FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 JULY 8, 2003 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

*Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 02-12797

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 01-10024-CR-SH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODCLIFFE HUGH MCPHEE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(July 8, 2003)

Before CARNES, MARCUS and SUHRHEINRICH*, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Rodcliffe Hugh McPhee (“McPhee”) appeals his 57-month sentence

imposed upon his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
1Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) provides: 

With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may

enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in

writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse

determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who

prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).

McPhee’s plea agreement states in pertinent part: “The defendant is entering a conditional

guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), whereby he expressly reserves

the right to appeal the district court’s adverse ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the

indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

2

100 kilograms or more of marijuana, while on board a vessel subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law

Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(j). McPhee entered a

conditional plea of guilty to Count One of a two-count indictment, expressly

reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the

indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).1

 On appeal, McPhee raises only the

issue of whether the district court erred in finding that the vessel Notty was subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States under § 1903. After thoroughly reviewing

the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in

finding that the Notty was a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,

and accordingly affirm. 
3

Generally, the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is

reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d

1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1997). However, we review de novo the district court’s

interpretation and application of the statutory provisions concerning the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, and review for clear error the district court’s factual

findings with respect to jurisdiction. See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088,

1114 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Hernandez v. United States, _ U.S.

_, 123 S. Ct. 1484, 155 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2003). 

The relevant facts are straightforward. On May 1, 2001, the United States

Coast Guard Cutters Bear and Tampa, which had been conducting law

enforcement surveillance in an area of the Caribbean Sea between eastern Cuba

and the Bahamas, maneuvered into position to intercept a go-fast vessel named

the Notty. When the Bear directed the Notty to heave to, the Notty increased

speed and attempted to evade the Coast Guard Cutters and air surveillance. 

During the high-speed chase that followed, Coast Guard personnel observed the

crew of the Notty throwing packages overboard as the Notty maneuvered in a zigzag pattern. The Tampa moved into position and fired warning shots in front of

the Notty, but the Notty proceeded to use evasive maneuvers for approximately
2These sections provide:

(a) Vessels of United States or vessels subject to jurisdiction of

United States

It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel . . . subject to

4

twenty more minutes. Eventually, the Notty stopped and a Coast Guard party from

the Bear boarded the vessel. 

McPhee and two other co-defendants, Darron Lloyd Rolle and Dave Mario

Williams, were found aboard the Notty. Although all three claimed Bahamian

nationality and the master of the Notty claimed that the vessel was registered in

the Bahamas, no registration was found on board the vessel. When inquiry

directed at Bahamian authorities did not result in an affirmative and unequivocal

assertion that the vessel was registered in the Bahamas, the Coast Guard deemed

the vessel stateless, arrested the defendants, and brought them to Key West,

Florida. The Coast Guard recovered a total of ninety-four bales of marijuana

(weighing 2,092 pounds) which had been thrown overboard during the hot pursuit.

McPhee was indicted, along with the other two crew members, for

conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute (Count One) and

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count Two) while on board a

vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C.

app. §§ 1903(j) and 1903(a).2 On October 30, 2001, McPhee and the co-
the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to knowingly or intentionally

manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or

distribute, a controlled substance.

. . . 

(j) Attempt or conspiracy

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense

defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those

prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of

the attempt or conspiracy.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), (j). 

5

defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the indictment, challenging the

government’s assertion that the vessel upon which they had been apprehended was

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. They claimed, in essence, that the

Notty had never left the territorial waters of the Bahamas and, therefore, that the

United States did not have authority to arrest them. (McPhee and his codefendants did not dispute that the Bahamian government could not verify that

their vessel was registered in the Bahamas.) The government responded, however,

that the Notty was subject to American jurisdiction because it was “without

nationality,” that is, it was a “stateless vessel” that had been intercepted in

international waters, and, that even if the vessel had been intercepted in Bahamian

waters, the Bahamas and the United States had entered into an agreement that

allowed the United States to exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels located

more than three miles from Bahamian land.
3Section 1903(c)(1)(E) provides: “[A] ‘vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States’ includes-- . . . (E) a vessel located in the territorial waters of another nation, where the

nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States.” 46 U.S.C. app. §

6

Soon thereafter, on November 30, 2001, the district court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss and, at the conclusion of the hearing,

invited the parties to supplement their pleadings in support of their positions. On

