1

DETERRING LIBYA

THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF

MUAMMAR QADDAFI

by

Craig R. Black, Commander, U.S. Navy

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 8

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
i

Deterring Libya

The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddafi

Craig R. Black, Commander, U.S. Navy

October 2000

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of

mass destruction. Copies of No. 8 and previous papers in this series are

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 8

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm
i

Contents

Page

Disclaimer .................................................................................................... i

The Author .................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments...................................................................................... iii

Introduction................................................................................................. 1

Libya Today ................................................................................................ 2

Personal History.......................................................................................... 2

Ideology and Style of Government.............................................................. 4

Foreign Relations ........................................................................................ 8

Threats to the Regime ............................................................................... 10

The Primacy of Oil.................................................................................... 12

Weapons of Mass Destruction .................................................................. 13

WMD Strategies and Scenarios ................................................................ 14

Is Qaddafi Deterrable? .............................................................................. 17

Notes ......................................................................................................... 21
Deterring Libya . . . 3

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the

U.S. Government, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
4 . . . Deterring Libya

The Author

CDR Craig Black is a U.S. Naval Aviator assigned to the Defense

Intelligence Agency, undergoing attaché training. He graduated from the

University of Missouri-Kansas City in 1982 with a Bachelor of Arts

degree in History. He received his commission as a Navy officer from

Aviation Officers Candidate School in 1982, earning his pilot’s wings in

1984. He is a 2000 graduate of the Air War College and the Armed Forces

Staff College.
Deterring Libya . . . 5

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr. Barry Schneider for his expert critique

and insight.
6 . . . Deterring Libya

Deterring Libya

The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddifi

Craig R. Black

Introduction

In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi—then a virtually

unknown army officer in his late twenties—rose to the leadership of Libya.

Armed with a vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small

group of his fellow officers who called themselves the Free Officers’

Movement. In a virtually bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and

absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. During

the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged as a charismatic and complicated

leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre and irrational, he has been

branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his fellow Arabs, he is

praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, while others

condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit of

Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization.

Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that “atomic weapons will be like

traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We

will have our share of this new weapon.” In 1987 Reuters quoted him as

saying: “The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves,

until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate

water and until they liberate Palestine.”1

 Qaddafi places little faith in his

armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986 U.S. air strikes against

Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes, Qaddafi has wistfully

spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that could threaten New

York.2

 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded

determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This

determination, coupled with Qaddafi’s long-term association with

terrorism, has caused grave concern among other nations—especially the

United States and Israel.

In this essay, I will analyze Qaddafi’s personal history, his leadership

style, and the support structure of his regime. From this analysis, I will

attempt to identify methods to deter him from employing weapons of mass

destruction.
Deterring Libya . . . 7

Libya Today

Libya has been described as an accidental and reluctant state. It was

created in the aftermath of World War II at the behest of the Great Powers,

its three culturally diverse provinces—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and

Fazzan—loosely joined under the monarchy of King Idris. Independence

occurred in 1951. Oil was discovered in 1959, soon to be followed by

extensive investment by western oil companies.3 After the 1969

revolution, a 12-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was

established and one of its first actions was to demand the withdrawal of

U.S. forces from Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli. Washington

acquiesced.4 During the 30 years since then, relations between the U.S.

and Libya have been marked by one crisis after another: Qaddafi’s efforts

to overthrow moderate Arab regimes; Libya’s apparent collusion with the

Soviet Union during the Cold War; attempts to restrict freedom of

navigation within the Gulf of Sirte; sponsorship of international terrorism;

and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Libya exists today as an isolated and distrusted nation, its economy

strained by the cumulative effects of a depressed oil market and the UN

sanctions imposed for its alleged complicity in the bombing of a Pan Am

747 over Scotland. On its western border is Tunisia—capitalistic and proWestern. To the east is Egypt, a friend of the U.S. and the first Arab state

to recognize Israel. Algeria, Libya’s other neighbor on the Mediterranean,

is the source of much of the Islamic extremism that threatens the Qaddafi

regime.

Personal History

Qaddafi was born during World War II in a Bedouin tent in the desert,

about 20 miles south of the seaside town of Sirte. His parents,

descendants of the Qathathfa tribe, were herders of camels and goats,

eking out an existence in one of the poorest countries in the world.

Qaddafi attended a Koranic elementary school followed by high school at

Sebha in the Fezzan, Libya’s southernmost province. There, at the age of

15, he began to listen to Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser on the

radio, memorizing the speeches and reciting them, word for word, to his

classmates whom he had organized into a revolutionary cell. Among his
8 . . . Deterring Libya

classmates were Abdel Salen Jalloud, who would become Qaddafi’s most

trusted deputy; Mustafa al-Kharoubi, who would be his intelligence chief;

and Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, the future commander-in-chief of the armed

forces.5

Qaddafi insisted that that his fellow cell members observe what he

called “revolutionary disciplines,” avoiding alcohol and dissolute ways.

