1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20- 22485-Civ-Cooke/Goodman

STEVEN J. TYMAN, individually and on behalf )

Of all other similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. )

)

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and LORENZO )

ENTERPRISES CORP. d/b/a LORENZO FORD )

)

Defendants. )

DEFENDANT, LORENZO ENTERPRISES CORP. d/b/a LORENZO FORD’S,

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS AND/OR

MOTION TO STAY COUNT III OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT UNTIL 

COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UNDER CHAPTER 501, FLA. 

STAT., AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

Defendant, Lorenzo Enterprises Corp. d/b/a Lorenzo Ford (hereafter “Lorenzo 

Ford” or “Defendant”), hereby moves this Honorable Court to enter an order compelling 

Plaintiff, Steven J. Tyman (“Mr. Tyman”) to submit to binding arbitration all of his claims 

against Lorenzo Ford plead in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. 1). Defendant also moves the Court 

for an order staying the proceedings as to Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint until Plaintiff 

complies with statutory conditions precedent to initiate suit against Defendant under Section 

501.98, Fla. Stat. In support, Defendant includes the below incorporated memorandum of 

law, stating:

Introduction

Pursuant to applicable Federal and Florida law, Plaintiff’s, Steven J. Tyman, claims 

must be arbitrated and not litigated in court, because the Plaintiff entered into an enforceable 

arbitration agreement as part of the transaction with Lorenzo Ford. All of Plaintiff’s claims 

against Lorenzo Ford derive from a vehicle lease transaction that occurred on October 19th

and 20th, 2019, which was consummated by a Florida Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement and 

Retail Lease Order executed by the parties. Both contracts include an express agreement to 

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arbitrate disputes between the parties. Plaintiff also agreed to waive his right to participate as 

a class representative or a class member in any class claim. Since a valid written agreement 

to arbitrate exists, the claims concern arbitrable issues, and arbitration has not been waived, 

enforcement of the arbitration agreement is required as a matter of law. For these reasons

and the reasons explained below, this Court must compel arbitration and stay all proceedings 

pending the final outcome of arbitration.

Factual and Procedural Background

On or about October 19th and 20th, 2019, Plaintiff presented to Lorenzo Ford in 

Homestead, Florida where he leased a new model year 2020 Ford Explorer. Dkt. 1, ¶ 34. 

Plaintiff brings four causes of action against Lorenzo Ford (violation of the Florida Deceptive

and Unfair Trade Practices Act, “FDUPTA” [Count III], Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment

[Count IV], Negligence [Count V], and Negligent Misrepresentation [Count VI]), all of which 

concern the allegation that Lorenzo Ford intentionally and/or negligently misrepresented to 

Plaintiff (and Ford Motor Company) that it performed required recall service to the Plaintiff’s

vehicle prior to the lease, when it had not.1 Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82-84, 90-92. 

Mr. Tyman alleges that he suffered damages when he leased the new motor vehicle 

from Lorenzo Ford, relied on Lorenzo Ford’s misrepresentations or omissions related to the 

condition of the vehicle and the performance of recall work, and decided to lease a vehicle he

“would not have leased” or “would have paid less [for]” had he known he would be 

responsible for paying for the recall work. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82-84, 90-92. 

The Parties Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes

It is undisputed that Mr. Tyman and Lorenzo Ford (the “Parties”) executed a Retail 

Lease Order and a Florida Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement (hereafter “MVLA”) to lease the 

new 2020 Ford Explorer. As is customary in the lease or purchase of vehicles across the 

country, the parties executed a Retail Lease Order which consummates the customer’s 

agreement to lease the vehicle from the dealer and the parties’ also executed a MVLA which 

concerns their agreement related to the financing of the lease (in this case through Ford Motor 

Credit Company). Both contracts are executed, along with various other documents, as part 

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint brings two class action causes of action against Ford Motor Company (Count I and II) 

and four individual claims against Lorenzo Ford (Count III – IV). Dkt. 1. If Plaintiff asserts that Count I and 

II are also against Lorenzo Ford, these claims also require arbitration. 

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of the lease transaction. A true and correct copy of the MVLA is attached to the Declaration 

of Miguel Ranilla as Exhibit 1(A). See Exhibit 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla. A true and correct copy 

of the Retail Lease Order is attached to the Declaration of Miguel Ranilla as Exhibit (1)B.

2

Id. The MVLA was executed via e-signature by Mr. Tyman and expressly included the 

arbitration provision below:

The MVLA further stated on the page for Mr. Tyman’s signature: “YOU 

ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE 

ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THIS CONTRACT.” See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A, 

2 While Plaintiff’s Complaint does not attach the Florida Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement or Retail Lease Order, 

applicable caselaw is clear that consideration of relevant materials outside of the “four corners of the complaint” 

is entirely appropriate where a party brings a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009); See Garcia v. Kendall Lakes 

Automotive, LLC, 2019 WL 1359475 (S.D. FL 2019) (“Accordingly, in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, 

the Court may consider matters outside of the four corners of the complaint”). The Eleventh Circuit treats a 

motion to compel arbitration as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

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pg. 8 of 8. The MVLA’s arbitration provision also expressly states: “[t]his contract is subject 

to the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.).” Id. 

