PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 09-1845 

_____________

ANGELIKA LAMONT, 

Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the 

Estate of Eric J. Quick, 

 Appellant 

v. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

MARK MANZO; 

CHRISTOPHER MODARELLI; 

KEITH MOYER, 

JOHN DOES, A-Z, fictitious names, police officers, 

supervisors, trainers, instructors, employees, agents and/or 

servants of the STATE OF NEW JERSEY and/or NEW 

JERSEY STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, jointly, 

severally, individually and/or in the alternative 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

District Court No. 1-04-cv-02476 

District Judge: The Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
2 

Argued January 25, 2011 

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 

and STEARNS, District Judge*

(Filed: March 4, 2011) 

Andrew M. Smith (argued) 

Amanda J. Houpt 

Smith, Marcino & Bowman 

208 North Easton Road 

Willow Grove, Pennsylvania 19090 

Counsel for Appellant

John C. Connell (argued) 

John P. Kahn 

Archer & Greiner 

One Centennial Square 

P.O. Box 3000 

Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033 

Counsel for Appellees

________________ 

 OPINION 

________________ 

SMITH, Circuit Judge. 

 

*

 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge 

for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
3 

This civil-rights case was filed after law enforcement 

officers shot and killed a suspected car thief during a standoff. 

Immediately prior to the shooting, the suspect had been 

standing with his right hand concealed in his waistband and 

appeared to be clutching an object. After being ordered both 

to show his hands and to freeze, the suspect suddenly pulled 

his right hand out of his waistband—not as if he were 

surrendering—but as though he were drawing a gun. The 

sudden movement prompted the officers to open fire, leading 

to the suspect’s death. The officers fired their guns for 10 

solid seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. Eighteen bullets 

hit the suspect, 11 of them from behind. It turned out that the 

suspect was not clutching a weapon; he was holding a crack 

pipe. 

 The administrator of the suspect’s estate filed this suit 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the officers’ use of 

force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. 

In due course, the District Court granted a defense motion for 

summary judgment, holding that the officers acted reasonably 

as a matter of law. To the extent that the District Court held 

that the suspect’s abrupt, threatening movement justified the 

officers’ initial use of deadly force, we agree. However, we 

conclude that a jury should decide whether the force became 

unreasonable some time thereafter—i.e., whether the officers 

should have ceased firing their weapons before they did. 

Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
4 

I

1

The events surrounding the deadly shooting took place 

shortly after 10:00 p.m. on July 21, 2003. New Jersey State 

Troopers Christopher Modarelli, Mark Manzo, Keith Moyer, 

Joseph Carson, and Thomas Hollywood were at the Bellmawr 

State Police Station when the radio dispatcher reported that 

local police were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle on Interstate 

295 near Route 30. The location is within the Bellmawr 

station’s jurisdiction, so the troopers drove out to the scene. 

When they arrived, they were advised that the suspect, a 

white male wearing a white t-shirt, dark sweat pants, and no 

shoes, had abandoned the vehicle and fled into the woods 

bordering the interstate. They were also told that local police 

officer Robert Swanson had gone after him. Modarelli, 

Moyer, Manzo, and Carson went into the woods to provide 

backup for Swanson. Hollywood stayed behind. 

The woods were dark and dense. The officers needed 

their flashlights just to see in front of them. At one point, 

Modarelli stumbled upon the suspect who was hiding under 

some brush. Modarelli ordered him to show his hands and 

surrender, but the suspect disregarded the commands and ran 

away. Modarelli, now joined by Moyer, followed after him. 

During the chase, the suspect got caught in a thicket. 

 

1

 As we must, we recount the facts and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the party who 

opposed summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 

(2007). 
5 

Trapped, he turned and faced Modarelli and Moyer, who 

drew their guns. Modarelli and Moyer shouted, “Don’t make 

me shoot you,” and (inconsistently) ordered the suspect to 

show his hands and to freeze. Swanson, Carson, and Manzo 

heard the commotion and joined Modarelli and Moyer. 

Manzo unholstered his gun. 

The officers were standing between five and eight feet 

from the suspect, and had their flashlights trained on him. 

