# Den Europæiske Unions C 277/10.

| | ISSN 1725-2393 |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 277 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 48. årgang10. november 2005 |

ISSN 1725-2393

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 277

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

48. årgang10. november 2005

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| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Meddelelser |
| | Rådet |
| 2005/C 277/1 | Meddelelse fra Danmark om gensidighed på visumområdet | 1 |
| 2005/C 277/2 | Meddelelse fra Sverige om gensidighed på visumområdet | 1 |
| 2005/C 277/3 | Meddelelse fra Republikken Østrig om gensidighed på visumområdet | 2 |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2005/C 277/4 | Euroens vekselkurs | 3 |
| 2005/C 277/5 | Kortfattede oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om statsstøtte, der er ydet i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23. december 2003 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med produktion, forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter | 4 |
| 2005/C 277/6 | Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag COMP/M.3997 — Sun Capital/Sara Lee) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  ) | 11 |
| 2005/C 277/7 | De Europæiske Fællesskabers Administrative Kommission for Vandrende Arbejdstageres Sociale Sikring — Omregningskurser for valuta i henhold til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72 | 12 |
| | DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE |
| | EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| 2005/C 277/8 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger i medfør af artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen for så vidt angår statsstøtte til det islandske undersøiske kabelprojekt (Farice) | 14 |
| 2005/C 277/9 | Statsstøtte — Island — Meddelelse fra EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden til EFTA-staterne, EU's medlemsstater og andre interesserede parter — Statsstøtteforanstaltning nr. 47901 (tidligere SAM 030.02.006) — Påtænkt støtte i form af en statsgaranti til deCODE Genetics i forbindelse med etablering af en afdeling for udvikling af lægemidler | 29 |
| | Den Europæiske Centralbank |
| 2005/C 277/0 | Den Europæiske Centralbanks henstilling af 26. oktober 2005 til Rådet for Den Europæiske Union om de eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (ECB/2005/10) | 30 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

I   Meddelelser

Rådet

2005/C 277/1

Meddelelse fra Danmark om gensidighed på visumområdet

1

2005/C 277/2

Meddelelse fra Sverige om gensidighed på visumområdet

1

2005/C 277/3

Meddelelse fra Republikken Østrig om gensidighed på visumområdet

2

Kommissionen

2005/C 277/4

Euroens vekselkurs

3

2005/C 277/5

Kortfattede oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om statsstøtte, der er ydet i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23. december 2003 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med produktion, forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter

4

2005/C 277/6

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag COMP/M.3997 — Sun Capital/Sara Lee) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  )

1

11

2005/C 277/7

De Europæiske Fællesskabers Administrative Kommission for Vandrende Arbejdstageres Sociale Sikring — Omregningskurser for valuta i henhold til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72

12

DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

2005/C 277/8

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger i medfør af artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen for så vidt angår statsstøtte til det islandske undersøiske kabelprojekt (Farice)

14

2005/C 277/9

Statsstøtte — Island — Meddelelse fra EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden til EFTA-staterne, EU's medlemsstater og andre interesserede parter — Statsstøtteforanstaltning nr. 47901 (tidligere SAM 030.02.006) — Påtænkt støtte i form af en statsgaranti til deCODE Genetics i forbindelse med etablering af en afdeling for udvikling af lægemidler

29

Den Europæiske Centralbank

2005/C 277/0

Den Europæiske Centralbanks henstilling af 26. oktober 2005 til Rådet for Den Europæiske Union om de eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (ECB/2005/10)

30

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| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst |

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(1)   EØS-relevant tekst

1

| DA | |
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DA

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I Meddelelser

Rådet

| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/1

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Meddelelse fra Danmark om gensidighed på visumområdet (1)

(2005/C 277/01)

I overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 om fastlæggelse af listen over de tredjelande, hvis statsborgere skal være i besiddelse af visum ved passage af de ydre grænser, og listen over de tredjelande, hvis statsborgere er fritaget for dette krav, med hensyn til gensidighedsmekanismen, kan Danmark oplyse, at danske statsborgere er underlagt visumpligt i forbindelse med indrejse i Australien.

Dette brev er sendt til Kommissionen, Generaldirektoratet for Retfærdighed, Frihed og Sikkerhed.

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(1)  Denne meddelelse offentliggøres i overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 (EUT L 141 af 4.6.2005, s. 3) om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 af 15. marts 2001 (EFT L 81 af 21.3.2001, s. 1).

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| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/1

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Meddelelse fra Sverige om gensidighed på visumområdet (1)

(2005/C 277/02)

I overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 skal jeg meddele Dem, at Kongeriget Sveriges statsborgere dags dato er undergivet visumpligt i følgende tredjelande, der er opført i bilag II til forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001:

| — | Australien |
| --- | --- |

—

Australien

| — | Brunei (for ophold over 14 dage; i tilfælde af kortere ophold udstedes visum på indrejsestedet) |
| --- | --- |

—

Brunei (for ophold over 14 dage; i tilfælde af kortere ophold udstedes visum på indrejsestedet)

| — | Venezuela (der kræves et turistkort udstedt af den venezuelanske konsulære repræsentation i udlandet som er gyldigt i 90 dage). |
| --- | --- |

—

Venezuela (der kræves et turistkort udstedt af den venezuelanske konsulære repræsentation i udlandet som er gyldigt i 90 dage).

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(1)  Denne meddelelse offentliggøres i overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 (EUT L 141 af 4.6.2005, s. 3) om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 af 15. marts 2001 (EFT L 81 af 21.3.2001, s. 1).

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| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/2

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Meddelelse fra Republikken Østrig om gensidighed på visumområdet (1)

(2005/C 277/03)

På grundlag af Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 om fastlæggelse af listen over de tredjelande, hvis statsborgere skal være i besiddelse af visum ved passage af de ydre grænser, og listen over de tredjelande, hvis statsborgere er fritaget for dette krav, med hensyn til gensidighedsmekanismen (EUT L 141 af 4.6.2005) skal Republikken Østrig meddele Dem, at østrigske statsborgere er undergivet visumpligt i følgende tredjelande:

| — | Australien |
| --- | --- |

—

Australien

| — | Brasilien (visumfrihed kun med henblik på turisme, visumpligt ved forretningsrejser) |
| --- | --- |

—

Brasilien (visumfrihed kun med henblik på turisme, visumpligt ved forretningsrejser)

| — | Brunei (visumfrihed i højst 30 dage) |
| --- | --- |

—

Brunei (visumfrihed i højst 30 dage)

| — | Nicaragua (visumfrihed i højst en måned) |
| --- | --- |

—

Nicaragua (visumfrihed i højst en måned)

| — | Venezuela (visumfrihed i højst 60 dage). |
| --- | --- |

—

Venezuela (visumfrihed i højst 60 dage).

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(1)  Denne meddelelse offentliggøres i overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 851/2005 af 2. juni 2005 (EUT L 141 af 4.6.2005, s. 3) om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 539/2001 af 15. marts 2001 (EFT L 81 af 21.3.2001, s. 1).

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Kommissionen

| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/3

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Euroens vekselkurs (1)

9. november 2005

(2005/C 277/04)

1 euro=

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,1738 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 137,68 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4613 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,67530 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 9,5645 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,5431 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | 72,47 |
| NOK | norske kroner | 7,7485 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9557 |
| CYP | cypriotiske pund | 0,5734 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 29,278 |
| EEK | estiske kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 248,85 |
| LTL | litauiske litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lettiske lats | 0,6964 |
| MTL | maltesiske lira | 0,4293 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 3,9978 |
| RON | rumænske lei | 3,6660 |
| SIT | slovenske tolar | 239,48 |
| SKK | slovakiske koruna | 38,921 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 1,5990 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,5995 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,3951 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 9,1054 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,7167 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,9968 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 227,91 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 7,9217 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 9,4910 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,3645 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 11 667,57 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,434 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 64,242 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 33,8630 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 48,366 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,1738

JPY

japanske yen

137,68

DKK

danske kroner

7,4613

GBP

pund sterling

0,67530

SEK

svenske kroner

9,5645

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,5431

ISK

islandske kroner

72,47

NOK

norske kroner

7,7485

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9557

CYP

cypriotiske pund

0,5734

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

29,278

EEK

estiske kroon

15,6466

HUF

ungarske forint

248,85

LTL

litauiske litas

3,4528

LVL

lettiske lats

0,6964

MTL

maltesiske lira

0,4293

PLN

polske zloty

3,9978

RON

rumænske lei

3,6660

SIT

slovenske tolar

239,48

SKK

slovakiske koruna

38,921

TRY

tyrkiske lira

1,5990

AUD

australske dollar

1,5995

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,3951

HKD

hongkongske dollar

9,1054

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,7167

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,9968

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 227,91

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

7,9217

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

9,4910

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,3645

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

11 667,57

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,434

PHP

filippinske pesos

64,242

RUB

russiske rubler

33,8630

THB

thailandske bath

48,366

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(1)

Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

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| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/4

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Kortfattede oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om statsstøtte, der er ydet i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23. december 2003 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med produktion, forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter

(2005/C 277/05)

Støtte nr.: XA 63/05

Medlemsstat: Frankrig

Region: Provence — Alpes — Côte d'Azur (PACA)

Støtteordningens benævnelse: Støtte til materielle investeringer til miljøbeskyttelse

Retsgrundlag:

| — | Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 de la Commission européenne |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 de la Commission européenne

| — | Articles L 1511-1 et suivants du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles L 1511-1 et suivants du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Délibérations no 03-177 du 17/10/2003, no 03-250 du 5/12/2003 et no 04-44 du 24/06/2004 du Conseil régional de la région PACA |
| --- | --- |

—

Délibérations no 03-177 du 17/10/2003, no 03-250 du 5/12/2003 et no 04-44 du 24/06/2004 du Conseil régional de la région PACA

Forventede årlige udgifter til støtteordningen: 400 000 EUR

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Støtten antager form af et tilskud på mellem 20 og 27,5 % af det støtteberettigede investeringsbeløb (ekskl. afgifter), alt efter hvilken form for støttemodtager eller område der er tale om. Der er sat et loft på 7 700 EUR pr. støttemodtager

Gennemførelsestidspunkt: Straks efter Europa-Kommissionens registrering og kvittering for modtagelsen

Støtteordningens varighed: Indtil 31. december 2006

Støttens formål: Foranstaltningen er omfattet af artikel 4, stk. 3, litra b), c) og d), i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23. december 2003. Den tager sigte på at fremme investeringer, som bidrager til at gennemføre miljøvenlige dyrkningsmetoder, og opfylder dermed behovet for at opretholde landbrugsaktiviteter og samtidig opnå kvalitativ forbedring, produktsikkerhed og bevarelse af naturressourcerne

Den vil gøre det muligt at finansiere investeringer som f.eks.:

| — | ruller til indsamling af plastunderdække og tildækningsmaterialer |
| --- | --- |

—

ruller til indsamling af plastunderdække og tildækningsmaterialer

| — | affaldskompaktorer |
| --- | --- |

—

affaldskompaktorer

| — | kværne til vegetabilsk affald: |
| --- | --- |

—

kværne til vegetabilsk affald:

| — | kompostvendere |
| --- | --- |

—

kompostvendere

| — | faste systemer for spredning af husdyrgødning |
| --- | --- |

—

faste systemer for spredning af husdyrgødning

| — | udstyr og investeringer, der er nødvendige til behandling eller genanvendelse af flydende affald |
| --- | --- |

—

udstyr og investeringer, der er nødvendige til behandling eller genanvendelse af flydende affald

| — | udstyr til ikke-kemisk ukrudtbekæmpelse |
| --- | --- |

—

udstyr til ikke-kemisk ukrudtbekæmpelse

| — | de nyeste former for sprøjter med skylletank og strømningsregulator |
| --- | --- |

—

de nyeste former for sprøjter med skylletank og strømningsregulator

| — | desinficering af jord ved hjælp af damp |
| --- | --- |

—

desinficering af jord ved hjælp af damp

| — | installationer til opsamling af rester af plantebeskyttelsesmidler i sprøjtetanke |
| --- | --- |

—

installationer til opsamling af rester af plantebeskyttelsesmidler i sprøjtetanke

| — | anordninger til opsamling af slam |
| --- | --- |

—

anordninger til opsamling af slam

| — | sikker opbevaring af farlige produkter |
| --- | --- |

—

sikker opbevaring af farlige produkter

| — | el-forsyning til isolerede bygninger ved hjælp af sol- eller vindenergi |
| --- | --- |

—

el-forsyning til isolerede bygninger ved hjælp af sol- eller vindenergi

| — | kompostspredere |
| --- | --- |

—

kompostspredere

| — | gylletanke |
| --- | --- |

—

gylletanke

Berørte sektorer: Samtlige momspligtige virksomheder i produktionssektorerne, hvis driftsleder er landbruger, og som er registreret i Mutualité sociale agricole (MSA) og sygeforsikringen for landbrugere (AMEXA)

Navn og adresse på den myndighed, der yder støtten:

| Monsieur le Président du Conseil régional de la région PACA |
| --- |
| Hôtel de région |
| 27, place Jules Guesde |
| FR-13481 Marseille Cedex 20 |

Monsieur le Président du Conseil régional de la région PACA

Hôtel de région

27, place Jules Guesde

FR-13481 Marseille Cedex 20

Internetadresse: www.cr-paca.fr

Sag nr.: XA 23/05

Medlemsstat: Det Forenede Kongerige

Region: Cheshire (inkl. grevskabet Cheshire og Halton og Warrington kommuner)

Støtteordning eller navn på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte:: Støtteinitiativ for forabejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter (revideret)

Retsgrundlag: Section 5 of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen eller det samlede individuelle støttebeløb, der ydes til virksomheden: De samlede bevillinger for hele ordningens varighed er på 190 000 GBP, fordelt således:

1. år 2005/6 — 70 000 GBP

2. år 2006/7 — 70 000 GBP

3. år (1. april til 30. juni 2007) — 50 000 GBP

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Den maksimale støtteintensitet er på 40 %, dog højst 62 500 GBP for hvert tilskud

Gennemførelsesdato:

Ordningens eller den individuelle støttes varighed: Ordningen er åben for nye ansøgere indtil den 31. december 2006, men udbetalinger (som først foretages, når arbejdet er afsluttet) vil fortsætte indtil den 30. juni 2007

Målet med støtten: Ordningen skal fremme den langsigtede udvikling af landdistrikterne i Cheshire. Den skal hjælpe landbrugsvirksomheder til at blive mere konkurrencedygtige, forbedre forretningseffektiviteten, imødekomme forbrugernes ønsker og øge værdien af deres produkter.

