a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate

May 2005 STATE DEPARTMENT

Improvements Needed 

to Strengthen U.S. 

Passport Fraud 

Detection Efforts

GAO-05-477
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

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To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-477, a report to the 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

May 2005

STATE DEPARTMENT

Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 

Passport Fraud Detection Efforts 

Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of those 

fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, stolen, or 

damaged passports and child substitution are among the other tactics used. 

Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals conceal their activities 

and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist that they could also be used to 

help facilitate terrorism. 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, 

and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from 

terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. citizens listed in the 

federal government’s consolidated terrorist watch list is not systematically 

provided to State. Moreover, State does not routinely obtain from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted 

by federal and state law enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 

federal and state fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State’s 

Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One 

of those not included was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. State does not 

maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, hindering 

information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing reductions and 

interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud referrals at some 

offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and investigative resources also 

hinder fraud detection efforts. 

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on 

State’s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to adjust 

the standards. State began implementing the new standards in January 2004 

to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform 

nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern 

that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to “shortcut” 

fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner 

concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a 

number of other modifications and compromises. 

Crimes Suspected of 37 Federal and State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were Included in Our 

Test 

Type of crime Federal fugitives State fugitives

Murder 5 4

Felonious assault and related acts 2 7

Child sex offenses 4 1

Drug trafficking 3 

Attempted murder 1 1

Bombings 1 

Child kidnapping 1

Other crimes 4 3

Total 20 17

 Sources: State Department and other federal agencies. 

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. 

passport is essential to the State 

Department’s efforts to protect U.S. 

citizens from terrorists, criminals, 

and others. State issued about 8.8 

million passports in fiscal year 

2004. During the same year, State’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

arrested about 500 individuals for 

passport fraud, and about 300 

persons were convicted. Passport 

fraud is often intended to facilitate 

other crimes, including illegal 

immigration, drug trafficking, and 

alien smuggling. GAO examined 

(1) how passport fraud is 

committed, (2) what key fraud 

detection challenges State faces, 

and (3) what effect new passport 

examiner performance standards 

could have on fraud detection. 

What GAO Recommends

This report makes six 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of State to consider ways to 

improve interagency information 

sharing, establish a centralized and 

up-to-date fraud prevention library, 

consider augmenting fraud 

prevention staffing, assess the 

extent to which interoffice 

workload transfers may hinder 

fraud prevention, and strengthen 

fraud prevention training and 

oversight. State generally 

concurred with our 

recommendations and indicated 

that it has begun taking steps to 

implement most of them. 

 
Page i GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud 9

State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts 12

Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection 

Remains Unclear 27

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 38

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Tables Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS 

Who Were Included in Our Test 14

Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who 

Were Included in Our Test 16

Figures Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related 

Operations 5

Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication 

Process 7

Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners 8
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Abbreviations

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

OIG Office of the Inspector General

SSA Social Security Administration

TDIS Travel Document Issuance System

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

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Page 1 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 20, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State 

Department’s effort to protect U.S. citizens and interests at home and 

abroad in the post-September 11 world. The department issued about 8.8 

million passports in fiscal year 2004. Each year, State passport examiners 

refer tens of thousands of applications they suspect may be fraudulent to 

their local fraud prevention offices. In fiscal year 2004, State’s Diplomatic 

Security Service arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud and 

about 300 were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate 

such crimes as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling.

You asked us to assess State’s efforts to detect passport fraud and whether 

new performance standards for passport examiners may require them to 

adjudicate passport applications too quickly to adequately detect such 

fraud. This report examines (1) how passport fraud is committed, (2) what 

key challenges State faces in its fraud-detection efforts, and (3) what effect 

new performance standards for passport examiners could have on fraud 

detection.

To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed fraud statistics 

maintained by State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and examined fraud 

statistics and selected investigative case files within State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security. To assess the key challenges State faces in detecting 

passport fraud, we directly observed State’s fraud detection efforts at 7 of 

the 16 domestic passport-issuing offices located across the United States; 

tested State’s use of electronic databases for fraud detection; ran the names 

of 67 different federal and state fugitives against State’s name-check 

system; analyzed State’s fraud referral statistics within the Bureaus of 

Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security; and interviewed cognizant 

officials in Consular Affairs’ Office of Passport Services, Office of Consular 

Fraud Prevention, and Consular Systems Division. We also met with 

cognizant officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of 

the Inspector General. To assess what effect new performance standards 
Page 2 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

for passport examiners could have on fraud detection efforts, we reviewed 

the test results and methodology that State used in developing the new 

standards, and interviewed union representatives for passport examiners, 

select examiners, the fraud prevention managers at all 16 domestic 

passport-issuing offices, and Consular Affairs officials responsible for 

developing and implementing the new standards. Our work was conducted 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

(For a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology, see app. I.)

Results in Brief Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the 

primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. Imposters’ 

use of legitimate birth and other identification documents belonging to 

others accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 

2004, while false claims of lost, stolen, or damaged passports; child 

substitution; and other methods accounted for the remaining 31 percent. 

According to State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, passport fraud is often 

committed in connection with other crimes, including narcotics trafficking, 

organized crime, money laundering, and alien smuggling. Fraudulently 

obtained passports help enable criminals to conceal their movements and 

activities. Further, U.S. passports allow their holders entry into the United 

States with much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens and also 

allow visa-free passage into many countries around the world, providing 

obvious benefits to criminals operating on an international scale. Concerns 

exist that fraudulently obtained passports could also be used to help 

facilitate terrorism. 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, 

including limited inter- and intra-agency information sharing and 

insufficient fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and investigative 

resources. These challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens 

from terrorists, criminals, and others who would harm the United States. 

Specifically, State does not currently receive information on U.S. citizens 

listed in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) database—the federal 

government’s consolidated terrorist watch list—and State does not 

routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names 

of other individuals wanted by both federal and state law enforcement 

authorities for various crimes. Many of these individuals are not identified 

in State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) name-check
Page 3 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

database for passports1 and could therefore obtain passports and travel 

internationally without the knowledge of appropriate authorities or, in 

some cases, potentially flee the country to escape charges. We tested the 

names of 67 different federal and state fugitives—some wanted for serious 

crimes—and found that fewer than half were in State’s system. One of 

those not included was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. Though State, 

TSC, and the FBI began exploring options for more routine information 

sharing on certain passport-related matters in mid- to late 2004, such 

arrangements are not yet in place. Further, State does not maintain a 

centralized electronic fraud prevention library that enables comprehensive, 

well-organized, and timely information sharing on fraud alerts, lost and 

stolen birth and naturalization certificates, counterfeit documents, and 

other fraud prevention resources among passport-issuing office personnel 

across the United States. We found that, in 2004, fraud prevention staffing 

changes at some domestic passport-issuing offices may have resulted in 

fewer referrals of potential fraud cases to Diplomatic Security for 

investigation. Interoffice transfers of passport adjudication cases may have 

resulted in fewer fraud referrals as well. We found that fraud prevention 

training is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices and that 

some examiners have not had formal fraud prevention training in years. 

Training and oversight of passport acceptance agent operations are even 

more sporadic. State does not have any way of tracking whether many 

acceptance agent employees are receiving required training, it makes 

oversight visits to only a limited number of acceptance facilities each year, 

and it does not maintain records of all of the individuals accepting passport 

applications at those facilities, posing a significant fraud vulnerability.

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have 

on State’s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State has continued to 

adjust the standards. To make passport adjudication work processes and 

related performance measurement more uniform across the 16 different 

domestic passport-issuing offices, State began implementing the new 

standards in January 2004. The 2004 performance standards placed more 

emphasis on meeting numerical production quotas because, for the first 

time, a required average production rate stands alone as a performancerating element for examiners. Passport examiner union representatives and 

some other examiners maintain that the numerical production standards 

force examiners to take “shortcuts” in fraud detection efforts. However, in 

1

State maintains a separate CLASS database for visas. References to CLASS throughout this 

report relate to the CLASS database for passports only. 
Page 4 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

response to union and examiner concerns, State eased the production 

standards during 2004 and made a number of other modifications and 

compromises at various times during the year. As a result, while over 60 

examiners were not achieving the required production rate midway 

through 2004, all but 18 of about 480 examiners nationwide were meeting 

the standards by year-end. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with our 

findings and conclusions. State indicated that it has already begun taking, 

plans to take, or is considering measures to address most of our 

recommendations. 

Background A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official 

verification of the bearer’s origin, identity, and nationality. Under U.S. law, 

the Secretary of State has the authority to issue passports. Only U.S. 

nationals2

 may obtain a U.S. passport, and evidence of citizenship or 

nationality is required with every passport application. For individuals 16 

or older, a regular U.S. passport issued on or after February 1, 1998, is valid 

for 10 years from the date of issue; it is valid for five years for younger 

applicants. Federal regulations list those who do not qualify for a U.S. 

passport, including those who are subjects of a federal felony warrant. 

