### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2794- 22 D.W.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. A.L.H., Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted March 11, 2024

– Decided March 20 , 202 4 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FV- 12

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- 04. A.L.H., appellant pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2794

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Defendant A.L.H. 1 appeals from September 1, 2022 and April 3, 2023 orders, which enforced his obligation to pay child support arrears to plaintiff
D.W.A. We affirm. Defendant is the father of two children he had wit h plaintiff, both of whom are now adults and emancipated. This child support dispute arises from a final restraining order (FRO), entered in favor of plaint iff against defendant in 2004. Pursuant to the FRO, defendant was obligated to pay child support, but instead amassed an arrearage exceeding $166,000 by the time the court heard the matter
in September 2022. The September hearing pertained to plaintiff's app eal from a child support hearing officer (CSHO) determination regarding defe ndant's obligation to pay the arrears. Both parties testified and the court obtained the following salient facts from defendant. He testified he had completed one year of college and worked in information technology (IT) for thirty ye ars. Defendant told the court he worked two IT jobs at a combined rate of ei ght y-five dollars per hour, which totaled $110,000 in yearly earnings. He had been o ut of work for two months, because there was a workforce reduction in one job and the other was a temporary position. He testified he had been conducting a job search by "go[ing]

1 We use initials to protect plaintiff's confidenti ality. R. 1:38 -3(d)(10).3 A- 2794

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online a lot," attending a job fair three months pr ior, and "putting . . . [his] name out there, . . . [and] calling up former colleagues ." Although defendant's arrearage was substantial, he admitted he had not made any payments, except by way of an involuntary levy in 2021. He conceded he owed the money and had not been meeting his obli gation. However, he managed to pay his rent for seven years and sold a car to meet his expenses, but not the arrearage obligation. Defendant testified h e was fifty-nine years old and not disabled. He claimed he had filed a motion to modify the arrears. The court entered the September 1, 2022 order requi ring defendant to : pay $1,000 by September 15, 2022 and $1,000 by October 13, 2022; pay $476 per week and stay current thereafter ; and provide probation with proof of ten job searches per week. A bench warrant would issue if defendant failed to comply with the order. Defendant did not appeal from the September order. In March 2023, probation moved to enforce litigant' s rights because defendant failed to comply with the September order . The CSHO found defendant was willfully noncompliant with the Septe mber order and sought defendant's incarceration

. The parties appeared and testified before a differ ent judge . Defendant's arrears totaled more than $164,000.4 A- 2794

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The judge noted that rather than pay the $476 per w eek, defendant was "paying, at his prerogative, between [thirty] and [ fifty] dollars per week." Further, defendant's probation officer had asked him to participate in a judiciarysponsored employment program geared to job placemen t in the IT field, but defendant did not comply. Defendant claimed he cou ld not travel from his home in Hudson County to Middlesex County to attend job fairs. Defendant reiterated he had once been making "somet hing like $95,000 a
year, " but was "not earning anything now." When the judge asked defendant how he was surviving, he advised he "had some money [set] aside." Defendant said his last full-time job was in 2018 and his las t employment of any type was in 2019. Probation advised the judge defendant's j ob searches were vague. Plaintiff noted the coercive measures the court too k in its September order had worked to an extent, because defendant made both $1 ,000 lump sum arrears payments. Defendant claimed he filed a motion to mo dify the arrearage amount in December 2022. However, the court had no record of the motion. Based on the facts presented, the judge found defen dant had the ability to pay $2,500 within two weeks and make another $2,500 payment two weeks thereafter. The judge ordered defendant to continu e provid ing proof of ten job searches per week and furnish proof of more detaile d job searches. Defendant5 A- 2794

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was order ed to comply with the probation officer's instruction s "regarding job fairs and other employment assistance." The judge did not incarcerate defendant.
I. On appeal, defendant claims the court intimidated him at the September 2022 hearing and never determined the issue of indi gency or his ability to pay. He alleges the court never considered his tax retur ns, pay stubs, or W2s. Defendant argues the court misinterpreted his earni ngs based on his testimony and imputed an income to him that he did not earn. He reiterates he filed a motion to modify his obligations in December 2022 t hat was never heard. Defendant claims the court repeated the same errors when it entered the April 2023 order. Moreover, he was prejudiced by t he CSHO's finding he was willfully not complying with the September 2022 ord er. Defendant claims he was unable to comply with the September 2022 order because of the COVID-19 pandemic and lock-down restrictions. Furthermore, the court ignored his job search efforts. Defendant blames plaintiff for orchestrating the p roceedings. He claims she sat on her rights for twenty years, the childre n are emancipated, and she now wants a windfall. He alleges the court misapplied the law because it was6 A- 2794

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required to weigh the statutory child support facto rs, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), before enforcing the arrears, and failed to make th ose findings as required by Rule 1:7 -4. Defendant claims the bench warrant requirement wa s "an egregious abuse of discretion as it is too excessive, when th ere are other remedies available, including termination of the child suppo rt arrearages due to [p]laintiff's bad faith abuse" of the legal process

. II. The general rule is that "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible e vidence." Gnall v. Gnall , 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). Therefore, we review a child support determination for an abuse of discretion. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012). "If consistent with the law, [the decision] will no t be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice ." Ibid. (quoting Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001 )). However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017).7 A- 2794

