Service Assessment

OHIO RIVER VALLEY FLOOD OF

MARCH 1997

August 1998

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Office of Hydrology

Silver Spring, Maryland
Service Assessment

 OHIO RIVER VALLEY FLOOD OF 

 MARCH 1997

August 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

William M. Daley, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

D. James Baker, Administrator

National Weather Service

John J. Kelly, Jr., Assistant Administrator
ii

 PREFACE

The National Weather Service (NWS), a line office of the Department of Commerce’s (DOC)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for providing public

forecasts and warnings of weather and river conditions for the protection of life and property and

to enhance the Nation’s economy. The NWS conducts a survey of significant weather events to

thoroughly assess the performance of the forecast system.

A NWS evaluation team was sent to the Ohio River Valley following severe weather events in

early March of 1997 that produced extensive flash flooding and record river flooding across the

region. The team focused on the hardest hit areas in the Ohio Valley including north central 

Kentucky and southwest Ohio. The team met with staff members of NWS offices in Louisville,

Kentucky, and Wilmington, Ohio, the Ohio River Forecast Center (OHRFC), and the National

Centers for Environmental Prediction’s (NCEP) Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPC),

as well as with State Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs) in both Kentucky and Ohio.

The survey provides an evaluation of the NWS weather forecasting and warning program and

offers recommendations for improvements in products and services. The survey team wishes to

thank all of the NWS personnel and state EMA officials that contributed information to the team.

We wish to express our sympathy for the losses experienced by the survivors of the floods and

extend our deepest regards to the friends and families of the ones lost to the disaster.

 John J. Kelly, Jr.

 Assistant Administrator

 for Weather Services

 
iii

 

 FOREWORD 

The commitment to excellence was demonstrated in the products and services provided by the

staffs at NWS offices throughout the Ohio Valley Flood of March 1997. These talented and

dedicated NWS teams were honored by being recipients of important achievement awards in the

months following the event.

 

NWSFO Louisville, NWSO Jackson, and NWSO Paducah each received the 1997 NOAA Bronze

Medal Awards. NWS Ohio River Forecast Center and NWSO Wilmington were each presented

the 1997 DOC Silver Medal. 

The outstanding performance of these offices serves as examples for all of us.

Glenn S. Austin, Survey Team Leader

Deputy Chief, Hydrologic Operations Division

National Weather Service
iv

 SERVICE ASSESSMENT TEAM

Following a major storm in which there has been a loss of life or extensive damage, a service

assessment team may be assigned by the NWS to provide an objective appraisal of products and

services and to make findings and recommendations for improving service. Such a team was

assembled to survey The Ohio Valley Flood of March 1997.

TEAM MEMBERS

Team Leader 

Glenn Austin Deputy Chief, Hydrologic Operations Division, Office of Hydrology, NWS

Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland

Kenneth Rizzo Meteorologist in Charge, NWSFO Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Al Matte IFLOWS Program Manager, NWS Eastern Region Headquarters,

Bohemia, New York

Bryce Finnerty (former) Research Hydrologist, River Forecast Systems Group, Office of

Hydrology, NWS Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland. Currently, 

Special Projects Section Leader, Dewberry & Davis Inc., Fairfax, Virginia
v

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Page

Preface......................................................................................................................... ii

Foreword..................................................................................................................... iii

Service Assessment Team............................................................................................. iv

Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................................................ vi

Executive Summary..................................................................................................... ix

Findings and Recommendations................................................................................... 1

Ohio River Forecast Center.............................................................................. 1

NWSFO Louisville, Kentucky.......................................................................... 1

NWSO Wilmington, Ohio................................................................................ 1

Emergency Management.................................................................................. 2

Observational Data.......................................................................................... 3

Dissemination.................................................................................................. 3

Appendix A - Hydrometeorological Summary.............................................................. A-1

Antecedent Conditions..................................................................................... A-1

Hydrometeorological Discussion...................................................................... A-1

Appendix B - Focus Areas............................................................................................ B-1

QPF.................................................................................................................. B-1

Stream gage reduction...................................................................................... B-6

External Coordination....................................................................................... B-6

Appendix C - Data Collection Systems......................................................................... C-1

Background ..................................................................................................... C-2

Automated Flood Warning Systems.................................................................. C-2

Appendix D - Office Summaries................................................................................... D-1

Ohio River Forecast Center............................................................................... D-1

NWSFO Louisville............................................................................................ D-4

NWSO Wilmington.......................................................................................... D-5
vi

 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFOS Automation of Field Operations and Services

AFWS Automated Flood Warning System

AHPS Advanced Hydrologic Prediction System

API Antecedent Precipitation Index

AWIPS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System

COMET Cooperative Program for Operational Meteorology and Educational Training

CSI Critical Success Index

CWA County Warning Area

DAPM Data Acquisition Program Manager

DCP Data Collection Platform

DES Department of Emergency Services

DWOPER Operational Dynamic Wave Model

EM Emergency Managers

EMA Emergency Management Agency

EOC Emergency Operation Centers

ESF Flood Potential Statement

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFA Flash Flood Watch

FFW Flash Flood Warning

FLDWAV Flood Wave (Dynamic Routing Model in NWSRFS)

FLW River Flood Warning

GUI Graphical User Interface

HAS Hydrometeorological Analysis and Support

HPC Hydrometeorological Prediction Center

HSA Hydrologic Service Area

ICP Interactive Calibration Program

IFLOWS Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System

KDES Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services

KEWS Kentucky Emergency Warning System

MAP Mean Areal Precipitation

MIC Meteorologist in Charge

NCEP National Centers for Environmental Prediction

NEXRAD NEXt Generation RADar

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NWR NOAA Weather Radio

NWSFO NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office

NWSO NEXRAD Weather Service Office

NWSRFC National Weather Service River Forecast System

NWS National Weather Service

NWW NOAA Weather Wire
vii

OFS Operational Forecast System

OHRFC Ohio River Forecast Center

PQPF Probabilistic Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts

QPF Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts

RFC River Forecast Center

RVF River Forecast Guidance

SOO Science and Operations Officer

STORMS State of Ohio Rain Monitoring System

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

UTC Coordinated Universal Time

WCM Warning Coordination Meteorologist

WFO Weather Forecast Office

WSR-88D Weather Service Radar-1988 Doppler

 
viii
ix

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction: A record event

The Ohio Valley is frequented by floods on an annual basis. However, flooding of the magnitude

comparable to the floods of March 1997 is a rare occurrence. Between March 1 and 3 , as much as

6 to 12 inches of rain fell in parts of northern Kentucky and southern Ohio. (See Figure 1.) This

produced a variety of flooding ranging from flash flooding in hilly terrain and poorly drained areas,

to small stream flooding in rural and urban areas, followed by very serious flooding that developed

along the Ohio River as well as many of its tributaries. 

