UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JOSEPH MARION RYWELSKI, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., President; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General; BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, Defendants - Appellees. No. 23-5099 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV -00217-CVE-SH) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , BALDOCK , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ The district court dismissed a comp laint against President Biden, the Department of Justice, Attorney General Garland, and the Bureau of

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the briefing and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment does not co nstitute binding pr ecedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 1, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 12 Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The plaintiff, Mr. Joseph Marion Rywelski, appeal s; and we affirm.
I. Mr. Rywelski bases his claim on th e Declaration of Independence. In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski challenged the validity of an administrative rule addressing regist ration requirements on firearms. For this challenge, he relied on the Declaration of In dependence. The district court sua sponte concluded that subj ect-matter jurisdiction didn’t exist. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
II. Standard of Review We conduct de novo review of the dismissal. Blue Valley Hosp., Inc.
v. Azar , 919 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019). If a district court “determines at an y time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).Courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists , even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006 ). So the district court appropriately consid ered whether subject-mat ter jurisdiction existed even though no one had questioned it. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. , 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are cour ts of limited jurisdicti on,” and “it is to be presumed that a cause lies outsid e this limited jurisdiction.” Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation , 770 F.3d 944, 946–47 Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 23 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and intern al quotation marks omitted). As the party seeking to invoke fe deral jurisdiction, Mr. Ry welski had to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 947. So Mr. Rywelski needed to allege a basis for

 diversity jurisdic tion (under 28 U. S.C. § 1332) or

 federal-question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). See Home Depot U.S. A., Inc. v. Jackson , 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). 1 In determining whether Mr. Rywelski met this burden , we credit all “well-pled factua l allegations.” Blue Valley Hosp. , 919 F.3d at 1283. Conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough. Peterson v.
Martinez , 707 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013).
III. Diversity Jurisdiction Federal courts have diversity ju risdiction if (1) the parties are citizens of different states or a fo reign country and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The United States is not a citizen for diversity purposes, and federal agencies and administrators cannot be sued in diversity. See Texas v. Interstate Comm.

1 In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski also invoked supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But supplemental ju risdiction exists only when the district court has dive rsity or federal-qu estion jurisdiction over at least one claim. See United Mine Worke rs of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). B ecause the district cour t correctly determined that it lacked both diversity and fede ral-question jurisd iction, no basis existed for supplemental jurisdiction. See id. at 726–27. Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 34 Comm’n , 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922 ) (concluding that di versity jurisdiction didn’t exist over the ICC and Railroad Labor Board because they “are not citizens of any State”); Gen. Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran , 921 F.2d 700, 703–05 (7th Cir. 1991 ) (concluding that no divers ity jurisdiction existed over the United States, a federal agency, and an agency administrator);
Com. Union Ins. Co . v. United States , 999 F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Secret Service lacks citizenship fo r purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Because the defendants are not c itizens of a stat e for diversity purposes, the district co urt correctly concluded th at it lacked diversity jurisdiction.
IV. Federal-Question Jurisdiction A plaintiff properly invokes federal-question jurisdiction when he pleads “a colorable claim arising unde r the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500 , 513 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dist. Dir. , 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[J]urisdiction under § 1331 exists on ly where there is a colorable claim arising under federal law.” (internal quotati on marks omitted)). Mr. Rywelski alleged that the ru le violates the Declaration of Independence. The district court conc luded that these allegations did not confer federal-question jurisdictio n because “the Declaration of Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 45 Independence does no t create a private right of action en forceable against the federal government .” R. at 48–49. Mr. Rywelski disagrees, arguing that the Declaration of Independence is the foremost of the c ountry’s “Organic La ws,” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2, and that “[n]o othe r founding document, or federal law, of the United States [can] amend, rep eal, or replace the Declaration or the rights recited therein,” id. at 3; see also id. at 6. He insists that

 the Declaration of Independence is “substantive law” creating “a legal basis for relief” and

 any “judicial opinions denying the Declaratio n as law should be made null and void.” Id. at 6, 15. But his argume nts reflect a misunderstand ing of the purpose of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Inde pendence states the prin ciples on which our government wa s founded. See United States v. Cruikshank , 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). The purpose was to guar antee the right of American colonies to seek independence from England, not to establis h a government. See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor , 28 U.S. 99, 158–59 (1830). The Declaration of Independence is thus a statement of principles and ideas, not of law, and does not grant enfor ceable rights. See Schifanelli v.
U.S. Gov’t , 865 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished; per curiam) (“The Declaration of Independe nce is a statement of ideals, not law.”); see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts , 37 U.S. 657, 680 (1838) (“[U]nder the Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 56 constitution [the court] is bound by events subsequent to th e declaration of independence . . . .”). Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Rywelski’s alle gations didn’t confer fede ral-question jurisdiction. Affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 6