United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 17, 2022 

Decided June 22, 2022 

Before

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 21-3165 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRYAN ROSSI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 20-CR-20017-001 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Bryan Rossi was convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in criminal 

sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and sentenced to ten years in prison and five years’ 

supervised release. He appealed, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is

frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and the issues an appeal of this kind 

would involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the

potential issues discussed in the brief and those that Rossi raises in his response under 

Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-3165 Page 2 

Rossi was arrested in 2020 after using a dating app to arrange a sexual encounter 

with a 15-year-old boy. Rossi had a sexually explicit online conversation with the teen—

actually an undercover federal agent—in which he requested sexual images after learning 

the boy was underage, then agreed to accept gas money and travel to the teen’s home for 

sex. When he arrived at the house at the prearranged time, Rossi was arrested and 

charged under § 2422(b) with attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity 

made criminal by 720 ILCS 5/11-1/60(d). Rossi went to trial. 

The government filed several pretrial motions in limine. Rossi objected only to 

the use of statements he made in his post-arrest interview, during which he admitted 

that he believed he was talking to a minor, but said he would not have had sex with an 

actual child. The court deferred ruling until trial. Twice before trial, Rossi affirmatively 

waived defenses based on entrapment, though he planned to argue that the purported 

minor’s apparent consent negated his criminal intent. 

During a two-day trial, the jury heard from FBI agents, including the one who 

had posed as the minor online. This agent testified that after Rossi was told he was 

speaking to someone who was “almost 16,” he asked for “sexy pics” and offered to 

drive to the teen’s house if he received $20 for gas. The jury also heard audio excerpts of 

Rossi’s post-arrest interview after the court found the statements admissible over 

Rossi’s objection. (Rossi argued they were irrelevant, but the court ruled that they were

probative of his state of mind.) At the close of the government’s case in chief, Rossi 

moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). The 

court summarily denied the motion. Rossi did not present a defense. 

The government submitted proposed jury instructions, most of them from this 

circuit’s pattern instructions and a few based on our published decisions. Rossi objected 

to two of the government’s proposed non-pattern instructions, 21 and 25, which 

respectively stated: “It is not required for the government to prove that the defendant

intended to engage in sexual activity with the minor,” and “The minor’s willingness to 

engage in sexual activity is irrelevant because, by law, a minor is unable to consent to 

sexual activity.” He also suggested adding language to the government’s proposed 

instruction 18, setting forth the elements of the offense, that would define the terms 

“persuade,” “induce,” and “entice,” and state that “[m]erely arranging an encounter does 

not meet the requirements of the law.” The court refused these changes, explaining that

the jury must deliberate on the unadorned statutory terms. The jury found Rossi guilty.

He did not move for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), (d). 
No. 21-3165 Page 3 

Rossi did not object to the presentence investigation report, which calculated a 

criminal history category of I and a total offense level of 30 under the Sentencing 

Guidelines, which included two additional levels for Rossi’s use of a computer. 

See U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.3(a)(3), (b)(3)(A) & (B). The guidelines range was thus 97 to 121 

months, adjusted to 120 to 121 months because of the statutory minimum. See § 2422(b); 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b); Sent’g Table. Rossi did not address the court at the sentencing 

hearing. The court adopted the PSR and discussed Rossi’s mental health history, 

achievements and aspirations, and good employment record. It sentenced him to 120–

months in prison and five years’ supervised release, each the statutory minimum term. 

See § 2422(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). 

In her Anders brief, counsel first correctly concludes that Rossi could not raise a 

nonfrivolous challenge to the court’s admission of excerpts from his post-arrest 

interview in which he said he went to the minor’s house only “for the gas money” and 

would not have had sex with a child. Rossi argued the statements were irrelevant

because he conceded that he was speaking with someone under 18 years old. But he 

could not show that the court overstepped its discretion by concluding Rossi’s postarrest statements were relevant to the knowledge element of the offense. § 2422(b);

United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1052 (7th Cir. 2014). 