Qaddafi’s puritanism has been attributed to his Bedouin origins as well as

to a reaction against the creeping corruption spread by the foreign oil

companies and contractors, maneuvering for positions and favors under

the monarchy. Qaddafi would be expelled from Sebha for political trouble

making, in particular for leading demonstrations against King Idris for his

lack of support for Nasser and the Palestinian cause against Israel.6

A summary of his early ideology:

He had soaked up the Arab revolutionary ideas which

poured out of Egypt under Nasser and, although he seemed

to have no clear ideology of his own, he had produced a

potent cocktail of revolution and Islamic extremism. He

was disciplined and immensely hard-working, and he had

tapped into the reservoirs of underground discontent that

existed in Libya under King Idris. He was poised to plan

the revolution and, taking the advice of his mentor,

President Nasser, and his Egyptian schoolmaster in Sebha,

he decided that the most fertile ground lay in the Libyan

armed forces.7

Qaddafi attended military college in Benghazi where he continued his

dissident activity, establishing the beginnings of the Free Officers’

Movement. After graduation in 1966, he traveled to England for several

months of training with the British signal corps. He was a poor soldier,

frequently being put on report for rudeness and insubordination and even

for suspicion of complicity in the summary execution of a fellow soldier.

It is clear that Qaddafi’s intention was not to serve a distinguished career

in the service of the monarchy, but to overthrow it.8

During the next three years, Qaddafi molded his group of fellow

officers into a full-fledged underground movement, ultimately

overthrowing the monarchy. He would turn this coup into a revolution,

attempting to change Libya from a conservative, colonial state into a
Deterring Libya . . . 9

modern, progressive one. This involved a major transformation of

society—changes in roles, attitudes, and behavior—all codified in The

Green Book, Qaddafi’s philosophy of the Revolution. Qaddafi initially put

the RCC in charge of the government and ruled by decree, campaigning to

rid the country of corruption and the symbols of Western imperialism.

The Americans and British left, the Italians were expelled, and Arabic was

restored as the official language. Corrupt politicians and military officers

were purged. Oil leases were renegotiated and many of the companies

nationalized. With the suspension of the constitution and the outlawing of

political parties, Qaddafi made himself the undisputed leader and architect

of his country’s future.9

Ideology and Style of Government

Since 1969, Qaddafi has dominated Libya’s policies by the sheer force

of his personality and leadership, seizing every opportunity to implement

his revolutionary ideology. He has devoted Libya’s considerable oil

wealth to building roads, schools, and hospitals. Villages have been

electrified and the desert irrigated. He has done as much as any other Arab

leader for women’s liberation and providing for popular decision-making

in government.10

Initially, as chairman of the RCC, Qaddafi controlled both the

legislative and executive functions of the government, experimenting with

the socialist policies employed in Nasser’s Egypt. But beginning in 1973,

dissatisfied with the level of revolutionary zeal displayed by the Libyan

people, Qaddafi launched his “Cultural Revolution.” He dismantled the

traditional apparatus of government and reorganized the country’s political

structure to follow his Third Universal Theory—a disavowal of capitalism

and communism in favor of socialism, popular democracy, Arab unity, and

progressive Islam. He set up what he envisioned as a direct democracy, in

which the instruments of government were placed in the hands of the

people. People’s Committees and popular congresses were formed at the

local, regional, and national levels to promote mass participation in the

nation’s decision-making process.11 What resulted though was a stifling,

overly rigid system that proved to be better at promulgating top-level

policy than it was at cultivating popular participation.12
10 . . . Deterring Libya

Although Qaddafi renounced all official posts and titles in 1979, he

has continued to dominate the political scene in his capacity as the “The

Leader of the Revolution.” A journalist with unprecedented access

reports:

Called simply “the Leader,” he (Qaddafi) is not,

technically the head of state. The ministers report to the

people’s congresses, not to him, and diplomats do not

present him their credentials. Western diplomats say he

probably has a veto power over official acts and that

certain security agencies still report to him. Yet few Libyawatchers pretend to understand his precise role.13

Qaddafi is supported by an extensive security network consisting of

his personal bodyguards, several elite military units, and the various local

People’s Committees. The result is multiple and overlapping layers of

surveillance that monitor and control the activities of anyone deemed a

threat to the regime. The regime’s security forces are regularly accused by

international human rights organizations of murder, torture, and

intimidation.14

Qaddafi’s inner circle is made up of long-time revolutionary

colleagues who have survived his frequent purges. A clear chain of

command is difficult to draw since the members of his inner circle and

security apparatus go by a misleading system of ranks and titles. A

lieutenant colonel might report to a captain who works for another official

with no rank at all. No one outside Libya—and perhaps even inside—

knows for sure who controls exactly what. The vagueness and obscurity

of this system is said to be of Qaddafi’s own design, intended to confuse

potential competitors within the regime.15

A generation of younger, more hard-line regime members is reported

to be moving up. Qaddafi keeps these ambitious underlings in check by

playing them off one another. No political heir has been designated and

there does not appear to be any blood relatives capable of taking the reins.

A report from a U.S. news magazine emphasizes this point:

For sheer intrigue, none of the succession struggles in the

Mideast can top Libya’s. The erratic but cunning Col.

Muammar Qaddafi, 56, has survived several assassination

attempts. If one finally succeeds, it is unlikely that any of
Deterring Libya . . . 11

his five sons will be able to hold power. The oldest, Saif alIslam, has inherited his father’s quirkiness: He bought two

rare Bengali tigers, named Fred and Barney, for $15,000

from a Milan zoo and brought them along when he studied

in Austria. U.S. officials point to one incident when asked

what to expect if Qaddafi disappears from the scene: In

July 1996, two of his sons, backing opposing soccer teams,

got into a dispute over a referee’s call. The match ended in

a shootout between each son’s retinue of bodyguards.16

Qaddafi has managed the personnel assignments within his regime by

paying close attention to tribal membership thereby consolidating alliances

and, by ensuring that no single tribe holds a monopoly on key positions,

guaranteeing his security.17 The predominate tribe within the regime and

the one critical to Qaddafi’s survival is his own, the Qathathfa. From the

Qathathfa, Qaddafi has promoted junior officers in the armed forces and

entrusted them with sensitive military posts. Making up a core of colonels

responsible to the preservation of the regime are, among others, Ahmad

Qathf al-Damm, responsible for the Cyrenaica region; Masoud AbdulHafith, commander of military security; Misbah Abdul-Hafith, responsible

