U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

99–825PDF 2005

ELIMINATING TERRORIST SANCTUARIES:

THE ROLE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 10, 2005

Serial No. 109–19

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 5

Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN, Director of Operations, United States 

European Command ............................................................................................ 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation: Prepared statement ............................................ 2

Mr. William P. Pope: Prepared statement ............................................................. 8

Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN: Prepared statement .............................. 18

APPENDIX 

Responses from Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN, to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas ............................................................................. 39

(1)

ELIMINATING TERRORIST SANCTUARIES: 

THE ROLE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:55 p.m. in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee will come to order. 

The title of this hearing is ‘‘Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 

Role of Security Assistance.’’

The 9–11 Commission pointed out in its report the importance of 

keeping terrorist organizations off guard, the importance of rendering them less capable of mounting a catastrophic attack against 

the United States by always keeping them on the defense. Part of 

the Administration’s strategy is eliminating terrorist sanctuaries 

around the world. Most of those sanctuaries, current and potential 

sanctuaries, are in remote areas of the developing world where government presence is very low. This includes much of the Sahel, Sahara and the Horn regions of Africa. It includes parts of the 

Caucasus like Georgia and certainly the southern Philippines, 

areas that we are going to focus on today. 

This hearing is going to look at U.S. programs to train and equip 

foreign military and security forces for counterterrorism and our 

ability to train them basically to go after these potential terrorist 

sanctuaries. Specific programs of interest that we are going to look 

at are the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the Georgia Sustainment and Security Operations Program and the security assistance training in the 

Philippines. PSI, as it is known, is being greatly expanded into the 

Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, which is of considerable interest to this Subcommittee, especially as it is to include development assistance and public diplomacy programs. Having visited PSI trained troops in Chad in January, I am especially interested in the details of this program. We saw a special brigade being 

trained there, and that particular elite unit has been quite effective 

against terrorist cells in that country. 

These train and equip efforts are aimed at eliminating what I 

would refer to as the next ‘‘Afghanistan,’’ another terrorist sanctuary like the one from which Osama bin Laden initiated the 9/11 

attacks. We need a sharp focus here. In the mid-1990s on this 

Committee, I tried hard to bring attention to Afghanistan. I said 

2

at the time that Congress needed to look no further than the World 

Trade Center bombing in New York City, the first Trade Center 

bombing, to see the adverse impact which an unstable Afghanistan 

can have on United States national security policy. I explained at 

the time as well that the potential existed for more World Trade 

Center-like bombings at home as a result of the instability in Afghanistan. 

But it was a situation where the Cold War was over. No one 

wanted to hear about this particular country. Historically we have 

a similarity here in the continent of Africa. Africa has been very 

much ignored, I think, and we have tried to put it on the radar for 

United States policy over the last few years. 

I think it is important that we remember that it was in Tanzania 

and it was in Kenya that our Embassies were attacked and Americans and Africans were killed. Osama bin Laden was harbored in 

Sudan early on. The terrorist threat in Africa is real and it is growing, and our European command understands that only too well, as 

we will hear today. 

Counterterrorism training is challenging the skills of U.S. service 

personnel. They are being sent into new situations, different countries, cultures and languages. These men and women are increasingly becoming ‘‘soldier-diplomats.’’ In playing this role, which they 

are doing very well, it is critical that there be close coordination 

with the State Department. While train and equip programming is 

important, combating terrorism requires many tools, including development assistance and diplomacy. The political implications of 

security assistance include its impact on the rule of law and on 

human rights, and these need to be constantly considered. These 

are challenging countries that we are talking about to do business 

in. 

A good public relations campaign must be waged too. When we 

are sending troops into countries, even just to train, it is critical 

that we couple it with a very good explanation, an explanation that 

will resonate with the locals, of what we are doing and why we are 

doing it. The 9–11 Commission warned that if we do not define ourselves in the Islamic world, the Islamists will certainly do that for 

us. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Today, the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation (ITNP) held a hearing on eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and the role of U.S. security assistance. ITNP Chairman U.S. Rep Ed Royce 

(R–CA–40) issued the following opening statement at the hearing: 

‘‘The 9/11 Commission and others have pointed out the importance of keeping terrorist organizations off guard, rendering them less capable of mounting a catastrophic attack against a U.S. target. Part of the Administration’s strategy is eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. Most sanctuaries, current and potential, are remote 

areas of the developing world, where government presence is low. This includes 

much of the Sahel, Sahara and Horn regions of Africa, areas of the country of Georgia, and the southern Philippines. 

‘‘This hearing will look at U.S. programs to train and equip foreign military and 

security forces for counter-terrorism efforts in terrorist and potential terrorist sanctuaries. Specific programs of interest are the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), the Georgia 

Sustainment and Security Operations Program and security assistance training in 

the Philippines. PSI is being greatly expanded into the Trans-Sahara Counter TerVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

rorism Initiative, which is of considerable interest to this Subcommittee, especially 

as it is to include development assistance and public diplomacy programs. Having 

visited PSI-trained troops in Chad in January, I am especially interested in the details of this program. 

‘‘These train and equip efforts are aimed at eliminating the ‘next Afghanistan’: another terrorist sanctuary like the one from which Osama bin Laden’s initiated the 

9/11 attacks. We need a sharp focus here. In the mid-1990s on this Committee, I 

tried hard to bring attention to Afghanistan. The Cold War was over though, and 

no one wanted to hear about this country. Historically Africa has been ignored, yet 

it was in Tanzania and Kenya that our embassies were attacked and Americans and 

Africans were killed. Osama bin Laden was harbored in early on Sudan. The terrorist threat in Africa is real and growing, which our European Command understands. 

‘‘Counter-terrorism training is challenging the skills of U.S. service personnel. 

They are being sent into new situations: different countries, cultures and languages. 

These men and women are increasingly becoming ‘soldier-diplomats.’ In playing this 

role, which they are doing well, it is critical that there be close coordination with 

the State Department. While train and equip programming is important, combating 

terrorism requires many tools, including development assistance and diplomacy. The 

political implications of security assistance, including its impact on the rule of law 

and human rights, needs to be constantly considered. These are challenging countries to do business in. 

‘‘A good public relations campaign must be waged too. When we are sending 

troops into countries, even just to train, it is critical that we couple it with a very 

good explanation—an explanation that will resonate with the locals—of what we are 

doing and why. The 9/11 Commission warned that if we do not define ourselves in 

the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do it for us. This is the role of public 

diplomacy, which we often shortchange.’’

Mr. ROYCE. I will turn now to our Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and then we will go to the witnesses. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our 

witnesses. I cannot be here for the entire hearing, so I will leave 

after this opening statement. I will be deprived of your oral presentation, but I have already looked at your testimony. 

The 9–11 Commission charged us in Congress and the Administration to prevent another Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to identify 

the places where terrorists are likely to find sanctuaries, prioritize 

those problems, develop a plan to address those potential sanctuaries and work to deny sanctuary to the terrorists. 

Congress enshrined this requirement in legislation to implement 

the Commission’s recommendations, and I look forward to reviewing the Administration’s plan to achieve those objectives. 

The questions we must ask today include, Which states have the 

desire, but not the resources, to confront terrorists on their own 

soil and how can we best help them? There are plenty of places 

where there are weak governments that would like to deny sanctuaries to terrorists, but are unable to do so. 

I commend the Chair, my good friend from the Los Angeles area, 

for his focus on North Africa’s Sahara and Sahel regions, as well 

as Georgia, the Philippines and other places of concern. They have 

the attributes identified by the 9–11 Commission and have already 

unwillingly provided a degree of safe haven, if only temporarily. 

Of course, Afghanistan was the premiere sanctuary. It was out 

of the way of the major powers and developed a symbiotic relationship with the terrorists. Al-Qaeda literally means ‘‘the base.’’ That 

is what Afghanistan offered. 

Some 10,000, 20,000, perhaps 60,000 individuals went through 

boot camp-style training and advanced terrorist workshops in the 

period from 1996 until the Taliban fell in November 2001. If we 

4

had paid more attention, I could tell you whether it was 10,000 or 

20,000 or 60,000, but even with an unprecedented satellite capacity, we were looking elsewhere. 

The existence of these bases, of course, were not concealed either 

from our satellites or even from those who bothered to read the 

very last pages of major newspapers, but it is impossible to find a 

columnist, a Member of Congress, or anyone in the Administration 

who, before 9/11, said it was critical to our national security to dislodge al-Qaeda by force from Afghanistan, even after we saw what 

happened in East Africa, after the USS Cole. We continued to regard Afghanistan as a minor concern and al-Qaeda as an entity 

that might from time to time kill a dozen Americans. We should 

have been far more vigilant. 

The fact though is that we cannot go to war with every country 

that willingly harbors terrorists, and the Iraq experience has kind 

of given preemption a bad name. In any case, I am sure, Admiral, 

you are not looking for another war right now. 

Our greatest challenge is to aid friendly countries and to see how 

we can confront unfriendly countries that provide safe haven for 

terrorists without resorting to war. There are probably no sanctuaries in existence today which would allow the Jihadists the freedom they had in Afghanistan. But we do face concerns in parts of 

Lebanon, Iran and Syria, and of course the Hezbollah demonstration in Beruit demonstrates that terrorist organizations can be very 

valuable to their, I would say, host governments, but I guess in the 

case of Syria and Hezbollah, host occupier. 

This Committee held hearings recently on Iranian terror. We 

know that al-Qaeda have been given sanctuary there, including a 

man believed to be behind the May 2003 Riyadh bombings, as well 

as one of bin Laden’s sons and, of course, many others. 

I know, Admiral, that you do not work for CENTCOM and so I 

will not ask you to address in detail Iran, but I hope Mr. Pope will 

tell us what we plan to do about sanctuary in Iran and to prevent 

that country from continuing to harbor al-Qaeda and other terrorists. 

Last, but certainly not least, respect for human rights is, of 

course, of concern. We have been found wanting ourselves, not to 

mention some of our allies. I would like to hear from both witnesses how those who participate in our assistance programs are 

vetted for previous human rights abuses and what type of training 

is given in respect for human rights and the rule of law to those 

participating in our training programs. 

Many of the countries that we are providing aid to do not have 

strong legal traditions or strong traditions of governmental respect 

for human rights, so how do we assure that the trainees live up 

to the standards that their own governments, at least nominally, 

embrace and that, of course, we embrace verbally as well? 

I thank the Chairman for the hearing. I thank the witnesses for 

their indulgence, and I hope to be back to ask some questions. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

We are going to go to Mr. William Pope, who is the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department where he 

has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy. Mr. Pope represents the SecVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

retary of State on the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Mr. 

Pope previously served as the Principal Deputy Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism at the Department of State. 

It is my understanding that after 35 years serving our Nation, 

Mr. Pope will be retiring as of tomorrow and in fact I understand 

his father preceded him in government service prior to this building even being built. Mr. Pope remembers when his father moved 

into this building. 

It is a pleasure, Mr. Pope, to have you with us today and also 

Admiral Tallent. 

Rear Admiral Hamlin Tallent is the Director of Operations for 

European Command, where he advises on the deployment of 

United States forces within the European Command’s area of responsibility. His previous assignment was Commander of Carrier 

Group 1. A naval aviator by background, Rear Admiral Tallent has 

commanded a carrier airwing, a fighter squadron and served as an 

instructor at Navy Fighter Weapons School, also known as Top 

Gun. He has been awarded numerous decorations, including the 

Legion of Merit and Defense Meritorious Service medal. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being with us, and we will 

begin with Mr. Pope. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM P. POPE, ACTING COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. POPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thanks very much for the opportunity to testify 

today and for those kind words just a minute ago. 

I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you 

include my full testimony in the record. 

Mr. Chairman, as the President made clear in his speech on 

Tuesday, March 8, counterterrorism assistance efforts are the first 

line of defense for the protection of our homeland, as well as U.S. 

personnel and facilities overseas. The President’s National Strategy 

for Combating Terrorism—I have a copy of it right here, and I 

know you are very familiar with that document—describes four 

main objectives: Defeat terrorist organizations by attacking their 

sanctuaries, leadership, finances and command and control; deny 

further sponsorship and sanctuary by cooperating with states to 

take action; diminish the conditions that terrorists seek to exploit 

by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk; and defend the United States, 

its citizens and interests at home and abroad. 

Partnership with foreign governments is important for each of 

these objectives. In today’s testimony I will focus primarily on the 

second: Denial of support and sanctuary to terrorists through cooperation with other states. 

Our Government must be prepared to help partner nations protect themselves and, by extension, the United States from terrorism with a wide spectrum of assistance and delivery platforms. 

Elements of this spectrum may include the most basic cop-to-cop 

training to military training and assistance at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. 

6

Each partner nation does not need every item in our inventory 

of deliverables. We have to discern, through expert assessment and 

analysis, what a nation’s most pressing requirements are. We must 

provide that assistance and training in a manner that complements 

the partner’s existing security infrastructure and that can be sustained. These programs are an investment based on U.S. security 

interests and objectives. The challenge, of course, is to make sure 

that our assessment of risk is accurate and also that we do not 

overlook tomorrow’s threat by focusing exclusively on today’s. 