Støtten vil blive udbetalt i overensstemmelse med artikel 7 i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004. Støtteberettigede udgifter vil omfatte a) opførelse, erhvervelse eller forbedring af fast ejendom, b) køb af nyt eller brugt udstyr og c) generalomkostninger som f.eks. honorarer til arkitekter, ingeniører og konsulenter, gennemførlighedsundersøgelser og erhvervelse af patenter og licenser (op til 12 % af de udgifter, der er nævnt i a) og b))

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Ifølge ordningen kan der kun ydes tilskud til forarbejdnings- og afsætningsaktiviteter, men den er åben for alle produkter i bilag I med undtagelse af skovbrugsprodukter, fiskevarer og sukkerprodukter. Der kan heller ikke ydes støtte til fremstilling og afsætning af produkter, der efterligner eller erstatter mælk og mejeriprodukter

Den støttetildelende myndigheds navn og adresse:

| Cheshire Rural Recovery |
| --- |
| Philip Leverhulme Centre |
| Reaseheath College |
| Nantwich |
| UK-CW5 6DF |

Cheshire Rural Recovery

Philip Leverhulme Centre

Reaseheath College

Nantwich

UK-CW5 6DF

Internetadresse: www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm

Klik på »Cheshire Rural Recovery Programme — P& M Grant Initiative«. Eller gå til http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/cheshire-pandm.pdf

Andre oplysninger: Ordningen blev oprindeligt oprettet i overensstemmelse med forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 som støtteordning XA 34/2004. Dette dokument ændrer XA 34/2004, idet opførelse, erhvervelse og forbedring af fast ejendom og generalomkostninger tilføjes som støtteberettigede udgifter. Den reviderede ordning afløser XA 34/2004, og rammebeløbet for XA 34/2004 overføres til denne ordning

Sag nr.: XA 34/05

Medlemsstat: Det Forenede Kongerige

Region: Nordirland

Støtteordningens benævnelse eller navn på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte: Støtte til etablering af unge landbrugere i Nordirland

Retsgrundlag: Financial Assistance for Young Farmers Scheme Order (Northern Ireland) 2005.

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen eller det samlede individuelle støttebeløb, der ydes til virksomheden:

| År | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Deltagere | 100 | 200 | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| I alt | 100 | 300 | 600 | 600 | 600 | 500 | 400 | 300 |
| Gns. rente-tilskud(GBP) | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 | 6 800 |
| Budget (GBP) | 680 000 | 2 040 000 | 4 080 000 | 4 080 000 | 4 080 000 | 3 400 000 | 2 720 000 | 2 040 000 |

År

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Deltagere

100

200

300

0

0

0

0

0

I alt

100

300

600

600

600

500

400

300

Gns. rente-tilskud(GBP)

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

6 800

Budget (GBP)

680 000

2 040 000

4 080 000

4 080 000

4 080 000

3 400 000

2 720 000

2 040 000

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Efter ordningen kan der ydes rentetilskud til lån, som unge landbrugere optager. Det maksimale støttebeløb er på 17 000 GBP over fem år. Den rentesats, der kan ydes tilskud til, er begrænset til 3,5 % over Bank of Englands Base Rate (ca. 2,5 % over de lokale långiveres Base Rate). Ansøgere, der optager lån over denne rentesats, hæfter selv for den større rentebetaling

Gennemførelsesdato: Sidste frist for indgivelse af ansøgninger er den 6. juni 2005.

Ordningens eller den individuelle støttes varighed: Ordningen løber over tre år fra juni 2005 til 31. maj 2008. Den maksimale varighed af den subsidierede rentebetaling er fem år, så de sidste betalinger finder sted senest den 31. maj 2013. Der er ingen restriktioner for lånebeløbet eller lånebetingelserne, men ordningen slutter den 31. maj 2008 eller tidligere, hvis alle disponible midler er blevet afsat. Da forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 kun fastsætter fritagelse for støtteordningen til den 30. juni 2007, vil man på et senere tidspunkt søge fremskaffe yderligere statsstøtte til den resterende periode af ordningen

Målet med støtten: Sektorudvikling. I overensstemmelse med artikel 8 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 vil de støtteberettigede udgifter omfatte rentetilskud til de lån, som unge landbrugere på under 40 år optager for at kunne etablere sig som driftsleder første gang. Det vil fremme investeringen i landbrugsdriften og skabe nye jobmuligheder eller øge værdien af landbrugsproduktionen i Nordirland

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Ordningen gælder for unge landbrugere, der navnlig vil beskæftige sig med produktion, selv om forarbejdning og afsætning kunne udgøre en del af landbrugsdriften. Ordningen gælder for alle typer produktion

Den støttetildelende myndigheds navn og adresse:

| Department of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| --- |
| Dundonald House |
| Upper Newtownards Road |
| Belfast |
| UK-BT4 3SB |

Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

Dundonald House

Upper Newtownards Road

Belfast

UK-BT4 3SB

Internetadresse: www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm

Klik på »Financial Assistance for Young Farmers Scheme for Northern Ireland« eller gå direkte til www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/financialassist-farmersni.pdf

Støtte nr.: XA 43/05

Medlemsstat: Det Forenede Kongerige

Område: Kent Downs — område af enestående naturskønhed

Støtteordningens betegnelse eller navnet på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte: The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service

Retsgrundlag: Sections 84 and 85 of The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000

Planlagte årlige udgifter til ordningen eller den samlede individuelle støtte, der er ydet virksomheden: 1. september 2005 — 31. juli 2006: 15 000 GBP

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Der kan ydes 100 % støtte i højst et år med mulighed for forlængelse på grund af uforudsete omstændigheder, dog senest til den 30. september 2006. Forlængelsen må ikke medføre øgede udgifter

Gennemførelsesdato: Den 1. september 2005

Støttens eller det individuelle støtteprojekts varighed: Sidste frist for indgivelse af ansøgninger er den 31. juli 2006. Støtten vil blive udbetalt indtil den 30. september 2006

Støttens formål: Sektorudvikling

Formålet med støtten er at formidle rettidig vejledning som kan befordre en økonomisk bæredygtig diversificering, der opfylder de miljømæssige og planlægningsmæssige krav. Støtten gennemføres i overensstemmelse med artikel 14 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004. De støtteberettigede udgifter vedrører konsulentbistand

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Landbrugere og virksomheder i landdistrikterne, der dyrker og høster samdyrkede afgrøder, frilandsgrønsager, salater, prydplanter (herunder planteskoleplanter, blomster og blomsterløg), græsfrø og -tørv, kvæg, får, svin, mejeriprodukter, fjerkræ og æg, indkvartering på landbrug (udlejning af værelser med eller uden morgenmad eller forplejning), hestepensioner og rideskoler eller landbrugsbaserede turistattraktioner

Navn og adresse på den støttetildelende myndighed:

| Kent County Council |
| --- |
| Invicta House |
| County Hall |
| Maidstone |
| UK-Kent ME 14 1XX |

Kent County Council

Invicta House

County Hall

Maidstone

UK-Kent ME 14 1XX

Navn og adresse på det organ, der forvalter støtteordningen

| The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service |
| --- |
| Kent Downs Unit |
| West Barn |
| Penstock Hall Farm |
| Canterbury Road |
| East Brabourne |
| Ashford |
| UK-Kent TN25 5LL |

The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service

Kent Downs Unit

West Barn

Penstock Hall Farm

Canterbury Road

East Brabourne

Ashford

UK-Kent TN25 5LL

Internetadresse: http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm

Klik på The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service. Oplysninger fås også direkte på www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes (the Kent Downs Rural Advice Service)

Andre oplysninger: Ordningen er åben for alle arealforvaltere og ikke kun for landbrugere. Støtte til ikke-landbrugsmæssige aktiviteter udbetales i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 om de minimis-støtte. Der kan også ydes støtte til diversificering fra landbrug til ikke-landbrugsmæssige aktiviteter

Modtagerne kan ikke vælge tjenesteyderen. Tjenesteyder vil være The Kent Downs Rural Advice Service (KDAS), som stiller konsulenter til rådighed, som er udvalgt ved offentlige udbud

Støtte nr.: XA 44/05

Medlemsstat: Frankrig

Støtteordningens navn: Støtte til teknisk bistand til projekter vedrørende opdræt af får og kvæg til slagtning

Retsgrundlag: Code rural, partie législative: articles L 621-1 à 621-11

Arrêté du ministre de l'agriculture, de l'alimentation, de la pêche et de la ruralité du 25 mai 2005

Forventede årlige udgifter til støtteordningen: Der er afsat et budget på 1 500 000 EUR for 2005

Hvis der er bevillinger til det, fornys budgettet i de to efterfølgende år og eventuelt yderligere, dog højst fem år

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Støtten kan udgøre indtil 40 % af de støtteberettigede udgifter, dog højst:

100 000 EUR pr. støttemodtager i en periode på tre år

100 000 EUR pr. program, der forelægges af en producentorganisation, eller 150 000 EUR pr. producentorganisation, hvis programmet forelægges af flere producentorganisationer

Iværksættelsesdato: Støtteordningen iværksættes, så snart Europa-Kommissionen har kvitteret for modtagelsen under forudsætning af, at midlerne stilles til rådighed og støtteordningen offentliggøres på OFIVAL-webstedet

Støtteordningens varighed: Hvis midlerne stilles til rådighed, tre år, eventuelt med forlængelse til fem år

Støttens formål: Ordningen gennemføres i overensstemmelse med artikel 13 og 14 i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23. december 2003

Ordningen har tre hovedformål

At kortlægge og beskrive markeder med gode afsætningsmuligheder for kvalitetsprodukter

At tilskynde til anvendelsen af aftaler mellem opdrættere og andre erhvervsdrivende i kødsektoren, herunder slagterier, med henblik på at øge værdien af produktionen og tilpasse varen til udviklingen i efterspørgslen

At bidrage til den tekniske bistand, der er nødvendig for at tilpasse produktionen til den kortlagte efterspørgsel

Ordningen gør det muligt at finansiere udgifterne til den tekniske bistand og rådgivning (undersøgelser samt igangsætning og opfølgning af projekter), der er nødvendige for gennemførelsen af projekterne, samt udgifterne til kontrol og undersøgelse af kvaliteten, markedsføring, kommunikation og markedsundersøgelser

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Bedrifter med opdræt af får og kvæg til slagtning

Navn og adresse på den myndighed, der yder støtten:

| Office national interprofessionnel des viandes, de l'élevage et de l'aviculture (OFIVAL) |
| --- |
| 80, avenue des terroirs de France — FR-75607 Paris Cedex 12 |

Office national interprofessionnel des viandes, de l'élevage et de l'aviculture (OFIVAL)

80, avenue des terroirs de France — FR-75607 Paris Cedex 12

Websted: www.legifrance.gouv.fr

Rubrik »droit français«»les autres textes législatifs« søg »JO no 124 du 29 mai 2005 texte no 72«

www.ofival.fr

Støtte nr.: XA 46/05

Medlemsstat: Det Forenede Kongerige

Region: North West England

Navn på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte: Homebred Limited

Retsgrundlag: Section 5 of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998.

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen eller den samlede individuelle støtte, der er ydet virksomheden: 1. august 2005 — 31. marts 2006: 20 000 GBP

1. april 2006 — 31. juli 2006: 45 000 GBP

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Der kan ydes 100 % støtte i højst et år med mulighed for forlængelse på grund af uforudsete omstændigheder, dog senest til slutningen af marts 2007. Forlængelsen må ikke medføre øgede udgifter

Gennemførelsesdato: Den første udbetaling vil ske efter 1. august 2005. (Jf. dog maksimal støtteintensitet)

Støttens eller det individuelle støtteprojekts varighed: Indtil den 30. juni 2006

Støttens formål: Sektor- og regionaludvikling

Northwest Regional Development Agency finansierer oprettelse af et regionalt kooperativ til markedsføring af rødt kød. Det forventede udbytte vil bestå i værdiforøgelse og nye muligheder, da en mere strømlinet forsyningskæde vil skabe en tættere forbindelse mellem landbrugsproduktionen og markedet og sikre en mere bæredygtig fremtid

Støtteordningen omfatter

Støtte til oprettelsen af en producentsammenslutning, jf. artikel 10 i forordning 1/2004. Støtteberettigede udgifter vil være administrative udgifter, advokatsalærer og administrationsgebyrer

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Produktion og markedsføring af rødt kød.

Navn og adresse på den støttetildelende myndighed:

| Northwest Regional Development Agency |
| --- |
| Renaissance House |
| Centre Park |
| Warrington |
| UK-WA1 1HA |

Northwest Regional Development Agency

Renaissance House

Centre Park

Warrington

UK-WA1 1HA

Internetadresse: http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/exist-exempt.htm.

Klik på »Homebred Programme«. Oplysninger fås også direkte fra www.defra.gov.uk/farm/state-aid/setup/schemes/(Homebred Programme.pdf)

Støtte nr.: XA 49/05

Medlemsstat: Grækenland

Region: Alle regioner

Støtteordning eller navn på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte: Investeringsprojekter vedrørende produktion og forarbejdning af landbrugsprodukter, som er omfattet af lov 3299/2004 om incitamenter til private investeringer i økonomisk udvikling og regional konvergens

Retsgrundlag: α) Νόμος 3299/2004 »Κίνητρα Ιδιωτικών επενδύσεων για την Οικονομική Ανάπτυξη και την Περιφερειακή Σύγκλιση« και β) Κοινή Υπουργική Απόφαση των Υπουργών Οικονομίας και Οικονομικών και Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων 24935/30.6.2005 (υπό δημοσίευση)

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen eller det samlede individuelle støttebeløb, der ydes til virksomheden: Det årlige beløb for budgetbevillingerne (forpligtelser): 150 mio. EUR.

Anslået årligt skattetab: 20 mio. EUR (der kan oprettes en skattefri reservefond op til ti år efter gennemførelsen af investeringer).

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Jf. de maksimumsbeløb, der er fastlagt i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 (artikel 4 og 7).