The Retail Lease Order included a substantively equivalent provision below:

See Ex 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. B, pg. 4. The Retail Lease Order was also executed by the 

parties and next to Mr. Tyman’s signature is the acknowledgment: “You have read each page 

of this Order and Agreement, including the arbitration provision on the reverse side, and agree

to its terms.” Id. Under Florida law, when parties to a contract execute two or more 

documents concurrently in the course of one transaction concerning the same subject matter, 

as the Parties did here, the documents must be read and construed together. Dodge City, Inc. 

v. Byrne, 693 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); See Morris v. Sheehan Buick Pontiac GMC, 

Inc., 2012 WL 12894289 (S.D. Fla. 2012).

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)

It is well-settled law that the FAA evinces a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. 

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. 

Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. 

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). By enacting the FAA, Congress intended 

to avoid the unnecessary expense and delay of litigation where parties had provided for the 

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more efficient process of arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 

395, 404 (1967). Federal policy, therefore, requires courts to “construe arbitration clauses 

generously, resolving all doubts in favor of arbitration.” Becker v. Davis, 491 F.3d 1292, 1305 

(11th Cir. 2007).

“By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a district 

court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration 

on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 

Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 213 (1985); John B. Goodman Ltd. v. THF Constr., Inc., 321 F.3d 1094, 1095 

(11th Cir. 2003) (“Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., a district court must grant a motion 

to compel arbitration if it is satisfied that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute.”).

Under the FAA, “parties [to an arbitration agreement] are generally free to structure 

their arbitration agreements as they see fit.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 

Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). State laws that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment 

and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the FAA are 

preempted. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).

Although the FAA governs the applicability of arbitration agreements, state law 

governs issues “concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 

generally.” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987); 

See Smart v. Bob Wilson Dodge Inc., 2006 WL 1037113 (M.D. Fla. 2006)(“It is now an axiom 

of federal and Florida law that written agreements to arbitrate are binding and enforceable, 

and that in the absence of waiver a court must compel arbitration when an arbitration 

agreement and an arbitrable issue exist”).

All Requirements for Ordering Arbitration Have Been Met

When presented with a motion to compel arbitration in Florida, a district court is 

tasked to consider three factors: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether 

an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived. Nat’l Auto Lenders 

Inc. v. Sys Locate, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322 (S.D. Fla.2010) (citation omitted); see also, 

Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999)) (“Under both federal and Florida law, 

there are three factors for the court to consider in determining a party’s right to arbitrate: (1) 

a written agreement exists between the parties containing an arbitration clause; (2) an 

arbitrable issue exists; and (3) the right to arbitration has not been waived.”).

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Here, all three factors are clearly satisfied, and Plaintiff’s claims against Lorenzo Ford 

should be compelled to arbitration.

1. A Valid Agreement to Arbitrate Exists Between the Parties

It cannot be disputed that the parties entered a MVLA which included the agreement 

to arbitrate shown above. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A, pg. 7 of 8. It also cannot be 

disputed that the parties executed the Retail Lease Order. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. B. 

While Plaintiff’s Complaint does not attach the MVLA or Retail Lease Order, the Complaint 

makes clear that Mr. Tyman leased a new model Ford Explorer from Lorenzo Ford on or 

about October 19th and 20th, 2019. See Dkt. 1, ¶ 10. In doing so, the parties’ executed the 

MVLA and Retail Lease Order.

The e-signature on the MVLA does not make the contract any less enforceable. In 

1996, Florida enacted the “Electronic Signature Act” which specifically provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise prohibited by law, an electronic signature may be used to sign a writing 

and shall have the same force and effect as a written signature,” § 668.004, Fla. Stat. (2003). 

Thus, there is no basis to dispute the legitimacy of the MVLA. See CEFCO v. Odom, 278 So. 

3d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (compelling arbitration for a contract executed electronically and 

stating succinctly “[e]lectronic signatures are valid”); See also Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & 

Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 789 (Fla. 2004).3

Second, by executing the documents, Plaintiff is unable to claim that he did not 

otherwise agree to arbitrate his claims with Defendant. Under Florida law, a party who signs 

an instrument is presumed to know its contents. Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 

1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (analyzing Florida law). That party “cannot avoid his obligations 

thereunder by alleging that he did not read the contract, or that the terms were not explained 

to him, or that he did not understand the provisions.” Id.; see also Linville v. Ginn Real Estate 

Co., LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Courts considering similar Florida 

motor vehicle sale contracts have consistently concluded that a customer who executed the 

contract could not avoid an obligation to arbitrate by alleging they simply did not read or

understand the provision. See Falcon v. Carmax, 2018 WL 3699336 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (Report 

and Recommendation adopted at 2018 WL 3696742); Murphy v. Courtesy Ford, LLC, 944 So. 

3 In fact, no signature is required to satisfy the FAA's written agreement requirement. BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee, 

970 So. 2d 869, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)

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2d 1131, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Consequently, the first factor (a valid agreement to arbitrate) has been established.

The Arbitration Provision is Not Procedurally or Substantively Unconscionable

Once it has been determined that an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties, 

it is possible for the provision to nevertheless be determined to be unenforceable because it is

“unconscionable.” Here, the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable as binding caselaw 

has already made clear that arbitration provisions related to the purchase of a motor vehicle 

nearly identical to the MVLA and Retail Lease Order in this case, are not unconscionable.

See Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336. Nevertheless, Defendant provides the applicable tests below.