In counterterrorism assistance, how we do things is as important 

as how much we have to spend. Measurable, lasting improvement 

in a partner’s capability to confront terrorist activity in or emanating from its territory usually demands customized programs, 

hands-on training, locally appropriate equipment and ongoing mentoring. It requires frequent face-to-face contact between U.S. Government personnel and the host nation’s security establishment, 

and it requires that our diverse Federal agencies, both military and 

civilian, work together to ensure that distinct initiatives are complementary and collaborative. 

The foregoing discussion of how counterterrorism assistance 

should be provided applies globally, Mr. Chairman, but, given your 

long interest in Africa, allow me to focus on that region. 

In 2004, the Center for International and Strategic Studies 

issued a report regarding counterterrorism in Africa. The authors 

were unambiguous:

‘‘The threat of terror to U.S. interests in Africa is concrete, rising and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high.’’

Two programs underway on the African continent offer useful illustrations of the requirements I have described and the challenges 

we face. 

Kenya: In 2003, the President announced the commitment of $100 million for an East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative for six 

countries in the region: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, 

Uganda and Kenya. As part of this effort, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative provided $10 million for an intensive in-country 

antiterrorism training program for Kenya. This program is overseen by my office and implemented by Diplomatic Security’s Office 

of Antiterrorism Assistance, ATA. ATA customized its plan to focus 

from the outset on what it perceived as the weakest link in Kenya’s 

capacity to combat terrorist organizations, interagency collaboration and command and control. In close coordination with senior 

Kenyan officials, ATA devised a 9-week training course that has 

been delivered to a hand-picked group of investigators, prosecutors, 

immigration officials and counterterrorism analysts. The participants graduate tomorrow, as a matter of fact, and they will go on 

to comprise the core staff of a Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Further specialized training and equipment will be forthcoming, 

but it will be crafted in consultation with this Kenyan task force. 

We are moving away from a ‘‘Here you go—good luck’’ kind of approach to terrorism assistance toward more of a ‘‘We are all in this 

together—what shall we do next’’ approach, a consultive, collaborative approach. 

7

Another element of the Kenya program worth noting is the Kenyan Navy. It is conducting maritime interdiction training with the 

assistance of U.S. Navy personnel. It has agreed to enroll maritime 

police officers into the next two 8-week courses it delivers. Police 

and Navy personnel will deploy together in joint coastal operations—an interesting development—share information and communicate with the Nairobi-based Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

The Kenya program represents several elements of the criteria I 

mentioned earlier, a customized approach based on the strengths 

and weaknesses of the partner nation; resident instructors, advisors and mentors who gain the trust and respect of their Kenyan 

colleagues; and various U.S. Government elements—State, DoD, 

Justice Department—working together to combine resources and 

expertise that ensures the most effective assistance possible. 

Sahel and North Africa: The Sahel region, home to more than 

100 million Muslims, is an area of potential vulnerability due to its 

vast low-density geography, nomadic populations and porous borders. International and indigenous terrorist groups have been able 

to travel across the region, smuggle contraband, including weapons, 

and recruit new members from indigenous populations. We seek to 

facilitate cooperation among governments in the region and to 

strengthen their capacity to combat terrorist organizations. 

The Pan-Sahel Initiative, which you mentioned, is a good example of the collaborative interagency program efforts I described as 

essential for success. The Pan-Sahel Initiative is an $8.4 million 

program to provide counterterrorist training that focused on the 

nations of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. 

In 2003–2004, our Defense Department colleagues in the European Command, EUCOM, provided trainers and U.S. Special 

Forces to train with the security forces of those governments. To 

complement EUCOM’s efforts with military units in the Sahel 

countries, we directed the Antiterrorism Assistance Program to 

work with the civilian law enforcement agencies of Chad, Mali, 

Mauritania and Niger as well. ATA has delivered approximately 

$6.6 million in training and assistance to those countries. 

As you mentioned, we are looking at a follow-on effort that would 

continue on the success of the PSI, and the working title for this, 

as you said, is the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative. It 

is under review within the Administration. We are working to integrate the concept into agency budget and program planning. 

I know I have run out of time, but——

Mr. ROYCE. Please continue, Mr. Pope, if you will. 

Mr. POPE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. POPE. We very much look forward to working with you. We 

applaud your interest in the Sahel, and we are looking very much 

forward to working with you on that. 

The foregoing descriptions of counterterrorism assistance efforts 

in Africa by no means reflect the extent of our CT operations. Our 

efforts in Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, 

Colombia and elsewhere are extensive and ongoing. I have provided 

an index, an appendix to my written testimony that describes in 

some detail—I am sure you have seen it—the priorities and 

8

progress of ATA’s counterterrorism assistance efforts in these countries and elsewhere. 

Terrorist Interdiction Program and Counterterrorism Finance: 

The mission to eliminate terrorist presence and sanctuaries globally extends beyond helping partner nations to investigate and 

interdict terrorists. We also must constrict their mobility and access to financial support. Through the Terrorist Interdiction Program we provide select nations with the computer systems, training and support to establish effective watchlisting capabilities and 

thereby help identify suspect persons attempting to pass through 

their air, land or seaports of entry. 

Combating terrorist financing remains a critical component of 

the war on terrorism, as terrorist groups need money—they need 

funds—to recruit, to train, to equip, to operate. Depriving them of 

funding provides us a better opportunity to identify, disrupt, prosecute and defeat terrorists. The interagency Terrorist Finance 

Working Group, chaired by State, coordinates, develops and delivers training and technical assistance to priority countries to bolster 

their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. 

In addition to working bilaterally, the U.S. has aggressively mobilized the U.N. and other international organizations to fulfill 

their counterterrorism obligations under U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1373. We work also with other donor nations in the 

G-8’s CTAG, Counterterrorism Action Group, et cetera. 

In conclusion, sir, let me finish with three points. First, we are 

running in a marathon, not a sprint. The starter gun went off, as 

you mentioned, in 1993 with the first attack on the World Trade 

Center, but it was not until the morning of September 11, 2001, 

that the majority of our citizens truly realized that, like it or not, 

we were at war. We cannot go it alone, and the role of security assistance in all its many forms is absolutely crucial to this struggle 

and to the security of our homeland. There is no question that 

Americans are safer if we can assist our international partners to 

stop terrorists overseas before they are able to bring violence to our 

home shores. That assistance must be robust and sustained for its 

effects to be realized. 

We must be practical and methodical in our efforts. There must 

be solid coordination among U.S. Government agencies here and 

abroad. In Washington, the Secretary, of course, with assistance 

from our office, coordinates overseas counterterrorism assistance. 

Finally, we must maintain a diverse and balanced portfolio of 

targeted countries in our assistance strategy. We must not focus 

exclusively on today’s threat areas only to find that the quarry has 

moved on to less hostile environs that we have ignored up to now. 

Thank you once again for calling the hearing today on this very 

important topic. I hope the testimony has been helpful so far. I 

would be delighted to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pope follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM P. POPE, ACTING COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF

THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

9

Mr. Chairman, as the President made clear in his speech on Tuesday, March 8, 

to prevent attacks on American soil, we must pursue partnership and cooperation 

abroad. Counterterrorism assistance efforts are the first line of defense for the protection of our homeland as well as U.S. personnel and facilities overseas. These programs are not foreign aid in the traditional humanitarian sense. They are an essential element of the vital U.S. interest in safeguarding Americans at home and 

abroad. 

The President’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism describes four main 

objectives:

• Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, 

leadership, finances, and command, control and communications;

• Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating 

with other states to take action against these international threats;

• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting 

the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas 

most at risk; and

• Defend the United States, its citizens, and interests at home and abroad.

Partnership with foreign governments is important for each of these objectives. In 

today’s testimony, I will focus primarily on the second—the denial of support and 

sanctuary to terrorists through cooperation with other states. 

Just as our views of the nature of warfare have changed to confront the threat 

posed by al-Qaida and its affiliates, so must our views of counterterrorism assistance evolve. A terrorist does not view an Aegis equipped missile destroyer like the 

U.S.S. Cole only as a deterrent. He also sees it as a target that he might hope to 

sink with a few hundred pounds of explosives and a small boat. Conventional weapons continue to hold an important place in our national arsenal, just as providing 

modern weapons systems to allies through foreign military financing and other 

forms of traditional security assistance continues to be in our national interest. But 

the rise of asymmetric warfare, to borrow a term used by military strategists in discussing terrorist operations, has required a fundamental adjustment in our nation’s 

security assistance strategy. 

Our government must be prepared to help partner nations protect themselves, 

and by extension the United States, from terrorism with a wide spectrum of assistance and delivery platforms. Elements of this spectrum may include the most basic 

cop-to-cop training in community policing on the streets of foreign capitals, tactical 

training of police SWAT teams and explosive ordnance disposal experts, investigative training in arcane areas such as the encrypted cyber communications and reverse money laundering schemes known to be used by terrorist organizations, the 

fostering of interagency cooperation through effective joint terrorism task forces, institutional reform of ponderous and sometimes corrupt security institutions, assistance in intelligence collection and analysis, and military training and assistance at 

the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 

Each partner nation does not need every item in our inventory of deliverables. We 

have to discern, through expert assessment and analysis, what a nation’s most 

pressing requirements are, and then we must convince its policy makers how we can 

best help. We must provide that assistance and training in a manner that complements the partner’s existing security infrastructure and can be sustained. It is 

worth noting that there will inevitably be countries with legitimate needs that we 

choose not to assist because, in our estimation, the potential threat emanating from 

or through that country to U.S. personnel or interests is low. As mentioned earlier, 

these programs are not need-based foreign aid in the traditional sense. They are an 

investment based on U.S. security interests and objectives. The challenge, of course, 

is to make sure that our assessment of risk is accurate and that we do not overlook 

tomorrow’s threat by focusing exclusively on today’s. 

As Members of Congress, you are accustomed to reviewing budgets and allocating 

resources. Please allow me to say a few words about something that is not easily 

reflected in budget figures. In counterterrorism assistance, how we do things is as 

important as how much we have to spend. From long experience, we know that impersonal training or equipment packages cannot be simply dropped into the hands 

of our partners and reasonably be expected to get results. Measurable, lasting improvement in a partner nation’s capability to confront terrorist activity in or emanating from its territory usually demands customized programs, hands-on training, 

locally appropriate equipment, and ongoing mentoring. It requires frequent, face-toface contact between U.S. government personnel and the host nation’s security establishment. It requires talented, experienced trainers, who regard their students 

as colleagues and treat them with respect. It requires the engagement of ambasVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
10

sadors and the most senior members of our foreign policy establishment to encourage an institutional environment in which tactical and operational training can take 

root and bear fruit. And it requires that our diverse federal agencies, both military 

and civilian, work together to ensure that distinct initiatives are complementary 

and collaborative. 

There is an additional benefit to the kind of hands-on training I have described 

that bears mention. Our nation’s commitment to sound human rights practices and 

conducting investigations under the rule of law is strong. Consistent exposure to 

former federal investigators and prosecutors from the United States helps bring the 

principles we teach in these areas in each of our courses into sharp relief. In the 

appendix to this testimony you may note one statistic of which we are most proud. 

Colombian anti-kidnapping units trained under the State Department’s 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program have rescued over 48 hostages from kidnappers and arrested 206. These units are vetted for human rights issues and provided human rights training. Although Colombia continues to suffer one of the highest kidnapping rates in the world, this type of assistance will make sustained 

progress in changing this trend. 

The foregoing discussion of how counterterrorism assistance should be provided 

applies globally, Mr. Chairman, but, given your long interest in Africa as the former 

chairman of the Africa subcommittee, allow me to focus on that region. I believe you 

were present in July 2004 when the Africa Policy Advisory Panel of the Center for 

International and Strategic Studies issued a report regarding counterterrorism in 

Africa. The authors were unambiguous: ‘‘The threat of terror to US interests in Africa is concrete, rising and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high.’’ Two programs underway on the African continent offer 

useful illustrations of the requirements I have described and the challenges we face. 

Kenya 

In June 2003, the President announced the commitment of $100 million for an 

East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) to provide counterterrorism equipment, training, and assistance to six countries in the region: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. As part of this effort, EACTI provided $10 million for an intensive in-country antiterrorism training program for Kenya. This program is overseen by my office and implemented by Diplomatic Security’s Office of 

Antiterrorism Assistance. The Kenya program was developed from the ground up. 

DS/ATA experts traveled to Kenya, consulted extensively with members of the Embassy Country Team, and employed experts from other USG agencies, to ensure 

that Kenya’s most pressing needs were addressed. Rather than simply use a training and equipment package for the Kenyans that we have used successfully in other 

countries, ATA customized its plan to focus from the outset on what it perceived 

as the weakest link in Kenya’s capacity to combat terrorist organizations: interagency collaboration, command and control. In close coordination with Kenya’s Commissioner of National Police, Director of Public Prosecutions, and others senior Kenyan officials, ATA devised a nine-week training course that has been delivered to 

a hand-picked group of investigators, prosecutors, immigration officials, and 

counterterrorism analysts. The participants graduate tomorrow, as a matter of fact, 

and they will go on to comprise the core staff of a Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF). Through nine weeks of training, institutional rivalries and suspicions have 

been broken down among the participants, and they are ready to bring their skills 

to bear in a concerted fashion. ATA has assisted in identifying and making ready 

a base from which the JTTF will operate. Each member brings to the task force the 

experience and resources of his or her agency, but they will now be working together 

across agency lines toward common counterterrorism objectives. 

