Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan

Observations on Civil Military Operations 

During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom 

by William Flavin

23 March 2004

iii

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter 1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2. Strategic Direction and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Chapter 3. Operational Direction and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chapter 4. Tactical Direction and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chapter 5. Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Chapter 6. NGO/IGO Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Chapter 7. Providing Appropriate Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter 8. Education and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Chapter 9. Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter 10. Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Chapter 11. Keys to Success in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Chapter 12. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

ANNEX A. CMO Study Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

ANNEX B. Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

ANNEX C. NATO and EU CIMIC Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

ANNEX D. United Nations S/RES/1383 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

ANNEX E. United Nations S/RES/1401 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

ANNEX F. OHDACA Check List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Glossary of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

v

Introduction

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Study of 

Civil Military Operations in Afghanistan, September 2001 to December 

2002.

Background and Time Frame

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College, 

has previously conducted studies of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in U.S. military 

engagements abroad. Based on comments from various levels of command engaged in 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the 

proper time to do an assessment of CMO there. Most participants would be completing 

tours and have the time and perspective to refl ect on their experiences. In late FY 03, 

PKI was reorganized into the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(PKSOI). This report is therefore published under the auspices of PKSOI.

The report covers the period from 11 September 2001 until the end of December 2002. 

Afghanistan remains a dynamic situation; therefore, the details associated with the fi ndings 

are temporally bound. This report attempts to identify the trends and concerns that still 

exist, although their dimensions and magnitude may change. 

Characteristics of Successful Civil Military Operations

The Department of Defense Dictionary defi nes Civil Military Operations as: 

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, infl uence, or exploit 

relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 

civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military 

operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civilmilitary operations may include performance by military forces of 

activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, 

or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or 

subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, 

in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations 

may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, 

or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.1 

Successful CMO:

• Achieve the national objectives through creating and sustaining appropriate 

conditions by harmonizing civil and military actions.

• Assist the commander in meeting his legal responsibilities under the laws of Armed 

Confl ict. Many times those tasks require close civil and military coordination.

• Achieve harmony between civilian and military actors to reduce the natural 

friction between them.

• Enable a successful transition from a military focused to a civil focused 

operation.2 
vi

The Challenges in Afghanistan

The military situation in Afghanistan epitomizes full spectrum operations as 

identifi ed in Joint and U.S. Army doctrine. Army Field Manual FM 3-0, Operations, 

states:

Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across 

the spectrum of confl ict Army commanders at all echelons may 

combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially 

to accomplish missions in war and military operations other than 

war (MOOTW). For each mission, the JFC and Army component 

commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type 

of operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate 

military operations in war and some small-scale contingencies (SSC). 

Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW 

that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagement (PME)... 

When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and 

sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to 

accomplish the mission. The JFC and the Army component commander 

for a particular mission determine the emphasis Army forces place on 

each type of operation. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive, 

stability, and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change 

from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving confl ict to 

war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations 

require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. 

Operations designed to accomplish more than one strategic purpose 

may be executed simultaneously, sequentially, or both. For example, 

within a combatant commander’s AOR, one force may be executing 

large-scale offensive operations while another is conducting stability 

operations. Within the combat zone, Army forces may conduct stability 

operations and support operations as well as combat operations.3

The excerpt above well describes the situation in Afghanistan. Military forces are 

conducting offensive operations against Taliban sanctuaries in the Eastern Mountains 

while building schools and wells in nearby villages, training the new Afghanistan Army, 

and supporting Humanitarian Relief Agencies in protecting the populations at risk from the 

harsh winter. Security levels and development vary greatly throughout the country, and 

commanders must allocate their resources to best advantage.

There are two separate military organizations with different orientations operating 

simultaneously. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the American-led coalition 

focused on eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat. OEF operates throughout the 

country wherever the threat might be located. The International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), sanctioned by the United Nations, is based in Kabul and immediate vicinity, and 

is concerned with the security and stability of Kabul. The different orientations of the two 

forces affect their relationships with the various civilian organizations. OEF uses U.S. 

CMO doctrine based on a combination of Desert Storm and Balkan experience, while 
vii

ISAF uses NATO Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine based on Northern Ireland 

and the Balkans. 

Non Governmental Organizations (NGO), International Governmental 

Organizations (IGO), and the relief community were uprooted and displaced after 

9/11 and are adapting to a new reality. Concerned for their safety, most of the nonindigenous NGO and IGO personnel departed Afghanistan leaving behind their national 

staffs. Under the Taliban, these organizations had developed relationships that created 

Humanitarian Space to deliver essential services such as health, agriculture, road repair 

and water. These were provided nearly exclusively by the NGO/IGO community and 

therefore, their departure had a signifi cant effect. After the military operations stabilized 

the situation, these NGOs and IGOs returned and are trying to reestablish themselves under 

a different political reality than existed under the Taliban.4 . 

The Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and later, the Islamic Temporary 

Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) were full players. Unlike Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 

Kosovo, Bosnia, or East Timor, indigenous governance is up and running, and is a key 

player. Under the Taliban, the relief community had developed relationships with various 

ministries. Now, the new governing body of Afghanistan wants direct infl uence over NGO 

and IGO activities. The international development and relief community is fi nding this a 

challenge.5

The operational environment remains unstable. The Taliban have not been 

eliminated but are in sanctuaries and passing undetected in various communities waiting 

for an opportunity to push their agenda. 6Various regional strong men, whose power has 

increased because of the confl ict, are vying with the central government for power. There is 

no peace settlement but rather a peace process inside of which all parties are maneuvering. 

There is no countrywide international security force and the new army, police, and border 

security forces of the Afghan government are not yet trained or deployed. 

The operation is being conducted in the context of other worldwide commitments.

Afghanistan competes with numerous and varied interests including Iraq, Iran, Colombia, 

North Korea and the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict for U.S. and world attention. These 

competing interests affect focus, commitment, and available resources.7

ix

Executive Summary

General

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) succeeded in supporting humanitarian assistance 

operations while simultaneously conducting combat operations. By all accounts, OEF 

won the hearts and minds of those people it touched, and the support of many others. 

OEF brought a level of stability to many areas and established close relationships with 

interagency organizations such as U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

OEF employed a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) for the 

fi rst time, and successfully directed and controlled an operational level Civil Affairs effort 

with limited resources. There were many challenges to overcome, and OEF continues to 

address them.

Strategic Direction and Coordination

The focus of U.S. national guidance was on destroying the Al Qaeda terrorist 

organization, infrastructure, and other terrorist groups; convincing or compelling 

states and non-state organizations to cease supporting terrorism; and providing 

military support to humanitarian operations. Its focus was not on conducting stability 

operations in support of Afghanistan. US national planning guidance focused on combat 

operations. The Humanitarian Assistance component of the planning guidance was designed 

to convince the Afghan people and the rest of the Islamic world that this was not a confl ict 

directed against them. It was also designed to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan 

people in support of U.S. combat operations. Nevertheless, the initial guidance was that 

the U.S. military would not participate in Nation Building. This guidance infl uenced the 

force structure and the operational and tactical approach. In June 2002, following the 

deployment of CJTF 180, the shift toward stability operations began. The pace of Civil 

Military Operations has accelerated since then, but the legacy of the fi rst year remains.

There appears to have been adequate national level guidance but no interagency 

plan was written until April 2002. That plan was not disseminated and proved to 

be inadequate. There were many committees and working groups formed but there was 

little coordination, direction, or sharing of information. All of the output of these working 

groups could have been pulled together had there been an interagency plan by late 2001 

or early 2002. 

Current policy directives do not require the development of a coordinated interagency 

plan. During the Clinton administration, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 required 

the government to conduct interagency pol/mil planning. National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD) XX, designed to replace PDD56, remains unapproved. This meant that 

for operations in Afghanistan, the various agencies involved planning and execution were 

not required to produce an interagency planning consensus. 

An interagency plan was fi nally requested in April 2002, fi ve months after operations 

had started. The published product did not meet the minimum requirements envisaged by 

NSPDXX. It did not prove useful toward establishing lines of authority and responsibility 

for the various aspects of Afghanistan operations. The lack of a plan resulted in the 

following gaps:
x

• Safe and secure environment countrywide could not be established. ISAF 

controlled only Kabul and OEF controlled just the areas near its bases and 

operations.

• Security Sector development has been retarded by the lack of a holistic coordinated 

approach. 

• Resources for the initial phases were constrained because of the “light footprint” 

of OEF and the limited capacity of other agencies.

• Governance has not been extended beyond Kabul because of the lack of a safe 

and secure environment and the lack of a functional security sector. Limited 

resources and the “light footprint” concept of United Nations Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan (UNAMA) compounded the lack of governance.

• Limited resources and lack of a countrywide secure environment also affected 

Humanitarian Assistance.

• Development and Reconstruction require a degree of central management and 

synchronization. The lack of a holistic interagency approach to the issue has 

slowed progress as well as limited resources.

Operational Direction and Coordination

The initial focus was to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists and not to conduct 

CMO/Stability Operations. By December 2002, CMO/ Stability Operations were key 

missions. From September 2001 until December 2002, the CMO concept of support 

had changed three times. The initial concept was wholesale support of non-military 

organizations from locations outside of Afghanistan. By November 2001, needs forced 

the concept to shift to retail support. A Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force deployed to Kabul and Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) expanded 

in the key locations in Afghanistan to expend Overseas Humanitarian Disaster, and Civic 

Aid (OHDACA) funds on quick impact, high visibility projects to “win the hearts and 

minds” of the Afghan people. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) 

and the US Embassy in Kabul worked closely with the CJCMOTF and the CHLCs to 

insure that the projects supported the legitimacy of the Afghan Transitional Authority 

(ATA) and later the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and met the 

appropriate contracting criteria. The quick impact missions took priority over the traditional 

assessment and coordination missions. With the deployment of Combined Joint Task Force 

180 (CJTF180), the concept changed to stability operations. At the operational and tactical 

levels, a full service concept was launched in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRT). These teams operated in eight major cities along with the United Nations Offi ce for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNAMA regional Offi ces. They 

not only provided the quick impact projects, but also provided a focal point to coordinate 

the reconstruction programs of the NGO, IGO, and the ITGA. The shift has been from just 

assisting other agencies from a distance to engaging inside Afghanistan in order to support 

Afghan institutions and to eliminate sources of instability. 

There was no holistic coordination mechanism established in Afghanistan to 

integrate civil and military operations. Under the “light footprint” concept, there 

would be no overall holistic international oversight of the peace building process as was 
xi

attempted in Bosnia and more successfully in Kosovo. Rather, the UN encouraged many 

countries to engage directly with the Afghan authorities. UNAMA only has two pillars: 

one for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction and the other for Political Affairs. So, unlike 

the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), it does not see 

itself as the central coordinator. The ISAF coordinates its activities through a CIMIC 

center with various Afghan ministries and NGOs, and the coalition forces coordinate their 

activities through the CJCMOTF with the same ministries and NGOs. Initially in the fi eld, 

the CHLCs coordinated locally with NGOs and IGOs that were in their areas. UNAMA 

uses the UNOCHA regional coordination centers to interface with NGOs and IGOs, and 

integrate that with the Afghan ministries’ efforts. Until July 2002, the relationship between 

UNAMA and the OEF coalition was distant and frosty. Each of the national embassies 

conducts its own business with the ITGA and UNAMA. The U.S. embassy coordinates 

with the CJCMOTF and CJTF180 through the Offi ce of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan 

(OMC-A). However, there is no organization charged with the overall coordination of all 

of these elements. In December 2002, CJTF 180 launched the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams and the Civil Military Coordination Center in Kabul in an attempt to bring together 

the efforts of all of these agencies. At the beginning of 2003, the ITGA had established 

consultative groups in an effort to get its hands around the reconstruction efforts.

Operational support was not focused on CMO.

• Information Operations were focused on supporting combat operations, and 

gaining legitimacy and force protection for OEF. Although ISAF used IO to 

effect, OEF had a diffi cult time exploiting the opportunities presented by CMO. 

• Intelligence Operations were focused on supporting combat operations. Again it 

was diffi cult obtaining products that supported CMO. HUMINT was inadequate 

and opportunities were missed. 

• Information Management was concerned with OEF combat operations. As of 

December 2002, CJCMOTF still did not have access to CENTRIXS (the coalition 

data network). The web-based system of CJTF 180 did not facilitate interagency 

coordination. 

• Command and Control relationships between CJCMOTF, its subordinate units, 

and the rest of OEF were confused and counter productive. There were issues 

concerning support of Special Forces, the commands in Tampa and Kuwait, the 

US Embassy, and the OEF subordinate task forces that were still unresolved in 

December 2002, over a year after CJCMOTF and CHLC had deployed. 

There were useful mechanisms created at USCENTCOM in Tampa and in 

Islamabad to coordinate CMO. A combined United Nations and NGO Liaison Team 

was created at USCENTCOM in Tampa to facilitate the fl ow of information and provide 

planning assistance, education, and subject matter expertise. CENTCOM established a 

Liaison Team in Islamabad that successfully coordinated and deconfl icted military and 

relief actions. By all accounts, these efforts were successful. 

Tactical Direction and Coordination

Success at the tactical level depended on the successful application of the principles 

of peace operations/stability operations. The ISAF forces and most of the US CA forces 
xii

had served in Bosnia and Kosovo, and applied the principles designed for successful 

tactical operations. These were the principles of consent, impartiality, transparency, force 

capability, and appropriate use of force. 

Successful tactical operations revolved around the concept of integrated 

interagency operations of USAID, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and 

Security Operations. ISAF arrived with a concept of “linked up government” along three 

key lines to be conducted simultaneously: Information Operations, Security Operations, 

and , Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The objective of CIMIC operations was to 

provide force protection for the ISAF force and to promote UNAMA and the ITGA by 

winning the “hearts and minds” of the people. Integrated teams patrolled day and night in 

villages around Kabul using their technology, especially night vision, to gain superiority 

over spoilers. CA teams operating with SOF approached this technique naturally, but 

the conventional forces took some time to develop this method of tactical CMO. 101st

Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division both wanted to use CA assets in support Airborne Division both wanted to use CA assets in support nd

of their operations, but the CA forces were concentrated in the CHLCs. Thus, aside from 

some limited staff elements, these units had no CA forces attached. The 101st initially used initially used 

its subordinate Canadian battalion to conduct CMO.

Conventional Units had diffi culty accomplishing the CMO mission because they 

did not have control of their CA war trace units. The WARTRACE CA units were 

controlled by the CJCMOTF and not by the task force commanders in whose areas they 

operated. Task force commanders were not sure how to infl uence the situation. Eventually, 

the commanders assumed CMO projects that had been initiated by CA forces. 

U.S. CA profi le differed from previous contingencies in that small CA teams 

conducted self-contained operations in the countryside removed from OEF support. 

CA accepted the risk and achieved credible results despite being neither equipped nor trained 

for such a mission. The teams identifi ed and funded high impact projects to bring stability 

to villages and win “hearts and minds.” With the advent of the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT) in December 2002, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was stood up 

to coordinate with NGOs, IGOs, USAID, Department of State, UNAMA, and ITGA. 

Doctrine

There is no approved interagency doctrine or policy. This resulted in inadequate 

interagency planning and management, and ultimately a lack of national level integration 

and synchronization

Joint and Army Doctrine do not adequately address the CMO that were and are 

being conducted in Afghanistan. There are no overall principles for CMO in either Joint 

or Army doctrinal manuals. Civil Affairs doctrine does not address the operations of the 

CHLCs and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams. Nor does it address the CJCMOTF 

and its relationships with the CA Commands, Brigades and Battalions. The relationship 

among the UN, U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. force commander also needs to be examined. 