State Passport Operations The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services oversees the 

Passport Services Office, within State’s Consular Affairs Bureau. Passport 

Services, the largest component of Consular Affairs, consists of three 

headquarters offices: Policy Planning and Legal Advisory Services; Field 

Operations; and Information Management and Liaison. The Office of 

Consular Fraud Prevention addresses passport, visa, and other types of 

consular fraud. The Consular Systems Division is responsible for the 

computer systems involved in passport services and other consular 

operations. The Office for American Citizens Services handles most issues 

relating to passport cases at overseas posts. The Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security is responsible for investigating individual cases of suspected 

passport and visa fraud. The State Department Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) also has some authority to investigate passport fraud. 

2

National means a citizen of the United States or a noncitizen owing permanent allegiance to 

the United States.
Page 5 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Figure 1 shows the key State Department units involved in passport-related 

operations.

Figure 1: Key State Department Units Involved in Passport-Related Operations

State operates 16 passport-issuing offices in Boston; Charleston, South 

Carolina; Chicago; Honolulu; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; 

New York; Norwalk, Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire; San Francisco; Seattle; and Washington, D.C.3

 These 16 offices 

employ the approximately 480 passport examiners4

 who are responsible for 

approving and issuing most of the U.S. passports that are printed each year. 

The number of passports issued by domestic passport offices has risen 

steadily in recent years, increasing from about 7.3 million in fiscal year 

2000 to 8.8 million in fiscal year 2004. Overseas posts deal with a much 

lower volume of passports by comparison, handling about 300,000 

3

There are two passport-issuing offices in Washington, D.C.: a regional passport agency and 

a special issuance agency that handles official U.S. government and diplomatic passports. 

4

State’s official title for the position of passport examiner is passport specialist.

Office of 

Passport 

Services

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

State Department

Bureau of 

Diplomatic 

Security

Office of 

Inspector 

General

Bureau of Consular Affairs

Office of 

Consular 

Fraud 

Prevention

Office of 

American 

Citizens 

Services

Consular 

Systems 

Division

Office of Passport 

Policy Planning and 

Legal Advisory 

Services

Office of Field 

Operations

Office of Information 

Management and 

Liaison

Domestic passportissuing offices
Page 6 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

worldwide in fiscal year 2004. With only a few exceptions, applications 

submitted and approved overseas are transmitted electronically to a 

domestic passport office to be printed. 

Passport Application and 

Approval Process

The majority of passport applications are submitted by mail or in-person at 

one of almost 7,000 passport application acceptance facilities nationwide.5

 

Passport acceptance facilities are located at certain U.S. post offices, 

courthouses, and other institutions and do not employ State Department 

personnel. The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are 

responsible for, among other things, verifying whether an applicant’s 

identification document (such as a driver’s license) actually matches that 

applicant. Applications go to a passport office to be examined after their 

information is entered, and payments are processed by a State Department 

contractor, Mellon Bank, in Pennsylvania.

Through a process called adjudication, passport examiners determine 

whether they should issue each applicant a passport. Adjudication requires 

the examiner to scrutinize identification and citizenship documents 

presented by applicants to verify their identity and U.S. citizenship. It also 

includes the examination of an application to detect potential indicators of 

passport fraud and the comparison of the applicant’s information against 

databases that help identify individuals who may not qualify for a U.S. 

passport. When passport applications are submitted by mail or through 

acceptance facilities, examiners adjudicate the applications at their desks. 

A relatively small percentage of the total number of passport applications 

are submitted directly by applicants at one of State’s domestic passportissuing offices. Applicants are required to demonstrate imminent travel 

plans to set an appointment for such services at one of the issuing office’s 

public counters. “Counter” adjudication allows examiners to question 

applicants directly or request further information on matters related to the 

application, while “desk” adjudication requires telephoning or mailing the 

applicants in such cases.

6 Figure 2 depicts the typical passport application 

and adjudication process.

5

Number is as of March 2005. State officials noted that this number changes frequently as 

new acceptance facilities are added and others are dropped. 

6

Applications accepted and adjudicated at the counter also undergo a number of desk 

adjudication steps to complete the fraud detection process before deciding whether to 

approve each passport.
Page 7 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Figure 2: The Typical Passport Application and Adjudication Process

Passport Fraud Detection 

Tools

The passport adjudication process is facilitated by computer systems—

including the Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), which appears on 

passport examiners’ screens when the adjudication begins. Figure 3 

identifies the key computer databases available to help examiners 

adjudicate passport applications and detect potential fraud.

Passport applicant Examiner

may need

additional

information

from the

applicant

Passport application

adjudication

Examiner

checks travel

document issuance

system for hits in

name-check databases

reviews results of

database checks

decides whether to

approve issuance of

a passport

●

●

●

●

checks

documentation of

applicant’s identity

and citizenship

checks application

for fraud indicators

●

Application

rejected

Additional

examination

by Fraud

Prevention

Manager

if fraud is

suspected

Diplomatic

Security

consideration

and/or

investigation

Arrest for

fraud

Passport

printing and

quality control

Passport

issuance

Data entry

and payment

processing at

Mellon Bank

Data entry

and payment

processing

at Passport

Office counter

Source: State Department.

Application filed

at an acceptance

facility

Appointment at

Passport Office

set

Application

mailed
Page 8 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Figure 3: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners

TDIS automatically checks the applicant’s name against several 

databases— including State’s Consular Lookout and Support System 

(CLASS), which contains information provided by various offices within 

State and information on outstanding criminal warrants provided by the 

U.S. Marshal’s Service, the FBI, and other state and federal agencies, as 

well as Health and Human Services’ database, which identifies parents who 

have been certified by a state agency as owing more than $5,000 in child 

support and therefore are not eligible for a passport. If TDIS indicates the 

applicant may have applied for a passport at another agency or been issued 

a U.S. passport within the last 10 years, it prompts the examiner to 

reference computer databases outside of TDIS to determine whether the 

prompt refers to the applicant or rather someone who resembles the 

applicant.

In addition, examiners scrutinize paper documents and other relevant 

information during the fraud detection process. Examiners compare the 

application submitted by the applicant to the information on the screen to 

make sure the information was entered properly, check for missing 

information, and analyze application documentation for various types of 

fraud indicators. In addition, examiners watch for suspicious behavior and 

travel plans. Examiners and acceptance agents are instructed to request 

additional proof of identification if they feel the documents presented are 

Travel Document

Issuance System

(TDIS)

Registers “hits” if a

passport applicant’s

information matches

or resembles records

from linked databases

Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)

Records from multiple government and law enforcement offices on criminals

and other individuals

Consular Lost and Stolen Passports database (CLASP)

Records on passports reported lost or stolen

Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS)

Electronic documentation of passport fraud cases and loss of nationality cases

Multiple Issuance Verification/In Process databases (MIV/IP)

Information on applicants that either hold at least one current U.S. passport

or have at least one application in process

Social Security data

Limited information from Social Security records

Passport Information Electronic Retrieval System (PIERS)

Images of applications for most passports issued in the past 10 years

Source: State Department.
Page 9 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

insufficient. State officials said that in such cases, some individuals 

abandon the application, and the names of those who do are placed in 

State’s name-check system and are more stringently scrutinized if they 

apply again. When examiners detect potentially fraudulent passport 

applications, they send the applications to their local fraud prevention 

office for review and potential referral to State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security for further investigation.

Identity Theft a 

Primary Means of 

Committing Fraud

Using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the 

primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. Applicants 

also commit fraud through other means. Passport fraud is often linked to 

other crimes. 

Passport Fraud Most 

Commonly Attempted by 

Imposters Using the 

Legitimate Documents of 

Others

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigators stated that imposters’ 

use of assumed identities, supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained 

identification documents, was a common and successful way to 

fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport. This method accounted for 69 percent 

of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 2004. Investigators found 

numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens obtaining U.S. passports 

using a false identity. One example identified by Diplomatic Security 

investigators involved an alien using another person’s identity to obtain a 

U.S. passport. In 2003, a woman using a fraudulent identity claimed to be 

born in Puerto Rico7

 and provided a Puerto Rican birth certificate when 

applying for a passport at a clerk of the court office in Florida. She also 

provided a Florida driver’s license.

