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HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND

MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE FACILITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 2, 2004

Serial No. 108–259

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

DIANE E. WATSON, California

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

J. VINCENT CHASE, Chief Investigator

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on August 2, 2004 ............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Horsley, Don, county sheriff, San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, State

of California; Heather Fong, chief of police, San Francisco Police Department, city of San Francisco, CA; Scott MacGregor, assistant chief,

California Highway Patrol, California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA; Mark Church, president, San Mateo County Board of

Supervisors, State of California; and Michael Nevin, supervisor, San

Mateo County Board of Supervisors, State of California .......................... 74

Nelson, Walfred A., Deputy Assistant Director, Enforcement Programs

and Services Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,

U.S. Department of Justice; and Michael Gulledge, Director, Office

of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General,

U.S. Department of Justice .......................................................................... 14

Ronay, James Christopher, president, the Institute of Makers of Explosives; and Barney T. Villa, international director, International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, Whittier, CA ....................... 116

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Church, Mark, president, San Mateo County Board of Supervisors, State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 93

Fong, Heather, chief of police, San Francisco Police Department, city

of San Francisco, CA, prepared statement of ............................................. 81

Gulledge, Michael, Director, Office of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 28

Horsley, Don, county sheriff, San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 76

Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 7

MacGregor, Scott, assistant chief, California Highway Patrol, California

Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, prepared statement of .............. 87

Nelson, Walfred A., Deputy Assistant Director, Enforcement Programs

and Services Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,

U.S. Department of Justice:

Information concerning explosives ........................................................... 46

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 18

Nevin, Michael, supervisor, San Mateo County Board of Supervisors,

State of California, prepared statement of ................................................. 103

Ronay, James Christopher, president, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 118

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Letter from Stanley Mathiasen ................................................................ 13

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Villa, Barney T., international director, International Association of Bomb

Technicians and Investigators, Whittier, CA, prepared statement of ...... 129

(1)

HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND

MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE FACILITIES

MONDAY, AUGUST 2, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

San Mateo, CA.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m., in San

Mateo Council Chambers, San Mateo, CA, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays and Lantos.

Also present: Representative Eshoo.

Staff present: Vincent Chase, chief investigator; and Robert

Briggs, clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. In the spirit of the person who trained me to be a

chairman, Tom Lantos, we start on time. A quorum being present,

the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and

International Relations hearing entitled, ‘‘Homeland Security: Surveillance and Monitoring of Explosives Storage Facilities,’’ is called

to order.

Let me thank Congressman Tom Lantos for inviting this subcommittee here today. In 1987, when I first arrived in Congress,

Chairman Lantos taught me a great deal about leadership and determination. Tom is one of the most articulate, passionate and persuasive members of the House of Representatives. He is also

known on both sides of the aisle for his principled and courageous

approach to international and domestic issues.

Congressman Lantos, ranking member of the International Relations and a senior of the Government Reform Committees, is a

thoughtful, energetic participant in our oversight, and we are

grateful for the opportunity to examine the adequacy of security

safeguards at explosive material storage facilities from his perspective. Tom and I are joined today by Anna Eshoo, a member of the

very powerful Energy and Commerce Committee as well as the Intelligence Committee. Ms. Eshoo is a very good friend and a highly

respected Member of Congress. She truly is an exceptional Member

of Congress, and we are delighted to have her join this subcommittee, and we will have the appropriate unanimous consent to make

her a full participant in this subcommittee.

During the weekend of July 4, 2004, almost 200 pounds of explosive material were stolen from the San Mateo County Crystal

2

Springs Reservoir Storage Facility. Military binary explosives, plastic C4, detonation cords and blasting caps were reported taken

from the magazine used to store explosives for training drills and

confiscated weapons and ammunition. Fortunately, the robbery

does not appear terror related and the suspects were apprehended

within days of the crime. Law enforcement authorities believe they

have recovered all of the explosives. This apparent local event

should serve as a national wake-up call and may be considered a

blessing in disguise, but we do need to wake up.

Many think that storage facilities operated by State and local

agencies may be more vulnerable to theft, sabotage or terrorist attack than those operated by businesses. Ultimately, we will look at

both. Securing explosives storage facilities present difficult challenges, demands and tough choices. The need for increased physical

security against heightened threats is obvious.

While it is not possible to eliminate the vulnerability of all attractive terrorist targets throughout the country, strategic improvements in security can make it more difficult to acquire explosive

material and can lessen the impact of attacks that do occur. The

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, still called

ATF, is responsible for enforcement of Federal laws relating to

storage of explosives in private facilities, but States have primary

authority and force protection standards at public sites. It is estimated there are hundreds of these bunkers throughout the United

States. Adherence to Federal security standards by public storage

facilities is voluntary.

As a result, it is unclear whether local law enforcement meet

minimal ATF guidelines or whether varying State and local security requirements provide adequate protection. Given the undeniable allure of explosives to terrorists, the subcommittee asked the

Government Accountability Office [GAO], to undertake a study to

examine the vulnerability of public and private explosive storage

facilities, and recommend actions needed to correct facility security

deficiencies. Such a risk management approach is essential to realign enhanced security measures with new, more dynamic threats.

Therefore, we meet this morning to ask if the public and private

sectors are pursuing a viable security strategy to protect the Nation’s explosive storage facilities. Federal witnesses will speak to

the adequacy of laws and existing enforcement programs to ensure

the security of high explosives stored by local law enforcement

agencies. State and local witnesses will testify about storage regulations and the need for uniform security standards. Witnesses

from business and industry will describe best practices for the storage of high explosives and industry recommendations for security

improvements. We appreciate the time, dedication and expertise of

all our witnesses. We are all members of one family, the United

States of America, and that is how I approach these hearings. We

look forward to their testimony.

At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished Member, Mr. Lantos.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first

say there is no Member of Congress for whom I have higher regard

or greater appreciation than you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. You have conducted a whole series of singularly significant hearings on homeland security ever since September 11,

and you have made an enormous contribution to enhancing our position as a Nation in the face of terrorist threats. I also want to

thank my good friend and neighbor, Congresswoman Anna Eshoo,

for joining our subcommittee. She and I share San Mateo County

in terms of Federal representation. She is an outstanding Member

of Congress, an important member of the Intelligence Committee,

and her contributions to enhancing domestic security have been

significant and will continue to be. I also want to thank both the

subcommittee staff, my personal staff and all of our witnesses for

their invaluable work.

I also want to congratulate law enforcement for apprehending

the criminals involved in this very serious theft of explosives. The

criminals have been apprehended, and the explosives have been recovered. This is one potential tragedy of significant proportions

which has been diffused.

I need not point out to anybody the unique and extraordinary

timing of this hearing. If you read this morning’s local papers or

The New York Times, if you listen to radio or watch television, the

topic is basically the topic of this hearing on a broader and more

expanded level.

I also would like to say a word about the committee on which

Chairman Shays and I have the privilege of serving. The Government Reform Committee is the oversight committee of the Congress

of the United States. Whatever the issue, inappropriate behavior

by cabinet members, as was the case of the Department of Housing

and Urban Development when I Chaired the subcommittee and

Chris was my invaluable Republican colleague, to now homeland

security, this committee looks to it that, a, laws are carried out as

they are supposed to be carried out, or, as is likely to be the case

with respect to today’s hearing, new legislation is introduced and

passed where gaps appear in the panoply of legislation that deals

with our national security.

Field hearings by this committee are fairly unusual. Field hearings demand that Members and staff go out to various parts of the

country, the infrastructure of Washington, DC, is not there, but occasionally field hearings are justified. This particular field hearing,

and I want to thank my friend Chris Shays for holding it, is in line

with other important field hearings this committee had here in San

Mateo County in earlier periods. During a particularly severe

storm over 20 years ago when Devil’s Slide was washed away, at

my request the then chairman of the committee brought out this

bipartisan committee to hold field hearings on Devil’s Slide with

laudable results. Over 20 years ago, I held the first field hearing

on the subject of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve here in San

Mateo County.

This time, a gap in our security, as it relates to the storage of

explosives by public agencies, not only will result in dealing with

this specific instance, which is really not our main concern—we are

6

not a law enforcement agency, and this is not a court of law. Our

main purpose will be to see what additional legislation is called for

to plug the loophole in this most important arena.

The explosives industry is big business. We are about 21⁄2 million

metric tons of explosives every year. It is over $1 billion in sales.

As we dig into this particular episode, we discover that there are

scores of thefts of high explosives across the country. At a time

when explosives are the preferred method of operation of terrorists,

the importance of safeguarding explosives should be obvious to all

of us.

Federal security standards by public storage facilities at the moment are voluntary. This is a pre-September 11 standard which

simply does not hold up in a post-September 11 world. In my judgment, we will need uniform Federal standards, uniformly enforced

across this country, and once we make that legislation, and it is

properly implemented, this particular gaping hole in our domestic

security structure will have been eliminated.

Let me say just one final word about funding. We must not allow

funding for homeland security to become pork barrel legislation. It

is, to quite an extent, as we meet here this morning. The State of

Wyoming receives about $38 per person for homeland security purposes; California receives about $5. At a time when some areas are

uniquely exposed to the dangers of terrorist attacks—and this

morning, Secretary Ridge has designated New York City, part of

New Jersey and our Nation’s capital as high-risk areas—the notion

that Wyoming should be getting many times as much per capita as

California, with all of its vulnerable facilities, is simply unacceptable. Pork-barrel funding of homeland security is simply not something that the American people will tolerate.

I suspect in many ways since September 11 we have been confronted with what I call the ‘‘guns of Singapore’’ phenomenon. As

some of you may know, the guns of Singapore in the Second World

War were fixed in place aiming at the sea. But the danger, the invasion and finally the occupation of Singapore came from the land

behind, and the guns of Singapore were never fired in that battle.

They couldn’t be—they were aimed at the wrong enemy. Now it is

self-evident that when, on September 11, the terrorist gangsters,

mass-murderers captured our civilian airliners, we had a phenomenon similar to the guns of Singapore. Our Air Force was more than

ready to deal with alien and hostile air forces which simply did not

materialize, but we were unprepared to deal with terrorism capturing domestic airliners.

At a time when explosives are so critical in the struggle against

terrorism, to see a facility just a few miles from here be as

undefended, unprotected as in fact they were during the 4th of July

weekend is something we cannot tolerate. As Chairman Shays so

properly indicated, we are dealing with a national wake-up call

which could be a blessing in disguise. If Congress acts and the administration follows, we will be able to plug this enormous loophole

in our national security apparatus. I look forward to hearing from

our witnesses, and I again want to thank you, Chairman Shays.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Lantos follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. At this time, let us just take care of some

business and ask unanimous consent to have Ms. Anna Eshoo participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. I also

would extend an invitation when we have more hearings back in

Washington, we would love your same participation. This is a facility, actually, in your district. Ms. Eshoo, wonderful to have you.

Mr. LANTOS. It is in my district, but who cares. [Laughter.]

This place is in my district; the facility is in hers.

Mr. SHAYS. Oh, no. I understand that. You are the reason why

we are here, Mr. Lantos, and we are in your district, but, Ms.

Eshoo, you have the floor.

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, first of all, welcome

to San Mateo County——

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. ESHOO [continuing]. And to California. We are very, very

pleased that you are here, and indeed it is an honor to have you

as chairman of this very important committee to be here.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me interrupt the gentle lady to say that my oldest brother lives in this district and is a constituent of Mr. Lantos.

Ms. ESHOO. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. We are still checking on whether he votes for me,

Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Ms. ESHOO. And, of course, to my colleague, Tom Lantos and his

outstanding work in the Congress, thank you for inviting me to

this hearing, allowing me to participate in it and to participate

with the subcommittee. And to everyone that is here sitting in

council chambers reminds me of the 10 years that I spent in local

government. And so wherever I am in San Mateo County, it makes

no difference to me, because San Mateo County is my home. So to

all of my colleagues and the board of the supervisors that are here,

to Sheriff Horsley, to all of the law enforcement people that are

here and the rest of the broader community, it is an honor.

The theft of the high explosives from a multistorage unit at Crystal Springs Reservoir on the 4th of July weekend was, I think, a

frightening incident for all of us who live in the area. It is also, I

believe, a warning about the broader weaknesses in the Federal

regulation of dangerous materials, and that is what this hearing is

about—how we can do better. And I think that given the lineup of

the witnesses and the information that will be drawn from them,

that we can learn more and really hit the bulls eye here and close

the loophole, as Congressman Lantos says, about these dangerous

materials.

I do want to recognize the good work of our law enforcement officials, because were it not for them there would be an added piece

to this hearing, and that is that what was stolen would still be out

there, which would add to and heighten the anxiety and the fear

of our people. So I salute you for that.

I also want to point out that there have been consistent efforts

in San Mateo County, and I am a real cheerleader for them, because, as our law enforcement officials and our elected officials

have had to transform themselves with the whole issue of homeland security, they have to translate it into hometown security.

That is really what it is. In Washington, we talk about homeland

11

security, but it all comes back to our local community. So to members of the board and to our law enforcement people, thank you.

The broader questions raised by this incident obviously cannot be

ignored. We need, in my view, stricter mandatory Federal requirements for safeguarding the facilities where high explosives are

stored. The current regulations, as I read them, don’t do what they

need to in order to keep our citizens safe. For almost all facilities,

current Federal guidelines only require a weekly inspection to

check for missing inventory and an ATF inspection once every 3

years. Not good enough anymore.

The ATF doesn’t require alarm systems, cameras, surveillance

equipment or security personnel to guard these sites. I can’t help

but think that when I am in a grocery store that they have more

security to protect the frozen food section, so we have a ways to go

on this. And we can do it. We know how. That is the best part of

it.

There are many more explosive storage sites throughout the

United States, and they are protected by a wide array of Federal,

State and local agencies, but how many munitions storage sites are

there in our country? Who controls them? How secure are these

sites under the ATF existing regulations, and how often are they

secured or inspected by the ATF to ensure compliance? Finally,

how much of this material is stolen or, ‘‘lost,’’ each year? My own

cursory review of the ATF Web site uncovered the sobering fact

that in a 5-year period between 1992 and 1996 more than 27,000

pounds of high explosives were stolen. So I think that we need to

have an inventory. We need to know who is checking the inventory.

We need a set of regulations that are very clear and will apply

across the board and then the implementation, carrying out of

what we need to do.

Since the attack on our country, I have heard countless first responders and public officials say that we have to be right 100 percent of the time where our enemies only need to be right once. I

think that we have been fortunate in this case. It could have been

many other things. It is not. But what we are here for today is to

draw a lesson from it, to probe the weaknesses and then build a

very strong safety net, a legal safety net, not only for San Mateo

County but for communities across our country.

And for that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for including me

in this hearing and of course to my friend and colleague, Congressman Tom Lantos, not only for his superb representation in the

Congress but also for his friendship that has stretched over so

many years. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentle lady very much and appreciate the

patience of our guests as well as our witnesses. We think it is important for our witnesses to know our general attitude about how

we are approaching this hearing, and would also like to do something I don’t usually do but recognize my staff member, Vince

Chase, who actually served in the Connecticut State Legislature for

16 years as a member of the legislature. I had already committed

to my staff all the activities and hearings they would have to the

rest of the year, and that was about a 60 hour a week job to finish

up, and then I came in and said, ‘‘Tom Lantos pointed out that we

have a very serious problem about how we store our explosive deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
12

vices and we are going to have a hearing in a few weeks.’’ Vince

dropped everything else and he has, I think, helped to present a

very nice hearing, and, Vince, we appreciate that very much.

I would ask unanimous consent to place in the record a letter

from the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I would ask unanimous consent that all members of

the subcommittee, and that includes Ms. Eshoo, be permitted to

place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. I would ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be

permitted to include their written statements, and without objection, so ordered.

We have three panels. Our general practice is 5 minutes, and

then we go to questions. We are going to do the 10-minute rule. I

will have Mr. Lantos ask questions for 10 minutes, Ms. Eshoo and

then I will as well. If you go over 5 minutes just a bit, that is OK.

I don’t want you to rush through it, but we don’t want it to be too

long because we do have three panels. And given that you have listened to all of us speak, I feel a little reluctant to be too strict on

the time here.

Our first panel is Mr. Walfred A. Nelson, Deputy Assistant Director of Enforcement Programs and Services Division, The Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of Justice, and our

next witness on the same panel is Mr. Michael Gulledge, Director,

Office of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice. We welcome both of you here.

We are going to have some interesting dialog.

We are all learning a lot about a new area for some, and I just

would point out that this is a subcommittee that has had over 50

hearings on this issue, and we had 20 hearings before September

11. One of the points that was made clear, 3 commissions before

September 11 all said, ‘‘We have a terrorist threat out there, we

need to have an assessment of that threat, we need a new strategy

to deal with it, and we need to reorganize our government to respond.’’ And one of the things that we clearly are doing, this is a

work in process, this is a hugely important issue that we are dealing with today. It has national significance to our homeland security and this is the beginning of what I expect will be a number

of hearings on this issue.

So you two gentlemen start this process off, and we thank you

very much. We will start with you, Mr. Nelson.

STATEMENTS OF WALFRED A. NELSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES DIVISION, THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND MICHAEL GULLEDGE,

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms.

Eshoo. I appreciate the opportunity——

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me, I need to be reminded. I did not swear

you in. No wonder you looked a little surprised at me. I said they

would be sworn in. We swear in all our witnesses. If you would

both stand and raise your right hands. I will just say, parenthetically, the only person I never swore in in my 8 years as chairman

was Senator Byrd—I chickened out. But everyone else has been.

[Witnesses sworn.]

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Mr. SHAYS. Both witnesses have responded in the affirmative,

and I am sorry, we will start the clock over again.

Mr. NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms.

Eshoo. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to

discuss ATF’s role in explosives enforcement in the United States.

ATF enforces Federal explosives laws and regulates commerce in

explosives. I would like to provide you with a general overview of

ATF explosives expertise and assets and then explain in more detail ATF’s role in ensuring the safe storage of explosives.