The relationship between supporting and supported units needs to be clarifi ed. 

Factors for successful doctrine:

• Maneuver units should conduct, coordinate and integrate their CMO efforts with 

assigned CA forces instead of the CJCMOTF conducting regional operations 

under its own direct control. 
xiii

• Maneuver units should have their WARTRACE CA elements assigned to them.

The US Air Force should include the concept of the Regional Air Movement Control 

Center (RAMCC) in its doctrine. The RAMCC was a key and essential organization 

supporting OEF but has not been included in Air Force doctrine.

Relationship with NGO and IGO Communities

The relationship between the U.S. Military and the NGO and IGO communities 

was more strained and less functional than in previous operations. The relationship 

between the military and the NGO community went through several phases and existed on 

several levels. 

• All sides struggling to establish relationships and operational parameters 

characterized the period prior to the start of combat operations. These were not 

clearly established before the confl ict. The lack of an interagency planning process 

contributed to this defi ciency. Also, the security climate restricted information 

fl ow and resulted in confusion.

• When the international community began wholesale distribution of aid, the military 

coordinated with the lead NGO and with the UN to facilitate delivery of supplies. 

As a result, the synchronization of combat operations with humanitarian relief 

succeeded. However, the NGO community, as well as the military Civil Affairs 

community, had some issues with the Humanitarian Air Drops. The working 

relationships with the NGO in Islamabad were close, but there were sensitivities 

over the neutrality issue. It was clear that a rift was developing between the war 

fi ghting mentality and the CMO mentality. NGO requests for security and air 

support were turned away because it was not the policy of OEF to provide either 

countrywide security or to divert military assets from combat operations to assist 

the NGOs. 

• As the international community began the retail distribution of aid, OEF deployed 

CHLCs into Afghanistan working along side the NGO and UN communities. The 

relationship among OEF, the UN, and the NGOs was chilly at the operational and 

managerial levels, but accommodations occurred at the tactical level. Because 

OEF was considered a belligerent, the UN was especially reluctant to associate 

with the U.S. military until it determined the attitudes of the Afghans towards the 

U.S. The NGO community was slow in returning to the Afghanistan countryside. 

Therefore, the Afghans turned toward the CHLCs, which could provide resources, 

rather than NGOs. Embarrassment, suspicion, and trepidation marked the formal 

relationship, and this manifested itself in the issue of CHLC personnel wearing of 

civilian clothing. Some, but not all, NGOs complained that the CHLCs’ wearing 

of civilian clothing compromised the NGOs’ neutrality. As a result, the CHLC 

dress was modifi ed. In spite of this problem, the NGOs continued to coordinate 

informally with the CHLC. For example, in Herat, the UN established a policy 

that the U.S. Military could not participate in their daily coordination meetings 

with the NGOs. But the next day after these meetings, the CHLCs visited the UN 

and the NGOs separately to coordinate.8 At the countrywide level, the CJCMOTF, 

because of its focus on projects, did not reach out to the NGOs and to the Afghan 
xiv

Ministries as did ISAF. The NGOs had certain expectations of the military based 

on U.S. doctrine and practice in the Balkans. However, not all were met. For 

example, the NGOs expected the military to provide countrywide security.

• When the US-led coalition began stability operations, relationships between the 

UNAMA and OEF improved, and new mechanisms were established to integrate 

and encourage NGO and OEF cooperation. Based on prior experiences, the 

NGOs recognized that the CHLCs were not in competition with them but would 

assist them in getting projects. The CJCMOTF shifted its focus from primarily 

projects to the full spectrum of CMO to enable Afghan institutions and NGOs. 

Coordination and cooperation mechanisms were established such as the Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMOC) 

in Kabul. A new attitude at UNAMA and an outreach program to the NGO 

community, combined with an understanding among all sides about the future 

improved the situation. The ITGA also demonstrated initiative by establishing 

Consultative Groups to coordinate reconstruction.

Successful relationships. 

• USAID, USCENTCOM, and the operators in the fi eld forged closer and more 

productive relationships. USAID representatives were initially skeptical of the 

ability of the CHLCs to identify and conduct projects. But because the military 

was the only entity to operate in theater and USAID access to the country was 

restricted, the military was the only tool that the U.S. government could use. 

USAID, initially through the embassy and then through fi eld offi cers, assisted 

CHLCs with the selection, funding and oversight of the programs. This close 

coordination with the operational command should serve as a model in the 

future.9

• The relationship between CHLCs and Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) 

was close. Early in the crisis, the CHLCs depended on OGA for assistance and 

funding. OGA were fl exible, helpful, and able to provide quick impact money. 

• The military was able to deconfl ict combat operations with Humanitarian Relief. 

CENTCOM was able to sanitize sensitive information and pass it to the NGO 

community in a timely manner.

• CJCMOTF worked closely with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. CJCMOTF arrived 

in Kabul with the U.S. Marine security team that opened the embassy and the 

CJCMOTF commander was a member of the country team. This provided him 

access to the interagency process and gave him the ability to assist directly in 

national policy issues. In November 2002, the U.S. Army deployed a Major 

General to head the Offi ce of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in the 

US Embassy and provided him with a broader mission than the previous OMC. 

OMC-A will focus on coordinating the security sector issues.

• UNOCHA, United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), and 

INTERACTION established a successful cell at USCENTCOM in Tampa to 

coordinate and inform the USCENTCOM staff on the conduct of CMO.
xv

• UNJLC concept worked exceedingly well in providing an emergency response 

to coordinate the relief efforts. The CJCMOTF worked closely with the 

UNJLC sharing information and assisting each other.

• CHLCs at the tactical level established productive and harmonious working 

relationships with several NGOs. There were many examples of NGOs and 

CHLCs sharing and cooperating on projects. 

• CJTF 180 has developed plans and command vision that recognizes the need 

to conduct harmonious operations with NGO and is proceeding to bring 

those visions to reality. This vision is being realized through the PRTs and 

the CJCMOTF coordination in Kabul. 

Providing Appropriate Forces

Tables of Organization and Equipment do not support the CA employment profi le 

in Afghanistan. The current TO&Es of the Reserve Component Civil Affairs Brigades and 

Battalions (RC) are based on the concept that these units will be operating in support of a 

conventional force that will provide force protection and support. Communications systems, 

weapons, transportation and other equipment are not adequate for independent operations. 

Civil Affairs units are not organized and equipped for the type of independent operations in 

an austere and non-permissive environment that they conducted in Afghanistan. 

The Army system did not supply appropriate forces and individuals in a timely 

manner for the CMO operations in Afghanistan. Units and individuals mobilized late 

with a cascading effect. Units were given shifting mission statements before, during, 

and after the mobilization process that affected their preparation. Composite Units were 

formed and deployed mixing derivative UIC with TO&E units. WARTRACE alignments 

were ignored. Mobilization sites did not properly prepare CA units for the specifi c region 

and missions. CA units had lower priorities than combat units and several key items on 

their Statement of Requirements (SOR) were not fulfi lled. 

Education and Training

Limited exposure to CMO in education and training has produced 

misunderstanding and a lack of appreciation. 

• Commanders, staffs, as well as soldiers did not appreciate the complexities of 

CMO when they initially deployed and were not comfortable in dealing with 

CA issues. Confi dence and understanding grew after on the job training. 

However, personnel turnover required that the process of education start 

anew. 

• For Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. Army realized that extensive preparation was 

necessary and established Mission Readiness Exercises (MRE) training programs 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LA and at Hohenfels, 

Germany for all units deploying to those theaters of operations. After a year and 

two rotations into Afghanistan, no similar program had been developed for units 

deploying to Afghanistan. 
xvi

Resources 

CMO was not properly resourced in the areas of transportation and communications. 

Diffi cult geography, lack of road infrastructure, and lengthy distances placed a premium on 

reliable transportation. The military force was structured and resourced to support combat 

operations. However, OEF units did not bring suffi cient transportation assets to support the 

civil demand present in a stability operation. 

• Availability of air support was a major constraint in obtaining resupply and 

support to civil military projects.

• Ground transportation support had to be contracted; the results were 

mixed.

• Communications equipment did not provide the appropriate connectivity 

among the CA units, the task force, other U.S. agencies and the NGO 

community.

Limited resources for CMO affected the concept of the operation and the 

relationship with non-military organizations. Under the “light footprint” concept, U.S. 

forces deployed with only that material and equipment that were directly related to combat 

operations. Military engineer assets were insuffi cient to support either humanitarian 

or development operations. Because of limited Afghan and NGO capacity, several key 

humanitarian infrastructure projects such as bridges repair were not accomplished. 

The funding process essential to supporting the civil projects proved to be 

restrictive and bureaucratic. 

• Operational Funds: The CA teams were given OPFUNDs for the fi rst time 

and they were indispensable in supporting isolated operations. 

• Project Funds: Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster and Civil 

Aid (OHDACA) provided the funding for most of the CMO projects. The 

OHDACA funds did accomplish the mission of providing a workable fi nancial 

tool to fund quick impact projects. The approval process, however, became 

bureaucratic, and the availability of contracting offi cers and transportation 

to get contracting offi cer to key areas was a constraint. OHDACA is a 

contracting tool and does not supply immediate impact monies. The CHLCs 

needed a fi scal tool that provided immediate impact monies for low dollar 

items. No such tool existed. 

• Financial Constraints. USAID money and OHDACA money cannot legally 

mix. The CHLC and implementing partners of USAID had to take care 

that there was separation of funded projects. This separation constrains 

the synchronization of an interagency approach to stability operations, and 

therefore defeats one of the underlying fundamentals.

Transportation of humanitarian supplies. The Denton Amendment allows 

humanitarian goods to fl y space available but there was no space available for OEF. There 

were other requirements in the War On Terrorism in other theaters that required airlift, 

not the least of which was Iraq. The forces supporting OEF depended on the U.S. Postal 

Service. 
xvii

Planning

The initial military planning for OEF did not consider long-term stability 

operations. Only limited Civil Affairs advice was provided in the initial planning because 

of problems with understaffi ng and mobilization. Without the Civil Affairs perspective, 

CMO was viewed as a logistics issue of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian supplies. 

Staffs were not directed to consider long-term stability operations in the initial planning. 

Initial CENTCOM/ARCENT planning was linear and did not facilitate concurrent combat 

and peace operations as described in Joint and Army Doctrine. Eight months into the 

operation with the deployment of CJTF 180, lines of operations fi nally did adequately 

address long-term stability operations.

Effects based planning worked. CJTF 180 used effects based planning to develop lines 

of operations and measurers of effectiveness that addressed long term stability operations. 

By following these concurrent lines of operations, the commander could allocate resources 

across the spectrum of operations to best achieve his objectives. Collaborative planning 

did not occur for stability operations.

OEF planners developed their plans in accordance with the Military Decision Making 

Process They then coordinated and deconfl icted the plans with the CA, NGO and U.S. 

government agencies and departments. In stability operations, other agencies and staff 

sections should participate in the Operational Planning Group deliberation during concept 

development. This was not done for OEF. Transition planning was inadequate.

Initial transitional planning focused on humanitarian assistance and not on stability 

operations in Afghanistan. Subsequent planning was hampered by the lack of a strategic 

level political military plan. Doctrinally, the considerations for developing a transition 

plan are well conceived but presuppose that a political military plan exists. How does the 

military conduct transition planning when there is no organization identifi ed by a political 

military plan that the military is to hand off to? Transition planning was still in fl ux by the 

end of this study.

Recommendations

• Develop clear political-military guidance for stability operations. The NSC 

should issue an NSPD replacing PDD56 and follow its guidance to produce a 

vision, a plan, and coordinating mechanism for interagency execution of stability 

operations.

• Establish interagency mechanisms at the operational theater level to 

coordinate theater wide military and civil efforts. 

• Revise Joint and Army doctrine to refl ect CMO/CA lessons learned in 

Afghanistan. The doctrine should address CMO principles, concept of operations, 

planning guidance, and command and control. 

• Organize and equip forces in accordance with revised doctrine. The new tasks 

performed by CA in Afghanistan must be supported by TO&E. Correct force 

design to organize and equip CA forces.

• Provide appropriate CMO/CA expertise at senior commands. Develop and 

resource the TO&Es, and Joint Manning Documents to provide the appropriate 

expertise. Support the interagency task force concept.
xviii

• Provide commanders fi nancial and resource fl exibility to address stability 

operations. Laws should be reviewed, agreements made, and commanders 

educated to obtain and use resources to the fullest extent to accomplish the 

stability mission.

• Establish clear lines of communication and coordination between military and 

NGOs/IGOs. Establish a CMO advisor for each Combatant Commander. Support 

the establishment of a FEMA-type interagency task force within the Combatant 

Command. 

• Ensure intelligence supports CMO and stability operations. Focus appropriate 

resources, particularly HUMINT, on supporting these types of operations.

• Ensure information operations support CMO and stability operations. IO must 

be designed to support stability operations. Establish theater integration and 

coordination mechanisms that link tactical level IO with interagency operational 

level guidance. Actively integrate civil affairs and intelligence in to Information 

Operations. 

• Ensure planning encompasses full spectrum operations. Concepts must include 

confl ict termination, post-confl ict actions, transition planning, along with relevant 

measures of effectiveness.

• Educate and train military and civilian leaders. Provide education at all PME 

levels on the principles of CMO. Develop, in concert with civilians, exercises that 

address CMO and stability operations.
1

Chapter 1. Background

This chapter outlines the basis and methodology for the study

Basis

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) located at the U.S. Army War College has 

conducted studies of civil military operations in previous contingencies ranging from Haiti 

to Hurricane Mitch to Kosovo. Based on comments from various command levels engaged 

in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark 

was the proper time to do an assessment. Most of the participants would have fi nished 

or be near the ends of their tours and possess perspective to refl ect on what had happened. 

Additionally, the arrival of the Combined Joint Task Force 180 in June 2002 provided the 

opportunity to understand its operational thrust. After the draft of this study was completed 

under the auspices of PKI, that Institute was reestablished as the U.S. Army Peace Keeping 

and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).

Methodology

The study considered basic documents such as orders, briefi ngs, and reports, along with 

academic research papers, news media, and conference reports. The key to understanding 

what lay behind the written word was in the interviews. The objective was to interview 

all of the key players from the strategic down to the tactical level even though the focus 

was to be at the strategic and operational level. To frame the interview, PKI developed the 

following study tasks:

a. Examine the U.S. Interagency process’s ability to provide adequate politicalmilitary planning guidance to the Combatant Commander.

b. Examine the civil-military coordination procedures and mechanisms at both 

the strategic and operational levels.

c. Examine civil-military operations from the coalition, ISAF, NATO/IGO 

perspective.

d. Determine the adequacy of procedures to plan, coordinate, establish, and 

execute the CMO/HA mission.

e. Determine if current Joint and Army CA/CMO doctrine is suffi cient in depth 

and clarity.

f. Study the evolution of the CJCMOTF.

g. Identify the lessons learned in standing up the CJCMOTF.

h. Determine the responsiveness of the Reserve Component (RC) mobilization 

process to support CMO/CJCMOTF operations for OEF. 

The above tasks formed the basis for a set of interview questions located at Annex A.