An experienced former U.S. investigator will be resident with the JTTF to provide 

ongoing assistance and advice. A British counterterrorism expert and the U.S. embassy resident legal advisor (an experienced U.S. prosecutor) will also be on hand 

for the long term to assist and advise. Further specialized training and equipment 

will be forthcoming, but it will be crafted in consultation with the Kenyan task force 

for their use in making arrests and prosecutions. We are moving away from a ‘‘Here 

you go—good luck’’ approach to counterterrorism assistance to more of a ‘‘We’re all 

in this together—what shall we do next’’ approach. The difference may appear subtle from here in Washington, but it has enormous implications for partner nation 

ownership, sustainability, and success on the ground. 

Another element of the Kenya program is worth noting. The Commissioner of National Police is eager to improve the KNP’s maritime interdiction capability, particularly in the waters along the northern coast, where traditional cargo dhows transit 

the Somali border on a daily basis. We know that some of these vessels carry contraband and persons of interest from a counterterrorism perspective, but there is 

11

currently a very limited capability to interdict and inspect them. A U.S. Navy group 

has been working with the Kenyan Navy in this area for some months. In planning 

the maritime element of its program, ATA has drawn extensively on the Navy 

group’s expertise. They have provided ATA with valuable information about navigational issues, fueling stations, launch ramps, and so forth. Some of their experts assisted ATA in the evaluation of a locally available and serviceable boat/engine package that is well suited to those waters and the interdiction mission. 

The Kenyan Navy, which is conducting maritime interdiction training with the assistance of U.S. Navy personnel for its own sailors, has agreed to enroll maritime 

police officers into the next two eight-week courses it delivers. Police and Navy personnel will deploy together in joint coastal operations. Since police have much wider 

arrest authority than navy personnel under Kenyan law, this will be mutually beneficial to both Kenyan services. In addition, they will provide information to the 

Nairobi-based Joint Terrorism Task Force for analysis. The JTTF will in turn provide leads, derived from investigative intelligence, to the maritime unit. 

The Kenya program represents several elements of the criteria that I mentioned 

earlier: a customized approach based on the strengths and weaknesses of the partner nation; resident instructors, advisors, and mentors who gain the trust and respect of their Kenyan colleagues; and various USG elements—State, DOD, Justice—

working together to combine resources and expertise that ensures the most effective 

assistance possible. 

Sahel and North Africa 

The Sahel region is an area of potential vulnerability due to its vast, low density 

geography, nomadic populations, and porous borders. International and indigenous 

terrorist groups have been able to travel across the region, smuggle contraband, including weapons, and recruit new members from indigenous populations. Islamist 

terrorist groups pose a terrorist threat to a region that is home to more than 100 

million Muslims. 

The most active group in the Sahel is the al-Qaida-affiliated Algerian Salafist 

Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). In 2003, a faction of this group led by 

Abderezzak al-Para held 32 European hostages in southern Algeria and northern 

Mali. 

We seek to facilitate cooperation among governments in the region (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria) and strengthen 

their capacity to combat terrorist organizations. 

The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) is a good example of collaborative, interagency program efforts that I have described as essential for success. The Pan Sahel Initiative 

is an $8.4 million program to provide CT training that focused on the nations of 

Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. In 2003–04, our Defense Department colleagues 

in the European Command (EUCOM) provided trainers from the U.S. Special Forces 

to train with the security forces of these governments. Countries in the region are 

active and willing partners in counterterrorism efforts. In 2004, forces from Niger 

and Chad engaged GSPC elements in their respective countries. In the case of Chad, 

its military forces killed or captured 43 operatives in a clash in northern Chad in 

March 2004, driving GSPC second-in-command Amari Saifi (a.k.a. Abderrezak alPara) into the hands of a Chadian rebel group, which eventually led to al-Para being 

turned over to Algerian custody in October. 

To complement EUCOM’s efforts with military units in the Sahel countries, we 

directed the Antiterrorism Assistance program to work with the civilian law enforcement agencies of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, as well. ATA has delivered approximately $6.6 million in training and assistance to these countries in Fiscal 

Years 2004 and 2005. 

The Administration is considering a follow-on effort that would continue the success of PSI, building upon that program, to improve the military and political capability of regional governments to meet the threats they face in the Sahel. The working title for this effort is the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, or TSCTI. 

The TSCTI would seek to further strengthen regional CT capabilities, enhance and 

institutionalize cooperation among the region’s security forces, promote democratic 

governance and human rights, and ultimately benefit our worldwide CT goals and 

bilateral relationships. The TSCTI concept would look beyond simply the provision 

of training and equipment for counterterrorism units, but also would consider development assistance, expanded public diplomacy campaigns and other elements as 

part of an overall CT strategy. TSCTI is under review within the Administration, 

and we are working to integrate the concept into agency budget and program planning processes. We look forward to working with you further on our efforts to improve security in the Sahel. 

12

The foregoing descriptions of counterterrorism assistance efforts in Africa by no 

means reflect the extent of our CT operations. I offer them, first, because I am 

aware of the Chairman’s extensive interest in the region, and, second, because I believe that we are now in the stage of our nation’s overall counterterrorism strategy 

that we must look beyond the immediate priority regions of the Middle East, South 

Asia, and East Asia. Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Colombia and elsewhere are extensive and ongoing. I have 

provided an appendix to my written testimony that describes in some detail the priorities and progress of ATA’s counterterrorism assistance efforts in these countries 

and elsewhere. 

Terrorist Interdiction Program and Counterterrorism Finance 

The mission to eliminate terrorist presence or sanctuaries globally extends beyond 

helping partner nations to investigate and interdict terrorists. We also must constrict their mobility and access to financial support. Through the Terrorist Interdiction Program, we provide select nations with the computer systems, training and 

support to establish effective watchlisting capabilities, and thereby help identify 

suspect persons attempting to pass through air, land or sea ports of entry. Since 

2001, twenty nations have been provided this capability, and they have been successful in interdicting insurgents in Iraq, hundreds of individuals traveling on stolen 

passports in Pakistan, as well as wanted criminals, narcotics smugglers, and human 

traffickers world-wide. The Terrorist Interdiction Program has, in several countries, 

become the cornerstone of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. 

Combating terrorist financing remains a critical component of the global war on 

terrorism, as terrorist groups need funds to recruit, train, equip, and operate. Depriving them of funding provides us a better opportunity to identify, disrupt, prosecute, and defeat terrorists. One way the USG combats terrorist financing is 

through foreign assistance capacity building programs administered by the State 

Department. 

The interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG), chaired by State, coordinates, develops, and delivers training and technical assistance to priority countries to bolster their anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing regimes. U.S. 

assistance programs address the legal drafting, financial investigations, bank regulatory supervision, financial intelligence units, and judicial/prosecutorial aspects of 

combating terrorist financing. In addition, these programs have begun to address 

the threat of terrorist financing through non-bank conduits, such as alternative remittance systems, cash couriers, and the abuse of charities. To date, 17 priority 

countries deemed most vulnerable to terrorist financing have been formally assessed, and training and technical assistance have been provided to countries, bilaterally and regionally, in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin 

America. In addition, U.S. anti-money laundering programs underway in regions 

traditionally plagued by narco-trafficking and organized crime networks have complemented counterterrorism finance efforts by reinforcing host government institutions’ ability to follow the money trail. 

Counterterrorism finance training programs have already paid dividends in the 

case of Indonesia. With U.S. assistance, Indonesia adopted amendments to its antimoney laundering law to meet international standards to avoid FATF sanctions, established a fully operational financial intelligence unit, and successfully prosecuted 

the main perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali bombing attacks. Just last month, 

Indonesia was removed from the Financial Action Task Force on Money 

Laundering’s NCCT blacklist. 

Multilateral Engagement 

In addition to working bilaterally, the United States has aggressively mobilized 

the United Nations and other international organizations to fulfill their 

counterterrorism obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. In 

UNSCR 1373, States agreed among other things to ‘‘deny safe haven to those who 

finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens.’’ We have 

used our permanent seat on the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) to ensure 

that the UN is closely monitoring member states’ implementation of their obligations. 

We also work with other donor nations in the Counterterrorism Action Group 

(CTAG), a G8-initiated forum for CT donors, to coordinate and increase CT assistance to high-risk countries. International donor assistance provided to these countries includes basic law-and-order capacity building, legislative assistance, and border security assistance. 

Conclusion 

Allow me to conclude, Mr. Chairman, with three summary points. 

13

First, we are running in a marathon, not a sprint. The starter gun went off in 

1993 with the first attack on the World Trade Center. Osama Bin Laden declared 

war on the United States and all Americans in 1996. Two U.S. embassies in Africa 

were attacked in 1998. The USS Cole was attacked in 2000. But it was not until 

the morning of September 11, 2001, that the majority of our citizens truly realized 

that, like it or not, we were at war. The rapid overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan was gratifying, but Osama Bin Laden remains at large, and, more important, 

his extremist vision continues to stir followers and sympathizers around the world 

to violence against us. We cannot go it alone, and the role of security assistance in 

all its many forms is absolutely crucial to this struggle and to the security of our 

homeland. There is no question that Americans are safer if we can assist our international partners to stop terrorists overseas, before they are able to bring violence 

to our home shores. That assistance must be robust and sustained for its effects to 

be realized. 

Second, we must be practical and methodical in our efforts. We are a large government with many different agencies that have important roles to play. There 

must be solid coordination of our engagement and assistance efforts abroad. In 

Washington, the Secretary of State, with assistance from my office, must continue 

to coordinate overseas counterterrorism assistance. In our missions overseas, the 

more nuanced work of ensuring collaboration among various members of the country 

teams is and must remain the responsibility of the Chief of Mission. That is not to 

say that there will not be and should not be some overlap of responsibilities among 

agencies. 

Finally, we must maintain a diverse and balanced portfolio of targeted countries 

in our assistance strategy. Al-Qaida’s strength is its proven ability to adapt and improvise. We must not focus exclusively on today’s threat areas, only to find that the 

quarry has moved on to less hostile environs that we have heretofore ignored. 

Thank you once again for calling a hearing today on this important topic. I hope 

that my testimony has been helpful, and I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have. 

APPENDIX

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program 

The Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program (ATA) is an essential mechanism for providing partner countries’ civilian law enforcement and security agencies 

with the training, equipment, and technology needed to improve their 

counterterrorism capabilities. 

The Secretary of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) formulates counterterrorism strategies, provides policy guidance to the ATA program, 

and identifies partner country training priorities. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism (DS/ATA) implements and manages program operations 

and coordinates closely with other federal, state, and local agencies that assist in 

providing expertise, assessments, training, and facilities. This synergy is essential 

to the success of the program. 

The ATA programs objectives are:

• To advance U.S. foreign policy goals by strengthening bilateral relationships. 

ATA training plays a vital role in the U.S. Government’s effort to build and 

sustain the global coalition of partner nations to fight terrorist organizations.

• ATA programs enhance and sustain our partner nations’ capacities to take 

strong, effective, and decisive measures to destroy terrorist capabilities. They 

serve as a force multiplier to bolster our own efforts to defend American citizens, U.S. business and civic interests, and U.S. Government interests 

abroad. This is a key part of our nation’s first line of defense in protecting 

the American homeland.

• ATA programs also enhance the operational and tactical capabilities of our 

partner nations to confront and defeat the threat of terrorism.

• By expanding the number of investigative course offerings and increasing the 

number of resident investigative advisors, ATA is greatly improving its ability 

to help partner nations detect, investigate, and arrest terrorists before they 

can strike.

ATA has grown each year since its inception in 1983 and this year’s budget exceeds $110 million. In 2004, ATA sponsored 209 courses and trained approximately 

4,900 students from 67 countries. Over the years, ATA has trained more than 

48,000 students from 141 countries. The type of training varies with the needs of 

each partner nation, and courses are tailored to local conditions. Training includes, 

14

but is not limited to: crisis management and response; cyber-terrorism; dignitary 

protection; bomb detection; airport security; border control; kidnap intervention and 

hostage negotiation and rescue; response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; countering terrorist finance; and, interdiction of terrorist organizations. 

All courses emphasize law enforcement under the rule of law and sound human 

rights practices. All students are vetted for human rights abuses and criminal 

records before being accepted for training. 

As terrorist networks adjust their tactics and strategies, ATA continues to adapt 

and refine its counterterrorism training initiatives to meet evolving threats. ATA 

has expanded its training platforms in order to maximize training benefits and minimize costs. While effectively conducting needs assessments and program reviews, 

developing curriculum, and managing training, ATA continues to coordinate and 

rely on the expertise of both federal and state law enforcement agencies. This synergy, along with our role to coordinate all US Government-provided civilian 

counterterrorism training with embassies and Chiefs of Mission, is essential to the 

success of our counterterrorism efforts and to the success of the ATA program. 

To determine which partner countries will receive ATA training, S/CT reviews 

and prioritizes the threat posed by international terrorists and coordinates with 

ATA to develop comprehensive, in-country training programs in the most vulnerable 

countries. 