A primary ATF strategic goal is the investigation of explosives

and arson-related crimes, such as bombings and explosives thefts.

ATF aggressively investigates bombings, fires and explosives thefts

to protect the public from the criminal or unsafe use of explosives.

ATF’s vigorous enforcement efforts include keeping explosives out

of the hands who would use explosives for criminal or terrorist purposes. One of the ways ATF accomplishes this is by investigating

all applicants for explosives licenses and permits and by inspecting

those entities. And if I could add, since the passage of the Safe Explosives Act in 2002, all persons desiring to obtain or receive commercial explosives are required to get a permit from ATF and are

subject to a fingerprint and background check.

On July 6, 2004, a break-in at the San Mateo County explosives

storage facility was discovered. The San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, San Francisco PD and the FBI advised ATF that they used explosives magazines housed in San Mateo County on property

owned by the City and County of San Francisco. ATF immediately

responded to the crime scene and began an investigation. From the

onset, ATF’s efforts to recover the explosives and bring those responsible to justice have been supported by many law enforcement

agencies, including the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the California Highway Patrol, Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Hayward Police Department, Union City Police Department, Oakland Police Department and the Walnut Creek Bomb Squad.

As part of the response, information received by Alameda County

Sheriff’s Office led law enforcement to possible suspects and suspect vehicles. As a result of the intensive investigation, we believe

ATF has recovered all the stolen explosives and arrested 4 individuals who were later indicted by Federal grand jury charging 21

counts relating to the theft, possession and distribution of the explosives.

ATF maintains a variety of licensing, regulatory and criminal enforcement initiatives that comprise a comprehensive strategy to

help ensure that explosives are not available for use by terrorists

or those who would commit violent crime. The ATF work force includes approximately 420 field inspectors who are responsible for

inspection of all 120,000 firearms and explosives licensees nationwide. Approximately 12,000 of that total are explosives licensees

and permittees, and, again, just to add, since the passage of the

Safe Explosives Act, over 3,600 additional companies have received

permits from ATF.

Since September 11, inspection of explosives storage facilities has

been ATF’s highest regulatory priority. The length of time it requires to conduct an inspection of any explosives facilities can vary

dramatically, from as little as several hours to as much as several

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weeks. And, of course, our prime focus is the safe storage and security of the explosives.

All persons storing explosives, including State and local government agencies, must meet certain storage requirements. Now,

these storage requirements are contained in a booklet that we provide to the public, and they are on our Web site as well. Only Federal Government agencies are exempt from storage requirements,

and that is as authorized by law at 18 USC Section 845(a)(6).

What types of things would an ATF inspector do when they went

out to check an explosives storage facility? Well, first of all, we

would look at all magazines to make sure that they continue to

meet construction, lighting and housekeeping requirements. We are

going to verify the types and locations of all magazines and inspect

all structures onsite. We are going to verify that the storage descriptions are accurate and that there have not been any unreported changes or additions to storage. We are going to verify all

outdoor magazines meet the table of distance requirements; that is

the distance that the magazines must be set off from public highways, residential communities and the like. We will determine the

class of explosives and appropriate type of magazine for each class,

and we will conduct an inventory to compare to transactions

records.

At the end of fiscal year 2003, there were 11,770 explosives licensees and permittees in the United States, and today we are over

12,000, so it is going up. ATF conducted 7,883 inspections of those

licensees and uncovered 1,165 public safety violations. Additionally,

last year, ATF opened in excess of 4,000 explosives and arson

criminal investigations and received reports of 79 thefts of explosives. By law, any person who has knowledge of the theft or loss

of explosive material from his or her stock must report that theft

or loss to ATF within 24 hours of discovery.

Now, in the past 10 years, ATF has received theft reports from

State, local and military entities 8 times. In a concerted effort to

keep all explosives out of the hands of those who would use them

for criminal or terrorist purposes, ATF investigates 100 percent of

all reported thefts or losses of explosives. And, if I can add, we do

more than that. We have a secure email net and we provide information on all thefts and losses to over 600 State, local and other

Federal agencies, to include details of the theft and pictures of the

explosives that have been stolen. After all, they are the individuals

who may come across them in their work.

Recently, ATF developed an Explosives Threat Assessment and

Prevention Strategy at the request of the Attorney General. Part

of this strategy involves Threat Assessment Guidelines that we

have issued to explosives industry groups. It covers security and

other areas that industry members would voluntarily strengthen

that are not covered by ATF regulations, such as employee security

awareness training. Our ATF inspectors will be using this guideline on current inspections for the rest of the year.

Although we cannot conduct mandatory inspections of State and

local storage facilities, we do often provide inspections for public

storage facilities on request. In 2003 and 2004, to date, ATF has

conducted 39 voluntarily requested inspections for explosives storage facilities owned by government entities.

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Our increased inspection efforts post September 11 have included

a number of initiatives. On September 11, 2001, ATF sent out a

letters to all Federal explosives licensees and permittees requesting

them to conduct a full inventory of all explosive items in their possession. And we asked that if there were any thefts or losses disclosed from this, that they report that to ATF immediately.

In October 2001, ATF initiated a program to inspect as many explosives industry members as possible, as quickly as possible, to

gather intelligence on possible criminal activities and to assess and

correct security and storage vulnerabilities. We conducted a total of

7,459 inspections in the ensuing 3 months. The results of this program included 198 referrals of potential suspicious activities to

ATF’s law enforcement arm and the issuance of 372 violations.

This increased inspection effort lead to the discovery and immediate seizure of over 4 million pounds of improperly stored explosive materials at one particular site, the largest seizure of explosives in ATF’s history. That explosives licensee had its Federal license revoked.

In May 2002, June 2003 and July 2004, ATF sent out additional

special notices to all Federal explosives licensees and permittees,

again stressing the need for continued vigilance and security assessments as a result of the events of September 11, 2001.

ATF believes in partnering with industry to promote public safety. Two examples of these partnerships are the ‘‘Be Aware for

America’’ and ‘‘America’s Security Begins With You’’ Program. In

response to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995, ATF and

The Fertilizer Institute began coordinating an awareness program

to prevent ammonium nitrate from being obtained by those with

criminal intent. The ‘‘Be Aware for America’’ campaign was officially launched in 1997. The campaign was designed to help the

fertilizer industry be alert to suspicious purchasers, to heighten security, to increase vigilance over storage and distribution and to

ensure that persons are able to recognize the theft from, or the

misreporting of, fertilizer product shipments.

ATF continues to work with explosives industry members such as

the Institute of Makers of Explosives, International Society of Explosives Engineers, the American Pyrotechnics Association and the

National Mining Association. ATF personnel attend numerous seminars and events sponsored by these organizations, and we work

with these groups to quickly and accurately distribute new information.

Again, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms. Eshoo, I appreciate

the opportunity to testify today and share with you information on

ATF’s explosives enforcement efforts. I would be happy to answer

any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. Mr. Gulledge.

Mr. GULLEDGE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Eshoo, members

of the subcommittee, on behalf of Inspector General Glenn Fine, we

appreciate your invitation to testify. We were invited today because

we recently reviewed how the ATF inspects firearms dealers. And

that same body of inspectors also do the inspections of explosives

licensees. The issues we raised and the recommendations we made

to improve that program could be helpful as the subcommittee examines the safeguarding of explosives. I would also point out that

our audit section is in the final stages of review of the intelligence

related to explosives, and we will be coming out with that audit in

the next few months.

Mr. SHAYS. Could you please put the mic a little closer, and

when you are trying to look at us, it takes away from the mic a

little bit, so——

Mr. GULLEDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Just slide it down in the middle more.

Mr. GULLEDGE. The Evaluation and Inspections section is also

reviewing the ATF’s implementation of the Safe Explosives Act. Because we have not finished that review, I don’t have final data, but

I can discuss the issues that we intend to examine.

Let me start by talking about our report on inspections of firearms dealers. First, we found that the ATF is not able to inspect

all gun dealers in person. Application inspections are crucial for ensuring that new dealers understand firearms laws, but the ATF

told us that because of staff shortages, many inspections had to be

done over the telephone. Now, that is not the case with inspections

of explosives applicants, as those inspections must be done in person. The impact of the resource shortages was evident in our analysis of ATF staffing. When we examined the field divisions, we saw

that some had far fewer inspectors relative to their workload than

others.

We also found that the average length of application inspections

varied widely. The divisions with the fewest resources spent the

least time on each application inspection, as little as 6 hours. Divisions that had more resources took longer, as long as 25 hours, on

average. According to ATF data, the distribution of explosives licensees is also imbalanced among the field divisions. It ranges from

about seven explosives licensees per inspector to over 70.

In response to our recommendations, the ATF is developing a

new staffing model to align its inspectors with its workload, and it

is also seeking to increase the number of application inspections

done in person.

Another of our findings was that compliance inspections of firearms dealers were infrequent and inconsistent. The ATF’s goal is

to inspect gun dealers every 3 years, but it inspected less than 5

percent in fiscal year 2002. At that rate, it would take over 20

years to inspect all 104,000 firearms dealers. Unfortunately, recent

data indicates that the number of firearms inspections has fallen

as ATF redirected resources to accomplish the inspections mandated under the Safe Explosives Act.

We also found that there were significant differences in productivity across divisions. The variations we found showed that different divisions do not conduct compliance inspections in the same

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way. More importantly, there was little correlation between the average time that a division took and how many adverse actions it

initiated and how many times it identified and referred suspected

gun trafficking to investigators. We recommended that the ATF

streamline and standardize its inspection process, and once that is

done revise its staffing requirements to reflect the number of inspectors that it actually needs to inspect gun dealers every 3 years.

The ATF has identified a number of steps that it has taken to implement those recommendations.

One initiative has already improved the ATF’s consistency in

taking adverse actions. In the past the ATF acted infrequently to

revoke licenses of dealers that had violated firearms laws. In fiscal

years 2002 and 2003, combined, the ATF issued only 84 notices of

revocation. In May 2003, ATF headquarters issued guidance to ensure that field divisions act when they find serious violations.

Under the new guidelines, the number of revocations has increased

substantially. During the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, the ATF

issued 59 notices of revocation, which is a better than 5fold increase over the rate of the prior 2 years.

One caution about that: We found that the adjudication process

for those revocations was lengthy. It averaged about 379 days from

the time an inspector recommended it until the time the case was

closed. And that was due, in part, to the heavy workload that is

put on the ATF’s legal staff. As firearms and explosives cases rise,

the competition for those legal resources will also increase.

Let me now turn to our review of the ATF’s implementation of

the Safe Explosives Act. After September 11, the Congress passed

this act to reduce the chance that would-be terrorists could easily

obtain explosives with which to carry out attacks in this country.

We are examining how effectively the ATF has implemented the licensing and inspection programs required by the act.

Our review will examine the trends in revocations and denials

before and after implementation of the act, as well as the efficiency

and effectiveness with which the ATF is carrying out its inspection

program. We expect that many of the actions that the ATF has already agreed to implement will extend to its explosives inspections.

Regarding the actions that the ATF is taking, on behalf of the

Inspector General, I would like to say that we appreciate the responsiveness and the willingness that the ATF has shown to address the problems we reported. ATF managers have taken the

matters seriously and we believe they are taking positive actions

that will improve the ATF’s operations.

That concludes my statement, and I will be pleased to answer

any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gulledge follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. We have the clock right over

there. We do 10-minute questioning. I will turn to Mr. Lantos and

then Ms. Eshoo.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank our two witnesses for their very informative testimony.

Let me say at the outset that whatever term of criticism my colleagues or I may have with regard to some of these issues, it is not

aimed at the very hard working and honest and public spirited individuals who work at these organizations. But since the issues are

literally issues of life and death, we have to see to it that episodes

such as the one we had here in San Mateo County don’t occur.

Let me turn to Mr. Nelson first. In your testimony, on page 4,

you state that of the—you are talking about the year 2003, which

is the last year for which you have statistics. You say that there

were 79 thefts reported in 2003. Seventy-three were from private

and commercial licensees, and 6 were from public sector facilities.

Can you give us an idea of how the six thefts from public sector

facilities are similar to, dissimilar from the one we had here in San

Mateo County? In how many of these instances were arrests made,

and in how many of these instances were the explosives recovered?

Mr. NELSON. I think in most of the cases the thefts were accomplished by breaking the lock, torching the lock, getting in through

that way. That is one of the most common ways of entry. As far

as recoveries from public sector thefts, I would have to develop that

information and provide it to you.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, what is your impression? Were all of the

criminals who committed these acts apprehended?

Mr. NELSON. I don’t know. I would have to find out. I suspect in

some cases probably not. I don’t have that information with me.

Mr. LANTOS. The choice, sir, would imply that the explosives

were not recovered.

Mr. NELSON. That could be.

Mr. LANTOS. That could be.

Mr. NELSON. I could get data on explosive recoveries as well.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, let me ask you to comment specifically on the

San Mateo case. You have now studied it. It is receiving national

attention. What is your ex-post analysis of what happened and why

it happened?

Mr. NELSON. Well, since that case is an active criminal investigation, I won’t provide a comment on it. It is under criminal investigation right now, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Can the gentleman just give us the details without

having to mention names and so on of what happened? I mean I

would think you have some capability to do that.

Mr. NELSON. Well, we believe we have recovered all the explosives, and we have made the four arrests, and it is still an active

investigation.

Mr. SHAYS. Can you talk about the facility, how it is set up,

whether it met standards and so on? I mean aren’t these questions

that you want to go through? We aren’t here to—we are here because—it would be kind of absurd not to be able to have something

to talk about.

Mr. NELSON. It was a blow torch entry and there were about 200

pounds of explosives that were taken, that was emptied out, 30 to

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35 pounds of plastic explosives, 114 pounds of binaries, 800 to 900

blasting caps, some data sheet and some dat cord and other items.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, who or what was taken, that is really not

Chairman Shays’ question and not my question. We visited the

site. There are four sheds. Three of them, as far as we could determine, had no alarm mechanism whatsoever. One had a non-functioning alarm mechanism. How typical is this at public facilities

where explosives are stored?

Mr. NELSON. Well, the only requirement that the public facilities

have is to comply with our regulations, and we do not require

alarm systems. Now, many industry members do have them.

Mr. LANTOS. Why don’t you require alarm systems?

Mr. NELSON. Well, it is not currently in the regulations.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, I understand, but why are they not? That is

the question.

Mr. NELSON. Well, in my statement, I mentioned the explosives

threat assessment and prevention strategy that we are working on,

and one of the things we have done is distribute to the industry

groups a number of voluntary items they can take to strengthen

the security——

Mr. LANTOS. You say voluntary items.

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. Now, what do you do when they choose not to do

so? I mean this is an arena where to have voluntary suggestions

is lunatic. These have to be mandatory, mandatory provisions. Does

ATF have a view today, 3 years after September 11, whether the

suggestions should be voluntary or whether these are mandatory

requirements, and if they are not followed, there will be a revocation of license?

Mr. NELSON. One of the requirements under the explosives statute, at 18 USC 942(j), is that our regulations must comply with the

general standards of safety and security of the industry. Now, we

can propose regulations, and of course we would have to do a crossbenefit assessment as part of that process. We currently have

regulations——

Mr. LANTOS. Have you proposed changes? Have you proposed

that these regulations be mandatory?

Mr. NELSON. We have not. The current regulation that we are

considering will require a strengthening of the magazines’ construction themselves to provide better bullet resistance, and that is

currently being worked on.

Mr. LANTOS. But it is still voluntary. It is not mandatory.

Mr. NELSON. Well, if this reg gets finalized, additional security

in the form of the construction would be required.

Mr. LANTOS. Mandatory?

Mr. NELSON. Mandatory. But with the explosives threat assessment, while we consider whatever other regulations we might want

to propose in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we have gone to

the industry and we have asked them, ‘‘Here are some additional

steps we would like you to take on a voluntary basis.’’ Now, all of

the industry groups have indicated to me that they wish to cooperate and to do these things, and many of them are already accomplishing this. One of them is alarm systems, cable TV cameras,

training for employees, better screening of visitors and repairmen

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and other people who might come to the site. Those type of things,

we cannot impose them without going through a rather lengthy

regulatory process. In advance of considering additional regulations, we have gone out with this voluntary concept.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, let me say to you, Mr. Nelson, speaking just

for myself, that this voluntary concept 3 years after September 11

just doesn’t wash, and the leisurely approach which your testimony

reflects I find appalling. We are 3 years into a declared war on

global terrorism, and we are still making voluntary suggestions,

which obviously are not doing the job, and based on your own testimony, we are talking about 79 thefts of explosives last year. But

that indicates to me that something better has to be put in place

than what it is in place.

Let me turn to Mr. Gulledge. Your testimony, sir, is a devastating indictment of ATF. Let me quote from your testimony: ‘‘Although we recognize that the ATF’s resources are limited, we concluded that the ATF’s lack of standardized inspection procedures

resulted in inconsistent inspections of Federal firearm licensees

and significant variation in the implementation of the inspection

program by the field divisions. Moreover, the lack of consistency

prevented the ATF from ensuring that its current resources are

being used as efficiently as possible.’’

Now, this is a very heavy indictment. You are saying that they

are not doing the job right at a time when the country is engaged

in a global war on terrorism. What are your specific comments

about the San Mateo episode?

Mr. GULLEDGE. Well, the San Mateo episode really—it depends

on what the Congress decides to do regarding——

Mr. LANTOS. We can’t hear you.

Mr. GULLEDGE. I am sorry.

Mr. SHAYS. I suggest that since you want to be courteous and

look at us, you move away from the mic. Let’s see how that works.

Mr. GULLEDGE. Can you hear me now?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, we hear you pretty well.

Mr. GULLEDGE. OK.

Mr. LANTOS. You have to speak up a bit too.

Mr. GULLEDGE. OK. Thank you. It would depend on what the

Congress decides to do regarding whether or not the ATF is required to visit those sites. The workload right now is unknown, to

my understanding. That is, we don’t know where all of these sites

may be across the United States.