Record flooding resulted along many rivers in northern Kentucky including the Rolling Fork River

at Boston, South Fork of the Licking River at Cynthiana, and the Licking River at Blue Licks Spring

and Falmouth. Record, or near record, flooding also occurred in Ohio with the most serious flooding

reported along Brush Creek and the Scioto and Great Miami Rivers. Levels on the main stem of the

Ohio were the highest in over 30 years.

Impact: Damages and fatalities

Disastrous flooding inundated dozens of river towns and cities forcing evacuations of thousands of

people. Most of the town of Falmouth in Pendleton County, Kentucky, with over 2,400 residents,

was evacuated. Flooding also inundated several other towns across the region including Boston,

Kentucky, where the water level reached the rooftops of many homes and smaller businesses.

Several communities along the Ohio River were given notice to prepare for flooding a day or more

in advance. This helped reduce damages significantly. Early warning of the flood allowed the city

engineers in Louisville to make use of the 45 flood gates, installed after the historic floods of 1937,

that protected all but the lowest elevations. Meanwhile, upstream, the NWS was given partial credit

for saving Opening Day of the Cincinnati Reds Baseball season. Forecasts from the OHRFC were

used in the flood warnings issued by NWSO Wilmington and relayed to the management at Cinergy

Field. Flood gates were closed and pumps activated that kept the flood water out of the stadium.

The flood warnings not only saved opening day, but also kept a new $2 million astroturf installation

from being ruined.

Major flooding impacted a total of six states across the region. The most severe flooding occurred

in Ohio and Kentucky with dozens of counties in each state declared natural disaster areas. Close to

14,000 homes were damaged or destroyed. Over 20,000 home and business owners applied for

disaster relief. Damage estimates totaled more than $500 million. 

Although effective lead time was provided by the NWS in the form of river flood and flash flood

warnings, a total of 33 people lost their lives due to flooding, including 21 in Kentucky, 5 in Ohio,

4 in Tennessee, and 3 in West Virginia. Hundreds of injuries were also reported. Many of these
x

 

 

 

 

 Figure 1. Storm Total Rainfall March 1-3, 1997.

losses may have been preventable. A dozen deaths were caused by drowning associated with vehicles

being swept away by flood currents. One university professor drowned while kayaking on a flooded

river, two drowned in a canoeing accident during the height of the floods, and another reportedly 

drowned while floating in a flooded stream in an inner tube. Five other victims of the floods were

safely evacuated but became worried about their property and returned home only to be trapped by

rising water and drowned. The specifics on the remaining deaths were not available. 
xi

Modernized NWS Forecast and Warning Services - An Operational Assessment

The NWS offices involved in this flood event produced literally hundreds of flood watches, warnings,

and follow-up statements. NWSFOs at Cleveland, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Charleston issued

flash flood watches for their respective forecast areas 4-8 hours ahead of the first occurrence

flooding. New “spin-up” offices (e.g., NWSOs in Paducah and Jackson, Kentucky, and Wilmington,

Ohio) were tested during this major event. Although many of their staffs had little or no previous

experience dealing with a flood event of this magnitude, the service assessment revealed that each

office performed admirably by providing timely and effective flood warnings for their service areas.

Ironically, Jackson, Kentucky, assumed responsibility for their hydrologic service area (HSA) on

March 1, 1997, the first day of the flood.

NWS modernization and restructuring includes the transferring of forecast and warning services from

the original 52 weather service forecast offices (approximately one per state) to 121 “advanced”

Weather Forecast Offices across the country. The transition for hydrologic services to the spin-up

offices in the Ohio Basin was completed prior to the timing of the event. This produced many

positive effects on field operations and services, as demonstrated during this flood. For example, the

NWSFO Louisville office previously was responsible for 80 specific river forecast points. This

number has now been reduced to 23 with the remaining sites distributed to several of the new offices;

such as, Paducah, Jackson, and Wilmington. 

Having the workload distributed to all of these offices helped make the job more manageable and

helped the staffs produce more timely flood watches and warnings. One negative effect the transition

has produced is that by dividing some of the river basins between two or more HSAs, it now makes

data collection and forecasting more complex requiring the River Forecast Center and emergency

managers (and other customers) to coordinate with more local NWS offices. 

The implementation of a National quantitative precipitation forecasting (QPF) program was another

NWS modernization milestone that helped NWS meteorologists and hydrologists perform more

effectively. Forecasters are now able to use a combination of hydrometeorological tools provided

by NWS modernization (e.g., mesoscale models, WSR-88D radar, and satellite estimates of

precipitation, etc.) along with specialized training to predict the location and timing of significant

rainfall. 

The OHRFC has been engaged in a Modernization Risk Reduction Exercise that was initiated in 1991

to evaluate the interaction of the RFC HAS function in the production of QPF through the

assimilation of QPF input from NCEP and the NWSFOs/NWSOs serving the Ohio Basin. As a result

of this effort, two interactive operational software components (HASQPF and WINQPF) were

developed. These were used effectively during this major event to create QPFs, produce an RFC

mosaic of the QPF, and process the basin average QPFs into the OHRFC forecast model. 

While the production of QPF is somewhat new to many local NWS offices (NWSO Wilmington

started producing routine QPF in October 1996), the Hydrometeorologic Prediction Center (HPC)
xii

has been involved in producing National scale QPF for 20 years. Their expertise and leadership have

been instrumental in helping develop similar abilities at the local offices.

The HPC QPF products are used as guidance by the local offices. Despite only modest success with

the 24-hour QPFs, there was considerably more important information relayed to the field offices

through the HPC 6-hourly forecasts and excessive rainfall forecasts. A special excessive rainfall

discussion issued at 10:00 p.m. Friday, February 28 indicated a potential for flood producing rains

in the Ohio Valley, and, as early as 2:00 a.m. Saturday, March 1st, the HPC sent messages to the

field offices raising the concern of a very serious flood threat for the region. This was 6-12 hours

before the first significant flooding developed. 