for the Benghazi sector; Khalifa Ihneish, commander of armaments and

munitions; Omar Ishkal, Al-Barani Ishkal, commander of domestic

security; Mohamad al-Majthoub al-Qaddafi, leader of the revolutionary

committees; Sayed Qathaf al-Damm, director of information and

propaganda; and Ali al-Kilbo, commander of the Azazia barracks and in

charge of protecting Qaddafi’s residence. These assignments feature a

great deal of overlap and are subject to frequent revision making it

difficult for even members of Qaddafi’s own tribe to gain leverage over

him. Qaddafi has had to eliminate at least one member of his extended

family when his primacy was threatened. His cousin Hassan Ishkal, in

charge of domestic security and Libyan troops in Chad, was gunned down

by regime supporters after it became clear that he was no longer willing to

adhere to Qaddafi’s orders.18

Other important but less strategic positions within the regime have

been filled by the Warfala tribe which enjoys blood ties to the Qathathfa.

A third tribe from which regime members have been recruited is the

Magharha.19
12 . . . Deterring Libya

Qaddafi has had a falling out with Abdel Salen Jalloud, his number

two man since the revolution. Jalloud, a member of the Magharha tribe,

was often cited as a possible successor to Qaddafi and as such, was

perhaps perceived by Qaddafi as a competitor. He has been stripped of his

power and replaced by Abdallah al-Sanussi, another member of the

Magharha tribe and Qaddafi’s wife’s brother-in-law.20 Sanussi is said to

lead a “dirty tricks department” that acts on Qaddafi’s authority. Sanussi,

along with five other Libyans, was recently convicted in absentia by a

French court for the 1989 bombing of a UTA DC-10 over Niger. He has

kept a low profile in recent months, perhaps to distance Qaddafi from the

bombing or even because he has been banished from the inner circle.21

Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, another revolutionary comrade of Qaddafi’s,

continues as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces but is said to

possess little real power. Mustafa al-Kharoubi has retained his position as

head of military intelligence but, like other members of the original RCC,

is struggling for his political survival.22 Two members of the original

RCC, Omar al-Maheshi and Bashir Hawadi, have led coup attempts,

earning themselves life prison terms and execution for their followers.23 It

would appear that Qaddafi distrusts long-serving regime members,

especially those from tribes other than his own. Influence and political

standing are no doubt what attracts a regime member to the inner circle

but, once attained, guarantee his decline.

Libya-watchers describe Qaddafi’s decision-making process as being

haphazard and rarely following any given theory or ideology. His

quirkiness and idiosyncrasies make great news copy. He receives Western

journalists and African dignitaries in a camel-skin tent, attired in a

Bedouin robe over western-style casual wear. His admirers claim that, by

living an austere life, Qaddafi is being true to his Bedouin nature. His

critics dismiss the tent, the rugs, and Bedouin garb as conceit.24

Insight into his personality can be gained by examining the policies of

this regime. Two examples of Qaddafi’s idiosyncratic leadership:

(In Qaddafi’s Libya) the Gregorian calendar has been

replaced with a new solar calendar that begins with the

migration of the Prophet Mohammed in 622. The names of

the Gregorian months have been replaced with names

invented by General Qaddafi. The traditional Lunar

Islamic calendar used by all Muslim countries have also
Deterring Libya . . . 13

been changed to begin with the death of the Prophet rather

than his migration. Hence, the simple task of determining

the day and date has become confusing because Libya

neither follows the standard lunar Islamic calendar nor the

global solar calendar. Every year a new set of rules and

regulations telling Libyans what to wear, eat, say, and read

is enacted by the regime.25

The domestic policies of the Libyan regime have often

bordered on fiction. A case in point is a 1977 edict

whereby the Libyan leader suggested that in order to

achieve self-sufficiency every Libyan family had to raise

chickens in the home. The cages and birds were imported

and, for an obligatory fee of fifty-seven dinars ($150 at the

1977 exchange rate), were distributed by the government to

Libyans. To many city dwellers in small apartments,

raising chickens in their kitchens was a difficult if not

impossible affair. The result was that many ate the birds

and found other uses for the cages.26

Qaddafi’s ideology and rule are constantly changing, sometimes in

different directions. Always experimenting, he tinkers with the

Revolution and its ideological mix, employing Islam, socialism, and

populism in varying degrees to suit the situation at hand. The Revolution

of today is unlike the Revolution of 10 years ago, and almost certainly

unlike what it will be 10 years from now.

Foreign Relations

Not since Nasser has an Arab leader attempted such an ambitious

foreign policy as has Qaddafi. Driven by his opposition to colonialism and

Zionism, as well as his vision of Arab unity, Qaddafi has pursued a world

order in which Libya and other Arab nations would take top billing. But

his revolutionary zeal and temperamental personality have progressively

isolated his regime.

Libya’s relations with its North African neighbors have been volatile.