Mr. LANTOS. Is it your testimony that as we sit here this morning we do not know how many such sites there are?

Mr. GULLEDGE. To my knowledge, we do not.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Nelson, is that accurate?

Mr. NELSON. Are you referring to explosives sites, generally, sir?

Mr. LANTOS. Public sites.

Mr. NELSON. I have not a total count. I know there are approximately 400 plus bomb squads, all of whom would probably have

some sort of facility, but I do not know. There is no requirement

for them to report it to us.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, how difficult would it be for a large agency to

at least have an accounting of how many sites, such as the one

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here in San Mateo County, exist in the United States? How huge

a task is that?

Mr. NELSON. We could attempt it on a voluntary basis, reach out

to all——

Mr. LANTOS. Why on a voluntary basis?

Mr. NELSON. There is no requirement for them to report this to

us.

Mr. LANTOS. Are you recommending that there be a requirement?

Mr. NELSON. Well, that would take an act of Congress.

Mr. LANTOS. No. I am asking whether your agency is recommending that Congress act?

Mr. NELSON. We would be happy to make technical comments

and discuss any proposals——

Mr. LANTOS. I am not asking you whether you want to make

technical comments. I am asking you, representing an agency,

whether you are prepared at this stage to recommend a complete

accounting for all such facilities, which it seems to me is step one

in regulating them. If you don’t know how many there are, how can

you regulate them?

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to just ask the audience to refrain from

the laughter, in general, just simply because this is a hugely important issue, and it would help us to just continue without the laughter. Thank you.

Mr. NELSON. We do not—anything we attempt, and it is probably

a good idea to get this count, would have to be voluntary. We do

not have the authority to require agencies——

Mr. LANTOS. Are you asking for the authority?

Mr. NELSON. We have not asked for it.

Mr. LANTOS. Why not?

Mr. NELSON. Again, when it comes to State and local agencies,

we partner with them in many things, but we are not their regulatory agency.

Mr. LANTOS. But don’t you minimally need to know how many

such facilities there are in the United States?

Mr. NELSON. Could you repeat the question, sir?

Mr. LANTOS. Yes. Wouldn’t step No. 1 in dealing with thefts,

such as the one we have here in San Mateo, be to know how many

such facilities there are and where they are located?

Mr. NELSON. One thing that we did in 2001 is we put out a letter

to all State and local law enforcement agencies about their requirements for storage and the fact that we would do a voluntary inspection. Some weeks ago, we started developing another letter to

go out and as part of that we are again offering to do these inspections. We can certainly develop a list from this effort, I would

think.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, you have 39 responses; isn’t that right?

Mr. NELSON. We had 39 requests for inspections.

Mr. LANTOS. Thirty-nine places requested that you inspect. What

percentage is that of the total facilities? What would be your guess?

Mr. NELSON. Well, I have already said that we don’t have an accurate number of those facilities, but if there were 400 bomb

squads, it would be about 10 percent.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman. And we thank our witnesses

as well. We are going to get to the bottom of these issues, and it

is just real important for us to understand the mind-set, and what

I am hearing is that somehow, on the public side of the equation,

we just have had a hands off, and I think your questions, Mr. Lantos, are going to lead to some very interesting changes. Ms. Eshoo.

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. How many law enforcement munitions

storage facilities are there in the United States?

Mr. NELSON. We don’t have a list of such facilities.

Ms. ESHOO. You referred to private over and over again in your

testimony. When you say private, what are you referring to? Do

you have any numbers for private? You don’t have any for public,

but you mentioned private.

Mr. NELSON. Well, for the last year, we’ve been entering data

into our inspection data base on the number of magazines. Now,

this is done by licensee and permittee basis as we inspect them,

and we’ve developed a list of over 8,000——

Ms. ESHOO. Is the inspection still once every 3 years?

Mr. NELSON. We are required to inspect licensees every application. So the license is good for 3 years, so when it comes up for renewal we will do an inspection. We also inspect more frequently

those licensees who have thefts, who have had public safety violations or other compliance problems.

Ms. ESHOO. I can’t help but think so far of the analogy of the

term, ‘‘safety net,’’ that is used in the health care arena and what

kind of shape our health care safety net is. I have a sinking feeling

that the safety net when it comes to this area is pretty tattered as

well. Is there any centralized list maintained by the ATF, either on

the public or the private side?

Mr. NELSON. On the licensed industry, we are developing such a

list.

Ms. ESHOO. You don’t have one yet.

Mr. NELSON. We are about one-third of the way through.

Ms. ESHOO. So nothing on the public side and one-third of the

way on the private side.

Mr. NELSON. As far as developing a list of magazines, that is correct.

Ms. ESHOO. Why wouldn’t you have this inventory?

Mr. NELSON. Now, I have to say that——

Ms. ESHOO. How do you measure how you are serving and inspecting if you don’t even have an inventory of who is there, either

public or private?

Mr. NELSON. Well, we have the information in files for each licensee, but we haven’t put it into a data base starting a year ago,

so when we do an inspection the first thing the inspector looks at

is the magazine list, to go out to inspect all those magazines to

make sure they are still there and they are still in compliance with

all the requirements.

Ms. ESHOO. Is it true that prior to September 11, 2001 the ATF

policy was not to investigate every theft or loss of explosive materials?

Mr. NELSON. Our policy——

Ms. ESHOO. It can be yes or no.

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Mr. NELSON. Well, it was not our policy to investigate 100 percent.

Ms. ESHOO. What percentage?

Mr. NELSON. I don’t have that information.

Ms. ESHOO. And have your policies changed since then?

Mr. NELSON. Yes. Starting in 2002, we have a policy to inspect

or investigate every reported theft of explosives, and we just entered into an agreement with The Fertilizer Institute to get reports

of stolen ammonium nitrate and we investigate all such thefts.

Ms. ESHOO. Is the facility that is in question, the facility here in

San Mateo County, is that a facility that is exempt from your

guidelines or is it included in it?

Mr. NELSON. The agencies are required to store in accordance

with our guidelines, by law.

Ms. ESHOO. Are they ever inspected by your professionals?

Mr. NELSON. They would only inspected if it is requested.

Ms. ESHOO. Was it requested?

Mr. NELSON. Not to my knowledge.

Ms. ESHOO. Ever?

Mr. NELSON. I don’t have any knowledge that is was.

Ms. ESHOO. To what extent do ATF officials enforce any kind of

needed improvements? I mean if you haven’t been out to inspect,

you are not going to see whether something is working efficiently

or effectively.

Mr. NELSON. We put out periodic newsletters to the industry giving them some advice, but, basically, it is the inspection when we

are onsite to see the condition of the magazines.

Ms. ESHOO. But the inspection is really based on something that

is somewhat voluntary or a request from another agency, correct?

Mr. NELSON. The inspection of public facilities is voluntary. The

inspection of private facilities is mandatory.

Ms. ESHOO. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, we have something

right on its head right there, I mean that private facilities are

mandatory and public facilities are not. I think in a post-September

11 era that it is either the Congress instructs this agency to protect

the public or I mean we have to do that ourselves. This is a gaping

hole in this. So I think that is something that we are going to have

to pay attention to.

Would an ATF inspector have necessarily cited a malfunctioning

alarm in proximity to a nature trail in an inspection report? Or do

they just not—I have a sense that you are putting out newsletters

and memos. I don’t have a sense that there are human beings there

that have seen the place and know the condition, understand the

proximity and understand what the situation actually holds relative to the public.

Mr. NELSON. When we do our compliance inspections, we do have

a work plan that the inspectors go through, and we look for

changes in construction to see if there is any kind of a problem. We

look at the——

Ms. ESHOO. Do you have a copy of such a report relative to this?

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Mr. NELSON. The work plan?

Ms. ESHOO. Yes.

Mr. NELSON. I can provide it. I don’t have it with me.

Ms. ESHOO. I think that it should be provided to the committee.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. ESHOO. There is something else, Mr. Chairman, that I think

that we should take a look at in the broader examination of this,

and that is the chemical security. We mentioned the Murrah Building in 1995 and even without access to explosives, a person with

proper knowledge can make a highly destructive bomb. And I think

that is an area that we are going to have to pay close attention to

in this. It is not simply the materials that these units held but also

as is the case on the world stage, what can be done with these explosives in the wrong hands, what the chairman of the 9/11 Commission referred to as imagination. We have to have our own

imagination about where these things can lead, and we are in

charge of really reshaping these things given what we have already

been made to imagine and understand.

So I think, Mr. Chairman, that there are already some key areas

that need to be plugged up. This whole notion of private and public

having different standards I don’t really think is acceptable. Thank

you.

Mr. SHAYS. All set?

Ms. ESHOO. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, and I agree with the lady. When I was

preparing for this hearing, I read an introduction to just the explosive industry. I want to read—believe it or not, this is just a short

part of it. I thought it was one sentence, I think it is two. It says,

‘‘The use of explosives in the United States as made possible a

standard of living that is widely recognized as the finest in the

world.’’ When I read that, I thought that was bizarre until I read

on. ‘‘Virtually all the progress in the American standard of living

has in some measure been impacted by the use of explosives,

whether for building and development of infrastructure, creating

one of the greatest transportation systems in the world, while also

extracting valuable minerals from the Earth or in 100 other ways.’’

And it was an important statement for me to read.

This is a hugely important industry, it impacts all of our lives,

and we are not trying to shut it down or to put it out of operation.

We want to know, though, how this system works. So we accept

that it is an important element to a modern society. And in my

backward way of thinking, I think of explosives more in a negative

way rather than a positive.

Having said that, listening to the statements and listening to my

two colleagues, it is astounding to me what we don’t know. And I

wonder if, in the back of my mind thinking, are we so loose about

this because somehow this gets into the issue, in a certain kind of

way, of gun control or in other words, ‘‘Don’t tread on me. It is in

the Constitution and so on.’’ And I just want to have a sense, we

aren’t suggesting in any way that regulating the use of explosives

somehow is related to the issue of gun control. Is it directly or indirectly related to that issue? Is that why—does this make it a sensitive issue?

Mr. NELSON. Of course, the ammunition is fired by an explosive,

but I don’t see the link.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that would be the only link, basically.

Mr. NELSON. I mean we work very closely with the explosives industry. These are professional people that want us to be safe with

explosives.

65

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I understand that. And I understand we want

to be safe. What I don’t understand is how we don’t have basic

things like how many private facilities there are to be inspected

and how many public facilities there are to be inspected and to be

made safe. And that I find bizarre.

And I will tell you—and I am smiling and I understand the

laughter in the audience as well-but it needs to be silent smiles,

I guess. I smile because when I went to see this facility, I was really surprised. I mean I had been led to believe that there was this

mechanism alarm system and given that there is not electricity to

it, solar panels makes sense, that is one way, and then I realized

it is sitting on the top of one shed, and there are three other—four

or three other sheds?

Mr. LANTOS. Three others.

Mr. SHAYS. Three other sheds without an alarm system. And I

expected to see a fenced in area, not at the gate when you drove

in but around the facility, much like you have in a transmissionsite

along electric generation with barbed wire. So I expected, one, to

see the alarm system posted to every one of the sheds and a fenced

in area, and I thought that rather than being able to drive our car

casually up, there would be some difficulty in basically even bringing a van up to it unless you had special kind of keys. So I am not

surprised that someone could come and try once and maybe fail

and come back the next day.

And so what I am interested in first knowing from you, Mr. Nelson, is when you would look at that as a private facility versus a

public facility, what was lacking that you would expect in a private

facility?

Mr. NELSON. I personally haven’t been to that site, so I don’t

know exactly. I have been told that it would largely be in compliance with our requirements.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there somebody on your staff who has been to the

site that could give testimony? Is there someone else who could

speak to that issue?

Mr. NELSON. No.

Mr. SHAYS. No. It is really too bad you didn’t go to that site. That

would have been helpful to us, and I guess we should have—I just

had an assumption you would.

Well, I will just tell you, I just saw sheds with some very small

panels, and if you sometimes, as you do here, get overcast skies,

I would think the panels would be bigger and storage would be bigger to do it. We will be asking someone about that facility, and we

can do that then.

So we need to be clear about this. How many private facilities

exist? Do we know that?

Mr. NELSON. We don’t have an exact count. It would be very difficult to develop an exact count.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it will happen, I can assure you. That is something that is going to happen from this hearing. Whether you recommend it, if you choose not to or your agency chooses not to, we

certainly will.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. May I break in?

66

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Mr. LANTOS. I find your answer very puzzling, Mr. Nelson, because the private facilities need to be licensed for 3 years. So all

you have to do is get an abacus and add up the number of licenses

that were requested. How on earth is it possible for you under oath

to tell us that ATF doesn’t know how many private facilities there

are if you have to license them?

Mr. NELSON. Sir, we know how many licenses and permits we

have issued. We know what the population of that is. But some licensees have one magazine, like a 50-pound box inside a black

power shop, other companies might have hundreds of magazines.

Mr. SHAYS. See, what is troubling, though, is it is might, and——

Mr. NELSON. Some do.

Mr. SHAYS. No, I understand, but in other words, that doesn’t

impact me the way it seems to impact you. It seems to me, we

would want to know how many are smaller, how many are larger.

We would want to—that is like basic information it would seem we

would want, and that was the reason why I was asking about is

this somehow related to some other issue that I am not aware, because it would seem to me that you would want to be responding

to Mr. Lantos by saying, ‘‘Mr. Lantos, we should get this information and since September 11 we have recommended that we do,’’

and then if you recommend it, then we go up the chain and sometimes it is Congress.

Sometimes people will actually testify in Congress and say,

‘‘Well, do have it, we just didn’t spend the money.’’ But, ultimately,

Congress needs to be told, and then we are the ones who have to

be held accountable. But if the people, the administrators are not

recommending it, it puts the focus a little differently.

So at any rate, there are a number of private facilities that range

in sizes, and we don’t really know, but you have the data somewhere in the permits and you—yes.

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir. We have all the data on all the magazines

in permit files. We haven’t added it up, and we are doing that.

Mr. SHAYS. And we need to. And we need to add them up. One

of the things I am struck with—and in the public sector, we don’t

even request that, is that correct, because you don’t oversee it?

Mr. NELSON. We do not oversee it.

Mr. SHAYS. So one of the things I think our committee would

want to recommend is, one, that you seek to do that quickly and

we still have an appropriations process in play, and we should be

checking that out.

Ms. ESHOO. Would the chairman yield for just a moment?

Mr. SHAYS. Sure, absolutely.

Ms. ESHOO. Does the ATF permit States and local governments

to develop regulations on this, create their own regulations regarding explosives?

Mr. NELSON. Absolutely. States have the right to develop their

own explosives regulations and licensing regimes. And we would be

happy to work with any State and provide technical advice.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I know that, but we would be happy if you were

more happy to do more than that. In other words, given September

11—I mean we don’t think it is a question of if but when, where

and of what magnitude you are going to deal with some very horVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rific attacks on the United States. I mean that is something I certainly believe and I think other Members do as well. One obviously

is the convention weapon or a conventional weapon with radioactive material. Plastic explosives are obviously a concern because

of their challenge in sometimes being detected and so on. And they

are all in these facilities.

What is troubling to me is once we get to the point of not knowing how many facilities we have, publicly or privately, it is the concept of voluntary participation. I want to be clear, does the requirements overseeing the private sector, are these regulations designed

by the industry or by the government?

Mr. NELSON. We are required by statute to consider the standards of the industry as we develop our regulatory scheme.

Mr. SHAYS. But your regulatory scheme trumps whatever the industry does, correct?

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. So they have to live up to your requirements.

Mr. NELSON. That is right.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, when you went through what the requirements

state, the next thing that begs the question is if actually you all

are living up to that requirement. Are inspections happening every

3 years, without question? Are you on top of that or are you lack

of manpower, meaning that you are not able to live up to even your

requirements?

Mr. NELSON. We have testified—previous directors have testified

and we have reported to Congress of the need for additional inspector resources. We are getting——

Mr. SHAYS. Because you are not able to live up to the standards.

Mr. NELSON. We are getting the job done on the Safe Explosives

Act mandatory inspections, but it is difficult to do a lot of other

things because of it.

Mr. SHAYS. So the inspections of firearms facilities and so on are

being pushed aside.

Mr. NELSON. Well, we have to do what is mandatory first and

use our resources as best we can——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just back up. The bottom line is for budgetary

reasons, from your standpoint, we aren’t meeting the requirements

that you are required to do. This is not a trick question.

Mr. NELSON. Well, we——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just explain something to you, Mr. Nelson. If

you don’t answer candidly, then you give us a pass. If you answer—

besides the fact you are required to, but when you answer candidly,

then we understand the problem. Don’t disguise the problem from

us because we are in a capacity to be helpful.

Mr. NELSON. Right. We have previously testified and we have reported that we need significant additional resources.

Mr. SHAYS. In order to do that job.

Mr. NELSON. In order to get the job done.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So we don’t know the number of sites, either private or public. We have certain requirements, and so walk me

through what the requirements would be on a site. And I will tell

you, I have gone through my second pass. I am going to take another 5 minutes, and I will give other Members a chance here. And

then what I want to do is understand—well, tell me what a site

68

should look like, first off. If this was a private site, what would the

site look like? What would it be required to have?

Mr. NELSON. OK. First of all, we look at the magazines that are

there to make sure that they have proper locks, proper doors, proper linings.

Mr. SHAYS. So what we referred to as sheds, you refer to as magazines.

Mr. NELSON. Right, that is correct. And there are——

Mr. SHAYS. So what do they need?

Mr. NELSON. They need to have proper construction——

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. NELSON [continuing]. Proper locks, proper doors, proper

housekeeping——

Mr. SHAYS. That is recordkeeping?

Mr. NELSON. No. Housekeeping would be trash, dried grass. Anything that would be flammable has to be kept away from it.

Mr. SHAYS. It needs lights?