Study Team Composition. PKI sought expertise and participation from the 

Department of State as well from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy School at Ft. Bragg, NC. 

Additionally, PKI coordinated to obtain RAND and OSD representation. The fi nal team 

was a seven person interagency team comprised of three PKI personnel, one individual 
2

from Department of State (Offi ce of Contingency Planning/POL/MIL), one individual 

from OSD (Offi ce of Stability – RAND contractor), one from the U.S. Institute for Peace 

(USIP) and one individual from U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Ft. 

Bragg, NC:

PKI gained approval and support from key agencies before commencing. The 

study was approved by RADM Robb, J5 of USCENTCOM on 28 Jun 02, by MG Boykin, 

CG, USAJFKSWC on 27 Jun 02 and by BG Mixon of CJTF180 on 7 Aug 02.

Recording and Footnoting the Results

USJFKSWC allowed PKI access to the 126th Military History Unit’s audio tapes of 

the U.S. Army Civil Affairs soldiers who served during the fi rst year in Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF). All interviewees signed release statements, but the USJFKSWC requested 

that their names not be used. All PKI interviews were conducted under Chatham House 

rules. None of the comments can be attributed. PKI has developed the following notation 

system for the footnotes. The note identifi es the organization and the date of the interview 

but not the person. For example, CJCMOTF 01, 4 Nov 02 and NGO 02, 5 Nov 02 identify 

two separate individuals interviewed on two separate occasions. The key to the notation 

and the original, attributed interview are maintain by PKI and can be reviewed with 

authorization by the Director of PKI. The footnote annotations are listed beside each of 

the sources below to assist the readers. 

Sources

The following agencies and organizations were interviewed with footnote identifi er:

US Military

U.S. Central Command, (CENTCOM number, date).

U.S. Army Central Command, (ARCENT number, date).

Combined Joint Task Force 180, Afghanistan, (CJTF 180, number, date).

Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, Afghanistan, (CJCMOTF, 

number, date).

10th Mountain Division, (10th Mountain Div, number, date).

101st Air Assault Division, ( Air Assault Division, (101ST, number, date).

360th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date). 

354th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).

352nd Civil Affairs Command, Civil Affairs Command, (352nd , CACOM, number, date)

489th Civil Affairs Battalion, (CJCMOTF number, date).

Subordinate CHLC, (CHLC number, date)

122nd Regional Operation Center, Regional Operation Center, (122nd ROC, number, date)

96th Civil Affairs Battalion, (96th CA, number, date)

United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. 

(USACAPOC, number, date)

377th Theater Support Command, (377th TSC, number, date)
US Army War College, (USAWC, number, date)

126th Military History Unit. (USJFKSWC Oral History Report number, OEF, 

date)

U.S. John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Archives. (USJFKSWC, 

number, date)

U.S. Government

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, (OSD, number, date)

Offi ce of the Secretary of State, (DOS, number, date)

U.S. Agency for International Development, (US EMBASSY, number, date)

U.S. Embassy, Kabul, (US EMBASSY, number, date)

Allied Military

3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, ( Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, (CANADA, number, date).

Joint Doctrine Development Center, United Kingdom, (UK, number, date)

International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, (ISAF, number, date).

UK Department for International Development (DFID), (UK, number, date)

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), (SHAPE, number, date)

United Nations

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, number, date)

United UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), (UN, 

number, date).

World Food Program, (IGO number, date).

UN Joint Logistical Center, (UN, number, date).

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, (UN, number, date).

NGOs (All identifi ed in footnotes as NGO, number, date)

InterAction

CARE

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Doctors Without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF)

Mercy Corps

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Humanitarian Aid Offi ce of the European Commission (Europa-ECHO)

 RAND Corporation (RAND)

3

5

Chapter 2: Strategic Direction and Coordination

This chapter examines key policies, concepts, strategic direction and coordination

International Direction and Coordination

Between the defeat and departure of the USSR’s occupation force in February 1989 

and the attacks of 9/11, the international community did not consider the political future of 

Afghanistan a priority. In fact, during that 12-year period there were only seven UN Security 

Counsel Resolutions relevant to Afghanistan, focused mainly on cessation of hostilities and 

the turn over of Osama bin Laden. The General Assembly passed a number of resolutions 

during the same time that focused on Human Rights and Emergency Assistance.10 The 

U.S. had no political or strategic vision in Afghanistan beyond the defeat of the USSR 

and therefore disengaged from the process. Although the U.S. chose to sit on the political 

sidelines, it did engage in a signifi cant humanitarian assistance and in a counter narcotic 

program in Afghanistan. During this period, the United Nations and various NGOs were 

engaged in primarily humanitarian support of Afghanistan with the U.S. being the largest 

donor of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. When Osama bin Laden and Al 

Qaeda took up residence in the country the U.S. and the UN engaged the Taliban via 

Security Council resolutions and sanctions focused on eliminating the Taliban’s support of 

terrorism. This general lack of political attention became signifi cant in the post 9/11world, 

where events rapidly outpaced policy.

While the speed at which events developed did not allow time for an international 

consensus on Afghanistan’s political future to crystallize, the international community was 

legitimately concerned about how to engage positively in Afghanistan. It neither wanted 

to repeat the mistakes of the USSR’s occupation nor to create a condition that portrayed 

the West as an occupier working through a puppet government inattentive to the desires 

of the Afghan people and destructive to Islam. Al Qaeda could use this image to increase 

its support in the Islamic world. Additionally, there was concern that Afghanistan could 

become a client state dependent on the international relief and development community, 

as had been the case before 9/11. These concerns shaped subsequent UN Security Council 

resolutions and the Bonn agreement. 

For the fi rst time since it was recommended in the Brahimi Report of 20 October 

2000, the UN formed an Integrated Mission Task Force to provide support and policy 

recommendations to Mr. Brahimi, the designated Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Afghanistan. This task force helped formulate the policy guidance, the concept 

for the organization and the mission of UNAMA.

 Security Council Resolution 1383 of 6 December 2001 established the guidance for a 

strategy:

... to help the people of Afghanistan to bring to an end the tragic confl icts 

in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, 

stability and respect for human rights, as well as to cooperate with the 

international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a 

base for terrorism..11
6

The Bonn Agreement, signed the previous day, stated that:

The interim arrangements are intended as a fi rst step toward the 

establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully 

representative government, and are not intended to remain in place 

beyond the specifi c period of time...[this interim authority was to] 

act in accordance with the basic principles and provisions contained 

in international instruments on human rights and international 

humanitarian law; cooperate in the fi ght against terrorism, drugs and 

organized crime; ensure the participation of women as well as the 

equitable representation of all ethnic and religious communities12.

The Bonn Agreement was not a peace agreement like the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace signed in Dayton was for Bosnia. It did not lay down a blue print for 

civil implementation as did nine of the eleven annexes of the Dayton agreement. Many 

key issues were either not addressed or left vaguely worded. The key issue of power 

sharing between local and central governments was not addressed. However, Bonn 

Agreement did establish a framework and a process. It was an attempt to address the 

concerns that the Afghans would oppose the imposition of a solution from outside players. 

An International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with assistance from 

the United Kingdom to support the peace process. ISAF was not sent to enforce a peace 

agreement but rather to assure the political neutrality and security of Kabul so that the new 

government could consolidate power. The Bonn framework was open-ended and required 

planning, coordination, and integration mechanisms to achieve its objectives.13

The United Nations concept to provide those mechanisms was through a “light 

footprint.” 

Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nation’s Secretary General’s Special Representative for 

Afghanistan stated, “Parachuting a large number of international experts into Afghanistan 

could overwhelm the nascent transitional administration and interfere with the building of 

local capacity...The peace and reconstruction process stand a far better chance of success 

when it is nationally owned rather than led by external actors.”14 The concept was not to 

create an Afghan society with an unhealthy dependency on the international community 

that could quickly outlast its welcome. Mr. Brahimi’s objectives for the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were:

• Deploy and establish a small international profi le.

• Work through partnership with the Afghan authorities.

• Integrate and coordinate the efforts of all agencies.15

Security Council Resolution 1402 of 28 March 2002 established UNAMA under the 

direction of UNPD rather than UNDPKO and provided the following guidance on the 

relationship among the UNAMA, the Afghan Government, and international donors:

Stresses that the provision of focused recovery and reconstruction 

assistance can greatly assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement 

and, to this end, urges bilateral and multilateral donors, in particular 

through the Afghanistan Support Group and the Implementation 

Group, to coordinate very closely with the Special Representative 
7

of the Secretary-General, the Afghan Interim Administration and its 

successors; Stresses also, in the context of paragraph 3 above, that while 

humanitarian assistance should be provided wherever there is a need, 

recovery or reconstruction assistance ought to be provided, through 

the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors, and implemented 

effectively, where local authorities contribute to the maintenance of a 

secure environment and demonstrate respect for human rights;16

This resolution marked a change in approach. Previous practice was not to funnel 

resources through indigenous authorities; now the situation was reversed. Additionally, 

it stated that developmental assistance should be conditional on supporting the Bonn 

agreement. That created tension with the NGO community. 

UNAMA was not developed from scratch, but rather was built upon the UN’s previous 

organizations in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, the UN had two separate existing missions: the 

UN Coordinator’s Offi ce (UNOC), also called United Nations Offi ce for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, which coordinated the seven regional centers 

responsible for humanitarian assistance and the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan 

(UNSMA), which had a political agenda. Both organizations had different tasks and end 

states. UNCO was run out of United Nations Offi ce of Humanitarian Assistance and UNSMA 

was run out of United Nations Department of Political Affairs. UNCO and UNSMA did 

not always have a harmonious relationship, despite UN efforts in 1998 to achieve this 

through a Strategic Framework for Afghanistan that aimed at “a more coherent, effective, 

and integrated political strategy and assistance programme.” Two groups were created 

to support this structure, the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) and the Implementation 

Group (IG).17 This approach failed also; additionally, after the imposition of sanctions in 

1999, relations with the governing Taliban also deteriorated. 

Given this past experience, UNAMA’s mandate was intended to integrate all UN 

efforts into a single mission “to ensure that all UN efforts are harnessed to fully support 

the implementation of the Bonn Agreement.”18 The Secretary General declared in an 19 

March 2002 report that UNAMA should:

Aim to bolster Afghan capacity (both offi cial and non-governmental), 

relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan 

staff as possible...thereby leaving a light expatriate ‘footprint.

19’

 Mr. Brahimi’s objective was to integrate all UN agencies under the SRSG and eliminate 

their stovepipe direction from their various headquarters in New York, Geneva, and Rome. 

Also, Brahimi did not want separate agencies of the UN to cut their own deals with different 

agencies of the Afghan Government, as had been the practice under the Taliban.20 

UNAMA was organized into two pillars: Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction and 

Political Affairs. The four-pillar structure that had been adopted for United Nations Interim 

Administration Mission in Kosovo was not used. There was no separate pillar for security 

or rule of law or Humanitarian Rights. In line with the ‘light footprint’ concept, UNAMA 

limited the size of the staff, especially in the areas of security, elections, humanitarian 

rights and Disarmament Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). There would be no 

overall holistic international oversight of the peace building process as in Kosovo. Instead, 
8

many countries were encouraged to engage directly with the Afghan authorities. The 

objective was to push the local authorities to accept responsibility for their own country 

and legitimize those authorities through providing effective international assistance

For instance, rather than establishing a pillar for rule of law, several nations assisted 

in developing the constituent pieces. Germany focused on the training of the policemen. 

Italy assisted the judiciary. The United States, along with Japan, focused on border guards 

and the United Kingdom worked with counter-drug activities.21

CJTF 180 estimated that the reconstruction effort involved six UN agencies, 33 Afghan 

Ministries, 250 NGOs, and 65 Nations without any coherent centralized management.22

With the signing of the Bonn agreement, a plan for Afghanistan to guide stabilization 

and appeal to donors was required; however, none was created. There are multiple visions 

for the End State in Afghanistan, including those of UNAMA, ISAF, OEF, the World Bank, 

and US Department of State. Not all of these visions are congruent on all points. There are 

differences concerning the status of humanitarian assistance and aid conditionality, human 

rights and gender policy. Some examples follow:

• Intermediate Transition Assistance Program (ITAP) 2002. This is a fundraising document intended by the UN to generate contributions and investments. 

It was prepared as a functional alternative to the UN consolidated appeals process 

supporting the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting. 

• U.S. Pol/Mil Plan prepared by the POLMIL bureau at US Department of State 

coordinated by the interagency, April 2002. This plan lays out one vision by 

the U.S. interagency but is not the action document used by the Afghans or by 

USCENTCOM.

• Transition Support Strategy for Afghanistan by World Bank, March 2002. It 

provides a framework for the donors and is focused on the activities of the World 

Bank. 23

• National Development Framework • National Development Framework by the Islamic Transitional Government of by the Islamic Transitional Government of 

Afghanistan (ITGA). The ITGA is using this blueprint. It is a living document 

drafted by the Afghan ministries in coordination with the United Nations and 

other interested nations to guide investment and serve as the basis for the National 

Development Budget. This is the most useful document and comes the closest to 

providing a strategic vision for the new Afghanistan according to the Afghanistan 

Research and Evaluation Unit.24

Differing views are not necessary counter productive as long as existing mechanisms 

can rationalize and integrate them. But the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Units’ 

study in August 2002 concluded:

It is clear that the assistance effort is perceived by those involved in it to be characterized 

by internal argumentation, interagency rivalry, weak cooperation, and strategic disarray. 

25

Unfortunately, the initial relationship between the US and the international community 

did not facilitate close working relationships. Initially, the US was considered a combatant 

in the process and therefore, kept at arms length by the UN and the NGO community. This 

attitude did not facilitate collaborative planning and coordination. A UN and NGO cell was 
9

establishing at Central Command and allies participated in the coordination process, but 

coordination at the operational level was a challenge. 

Early on, the United Nations Joint Logistical Center (UNJLC) provided the key 

coordination and integration mechanism to link the strategic to the operational and enable 

the Humanitarian Relief supply deliveries.

In November 2002, UNDPKO assumed the mission support for UNAMA. UNDPKO 

provided quiet support from the beginning, but its signifi cant planning and coordination 

capability was not formally harnessed. This had as much to do with US national agenda 

not to call Afghanistan a Peace Operation as with the UN concept for engagement.26

In December 2002, The Afghan Government established Consultative Groups (CGs) to 

focus on specifi c benchmarks in the 12 development programs as defi ned in the National 

Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors. These 

groups will include representatives from the Afghan Government, focal point donor, 

UNAMA, and NGOs. The hope is that these 12 groups, reporting to the Afghanistan 

Development Forum, will provide rationalization for the development process. CJCMOTF 

has deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with these ministries and assist.27

U.S. National Direction and Coordination.

Four factors shaped U.S. National Direction and Coordination: lack of an adequate 

interagency plan, the focus on hunting terrorists and not on nation building, security 

concerns that hindered coordination and information sharing, and resource constraints and 

concerns.

The suddenness with which the need to deal with Afghanistan arose, hindered the 

interagency process in developing consensus. Policy was developed concurrently with 

operational planning and many times operational realities out paced policy guidance. The 

quick end to the Taliban resistance accelerated the need to “do something.” 