He has plunged into armed conflict with five of his six neighbors. Niger,

the only neighbor he has not clashed with, is too weak to stand up to Libya
14 . . . Deterring Libya

and has adopted a policy of accommodation towards the Qaddafi regime.27

Qaddafi has threatened to support opposition groups in Algeria and

Tunisia as penalty for not supporting Libya against the UN sanctions.28

Egypt, Libya’s closest friend during the early years of the Revolution,

attacked Libya in 1977 in a brief, punitive war after Israeli intelligence

informed President Sadat that a Libyan assassination attempt was

brewing.29 Libya has staked claim to the Auzo strip of Chad since 1974

for ideological reasons and economic gain from Chad’s rich uranium

deposits. A protracted conflict ensued, ending in a devastating and

embarrassing defeat for Qaddafi’s forces.30

Qaddafi has meddled in the internal politics of virtually all of subSaharan Africa. In an effort to undermine Western and Israeli influence on

the continent, he has provided aid, both military and economic, to a

veritable Who’s Who of African bad guys—Amin in Uganda; Bokassa in

the Central African Republic; and Mobuto in Zaire.31 These efforts earned

him the dubious distinction of being the first political leader to be denied

the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 32

In the greater Arab world, Qaddafi’s insistence on a violent solution to

the Palestinian problem has alienated Libya from the governments of

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf States; while Libya’s support for Iran

during the Iran-Iraq war turned even Saddam Hussein against Qaddafi.33

Cut off from the world by UN sanctions and resentful at the Arab

world for turning its back on him, Qaddafi has attempted to redefine his

foreign policy efforts in Africa. Evidently abandoning pan-Arabism for

the time being and embracing “pan-Africanism,” he has reached out to

South African President Nelson Mandela and attempted to mediate

conflicts in Congo, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Liberia, and Sudan. At the June

1998 OAU summit, African leaders declared that they would ignore the

UN airline embargo against Libya. In gratitude, Libya rewarded African

heads of state with large cash gifts for each visit that violated the

embargo.34

Qaddafi’s association with state-sponsored terrorism has earned him

the enmity of both the Arab world and Western democracies. He is

reported to have supported some 50 terror organizations and subversion

groups, in addition to more than 40 radical governments in Africa, Asia,

Europe, and America.35 Among the terrorist groups that continue to

receive direct support from his regime are Abu Nidal and Hamas.36 An
Deterring Libya . . . 15

analysis of the terrorist groups and causes Qaddafi has supported does not

reveal a clear ideological pattern. His indiscriminate sponsorship of

groups as diverse as Hamas (the liberation of Palestine), the Irish

Republican Army (Irish independence), and the Red Brigades (Marxist

upheaval) suggests that he considers terrorism not so much as a tool to

advance the Revolution but as a weapon to be used against his perceived

foes—Israel and the Western democracies.

Libya’s alleged involvement in the 1986 bombing of a Berlin

nightclub that killed two U.S. servicemen resulted in U.S. air strikes

against Tripoli and Benghazi, killing 36 Libyans, including Qaddafi’s 16-

month-old daughter.37 Less violent but even more damaging to Libya

were the UN sanctions prompted by the 1989 Pan Am bombing. UN

sanctions, in effect from 1992 to 1999, crippled the Libyan economy and

isolated the country from the world community. 38

But the incidence of Libyan-sponsored terrorism during the 1990’s

appears to have declined, if not ceased. This could be a result of UN

sanctions and/or the U.S. air strikes. An Australian study of world-wide

terrorism, conducted in 1996, shows that Libyan-associated terrorist

groups were substantially less active during the 20 months after the air

strikes than before. The terrorist activity that persisted shifted away from

acts of high and medium severity toward acts of low severity—evidence

that military force might have some value in deterring terrorism, at least

for the short term.39 In interviews with western journalists, Qaddafi and

his ministers insist that if Libyans have been involved in terrorist acts, they

were not implementing Libyan policy.40 This contrasts sharply with

Qaddafi’s public rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s when terrorists were

exalted as heroes and martyrs.

Qaddafi has paid a high price for his revolutionary zeal. He has

virtually no friends or allies outside of Libya’s borders. His support for

terrorism, rather than advancing the Revolution and enhancing his political

clout, has increased Libya’s isolation, leading to a crippled economy and

emboldened internal opposition groups. Although Qaddafi has displayed

relatively good behavior for the past 10 years, his hatred of imperialism

and Zionism likely remains the root of his ideology and the driving force

of his foreign policy.

Threats to the Regime
16 . . . Deterring Libya

Qaddafi, though possessing a monopoly on wealth and power, faces

opposition from multiple segments of Libyan society. The regime’s

redistribution of property and the nationalization of virtually all industry

and commerce have alienated Libya’s middle class. Intellectuals and

students have been scarred by a series of barbaric hangings carried out at

the country’s universities. The Muslim clergy view Qaddafi as a heretic

for his reinterpretation of the Koran. Military officers are infuriated by

Qaddafi’s plans to raise a people’s militia to replace the regular army.41

As Qaddafi has become more isolated, he has become less tolerant of

criticism, repressing Islamic extremist groups and imposing brutal control

over ethnic and tribal minorities. Tribes such as the Berbers, Tuaregs, and

Warfalla are the bedrock of Libyan social structure and their growing

disenchantment with the regime does not bode well for Qaddafi.42 The

tribal tension has even extended to his own Qathathfa tribe whose

members have been accused of plotting to assassinate him.43

One of the many inconsistencies in the Qaddafi regime’s policies has

been its long-standing support of international Islamic opposition groups.