ATA’s major program priorities are as follows:

• In Afghanistan, ATA helped to select then trained and equipped special 

agents for the Afghan Presidential Protection Service. Instruction provides 

students with the full range of protective detail responsibilities. ATA also established a mentor program where ATA mentors travel with the Presidential 

protective detail and provide guidance to the Afghan agents as they grow into 

the challenging assignment of protecting the President of Afghanistan. ATA 

will expand the program this year to provide enhanced, specialized 

counterterrorism training.

• Since 1987, ATA helped the Government of Pakistan establish and train a 

Special Investigation Group for counterterrorism. Special Investigation Group 

members played a key role in identifying the perpetrators responsible for unsuccessful assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister last 

year. Future ATA training and assistance in Pakistan will principally focus 

on infrastructure protection and investigative courses focused on Interdicting, 

and Investigating Acts of Terrorism.

• In Indonesia, ATA helped establish and train a special police unit called 

Counterterrorism Task Force 88. Task Force 88 members are responsible for 

arresting more than 120 suspects of terrorist activities in Indonesia. ATA will 

provide training that continues to increase the Government of Indonesia’s crisis response capabilities with the objective of institutionalizing training within the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

• As a key ally in the global war on terror, the Philippines faces threat from 

several indigenous and regional terrorist groups that have also targeted and 

killed Americans. ATA plans to launch an intensive program to assist the 

Philippine police with a sustainable CT capacity, including but not limited to 

pro-active police intelligence, SWAT, incident investigation, and maritime CT 

training. This training will establish the essential infrastructure and will 

begin to fulfill commitments that President Bush has identified as 

counterterrorism priorities during his October 2004 visit to Manila. This program, which will focus on developing the police capacity to prevent, tactically 

confront, and investigate for prosecution terrorist activity, complements ongoing DOD efforts to train the Philippine military forces.

• The Kenya In-Country program is designed to build and sustain Kenya’s capacity to counter terrorism. ATA has helped the Government of Kenya form 

and train an interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force to coordinate nationwide 

counterterrorism efforts. Kenya has made considerable progress in the past 

year by drafting a National CT Strategy, convening a National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), creating a National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC), and establishing an Antiterrorism Police Unit. The JTTF will provide enhanced communication, command, and control among Kenya’s security 

agencies. ATA will also assist the Kenyan National Police with establishment 

of an effective maritime interdiction program to prevent the traffic in arms, 

terrorist suspects, and other contraband along the east African coast.

• In Colombia, ATA’s Anti-Kidnapping Initiative has provided training and 

equipment to Colombia’s special anti-kidnapping units. It has also helped creVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

ate a national anti-kidnapping data automation system that allows a number 

of agencies and tactical units to share and utilize information crucial to preventing kidnappings, rescuing hostages, and arresting kidnappers. Anti-kidnapping efforts are part of the US counterterrorism strategy because the vast 

majority of kidnappings are carried out by two terrorist organizations, the 

FARC and the ELN.

• Tens of thousands of foreign law enforcement professionals have graduated 

from ATA training over years, and they represent a valuable force multiplier 

in America’s long-term strategy to combat terrorism. ATA seeks to cultivate 

the goodwill generated by training with partner nations through the development of an alumni network. The network program will facilitate the organization of in-country or regional conferences on counter-terrorism, provide Diplomatic Security Regional Security Officers with the names of ATA graduates 

and their specialties for use in areas such as VIP protection, and improve the 

sustainment of ATA training by facilitating contacts among graduates in a 

country or region. 

Examples of the ATA Program’s Impact 

In many countries, ATA-trained officials have played key roles in local, regional, 

and global counterterrorism efforts. ATA alumni have served as the lead investigators of a number of recent terrorist attacks and have utilized their training to arrest 

many of the perpetrators. The following are just a few examples of the overall impact of the program.

• In November, Indonesian counterterrorism Task Force 88 officers arrested the 

terrorist who had commanded a lethal attack on the Australian Embassy in 

Jakarta. When the arrest was made, the terrorist had explosives in his possession and was planning additional attacks. Task Force 88 also apprehended 

three terrorists as they attempted to bomb a major shopping center. Additionally, they arrested 11 other bombing suspects, including members of the 

Jemaah Islamiya terrorist organization.

• In Colombia, ATA-trained GAULA anti-kidnapping units have rescued 48 kidnapped hostages, including two American citizens. In conducting these operations, the GAULA units arrested 206 hostage takers, killed four hostage takers, and recovered $7 million in ransom money.

• In the Philippines, ATA-trained officers led the investigations of three terrorist bombing incidents. ATA-trained officers were instrumental in securing 

the release of an American citizen kidnapped by a crime syndicate in Manila.

• In Pakistan, the ATA-trained Special Investigation Group arrested several 

terrorists who had attempted twice to assassinate President Musharraf and 

had detonated two car bombs near the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. The SIG 

also arrested twelve terrorists involved in the attempted assassination of 

Prime Minister-designate Shaukat Aziz.

• In Uzbekistan, ATA-trained police responded to the scenes of a series of terrorist bombings last year, professionally collected and analyzed evidence, arrested several dozen suspects, and secured three tons of explosives. When the 

U.S. Embassy was attacked in July 2004, ATA-trained police employed many 

of these skills again. They cooperated fully and professionally with the FBI 

and other USG agencies investigating the attack—a level of cooperation that 

was directly fostered by investigative skills and collaborative relationships 

gained through ATA training.

• Through a $12-million program spanning 30 months, ATA served as the primary antiterrorism trainer for the Government of Greece in preparation for 

the 2004 Athens Olympics.

Mr. ROYCE. It has been, Mr. Pope. Thank you very much. 

Mr. POPE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will go now to Admiral Tallent. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL HAMLIN B. TALLENT, USN, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

Admiral TALLENT. Chairman Royce and distinguished Members 

of the Committee, on behalf of the soldiers and the sailors and the 

airmen and the marines and the Department of Defense civilians 

16

and their families we have in U.S. European Command, I want to 

thank you so much for having this hearing and giving me an opportunity to be here. I want to also thank you for the strong and continuing support that you and the Nation show for men and women 

who are deployed. I am confident that they know and they understand the level of this support, and it is an honor for me to be able 

to express gratitude for what you are doing to support us on our 

behalf. 

Sir, I would like with your permission to submit my written 

statement and request it be made a matter of the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection. 

Admiral TALLENT. Thank you, sir. 

Sir, I would also like to thank you and Congresswoman McCollum and Congresswoman Watson and Congresswoman Lee for the 

trip you took to visit us. It is so important. I cannot stress that 

enough. To have elected Members from our country, from powerful 

Committees, come and look at what we work with every day is 

such a tremendous message not just for the people in Africa, but 

for us too. It is so important for you to come down there. 

You know, the Mercator projection has done us such a disservice. 

Remember all those years you thought that Africa was just about 

that size? It is a long way to go. It is arduous, and the things you 

see are troubling, but I just want to thank you so much for coming 

down there. 

I really only, in the interest of time, want to offer one point or 

one thought. 

Mr. ROYCE. Admiral, I have read your testimony, but I would encourage you to go ahead and state your case. 

Admiral TALLENT. Let me just talk to you for a second, to you 

and the Members of the Committee. 

Mr. Pope has offered, I think, a good list of activities, of security 

assistance activities that we as a Nation apply, and also in my 

written testimony you will see a list of these kind of activities too, 

things like the Joint Combined Exercise Training Program that you 

saw a part of when you went down to Chad. 

Things like the International Military Education Training where, 

as you know, we take civilians and military leadership and expose 

them to our culture. That is the best selling thing you can do. 

Things like our state partnership program, things like Partnership 

for Peace, these kind of activities. There is a list of these things, 

and I think we should be proud of them. There are millions of dollars of treasury and time that are dedicated to these programs. 

They are well-intentioned. They are tremendous. 

My thought is when we look at the war on terror, I wonder, Is 

the application of these programs complete? I am not questioning 

the value of them, not at all, but is the application complete? The 

programs that I have talked about are kind of in two categories. 

There is an incremental improvement category of people and infrastructure, and then there is an elimination, a reduction of misery 

category that is totally reactive or mostly. 

Sometimes you get the idea that these programs, the engine of 

them is the bigness of our heart, and that is okay. I think Americans are among the most generous people on Earth. I think we 

have statistics that prove that. I think that most Americans are 

17

under a common notion that if they hear a cry for help, it is help 

from them, not from the guy next to them, or to be disregarded, 

but it is meant for them. I think that is who we are. 

Is that enough though? Passion-based programs can be fleeting, 

and at some point there has to be such an overwhelming event that 

the drive, the energy behind it—so is that enough?, I ask. 

I think that the global war on terror offers us an opportunity. 

And I am reluctant to use that word in the context of the global 

war on terror, but there is an opportunity, certainly—most certainly—a responsibility, for us to take a look at programs we offer 

in context of a war that we are fighting in terms of a long-term 

commitment to people. 

I wonder. In military doctrine there is campaign planning, and 

by God we plan. I mean, beagles dig. We plan. That is who we are. 

In campaign planning there are four phases. The first phase is 

deter and engage. The second phase is seize the initiative. The 

third phase is decisive operations, and the fourth phase, phase 4, 

the infamous phase 4 you have probably heard of relative to the 

war on Iraq, is transition. 

What we wonder in U.S. European Command and what General 

Jones refers to is, Should there not be another phase, phase 0 if 

you will, prevention? Should we not have the same kind of campaign planning to prevent things from happening as opposed to 

dedicating our resources, our treasury, our people, to going and addressing it after the fact? Because we know we have data that indicates it is 100 times cheaper if you can prevent. 

We know what happens. I mean, I will think about Africa now. 

Things happen. We send in the Marines or a like outfit. There is 

an activity on the ground. There could be a handoff to another entity like the United Nations. By the way, we know the United Nations. I mean, 27 percent of that peacekeeping bill is paid by us, 

so when someone says hand it off to the United Nations, what they 

are saying in effect is hand it off to the United States taxpayer. 

There is a business case to be made for prevention, and so this 

is the genesis of our thinking on the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and I say it is an initiative, but it is designed to be preventative. 

We can take a look at the objectives in that area, our objectives, 

and I say at large, our United States, the objectives of the people, 

and the sovereign nations that live there. What do they want? 

Again, some time arises. Let us say it is 5 or 10 years or whatever. 

What do you want to happen? What do you want not to happen in 

that area? What kind of effects can you put in place to reach those 

objectives? What kind of activities can you generate? How do you 

fund it? 

I mean, to take a look at a region in its totality and see how you 

can put together a concrete program, a comprehensive program 

that prevents bad things from happening to people. 

Sir, those are my opening remarks. I really look forward to answering any questions that I can. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Tallent follows:]

18

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL HAMLIN B. TALLENT, USN, DIRECTOR OF

OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sherman, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of 

the United States European Command (EUCOM), to discuss the role of security assistance in eliminating terrorist sanctuaries within the context of our overarching 

theater strategy. In addition, I will also provide a framework of our Theater Security Cooperation programs which are an essential component towards our ongoing 

efforts to promote security, build relationships, and prevent conflict. 

On behalf of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Department of Defense 

Civil Servants of EUCOM, and their family members, I want to express our gratitude for your continued support. 

Our history of bringing stability to areas plagued by ethnic and cultural conflict 

has prepared us to extend our focus to the east and south. Checking the spread of 

radical fundamentalism in the largely ungoverned spaces in the Caucasus, and 

Northern and Western Africa will require patience and sustained effort. Our goal 

is to assist nations of these regions to build and sustain effective and responsive 

governments and to develop security structures responsive to emerging democratic 

governments. Our success depends on maintaining relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation, tailored to the social, economic, and military realities in both the Caucasus and Africa. 

As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today’s complex security environment requires a 

greater degree of coordination within the U.S. government and with our allies. 

EUCOM’s plan to promote cooperative security relationships, enhance the capacity 

of foreign partners, and expand cohesion within the interagency team is consistent 

with the four core pillars (Building Partnerships to Defeat Terrorist Extremism, Defending the Homeland In-Depth, Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic 

Crossroads, Preventing the Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by 

Hostile State or Non-State Actors) of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review. We must leverage the full spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and military options to advance our national interests and improve our ability to prevent 

conflict and achieve post-conflict stability when necessary. 

II. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Instability in Africa and the Caucasus shapes the direction of EUCOM’s Global 

War on Terrorism efforts to meet the challenges of irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive threats to our security and freedom. The new security menace is transnational 

and characterized by enemies without territory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, uncontrolled refugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas. Many of these threats are nurtured in under-governed regions 

where terrorists and extremist organizations seek new havens from which to recruit 

and to operate. We are evolving our strategic posture to reflect the new security reality. EUCOM’s greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield. This is accomplished 

through influence, forward presence and engaged leadership. It is sustained only 

through our enduring and visible presence and commitment in the theater. 

Our 21st century center of gravity reflects the continuing importance of the 

Caucasus and the ‘‘ungoverned’’ regions of North and West Africa. As a result of 

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, transnational extremists are increasingly denied their former sanctuaries. Subsequently, they are more reliant on 

leveraging and franchising indigenous and affiliated terrorist groups worldwide. 

Further, transnational extremists have demonstrated an interest in exploiting areas 

where nations are already struggling with resource scarcity, weak national institutions, poverty and inexperienced militaries. These regions are defined by endemic 

imbalances in the distribution of wealth, staggering health problems, fragile political systems, regressive social systems and disenfranchised youth susceptible to the 

lure of extremism. They contain equal potential for either positive growth, or catastrophic failure. 

Caucasus 

Although the Caucasus is torn by separatist conflict and is also plagued with corruption and crime, some parts of the region have made remarkable progress toward 

democracy and sound governance in the last year. The Caucasus is increasingly imVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
19

portant to our interests. Its air corridor has become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and our bases in Europe. Caspian oil, carried through the 

Caucasus, may constitute as much as 25 percent of the world’s growth in oil production over the next five years, while Caspian hydrocarbons will diversify Europe’s 

sources of energy. This region and Georgia in particular, is a geographical pivot 

point in the spread of democracy and free market economies to the states of Central 

and Southwest Asia. 

Africa 

The United States faces strategic options and competition in Africa. According to 

the 2004 report of the UN Organization for Industrial Development, ‘‘Sub-Saharan 

Africa is the only region of the world where, for the last 20 years, extreme poverty 

hasn’t stopped gaining ground.’’ Continued poverty is but one of the many effects 

of years of tragic violence and instability in certain regions of Africa. Evidence 

shows that terrorists intend to take full advantage of this. 

Violence from numerous crises has created areas of lawlessness that transcend 

state borders and cause instability. High population growth rates, poor land management, desertification and agricultural disruptions caused by economic shifts, internal conflicts, and refugee influxes are making it increasingly difficult for several 

countries to feed themselves. This is especially true in Chad, where drought and refugees from the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan have created a humanitarian 

catastrophe. In many areas of the Sahara Desert (Mali, Mauritania, Niger and 

Chad) there is very little military or police presence, and often no central government influence. These problems, aggravated by difficult terrain and a lack of infrastructure, have allowed smuggling and conflict to flourish. 

Fragile democracies have to combat serious challenges to include security concerns, social pressures, teachings of radical fundamentalism, disease, and criminality that imperil the future hopes for the people of Africa. Again, the broad expanses of ungoverned or poorly governed regions, as well as the proximity and ease 

of movement to population centers in Europe, are increasingly attractive to 

transnational terrorists interested in exploiting the region for recruiting, logistics, 

and safe havens. The breeding grounds of terrorism and illicit activity on the continent of Africa require our attention at both the national and regional security 

level. 

III. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGY

In a world of uncertainty and unpredictability, EUCOM must have the agility to 

rapidly respond to a range of threats that were largely unforeseen just a few years 

ago. Geographically, EUCOM is ideally positioned to disrupt and prevent terrorists 

from using their lines of communication and methods of resourcing that are crucial 

to their operations and sustainment. Forward stationed forces serve to strengthen 

U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy; signal U.S. commitment to the security of friends 

and allies; demonstrate the resolve of the United States to meet its commitments; 

and bolster regional security through theater security cooperation programs. 

EUCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs are the centerpiece of our 

efforts to promote security and stability by building and strengthening relationships 

with our allies and regional partners and are an indispensable component of our 

overarching theater strategy. They are regionally focused and assist our allies with 

the development of capabilities required to conduct peacekeeping and contingency 

operations with U.S. forces. Well trained, disciplined allied and friendly forces reduce the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for warfighting success, 

and ultimately mitigate the burden on U.S. forces. Most importantly, Theater Security Cooperation efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the Global War 

on Terrorism by building understanding and consensus on the terrorist threat; laying foundations for future ‘‘coalitions of the willing;’’ and extending our country’s security perimeter. 

Security Cooperation Activities are managed programs planned and executed for 

the purpose of shaping the future security environment in ways favorable to U.S. 

interests. A number of programs are provided under the TSC umbrella including: 

bilateral and Partnership for Peace training events and exercises; Joint Combined 

Exchange Training (JCET); the State Partnership Program (SPP); and foreign assistance programs such as International Military Education (IMET), and Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF). Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program 

(RDCFP) provides Title 10 funding for educational opportunities for key foreign officials to increase cooperation in conducting the Global War on Terror. These programs provide access and influence, help build professional, capable militaries in allied and friendly nations, and promote interoperability with U.S. forces. We execute 

these security assistance programs in concert with U.S. Embassy Country Teams. 

20

Security Assistance 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources to assist nations to 

acquire U.S. military equipment and training. It is an essential instrument of influence; builds allied and coalition military capabilities; and improves interoperability 

between forces. Georgia receives a significant amount of FMF and effectively serves 

beside our forces in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (including Expanded 

IMET (E–IMET)) provides education and training opportunities for foreign military 

(IMET) and civilian personnel (E–IMET). These programs enhance coalition operations by improving military-to-military cooperation and interoperability; reinforcing 

civilian control of the military; advancing the principles of responsible governance; 

and supporting the stability of newly-formed democracies. As a result of the relationships that develop from this program, our return on investment in long-term access and influence is significantly enhanced. Today’s IMET participants are tomorrow’s senior foreign military and civilian leaders. In Africa, IMET and E–IMET 

have been the most successful programs in promoting professional militaries that 

respect democracy and human rights. 

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), conducted under the authority of title 

10, is designed to: demonstrate continued American intent and capability; reassure 

allies and friends; promote regional cooperation and trust; deter potential regional 

aggressors; build force interoperability; and, maintain access to key host nation military personnel and important support facilities. Special Operations Command, Europe participated in 16 JCET events in nine countries during fiscal year 2004. The 

Secretary of Defense has approved 36 JCET programs in EUCOM’s area of responsibility in fiscal year 2005, nine in Europe and 27 in Africa. Another 61 have been 

requested. An additional and highly desirable benefit of JCETs is that they contribute to the U.S. regional strategy and have become a complementary part of the 

EUCOM’s interaction with regional militaries. 

Partnership for Peace (PfP), a successful NATO outreach program, has increased 

stability and built stronger security relationships in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through political consultations and individual national programs. EUCOM 

involvement and leadership in PfP training, exercises, and bilateral programs with 

participating nations help make this program a success. Thirty nations have joined 

the PfP since it was launched in 1994, with 10 achieving NATO membership. Seven 

of these 10 nations were accessed via the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). 

The MAP provides for concrete feedback and advice from NATO to aspiring countries on their own preparations directed at achieving future membership. Currently, 

EUCOM continues to help three MAP nations (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) 

meet membership requirements, especially in the areas of civil-military relations 

and making appropriate military contributions to the Alliance. 

Defense and Military Contacts 

Another viable influencing activity is Defense and Military Contacts. Under this 

program professional military contacts build valuable, often life-long relationships 

at all levels that serve to enhance cooperation and advance U.S. strategic interests. 

An additional influential program employed by EUCOM is the National Guard State 

Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP links U.S. states and territories with partner 

countries for the purpose of supporting EUCOM’s security cooperation objectives 

and assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments. The unique civil-military nature of the Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities that provide 

great flexibility in meeting our Theater Security Cooperation objectives. Currently 

there are 25 states partnered with 23 foreign nations in the EUCOM AOR. 

This past year was extremely successful as National Guard Soldiers and Airmen 

conducted over 115 events with partner nations. Indeed, SPP has been so successful 

that EUCOM is aggressively seeking funding to expand the program in Africa. In 

the last two years, four partnerships have been added: South Africa—New York; 

Morocco—Utah; Ghana—North Dakota; Tunisia—Wyoming. SPP is a key Theater 

Security Cooperation tool that supports U.S. Government objectives by promoting 

access, bolstering capabilities, and enhancing interoperability. 

EUCOM’s TSC strategy is derived from regional priority and policy themes stated 

in the Secretary of Defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance. EUCOM has taken a 

regional approach that links individual country objectives to broader theater goals. 

In Africa, EUCOM’s priorities are to increase the capability of African nations to 

conduct peacekeeping and contingency operations in their regions, particularly 

through the African Union and other regional organizations; to protect natural resources; and to promote stability by assisting medical advice and assistance progress 

21

on health issues such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, malaria and other diseases that have 

humanitarian and strategic consequences. 

Clearinghouse initiatives, designed for Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast 

Europe allow the United States to coordinate actions with other nations involved 

in security cooperation in the same region. Each serves as a multi-national forum 

for interested countries to share information about their security assistance programs for specific regions. The objective is to optimize the use of limited resources 

by merging the various security cooperation programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort. Clearinghouses provide a medium for deconflicting programs, avoiding duplication and finding ways to collaborate and cooperate.

• The Africa Clearinghouse, not to be confused with the G* Clearinghouse to 

support PSO capability in Africa, is EUCOM’s most recent initiative has 

brought thirteen African countries together with NATO, the United Nations, 

and the European Union. The inaugural conference, held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States 

(ECOWAS). The regional approach continued in December 2004 with a conference concentrated on east Africa.

• The Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, aimed at the three Adriatic Charter nations (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia) plus Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia 

and Montenegro, is open to all NATO, European Union, and partner countries 

(Russia and Ukraine specifically) that have engagement programs in Southeastern Europe. The objectives of this clearinghouse are to assist the Adriatic 

Charter nations in their efforts toward NATO membership and to speed the 

integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro into the 

Euro-Atlantic Community.

• The South Caucasus Clearinghouse is now firmly established as a forum for 

EUCOM, our European partners, and international organizations like NATO 

and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to coordinate 

security cooperation programs with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This 

clearinghouse focuses on defense reform, energy security, maritime security, 

disaster response, peacekeeping, and training and education. 

IV. GEORGIA SUSTAINMENT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS PROGRAM (SSOP)

The Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) is a security 

assistance program designed to create an increased capability in the Georgian military to support Operation Iraqi Freedom stability missions. SSOP will also help solidify the progress made during the very successful Georgia Train and Equip Program and continue to assist in the implementation of western standards in the 

Georgian armed forces. This program, lasting about 18 months, will cost approximately $60 million. Funding for the program is provided under fiscal years 2005 and 

2006: Title 10—$27.1M, Title 22—$17.33M, and other (i.e. Excess Defense Articles, 

Donor Nation Program)—$16.5M. 

As a result of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) the Georgian military has significantly increased its capability to execute combined operations in a 

multi-nation environment, enhanced their ability to protect their sovereignty, improved their ability to defeat transnational terrorists’ cells, and stabilize the region 

from potential terrorist activities. A remarkable aspect to this program is the impact 

that can be achieved at the small unit level. GTEP training was conducted using 

U.S. Special Operations Forces and U. S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe from May 

2002 to May 2004. During this time approximately 2,600 Georgian soldiers, including a headquarters staff element and 5 tactical units, received training. The most 

recent benefit of GTEP came on 1 March 2005, when Georgia deployed the first full 

infantry battalion in support of operations in Iraq. Georgian troops have also supported operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. EUCOM expects the rotation of Georgian forces in support of this critical mission to continue under the Sustainment and 

Stability Operations Program. 

The Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) is designed 

to train two Infantry Battalions for peacekeeping missions in Iraq; two Logistics 

Battalions; specialized units for the Georgian 1st Brigade; and staff training for the 

1st and 2nd Georgian Brigade, the Land Forces Command Staff, and the Operations 

Cell of the Georgian General Staff. Additionally, SSOP will provide Georgia with a 

cadre of trainers and staff to support additional personnel and peacekeeping units. 

In January 2005, Phase I of SSOP commenced as EUCOM conducted a Pre-Deployment Site Survey and assessment of the Georgian Army, focusing on the readiness of the infrastructure and the personnel manning of the first battalion to undergo training. On 1 March, a Georgian Battalion deployed to Iraq, a prerequisite for 

22

commencement of follow-on SSOP phases. Based on the readiness of the Georgians 

to conduct the training and availability of funding and equipment, we have set a 

start date of mid-April 2005 to begin the training of the first infantry battalion. We 

estimate that the program will be completed by summer 2006. EUCOM, in coordination with the Defense Department and the Department of State, plans to continue 

its military transformation support to this developing democracy. This effort is an 

example of a program in which a small investment can yield enormous dividends 

in our effort to promote peace, stability and democracy. It is also an example of how 

small unit training programs, operating at the tactical level, can produce a strategic 

result. 

V. TRANS–SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE (TSCTI)

Torn apart by war, disease and poverty, and marked by vast ungoverned spaces, 

Africa is an emerging haven for our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism. That 

is why stability on that continent has emerged as such a key goal of EUCOM’s strategic plan. Despite obvious problems, African nations are joining together and making progress in their quest to provide security and stability for Africans. The United 

States should focus efforts on assisting our African partners in building their regional capabilities. 

The Trans-Sahara region spans ten African and Maghreb countries and is an area 

of acute vulnerability due to vast expanses of desert and porous borders. With a 

long history of being a center through which arms and other illicit trade flow, it is 

becoming increasingly important as terrorists now seek to use these routes for 

logistical support, recruiting grounds, and safe haven. We have indications of extremist groups with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq operating in the Sahel. 

