### Peace Operations

Author: William Lewis, Senior
Fellow

Note:

Conclusions

About the Workshop

Background

The virtual collapse of the UN humanitarian assistance
and peace operations in Bosnia, and the failure of a special
mission dispatched to negotiate peace among contending
clan groups in Somalia, have compelled the UN to face
reality. The United Nations is at system overload as it
attempts to shoulder its main post-Cold War challenge the
maintenance of peace in an increasingly turbulent world.
This is exacerbated by a growing reluctance of nations to
provide "blue helmet" volunteers to serve in volatile
situations where the prospect of casualties cannot be
ignored. Indeed, despite the energetic leadership of Under
Secretary-General  Kofi R. Annan who directs the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the organization
has increasing difficulty in acquiring properly trained and
equipped forces in time to intervene in conflict situations
and humanitarian crises.

Reserve UN Forces

Recognizing the serious nature of the problem,
Boutros-Ghali presented a special report to the Security
Council An Agenda for Peace (1992) that called for
member states to place on  reserve for UN use standby
national forces. In a subsequent article published in
Foreign Affairs, he acknowledged that peace operations
were expanding beyond traditional UN boundaries to
include disarming of warring factions and national
stabilization measures in "failed states". Boutros-Ghali
called for systemized standby arrangements "by which
governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an
agreed period of notice, specially trained units for
peacekeeping service."  He has requested that a registry of
national forces be established including military and police
personnel and equipment that governments would be
prepared to make available at short notice. Through this
approach, national commitments would serve as building
blocks to be used to "construct peacekeeping operations in
varying sizes and configurations."

Since the tendering of the Agenda report, the UN has
suffered the twin sticker shocks of rising costs to maintain
70,000 peacekeepers in far flung field operations and
disturbing casualty figures (one peacekeeper killed, on
average, every two days in  1994). The organization
remains unable to deploy units to meet crises in a timely
fashion. And, contingents frequently encompass forces with
vastly differing competencies, training, and equipment. The
painful debacle of Rwanda in mid-l994 exposed these
infirmities and has intensified the search by the UN
leadership and key member states for alternative
approaches. In the interim, the UN headquarters military
staff has been substantially augmented, a manned
operations center has been established and arrangements
have been made for improved information flows.

The United Nations has a standby force agreement with
almost 50 member states, including the United States, each
having pledged to make military forces or equipment
available for future peace operations. Most potential
contributors, however,  reserve the right to reject such
calls by the Security Council and almost all did so during
the Rwanda crisis. One diplomat has characterized the
standby force approach as comparable to "a traveller's
check with only one signature."  Nevertheless, the
secretary-general, in a report to the General Assembly and
Security Council  (January 3, 1995), urged consideration
be given to a "strategic reserve" of battalion-sized forces 
national units to be placed at the disposal of the Council
for future peace operations.

In addition to the unwillingness of the major powers to
offer a blank check on the availability of their standby
reserve forces, a number of other obstacles exist. Not the
least of these is the absence of agreed military doctrine and
political guidelines in operations-less-than-war (i.e.,
activities falling between traditional nonviolent
peacekeeping and coercive enforcement measures). In
addition, establishment of  effective command and control
within a diverse multinational force represents a major
challenge.  Short of a Desert Storm operation, effective
unity of command is difficult to  achieve even unity of purpose is not always
obtainable. Finally,  the secretary-general, in his l995 report,
acknowledges that, even with the availability of standby
forces, common training standards and equipment
interoperability in the field are difficulties yet to be
overcome.

A Permanent Rapid Reaction Force?

Faced with obstacles confronting a reserve force, and
fearful that recent UN failures will transform the
organization into another League of Nations, several
alternatives are being studied. The most ambitious has
been to develop a standing rapid reaction force, under the
auspices and direction of the Security Council and the UN
Secretariat.

Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary and
a key proponent of the idea, argues: "The United  Nations
will have to get a capacity of its own.... There is too much
of a gap between Security Council decisions and action on
the ground." The proposal is favored by a number of UN
officials and private organizations in the United States as
well as by some leading print media in this country and
abroad.

The Netherlands is favorably disposed and its UN
Representative, Nicholas Biegman, is conducting a
feasibility study. Other delegations, notably the Australians
and the Scandanavians, are also studying the issue. All are
expected to present their recommendations in September
1995 before the General Assembly.  While their efforts
have not yet reached concrete form, the contemplated rapid
reaction force would be of brigade size (3,000-6,000 men),
with dedicated airlift, communications, and logistics
support capabilities.

Canada is also developing a proposal and is  using the
Lester Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Center
to work with an international group in preparing a plan. Its
initial idea is for a 10,000-man combined force, half
military and half civilian (humanitarian, police and justice,
etc.).

Some nations, including the United States, have
withheld support, preferring to work through enabling
Security Council resolutions which are often implemented
through regional organizations. The latter, however, 
raises the specter of cementing spheres of influence e.g.,
Russia in the "Near Abroad", France in Francophone
Africa, and the United States in the Caribbean. (See
Strategic Forum # 25, "Peace Operations: Involving
Regional Organizations".)

Permanent Force Factors to be Weighed

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars,
and the total collapse of governmental authority in some
states are among the principal threats to international peace
and stability. Hence, the notion of a permanent rapid
reaction force or "fire brigade" at the service of the
Security Council is attractive on initial examination.