Within Libya, though, the same groups have been the objects of brutal

repression. Although by all accounts a devout Muslim, Qaddafi has long

been distrustful of religious organizations since they often become

involved in politics, breeding factionalism, and undermining his

revolutionary objectives. As part of his campaign to eliminate

independent sources of power that could challenge his ideology and

leadership, Qaddafi has attacked the Islamists as agents of reaction and

obstacles to the progress of the Revolution.44

Religious groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, have objected

to Qaddafi’s efforts to concentrate religious power in his own hands and to

make himself the sole interpreter of the Koran. They are resentful of the

socialist changes that have taken place and critical of Qaddafi’s promotion

of his doctrine over that of traditional Islamic teachings. The

Brotherhood’s appeal is growing among city dwellers and the poor who

respond to its vision of reformulating Arab institutions along Islamic

ideals.45

The National Salvation Front is the other group that poses a threat to

Qaddafi. Established in 1981, this party has attempted to craft a platform

that accommodates both secular and Islamic opponents of Qaddafi. Of

special significance has been this group’s effort to establish connections
Deterring Libya . . . 17

with members of the Libyan armed forces. Two recent arrivals on the

Libyan political landscape are the Islamic Martyrdom Movement and the

Libyan Islamic Group. Both of these mysterious organizations seem to be

focusing their recruiting efforts on poverty-stricken Libyan veterans of the

Afghan conflict.46

During the past few years, anti-regime violence by Islamic extremists

has reached new levels of intensity. Guerrilla forces have clashed with

Libyan troops and are rumored to have attempted to assassinate Qaddafi.47

Although the level of violence has not reached the same scale as it has in

neighboring Algeria, the ability of the Islamic guerrillas to obtain

advanced weapons and conduct raids against Qaddafi’s security forces are

reasons for the regime to worry.

Despite the recent surge of extremist violence, the army still holds the

key to the future of the regime. Qaddafi’s ill-fated adventures in Chad

have caused considerable discontent among officers as has his attempts to

reduce the power of the army by creating an alternative popular militia.

Although the military has the power to challenge Qaddafi, it lacks a

coherent ideology to legitimize its rule and attract support from other

disaffected groups. This has led military challengers to seek an alliance

with an opposition group that possesses legitimacy and ideological

appeal—the Islamic extremists.48

The Primacy of Oil

Qaddafi has long known the political power of oil. His regime

maintains a monopoly on the distribution of oil revenues, the country’s

primary source of income. He has used these revenues to bankroll

spectacular, if wasteful, development. Billions of petrodollars have gone

to finance the causes of liberation, terrorism, and Islam throughout the

world and have paid for Libya’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

programs. Qaddafi has distributed oil revenues in ways to influence tribal

leaders and placate those who question his eccentric political concepts,

foreign policy adventures, and lack of economic planning. But Libya is a

slave to the price of oil. Depressed oil prices and a production complex

hobbled from embargoes have put Qaddafi is a difficult position.49

Qaddafi is running out of money. The state runs almost all the

economy and does so badly. Black marketeering and corruption are
18 . . . Deterring Libya

rampant. Huge sums are spent on eccentric schemes such as the

construction of a $25 billion “Great Man-made River Project” across the

Sahara.50 Without the huge inflow of petrodollars he has been accustomed

to, Qaddafi will find it difficult, if not impossible, to keep his support base

content.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In spite of sanctions, embargoes, and a moribund economy, (not to

mention the Non-Proliferation Treaty which Libya ratified in 1981),

Qaddafi continues to pursue attainment of nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons. In his own words, the primary threat to Libya is

“Israel’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of hitting targets

in Libya.”51 He evidently believes that these weapons can raise his

international stature, deter U.S. and Israeli attack, intimidate his neighbors,

and serve as cheaper alternatives to more expensive conventional forces.

But even after 30 years of trying to develop a nuclear weapon, Libya’s

nuclear program remains in the embryonic stage. It has succeeded only in

providing some training to a number of students and technicians and the

establishment of a nuclear research center, which includes a small Sovietsupplied research reactor under International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards.52 Progress has been hampered from mismanagement, lack of

spare parts, and the reluctance of foreign suppliers to provide assistance.

Qaddafi does not appear to have abandoned his goal of acquiring

nuclear weapons. There are reports that Libya tried to buy a nuclear bomb

from China in 1970 and Russia in 1992.53 Libya assisted Pakistan in its

development of nuclear weaponry, through direct financial aid as well as

by serving as an intermediary in the procurement of Niger-mined uranium.

This was no doubt with the hope that Pakistan would one day provide

Qaddafi with a nuclear weapon or at least the expertise for him to develop

his own.54 But with the execution of Pakistani prime minister Ali Bhutto

in 1979, Libya’s hopes for an “Islamic Bomb” from Pakistan appear to

have diminished.55

Although Libya is a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention,

it has pursued development of biological weapons for many years. Its

program remains in the early research and development status though,

primarily for want an adequate scientific and technical base. The program
Deterring Libya . . . 19

suffers from the same difficulties as the nuclear program in acquiring

needed foreign equipment and technical expertise.56 This is scant

reassurance since biological weapons are a great deal easier to produce

than nuclear weapons and can be done clandestinely with equipment

otherwise used for commercial industry.