Gennemførelsesdato: Fra den dato, hvor den fælles ministerielle afgørelse er offentliggjort i »Efimerida tis Kyvernisis« (statstidende)

Støtteordningens eller den individuelle støttes varighed: Ordningens varighed: indtil 31. december 2006

Støttens formål: Støtten gives i henhold til artikel 4 (investeringer i landbrugsbedrifter) og artikel 7 (investeringer i forarbejdning og afsætning) i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004.

De støtteberettigede omkostninger omfatter (a) opførelse, erhvervelse eller forbedring af fast ejendom, (b) køb eller leasing af udstyr op til købsværdien af udstyret og (c) generelle immaterielle udgifter til afskrivningsberettigede aktiver (udgifter til indførelse, udvikling, teknologioverførsel, erhvervelse af patenter og licenser, undersøgelser vedrørende investeringsprojektet samt arkitekters, ingeniørers og konsulenters honorar (op til 8 % af investeringsplanens samlede udgifter)

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Støtteordningen vedrører produktion og forarbejdning af husdyr og planteproduktion under forudsætning af, at dette er i overensstemmelse med EU-lovgivningen og mere specifikt de restriktioner, der er fastsat i forbindelse med den fælles markedsordning.

Navn og adresse på den støttetildelende myndighed:

| Ministry of Economy and Finance |
| --- |
| Nikis 5, |
| EL-ΤΚ 10180, Athen |

Ministry of Economy and Finance

Nikis 5,

EL-ΤΚ 10180, Athen

| Ministry of Development |
| --- |
| Mesogion 119 |
| EL-TK 10192, Athen |

Ministry of Development

Mesogion 119

EL-TK 10192, Athen

Direktorater for planlægning og udvikling i 13 regioner

Internetadresse: http://www.mnec.gr/anaptyksiakos_nomos_3299_2004_main.aspx

Andre oplysninger: Den fælles ministerielle afgørelse fra økonomi- og finansministeriet og landbrugsministeriet, nr. 24935/30-7-2005 kan også findes på webstedet efter offentliggørelsen i»Efimerida tis Kyvernisis« (statstidende), og den vil træde i kraft fra dette tidspunkt

Støtte nr.: XA 53/05

Medlemsstat: Frankrig

Region: Picardie

Støtteordningens betegnelse: Investeringsstøtte til diversificering af landbruget

Retsgrundlag:

| — | Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission

| — | Article L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Article L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Délibération no ECO 103-2 de la commission permanente du conseil régional du 29 octobre 2004 |
| --- | --- |

—

Délibération no ECO 103-2 de la commission permanente du conseil régional du 29 octobre 2004

Planlagte årlige udgifter: 300 000 EUR

Maksimal støtteintensitet:

| — | 25 % generelt |
| --- | --- |

—

25 % generelt

| — | 35 % for landbrugere, der har været etableret i mindre end 5 år. |
| --- | --- |

—

35 % for landbrugere, der har været etableret i mindre end 5 år.

Loft for støtteberettigede investeringer: 40 000 EUR pr. projekt, eller et generelt støtteloft på 10 000 EUR, dog 14 000 EUR for landbrugere, der har været etableret i mindre end 5 år.

Disse satser kan i givet fald hæves til 40 %, og loftet for støtteberettigede investeringer kan fordobles, hvis der indgås aftaler med andre lokale myndigheder (departementer, interkommunale strukturer, kommuner) om at støtte projekter i særlige geografiske områder (f.eks. landbrug i bynære områder).

Hvis det drejer sig om andelsstrukturer med deltagelse af flere landbrugere, kan lofterne for støtteberettigede investeringer og følgelig de maksimale støttesatser også fordobles.

Gennemførelsestidspunkt: Efter modtagelse af Kommissionens kvittering for modtagelse

Støtteordningens varighed: På ubegrænset tid, forudsat at der er budgetbevillinger

Støttens formål: I regionen Picardie at fremme udviklingen af værksteder til diversificering af produktionsaktiviteterne, der vil fungere som skabere af merværdi for landbrugsbedrifterne

Berørte sektorer: Sektorerne produktion, forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter.

Støtten tager sigte på alle landbrugsbedrifter, der vil foretage investeringer i projekter til diversificering af forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter, udvikling af serviceydelser til befolkningen og lokalsamfundene, landbrugsturisme, lancering eller udvikling af nye produkter eller udvikling af rideaktiviteter.

Navn og adresse på den ansvarlige myndighed:

| Conseil régional de Picardie |
| --- |
| 11, mail Albert 1er |
| BP 2616 |
| FR-80026 Amiens cedex 1 |

Conseil régional de Picardie

11, mail Albert 1er

BP 2616

FR-80026 Amiens cedex 1

Internetadresse: http://www.picardie.fr/fr/page.cfm?pageref=guidedesaidesagri

Støtte nr.: XA 54/05

Medlemsstat: Frankrig

Region: Limousin

Støtteordningens betegnelse: Støtte til fortsat certificering som »økologisk landbrug«

Retsgrundlag:

| — | Article 13 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 13 du règlement (CE) no 1/2004 du 23 décembre 2003 de la Commission

| — | Articles L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles L. 1511-1 et L. 1511-2 du code général des collectivités territoriales

| — | Décision du Conseil régional du Limousin du 23 juin 2005 |
| --- | --- |

—

Décision du Conseil régional du Limousin du 23 juin 2005

Planlagte årlige udgifter til støtteordningen: 85 000 EUR.

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Immaterielle investeringer. Conseil régional betaler en del af udgifterne til certificeringen, idet det yder en støtte på 80 % af enhedsprisen (eksklusiv skat) pr. certificering, som i 2005 er mellem 200 og 800 EUR

Gennemførelsestidspunkt: Efter modtagelsen af Kommissionens kvittering for modtagelse

Støtteordningens varighed: Indtil den 31. december 2005

Støttens formål: I henhold til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2092/91 skal alle erhvervsdrivende, der er beskæftiget med økologisk landbrugsvirksomhed, kontrolleres og certificeres af kontrolorganer, der er anerkendt af landbrugsministeriet og opfylder kravene i standard EN 45011. Formålet med denne støtte er at fremme udviklingen af økologisk landbrug ved at finansiere udgifterne til certificering af bedrifterne

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Alle landbrugere med hovedsæde i Limousin, der anvender økologiske produktionsmetoder, og som pr. 1. juli 2005 har anmeldt deres aktiviteter (1) som »økologisk landbrug« eller »omstilling til økologisk landbrug«, og som ikke modtager støtte til omstilling (CTE-CAB (2) eller CAD (3)-CAB), hvis den samlede støtte via CTE eller CAD/CAB (over en 5-årig periode) (4) og den støtte, de har anmodet om til certificering, ikke overstiger 15 000 EUR

Navn og adresse på den ansvarlige myndighed:

| Monsieur le Président du Conseil Régional du Limousin |
| --- |
| 27 Boulevard de la Corderie |
| FR-87031 Limoges cedex |

Monsieur le Président du Conseil Régional du Limousin

27 Boulevard de la Corderie

FR-87031 Limoges cedex

Internetadresse: http://www.cr-limousin.fr, klik på »guide des aides«

Sag nr: XA 56/05

Medlemsstat: Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland

Region: Bayern

Støtteordning eller navn på den virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte: Firma Florapharm Pflanzliche Naturprodukte GmbH, 96110 Scheßlitz

Retsgrundlag: Richtlinie zur Durchführung der bayerischen regionalen Förderungsprogramme für die gewerbliche Wirtschaft (veröffentlicht im Allgemeinen Ministerialblatt AllMBl. 2002 S. 168; Beihilfe Nr. XS 29/02)

Im Rahmen des Programms können Investitionen von KMU branchenunabhängig und ohne Beschränkung auf bestimmte Produkte gefördert werden. Zweck dieser Beihilferegelungen ist die Stärkung der Wettbewerbs- und Anpassungsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft und die Schaffung bzw. Sicherung von Arbeitsplätzen insbesondere in strukturschwachen und ländlichen Räumen. Gefördert werden Investitionen von förderungswürdigen Unternehmen der Industrie, des Handwerks, des Handels, des Fremdenverkehrsgewerbes und des sonstigen Dienstleistungsgewerbes.

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen eller det samlede individuelle støttebeløb, der ydes til virksomheden: 330 000 EUR

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Omfanget af støtten: 14,96 %

Gennemførelsesdato: Forventes at blive 1. september 2005

Ordningens eller den individuelle støttes varighed: Udbetaling af støtten forventes at ske ultimo 2005

Målet med støtten: Fremme af investeringer jf. Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004 af 23.12.2003 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med produktion, forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter. Med henblik herpå har virksomheden planlagt udvidelser (bygning til lager og produktion samt anskaffelse af nye maskiner og nyt udstyr). Ved hjælp af støtten sikres 38 varige arbejdspladser, og der skabes yderligere 19 varige arbejdspladser — hvoraf 10 er uddannelsespladser

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Forarbejdning og markedsføring, teproduktion.

Den støttetildelende myndigheds navn og adresse:

| Regierung von Oberfranken |
| --- |
| Ludwigstraße 20 |
| DE-95444 Bayreuth |

Regierung von Oberfranken

Ludwigstraße 20

DE-95444 Bayreuth

Internetadresse: Under www.regierung.oberfranken.bayern.de\brf kan man finde kriterier og betingelser for tildeling af støtte efter godkendelsen heraf.

Sag nr.: XA 58/05

Medlemsstat: Italien

Region: Veneto

Støtteordningens benævnelse eller navnet på den virksomhed, der modtager en individuel støtte: Årsplan for uddannelsesaktiviteter for 2005. Uddannelsesaktiviteter i primærsektoren. Beslutning nr. 1101 af 18.3.2005 truffet af »Giunta della Regione Veneto«

Retsgrundlag: L. 845/1978 »Legge quadro in materia di formazione professionale«

L.R. n. 10 del 30.1.1990. »Ordinamento del sistema della formazione professionale e organizzazione delle politiche regionali del lavoro«

Forventede årlige udgifter til ordningen: Støtteordningen omfatter 2 000 000 EUR, der ydes til undervisningsorganer, der er godkendt af »Direzione Formazione della Regione Veneto«, med henblik på uddannelsesaktiviteter i primærsektoren.

Der kan ydes støtte til uddannelsesforanstaltninger på arbejdsstedet, dvs. rettet mod ansatte inden for de i beslutningen fastsatte områder

I medfør af artikel 17, stk. 1, litra a), i forordning nr. 1/2004 bekræftes det, at de disponible midler på det pågældende regionale budget andrager

Kapitel 72040 — bidrag i kapitalstøtte: 2 000 000 EUR

Maksimal støtteintensitet: Støtten ydes på grundlag af omkostningerne pr. undervisningstime, p.t. 110,00 EUR/undervisningstime

Gennemførelsesdato: Støtten ydes, når ordningen er indført ved »Decreto del Dirigente Regionale« og offentliggjort i »Bollettino Ufficiale della Regione Veneto«

Ordningens eller den individuelle foranstaltnings varighed: Støtteordningen bringes til ophør, når restbeløbet er udbetalt til de pågældende undervisningsorganer, hvilket finder sted efter kontrol og godkendelse af regnskabet

Målet med støtten: Regionen Veneto bevilger årligt midler til gennemførelse af videreuddannelsesforanstaltninger til fordel for landbrugere, medhjælpere, tekniske assistenter og andre erhvervsgrupper, som er beskæftiget i landbrugssektoren (L.R. nr. 32 af 9.8.2003), med henblik på:

at fremme udbredelsen af iværksætterkultur

at forbedre landbrugsmedarbejdernes faglige kvalifikationer

at højne kundskabsniveauet inden for teknologisk innovation

I regionalrådets beslutning nr. 1101/2005 henvises der derfor til artikel 14 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2004. Under støtteordningen kan der således ydes støtte til dækning af omkostningerne ved tilrettelæggelse af uddannelsesprogrammet.

Berørt(e) sektor(er): Ordningen yder støtte til erhvervsuddannelse af personer, som har afsluttet tvungen skolegang/frivillig erhvervsuddannelse i medfør af L. 53/2003

Den støttetildelende myndigheds navn og adresse:

| Regione Veneto |
| --- |
| Segreteria Formazione e Lavoro |
| Direzione regionale Formazione |
| Via G. Allegri n. 29 |
| IT-30174 Mestre Venedig |

Regione Veneto

Segreteria Formazione e Lavoro

Direzione regionale Formazione

Via G. Allegri n. 29

IT-30174 Mestre Venedig

Websted: www.regione.veneto.it /servizi alla persona/formazione e lavoro/formazione continua e permanente

Andre oplysninger: For yderligere oplysninger:

Direzione Formazione

tlf. (39) 412 79 50 30 — 5029

fax (39) 412 79 50 85

---

(1)  Anmeldelse om økologisk drift er obligatorisk og indgives til »Agence Bio«.

(2)  CTE: Contrat Territorial d'Exploitation, CAB: Conversion Agriculture Biologique

(3)  CAD : Contral Agriculture Durable

(4)  Dette beløb vil blive kontrolleret på grundlag af en kopi af CTE/CAD/CAB-kontrakten.

---

| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/11

---

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion

(Sag COMP/M.3997 — Sun Capital/Sara Lee)

Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure

(2005/C 277/06)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

| 1. | Den 26. oktober 2005 modtog Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, der tilhører koncernen Sun Group (»Sun«, USA), gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol som omhandlet i forordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Sara Lee Corporation's (USA) europæiske mærkevareafdeling (»The Business«). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 26. oktober 2005 modtog Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, der tilhører koncernen Sun Group (»Sun«, USA), gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol som omhandlet i forordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Sara Lee Corporation's (USA) europæiske mærkevareafdeling (»The Business«).

| 2. | De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:






  — | Sun: gruppe af private equity-investeringsfonde, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:

—

Sun: gruppe af private equity-investeringsfonde,

| — | The Business: design, produktion, distribution og salg i Europa af mærkevarer, f.eks. herre- og dameundertøj, strømper og sokker. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Business: design, produktion, distribution og salg i Europa af mærkevarer, f.eks. herre- og dameundertøj, strømper og sokker.

| 3. | Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag muligvis vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens meddelelse om en forenklet procedure til behandling af visse fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag muligvis vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens meddelelse om en forenklet procedure til behandling af visse fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2).

| 4. | Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.
  Bemærkningerne skal være Kommissionen i hænde senest ti dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sag COMP/M.3997 — Sun Capital/Sara Lee sendes til Kommissionen pr. fax ((32-2) 296 43 01 eller 296 72 44) eller med post til følgende adresse:





  Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for Fusioner |
| J-70 |
| BE-1049 Bruxelles |

4.

Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.

Bemærkningerne skal være Kommissionen i hænde senest ti dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sag COMP/M.3997 — Sun Capital/Sara Lee sendes til Kommissionen pr. fax ((32-2) 296 43 01 eller 296 72 44) eller med post til følgende adresse:

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for Fusioner

J-70

BE-1049 Bruxelles

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

(2)  EUT C 56 af 5.3.2005, s. 32.

---

| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/12

---

DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABERS ADMINISTRATIVE KOMMISSION FOR VANDRENDE ARBEJDSTAGERES SOCIALE SIKRING

Omregningskurser for valuta i henhold til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72

(2005/C 277/07)

Artikel 107, stk. 1, 2, 3 og 4, i forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72

Referenceperiode: oktober 2005

Anvendelsesperiode: januar, februar og marts 2006

| | EUR | CZK | DKK | EEK | CYP | LVL | LTL | HUF | MTL | PLN | SIT | SKK | SEK | GBP | NOK | ISK | CHF |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 EUR = | 1 | 29,6747 | 7,46196 | 15,6466 | 0,573186 | 0,696519 | 3,45280 | 251,847 | 0,429300 | 3,92287 | 239,525 | 38,9233 | 9,42225 | 0,681367 | 7,83471 | 73,2914 | 1,54897 |
| 1 CZK = | 0,0336987 | 1 | 0,251459 | 0,527270 | 0,0193156 | 0,0234718 | 0,116355 | 8,48691 | 0,0144669 | 0,132196 | 8,07169 | 1,31167 | 0,317518 | 0,0229612 | 0,264020 | 2,46983 | 0,0521984 |
| 1 DKK = | 0,134013 | 3,97680 | 1 | 2,09685 | 0,0768143 | 0,0933426 | 0,462720 | 33,7507 | 0,0575318 | 0,525715 | 32,0995 | 5,21623 | 1,26270 | 0,0913120 | 1,04995 | 9,82201 | 0,207582 |
| 1 EEK = | 0,0639116 | 1,89656 | 0,476906 | 1 | 0,0366332 | 0,0445157 | 0,220674 | 16,0959 | 0,0274373 | 0,250717 | 15,3085 | 2,48765 | 0,602192 | 0,0435473 | 0,500730 | 4,68418 | 0,0989973 |
| 1 CYP = | 1,74464 | 51,7716 | 13,0184 | 27,2976 | 1 | 1,21517 | 6,02388 | 439,381 | 0,748972 | 6,84397 | 417,884 | 67,9069 | 16,4384 | 1,18874 | 13,6687 | 127,867 | 2,70239 |
| 1 LVL = | 1,43571 | 42,6043 | 10,7132 | 22,4640 | 0,822929 | 1 | 4,95722 | 361,579 | 0,616351 | 5,63210 | 343,889 | 55,8826 | 13,5276 | 0,978246 | 11,2484 | 105,225 | 2,22388 |
| 1 LTL = | 0,289620 | 8,59439 | 2,16113 | 4,53157 | 0,166006 | 0,201726 | 1 | 72,9398 | 0,124334 | 1,13614 | 69,3713 | 11,2730 | 2,72887 | 0,197337 | 2,26909 | 21,2267 | 0,448613 |
| 1 HUF = | 0,00397067 | 0,117828 | 0,0296290 | 0,0621275 | 0,00227593 | 0,00276565 | 0,0137099 | 1 | 0,00170461 | 0,0155764 | 0,951076 | 0,154552 | 0,0374127 | 0,00270548 | 0,0311091 | 0,291016 | 0,00615045 |
| 1 MTL = | 2,32937 | 69,1235 | 17,3817 | 36,4468 | 1,33516 | 1,62245 | 8,04286 | 586,645 | 1 | 9,13782 | 557,944 | 90,6669 | 21,9479 | 1,58716 | 18,2500 | 170,723 | 3,60813 |
| 1 PLN = | 0,254916 | 7,56455 | 1,90217 | 3,98856 | 0,146114 | 0,177554 | 0,880173 | 64,1996 | 0,109435 | 1 | 61,0587 | 9,92215 | 2,40188 | 0,173691 | 1,99719 | 18,6831 | 0,394857 |
| 1 SIT = | 0,00417493 | 0,123890 | 0,0311531 | 0,0653234 | 0,00239301 | 0,00290792 | 0,0144152 | 1,05144 | 0,0017923 | 0,0163777 | 1 | 0,162502 | 0,0393372 | 0,00284466 | 0,0327093 | 0,305986 | 0,00646684 |
| 1 SKK = | 0,0256916 | 0,762390 | 0,191709 | 0,401986 | 0,0147260 | 0,0178947 | 0,0887078 | 6,47033 | 0,0110294 | 0,100785 | 6,15378 | 1 | 0,242072 | 0,0175054 | 0,201286 | 1,88297 | 0,0397955 |
| 1 SEK = | 0,106132 | 3,14943 | 0,791951 | 1,66060 | 0,0608332 | 0,0739228 | 0,366452 | 26,7289 | 0,0455624 | 0,416341 | 25,4212 | 4,13100 | 1 | 0,0723146 | 0,831512 | 7,77855 | 0,164395 |
| 1 GBP = | 1,46764 | 43,5518 | 10,9515 | 22,9636 | 0,841229 | 1,022240 | 5,06746 | 369,620 | 0,630057 | 5,75735 | 351,536 | 57,1253 | 13,8285 | 1 | 11,4985 | 107,565 | 2,27333 |
| 1 NOK = | 0,127637 | 3,78759 | 0,952423 | 1,99709 | 0,0731597 | 0,0889017 | 0,440705 | 32,1450 | 0,0547946 | 0,500703 | 30,5723 | 4,96805 | 1,20263 | 0,0869676 | 1 | 9,35470 | 0,197706 |
| 1 ISK = | 0,0136442 | 0,404887 | 0,101812 | 0,213485 | 0,00782064 | 0,00950342 | 0,0471106 | 3,43624 | 0,00585744 | 0,0535242 | 3,26812 | 0,531076 | 0,128559 | 0,00929668 | 0,106898 | 1 | 0,0211344 |
| 1 CHF = | 0,645590 | 19,1577 | 4,81737 | 10,1013 | 0,370043 | 0,449666 | 2,22909 | 162,590 | 0,277152 | 2,53256 | 154,635 | 25,1285 | 6,08291 | 0,439883 | 5,05801 | 47,3162 | 1 |

EUR

CZK

DKK

EEK

CYP

LVL

LTL

HUF

MTL

PLN

SIT

SKK

SEK

GBP

NOK

ISK

CHF

1 EUR =

1

29,6747

7,46196

15,6466

0,573186

0,696519

3,45280

251,847

0,429300

3,92287

239,525

38,9233

9,42225

0,681367

7,83471

73,2914

1,54897

1 CZK =

0,0336987

1

0,251459

0,527270

0,0193156

0,0234718

0,116355

8,48691

0,0144669

0,132196

8,07169

1,31167

0,317518

0,0229612

0,264020

2,46983

0,0521984

1 DKK =

0,134013

3,97680

1

2,09685

0,0768143

0,0933426

0,462720

33,7507

0,0575318

0,525715

32,0995

5,21623

1,26270

0,0913120

1,04995

9,82201

0,207582

1 EEK =

0,0639116

1,89656

0,476906

1

0,0366332

0,0445157

0,220674

16,0959

0,0274373

0,250717

15,3085

2,48765

0,602192

0,0435473

0,500730

4,68418

0,0989973

1 CYP =

1,74464

51,7716

13,0184

27,2976

1

1,21517

6,02388

439,381

0,748972

6,84397

417,884

67,9069

16,4384

1,18874

13,6687

127,867

2,70239

1 LVL =

1,43571

42,6043

10,7132

22,4640

0,822929

1

4,95722

361,579

0,616351

5,63210

343,889

55,8826

13,5276

0,978246

11,2484

105,225

2,22388

1 LTL =

0,289620

8,59439

2,16113

4,53157

0,166006

0,201726

1

72,9398

0,124334

1,13614

69,3713

11,2730

2,72887

0,197337

2,26909

21,2267

0,448613

1 HUF =

0,00397067

0,117828

0,0296290

0,0621275

0,00227593

0,00276565

0,0137099

1

0,00170461

0,0155764

0,951076

0,154552

0,0374127

0,00270548

0,0311091

0,291016

0,00615045

1 MTL =

2,32937

69,1235

17,3817

36,4468

1,33516

1,62245

8,04286

586,645

1

9,13782

557,944

90,6669

21,9479

1,58716

18,2500

170,723

3,60813

1 PLN =

0,254916

7,56455

1,90217

3,98856

0,146114

0,177554

0,880173

64,1996

0,109435

1

61,0587

9,92215

2,40188

0,173691

1,99719

18,6831

0,394857

1 SIT =

0,00417493

0,123890

0,0311531

0,0653234

0,00239301

0,00290792

0,0144152

1,05144

0,0017923

0,0163777

1

0,162502

0,0393372

0,00284466

0,0327093

0,305986

0,00646684

1 SKK =

0,0256916

0,762390

0,191709

0,401986

0,0147260

0,0178947

0,0887078

6,47033

0,0110294

0,100785

6,15378

1

0,242072

0,0175054

0,201286

1,88297

0,0397955

1 SEK =

0,106132

3,14943

0,791951

1,66060

0,0608332

0,0739228

0,366452

26,7289

0,0455624

0,416341

25,4212

4,13100

1

0,0723146

0,831512

7,77855

0,164395

1 GBP =

1,46764

43,5518

10,9515

22,9636

0,841229

1,022240

5,06746

369,620

0,630057

5,75735

351,536

57,1253

13,8285

1

11,4985

107,565

2,27333

1 NOK =

0,127637

3,78759

0,952423

1,99709

0,0731597

0,0889017

0,440705

32,1450

0,0547946

0,500703

30,5723

4,96805

1,20263

0,0869676

1

9,35470

0,197706

1 ISK =

0,0136442

0,404887

0,101812

0,213485

0,00782064

0,00950342

0,0471106

3,43624

0,00585744

0,0535242

3,26812

0,531076

0,128559

0,00929668

0,106898

1

0,0211344

1 CHF =

0,645590

19,1577

4,81737

10,1013

0,370043

0,449666

2,22909

162,590

0,277152

2,53256

154,635

25,1285

6,08291

0,439883

5,05801

47,3162

1

| 1. | I henhold til forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72 sker omregningen til en given valuta af beløb udtrykt i en anden valuta til den kurs, der i løbet af den i stk. 2 fastsatte referenceperiode beregnes af Kommissionen på grundlag af det månedlige gennemsnit af de referencekurser for omregning af valutaer, der offentliggøres af Den Europæiske Centralbank. |
| --- | --- |

1.

I henhold til forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72 sker omregningen til en given valuta af beløb udtrykt i en anden valuta til den kurs, der i løbet af den i stk. 2 fastsatte referenceperiode beregnes af Kommissionen på grundlag af det månedlige gennemsnit af de referencekurser for omregning af valutaer, der offentliggøres af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

| 2. | Referenceperioden er:






  — | januar måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. april |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Referenceperioden er:

—

januar måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. april

| — | april måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. juli |
| --- | --- |

—

april måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. juli

| — | juli måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. oktober |
| --- | --- |

—

juli måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. oktober

| — | oktober måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. januar. |
| --- | --- |

—

oktober måned for omregningskurser, der skal anvendes fra den følgende 1. januar.

Omregningskurserne for valuta vil blive offentliggjort i andet nummer af Den Europæiske Unions Tidende (C-udgaven) i februar, maj, august og november.

---

DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

| 10.11.2005 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 277/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2005

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 277/14

---

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger i medfør af artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen for så vidt angår statsstøtte til det islandske undersøiske kabelprojekt (Farice)

(2005/C 277/08)

Ved beslutning nr. 125/05/COL af 26. maj 2005, som er gengivet i sin autentiske udgave efter dette resumé, indledte EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden proceduren i medfør af artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol (aftalen om tilsynsmyndigheden og domstolen). Den islandske regering er blevet orienteret herom, idet den har fået tilsendt en kopi af beslutningen.

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden opfordrer hermed EFTA-staterne, EU-medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger til ovennævnte foranstaltning inden en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse til:

| EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| --- |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| BE-1040 Bruxelles |

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

35, Rue Belliard

BE-1040 Bruxelles

Bemærkningerne vil blive sendt til den islandske regering. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUMÉ

Sagsforløb

Ved brev af 27. februar 2004 anmeldte de islandske myndigheder en statsgaranti til EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden, i det følgende benævnt »myndigheden«, vedrørende et undersøisk kabelprojekt i Island. Projektet blev imidlertid gennemført, inden myndigheden havde mulighed for at kommentere det. Myndigheden har også som led i en særskilt procedure på konkurrenceområdet anmodet Farice hf om oplysninger med henblik på en analyse i overensstemmelse med artikel 53 og/eller 54 i EØS-aftalen.

Beskrivelse af støtteforanstaltningen

Farice-projektet vedrørte udlægning og forvaltning af et undersøisk telekommunikationskabel til at forbinde Island og Færøerne med Skotland.

Island og Færøerne har siden 1994 været internationalt forbundet via de undersøiske telekommunikationskabler CANTAT-3. CANTAT-3 blev etableret som et konsortiumkabel med internationale og islandske partnere (Og Vodafone og Landssími Islands hf — i det følgende benævnt »Síminn«). Der er aldrig etableret andre fiberkabler til Island. Da CANTAT-3 havde tekniske begrænsninger og satellitter ikke var økonomisk rentable, blev der søgt efter andre transmissionsalternativer til en pålidelig forbindelse.

