a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

May 2005 OVERSEAS 

SECURITY

State Department Has 

Not Fully 

Implemented Key 

Measures to Protect 

U.S. Officials from 

Terrorist Attacks 

Outside of Embassies

GAO-05-642
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-642.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-642, a report to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

May 2005

OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not Fully 

Implemented Key Measures to Protect 

U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks 

Outside of Embassies 

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, 

protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, 

State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies 

safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. 

State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and 

implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently 

initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, 

State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal 

and financial issues. 

Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials 

outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on 

training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that 

State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement 

accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security 

procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress 

that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State’s 

hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have 

not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained 

to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures. 

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its 

scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 

Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security 

vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The 

multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. 

officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee 

association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to 

posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could 

qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. 

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences 

is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security 

program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State 

officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited 

deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences 

of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of 

U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater 

protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance 

detection teams in residential areas. 

U.S. government officials working 

overseas are at risk from terrorist 

threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy 

officials have been attacked—23 

fatally—by terrorists outside the 

embassy. As the State Department 

continues to improve security at 

U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are 

likely to focus on “soft” targets—

such as homes, schools, and places 

of worship. 

GAO was asked to determine 

whether State has a strategy for 

soft target protection; assess 

State’s efforts to protect U.S. 

officials and their families while 

traveling to and from work; assess 

State’s efforts overseas to improve 

security at schools attended by the 

children of U.S. officials; and 

describe issues related to 

protection at their residences. 

What GAO Recommends

We are recommending that the 

Secretary of State develop a soft 

targets strategy; develop 

counterterrorism training for 

officials; and fully implement its 

personal security accountability 

system for embassy officials. State 

generally agreed with our 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key 

Issues Need to Be Resolved 9

State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability 

Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy 

Personnel 10

State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not 

Yet Fully Defined 18

Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families 

at Residences against Terrorist Threats 23

Conclusion 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 32

GAO Comments 42

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Figures Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks 

Outside Embassies, 1968-2003 2

Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat 

Levels 7

Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the 

Accountability Review Boards, 1986-2004 12

Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family 

Members 15

Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets 

Program 20

Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets 

Program 21

Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing 25
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Abbreviations

AFSA American Foreign Service Association 

ARB Accountability Review Board

COM chief of mission

DCM deputy chief of mission

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security

DSAC Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course

FAH Foreign Affairs Handbook

FAM Foreign Affairs Manual

OBO Overseas Buildings Operations 

OSPB Overseas Security Policy Board

RSO regional security officer

SAFE Serving Abroad for Families and Employees

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Page 1 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 9, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and

International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas are 

at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been 

attacked—23 fatally—by terrorists outside the embassy (see fig. 1). As the 

State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, 

concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on “soft” 

targets—such as homes, schools, and places of worship.1

 Recent terrorist 

attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and 

places of worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated 

security assessments have further documented this growing concern and 

recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials 

and their families in soft target areas.

2 

1

State, in commenting on our draft, stated it had not defined what constituted a soft target. 

As a result, we used State Department language contained in travel warnings concerning 

potential terrorist attacks. We further confirmed this description based on similar language 

contained in other State documents and discussions with numerous State security experts. 

According to the State travel warnings, the State Department considers soft targets to 

include places where Americans and other westerners live, congregate, shop or visit, 

including hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, identifiable Western businesses, 

housing compounds, transportation systems, places of worship, schools, or public 

recreation events. 

2

These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on 

Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2) Accountability Review Board reports that 

followed assassinations of U.S. officials in 1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999 

Report by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).
Page 2 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks Outside Embassies, 1968-2003

Because of the large number of U.S. officials and their families living 

abroad that are potentially at risk, you requested that we evaluate State’s 

programs and efforts to protect them from terrorist attacks while outside 

the embassy. You specifically asked us to determine whether State has a 

strategy for soft target protection; assess State’s efforts to protect U.S. 

officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and 

from work; assess State’s efforts overseas to improve security at schools 

attended by the children of U.S. officials;3

 and describe issues related to 

protection at their residences. 

To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their 

families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents, 

interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and attended security 

training and briefings available to State officials. In addition, we 

interviewed several members of the Overseas Security Policy Board 

(OSPB), an interagency consultative body that considers, develops, 

coordinates, and promotes security policies, standards, and agreements on 

overseas security programs that affect U.S. personnel at missions. We also 

reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable 

discussions with State and other agency officials, including family 

Deaths and location (each square represents one death)

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

1968

Guatemala

Uruguay

Sudan

Cyprus

Afghanistan

Greece

Lebanon

Greece

Philippines

Mexico

Pakistan

Pakistan

Gaza

Jordan

El Salvador

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

3

Other places could include places of worship, restaurants, and shopping centers.
Page 3 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

members, at five posts in four countries. Post selection was based on a 

number of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism threat 

levels. For the purpose of this report, our focus on soft target protection 

primarily pertains to U.S. government officials and their families and other 

post personnel who fall under chief of mission authority. To limit the scope 

of our review, we did not look at post evacuations, or security advice or 

assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, and the consular warden system. 

Appendix I provides more information on our scope and methodology. We 

conducted our evaluation from March 2004 through February 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families outside the embassy, including security 

briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection 

(these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report).4

However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly 

identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect 

U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the 

embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing 

and implementing such a strategy. According to State officials, they have 

recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this 

effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of 

legal and financial issues. 