To find a contract unconscionable under Florida law, a party must establish that the 

contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Golden v. Mobil Oil Corp., 882 

F.2d 490, 493 (11th Cir. 1989). The party seeking to avoid the arbitration provision has the 

burden to establish unconscionability. Murphy, 944 So. 2d at *1134.

a. Procedural Unconscionability

In Falcon, this District considered a substantively identical arbitration provision which 

was included in a contract for the purchase of a motor vehicle and included a waiver of the 

plaintiff’s right to participate in a class action. 2018 WL 3699336 at *1. This Court concluded 

that enforcement of the provision was permitted (and not procedurally unconscionable) 

notwithstanding the Plaintiff’s allegations that it was an adhesion contract and that he was 

“rushed” through his review of the documents. Id. at *4. This Court reasoned that the contract 

was not an adhesion contract because the customer maintained the ability to walk away from 

the dealership and that the review of the documents was a responsibility of the purchaser in 

deciding to executed the agreement, not one that was invalid because he was “rushed.” Id. at 

*5. Other Florida courts have made identical decisions. See e.g., Murphy, 944 So. 2d at 1134 

(finding arbitration agreement procedurally conscionable even though the car dealership that 

drafted the agreement testified “that it was not their practice to inform customers of terms on 

the back or of the arbitration provision, and they did not inform the buyer of these terms.”);

See also Garcia, 2019 WL 1359475 at *6.

b. Substantive Unconscionability

The court in Falcon also explained that the arbitration provision was substantively 

conscionable despite its inclusion of a class action waiver provision based on the United States 

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Supreme Court’s precedent in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011),

which found that any state law prohibition on the inclusion of a class action waiver within 

the terms of an arbitration provision “interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration 

and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336 at *5

(quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344); See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212-

13 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that Florida law would be sympathetic to the Plaintiffs' 

arguments here, and would invalidate the class waiver simply because the claims are of small 

value, the potential claims are numerous, and many consumers might not know about or 

pursue their potential claims absent class procedures, such a state policy stands as an obstacle 

to the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements to their terms, and is preempted”). 

This District in Falcon reasoned that since the arbitration provision authorized the 

arbitrator to award “all individual remedies permitted by the substantive law that would 

apply” there was no other basis for the plaintiff to assert that the arbitration provision was 

substantively unconscionable. Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336 at *6. The court additionally 

acknowledged that claims brought under FDUTPA “have regularly been referred to 

arbitration.” Id.; See e.g. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1216 (enforcing arbitration clause that involved 

FDUTPA claim); See Murphy, 944 So. 2d at 1133; See Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 So. 2d 

453, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

The issue here is identical to the situation this District ruled on, and referred to 

arbitration, in Falcon. See 2018 WL 3699336 at *7. Mr. Tyman is unable to claim that he did 

not agree to arbitration or that the terms were withheld from him. Likewise, Mr. Tyman 

retains all of the individual remedies under substantive law. Since the parties’ agreement to 

arbitrate was not procedurally unconscionable, it is a valid arbitration agreement under 

Florida law and any substantive unconscionability need not be considered. Id.

Even if it the parties’ agreement to the arbitration provision was determined to be 

procedurally unconscionable, the agreement would still be valid as it is substantively

conscionable. 

The arbitration provision in this case includes a class action waiver but the United 

States Supreme Court has foreclosed any argument that this is unconscionable.

4 See 

4 The Complaint does not bring class action claims against Lorenzo Ford, so it is not clear that this analysis is 

even necessary. Nevertheless, binding caselaw is clear that this would not be a basis to rule arbitration 

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Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (ruling that a state whose public policy found waiver of class action 

rights unconscionable, as preempted by the FAA). The 11th Circuit and Florida Supreme 

Court have both acknowledged the application of Concepcion to foreclose any legal argument 

that a class action waiver makes arbitration unenforceable. See e.g. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1205; See 

McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC v. Betts, 112 So. 3d 1176, 1180 (Fla. 2013).

Besides the class action waiver, the MVLA’s arbitration provision is exactly like the 

one in Falcon which was determined to be valid and enforceable. 2018 WL 3699336 at *7. 

The Parties’ arbitration provisions do not limit Mr. Tyman’s individual remedies, his ability 

to recover attorney’s fees permitted by applicable law, and does not impose unreasonable 

costs. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A & B. There is no basis in law or fact for the Court to 

hold that the agreement to arbitrate is not valid.

2. Plaintiff’s Claims against Lorenzo Ford are Arbitrable Issues

An order compelling arbitration is further required as the Parties’ entered a valid 

arbitration agreement and Plaintiff’s Complaint brings arbitrable issues under the arbitration 

provision. Each of Plaintiff’s claims against Lorenzo Ford arises from the parties' unique 

contractual relationship, thus the claims are arbitrable issues under the Parties agreement. 

This District has already examined a similar arbitration provision and determined that claims 

related to the condition of a vehicle purchased from a dealership were arbitrable. See e.g. 

Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336 at *1 (compelling arbitration of claims of FDUTPA and negligence 

brought against a motor vehicle dealership).

“[T]he party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of establishing that Congress 

intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims as issue” Garcia, 2019 WL 1359475 at 

*3 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 

L.Ed.2d 373 (2000)). All doubts regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement must be 

resolved in favor of arbitration. Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So.2d 952, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

The Arbitration Provision is Broad in Scope

The MVLA’s arbitration provision states from the very beginning that arbitration is a 

method of “resolving any claim, dispute, or controversy.” See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A, 

pg. 7 of 8. It states that the parties “may choose at any time, including after a lawsuit is filed, 

unenforceable.

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to have any Claim related to this contract decided by arbitration.” Id. (emphasis added). 