Islamist terrorist organizations in the countries that border the Sahara, like the alPara faction of the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) that held 

32 Europeans hostage in 2003, continue to pose a threat to the stability of an already vulnerable region. 

The Administration is considering a long-term interagency plan to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa. The goal of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, or TSCTI, proposes to assist governments in this region to better control 

their territory and to prevent huge tracts of largely deserted African territory from 

becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. TSCTI is being planned as a follow-on 

to the successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) that began in 2002, which helped train 

and equip at least one rapid-reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the 

four Saharan states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. 

The overall approach is straightforward: build indigenous capacity and facilitate 

cooperation among governments in the region that are willing partners (Algeria, 

Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with Libya 

possibly to follow later if relations improve) in the struggle with Islamic extremism 

in the Sahel region. TSCTI would help strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region’s security forces, 

promote democratic governance, and ultimately benefit our bilateral relationships 

with each of these states. Key aspects of the TSCTI training would include basic 

marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, patrolling and medical 

care. TSCTI, like the PSI, would seek to directly engage with participating nations 

and assists in protecting their borders and exploiting opportunities to detect and 

deter terrorists by providing basic training and equipment and train additional 

forces. The TSCTI also envisions engagement with more countries than PSI with a 

greater emphasis on helping to foster better information sharing and operational 

planning between regional states. We would fully coordinate TSCTI efforts with 

U.S. Country Teams to ensure that the total U.S. effort in the GWOT is complementary and tailored to the unique conditions within each country in this region. 

TSCTI would support U.S. national security interests in the Global War on Terrorism by enhancing African regional security and promote an Africa that is selfsufficient and stable. The program would also better prepare participating nations 

to stop the flow of illicit arms, goods, and people through the region helping focus 

nations to better protect their own vast borders and regions. 

America’s war on terrorism cannot be fought alone. Historically, proactive security 

costs with programs such as the PSI are significantly less expensive than reactive 

missions to the world’s hotspots. Political instability in Africa that is left to fester, 

could lead to repeated interventions at enormous costs to U.S. taxpayers. TSCTI 

would be a proactive program that is a relatively small investment, but that could 

be a powerful inoculation against future terrorist activity leading to an increasingly 

stable Africa. The Administration is reviewing how best to transition from planning 

to implementation of this program including ways to use existing resources more efVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:06 Jun 01, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\031005\99825.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
23

fectively and ensuring that TSCTI is integrated into future budget and planning cycles. Long term, continuous engagement will build bonds where few existed and 

strengthen those already established. The U.S. needs to continue security cooperation measures with nations that support regional initiatives leading to peace and 

stability. 

EUCOM’s security objectives in Africa are to eliminate ungoverned areas, counter 

extremism, and end conflict in order to reduce the chronic instability that hampers 

and often extinguishes hope for political and economic development. Development 

of effective security structures in Africa will lay the foundation for future success; 

however, they are dependent upon on commitment of manpower, financial, and institutional resources necessary to establish and sustain real progress. African security issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. Modest near-term 

investments will enable us to avert the manifestation of problems that may require 

extensive U.S. intervention in the future which could prove costly. 

VI. CONCLUSION

It is a privilege to represent this proud nation. The challenges we now face are 

enormous, yet our past is replete with examples of how we have overcome daunting, 

seemingly insurmountable barriers that tested our resolve. Our history demonstrates our commitment to the principles of freedom. What lies before us is the 

opportunity to advance our leadership role in global affairs, define the 21st Century, 

and extend peace and prosperity throughout the world. The indispensable influence 

attained by our forward presence and robust Theater Security Cooperation programs provides the best chance for fighting the Global War on Terrorism and meeting our national security goals.

Mr. ROYCE. Do you think that the TSCTI does that? 

Admiral TALLENT. I do, sir. I would like to explain how. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, but I would like you to also tell us what stage 

you think that is really in. That is a concern of mine. I would like 

to hear from both of you on that. 

Thank you again, Admiral Tallent, for your testimony. Please 

continue if you can with a response to what stage is that initiative 

actually in? 

Admiral TALLENT. Yes, sir. TSCTI, the Trans-Sahara Counter 

Terrorism Initiative, is a program that we have been working on 

for 2 years. The fellow sitting behind me with the white hair is an 

F–14 fighter pilot, or he used to be. Now his full-time job is the 

Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative. His name is Otto 

Seiber. 

We took a look at the question of, in a sovereign nation, How do 

you fight the war on terror? I would just ask you, if you would for 

a moment set aside Iraq and set aside Afghanistan, and then you 

ask yourself. You know, when I ask myself, What am I doing to 

fight the war on terror, what am I doing? It is frustrating. I think 

it is frustrating for a lot of us because we are not over in places 

shooting it up and taking decisive corrective actions and those kind 

of things. So it is very frustrating when you say, What am I doing 

for the war on terror? 

We thought, What could we do? Can you build a capability for 

a country that does not have much to be able to exercise its law 

throughout its borders? Can you do that? Can you train them? I 

do not mean train them and walk away. I am talking about training them and then keeping a syllabus-generating force there that 

keeps the training going for a long time, for as long as we can 

make this program go. I am talking about more than 5 or 6 years. 

Then you wonder, Well, what is different about that, really from 

other kind of piecemeal programs? The idea is to connect these 

forces in these countries with their neighboring countries. It is 

24

hard to believe that until we pulled together the chiefs of defense—

a few months ago in Stuttgart—it was the first time they had ever 

met each other. They had never talked to each other. There is no 

crossborder understandings. 

Do you remember in the old Bonnie and Clyde days whenever 

the sheriff would chase the bank robber to the county line and then 

had to stop? This is how they operate down there. 

The ability to have information sharing and intelligence sharing 

and be able to connect all that in a comprehensive program that 

has a regional effect is one aspect. 

The second aspect though is this message that, sir, you talked 

about. You referred to it, and that is this public diplomacy message. We have been approached by leadership in the Sahara region, 

by Imams—I am not talking about just government leadership; I 

am talking about social leaders as well—who are concerned, who 

are concerned about this growing influx of the long beards, about 

this growing message, this Islamic extremist message. 

They put that against this youth bulge that they have, and then 

you put that against the high unemployment rates they have, and 

you see a potential problem that is developing. How do you combat 

that? 

Mr. ROYCE. Is it the presence of the long beards, or is it the presence of other Imams funded from the Gulf States with resources 

that make it possible——

Admiral TALLENT. Excellent. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. To start schools in Algeria? 

Admiral TALLENT. Well, we were engaged in just such a question 

about how did Algeria turn the corner. 

I remember one Algerian official explained it to me. We found 

that the Saudi Wahhabists—yes. That the Saudi mosque in Algiers 

was being used for this Jihadist activity, and we had to close that 

down. 

Mr. ROYCE. I know we are looking at it in terms of people, you 

know, the spread of the long beards as you say. I wanted to ask 

about the phenomenon of the resources, the Gulf State funding 

that comes in that builds the competing mosque with a new philosophy compared to the Imam who was there. 

I understand that that always comes with a condition. An Imam 

who is a Gulf State Imam, not a local Imam, and so I would ask 

you about that. 

Admiral TALLENT. I do not have figures on the amount of funds 

that are coming into that region from the Gulf States, but I do 

know that the message is coming directly from Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. ROYCE. We were in Chad, in northern Chad, as you know. 

We saw out of the desert—I thought it was a mirage at first. We 

saw this grand mosque that was absolutely towering, a beautiful 

building, but this was in one of the most desolate areas I had ever 

been. I asked about how that was possible. The answer was well, 

Kuwaitis provided the money for that mosque and for the Imam. 

I am going to go to Ms. McCollum for any questions she might 

have, and then we will return. 

Thank you, Betty. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am not going to apologize for the meeting that I am going to have because it is to save 

25

the children in Africa on some issues in Malawi, which is not part 

of the PEPFAR AIDS funding package. 

This is a note I left Mr. Royce, so you know it is true:

‘‘Dear Ed, I am sorry I have to leave. This is a wonderful meeting, except I am afraid the question I have they will not be 

able to answer, and that is, Why is there a zero amount in the 

Bush budget in the future years?’’

Then I told him where I was going, and I said:

‘‘If you want to count me in to find dollars for DoD for Africa, 

I am there.’’

I know you cannot answer the question, so mine is more of a 

comment. In all the testimony that we have heard repeatedly in 

the International Relations Committee, when we go to classified 

briefings, when I read books on history, when I read current political science books, we are in a new world. 

Part of that new world is reaching out and building relationships 

and partnerships. We have started to build a partnership, and it 

is a wonderful one. It is one that is not only good I think for us 

as a leader in democracy, but it is also good for us for our own national security. 

Not to continue that partnership, to walk away when we know 

that in the past when we have walked away from opportunities, as 

you so well put, Mr. Pope, in Afghanistan, and the havoc that it 

wreaks, the broken promises that people feel does nothing to add 

to our national security, nor does it for our leadership in democracy, and I truly believe our country is a leader in democracy. 

I am so glad that I was invited to go on the codel for many reasons, but one of the reasons was seeing the pride, the professionalism, the partnership between the people in Chad and the 

military and our military. 

I just thank you both for your service, and I will talk to you 

about things later, and congratulations on your retirement, Mr. 

Pope. 

Mr. POPE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman McCollum. I appreciate 

it very much. 

Going to that question and going to the initiative that our Administration is attempting to put together, I know that there is an 

intent to draw from numerous sources, including development assistance and including public diplomacy funds, to jump this number up from I think it was about $8 million to an initiative in the 

vicinity of $100 million. 

One of the questions that that would bring to mind is, assume 

you achieve that. Admiral, How do you keep a program of that size 

from becoming bureaucratic? 

Robert Kaplan is a respected military writer, and he wrote, ‘‘The 

smaller the American footprint the more effective the operation,’’ so 

he has been critical of our efforts in Afghanistan because he sees 

the support tail getting longer and the command structure getting 

too layered. 

In his opinion, United States forces were at their best when they 

first went into Afghanistan when the bureaucratic layers, to use 

26

his words, between the U.S. forces and the Secretary of Defense 

were severed at the time. 

How do we expand and get more countries’ militaries geared up 

for the terrorist fight? We know this has worked in Mauritania, 

Chad, Niger, but the question for me is, we now are going to expand this fairly rapidly. How do we make sure that the emphasis 

is on guys getting their boots dirty and not on the paperwork? 

Admiral TALLENT. Thank you, sir. This program is designed to 

have small groups of trainers in each of nine countries. We were 

going to start with four countries at a time. When I say small 

groups of trainers, I am talking 30 trainers. The idea is to have 

these trainers train the leadership in these nations. 

I will tell you that the willingness and the aggression, positive 

aggressiveness of the countries we are talking about and their energy to take this capability, this program, is so refreshing. You saw 

it in Chad. I do not need to say that to you. 

The way you keep the footprint small is you have a very focused 

program. You concentrate on training the trainer. This is about Africans helping themselves. This is not about us doing it for them. 

I read testimony from you, sir, where you said we have to do 

more. I will paraphrase. You said we have to have a different approach to Africa than just aid. It has to be much more than that. 

We feel that if we give them the training up front and then the 

critical piece, the piece that has not been provided hitherto, is the 

sustainment of the equipment, the sustainment of the syllabus 

with a small group of people on the grounds, an agreed-to list of 

measures of effectiveness on how they are doing, how they are progressing so that these measures of effectiveness will be how we 

judge the program, not by laying out a bunch of bureaucracy and 

a bunch of people checking our math. 

Also, the maintenance of vehicles and maintenance of the communications systems and infusion cells and things like this. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if I am 

being repetitive. I missed part of the testimony, and I apologize for 

that. 

I worked in counterterrorism at the Justice Department, and one 

thing, or at least my experience is, we would get these intelligence 

cables and intercepts. One in particular came out of the Sudan. 

Many came from Mexico and South America. The real problem we 

had was just determining, and I am sure you have encountered 

this, trying to determine if they were accurate or not. You know, 

you get all the stuff coming in. You think, my God, is this really 

happening or not? If it is, it is a very frightening scenario. 

It really goes to the issue of human intelligence as well. Some 

of it we got obviously from intercepts, but the human intelligence 

portion I think can be very valuable, but also very unreliable, depending on the source of the information. 

I think Special Operations are fighting this war on terror overseas. That is the way to do it in a very strategic, focused way, but 

I guess my question is, What are we doing to coordinate with not 

just the U.S. intelligence, but the global intelligence community to 

get this kind of information that is so critical to protecting our 

country? 

27

For instance, with CSEN in Mexico, we tried to reach out to 

them. They seemed a little more reliable than the PGR, which was 

the Attorney General’s Office. 

I was just kind of curious what the military is doing in that regard to strengthen our intelligence capabilities. 

Mr. POPE. He is asking about the military, and I feel less capable 

of talking about that than you, but I can also say something. 

Mr. MCCAUL. But if you would comment. Maybe part two of the 

question, and you may have answered this already and I apologize, 

but the sanctuaries seems to be Third World. What specifically can 

we do to these sanctuaries to prevent them from becoming the future Afghanistans of the world? 

Admiral TALLENT. There is a difficulty when you share intelligence with countries, and it is not just with them. It is the neighboring countries. I mean, you can talk to each other in bilateral arrangements, but when you are talking about the third party then 

it gets to be very complicated. 