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards 

against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work—

counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into terrorist 

attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other things, the officials 

lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. In 

response, the investigations recommended that State provide hands-on 

counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to 

ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, State has 

not fully implemented these recommendations. It does not require 

counterterrorism training for U.S. officials and their families at high- or 

critical-threat posts. In addition, State has not fully implemented 

4

In instances of imminent threat, State can provide a variety of measures, including armored 

vehicles for commuting purposes, protective details, travel advisories for specific areas, or 

evacuations of family members and U.S. officials. 
Page 4 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

accountability procedures for monitoring and promoting security 

procedures. According to State, training has been hindered by limitations in 

funding and training capacities. Further, State has asserted that 

implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term 

process. Moreover, State has not been training its ambassadors, deputy 

chiefs of mission, and regional security officers on ways to effectively 

promote the use of the personal security procedures. 

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but the 

scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 

Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security 

vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. To 

respond to this congressional concern, State developed a multiphase 

program that provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and 

their families at schools and some off-compound employee association 

facilities overseas from terrorist threats.5

 However, during our visits to five 

posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools qualified 

for security assistance under phase three of the program, with some 

regional security officers considering whether to fund schools in which just 

a few American children were enrolled. 

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their 

residences is designed primarily for crime, not terrorism. The Residential 

Security program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatterresistant window film, limited access control measures, and local guards. 

As the crime threat increases, hardware and guard services can be 

correspondingly increased at the residences. State officials said that while 

the Residential Security program provides effective deterrence against 

crime, it could provide only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To 

minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some 

posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific 

apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist 

attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in the 

residential areas.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, working with the 

Overseas Security Policy Board, develop a comprehensive soft targets 

5

The schools include American and international schools attended by dependents of U.S. 

government officials and American citizens. Some schools are State Department-sponsored 

schools, which receive direct educational grants from State’s Office of Overseas Schools. 
Page 5 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

strategy with OSPB standards that takes funding limitations, training, and 

accountability into consideration; develop stronger counterterrorism 

training requirements for officials going to high- and critical-threat posts; 

and fully implement a personal security accountability system for all 

embassy officials, including developing related personal security standards 

for the Foreign Affairs Manual.

Background With the changing security environment and the emergence of terrorist 

coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat of terrorism 

against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over the past 

decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in 

Africa, the State Department has been hardening its official facilities to 

protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel abroad. However, as State 

hardened embassies, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) 

raised concerns about the vulnerability of soft targets.6

Soft Targets, Size, and 

Scope of American 

Overseas Diplomatic 

Presence Defined

According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft 

targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and 

other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include hotels, 

clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of 

worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. 

government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their 

vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible for 

protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in 

embassies and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government 

officials at approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies besides 

State—including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland 

Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the 

United States Agency for International Development—and all fall under 

chief of mission authority. State officials indicated that only about one-third 

of officials at all posts are from the State Department. 

6

AFSA is the professional representative and labor union of the 23,000 active and retired 

Foreign Service personnel serving in the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Foreign Commercial Service, Foreign Agriculture Service, and the 

International Broadcasting Bureau. AFSA first raised the issue of soft targets during its 

testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Justice, State, and the Judiciary, in May 2002. AFSA stated that as security at posts and 

missions increases, terrorists could shift their strategy to include soft targets outside 

embassy walls. 
Page 6 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Entities Responsible for 

Protection of U.S. Officials 

and Their Families Abroad

The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their families are 

defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the Omnibus Diplomatic 

Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Department of State is given 

responsibility for the protection of U.S. officials and their families 

overseas.7

 The act directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement 

policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide 

for the security of U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature and 

establishes within State the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The 

mission of DS is to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct 

of U.S. foreign policy. Within DS, there are a number of offices that address 

and implement security policies and practices to protect facilities and 

personnel at posts.8

 At posts abroad, the chiefs of mission are responsible 

for the protection of personnel and accompanying family members at the 

missions.9

 Additionally, regional security officers (RSOs) administer all 

aspects of security programs at posts. The RSOs’ responsibilities include 

providing post officials and their families with security briefings upon their 

arrival; designing and implementing residential security and local guard 

programs; liaising and coordinating with the host country law enforcement 

and U.S. private sector communities to discuss threat issues; and offering 

security advice and briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S. 

government officials.

The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic 

personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on 

Diplomatic Relations.10 The convention states the host country should take 

appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel, and their families, 

including protecting the consular premises against any intrusion, damage, 

or disturbances.

7

Public Law 99-399, codified at 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq. The act also establishes the security 

functions of the Secretary of State, as delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic 

Security.

8

These include the Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office of Intelligence and Threat 

Analysis, Office of Physical Security Programs, and the Office of Training. 

9

The chief of mission is generally the ambassador, who is also responsible for the safe and 

efficient evacuation of U.S. citizens when their lives are endangered. In the absence of an 

ambassador at post, the deputy chief of mission (DCM) assumes this responsibility.

10Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. A subsequent 1963 convention 

reinforces the host country protection of diplomatic officials. See Vienna Convention on 

Consular Relations and Optional Protocol, 1963.
Page 7 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from 

19 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is responsible for 

considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting security policies, 

standards, and agreements on overseas operations, programs, and projects 

that affect U.S. government agencies under the authority of the chief of 

mission. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform 

guidance for residential security and local guard programs based on threat 

levels. The Security Environment Threat List, published semiannually by 

State, reflects the level of threat at all posts in six threat categories, 

including crime, political violence, and terrorism.11 Over 50 percent of all 

posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see fig. 2).12

State, in consultation with representatives of the board, develops security 

standards, based on threat levels, for U.S. missions overseas.13

Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat Levels

Note: Calculations are based on 260 posts abroad. Threat levels indicated are for transnational 

terrorism.