Farice-projektet er et initiativ, der er lanceret af det næsten 100 % statsejede islandske teleselskab Síminn og teleselskabet på Færøerne Føroya Tele. I 2002 blev det klart, at Farice-projektet ikke ville kunne gennemføres som et rent kommercielt forretningsforetagende. Det blev derfor besluttet, at den islandske stat skulle bidrage aktivt til projektet. For det andet blev Og Vodafone opfordret til at deltage i projektet. Et holdingselskab E-Farice, som er indehaver af alle de islandske andele i Farice hf (E-Farice ejer 80 % af Farice hf), opkøbte Og Vodafones og Síminns andele i CANTAT-3. Der blev overvejet andre forhandlinger om leasing af yderligere CANTAT-3-kapacitet fra CANTAT-3-konsortiummedlemmet Teleglobe. Ifølge anmeldelsen skulle E-Farice håndtere alle internationale forbindelser til Island.

Anmeldelsen vedrører en statsgaranti for et lån på 9,4 mio. EUR til Farice hf. Dette lån udgør en del af en større pakke af langfristede lån (herunder tre andre lån fra forskellige banker) på i alt 34,5 mio. EUR. Farice hf har betalt en årligt beregnet markedspræmie på forhånd. Síminn og Føroya Tele stillede garanti for to af de andre lån; for det fjerde lån var der ingen garanti. Lånet med sikkerhed fra den islandske stat havde de bedste markedsbetingelser, dvs. Euribor [...] (1) p.a. (sammenlignet med Euribor [...] p.a. for lånet uden sikkerhed.

I januar 2003 øgede den islandske stat — i forbindelse med en forhøjelse af Farice hf's samlede aktiekapital — sine andele fra oprindeligt 27 % til 46,5 %. De islandske myndigheder har oplyst, at private virksomheder ikke ønskede at levere yderligere aktiekapital. Síminn, som oprindeligt besad 47 % af andelene, reducerede sin aktiekapitel til 33,33 %.

Statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

Myndigheden noterer sig, at de islandske myndigheder ved for sent at anmelde de to støtteforanstaltninger til myndigheden har tilsidesat deres stand-still forpligtelse med det til følge, at foranstaltningerne, hvis de skulle blive anset for at være statsstøtte efter artikel 61, stk. 1, i EØS-aftalen, ville udgøre en »ny støtte« efter artikel 1, litra f), i del II i protokol 3 til tilsyns- og domstolsaftalen.

Myndigheden mener ikke, at den islandske stats lånegaranti og aktiekapitalforhøjelse til fordel for Farice-projektet kan siges at være forbundet med et generelt infrastrukturprojekt, og dermed ikke kan betragtes som statsstøtte. Myndigheden mener ikke, at der er tale om et infrastrukturprojekt, der er åbent for alle brugere uden forskelsbehandling, men at projektet snarere retter sig mod en vis målgruppe i forretningsverdenen, nemlig leverandører af teletjenester. Disse lancerede et privat initiativ, som staten reagerede på. Farice hf leverer i sin egenskab af forvaltningsorgan for infrastrukturen en tjenesteydelse mod vederlag. Ifølge Kommissionens praksis kan det i en sådan situation ikke afvises, at et individuelt selskab indrømmes en fordel.

Myndigheden baserer sin statsstøttevurdering af lånegarantien på kapitel 17, stk. 4, nr. 2, i myndighedens statsstøtteretningslinjer, som fastslår, under hvilke betingelser en garanti kan anses for ikke at falde ind under EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1. Myndigheden noterer sig, at statens indgreb har medført gunstigere rentesatser. De islandske myndigheder benægter ikke dette, men anfører, at en statsgaranti altid medfører bedre markedsbetingelser, og at den eneste relevante betragtning må være, om der er betalt en passende præmie. Myndigheden har sin tvivl med hensyn til, om Farice hf uden statsgarantien overhovedet ville have været i stand til at forhandle om et lån på 9,4 mio. EUR i betragtning af, at selskabet allerede havde optaget andre lån til at finansiere projektet. Myndigheden mener, at de fire lån skal betragtes særskilt, da der er bevilget af forskellige banker, er forbundet med forskellige tilbagebetalingsordninger og rentesatser og garanteres af forskellige kautionister. I den forbindelse tager myndigheden også hensyn til, at den islandske stat stiller sikkerhed på 100 % for lånet på 9,4 mio. EUR. Myndigheden tager endvidere hensyn til, at den betalte præmie på ingen måde udligner den fordel, der følger af statsindgrebet. Det er myndighedens opfattelse indledningsvis, at Farice hf ikke bør kunne drage fordel af finansielle betingelser, som selskabet uden statens indgreb ikke ville har kunnet opnå på markedet. Myndigheden mener — særlig når man sammenligner med lånet uden sikkerhedsstillelse — at Farice hf har opnået bedre finansielle betingelser, som det ikke betaler for i passende omfang.

Myndigheden vurderede den islandske stats aktiekapitalforhøjelse efter kapitel 19 i myndighedens statsstøtteretningslinjer. Den noterer sig, at Farices hf's samlede aktiekapital blev væsentligt forhøjet, også med en aktiekapitalforhøjelse fra private operatørers side, men den islandske stats andel voksede uforholdsmæssigt meget set i forhold til de private aktionærers med 20 procentpoints. Da de islandske myndigheder har anført, at Síminn betragtede projektet som et finansielt risikabelt foretagende, er det myndighedens foreløbige holdning, at private virksomheder i relative termer trak sig ud af projektet på grund af ringe udsigter til fortjeneste.

Det er myndighedens foreløbige holdning, at foranstaltningerne styrkede Farice hf's stilling i forhold til konkurrenter, som ikke kan forlade sig på statens deltagelse eller lånegarantier, og at de dermed fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen. Da levering af teletjenester er en handelsaktivitet, påvirkes handelen mellem de kontraherende ligeledes.

Støttens forenelighed med EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c)

Myndigheden vurderede foranstaltningerne direkte på grundlag af EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), da der ikke findes rammebestemmelser eller gruppefritagelser, som kan berettige foranstaltningerne

Hvad angår foranstaltningernes nødvendighed, erkender myndigheden, at det nye undersøiske kabel, som vil blive den primære transmissionsforbindelse til Island, har større kapacitet, er mere pålideligt og sammen med backup fra CANTAT-3 vil kunne sikre levering af teletjenester til Island. Levering af bredbåndsydelser er et legitimt mål og er en type tjenesteydelse, som i kraft af sin art vil kunne påvirke produktiviteten og væksten i en lang række sektorer og aktiviteter positivt. Uden statens deltagelse ville projektet enten være blevet forsinket eller overhovedet ikke gennemført, da projektet ikke som sådant var kommercielt rentabelt.

Som led i proportionalitetsvurderingen skal myndigheden afveje fordelene med hensyn til sikring af en pålidelig forsyning af Island med teletjenester i forhold til ulemperne i form af fordrejning af konkurrencen med andre konkurrenter, som ikke har adgang til offentlig finansiering i forbindelse med lignende projekter. Myndigheden vil i den forbindelse bl.a. undersøge følgende punkter som led i en formel undersøgelsesprocedure:

| — | Myndigheden noterer sig for det første, at hverken udlægningen eller forvaltningen af kablet blev overdraget Farice hf efter et åbent udbud. |
| --- | --- |

—

Myndigheden noterer sig for det første, at hverken udlægningen eller forvaltningen af kablet blev overdraget Farice hf efter et åbent udbud.

| — | Myndigheden noterer sig, at aktionæraftalen kræver en ikke-diskriminerende, gennemsigtig prisfastsættelse på markedsvilkår. Skønt aktionæraftalen generelt set er åben for nye deltagere, vil myndigheden tage i betragtning, at aktionæraftalen fastsætter, at de stiftende parter altid har mulighed for at opretholde deres aktieposition, hvilket stiller dem mere fordelagtigt end nyankomne. |
| --- | --- |

—

Myndigheden noterer sig, at aktionæraftalen kræver en ikke-diskriminerende, gennemsigtig prisfastsættelse på markedsvilkår. Skønt aktionæraftalen generelt set er åben for nye deltagere, vil myndigheden tage i betragtning, at aktionæraftalen fastsætter, at de stiftende parter altid har mulighed for at opretholde deres aktieposition, hvilket stiller dem mere fordelagtigt end nyankomne.

| — | Myndigheden vil tage hensyn til det samlede støttebeløb, som er begrænset, for så vidt angår garantien. Med hensyn til forhøjelsen af statens aktieandel noterer myndigheden sig, at statens aktiekapital i juni 2003 allerede var faldet til 41 %, medens Síminns andel voksede til 29 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Myndigheden vil tage hensyn til det samlede støttebeløb, som er begrænset, for så vidt angår garantien. Med hensyn til forhøjelsen af statens aktieandel noterer myndigheden sig, at statens aktiekapital i juni 2003 allerede var faldet til 41 %, medens Síminns andel voksede til 29 %.

| — | Myndigheden har visse forbehold med hensyn til konkurrenceaspektet. EF-Domstolen har fastslået, at en forenelighedsundersøgelse i henhold til statsstøttebestemmelserne ikke må give et resultat, der strider mod andre traktatbestemmelser, som også omfatter artikel 53 og/eller 54 i EØS-aftalen. I den forbindelse noterer myndigheden sig bl.a., at man, selv om den eksisterende CANTAN-3-infrastruktur stadig er på plads, kan befrygte, at alle CANTAT-3-forbindelser til Island i fremtiden vil blive kanaliseret gennem E-Farice hf, som ejer aktiemajoriteten i Farice hf. Der består således en risiko for, at konkurrencen i forbindelse med forbindelser til Island elimineres, da der kun vil være en leverandør tilbage på markedet. |
| --- | --- |

—

Myndigheden har visse forbehold med hensyn til konkurrenceaspektet. EF-Domstolen har fastslået, at en forenelighedsundersøgelse i henhold til statsstøttebestemmelserne ikke må give et resultat, der strider mod andre traktatbestemmelser, som også omfatter artikel 53 og/eller 54 i EØS-aftalen. I den forbindelse noterer myndigheden sig bl.a., at man, selv om den eksisterende CANTAN-3-infrastruktur stadig er på plads, kan befrygte, at alle CANTAT-3-forbindelser til Island i fremtiden vil blive kanaliseret gennem E-Farice hf, som ejer aktiemajoriteten i Farice hf. Der består således en risiko for, at konkurrencen i forbindelse med forbindelser til Island elimineres, da der kun vil være en leverandør tilbage på markedet.

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(1)  De skarpe parenteser angiver, at der er slettet tal, som er omfattet af forretningshemmeligheden.

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EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 125/05/COL

of 26 May 2005

to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to State aid in favour of Farice hf.

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26 thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (2), in particular to Article 24 as well as Article 1(2) in Part I and Articles 4(4) and 10 in Part II of Protocol 3 thereof,

Having regard to the Authority's Guidelines (3) on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, and in particular Chapter 17 on State guarantees and Chapter 19 on public authorities' holdings,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

By letter dated 27 February 2004 of the Icelandic Mission to the European Union, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 26 February 2004, the Icelandic authorities notified the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter ‘the Authority’) of a State guarantee in favour of a submarine cable project in Iceland, i.e. the Farice project. The letter was received and registered on 1 March 2004 (Event No: 257593).

Supplementary information was submitted by letter from the Icelandic Mission dated 14 May 2004, forwarding a letter by the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated 13 May 2004. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 May 2004 (Event No: 281472).

The Authority requested further information on the notification by letter dated 22 April 2004 (Event No: 261084). The Icelandic authorities responded by letter dated 25 June from the Icelandic Mission, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 28 June 2004 (Event No: 285971).

The Authority requested further information by letter dated 10 August (Event No: 286427), to which the Icelandic Mission responded by letter dated 8 September 2004, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 7 September 2004 (Event No: 291944).

By letter dated 16 December 2004, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities about its doubts concerning the compatibility with the EEA Agreement of the notified guarantee and of the increase of the Icelandic State's share capital in Farice hf. (Event No: 299813). The Icelandic authorities reacted to that by letter dated 21 January 2005 from the Icelandic Mission, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 21 January 2005. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 24 January 2004 (Event No: 306 312).

In addition, under separate competition proceedings, the Authority had, by letter to Farice hf. dated 31 January 2003, expressed certain competition concerns and requested information concerning the FARICE project in order to enable the Authority to facilitate the assessment of the project's competitive impact. By letter dated 6 May 2004 the Authority addressed a formal request for information to Farice hf. (4). Farice hf.'s reply was received by the Authority on 21 October 2004.

2.   Description of the Farice project

The Farice project concerns the construction and management of an undersea telecommunications cable connecting Iceland and the Faeroe Islands with Scotland.

Since 1994, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were internationally connected with the undersea telecommunication cable CANTAT-3. CANTAT-3 was set up as a consortium cable. Access to CANTAT-3 was secured via membership of the consortium (5), by defeasible rights of use and by leasing capacity from the consortium member Teleglobe. CANTAT-3 has connection points in Canada, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany. With the build-up of trans-Atlantic cable systems competing with CANTAT-3, the founders of CANTAT-3 had access to other, more economical connections. The Icelandic and the Faeroe parties, however, still had to rely on the CANTAT-3 connection. That was one consideration for these parties to consider the development of a new connectivity. Besides, the CANTAT-3 cable had certain technical limitations, as it was an older generation cable which is not always reliable and has limited capacity. No other single international fibre network project has reached these two countries since 1994, despite a general capacity growth of international and interregional telecommunications routes. According to information by the Icelandic authorities, the geographically isolated location of the two countries and the limited market size prevented this.

Satellite connections which serve as a second connectivity are expected to rise in costs and are, in any event, not considered appropriate for transmitting delay sensitive internet traffic. In order to handle the increased telecommunication traffic, an alternative had to be developed.

The Farice project came about from an initiative by the almost 100 % State owned Icelandic telecom operator Landssími Íslands hf (hereinafter Síminn) and the incumbent telecom operator in the Faeroe Islands, Føroya Tele, which were considering the development of a submarine cable linking Reykjavík, Tórshavn and Edinburgh. However, in 2002 it became clear that the FARICE project seemed unable to gain momentum as a purely commercial business case (6). A feasibility study conducted in March 2002 concluded that it would not be possible to fund the project through conventional project financing. A broad alliance behind the project was sought in order to secure its realisation. This resulted in two decisions:

Firstly, the communication authorities of Iceland and the Faeroe Islands became involved in the preparation of the project. In particular the largest sponsors, Síminn and Føroya Tele, made it clear that they were not interested in providing the necessary loan guarantees on behalf of the whole telecom market (7). The State would therefore have to participate and contribute actively in the project.