Internal and External Coordination

A review of the official logs indicated that coordination of critical information (e.g., QPF gage data,

etc.) was effectively accomplished between National, regional, and local NWS offices. Interviews

with users revealed the transfer of forecast and warning information to state and local emergency

management was performed with sufficient time to permit life-saving evacuations in many cases and

property-saving emergency actions in several others.

The local NWS offices as well as regional public affairs specialists handled large volumes of queries

from the media on national and local levels concerned about the flooding. Contacts included: ABC,

CBS, and NBC television networks, Jim Lehrer News Hour, World News Tonight, Discovery

Channel, NBC Dateline, Associated Press, “The Washington Post”, “USA Today”, and almost all of

the local newspaper, radio and television outlets. A media advisory prepared by Eastern Region and

distributed over the NOAA Fax Board and Internet system listed NWS personnel the media could

contact for information in the Eastern, Southern, and Central Regions. Also included were NWS

Internet addresses for online information.

Summary

The Assessment Team reports that NWS forecasts and warnings, along with extensive preparedness

efforts, resulted in substantial savings in flood damages and helped reduce the number of deaths and

injuries caused by the floods. Effective use of new technologies; such as, the WSR-88D radars and

STORMS and IFLOWS raingage networks significantly helped forecasters monitor conditions and

produce early flood watches and warnings. When equipment and communications failures did occur,

NWS offices worked effectively to minimize the impact on operations.
xiii

Current efforts to implement more sophisticated river forecasting procedures were not in place during

this event. This brings hope that these improvements will lead to even more timely and accurate

forecasts of future floods. Restoration of stream gages that have been closed; such as, the one

discontinued at McKinneysburg, Kentucky, will continue to be a high priority, especially for those

gages located upstream of flood prone areas. Certainly, timely data from these gages would also

improve the timeliness and accuracy of our forecasts and warnings.

However, the larger challenge for the NWS is to continue to develop the capability to predict large

rainfall events that produce excessive amounts of rain and cause devastating floods. In order to

advance our capabilities, we need improved science, modeling, operational enhancements, real-time

automated data, and the ability to portray the uncertainties in the forecast data in a way the public and

other NWS customers can understand and use. In addition, outreach efforts to better educate

emergency managers, media, and the general public regarding the dangers associated with flooding

need to be increased in order to help reduce the number of lives lost and damages incurred during

floods like the Ohio Valley Flood of March 1997.

 
1

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ohio River Forecast Center

 

Finding A-1: Ohio EMA expressed interest in probabilistic river stage forecasts and urban flood

inundation maps in order to assess the “worst case” scenarios and the magnitude of high, medium,

and low-risk events.

Recommendation A-1: The OHRFC should implement procedures which can be used to create

the types of river products Ohio EMA has requested.

Finding A-2: River forecasts are created by OHRFC and intended for the use of the local NWS

offices it supports, as well as some special cooperators. Improper redistribution by some

cooperators has made these “internal” products accessible to the public via the Internet.

Recommendation A-2: Appropriate labeling and disclaimer information should be used in these

products and on webpages to eliminate any potential confusion between the content of the river

forecasts issued by the OHRFC and the River Flood Warnings and Statements issued by the local

NWS offices. OHRFC should coordinate with the USACE to ensure that river forecasts are not

distributed, to the extent permitted by law.

.

NWSFO Louisville, Kentucky

Finding B-1: During the flooding, NWSFO Louisville was involved with multiple severe

weather threats as well as the flood threat. All fatalities in the Louisville service area, however,

were flood related.

Recommendation B-1: NWS Louisville should increase the visibility of the dangers associated

with flooding in their weather education programs, and to the extent possible, increase their

outreach efforts on flood preparedness. 

NWSO Wilmington, Ohio

Finding C-1: NWR coverage is poor in Scioto County, Ohio, and the surrounding area. 

Recommendation C-1: The NWS should continue to work with the Ohio EMA and others on

getting the necessary equipment installed and operating in the Portsmouth, Ohio, area.
2

Emergency Management

Finding D-1: Kentucky and Ohio emergency operations centers (EOCs) have a tremendous

workload during severe weather and flooding events as they become inundated with numerous

watches, warnings, and follow-up statements from several different NWS offices. The EOC has a

difficult time assimilating this information and relaying it to the county EMs.

Recommendation D-1: Changes should be considered in NWS products to make them easier to

understand and use by customers such as the EOCs.

Finding D-2: Kentucky Emergency Management Officials were not fully aware of modern

information technologies; such as, the Internet and the Emergency Management Weather

Information Network (EMWIN), that can provide them with access to important NWS weather

forecasts and warnings. 

Recommendation D-2: NWSFO Louisville should inform and educate Kentucky Emergency

Management on these information technologies.

Finding D-3: There is a high turnover rate at the local (county) offices of emergency

management. These people play a critical role in disseminating important weather warnings and

information in their communities.

Recommendation D-3: The local NWS should become more active in working with the state

and county emergency management officials in Kentucky and help plan and conduct periodic

training workshops.

Finding D-4: Emergency management officials experienced added levels of complexity in

interpreting NWS products issued under different regional policies.

Recommendation D-4: Recognizing that products are tailored to meet the needs of several

different local customers, NWS headquarters and regional offices must address product

uniformity and standardization to reduce impact on users; such as, state EMs, who rely on

products from several different NWS offices.

Finding D-5: A valuable supplemental service was provided to the emergency management

community by the use of pagers to alert EMs in Ohio of the issuance of watches and warnings. 

Pagers have been particularly useful in areas where NWR coverage is poor or when EM directors

are away from their homes or offices.

Recommendation D-5: EMs should take advantage of commercial pager services that currently

deliver NWS watches and warnings available from EMWIN or NWW.
Finding D-6: The video “Low Water Crossing - The Hidden Danger” that was produced by the

NWS Office of Hydrology (OH) has become a very popular tool in revealing the dangers that

develop when roads and bridges become covered by flood water. (Over one-third of the fatalities

caused by the severe flooding during this event were operators or passengers of vehicles that were 

swept away by flood waters.) The Kentucky DES would like to get sufficient copies of the video

to provide one to each of their 120 county EMs.