Diplomatic Security investigators also found cases of U.S. citizens using the 

documentation of others to hide their true identity. In 1997, a naturalized 

U.S. citizen born in Cuba stole a Lear jet and transported it to Nicaragua for 

use in charter services. At the time of his arrest in 2003, he was using an 

7

Many issuing office managers and Diplomatic Security agents said that applicants 

fraudulently using legitimate Puerto Rican birth certificates is a key fraud concern. They 

said that legitimate Puerto Rican birth certificates are readily available because they are 

commonly required in Puerto Rico as identification for enrolling children in school and 

other activities, and they aren’t subsequently taken care of properly. Also, there have been 

many instances of lost and stolen blank Puerto Rican birth certificates. State recently began 

requiring examiners to give additional scrutiny to Puerto Rican birth certificates, and State 

officials also met with senior officials of the Puerto Rican government to encourage them to 

impose more controls over the issuance of multiple birth certificates. 
Page 10 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

assumed identity and possessed both false and legitimate but fraudulently 

obtained identification documents, including a U.S. passport in the name 

he used while posing as a certified pilot and illegally providing flight 

instruction. Seized at his residence when he was arrested were two Social 

Security cards, four driver’s licenses, three Puerto Rican birth certificates, 

one U.S. passport, one pilot identification card, numerous credit cards and 

checking account cards, and items used to make fraudulent documents. In 

October 2004, he pled guilty to knowingly possessing five or more 

“authentication devices” and false identification documents, for which he 

was sentenced to 8 months’ confinement. In another case, a man wanted 

for murdering his wife obtained a Colorado driver’s license and a passport 

using a friend’s Social Security number and date and place of birth. Three 

and four years later he obtained renewal and replacement passports, 

respectively, in the same assumed identity. He was later arrested and pled 

guilty to making a false statement in an application for a passport. He was 

sentenced to time served (about 7 months) and returned to California to 

stand trial for murdering his wife. In a third example, a woman obtained a 

U.S. passport for herself and her daughter using the assumed identity of a 

friend and that friend’s daughter. The individual fled the country, but was 

eventually caught, returned to the United States, and tried for forgery, 

criminal impersonation, and child abduction. 

Various Other Methods 

Used to Fraudulently Obtain 

Passports

Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including 

submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child 

substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Some fraudulently 

obtain new passports by claiming to have lost their passport or had it stolen 

or that it was damaged. For example, one individual who used another 

person’s Social Security number and Ohio driver’s license to report a lost 

passport obtained a replacement passport through the one-day expedited 

service. This fraudulently obtained passport was used to obtain entry into 

the United States 14 times in less than three years. Diplomatic Security 

officials told us that another means of passport fraud is when individuals 

obtain replacement passports by using expired passports containing 

photographs of individuals they closely resemble. This method of fraud is 

more easily and commonly committed with children, with false 

applications based on photographs of children who look similar to the
Page 11 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

child applicant.8 Assuming the identity of a deceased person is another 

means of fraudulently applying for a passport. Diplomatic Security 

investigated an individual who had been issued a passport in the identity of 

a deceased person and was receiving Social Security benefits in the 

deceased person’s name. The individual was charged with making false 

statements on a passport application.

Passports Used to Commit 

Other Crimes

According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport 

fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including 

narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien 

smuggling. According to Diplomatic Securityofficials, concerns exist within 

the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport fraud 

could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. Using a passport with 

a false identity helps enable criminals to conceal their movements and 

activities, according to a State Department document. U.S. passports 

provide their holders free passage into our country with much less scrutiny 

than is given to foreign citizens. U.S. passports also allow visa-free passage 

into many countries around the world, providing obvious benefits to 

criminals operating on an international scale. According to State officials, 

the most common crime associated with passport fraud is illegal 

immigration. For example, one woman was recently convicted for 

organizing and leading a large-scale passport fraud ring that involved 

recruiting American women to sell their children’s identities, so that 

foreign nationals could fraudulently obtain passports and enter the United 

States illegally. According to the Department of State, the woman targeted 

drug-dependent women and their children, paying them about $300 for 

each identity and then using the identities to apply for passports. The 

woman then sold the fraudulently obtained passports to illegal aliens for as 

much as $6,000 each. Other leaders of alien smuggling rings have also been 

recently convicted. One such ring had been smuggling hundreds of 

undocumented aliens from Ecuador and other parts of South America into 

the United States for fees of $12,000 to $14,000 each.

8

In an effort to address this problem, State established a new requirement in February 2004 

that children aged 14 and under appear with their parents when applying for a passport to 

allow comparison of the children to the photographs being submitted.
Page 12 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

State Faces Challenges 

to Fraud Detection 

Efforts

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts. 

Limited interagency information sharing between State and law 

enforcement and other agencies makes it more difficult to protect U.S. 

citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others who would harm the United 

States. Intra-agency information sharing between passport-issuing offices 

and headquarters, and between offices, is also limited because State lacks a 

centralized and up-to-date fraud library accessible by all staff. Additionally, 

insufficient fraud prevention staffing, training, and oversight has resulted in 

reduced fraud detection capabilities at the issuing offices. Finally, 

overstretched investigative resources within State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security and Office of Inspector General have prevented investigators from 

devoting adequate time and continuity to passport fraud investigations. 

Limited Interagency 

Information Sharing May 

Allow Individuals with 

Terrorism Ties and Criminal 

Fugitives to Obtain 

Passports

One of the key challenges to State’s fraud detection efforts is limited 

interagency information sharing. State does not have access to certain 

information in the Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) consolidated watch 

list database. Additionally, State’s CLASS name-check system does not 

include names of all criminals wanted by federal and state law enforcement 

authorities. Further, access to information from other agencies varies.

State Lacks Access to TSC 

Database 

State currently lacks access to the names of U.S. citizen “persons of 

interest” in TSC’s consolidated terrorist watch list database. TSC was 

created in 2003 to improve information sharing among government 

agencies. By consolidating terrorist watch lists, TSC is intended to enable 

federal agencies to access critical information quickly when a suspected 

terrorist is encountered or stopped within the United States, at the 

country’s borders, or at embassies overseas. Because State’s CLASS namecheck database for passports does not contain the TSC information, U.S. 

citizens with possible ties to terrorism could potentially obtain passports 

and travel internationally without the knowledge of appropriate 

authorities.

Although TSC has been operational since December 1, 2003, State and TSC 

did not begin exploring the possibility of systematically uploading data 

from TSC database into passport CLASS until December 2004. State 

initiated discussions with TSC after an official in State’s Passport Services 

Office attended an interagency meeting and became aware that information 

on certain U.S. citizens was available in the TSC database. A TSC official 

told us that the center had devoted substantial effort in the first 16 months 
Page 13 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

of its operation to reaching out to federal agencies that could benefit from 

TSC information. However, efforts to prevent the entry of or locate foreign 

citizens who would do harm to the United States had been a higher 

immediate priority in the early stages of operation than information-sharing 

efforts involving U.S. citizens. The official also noted that, while TSC plays 

an outreach role with other agencies, it is up to the individual agencies 

involved to define their own specific information requirements. 

State and TSC have not reached an agreement about the informationsharing proposal, though State sent an official proposal to TSC in January 

2005. TSC has noted that it is in the process of addressing certain legal 

questions relating to privacy. A TSC official told us that she does not 

foresee any technical limitations because TSC already has an “elaborate 

interface” with State’s CLASS system for visas. She added that TSC agrees 

that it is important to work out an agreement with State.

State’s CLASS Name-Check 

System Does Not Include Names 

of All Fugitives Wanted by 

Federal and State Law 

Enforcement Authorities

Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently 

provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law 

enforcement authorities, State’s CLASS name-check system does not 

contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and 

other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports and 

potentially flee the country. The subjects of federal felony arrest warrants 

are not entitled to a U.S. passport. According to FBI officials, FBI databases 

contain the names of approximately 37,000 individuals wanted on federal 

charges. State Department officials acknowledge that many of these 

individuals are not listed in CLASS. We tested the names of 43 different 

federal fugitives and found that just 23 were in CLASS; therefore, passport 

examiners would not be alerted about the individuals’ wanted status if any 

of the other 20 not in CLASS applied for a passport. One of these 20 did 

obtain a U.S. passport 17 months after the FBI had listed the individual in 

its database as wanted.

A number of the 20 federal fugitives who were included in our test and 

were found not to be in CLASS were suspected of serious crimes, including 

murder. Table 1 lists the crimes suspected of the federal fugitives in our 

test. Fourteen were wanted by the FBI—including one on its Ten Most 

Wanted list (the names of all 14 were posted on the FBI’s Web site). Six 

other fugitives not in CLASS were wanted by other federal agencies—two 

by the U.S. Marshal’s Service; two by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives; and two by the U.S. Postal Service. 
Page 14 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were Included 

in Our Test

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the State Department’s CLASS name-check system.

State officials told us they had not initiated efforts to improve information 

sharing with the FBI on passport-related matters until the summer of 2004 

because they had previously been under the impression that the U.S. 

Marshal’s Service was already sending to CLASS the names of all fugitives 

wanted by federal law enforcement authorities. The officials noted that the 

U.S. Marshal’s Service had been cooperative in providing names to CLASS 

from its main database of fugitives. However, prior to the summer of 2004, 

State officials were not aware that the information in the U.S. Marshal’s 

database was not as comprehensive as that contained in the FBI-operated 

National Crime Information Center database. State officials became aware 

of this situation when the union representing passport examiners brought 

to their attention that a number of individuals on the FBI’s Ten Most 

Wanted list were not in CLASS. 