Mr. NELSON. If it has lights, they have to comply with the regulations. Many do not have lights. It is has to have proper roof. Of

particular importance is its location. It has to be located a certain

distance from residential inhabited buildings, from public highways, from passenger railroads. We do take measurements of these

facilities to the nearest public road or to a house if it looks to be

a concern. One of the concerns we have is encroachment of civilization on these items.

Mr. SHAYS. Does it have to have an alarm system?

Mr. NELSON. They are not required to have an alarm system.

Mr. SHAYS. Do they need to have video cameras?

Mr. NELSON. That is not required.

Mr. SHAYS. If a site is broken into, what is the penalty if someone doesn’t report a theft?

Mr. NELSON. If a store doesn’t report it, it is a felony.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So they are clearly breaking the law. If they report it, do they have to give you a clear inventory of what is missing?

Mr. NELSON. Yes. They have to give us a complete inventory.

Mr. SHAYS. If something is not reported, do they have to count

account for every explosive device that is used, so if you went in,

you would be able to ask them how many explosives devices were

used at each particular place?

Mr. NELSON. They have to keep a daily summary of magazine

transactions for each storage facility that shows what went in and

what went out every day.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And that is not voluntary; they have to do that.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. If they don’t do it, they lose their license.

Mr. NELSON. They could lose their license if it is a willful act.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. The interesting thing is if someone wanted to

cover up an event, they would simply claim that an error was detonated at a certain site, and since you don’t really have something

recoverable, they can just——

Mr. NELSON. Since it is consumed, that is correct.

69

Mr. SHAYS. OK. All righty. I have asked the questions I wanted.

Is there any questions any of you want—is there any question,

Vince, that we needed to ask? OK.

Mr. LANTOS. I would like to go through one item. I am profoundly puzzled by this repeated distinction between private and

public facilities. Let me take you to another arena. Let me take

you, for instance, to the hospital arena or the university arena

where, clearly, for certain purposes, there is no distinction. Publicly

owned hospitals must live up to the same requirements that privately owned hospitals have to live up to. They have to have the

same standards of sanitation, they have to have equally qualified

people, whether they are physicians or nurses or what have you,

they must live up to the same requirements with respect to dangerous waste disposal, because these are functional concepts and

they have nothing to do with ownership, whether these are privately owned or publicly owned. The University of California Medical School, which is in my district, has exactly the same requirements along a myriad of items that Stanford University Hospital

in my good friend’s district has to live up to.

Explain to us, both of you gentlemen, if you would, a logical rationale for establishing what to me are nonsensical differentials between what you require of private facilities and public facilities?

Because what we are dealing with is explosives. The explosive

doesn’t know whether it is located in a privately owned facility or

in a publicly owned facility. It is just an explosive, a very dangerous thing. Why wouldn’t a rational approach by an agency,

which is responsible for the safety thing of this, have the same regulations whether the entity is privately owned or publicly owned?

Mr. NELSON. We do have the same regulations, and the public

facilities, by law, must comply with our standards. However, Congress exempted the State and local agencies from all other explosives controls when the law was passed in 1970. We have no inspection authority.

Mr. LANTOS. I will be the first one to stipulate Congress passes

very stupid laws with great frequency. [Laughter.]

Since this was done in 1970——

Mr. SHAYS. You are definitely allowed to laugh at that one.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LANTOS. Since this was done in 1970, Mr. Nelson, has your

agency requested, before or after September 11, that the same provisions apply to both public and private facilities? And if not, why

not?

Mr. NELSON. I don’t believe we have.

Mr. LANTOS. And why not?

Mr. NELSON. We have not, and I can’t answer that.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, now that you have had the pleasure of our

questioning, will you go back to your head office and recommend

that the same safety provisions apply to both publicly and privately

held facilities?

Mr. NELSON. I will certainly be discussing it.

Mr. LANTOS. What is your own view?

Mr. NELSON. My view is that those facilities should comply with

all the standards that private facilities should comply with.

Mr. LANTOS. On a mandatory basis or on a voluntary basis?

70

Mr. NELSON. Well——

Mr. LANTOS. I mean that is the crux of the issue.

Mr. NELSON [continuing]. It would certainly be helpful if the

States would require this compliance.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, let’s assume—this is not a State issue, this is

a country, and whether the explosive is stolen from San Mateo, it

can be transported to Nevada and be used there. This is not a

States’ rights issue, so don’t divert us in that direction, because we

just won’t follow. Do you recommend on the basis of this hearing

that the same safety provisions be applied to private and public facilities on a mandatory basis?

Mr. NELSON. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you. How about you, sir?

Mr. GULLEDGE. The application of the inspection requirements is

really Congress’ decision to make.

Mr. LANTOS. We understand that. What is the recommendation

of the Department of Justice?

Mr. GULLEDGE. Certainly, on behalf of the Inspector General, I

think that we would want to look at this a little closer before we

make a specific recommendation for legislation. I would point out

to you at this time, though, that it would be a little more encompassing than just State-owned. There are other facilities out there

that are not subject to ATF regulation, for example, those that are

overseen by the Mine Safety and Health Administration. ATF

doesn’t oversee those, so if you want to come up with an all-encompassing regulation, we need to identify all of those.

Mr. SHAYS. You are talking about the Federal Government.

Mr. GULLEDGE. Yes. Yes. And the military. Certainly, they are

going to be exempted from certain parts of this because of the volume that they deal with. And we really want before we get back

with you to sit down and think about what we would recommend

that you do.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, no one is recommending that the military be

subjected to ATF rules and regulations. What we are talking about

civilian agencies.

Mr. GULLEDGE. Clearly, expanding inspection oversight to those

areas for which the regulations already apply would be a logical extension.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Eshoo.

Ms. ESHOO. Just a few quick questions. Mr. Nelson, you went

through a list of areas that raise the introspect of your agency. Not

having gone out to see this site, which is unfortunate, I think that

the whole issue of the public’s drinking water supply should be

taken into consideration where explosives are stored, because, surely, this site fits into that category, and we can’t afford to have the

better part of a region without a protected water supply.

Which leads me to my next question, which I would like to ask

Mr. Gulledge. At what point, in your opinion, do cases like this one

transcend a law enforcement issue and become a question of homeland security?

Mr. GULLEDGE. Certainly, any time you see a vulnerability, at

the Inspector General’s Office we would want to point that out so

that the agency or the Congress can act on it. Any time you idenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tify a gap in our coverage of protections. I don’t think there is a

bright line, but, clearly, this case has exposed a vulnerability.

Ms. ESHOO. I think in working with the committee that you consider any standards or guidelines being put into place to alert the

Department of Homeland Security officials of the security threat

such as this one. Life is not tidy anymore, for sure, and I think

that what we are suffering from in our many agencies, certainly,

we are—I am meeting tomorrow to be going back to D.C. for the

hearings that are commencing on the recommendations of the 9/11

Commission relative to our intelligence community, and we know

that there are, have been, so many smokestacks, so to speak. And

I think that we have a smokestack quality here to this issue as

well. We can’t have Federal agencies pointing fingers, doing this,

going in different directions on this and the gaps between public

and private, the overlap of Department of Homeland Security relative to the guidelines on these explosives, etc. So I just wanted to

point that out.

I also want to know-and I am not so sure that this has been set

down and whether it is absolutely clear—where does the ATF jurisdiction begin and end relative to the issue that this hearing is

about?

Mr. NELSON. With regard to explosives, it begins when the explosives are created and enters storage, and——

Ms. ESHOO. For both public and private or not?

Mr. NELSON. Well, for the storage, it is public and private; yes,

ma’am. We do not regulate the transportation of explosives, so explosives get produced and they might be stored for a few days, then

they are loaded onto trucks or——

Ms. ESHOO. So your jurisdiction is both public and private for the

storage and for maintenance of the explosives. And then you have

inspections or those are voluntary?

Mr. NELSON. The inspections of licensed entities are mandatory.

They are involuntary.

Ms. ESHOO. That is where there is a separation between public

and private.

Mr. NELSON. They are warrantless inspections as well.

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. We are going to close up real quick, but just to clarify

the record, Mr. Nelson, the issue of oversight of private facilities

you have law and regulation that basically requires them to move

up to the Federal standard and you inspect them, correct?

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And they can’t trump what the Federal Government

requires. I mean they can do better, but they can’t do worse.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. When it comes to local facilities, I thought you were

basically saying public facilities have to conform to the Federal

standards but you don’t inspect them. I don’t think that is accurate, so I must have misunderstood.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct. They have to conform to our storage

requirements, magazine construction, etc., but we do not have inspection authority.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. But they don’t necessarily have to conform to

your recordkeeping. They have to conform to everything——

72

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. So they have to conform to some but not everything.

Mr. NELSON. That is right.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is if they don’t, you can’t hold them

accountable. One, you can’t inspect them, and, two, you can’t hold

them accountable, correct?

Mr. NELSON. I think our only alternative if we had a serious

enough matter would be to go to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it is interesting that to think, and I am trying—there is a reason why everything tends to happen, whether it

is a good reason or a bad reason. The fact that you didn’t go to the

facility tells me in spite of the fact that we were having this hearing on that facility, I would have though your curiosity would have

gotten to you—it kinds of suggests to me that, one, you have more

than enough work to do and you are not looking for more, but it

also says to me that there may be a whole standard of failure to

provide proper conformity to the Federal statute, but we don’t

know because we are not looking, because you could have gone. I

think you would have been pretty surprised by that facility. I have

to think you would have been. Maybe you wouldn’t have been.

And it just speaks—it says something to me about the fact that

we require some things to be done on the public side, but we don’t

inspect them and there is no enforcement of it, so it is kind of

pointless, but we may not know how bad the facilities are, and we

certainly don’t know if there is uniformity. At least on the private

side we know there is some uniformity. On the public side, there

may be no uniformity. Heck, there could be even some sites worse

than this one. I would like to just ask if, Mr. Nelson, do you have

anything that you would like to just put on the record that you just

want to say that maybe you thought should have been asked that

we didn’t ask? Anything that you would like to put on the record?

Well, just think about it for a second.

Let me just conclude by asking the IG, is there anything we need

to be putting on the record? We didn’t ask you as many questions,

but anything you would like to put on the record that wasn’t?

Mr. GULLEDGE. Yes, sir, very briefly. Based on our look at the

inspections of gun dealers, there are three things that we think you

should consider while you are looking at the explosives protection.

First is identifying where all of those explosives are located. Once

you identify all of those locations, compare those to where the explosives licensees who are now licensed are and where the gun

dealers are, because you need to see where that distribution of

workload is so that you can properly staff the agency——

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. GULLEDGE [continuing]. That is the second thing, put the

people, the inspectors who are on staff where they are needed.

Mr. SHAYS. It is very clear you have pointed out a tremendous

disparity in workload.

Mr. GULLEDGE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. And what is the other issue?

Mr. GULLEDGE. The last issue is that right now the staffing request that I believe you discussed earlier only addresses inspectors.

As you have more inspectors and you do more inspections, you are

going to have followup actions to take, and part of the delays that

73

we saw were due to a lack of legal staff. So the consideration of

how you are going to have to address this is more than just inspectors.

Mr. SHAYS. Got you. Mr. Nelson, any other point you would like

to make?

Mr. NELSON. I just want to say again that the regulation of explosives is a partnership with industry. We must rely on them to

get the job done, to know what the rules are, and, by and large,

they do.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that raises other questions. The ‘‘by and large’’

scares the hell out of me. But, clearly, there has to be that partnership. Is there any other question? We are all set. Thank you both

very much. We appreciate your service to your government. I think

we have some work to do. All of us can chip in to do that.

We will start with our next panel. Our next panel is comprised

of five members. Mr. Donald Horsley, county sheriff, San Mateo

County Sheriff’s Office; Ms. Heather Fong, chief of police, San

Francisco Police Department; Mr. Scott MacGregor, assistant chief,

California Highway Patrol, California Department of Justice, State

of California; the Honorable Mark Church, president, San Mateo

County Board of Supervisors; and the Honorable Michael Nevin,

supervisor San Mateo County Board of Supervisors. I invite all of

our five witnesses to come. Do we have enough space for five?

We are waiting for two witnesses. Bob, can you please get Mr.

Nevin and Mr. Church?

If the witnesses could stand, I need to swear our witnesses in

and anyone who may be making a comment as well accompanying

them.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. For the record, our witnesses and potential witnesses

have all responded in the affirmative. We are pressing the time period a little bit, and I am going to ask, except I am going to give

special dispensation to the chief from San Francisco to go over the

5 minutes, but I am going to ask everyone else to be within the

5 minutes. And just to say to all of you it is wonderful to have your

participation and say particularly to Chief Fong, your reputation

around the country is a very good one, and we congratulate you for

the fine work you are doing in this work that you do. All of you

are very accomplished, and we thank all of you for that. Sheriff,

we appreciate your participation as well, and all of you. But a special note to someone taking on a major assignment in a city like

that, that is quite something. Actually, the sheriff has a pretty big

territory too, correct?

Mr. HORSLEY. I do. I do, indeed.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I was having you look at me thinking I went

down the wrong trail here. [Laughter.]

So I thank all of our witnesses, and you have all been sworn in,

and we will start with you, Sheriff.

74

STATEMENTS OF DON HORSLEY, COUNTY SHERIFF, SAN

MATEO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

HEATHER FONG, CHIEF OF POLICE, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CA; SCOTT

MACGREGOR, ASSISTANT CHIEF, CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SACRAMENTO, CA; MARK CHURCH, PRESIDENT, SAN MATEO

COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

AND MICHAEL NEVIN, SUPERVISOR, SAN MATEO COUNTY

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. HORSLEY. Well, thank you members of the Subcommittee on

National Security for your leadership on this issue and for your

willingness to work with law enforcement on developing national

standards for explosives storage facilities. I would like to begin by

giving a brief synopsis of the events that highlighted the need for

this hearing.

The San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, along with San Francisco

Police Department and the FBI have maintained a munitions storage site on the city of San Francisco Watershed property for nearly

20 years. Over the July 4th weekend, the storage facility was burglarized and approximately 200 pounds of explosives were taken.

We promptly notified the media and all State and local law enforcement agencies of the theft, and thanks to the combined efforts of

local law enforcement and the investigative work of ATF, the culprits were quickly apprehended and all of the stolen material, including the 10 pounds of C4 explosives belonging to the San Mateo

County Bomb Squad, was recovered.

Since the buck stops at the top of an organization, I take full responsibility for the breach in security of our munitions bunker.

While the bomb squad stored the explosives in an approved and

theft resistant munitions storage container and sited the secure

container in a remote location away from buildings and population

centers, we mistakenly relied on the remoteness and secrecy of the

location and the physical security of the ATF-approved munitions

storage sheds for security. It was also thought that the random patrols by watershed rangers who are responsible for keeping out

trespassers, but were not specifically responsible for the munitions

storage site, was additional security for the site. Unfortunately, I

was not made aware that the alarm on the storage containers was

inoperable.

In hindsight, the Sheriff’s Office Administration should have established a regularly scheduled inspection of the site by our Office

of Professional Standards. Clearly, fencing of the site, a functioning

alarm and remote surveillance by camera could have prevented

this incident from occurring.

Some may ask why these materials are stored at all? All law enforcement agencies that maintain bomb disposal squads need to

have both explosive material and a safe and secure storage facility.

Explosive materials are used for training purposes. Specifically, we

must have explosive materials if we are to train canines to locate

explosive devices. Additionally, bomb disposal units are called upon

to dismantle explosive devices and store the material for either evidence and/or destruction. And, last, there are occasions when unVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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stable and explosive materials are recovered by a bomb disposal

squad that must be destroyed by the use of explosives.

Subsequent to the incident in San Mateo County, I have found

that there have been similar losses of explosive materials nationwide. I think that it is timely that this review of national and State

regulations and standards takes place. At the request of this committee, I have been asked to make recommendations regarding

Federal and State guidelines for the storage, monitoring and protection of publicly owned explosives material storage sites.

The current regulations are found in title 27, Code of Federal

Regulations. In summary, ATF requires that explosive materials be

stored certain distances from populated buildings and that the munitions storage facility be constructed of quarter-inch steel and

lined with two-inch plywood and that it be theft and bullet resistant. Our storage container met these minimum requirements. The

FBI further requires that bomb technicians must have successfully

completed the Redstone Arsenal training curriculum.

From our review of this event, the Sheriff’s Office will be taking

the following steps, and I would suggest that these local requirements might be a good starting point for future legislative action.

First, we obviously need to find a secure location in which to store

explosives and other volatile substances that meets ATF guidelines.

The location must be fenced, the site will have a working alarm

system, cameras should monitor the location, bomb squad members

will monitor the cameras. There will be physical checks which include an entry log, inventory log update when items are being utilized or stored. The log will include an employee signature and

date. The inventory entries must be specific regarding item,

amount, weight or volume of content. A regular rotation of on-call

bomb techs will check and double check log entries and inventory.

The bomb squad manager will receive a monthly copy of the storage facility’s current contents and inventory. The bomb squad manager will make random, periodic inspections of the site to verify accuracy of the inventory reports and the working conditions of all

security devices, and these reports will be directly sent to the sheriff. ATF will be requested to inspect the storage site yearly with

the results, again, reported directly to my office.

Regarding national standards, I would also recommend the following: Give ATF authority to require that all explosive storage

sites submit to an annual inspection; two, require licensing of all

explosive storage sites; three, any agency that fails to comply with

ATF safety and security requirements will be decertified to store

explosives or operate a Bomb Disposal Squad; four, require a specific training course for managers of bomb squads to ensure that

they have knowledge of professional practices and to ensure compliance with all appropriate protocols.

That concludes my comments, and I would again like to thank

this committee for your leadership in this issue and for your work

in helping to develop national standards for explosive storage facilities.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horsley follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Sheriff. Thank you for your recommendations. Chief.

Ms. FONG. Chairman Shays, Congressman Lantos, Congressman

Eshoo, thank you for giving us the opportunity to participate in

this hearing. This is a key matter throughout not only law enforcement and the subcommittee but to the public at large.