The overall direction from U.S. leadership was clear: “to support the creation of 

an international political environment hostile to terrorism...” An interagency plan to 

operationalize this azimuth was required.28 

A Campaign Coalition Working Group chaired by the NSC met within days of 9/11. It 

interacted with the UN and was instrumental in assisting the UN construct its response to 

global terrorism. This group, along with a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) chaired 

by State and NSC, led the discussion on post-war Afghanistan. The PCC, in coordination 

with the UN, worked out the concept for the UN transitional administration and the 

concept for the ISAF. The UK took the lead for the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF). 

Many more committees and working groups formed concurrently, and many people 

tried to help, but there was little coordination, direction, or sharing of information among 

them. An interagency political military plan could have pulled all of this effort together. 

The current administration is under no directive to develop such a plan. PDD56, approved 

under the Clinton administration, required interagency pol/mil planning. NSPD XX, 

designed to replace PDD56, still awaits approval. This meant that for Afghanistan, no 

mechanism existed to force an interagency planning consensus.29

An interagency plan was fi nally requested in April 2002, fi ve months after operations 

had started. The published plan did not meet the minimum requirements envisaged 
10

by NSPDXX, nor was the plan utilized as an implementing and tracking tool after its 

production. Specifi c problems included: 

• The end states, interim objectives and measures of effectiveness that were 

described in the plan were neither disseminated nor used. 

• The plan did not describe an inter-agency division of labor.

• The plan did not specify lines of authority among U.S. government agencies

• The plan did not fully developed the international context for U.S. engagement

• The plan did not establish a balance between short term needs against long-term 

objectives—for example funding of proxies to prosecute the war was focused on 

short term objectives that confl icted with the long term-objectives of building a 

new Afghan Army and the power of the central government.30

Another factor that affected the strategic direction of the operation was the initial 

decision that the U.S. would not focus on Nation Building or Peace Operations. Although 

unrealistic, it was an outgrowth of the lack of a political/military planning process. This 

initial direction stunted the development of a coherent approach to address the reality on 

the ground in Afghanistan. It affected the operational concept of USCENTCOM, the 

organization of the forces, engagement with other agencies and allies, the relationship 

with NGOs and with the Afghan population. Since January 2002, Civil Affairs Teams 

were supporting projects that could be termed “nation building.” The focus shifted toward 

stability operations with the deployment of JTF 180 in July 2002, the development of a 

Civil Military Concept of Operations, and the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams in December 2002. 

Security concerns also impacted strategic direction. The focus on defeating terrorists 

led to the imposition of restraints that that eliminated much of the coordination and 

information sharing with NGOs/ IGOs. Although an LNO cell consisting of UN and 

NGO representatives was established at USCENTCOM, there was little interface and 

preparation similar to that accomplished before military operations in Haiti or the Balkans. 

Humanitarian and military operations were successfully deconfl icted through the sharing of 

information, but collaborative planning for stability operations did not occur. This lack of 

coordination led to misunderstandings and a great deal of friction and lost opportunities.31

Finally, the need to allocate resources for Iraq and other battlefronts against worldwide 

terrorism shaped strategy in Afghanistan. Additionally, the enormity of the issues in 

Afghanistan led to a concern that Afghanistan could become a “black hole” that would 

consume U.S resources and capacity. These concerns, coupled with that of being seen 

as a conqueror and out lasting the welcome of the Afghan people, as well as providing 

propaganda and recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, convinced U.S. leadership to adopt a “light 

foot print” concept. So, the military designed a small force optimized to seek and destroy 

Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and have minimal contact with the local population.

Gaps

The above described conditions contributed to the following gaps between needs and 

capabilities:
11

Safe and Secure Environment

On 29 January 2002 President Bush stated: 

The United States is committed to building a lasting partnership in 

Afghanistan. We will help the new Afghan government provide the 

security that is the foundation for peace.32

In March 2002, the Security-General’s report to the Security Council described the 

following situation:

At present the Force (ISAF) remains limited to Kabul, while the main 

threats to the Interim Administration emanate from the provinces. There 

is a continuing danger that existing security structures, both Afghan and 

international, will not adequately address the security threats that are 

currently discernible33. 

A year later in March 2003, the situation was much the same:

Security remains the most serious challenge facing the peace process in

Afghanistan. Security must be improved to allow the re-establishment 

of the rule of law, ensure the protection of human rights, promote the 

reconstruction effort and facilitate the success of the complex political 

processes, including the development of the new constitution and the 

holding of free and fair elections. Afghans in many parts of the country 

remain unprotected by legitimate State security structures. Criminal 

activity by armed groups has of late been particularly evident in the 

north, east and south, and in many areas, confrontation between local 

commanders continues to contribute to instability.34

Coalition forces comprising OEF are focused on hunting Al Qeda and Taliban 

remnants, while the ISAF’s “light footprint” limits it to Kabul and its environs. As a result, 

large swaths of Afghanistan remain unsecured. Local warlords still hold sway in many 

areas. Their relative power has even increased in some instances because of resources and 

support that the U.S. gave and is still giving some of them. 

 There have been debates in the UN and among coalition partners about expanding 

ISAF or directing OEF to assume a country-wide security mission. ISAF, as of this 

writing, does not appear to be expanding. OEF has no plans to increase in size or capability. 

Although OEF has launched the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to try to 

address some of these issues and extended presence, they were not to extend the “ISAF” 

effect of establishing a long term safe and secure environment. NATO has now assume 

the responsibility for ISAF and is considering assuming the responsibility for some of the 

PRTs.

Of course, a wide range of reconstruction, development, and political/legal initiatives 

cannot be extended throughout the country without a safe and secure environment. The 

Afghanistan Army, national police, border guards and other security forces will take several 

years and a great deal of support and political deal making before they are effective. Until 

these forces are ready, or the international community takes action, the security gap will 

remain.
12

Security Sector

Building viable Afghanistan security sector is an essential step. Nevertheless, no 

holistic approach exists to develop required institutions and UNAMA’s charter includes no 

security sector pillar. 

• Afghan National Army (ANA). Initially the focus was on training tactical units and 

not on a complete renovation of the defense structure. Over time, however, the U.S. 

has taken an increasingly comprehensive approach. In October 2002, the Offi ce 

of Military Cooperation –Afghanistan (OMC-A) at the US Embassy received the 

mandate to coordinate all security sector issues for the U.S. Government, which is 

a step toward achieving a holistic U.S. approach toward the security sector. The 

U.S. has also contracted Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MRPI) to 

assess the situation and help develop a more comprehensive development program 

for the ANA and the Ministry of Defense. 

• Rule of Law. Rule of Law consists of many interrelated parts. These constituent 

parts must be approached in a comprehensive manner supported by military, 

political, and economic development to be successful. Getting the drug trade 

under control and disarming and demobilizing the various local militias will be 

critical. However, there is no comprehensive approach; indeed, the establishment 

of fi ve separate Consultative Groups within the Transitional Government for rule 

of law reinforces fragmentation. 35 

a. Judiciary: Italy has the lead, with the U.S. in support. The U.S. program is 

valued at $2 million. Implementation has been delayed by uncertainty over 

the outcome of Afghanistan’s constitution drafting process. 

b. Police: Germany has the lead, and the U.S. will follow. The U.S. is a major 

contributor, having offered $25 million. 

1. Police Intelligence: Germany is the lead.

2. Criminal Investigations: UK is the lead.

c. Border Police. The U.S. is responsible for training but there is no money, no 

air support, and no overall vision or structure.

d. Penal: No one has the lead. At last report, one Finnish offi cer was monitoring 

the situation for the UN. The Afghan police run the prisons in a Soviet Style, 

so there are many problems.

e. Counter Drug and Drug Interdiction: The UK has the lead and has asked 

the U.S. for support. A Counter-Narcotics Directorate has been established 

within the ITGA, but this agency shares the same lack of resources, capacity, 

and clout outside of Kabul as the rest of the Afghan government.

f. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). The program 

currently is voluntary, coordinated by the ITGA and a small UN offi ce. 

Although it is well funded by Japan, there may be problems in putting teeth 

into the program. Reforming the Ministry of Defense is a necessary fi rst step 

to avoid the perception that DDR is merely a Tajik plot to eliminate military 
13

competitors. The U.S. policy is that OEF forces will not get involved in 

engagements between Afghan factions or support DDR by use of force. 36

Resources

Resource shortfalls have limited international capacity on the ground to accomplish 

vital tasks directly, as well as limited the ability to assist the ITGA extend its infl uence

Great distances and a lack of useable road infrastructure in the country make air 

transport essential. But the U.S. military has provided only enough airlift to support 

combat operations and not CMO. This lack of air assets has prevented the extension of 

central government control. For instance, in November 2002, limited air support prevented 

the government from getting the new currency to all areas of the country in an acceptable 

time, resulting in currency speculation and devaluation. Additionally, contracting offi cers 

are needed to execute contracts supporting development and humanitarian relief. The few 

contracting offi cers are limited by the availability of air transport to such a degree that 

contracts for critical support are often delayed. Lack of military air assets has also driven 

the international community to contract primarily East European and Russian entrepreneurs 

at premium prices. 37

Insuffi cient engineer capacity on the part of ISAF and OEF, coupled with the lack of 

local capacity and NGO capacity, has delayed critical infrastructure recovery necessary for 

humanitarian relief and extension of central governmental infl uence. The OEF coalition 

brought just enough engineer support to focus on the primary mission of hunting Al Qaeda 

and the Taliban. Because the military was not going to do nation building there was no 

need to provide extra capability. This is a capability that NGOs and IGOs have been 

conditioned to expect from past operations. This state of affairs limited capacity compelled 

them to contract for support with external players such as Turkey and Pakistan. 

The “light footprint” has led to proxies, such as the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) 

employed by the local and provincial warlords, to continue to provide security and 

services. This program, using generous pay scales, has, at times, increased local power 

at the expense of the central government, and upset the local economic structure and 

expectations. Additionally, it has led to complications when the new police and Afghan 

National Army arrive in the outlying regions. 

Governance

A governance gap is the result of the preceding gaps. Control from Kabul will 

take time to extend to all parts of the country, resulting in a high degree of ineffi ciency, 

ineffectiveness, lack of coordination, and delay. This in turn, empowers local strong men 

who have differing agendas and loyalties.

Fragmentation will likely increase with implementation of the concept of the Afghan 

Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). Its role is to encourage national governments 

to deal separately with various parts of the ITGA, as well as the local governors and 

warlords. The concept to establish twelve consultative groups for each of the twelve 

National Development Program defi ned within the National Development Framework is 

designed to enable donors to fi nalize their support to each program area in consultation the 

Afghan Government stakeholder38. 
14

Humanitarian Assistance

The absence of a safe and secure environment and the concomitant hesitancy of 

NGOs to expand into the countryside, along with infrastructure shortfalls, have slowed the 

response to people at risk. There is a humanitarian assistance gap to overcome.

OEF support to humanitarian assistance was defi ned in the context of supporting 

combat operations, deconfl icting those operations with humanitarian assistance but not in 

providing critical support countrywide. If the relief efforts were in proximity to or could 

infl uence OEF operations, then support could be considered. But general relief convoys 

transiting the county were on their own with no promise of any security support from OEF. 

While both OEF and ISAF forces have responded to crises, there remains no overarching 

plan to support humanitarian assistance. 

Development/Reconstruction

A development/reconstruction gap exists principally because initially there was no 

central management mechanism assessing the entire Afghanistan picture. Placing the 

various Afghan Ministries in charge, assisted by the international community, has led to 

diffusion. Mr. Brahimi has attempted to guide the UN agencies and the Afghan ministries 

but there are many other forums, groups, meetings and people dealing with various Afghan 

Ministries. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit wrote in August 2002:

There is no entity meeting or process that incorporates the term “strategic 

coordination” in it formal title, and partly because the processes of 

coordination were being re-invented at the time of writing. It is also due 

in part to the diffi culty in identifying what actually constitutes strategy 

for the international assistance effort for Afghanistan, and who or what 

is responsible and accountable for it.39

Some of the organizations, operating in stovepipe fashion, attempting to coordinate 

development/reconstruction are listed below. Though some have done good work, the 

whole is less than the sum of the parts.

Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). Formed in April 2002 to 

coordinate all external assistance to Afghanistan. It participates in two types of meetings: 

one held by the Afghan authorities, another by the CJCMOTF. It does not address security 

issues. 

National Security Coordination Meeting. Forum for coordination of security sector. 

To date it has only been a clearing house for information, but has the potential to be a policy 

and coordination body. 

Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group (ARSG). Provides a forum to vet donors.

Afghan Support Group (ASG). Provided some direction to focus monies funneled 

into the country from 1997 through the end of 2002, when it was discontinued and 

transferred its responsibilities to the ITGA. 

United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA and its 

regional offi ces are growing into focal points for the NGO community. In December 2002, 

CJTF 180 began the deployment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams to be located near 

the UNAMA regional offi ces in an effort to harmonize the efforts of the military, NGOs/

IGOs, and ITGA. 
15

Consultative Groups (CGs) In December 2002, the Afghan Government established 

Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on specifi c benchmarks in the 12 development 

programs as defi ned in the National Development Framework presented in October 

2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the Afghan 

Government, focal point donor, UNAMA, and NGOs. The hope is that these 12 groups, 

reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum, will provide some harmonization and 

rationalization for the development process. By December, the CJCMOTF had deployed 

civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with and assist the ITGA ministries.40

Even though the monetary assistance that Afghanistan now receives exceeds any 

previous amounts, the needs are daunting. At the Tokyo Conference, the World Bank 

and the Asian Development Bank along with the UN Development Program provided an 

estimate of the minimum reconstruction requirement. But the pledges of grants and loans 

totaled only 60 percent of the low-end fi ve-year projection. Some of these pledges were 

slow to be paid and the humanitarian needs of food, water and medicine seem to act as 

a “black hole” sucking in an ever-increasing amount of monies that should go toward 

reconstruction. Although President Bush referred to a “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan,” 

nothing akin to it has yet been developed for Afghanistan. 41

More donor money is needed urgently to buttress what is still a tenuous 

transition to sustainable peace. The average Bosnian or East Timorese 

receives more than $200 in foreign assistance per year, while the average 

Afghan has probably been allocated about $85. Yet, the requirements 

in Afghanistan are greater than those in Bosnia or East Timor. A more 

realistic assessment suggests that Afghanistan needs some $15 billion 

over the next fi ve to eight years. This is three times the sum pledged in 

early 2002 at a major donor conference held in Tokyo.

Afghanistan’s needs were underestimated partly because the assistance 

program at the Tokyo conference was cobbled together on the basis of 

very little information or discussion. The Afghan Interim Administration, 

which had been in offi ce for less than two months, presented a very 

modest budget proposal for the country’s recovery. Donors were also 

in something of a wait and see mood. They wanted to be sure that any 

money would be spent effectively.42

Factors for Successful Strategic Direction and Coordination

• Establish clear political guidance. 

• Publish a political-military plan. 

• Establish coordination mechanisms. 