December 26, 2001, the district court denied the defendants’ motion, finding that

the Notty was indeed subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because it was

a vessel without nationality seized in international waters, and that, in any event,

the Bahamian Government consented to enforcement of American law by the

United States in Bahamian territorial waters. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f) (“All

jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to

be determined solely by the trial judge.”); see also Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1111-12

(holding that 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903, which allows the court to decide whether the

MDLEA’s jurisdiction and venue requirements are met as a matter of law, does

not violate defendant’s due process or jury trial rights). After the denial of this

motion, as noted, McPhee entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count One. This

appeal ensued.

McPhee urges that the statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction

imposed by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(E)3 were not met because, at the time of
1903(c)(1)(E).

4Section 1903(c) also provides in relevant part:

(1) . . . [A] “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”

includes--

(A) a vessel without nationality;

. . . 

(2) For purposes of this section, a “vessel without nationality”

includes--

. . . 

(C) a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge

makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation of registry does not

affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its

nationality. . . .

46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A), (2)(C).

7

the seizure, the Notty was located within the territorial of waters of the Bahamas,

and, the Bahamian Government had not consented to the enforcement of American

law by the United States in its territorial waters. We need only decide one issue

today -- whether, at the time of seizure, the Notty was a stateless vessel located

within international waters. Because we are satisfied that it was, the Notty was a

vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and accordingly, we need

not answer the more difficult questions of whether the Bahamian Government

consented to the enforcement of American law by the United States in the

territorial waters of the Bahamas, or whether the United States had jurisdiction to

seize a stateless vessel without consent, within Bahamian territorial waters.4

 
5Lieutenant Walsh testified that a vessel must generally be “12 miles” from a foreign

nation to be in international waters, although “[t]here are some countries that claim less than 12

miles.” Testimony of Lieutenant Walsh before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 19. He

explained that the Bahamas claims a twelve-mile territorial water boundary. See id.

8

In United States v. Marino-Garcia, we concluded that “international law

permits any nation to subject stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction,”

and, consequently, that “all persons aboard vessels engaged in drug trafficking that

[fail] to unmistakably accede to the authority of a single sovereign while

traversing the high seas [are] subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the United

States.”5

 679 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1982); see also 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-1

(defining “high seas” (with exceptions not relevant here) as “all waters which are

neither territorial seas nor internal waters of the United States or of any foreign

country”); 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-5(b) (defining “territorial seas” of foreign countries as

“waters within the belt that is adjacent to its coast and whose breadth and baseline

are recognized by the United States”). The United States generally recognizes the

territorial seas of foreign nations up to twelve nautical miles adjacent to

recognized foreign coasts. See United States: Proclamation on an Exclusive

Economic Zone, 22 I.L.M. 461, 462 (March 10, 1983) (“The United States will

respect only those territorial sea claims of others in excess of 3 nautical miles, to a

maximum of 12 nautical miles, which accord to the U.S. its full rights under
6As explained by the Government, although the United States is not a party to the

Convention, the Government “generally recognizes [the Convention] as customary international law

apart from the deep sea-bed mining provisions.” See Government’s Suppl. Response in Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, submitted to the district court on December 10, 2001, at 6; see

also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-777, at § 104 (2002) (“The United States, although not a party to the

[Convention], has consistently maintained that specific provisions . . . represent customary

international law.”).

9

international law in the territorial sea.”); United States Ocean Policy, Statement by

President Reagan, 22 I.L.M. 464, 464 (March 10, 1983) (“[T]he United States will

recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the

[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], so long as the rights and

freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by

such coastal states.”); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1272, Part II § 2, Art. 3 (“Every State has the right

to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical

miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this

Convention.”).6

McPhee offers two arguments in support of his claim that the Notty was in

Bahamian territorial waters at the time of its seizure and his arrest. First, he says

that the district court clearly erred in finding the coordinates plotted by Lieutenant

Thomas F. Walsh on the Tampa’s navigation chart, Government Exhibit 1, to be

the most accurate source of information regarding the position of the Tampa at the
7At oral argument, McPhee conceded that this location was not accurate.