Secondly, it was considered important that Og Vodafone, a major player in the Icelandic telecom market, should participate actively in the project. It was decided that besides the establishment of Farice hf, a holding company Eignarhaldsfélagið Farice ehf. (hereinafter ‘E-Farice’) (8) should be established. This company, while holding all the Icelandic shares in Farice, should buy Og Vodafone's capacity in CANTAT-3. A similar offer was made to Síminn which, according to the IBM report submitted by the Icelandic authorities, resulted in E-Farice handling all international connectivity for Iceland. As stated in the notification, CANTAT-3 capacity will consequently be operated and sold by E-Farice (9).

In 2002 the new limited company, Farice hf, was established with the purpose of preparing, constructing and operating a submarine communication cable system to transfer telecommunications and internet traffic between Iceland, the Faeroe Islands and the UK. The shareholders of this company were Síminn (47,33 %), Og Vodafone (1,33 %), the Government of Iceland (27,33 %), three other Icelandic operators which held together 3,99 %, Føroya Tele (17,33 %), and two other Faeroe telecom operators, which each held 1,33 % (10). The new Farice cable includes an Iceland backhaul (Reykjavík to Seyðisfjörður), a submarine section (Seyðisfjörður to Dunnet Bay), a Faeroese backhaul (from Funningsfjörður to Tórshavn) and a UK backhaul (Dunnet Bay to Edinburgh). No public tender was carried out to entrust the management of the cable, which was granted to Farice hf.

A shareholders' agreement dated 12 September 2002 provided that the pricing policy of Farice should be based on the principles of cost orientation, transparency and non-discrimination.

The Icelandic authorities have further pointed out that the use of the Farice cable is open to foreign and domestic operators alike, on equal terms and prices. The shareholders' agreement is also open to new shareholders. It stipulates, however, that the existing shareholders will always be offered the possibility of maintaining their equity position in the company if the share capital is increased.

The formal opening of the Farice submarine transmission cable was in February 2004. While it will constitute the primary transmission line for Iceland's telecommunications, the CANTAT-3 capacities will be used as a back-up.

3.   Description of the aid measure

a.   The loan guarantee

The object of the notification concerns the grant by the State of a guarantee for a loan of EUR 9,4 million in favour of Farice (hereinafter: the A Term Loan). This loan forms part of a broader long-term loan package for a maximum amount of EUR 34,5 million.

According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, in particular the Agreement between Farice hf, Íslandsbanki hf, other financial institutions and other guarantors, on 27 February 2004 signed loans (hereinafter: the loan agreement) for a maximum amount of EUR 34,5 million, break down as follows:

| Loan | Million EUR | Lender | Interest rate (11) | Interest periods | Repayment | Guarantor |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of instalments | Start of repayment |
| A | 9,4 | The Nordic Investment Bank | [...] (12) | 6 months | 8 semi-annual payments | Sept. 2011 | Government of Iceland |
| B | 4,7 | The Nordic Investment Bank | [...] | 6 months | 5 semi-annual payments | Sept. 2009 | Landssími Íslands hf (Síminn) |
| 4,7 | Íslandsbanki hf |
| C | 4,7 | Føroya banki | [...] | 3 months | 10 quarterly payments | Sept. 2009 | Telefon verkið P/F |
| D | 11 | Íslandsbanki hf | [...] | 1 month | 48 monthly payments | Sept. 2005 | None |

Loan

Million EUR

Lender

Interest rate (11)

Interest periods

Repayment

Guarantor

Number of instalments

Start of repayment

A

9,4

The Nordic Investment Bank

[...] (12)

6 months

8 semi-annual payments

Sept. 2011

Government of Iceland

B

4,7

The Nordic Investment Bank

[...]

6 months

5 semi-annual payments

Sept. 2009

Landssími Íslands hf (Síminn)

4,7

Íslandsbanki hf

C

4,7

Føroya banki

[...]

3 months

10 quarterly payments

Sept. 2009

Telefon verkið P/F

D

11

Íslandsbanki hf

[...]

1 month

48 monthly payments

Sept. 2005

None

The State guarantee for the A term loan is a guarantee of collection, i.e. Farice hf.will be fully liable for payment of the loan and the creditor will need to exhaust the recourses for collection from the company before the State guarantee can take effect. Farice hf. was obliged to pay an annual market premium of [...] (established by the Icelandic National Debt Management) and a fee of [...] ISK. The payment was done in advance [...].

An earlier guarantee of collection was signed in July 2003 in relation to a bridge loan of EUR 16 million. The guarantee of collection covered EUR 6,4 million, i.e. 40 % of that loan. The bridge loan was paid up upon the release of the long-term loan of EUR 34,5 million and the guarantee of collection for the bridge loan ceased to exist the same day. Farice hf. paid a [...] guarantee fee and a guarantee charge of [...] ISK for that guarantee.

b.   The Icelandic government's increase in share capital

In the beginning of January 2003, the State participation in Farice hf increased from an initial share of 27 % up to 46,5 %. Following the explanation given by the Icelandic authorities in their reply of June 2004,

‘As the business plan evolved, the funding needs of the company became clearer and it was decided to increase the company's share capital. All operators in Iceland and Faeroe Islands were invited to buy shares in the share capital increase. As Síminn made it clear that the company would not want to provide more than 33,33 % of the share capital, Telefonverkið would provide necessary share capital from the Faroese site (19,93 %), the Icelandic government had to provide 46,53 % of the necessary share capital as other operators in Iceland did not have the financial capacity to buy more than 1,2 % of the share capital.’

As stated by the Icelandic authorities, the total share capital of Farice hf was increased from EUR 337 000 to EUR 14 million. Details on the share capital contribution of the different shareholders can be seen from the table below:

| | |
| --- | --- |

4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

The Icelandic government first states that the measures cannot constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, as the Farice project constitutes infrastructure, which is open to all potential users on a non-discriminatory basis.

Further, the Icelandic authorities argue that the State guarantee fulfils all the conditions set out in Chapter 17.4 of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines. The Icelandic authorities point out that — as can be seen from the three other tranches of the loan — Farice would have been able to secure a loan on market conditions. It is, however, clear that interest rates will always be more favourable in the case of a State guaranteed loan and that, therefore, these conditions should not be expected to be the same as normal conditions on the financial market. As long as the market price paid for the guarantee is correct, there is no room for State aid. The banks were asked to provide a non indicative bid for a loan up to EUR 32 million. Four offers varying in form and cost offered interest rates ranging from [...].

The authorities further point out that the EUR 34,5 million loan should be seen as one loan subdivided into four tranches. In that respect, the Farice project is financed to a large extent independently of the State guarantee, which only covers 27,25 % of the full loan.

one

As to the share capital increase, the Icelandic authorities point out that the increase in share capital took place in January 2003, i.e. only four months after the establishment of Farice hf. The Icelandic State's share increase should therefore not be seen as an injection of fresh capital, but rather as the initial setting up of a company. In this respect it should be noted that the private investors provided for almost 60 % of the total share capital increase or EUR 8,1 million compared to the government share of EUR 5,5 million (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this does not only show that the private share holders were willing to participate in the company, but also that they were willing to participate to a significant degree.

13

In any event, given the size of the Farice project, the project would qualify as aid to small and medium sized undertakings.

In any event, given its significant importance for securing the necessary connectivity of Iceland to the world, the support should be allowed under Article 61(3)(b) or (c) of the EEA Agreement.

II.   APPRECIATION

1.   Obligation to notify

According to Article 2(1) read together with Article 3 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘any plans to grant new aid shall be notified to the Authority in sufficient time by the EFTA State concerned and shall not be put into effect before the Authority has taken, or is deemed to have taken, a decision authorising such aid.’

any plans to grant new aid shall be notified to the Authority in sufficient time by the EFTA State concerned and shall not be put into effect before the Authority has taken, or is deemed to have taken, a decision authorising such aid.

Farice hf. was established in 2002 and the construction work started already in June 2003. The cable was officially opened in February 2004 (14). The share capital increase took place in January 2003 and the guarantee of collection by the Icelandic authorities dates to 27 February 2004, i.e. before the Authority had a chance to express a view on the notification of the measures on 27 February 2004.

14

The Authority therefore notes that the Icelandic government has not respected the stand-still obligation, with the consequence that if the measures were found to be State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, they would constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(f) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, subject to potential recovery, if declared incompatible with the EEA Agreement.

2.   State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘...any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.

The Authority will therefore assess whether:

| — | there is an intervention by the State or through State resources; |
| --- | --- |

—

there is an intervention by the State or through State resources;

| — | which confers an advantage on the recipient; |
| --- | --- |

—

which confers an advantage on the recipient;

| — | distorts or threatens to distort competition; and |
| --- | --- |

—

distorts or threatens to distort competition; and

| — | which is liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

—

which is liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

2.1   The Farice project as an infrastructure project

The Icelandic authorities argue that the support to the Farice project does not comprise any State aid, given that the submarine cable qualifies as infrastructure and support in its favour therefore constitutes a ‘general’ and not a selective measure. As stated in the European Commission Communication COM (2001) 35 final, ‘Reinforcing quality service in sea ports: a key for European transport’ (15), the criterion of selectivity is an important benchmark for deciding whether a concrete financing measure constitutes State aid.

15

In Commission practice State funding for the construction or management of infrastructure is not to be regarded as aid, if the infrastructure is directly managed by the State (which is not the case in the present project) or if there is a public tender for the selection of the manager and if access to the infrastructure is open to all potential users on a non-discriminatory basis (16).

16

The Authority notes that while wide participation might have been sought within the project, neither the construction nor the management of the company was organised by a public tender. The government participation rather responded to a private initiative, started by the two incumbent telecommunication operators (17).

17

The Authority also has doubts concerning the non-discriminatory access. While the participation in the company according to the shareholders' agreement is not restricted, the Authority notes that the founding shareholders keep certain pre-emptive rights (see section I.2 of this Decision), which seems to place them in a better position than new shareholders.

Regardless of this, in line with Commission practice, a measure in any event constitutes aid and not a general measure, if the body managing the infrastructure is pursuing an economic activity, as this may provide a potential advantage to the beneficiary (18) in relation to competing operators. In this respect it suffices to note that the State support benefits Farice hf. which manages the cable and sells users' rights to interested parties against remuneration. According to the case law of the European Court of First Instance, the management of infrastructure constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (19). Farice hf. is able to profit from an infrastructure construction secured with a State guarantee and with government participation in a situation in which private parties were not willing to ensure the full financing of the project, whereas other operators might have to finance 100 % of it on their own.

18

19

In addition, for State aid purposes, it should be noted that the participation in the company is mainly geared towards telecommunication operators. Connectivity via the Farice cable is currently only sold in large units to business operators who resell the service on the downstream market to end users. It was these business operators who took the initiative to which the State responded. The type of service is therefore targeted at commercial operators and not at the general public. The Authority therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, considers that the project should be looked at rather as being a dedicated facility for undertakings, which is within the scope of State aid control, rather than a general infrastructure (20).

20

2.2.   The loan guarantee by the Icelandic State

In general, a State guarantee enables its beneficiary to obtain better financial terms for a loan than those normally available on the financial markets. Therefore, guarantees given by the State may fall within the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

However, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter 17.4 (2) of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines on State Guarantees (hereinafter: the Guidelines), the Authority considers that an individual State guarantee does not constitute State aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils all the following conditions:

| (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The borrower would, in principle, be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The borrower would, in principle, be able to obtain a loan on market conditions from the financial markets without any intervention by the State;

| (c) | The guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and is not open-ended;

| (d) | The market price for the guarantee is paid (which reflects, amongst other things, the amount and duration of the guarantee, the security given by the borrower, the borrower's financial position, the sector of activity and the prospects, the rates of default, and other economic conditions). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

The market price for the guarantee is paid (which reflects, amongst other things, the amount and duration of the guarantee, the security given by the borrower, the borrower's financial position, the sector of activity and the prospects, the rates of default, and other economic conditions).

According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, the project could not gain momentum as a purely commercial business case and required the involvement of the State. Although the borrower was not technically in financial difficulty, the fact that the banks did not only require a guarantee of the State for the A Term Loan but also of the two former State telecommunication monopolists (Síminn for the B Term Loan and Telefonverkið P/F for the C Term Loan), which are still owned by the respective States, shows that Farice was not in the position to obtain a loan on market conditions without any intervention by the State. For this reason, it is questionable whether the second condition is fulfilled.

The Icelandic authorities however argue that the second condition should be understood to be that the borrower was able to obtain ‘a’ loan, not necessarily ‘the loan on the same conditions’. In particular the D tranche loan shows that it was possible for Farice hf. to obtain a loan ‘as such’. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities argue that it is evident that, backed up with the State guarantee, the loan would be granted at more favourable conditions. The decisive factor therefore is only whether the price for the guarantee is a market price.

The Authority agrees that the first condition only states that the borrower would ‘in principle’ be able to obtain a loan on market conditions. However, it still needs to be considered that point 17.1(1) of the Guidelines describes State guarantees as normally enabling the borrower to obtain better financial terms than those normally available on the financial markets, which leads to distortions of competition and the potential classification as ‘aid’. It is exactly that advantage resulting from the State intervention which raises a State aid concern. Against this background, there would be no aid element involved if the State backed-up loan did not lead to any advantages in the interest rate. However, if the State intervention leads to ‘better’ market conditions, this must be taken into account for the assessment under the State aid provisions. The Authority does not exclude, at this stage of the proceedings, that the distortive effect resulting from better market conditions can be adequately — but then also would have to be — considered in the assessment of the adequacy of the market premium (fourth condition), and will investigate that further in the formal investigation procedure.

better

However, the Authority notes, that while Farice hf. was able to secure an EUR 11 million loan on market conditions (D loan), it is not clear whether the banks would have granted any further loans to the project without any intervention from the State. This aspect would have to be assessed under the first condition. The Authority is therefore not entirely certain about the relevance of the argument that Farice hf. was able to negotiate the EUR 11 million loan.

further

This

The overall loan package is made up of four (or five) different loan amounts with different borrowing conditions, different lenders and different guarantees. Therefore, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that each part of the overall loan amount constitutes an independent loan as such. For this reason, the Authority initially considers that the guarantee of the State covers 100 % of the guaranteed A Term Loan for a maximum amount of EUR 9,4 million. Hence, the third condition laid down in Chapter 17.4(2) of the Guidelines to exclude the existence of State aid does not seem to be fulfilled.