Available evidence suggests that only Libya’s chemical warfare

program has made any real progress. During the 1980s, it succeeded in

producing up to 100 tons of blister and nerve agent at its Rabta facility,

although many of the precursor chemicals were obtained from foreign

sources.57 The focus of intense media attention, Rabta was shut down in

1990—ostensibly because of a fire—only to be reopened in 1996. While

Rabta was inoperative, Qaddafi’s efforts shifted to the construction of a

hardened, deeply buried facility at Tarhunah, southeast of Tripoli.58 Over

a hundred tons of mustard and nerve gases are believed to be stockpiled at

Tarhunah. As if this were not enough, the facility is reported to be capable

of producing up to 1,000 tons of mustard gas, 90 tons of sarin, and 1,300

tons of soman nerve agent per year.59

In addition to his quest for WMD agents, Qaddafi has been shopping

for suitable delivery vehicles. Libya’s only operational ballistic missile

system is the Scud-B, acquired from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s.

These missiles are at the end of their service life and suffering from a host

of maintenance problems. In January 2000, only a few days after Libya

and Britain exchanged ambassadors for the first time in 15 years, Libya

was caught trying to smuggle Scud components from China through

London.60 Efforts to procure the North Korean No Dong missile have

been unsuccessful. UN sanctions have stymied Libya’s efforts to develop

the Al Fatah, a missile of its own design.61

WMD Strategies and Scenarios

Five WMD strategies have been identified that might be used by a

state like Libya against the U.S. and its allies.62 The first would be to

fracture the allied coalition. Within the range of Libya’s missiles and

aircraft lie North Africa, southern Europe, Israel, and Turkey. By holding

these nations at risk, Qaddafi could coerce them into refraining from

joining any coalition against him. Without the participation of North

African and Mediterranean members, a U.S.-led coalition against Libya
20 . . . Deterring Libya

would suffer from a perceived lack of legitimacy or even be labeled as

U.S. aggression.

The second WMD strategy would be to defeat the U.S. at home. High

U.S. and Allied casualties caused by WMD attack, or merely the fear of

high casualties, could damage U.S. public support of the war effort.

Qaddafi surely took note of the quick U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon in

1983 and Somalia in 1993 that were spurred by the deaths of U.S.

servicemen.

The third strategy involves using WMD to shatter a U.S.

expeditionary force. Qaddafi’s armed forces are weak and would be no

match for those of a U.S.-led force in a conventional engagement. A

massive WMD attack against the invading army would go a long ways

toward leveling the playing field. Aimed at troop concentrations, either on

the battlefield or at a point of debarkation, the WMD attack could inflict

thousands of casualties and set the U.S. war effort back months (if it

doesn’t provoke nuclear retaliation). During the time it would take to

rebuild the expeditionary force, U.S. public opinion might force a

compromised peace to be negotiated.

Another strategy would be the use of WMD to secure the endgame.

Qaddafi, when faced with an impending military defeat, could gain

negotiating leverage by threatening to go down in a blaze of WMD glory.

U.S. and Allied leaders, even though victorious on the battlefield, might be

tempted to allow Qaddafi to remain in power rather than suffer additional

casualties.

A final strategy for Qaddafi might be to use WMD to avenge the

defeat of his regime. Samson-like, he could strike out against those

nations he perceives as responsible for his overthrow. With nothing left

for Qaddafi to lose there would be little that could be done to deter him.

When these strategies are applied to Libya’s domestic and foreign

affairs situation, three WMD scenarios become evident. The first involves

Qaddafi employing WMD to defeat or repel an invading force or, as

discussed above, to secure the endgame after his forces have been overrun.

The only known instance of Libyan use of WMD occurred in 1987 during

Libya’s military operation in Chad. Chadian forces, with French and U.S.

support, had turned the tide against their Libyan opponents and launched a

surprise attack against a military base inside Libya. In response, Qaddafi

ordered a chemical weapons attack—mustard gas delivered by a transport
Deterring Libya . . . 21

aircraft.63 This suggests what the Libyan response would be against an

attack by the U.S. or Egypt.

Warning signs preceding such a response are difficult to predict given

the shroud of secrecy that cloaks the Qaddafi regime. Increased activity at

the Tarhuna and Rabta facilities might be an indicator. So might be a

protective withdrawal of his air force which, until his missile capability

improves, is his most reliable chemical weapons delivery capability.

There have been unconfirmed reports that the Great Man-made River

Project, with its hundreds of miles of tunnels, is not merely an eccentric

irrigation scheme but a method to store and transport WMD out of sight of

Western intelligence sensors.64 If this is the case, close attention must be

paid to that system’s nodes and service points.

The second WMD scenario involves a revenge attack against Western

or Israeli targets. Following the 1986 U.S. air strikes, Libya launched two

Scud missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa.65 Although both missiles

fell short of their target (intentionally?), the attack demonstrated Qaddafi’s

willingness to lash out at third party populations in an attempt to fracture

coalitions and shake public resolve. A twist to this scenario might have

Qaddafi utilizing his terrorist connections to carry out the attack. This

could even be ordered after his overthrow, either from a hiding place

within Libya or while in exile abroad. An intelligence community

observation:

Whereas Tripoli employs its own intelligence officers to

eliminate opposition figures, it employs surrogates for its

nastiest operations. Deviation from this norm, as in the

Lockerbie bombing, has proved disastrous. Consequently,

if Tripoli wishes to mimic the Tokoyo underground gassing,

it will turn to a third party like the Abu Nidal faction.66

The third scenario has Qaddafi using WMD to eradicate opposition

groups. According to dissident and diplomatic sources, armed opposition

to the regime is growing. Libyan air force fighter-bombers and helicopter

gunships have repeatedly struck suspected militant hideouts in the Green

Mountain region.67 It is difficult to determine how effective these

operations have been but, given the weakness of the Libyan military and

the growing threat from dissident groups—both tribal and religious, it is

conceivable that Qaddafi might one day be forced to take a page from
22 . . . Deterring Libya

Saddam Hussein’s playbook and employ chemical weapons against his

own people.