The San Francisco Police Department has, since at least the mid1970’s, shared explosive storage magazines with the San Mateo

County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As

a result of a burglary over the 4th of July holiday weekend, a large

quantity of explosives and other materials were stolen. Officers

from the San Francisco Police Department uncovered this crime on

July 6 and immediately made notifications to our law enforcement

colleagues. Because of the good work of the agents from the Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and other allied agencies, suspects were rapidly apprehended and the stolen items located.

This incident has given rise to a much-needed examination of

how we in the San Francisco Police Department store explosive

materials. I have reviewed the department’s practices in this area

and would like to briefly go over them to provide context for this

discussion. The San Francisco Police Department maintained two

of the magazines at the Crystal Springs Skyline Quarry facility.

One of the magazines was used to store high explosives, along with

breaching and demolition charges. The other was used to store

flares, tear gas and so forth but no high explosives. At the time

that the burglary was discovered, the watershed site was only

being used as a storage magazine. It was no longer being used as

an explosives range. Since the burglary, our department no longer

stores any materials at the site.

This site is a former quarry, which has generally been secluded

from public access. The magazines themselves are in a remote area

behind two locked gates. The bunkers are standard explosive magazines and meet the industry standards for explosive magazines.

Unfortunately, what makes this such an attractive site due to its

isolation from populated areas or structures also makes it susceptible to theft. Aside from the FBI, no other entity outside of the

San Francisco Police Department stored any explosive materials in

our magazines.

The officers of our department’s EOD team have undergone the

same rigorous training as bomb officers do across the country. They

attend the FBI-sponsored Explosive Ordnance Disposal training at

the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Our EOD officers belong to the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, a professional organization that sets standards, internationally, holds regular conferences and offers cutting-edge training to its members.

As for the security of the explosive magazines, we, in part, depended on resident watershed rangers that have been deputized by

San Mateo County. The San Francisco Police Department relied on

them to notify law enforcement if they saw anything unusual during their regular patrols of the area. There was also a verbal understanding that any suspicious activities observed by other Water

Department employees would immediately be relayed to law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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forcement, including the San Francisco Police Department and the

San Mateo County EOD Units.

Beyond question, the San Francisco Police Department needs a

secure, modern facility to store munitions, and this incident gives

great urgency to that need. A new site should have an alarmed

fence, as well as motion sensors that would activate a video camera

system. In contrast to what was available when the current facility

was built, there is much better technology today. We need to relocate to a site in a more protected area with new magazines,

equipped with reliable security safeguards.

We further need to have a site that has electricity and can serve

as a real training range. With electricity, there would be greater

usage and consequently, an enhanced law enforcement presence.

Motion-sensitive video cameras could be placed on the perimeter

and record trespassers once activated. A permanent structure, with

lighting, video surveillance and completely meeting the ATF standards must be constructed to meet an inarguably compelling and immediate need for safe and secure explosive storage.

In addition to the construction of a new facility for storage, a

strong internal protocol detailing the safety and security guidelines

for the bunkers must be developed and rigorously enforced. The

verbal agreements of the past must be replaced with written protocol, frequent documented site visits and regularly scheduled inventories. The officer-in-charge of the EOD Unit will be responsible for

ensuring adherence to these guidelines, for personal site inspections and for coordinating an annual inspection by the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Additionally, every officer assigned

to the unit must be fully familiar with all pertinent regulations

governing the operation and maintenance of an explosive magazine

facility.

There is no question that the lessons learned from this incident

have brought the issue of secure explosive materials storage to the

forefront of our concerns. We understand that a new location is

mandatory, and we look to whatever assistance we can obtain from

our local, State and Federal partners to assist us in this endeavor.

We must identify a solution to this pressing issue, and I have designated a member of the command staff to work closely with Sheriff Horsley and his designee to look for that location and to ensure

that it is one that is safe.

As I am sure you are well aware, there are no properties in San

Francisco County that would qualify as a site given the large radius needed to store explosive materials. Furthermore, State regulations bar the transport of explosives over bridges, thus precluding, at a minimum, siting any facility in Marin County. We sincerely hope that as a result of these hearings, steps can and will

be taken to once and for all identify a site where the storage of explosives can be done safely and securely and with minimum impact

on the surroundings.

We thank you for your consideration, we thank you for your concern, and we are committed to working together with you and local

law enforcement, as well as the Federal Government, to ensure

that this situation is never presented again. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fong follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Chief. Now we will hear from Scott

MacGregor, assistant chief, California Highway Patrol. Welcome.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Good morning Mr. Chairman and committee

members. Thank you also for this opportunity to speak before you

this morning on this important issue dealing with the monitoring

and protection of publicly owned explosive material storage sites.

For the most part this morning, I will be——

Mr. SHAYS. Just check, is your mic on? I am hearing you so well,

but I am not sure it is on.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I appear to have a green light if that is an indicator. For the most part this morning, I will be talking about the

activities of the California Highway Patrol rather than specifically

the site here in San Mateo County.

And let me first say that the CHP does follow existing Federal

and State guidelines regarding the storage and transportation of

explosive materials. While the CHP is a Statewide law enforcement

agency, we are currently operating in all 58 counties of California,

and today we maintain 13 Type 2 magazines for explosive materials. The majority of our magazines are maintained for preservation of explosives in small amounts for ongoing training for CHP

explosive detection canines, as the Sheriff had pointed out. The canine handler teams are located throughout the State and are an integral part of our homeland security efforts here in California.

In response to the recent events here in San Mateo County, the

CHP, as well as other law enforcement agencies, have reviewed its

procedures to ensure that both the safety and the security of the

magazines have not been compromised. And this process has included a number of steps involving the review of current Federal,

State and local law and guidelines, as well as discussions with

members from Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the California Department of Toxic Substances Control, the State Fire Marshal and

California Department of Forestry. And a summary of our review

of those pertinent regulations and laws has been provided to this

committee.

Now, in the time for my remarks, I won’t be able to adequately

describe each of the agency’s specific roles and responsibilities regarding explosive handling. However, I can say that I have been

very impressed by the spirit of cooperation and level of communication from Federal, State and local leaders. And as I am sure you

are aware, law enforcement agencies are exempt—as has been

pointed out in this hearing thus far, they are exempt from Federal

and State laws relating to obtaining a license for storing explosive

materials. However, we are not exempt from any Federal storage

requirements, and, simply put, and I think this has been reinforced

by other speakers, we must follow the Federal regulations, but we

do not have to obtain a physical license in order to do so.

On the State level, law enforcement derive a similar exemption

from explosives regulations from the California Health and Safety

Code and the California Penal Code. Regardless of those State exemptions, the requirement to follow Federal storage regulations

still exists. And once again, the CHP does meet or exceed all current Federal explosive storage requirements.

For example, while there is currently no Federal or State requirement for an outside entity to inspect our magazines, as a matVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ter of departmental policy, the CHP does request and receive,

through the California State Fire Marshal, inspections of our magazines to ensure they are properly located, secure and compliant

with title 27 provisions.

The CHP also follows up with formal letters of confirmation from

the California State Fire Marshal outlining that those inspections

have taken place and their results. And, additionally, the CHP has

established an internal guideline regarding the inventory and inspection of our storage facilities, and we maintain a secure roster

of all key holders. And, further, as a matter of policy, these magazines do not hold evidentiary explosive materials. We also fulfill

the requirement that is currently in Federal regulation to notify

local fire officials regarding the locations of those magazines sites.

While I am not going to detail specifics regarding the actual CHP

security measures at each of the locations, I can assure you that

we take into account the need for a higher level of protection based

upon the unique nature of each individual facility.

And if I could summarize our research very quickly, it appears

that there is no Statewide list of law enforcement agencies’ explosive storage facilities. One simply does not exist to date. And since

a list of that type may be beneficial for Statewide operations, security and certainly the security of all these sites, we have provided

the California’s Office of Homeland Security with a list of several

items to be considered here by the State of California.

And those items include an evaluation and consideration of the

following: First of all, an evaluation of the State of California formally adopt title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations through legislation. We also provided a recommendation that the State of California develop and maintain a confidential list of all law enforcement explosive storage magazines and their locations that would be

updated on a semi-annual basis. Additionally, law enforcement

agencies conduct and maintain a log of physical security inspections available for random audit and that law enforcement agencies

provide to the State of California ongoing, updated confidential rosters of people who are authorized to access explosive storage magazines. One additional item that we have discussed with the Department of Homeland Security here in California is the possibility of

law enforcement agencies maintaining current physical inventoies

of explosive storage magazines, and, again, that those magazines

be randomly audited and reported. And, finally, an improved notification system be established for purposes of collecting and maintaining reports of lost or stolen explosives.

And in closing, while the events here in San Mateo County were

unfortunate, it has given the law enforcement community, the Federal, State and local government the opportunity to evaluate current regulatory and operational standards and to take the additional steps necessary to heighten the security of those facilities.

And, Mr. Chairman and committee, I thank you for this opportunity and welcome any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. MacGregor follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank you very much. I appreciate the helpful advice and concern that all three of you have shown. We will now go

to this side now and hear from our two supervisors. First, Mark

Church and after him, Michael Nevin.

Mr. CHURCH. Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.

Thank you, Representative Shays for the opportunity to address

this subcommittee. Those of us here in San Mateo County especially want to thank Representative Lantos for making this hearing

possible and Representative Anna Eshoo for bringing to the attention of Secretary Tom Ridge and this subcommittee the challenges

that local governments face, such as San Mateo County, in improving security for explosives storage facilities.

In a recent letter to Secretary Ridge, Representative Eshoo pointed out that inadequate first responder funding and misallocation of

Homeland Security funds were important factors in the recent theft

of government-owned explosives from a storage bunker located on

San Francisco Public Utility Commission property in San Mateo

County. I believe this incident highlights how important it is for

the Federal Government to assume an appropriate role in assisting

local agencies to protect their communities and the Nation.

The State fire marshal has promulgated regulations to address

the storage of explosives in California. While these regulations set

physical standards for explosive storage facilities, they were adopted long before the present threat environment emerged, and they

do not reflect current risks to these facilities.

Further, to the extent that Federal regulations address explosives storage, much more needs to be done to increase the coordination and communication between the Federal agencies and the operators of these local facilities. The Federal Government, with its

much greater knowledge of how risks to explosive storage facilities

affect homeland security, must work with local agencies to continue

developing appropriate standards at the national level. And once

such standards are developed, it will be equally important for the

Federal Government to provide local agencies with the resources

necessary to implement them.

Local governments’ law enforcement and first responder resources have been stretched thin due to the recent budget crisis in

this State. This fact makes Federal homeland security assistance,

such as through the State Homeland Security Grant Program,

more critical than ever before. We believe a number of important

improvements could be made to the Homeland Security Grant Program that would make the program more effective. First, a greater

degree of flexibility with respect to the use of funds provided

through the program would assist local agencies as they prioritize

their homeland security spending. Second, a streamlined application process, which would allow local agencies to apply directly to

the Department of Homeland Security for grants and deal directly

and expeditiously with the Department on inquiries related to

grants, would greatly increase local law enforcement and first responder effectiveness. And, third, it is essential that Federal Homeland Security Grant funding be tied to a realistic assessment of the

threats based upon localities and the costs incurred in responding

to those threats.

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It seems clear that parts of the country, such as the San Francisco Bay Area with its large population and popular tourist attractions, present a number of potential terrorist targets far in excess

of those other parts in the country. The costs of defending against

potential terrorists threats is also much higher here than in other

parts of the country. Yet, as both Representative Lantos and Representative Eshoo have pointed out, under the current Homeland

Security grant allocations, Wyoming, for instance, receives $38 per

capita whereas California receives only approximately $5 per capita. The level of funding made available under the State Homeland

Security Grant Program simply much take into account the disparate terrorist threats and the resulting differences in fiscal demands

placed on local governments.

In addition to the formulaic calculation, another issue relates to

the fact that metropolitan area homeland security funds were allocated last year to urban cities through the Urban Area Security

Initiative Program. And while San Francisco has vulnerabilities,

the funding model does not reflect the fact that the San Francisco

Bay Area, including San Mateo County, is really one urbanized

area with vulnerabilities typical of urban cities. The largest intermodal transportation hub west of St. Louis, for example, is located

in San Mateo County, as are other critical infrastructure such as

the San Francisco International Airport and the San Francisco

Hetch Hetchy watershed—the location of the bunker that brought

us all here today. Yet, to date, San Mateo County, though it is

home to significant economic and public infrastructure, has not received grant funding targeted to urban cities. This, underscores, I

believe, a major flaw in the current allocation methodologies and

the need to ensure that future homeland security funds are allocated based on real threats and allocated to localities that are vulnerable.

As the 9/11 Commission found, the last best hope for the community rests primarily with first responders. We must ensure that

they have the resources, the information and the flexibility necessary to do their jobs effectively. Thank you again, Mr. Chair and

committee members, for holding this meeting in San Mateo County

and for the opportunity to address this subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Church follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Church. I didn’t properly note that

you are the president of the supervisors at this time, and we appreciate you being here. And at this time, we will hear from Michael

Nevin.

Mr. NEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the last shall try to

be brief. But, first of all, please take back to Washington for us

how very proud we are of the gentleman and the gentle lady representing California and representing us in San Mateo County.

Mr. SHAYS. Duly noted and it is in the record. It will stay in the

record.

Mr. NEVIN. I want Congress to know that.

I asked that you come and you came, and I am very grateful for

that. As a former San Francisco police inspector, I fully recognize

that national security begins with local law enforcement. Homeland

Security’s foot soldiers can be found patrolling the streets of America’s cities and counties as police officers and as deputy sheriffs.

While we go to great lengths to ensure that security at our highlevel profile military and governmental facilities is not compromised, we cannot ignore the potential threats that exist on the

local level. It is not enough that the Federal Government is aware

of the dangers that these threats pose. They must also take definitive steps to ensure that local governments and our first responders have the direction, the training and the funding necessary to

effectively protect our citizens.

The facility held explosives that were powerful enough to blow up

a hole in the Golden Gate Bridge. This is pretty serious. It is important to understand that this is not a situation unique to the Bay

Area or to San Mateo County. In fact, last year, the ATF figures

were 79, mine were 80, that is close enough for government work,

but 80 instances of stolen high-level explosives nationwide. Facilities like ours are scattered across the landscape of this country,

and, unfortunately, the security protocols at these facilities are just

as scattered.

As Anna Eshoo pointed out, this particular bunker is right near

our watershed, right near the watershed and also the power line,

the pipeline that sends water to the people in the peninsula right

near by. Another question that I have after being involved in this

hearing this morning is should we look at the life expectancy of

these bunkers and these facilities?

This is the simple task in the interest of the public. AFT mandates high-level explosives are stored away from the population

areas, I understand that. But, unfortunately, the more remote

areas become, the more difficult it is to patrol for local government.

In these cases, protecting our citizens requires expert planning and

clear, specific directive.

If this incident can happen here, it can happen anywhere. As

long as all other law enforcement agencies in our county and in our

State are each individually responsible for securing these dangerous materials, we will not be able to guarantee that they are

adequately protected as long as there are no standards to meet or

oversight to ensure accountability to those standards, we cannot

claim to be doing our best to protect our citizens.

You have come today. We are very grateful to San Mateo County

because you too recognize that there are flaws in the system, and

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they need to be changed. It is my recommendation that you take

necessary steps to enact uniform, nationwide, minimum security

standards where high-level explosives are stored and that those

standards, their implementation, their enforcement, their oversight, their training to local government be funded by a Federal

agency.

Again, I want to thank you, Congressman Lantos and Congressman Eshoo, for listening to our call and obviously, Mr. Chairman,

for coming here to California. And we are all very grateful and

maybe a little safer because of these hearings.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nevin follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you both very much. Because you all have basically stayed within the 5-minute framework, we will stay with

our 10-minute questioning. So, Mr. Lantos, you have 10 minutes,

and then, Ms. Eshoo, you will have 10.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first

thank the five outstanding witnesses for extremely helpful testimony. I usually brag about my 17 grandchildren, but this time I

am going to brag about our public servants, and I do so with great

pleasure.

Let me first turn to Sheriff Horsley, and let me say before I raise

my questions how grateful we all are for your outstanding public

service to our community.

Mr. HORSLEY. Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. You have done an outstanding job, and we are profoundly mindful of it.

Since the purpose of this hearing is not to be deal with the particular episode but to use this episode as a catalyst device to build

national legislation, let me just hear from you, Sheriff Horsley,

which I think will put this issue at rest in terms of the San Mateo

County happening, you state, ‘‘In hindsight, the Sheriff’s Office administration should have established a regularly scheduled inspection of the site by our Office of Professional Standards. Clearly,

fencing of the site, a functioning alarm and remote surveillance by

camera could have prevented this incident from occurring.’’ We

agree and I think we can move on to other items.

Since this is a nationwide problem, and I think it is very important to underscore that according to the statistics, we were given

79 or 80 thefts occurred last year, and I would like each of you to

respond to my question, do you see any justification for exempting

public entities, not including the military, public entities from the

same mandatory requirements that are presently in effect for private entities? You may begin, Sheriff.

Mr. HORSLEY. Well, I see no reason why there shouldn’t be same

standards for public as well as private, and it is inexcusable the

breach in security, and I welcome that there be national standards,

and we need to all comply with national standards. And there

should be some very rigorous regulations on these kinds of sites.

Mr. LANTOS. Chief Fong.

Ms. FONG. I concur with Sheriff Horsley. As this incident shows,

we are not immune from criminal activity, and the situation occurred. I think that we should meet the same guidelines as all

other storage facilities.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you. Chief MacGregor.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Congressman, as I stated in my testimony, the

State of California, we have provided some recommendations for

the State to consider here as far as enhancing current regulations

and have actually implemented some on our own above and beyond

what is currently required. So I see that being a very positive step.