They repeatedly ordered the suspect to show his hands and to 

freeze. Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo had their guns drawn 

and pointed at the suspect. Although facing the officers, the 

suspect’s body was not square. He was standing at an angle, 

with his right shoulder forward. His left hand was positioned 

above his forehead (apparently to shield his eyes from the 

light), while his right hand was tucked into the left side of his 

waistband and appeared to be clutching an object. 

Suddenly, the suspect pulled his right hand out of his 

waistband, not as if he were surrendering, but quickly and as 

if he were drawing a pistol. As the suspect made the sudden 

movement, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo opened fire. As the 

first shots were fired, Carson’s flashlight was hit by a 

projectile (later determined to be a ricochet from one of the 

troopers’ shots), and he fell to the ground. Swanson went to 

his aid, and after determining that he was unwounded, helped 

him up. Meanwhile, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo continued 

firing at the suspect. At some point, the suspect turned away 

from the officers, yet they kept firing, shooting him in the 

legs and buttocks. The suspect finally fell to the ground, 

landing on his stomach and facing away from the officers. 
6 

Swanson approached the suspect and determined that he had 

no pulse. He was later pronounced dead. 

In all, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo fired 

continuously for ten seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. 

Modarelli and Moyer each fired 14 shots (thus emptying their 

magazines), and Manzo fired 11 times. Eighteen bullets 

struck the suspect, and 11 hit him from behind. A medical 

examiner identified two bullets that were likely fatal, both of 

which struck the suspect in the chest. The examiner could 

not, however, determine when during the course of the 

shooting the fatal bullets hit the suspect. 

The suspect was later determined to be Eric Quick. It 

turned out that Quick did not have a gun in his right hand; he 

held only a crack pipe. The pipe was shaped like a 

cigarette—two inches long, cylindrical, and clear. A 

toxicology report suggests that Quick was under the influence 

of cocaine and heroin at the time of the incident. 

II

 The plaintiff is the administrator ad prosequendum of 

Quick’s estate. On April 14, 2004, she filed this lawsuit in 

state court. In relevant part, the complaint asserts Fourth 

Amendment excessive-force claims against Modarelli, 

Moyer, and Manzo. The troopers removed the case to the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on 

May 27, 2004. In 2005, the case was stayed pending the 

outcome of a grand jury investigation into the troopers’ 

conduct. The grand jury ultimately declined to indict the 
7 

troopers, and the case was resumed. On May 22, 2008, the 

troopers moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense 

of qualified immunity. 

The District Court granted the motion on February 25, 

2009. The Court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 

the use of force was necessarily unreasonable because the 

troopers’ decision to pursue Quick into the woods—rather 

than set up a perimeter and use a K-9 to flush him out—was 

unreasonable. This argument lacks merit, the Court 

explained, because “the act that presumably justified the use 

of deadly force was not the [troopers]’, but rather Quick’s. 

The troopers did not resort to deadly force until Quick 

suddenly ripped his right hand from his waistband.” JA 15. 

The Court next concluded that Quick’s sudden, threatening 

movement justified the troopers’ initial use of deadly force. 

Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there 

is a triable issue on whether the use of force, even if initially 

justified, became unreasonable as the events transpired. The 

Court opined, “When Quick made a sudden movement and 

ripped his right hand from his left waistband, the troopers, 

believing Quick had a gun, all fired at the same time and 

stopped once Quick was no longer a threat.” Id. at 22. The 

Court acknowledged that “the number of bullets fired appears 

‘excessive’ in laymen’s terms,” but stressed that “[t]here is no 

evidence that any of the troopers fired mindlessly or paused 

and then resumed firing after Quick was on the ground facedown.” Id. at 22–23. The Court explained further that, 

although “eleven bullets struck Quick in the posterior of his 

body[,]” this “does not, standing alone, show that” the 

troopers continued firing after “Quick was no longer a 
8 

threat.” Id. at 22 n.14. 

The plaintiff appealed. 

III 

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1291. Our review of a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment is plenary. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 

279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008). 

IV 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Facts that could 

affect the outcome are “material facts,” and a dispute about a 

material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to 

permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 

(1986). 

Because “the victim of deadly force is unable to 

testify,” Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999), 

we have recognized that a court ruling on summary judgment 

in a deadly-force case “should be cautious . . . to ‘ensure that 

the officer[s are] not taking advantage of the fact that the 
9 

witness most likely to contradict [their] story—the person 

shot dead—is unable to testify,’” id. (quoting Scott v. 

