct commonly, and adversely, affected the entire class”);

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James D. Hinson Elec. Contr., 275 F.R.D. at 647 (individual questions did not predominate where 

defendant’s “conduct was the same with regard to each class member in all relevant respects”). 

Class members’ states of mind will not come into play because, as to the emergent class, 

hospitals had no opportunity to even attempt to discern whether members were insured, let alone 

whether ELAP would reprice their Claims. See pp. 5-6, supra. Thus, no class member could have 

known that emergent Claims would be subject to ELAP’s RBP scheme. See id.

See pp. 

7-9, supra. In every case, Defendants’ retention of the benefits conferred on them was unjust.

See Abernathy Report at Opinion #2 & App’x F.

Id. at Exhibit 4.

Regardless, “individual damage calculations generally do not defeat a finding that common 

issues predominate.” Brown v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 

2016). “[I]ndividualized damages calculations are insufficient to foreclose the possibility of class

certification, especially when, as here, the central liability question is so clearly common to each 

class member.” Carriuolo, 823 F.3d at 988.

Memorial has satisfied Rule 23(b)(3).

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B. A Class Action Would Be Superior to the Adjudication of Individual Claims.

Courts consider four factors to identify the superior method of adjudication: (1) the interest 

of individual class members in controlling the prosecution and defense of separate actions; (2) the 

extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against 

any members of the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating litigation of the claims in the 

particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 

action. “No single element is determinative, ... and this is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the 

factors that the Court should consider.” Walco, 168 F.R.D. at 337 (cleaned up).

1. Individual class members’ interest in separate actions and the extent and 

nature of litigation already commenced

With thousands of members comprising the nationwide issue class and more than two 

hundred class members in Florida, the adjudication of individual lawsuits in different fora would 

be less efficient than resolving all claims through a class action. See, e.g., Williams, 280 F.R.D. at 

675 (“[E]ven a large and complex class action lawsuit would be more manageable . . . than being 

inundated with thousands of individual lawsuits with overlapping factual allegations and all 

involving the same proof to establish an identical illicit scheme against the same Defendants.”). 

On the nature and status of litigation already commenced, this is the only class action lawsuit

involving Defendants’ RBP scheme. Individual actions against these Defendants have arisen, but 

none based on the same legal theories pursued here. See, e.g., IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. ELAP 

Servs., LLC, 2018 WL 4688358 (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2018). Regardless, the presence of a “few other

suits” will not defeat superiority. 2 NEWBERG § 4:70; see CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Broad & 

Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he mere existence of individual actions brought 

by putative class members does not necessarily defeat a claim for superiority.”). 

Litigating these claims individually would also maximize the risk of inconsistent outcomes. 

Case 0:20-cv-61007-AHS Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2023 Page 28 of 33
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See, e.g., Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 307 F.R.D. 183, 218 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing “risk 

generating inconsistent outcomes on the same essential facts”). A class action, by contrast, will 

resolve hospitals claims against ELAP and GPA efficiently and with one stroke. 

2. Difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action 

“[Manageability] concern[s] will rarely, if ever, be in [themselves] sufficient to prevent 

certification of a class.” Klay, 382 F.3d at 1272; see also 2 NEWBERG § 4:72. “Courts are generally 

reluctant to deny class certification based on speculative problems with case management.” 

Managed Care Litig., 209 F.R.D. at 692. “[W]here a court has already made a finding that common

issues predominate over individualized issues, we would be hard pressed to conclude that a class 

action is less manageable than individual actions.” Klay, 382 F.3d at 1273; see Sacred Heart 

Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Mil. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1184 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(“[T]he predominance analysis has a ‘tremendous impact on the superiority analysis . . . for the 

simple reason that, the more common issues predominate over individual issues, the more desirable 

a class action lawsuit will be as a vehicle for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims.’”).

Memorial does not anticipate any significant difficulty for the Court in managing this case 

as a class action. Memorial seeks to certify two Florida classes on its FDUTPA and unjust 

enrichment claims (emergent and non-emergent), obviating the need to undergo analysis of 

variances in state laws, and the alternative to class certification would likely result in a 

“multiplicity and scattering of suits with the inefficient administration of litigation which follows 

in its wake.” Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968). 

Memorial also seeks certification of a nationwide issue class on whether Defendants have 

been unjustly enriched by their practices. As explained below, certification of an issue class would 

create efficiencies for the courts and the parties by narrowing further litigation of the class’s unjust 

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enrichment claims to a single issue. See Section III, infra. Certification of an issue class would be 

superior to the individual litigation of all elements of thousands of individual plaintiffs’ claims. 

See, e.g., Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prod. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 416 (6th Cir. 2018) (certifying 

seven issues because “[e]ven if the class members brought suit individually, the seven certified 

issues would need to be addressed in each of their cases[,]” and “[r]esolving the issues in one fell 

swoop would conserve the resources of both the court and the parties [and] . . . will materially 

advance the litigation.”). A class action is the far superior method of adjudication.