17

Chapter 3: Operational Direction and Coordination

This chapter considers key operational direction and coordination

Operational Focus

OEF’s initial focus was to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists. Stability operations as 

such were not considered. The U.S. did not intend to conduct nation building. Nevertheless, 

the leadership recognized that the result of combat operations would exacerbate the 

already grave humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Therefore, humanitarian relief would 

be necessary and U.S. support for humanitarian relief would demonstrate to the world that 

OEF was not directed Islamic people, but indeed intended to aid them

The initial OEF operational concept was:

On Order, USCENTCOM, as part of a National Counter Terrorist 

Campaign and ICW Allies and Coalition partners conduct sustained 

military operations within the AOR to destroy the Al Qaida terrorist 

organization, infrastructure and other terrorist groups. Convince or 

compel states and non-state organizations to cease support of terrorism 

and eliminate terrorist access to WMD. Be prepared to provide military 

support to humanitarian operations. Once initial objectives are achieved, 

maintain capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of 

terrorism. Protect citizens, forces and critical infrastructure of the U.S., 

Allies and friends.43 

USCENTCOM envisioned providing support to NGOs/IGOs that were conducting 

humanitarian assistance throughout all four phases of the operation. The intent was to 

“mitigate the humanitarian crisis and allow the Coalition to continue its campaign against 

international terrorism.”44 

In this context, military humanitarian assistance had a signifi cant psychological 

operations dimension. Its goals were behavioral as well as purely humanitarian. Those 

goals were to: 

• Prevent destabilization of the region by preventing the refugee fl ow into 

Pakistan.

• Insure that the coalition could continue its campaign against international terrorism 

without interference from civilians.

• Generate support among the Afghan people for the coalition campaign, i.e. “win 

their hearts and minds.”

• Prevent a humanitarian disaster that would have negative political consequences 

for the U.S. and the Coalition in their war against terrorism.

Wholesale Method of Aid Distribution (Sep 01 – Nov 01). The initial approach was 

that of wholesale distribution. The military would liaise with relevant NGOs/IGOs through 

the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), use the existing civilian framework where ever 

possible, employ the most effi cient military air capability available, and then cease military 

support once NGOs/IGOs reestablished delivery of vital aid using their own resources. The 
18

military would use the existing civilian infrastructure and provide emergency support only 

as required. Military involvement would cease once the aid community could generate 

enough capacity to take over the delivery of humanitarian supplies. 

In October 2001, OEF planners did not see the need for Civil Military Operations on 

the ground in Afghanistan. Additionally, the UN desired to minimize its association with 

the coalition on the ground and were satisfi ed with wholesale humanitarian assistance. 

USCENTCOM would support the delivery of humanitarian assistance from locations in 

Islamabad, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan without ever having to establish a long-term presence 

in Afghanistan. This concept supported the “light foot print” concept and reservations 

against nation building.

To coordinate these humanitarian operations, USCENTCOM tasked US Army Forces 

Central Command (ARCENT) to put together an organization. Based on joint doctrine, 

ARCENT elected to establish a Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force 

(CJCMOTF). A crucial problem was which unit to organize the CJCMOTF around. The 

CJCMOTF was to support NGOs/IGOs, but there was no Pol/Mil plan, and no idea of 

what the end state should look like. The lack of guidance was exacerbated by the limited 

peacetime CMO planning capability in ARCENT. Recommendations to form the core 

of the CJCMOTF ranged from a Civil Affairs Brigade, an active Engineer Brigade, and 

even U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF). Ultimately, because ARCENT 

viewed the mission as primarily logistical and somewhat analogous to the BRIGHT STAR 

exercise template of four to fi ve remote logistics bases, ARCENT tasked units that had 

recently exercised in BRIGHT STAR, the 377th Theater Support Command, (RC), and the 

122d Rear Operations Center, (RC) to form the core of the CJCMOTF. Rear Operations Center, (RC) to form the core of the CJCMOTF. 

The USCENTCOM, ARCENT, 377th TSC, and 122 d ROC commanders had all ROC commanders had all d

developed personal relationships working with each other over the years on USCENTCOM 

plans and exercises. This was in contrast to the lack of such relationships between civil 

affairs personnel and the USCENTCOM or ARCENT senior commanders and staffs. The 

122 d ROC provided 34 offi cers and enlisted to man staff sections, while the 377 ROC provided 34 officers and enlisted to man staff sections, while the 377 d th TSC 

provided fi llers. ARCENT provided the plans section until the 352d CA Command could CA Command could d

provide fourteen captains to form a planning cell. CJCMOTF was initially commanded 

by the 122 d ROC commander and subsequently, when the need arose for a fl ag offi cer, by ROC commander and subsequently, when the need arose for a flag officer, by d

Deputy Commanding General, 377th TSC.45 From the outset then, while understanding 

logistics, the CJCMOTF did not possess great CMO experience or expertise. 

CJCMOTF started its life in Atlanta, GA with ARCENT. But as the locus of 

coordination was in Tampa at USCENTCOM, CJCMOTF established a presence there 

as well. CJCMOTF started out as a true combined headquarters early on. Department 

for International Development (DFID) from the UK, and the UK CIMIC team joined 

the CJCMOTF in Tampa (though when the CJCMOTF deployed to Kabul in December 

2001, the chief of the UK CIMIC team joined ISAF. The rest of the British CIMIC team 

and DFID representative remained with CJMOTF until April 2002). The Australians and 

New Zealanders were to provide teams but a civilian clothes issue prevented them from 

joining.46

On the other hand, CJCMOTF was not joint. The Air Force never provided personnel. 

While the Marines did mobilize part of their Civil Affair Group (CAG), they did not 

provide an offi cer to the CJCMOTF in that capacity. There was a real need for an Air Force 
19

offi cer to assist in dealing with the signifi cant airlift issues that would be associated with 

the CMO effort. 

On 11 October 2001, a major from the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Islamabad 

along with the USCENTCOM LNO team led by USAF Brigadier General to establish a 

coordination center. The major established a CMOC along with four members of the British 

CIMIC team headed by deputy commander of UK CIMIC and DFID representative. It was 

several weeks later before any other U.S. personnel arrived to assist. The UK assistance 

made the mission in Islamabad possible.

The CMOC created Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) to gain acceptance 

with the NGO/IGO and UN community, who were concerned about the term military 

in CMOC. The CHLCs coordinated with this community, assisted them in providing 

humanitarian assistance, assessed the requirements for assistance in Pakistan, and laid the 

initial ground work for future relationships with the UN. The key task was deconfl icting 

humanitarian assistance with combat operations. 

The deconfl iction mission was a success, but the NGOs/IGOs and UN wanted more 

in the way of support, but under the wholesale approach OEF was not going to provide 

logistical or security support to the international aid community.

After Kabul fall on 13 November 2001, the aid community started to move to Kabul. 

Because the locus of action had shifted into Afghanistan, it became apparent that the CHLC 

function could be better served there. In December 2001, the CHLCs moved to Kabul with 

the idea of setting up the same type of operation that it had been conducting in Islamabad, 

but the approach then changed. Commander CJCMOTF in Kabul directed that the mission 

was to identify projects to assist the Afghan people.47 

Retail Method of Aid Distribution (Nov 01- Jun 02). The move to the retail 

approach was driven by several factors: frustration at USCENTCOM with the progress 

of humanitarian assistance, the need for ground truth, SOF requirements for support 

to indigenous fi ghters, and the IO imperative to do something positive for the Afghan 

people to convince them and the Islamic world that this was not a confl ict against Islam. 

Commanders at all levels realized that some type of on-the-ground assistance had to be 

provided immediately and could not wait until combat operations ceased. 48 

As the CJCMOTF and CHLCs moved into Afghanistan, they realized that the concept 

of quick impact projects could accomplish the following objectives: 

Minimize the negative effects of Combat Operations

Enhance the Credibility of Coalition Forces with the Afghan People

Enhance the Credibility of the Interim Government.49

There were few engaged NGOs in the unsecured, volatile confl ict areas where a civic 

action program was needed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The 96th CA 

Battalion received the mission and deployed with the following initial objectives:

Support the families of the warriors that the Special Forces were advising

Support the local leaders through providing them immediate impact 

projects.50
20

The 96th CA, in coordination with the JSOTF, conceived and deployed Humanitarian 

Assistance Survey Teams consisting of different functional specialists to assess critical 

infrastructure to include schools, hospitals, water, power and electric. Projects were then 

recommended to support the Special Forces missions.51 Initially, the money for these 

projects came from the Special Forces, OGAs (Other Governmental Agencies,) and some 

UK Department for Foreign Internal Development (DFID) sources. The initial canal 

project in Herat for Ismail Khan was supported by these sources. When additional support 

was required, the request went to USCENTCOM where a reserve CA offi cer in the CMO 

cell at CENTCOM, who understood Offi ce of Humanitarian Disaster Assistance Civil 

Aid (OHDACA) funding, worked the action with the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Confl ict to make OHDACA funds 

available.52

Debra Alexander of the USAID Offi ce of Transitional Initiatives arrived in theater 

about the same time that the CJCMOTF and CHLC were starting their programs. Ms. 

Alexander had worked with the CA teams in Kosovo and Bosnia, and realized their potential 

in Afghanistan. For security reasons, the Regional Security Offi cer in the U.S. Embassy 

would not support USAID representatives operating outside of Kabul, so Ms. Alexander and 

Elizabeth Kvitashvili of USAID at the embassy coordinated with Commander CJCMOTF, 

to see if the CHLC could assist and provide security. A sound relationship was developed 

whereby each organization could assist the other. USAID had DOS money and CJCMOTF 

had DOD money to spend on projects. USAID had experience to assist the CHLC and the 

CHLC had access and security in areas that USAID needed to have infl uence. CHLC could 

identify projects and conduct assessments, and USAID could use that information to obtain 

contracting partners. This arrangement proved to be successful.53

By January 2002, the CHLC employment concept was in place. Its focus was on 

immediate impact projects using Offi ce of Humanitarian Disaster Assistance Civil Aid 

(OHDACA) funds administered by DOD in coordination with USAID to win the hearts 

and minds of the people in areas near coalition operations. The intent of the OHDACA 

program was to “enhance force protection and facilitate coalition presence.” Instructions 

from commander Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) were clear that 

this was not a purely humanitarian program but an information operation. The focus was 

not on performing surveys and establishing long-term programs, but on searching for quick 

impact programs that would provide the most visibility for the limited funds available. 

It was project-oriented and coordinated with USAID. This played to the strengths of a 

CJCMOTF under the leadership of a Theater Support Command more comfortable with 

project selection and execution than with CMO. Initially, CFLCC directed activities only 

in permissive areas in support of OEF forces. 54 

The CHLC had criteria established by OSD and looked for projects that fi t those 

criteria. However, there was no overall international or U.S. interagency plan to guide 

either USAID or CJCMOTF in selecting these projects or fi tting them into a coherent 

whole. Each organization, therefore, made selections based upon their best judgment.55

The following is a summary of the approval criteria:

• Support the Basic Needs of the Afghan People

• Provide Access to and Increase Afghan Support for Coalition Efforts in 

Afghanistan
21

• Provide Support to the Legitimacy of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)

• Support the Efforts of the Primary Post-confl ict Phase Actors. (AID, DFID)56

Because there were eight CHLCs and the CJCMOTF to share only $2.5 million of 

initial OHDACA monies, the guidance was to spread the money as widely as possible to 

achieve the maximum effect. The majority of projects attended to the needs and desires of 

the local authorities and focused on schools, medical facilities, and water. From August to 

May 2002 the CHLC in Gardez initiated $350,000 worth of projects. This translated into 

19 projects. There were 16 school projects, two clinic and hospital projects and one water 

project. The overall breakdown of projects completed as of May 2002 was 41 percent 

schools, 30 percent medical, 20 percent water, and the rest on agriculture, bridges and 

other.57

 Project Summary Rollup May 2002

TYPE ESTIMATED 

EXPENDITURES

Bridge/Road $15,000

Agriculture $47,120

Other $163,250

Irrigation $191,125

Water Well $316,190

Hospital/Med $785,209

School $1,048,694

TOTAL $2,566,588

At times, CHLCs would be in the uncomfortable position of trying to keep the support 

of the local community while they waited on funds or the visit of a contracting offi cer for 

up to six weeks. This problem manifested itself on one of the very fi rst projects, the canal 

project for Ishmael Khan. The project consisted of clearing out 170 kilometers of canals 

in time for the planting season while employing between 5,000 and 12,000 individuals 

in a cash and food for work program. Funding delays caused signifi cant concern with 

the CHLC and tension with locals, as it kept promising the money as the weeks went by. 

Eventually, funds arrived and the project was a success, not only employed many locals but 

also reclaiming over 400 hectares of arable land, thus increasing food production, feeding 

Iranian refugees and engaging USAID’s implementing partners.58

Initially, CHLCs wore civilian clothes, concealable body armor, carried concealed 

weapons, and lived in houses in the local neighborhoods. ARCENT approved these 

procedures to reduce the visibility of coalition forces in the Area of Operations. 59 Later, 

some of the NGO community would object to CHLC wearing civilian clothes and the 

policy was changed.60

The NGOs expected to coordinate through a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) 

and not have CHLCs contracting for projects. Initially, the CMOC function of enabling 
22

and supporting NGOs to provide relief was performed by the CHLC in Islamabad by 

deconfl iction of combat operations with humanitarian relief. However, when civil affairs 

deployed into Afghanistan, this function lapsed. Although two organizations were formed 

called CMOC North and CMOC South, they were essentially logistical centers and did not 

perform any outreach. ISAF, through its only CIMIC Center in Kabul, did perform the 

functions of a CMOC. CHLCs in their areas coordinated with the NGOs in support of their 

high impact projects, but did not perform traditional CMOC functions. 

Because of the status of the U.S. as a combatant, the NGO community was not entirely 

comfortable in associating with the U.S. military. The UN only invited the U.S. military 

to participate in their meetings on a case-by-case basis and would rarely attend meetings 

called by the military. However, the CHLC in Islamabad did force the issue and would go 

to the private offi ces of UN and NGOS, and meet with them discreetly to accomplish the 

mission. 61

Commander CJCMOTF could not arrange a personal meeting with the UNAMA 

leadership until CJTF 180 arrived and took control in May 2002. Just before he turned 

over command in May 2002, the CJCMOTF Commander attended a meeting with the 

Commander CJTF 180 and UNAMA. At that meeting, UNAMA extended an invitation, 

stating that it was time to start a dialogue62.

In the fi eld, the CHLCs did establish working relationships with the NGOs. There 

are many accounts of NGO and CHLC sharing projects and coordinating on efforts. The 

CHLC in Mazar-E-Sharif reported that they worked successfully with about 48 different 

NGOs. Information was the primary currency that CHLC offered.63

Overall, however, even with its wholesale approach, OEF offered little that NGOs/

IGOs wanted. 

Stability Operations. (Jun 02-Present). With the deployment of CJTF 180 in May 

2002, the focus began to change from combat operations with humanitarian assistance 

support to stability operations and the enabling of Afghan institutions. CJTF 180 believed 

that CJCMOTF had a vital role to play here. Additionally, the 350th CA Brigade assumed 

command of the CJCMOTF and began to look upon the situation as a CMO problem with 

long-term implications. CJTF 180 developed a plan in which two of the three major lines 

of operations embraced stability operations. Civil Affairs Ministerial Teams arrived in 

November 2002 and CJCMOTF engaged with the Afghan Ministries through these teams 

to focus on reconstruction. Previously, such linkage was ignored.64. 

CJTF 180 also directed more CHLCs be deployed to hot spots and not just into 

permissive areas. With the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 

in December 2002, CJTF 180 provided the CMOC function that had been lacking before 

and created what the UK calls “linked up government” with DOS, USAID, UNAMA, and 

ITGA representatives. 