Mr. LANTOS. Do you see any justification for having a different

set of criteria for facilities which are privately owned or publicly

owned?

Mr. MACGREGOR. No, sir, not as it relates to safety components,

no.

Mr. LANTOS. Right.

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Mr. CHURCH. I see no basis for the distinction. The same risks

are associated with both types of facilities.

Mr. NEVIN. The standards should be the same. You articulated

it well, Congressman, when you spoke about health care and hospitals. The standards should be no different for public or private,

no different when it comes to explosives in an issue this serious.

Mr. LANTOS. I very much appreciate this. One of the comments

you made, Chief Fong, if I understood you correctly, is that you removed all of your explosives from this facility and you are using

another facility outside of San Francisco at the moment because

San Francisco is not equipped to handle this. Am I correct?

Ms. FONG. The high explosive materials that were stolen have

been recovered, and they are currently in evidence, and so they are

being stored by the ATF as evidence at this time. So we are not

storing any high explosive materials.

Mr. LANTOS. Is it your intention in the future to use an upgraded

and appropriately secured San Mateo County facility?

Ms. FONG. We will be working together with Sheriff Horsley to

identify a suitable location with suitable security.

Mr. LANTOS. Now, Chairman Church, you spent a lot of time on

the funding issue, and I fully agree with all of your comments. Explain to me, if you can, other than blatant pork belly legislation,

how could anyone justify giving Wyoming almost eight times the

per capita support that California has? With all due respect to Wyoming, I think the San Francisco International Airport is a slightly

more exposed place.

Mr. CHURCH. Well, Representative Lantos, I think our thinking

is the same on this issue. I think it is very important that Congress

place a high level of priority in metropolitan areas throughout the

country. That is the first area that has the greatest threat. Rural

areas, certainly if funding is available at a later date, would be provided for as well, but the greatest threat, I think we can all agree,

is in major metropolitan areas.

Mr. LANTOS. Major metropolitan areas cannot be divided into the

core city and the surrounding region, because San Francisco International Airport, among other things, clearly is a potential location

of threat.

Mr. CHURCH. That is right. And as I pointed out in my testimony, we are really one urbanized area. We have 6 to 7 million

people in the San Francisco Bay Area. For all practical purposes,

we are one urbanized city, we have critical infrastructure located

here, we have the water supply, we have the power supply, we

have San Francisco Airport, we have the largest transportation hub

west of the St. Louis right here in San Mateo County. And it is inequitable for San Francisco and other major cities to receive all of

the funding without providing some of that funding to the outlying

areas, such as San Mateo County, which has practically the same

population as San Francisco.

Mr. LANTOS. I fully agree with you, and I think both my colleagues and I will use whatever influence we have to see to it that

the funding formulas be changed. Supervisor Nevin, you wanted to

comment.

Mr. NEVIN. I just wanted to make the comment you made the

comment about Wyoming. The comment about California we are

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the seventh largest nation in the world, and we are also a border

State, which makes it even more of a difficulty as far as national

security is concerned with the security of this State and this area.

Mr. LANTOS. Now, I must admit to considerable surprise, that

the testimony from the previous panel, in response to my question,

was that they don’t know how many such sites there are in the

United States. I wonder what your reaction was to this, to me,

mind-boggling response.

Mr. HORSLEY. If you are asking me, Congressman Lantos, I was

very surprised. I assumed that they knew that—where all the sites

were at in the State of California and throughout the Nation. So

I was surprised that they did not have clear information or clear

knowledge of all those potential sites.

Mr. LANTOS. Chief Fong.

Ms. FONG. I think given the lack of requirement for licensing and

inspections, this would be a conclusion that without those initials

steps, it would be difficult to know where all the sites are.

Mr. LANTOS. So, in a sense, what you are saying is the same requirements should be applied to public entities, which then would

enable it the appropriate deal to have a number for us as to how

many such types there are which contain hazardous materials.

Ms. FONG. That is correct. I think we can be helpful to whoever

the regulatory agency is then.

Mr. LANTOS. Chief MacGregor.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Congressman, as I pointed out, we were quite

surprised as well after the fact. We certainly were aware of where

each and every one of our particular——

Mr. LANTOS. Of course.

Mr. MACGREGOR [continuing]. Magazines were, but in investigating this further, we quickly found out that there was not a Federal

or State entity that had knowledge of all the locations, and as such,

that was one of the recommendations we brought forth to the State

Office of Homeland Security as a consideration here for California.

Mr. NEVIN. I would be surprised if we didn’t hear when those

statistics come out that the number of situations like San Bruno

in San Mateo County are in the hundreds, if not up to a couple

thousand, of those same kinds of bunker situations throughout this

country. That would surprise me if those figures aren’t extremely

high in those kinds of numbers.

Mr. CHURCH. In order to assess the full extent of the risk and

the threat, we think that step No. 1 would be to identify all the

sites and conducting an inventory, and so, yes, I was surprised it

hadn’t been done.

Mr. LANTOS. Now I will use my final question to take advantage

of your presence, Mr. Chairman, and ask each of our panelists to

share as candidly as you are willing, which I think is a very high

degree of candor, what recommendations would you like the three

of us to take back to our friend Tom Ridge, with respect to the

whole issue of funding homeland security issues? Sheriff, start with

you.

Mr. HORSLEY. Well, one of the things that I think that ATF probably doesn’t have the personnel, and I would probably recommend

that they get some additional personnel to conduct what I would

think would be just a basic requirement and we would have to—

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I think all these facilities should be licensed, should be inspected

and should have some basic requirements. And I think Chief Fong

and I, as well as the Highway Patrol, have outlined what we would

recommend that there are some basic security measures that must

be in place and should be part of the licensing requirement.

Mr. LANTOS. Chief Fong.

Ms. FONG. I think with regards to instituting regulations and expectations on different agencies, it is much like the acquisition of

personal protective equipment. There needs to be funding up-front,

not only for the ATF or the regulatory agency but for all law enforcement to be able to comply with the regulations. Otherwise, the

unfunded mandate becomes very problematic at the local government level. No matter how hard we try to meet those regulations,

we would not be able to. So I think there needs to be directed funding toward that goal.

Mr. LANTOS. I couldn’t agree with you more. Chief MacGregor.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Yes. I was going to echo the Chief’s comments

with regards to unfunded mandates and also point out on this discussion of establishing a confidential list of locations, I think confidentiality in terms of that list is paramount in that if you have

a list that is readily available that shows you, hey, here are all the

locations, it tends to potentially bring folks that would use that as

a guide, if you will, to try to go searching for what they are looking

for.

Mr. LANTOS. Chairman Church.

Mr. CHURCH. Well, I agree with all the witnesses. We need uniform standards, they need to be mandated, but we need the resources necessary to implement those standards. But on the broader issue of funding, local government knows its needs better than

national government.

Mr. LANTOS. We need flexibility.

Mr. CHURCH. We need flexibility, we need local control. The State

budget crisis, as I mentioned, has created a real problem for us,

and we need flexibility not with just equipment but perhaps with

personnel as well. Perhaps there can be some flexibility to allow

some of this funding to go for personnel. Having the equipment is

great, but if you don’t have the staffing to use it, it doesn’t do us

much good.

Mr. LANTOS. You have been the leader of this whole issue, Supervisor Nevin. You have great personal experience in the general

field. What are your thoughts?

Mr. NEVIN. Well, my thoughts are, first of all, let me tell you

what you have brought out, that this congressional committee has

brought out, is in fact homeland security, and I am very satisfied

that we are going to get from you and your leadership passed

through Congress regulations, minimum regulations or whatever to

take us out of this horrible situation we find us in. But funding

should never be dependent on a city and county’s ability to pay,

law enforcement’s ability to pay. Those standards could never be

met unless the funding marries the regulation, so to speak. So that

is why I think it is so important, and at no time in our history

could we be talking about more important than homeland security

and these bunkers in San Bruno.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Eshoo.

Ms. ESHOO. First, I want to salute everyone that just gave testimony. You are a great source of pride to me, and it reminds me

of the cooperation that San Mateo County has had with the City

and County of San Francisco for decades and decades and decades.

In fact, the City and County of San Francisco owns more property

in San Mateo County than San Mateo Countians. So what we

share and how we cooperate with one another I think is one of the

more important stories of our region, and I salute you for it.

To Sheriff Horsley, thank you for being forthright and saying

that the buck stops with you. You said it up-front, and because you

did, it has allowed us to get on to the really larger issues that are

attendant to what this hearing is all about. To my two colleagues

from the board of supervisors, I couldn’t be prouder. We have a

great tradition of local government here and the people that have

served, and I say that—I think she was—well, she was here earlier—former Supervisor Mary Griffin who served with distinction

on your board as well. And, of course, to the Highway Patrol, you

are very special to me and people throughout our State, and what

you have done during periods of real crisis and tension, I thank

you.

On the first issue of homeland security, I want to associated myself with what my colleagues have said. We do not have enough

flexibility with the grants that come through Homeland Security,

and I say to my colleagues that serve on the committee that will

take this back, I think it is an area that deserves some special attention now. We have been discussing homeland security for a

while. Now we are talking about hometown security and what people need. First responders and law enforcement people say to me

over and over and over again, ‘‘We need some flexibility,’’ and we

have to remind ourselves that all of these areas relative to homeland security are personnel-heavy. They are manpower-heavy. If we

don’t have the people to implement all of this, then most frankly

we are missing the point.

In the highly prescriptive list of authorized program expenditures in the State Homeland Security Grant Program, they permit

our local first responders to buy night vision goggles and euthanasia kits but prohibit them from using the money for fundamentals. Now, we need to take a look at this. I am not saying the night

goggles and euthanasia kits aren’t important and appropriate at

the right time, but if we can’t train people in the Sheriff’s Department and in the local PDs, then again we have missed the boat.

Now, in terms of questions, I would like to ask the Sheriff, was

everything that was stolen from the site recovered, regardless of

what it is called? And I am not out of the law enforcement community, so I am not going to try to resolve your language, but was everything that was stolen recovered?

Mr. HORSLEY. In short answer, yes, everything was recovered. I

would like to just echo something about your comments about flexibility. You have been a great help to us in getting some flexibility

when it came to training and backfill for our officers, and, as you

know, before that wasn’t possible, and thanks for your efforts in

helping us getting some degree of flexibility. And I would echo

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what you say in terms of the Homeland Security grants. There does

in fact need to be greater flexibility to meet local needs.

Ms. ESHOO. Good. So everything has been secured?

Mr. HORSLEY. Everything has been recovered, yes.

Ms. ESHOO. Was there ever any guidance given to your agencies

after September 11, formally or otherwise, from Federal officials on

the need and the best courses of action to protect high explosives

from theft?

Mr. HORSLEY. Not that I am aware of, no.

Ms. ESHOO. Chief.

Ms. FONG. No.

Ms. ESHOO. No? That is stunning to me. That is really stunning

to me that the Federal Government, given what we face to secure

our country, never put anything out on this.

Is this the first security breach at this facility, Sheriff?

Mr. HORSLEY. No. Actually, one predates my taking office. I

think it was in 1988 there was a burglary at the site, and at the

time it was thought that we should put an alarm in. And an alarm

actually was for both San Francisco’s munitions storage sites as

well as ours, and there were a couple that handled fireworks that

were not alarm. So an alarm was put in about—right after that

burglary in 1988.

Ms. ESHOO. What kind of security clearance is there relative to

those that know that such a site exits? How did this individual

even know that this place was there? Was a superviser for 10

years. I never knew that this place existed. Not that I needed to,

but——

Mr. HORSLEY. I guess we mistakenly believed that it was a secret

location, and the only people who knew about it were the EOD staff

from both SFPD, the FBI and the Sheriff’s Office. Unbeknownst to

us, this particular individual, and I won’t say too much, but was

a plumber in that area and apparently had seen the officers going

into that area and perhaps followed them in.

Ms. ESHOO. So there really aren’t—again, when we speak about

standards, something needs to be spoken to about the individuals

that are in charge of being secured—not only a secured facility

with standards surrounding it, but also do you think that there

need to be standards developed about who in fact knows where

these facilities are and what they contain?

Mr. HORSLEY. I do indeed. I think all of our EOD people should

be greater security clearance than the average officer.

Ms. ESHOO. When the theft was discovered, was there any initial

concern about it being a terrorist threat? I mean how was that determined? Common sense?

Mr. HORSLEY. To be honest, yes, that was exactly my initial

thought was that it was potentially a terrorist. So we did notify the

FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force. As I said, we also notified every

law enforcement agency, I think, in the entire country and put

every particular resource that we and all of the local law enforcement had——

Ms. ESHOO. What did they do, Sheriff, when you contacted them?

Were they cooperative?

Mr. HORSLEY. There was a great deal of cooperation between all

law enforcement agencies, and we have what is called a High-InVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tensity Drug Trafficking Task Force here, which Chief Fong is part

of, as well as myself and Highway Patrol. We have eight different

Federal law enforcement agencies that are part of it, as well as

eight State and local agencies. And so we have really established,

I think, a great network of excellent working relationships with

both our Federal and State counterparts, and I think all of that

was helpful in bringing this case to a successful conclusion.

Ms. ESHOO. Does the State of California—I don’t know who

wants to take this—does the State of California have regulations

regarding the storage of explosives that are more explicit than

those created by the ATF?

Mr. MACGREGOR. I don’t know—referring to who was going to

answer the question. To answer your question, I think the short

answer is we rely on title 27 of the Federal regulation as a guide

here in California. We have recommended or we have asked that

the State look at adopting those regulations formally through legislation. There are some additional enhancements here in the State

as it relates to transportation of explosives, but storage really falls

under those Federal criteria.

Ms. ESHOO. Don, did you want to add anything to that?

Mr. HORSLEY. No.

Ms. ESHOO. Well, again, I want to thank you. I am very proud

to work with you, and I think that when we talk about standards

that in listening to you and watching you work and valuing our

partnership, that there is only one standard for all of you, and it

is called high. So thank you to all of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you very much. Let me say to all of you that

I sometimes go to an event and sometimes after the event I say,

‘‘I really had a tougher question but I didn’t want to ask you.’’ The

tougher question I appreciate having the opportunity to respond to.

I learn from it. And if I could just go beyond the issue of the buck

stops here and so on and just ask you to respond to a few questions, Sheriff.

When I saw the facility, I thought the facility was short of pathetic, and I am just curious, have you ever seen that facility, and

is that facility that you have been to or has it just never showed

up on your radar screen?

Mr. HORSLEY. I have seen it once.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I expected to see a facility with an outer gate

and inner gate and I won’t say a moat but close to it. I expected

to see an alarm system that was attached to all four magazines.

I think the alarm system was only attached to one; is that correct?

Mr. HORSLEY. No. It was attached to two.

Mr. SHAYS. To two of the four.

Mr. HORSLEY. Of the four.

Mr. SHAYS. And it was basically a solar panel that gives it some

kind of juice to do the alarm system if it is functioning. What do

we know about how long that system hasn’t functioned?

Mr. HORSLEY. Regrettably, I believe it has been off for probably

10 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. OK. And in terms of this to say, who is in

charge of it, ultimately? By the buck stops here, are you in charge

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or is San Francisco in charge, is the State in charge? Who is in

charge?

Mr. HORSLEY. I think each agency is responsible for their own

magazine, so I was certainly responsible for ours.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. But in a sense, my feeling is if everyone is in

charge, no one is in charge, candidly.

Mr. HORSLEY. I agree.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. So in a sense, I mean it is important for us to

know what the Federal requirement is and the Federal mandate,

but I suspect you don’t believe that we have to tell you how to run

a facility to have it be performing properly, correct?

Mr. HORSLEY. In retrospect, certainly not. We should have—we

were certainly negligent in the way it was run. And I would have

to say that I had never been out to the site, to be honest, until

after the break-in, and I was as appalled as you to see the surroundings.

Mr. SHAYS. Which just suggests with the requirements that people have it just didn’t show up on radar screens. What I don’t quite

understand is, first, tell me why this facility is needed and maybe

the other two—first off—when I say first off, I have a lot of first

offs, sorry—the county uses this facility, correct?

Mr. HORSLEY. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. The FBI uses this facility?

Mr. HORSLEY. Yes, they do.

Mr. SHAYS. And the San Francisco Police uses it. Anybody else

use this facility?

Mr. HORSLEY. Not to my knowledge, no.

Mr. SHAYS. So, basically, there is a mixture of three, and each

of you know you have to keep track of your own use of it, but are

you able to use each of the magazines or are you assigned? Explain

to me.

Mr. HORSLEY. We were assigned to two of the magazines.

Mr. SHAYS. And the two that you were assigned to you had an

alarm system that didn’t work, but you had an alarm system to

those?

Mr. HORSLEY. No, to only one. Only one of them. The one that

stored the high explosives. The one that stored the confiscated fireworks did not have an alarm.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So why would the County need this facility?

What would you have that you would need to put in there?

Mr. HORSLEY. Well, a bomb squad has to have a certain amount

of material. For example, recently, discovered a couple of World

War II torpedoes in one of our harbors, and you have to destroy

it. So you do need to have some explosive to explode those torpedoes. So you do need to have some explosive to get rid of devices

like that.

There are other cases where we will sometimes come across dynamite that some person has in the house and maybe they have

subsequently been deceased and an executive comes along and

finds that we have a very unstable substance. So we have to take

it somewhere before we can dispose of it. And the other is that we

oftentimes have to respond to bomb calls and again we seize that

material and you have to keep it for both evidence until eventually

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you can destroy it. And then, last, you do need to have some C4

if you are going to do some training for your canine officers.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Chief Fong, how does San Francisco use

this facility? Is this the only facility you use or is it one of many?

Ms. FONG. This is the main facility for the city. There is a separate EOD facility at the airport.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And what do you use it for?

Ms. FONG. As the Sheriff mentioned——

Mr. SHAYS. The same things?

Ms. FONG. Similar things.

Mr. SHAYS. Anything different than other than the Sheriff’s mentioned?