Recommendation D-6: OH should provide copies of the video to Kentucky DES.

Observational Data

Finding E-1: Weather Service Radar-88D (WSR-88D) precipitation estimates were the

invaluable tool that most flash flood warnings were based on. Radar precipitation estimates were

within an inch of reliable ground truth measurements. The WSR-88D performed superbly during

the event.

Recommendation E-1: None.

Finding E-2: The rain gage network in many parts of Kentucky (including the Licking River

Basin) is not adequate to provide a good estimate of the areal rainfall. 

Recommendation E-2: NWS officials at local, regional, and National levels, as well as the EM

community, need to remain focused on reducing this problem. If funding becomes available, the

Kentucky IFLOWS Network should be expanded to include these data-sparse areas. Also, all

efforts should be made to expand and complete the STORMS system in Ohio as originally

planned.

Finding E-3: Many manually read stream gages (including those located at Falmouth and Blue

Licks Spring, Kentucky) were inaccessible due to high water during the flooding. 

Recommendation E-3: NWS should produce a prioritized list of sites that could be automated

and continue to work with cooperators to establish a more effective stream gage network as

funding permits. 

Dissemination

Finding F-1: The Internet played an important and significant role supplementing NOAA

Weather Wire (NWW) and NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) in the warning information 

dissemination process. However, not all NWS products are currently available over the Internet.

Recommendation F-1: The Interactive Weather Information Network (IWIN) should be

enhanced and become a reliable database that includes access to all NWS public products.
A-1

APPENDIX A 

HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL SUMMARY

Antecedent Conditions

Soil moisture was near normal across the Ohio Valley prior to the March floods. While

precipitation had been at, or above, normal in the fall, the winter months of December through

February saw precipitation amounts averaging nearly 200 percent of normal. The growing season

had not started. Therefore, once heavy rain developed, greater runoff volumes were produced 

than would have occurred had the vegetation been active. Stream levels were well within their

banks and the main stem rivers, including the Ohio River were at seasonal levels. There was no

snowpack in the Ohio River Basin on the last day of February, the day before the heavy rains

started to fall.

Hydrometeorological Discussion

Large scale mechanisms provided all of the right ingredients to produce excessive rainfall. An

upper level ridge was positioned over the east coast with a longwave trough located just east of

the Rocky Mountains at 00Z Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on Saturday, March 1, 1997. 

This produced a southwest flow aloft over the Ohio Valley throughout the first weekend in

March. Perturbations were ejected out of the base of the trough and traveled over the Ohio

Valley producing an unstable atmosphere. A low level jet with wind maximums of 50 knots

developed and persisted for more than 24 hours. The low level jet helped transport abundant

moisture and warm temperatures northward into the region Friday night and Saturday. 

Precipitable water values increased to nearly 200 percent with surface dew-points in the region

reaching into the mid-60s.

A warm front proceeded to move slowly northward during the day reaching north of the Ohio

River by Saturday night. Widespread moderate to heavy rainfall developed over Arkansas and

Missouri then spread northeast across the Ohio Valley. Extremely strong storms over the midsouth produced destructive tornadoes with the greatest devastation occurring in Arkansas where

over 20 deadly twisters developed during the day. 

The instability axis shifted northeast and intersected with an outflow boundary over Kentucky late

Saturday. Steady rainfall conditions developed over northern Kentucky, as well as adjacent parts

of southern Indiana and Ohio, and western West Virginia, fed by a persistent influx of Gulf 

moisture transported northward by the low level jet. Copious rainfall continued Saturday night

and into Sunday morning as numerous thunderstorms repeatedly tracked over the same area. The 

rain temporarily subsided Sunday but reintensified as the main upper level storm system kicked

out and traversed the region Sunday night and early Monday. 
B-1

 APPENDIX B

 FOCUS AREAS

QPF

QPF is a future basin average precipitation forecast product which is input directly to rainfall

runoff models for river forecasting. The end-to-end QPF process starts with the issuance of QPF

from NCEP’s HPC. These National-scale QPF products are used as guidance by the Weather

Forecast Office (WFOs) and RFCs. WFOs issue local-scale QPF based on several factors,

including HPC products, atmospheric model output, current hydrometeorological factors,

including remote-sensed data (e.g. satellite, sounding, and radar information, etc.), and knowledge

of local climatology. All the WFOs in the OHRFC area send their QPF to the RFC where it is

mosaicked together, and significant inconsistencies between adjacent areas are resolved using

verbal communications or with software tools. In this particular event, the HAS forecasters called

HPC and the WFOs to coordinate on the final QPF estimates before using them as input to the

hydrologic models.

Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, show QPF from the HPC, WFOs (NWSFOs and NWSOs), and OHRFC,

respectively, spanning from 12Z on March 1 through 12Z on March 2. Figure 2d shows the

observed mean areal precipitation (MAP) for the event. Figure 2a shows the HPC QPF forecasts

attempted to resolve the large-scale temporal and spatial character of the precipitation and

generally predicted the rainfall pattern to be in an elongated southwest to northeast pattern. 

WFO QPF attempted to resolve these same precipitation characteristics at a much finer

resolution. Figure 2b is a composite of QPF forecasts issued by several NWS offices in the

OHRFC area of responsibility. As these forecasts were issued a couple of hours after the HPC

guidance, it is clear that forecasters made some adjustments moving the area of greatest rainfall

expected northward and closer to the forecast position of the warm front. The magnitude of the

expected maximum rainfall was increased as well. The figure also illustrates significant spatial

differences in forecasts that can occur between different offices. (For example, notice 3 inches

(light purple) v.s. 1 inch (red) in northern Kentucky.) 

Figure 2c depicts how the Hydrometeorological Analysis and Support (HAS) forecaster at the

RFC eliminated these sharp differences by smoothing the spatial variability of the QPF into an

RFC-wide product. Figure 2d shows the observed basin average rainfall for the 24-hour period.

The figure identifies the sharp spatial boundaries and variability of the observed rainfall. 