11The threat rating in each category can be designated as low, medium, high, or critical.

12The figure is an approximation since the total number of posts open abroad fluctuates.

13The OSPB standards for State programs appear in State’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 

and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH).

11%

45%

44%

Critical

High

Medium

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information.
Page 8 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or loss 

of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S. government mission 

abroad, State is required to convene an Accountability Review Board 

(ARB). ARBs are composed of five individuals, four appointed by the 

Secretary of State and one by the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency. Members investigate the security incident and issue a report with 

recommendations to promote and encourage improved security programs 

and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has 

taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have 

been 11 Accountability Review Boards convened since the board’s 

establishment in 1986.

Appropriations 

Subcommittee Urges State 

to Develop a Soft Target 

Strategy 

The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and 

the Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a 

strategy for addressing, in the short and long term, threats to locales 

abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. This included 

providing security enhancements for locations that are affiliated with the 

United States by virtue of the activities and the individuals they 

accommodate and therefore might be soft targets. In a number of 

subsequent reports, the subcommittee has focused its concern about soft 

targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular 

gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was earmarked 

for soft target protection, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at 

overseas schools.14 Moreover, in fiscal year 2004, Congress earmarked an 

additional $15 million for soft targets.15 

More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee 

report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005 

14For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked “up to” $15 million in the Overseas Buildings 

Operations appropriations to address security vulnerabilities of soft targets, particularly 

overseas schools. State set aside $5 million to undertake a review of the security of all 

overseas schools attended by children of nonmilitary U.S. government employees. 

Additionally, under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, $10 

million in new funding was provided for soft target protection in fiscal year 2003. We discuss 

State’s review of overseas schools protection, including funding allocation, in a later section 

of this report.

15The final amount was $14.8 million after a rescission.
Page 9 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

appropriations further stressed the need to protect these areas.16 The 

language in the Senate appropriations report directs State to develop a 

comprehensive, sustained strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft 

targets. Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy should be 

submitted to the committee no later than June 1, 2005. For fiscal year 2005, 

Congress earmarked $15 million to secure and protect soft targets, of 

which $10 million is for security at overseas schools attended by 

dependents of U.S. government employees. 

State Has Not 

Developed a Strategy 

to Cover Soft Target 

Areas; Key Issues Need 

to Be Resolved 

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security 

briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection 

(these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report). Despite 

these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly 

identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect 

U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. 

State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and 

implementing such a strategy. They indicated they have recently initiated 

an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State 

officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and 

financial issues. 

State Cites Limitations in 

Developing a Soft Target 

Strategy

State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect 

U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. 

A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S. officials and 

thief families in areas where they congregate, such as schools, residences, 

places of worship, and other popular gathering spots. 

However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex 

issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about the 

broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials told us that 

the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow and become more 

complex, and they questioned how far State’s protection of soft targets 

should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect 

U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or to places of 

16S. Rpt. No. 108-344, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 154 (2004); H. Rpt. No. 108-792, 108th Cong., 2nd

Sess. 828 (2004).
Page 10 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial 

challenges, including sovereignty and separation of church and state, that 

have not been resolved by the department. They also told us that specific 

authorization language would be needed to move beyond a State program 

that currently focuses on providing security upgrades to schools and offcompound employee association facilities abroad. State officials also 

indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets—

including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas 

where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be 

necessary to complete a strategy. 

Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy, 

some State officials told us that several existing programs could help 

protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are 

not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they 

should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be 

more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether 

new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps. 

A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working 

group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to 

address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their 

families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy. 

According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and 

provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005. 

State Has Not Fully 

Implemented ARB 

Training and 

Accountability 

Recommendations to 

Improve Security for 

Embassy Personnel

Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among 

other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help 

counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide hands-on 

counterterrorism training to help post officials identify terrorist 

surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. They also 

recommended State implement an accountability system to reduce 

complacency about following these procedures. After each investigation, 

State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we 

found that State’s hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all 

personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with 

security requirements have not been fully implemented. According to State, 

training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training capacities, 

and implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term 

process. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and 
Page 11 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

RSOs were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended 

to protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.

Investigations Identify Key 

Vulnerability, Recommend 

Training and Accountability 

Safeguards

Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S. officials 

on their way to work (see fig. 3): (1) the June 1988 assassination of a post 

official in Greece, (2) the April 1989 assassination of a post official in the 

Philippines, (3) the March 1995 assassination of two post officials in 

Pakistan, (4) the October 2002 assassination of a post official in Jordan, 

and (5) the October 2003 assassination in Gaza of three post contractors 

from Israel.17

17The remaining six ARBs include the April 1988 attack on U.S. facilities in Honduras, the 

1990 attack on a U.S. facility in Bolivia, the 1992 attack on the Ambassador’s residence in 

Peru, the 1995 attack on a U.S. facility in Saudi Arabia, and the 1998 bombings of U.S 

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The ARB reports were completed the same year as the 

assassinations, except for the Jordan and Gaza ARBs, which were completed the year 

following the assassinations.
Page 12 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the Accountability Review 

Boards, 1986-2004

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Several of these ARBs recommended that State provide better training, 

indicating that security briefings were not sufficient to identify 

preoperational surveillance by terrorists, or to escape the attack once 

under way. In addition, several ARBs found that State lacked monitoring or 

accountability mechanisms to ensure that U.S. officials complied with 

personal security measures. For example, a recent ARB recommended that 

supervisors at all levels monitor their subordinates’ implementation of 

these countermeasures. 