10

time the Notty was boarded. He suggests that the district court wrongly accepted

the chart, which placed the Notty approximately 17 miles east of Cay Santo

Domingo and in international waters at the time it was boarded, over two other

sources of information about the Notty’s location: the Law Enforcement Checklist,

which placed the Tampa at a position three miles north of Cuba at that time;7 and

the Miami Command Center Chronological Phone Log, which placed the Tampa

approximately ten miles north of the nautical chart position and within twelve

miles of Cay Verde and Cay Santo Domingo, i.e., well within Bahamian territorial

waters. Second, he argues that even if the Notty was not intercepted within twelve

miles of a known Bahamian landmark, it was still in Bahamian territorial waters

because it was within twelve miles of Saint Vincent Rock, which, he contends, is a

Bahamian island from which Bahamian territorial waters radiate. 

After thorough review of the record, we can find no clear error in the district

court’s determination that the navigation chart was the “most accurate source of

information” as to the Notty’s location at the time of its interception. At the

evidentiary hearing, the Government offered the testimony of Lieutenant Walsh,

Operations Officer and Navigator on the Tampa at the time of the interception. 

Lieutenant Walsh testified that Government Exhibit 1 was the chart that was on
11

board the Tampa at the time of the pursuit of the Notty, and that the chart indicated

that the Tampa was located “[j]ust over 17 miles east of Cay Santo Domingo,”

unambiguously in international waters at the time of its interception. He explained

that it was his job to ensure that he was cognizant of the Tampa’s position

wherever it was on the high seas, and that late in the evening of April 30, 2001 and

early morning of May 1, 2002, he plotted the Tampa’s pursuit of the Notty

according to coordinates provided by a “Global Positioning System” (“GPS”) on

the navigation chart. Walsh explained that a GPS “receives information from

satellites . . . [which] is processed and that information is displayed . . . as

numbers [that can be] transferr[ed] to [a] chart or [] map.” He added that the

boarding vessel and the Notty were “no more than 1,000 yards or half mile from

[the] plotted position” of the Tampa at that time. When questioned about the

different coordinates provided on the Command Center Phone Log, he explained

that the information found in the Log is not accurate, as demonstrated by the fact

that it indicates a position close to or in violation of standing orders “not [to] take

the ship into water less than six meters.” He also observed that the navigation

chart indicates the accurate position because it was recorded on board the Tampa

contemporaneously with the interception, while the Phone Log was prepared by
12

individuals in Miami based on coordinates transmitted to them via satellite from

the Tampa.

 McPhee argues, nevertheless, that the district court committed clear error in

crediting the testimony of Lieutenant Walsh and the navigation chart. We

disagree. “Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must affirm the district court

unless review of the entire record leaves us ‘with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d

1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985)). Furthermore, “we allot

substantial deference to the factfinder, in this case, the district court, in reaching

credibility determinations with respect to witness testimony.” EEOC v. Joe’s

Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Stano v.

Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that we defer even

beyond clear error review to trial court findings relating to witness credibility

determinations)). “As long as the district court’s findings are plausible, we may

not reverse the district court even if we would have decided the case differently.” 

Englehard, 126 F.3d at 1305 (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at

1511). As the Supreme Court explained, deference to the district court is

important to the proper functioning of the judiciary:
13

The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with

experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the

trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely

contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a

huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to

a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their

energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account

of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more

judges at the appellate level is requiring too much.

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75, 105 S. Ct. at 1512.

McPhee has not pointed us to anything in the record demonstrating that the

district court’s findings were erroneous, let alone clearly erroneous. “‘Where there

are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.’” Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d

1218, 1227 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at

1511). Here, the district court was presented with a substantial body of evidence

to support its finding that the navigation chart was the more reliable source for

discerning the location of the Notty. As discussed, supra, Lieutenant Walsh

testified that the most accurate way to determine the location of the Notty when it

was apprehended was by using the Tampa’s navigation chart from the time of the

event, and that the Phone Log location could not be expected to be as accurate. 