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). Thus, a court 

should avoid simply accepting “‘what may be a selfserving 

account by the officer[s]. It must also look at the 

circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to 

discredit the police officer[s’] story, and consider whether this 

evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the 

officer[s] acted unreasonably.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 

915). 

This is not to say that the summary judgment standard 

should be applied with extra rigor in deadly-force cases. Rule 

56 contains no separate provision governing summary 

judgment in such cases. Cf. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 

Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Just as in a run-ofthe-mill civil action, the party opposing summary judgment in 

a deadly-force case must point to evidence—whether direct or 

circumstantial—that creates a genuine issue of material fact, 

“and may not rely simply on the assertion that a reasonable 

jury could discredit the opponent[s’] account.” Estate of 

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003); see 

Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899–900 (8th Cir. 

2001); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1996); 

Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d 

Cir. 1989). Our conclusion on this score is reinforced by 

decisions refusing to ratchet up the summary judgment 

standard for other types of cases. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

256–57 (defamation cases requiring a showing of malice); 

Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1396 (employment-discrimination 

cases); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st 
10 

Cir. 1987) (antitrust cases); see also Gordon v. United 

Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 896 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, 

J., dissenting) (“[Rule 56 prescribes] a universally applicable 

standard; there is no room for a thumb on the scale against 

summary judgment in any class of cases.”).

V 

The District Court held that the troopers were entitled 

to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claims. Government officials performing discretionary 

functions are immune “from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982). To determine whether an officer is qualifiedly 

immune from suit, we ask (1) whether the officer violated a 

constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly 

established, such that “it would [have been] clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 

situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–

02 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 

(1987) (holding that, for purposes of the second question, the 

right must have been clearly established in a particularized 

sense, such that “a reasonable official would [have 

understood] that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] that right”). 

Although we have discretion to tackle the “clearly 

established” issue first, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 

818 (2009), we will begin with the question whether the 

troopers violated Quick’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
11 

A

 The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . 

. . seizures.” To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and 

that it was unreasonable under the circumstances. Brower v. 

County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). There is no dispute 

that the troopers “seized” Quick when they shot and killed 

him. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding 

that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure”). 

The question, instead, is whether the seizure was 

unreasonable. 

 It is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force 

against a suspect unless the officer has good reason “to 

believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 

serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 

U.S. at 3. In determining whether this standard was violated, 

we must remember that law enforcement officers “are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Thus, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a 

particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 

a reasonable officer on the scene”; Monday morning 

quarterbacking is not allowed. Id. at 396; see also Brown v. 

United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.) 

(“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 

an uplifted knife.”). Under this “standard of reasonableness 
12 

at the moment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, an officer who 

uses deadly force in the mistaken belief that a suspect is 

armed will be forgiven so long as the mistake is reasonable 

and the circumstances otherwise justify the use of such force. 

See id. at 396; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Curley v. Klem, 298 

F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002). 

In this case, the troopers were advised that local police 

were driving down the interstate in pursuit of a suspected car 

thief, later determined to be Quick. Car theft is a relatively 

serious (though not inherently violent) offense. When the 

troopers arrived at the scene, they were told that Quick had 

fled into the dark, thicket-filled woods bordering the 

interstate. Once in the woods, Modarelli happened upon 

Quick and ordered him to show his hands and surrender. 

Quick fled. When they encountered Quick again, the troopers 

repeatedly ordered him to show his hands and to freeze. 

Quick refused to comply. Instead, he stood with his right 

hand concealed in his waistband, apparently clutching an 

object. He then suddenly pulled his right hand out of his 

waistband—a movement uniformly described by those on the 

scene as being similar to that of drawing a gun. At that point, 

the troopers were justified in opening fire. “An officer is not 

constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon [a] 

weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself 

against a fleeing suspect who . . . moves as though to draw a 

gun.” Thompson, 257 F.3d at 899. Waiting in such 

circumstances could well prove fatal. Police officers do not 

enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to uphold the 

Constitution. See also Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 439 

(8th Cir. 1993) (shooting was reasonable where, during a foot 
13 

chase of an armed assault suspect, the suspect suddenly 

reached into his waistband despite having been ordered to 

freeze); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500–01 (5th Cir. 