We also agree with counsel that Rossi could not raise a nonfrivolous challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. The court denied his in-trial Rule 29(a) 

motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, and Rossi did 

not renew that motion under Rule 29(c) after the verdict. As a result, Rossi would have 

to show on appeal that his conviction was a manifest miscarriage of justice. 

See United States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir. 2020). He would be unable to do 

so because the jury received sufficient uncontested evidence that Rossi requested explicit 

images of a minor, arranged a sexual encounter, then traveled to meet the minor for sex

that would have been criminal under state law. See § 2422(b); 720 ILCS 5/11-1/60(d). 

Although Rossi wishes to argue that he was improperly prevented from raising an 

entrapment defense, he affirmatively waived any defense based on entrapment both in 

his response to the government’s trial brief and orally at a pretrial hearing. 

Counsel next reviews Rossi’s preserved objections to the jury instructions and 

concludes that it would be frivolous to pursue them on appeal. We would review the 

district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 929 (7th Cir. 2022). First, we would be 

unable to find error in the decision not to define the terms “persuades,” “induces,” 
No. 21-3165 Page 4 

“entices” and “coerces” as Rossi proposed. Rossi relied on United States v. Clarke, 

842 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2016), for his definitions, but in that case, as here, the district court 

ruled that the jury should apply the ordinary meanings of the terms. See id. at 296–97. 

And we have already rejected vagueness challenges to § 2422(b), explaining that 

Congress intended the factfinder to consider the specific nature of the defendant's efforts

to persuade the minor. United States v. McMillan, 744 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel also correctly concludes that the district court appropriately declined 

Rossi’s proposed addition to the same instruction: “Merely arranging an encounter does 

not meet the requirements of the law.” True, “speech alone” is not a substantial step in 

an attempt to entice. United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2011). But 

specific intent to engage in sexual activity can be proven by a “a face-to-face meeting in 

the course of a grooming process,” particularly—as here—when preceded by requests 

for explicit images and an exchange of value. See United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 246–

47 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Second, we agree with counsel that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

overruling Rossi’s objections to two other instructions because they were correct statements 

of the law. See United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir. 2017). Rossi sought to strike 

the instructions: “It is not required for the government to prove that the defendant 

intended to engage in sexual activity with the minor” and “The minor’s willingness to 

engage in sexual activity is irrelevant because, by law, a minor is unable to consent to 

sexual activity.” But we have held that § 2422(b) criminalizes procuring a minor’s assent to 

sexual activity, not engaging in sexual activity, and the legal age of consent in Illinois is 

17 years old. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.70(b); Berg, 640 F.3d at 243, 250. It was therefore 

reasonable for the court to conclude that these instructions would aid the jury. 

Rossi’s response proposes appellate challenges to two other jury instructions, but 

his counsel approved those instructions after discussion on the record, thereby waiving 

further challenges to them. See United States v. Hicks, 15 F.4th 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Turning to sentencing, counsel advises us that Rossi could make no nonfrivolous 

argument that his sentence was the result of procedural error. Rossi did not object to the 

PSR, and so we would review for plain error. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 

(7th Cir. 2016). Rossi has no grounds for challenging the base offense level of 28 or the 

two-level increase for using a computer as incorrect. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.3(a)(3); (b)(3)(A) 

and (B). And the court correctly adjusted the guidelines range to incorporate the statutory 

minimum term of imprisonment. See § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). The court also
No. 21-3165 Page 5 

properly acknowledged the statutory and guidelines ranges of supervised release for 

Rossi’s offense—five years to life—and exercised its discretion not to impose a longer 

term. See United States v. Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (failing to compare 

statutory and guidelines ranges for supervised release may be procedural error).

Finally, counsel correctly concludes that it would be pointless for Rossi to 

challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. On appeal, we would presume 

that his prison and supervised-release terms, which are within the applicable guidelines 

ranges, are reasonable. See United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022) (prison 

term), United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2017) (supervised release). 

The court lacked discretion to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. 

See United States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). And the court imposed the 

minimum following a discussion consistent with the factors under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1)—especially Rossi’s achievements, aspirations for the future, and other 

personal characteristics. See Major, 33 F.4th at 380. 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.