McPhee offered precious little to contradict Lieutenant Walsh’s testimony as to

the precise geographic location of the Notty at the time of seizure. 
8McPhee does not dispute that if we find that the Notty was not within Bahamian

territorial waters at the time of the interception, we need not reach whether the Bahamian

Government had consented to the enforcement of American law by the United States as required by

§ 1903(c)(1)(E).

9The Government argued that the Notty was in international waters or on the “high seas”

because “Saint Vincent Rock is a rock. If it was an island, it would be called Saint Vincent Island,

not Saint Vincent Rock.” Ultimately, we must determine whether it is a rock or an island according

to the statutory definitions provided by the Archipelagic Act. We note in passing that for some

purposes, the label is not altogether satisfying. Thus, for example, in the metaphysical sense, we can

discern no reason why something could not be both a rock and an island at the same time. See Paul

14

McPhee also suggests, however, that he can prevail even if the navigation

chart position is considered accurate, because the position it provides still places

the Notty within Bahamian territorial waters and the Bahamian government did

not consent to the enforcement of American law within its territorial waters.8

 This

turns entirely on whether Saint Vincent Rock, which, according to the navigation

chart, was located within twelve miles of the Notty at the time of the interception,

is a “rock” or an “island” for the purposes of determining Bahamian territorial

waters. If Saint Vincent Rock is a Bahamian “island” from which the twelve-mile

Bahamian territorial boundary could radiate, then the Notty was within Bahamian

territorial waters at the time of the interception; however, if it is a “rock,” then the

Notty was in international waters or at “high seas” at that time. Both sides agree

that this determination must be made in accordance with the definition of “island”

provided in The 1993 Archipelagic Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction Act of the

Bahamas (the “Act” or the “Archipelagic Act”).9
Simon and Art Garfunkel, I am a Rock, on Sounds of Silence (Columbia 1966) (“A winter’s day,

in a deep and dark December. I am alone, gazing from my window, to the streets below, on a freshly

fallen silent shroud of snow. I am a rock, I am an island. I’ve built walls, a fortress deep and mighty,

that none may penetrate. I have no need of friendship, friendship causes pain. It’s laughter and it’s

loving I disdain. I am a rock, I am an island. Don’t talk of love. Well I’ve heard the word before.

It’s sleeping in my memory. I won’t disturb the slumber of feelings that have died. If I never loved,

I never would have cried. I am a rock, I am an island. I have my books and my poetry to protect me.

I am shielded in my armor. Hiding in my room, safe within my womb, I touch no one and no one

touches me. I am a rock, I am an island. And a rock feels no pain. And an island never cries.”).

Of course, neither Simon nor Garfunkel has been identified as a nautical expert.

15

The district court began its analysis by taking judicial notice of the fact that

the Bahamas claims a twelve-mile territorial limit, and found that at the time of the

interception the Notty was over twelve miles from Cay Santo Domingo, the closest

Bahamian island. See Archipelagic Act, at § 4(1), (3) (“The territorial sea of The

Bahamas comprises those areas of the sea having as their inner limits the baselines

described in this section and as their outer limits a line established seaward from

those baselines every point of which is at a distance of twelve miles from the

nearest point of the appropriate baseline . . . [in part defined as] baselines from

which the breadth of the territorial sea of The Bahamas . . . measured [from] the

low water line along the coast of each island.”). Applying the definitions provided

in the Archipelagic Act, the district court determined that, “[h]aving heard the

testimony of Lieutenant Joseph Kramek, having examined the chart marking

depicting St. Vincent Rock, and having reviewed the Bahamian Archipelagic

[Act], the Court concludes that St. Vincent Rock does not constitute an island for
10Lieutenant Walsh testified in relevant part as follows:

Q. [Government counsel] Now, somewhat to the northeast . . .

there is an indication of Saint Vincent Rock, do you see that?

A. [Lieutenant Walsh] Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Are you familiar with whether or not that is a Bahamian

territory or not?

A. My understanding is that is not Bahamian territory.

Q. What is the basis for that understanding?

A. Based upon the symbol that is drawn on the chart.

Q. And what is that symbol?

A. It resembles a plus.

Q. Okay. And what does that plus mean on nautical charts?

A. There could be a possible -- very shallow waters. It could at

times have rocks in the vicinity of the surface of the water.