1991) (shooting was reasonable where officers approached 

the vehicle of a robbery suspect and, after being ordered to 

show his hands, the suspect reached under his seat multiple 

times). 

To be sure, the plaintiff’s brief suggests that Quick 

was simply complying with the order that he show his hands 

when he pulled his hand out of his waistband. See Pl.’s Br. at 

10. But, as the plaintiff seemed to acknowledge at oral 

argument, the undisputed evidence shows that Quick pulled 

his hand out of his waistband, not as if he were surrendering, 

but abruptly and as though he were drawing a pistol. Given 

the state of the record, we are compelled to hold that the 

troopers reasonably believed that Quick was drawing a gun, 

not complying with their command that he show his hands. 

B 

The plaintiff argues that there is a triable issue on 

whether the troopers’ continued use of force, even if initially 

justified, became excessive as the events unfolded. We agree. 

Even where an officer is initially justified in using force, he 

may not continue to use such force after it has become 

evident that the threat justifying the force has vanished. See

Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 

2009) (observing that “an exercise of force that is reasonable 

at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the 

justification for the use of force has ceased”); Waterman v. 
14 

Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[F]orce justified 

at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds 

later if the justification for the initial force has been 

eliminated.”); Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (“A passing risk to a 

police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise 

unthreatening suspect.”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 

(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which 

he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot 

at any time thereafter with impunity.”).

Here, the troopers opened fire as Quick yanked his 

right hand out of his waistband. At that point, the troopers 

reasonably believed that Quick was pulling a gun on them. 

But after Quick made this sudden movement, his right hand 

was visible to the troopers, who were standing between five 

and eight feet away and had their flashlights trained on him. 

(Indeed, Modarelli has stated that he could see Quick’s right

hand while firing his weapon.) Although Quick’s weaponless 

right hand was fully visible immediately after the troopers 

began firing, the troopers continued to fire for roughly 10 

seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. On these facts, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that the troopers should have 

recognized that Quick was unarmed and stopped firing 

sooner. 

We have not overlooked the fact that, just as the 

troopers began firing, Carson’s flashlight was struck by a 

projectile, causing him to fall to the ground. We assume that 

the troopers could reasonably have believed that the flashlight 

was hit by return fire, thus justifying the further use of deadly 

force. But the evidence shows that the flashlight was hit as 
15 

the first shots were fired. In our view, a jury could find that 

the troopers should have realized that Quick did not have a 

weapon some time thereafter and ceased fire. 

We are, moreover, concerned by the fact that 11 of the 

18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from behind. The 

troopers try to explain this by saying that Quick spun around 

and fell to the ground as the final shots were fired. Frankly, 

this explanation sounds a bit far-fetched. If the troopers’ 

account were accurate, one might expect to discover that a 

small number of bullets hit Quick from behind. In fact, more 

than half of the 18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from 

behind. In these circumstances, a jury may find that the 

troopers improperly continued firing after Quick had turned 

away from them and no longer posed a threat. See Bing v. 

City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Carr 

v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003); Gardner 

v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253–54 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis, 999 

F.2d at 247; Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1332–

33 (11th Cir. 1988).2

 

Having determined that a jury could find that the 

troopers’ use of force reached excessive proportions, we now 

move to the second qualified immunity question: whether the 

right at issue was clearly established. See Saucier, 533 U.S. 

at 201. We conclude that it was. As explained, the evidence 

 

2

 On the current record, the timing of the fatal shots is unknown, so 

the troopers have not suggested that Quick had already died by the 

time any excessive shots were fired. 
16 

would permit the conclusion that the troopers continued firing 

at Quick after a reasonable officer would have realized that he 

did not pose a serious threat and stopped shooting. Assuming 

(as we must) that this view of the evidence is the one that 

ultimately will prevail, the troopers clearly are not entitled to 

qualified immunity. It has long been the law that an officer 

may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer 

reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious 

bodily injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 

11; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294. In short, the dispute in this 

case is about the facts, not the law. The doctrine of qualified 

immunity is therefore inapposite. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

205 (qualified immunity excuses reasonable “mistake[s] as to 

what the law requires”). 