Although the mosaicked QPF did not capture the small scale differences and maximum rainfall

that occurred in these sub-basins, it was accurate at depicting the basins where the rainfall was

concentrated. Updated QPF was used in later model runs as forecasters and hydrologists

continued to produce forecasts and warnings of the rising river levels.
B-2

 Figure 2a. HPC 24-hour QPF ending 12Z, March 2, 1997
B-3

 Figure 2b. WFO 24-Hour QPF Ending 12Z, March 2, 1997
B-4

 Figure 2c. HAS 24-Hour QPF Ending 12Z, March 2, 1997.
B-5

 Figure 2d. Actual 24-Hour Basin Avg. Rainfall Ending 12Z, March 2, 1997
B-6

Significant training (i.e., repetition of heavy showers over the same area) occurred over

numerous river basins in parts of north central Kentucky and southern Ohio. One of the

hardest hit areas included the Licking River Basin in which lies the town of Falmouth,

Kentucky that was evacuated of its approximately 2,400 residents. Figure 3 shows the

location of the Licking River Basin, towns, and NWS offices. A comparison of this map

with the previous QPF charts clearly shows the difficulty presented to forecasters and

hydrologists who are challenged with predicting the timing and amount of heavy rain over

basins of this small a scale. 

Stream Gage Reduction

Up until 1994, an automated stream gage and data collection platform (DCP) was maintained

by the USGS upstream of Falmouth at McKinneysburg, Kentucky. The site was funded

under a cooperative agreement between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological

Survey, and the state of Kentucky. The gage was removed due to loss of funding in the fall

of 1994. The NWS strongly opposed the closure of the site and made unsuccessful attempts

to keep it active.

A wire-weight gage exists at Falmouth, Kentucky. Cooperative observers take manual

readings and report river stage levels to the NWS typically once a day. During high water

episodes, the cooperative observers can be relied upon to provide updates to the NWS more

than once a day. Darkness and extreme flooding make reporting difficult or impossible. This

was the case during the March 1997 flood event.

The lack of telemetered stream level information delayed critical information from being

relayed to NWS forecasters and hydrologists. However, the impact on the timeliness and

accuracy of the river stage forecast at Falmouth is not exactly known as the river forecast

system could not be reproduced during the service assessment.

External Coordination

The emergency management agencies of both Kentucky and Ohio reported being very

satisfied with the levels of coordination experienced during the event. They had high praise

for the responsiveness of NWS offices to meeting their needs and the levels of interaction

that occurred between the NWS and their own agencies. Two issues that were raised were

1) the complexity of dealing with the large volume of products issued during the flooding

event from multiple offices and 2) non-standardization of product content and format.

During the event, Ohio EMA received volumes of flood bulletins from NWS offices in three

states. The EMA reported that efforts to ingest information coming from different offices

and decipher it all into a single composite increased the difficulty of their tasks. Kentucky 
B-7

 Figure 3. Licking River Basin Flood Area.

Department of Emergency Services (KDES), which was involved with products from NWS

offices in two different states (in two different NWS regions), reported similar experiences

and expressed a desire for the NWS to provide some relief from their information recompositing and mosaicking requirements.

Ohio EMA, which, unlike Kentucky, does not have a watch officer on duty at the state EOC

24 hours a day, also expressed being very pleased with pager notification of watch and

warning issuances by NWS offices within the state. They reported receiving excellent “heads

up” information from the NWS state liaison office (NWSO Wilmington) in order to spin up

their operations and follow up on information as the event developed. They requested that

NWS offices located outside the state boundaries that serve Ohio counties provide a similar

service. Pager notifications, however, could become a significant work load issue for local

offices if not controlled in some manner under some consistent policy. Automating the

entire procedure to eliminate any extra steps by a forecaster would help address this

potential.
C-1

APPENDIX C

DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS

Background

Most automated data collection networks that provided river stage and rainfall information to

the NWS and EMs performed well during the event. However, the frequency of information

from automated DCPs was limited to the 4-hour reporting criteria established by the U.S.

Army Corps on Engineers (USACE). Automated networks; such as, the STORMS and

IFLOWS provided near real-time reporting updating every 15 minutes. A computer failure

at NWSO Wilmington did, for a time, compromise the availability of STORMS and

IFLOWS data to the Wilmington office (see below). There were also a few stream gages

lost during the flood, but most operated reliably throughout the event. 

Manual coop observer networks were significantly degraded at critical times during the event 

as observers became increasingly involved in efforts to protect their own lives and property. 

NWSFO Louisville lost about 30 percent of all its observers as the event unfolded. Losses

were greatest in areas where rain fell the heaviest and from which the information was most

needed. While NWSO Wilmington lost the input from only a few manually collected

observations, one of those lost was from Falmouth, Kentucky. The last stage reading NWSO

Wilmington received from Falmouth, taken by a dedicated observer using a wire-weight

gage, was about 12:00 noon on Saturday, after which the observer was evacuated. Police

and emergency management personnel attempted to continue to keep the Wilmington office

informed of river stage; but as the gage site became increasingly inaccessible, and eventually

totally submerged, only crude estimates from a distance could be provided.

WSR-88D doppler radar estimates of rainfall were very accurate and were the primary tool

by which both NWSFO Louisville and NWSO Wilmington issued their flash flood warnings. 

While extreme catches of rainfall at specific gages (13.42 inches for IFLOWS and 9.18 inches

for STORMS) did exceed radar estimates, the WSR-88D depicted rainfall distribution and

average intensities very accurately and was indispensable in keeping forecasters appraised of

the developing situation. 

 Automated Flood Warning Systems

Automated flood warning systems (AFWS) utilize real-time event-initiated precipitation

gages, stream gages, and other automated sensors to provide the NWS and emergency

management (EM) community time-critical information on flash flood threats. Information is

provided on a time frame, at a frequency, and from locations at which it otherwise might not

be available. Whether used independently or in conjunction with WSR-88D radar
C-2

information and other modernized NWS technologies, such systems can be a very effective

tool for forecasters to use in maximizing lead times for flash flood watches and warnings and

to provide input into river forecast models for the preparation of main stem river forecasts. 

Kentucky IFLOWS

The Kentucky IFLOWS is operated under a cooperative program administered by the State

of Kentucky and the NWS. As one of the original IFLOWS states, Kentucky operates and

maintains the system while costs of capital infrastructure replacement are funded through the

NWS. 