Ms. FONG. No.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What I didn’t understand was your reference to

the bridges. I mean if you have explosives on one side, you have

to get it to the other side, whether or not the facility is here. I don’t

get the concept of the bridges as it relates to this issue.

Ms. FONG. There are Department of Transportation regulations

that prohibit us from transporting explosive devices over bridges.

Mr. SHAYS. No, I understand that. But I don’t understand how

that relates to a facility. I mean if you have it in San Francisco,

how does that relate to having this facility?

Ms. FONG. If the evidence, for instance, is from San Francisco,

we can come to San Mateo County without going on a bridge. If we

were to have a facility for storage in Marin or in the East Bay, we

would have to rely on bridges in order to get there.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So since the issue is from San Francisco this is

a site you can get to without a bridge.

Ms. FONG. Without a bridge, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And if I could ask out deputy chief, how do

you—you don’t use this facility.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Don’t use that particular facility; no, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. But you do have facilities. Did you use them for the

same general purposes?

Mr. MACGREGOR. Largely, almost the vast majority of ours is exclusively for training.

Mr. SHAYS. When we look at our nuclear facilities, we realize I

think we have too many. This is where we have weapons grade material, where we process it and so on, and we make our country

safer, I think, I believe, if we are able to reduce the number of facilities. Is there logic, do you think, in trying to find less facilities

or do we need to have these facilities close enough? I guess you

wouldn’t know how many we have around the country, none of us

seem to. Amazing.

Mr. HORSLEY. We do know something about the Bay Area. There

are facilities in other counties, and we do—the idea of having a regional with San Francisco and San Mateo County I think is exactly

what you are saying, is that we don’t each individually have a separate site, and when we find a new site, it will again be a shared

site between San Francisco and San Mateo County.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And the bottom line, though, is from that it is

conceivable that we might want to see some consolidation around

the country. That might be a question we might——

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Mr. HORSLEY. I would suggest that is an excellent idea, and we

will probably work with Santa Clara County as well.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. In terms of cost sharing, is there any costs involved here that you had to cost share or is there no real costs?

Mr. HORSLEY. Well, there wasn’t any cost sharing, but probably

there would be in the future.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just react to something, Chief MacGregor,

that you said when you made reference to the whole issue of mandate. I believe you require things that most of the time you need

to come up with the money. But if we require a local school system

that is discriminating to stop discriminating, we don’t necessary

feel we have to provide them money so that they can do what they

should be doing, which is not discriminate.

It seems to me that if you all move this stuff, that it is not necessarily a requirement—I mean I am throwing it out for dialog—

not necessarily a requirement that the Federal Government enable

you to have it just because we tell you you need to store it safely.

It doesn’t seem to me as a general rule that just because we say

we want there to be safety and there should be some uniformity

that the Federal Government has to come up with everything to

pay for it. Otherwise, you are basically saying to me that any time

the Federal Government does anything, we have to give you

money, give my local community money.

Now, I do have some sensitivity on this other issue. Our subcommittee, as I said, has had over 50 hearings. We have had a lot

of hearings on the whole issue of how do we provide money to firstline responders, or first responders, and we believe it needs to be

on a threat, not based on a per capita, which is your point, Mr.

Lantos.

The fact is, in Congress, when we saw that bill come out of the

Select Committee on Homeland Security, because we haven’t yet

decided how we reorganize government to have oversight, it went

to the Transportation Committee, and the Transportation Committee on a bipartisan basis almost uniformly decided that it would be

based on per capita, a good chunk of it. So this is a debate that

we have to sort out in Congress, and it doesn’t seem to know Republican or Democrat, it seems to be based on who is getting more

money and who is getting less.

I believe that if parts of my State got less and you donated parts

of my own, that I could make argument to a threat area because

we are in New York City. Clearly, a place like New York City

needs a lot more money and Boston and Washington, DC, and San

Francisco, and then it seems to me it filters down from there. But

I just want you to know in this debate that we are having in Washington, it doesn’t seem to have fallen on party lines, it seems to be

on geographic issues, and everybody, every member wanted to say,

‘‘I did something.’’

You had your September 11 book here. I will say to you, they

have done a great job. I think they have done a great job, and they

have given us—and they say it needs to be threat-based allocation

of money and they say a lot of other things, but they have given

us, I think, a very fine instrument to be able to move forward.

I don’t really have any other general points other than to say I

think we are all on the same wavelength here, and I do appreciate,

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Sheriff, your candor. We all need to be working together, we all

need to be doing a better job. We all, ultimately, are part of the

same team—not, ultimately, we are, and, ultimately, we better figure that out. I don’t know if there is any closing comments that

any of you would like to make or, Mr. Lantos, do you have any——

Mr. NEVIN. Just a follow-out from this, what I would hope that

a look, a side look or whatever from this, although it wouldn’t be

necessarily part of this issue this morning, but a look at environmental regulations when it comes to destruction of disposing of

these materials, how many of these materials is necessary for evidence, real, true evidence in future work of law enforcement and

how many can we safely and environmentally soundly get rid of?

Mr. SHAYS. I think that is a key point. Thank you for making it.

Bottom line, some of this stuff we may not need to keep, but the

stuff we do we want to have better be secured.

Mr. CHURCH. When you consider the criteria for proposed legislation, you might consider with respect to shared facilities requiring

an agreement between the agencies as to an assumption of responsibility and perhaps a filing of that assumption with the ATF.

Mr. SHAYS. So your point is it needs a formal agreement to protect, and it seems to me we are letting it—one person ultimately

needs to take charge. We shouldn’t have these shared facilities

without ultimately one person saying, ‘‘This will be my responsibility.’’

Mr. CHURCH. Exactly. You raised the point that when everybody

is sharing a responsibility and everyone is in charge, no one is in

charge. I think a written agreement would delineate that and solve

that issue.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you. That is a very helpful way to describe it. Any last comment from any of you?

Mr. HORSLEY. I would just say that I oftentimes tell my staff

that a crisis sometimes creates an opportunity for growth and this

crisis certainly creates an opportunity, I guess, for us to look at

this from a State and national perspective, and it forces us internally to do a much better job than we did in the past. So thanks

for the hearing.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, thank you. But it also, I think, gives you all

an opportunity, given you had this experience, to kind of lead the

charge and say, ‘‘These are lessons we have learned, and this is

what we think needs to happen,’’ and I appreciate that a lot.

Mr. HORSLEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. All set?

Mr. LANTOS. Can we just thank all the other officers for their

participation in the hearing?

Mr. SHAYS. Oh, absolutely, yes.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I will say that one of the things of September 11th

that is very touching for me, is September 11 was one of my white

collar constituents who knew that their services were not required

as we tried to deal with dealing with September 11, obviously, as

you know, it was right near our community, and so I saw presidents of companies literally handing out gloves at the Ground Zero

just wanting to be a part and a tremendous respect for our police,

fire, emergency medical, our first responders of all kinds and I pray

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that we haven’t lost that respect, because we have deep respect for

what all of you do, and I don’t think we have lost that respect, but

it is good to be reminded. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

We are going to get to the next panel. I will just call them up.

I am going to have Mr. Lantos swear them in and begin the testimony. Mr. James Christopher Ronay, president of the Institute of

Makers of Explosives, and Mr. Barney T. Villa, international director, International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators. Mr. Lantos will swear in our witnesses. I will be back shortly

to proceed.

Mr. LANTOS. If you gentlemen will please raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. LANTOS [presiding]. Please be seated. We will begin with

you, Mr. Christopher Ronay. You are president of the Institute of

Makers of Explosives. You have a long history of experience in this

field. I would like to ask you to summarize your testimony in about

5 minutes or so, telling us what your institute does and what your

views are concerning the issue that brought us here and the broader issue of what Federal legislation we might need to plug the loopholes which exist.

STATEMENTS OF JAMES CHRISTOPHER RONAY, PRESIDENT,

THE INSTITUTE OF MAKERS OF EXPLOSIVES; AND BARNEY

T. VILLA, INTERNATIONAL DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOMB TECHNICIANS AND INVESTIGATORS,

WHITTIER, CA

Mr. RONAY. Thank you, Mr. Shays and other members of the

subcommittee. My name is Christopher Ronay. I am the president

of the Institute of Makers of Explosives, commonly in the community referred to as the IME. The IME represents the U.S. manufacturers of industrial high explosives and other companies that distribute explosives or provide related services.

Over 21⁄2 million metric tons of industrial explosives are consumed annually in the United States, as you have pointed out.

They are essential to mining, quarrying, construction, demolition,

the production of petroleum and natural resource exploration. Metals, minerals, oil, electricity, construction activities and materials

and many consumer products are available today because of these

explosive products.

The IME is the safety and security institute serving the industrial explosives business, the government and industry for over 90

years. IME member companies produce over 98 percent of the explosives that I have described. Our mission at the IME is to promote safety and the protection of employees, users, the public, the

environment and to encourage the adoption of uniform rules and

recommendations in the manufacture, transportation, storage, handling, use and disposal of these explosive materials.

The history of our involvement in the development of Federal explosives law dates back to 1913. Industry best practices and recommendations are codified in our Safety Library Publications.

Many of these have parts of them that pertain to explosives storage. They are constantly updated and evaluated by our experts in

the industry. These recommendations were developed over the

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years through scientific application of engineering principals and

practical experience.

Immediately following the events of September 11, the institute

developed a set of enhanced security measures, a copy of which is

attached to my statement in the back. We developed this actually

on September 11, on that date. I was in touch with many of my

member companies in order to develop these enhanced security

measures. We knew we needed to step up vigilance due to the increased terrorist threats to America, even though explosives had

never been used on that day.

These measures were disseminated throughout industry and to

all relevant government agencies. One of the most significant recommendations in this document was for government-administered

background checks and security clearances for everyone who handles explosive materials. And, as the ATF testified, that was

brought about in the Safe Explosives Act of 2002.

While these enhanced security measures generally addressed security, background checks and facility and transportation security,

it was only the beginning. The institute is developing a 30-page set

of comprehensive recommendations regarding the security of all operations involving explosives materials.

It is anticipated that these recommendations will be published in

the next couple of months. They are not yet approved by our board

and our membership, but this is a very extensive and detailed document, which goes far beyond what is required by Federal law

today. This is in keeping with developing a viable strategy to protect the Nation’s explosive storage facilities that you mentioned at

the beginning of this hearing. It has been our practice to update

and make new recommendations, as necessary, throughout the 90-

year history of this organization.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that the IME’s founding documents in 1913 set forth safety and security as a platform of the organization. Regulating entities have relied on us ever since as the

most knowledgeable and competent source of information on which

to base their explosive regulations. We do not take that responsibility lightly.

I want to thank this subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and to present the best practices of the industry as they relate to the storage of these essential products. We appreciate your efforts to address this sensitive and important issue

surrounding the protection of explosive materials. This concludes

my summary testimony. I will be pleased to answer any questions

that you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ronay follows:]

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Mr. LANTOS. We will have some questions. First, I want to introduce Mr. Barney T. Villa, with 30 years of law enforcement experience. You currently are director of the International Association of

Bomb Technicians and Investigators, and we are delighted to have

you here.

Mr. VILLA. Good afternoon, sir. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I am Barney T. Villa, international director of the International Association

of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, referred to as the IABTI.

I am also a full-time deputy sheriff for the Los Angeles County

Sheriff’s Department, assigned to the Arson Explosives Detail.

With me today is Greg Smith, Region 1 director of the IABTI. Greg

is also a full-time employee with the California Department of Forestry, Arson Bomb Unit.

The IABTI was formed after the first National Explosive Ordnance Disposal Conference, held in March 1973, in Sacramento,

CA. It was decided then that a professional association was required to address the needs of this unique group. This led to the

establishment of the International Association of Bomb Technicians

and Investigators. A formal charter was developed with a total of

64 members. We are now 5,000 members, in 60 countries around

the world.

The IABTI is an international, independent, nonprofit, professional association committed to countering and defeating the growing menace that bombs and weapons of mass destruction present

worldwide. The IABTI is the world leader in the dissemination of

information and training on destructive devices to the national and

international public safety community. This is sought through the

exchange of training, expertise and information among personnel

employed in the fields of law enforcement, fire and emergency services, the military, forensic science and other related fields.

While the legitimate uses of explosives in areas such as construction, mining and land clearance has made our modern lives easier,

tragically, explosives have also been diverted to criminal activities,

including murder, intimidation, extortion and malicious destruction

of property. Explosives have always been a critical tool for bomb

disposal technicians, bombing investigators and in other related

fields. They are used in the render safe and disposal of improvised

explosive devices and components, technician training and scientific testing.

The IABTI strongly advocates that all of its members who maintain explosive storage facilities ensure that they are in compliance

with local, State and Federal guidelines related to explosive magazines. State and local authorities are subject to Federal explosive

law relative to storage, but as they are not licensees or permit

holders, they do not have oversight by ATF. Entities request an

ATF review of their storage facility to verify their compliance. Additionally, technicians can receive training on the proper use, handling and storage of explosives through the IABTI.

The IABTI further advocates that their members exercise best

practices and measure up to an equivalent of ATF standards and

regulations or some other professional set of guidelines. We recommend that additional security enhancements, such as security

lighting, fencing, alarms and cameras, are installed at their respecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
127

tive explosive storage facilities wherever practicable. The IABTI

understands and respects the budgetary problems faced by bomb

squad commanders who seek funding for such items for the safety

and security of their explosive storage facilities. We understand

from our membership that this funding is sometimes only approved

after substantial delays or after a theft occurs. This is often due

to conflicting priorities in the allocation of the funding that is available to most agencies.

The IABTI believes that the aforementioned enhancements to the

current standards are critical to ensuring the secure storage of explosives. The budget constraints experienced by most agencies prohibit the implementation of many of the recommended security enhancements. We believe that the security of explosive storage facilities might prove to be a proper allocation for Homeland Defense

funds. Further, we respectfully request that the committee review

the allocation of these funds to determine if any might be available

for this important project.

We encourage all of our members to provide best practice standards and advisory functions in the preparation of relevant safety

and security legislation. Many of our members in the United States

solicit the ATF to inspect their explosive storage facilities on a

more frequent basis than that which is mandated by current regulations. Federal Law relating to explosives taken from 18 USC

chapter 40, subpart K- Storage, section 55.204, states any person

storing explosive materials shall inspect his magazine at least

every 7 days. We encourage our membership to surpass this mandate and perform inspections on a daily basis whenever possible.

We know from ATF statistics that break-ins occur in many different ways. Locks cut and pried, doors pried or blown open, keys

used, wall entry, roof entry, window and/or vent entry, floor entry

and even the inside helper from the respective company who owns

and maintains the explosive storage facility. The IABTI encourages

its membership to adhere to all of the Federal laws and regulations

as a best practice policy to prevent such activities from happening.

The possession of explosives by civilian bomb technicians is paramount in order for them to perform their daily duties. In addition

to the functions while doing render-safe procedures, we are also

mandated to perform a minimum amount of training with both

high and low explosives each year to keep our certification current

as working bomb technicians. Major bomb squads across the

United States maintain and operate their own explosive storage facilities. They strictly adhere to current Federal regulations by

working very closely with each other in their efforts to prevent

such thefts.

On behalf of the men and women of the International Association

of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, we thank you for your time

today. We remain committed to bringing the very best to our membership with new ideas that may come forth from these meetings.

The use of explosives remains the preferred weapon of terrorists,

and the use of explosives by bomb disposal technicians will continue to be a valuable tool in their fight in the war on terrorism.

128

We praise the efforts of the subcommittee to address the sensitive

and important issues surrounding the storage of explosive materials. This concludes my testimony, and I, too, would be pleased to

answer any questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Villa follows:]

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Mr. LANTOS. Well, thank you very much, both of you. First, let

me begin by a general question. You were here throughout the

hearing, and you noticed that both of my colleagues and I expressed disagreement with the current treatment of privately

owned and publicly owned facilities where explosives are located.

Do you agree with the current practice, that when it comes to public facilities, we should deal with voluntary compliance while with

respect to privately owned facilities, there should be licensing and

in case of failure removal of the license? It seems to me and it

seems to my colleagues, I take it, that explosives, since they are

the weapon of choice of terrorists, in the post-September 11 era

must have the same treatment whether they are still the private

or public facilities. I would like to ask each of you to give your

views on this. Mr. Ronay.

Mr. RONAY. In as much as it is within the purview of the private

sector industry to comment on whether it should be or not, I would

like to emphasize that they are required to follow those rules. It

is the licensing issue that is in question. Since public facilities or

agencies are not licensed, ATF does not have the authority to inspect them. They can provide——

Mr. LANTOS. Would you say that we give ATF that authority?

That is the question.

Mr. RONAY. I certainly would have no disagreement with giving

them the authority. I do have a question in that if they were authorized to license local entities and they found that licensee out

of compliance and they removed or rejected his license, he would

still have to have explosives in his possession to do his job of public

safety.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, the other option would be if, for instance, hypothetically, San Mateo County is now licensed to store explosives,

does not live up to the licensing requirements and the license is removed, this county would have to contract out to Santa Clara

County for storage of explosives if in fact they need it.

Mr. RONAY. That would certainly be one solution.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, can you think of any other rational solution

or do you think that a public—I mean we now had Sheriff Horsley

privately and publicly admit they goofed, they made a mistake. The

facility was unsafe. It was broken into, 200 pounds of explosives

were stolen, and had it not been for the extremely skillful work of

our law enforcement agencies, we would not know today where

these explosives are, whether they had gotten into the hands of terrorists and what they could be used for. So if a public agency is

incapable of living up to its responsibility of safeguarding explosives, then, clearly, that agency will lose its right to store explosives.