- 22 II I. At the outset, we decline to consider defendant's arguments pertaining to the September 2022 order because he did not file a timely appeal from that order.
R. 2:4 -1(a). The September order, along with the court's finding regarding defendant's arrears, earnings, and ability to pay, is final.
IV. "The obligation to provide child support 'is engrai ned into our common law, statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (qu oting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). For that reason, "enforcing the parental duty to support children is 'an inherent part of the "best interest s of the child" rubric which underlies our family courts.'" Ibid. (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Div. of Soc. Servs. for D.M. v. G.D.M., 308 N.J. Super. 83, 88 ( Ch. Div. 1997)). It is well-established "the enforcement, collection , [and] modification . . . of unpaid arrearages in . . . child support payment s are matters addressed to the sound discretion of the court." In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. 317, 327 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N .J. Super. 130, 141 (App. Div. 1981)). Likewise, the "[i]mputation of income is a discreti onary matter not capable of precise or exact determination[,] but ra ther require[s] a trial judge to8 A- 2794

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realistically appraise capacity to earn and job ava ilability." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (second alter ation in original) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 158 (App. Div. 2013) , rev'd on other grounds, 222 N.J. 414 (2015)). Having considered the record pursuant to these prin ciples, we reject defendant's arguments the April 2023 order was the product of either an abuse of discretion or a misapplication of the law. Init ially, defendant's assertion the court was required to apply the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a ) factors in deciding the arrearage issue is misplaced. That statute governs the calculation of child support, not the setting of an arrearage payback am ount. We also reject the claim the court erred when it enforced his obligation to pay the arrears. The record reveals defendant made no mean ingful effort to pay child support, let alone the arrears, and only made limited payments because of the coercive effect of the enforcement orders enter ed by the court. Defendant claims the court failed to consider his income docu mentation, yet the record does not show he offered it to the court and no such doc umentation is contained in the appellate record. The record is also devoid of the job searches he claims the CSHO misrepresented to the court. Rather, the reco rd shows the court discerned defendant's income and ability to pay, based on his sworn testimony and9 A- 2794

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representations he had earned between $95,000 and $ 110,000. Therefore, the substantial, credible evidence in the record showed defendant was not indigent, had the ability to pay, and willfully refused to do so. Defendant's claim he filed a motion to modify the a rrears is unavailing. He never told the court why he was entitled to a mo dification and how it would impact the arrears that had accumulated. Defendant 's appellate appendix contains only the first page of the modification application bear ing the court's received and filed stamp dated December 28, 2022. However, beyond completing the caption and heading, the document is blank and provides no explanation of defendant's reasons for modifying th e arrears. We categorically reject defendant's argument that p laintiff was not entitled to the arrears because she sat on her righ ts. A review of the record shows she was anything but complacent and expressed frustration because defendant had refused to pay support while she was raising the children. It is inconsequential that the children are now emancipat ed. "Laches is an equitable doctrine which penalizes kn owing inaction by a party with a legal right from enforcing that right after passage of such a period of time that prejudice has resulted to the other [p arty] so that it would be10 A- 2794

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inequitable to enforce the right." L.V. v. R.S., 3 47 N.J. Super. 33, 39 (App. Div. 2002). Notably,

[t]he length of delay, reasons for delay, and chang ing conditions of either or both parties during the del ay are the most important factors that a court considers a nd weighs . . . . It is because the central issue is whether it is inequitable to permit the claim to be enforce d that generally the change in condition or relations of t he parties coupled with the passage of time becomes th e primary determinant . . .

. Inequity more often than not, will turn on whether a party has been misled to [th eir] harm by the delay. [Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of Hackensack , 90 N.J. 145, 152- 53 (1982)).]
"T he application of laches to matters of parent-child relationships have been carefully circumscribed." Id. at 41. Laches clearly does not apply here because th ere is no evidence plaintiff acquiesced in the enforcement of the child support a rrears or that defendant was "misled to his harm by the delay." Id . at 39. As we noted, it was plaintiff who appeal ed from the CSHO's arrearage payback determination in September 2022. When the court asked her why she was appealing, she said: "I've been at this for numerous years with . . . defendant. He was ordered to do job searches before and didn't comply . . . . I just don't have any faith that he's going to do what is recommended."11 A- 2794

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We also decline to apply laches here because it is fundamental that child support belongs to the child and cannot be waived b y a parent. Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993). Therefore, even if plaintiff were negligent in enforcing defendant's a rrearage obligation, "there is no basis to impute to a child the custodial parent' s negligence, purposeful delay[,] or obstinacy so as to vitiate the child's independent right of support from a natural parent." L. V., 347 N.J. Super. at 40. Finally, it is a bedrock principle of our law that both parents bear the obligation for support of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 593 (1995). Another basic principle is that one who se eks equity must do equity and come to court with clean hands. Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 345 (2009).

The doctrine of unclean hands embraces the principl e that a court should not grant equitable relief to a party who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matt er of the suit. It calls for the exercise of careful and just discretion in denying remedies where a suitor is gu ilty of bad faith, fraud[,] or unconscionable acts in th e underlying transaction. [Pellitteri v. Pellitteri, 266 N.J. Super. 56, 65 ( App. Div. 1993) (citation omitted) .] Defendant's refusal to pay child support, except by means of coercive enforcement, convinces us he acted in bad faith and had unclean hands. As a result of his conduct, his children entered adultho od without the benefit of his12 A- 2794

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support. Although defendant's appearances at the September 2022 and A pril
2023 hearings were not pursuant to an arrest warrant, ne ither the legal nor the equitable arguments defendant raises on appeal favo r relieving him from the obligation to comply with the April 3, 2023 order. To the extent we have not addressed an argument rai sed on the appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant dis cussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.