Kentucky IFLOWS is a combined broadcast and polled system. As one of the earliest

implementations of the IFLOWS concept, only local NWS offices, the state Emergency

Operations Center (EOC) in Frankfort, and five state emergency operations centers are fully

networked with full two-way communications capability. The 37 Kentucky county base

stations that are also part of the system operate in a receive only (broadcast) mode. The state

computer system in Frankfort controls information on the Kentucky network and distributes

data and message traffic to all computers attached to the network including machines at

NWS offices in Jackson, Louisville, and Wilmington. Information is passed on further

through gateways to other IFLOWS networks including those of Virginia and West Virginia. 

The Kentucky Emergency Warning System (KEWS), a state-wide microwave network, is

used extensively for many of these connections. The NWS Automation of Field Operations

and Services (AFOS) network connection to Kentucky IFLOWS is at NWSFO Louisville. 

With the integration of a USACE flood mitigation project in Harlan County, Kentucky, there

are now 165 precipitation gages and four streamgages in Kentucky available to the NWS and

EM personnel over this network. All are located in the eastern portion of the state and, with

one exception, in the service areas of NWSFO Charleston, NWSO Wilmington, and NWSO

Jackson. NWSFO Louisville has one IFLOWS gage located in its warning area. 

Ohio STORMS

STORMS is a cooperative effort by the State of Ohio and the NWS and fully funded through

the State of Ohio. The state supplies all equipment and maintenance for the system. Ohio

plans to install STORMS precipitation gages in at least 44 of its counties and has begun

implementation with its most flash-flood-prone counties first. 

STORMS presently uses a modified version of NWS IFLOWS software to collect

precipitation data via a state-operated microwave system which passes it on to base stations

at the state emergency operations center in Columbus and NWSFO Cleveland. Information

is then passed via the IFLOWS AFWS network to Weather Service Offices in Wilmington,
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Charleston, and Pittsburgh. Ohio counties dial into the state emergency management

computer site at Columbus for information on rainfall, flash flood guidance, etc., in their own

areas. Ohio STORMS data enters AFOS at NWSFO Cleveland. Together with a City of

Cincinnati and Hamilton County data system, which has been integrated into the STORMS

and IFLOWS networks, there are now 105 precipitation gages and 4 stream gages installed

in 23 Ohio counties. At the time of the event, a computer at NWSO Wilmington was

controlling the exchange of information between NWSO Wilmington, NWSFO Cleveland,

and the state EMA in Columbus. 

System Performance

IFLOWS and STORMS data were characterized as being extremely valuable, and practically

indispensable, by offices having parts of these gaging networks in their service areas. This

information was used by offices to keep ahead of the event as it progressed from urban

flooding to flash flooding to small stream flooding and, finally, to river flooding. The

information helped forecasters make critical and timely decisions to warn as the event

unfolded. 

The excellent performance of the WSR-88D in this event offset, to some extent, NWSFO

Louisville’s absence of real-time gage data. Extensive coordination between Louisville and

offices with IFLOWS and STORMS information under their radar umbrellas (e.g.,

Wilmington, Jackson, and Cleveland), appears to have also increased and verified the

confidence Louisville staff placed in the high values the WSR-88D was reporting for rainfall

intensity during the event.

At approximately 8:34 UTC on February 27, the NWSO Wilmington computer which is the

office’s link to both the Kentucky IFLOWS and the Ohio STORMS networks, stopped

communicating. Initial efforts to restart the system and reestablish communications were

unsuccessful. Since Wilmington was the controlling system among the three networked

offices in Ohio, information exchange over this network ceased between NWSO Wilmington,

the state EOC at Columbus, and NWSFO Cleveland. However, both the state EOC at

Columbus and NWSFO Cleveland continued to receive STORMS information over their

direct connections to the state microwave system. NWSFO Cleveland continued to pass 

information on to other NWS offices over the AFWS system. The time intensive task of

rebuilding Wilmington’s computer system files was later undertaken and the system brought

back into the networks at approximately 14:34 UTC on March 1.

During the time the computer was off line, NWSO Wilmington relied on AFOS for hourly

STORMS and IFLOWS information. Wilmington also dialed into the state STORMS

computer at Columbus for STORMS graphical applications and data of increased frequency. 

There was some initial confusion involving a 12-hour time shift on time stamping for the

onset of the event, and data representation, on the state STORMS computers. The Ohio
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EMA is continuing to investigate what may have caused this. They are now of the opinion

that it was a software problem which had not manifested itself previously because of the

nature of this event. It was of such intensity that it was the first time so many reports from

so many of the increasing numbers of STORMS gages were processed at the same time. 

The state is taking steps to address such scenarios in the future. These irregularities were

limited to STORMS computers and were not reported in Ohio STORMS gage data that was

processed by NWS IFLOWS computers and passed into the AFWS network. 

With regard to the Wilmington computer failure, it does appear the problem was at

Wilmington and was specific to the machine and not with the communication links to it. 

Rebuilding the files to get it back up and running, however, destroyed much of the

information on the status of the system when it failed and may make the ultimate conclusions

as to what actually caused the failure speculative.

NWSO Wilmington has responsibility for 12 Kentucky counties, but only four have IFLOWS

data. Gage data was not available in the Kentucky area where the NWS believes the heaviest

rain fell (based on radar analysis). There is an active co-operative observer program in this

area, but their gages were destroyed, or they were unable to report due to personal need to

evacuate. 

The State of Ohio is in the process of expanding STORMS coverage to five gages per Ohio

County. The NWSO Wilmington is very satisfied with the support from the State of Ohio for

the STORMS network. 

Alternative Data Collection/Dissemination Sources

Approximately one week prior to the event, NWSFO Louisville implemented the transfer of 

Kentucky IFLOWS information to an office Internet Web page. Since then, data from other

states has been added. This serves as a secondary source of precipitation information on a

frequency greater than that which is transferred over AFOS for data from Ohio as well as

that from Kentucky in the event of a future systems failure. In addition, the State of Ohio

intends to link NWSO Wilmington to the STORMS data collection network with a dedicated

line in order to provide NWSO Wilmington with direct access to unfiltered STORMS data. 