However, a number of difficulties must be overcome
before implementation. The proposal itself is not new. It is
imbedded in Articles 43 through 46 of the  Charter, and
was intended originally to provide a pillar for "collective
security" under UN auspices. At the core of "collective
security" were to be the five permanent members of  the
Council each of which was expected to make forces,
airfields and port facilities available "for the purpose of
maintaining peace and security." It was understood that
each could veto resolutions mandating their use. The Cold
War laid to rest these plans and a Military Staff Committee
of the "Permanent Five," intended to advise and assist the
Council on military matters, fell into disuse.

The veto can still be used, the existence of a standing
force notwithstanding, to frustrate Council resolutions or
their effective implementation. Russia has recently adopted
positions at odds with other members of the permanent
five witness their veto of the resolution in  December to
cut off fuel supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. On the other
hand, this also provides the United States with an essential
assurance that the UN force could not be used without its
approval. Without such a provision, Congress would
certainly oppose it and would not allocate funds for such
a force.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is potential
assignment of rapid reaction forces to traditional
peacekeeping missions and roles. Such activity, however,
does not require heavily armed  forces prepared to
undertake "forcible entry" into unstable  areas. Traditional
peacekeeping, rather, entails the introduction of lightly
armed observers or interposition forces, dispatched after a
cease-fire has been effected and upon formal invitation of
the parties to a dispute. Historically, such operations have
evolved out of inter-state conflict. In recent years,
however, conflicts have much more frequently reflected
intra-state conflicts and the collapse of governing
institutions, situations that fall outside the traditional
peacekeeping frame of reference. This is apt to continue,
an unfortunate reality of the post-Cold War world.

A rapid reaction force would also be available for
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda-like crisis situations.
The collapse of government authority, genocide and large
refugee outpourings that threaten stability in neighboring
areas would provide ample justification for UN
involvement. However, the organization's traditional rules
of engagement might need to be altered to permit robust
military responses in threatening situations. In short, the
UN, if engaged in nation building, might have to be
prepared to expose its military to conflict, shredding any
pretense at neutrality, and accepting the likelihood of
extended involvement and uncertain casualties. In addition,
such intervention would carry with it acceptance of a
heavy obligation nation building that has frustrated the
organization in the past.

Rejection of nation building responsibility would
confine the force mandate to humanitarian assistance. The
organization would not be in a position to enforce peace;
nor could its units fully protect themselves or designated
safehaven areas. At best, it could only help feed displaced
popula-tions and appeal for temporary cease-fires.

A further consideration concerning humanitarian
intervention is the need to ensure that  sufficient military
backup is available should the force require reinforcement
or replacement after extended field service. In Korea in
1950 and the Gulf in 1990-1991, the UN avoided this
problem by authorizing formation of ad hoc coalitions
under American auspices.

Rapid Reaction Force Configurations

Various force configurations are under discussion
ranging from light, easily transported mobile forces to
heavily armored units capable of local peace enforcement.
Most discussions are in terms of a brigade-sized force,
although the Australian government has suggested a much
more substantial force reaching to division size (12,000-
14,000 men) with integral medical and other support
elements. Cost estimates range from $300 million to $1
billion annually. The actual cost will be influenced by
several factors:



- Force Composition Volunteers (e.g., the French Foreign Legion), integrated national
units, or some combination thereof;
- Training and  Language Requirements To assure effective integration, common
language and combat standards would have to met;
- Command and Control Involving joint task force development, integrated
communications systems, etc. An overriding consideration
would be sources of funding to stand up the force, train and equip it, and sustain it
for field operations.

Not to be ignored as well is the question of force
basing. Extensive training and field exercises require
basing at a single location, one in which effective
communications and command and control systems could
be implanted. Finally, geographic location in relation to
likely crisis areas, in addition to ready access to logistic
support facilities, would pose vexing difficulties as would
transport needed for troop supply and rotation purposes.

The Follow-on Problem

Central to thinking in interested member states is the
requirement  for standby  national  units  to  relieve the
deployed rapid reaction force to permit it to meet other
field assignments. Here, too, several problems require
addressal. Most regional groupings, such as the OAS and
the OAU, have minimal military experience and
capabilities in peace operations, as the Rwanda debacle
clearly demonstrated. NATO, for its part, has not fared
well under existing UN rules of engagement. Thus, basic
premises of planning for follow-on requirements deserve 
close scrutiny.  Member  state and regional organization willingness to assume
follow-on responsibilities are problematic at best when cost and
casualty factors are considered.

The reluctance of member states to assume follow-on
responsibilities would pose fresh challenges for the
secretary-general and the Security Council.

For example:



- Clear delineation of the "fire brigade's" mandate,  period  of insertion,  and exit
strategy mwould be required;
- Concomitantly, conditions to be met on the ground prior to insertion of follow-on
forces would be subject to extensive negotiation;
- Timing of force insertion could be affected by such local conditions as sudden
threats to "fire brigade" security or integrity of its operations (as occurred in
Somalia).

Recommendations

Proposals to organize a permanent peace operations force are likely to be
debated later this year in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Obstacles
to rapid approval will prove formidable. A more promising path to pursue by the
U.S. would entail several steps to enhance the secretary-general's proposals for an
effective standby force, including: