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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO.:

WESMI DAOUT,

Plaintiff, 

v.

MEDICAL TRANSPORT SOLUTIONS, INC., 

a Florida Profit Corporation

Defendant.

_______________________________________/

COMPLAINT & DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, WESMI DAOUT (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Daout”), by and through 

undersigned counsel, files this Complaint against Defendant, MEDICAL TRANSPORT 

SOLUTIONS, INC. (“Defendant” or “MTS”), and states as follows:

NATURE OF THE SUIT

1. This action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to 

recover from Defendant overtime compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other damages permitted by law. 

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

2. Mr. Daout was an employee who performed services on behalf of 

Defendant in Broward County, Florida, and nearby/adjacent counties.

3. MTS is a Florida limited liability company located in Pembroke Pines,

Broward County, Florida, and which, at all times relevant, performed work in Broward

County, Florida.

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4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court, as the claims are brought pursuant to 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., hereinafter “FLSA”), 

to recover unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, to 

obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

5. Venue is proper in this Court, as the actions giving rise to this lawsuit 

occurred in Broward County, Florida, and in nearby/adjacent counties.

FLSA COVERAGE

6. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be an 

“employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

7. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was an “employee” within the 

meaning of the FLSA. 

8. At all times material hereto, Defendant was Plaintiff’s “employer” within 

the meaning of the FLSA. 

9. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be, an 

“enterprise engaged in commerce” or in the production of goods for commerce as defined 

by the FLSA.

10. At all times material hereto, Defendant was primarily engaged in 

providing medical transport services to local patients via dispatch from its headquarters 

located in Broward County, Florida.

11. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was “engaged in commerce” within 

the meaning of § 6 and § 7 of the FLSA, but not for purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.

12. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was engaged in the “production of 

goods for commerce” and subject to the individual coverage of the FLSA, but not for 

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purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.

13. At all times material hereto, Defendant had two (2) or more employees 

handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that had been moved in or 

produced for commerce, such as phones, printers, and office equipment, but which had 

come to rest within its office location in Broward County, Florida. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

14. Mr. Daout worked for Defendant under the title of Driver from on or 

about August 26, 2019, through December 15, 2019.

15. Mr. Daout always worked in Broward County, Florida, and 

nearby/adjacent counties, and his activities were at all times controlled and closely 

supervised by Defendant’s managers and supervisors.

16. Mr. Daout’s responsibility with MTS was to drive local patients to and 

from their medical and dental appointments.

17. Mr. Daout had no authority to hire or fire employees of MTS.

18. Mr. Daout had no authority to discipline employees of MTS.

19. Mr. Daout had no authority to determine the schedules to be worked by 

any employees of MTS, or to change the schedules.

20. Mr. Daout had no authority to set rates of pay for other employees or 

agents of MTS.

21. Mr. Daout had no input into performance reviews of other employees or 

agents of MTS.

22. All of Mr. Daout’s major decisions had to be cleared in advance by one 

of MTS’s supervisors.

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23. Mr. Daout was closely monitored by MTS’s managers and supervisors at 

all times.

24. Mr. Daout followed procedures established by MTS and did exactly as he 

was instructed to do.

25. Mr. Daout was not an independent contractor and was instead an MTS 

employee.

26. Mr. Daout had no right to control how he did his job.

27. Mr. Daout’s work, driving patients to medical and dental appointments, 

was unquestionably an essential part of MTS’s business.

28. Mr. Daout hired no helpers, and was not authorized by MTS to hire any 

helpers to perform his job functions.

29. Mr. Daout’s work required no special skill.

30. Mr. Daout’s work relationship with MTS was permanent.

31. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant regularly required 

Plaintiff to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week.

32. Defendant hired Plaintiff at a day rate of $115.00 per day, and Plaintiff 

therefore had no opportunity for profit or less, depending on his skill.

33. Plaintiff regularly worked sixty-five (65) or more hours per week for 

Defendant.

34. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff full and proper overtime compensation

for all hours worked over forty (40) per week during the above-noted time period, instead 

paying him the day rate noted above for each day of work.

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35. When Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours in a given work week, 

Defendant failed to properly pay him for all overtime hours worked. 

36. Plaintiff should have been compensated at the rate of one and one-half 

times Plaintiff’s regular rate for all hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) 

hours per week, as required by the FLSA, throughout his employment.

37. Defendant violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 in that:

(a) Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks for 

his period of employment with Defendant;

(b) No payments or provisions for payment have been made by Defendant to 

properly compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times 

Plaintiff’s regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per 

work week, as provided by the FLSA; and

(c) Defendant failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.

38. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an attorney 

to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure rendered him exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

39. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with the 

Department of Labor to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure 

rendered him exempt from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

40. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an accountant 

to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure rendered him exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

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41. Based on the allegations in Paragraphs 38-40, above, Plaintiff is entitled 

to liquidated damages, as Defendant has no objective or subjective good faith belief that 

its pay practices were in compliance with the FLSA.

42. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A. 

to represent him in the litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its 

services.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION

43. Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 42, above, as 

though set forth fully herein, and further alleges as follows: 

44. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid time and one-half his regular rate of pay for 

each hour worked in excess of forty (40) per work week. 

45. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff regularly 

worked overtime hours, but was not paid full and proper time-and-one-half

compensation for all hours worked. 

46. Plaintiff was not an exempt employee as defined by the FLSA, and was 

instead paid on a day rate basis.

47. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful, and unlawful acts in 

refusing to pay Plaintiff time-and-one-half his regular rate of pay for each hour worked 

in excess of forty (40) per work week in one or more work weeks, Plaintiff has suffered 

damages in addition to incurring reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

48. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff is 

entitled to liquidated damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his

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favor against Defendant, and that this Court:

a. Declare, pursuant to the FLSA, that the acts and practices complained 

of herein are in violation of the maximum hour provisions of the 

FLSA;

b. Award Plaintiff overtime compensation in the amount due to him for 

time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week;

c. Award Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the 

overtime award; 

d. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and expenses of 

the litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b);

e. Award Plaintiff pre-judgment interest; and order any other and further 

relief that the Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right by 

jury.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted, 

By: /s/Noah E. Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476 

RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. SR 84, Suite 103

Davie, Florida 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail:noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

Trial Counsel for Plaintiff

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