In the summer of 2004, State requested, and the FBI agreed, to provide the 

names from the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list, though State officials told us 

they often obtain this information by periodically checking the FBI’s Web 

site. As part of these discussions, State and FBI explored other 

information-sharing opportunities as well, and FBI headquarters officials 

sent a message instructing agents in its field offices how to provide names 

of U.S. citizens who are FBI fugitives (other than those from the Ten Most 

Wanted list) to State on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, State began 

discussions with the FBI about receiving information on individuals with 

FBI warrants on a more routine and comprehensive basis. During the most 

recent negotiations, in December 2004, FBI officials told State officials that 

they would need a written proposal outlining State’s specific technical and 

information needs, following which negotiations could begin to develop a 

formal agreement. One possibility that was discussed for additional name 

Type of crime Number of fugitives

Murder 5

Felonious assault and related crimes 2

Child sex offenses 4

Drug trafficking 3

Attempted murder 1

Bombings 1

Other crimes 4
Page 15 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

sharing was for the FBI to send State weekly extracts from its databases, 

while another possibility would be to give State officials the ability to 

access the FBI’s wanted-persons database. According to State, it sent a 

written request to the FBI outlining its needs in April 2005. State also noted 

that it had reached agreement in principal with the FBI on information 

sharing efforts related to FBI fugitives.

According to FBI officials, State requested that the FBI provide only the 

names of FBI fugitives and not those of individuals wanted by other federal 

law enforcement entities. A State official told us that the information 

provided by the U.S. Marshal’s Service together with that to be requested 

from the FBI would enable State to meet its regulatory requirement that it 

not issue passports to subjects of federal felony arrest warrants. However, 

we noted that the limited information State was receiving on fugitives 

wanted by the U.S. Marshal’s Service was not as comprehensive or up to 

date as State officials believed: two of nine individuals wanted by the U.S. 

Marshal’s Service were not in CLASS at the time of our test. The FBI is the 

only law enforcement agency that systematically compiles comprehensive 

information on individuals wanted by all federal law enforcement agencies, 

and, according to FBI officials, it is the logical agency to provide such 

comprehensive information to State.

The FBI is also the only law enforcement agency that compiles 

comprehensive information on individuals wanted by state and local 

authorities. According to FBI officials, FBI databases contain the names of 

approximately 1.2 million individuals wanted on state and local charges 

nationwide. FBI officials told us they believed it would be more useful for 

State to have a more comprehensive list of names that included both 

federal and state fugitives. These officials pointed out that some of the 

most serious crimes committed often involve only state and local charges. 

We tested the names of 24 different state fugitives and found that just 7 

were in CLASS; therefore, the CLASS system would not flag any of the 

other 17, were they to apply for a passport.9

 Table 2 lists the crimes 

suspected of the 17 state fugitives not in CLASS who were included in our 

test.

9

We also noted that 10 of the 20 tested federal fugitives that were not in CLASS were also 

wanted on state charges. Thus, if State fugitives had been listed in CLASS, these individuals 

would have been flagged, even if information on their federal warrants had been missed.
Page 16 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were Included in 

Our Test

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the State Department’s CLASS name-check system.

State Department officials told us that having a comprehensive list of 

names that included both federal and state fugitives could “clog” State’s 

CLASS system and slow the passport adjudication process. They also 

expressed concern that the course of action required of State would not 

always be clear for cases involving passport applicants wanted on state 

charges. The officials pointed out that, though the law is specific about 

denying passports to individuals wanted on federal felony charges, the law 

was not as clear cut about doing so in the case of state fugitives. However, 

FBI officials told us that, at a minimum, State could notify law enforcement 

authorities that such individuals were applying for a passport. Then, the 

relevant law enforcement authorities could make their own determination 

about whether to obtain a court order that would provide a legal basis for 

denying the passport or to simply arrest the individual or take some other 

action. State officials noted that, to work effectively, such an arrangement 

would require the FBI to establish some sort of liaison office that State 

could contact in such instances. 

Access to Information from 

Other Agencies Varies

State receives varying degrees of information from several other agencies, 

including the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and 

individual state departments of motor vehicles. 

• Health and Human Services provides names of parents who have been 

certified by a state agency as owing more than $5,000 in child support 

payments and are therefore not eligible for a U.S. passport. According to 

State officials, this information-sharing arrangement has been very 

successful in preventing such individuals from obtaining passports.

Type of crime Number of fugitives

Murder 4

Felonious assault and related crimes 7

Child sex offenses 1

Attempted murder 1

Child kidnapping 1

Other crimes 3
Page 17 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

• State is negotiating with DHS to gain access to naturalization records to 

verify applicants’ citizenship. State officials currently rely on ad hoc 

information from DHS colleagues, according to Passport Services 

officials, and irregular notifications from DHS when fraudulent 

passports are confiscated. 

• State currently uses limited information from Social Security records 

which are quickly becoming outdated that SSA provided to State on a 

one-time basis in 2002. Though State and SSA signed an April 2004 

memorandum of understanding giving State access to SSA’s main 

database to help verify passport applicant’s identity, the memorandum 

had not been implemented as of March 2005 because the system was 

still being tested to ensure SSA privacy standards. The agreement will 

not include access to SSA death records, though State officials said they 

are exploring the possibility of obtaining these records in the future. 

• Issuing office officials have contact with officials in individual state 

departments of motor vehicles to confirm, for example, the physical 

characteristics of individuals presenting drivers licenses as 

identification. However, these are informal contacts cultivated by 

individual State officials.

Limited Intra-agency 

Information Sharing and 

Unclear Fraud Support 

Responsibilities May Be 

Affecting Fraud Detection 

Capability

State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud 

prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office personnel in 

the United States, and overseas, to efficiently share fraud prevention 

information and tools. As a result, fraud prevention information is provided 

inconsistently to examiners among the 16 domestic offices. Though offices 

share information through local fraud prevention files or by e-mailing 

relevant fraud updates, the types and amount of information shared with 

passport examiners in each office vary widely. For example, at some 

offices, examiners maintain individual sets of fraud prevention materials. 

Some print out individual fraud alerts and other related documents and file 

them in binders. Others archive individual e-mails and other documents 

electronically. Some examiners told us that the sheer volume of fraudrelated materials they receive makes it impossible to maintain and use 

these resources in an organized and systematic way. 

In contrast, the issuing office in Seattle developed its own online fraud 

library that contained comprehensive information and links on fraud alerts 

nationwide. Some information was organized by individual state, including 

information such as the specific serial numbers of blank birth certificates 
Page 18 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

that were stolen. The library contained sections on Social Security 

information, government documents related to U.S. territories, recent fraud 

updates, and fraud-related news, among other information. It included 

examples of legitimate as well as counterfeit naturalization certificates, 

false driver’s licenses, fraud prevention training materials, and a host of 

other fraud prevention information resources and links. Seattle offered a 

static version of its library on CD-ROM to other issuing offices at an 

interoffice fraud prevention conference in 2003. A few of the other offices 

used this resource to varying degrees, but their versions have not been 

regularly updated since 2003. An Office of Consular Fraud Prevention 

official told us that they uploaded at least some of the information onto its 

Web site, but that material has not been regularly updated, either. The 

developer of the library has since been reassigned. Most of the 16 fraud 

prevention managers we talked to believed that the Bureau of Consular 

Affairs should maintain one centralized, up-to-date fraud prevention 

library, similar to the Seattle-developed model, that serves offices 

nationwide. 

Consular Affairs’ Office of Consular Fraud Prevention maintains a Web site 

and “e-room” with some information on fraud alerts, lost and stolen state 

birth documents, and other resources related to fraud detection, though 

fraud prevention officials told us the Web site is not kept up to date, is 

poorly organized, and is difficult to navigate. Fraud prevention officials 

also told us that most of the information on the site relates to visas rather 

than U.S. passports. We directly observed information available on this 

Web site and in the “e-room” during separate visits to State’s passportissuing offices and noted that some of the material was outdated. For 

example, in September 2004, we noted that certain information on state 

birth and death records had not been updated since September 2003 and 

that information on fraudulent U.S. passports had not been updated in 

more than a year.

In addition to limited information sharing, State’s fraud prevention support 

services are not closely coordinated with the passport-issuing offices. 