The PRTs are intended to help combat the causes of instability by forming and 

facilitating information-sharing bodies that support the ITGA. This should stimulate and 

enhance local, regional, and national reconstruction efforts by monitoring and assessing 

military, political and civil reform efforts and providing data into the Afghan Information 

Management Service (AIMS) data bank. The PRTs are planned to be located in the eight 

locations where the UNOCHA coordinators are also located. CJTF 180 has asked other 

nations to provide the lead for these PRTs. The UK has agreed to run one of them. The 
23

concept had the support of President Karzai who took a direct interest in their deployment 

and support. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACABAR) also supports 

this initiative. 

It is not the purpose of the PRTs to extend the ISAF Effect. This is not a “force” to extend 

a security umbrella over these regions. That will remain an issue and has been identifi ed by 

ACABAR and the British Agencies Afghan Group (BAAG) as a major concern. 

Coupled with the creation of the PRTs was the coming together of a national level 

coordination body for reconstruction. In December 2002, The Afghan Government 

established Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on the attainment of specifi c benchmarks in 

the 12 development programs defi ned in the National Development Framework presented 

in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the 

Afghan Government, focal point donor, UNAMA, and NGOs. The intent is that these 12 

groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum will provide some rationalization 

for the development process. CJCMOTF has deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to 

link up with these ministries and assist.65

In February 2003, President Karzai established a cabinet level committee composed of 

the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and the 

NSC Advisor. Ambassador Bill Taylor, the Special Ambassador for Reconstruction, will 

represent the US Government. This committee should help to provide the national level 

guidance for reconstruction that is needed. 

CJMOTF established an outreach program called the Civil-Military Coordination 

Center (CMCC) to share information among NGOs/IGOs and the ITGA and participate 

in reconstruction.

In December 2002, ISAF provided a permanent liaison section to the CJCMOTF. Up 

until this time they did not feel comfortable with the close relationship because of the 

combatant status of OEF. 

By the end of December 2002, UNAMA and the ITGA demonstrated more initiative 

by hosting planning workshops on development. In January 2003, UNAMA hosted a 

series of planning workshops in Bamyan that included key players such as: IOM, UNHCR, 

UN Habitat, Solidarities, Secretary of the local Governor, Education and Public Works 

Directors, Aga Khan Development Foundation, and representatives from the PRTs. The 

UNAMA area coordinator met with the commander of the PRT in Bamyan and agreed 

to act as moderator between the U.S. coalition and assistance organizations. This is a 

signifi cant step forward in the relationships. The civil affairs will vet all of their projects 

through the UNAMA coordinator. According to the USAID regional representative, “The 

PRT has been invited to attend the UN Heads of Agencies monthly meetings; attend the biweekly NGO forum facilitated by UNAMA; and meet weekly with UNAMA.” This again 

is a signifi cant advance toward harmonization. 66 

These programs were starting as this study ended so it was not possible to evaluate 

them.67

Operational Support 

Information Operations. Initially, there was no coherent IO program at the 

strategic level. This was due in part to the rapidity with which the operation unfolded. 

USCENTCOM’s initial IO focus was on support to combat operations by gaining legitimacy 

for the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. 
24

USCENTCOM’s major IO objectives were:

• Build/maintain regional/international support for U.S. and coalition operations 

and objectives.

• Compel states and non-state entities to withhold support to terrorist 

organizations.

• Support humanitarian assistance to eliminate or mitigate the conditions that spawn 

terrorist organizations.

These were translated into the following PSYOP objectives:

• Infl uence regional state sponsors to cease harboring terrorists

• Isolate al-Qaeda

• Isolate the Taliban

o De-legitimize the Taliban’s claim to rule.

o Counter anti-American propaganda

o Reinforce the legitimacy of the operation

o Promote civilian non-interference with the operation

o Support an independent and viable Afghanistan.68

Only the fi nal item on this list concerned peace building in Afghanistan. In contrast, 

ISAF’s IO did focus on the long-term stability of Afghanistan and, combined with civilmilitary cooperation, intelligence, and security operations, proved a success. OEF’s 

IO campaign’s effectiveness varied depending on the abilities of the various units. The 

Canadians, subordinate to the 101st Airborne at Kandahar, took the very general guidance Airborne at Kandahar, took the very general guidance st

and built a successful information campaign from the ground up.69

Information Operations supporting CJCMOTF were under resourced and not focused. 

The CJCMOTF had no IO staff element until December 2002. Though ISAF had 

demonstrated the power of CMO with IO, this was not practiced by OEF.

Civil affairs elements had the majority of the contact time with the locals and therefore 

were an excellent organization to carry the IO themes and provide feedback needed to adjust 

the program. However, the lack of vertical information fl ow inhibited this potential. 

Opportunities were consistently missed. Several school and public facilities openings, 

and medical assistance missions were not exploited. For example, there was a serious 

whooping cough outbreak in the Badakhshan province and medical relief from World 

Health Organization and the Afghan Ministry of Health could not get to the site of the 

outbreak. About ten children a day were dying. Air transport was the only solution, because 

the medication would expire in 48 hours without refrigeration, and it would take weeks to 

get over the Hindu Kush by ground transportation. Ultimately, the JSOTF provided air 

support, but there was not signifi cant interest at CJTF 180 to exploit the IO aspects of 

saving a province from epidemic. Requests for Combat Camera, PSYOP, and international 

media were not supported. The operation was a success but an opportunity was lost.70

IO also failed to support the PRTs. For a month and half during the fi elding of the 

Gardez PRT there was a media blackout imposed by CJTF 180. This blackout was designed 
25

to allow the deputy CJCMOTF commander to test the PRT concept out of the limelight. 

In the absence of a positive IO effort, the media issued a spate of articles that were in the 

main negatively focused and one sided. No rebuttals were offered. When the blackout 

was lifted, the entire program operated under a cloud. The success of the PRT program 

depends on the support of U.S. decision makers, NGOs/IGOs and coalition partners, along 

with the Afghan authorities, UNAMA and ACBAR. Transparency is key to gaining this 

trust and support.71 . 

In November 2002, a senior offi cer in CJCMOTF, after six months in theater, described 

IO as being poor from the beginning. “There were no themes, no messages, no coordination 

and in my opinion, information operations does not exist. It should be more than just 

publishing the actions of civil affairs at the national level”.72

Intelligence Operations. As with IO, the focus of intelligence operations was on 

supporting combat operation against al-Qaeda and Taliban. Again, because there was no 

interagency plan and a directive not to engage in nation building, the intelligence effort was 

slow in analyzing those items that would be critical for long-term stability.

OEF’s “light footprint” imposed severe limits upon information gathering. Additionally, 

the uncertain security situation had driven most NGOs/ IGO out of much of Afghanistan. 

The tendency therefore was to rely more heavily on technical intelligence. Technical 

intelligence, however, has substantial limits in stability operations. 

While most U.S. forces were reluctant to get out among the people and exploit 

information, other coalition forces and ISAF, based on CIMIC concepts and their 

experiences in the Balkans, put foot patrols among the local villages and had selected 

individuals live in the villages, much like the CHLCs and the Special Forces. These new 

sources of information increased the overall security of the forces and allowed them to 

assess the attitudes of the locals. After Operation Anaconda, the 3d Brigade of 101 Brigade of 101st Airborne Airborne 

Division moved among the villagers and assumed a respectful and non –threatening stance 

toward the locals. This enabled them to gain their respect and trust. The U.S. Army Center 

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported “locals in turn started providing intelligence 

to the soldiers on who was a Taliban and who was not, thus increasing their success in the 

war on terrorism.”73

Initially, the NGOs/IGOs needed information on combat operations to deconfl ict 

deliveries of humanitarian relief. At USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa this issue 

was resolved by providing an intelligence team for the coalition and NGO/UN LNO 

team. They were able to sanitize the intelligence products in a timely manner to facilitate 

coordination and planning for the delivery of humanitarian relief. This carried over to the 

CHLC in Islamabad. Nevertheless, a great deal of information remained over classifi ed. 

For example, maps depicting the location of land mines that were readily available for 

NGO and IGO in the Balkans were restricted because of the perceived need to protect US 

forces. Additionally, many Reserve CA offi cers did not possess Top Secret Clearances and 

could not get access.

The lack of intelligence sharing affected operations in the fi eld. For example, many 

documents that coalition forces needed were marked NOFORN and thus kept them out 

of the hands of allies and partners. In an extreme instance, The Canadians were routinely 

denied access to intelligence products in Kandahar for which they had been the primary 

source based on their HUMINT operations in the local villages.74
26

Information Management.

CJTF 180 established a web based information management system. The success of 

the system depended on web design, data base management, and accessibility to nonmilitary organizations. The system did not facilitate effi cient and effective execution. 

CALL reported:

Part of the problem was each higher headquarters had a SIPRNET 

information page but had not maintained them. Many pages were out 

dated, even those shown the CAAT. Data on them was over 3 weeks old; 

some pages were over a month old.75

It was a pull system that did not fi t the expectations of non-military organizations. 

For instance, U.S. embassies were conditioned to reading cables. CJTF 180 provided the 

embassy in Kabul with a computer terminal and instructions for accessing their web based 

systems, but the embassy was never really comfortable dealing with such a system.76

Much of the CMO coordination was handled via email and the internet. This again 

was breaking new ground. The 96th CA had their dedicated channel over PSC-5, ran chat 

room and shared information over SIPR.77 There were some challenges with the Reserve 

Components. Initially, the CJCMOTF was on a separate server that routed through Atlanta. 

Several times service outages on weekends could not be solved until the workers in Atlanta 

returned on Monday. Also, there was no common drive between CJCMOTF and CJTF 

180, so that information sharing suffered

AIMS

The Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) is a database that portrays 

the status of humanitarian assistance activities, to include who is doing what and where, 

funding, maps and geographic information, and reports from other organizations’ 

websites.78. ISAF, CIMIC, CJCMOTF, and the Afghan Ministries use this service. The 

CHLCs and now the PRTs input their projects into this database. The intent is to present 

an integrated picture to help coordinate activities. There have been challenges managing 

the databases and keeping the information current. CHLCs reported that the database is an 

excellent reference point, but that it must be verifi ed by on the ground face-to-face meeting 

with the local authorities. 79 

CENTRIXS

Coalition Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) is the 

USCENTCOM coalition classifi ed data network. CJCMOTF had not been given this 

system when it set up in Kabul. Lack of this system severely limited the information 

sharing with coalition partners and kept the CJCMOTF “out of the loop.” Such a system 

should have been fi elded immediately to the CJCMOTF. As of January 2003, it had yet to 

be fi elded to it. 

Targeting 

CFLCC initially conducted Targeting at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and not in the area of 

operations at CFLCC Forward, the 10th Mountain Division, in Bagram. CJTF 180, in June 
27

2002, brought the Targeting process forward into the area of operations. It was initially 

focused on combat. Non-lethal means, except for some IO, were not considered because 

OEF was not conducting nation building. Under CJTF 180, however, the integration of the 

full spectrum of lethal and non-lethal means is better understood and applied, but training 

and experience are still needed to translate the plans to actions.80

Command, Control, and Coordination

Command Relationships. A number of C3 questions confronted planners:

To whom should CJCMOTF report, USCENTCOM or CFLCC? Initial thoughts 

were that it should report directly to USCENTOM. The rationale was: 

• Humanitarian assistance should be separated from the operational commander in 

order to provide a greater perception of neutrality from third parties.

• CJCMOTF was a strategic asset and therefore should have a direct relationship 

with the strategic headquarters.

• Coalition member representatives and the representatives of some civilian agencies 

located themselves in Tampa; therefore, CJCMOTF should be co-located with 

them.

Commander USCENTCOM decided to place CJCMOTF OPCOM to the CFLCC in 

Kuwait for the following reasons.

• ARCENT/CFLCC was tasked with conducting the operational aspects of 

the campaign, and controlling CJCMOTF would allow them to integrate and 

synchronize supporting elements. 

• If humanitarian operations needed to be conducted in Afghanistan, then having 

the CJCMOTF within theater made better sense.

• Early on there was an information gap between Tampa and what was happening 

on the ground. CJCMOTF needed to be close to the area of operations to obtain 

ground truth. 

To whom should the 96th CA Battalion (AC) report? SOCCENT and JSOTF-N

wanted the unit to report to the SOF whom they were directly supporting. Conversely, 

CJCMOTF wanted the 96th CA Battalion to report to it because it was tasked with 

coordinating all humanitarian assistance in theater. The 96th CA Battalion is part of the 

SOF community, and was accustomed to receiving support from that community. The unit 

was unsure whether CJCMOTF and the CFLCC, both essentially conventional commands, 

would understand and properly support it. Ultimately, The 96th CA Battalion was directed 

to report to both headquarters. CAT-B and two CAT-A of C/96th were attached to JSOTF-N 

in November 2001, and the rest of the committed elements of the 96th CA Battalion were 

attached to CJCMOTF. The Company commander took the majority of his guidance from 

CJCMOTF and balanced that against JSOTF-N. This situation remained until the 489th CA 

Battalion (RC) replaced the 96th CA Battalion81

What is the proper relationship between the CHLCs and the SOF they support? 

The CA units working with SOF reported through the CJCMOTF to the CFLCC at Camp 
28

Doha, Kuwait. The SOF reported through the JSOTF to SOCCENT. The two elements 

were able to work together successfully, but problems arose when approval was needed for 

immediate impact projects. Those projects that supported the SOF mission were vetted 

by CJCMOTF and USAID, and approved by CFLCC out of the chain of command of 

the SOF. The CHLCs had to work out the issues between the SOF, OGA, USAID, and 

CJCMOTF to reach a consensus on how they would approach projects.82 The bottom line 

was that professionals at all levels made the process work so that appropriate projects were 

identifi ed and funded, but it was harder than it needed to be. 

What is the relationship between units with attached Civil Affairs and the CHLCs 

working in their Area of Operations? CHLCs were under the operational control of 

CJCMOTF in Kabul. However, the CAT-A assets that were mobilized were WARTRACE 

CA elements for the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, and the 82nd

Airborne Division. These units assumed that their WARTRACE units would support 

them, but that was not the case. These divisions deployed without their direct support 

CA elements. This shortfall was addressed by workarounds in theater with the CMOC’s 

providing personnel to furnish the maneuver units some support. However, the maneuver 

commanders still had a diffi cult time infl uencing the civil environment in their AOs. The 

question that arose was should the CHLCs report to the maneuver commander in whose 

area they were working? There were no liaisons or communication between the maneuver 

units and CHLCs. When the commands did get attached civil affairs elements, there was 

still no easy way to determine how the maneuver commander could have input. CJTF 180 

was working on this issue when this study ended. The command and control issue, and the 

relationships between the operational level CA and the direct support to the combat unit 

CA must be clearly defi ned and understood before operation starts.83

What is the relationship between CJCMOTF and the US Embassy? BG Kratzer 

was dual-hated as the commander CJCMOTF and the deputy chief of the Offi ce of Military 

Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A). LTG Milolshek, the CFLCC commander, was the 

OMC-A chief but remained in Kuwait. Commander CJCMOTF therefore dealt with 

USAID, UNAMA, ISAF, and the ATA, all the key organizations that would shape the 

future of Afghanistan. CJCMOTF was the key representative of USCENTCOM in signing 

the ISAF and the ATA Military Technical Agreement, and in attending the Tokyo donors’ 

conference. Thus, an organization that was considered only an ancillary supporting mission 

was in fact in a position of signifi cant political/military infl uence, even though it was not a 

headquarters with signifi cant CMO expertise until May 2002.84

Coordination at Central Command:

Civil Military Operations Cell:

There was only one CA offi cer at USCENTCOM when operations began, and he was 

working in the J5 supporting the Combatant Commander’s security cooperation plan. 