Total = 11

Number of attacks on U.S. officials 

going to a work site, 5

Number of attacks against embassies, 2

Number of attacks on U.S. facilities 

(nonembassy), 4

36%

45%

18%

Source: GAO analysis of ARB reports.
Page 13 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

State Agreed to Implement 

ARB Recommendations in 

Reports to Congress, but 

Implementation Is 

Incomplete

Although State agreed with the ARB’s recommendations and reported to 

Congress that it planned to implement them, many have yet to be fully 

implemented.18 For example, State’s hands-on training course, which 

teaches surveillance detection and counterterrorism driving skills, is still 

not required and has been taken by relatively few State Department 

officials and their families. State provided posts with some additional 

guidance to improve accountability, such as making personal security 

mandatory and holding managers responsible for the “reasonable” 

oversight of their staff’s personal security practices, but we found 

implementation in the field to be incomplete. Furthermore, there are no 

monitoring mechanisms to determine if post officials are following the new 

security procedures.

Despite State Agreement that 

Counterterrorism Training Is 

Needed, It Is Still Not Required

State reported to Congress that it agreed with the ARB recommendations 

to provide counterterrorism training. Specifically, in 1988, it reported that it 

“agreed with the general thrust of the recommendations” to provide handson training and refresher courses. In 1995, State reported that it “reestablished the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those 

going to critical-threat posts to teach surveillance detection and avoidance, 

and defensive and evasive driving techniques.” In 2003, State reported it 

agreed with the recommendations that employees from all agencies should 

receive security briefings and indicated that it would use the OSPB to 

review the adequacy of its training and other personal security measures.19

State implemented the board’s recommendation to require security 

briefings for all staff. In December 2003, the OSPB members agreed that 

predeparture security briefings should be mandatory for all officials 

planning to work at posts abroad. On March 23, 2004, State notified posts 

worldwide that, starting June 1, 2004, personal security briefings would be 

required for all U.S. personnel working at posts. State has required that its 

officials attend predeparture security briefings, such as Serving Abroad for 

18The reports are provided to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

19The Overseas Security Policy Board is responsible for developing, coordinating, and 

promoting uniform policies and standards on security programs and projects that affect U.S. 

government civilian agencies abroad, including diplomatic missions. 
Page 14 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Families and Employees, since 1987.20 The briefing covers a variety of postrelated issues, including alcoholism, fires, crime, sexual assaults, and 

terrorist surveillance. Once officials arrive at their posts, they receive 

country-specific security briefings by the RSO. In addition, RSOs can 

provide threat-specific security briefings on a case-by-case basis. Family 

members are strongly encouraged to attend both predeparture and post 

security briefings. Figure 4 provides additional information on security 

briefing and training available to U.S. officials and their families. 

20Before Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, State officials were required to take 

the Security Overseas Seminar, a 2-day briefing course that covered a wide variety of 

security issues. The Security Overseas Seminar was combined with another course, Working 

in an Embassy, to create Serving Abroad for Families and Employees in early 2004.
Page 15 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family Members

However, few officials or family members working at embassies have taken 

DSAC. State offers DSAC as an elective to post officials and spouses going 

to high- and critical-threat posts. State does not track the number of 

officials who have taken DSAC; thus it is not clear how many officials have 

received this training. State officials estimate that 10 percent to 15 percent 

of department officials have taken the course, and this appears consistent 

with our findings at the five posts we visited. DSAC consists of 2 days of 

surveillance detection training, 2 days of counterterrorism driving, and 1 

day of emergency medical training. 

During our visits to five posts, we found significant disparities in the levels 

of security briefings and training of post personnel. We held a variety of 

Location

Course length

Type of course

Name of course

Washington, D.C.

4 days

Lecture

Serving Abroad for Families 

and Employees (SAFE)

At post

1-2 hours

Lecture

Regional security officer (RSO) 

security in-briefing

Washington, D.C.

5 days

Hands-on

Course requirement 

and audience

MANDATORY briefing for all U.S. 

government officials and their 

families going to posts abroad

REQUIRED briefing for all U.S. 

government officials and their 

families upon arrival at post

ELECTIVE training for U.S. government 

officials and their families going to highand critical-threat terrorism posts

Course content Includes:

• Terrorist surveillance

• Fire safety

• Hostage survival

• Crisis management

• Sexual assault

• Crime prevention

Varies by post—could include 

discussion of:

• RSO staff and responsibilities

• Crime situation

• Driving regulations

• Local customs

• Terrorism threat

• Surveillance

 detection

• Counterterrorism

 driving

• Emergency medical

 training

Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism 

Course (DSAC)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
Page 16 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

round-table discussions at each of the five posts we visited, including with 

senior and junior State Department officials, non-State officials, and 

officials from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities. 

We found that post officials from law enforcement, intelligence, and 

defense communities had generally received rigorous hands-on training in 

areas such as surveillance detection, counterterrorism driving, emergency 

medical procedures, and weapons handling. Officials who had completed 

DSAC-type training agreed that hands-on training was needed to give 

people the skills and confidence to identify and respond to terrorist threats. 

In contrast, relatively few other officials, including those from State, had 

received DSAC-type counterterrorism training. For example, we found that 

roughly 10 percent of State Department officials indicated they had taken 

hands-on training; the figure was even smaller for other employees. 

Officials gave several reasons for not attending DSAC: they were not aware 

the course was offered, did not believe they were eligible, or were under 

pressure to quickly transfer to their new posts. They also told us that the 

course often conflicted with other training offered by State.

Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings, like Serving 

Abroad for Families and Employees, are no longer adequate to protect 

against current terrorist threats. In response, DS developed a proposal in 

June 2004 to make DSAC training mandatory. The proposal would provide 

training, at an estimated cost of about $3.6 million, to about 775 officials, 

including 95 eligible family members, from all agencies working at criticalthreat posts. DS officials said that DSAC training should also be required 

for all officials, but that issues related to costs, adequacy of training 

facilities, and the ability to obtain Overseas Security Policy Board 

agreement were constraining factors. As of April 18, 2005, the proposal had 

not been approved.

Accountability Mechanism Still 

Not in Place to Promote 

Compliance with Personal 

Security Guidelines

Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability 

system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 

1988, there is still no system in place to ensure that post-related personnel 

are following personal security practices. Despite ARB recommendations 

to implement accountability mechanisms for personal security, it remains 

State’s position that security outside the post is primarily a personal 

responsibility. As a result, there is no way to determine if post officials are 

following prescribed security guidelines. Beginning in 2003, State has tried 

to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance. 

However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are 

not following many of these new procedures.
Page 17 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

In response to the 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve 

compliance with State’s personal security procedures for officials outside 

the embassy, including the following:

• In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria, known as the 

core precepts, so that rating and reviewing officials could take personal 

security into account when preparing performance appraisals. Posts 

were notified of this new requirement on July 30, 2003.

• On December 23, 2003, State made a number of revisions to its Foreign 

Affairs Manual (FAM), such as stating that employees should 

implement personal security practices.

• On May 28, 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal 

Security Self-Assessment Checklist. 

However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these key policy 

changes. For example, none of the officials we met with, including 

ambassadors, DCMs, RSOs, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings 

process now includes an assessment of whether staff are following the 

personal security measures or that managers are now responsible for the 

reasonable oversight of subordinates’ personal security activities. 

Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we 

found no one was using the checklists to improve their personal security 

practices. 

Furthermore, State’s original plan, to use the checklist as an accountability 

mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its June 2003 

report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB recommendations, 

State stipulated that staff would be required to use the checklist 

periodically and that managers would review the checklists to ensure 

compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability 

mechanism. According to State officials, they dropped the accountability 

features out of concern that the review would be too time consuming. 

We found that State had not issued any guidance on how these new policies 

and practices should be implemented or monitored. For example, the 

Foreign Affairs Manual does not specify how managers are to provide for 

the “reasonable” oversight of their staff’s personal security practices or 

how to provide for compliance and oversight. As a result, post staff were 

not sure how these new policies should be implemented. In addition, RSOs 

lacked guidance on how to promote these new policies. RSOs and 
Page 18 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

supervisors stated that they have no responsibility or authority to monitor 

post employees for compliance with the new security policies, and the 

officials we spoke with at five posts said they did not have, and did not 

want, this responsibility. 

In discussing our preliminary findings with DS officials, they noted a range 

of challenges associated with improving security for officials outside the 

post. State’s primary focus has been, and will continue to be, protecting 

U.S. officials inside the post since posts are considered higher value targets 

symbolically and because of the potential for mass casualties. In explaining 

why posts were not aware of the new personal security regulations, DS 

officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work and may have 

simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs Manual. They 

also noted that changes like this take time to be implemented globally. 

Nonetheless, improving security outside the embassy is critical and, 

according to a number of State officials, improvements in this area must 

start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet we noted 

that they, along with the RSOs, were not trained in how best to provide 

such security before going to post. For example, based on our observations 

at the training courses and a review of the course material, the ambassador, 

deputy chief of mission, and RSO training courses did not address how 

State’s personal security guidelines can be best promoted. The instructors 

and DS officials agreed that this critical component should be added to 

their training curriculum. 

State Develops Soft 

Targets Program for 

Schools but Scope Is 

Not Yet Fully Defined

In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began 

developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security 

hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some 

off-compound employee association facilities.21 However, we found that 

the scope of the program is not yet fully defined, including the criteria for 

school selection. 

21The schools include American and international schools attended by dependents of U.S. 

government officials and American citizens. Some schools are State Department-sponsored 

schools, which receive direct educational grants from State’s Office of Overseas Schools. 
Page 19 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

State Initiates Multiphase 

Program to Primarily Protect 

Schools

In response to direction in both the House Conference report and Senate 

Appropriations Subcommittee report, State addressed the issue of 

providing security enhancements to overseas schools attended by 

dependents of U.S. officials and American citizens. In 2003, State began 

developing a plan, known as the Soft Targets program, to expand security 

for overseas schools to protect against terrorism. Specifically, State’s Office 

of Overseas Schools, Overseas Buildings Operations, and DS have been 

working together on the program. The program has four proposed phases. 

The first two phases focused on department-sponsored schools that have 

previously received grant funding from the State Department.22 In phase 

one of the program, department-sponsored schools were offered funding 

for basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way 

radios for communication between the school and the embassy or 

consulate, and public address systems (see fig. 7). As of November 19, 

2004, 189 department-sponsored schools had received $10.5 million in 

funding for security equipment in phase one of the program. 

22Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from State’s Office of 

Overseas Schools. There are over 185 department-sponsored schools worldwide.
Page 20 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets Program

The second phase of the program addresses any additional security 

enhancements that department-sponsored schools could benefit from and 

takes into consideration the local threat level, the nature of the 

vulnerability and measures required to correct the deficiency, and the 

Source: GAO.
Page 21 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

percentage of U.S. government dependent students in the school. Schools 

have requested funding for security enhancements such as perimeter 

fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths (see fig. 8). As of 

November, 2004, State has obligated over $15 million in funding for 

department-sponsored schools for phase two security upgrades. 

Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets Program

Phase three of the program plans to address security enhancement needs 

of nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas attended by dependents of 

U.S. government officials or U.S. citizens. This phase provides funding for 

phase one enhancements such as the shatter-resistant window film, radios, 

and public address systems. State plans to implement the fourth phase of 

the Soft Targets program to include phase two enhancements for 

nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas that qualify. 

Source: GAO.
Page 22 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Within the Soft Targets program, State also has focused on enhancing the 

security for embassy and consulate employee associations that have 

facilities off-compound, such as recreation centers. The Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations has been collecting data on the security 

needs of these facilities to determine the type of security equipment or 

upgrades that would be most beneficial. The facilities, working with the 

RSO at post, have been asked to identify physical security vulnerabilities 

that could be exploited by terrorists. As of September 2004, 24 of the 34 

posts with off-compound employee association facilities had requested a 

total of $1.3 million in security upgrades, which includes funding for 

perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window film. In fiscal year 2004, 

almost $1 million was obligated by State for security enhancements at offcompound employee association facilities. 

Full Scope of School Program 

Not Yet Determined

RSOs said that identifying and providing funding for security 

enhancements at department-sponsored schools for phase one and phase 

two security enhancements were straightforward because of the preexisting relationship with these schools. However, they said it has been 

difficult to identify nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three of 

the program. Some RSOs told us they were not sure about the criteria for 

approaching nondepartment-sponsored schools in phase three and were 

seeking guidance from headquarters on this issue. For example, some 

RSOs were not sure what the minimum number of American students 

attending a school needed to be for the school to be eligible to receive 

grant money for security upgrades. Some RSOs at the posts we visited were 

considering offering funding to schools with as few as one to five American 

students. Moreover, one RSO was seeking guidance on what constitutes a 

school and questioned whether informal facilities attended by children of 

U.S. missionaries could qualify for the program. 

State officials told us they sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004 with 

more detailed information on school selection. They explained that they 

have asked RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools 

attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents. 

State officials from DS and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 

(OBO) acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been difficult 

since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an OBO 

official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than 250 posts 

have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO officials stated they 

will use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be eligible for 

funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the program. In 

anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, OBO officials 
Page 23 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

further explained they have also asked RSOs to identify other facilities and 

areas that Americans frequent, beyond schools and off-compound 

employee association facilities, that may be vulnerable against a terrorist 

attack. 

Issues Related to the 

Protection of U.S. 

Officials and Their 

Families at Residences 

against Terrorist 

Threats 

State’s primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families 

at their residences, the Residential Security program, is principally 

designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security 

hardware and guard service; as the threat increases, the hardware and 

guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State 

officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by 

the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it 

could provide limited or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. To provide 

greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used 

surveillance detection teams in residential areas, despite guidance that 

limits their use primarily to the embassy. 

Residential Security and 

Local Guard Programs Tied 

to Crime Levels

State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for 

U.S. officials and their families overseas. Housing options could include 

single-family dwellings, apartments, and compound and clustered 

housing.23 Each post is responsible for designing and implementing its 

Residential Security program based on factors that include host country 

law enforcement capabilities, the post-specific threat environment, and 

available funding. The Residential Security program includes basic security 

hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, access control 

measures, and local guards. As the threat increases, hardware and guard 

services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. The standards 

used to determine the minimum acceptable level of residential security 

protection are guided by threat ratings established in the Security 

Environment Threat List. For the Residential Security program, DS uses the 

standards for the threat rating categories of political violence and crime, 

though not for terrorism. Standards for residential security also differ 

depending on the types of residences. 

23According to State’s Foreign Affairs Handbook, 12 FAH-8 H-146, each type of housing has 

its advantages and disadvantages. We did not undertake a comprehensive review to 

determine the most effective housing option to deter terrorism. 
Page 24 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Security at the residences can be augmented by the use of local guards. 

Local guard functions vary by threat ratings for crime and political violence 

and by the type of residence protected. The local guard program for 

residential security may include mobile patrols, quick reaction forces, and 

stationary guards. Figure 9 provides an illustration of a stationary guard at 

a residence. The mobile patrols are assigned responsibility for visiting 

residences periodically, and respond to alarms at residences or when 

emergencies arise. All posts we visited utilized local guards for some 

aspect of residential security; some posts, due to the higher threat levels, 

had more comprehensive local guard coverage than others. For example, 

all posts we visited had mobile patrols for residential neighborhoods, while 

only two posts had stationary guards at residential housing. Moreover, 

some posts with mostly apartment housing had a guard or doorman 

stationed at the entrance of the building to provide a first line of security, 

primarily against crime. 
Page 25 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing

Post officials, including RSOs, told us that the Residential Security program 

provides effective deterrence against crime and could provide some 

deterrence against a terrorist attack, though State officials felt it could 

provide little or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. State and post 

officials indicated that the biggest concern at residences, when considering 

the type of security to implement, has been the threat from crime. 

However, as the threat environment has changed and terrorists have 

changed tactics from kidnapping to detonating car bombs outside of 

residences, some posts have changed their housing profile. Some posts we 

visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or 

Source: GAO.
Page 26 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential 

terrorist attack. For example, post management at two of the posts we 

visited have decided to limit the number of Americans in apartment 

housing to 25 percent of the entire building population to minimize the 

impact of a car bomb detonated outside residential housing. Some senior 

DS officials told us that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a 

variety of housing options, including apartments and single-family homes. 

By having a mix of housing options, post officials are dispersed, reducing 

the number of potential targets. 

Use of Surveillance 

Detection Program at 

Residences 

To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we 

visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The 

Surveillance Detection program was implemented in response to the U.S. 

Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The 

mission of the program is to enhance the ability of all posts to detect 

preoperational terrorist surveillance directed against primary diplomatic 

facilities, such as the embassy. According to State’s Surveillance Detection 

Operations Field Guide and the Foreign Affairs Handbook, surveillance 

detection units can be used to cover other facilities, such as off-compound 

employee association facilities and residences, only if there is a specific 

threat directed against such areas.24 In addition, surveillance detection can 

be used to cover large official functions. 

At many of the posts we visited, the RSOs were routinely utilizing 

surveillance detection units to cover areas outside key embassy facilities, 

such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools where U.S. 

embassy dependents attend. RSOs told us that the Surveillance Detection 

program is instrumental in providing deterrence against potential terrorist 

attacks. Furthermore, some RSOs told us that the use of surveillance 

detection at school bus stops and outside schools provides a sense of 

comfort for post officials and their spouses who have dependents in 

international or American schools. During our post visits, some RSOs 

argued that the current program guidelines are too restrictive and that 

State should allow flexibility in using surveillance detection for areas 

24Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and Operations Field Guide 

Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.
Page 27 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

outside the embassy deemed appropriate by the RSO.25 Senior State 

officials told us, while the use of the surveillance detection in soft target 

areas could be beneficial, the program is labor intensive and expensive and 

any expansion of the program could require significant funding. 

Conclusion The State Department is responsible for protecting more then 60,000 

employees and their families who work overseas. Recent terrorist attacks 

and threats have heightened demands that State provide adequate safety 

and security outside embassy compounds. We found that State has not yet 

developed a strategy addressing the appropriate level of protection needed 

for schools, places of worship, and private sector recreation facilities 

where employees and families tend to congregate. State officials are 

concerned about the feasibility and costs associated with providing 

protection for these “soft targets.” 

Prior investigations into attacks against U.S. officials have resulted in 

recommendations that State implement improvements to protect U.S. 

officials against terrorist attacks. However, our analysis indicated that 

State has not fully implemented several of these recommendations related 

to training and accountability mechanisms designed to improve personal 

safety. Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to protect U.S. 

officials and their families, and as part of this effort, undertake an 

assessment of the level of protection to be afforded to officials and their 

families while commuting, and at residences, schools, and other 

community-based facilities. We also believe that State should provide 

adequate counterterrorism training and fully implement its accountability 

mechanisms to afford greater awareness and implementation of security 

safeguards for U.S. officials and their family members while outside the 

embassy compounds. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas 

Security Policy Board, take the following 11 actions: 

• Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target 

strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State’s 

25The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe other areas besides the 

embassy and key residences, but only if there are specific threats present at these locations.
Page 28 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families 

outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial ramifications 

of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the 

private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with FAM standards 

and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which State is 

deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy emergency 

action plan elements of the soft targets program. 

• Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts, officials, 

and family members should receive counterterrorism training first; 

track attendance to determine compliance with this new training 

requirement; and add a “soft target protection” training module to the 

ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training to promote 

the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

• Fully implement the personal security accountability system that State 

agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy 

officials, and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign 

Affairs Manual that can be used to monitor compliance.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this 

report (see app. II). State generally agreed with most of our report 

recommendations and said it would examine the others. Specifically, State 

agreed to incorporate a soft target training module into RSO training, and 

stated that the department would ensure that similar training be developed 

and added to the ambassadorial and deputy chief of mission training to 

promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the 

embassy. The department also agreed to track attendance with the 

counterterrorism training course if it becomes a requirement, and noted 

that, as of March 2005, all diplomatic security courses are now tracked for 

enrollment and attendance. With regard to the recommendation to fully 

implement the personal security accountability system, State agreed to 

reiterate, through additional notifications and guidance, the accountability 

requirements and other tools available to improve personal security. 

Regarding our recommendation that State develop a comprehensive 

strategy, State indicated that it was prepared to examine, in conjunction 

with the OSBP, the contents and recommendations of the report as they 

relate to their security programs, but did not indicate whether they would 

incorporate any of the specific elements of the recommendations into its 

new soft targets security strategy. 
Page 29 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

State expressed concern that our draft report mischaracterized the 

department’s responsibility to protect Americans living abroad, and implied 

that State was responsible for providing these Americans a similar level of 

protection provided to diplomats and their families. We have clarified the 

scope and methodology and text of the report to focus on State’s roles and 

responsibilities to protect U.S. diplomats and their families, and have 

deleted references to how State provides safety and security support to 

U.S. citizens abroad. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4268 or at fordj@gao.gov. Another contact and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs

and Trade
Page 30 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their 

families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents and 

conducted interviews with State officials in Washington, D.C. In addition, 

we reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable 

discussions with State and other agency officials at four U.S. embassies and 

one consulate overseas. In Washington, D.C., we reviewed the Diplomatic 

Security sections of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign Affairs 

Handbook and read numerous State cables pertaining to personal security 

and other security practices. In addition, we reviewed eight Accountability 

Review Board (ARB) reports and State’s responses to Congress based on 

these ARBs, and met with the Chairman of the Amman, Jordan ARB. We 

interviewed officials from a number of State bureaus and offices. We met 

with officials from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), including 

officials from the Office of International Programs, Office of Facility 

Protection Operations, Office of Physical Security Programs, Office of 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Regional Directors, Office of 

Countermeasures, and DS Training. We also met with officials from State’s 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of Management Policy, 

Office of Overseas Schools, Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs, 

Foreign Service Institute, and Office of the Inspector General. Moreover, 

we met with representatives of the Overseas Security Policy Board. To 

better understand the support for the Soft Targets program, we met with 

executive members of the American Foreign Service Association and also 

reviewed a number of congressional reports that mention the protection of 

soft targets.