“Claims include but are not limited to the following: 1) Claims in contract, tort, 

regulatory or otherwise; 2) Claims regarding the interpretation, scope, or validity of this 

provision, or arbitrability of any issue except for class certification; 3) Claims between you 

and us, our employees, agents, successors, assigns, subsidiaries, or affiliates; 4) Claims arising 

out of or relating to your application for credit, this contract, or any resulting transaction or 

relationship, including that with the dealer, or any such relationship with third parties who do 

not sign this contract.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Retail Lease Order is identical in its scope. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. B, pg. 

4. It states that “any claims or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or 

otherwise...between you and us..., which arises out of or related to your credit application, 

purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this Order and Agreement or any resulting transaction 

or relationship... shall... be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration.” Id. While equally broad 

in its scope, the provision specifically acknowledges that disputes related to the “condition” 

of the vehicle are within the scope of arbitration. Id.

The 11th Circuit has expressly recognized Florida law differentiates between clauses

which agree to arbitrate claims only “arising from” the contract and provisions which more 

broadly agree to arbitrate claims “arising from and related to” the contract. 

In analyzing the scope of an arbitration clause, Florida courts draw a 

distinction between clauses that require arbitration of claims “arising out of” 

the subject contract and those that require arbitration of claims “arising out of 

or relating to” the contract. See Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So.3d 

587, 593 (Fla. 2013) (emphasis in original). The former are considered to be 

“narrow in scope” and apply only to “those claims that have a direct 

relationship to a contract’s terms and provisions.” Id. The latter are considered 

to be “broad in scope” and apply to “claims that are described as having a 

‘significant relationship’ to the contract—regardless of whether the claim is 

founded in tort or contract law.” Id. (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 

So.2d 633, 637–38 (Fla. 1999)).

Leidel v. Coinbase, Inc., 729 Fed. Appx. 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2018)

The arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Lorenzo Ford is facially in the “broad 

in scope” camp. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A, pg. 7 of 8 (“Claims include but are not 

limited to the following: 1) Claims in contract, tort, regulatory or otherwise;... 4) Claims 

arising out of or relating to ... this contract, or any resulting transaction or relationship”); Id.,

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Ex. B, pg. 4 (“any claims or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise...between 

you and us..., which arises out of or related to your credit application, purchase or condition

of this Vehicle, this Order and Agreement or any resulting transaction or relationship”). Thus, 

the Plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable if there is a contractual nexus or relationship between the 

claims and the contract.

A Contractual Nexus Exists Between the 

MVLA and Retail Lease Order and each of Plaintiff’s Claims against Lorenzo Ford

A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint shows that each of Plaintiff’s claims against Lorenzo 

Ford arise from the parties' unique contractual relationship, thus the claims are arbitrable 

issues under the Parties agreement. 

To determine if a particular claim is within the scope of the arbitration provision

depends on the existence of some nexus between the dispute and the contract containing the 

arbitration clause. Vivas v. Safra National Bank of New York, 2010 WL 11602462 (S.D. Fla. 

2010). Meaning, the claims must be the type of claims the parties agreed to arbitrate. The test 

to determine whether a significant relationship or nexus exists has been summarized as 

follows:

“[A] significant relationship is described to exist between an arbitration 

provision and a claim if there is a “contractual nexus” between the claim and 

the contract. A contractual nexus exists between a claim and a contract if the 

claim presents circumstances in which the resolution of the disputed issue 

requires either reference to, or construction of, a portion of the contract. More 

specifically, a claim has a nexus to a contract and arises from the terms of 

the contract if it emanates from an inimitable duty created by the parties' 

unique contractual relationship. In contrast, a claim does not have a nexus 

to a contract if it pertains to the breach of a duty otherwise imposed by law 

or in recognition of public policy, such as a duty under the general common 

law owed not only to the contracting parties but also to third parties and 

the public.

Jackson, 108 So.3d at 593 (internal citations omitted).

While a “significant relationship” does not exist merely because the parties in the 

dispute have a contractual relationship, Id. at 593, it does exist where the claims are 

inextricably intertwined with both the circumstances that surrounded the transaction from 

which the contract emanated and the contract itself. See Newco Energy Acquisitions Holdings, 

LLC v. Shulgen, 2013 WL 12149763 (S.D. Fla. 2013). This is regardless if the claims are 

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brought as a breach cause of action, or instead as a tort. Stacy David, Inc. v. Consuegra, 845 So. 

2d 303, 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Deciding whether a particular claim is covered by a broad 

arbitration provision requires a determination of whether a significant relationship exists 

between the claim and the agreement containing the arbitration clause, regardless of the legal 

label attached to the dispute”).

Where the plaintiff’s claims, even tort claims of negligence, arise from a duty deriving 

from the parties’ contractual relationship, the claim is properly arbitrable. See e.g. Falcon, 2018 

WL 3699336; See Vivas, 2010 WL 11602462.

In Falcon, a consumer purchased a vehicle from a dealership and brought claims of 

breach of contract, negligence, and violation of FDUTA, after the vehicle immediately began 

experiencing mechanical problems during its first day of use. 2018 WL 369936 at *1. The 

court granted the dealership’s motion to compel arbitration as to all of the plaintiff’s claims

determining that the claims related to the condition of the vehicle and a contractual nexus

existed. Id. at *7.