Multiple headquarters offices, including the Office of Consular Fraud 

Prevention and Office of Passport Policy Planning and Legal Advisory 

Services, claim some responsibility for fraud trend analysis and fraud 

prevention support but fraud detection personnel in issuing offices are 

unclear as to which offices provide which services. Most of the 16 fraud 

prevention managers we interviewed said they do not clearly understand 

the respective roles of these headquarters offices in helping them with their 

fraud detection efforts. Also, while officials in these two offices said they 
Page 19 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

are responsible for analyzing fraud-related data to identify national or 

region-specific trends on factors such as the types, methods, and 

perpetrators of fraud, most fraud prevention managers told us they could 

not recall having received much analysis on fraud trends from these offices 

beyond individual fraud alerts. We noted that the Office of Passport Policy 

Planning and Legal Advisory Services only recently began to perform some 

basic fraud trend analysis on a systematic basis.10 Office of Consular Fraud 

Prevention officials told us they spend most of their time on visa fraud 

because each domestic agency has its own fraud detection apparatus. 

While this office provides some training services, these are limited, and 

much other training is provided by issuing offices and is not coordinated 

with headquarters. 

Insufficient Fraud 

Prevention Staffing, 

Training, Oversight, and 

Investigative Resources 

Make Fraud Detection More 

Difficult

Limited fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and investigative 

resources pose additional challenges to fraud detection efforts. A staffing 

realignment reduced the time available to Fraud Prevention Mangers to 

review cases and make decisions on fraud referrals. Additionally, 

interoffice transfers of passport adjudications have, in some cases, led to 

fewer fraud referrals back to the originating offices. Further, State’s lack of 

a standard refresher training curriculum and schedule has led to uneven 

provision of such training. Additionally, sporadic training and limited 

oversight of passport application acceptance agents constitute a significant 

fraud vulnerability. Finally, overstretched investigative resources hinder 

fraud detection efforts.

Staffing Change Reduced Time 

Available to Review Fraud Cases

In January 2004, State eliminated the assistant fraud prevention manager 

position that had existed at most of its domestic passport-issuing offices, 

and most Fraud Prevention Managers believe that this action was harmful 

to their fraud detection program, in part by overextending their own 

responsibilities. State eliminated the permanent role of assistant primarily 

to expand participation of senior passport examiners serving in that role on 

a rotational basis; the purpose was to help the examiners gain a deeper 

knowledge of the subject matter and, in turn, enhance overall fraud 

detection efforts when the examiners returned to adjudicating passport

10About 10 years ago, the Office of Consular Fraud Prevention stopped doing case work on 

individual potentially fraudulent applications in an effort to become more involved with 

overall program management and to identify overall trends. 
Page 20 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

applications.11 Prior to the permanent position being abolished, 12 of the 16 

passport issuing offices had at least one assistant manager (2 offices had 

two).12 Of the 4 offices that did not have permanent assistants, 3 did not 

have them because they had relatively low workloads and 1 had been in 

operation only for a few years and had not yet filled the position. Managers 

at 10 of the 12 offices that had assistants told us that the loss of this 

position had been harmful to their fraud detection program. In particular, 

managers indicated that the loss of their assistant impacted their own 

ability to concentrate on fraud detection by adding to their workload 

significant additional training, administrative, and networking 

responsibilities. Fraud Prevention Managers also said that taking on their 

assistant’s tasks had diverted their attention from their fraud trend analysis 

as well as their preparation of reports to Washington, D.C., and cases for 

referral to Diplomatic Security. Some managers said they are now 

performing more case work than before because they lack an experienced 

assistant and do not always believe they can rely on rotating staff to do this 

work unsupervised. 

Fraud Prevention Managers and other State officials have linked declining 

fraud referrals to the loss of the assistant fraud prevention manager 

position. In the 12 offices that previously had permanent assistants, fraud 

referral rates from the managers to Diplomatic Security decreased overall 

by almost 25 percent from fiscal year 2003 through 2004,13 the period during 

which the position was eliminated, and this percentage was much higher in 

some offices.14 Fraud Prevention offices screen fraud referrals received 

from examiners, perform certain checks on applicant information, and 

11All 16 offices now have senior examiners rotate through the fraud office—generally two at 

a time, one short and one longer term. The long-term rotator is expected to do some of the 

tasks the assistant manager performed; however, Fraud Prevention Managers said that not 

all long-term rotational staff are capable of handling these tasks as well as the permanent 

assistants had. Further, most managers spend considerable time training rotating staff 

coming into the fraud office. 

12Of the 12 offices, 10 already had senior examiners routinely rotating through the office to 

assist in running the fraud prevention program.

13In the 4 offices that did not previously have permanent assistants, fraud referral rates 

decreased on average by only 7 percent during the same period. As noted, 3 of these offices 

have low workloads. One of the 4 has the second highest workload nationwide, and its fraud 

referral rate remained relatively static during this period.

14Two offices that had assistant fraud prevention managers in 2003 saw increases in their 

fraud referral rates. These 2 offices received just over 8 percent of the total applications 

received by offices that had assistants.
Page 21 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

assess the examiner’s rationale for making the referral before the fraud 

prevention manager can determine whether to refer the case to Diplomatic 

Security for further investigation. Without their assistants helping them 

with these and other duties, managers said they are making fewer fraud 

referrals to Diplomatic Security because they lack the time and do not 

believe they can fully rely on new rotational staff to take on this 

responsibility. In one issuing office where referrals to Diplomatic Security 

were down 41 percent, the manager indicated that loss of his assistant had 

slowed his ability to get cases to Diplomatic Security because he had to 

perform many of the assistant’s duties. A Diplomatic Security agent in 

another issuing office, where the fraud referral rate was down by 55 

percent, said the overall effect of eliminating the assistant manager 

position had been harmful to fraud detection efforts at least in part because 

the permanently assigned assistants had developed valuable personal 

contacts and cooperative arrangements over time with state and local law 

enforcement authorities, department of motor vehicle officials, and others, 

and that such relationships could not be easily developed or maintained by 

rotating staff. 

Most Fraud Prevention Managers acknowledged the value of having senior 

examiners rotate into the fraud prevention office for temporary 

assignments; however, the managers said that rotating staff should 

augment the efforts of a permanent assistant and not serve in place of that 

role. Passport Services management told us they were not planning to reestablish the permanent assistant role,15 but that they are in the process of 

filling one to two additional fraud prevention manager positions at each of 

the 2 offices with the largest workloads nationwide. Both of these offices 

operate multiple shifts each workday, and the new managers are intended 

to provide more comprehensive fraud prevention support for all of the 

shifts. State also plans to establish one additional fraud prevention 

manager position at another issuing office with a large workload. There are 

no current plans for additional positions at any of the other 13 offices. 

15State officials told us they did not wish to re-establish the permanent assistant fraud 

manager role at least in part because it had never been an official State Department position 

with a position description.
Page 22 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Interoffice Transfers of Passport 

Adjudication Workload Result, in 

Some Cases, in Fewer Fraud 

Referrals Back to Originating 

Office 

As adjudication workload and production capacity fluctuate at individual 

passport-issuing offices, State routinely transfers adjudication cases among 

the different offices to keep workload and capacity in balance at each 

location. Fraud Prevention Managers at a number of issuing offices said 

they had noticed that a lower percentage of fraud referrals are being 

returned to them from the 3 offices that were assigned the bulk of 

workload transfers from other offices.16 The Fraud Prevention Managers 

noted that, over the course of a year, the many thousands of passport 

applications originating from one particular region should generally be 

expected to generate a consistent rate of fraud referrals. In fiscal year 2004, 

28 percent of passport applications were transferred to 1 of these 3 offices 

for adjudication, while other issuing offices adjudicated 72 percent. 

Although these 3 offices received 28 percent of the applications, they 

provided only 11 percent of total fraud referrals to the originating agencies; 

the other 89 percent were provided by regional agency passport examiners 

(74 percent) and others, including acceptance agents (15 percent). For 

fiscal year 2003, the 3 processing centers adjudicated 26 percent of the 

applications but provided only 8 percent of the fraud referrals. In 2004, 1 of 

the issuing offices transferred out to processing centers 63 percent of its 

applications (about 287,000) but received back from the processing centers 

only 2 percent of the fraud referrals it generated that year. In 2003, this 

office transferred out 66 percent of its workload, while receiving back only 

8 percent of its total fraud referrals.

Fraud Prevention Managers and other officials told us that one reason 

fewer fraud referrals return from these 3 offices is that passport examiners 

handling workload transfers from a number of different regions are not as 

familiar with the demographics, neighborhoods, and other local 

characteristics of a particular region as are the examiners who live and 

work there. For example, some officials noted that, in instances when they 

suspect fraud, they might telephone the applicants to ask for additional 

information so they can engage in polite conversation and ask casual 

questions, such as where they grew up, what school they attended, and 

other information. The officials noted that, since they are familiar with at 

least some of the neighborhoods and schools in the area, applicants’ 

answers to such questions may quickly indicate whether their application is 

16Two of these 3 offices—Charleston, South Carolina, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire—

are passport processing “megacenters” that do not cover a specific region of the country but 

rather process applications from across the country. The third office, New Orleans, does 

cover a specific region; however, it also performs some of the functions of a megacenter by 

processing a substantial number of applications that originate in regions other than its own. 
Page 23 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

likely to be fraudulent. One examiner in an office that handled workload 

transfers from areas with large Spanish-speaking populations said that the 

office had an insufficient number of examiners who were fluent in Spanish. 