To obtain firsthand experience of security and antiterrorism training 

available to State and non-State personnel, we attended a number of 

training courses and briefings. We attended the 2-day Security Overseas 

Seminar, the 5-day Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, and Regional 

Security Officer security in-briefings at posts we visited. We also attended 

sections of the Ambassadorial Seminar and the Regional Security Officer 

Training to better understand how the issue of protecting U.S. officials and 

their families outside the embassy was addressed. 

We conducted fieldwork at five posts—four embassies and one consulate—

in four countries.1

 We chose the posts based on a number of factors, 

including variety in post size and post terrorism threat levels. At each of the 

posts, we generally met with the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, 

1

For sensitivity reasons, we have not identified the posts we visited.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

DS and other State officials, and post officials representing other U.S. 

government agencies, including personnel from the law enforcement, 

intelligence, and defense communities. We also held roundtables, at all 

posts, with State and non-State officials as well as spouses of post officials, 

to obtain information on their security awareness and training. At most of 

the posts we visited, we met with representatives of the post’s Emergency 

Action Committee and the host nation police. In addition, we met with 

representatives of the Overseas Security Advisory Council at some posts. 

To better understand the Soft Targets program, we met with school officials 

at American or international schools in each country. Finally, we observed 

residential security measures at post housing at each post we visited. 

To assess the reliability of the funding data for the Soft Targets Program, 

we asked State officials to respond to a standard set of data reliability 

questions. Based on their responses and follow up discussions, we 

determined that the data used in the report for Soft Targets funding is 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Our focus on soft target protection pertains primarily to U.S. government 

officials and their families and other post personnel who fall under chief of 

mission authority and not to the entire American community abroad. To 

limit the scope of our review, we did not assess the security advice or 

assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the consular warden system, or 

evacuations. We also did not undertake a comprehensive review of 

residential housing to determine which residential option provides the 

most effective deterrent against terrorist attacks. 

We conducted our work from March 2004 through February 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 32 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 33 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 34 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 35 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

See comment 4.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 36 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Now on p. 4.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 1.

See comment 6.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 37 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Now on p. 1.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 2.

See comment 8.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 9.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 38 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Now on p. 5.

See comment 10.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 11.

Now on pp. 8 and 9.

See comment 12.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 39 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Now on p. 11.

See comment 13.

Now on p. 27.

See comment 14.

Now on pp. 27-29.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 40 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 41 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 42 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

The following are GAO’s comments on State’s letter dated April 18, 2005.

GAO Comments 1. We agree that State does not have an official definition of soft targets 

and modified the text, where appropriate, to make this clear. Given this 

absence, we relied upon a State Department travel warning that 

included the specific language used in the draft report. 

2. State indicated that, had we used a narrower definition of soft targets, it 

could have dramatically changed the conclusions of our work. We 

disagree. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect 

U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes, 

recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy 

compounds.

3. Although State, in its comments, indicated that it has long had a 

“security strategy” to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the 

embassy, it was never able to produce such a document. In addition, 

while State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect 

U.S. officials and their families at soft target areas, senior DS officials 

agreed that these programs are not tied together in an overall strategy. 

In January 2005, State agreed that it should develop a comprehensive 

soft target strategy, and as part of that effort, undertake a formal 

evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively integrated 

and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps. 

State said it planned to complete the strategy by June 1, 2005.

4. We have taken out reference to “other Americans” throughout the 

report, except in reference to the Soft Targets Program, which covers 

U.S. children and teachers who have no affiliation with the U.S. 

government. We have also modified the scope and methodology to 

show that our focus is “primarily” on the protection of U.S. government 

officials and their families.

5. We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear 

about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase 

three of the Soft Targets Program. Phase three, because it can 

encompass all schools in a country with one or more Americans, can 

potentially include vastly more schools than in phase one or two of the 

program. We recognize that the department’s Soft Targets Working 

Group is currently defining parameters for which schools could qualify 

under phase three, in addition to identifying other vulnerable off-
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 43 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

compound facilities. We believe that a soft target strategy could help 

identify which schools most urgently need security improvements. 

6. We clarified the report to stipulate that these reports focused on the 

security of U.S. officials.

7. See GAO comment 1. We have also changed the word “defines” to 

“considers.”

8. It is not uncommon for GAO to clarify, add specificity and thus make 

adjustments or changes to a requested engagement, provided that these 

adjustments and changes are discussed and agreed upon by the 

requester. We informed State of these changes.

9. See GAO comment 4.

10. See GAO comment 1.

11. See GAO comment 4.

12. The appropriations subcommittee report language is within the scope 

of the GAO review because it covers U.S. officials and their dependents, 

which is the primary focus of our review. Moreover, this language was 

based on testimony provided by AFSA out of concern that the 

department was not providing adequate security for U.S. diplomats and 

their families while they are outside of the embassy compound. GAO 

agrees that the subcommittee report language is not binding and we are 

not judging the department’s performance against this language. 

However, we agree with the subcommittee, as State has, that State 

should develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy. 

13. In our draft, we noted that the officials were attacked on their way to 

work, either in their driveway or as they drove to a work site. The Gaza 

attack occurred while the officials were on their way to the work site. 

14. See GAO comment 4.

We have incorporated technical comments in the report where appropriate.
Page 44 GAO-05-642 Overseas Security

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contacts Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128

Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the above named individuals, Edward George and Andrea 

Miller made key contributions to this report. Joe Carney, Martin De Alteriis, 

Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Elizabeth Singer, and Michael Derr provided 

technical contributions. 

(320348)
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