In Vivas v. Safra National Bank of New York, a family opened a bank account with 

defendant, a bank, which was substantially depleted due to several high-risk investments by 

which plaintiffs alleged they did not authorize. 2010 WL 11602462 at *3. The bank attempted 

to compel the claims to arbitration based on a contract executed by the parties. Id. The 

plaintiffs argued their tort causes of action for fraud, negligent supervision, conversion, and 

gross negligence were not arbitrable as they were causes of action “not governed by the 

contract, or imposed by a ‘unique relationship’ between the parties by virtue of the existence 

of an underlying contract” and were instead related to “duties that are based in law in 

furtherance of public policy.” Id. at *9. This Court rejected this argument reasoning:

“It is true that the tort causes of action brought by the Plaintiffs reflect 

considerations of public policy and duties generally owed to others outside of 

contractual relationships. But the Plaintiffs are incorrect in arguing that the 

contract in this case did not place the Parties in a “unique relationship.” In fact, 

the Parties would have no relationship if the Plaintiffs had decided against 

banking with the Defendant. In other words, all the causes of action brought 

by the Plaintiffs “raise[ ] an issue that requires reference to or construction of 

some portion of the contract for resolution.” Maguire v. King, 917 So.2d 263, 

266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“Arbitrability depends on the relationship between 

the claim and the agreement, not the legal label attached to the dispute.”). The 

contractual relationship between the Parties in this case is not incidental or 

secondary in importance, but rather it serves as the foundation of their 

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relationship and the sole reason they are in dispute. As such, the tort claims 

raised by the Plaintiffs would be “nonsensical when divorced from the 

contractual obligations [in dispute].” Id. at 266.

Vivas, 2010 WL 11602462 at *8. 5

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Lorenzo Ford

A review of Plaintiff’s four individual causes of actions against Lorenzo Ford makes 

clear each are inextricably intertwined to the parties’ contracts. The Plaintiff’s claims of a

violation of FDUPTA, Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment, Negligence, and Negligent

Misrepresentation, all concern the allegation that Lorenzo Ford intentionally and/or 

negligently misrepresented to Plaintiff that it had performed required recall service to 

Plaintiff’s vehicle prior to the lease, when it had not. Dkt, 1, ¶¶ 10, 53-56, 77-79, 80-85. It is this

alleged misrepresentation or omission about the condition of the vehicle, as well as 

misrepresentations allegedly made by Lorenzo Ford to Ford Motor Company that it had done 

the recall repairs, which are the basis for Plaintiff’s general assertion that he did not receive 

the full value of his bargain with Defendant when he leased the 2020 Ford Explorer. Id., ¶¶

55, 73-74, 77, 93. This is especially clear as Plaintiff’s Complaint culminates by seeking

recovery of damages as he “would not have leased the 2020 Ford Explorer, or would have 

paid less for the vehicle” if not for Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations or material 

omissions. Id., ¶¶ 73, 74, 77, 93.

The claims do not represent breach of duties generally owed by Defendant to others 

besides the contracting parties, but duties that only arose when the parties entered the lease 

agreement. Vivas, 2010 WL 11602462 at *10 (“The contractual relationship between the 

Parties in this case is not incidental or secondary in importance, but rather it serves as the 

foundation of their relationship and the sole reason they are in dispute”). Plaintiff seeks 

recovery of damages for a difference between what he paid and the contract price he would 

5 Compare this with a case where the plaintiff brought claims related to duties generally owed by the defendant 

to anyone, and not arising from a contractual relationship. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1999) 

In Seifert, a homeowner brought a wrongful death claim against her contractor after an incorrectly installed air 

conditioning system caused carbon monoxide emissions from a car in the garage to be distributed into the home, 

killing her husband. 750 So.2d 633 at *634. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the homeowner’s 

wrongful death negligence claims did not have a “contractual nexus” as the particular tort claim against the 

contractor represented a duty generally owed by the contractor to anyone who entered the home, and did not 

depend on the existence of the contractual relationship between the parties. Id. at *639 (“These allegations rely 

on obligations that would extend to anyone, third parties as well as the [Homeowners], who might be injured 

by [defendant’s] tortious conduct”).

Case 1:20-cv-22485-MGC Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/23/2020 Page 13 of 21
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have paid had the dealership not misrepresented the condition of the vehicle. Id., ¶¶ 73, 74, 

77, 93. These claims and the damages they seek cannot be divorced from the two parties’ 

unique contractual relationship, thus they are arbitrable. See Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336; See 

Vivas, 2010 WL 11602462.

a. Count III – FDUTPA

A long list of cases reveal that claims brought under FDUTPA have regularly been 

referred to arbitration. See generally, Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1216 (enforcing arbitration clause that 

involved FDUTPA claim); Murphy, 944 So. 2d at 1131(“Florida case law is clear that 

FDUTPA claims can properly be submitted to arbitration.”); Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 

So. 2d 453, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“If the statutory cause of action is based, as in this case, 

on matters growing out of a contract which covers the dispute, and relies on the same facts as 

the dispute which is subject to arbitration, there is no basis to exclude the FDUTPA issue

from arbitration.”); Simattina Holdings, LLC v. Steri-Clean, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1291 

(S.D. Fla. 2016) (“In any event, the [FDUTPA] claim is arbitrable because whether 

Defendants made representations or omissions likely to mislead Plaintiff or violated a statute 

or rule proscribing unfair practices, the causation leading to any damages springs from 

Plaintiff entering into the Franchise Agreement.”); See also, Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336.

Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Lorenzo Ford violated FDUPTA “by 

knowingly and intentionally leasing Plaintiff a new motor vehicle with open FSAs that had 

not been remedied and then falsely reporting that the FSA repairs on the Plaintiff’s vehicles 

had been done.” See Dkt. 1, ¶ 71. The claim continues stating:

73. The facts concealed or not disclosed... are material in that a reasonable 

consumer would have considered them to be important in deciding whether to 

purchase or lease a new vehicle and at what price. Had Plaintiff known that 

FSAs on his 2020 Ford Explorer existed and had not been remedied and that 

he would ultimately be responsible for pay for the FSA repairs, Plaintiff would 

not have purchased the vehicle, or would have paid less for the vehicle.”

See Dkt. 1, ¶ 73. 

There is no doubt that Plaintiff’s claims “emanates from an inimitable duty created by 

the parties' unique contractual relationship.” See Jackson, 108 So.3d at 593. Lorenzo Ford 

would certainly have no duty to disclose to Mr. Tyman materials facts about the condition of 

the new 2020 Ford Explorer, if it was not entering an agreement to lease Mr. Tyman the 

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vehicle. Mr. Tyman cannot assert that he would have “paid less for the vehicle” if there was 

not a higher price derived from MVLA and Retail Lease Order which he agreed to pay before 

he had knowledge of the allegedly omitted material facts about the condition of the vehicle.

Dkt. 1, ¶ 73.

Further, while Plaintiff does reference a regulatory requirement related to the 

performance of recall work, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(a), the Complaint correctly notes that the 

statute prohibits “manufacturers and dealers from selling new any vehicles that contain a 

safety defect for which a recall was issued.” See Dkt. 1, ¶ 15. (emphasis added). Thus, 

Defendant’s alleged “duty” under the statute could only arise if the dealership sold or leased

a new motor vehicle. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(a). This fact requires reference to (and consideration 

of the construction of) the parties’ unique MVLA and Retail Lease Order which are the 

documents which represented to Mr. Tyman that the subject vehicle was “NEW” and that a 

lease occurred. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A & B.

The FDUTPA cause of action is especially reliant on the existence of the parties’

contract, as FDUTPA only applies to deceptive or unfair “acts or practices in the conduct of 

any trade or commerce.” See Dkt. 1, ¶ 69 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 501.202 & 204). Plaintiff asserts 

that Lorenzo Ford was engaging in “trade or commerce” by leasing the motor vehicle to Mr. 

Tyman, thus, it cannot then argue that its claim does not have a nexus to the parties’ contract.6

Id. at ¶ 69. If the dealership was not engaging in trade or commerce during their allegedly 

improper activities, FDUTPA would not apply. See Fla. Stat. § 501.204.

b. Count IV – Fraud or Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff’s fraud or fraudulent concealment claim is based on the very same allegations 

as the FDUTPA claim: that Lorenzo Ford “made material misrepresentations and omissions 

concerning a presently existing or past fact” when it “leased Plaintiff a new 2020 Ford 

Explorer with open FSAs without fully or truthfully disclosing to Plaintiff that the FSA’s 

existed and had not been remedied.” See Dkt. 1, ¶ 77. Thus, the nexus is the transaction which 

was consummated by the contract. 

6 Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8): “Trade or commerce” means the advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or 

distributing, whether by sale, rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, or any property, whether tangible or 

intangible, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever situated. “Trade or commerce” shall 

include the conduct of any trade or commerce, however denominated, including any nonprofit or not-for-profit 

person or activity.

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The cause of action expressly alleges that “Plaintiff was fraudulently induced to lease a 

2020 Ford Explorer with open FSAs.” Id., ¶ 77 (emphasis added). Multiple Florida cases 

considering arbitration provisions have concluded that claims of fraudulent inducement 

necessarily relate to the party’s contract. See Passerrello v. Robert L. Lipton, Inc., 690 So.2d 610

(Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(“It is well settled, however, that where the entire agreement is alleged 

to have been fraudulently induced, not the arbitration provision itself, the entire matter is to 

be resolved by arbitration.”); Berman v. Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 717 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1998)(holding that employees claims that the employer made false statements that 

fraudulently induced him to enter into an employment relationship were arbitrable issues); 

Maguire v. King, 917 So.2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)(“The alleged fraud and misrepresentation 

on behalf of [defendants] can only be seen as arising out of or relating to the obligations they 

assumed under their contract with [plaintiff], accordingly, the trial court's order concluding 

that [plaintiff’s] tort claims were not arbitrable was clearly erroneous.”); See also, Great W. Fin. 

Sec. Corp. v. Grandison, 701 So.2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

In Stacy David, 845 So. 2d 303, a consumer brought claims against a dealership related 

to the condition of a vehicle he purchased including claims under FDUTPA, of fraud, breach 

of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation after the consumer discovered allegedly 

undisclosed damage to the vehicle sustain prior to the sale. After the trial court denied a 

motion to compel arbitration, the Second DCA reversed that decision reasoning that “tort 

claims based on duties that are dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship 

between the parties are normally arbitrable.” Id. at *306. It reasoned “the duties under 

theories such as fraud in the inducement of a contract, fraud in the performance of a contract, 

or negligent misrepresentation are duties dependent upon the existence of a contract 

relationship between the parties.” Id. at *306.

Again, Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud by Lorenzo Ford emanates from a duty created 

by the parties' contractual relationship. In other words, Lorenzo Ford had no duty to disclose

material facts about the condition of the vehicle to Mr. Tyman had the parties not entered an 

agreement whereby Lorenzo Ford leased him the motor vehicle. Only Mr. Tyman has 

standing to bring a claim seeking damages related to the allegedly inflated price of the vehicle.