The Icelandic authorities argue that there is only one loan at stake, at EUR 34,5 million. However, as can be seen from the loan agreement, while granted for the same collateral, the four loans are granted by different banks which assume the responsibility for their loan amount only. None of the banks would take over — in case of a failure of Farice hf. — the liability for any of the other loans. The different loans do not only have different repayment periods and a different number of instalments, but also different guarantors. Against this background, the combination of the loans in one joint document does not appear to be of significant relevance.

their

It should further be noted that the 80 % rule should ensure that the creditor still has an incentive to reflect on the risk which he is willing to assume. Against this background, it does not seem correct to take into account — in relation to the business decision made by the Nordic Investment bank and in order to establish the loan basis to which the 80 % rule applies — that other loans are granted by Íslandsbanki. The Nordic investment bank has not assumed any responsibility for these loans and would not consider them in its decision to support Farice.

If anything, the A loan could be considered together with the second loan granted by the Nordic Investment bank, i.e. the first part of the B loan. However, the Authority still has doubts on this perspective, as the B loan is secured by the 100 % State owned company Síminn. The incentive for Nordic investment bank to assume an ordinary risk assessment, the same as it would undertake for a borrower who cannot rely on the State or State owned companies, is therefore considerably reduced.

Regarding the fourth condition, the Authority notes that the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund assessed the appropriate guarantee fee and guarantee charge for a State guarantee in relation to the A Term Loan. It charged a fee of ISK [...] plus a proportional fee of [...] p.a. on the balance of the loan at the beginning of each period. The total charge amounted to [...] and was already paid in advance.

Assuming only that the State Guarantee Fund took into account, in the assessment of the premium, the concrete characteristics of the guaranteed loan, in particular the conditions for repayment (21) and that it followed for its assessment the so-called market investor principle, would the fourth condition laid down in Chapter 17.4(2) of the Guidelines be fulfilled. However, despite being invited to prove that this is a market rate, the Icelandic authorities have not substantiated this point, but mainly limited themselves to repeat the relevant provisions of the State Guarantee Fund Act. The Authority notes that while taking into account that the guarantee in question is a guarantee of collection with a lesser risk, the premium charged to Farice is at the very low end of the spectrum of interest rates to be fixed by the National Debt Management Agency [...], which has not been reasoned by the Icelandic authorities.

21

Further indication of the appropriate market rate can be derived from point 17.1(2) of the Guidelines which identifies the amount of aid, i.e. the cash grant equivalent, for an individual guarantee, as the difference between the market rate and the rate obtained thanks to the State guarantee after any premiums have been deducted. This is based on the understanding that if the borrower profits from a favourable interest rate, which he would not have gotten without State intervention, the aid element is the amount which remains in comparison to the market rate and after the premium has been deducted. If the premium does not fully remove this advantage, the State guarantee would still benefit the recipient and thus distort the market. In such circumstances the advantage resulting from the guarantee has not been clawed away by the premium and would have to be classified as aid (22).

after

22

The Authority notes that the difference between the A tranche loan of [...] points compared to [...] of the B loan, is [...], which is not fully compensated by the [...] premium paid by the State. However, the Authority still considers comparing the interest rate of the A tranche with the D tranche of the loan, which is the only tranche not backed up by the State or a State owned company, which results in a remaining aid element of [...]. Firstly, the Authority assumes that the guarantee given by the 100 % owned telecom operators Síminn is also imputable to the State, but will investigate that point further during the investigation. In any event, operators in similar projects might not be able to secure such guarantees — and the favourable market conditions resulting therefrom — so that in the Authority's preliminary view the comparison with the D loan seems to be the valid comparison (23).

23

The intervention of the State strengthens the position of Farice hf. in securing the project financing versus competitors who do not profit from such a guarantee and would have to make the investment solely on market terms. The guarantee is given for a project which is carried out by multinational business operators and constitutes an activity which is subject to trade between the Contracting Parties.

2.3   The increase in the participation of the State as shareholder of Farice hf.

Between the time of the establishment of the company in September 2002 and the time of the notification at the beginning of 2004, the State participation in Farice hf increased from an initial share of 27 % up to 46,5 %. Following the explanation given by the Icelandic authorities in their reply of June 2004, Síminn made it clear that it did not intend to provide more than 33,33 % of the share capital (24).

24

For State aid purposes, it has to be established whether the capital increase at Farice engaged by the State is directly in conformity with the market investor principle. Chapter 19 of the Guidelines establishes the general approach of the Authority with regard to the acquisition of share holdings by public authorities.

According to Chapter 19.6.(b) of the Guidelines, no State aid is involved where fresh capital is contributed to an undertaking in circumstances that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions. This can apply when public holdings in a company are to be increased, provided that the capital injected is proportionate to the number of shares held by the authorities and goes together with the injection of capital by a private shareholder. The private investor's holding must have real economic significance.

On the other hand, there is State aid where fresh capital is contributed in circumstances that would not be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions. Following Chapter 19.6.(c) of the Guidelines, this is, amongst others, the case where the injection of capital into companies whose capital is divided between private and public shareholders makes the public holding reach a significantly higher level than it was originally and the relative disengagement of private shareholders is largely due to the companies' poor profit outlook.

The Icelandic authorities point out that the Icelandic's State share capital increase should not be looked at as an injection of fresh capital, but rather as the initial setting up of the company. The Authority points out that the State Aid Guidelines consider the share capital increase, regardless of at what point in time it takes place, as a subcategory of the injection of fresh capital. As the Guidelines reflect the general principle of private market investor behaviour, the share capital increase must be analysed on its merits. Even if the Government had assumed the higher share already during the preparation phase, this still would have made the increase subject to an analysis under the State aid provisions. For that assessment it is therefore only relevant whether the share capital increase reflects the rationale of a private market investor.

The Authority does not deny that in real terms the private operators' holdings occurred at the same time of the capital increase by the State. However, the Authority takes the (preliminary view) that the share increase of the private operators was not proportionate to the share capital increase by the State.

As can be seen from the table above (see section I.3.b. of this Decision) Farice hf.'s capital rose from EUR 337 000 to EUR 14 646 000 in January 2003. The share of the Icelandic State grew from 27,33 % (EUR 92 000) to 46,5 % (EUR 6 206 000), i.e. by almost 20 percentage points. While it is correctly stated by the Icelandic authorities that the share of Síminn grew from EUR 160 000 to EUR 4 446 000, in relative terms the share of Síminn fell from 47,33 % to 33,33 % (14 percentage points). Except for Telefonverkið, the shares of all other participants also fell (from 1,33 % to 0,33 %), which shows that in relative terms the private operators disengaged from the project.

This is likely to result from the poor outlook of the company's profit. In their letter of September 2004, the Icelandic authorities have submitted that:

‘Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet foreseeable demand, as well as providing an alternate route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment (especially for a limited company in line for privatisation). In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by the demand, the Government stepped in.’

The Icelandic authorities further state that the market's reluctance towards the project was indicated in the preparatory phase when Síminn and Telefonverkið engaged IBM Consulting to advise them on the economic viability of the project and its financing possibilities. The findings strongly suggested that the funding could not be done via traditional means (25).

market's reluctance

25

It seems from this that the initial lack of engagement from private investors was the reason for the subscription of the necessary capital increase by the Government in early 2003 (26), which raised the State participation in Farice hf.

26

The increase in the State's share of Farice was further accompanied by the grant of a State guarantee to cover the A Term Loan of EUR 9,4 million. It is thus the preliminary opinion of the Authority that State aid can be presumed in the capital injection subscribed by the Icelandic authorities in Farice which led to an increase in the State share in the company from 27 % to up to 46,5 %. Additionally, according to Chapter 19.6(d) of the Guidelines, there is a presumption that there is State aid where the authorities' intervention takes the form of acquisition of a holding combined with other types of interventions which need to be notified pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

The intervention of the State strengthens the position of Farice hf. in securing the project financing versus competitors who do not profit from such a State participation in a situation in which private operators are not willing to raise additional funds. The share increase concerns a project which is carried out by multinational business operators and constitutes an activity which is subject to trade between the Contracting Parties.

a.   Conclusion

In the Authority's preliminary view, the State guarantee and the capital share increase by the Icelandic State constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Compatibility

In the Authority's view, the aid measures do not comply with any of the exemptions provided for under Article 59(2) (27) and Article 61(2) or (3)(a) and (d) of the EEA Agreement. In the Authority's preliminary view, the State support also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement. Despite the fact that the project is transnational, the aid in question presents itself in the form of sector aid, benefiting an individual company (Farice hf) and brought about by a private initiative of a group of business operators. It is therefore questionable that this can be regarded as a project which is of common European interest.

27

It needs to be assessed whether the aid could be justified under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. Under this provision aid may be declared compatible if ‘it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’.

it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest

However, the Authority finds that none of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines can be applied to assess aid measures that target this objective. The Authority in particular does not share the Icelandic authorities' view that the measure falls under the Act mentioned in point 1 f) of the EEA Agreement concerning aid to small and medium sized undertakings (28). In order to fall under the block exemption, Farice would have to be an independent enterprise in the meaning of Article 1(3) in conjunction with Article 1(1) in Annex I of the Act. However, more than 25 % of the capital is owned by operators which fall outside the SME definition (this goes both for the State owned Síminn and the share ownership of the Icelandic State).

28

The Authority therefore considers that the compatibility assessment is to be based directly on Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

In this respect, the Authority will have to investigate the necessity and the proportionality of the measure. The Authority, however, notes that the Icelandic authorities have not yet provided sufficient information to enable the Authority to carry out a full analysis of this issue. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has come to the preliminary conclusions below.

3.1   The necessity of the aid measures

The Authority notes that the project intends to secure internet connectivity to Iceland by having a reliable transmission method to which the former CANTAT-3 connection will serve as a back-up. Because of its geographic location, Iceland is particularly dependent on having access to economic and reliable telecom connectivity. As can be seen from section I.2 of this Decision, alternatives in the form of the existing CANTAT-3 cable or satellites were no longer options, either because of their technical limitations or dependencies on other consortium shareholders (CANTAT-3 (29)) or their rising costs (satellites). The new submarine cable, which is to become the primary transmission connection to Iceland, has greater capacities, is more reliable and — together with the backup by CANTAT-3 — is able to secure the provision of telecommunication services to Iceland. The availability of broadband (30) has been acknowledged in Commission policy and State aid decisions (31) as a legitimate objective and type of service which is by its nature capable of positively affecting the productivity and growth of a large number of sectors and activities.

29

30

31

As can be seem from its history (in particular the feasibility study of March 2002), the Farice project was not able to emerge as a purely private initiative. Both, State guarantees and share capital increases resulted from the need of a greater State participation to make the project economically viable. Without State participation, the project would either have been delayed or not undertaken at all, so that the Authority takes the preliminary view that the State support was necessary.

3.2   The proportionality of the aid measures

In order for the aid measures to be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, it must be proportionate to the objective and not distort competition to an extent contrary to the common interest. The trade-off between the advantages in terms of guaranteeing a reliable provision of telecommunication services to Iceland must be weighed against the disadvantages of the distortion of competition in comparison to competitors, which do not have access to public funding when realising similar projects.

The Authority cannot yet make a final assessment of that question on the basis of the available information. However, it will — in the formal investigation procedure — consider the following aspects:

| — | The Authority first notes that neither the construction nor the management of the cable were given to Farice hf. after an open tender. The Authority is not yet convinced that the widespread information on this project as claimed by the Icelandic authorities can replace a formal tender procedure, in particular as the desirable widespread participation was limited to Icelandic and Faeroe parties (32). The Authority points out that the open tender was considered a positive, although not necessarily mandatory, element for the approval of broadband projects in Commission practice (33). In these decisions it was, in particular, stressed that the tendering out of the management of the cable to an independent asset manager secured the neutrality of the infrastructure manager better than in a situation in which the service provider has control over the infrastructure, as is the case here. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority first notes that neither the construction nor the management of the cable were given to Farice hf. after an open tender. The Authority is not yet convinced that the widespread information on this project as claimed by the Icelandic authorities can replace a formal tender procedure, in particular as the desirable widespread participation was limited to Icelandic and Faeroe parties (32). The Authority points out that the open tender was considered a positive, although not necessarily mandatory, element for the approval of broadband projects in Commission practice (33). In these decisions it was, in particular, stressed that the tendering out of the management of the cable to an independent asset manager secured the neutrality of the infrastructure manager better than in a situation in which the service provider has control over the infrastructure, as is the case here.

32

33

| — | The Authority notes that the shareholders' agreement provides for a non-discriminatory, transparent pricing on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority notes that the shareholders' agreement provides for a non-discriminatory, transparent pricing on market terms.

| — | The Authority will also consider that the shareholders' agreement is in principle open to new entrants. The Authority has however doubts on the position of new entrants in relation to the founding parties, as section 7 of the Shareholders agreements protects the founders' position by giving them the possibility to maintain their equity position. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority will also consider that the shareholders' agreement is in principle open to new entrants. The Authority has however doubts on the position of new entrants in relation to the founding parties, as section 7 of the Shareholders agreements protects the founders' position by giving them the possibility to maintain their equity position.

| — | The total amount of aid is, with regard to the State guarantee, rather limited. As to the State's share increase, the Authority notes that in June 2003 the State's share capital has already decreased to 41 %, whereas Síminn's participation rose to 29 %. The Authority also notes that while the State disproportionately increased its share capital in January 2003, the private operators showed willingness to multiply their support. |
| --- | --- |

—

The total amount of aid is, with regard to the State guarantee, rather limited. As to the State's share increase, the Authority notes that in June 2003 the State's share capital has already decreased to 41 %, whereas Síminn's participation rose to 29 %. The Authority also notes that while the State disproportionately increased its share capital in January 2003, the private operators showed willingness to multiply their support.

| — | The Authority has, in its correspondence with Farice hf. under the competition proceedings, raised certain competition concerns. The European Court of Justice has established that a compatibility assessment under the State aid provisions should not produce a result which is contrary to other treaty provisions. Consequently, for the assessment under the State aid provisions, it is also relevant whether State support is given to a project which might raise competition concerns under the application of Article 53 and/or 54 of the EEA Agreement (34). In this regard, the Authority inter alia notes that although the existing infrastructure CANTAT-3 still remains in place (35), there is a concern that in the future, all CANTAT-3 connectivity to Iceland will be channelled through E-Farice hf, which holds the majority of shares in Farice hf. (36). Hence, there is a risk that competition in connectivity to Iceland would be eliminated, as only one supplier would remain on the market. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Authority has, in its correspondence with Farice hf. under the competition proceedings, raised certain competition concerns. The European Court of Justice has established that a compatibility assessment under the State aid provisions should not produce a result which is contrary to other treaty provisions. Consequently, for the assessment under the State aid provisions, it is also relevant whether State support is given to a project which might raise competition concerns under the application of Article 53 and/or 54 of the EEA Agreement (34). In this regard, the Authority inter alia notes that although the existing infrastructure CANTAT-3 still remains in place (35), there is a concern that in the future, all CANTAT-3 connectivity to Iceland will be channelled through E-Farice hf, which holds the majority of shares in Farice hf. (36). Hence, there is a risk that competition in connectivity to Iceland would be eliminated, as only one supplier would remain on the market.