Since no single opposition appears capable of ousting Qaddafi, a

coalition of groups would have to be formed. A WMD attack against one

group would likely discourage other dissident groups from joining the

cause. Such an attack would probably be prompted by an opposition

victory over regime forces and prefaced by an increase in Qaddafi’s

revolutionary rhetoric, both through speeches and the state-sponsored

media. His favorite euphemism for enemies that he desires to kill is “Mad

Dogs,” a label he has applied to Islamic extremists. He is also prone to

accuse his enemies—before he eliminates them—of collaborating with

U.S. or Israeli intelligence. 68

Is Qaddafi Deterrable?

Qaddafi has frequently been characterized by Western governments as

being irrational or insane. His policies often seem senseless and

counterproductive. His most brazen acts of terror—the Pan Am and UTA

bombings—are nihilistic and self-destructive. He has used chemical

weapons; he continuously defies international norms; he sponsors terrorist

groups. For these reasons, he might be deterrable only to a degree.

A study of Qaddafi’s personal history does not show a leader who is

willing to go down in flames for his beliefs, but one who has repeatedly

modified his ideology to safeguard his position as the Leader of the

Revolution. His variable standing on Islam, for instance. When it was

necessary to legitimize his ideology, he embraced Islam and was an

enthusiastic proponent of strict Koranic law. But when the Muslim clerics

criticized his Third Universal Theory, arguing that it was counter to

Islamic doctrine, Qaddafi jailed them and proclaimed that, with Islam,

people could speak directly with Allah and therefore did not require

clergymen as intermediaries.

Qaddafi, although complicated and difficult to read, seems to possess

a degree of pragmatism. He will adjust the mix of his ideology—a little

socialism one day, some Islam the next, a heavy dose of populism—to

keep the revolution (i.e., his life and power) alive. He is not likely to do

anything that will destroy all he has worked for. Hobbled by UN sanctions

and his pariah status, he appears to have come around to the view that
Deterring Libya . . . 23

conciliatory diplomacy might be more effective in furthering Libya’s

influence than proclamations of support for terrorists and revolutionaries.

To deter Qaddafi, something of his that he holds dear must be held at

risk. His military would make a poor target as it has become so weak and

ineffectual that it is incapable of harming anyone except perhaps his own

regime. Counterforce strategies against Libya’s WMD facilities could be

useful if the weapons were stored someplace more accessible than

Tarhunah, the design of which is said to have been constructed from

Soviet bomb shelter blueprints and therefore virtually impregnable to

conventional air attack.69 Pressure applied to Qaddafi’s international

support base would be effective if such a base existed. Qaddafi has been

so ostracized by the leaders of the Arab world that they are unlikely to

jeopardize their international standing to support him. Although Qaddafi

claims that Libya is the gateway to Africa and that he is an African above

all else, the affinity displayed toward him by African leaders exists only in

proportion to how much financial aid Libya doles out. Qaddafi’s domestic

support base is provided chiefly by the three tribes from which his inner

circle members hail. Tribal support depends a great deal on how well the

tribes fare economically under the regime. They are not likely to cause

trouble if their leaders and members are well cared for. All things

considered, there appears only one prop holding up the Qaddafi regime—

oil.

As we have seen with the UN sanctions and the decline in oil prices,

when oil revenues dry up, so does the ability of the Qaddafi regime to

provide financial benefits to its support base—tribal leaders, the urban

poor, and politicized youth. Oil revenues finance his security police and

military, placate potential opponents, and keep his friends happy. Oil is

clearly Qaddafi’s source of power and the key to deterring him.

Before we go any further, we must consider what a Libya without

Qaddafi would look like and if such a situation would be more desirable

than the one that exists now. Qaddafi has succeeded in disturbing the

political environment in such a way as to prevent the emergence of a

civilian opposition. The greatest threat to his regime is a coalition of

Islamic extremist groups and the military. If and when these factions link

up, Qaddafi’s days are numbered. Given the regional destabilization

threatened by Islamic extremism and the specter of religious fanatics in
24 . . . Deterring Libya

possession of Libya’s chemical weapons stocks, it can be argued that the

region would be worse off without Qaddafi than with him.

Military strikes against Libya’s oil industry could target the pipelines,

port facilities and the oil fields themselves. But with any military

operation there exists the risk of WMD retaliation, either against the U.S.

or its allies. And even if Qaddafi does not lash out with WMD, he can

improve upon his pariah status by claiming that the U.S. is bullying him

and, by destroying his oil industry, is responsible for the suffering of

thousands of Libyans.

The method to deterring Qaddafi appears to be the judicious use of

sanctions. Sanctions applied directly toward Libyan WMD production are

difficult to enforce since many of the technologies involved have

legitimate applications within civilian industry (this is especially true for

chemical and biological weapons, less so for nuclear). The sanctions

should take advantage of the Qaddafi regime’s dependence upon

petrodollars and specifically target Libya’s oil production industry—

production equipment, technical assistance, access to foreign markets, etc.