This is not a duty or obligation owed by Lorenzo Ford to third parties in general. Mr. Tyman 

cannot allege to have been fraudulent induced but for a contract with terms he was allegedly 

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induced into accepting. This cause of action is therefore arbitrable.

c. Count V – Negligence

Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action alleges that “Lorenzo Ford leased Plaintiff a new 

2020 Ford Explorer with open FSAs without performing the repairs order by the FSAs in 

violation of federal law and Ford’s policies and procedures. In addition, Lorenzo Ford closed 

the FSAs indicating that the FSA repairs had been done when they had not been resulting in 

Plaintiff becoming responsible for paying for the FSA repairs.” See Dkt. 1, ¶ 82. It alleges 

“Lorenzo Ford had a duty to remedy any outstanding FSAs prior to leasing the 2020 Ford 

Explorer new to Plaintiff in order conform to federal law and Ford’s policies and procedures.” 

Id., ¶ 82. (emphasis added).

Identical with the analysis of the prior claims, Plaintiff’s negligence claims inarguably 

arise from a duty that is unique to the parties’ contractual relationship. As Plaintiff’s 

Complaint asserts, Lorenzo Ford only had a duty to remedy outstanding FSAs when it chose 

to lease the 2020 Ford Explorer new to Plaintiff. See Dkt. 1, ¶ 82. Lorenzo Ford leased the 

vehicle to Plaintiff through the MVLA and Retail Lease Order. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, 

ex. A & B. Review and consideration of the terms of the MVLA and Retail Lease Order reveals 

that the vehicle was leased to Plaintiff, and that it was leased as a “NEW” vehicle. Id. Plaintiff 

cannot avoid the arbitration agreement simply by ignoring it and alleging facts that it could 

only prove through a later presentation of the contracts.

This type of negligence claim, while related to considerations of public policy, is not a 

duty owed to third parties in general, but a claim that cannot be divorced from the parties’ 

lease contract. See e.g., Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336; See Vivas, 2010 WL 11602462.

d. Negligent Misrepresentation

Plaintiff’s last cause of action against Lorenzo Ford alleges that defendant “failed to 

use reasonable care when it leased Plaintiff a new 2020 Ford Explorer with open FSAs 

without performing the repairs ordered by the FSAs in violation of federal law and Ford’s 

policies and procedures.” Dkt. 1, ¶ 88. “If not for Defendant, Lorenzo Ford’s 

misrepresentations and materials omissions, Plaintiff would not have leased the 2020 Ford 

Explorer, or would have paid less for the vehicle.” Dkt. 1, ¶ 93. 

This claim, like the above claims, is arbitrable and courts have ordered just that in 

similar circumstances. See e.g., Stacy David, 845 So. 2d 303 at 305. Plaintiff’s negligent 

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misrepresentation claim emanates from a duty created by the parties' contractual relationship; 

namely, the agreement of Lorenzo Ford to lease a new 2020 Ford Explorer to Plaintiff. See 

Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ex. A & B. This agreement, the MVLA and Retail lease Order, also 

contain an agreement that the parties could require disputes to be submitted to arbitration. Id.

Enforcement of this arbitration agreement is required by law. Plaintiff cannot seek recovery 

of damages on the basis that he “would have paid less for the vehicle” if there was not a price 

that he did pay which is derived only from review of the terms of the MVLA. Id.

3. Lorenzo Ford has Not Waived its Right to Arbitrate

Finally, Lorenzo Ford has not waived its right to arbitration. Defendant moves to 

compel arbitration in response to being served with Plaintiff’s Complaint and has not 

otherwise attempted to defend the claim using the court. Plaintiff also has never attempted 

to arbitrate the claim and had this effort ignored be Defendant. See Falcon, 2018 WL 3699336 

at *7 (holding plaintiff’s argument that dealership waived right to arbitrate by not preemptively initiating arbitration was “nonsensical”).

The Court Should Stay This Action Pending the Outcome of Arbitration

Once this Court orders this matter to arbitration, the FAA requires that it stay the 

instant proceeding. Section 3 of the FAA provides:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States 

upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 

arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the 

issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 

agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such 

arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....

9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).

Cases interpreting this provision of the FAA state that, once the Court finds the parties’ 

dispute referable to arbitration, it has no choice but to stay the action in response to a motion 

requesting the same. Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 

1993) (Section 3 of the FAA is mandatory).

The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that a stay is required under Section 3 

of the FAA when an arbitration provision is enforced against a non-signatory to the 

agreement. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009).

Case 1:20-cv-22485-MGC Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/23/2020 Page 18 of 21
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY 

PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLIANCE WITH § 501.98, FLA. 

STAT.

Defendant, Lorenzo Ford, additionally moves this Court to stay the proceeding to 

require Plaintiff to comply with statutory conditions precedent under Fla. Stat. § 501.98 which 

requires the Plaintiff to send a 30 days pre-suit demand letter before bring claims against 

Lorenzo Ford under FDUTPA. See Fla. Stat. § 501.98.

Chapter 501 includes specific provisions concerning the application of FDUTPA to 

motor vehicle dealers located in the State. See Fla. Stat. § 501.975-98. Section 501.98, Fla. Stat. 

states:

“(1) As a condition precedent to initiating any civil litigation, including 

arbitration, arising under this chapter against a motor vehicle dealer, which 

may also include its employees, agents, principals, sureties, and insurers, a 

claimant must give the dealer a written demand letter at least 30 days before 

initiating the litigation.