We have had success though in developing a series of bilateral 

relationships. A lot of this stuff can be shared. It is just how you 

do it. A lot of it is just cutting through the process by which you 

share this intelligence. 

Your comment about HUMINT though is very good because in 

the Trans Sahel they have a little bit of kind of a rudimentary direction-finding capability where you will get a patrol going down a 

line of bearing, but whatever was generating the signal could be 2 

feet away or 3,000 miles away, you know, and so it is very difficult 

for them. They come across a lot of cold campfires with that kind 

of routine. 

A lot of their HUMINT, some of it is good of course, but some 

of it has other agendas. You will have a situation where a person 

will report, I saw three SUVs heading east toward Gao, let us say 

in Mali. Well, four or five people report that. Before you know it 

you have 12 trucks heading toward Gao, and each one has 10 people. My gosh, there are 120 people we are going to face, when actually you are talking about a truck or two or three and there are 

about 10 or 12 people. 

When you have a little force like that, that has limited mobility, 

and we are definitely talking about that situation in the Trans 

Sahel, the one thing that will help them is to give them spot information on where this entity is that they are interested in. 

Now, we have a variety of techniques that we should not talk 

about, and I know that the Chairman has heard the story of about 

how in Chad we were able to provide information to the Algerians 

and the Nigeriens, and we pushed this fellow, Al Para, and his 

band of about 40 folks, all across Niger by handing them spots of 

information. 

They got Al Para and his band out beyond his logistics line. He 

kept going east and kept going east, and we were able to alert the 

Chadians that this fellow was coming, and they were able to set 

up a blocking formation, engaged, killed about half of them or more 

and captured the rest of them. Now this Al Para character is in jail 

in Algeria. 

This is one of the first times that we ever were able to coordinate 

through intelligence sharing three different entities, Chad, Niger 

28

and Algeria, in the capture of this person we had been looking for. 

The Algerians had been looking for him for 10 years. 

There are things we can do. Granted, there is a wide spread of 

space here. It is very complicated, and it gets more complicated 

when you get inside urban areas, but this is what we have been 

doing, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. This is a follow-up to underscore the importance of 

human intelligence. If I am getting into a classified area, let me 

know. 

Are you seeing any use of IT computer technology or cell phones 

in this area, or are they sort of getting off? Perhaps they did not 

have them in the first place, but are they getting off sort of that 

mode of communication? 

Admiral TALLENT. The amazing thing is just how widespread, 

and I will say the Internet is just a kind of an umbrella for transmission of this kind. It is amazing how widespread a wireless information transfer is. 

I mean, the desert out there, it is a large place, but it is not 

empty. You go to Timbuktu. It is in the middle of nowhere, and 

right there is an Internet cafe, and an Imam has his own Web site. 

You go to someplace like in Tamanrasset in southern Algeria, 

and there is not anything there. It is like the Chairman described 

the mosque. I mean, there is just nothing there but camels and 

such, but there is an Internet cafe there, and everyone has a cell 

phone. It is somewhat amazing how connected they are. 

Of course, the bad news is that the ability to coalesce thoughts 

and activities, as you know, with that kind of capability is both a 

good and bad thing. I mean, I would say that the international terrorist franchise, if you will, is using the Internet so much more 

than ever they have done in the past, that and couriers in some 

cases. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I guess that could be good news. I know certainly 

we hear that bin Laden is not using his cell phone anymore. That 

could be good news. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. McCaul, we will go to Mr. Sherman, and then 

we will come back to you for any additional questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Just looking at this map of the unified command 

and reflecting that I believe we are the first country in the history 

of the world to have a command structure designed to have some 

degree of force involvement in every square inch on the planet, I 

do not know whether to view this with pride or with the fear of 

hubris, but it is daunting. Rome had different legions with different 

commands, but they did not have Greenland assigned to any of 

them. 

How are we doing in terms of cooperation with Britain and 

France and other European countries in Africa, and do we see rivalries there or a sharing of responsibility? 

Mr. POPE. Let me try it to start with. In terms of the civilian side 

of things, we cooperate with them very well. In my time doing 

counterterrorism and working on these, what I call capacity-building issues, I certainly have not seen those rivalries. 

In particular, we work through an organization—I mentioned it 

in my testimony—that was started when we were head of the G-8, 

29

the CTAG, and it was basically because we and they and others 

were getting far more all around the world, not just Africa, than 

we could possibly meet for capacity building of all kinds—police 

units, airport improvement, computer programs to find and freeze 

money, everything you could imagine. 

In that sense, not just Africa, but globally, we cooperate with 

them as well as others and very well. I have not sensed the rivalry, 

in other words. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I know France takes a rather protective view of 

its position in Francophone African commercially. I guess that has 

not interfered with our cooperation with the counterterrorism effort. 

Mr. POPE. I have not seen that, no. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Admiral Tallent, you mentioned Libya as a possible TSCTI country down the road. Just the fact that you are mentioning it is a sea change in our relationship. 

How do you see our relationship progressing, and is security cooperation 1 year down the road, or 5 years, or 10 years, or when 

the Dodgers win the Series? 

Admiral TALLENT. My leadership is very aggressive and very 

proactive, and we are making appropriate and, I think, best efforts 

to convince our seniors of the necessity of engaging with Libya. 

When I make this comment, we are continuously pressing. General Jones has got a personal message already going up the chain 

to the SECDEF to address this, to keep the pressure on to get more 

engaged with Libya not only in terms of commerce, but military, 

military engagement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you see Libya’s objectives, and I realize 

Ghadafi is a little mercurial, but are they folks that really want to 

help us stop terrorism and bring stability to Northern Africa? 

Admiral TALLENT. I think that Colonel Ghadafi certainly has 

agendas, but I am convinced the reason that he has swung in our 

direction is because of his tremendous fear of the Islamic extremist 

inroads that were being made in his country. 

I mean, he has got his own Libyan fighting group that is coming 

up on his neck. That is what he is afraid of, and he, I think, realizes that he needs to be a part of this larger global war on terror 

if he is going to survive that. It is a pragmatic approach by him. 

Could I make a comment, sir, on the question that Mr. Pope answered and that has to do with your question about France? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Admiral TALLENT. Sir, last week I had a conference with my 

counterparts, the French and the UK J–3s. This was a second 

meeting we had. Specifically what we decided out of that was to 

do the combined planning for evacuation operations for the Cote 

d’Ivoire should that come up and combined operations for Nigeria. 

As you might remember, when we were in Liberia 2 years ago 

it was the French that made an initial pickup of some of our people. Also in Cote d’Ivoire it was the French who offered to help us 

take our people out of there. Also in Sudan it was the French that 

provided refueling and aircraft support for the cargo planes that we 

sent into the Darfur. From a military perspective, we have a tremendous relationship with them. General Jones has started 

the——

30

Mr. SHERMAN. So when you are on board and you get a hamburger on one of our aircraft carriers, for example, you get that 

with French fries? 

Admiral TALLENT. French fries. We do French fries and pommes 

frites. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Hopefully you will be able to get a similar accompaniment to your hamburger if you eat in the dining room here in 

the Capitol. 

Admiral TALLENT. Sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Go ahead, please. 

Admiral TALLENT. Our relationship mil-to-mil is very positive. 

General Jones has instituted a NATO fusion cell concept whereby 

we fuse and share information with our NATO partners. This is a 

new idea. 

We also have clearinghouses. We have one specifically devoted to 

Africa. What we were finding is when we were down in Africa we 

were fumbling around over each other. We would go in and train 

a group in Ghana, let us say, only to find out the French had 

trained them the year before, the same group, so we were duplicating efforts. It was just insane. 

We started these clearinghouses. We have had three or four of 

them to point, and we were able to pull together partners and talk 

about what all of us are doing as opposed to Africa. We also have 

them for the Caucasus and for other places. 

Mr. POPE. I would just add, sir, if I could, the British, as you can 

imagine, both the British and French are very good on counterterrorism. We work well with them. They are good in their own right, 

and they are good together. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Heartening to hear that, and if I was not on Atkins I would join you for some French fries. 

The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, Mr. Pope, 

talks in terms of countries that harbor terrorists, and I wonder, If 

a country is a state sponsor of terrorism, do they automatically go 

in that same category, or do we treat harboring terrorists separately from sponsoring terrorism? 

Mr. POPE. The way it is evolving it is not necessarily exactly the 

same now, but it does not necessarily have to be a harboring, although it can be. It can also be assisting in some way. 

For example, Saddam had a long history of helping terrorist 

groups like, for example, Abu Abas of Achille Lauro fame or infamy 

was discovered in Baghdad. That type of harboring and help to terrorists. 

North Korea has had its own particular reason, for example, for 

being on that list. It is kind of a mixed bag is what I am saying. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But you can make the list whether you harbor or 

whether you help? 

Mr. POPE. Or whether you carry out. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Or respond or carry out. 

Mr. POPE. Like, for example, blowing up airliners over the Pacific. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Independent contractor, employee. Yes. 

Mr. POPE. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

31

Mr. POPE. It is a mixed bag. I would just say about that, in principle we really like to take countries off the state sponsor list as 

well as put them on, and countries like Libya, for example, know 

what they need to do to get off. Ghadafi has done some things and 

not done some things, but he is moving the Sudanese and others. 

There are others who are not making it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that while our Committee is 

doing what we can against terrorism, there is the area of trade 

where, believe it or not, you have one category for Communist 

countries, but you do not put into that category state sponsors of 

terrorism. So if Laos just chooses to be Communist and otherwise 

causes us no problem, they would be listed as a Communist country and eligible for the worst possible trade relations, but if you, 

say, harbor bin Laden, well, that is not as bad. Everybody in my 

district kind of thinks that bin Laden is worse than, you know, 

communal farms in Laos. 

I hope that we get a chance to talk to our brothers and sisters 

over on the Ways and Means Committee and see whether we can 

treat terrorist sponsors with the same voracity that we treat those 

countries that are Communist, some of which may cause us no 

harm. 

Mr. Pope, in the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, which 

we enacted late last year, the definition of a state sponsor of terrorism was changed to include countries that tolerate terrorists on 

their soil. How has this affected the Secretary’s determination as 

to who is on that list? So really, kind of back to that harboring 

versus sponsoring issue. 

Mr. POPE. Sure. The list has not changed with the exception, of 

course, of deleting Iraq. As I mentioned, all of us would like to 

ideally see all of them get off, all of them get out of the business 

of doing the things that caused them to get on in the first place. 

Everybody knows what is needed to be done, and we are monitoring it closely. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

After 9/11, I think we learned a lot of lessons about communication coordination. Certainly in the world I was working in, the FBI, 

the criminal side of the house did not talk to the intelligence side 

of the house. It was very dysfunctional. Fortunately, the Patriot 

Act has changed that, but you see that not just with the FBI, but 

with the intelligence community in general, with the military. 

My question is, in general, if you could talk about your two respective offices. How are you specifically coordinating and communicating, that being the DoD and the State Department, toward 

these counterterrorism agendas? 

Mr. POPE. Sure. If I could start, first of all, with your permission, 

let me just give you 1 second of history. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. 

Mr. POPE. I was overseas for about 61⁄2 years on overseas assignments, and I came back at the end of the summer of 2002, so just 

a little less than a year after September 11, and then I got plunged 

in on working on counterterrorism. I got plunged into this world, 

the CSG that the Chairman mentioned and other groups. 

32

I was really struck by the breaking down of stovepipes already. 

Of course, in the last 21⁄2 years, approximately, that I have been 

doing this I was struck then, and I am very pleased at the—I 

mean, people really get it. I just have not seen in my time a lot 

of turf battles and that kind of thing. People are very open. People 

really get it. I mean, we honestly spend more time together than 

we do with our own families. We are just meeting all the time and 

sharing. I am not saying it is perfect, but it does work. That is the 

interagency. 

Inside the State Department we tend to be the principal coordinators. That is our job. Principal coordinators with the different 

kinds of bureaus called regional bureaus like the Africa Bureau, for 

example, as well as the functional bureaus, and make sure that everybody is on the same page. 

We recently created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary in my office for Homeland Security to make sure that we were better 

plugged in with them. In other words, the past 3 years have been 

a period not only of trying to hunt down the principal leaders of 

al-Qaeda and break up attacks and that kind of thing, but also to 

create or improve a whole range of bureaucratic things. At these 

meetings, for example, both OSD and JCS are represented. We 

sent one of our senior officers, a really good senior officer, to 

EUCOM, and he is embedded, if you want to use that word, in 

EUCOM. We are doing what we can do to make what you are saying happen. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Does that also point to the issuance of visas and 

passports and getting that kind of information, sharing the information? 

Mr. POPE. Well, yes. There are all kinds of databases and procedures set up. I mean, we in our office do not deal so much with 

passports and visas, but——

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. I understand. 

Mr. POPE [continuing]. DHS, for example, is plugged into that, 

as is the intelligence community. Everybody who gets pieces of information feeds it in so it can go both to consular officers before 

a person comes or, if someone has a preexisting visa, so it can be 

available to people at the border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Great. Admiral Tallent? 