C 

 Finally, the plaintiff argues that the troopers’ decision 

to pursue Quick into the woods violated standard police 

procedures and was unreasonable. According to a police 

expert retained by the plaintiff, the troopers should have set 

up a perimeter around the woods and used a K-9 to flush 

Quick out. If the decision to enter the woods was 

unreasonable, the plaintiff reasons, then any force employed 

once in the woods was necessarily unreasonable, too, because 

the force would not have been used had the troopers not gone 

into the woods. We reject this argument, as it is premised on 

a flawed understanding of the doctrine of proximate 

causation. 

 Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish 
17 

both causation in fact and proximate causation. See Brower, 

489 U.S. at 599; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 

(1980); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); 

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 

A superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate causation. 

Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1993); Warner 

v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 

1997) (noting that “in cases brought under § 1983 a 

superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law 

tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability”); Hector v. 

Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J., 

concurring) (observing, in a § 1983 case, that the “causal 

chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can be broken by a 

. . . superseding cause”); see generally Restatement (Second) 

of Torts §§ 440–453 (1965). 

 In Bodine, for example, police officers entered the 

plaintiff’s home to arrest him. According to the officers, the 

plaintiff reacted violently, thus requiring them to use force to 

effect the arrest. 72 F.3d at 395. The district court held that 

the officers’ entry into the plaintiff’s home was unreasonable 

and violated the Fourth Amendment. Having so concluded, 

the court held that any force used once in the home, even if 

ostensibly justified, was necessarily unreasonable. Id. at 395–

96. We disagreed with this analysis, explaining that it 

misapplied the doctrines of proximate and superseding 

causation. To illustrate, then-Judge Alito offered the 

following hypothetical, which is instructive here: 

Suppose that three police officers go to a 

suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and 
18 

that they [enter illegally.] Once inside, they 

encounter the suspect, identify themselves, 

show him the warrant, and tell him that they are 

placing him under arrest. The suspect, 

however, breaks away, shoots and kills two of 

the officers, and is preparing to shoot the third 

officer when that officer disarms the suspect 

and in the process injures him. Is the third 

officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to 

the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry . . 

. rendered any subsequent use of force 

unlawful? The obvious answer is “no.” . . . . 

The suspect’s conduct would constitute a 

“superseding” cause . . . that would limit the 

officer’s liability. 

Id. at 400. In other words, as long as “the officer[’s] use of 

force was reasonable given the plaintiff’s acts, then despite 

the illegal entry, the plaintiff’s own conduct would be a 

[superseding] cause that limited the officer[’s] liability.” 

Hector, 235 F.3d at 160 (describing Bodine); see also 

Brower, 489 U.S. at 599; Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 

F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 1985). But see Espinosa v. City 

and Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 538–39 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

The D.C. Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in 

Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). There, an off-duty police officer observed two people 

having sex inside a parked car. The officer tapped on the 

window of the car as he walked past. Irritated, the driver 
19 

attempted to run the officer over. The officer jumped out of 

the way, drew his gun, and ordered the occupants out. Once 

outside, the driver made a threatening movement towards the 

officer, whereupon the officer shot and killed him. 494 F.3d 

at 1099–1100. In the ensuing civil suit, the plaintiff advanced 

the theory that, if the officer had acted unreasonably in 

initiating the encounter, the officer was necessarily liable for 

the shooting, regardless of whether it was done in selfdefense. The D.C. Circuit rejected this theory, holding that 

the suspect’s threatening movement was a superseding cause 

that broke the causal chain between the initial stop and the 

shooting. Id. at 1104–05 & n.5. 

Based on Bodine and Hundley, we conclude that the 

troopers’ decision to enter the woods did not proximately 

cause Quick’s death. Rather, Quick’s noncompliant, 

threatening conduct in the woods was a superseding cause 

that served to break the chain of causation between the entry 

and the shooting. Holding otherwise would, as noted in 

Hundley, tend to deter police officers “from approaching and 

detaining potentially violent suspects.” 494 F.3d at 1105. 

VI 

 The District Court correctly determined that the 

troopers’ initial use of deadly force was permissible. But the 

Court erred in ruling for the troopers on the plaintiff’s claim 

that the force became excessive as the events transpired. It 

may be that the troopers were justified in their use of force at 

all times, but it will be up to a jury to make that decision. The 

District Court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and 
20 

reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for further 

proceedings.