While failure of communications links has not been identified as a cause of any data flow

interruption during this event, the additional connectivity would further ensure Wilmington’s

access to the STORMS data stream in the future. 
D-1

 APPENDIX D

 OFFICE SUMMARIES

 Ohio River Forecast Center

Hydrologic Modeling and Transition Status

River forecasts produced by the OHRFC, in particular those on the main stem of the Ohio

River, were both accurate and timely and provided excellent lead-time for users. The

OHRFC used a locally developed river forecast system called the Interactive Forecast Model

(IFM), which was developed in 1988 and designed specifically for the Ohio Basin. This

unique IFM system is DOS based and runs on a personal computer . It was started with

early versions of the NWS River Forecast System (NWSRFS).

The latest version of NWSRFS is a nationally supported Unix workstation based modular

forecasting system which allows an RFC to: process radar data for flood forecasting, change

model time step output to a shorter time step; such as, 3 hours, uses the Sacramento model

which is the cornerstone of NWS hydrologic forecasting; calibrate both runoff and snow melt

models; generate probabilistic ensemble forecasts; perform reservoir modeling; and

implement the advanced dynamic channel routing techniques in Operational Dynamic Wave

Model (DWOPER) and Flood Wave Dynamic Routing Model in NWSRFS (FLDWAV). 

The OHRFC transition to modernized operations was initiated in 1995 but was side-tracked

due to a shortage of staffing and extensive flooding that occurred in the Ohio Valley in 1996

and 1997. The transition includes a conversion from IFM to the Interactive Forecast

Program (IFP) which consists of the proven hydrologic physical process modeling of the

NWSRFS's Operational Forecast System (OFS) combined with a graphical user interface

(GUI) to provide river forecasters with: (1) the information needed to make decisions about

the correctness of data or model results, and (2) the capability to easily and quickly put those

decisions into action to produce forecasts reflecting their best judgement about current and

future hydrometeorologic conditions.

Completion of the transition plan will provide the foundation for advanced hydrologic

modeling techniques; such as, flood inundation mapping, distributed modeling, and the

processing of probabilistic quantitative precipitation forecasts (PQPF) required to produce

probabilistic river stage forecasts (PRSF). 

 

The computer hardware required to perform the transition plan to NWSRFS is already in

place at the OHRFC. Training of the OHRFC staff has been given in the areas of NWSRFS,

the operational forecasts system (OFS), the Sacramento model and snow model calibration,

and the interactive calibration program (ICP).
D-2

HAS Activities

The HAS program was implemented at OHRFC in 1989 (see reference to Risk Reduction

exercise mentioned in the Executive Summary.) Three HAS forecasters on staff are joined

by HAS-qualified hydrologists to assist with the workload when necessary. Routinely, they

work two shifts covering 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. seven days a week. The HAS function

went on 24 hours a day shift work starting at 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, March 1, and continued

until March 10. 

There are many demands on the person performing the HAS function; such as, quality

control of the multi-sensor precipitation estimations (Stage III) and coordinating QPF with

all the forecast offices in the RFC boundary. The HAS function is ultimately responsible for

finalizing QPF for input into the hydrologic models. OHRFC HAS forecasters specifically

mentioned the possibility of heavy rain as early as 6 days prior to the flood event and did an

excellent job of coordinating with local offices and the HPC during the event.

During the flooding, WFOs are generally updated QPF twice a day and submitted it to the

OHRFC. The OHRFC produced a mosaicked version of the QPF input from the WFOs that

was then used as input to river forecasts. 

Radar Precipitation Estimates - Stage III 

Stage III is an hourly gridded precipitation product which mosaics together all the various

radars in the RFC area and optimally merges them with the gage precipitation estimates. The

HAS forecaster reviews the hourly Stage III products for problems. This manual quality

control procedure is very time consuming. 

Stage III has been running at the OHRFC since 1995 but was not used directly as input to

hydrologic models during the flood. HAS forecasters experienced extended periods of time

where Stage III products did not get reviewed because attention was concentrated on

monitoring the event at hand, updating QPF, and coordinating with WFOs. 

When Stage III was run, and when the Post Analysis was produced, it was helpful and

provided accurate hourly precipitation estimates. The 1-hour precipitation estimates were

very helpful when 6-hour gages had not reached their reporting times and for assessing the

precipitation fields at odd synoptic times. Figure 4 shows a Post Analysis product which

compares 24-hour storm totals from the Stage III hybrid precipitation estimates with that of

the gage-only precipitation estimates. The figure shows that Stage III performed very well.
D-3

 Figure 4. Stage III Precipitation Estimate Ending 12Z, March 2, 1997

Operations at OHRFC During a Record Flood Event

 

Hydrologic forecast shifts are staffed at OHRFC from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. However,

once the radar and ground based gage networks observed significant precipitation developing

in the Ohio Valley, OHRFC began 24-hour staffing starting 5:30 a.m. Saturday, March 1,

1997, and continuing for 10 days until midnight on Monday, March 10, 1997. 

Using precipitation data and QPF, the RFC created numerous river forecasts that were used

by local weather offices who issued dozens of critical flood warnings that helped save

hundreds of lives. One such area was Falmouth, Kentucky, where an accurate and timely

flood forecast and warning was instrumental in helping to initiate the evacuation of the

town’s residents. 

OHRFC had a tremendous number of telephone calls to deal with. The media contributed a

disproportionately large volume of calls to the RFC workload. Even the public was calling

the RFC for information without going through the established channels. Barge operators on

the Ohio River were reported to have called from their towboats using cellular phones in

order to get the most up-to-date river information.
D-4

 NWSFO LOUISVILLE

Operations at a Forecast Office During a Record Flood Event

Residents across northern Kentucky and southern Ohio all had the same thing to say about

this event. They never saw it rain that hard in their entire lives. It rained, and it rained, then

it rained harder. Storm drains failed to handle the excessive runoff rates. Highways became

channels for handling storm water surpluses. Cars and trucks became amphibious vehicles,

many with passengers trapped within.

The NWSFO Louisville hydrologic service area (HSA) stretches from southern Indiana

counties located across the Ohio River from Louisville south to the Tennessee border. As

frequently happens, portions of the HSA were under Severe Weather Watches and Warnings

while the forecaster was busy issuing the first Flash Flood Watch for the area before dawn

Saturday. Flash flood warnings quickly followed before the midnight shift had a chance to be

relieved that morning. Rainfall of 1 to 3 inches was already measured in some areas by 12:00

UTC Saturday, March 1.