She and other officials emphasized the usefulness of that skill in detecting 

dialects, accents, handwriting, and cultural references that conflict with 

information provided in passport applications. Moreover, some officials 

added that passport examiners at centers handling workload transfers are 

not always well trained in region-specific fraud indicators and do not have 

the same opportunity to interact directly with applicants as do the 

examiners working at public counters in regional offices. 

State Lacks Established 

Refresher Training Curriculum; 

Such Training Is Provided 

Unevenly across Offices

State has not established a core curriculum and ongoing training 

requirements for experienced passport examiners, and thus such training is 

provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices. While State 

recently developed a standardized training program for new hires that was 

first given in August 2004, the Fraud Prevention Managers at each passportissuing office have developed their own fraud detection refresher training 

approaches and materials. We reviewed the training programs and 

materials at all 7 issuing offices we visited and discussed the programs and 

materials at other offices with the remaining nine Fraud Prevention 

Managers by telephone and found that the topics covered and the amount 

and depth of training varied widely by office. Some had developed regionspecific materials; others relied more heavily on materials that had been 

developed by passport officials in Washington, D.C., much of which were 

outdated. Some scheduled more regular training sessions, and others held 

training more sporadically. Several examiners told us they had not received 

any formal, interactive fraud prevention training in at least 4 years.

Some Fraud Prevention Managers hold brief discussions on specific fraud 

cases and trends at monthly staff meetings, and they rely on these 

discussions to serve as refresher training. Some Fraud Prevention 

Managers occasionally invite officials from other government agencies, 

such as the Secret Service or DHS, to share their fraud expertise. However, 

these meetings take place when time is available and may be canceled 

during busy periods. For example, officials at one issuing office said the 

monthly meetings had not been held for several months because of high 

workload; another manager said he rarely has time for any monthly 

meetings; and two others said they do not hold such discussions but e-mail 

to examiners recent fraud trend alerts and information. 
Page 24 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Sporadic Training and Limited 

Oversight of Acceptance Agents 

Constitute Significant Fraud 

Vulnerability

Numerous passport-issuing agency officials and Diplomatic Security 

investigators told us that the acceptance agent program is a significant 

fraud vulnerability. Examples of acceptance agent problems that were 

brought to our attention include important information missing from 

documentation, such as evidence that birth certificates and parents’ 

affidavits concerning permission for children to travel had been received, 

and identification photos that did not match the applicant presenting the 

documentation. Officials at one issuing office said that their office often 

sees the same mistakes multiple times from the same agency. 

These officials attributed problems with applications received through 

acceptance agents to the sporadic training provided for and limited 

oversight of acceptance agents. State has almost 7,000 passport acceptance 

agency offices, and none of the 16 issuing offices provide comprehensive 

annual training or oversight to all acceptance agency offices in their area. 

Instead, the issuing offices concentrate their training and oversight visits 

on agency offices geographically nearest to the issuing offices, those in 

large population centers, those where examiners and Fraud Prevention 

Managers had reported problems, and those in high fraud areas.17 Larger 

issuing offices in particular have trouble reaching acceptance agency staff. 

At one larger issuing office with about 1,700 acceptance facilities, the 

Fraud Prevention Manager said he does not have time to provide 

acceptance agent training and that it is difficult for issuing office staff to 

visit many agencies. A manager at another large issuing office that covers 

an area including 11 states said she does not have time to visit some 

agencies in less populated areas and concentrates her efforts in higher 

fraud areas, which tend to be in the larger cities. 

Officials at one issuing agency noted that State had worked together with 

the U.S. Postal Service to develop CD-ROM training for use at Postal 

Service acceptance facilities. The officials noted that, while they believed 

the training had been well designed, State does not have any way of 

tracking whether all postal employees responsible for accepting passport 

applications actually receive the training. Additionally, issuing office 

officials also said that acceptance agent staff should receive training from 

outside agencies such as state departments of motor vehicles, local police, 

17Management officials at one office said some acceptance facilities have a particularly high 

fraud risk and their work has to be scrutinized carefully. Management officials at another 

issuing office said their goal is to train all acceptance agents once every 3 years, but that 

they have not yet reached this goal. 
Page 25 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

and the FBI on document authenticity and fraud. Other issuing office 

officials said acceptance agents should also receive interview training.

Finally, while State officials told us it is a requirement that all acceptance 

agency staff be U.S. citizens, issuing agency officials told us they have no 

way of verifying that all of them are. Management officials at one passportissuing office told us that, while their region included more than 1,000 

acceptance facilities, the office did not maintain records of the names of 

individuals accepting passport applications at those facilities and the office 

did not keep track of how many individuals acted in this capacity at those 

facilities.

Overstretched Investigative 

Resources Hinder Fraud 

Detection

Although State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided additional 

resources for investigating passport fraud in recent years, its agents must 

still divide their time among a number of competing demands, some of 

which are considered a higher priority than investigating passport fraud. A 

Diplomatic Security official told us that, after the September 11 terrorist 

attacks, the bureau hired about 300 additional agents, at least partially to 

reduce investigative backlogs.18 Diplomatic Security and passport officials 

told us that, while the increased staff resources had helped reduce 

backlogs to some degree, agents assigned to passport fraud investigations 

are still routinely pulled away for other assignments. For example, a 

significant number of agents from field offices across the country are 

required to serve on “protective detail” in New York when the United 

Nations General Assembly convenes and at various other diplomatic 

events. We found that at most of the offices we visited during our 

fieldwork, few of the agents responsible for investigating passport fraud 

were actually physically present. At one office, all of the agents responsible 

for investigating passport fraud were on temporary duty elsewhere, and the 

one agent who was covering the office in their absence had left his 

assignment at the local Joint Terrorism Task Force to do so. A number of 

agents were on temporary assignments overseas in connection with the 

2004 Summer Olympics in Greece. Agents at one office said that five of the 

eight agents involved in passport fraud investigations there were being sent 

for temporary duty in Iraq, as were many of their colleagues at other 

offices.

18State officials also noted that the Bureau of Consular Affairs funds more than 120 

Diplomatic Security agent positions nationwide to help support efforts to investigate 

passport fraud.
Page 26 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Agents at all but 2 of the 7 bureau field offices we visited said they are 

unable to devote adequate time and continuity to investigating passport 

fraud because of the competing demands on their time. The agents 

expressed concerns about the resulting vulnerability to the integrity of the 

U.S. passport system. We noted that the number of new passport fraud 

investigations had declined by more than 25 percent over the last five 

years, though Diplomatic Security officials attributed this trend, among 

other factors, to refined targeting of cases that merit investigation. A 

number of Diplomatic Security agents pointed out that passport fraud 

investigations are often “time sensitive” and that opportunities to solve 

cases are often lost when too much time elapses before investigative 

efforts are initiated or when such efforts occur in fits and starts. The 

rotation of Diplomatic Security agents to new permanent duty stations 

every 2 or 3 years also makes it more difficult to maintain continuity for 

individual investigations. Passport-issuing office officials told us that cases 

referred to Diplomatic Security sometimes take a year or more to 

investigate. The officials also said that the investigating agents often do not 

have time to apprise passport-issuing offices of the status of individual 

investigations and, thus, that the opportunity to convey valuable “real-time” 

feedback on the quality of fraud referrals was lost. The Special-Agent-inCharge of a large Diplomatic Security field office in a high fraud region 

expressed serious concern that, in 2002, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

began requiring that most cases be closed after 12 months, whether or not 

the investigations were complete. This requirement was meant to reduce 

the backlog of old cases. The agent said that about 400 cases at his office 

were closed before the investigations were complete and that this action 

had taken place over his strenuous objection. A Diplomatic Security official 

in Washington, D.C., told us that, while field offices had been encouraged to 

close old cases that were not likely to be resolved, there had not been a 

formal requirement to close all cases that had remained open beyond a 

specific time limit. 

State officials agreed that Diplomatic Security agents are not currently able 

to devote adequate attention to investigating passport fraud. State officials 

told us that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security plans to hire 56 new 

investigative agents over the next few years to augment passport fraud 

investigation resources at each Diplomatic Security field office nationwide. 

According to State officials, these new investigators will be solely 

dedicated to investigating passport and visa fraud and will not participate 

in protective details or other temporary duties that would distract them 

from their investigative work. The new hires are to be civil service 

employees and will not be subject to the frequent rotations to new duty 
Page 27 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

stations that regular Diplomatic Security agents experience as foreignservice officers.