Testimony of Lieutenant Walsh before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 44-45.

16

purposes of measuring the Bahamas’ twelve-mile territorial limit.” The district

court’s finding that Saint Vincent Rock is not an island is a finding of fact that we

review for clear error. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114. 

Contrary to McPhee’s claim, the record is replete with evidence that Saint

Vincent Rock is not a Bahamian island for the purposes of determining Bahamian

territorial waters. In the first place, Lieutenant Walsh testified that Saint Vincent

Rock is “not Bahamian territory” because the markings on the navigation chart,

which identify Saint Vincent Rock, indicate “very shallow waters [and that there

could be] rocks in the vicinity of the surface of the water.”10 This testimony was

bolstered by the testimony of Lieutenant Joseph Kramek, an attorney with the

United States Coast Guard, who explained that Saint Vincent Rock “is normally a
11Lieutenant Kramek testified in relevant part in these terms:

Q. [Government counsel] On Government’s Exhibit 1A [an

enlargement of Exhibit 1], there is an indication Saint Vincent

Rock. Do you see that?

A. [Lieutenant Kramek] Yes, I do.

Q. And are you familiar with the markings that indicate where

Saint Vincent Rock is?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. And what do those markings mean?

A. That plus sign indicates that certain times that there may be

rocks awash there. However, it is normally a submerged rock.

Q. And is that Saint Vincent Rock a territory claimed by the

Bahamas?

A. No, it is not, sir. Since it is normally a submerged rock, it

would not qualify as land and therefore you would not extend

a territorial sea claim from that position[.]

Q. And are you familiar with the Bahamian law on how the

Bahama claims -- or how the Bahamas defines territory -- its

own territory?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

. . . 

A. . . . I am reading from the Bahamian Archipelagic Waters and

Maritime and Jurisdiction Act of 1993, which is essentially

17

submerged rock [and therefore] would not qualify as land.” He further explained

that it does not satisfy the definition of “island” -- a naturally formed area of land

which is surrounded by and above water at mean high-water -- in the Archipelagic

Act § 2. He also explained that Saint Vincent Rock does not fit the definition of

low-tide elevation under the Act § 4(5) (“a low-tide elevation is a naturally formed

area of land which is surrounded by and is above water at mean low-water but is

submerged at mean high-water”) because “it is not a naturally formed barrier of

land which is surrounded by above water, mean low water.”11 Furthermore,
the Bahamian statute on how they define their territorial sea

claims. 

And in the definition[] section, which is on page 2, paragraph

2, the word “island” means a naturally formed area of land

which is surrounded by and above water at mean high water.

Q. And based on that definition, does Saint Vincent Rock qualify

as a Bahamian territory?

A. No, it does not, sir.

. . . 

Q. You testified that at times Saint Vincent Rock is awash. Why

is it that it does not fit the definition of low tide elevation?

A. It doesn’t fit the definition of low tide elevation because it is

not a naturally formed barrier of land which is surrounded by

above water, mean low water.

Testimony of Lieutenant Kramek before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 46-48, 52.

18

McPhee submitted nothing to support a finding that Saint Vincent Rock lies within

the breadth of the Bahamian territorial sea and, therefore, no support for his

position that it fits the definition of the Act § 4(4) (“Where a low-tide elevation

lies wholly or partly within the breadth of sea which would be the territorial sea of

The Bahamas if all low-tide elevations were disregarded for the purpose of

measurement of the breadth thereof, the low-tide elevation shall be treated as an

island.”). 

Other record evidence also supports the district court’s finding. When the

navigation chart and Chart No.1, United States of America Nautical Chart --

Symbols Abbreviations and Terms (10th ed. 1997) (“Chart No. 1”) are read

together, they indicate that Saint Vincent Rock is a rock and not an island. 
19

Specifically, the navigation chart indicates the presence of Saint Vincent Rock

with a plus sign encircled by dashes, which, according to Chart No. 1, represents a

“[d]angerous underwater rock of uncertain depth.” See Chart No. 1, at 43.

On this unambiguous record, we conclude that the district court did not

clearly err in finding that the Notty was a stateless vessel found in international

waters at the time of its interception by the United States Coast Guard. 

Accordingly, the Notty was a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States

and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.