34

inter alia

35

36

4.   Conclusion

The Authority therefore concludes that it has doubts as to whether the support in favour of Farice hf. is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in particular with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority. The Authority may conclude that the measures in question would be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, if they were necessary and proportionate and thus would fulfil the requirements for being exempted from the prohibition against State aid as laid down in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, requests the Icelandic authorities to submit its comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requires the Icelandic government, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the support measures in favour of Farice hf.,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

| 1. | The Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the support measures in favour of Farice hf. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the support measures in favour of Farice hf.

| 2. | The Icelandic government is requested, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, to submit its comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measure. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Icelandic government is requested, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, to submit its comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid measure.

one month

| 3. | The Icelandic government shall be informed by means of a letter containing a copy of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Icelandic government shall be informed by means of a letter containing a copy of this Decision.

| 4. | The Icelandic Government is invited to notify without delay the potential aid beneficiary of the initiation of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Icelandic Government is invited to notify without delay the potential aid beneficiary of the initiation of the proceedings.

| 5. | The EC Commission shall be informed, in accordance with Protocol 27(d) of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The EC Commission shall be informed, in accordance with Protocol 27(d) of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of this Decision.

| 6. | Other EFTA States, EU Member States, and interested parties shall be informed by the publishing of this Decision in its authentic language version, accompanied by a meaningful summary in languages other than the authentic language version, in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto, inviting them to submit comments within one month from the date of publication. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Other EFTA States, EU Member States, and interested parties shall be informed by the publishing of this Decision in its authentic language version, accompanied by a meaningful summary in languages other than the authentic language version, in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto, inviting them to submit comments within one month from the date of publication.

Official Journal of the European Union

| 7. | This Decision is authentic in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

7.

This Decision is authentic in the English language.

Done at Brussels, 26 May 2005.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Einar M. BULL

Acting President

Bernd HAMMERMANN

College Member

---

(1)  Hereinafter referred to as the EEA Agreement.

1

(2)  Hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

2

(3)  Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, adopted and issued by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 January 1994, published in OJ 1994 L 231, EEA Supplement 3.9.1994 No 32. The Guidelines were last amended on 15.12.2004.

3

(4)  In accordance with the provisions of Protocol 21 to the EEA Agreement and Article 11 of Chapter II, Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

4

(5)  The consortium included inter alia the Icelandic telecom operator Landssími Íslands hf., Teleglobe and Deutsche Telekom.

5

inter alia

(6)  See Summary Report, provided as Annex 1 to the notification.

6

(7)  See also the following comment by the Icelandic authorities: »Although the designated universal service provider, and as such required to provide secure long-distance communication, Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet demand, as well as providing an alternative route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment. In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by demand, the government stepped in.«

7

Although the designated universal service provider, and as such required to provide secure long-distance communication, Síminn felt that increasing the capacity to meet demand, as well as providing an alternative route for emergencies, was a financially risky undertaking, providing little return on investment. In order to facilitate the necessary upgrade in capacity, particularly in view of the short time frame available until capacity would be outstripped by demand, the government stepped in

(8)  In 2003, E-Farice ehf held 80 % of the shares in Farice hf, with the 20 % remaining shares held by Føroya Tele (17,3 %) and other Faeroe parties (together 2,7 %).

8

(9)  The IBM report stresses the business possibility that E-Farice's purchase of CANTAT-3 connectivity gives the possibility to ring-connect the two cable systems in such a way that Farice hf. can offer its customers secured connectivity. The report further describes negotiations of E-Farice with Teleglobe to further lease CANTAT-3. It has been discussed whether Farice hf. or E-Farice should lease all available capacity to Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.

9

all

(10)  Initial capital contributions, which were later changed. The holding company E-Farice holds all the shares of the Icelandic parties in Farice hf.

10

(11)  Although in the letter accompanying the notification reference is made to Libor as the basis for establishing the rate of interest to the Loan for each tranche, clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement refers to Euribor. For this reason, the Authority considers the Euribor rate to be the valid reference for the determination of the rate of interest applicable to the Loan for each interest period.

11

(12)  Brackets throughout the text indicate figures which have been deleted because they are covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

12

(13)  It seems however, that this statement by the Icelandic authorities rather refers to the share capital split between the capital holder in June 2003. In January 2003, the Icelandic government had a share of EUR 6,2 million.

13

(14)  Press release of 3 February 2004.

14

(15)  Communication of 13.2.2001, COM (2001) 35 final.

15

(16)  Commission decision N 527/02 — Greece Financial support of a private company for the design, construction, testing and commissioning of the aviation fuel pipelines for supply of the new Athens International Airport.

16

(17)  See Commission decision C 67-69/2003 concerning aid for the construction of a propylene pipeline between Rotterdam, Antwerp and the Ruhr-area, paragraph 48. The Authority will further look at the argument of the Icelandic authorities that according to Directive 2002/20/EC the license can only be granted by way of authorisation and that therefore the requirement of a public tender cannot be relevant. The Authority takes the preliminary view that, given all the other circumstances in this case, even if the argument was found valid, it is not likely to make a difference for the assessment.

17

(18)  See Commission decision N 527/02 with further references in footnote 8. Also Commission decision N 860/01 — Austria on the ski resort Mutterer Alm where the running of ski lifts was considered to be an economic activity benefiting the operator of the ski lift and therefore not constituting an infrastructure measure. See Commission decision C 67-69/2003, paragraph 48.

18

(19)  See Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. European Commission, [2000] ECR II-3929.

19

Aéroports de Paris

European Commission

(20)  See Commission decision N 213/2003 — Project Atlas, broadband infrastructure for business parks.

20

(21)  The provisions of the loan agreement foresee the possibility of prepaying the whole or part of the loan, except for the A term loan, without any prepayment fee.

21

(22)  The Icelandic authorities do not consider that aspect, but look at the adequacy of the market price as such. The result is that the fact that the State guarantee has led to better loan conditions than market conditions, is neither considered under the first condition (see above) nor under the fourth condition.

22

(23)  According to Clause 7.4 of the Loan Agreement, solely the margin for the A Term Loan can be modified after signature of the agreement. Such an amendment may take place on 18 March 2011 and will be effective until the loan maturity. As this is depending on the future negotiations, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether such a modified margin would constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement or whether such aid could be authorised. However, the Icelandic authorities would be able to identify the existence of an aid element for any future modification by applying the calculation parameters laid down in the previous paragraph and, in case of the existence of an aid element, would have to notify the aid measure to the Authority.

23

(24)  See section I 3.b of this Decision.

24

(25)  See letter by the Icelandic authorities dated 25 June 2004, page 3.

25

(26)  The Authority is aware of the reference of the Icelandic authorities to the speech of the chairman on 24 January 2004. However, this speech only states that there is a ‘modestly profitable business case’ and that the private operators also provided securities. The latter point has never been denied by the Authority; the question whether the share increase by the State is proportionate is, however, not answered.

26

modestly profitable business case

(27)  The Icelandic authorities have not provided information which enables the Authority to make an assessment under that provision.

27

(28)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 33), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 364/2004 of 25 February 2004 (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 22). The point ‘Aid to small and medium enterprises’ was inserted by Joint Committee Decision No 88/2002 (OJ L 266, 3.10.2002, p. 56 and EEA Supplement No 49, 3.10.2002, p. 42), e.i.f. 1.2.2003. The amendment was inserted by Decision No 131/2004 (OJ No L 64, 10.3.2005, p. 67 and EEA Supplement No 12, 10.3.2005, p. 49), e.i.f. 25.9.2004.

28

(29)  As stated in the summary report submitted by the Icelandic authorities in the notification dated 27 February 2004, the consortium member Teleglobe, in particular, was faced with business difficulties.

29

(30)  Data transmission in which a single medium can carry several channels at once. The term is also used to compare frequency bandwidth greater than 3 MHz narrowband frequencies. Broadband can transmit more data at a higher speed.

30

(31)  See e-Europe 2004 Action Plan, Communication from the Commission, An information society for all, 28.5.2002, COM (2002) 263 final, see Commission Decision N 231/2003 Project Atlas — broadband infrastructure for business parks and N 307/2004 Broadband in Scotland — remote and rural areas.

31

(32)  The Icelandic authorities state: ‘Widespread participation was sought in Iceland and the Faeroe Islands for shareholders in the Farice project and all telecoms operators were invited to participate in the foundation of the company.’

32

Widespread participation was sought in Iceland and the Faeroe Islands for shareholders in the Farice project and all telecoms operators were invited to participate in the foundation of the company

(33)  Commission Decision N 307/2004, N 199/2004 and N 213/2003.

33

(34)  Cf. Case C-225/91, Matra SA v Commission, [1993] ECR-3203, paragraph 41.

34

Matra SA

Commission

(35)  On the co-existence of existing infrastructure, see Commission Decision N 307/2004, paragraph 45, where it is positively outlined that this minimises the risk of unnecessary duplication and limits the economic impact for operators that already have infrastructure in place. See also Commission Decision N 199/2004, paragraph 41, N 213/2003, paragraph 47.

35

(36)  See footnote 8 of this Decision.

36

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10.11.2005

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STATSSTØTTE — ISLAND

Meddelelse fra EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden til EFTA-staterne, EU's medlemsstater og andre interesserede parter

Statsstøtteforanstaltning nr. 47901 (tidligere SAM 030.02.006) — Påtænkt støtte i form af en statsgaranti til deCODE Genetics i forbindelse med etablering af en afdeling for udvikling af lægemidler

(2005/C 277/09)

Ved brev af 27. maj 2002 underrettede den islandske regering EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden om et forslag om at stille en garanti for deCODE Genetics Inc. (USA) i forbindelse med et bioteknologisk forsknings- og udviklingsprojekt, som virksomheden vil iværksætte i Island.

I maj 2002 gav det islandske Alting finansministeriet bemyndigelse til at stille en garanti til deCODE Genetics Inc. (USA) for en obligation på 200 mio. USD. Indtægterne fra obligationen skulle bruges til at etablere en ny afdeling for lægemidler i Island og til at finansiere en række programmer for udvikling af lægemidler.

Den 16. juli 2003 indledte Tilsynsmyndigheden den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i protokol 3, til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen over for denne støtte. Beslutningen blev offentliggjort i EØS-afsnittet af og EØS-tillægget til Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
   (1).

Ved brev af 14. april 2004 trak Island ovennævnte anmeldelse tilbage.

Da de islandske myndigheder har trukket anmeldelsen tilbage og ikke har i sinde at yde den anmeldte støtte, har Tilsynsmyndigheden besluttet at afslutte proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i protokol 3 til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen.

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(1)  EUT C 308 af 18.12.2003, s.22 og EØS-tillægget til Den Europæiske Unions Tidende nr. 63, s. 10, af samme dato.

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Den Europæiske Centralbank

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DEN EUROPÆISKE CENTRALBANKS HENSTILLING

af 26. oktober 2005

til Rådet for Den Europæiske Union om de eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland

(ECB/2005/10)

(2005/C 277/10)

STYRELSESRÅDET FOR DEN EUROPÆISKE CENTRALBANK HAR —

under henvisning til statutten for Det Europæiske System af Centralbanker og Den Europæiske Centralbank, særlig artikel 27.1, og

ud fra følgende betragtninger:

| (1) | Regnskaberne for Den Europæiske Centralbank (ECB) og for Eurosystemets nationale centralbanker revideres af uafhængige eksterne revisorer, der indstilles af ECB's Styrelsesråd og godkendes af Rådet for Den Europæiske Union. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regnskaberne for Den Europæiske Centralbank (ECB) og for Eurosystemets nationale centralbanker revideres af uafhængige eksterne revisorer, der indstilles af ECB's Styrelsesråd og godkendes af Rådet for Den Europæiske Union.

| (2) | Mandatet for de nuværende eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland er udløbet og vil ikke blive fornyet. Det er derfor nødvendigt at udnævne eksterne revisorer fra regnskabsåret 2005. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Mandatet for de nuværende eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland er udløbet og vil ikke blive fornyet. Det er derfor nødvendigt at udnævne eksterne revisorer fra regnskabsåret 2005.

| (3) | The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland har valgt Deloitte & Touche som sine eksterne revisorer for regnskabsåret 2005, og efter ECB's opfattelse opfylder de foreslåede revisorer de nødvendige krav. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland har valgt Deloitte & Touche som sine eksterne revisorer for regnskabsåret 2005, og efter ECB's opfattelse opfylder de foreslåede revisorer de nødvendige krav.

| (4) | Varigheden af de eksterne revisorers mandat er tre år, med mulighed for forlængelse — |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Varigheden af de eksterne revisorers mandat er tre år, med mulighed for forlængelse —

VEDTAGET FØLGENDE HENSTILLING:

Det henstilles, at Deloitte & Touche udnævnes til eksterne revisorer i the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland for regnskabsåret 2005 for et tidsrum på 3 år, med mulighed for forlængelse.

Udfærdiget i Frankfurt am Main den 26. oktober 2005.

Formand for ECB

Jean-Claude TRICHET

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