State Department OIG officials told us that the OIG also has authority to 

investigate passport fraud. However, OIG officials told us that budgetary 

constraints and related staffing reductions in recent years had severely 

restricted its ability to investigate such fraud. The OIG has invested more 

resources in efforts to pursue visa fraud, primarily because visa fraud is 

more prevalent than passport fraud. The OIG has focused most of its more 

recent passport-related efforts on assessing systematic weaknesses in 

fraud detection efforts. The idea was to produce broad findings that would 

be of greater benefit than individual passport fraud investigations could be 

expected to yield with such a low investment of staff resources available. 

Effect of New 

Examiner Performance 

Standards on Fraud 

Detection Remains 

Unclear

Although State’s approach to developing new nationwide passport 

examiner production standards, which were implemented in January 2004, 

raises a number of methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the 

standards make an assessment of their impact on fraud detection 

premature. State intended that the new nationwide standards would make 

performance expectations and work processes more uniform among its 16 

issuing offices. State tested examiner production capabilities before 

standardizing the passport examination process and used the test results in 

conjunction with old standards to set new nationwide standards. The new 

standards put additional emphasis on achieving quantitative targets. 

Responding to concerns about their fairness, State made a number of 

modifications to the production standards during the year, making it 

unclear what impact the standards have had on passport fraud detection.

Methodological Concerns 

Exist Regarding State’s 

Development and 

Implementation of New 

Performance Standards

Consular Affairs officials stated that they created nationwide production 

standards to make performance expectations of examiners and the 

passport examination process as similar as possible at all domestic 

passport offices. Though the issuing offices already had production 

standards for their examiners, the average number of cases examiners 

were expected to adjudicate per hour varied from office to office, creating 

confusion and raising questions about equity among passport examiners, 

according to State officials. In an effort to identify reasonable production 

standards that would be applicable nationwide, State tested examiner 

production capabilities at all of its domestic passport-issuing offices. 

Issuing office management in each of the 16 offices measured the number 
Page 28 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

of passport cases completed by each examiner over a two-week period in 

April 2003 and computed the hourly average for their office. Management 

did not inform examiners that their production rates were being measured 

for the test. 

Passport Services officials set the new performance standards, but they did 

not fully standardize some work processes and methods of counting 

production until after the new numbers were set. After considering 

nationwide test results, offices’ old standards, and passport office 

partnership council feedback,19 headquarters officials at Passport Services 

decided on the new standards for both desk and counter adjudication. The 

new standards were implemented in January 2004 and varied by pay grade 

level. After deciding on the production standards, State standardized the 

work processes and counting methods that were the basis of examiners’ 

production averages. For example, State officials encouraged all domestic 

passport offices to include expedited cases in examiners’ production 

averages to make examiners’ work more comparable nationwide, though 

some examiners and issuing office managers said expedited cases take 

longer to complete because they require additional steps. Also, State’s 

decision to base examiner’s production averages on a 7-hour day starting in 

January 2004 marked a change for offices that previously had measured 

production based on a 61⁄2- or 71⁄2-hour day.

State’s decision to measure and compile nationwide production averages 

before fully standardizing the application examination process and the way 

completed cases are counted at the passport-issuing offices limited the 

validity of State’s test results. GAO has reported that consistency is a key 

element for data reliability and that the data obtained and used must be 

clear and well-defined enough to yield similar results in similar analyses. 

However, we found that State had attempted to uniformly measure 

production capacity at its 16 issuing offices when the individual offices 

were still using differing work processes and methods of counting 

production. Upon visiting 7 of the 16 offices after the new standards had 

been implemented, we found that several differences in passport 

adjudication practices and methods for counting production still existed. 

For example, at some offices, the more complex and time-consuming cases 

were included in examiner production averages, while at other offices they 

were not. In addition, issuing office and headquarters management told us 

19Passport office partnership council participants include issuing office management and 

union-designated employees.
Page 29 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

that contract staff at some issuing offices performed certain tasks that 

helped speed up examiner production, while such tasks were performed by 

examiners at other offices. State told us 5 months after they had 

implemented the standards that domestic offices’ requirements for 

counting completed cases still varied and that this situation could make it 

easier for examiners at some offices to meet their production standard. 

State officials acknowledged that these processes and procedures should 

be standardized to ensure that the standards are fair. If State had 

standardized its work processes and procedures for measuring 

performance before testing production, the test would presumably have 

produced more valid results that could have been used to set uniformly 

attainable production standards. 

Production Standards’ 

Effect on Fraud Detection 

Unclear

Because State adjusted the impact of production on examiners’ 

evaluations, the production standards implemented in 2004 placed 

increased pressure on examiners to focus on production numbers. Before 

State introduced the new standards, quantitative production requirements 

were grouped together with qualitative measures for performance ratings. 

For example, one former evaluative element paired the requirement that a 

GS-11 examiner adjudicate 25 to 28 cases per hour with a qualitative 

assessment of the examiner’s overall knowledge of the adjudication 

process. Supervisors and management officials at some of the domestic 

passport offices we visited said that if in previous years examiners failed to 

meet their minimum production number, the supervisor could still rate the 

examiner fully successful based on better performance against qualitative 

standards within the same rating element. However, the 2004 standards 

separated the quantitative performance measures—production numbers 

and error rates—from qualitative elements. Examiners not meeting the 

minimum hourly production average for the year were to receive an 

unsuccessful rating on that performance element, regardless of qualitative 

performance.20 An unsuccessful rating in one element results in an 

unsuccessful rating overall, even if the examiner rates outstanding in the 

other three skill elements. State officials said they made this change to 

clarify the criteria on which examiners were rated. 

20Examiners meeting the production requirement but not meeting minimal requirements in 

the areas of adjudicative knowledge, customer service, or fraud prevention would also 

receive an unsuccessful rating.
Page 30 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Since the new production standards were set, State has incorporated 

computer upgrades and process changes that have enhanced fraud 

detection, but may have slowed the examination process. For example, at 

passport office counters, State upgraded the computer system to allow 

examiners to perform cashiering functions and to produce a receipt 

immediately for all financial transactions, thus adding time to each case 

requiring a fee. In addition, State added a page to the standard passport 

application in March 2005, thus requiring more information from each new 

applicant. Headquarters officials, regional office managers, and examiners 

agreed that these changes enhance fraud prevention efforts. But while they 

were pleased with the enhanced fraud detection capabilities, some 

examiners and examiners’ union representatives told us the changes may 

slow production now that examiners are required, for example, to 

scrutinize longer applications. 

Passport examiners and union officials argue that the new standards’ 

emphasis on production combined with changes to the examination 

process have made it more difficult to meet the new production standards 

without shortcutting fraud detection efforts. Some examiners we talked to 

said changes to annual evaluation criteria and to the examination process 

put additional pressure on them to focus on their numbers more than their 

efforts to detect fraud. Some also told us they believe the new standards 

were evidence that management prioritizes quantity of work over quality. 

Union representatives said examiners frequently complain that, to achieve 

their number targets, they have to skip required steps in the examination 

process or scrutinize applications less thoroughly than necessary to 

adequately detect fraud. A number of examiners at each domestic office we 

visited either stated they take shortcuts themselves or know colleagues 

who do. Some said, for example, they do not thoroughly check Social 

Security information provided on the computerized examination software 

against the information on the individual’s application. Others reported 

they do not thoroughly check all “hits” generated by the computer 

software—information that may help identify applicants flagged as 

fugitives or raise other concerns in one of State’s passport-related 

databases. An examiner noted that most hits, when further scrutinized, 

prove to be invalid, and thus the chances of missing a valid hit were low. 

Union representatives said they are hesitant to share such examples with 

passport management because examiners fear negative repercussions.

Headquarters and regional office management said it is difficult to assess 

the number or magnitude of shortcuts being taken and the impact of 

shortcuts on fraud detection. Management officials at some of the offices 
Page 31 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

we visited said supervisors audit only a limited percentage of cases after 

they are examined and that audits would not necessarily reveal that 

examiners had taken shortcuts. The impact of shortcuts on fraud detection 

is also difficult to assess because the overall incidence of detected fraud is 

low. One examiner noted that if she failed to check any fraud indicators at 

all and granted a passport to every applicant, she would be right more than 

99 percent of the time. State data show that less than one-half of 1 percent 

of applications in 2004 were identified as potential frauds. 