For these sanctions to be effective, they must be multilateral. This is

evident by the relative ineffectiveness of the U.S. embargo against Libya,

in effect since 1986. Even in the face of American pressure, there have

always been nations—some of them U.S. allies—willing to trade with

Libya. It was only with the UN sanctions, in effect from 1992 to 1999,

that Qaddafi was squeezed into what resembled respectable behavior. For

the first time, Libyans could not blame solely the U.S. and Israel for their

problems but had to face the fact that they were international outcasts. In

April 1999, the sanctions produced their desired effect with the turnover of

the two Libyan suspects in the Pan Am bombing, and were suspended.

The key to preventing Qaddafi from misbehaving in the future is an

efficient process of reinstating the sanctions. A healthy level of fear for

the survival of his regime will keep Qaddafi on his best behavior.
26 . . . Deterring Libya

Notes

1. Geoff Simons, Libya--The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin’s Press,

1996), 257.

2. Robert Waller, “Libyan Threat Perception,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7,

No. 9 (September 1995), 408.

3. Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, (Ithaca and London: Cornell

University Press, 1998), 41-46.

4. David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 61.

5. John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, (New York: Hold, Rinehard & Winston,

1982), 14.

6. Ibid.

7. Blundy and Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, 44.

8. Ibid., 46-47.

9. Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-

1980, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 260-263.

10. Milton Viorst, “The Colonel in his Labyrinth,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, Issue 2,

(Mar/Apr 99), 72-73.

11. George Joffé, “Qadhafi’s Islam in Local Historic Perspective,” Qadhafi’s Libya

1969-1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 149-150.

12. Mansour O. El-Kikhia, Libya’s Qaddafi—-the Politics of Contradiction,

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 45-55.

13. Viorst, “The Colonel in his Labyrinth,” 71.

14. 1998 Human Rights Report-Libya Country Report, U.S. Department of State,

1999, 1.

15. Waller, “Libyan Threat Perception,” 408.

16. Thomas Omestad and Warren P. Strobel, “Here Come the Sons,” U.S. News &

World Report, Vol. 126, Issue 7 (22 February 1999), 41-43.

17. El-Kikhia, Libya’s Qaddafi—-the Politics of Contradiction, 89-92.

18. Ibid.
Deterring Libya . . . 27

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Viorst, “The Colonel in his Labyrinth,” 71.

22. El-Kikhia, Libya’s Qaddafi, 86-92.

23. Ibid., 170.

24. Viorst, “The Colonel in his Labyrinth,” 65.

25. Ibid., 105.

26. Ibid., 105-106.

27. Ibid., 148.

28. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 132.

29. Ronald Bruce St John, Qaddafi’s World Design, Libyan Foreign Policy 1969-

1987, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), 60.

30. Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, 145.

31. St John, Qaddafi’s World Design, 98-99.

32. Ibid,. 149.

33. Simons, Libya—The Struggle for Survival, 14-17.

34. Scott Peterson, “Col. Qaddafi Seeks to Lead New Club—Africa,” Christian

Science Monitor, 9 September 1999.

35. Blundy and Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, 150.

36. Robert Waller, “The Libyan Threat to the Mediterranean,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, (May 1996), 227.

37. Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival, 336.

38. Scott Peterson, “Trying to shed Pariah Status, Libya Warms to West,” Christian

Science Monitor, 13 September 1999.

39. Henry W. Prunckun, Jr. and Philip B. Mohr, “Military Deterrence of

International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon,” Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 20 (July-September 1997), 267-280.

40. Viorst, “The Colonel in his Labyrinth,” 67-71.

41. Martin Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State—the Adventurist Politics of

Muammar Qaddafi, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 33.
28 . . . Deterring Libya

42. 1998 Human Rights Report-Libya Country Report, U.S. Department of State,

1999, 1.

43. Alan George, Ghaddaffi: “Trouble in the Extended Family,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, vol.8, no.11 (November 1996), 525.

44. Ray Takeyh, “Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam,” Washington

Quarterly, vol.21, no.3 (Summer 1998), 162.

45. Ibid., 167.

46. Ibid., 167-168.

47. Viorst, “The Colonel in His Labyrinth,” 62.

48. Ibid., 166.

49. “Muddling On,” Economist Vol.352, No.8135, (4 September 1999), 47.

50. Viorst, “The Colonel in His Labyrinth,” 62.

51. Waller, “Libyan Threat Perception,” 408.

52. Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, November

1997, 35.

53. Waller, “The Libyan threat to the Mediterranean,” 228.

54. Simons, Libya: Struggle for Survival, 257. Also see Weissman and Krosney,

The Islamic Bomb.

55. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, (New York: Times

Books, 1981), 211-213.

56. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 37.

57. Ibid., 35

58. Ibid.

59. Waller, “The Libyan Threat to the Mediterranean,” 228.

60. T.R. Reid, “Britain Catches Libya Trying to Skirt Arms Ban,” Washington Post,

(10 January 2000).

61. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 37.

62. Barry R. Schneider, “Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass

Destruction,” Airpower Journal, (Special Edition 1996), 36-47.

63. Joshua Sinai, “Ghadaffi’s Libya: the Patient Proliferator,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, Vol. 10, No. 12, (December 1998), 27.
Deterring Libya . . . 29

64. Ibid.

65. Waller, “The Libyan threat to the Mediterranean,” 228.

66. Ibid.

67. James Bruce, “Gaddafi tunnels into trouble both within and without,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly (11 September 1996), 24.

68. Waller, “Libyan Threat Perception,” 407.

69. Sinia, “Ghadaffi’s Libya: the Patient Proliferator,” 28.
30 . . . Deterring Libya

USAF Counterproliferation Center

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction.

Barry R. Schneider, Director

USAF Counterprofliferation Center

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor

The Counterproliferation Papers

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538)