ARCENT did have three CA offi cers assigned but there was a lack of integrated and 

coordinated planning with the supporting 352nd CA Command. An Operational Planning 

Team from the 352 CA Command existed but was never requested. The CENTCOM After 

Action Reports from exercises in the previous two years identifi ed defi ciencies in CMO 

planning.85
29

The 352d CA Command was able to deploy a few individuals to USCENTCOM in the CA Command was able to deploy a few individuals to USCENTCOM in the d

fi rst several weeks after September 2001, but the remainder was delayed by signifi cant 

mobilization challenges. Eventually, a CMO cell of approximately 35 personnel was 

established in the USCENTCOM J5. The impact was that critical decisions about the 

future of OEF were made without essential input from CMO experts. All of the projects 

were considered in the short term of supporting the combat operation without seeing the 

long-term implications of the stability part of the operation.86

Humanitarian Assistance Working Group (HAWG).

The HAWG was established by the CJCMOTF in Tampa to coordinate the humanitarian 

relief effort into Afghanistan by matching requirements with resource. It responded 

to requests for assistance and provided information to deconfl ict relief and combat 

operations. Doctrinally, it was a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) operating 

at the USCENTCOM level. It was chaired by CJCMOTF and its membership included 

representatives from all coalition nations, UNOCHA, UNJLC, INTERACTION, and the 

USCENTCOM J2 and J5.

Here is an example of how the HAWG typically operated:

USCENTCOM presented a sanitized, unclassifi ed intelligence and situation briefi ng, 

INTERACTION reviewed the NGO situation, UNOCHA reviewed the UN Relief situation, 

and UNJLC reviewed the status of the delivery of relief. CJCMOTF then would review the 

major projects and seek support from coalition members. Members of the group could then 

request support from USCENTCOM. At the end of the meeting, CJCMOTF would meet 

separately with each of the participants to clarify and arrange details. These informal and 

private meetings seemed to be where most business was conducted. 

CJCMOTF would then coordinate any air movement of relief with the J-3 Air, who 

passed it on to the Air Force. This situation existed for at least four months until a Regional 

Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC), an organization designed to deconfl ict civil, 

military, and humanitarian air movement, was established in February 2002.87 

The HAWG continued to match resources with requirements. As the operation shifted 

into the theater, as more of the staff deployed, and as the operational tempo increased, the 

demand for information increased. Ground truth was only available in theater but parts 

of the CJCMOTF remained in Tampa so that functions were being performed in several 

places. This arrangement did not seem the best use of the available assets and by June 

2002, with the deployment of CJTF 180, the CJCMOTF in Tampa was dissolved and its 

function assumed by the J5. 

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Meeting:

This meeting was similar to the doctrinal concept of the Humanitarian Assistance 

Coordination Center (HACC) was run by the USCENCTOM J-5. J-2, CJCMOTF, and 

the UN and NGO representatives normally attended; none of the coalition representatives 

were invited. Its purpose was to bring USCENTCOM and UN and NGO communities 

together. The agenda mainly dealt with contingencies such as the Winter Weather Crisis 

and the Water Crisis.
30

UN and NGO Cell in Tampa.

The decision to place a non-military, non-U.S. government cell in the parking lot of 

USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa was controversial and sensitive. The personalities 

in INTERACTION, the UN and USAID realized that this operation had a large civilian 

component that would get more important as time went on. Many in the UN and NGO 

community were concerned that this might compromise their neutrality. Nevertheless, 

community leaders understood that they had to take that risk to obtain the benefi ts of close 

association. The entire effort was kept out of the press and the public eye. INTERACTION 

petitioned Department of Defense offi cials who were initially cool to the idea of inserting an 

NGO representation at USCENTCOM. USAID and UNOCHA met with the Commander 

USCENTCOM and got the concept approved. The cell was formed in October 2001, 

and was composed of representatives from UNOCHA, World Food Program, representing 

the INTERACTION, and at times, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), USAID’s Offi ce of Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), and the U.S. State 

Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM).

The purpose of the cell was to provide NGO/IGO perspective to the command, facilitate 

the fl ow of information affecting relief and recovery, advocate greater involvement of 

coalition forces in the completion of requests for assistance submitted by the NGOs, and 

provide education and subject matter expertise to the USCENTCOM staff. 

Although the interagency group did have access to the command group through the 

Deputy Commander, it did not have access to the planning process and was not involved in 

the critical Operations Planning Groups. Their advice was sought only after a concept had 

already been devised and many times the information was a one-way street. USCENTCOM 

requested information and the NGOs/IGOs responded. In spite of that, the NGOs/IGOs 

enjoyed some success:

• They were able to halt the Blind Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) air drops in 

Afghanistan. On 13 December 2001, the unattended (Blind) airdrops using the 

fl utter method were stopped and on 24 December 2001, all Blind airdrops were 

stopped. This operation was not popular with the civilian relief community. 

• They obtained a policy change on the issue of the reserve CA teams wearing 

civilian clothes and carrying weapons. 

• They were able to affect some of the targeting of airfi elds that needed to be used 

for follow-on humanitarian relief supplies.

• They were partially successful in focusing the military on the rehabilitation of 

vital infrastructure to facilitate long-term relief instead of “high profi le- low 

impact” projects designed to win hearts and minds. 88

The interagency LNO team suffered from poor communications between Tampa and 

the operational area. The NG/IGO communities have not invested in the same level of 

communication as the military. USCENTCOM often demanded a level of detail and data 

about operations that could not be obtained. INTERACTION recommended that in the 

future, a forward team should be placed in the theater with communication assets so that 

the LNO teams would be more responsive. 
31

By February 2002, UNAMA had been established along with the UNOCHA regional 

offi ces, the CJCMOTF had deployed to Kabul and the RAMCC had been established, and 

the locus of action began to shift forward. The liaison cell now reported to the J5 instead 

of the Deputy Commander. By June 2002, the group’s usefulness appeared to be over 

and it was disbanded. But USAID, realizing the importance of such an organization, has 

established a linkage with USCENTCOM.89

Part of the cell’s success obviously depended on the personalities of its people. The cell 

had to interact with both civilians and military, and relate to both. It had to be able to place 

issues in a format that both the military and NGOs could understand. It had to understand 

the processes of all players and how to enter the process and fi nd the correct pressure points 

with out alienating the parties involved. It was fortunate that the UN had a retired Army 

Colonel who had not only been a regional coordinator in Somalia and East Timor, but also 

had most recently come from the US Army Peacekeeping Institute where he possessed the 

appropriate security clearances and understood how all sides worked.90

Coordination in Afghanistan:

No overall coordinating mechanism existed for the various peace building efforts in 

Afghanistan; rather organizations concerned themselves with portions of it.

UN Joint Logistical Center (UNJLC)

The UNJLC was one of the most successful organizations to coordinate the relief 

effort. The concept was developed in 1997 for the World Food Program to handle complex 

contingencies and integrate the efforts from many different responders. When the crisis 

phase is over, the UNJLC will dissolve and the UNOCHA or UNHCR will take the lead. 

The UNJLC had two operations centers in Islamabad and Rome and six satellite 

centers in Kabul, Mazari-e-Sharif, Faizabad, Kandahar, Duchanbe, and Herat. The UNJLC 

coordinated all humanitarian assistance air and land movements, consolidated requests and 

forwarded them to USCENTCOM to ensure deconfl iction and, in some instances, security. 

A major challenge was poor communications connectivity between the UNJLC and 

USCENTCOM. Additionally, the requirement that the UNJLC provide 72 hours advance 

notifi cation was problematic, since the relief community often could not confi rm missions 

more than 24 hours in advance.91 Nevertheless, the UNJLC succeeded in coordinating 

large amounts of relief aid and getting it to populations at risk.92

UN Offi ce Chief of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA)

UNOCHA has seven regional offi ces in Afghanistan to handle relief and development. 

These offi ces provide a forum for NGOs/IGOs to coordinate initiatives. UNOCHA 

coordinated with CJCMOTF in Islamabad on a case-by-case basis. CJCMOTF has used 

these UNOCHA to exchange information with NGOs with whom they do not normally 

communicate.

UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) Area Coordinators

UNAMA established area coordinators in an attempt to synchronize reconstruction and 

governance efforts in the provinces. These area coordinators host and facilitate meetings 

among the aid community and locals. 
32

ISAF CIMIC Center

ISAF established a CIMIC center to coordinate its programs with the NGOs/IGOs in 

the area around Kabul. CJCMOTF provides an LNO, initially on a temporary basis and, 

by March 2003, permanently. CJCMOTF coordinates with ISAF on deconfl icting projects. 

CIMIC staff has attempted to engage USAID to participate, but as of December 2002, it 

had not elected to do so.93

Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA)

The AACA is a statutory body of the Afghan Interim Administration responsible for 

coordination of all external assistance in Afghanistan. CJCMOTF was fi rst invited to 

participate in the AACA meeting in May 2002.94

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. (ACBAR)

ACBAR was formed in 1988 and provides a forum for NGOs to obtain information and 

coordinate. ACBAR has been trying to reestablish itself in Kabul and regain status as a lead 

agency for NGOs, but this has proven diffi cult. It does have a Resource and Information 

Center in Peshawar. In April 2002, the Kabul-based “NGO Forum” was placed under 

ACBAR,s aegis, which then included approximately 70 NGOs. 

CJCMOTF Meetings and Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)

When CJCMOTF established itself in Kabul in December 2001, there was no CMOC 

function being performed there. CJCMOTF started a weekly meeting that included 

representatives of the Interim Government, along with some NGOs, ISAF and eventually 

UNAMA. At fi rst the commander, CJCMOTF, believing the meetings were unsuccessful, 

canceled them. But the NGOs objected. The commander subsequently discovered that the 

meeting minutes were being distributed to the greater NGO community, which felt uneasy 

attending. The command reestablished the meetings because of this wide, if indirect, 

appeal to the NGOs.95

When the 350th CA Brigade stood up as CJCMOTF in May 2002, it planned to reach 

out to the NGO and Afghan community. The Civil-Military Coordination Meeting (CMCC) 

was formed in December 2002 to provide national level interface with the ITGA ministries, 

UNAMA, ISAF, and NGOs/IGOs on a weekly basis. In March 2003, the meeting was moved 

outside of the secure compound to provide better access to non-military organizations.96

Consultative Groups (CGs)

In December 2002, the ITGA established CGs to focus on attaining specifi c benchmarks 

in the 12 development programs defi ned in the National Development Framework presented 

in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the 

Afghan Government, focal point donors, UNAMA, and NGOs. The intent is that these 12 

groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum, will provide rationalization for 

the development process. By December 2002, the CJCMOTF had deployed civil affairs 

ministerial teams to link up with these groups and assist.97

CJCMOTF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
33

CJTF 180 established PRTs in December 2002 as a tool to help set the conditions for 

the move from combat operations (Phase III) to post combat operations and reconstruction 

(Phase IV). The concept included embedded interagency partners within PRTs. USAID, 

DOS, and DOJ were some of the suggested interagency partners to work closely with 

the coalition and Afghanistan Ministry offi cials. The PRTs mission would be to facilitate 

information sharing among various agencies, to strengthen and extend ITGA infl uence, to 

provide advice and assistance, to provide a safer environment by assisting with the regional 

development of the Afghan Nation Army and local Afghan law enforcement authorities.98

PRT Cabinet Committee of the ITGA

This committee was is formed after December 2002, and is composed of the Ministry 

of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and the NSC 

Advisor. The State Department’s special ambassador for reconstruction will represent 

CJTF 180. This committee should help to provide the national level guidance for 

reconstruction. 

Hindrances to Effective Direction and Coordination

Many personnel working CMO in the fi eld felt constrained by what seemed to be an 

insatiable hunger for information at all levels of command. Soldiers called this “feeding 

the monkey”; even NGOs felt this pressure. Two contributing factors appear to be:

Oversupervision at All Levels. Frequently, each echelon of command from 

CJCMOTF to CFLCC to USCENTCOM questioned the decisions and judgment of 

subordinate elements. This was most apparent in the OHDACA approval process. For 

example, a CHLC in Kabul submitted a proposal to shift work on the waiting room of the 

Women’s Hospital in Kabul to the kitchen because an NGO had proposed to renovate the 

waiting room. A change to the scope of work was submitted, reviewed and approved by 

CJCMOTF, but disapproved by CJTF 180 and returned with questions about the cost. The 

review team at CJCMOTF was comprised of 12 reservists who were certifi ed, licensed 

professional civil engineers. CJTF 180 had one U.S. Army engineer captain, a recent 

graduate of the advanced course. Yet rather than defaulting to the senior expertise that 

existed at the fi eld level, each level of command felt compelled to comment and concur or 

non-concur. The project in question was eventually approved without alternation but this 

required several staff offi cers and commanders to waste considerable time and effort in a 

needless bureaucratic shuffl e. In another example, the CHLC in Herat found many local 

NGOs willing to do projects such as schools and wells. The CHLC believed it should 

therefore focus on long-term projects such as the refurbishment of the canal. CJCMOTF 

directed instead that they remain focused on schools and wells99. 

Lack of understanding of CMO. CMO is complicated. It deals with civil 

populations and issues such as claims, environmental law, fi scal responsibilities, human 

rights, security assistance, intelligence, the laws of armed confl ict and rules of engagement, 

international agreements, and information operations. It requires close coordination with 

NGOs/IGOs and foreign governments. The military does not routinely train and prepare 

its commanders to function in such an environment. The result is that commanders are 

understandably conservative in their approach in a desire to do the right thing and this can 

lead to micromanagement.100
34

Factors for Successful CMO at the Operational Level 

• CMO planning and advisory structures should be established at all 

combatant command headquarters and land component headquarters.

o Civil Affairs should provide full time planning and advice. 

o Interagency, NGO, and IGO advisors should be present at these 

headquarters. 

o Commanders should call upon the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion Regionally 

aligned company and reserve Civil Affairs units WARTRACED to their 

commands when facing civil military issues.

• Humanitarian Assistance should be considered a CMO and not just a 

logistical mission. 

• Clear command and control must be established over CMO. CMO is a 

command responsibility. The command relationships with the Civil Affairs 

Forces needs to be clarifi ed.

• Coordination and integration mechanisms should be established early to 

synchronize security, relief, and reconstruction efforts.

• Commanders and staff must consider legal and fi scal issues before 

deployment and become comfortable with them.
35

Chapter 4: Tactical Direction and Coordination 

This chapter describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to 

accomplish CMO at the tactical level

UK CIMIC Concept.

The UK provided ISAF’s initial leadership and incorporated the experience of Northern 

Ireland and the Balkans in designing an approach to civil military operations. Large portions 

of the international force had served in Bosnia or Kosovo and were therefore familiar with 

NATO CIMIC. The UK provided national level direction for CIMIC, specifi cally to support 

the return of governance and the reconstruction of the Afghan society so that it could be 

reintegrated “as a responsible member of the international community.”101 Additionally 

ISAF had a mandate from the UN and a Military Technical Agreement with the AIA. This 

allowed ISAF to develop a tactical approach based on the following principles.

• Consent. Each soldier was to ensure that all actions focused on increasing and 

maintaining the consent of the Afghanis supporting the Bonn process. ISAF was 

a guest and therefore was not to conduct itself as an occupying force. 