Admiral TALLENT. Sir, I think your question leads to one of the 

greatest challenges we have. You know, we talk about sanctuary, 

and a lot of times our mind goes to the desert or something like 

that. A sanctuary that we offer is our inability to work in an interagency approach in the time required to get the job done. 

First of all, I mean, there is no interagency. There is no number 

you can call like interagency answering. There is just a whole, I 

guess the technical word is bunch, a whole bunch of different offices that you have to pull together to try to come up with a legitimate body of thought on something. 

As Mr. Pope said, right now in EUCOM we have planners who 

work with our planners, and they are from the three digit agencies 

to include State, Counterterrorism. Tim Walsh is our guy. We have, 

of course, the FBI, the Treasury. We are trying to get greater representations. 

33

General Jones would like to have much more participation in this 

‘‘joint interagency coordination group,’’ that we call it than we have 

right now——

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Admiral TALLENT [continuing]. But these members help us, and 

they are a part of our planning teams. Still, there are disconnects 

though when you try to go beyond the local level and get decisionmaking at higher levels. 

We also have a problem in that the culture and planning is different with the interagency, the different groups. For instance, 

State Department does not have the same mechanisms and doctrine for planning that we have. We have different tools. We are 

very attuned to collaborative environments where we are doing 

planning through cyberspace together so that we can work with 

SOCOM and with STRATCOM and with CENTCOM altogether, as 

well as the Joint Staff, so we are able to get into cyberspace together in virtual planning rooms. 

The other agency players do not have those kind of equipments, 

so there are some culture problems. There are some tool/equipment 

problems. There are procedural problems. All of this together is stifling our ability, I think, to do very quick interagency agreed-upon 

plans in this fight on terrorism. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So right now the structure is you just have these 

plans to try to track membership. What about the Counterterrorism Center? Do you participate fully—will you—in that new center? 

Mr. POPE. The CTC you are talking about? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Admiral TALLENT. The CTC. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Are you participating in that? 

Admiral TALLENT. That is going to be at a level beyond where 

we are. I do not know yet what the representation attachments are 

going to be, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. 

Mr. POPE. DoD will. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. 

Mr. POPE. They will for sure. They are already out there. We 

have somebody out there, FBI, CIA and others. In my view, it is 

not the question you asked, but in my view what was TTIC—the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center—and what is now the NCTC 

was a great idea. In my view, it was the sort of thing I wish I had 

thought of myself because it is a place where really smart people 

can come together, and you get bits. 

I have actually seen it, without being able to talk in any detail 

here, where you get bits of information, maybe one from an African 

Government, and one from somebody else, and one from one of our 

agencies, and you put it together at TTIC—now NCTC—on their 

analytical and you say, ‘‘So that is what this guy is up to.’’ But you 

could not see it from any one of the pieces. They are moving into 

strategic operational planning as well. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sitting from where I am, of course, I am trying to 

think of ways to help you in terms of as a Member of Congress. 

Of course, the President has an Executive Order on TTIC and the 

NCTC, and, of course, we passed it legislatively in the last session, 

34

so I hope that provides some structure for you to be able to coordinate better. 

Mr. POPE. It is. It is already starting to get there. There is a 

strategical operational planning group. Originally TTIC was analysis. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Mr. POPE. Now there is this new piece. They are standing up 

very shortly. We have people, as does DoD. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good to hear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POPE. It is going to be a bonus. 

Mr. ROYCE. You know, there is another aspect of this that I think 

is interesting. These are elite brigades that I saw trained in Chad, 

and I witnessed the same thing in Senegal some years ago where 

ACRI units were being trained there. There is another aspect of 

this going, Admiral Tallent, to your long-term vision and that is 

something that General Abubakar told us in Nigeria after Sani 

Abacha had that heart attack or whatever happened to him. The 

troika turned to General Abubakar and said, ‘‘Okay, you are in 

charge now.’’

General Abubaker contacted us, and his statement was, ‘‘I do not 

want to be in charge of some troika.’’ He said, ‘‘I should take my 

orders from the Constitution, and we do not have one, and from an 

elected Government, and we do not have one.’’ He said, ‘‘I learned 

that at Fort Benning, Georgia.’’ He was very proud of this. 

He said, ‘‘We are going to have an election.’’ He asked General 

Colin Powell and I. We were Co-Chairmen of this election observer 

team. ‘‘We are going to have an election, and after that election I 

am going home. We are going to have a Constitution, and the Officer Corps are going to take their orders from the Constitution.’’ 

General Powell was there on the ground for the week leading up 

to that Constitution to tell the officers in this election, ‘‘Gentlemen, 

you stay in the barracks. You stay in the barracks.’’

The important aspect of this was Abubakar’s own intent to drill 

into his officers this fealty to a Constitution and his almost obsession with enacting one after the election and also his thought that 

he was going to expand that knowledge throughout the upper echelons of the military right down to the most junior officers and enlisted men. 

Now, if that can translate long-term, if other officers in Chad and 

Senegal and other places where I have seen this training, who take 

this great pride, if they can go through the human rights component of this, the more expansive explanation of governance that so 

impacted General Abubakar, then there might be very real hope for 

the question you initially raised, which is the sustainability longterm in the developing world for a transfer to a type of government 

which is more responsive to the needs of the people and, therefore, 

less susceptible to the type of anarchy and chaos that form the 

breeding ground for al-Qaeda. 

I was going to ask you about that and ask you about any component in this plan of the same type of training that went on at Fort 

Benning, Georgia. 

Admiral TALLENT. Sir, I think what you brought up is more important ultimately than the marksmanship and the patrolling and 

35

the overland navigation, the communication, the logistical planning 

portions of this syllabus. 

A key part of the syllabus that we are talking about covers exactly the subjects that you are talking about, specifically the rule 

of law, specifically the support for representation of elected leadership. 

We get into the value of diversity in terms of gender. I mean, we 

are somewhat careful about that with Muslim countries, but that 

has got to be discussed too. That is a critical part of this syllabus. 

This syllabus, as I say, is exercised after our major trainers leave. 

We have people there, as I said, that will oversee the syllabus in 

conjunction with the country leadership, the military leadership. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Pope? 

Mr. POPE. If you were going to stay on that line I will come in 

in just a minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. No. I will go to you. Go ahead. 

Mr. POPE. Thanks. I was just going to say, if you would permit 

me, beyond the military, you remember I mentioned that after September 11 we moved in a rather aggressive way on a number of 

areas, including what we call capacity building. Some of my colleagues back here worked very, very hard to do that. 

Some of it was sort of related, for example, building counterterrorism police units in some places, but some of it was really different from the kind of thing that the Admiral does. For example, 

one of the things we were helping in a number of countries is with 

their legal systems, and what you were talking about reminded me 

of that. 

Many, many countries took a look at their legal systems, assumed they had laws against terrorism and found out they did not. 

They had laws against money laundering or against drug trafficking. 

We have helped through the Justice Department. We have sent 

what are called attache ́s from Justice Department to a number of 

places to help laws, help draft laws and guide them toward it because it has been very discouraging in a few cases for some of the 

law enforcement people to come up and essentially say, ‘‘Look, I got 

him. He was about to blow something up.’’ Then the prosecutor 

looks and says, ‘‘Do you know what? There is no law against that.’’

We have been helping in a whole range of areas, finding and 

freezing money and other things, but also on the legal because you 

would be very surprised at how many countries globally—not only 

Africa—thought they had laws against terrorism and then after 

September 11 they looked and did not. They had big holes. 

Mr. ROYCE. I talked about that issue in Tanzania with President 

Mkapa because in Zanzibar, as you know, that was being used as 

a transfer point without the ability really to monitor or without the 

transparency. They have now moved that legislation, but you are 

right. It is an area where also, I believe, if we would elevate our 

position in Treasury, if we would elevate the influence of our U.S. 

Treasury Department and use our positions, frankly, on the World 

Bank and the IMF in order to force—we have some hard power and 

soft power involved here—in order to really seek compliance with 

transparency worldwide in the banking system. 

36

If you choke off the funds necessary to train Jihadists and to 

plan attacks, it is hard to sustain all of that, the training camps 

and so forth, without the funds. 

A concerted effort on this front is also important. If you are incountry doing the other training, it is a way to make the connection 

and make it understood. 

Mr. POPE. We are working on those things every day, and we 

have no intention of stopping on any of that, not Africa and elsewhere. 

Mr. ROYCE. One of the things that I have noticed is there is a 

great deal of disinformation while the United States is in-country, 

and I am going to take the Philippines as an example. 

We are in inoculating people with vaccinations, and the response 

on the radio is do not take the vaccination because it will turn 

Muslims into Christians. Silly stuff. But is U.S. public diplomacy 

countering the type of nonsense that we often see put in play as 

a disinformation campaign? We have kind of a mixed record on 

public diplomacy. 

Mr. POPE. Well, we are trying. The Embassies, for example, 

every Embassy in developed countries or developing countries devotes some aspect of its work to do that very kind of thing. It is 

not all meant to counteract, some of it is cultural exchange and 

things, but some of it is directly to do what you are talking about. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right, but it is pretty minuscule in terms of the 

funding. I think a more robust——

Mr. POPE. I agree with you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am thinking back also to the effectiveness during 

the Cold War——

Mr. POPE. Yes. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. Of Radio Free Asia and Radio Liberty 

in which there were so many and in which we used local Poles and 

Czechs and East Germans and so forth who had their finger on the 

pulse, but we had the budget really to communicate with people 

and to knock down successfully these different arguments that 

were continually brought to the fore. I do not know that we have 

that capability right now in our public diplomacy area, and I 

thought I would ask. 

Mr. POPE. We could certainly do better. We could certainly do 

better. Secretary Rice has talked about it some and probably others 

as well. 

Mr. ROYCE. Increasing the capacity of the Georgian military. Admiral Tallent, you had made reference to that, but I was going to 

ask you about security cooperation with Georgia. That was developed so that Tbilisi could assert better control over its Pankisi 

Gorge. 

There is an ongoing problem in that gorge. I have talked to a 

couple of Dagestan Russian legislators over the years who have 

come out here—one is a doctor on humanitarian missions—who 

have explained the use of that gorge by not only Chechens and 

Osama bin Laden, but another terrorist organization. Are we confident, now that we have gone through the exercise, that it is 

cleared of transnational terrorists at this point? 

Admiral TALLENT. I do not think you could ever say that it is 

cleared, but we keep a heavy watch on that place, as much as we 

37

can. You are right. The Georgia train and equip program trained 

about 2,600 soldiers with the idea of internal security specifically 

for that problem we are talking about. 

We of course negotiate with and talk and work with the Russians 

on a routine basis and are trying to develop that relationship. I 

was with General Wald, and we went in October to visit them. 

They are coming back to visit us this spring. The Russians are very 

sensitive to that and will often raise the thought that Chechen and 

other terrorists are running rampant in the Pankisi Gorge, so we 

are very sensitive to that, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. Admiral Tallent, our time has run out, but I very 

much appreciate your testimony here today. Thank you for all your 

answers and your testimony. 

Mr. Pope, thank you as well. 

Mr. POPE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSES FROM REAR ADMIRAL HAMLIN B. TALLENT, USN, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF TEXAS

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Question: 

What are the safeguards that keep U.S. trained troops from committing human 

rights abuses—especially in countries where the government response to terrorist 

groups has victimized innocent civilians caught in the middle of the conflict? Defense 

Department officials stressed that Georgia training included respect for human rights 

and civilian control of the military. Is this replicated in other programs? What are 

some examples of these types of human rights safeguards? 

Response: 

The United States military is the finest, best trained, and most disciplined military in the world. When we embark on training foreign troops, we endeavor to impart the elements of leadership and discipline, as well as the principle of accountability, that underpin the adherence to international human rights standards. 

Training on respect for the rule of law and human rights is integral to our programs. We communicate through diplomatic channels and directly to our military 

counterparts the expectation that U.S. security assistance and training will be withheld if there are human rights abuses attributable to a foreign military or regime. 

In some instances, the U.S. has been able to assist in taking custody of violators, 

for example in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, for transfer to an appropriate 

court or tribunal. Finally, we set the example. In those extremely rare instances of 

abuse such as Abu Ghraib, we deal with our own human rights violators with quick, 

determined justice. 

All train and equip programs administered through the U.S. European Command 

include training on human rights and the rule of law. In addition, other Security 

Assistance Programs, such as Expanded International Military Education and 

Training (E–IMET), cover the Law of Armed Conflict, Constitutional Law, and 

Human Rights Training. This training is conducted by the Defense Institute of 

International Legal Studies (DIILS). 

There are sanctions in place that prevent Title 10 and Title 22 resources from 

being spent on nations involved in human rights violations. Prior to the execution 

of any Security Assistance mission involving U.S. military forces, human rights vetting occurs to verify that the militaries and countries we are engaged in are not involved in human rights violations. Once trained, sustained engagement through exercises and normal operations continues to promote and safeguard human rights. 

40


99825a.eps
41


99825b.eps
42


99825c.eps
43


99825d.eps
44


99825e.eps
45


99825f.eps
46


99825g.eps
47


99825h.eps
48


99825i.eps
49


99825j.eps
50


99825k.eps
51


99825l.eps
52

Æ


99825m.eps