(2) The demand letter, which must be completed in good faith, must:

(a) State the name, address, and telephone number of the claimant.

(b) State the name and address of the dealer.

(c) Describe the underlying facts of the claim, including a statement 

describing each item for which actual damages are claimed.

(d) State the amount of damages, or, if not available, the claimant’s 

best estimate of the amount of damages.

(e) To the extent available to the claimant, be accompanied by all 

transaction or other documents upon which the claim is based.”

Section 501.98(8), Fla. Stat., further requires:

“(8) If a claimant initiates civil litigation, including arbitration, without first 

complying with this section, the court or arbitrator shall stay the action upon 

timely motion until the claimant complies with this section. Attorney fees and 

court or arbitration costs incurred by the claimant before compliance with this 

section are not recoverable under this chapter.”

Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint brings individual claims under FDUTPA (Chapter

501) against Lorenzo Ford. It is undisputed that Lorenzo Ford is a motor vehicle dealer. Dkt. 

1, ¶ 13. As a condition precedent to bringing claims against the motor vehicle dealer, Plaintiff 

Case 1:20-cv-22485-MGC Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/23/2020 Page 19 of 21
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was required to provide a written demand letter at least 30 days before initiating litigation 

which complied with section 501.98(2), Fla. Stat.7 Williams v. John Hall Chevrolet, Inc., 2017 

WL 11037517 (M.D. Fla. 2017)(staying claim and ordering Plaintiff to comply with 

conditions precedent under § 501.98, Fla. Stat.). Plaintiff did not comply with this condition 

precedent. See Ex. 1: Decla. of M. Ranilla, ¶ 6.

Section 501.98(8), Fla. Stat. makes clear that if a plaintiff initiates civil litigation 

without first complying with this requirement “the court... shall stay the action upon timely 

motion by the claimant until claimant complies with this section.” Williams, 2017 WL 

11037517 at * 2 (“Thus, if a plaintiff initiates a civil action without complying with 

FDUTPA’s conditions precedent, the court is required to stay the action until the plaintiff 

complies with this section.”).

Given Plaintiff’s failure comply with this requirement, this Court must stay the 

proceedings as to Count III until Plaintiff has complied with the conditions precedent for 

bringing litigation under FDUTPA against Lorenzo Ford.8

WHEREFORE, Defendant, Lorenzo Ford, by and through undersigned counsel, 

would respectfully request that this Court enter an Order granting Defendant's Motion to

Compel Arbitration as to each of the claims by Plaintiff against Lorenzo Ford and enter an 

order Staying the Proceedings pending binding arbitration. Defendant, also respectfully 

request that this Court enter an Order granting the Motion to Stay the proceeding as to Count 

III until Plaintiff complies with conditions precedent under Section 501.98, Fla. Stat., and/or 

direct such actions before initiating arbitration, as well as any other relief the Court deems 

proper. Lorenzo Ford reserves any and all defenses to the Complaint.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), counsel for Defendant has conferred with counsel 

for Plaintiff in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised herein and has been unable to do 

7 This requirement is not insignificant, as § 501.98(4)(a), Fla. Stat. makes clear that “[a] claimant may not initiate 

civil litigation, including arbitration, against a dealer ... for a claim arising under this chapter related to, or in 

connection with, the transaction or event described in the demand letter if, within 30 days after receipt of the 

demand letter, the dealer pays the claimant the amount sought in the demand letter, plus a surcharge of the lesser 

of $500 or 10 percent of the damages claimed.” Thus, the pre-suit requirements allow motor vehicle dealers to 

resolve these matters early on so as to avoid unnecessary litigation. 8 Count I of the Complaint brings FDUTPA claims against Ford Motor Company, not Lorenzo Ford. In the 

event that Plaintiff asserts Count I’s claims are also directed at Lorenzo Ford, this count would also need to be 

stayed.

Case 1:20-cv-22485-MGC Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/23/2020 Page 20 of 21
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so.

Dated: July 23, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

BASS SOX MERCER

/s/ Jason T. Allen

Jason T. Allen (FBN 25659)

2822 Remington Green Circle

Tallahassee, FL 32303

Telephone (850) 878-6404

Facsimile (850) 942-4869

jallen@dealerlawyer.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 23, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing motion with 

the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing 

to the following at their e-mail address on file with the Court:

Laurence M. Krutchick

LMK Legal

7450 SW 172nd Street

Palmetto Bay, FL 33157

lmk@lmklegal.com

Timothy G. Blood

Paula R. Brown

Jennifer L. MacPhearson

Blood Hurst & O’Readon, LLP

501 West Broadway, Suite 1490

San Diego, CA 92101

tblood@bholaw.com

pbrown@bholaw.com

jmacphearson@bholaw.com

Michael T. Fraser

The Fraser Law Firm, P.C.

4120 Douglas Blvd., Suite 306-262

Granite Bay, CA 95716

mfraser@fraserlawfirm.net

David Massey 

Florida Bar Number: 086129 

David.massey@hoganlovells.com

Reginald Cuyler Jr. 

Florida Bar Number: 0114062 

reginald.cuyler@hoganlovells.com

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 600 Brickell 

Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Telephone: 

(305) 459-6500 Facsimile: (305) 459-6550

/s/ Jason T. Allen

Jason T. Allen (FBN 25659)

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