Mr. RONAY. That does present a problem for an agency that has

those responsibilities in bomb disposal, explosive entry and so

forth. So I think the punishment, if you will, or the result of noncompliance would have to be measured in some way other than denying that community the ability to do their job. And I think from

ATF’s point of view, that is the only way that they enforce the law

now except for prosecution, as Mr. Nelson mentioned, they lift the

license. And in a private entity, that means out of business. So

there is that severe penalty there, and someone else picks up that

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business. But in the public atmosphere or arena, that isn’t the

case, and Mr. Villa is probably in a better position to address that

than I, but that would be my perspective on it following a career

in law enforcement myself.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Villa.

Mr. VILLA. In answer to your question, yes, and I see every day

as being a learning experience, and from this situation, be it in

northern California or southern California where we know these

thefts have occurred at other law enforcement agencies, Nashville,

we would encourage again anything that would be proactive to prevent the future theft of explosive magazines.

Mr. LANTOS. Do you therefore favor treating both private and

public storage facilities on the same basis, on a mandatory basis,

not on a voluntary basis?

Mr. VILLA. It would appear that would be a recommended way

of proceeding in the future, yes.

Mr. LANTOS. Now, let me ask a general question of you, Mr.

Ronay, because you have lived with this industry for a long time,

and most of us know very little about it. You are telling us that

is a $1 billion industry; 21⁄2 million tons of explosives are sold every

year, about that. How concentrated is the industry, how many

manufacturers are we dealing with?

Mr. RONAY. Not very many. We have approximately less than 20

manufacturers.

Mr. LANTOS. On the top five control how much of the market?

Mr. RONAY. The top five probably control—you know, this isn’t

something that IME keeps tracks of, but I am going to guess that

they probably control 80 percent of the market.

Mr. LANTOS. Is there any problem with respect to storage as far

as the manufacturers are concerned?

Mr. RONAY. There are always problems surrounding the security

of any of our operations when you are dealing with an inherently

hazardous material, a dangerous material like explosives. Manufacturers apply not only compliance with the regulations but they go

above and beyond those regulations in many cases where their facilities can allow it or mandate it and what they can afford. I mean

we have large and small manufacturers, distributors and using entities which are not IME members but all of those mines, quarries

and facilities out there that also have to store explosives. The impact of putting a security alarm system in, for example, is very different for them than it is for a large manufacturer who can plan

to do that when he doesn’t have to move it around necessarily. So

it is very difficult to say one size fits all in this type of regulatory

activity.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Villa, what is your view of the episode here in

San Mateo County?

Mr. VILLA. Well, if I may, I do have a prepared statement for

that, and if I could read that. I do not know anything about the

security conditions, good, bad or otherwise or of the magazines involved in the report of this of explosives. This is in response to the

real and anticipated backlash that the incident may entail. By the

way, great job to the investigation of this incident and the prompt

apprehension of a suspect, major recoveries of the stolen goods.

This was a tribute to great teamwork. The ATF press release that

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I saw is a nice example of giving appropriate credit to the local

agencies involved for their diligent work toward solving these burglaries.

Mr. LANTOS. Now, how many bomb squads are there in the

United States, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. VILLA. Currently, there are 450 accredited bomb squads, and

these are accredited by the National Association of Bomb Squad

Commanders. I have been touch with Stan Matheson and the current Chair of the National Association of Bomb Squad Commanders. It is my understanding that he has prepared a letter for this

hearing today to be read into the record. Greg Smith is a bomb

squad commander, and I am sure he would be happy to read that

into the record if so be.

Mr. LANTOS. Would you like to do that, sir? Do we have it in the

record already? Oh, OK. It is in the record. Good. Good. Do each

of these bomb squads have a storage facility, to the best of your

knowledge?

Mr. VILLA. To the best of my knowledge, not every single one

would have one. It would be a similar situation such as the incident that we are talking about.

Mr. LANTOS. Where they would share it?

Mr. VILLA. Yes. Multiple agencies would share it.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Ronay, you were out at the site with us this

morning?

Mr. RONAY. Yes, I was.

Mr. LANTOS. This is the first time you saw the San Mateo facility?

Mr. RONAY. Yes.

Mr. LANTOS. Will you share your candid view with us of what

your judgment was of the quality of that facility in a time of terrorist threats?

Mr. RONAY. Well, let me address it in terms of the facility as I

saw it very briefly this morning and the regulations. It appeared

to me that all four of those storage magazines were in compliance

or were up to the specifications required for magazines. It also appeared to me that the American Table of Distances, that is the separation distances between the magazines and public highways and

inhabited buildings, was appropriate, although I couldn’t judge that

entirely. The security of the location, that is the locked gates and

the access to it, certainly appears to have exceeded what is required in regulations of any explosives storage site. The fact that

they had an alarm system on it, albeit it was not functioning, is

also in addition to what is required by Federal law.

Now, we are recommending today, in a post-September 11 environment that security alarm systems, photographic security would

be a very appropriate and we recommend that it be in place at

storage facilities where it is appropriate. There are situations

where it cannot possibly be implemented, although technology

today is coming around to the point where these things can be as

remote as the moon if necessary, and of course that will enhance

security down the road. Historically, that hasn’t been the case, and

because magazines are remotely located for safety reasons, they are

very difficult to secure in the public sector and in the private sector.

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So my take on what I saw this morning was that it was not particularly unusual. I might even hazard a guess that location was

the same when that was an operating commercial quarry. I don’t

know that but I am guessing 30 years ago when it was a quarry

that might have been where those magazines were located. And

someone would have had to pass through these security locks to get

to it, which is probably in excess of what many facilities have

today.

Mr. LANTOS. So what you are saying is this facility, which was

broken into by a couple of thugs, is probably better than some facilities elsewhere in the country.

Mr. RONAY. Yes, I would say so, because of the gated security

only, really, the fact that we went through how many gates to go

in there this morning, which were locked, apparently.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I apologize for not

being here for your oral testimony. I am on a different timeframe

back East and had to make a few calls. So some of what I may ask

could be a little repetitive, and I apologize, and I hope Mr. Lantos

will give me a little leeway there.

I, first, would love to know, this may sound a little strange, but

what got you in this line of work? I mean when you grew up, I am

not sure that either of you said, ‘‘I am going to get into the explosives industry business.’’ Did it just evolve over time or is it——

Mr. RONAY. It would seem to, yes. I mean I had some military

experience with explosive ordnance disposal. I got into the FBI and

ended up, because of that other experience, working with explosives for, I think, 18 years of that career. And then the industry

brought me in to do this, so I have been around it for 35 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Ronay, when I read your bio, I didn’t know, how

long were you in the FBI for? I knew you were in——

Mr. RONAY. Twenty-three years, almost 23 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Villa, how did you get into this line of work?

Mr. VILLA. As a deputy sheriff for the County of Los Angeles, I

was invited to joint the bomb squad as a result of a supervisor that

I used to work for. And when there were some openings in the

bomb squad, I was asked to join the bomb squad. I find it to be

the best job in law enforcement based on the fact that as a bomb

technician and investigators, we know when we go down range and

render the device safe, we are able to go out and investigate the

crime and put the criminals in jail who made the bomb.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I think it is extraordinarily important work,

but I think it is highly dangerous. You must have a keen sense of

focus, and I appreciate both of you. Mr. Ronay, were you actually

in making bombs harmless as well or were you more administrative?

Mr. RONAY. Well, the 2 years that I spent in explosive ordnance

disposal operations I was the commander of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment at Fort Benning, Georgia, and we did

that on that base and in the surrounding areas. And in those years,

in the sixties, the military had a large responsibility for the surrounding community in the bomb disposal business. And as it has

developed over the years, law enforcement has taken that responsibility over.

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Mr. SHAYS. I have been to Iraq five times, and the last meeting

I had was with the folks that—it is an acronym called SEXY but

they basically are trying to analyze the detonation devices, who

makes these bombs. And I knew the first few times I was there

that there were literally hundreds of depots of munitions that were

miles square.

But what I learned the last time was that they had pre-deployed

these munitions all along the Iranian border, and they are in

farms, they are in shacks, and there are just people continually

going and getting them. And what fascinated me was all the different ways they detonated these weapons, from your keychain to

what opens your car doors, to your garage door openers, to the kids

that make these little model cars run, to cell phones and so on.

But what was fascinating to me was they were actually able to

tell us how many people made these weapons, and they could almost begin to tell us where they were made based on the materials

used. It is an amazing amount of work, and they only had 10 people. They have increased that to many more, and they are getting

a lot more successes and actually tracking who is making these

weapons.

But from my standpoint, obviously relating to this hearing, is

that is the technology continuing to improve, and is it easier for

someone not in the profession and in a vocation to make weapons?

Is it easier today if it is not your vocation to make weapons, significant explosive devices?

Mr. VILLA. I can answer that based on the age of the computer

and the Internet. We have a youthful fascination of children who

like to experiment with explosives, and what they don’t know they

can obtain from the Internet. Anything and everything they want

to know about explosives is obtained from the Internet.

Mr. SHAYS. So the technology is there, but is it also easier to

make these weapons?

Mr. VILLA. It is everyday materials, some of which you can purchase at grocery stores that they can take home and make bombs

with. This isn’t really the forum to address how they do it, but——

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I don’t need to know that.

Mr. VILLA [continuing]. But it is very simple for them. The technology, in some cases, is sophisticated when you talk about the

electronically controlled devices and electronic countermeasures,

but it is readily available.

Mr. SHAYS. Give some reality to 200 pounds worth of explosive

devices that were taken. It is not like they needed—two individuals

or three with backpacks could have taken away these weapons, correct? They didn’t have to drive up. But what could they do with

these kinds of weapons? The plastic devices in particular I am curious about. How could these weapons have been used in an a way

that would be threatening to society? Is 200 enough, 200 pounds

enough or is it more than enough?

Mr. VILLA. Well, I guess the simplest form, to go back to Pan Am

Flight 103, it took a very little amount of high explosives to take

out a 747 out of the sky and kill the amount of people that it killed.

Mr. SHAYS. How many pounds is speculated that it took?

Mr. VILLA. Less than one.

Mr. SHAYS. Less than one?

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Mr. VILLA. One pound.

Mr. SHAYS. And are plastic devices a bigger concern than other

types of devices in terms of being able to get through a system?

Mr. VILLA. When you refer to plastic, I am assuming that you are

talking about plastic explosives.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. VILLA. C4 or Semtex.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. VILLA. It is available.

Mr. SHAYS. Should we be more alarmed that someone is able to

get a C4 explosive device than some other type of device?

Mr. VILLA. We should be alarmed when anyone other than a

trained professional is in possession of explosives.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. RONAY. Specifically, to address your question, in the hands

of a criminal, whether it is C4 or emulsion commercial explosives

or dynamite is probably not the question to be asked. It is how did

they get a hold of it and what are they going to do with it? They

all do the same relative damage for a terrorist. In the demolition

business or in the commercial blasting business, there are big differences between them, but in a criminal bomb it is not significant.

Mr. SHAYS. You are more interested in the fact of not being able

to know if someone was bringing a device onto an airplane. Some

devices are easier to get into than others. That is really the focus

of my question.

Mr. RONAY. Oh, I see. You refer to the making of plastic explosives.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is were there any devices that had

been taken from this facility that would have been easier to bring

in than some other types of explosive devices?

Mr. RONAY. Not to my knowledge, although I don’t know the

other explosives that were taken besides the C4. I haven’t heard

what type they were.

Mr. SHAYS. Is a blasting cap, a blasting detonator large enough

to bring down an airplane or would you need something more than

that?

Mr. RONAY. You would need something more.

Mr. SHAYS. Can you package a few of them together and then

you have—not necessarily?

Mr. RONAY. That generally isn’t done, but, yes, if you mass

enough of them together, I suppose you could make a pretty

good——

Mr. VILLA. And not to minimize what a blasting cap is, a blasting

cap is made from raw explosives. A blasting cap could very easily

injure someone or possibly kill them.

Mr. SHAYS. The focus of our hearing obviously was to see if this

is the wake-up call. Well, first off, we view this as a wake-up call,

and now we are just trying to assess what we need to wake up to.

It blew me away, but probably not you, because this is something

you are more familiar with, but it blew me away that we do not

know how many private facilities, we do not know how many public

facilities. We clearly are not inspecting the private facilities to the

extent they need to be inspected because of resources not being allocated. But in the public facilities it seems like we are not even

140

sure who is in charge. You can have a few leaders in this facility.

Any of that surprise you or was it just common knowledge?

Mr. RONAY. Well, ATF is not authorized, the government is not

authorized to know how many public facilities there are. They are

exempt from the Federal law. Private facilities, the commercial facilities, I am not sure if the ATF testified to the number of licensees that they had.

Mr. SHAYS. They gave licensees but they couldn’t tell us where

they were, the extent to the——

Mr. RONAY. Well, they can. He just didn’t have that assembly in

the data base.

Mr. SHAYS. But they can’t because they don’t have it in their

data base. They have the information in raw data, but they can’t—

K-Mart can tell us what sold in the last 10 minutes or the last 5

minutes.

Mr. RONAY. There are probably around 50,000 storage facilities

in the country, commercial or private, if you will. I believe those

probably are operated by 12,000 or so licensees that ATF licenses.

They would have a lot of digging to do to be able to account for exactly every location or magazine, which I am sure they will do now,

and I think that is a good thing to do, but it is very difficult to

know where every magazine is from every licensee.

Mr. SHAYS. Because they keep being moved?

Mr. RONAY. Especially in construction jobs when you have a permit to store and to use but you are moving around with the job.

In this day and age, explosives are actually stored on the truck

that pumps them into where the drill holes are. So those things are

constantly in flux even though the operations are—they are constantly moving. So it is difficult to know where all those vehicles

or moving magazines are at any one time.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything that would surprise us but not surprise you that you think we should know? And that is not meant

to be a cute question, but in other words we focused on what we

focused on, but as you were listening, did you say, ‘‘My God, if they

only knew the half of it.’’

Mr. RONAY. No, but I did repeatedly realize that there is a lack

of understanding, I believe, by everybody as to what the ATF jurisdiction is in these cases. They do not have the authority in the law

to oversee these public entities.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Lantos, do you have anything?

Mr. LANTOS. Well, I just want to pursue this last answer. Is the

ATF lacking authority because it hasn’t asked for it or is ATF lacking authority because it never asked for authority?

Mr. SHAYS. Could I add another one? Is it lacking authority because there is some element here that neither of us are grasping,

because there is a political challenge here that neither of us seem

to understand but everybody else understands?

Mr. VILLA. I think if I could, I think that we expect and we hold

ourselves up to a higher standard.

Mr. SHAYS. Who is we?

Mr. VILLA. Law enforcement. And I would suggest that if any

bomb squad commander had the appropriation of funds to make

sure that his or her facility was secure to the max, that is what

they would be doing, but their hands are tied. They do not have

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a checkbook that allows them to write a check for $10,000 to update their security standards.

And with respect to what ATF is doing or what they can do or

what they have asked for, I believe that it would be a proactive approach on their part to enforce the current regulations that are already in place. It is incumbent upon the local bomb squads to make

sure that the security and the necessary implementation of security

is installed so that we prevention future thefts.

Mr. LANTOS. But with all due respect, Mr. Villa, this little facility

that Congressman Shays and I inspected, and several others were

with us, is a very tiny facility, very inexpensive, terribly run down.

We are dealing with two very wealthy counties, San Mateo and

San Francisco Counties. It simply makes no sense to argue that

these two wealthy counties with their population and with their resources could not pay for a secure facility. That simply won’t wash.

Mr. VILLA. Agreed.

Mr. LANTOS. It simply won’t wash.

Mr. SHAYS. In particular, since they more than anyone else

would know the significance of what is in there.

Mr. VILLA. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. So your comments would almost argue that the reverse should happen. That is why it was so shocking, frankly, to

see it. When I asked about was there anything ‘‘but you don’t know

the half of it,’’ you smiled, Mr. Villa. Was that just because you

have a great smile or you could think of something?

Mr. VILLA. I am just thinking——

Mr. SHAYS. You are under oath, Mr. Villa. Is there anything that

we don’t know that is out there that better be addressed?

Mr. VILLA. I am not smiling to make light of what is occurring

here today. I am only suggesting that based on what we know and

what we hear from bomb squad commanders is sometimes they will

put in requisitions for funding and they are not funded. And that,

again, would be incumbent upon each individual agency that owns

and operates, maintains an explosives storage facility.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to tell you what I am hearing. You are

saying that people who work with these highly explosives know

that they are underfunded, put in requests to local agencies or

State or Federal—excuse me, local or State, county and are not getting the response, and then they just back off. But to me that is

like playing Russian roulette. If something does happen, they

would be the ones who will get blamed, ultimately.

Mr. VILLA. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe what we can do is we can spark a little bit

of a debate that people ask what they need and then it goes up the

chain, and ultimately someone will have to be held accountable,

even if it comes to us.

Is there anything else, Mr. Lantos, you want to ask? Anything

you want to put on the record that is not on the record?

I would just conclude by saying to you that I really don’t think

I fully grasp the significance. I said it once but I am going to say

it again, because the significance of this industry to the economic

well-being of our communities, and it does tell me, though, it needs

a heck of a lot more attention. And I do believe that there are probably very sound practices in the public sector and the private secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Feb 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98210.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tor, but I also suspect that there are some real vulnerabilities in

the private sector as well that we need to shore up.

So I am pretty certain that Mr. Lantos and I will be coming up

with some recommendations, both in writing to the Secretary in

terms of our appropriators as well. And this will be work that we

would—some of it might be administrative, some of it might be regulation, some of it could be executive order, and some of it might

take an active of Congress, but we will look at all that.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, before we close and before I thank

our two witnesses, may I thank members of your staff, Vince Chase

and Bob Briggs, for an outstanding job. Thank you for coming out

here. Thank the city of San Mateo for their courtesy in making this

available to us. We thank the San Mateo Police Department for

their usual and extraordinary cooperation.

Mr. SHAYS. We will note that and thank you all. And thank you,

Mr. Lantos, for asking that we come here. The fact is when you

make those suggestions, we just do it. Thank you.

With that, we will call this hearing closed.

[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., the subcommittee hearing was adjourned.]

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