The threat of severe weather persisted all day over Kentucky. However, actual severe

storms remained isolated and primarily developed over the south central and southeast parts

of the state. Before noon, forecasters shifted their focus to the heavy, persistent rainfall but

still didn’t know what kind of a flood fight they were getting into. Additional rainfall during

the day on Saturday averaged about 1 to 2 inches.

River gages and cooperative observers began to signal that the excessive runoff was reaching

many of the smaller streams and tributaries by early that afternoon. The first of the river

flood warnings were issued while flash flood warnings continued to be reissued and updated

for nearly every county in the NWSFO Louisville area of responsibility. The precipitation

estimates from the new WSR-88D Doppler radars compared well with “ground truth”

reports. Point maximums were exceeding 6 inches with basin averages amounting to more

than a few inches.

The Louisville HSA includes 23 official river forecast points. Before the end of the day, the

forecast office staff had issued river flood warnings with lead times ranging from 0.5 hour to

as much as 30 hours for all but one of the 23 locations. (The gage was reading 0.1 foot

above flood stage when the warning was issued for the 23rd site.)

A new 24-hour rainfall record was established on March 1, 1997, for Louisville as 10.48

inches of rain occurred. The previous rainfall record for Louisville was 6.97 inches set back

on March 9, 1964. This also establishes a new state-wide record for 24-hour rainfall

breaking the previous 24-hour rainfall record for Kentucky which was set at Dunmor in

Muhlenberg County on June 27-28, 1960, when 10.40 inches were recorded. Although the

rain finally diminished, the flood fight lasted for days. Storm total rainfall estimates from the
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multi-sensor Stage III processing at OHRFC indicated a maximum of 12-13 inches centered

over northern Kentucky close to the capital city of Frankfurt. A large swath of 10+ inches

covered over 100 square miles. 

QPF Activities

NWSFO Louisville has been issuing QPF on a routine basis for over 5 years. QPFs are

typically prepared once per day by the midnight public forecaster and issued around 6:00 a.m. 

Updates were provided whenever requests were received from the OHRFC HAS forecasters. 

The NWS Central Region has instituted a QPF verification program. Also, the Science and

Operations Officer at Louisville has initiated a Cooperative Program for Operational

Meteorology Education and Training (COMET) partnership with St. Louis University with a

goal to develop improved QPF forecasting methodologies.

NWSO WILMINGTON

Operations at a Spin-up NWSO During a Record Flood Event

NWSO Wilmington is a spin-up office that was commissioned on October 1, 1994. It serves

36 counties in the southwest half of Ohio, 12 counties in north central Kentucky, and eight

counties in Southeast Indiana. NWSO Wilmington assumed HSA responsibility on

December 1, 1994. 

On the evening of Friday, February 28, 1997, a Flood Potential Statement (ESF) was issued

just before 2000 UTC emphasizing the possibility of flooding on Saturday night in West 

Central Ohio. A follow-up telephone call was made to the State Emergency Management

Office by the service hydrologist. After coordination with NWSFO Cleveland, Ohio, a Flash

Flood Watch (FFA) was issued around midnight and included the Ohio portion of NWSO's

Wilmington's HSA. Flash Flood Watches were issued by NWSFOs Louisville and

Indianapolis for the Indiana and Kentucky portion of NWSO Wilmington county warning

area before daybreak the next morning.

 NWSO Wilmington began issuing Flash Flood and Flood warnings between 1200 and 1300

UTC Saturday, based on WSR-88D radar precipitation estimates and precipitation

measurements based on STORMS rain gages. Data supplied by both systems proved to be

highly reliable. At 1310 UTC a Flood Warning (FFW) was issued for Pendleton County

(Falmouth) for urban and small streams. This was followed by a River Flood Warning

(FLW) for the Licking River at Falmouth issued at 1524 UTC predicting that river flooding

would begin in the late afternoon. Another FFW for Pendleton County issued at 2105 UTC

warned that the serious flash flooding was going to continue into Saturday evening. It is

estimated the Licking River at Falmouth reached flood stage sometime early Saturday

afternoon and crested approximately 24 feet above flood stage Sunday afternoon.
D-6

A total of 62 flash flood warnings were issued on March 1-2, 1997. Two of the initial flood

warnings were based on RFC headwater advisory tables. Thirteen forecast points flooded. 

There were two new record flood stages established. The average lead time to flood was

between 5 and 6 hours, with the longest lead time over 36 hours. Sixty-five river flood

products (warnings and statements) were issued. An important aspect of NWSO

Wilmington's operations during the event were human resources. All readily available staff

(seven people) worked extra duty during that period. The heavy workload associated with

the event pushed the limits of staff's physical and mental ability. 

QPF Activities

Prior to this flood event, NWSO Wilmington had been issuing QPF on a routine basis for

only 5 months. It was the first spin-up office in the NWS Eastern Region to begin issuing

QPF. A QPF training session was given to the staff in September 1996. There is no QPF

performance feedback to the forecast staff at this time.

QPFs are typically prepared once per day by the midnight forecaster and issued around 6:00 

a.m. For significant rainfalls, additional QPFs are issued in the evening between 6:00 a.m.

and 8:00 p.m. NWSO Wilmington contributed to each request for updated QPF input

during the event.

 

Special Coordination Activities with Emergency Managers

NWSO Wilmington maintains a very proactive hydrologic preparedness program in

cooperation with the Ohio EMA. Letters were sent to each county Emergency Manager

(EM) concerning hydrologic preparedness as part of the annual Ohio Severe Weather and

Flood Safety Week. Preparedness activities in Kentucky included individual letters sent to

each county explaining hydrologic watches and warnings. Additionally, in 1996, a letter was

sent to each county emergency management supervisor requesting information on flash flood

prone areas. 

Specific briefings to the Ohio EMA began on the afternoon of Friday, February 28, 1997, for

potential heavy rain on March 1-2, 1997. Additional telephone calls were made to individual

counties as warnings were being issued on March 1, 1997. Additional subsequent briefings 

to the Ohio EMA were conducted during the late morning and early evening Saturday,

March 1, 1997. Daily briefings then continued through March 10, 1997. 

Watch and warning information was also distributed by the Wilmington staff through a

pocket paging system. This paging system provided information to rural areas not covered 

by NOAA Weather Radio. Flood information, but no flood warnings, was also posted on the

NWSO Wilmington (and OHRFC) homepage.