Because State has modified the 2004 production standards in response to 

management, union, and examiner concerns, the standards’ effect on fraud 

detection is unclear. State officials told us that, from the outset of 

implementing the production standards, they had planned to reassess the 

standards regularly and to adjust them as necessary. In July 2004, State 

responded to a union suggestion to reduce by one-half hour the number of 

daily work hours used to calculate the hourly production average, thus 

acknowledging that time examiners spend doing essential tasks, such as 

reading e-mail updates, should not be factored into their hourly production 

averages. Both desk and counter examination production standards were 

lowered during 2004, and certain offices were exempted from either desk 

or counter measurement due to regional workload variations. One such 

exemption occurred in September 2004, when State informed regional 

management that neither New York nor Hawaii should rate examiners on 

desk examination production averages in 2004 because their desk 

workloads were too low to enable a fair rating of examiners. Also, 

headquarters passport management lowered the counter production 

requirement for GS-9 and GS-11 passport examiners retroactive to

January 1, 2004. While about 63 examiners were not achieving the required 

production rate after the first quarter of 2004, all but 18 of State’s 

approximately 480 examiners nationwide had met the standards by the end 

of the year. Because State’s changes to the production standards continued 

throughout 2004, the standards’ net effect on fraud detection efforts 

remains unclear. 

Conclusions Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is an essential component of 

State’s efforts to help protect U.S. citizens from those who would harm the 

United States. The steadily increasing volume of passports issued each year 

underscores the importance of this task. State has a range of tools and 

resources at its disposal to help detect passport fraud, and it has taken a 

number of important measures in recent years to enhance its efforts in this 

area. However, State still faces a number of key challenges. Included 
Page 32 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

among them is limited information sharing with TSC, the FBI, and other 

agencies, making it more difficult to protect the United States from 

terrorists, criminals, and others. State has begun working with these 

agencies to address this problem and is dependent on their cooperation to 

remedy it. Limited intra-agency information sharing and insufficient fraud 

prevention staffing, training, oversight, and investigative resources also 

make fraud detection more difficult. Together, these challenges constitute a 

serious concern to the overall effort to secure the borders of the United 

States and protect its citizens. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve the coordination and execution of passport fraud detection 

efforts, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following six 

actions: 

• Expedite, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General, Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secretary of Homeland Security, 

arrangements to enhance interagency information sharing, and reach 

agreement on a plan and timetable for doing so, to ensure that State’s 

CLASS system for passports contains a more comprehensive list of 

individuals identified in the Terrorist Screening Center database as well 

as state and federal fugitives and that such information is made 

available to State in an efficient and timely manner.

• Establish and maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud 

prevention library that would enable passport agency personnel at 

different locations across the United States to efficiently access and 

share fraud prevention information and tools.

• Consider designating additional positions for fraud prevention 

coordination and training in some domestic passport-issuing offices.

• Assess the extent to which and reasons why workload transfers from 

one domestic passport-issuing office to another were, in some cases, 

associated with fewer fraud referrals, and take any corrective action 

that may be necessary. 

• Establish a core curriculum and ongoing fraud prevention training 

requirements for all passport examiners, and program adequate time for 

such training into the staffing and assignment processes at passportissuing offices.
Page 33 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

• Strengthen fraud prevention training efforts and oversight of passport 

acceptance agents.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II). 

State generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations. State indicated that it had agreed in principle with the 

FBI on information-sharing arrangements concerning subjects of federal 

felony arrest warrants and planned to establish an automated mechanism 

for obtaining information from the FBI on the subjects of state warrants. 

State said that it was designing a centralized passport “knowledgebase” for 

passport examiners that includes information on fraud prevention 

resources. It said it would consider rotating GS-12 Adjudication 

Supervisors through local fraud prevention offices to relieve Fraud 

Prevention Managers of some of their training responsibilities. State is also 

establishing a standardized national training program for passport 

examiners, instituting a regular nationwide quality review program for 

passport acceptance agent work, and adapting and expanding computerbased training for U.S. Postal Service acceptance facilities for more 

widespread use among acceptance agents nationwide. State did not 

address our recommendation that it assess the extent to which and reasons 

why workload transfers from one domestic passport issuing-office to 

another were, in some cases, associated with fewer fraud referrals and to 

take any corrective action that may be necessary.

The FBI also reviewed a draft of this report for technical accuracy. The 

FBI’s comments have been incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. We will then send copies to interested congressional 

committees and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available 

to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 34 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Additional GAO contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 35 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To examine how passport fraud is committed, we reviewed State 

Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security closed passport fraud case files 

and Bureau of Consular Affairs statistics on passport fraud. We also met 

with officials at State’s Diplomatic Security Headquarters Criminal Division 

and at Diplomatic Security’s Field Office in Miami and conducted telephone 

interviews with Diplomatic Security officials at field offices in Chicago and 

San Francisco. 

To identify and assess the key challenges State faces in detecting passport 

fraud, we directly observed State’s fraud detection efforts at 7 of its 16 

domestic passport-issuing offices; tested State’s use of electronic databases 

for fraud detection; analyzed fraud referral statistics from the Bureaus of 

Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security; and interviewed cognizant 

officials in both of these bureaus. We visited State’s passport-issuing offices 

in Charleston, South Carolina; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New 

York; Seattle; and Washington, D.C. We chose these fieldwork locations to 

gain an appropriate mix of geographic coverage, workload, levels and types 

of passport fraud, and counter-to-desk adjudication ratios. In addition, we 

chose the Charleston office because it is one of the two passport 

“megacenters” responsible for adjudicating applications from other 

regions. 

To test the electronic databases that State uses to help detect fraud, we ran 

the names of 67 different federal and state fugitives against State’s CLASS 

name-check system. Our test was not intended to employ a representative 

sample, and we did not generalize our results to the universe of wanted 

U.S. citizens. The test results were intended to provide a firsthand 

illustration of a problem that State and Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) officials acknowledge exists.

• We selected names of individuals with federal and state warrants from a 

variety of government agencies and offices—the FBI; U.S. Marshal’s 

Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Drug 

Enforcement Administration; U.S. Postal Service; and various state and 

local law enforcement offices. Many of the names were taken from 

publicly available Internet sites, including those operated by the FBI and 

Department of Justice. 

• We verified that all of the individuals were listed as “wanted” in the FBI’s 

national criminal database as of the date of our test in December 2004.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

• In December 2004, we supervised the entry of the name and date of birth 

of each of the 67 fugitives into State’s system by an Office of Passport 

Services official. Three GAO employees verified each entry’s accuracy. 

• For each entry, we recorded whether State’s system contained a record 

of that fugitive and, if it did, we noted the type of “lookout” that had 

been entered, such as wanted person information from the U.S. 

Marshal’s Service or a child support “lookout” from Health and Human 

Services.

We analyzed fraud referral statistics from the Consular Affairs Office of 

Passport Services and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for fiscal years 

2000 through 2004. We reviewed the statistics and verified their accuracy 

by comparing select data with the individual issuing offices’ monthly 

reports that are State’s original source for compiling these data. Together 

with Passport Services officials, we identified the methods used to capture 

and compile the data and determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable and generally usable for the purposes of our study. We did not use 

data elements that we did not deem reliable.

At each of the 7 offices we visited, we conducted interviews with officials 

such as the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Fraud 

Prevention Manager, Adjudication Manager, Customer Service Manager, 

supervisors, and certain passport examiners.1

 We interviewed some 

examiners who expressed an interest in meeting with us and chose others 

at random. We conducted telephone interviews with the Fraud Prevention 

Managers at all 9 of the offices that we did not visit, using a list of questions 

identical to that used in interviews with their counterparts at offices we 

visited. We also met with Diplomatic Security agents attached to field 

offices responsible for investigating fraud suspected at the offices we 

visited. In addition, we interviewed cognizant officials in Consular Affairs’ 

Office of Passport Services, Office of Consular Fraud Prevention, and 

Consular Systems Division; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and the 

Office of the Inspector General. We also met with FBI and Terrorist 

Screening Center officials, including attorneys, to discuss technical and 

potential legal issues that might affect interagency information sharing 

arrangements with State.

1

At each office we visited, we met with almost all of these officials. In a few instances, one 

or two of these officials were not available during our visit, and, in these cases, we 

addressed the relevant questions to their superiors.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

To assess the potential effect of new performance standards, which were 

implemented in January 2004, on State’s fraud detection efforts, we 

reviewed the methodology and criteria that State used in developing the 

new standards. We compared the adjudication processes that were in place 

when State tested examiner production capacity with those in place when 

State implemented the new standards and against which it applied them. 

We interviewed passport examiner union representatives and select 

examiners at the 7 offices we visited and the fraud prevention managers at 

all 16 domestic passport-issuing offices to obtain their views on the 

potential effect of the new standards on fraud detection efforts. We also 

obtained views on the same subject from the Consular Affairs Passport 

Services officials who oversaw the development and implementation of 

and ongoing adjustments to the new standards. 

We conducted our work from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 38 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 39 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 40 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 41 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 42 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 43 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 44 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud
Page 45 GAO-05-477 U.S. Passport Fraud

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Michael Courts, (202) 512-8980

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the individual named above, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph 

Carney, Paul Desaulniers, and Edward Kennedy made key contributions to 

this report. Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos provided 

technical assistance.

(320267)
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