C. The Court Should Certify a Rule 23(b)(2) Class for Injunctive Relief.

To certify a class for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant “has acted 

or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class so that final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(2). The Court should certify a Florida class to enjoin Defendants from continuing to apply 

RBP to underpay hospitals accessed by ELAP plan members. FDUTPA authorizes any aggrieved 

party to pursue injunctive relief. See Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1).

Memorial asserts that Defendants continue to apply RBP uniformly and arbitrarily to 

underpay all hospitals serving ELAP plan members. Defendants execute their scheme by using 

deceptive identification cards and otherwise failing to disclose to hospitals that RBP would be 

applied to compensate them for their services. No putative class member is excepted from the 

scheme’s reach. Accordingly, Memorial seeks certification of an injunctive class under Rule 

23(b)(2) requiring Defendants to terminate its RBP scheme and begin compensating hospitals

based on the reasonable value of the services provided.

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III. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY A NATIONWIDE ISSUE CLASS ON 

MEMORIAL’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM.

Memorial further seeks certification of a nationwide issue class on the question of whether 

Defendants have unjustly retained benefits realized from its RBP scheme. Rule 23(c)(4) provides 

that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 

particular issues.” “This provision allows a court to create subclasses and certify classes as to 

specific common issues and leave the remaining individual issues to be resolved in individual 

suits in other forums.” Begley v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 489, 497 (N.D. Ga. 2001). “[A]

court may employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify a class on a particular issue even if the action as a

whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.” In re Nassau Cnty. Strip

Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Weidman v. Ford Motor Co., 2022 

WL 1071289, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2022) (“[A] majority of the courts of appeals have

concluded that . . . Rule 23(c)(4) can be used even though full Rule 23(b)(3) certification is not

possible due to the predominance infirmities.”).

Certification of an issue class here would resolve the central question of Memorial’s and 

the class’s unjust enrichment claims—whether Defendants’ profits arising from the subject 

business practices were, in fact, unjustly secured—while creating efficiencies for the judiciary and 

the parties alike. Certification of this issue would not entirely resolve Defendants’ liability, but

answering this question will materially advance litigation of Memorial’s unjust enrichment claim.

If the jury concludes that Defendants were not unjustly enriched, then Memorial’s and the class’s

claims fail. If the jury finds that Defendants were unjustly enriched, then the scope of subsequent

trials will be narrowed to a single issue—whether Memorial and the class-member hospitals

Case 0:20-cv-61007-AHS Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2023 Page 31 of 33
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conferred a benefit, directly or indirectly, on Defendants.12 Cf. Weidman, 2022 WL 1071289, at

*15; see also, e.g., Martin, 896 F.3d at 416 (certifying issue classes because certification would 

conserve resources and expedite litigation); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 

2014) (“The phased trial of common issues in this case would undoubtedly prevent the repetitious 

re-litigation of these common issues by each individual claimant in thousands of separate 

lawsuits.”); Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d at 225 (district court erred in failing to 

certify liability class because, inter alia, certification was the “most fair and efficient method of 

resolving th[e] case”) (cleaned up). Class members could then, if they chose, pursue litigation on 

this issue individually or on behalf of statewide classes, minimizing the risk of contradictory 

rulings in the issue of unjust enrichment and conserving judicial and the parties’ resources. See, 

e.g., Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2017) (certifying issue 

class because “if liability claims proceed[ed] separately, there [would be] a very real risk 

of inconsistent adjudications holding Defendant to varying standards of conduct with respect to 

the same common nucleus of operative facts . . .. [R]epeated litigation of the same core liability 

issues would be grossly inefficient and wasteful of the resources of the parties and the judiciary.”).

CONCLUSION

The Court should enter an order certifying the classes defined by Memorial pursuant to Rule 

23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4), and designating Memorial as class representative and Benjamin 

Widlanski of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP and Danya Pincavage of Wolfe Pincavage

LLP as class counsel.

Respectfully submitted: January 13, 2023

12 As explained above, Memorial’s damages expert has already calculated each class member’s 

damages. See p. 2, supra.

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/s/Benjamin J. Widlanski

Benjamin J. Widlanski., Esq.

bwidlanski@kttlaw.com

Fla. Bar No. 1010644

Gail McQuilkin, Esq.

gam@kttlaw.com

Fla. Bar No. 969338

Tal J. Lifshitz, Esq. 

tjl@kttlaw.com

Fla. Bar No. 99519

Michael Lorigas, Esq.

mlorigas@kttlaw.com

Fla. Bar No. 123597

KOZYAK TROPIN &

THROCKMORTON LLP

2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9th Floor

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: (305) 372-1800 

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Douglas A. Wolfe

Douglas A. Wolfe, Esq.

doug@wolfepincavage.com

Fla. Bar No. 28671

Danya J. Pincavage, Esq.

danya@wolfepincavage.com

Fla. Bar No. 14616

Hana A. Aryan, Esq. 

Hana.aryan@wolfepincavage.com

Fla. Bar No. 1003617

WOLFE | PINCAVAGE

7800 SW 57th Avenue, Suite 217

Miami, Florida 33143

Telephone: (786) 409-0800

Counsel for Plaintiff

Case 0:20-cv-61007-AHS Document 142 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2023 Page 33 of 33