• Impartiality. The soldiers were to treat all Afghanis impartially in respect to 

supporting the Bonn process

• Transparency. As in all such operations, the forces had to be open about what 

they were doing and what was expected from the Afghanis.

• Capability. The force had to project that it was prepared to handle any threat.

• Appropriate use of Force. Because ISAF did not have overwhelming force to 

face down challenges, it accomplished the mission by supporting the police and 

authorities in Kabul. 

Based on the experience in Kosovo, ISAF developed a Military Technical Agreement 

with the Afghan Authorities that served as a memorandum of understanding and an element 

of transparency. The key aspect was the linkage of Information Operations with CIMIC 

and Security. 

• Information Operations were the number one priority for all members of ISAF. 

Initially, there was a complete lack of information among the Afghanis, some 

of whom thought that the USSR had returned. Most knew nothing about the 

Bonn agreement and UNAMA. ISAF published a newspaper, used loudspeaker 

broadcasts, and conducted information patrols among the people.

• CIMIC was focused on increasing the force protection of ISAF. It was about 

winning the hearts and minds of the people, and infl uencing them in a positive 

manner toward ISAF. CIMIC was seen as a bridge between the Afghans and 

ISAF. The UN and the NGOs were responsible to support the locals and provided 

basic care and reconstruction. Military CIMIC was a focused program. CIMIC 

teams were assigned sectors in Kabul, so that they could become familiar with 

the problems and issues, and develop relationships with the locals. ISAF ran a 

CIMIC center to coordinate its activities with the AACA and the over 600 NGO 

eventually working in Kabul. The center was identifi ed viable projects and linked 
36

them up with security providers. CIMIC developed a useful database that was 

valued by NGOs. 

• Security was based on the Northern Ireland experience. Companies were billeted 

with the local police at their stations. Combined patrols included a competent 

interpreter. Patrols consisted of a four-man section with other four-man sections 

satellited around them. Normally, ISAF patrolled by vehicle during the day and 

by foot at night. Locations depended on specifi ed measures of effectiveness and 

the relationship with the civil community.102

U.S. CMO 

CJCMOTF and the CHLC conducted CMO in support of SOF and later supported 

USAID and other agency projects. The conventional units also conducted CMO in support 

of their local operations. 

CJCMOTF. The 96th CA Battalion (AC) deployed initially in support of the SOF 

supporting the Northern Alliance. The teams lived alongside Special Forces A Teams. 

CHLCs depended on the local militia forces, the Afghan Militia Force (AMF), for protection, 

access to the locals, and as a source of information. Maintaining good relationships with 

the local warlord was essential. Initially, all of the contracting and monies went to support 

locals loyal to the warlords.103

Like the ISAF, US CMO had the greatest impact when civil affairs, information, 

intelligence, and security operations integrated. This village teaming concept is taught at 

the civil affairs school and was used in Vietnam and Haiti. When the CHLC fi rst moved 

into Gardez, locals pelted them with stones. But after the community saw that CHLCs 

could provide improvements attitudes changed. Even in Kandahar, the Taliban’s former 

base, there was a change of attitude after the CHLC built a school. A prime example of 

how CHLC can affect a shift in attitudes was in Deh Rawod. The CHLC moved into a 

hostile situation there after an incident involving accidental lethal bombing of a wedding 

party. After constructing a clinic and some wells, the local attitudes improved. “The 

Afghanis subscribe to the axiom that deeds speak louder than words”.104 

Conventional Forces. The initial units deploying to Afghanistan, the Marines, the 

10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division, were told that their mission Airborne Division, were told that their mission st

was combat and not to expect to come into contact with the locals. This guidance was 

incorrect, because in complex contingencies such as Afghanistan, CMO is to be expected. 

Army units did not deploy with their WARTRACE civil affairs attachments and did not 

exchanged LNOs with the CJCMOTF, and therefore had no infl uence over any of the CMO 

being conducted in their areas of operation. Although the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Airborne 

Division created a CMO cell of a captain (with no CMO experience) augmented by two 

civil affairs offi cers from CJCMOTF, its efforts were limited to focusing on mounted force 

protection patrolling. 105. 

 The 3d Brigade of the 101t Airborne Division did grant permission for the Princess Airborne Division did grant permission for the Princess t

Patricia’s Light Infantry Battalion from Canada to conduct CIMIC operations. The 

Canadians were fully versed in the type of CIMIC operation that ISAF was conducting, 

and had experience from Bosnia and Kosovo. Canadians adopted the U.S. Special Forces 

profi le of soft caps, no fl ack vests, some beards, and living and working with the locals in 

Kandahar. Initially, they only conducted reconnaissance patrols and used the Special Forces 
37

contacts with the local warlord to gain introductions to the village leaders. They started 

by conducting joint patrols with the warlord’s men until the Canadians were accepted in 

their own right. Their CIMIC offi cer took up residence in the warlord’s ‘headquarters” and 

provided them squad radios to demonstrate trust and insure positive communication to 

resolve crises.106

The local leaders were concerned for their safety, material well being, as well with what 

was going to happen to the local political structure. By understanding these concerns, the 

Canadians tailored their PSYOP and CIMIC approach. However, the Canadians had no 

money and were unable to deliver any sort of assistance for three months, until $50,000 

allocated from operational funds, coupled with private donations the unit generated from 

its own troops and supporters back in Canada, allowed freedom of action. Eventually, the 

Canadians successfully linked up with the CHLC and, with CHLC assistance, developed 

project requests that were approved through the CJCMOTF process for funding. They 

were able to rebuild eight schools and sink 20 wells before they redeployed. An old villager 

told one of the Canadians that he remembered that the Russians tried to buy friendship by 

just handing out goodies. But the unit provided assistance, advice, and some money and 

material to improve the long-term success of the village. 107 

The tactical method employed was the triad of CIMIC, PSYOP, and HUMINT. A 

village team would be comprised of each of these disciplines. The Canadians received 

support from U.S. PSYOP and MI personnel. The PSYOP team had a black American 

Muslim as a team member who proved to work very well with the locals. The soldiers 

would engage the locals in conversation about topics important to that village. The used 

the passive technique of eliciting information. The PSYOP would hand out leafl ets and 

talk with leaders about the purpose and meaning of OEF. In exchange, the villagers would 

inform the unit about the Taliban cells and criminals previously unknown. The locals also 

provided information on the following:

• Location of minefi elds, UXO and other hazards

• High confi dence routes suitable for Coalition operations

• Local customs, sensitivities, politics military structures etc.

• Likely enemy approaches to Kandahar Air Field and preferred enemy methods of 

attacking and disrupting coalition efforts.108

The Canadians felt that their unit was able “to dominate the ground (in this case, the 

‘hearts and minds’) of a patrolling area of roughly 100 square kilometers containing perhaps 

10,000 people with one liaison offi cer and $50,000 supported by a reconnaissance platoon, 

a fi nance offi ce, a judge advocate general offi ce, PSYOP and medical support. 109

After Operation ANACONDA, the remainder of 3d Brigade 101 Brigade 101st Airborne Division Airborne Division 

began conducting operations similar to the Canadians. It went so far as to direct 3-187 

Infantry to co-locate one of its TOW HMMVW platoons with a local Afghan Force. By 

the end of the unit rotation, the 101st demonstrated the CMO fl exibility that enabled them demonstrated the CMO flexibility that enabled them st

to make considerable headway with the locals. 

Information Operations used the bottom up method. TF MOUNTAIN and TF 

RAKASAN identifi ed themes, but the integration and synchronization group at the 

battalion level developed the actual text. These messages were adjusted based on the 
38

results of information gathered by previous patrols in the villages. The integration group 

worked off a matrix that projected four days in advance. Intelligence, operations, CIMIC, 

the patrol leaders and the commander vetted the messages. Word of mouth was the key 

means of transmission. Interpreters would pass on information and make sure that it got 

back to the warlord. Everyone was aware that whatever was said in the presence of the 

interpreter would be passed back to infl uential Afghans. 

MEDCAP was a signifi cant part of the mission. The needs were signifi cant in and around 

Kandahar, because there was no local medical or veterinarian infrastructure. The villages 

were selected based on population, medical need, tactical importance, and intelligence 

value. HUMINT personnel would talk with the leaders while the medical teams looked 

after the people. The MEDCAP would check on other projects such as wells, and hand out 

leafl ets and soccer balls.

Factors for Successful CMO at the Tactical Level

• Understand and apply doctrinal principles.

• Develop a CMO plan before deploying. There was no CJCMOTF Component 

plan to guide the tactical level of CMO. It was built after deployment.

• Provide ready funds to quick impact projects.

• Develop constructive relationships with NGO and IGO so that their 

considerable capabilities can be leveraged in support of long-term 

development. The resources that the military can provide will always be 

limited. Success depends upon the ability of the military to enable the NGO 

and IGO communities to assume the lead in assisting and reconstructing 

the communities. A clear concept on how to do this must be in place before 

deployment.

• Conduct comprehensive Information Operations at all levels. An IO campaign 

plan should be developed before deployment that addresses the fundamentals 

of stability operations. All members of the unit must promote and reinforce 

the positive aspects of the military presence and support consensus for the 

political processes. IO must be adjusted based on the HUMINT that is 

gathered locally.

• Coordinate and synchronize all operations. All of the following disciplines 

must be integrated: intelligence, civil affairs, information operations, and 

security. 

• Provide fi scal fl exibility for commanders. Commanders should be free to use 

O&M monies, conduct MEDCAP and pay claims when they directly support the 

mission.

• Resource the CMO effort. CMO was not adequately resourced with money, 

transportation, communications, or access to humanitarian resources. 110 
39

Chapter 5: Doctrine

This chapter examines current doctrine in light of the actual operations 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom

Interagency

There is no interagency doctrine. There have been previous attempts to establish 

standards and procedures. Operation Restore Democracy (1994) in Haiti was the genesis 

in May 1997 of PDD 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” In 1998, the 

NSC published the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingencies to 

institutionalize the mechanisms directed in PDD 56. 

PDD 56 and the handbook were not reissued with the new administration. A draft NSPD 

XX covering interagency procedures was prepared, but has not been approved. There is 

no current guidance on how to integrate and synchronize political-military interagency 

operations.

Multinational

There is no multinational doctrine USCENTCOM/coalition operations. NATO has 

STANAGS and Allied Joint Publications to guide operations. American British Canadian 

Australian Forces (ABCA) has QSTAGs, and the Coalition Operations Handbook for 

Multinational Forces. Because USCENTCOM had no multinational procedural manual or 

SOP, coalition forces defaulted to that with which they were most familiar.111

The Canadian Princes Patricia’s Light Infantry, attached to the 3d Brigade of the Brigade of the 

101st Airborne Division, operated in accordance with NATO CIMIC principles while Airborne Division, operated in accordance with NATO CIMIC principles while st

the remainder of the division’s units operated in accordance with U.S. CMO doctrine. 

The approach of both organizations to the Afghan situation was quite different. The 101st

Airborne Division did not receive its WARTRACE CA units and hesitated, without its 

expertise, to be engaged. The Canadians, in accordance with CIMIC doctrine, engaged up 

close with the locals.112

U.S. Joint Doctrine

U.S. Joint Doctrine properly describes the operational environment that exists in 

Afghanistan but does not provide adequate guidance for CMO. JP 3-0, Joint Operations

and 3-07, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), describe simultaneous theater 

operations where part of the theater could be in a wartime state, while the other part is in a 

post-confl ict state, and the commander is encouraged to synchronize both efforts toward a 

common goal.113 In accordance with Joint Doctrine, Afghanistan is a MOOTW involving 

the use or threat of force. 114 The coalition forces supported an insurgency to overthrow 

the Taliban and are now conducting counter-insurgency operations to eliminate resistance 

while using Foreign Internal Defense techniques to support the ITGA and facilitate 

humanitarian assistance. The doctrine for MOOTW in JP 3-07 and its subordinate TTP 

on Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-07.1, Anti Terrorism, JP 3-07.2, Peace Operations, JP 

3-07.3, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-07.6, adequately cover the planning 

and execution of an Afghanistan-type of operation through transition planning. The force 

commander must recognize, however, that he is in a MOOTW. The initial vision, planning 
40

and execution of Operation Enduring Freedom indicated that this was not understood. In 

June 2002, CJTF 180 issued orders and plans that indicating it does understand operations 

in Afghanistan are MOOTW. 

Joint CMO doctrine, JP 3-57, states that CMO is the responsibility of the entire 

command but the Army has not internalized this concept. JP 3-57 states: 

CMO are an inherent responsibility of command... Joint force commanders 

(JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) (i.e., those specialized units trained to 

plan and conduct CA activities) with other military forces (e.g., maneuver, 

health service, military police, engineering, transportation, and other 

special operations forces) and civilian organizations (both governmental 

and nongovernmental) to provide the capabilities needed for successful 

CMO. While CA are the “bedrock” facilitating application of these 

selected capabilities, this joint publication (JP) refl ects the transition 

from a primarily CA approach to the broader and over-arching concept 

of CMO....CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military 

forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces115.

In OEF, the U.S. Commanders usually defaulted to the Civil Affairs to take care of 

CMO unlike the ISAF, which made it part of every unit’s responsibility.

CMO doctrine, as described in JP 3-57, does not establish any principles to 

guide the commander. Unlike Joint MOOTW doctrine, Joint CMO doctrine fails to 

describe and offer suggestions on how a commander can approach the type of operational 

environment that is found in Afghanistan, where confl ict and peace operations coexist. The 

manual states that most operations will fall between the two extremes of support to war 

and peacetime operations. Unfortunately, the manual does not address operations that fall 

between the two extremes and offers the commander little guidance on how to balance the 

resources between combat and stability operations. Figure 1-3, “Civil Military Missions 

in Support of Major Regional Confl icts and other Combat Operations,” in JP 3-57 provides 

examples of civil military support during each phase of an operation. But it only provides 

examples for the pure combat option and not the most likely operation that falls between 

the extremes.116 Further, JP 3-57 does not establish any principles for CMO, though it 

does list some for Civil Affairs Activities. NATO and the EU have established a set of 

principles for CIMIC that should be considered as a starting point. These principles are 

listed in Annex C of this study. 

The Civil Affairs Principles in the joint CMO manual do not describe how CMO 

is being conducted in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The principle of 

“Economy of Personnel and Resources” does not paint an accurate picture. That principle 

states, “The activities of Civil Affairs should be limited, where possible, to those involving 

coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities.” 117

CHLC functions, with direction from CJCMOTF, were similar to an NGOs taking direct 

action in the community. Later with the establishment of the PRTs all of the functions of 

coordination, liaison, interface and direct action on projects were combined. Civil Affairs 

support to Unconventional Warfare was another emerging concepts. These concepts should 

be evaluated for inclusion in doctrine. 

The concept of a CJCMOTF was validated by this operation. This task force 

provided oversight and control of the civil military effort at the operational level. However, 
41

some issues need to be clarifi ed. Commander relationships and coordination between 

the CJCMOTF and its operational elements and the CA teams attached to the maneuver 

elements must be delineated. The issue of supporting and supported needs to be clarifi ed 

as it relates to the maneuver units. Issues to address include the following. Maneuver 

units did not have their WARTRACE CA slice with them and CJCMOTF controlled the 

CA efforts throughout the theater. How do the maneuver units conduct CMO under this 

situation and how is it coordinated and integrated? When they do have their WARTRACE 

units, how are their activities coordinated with CJCMOTF’s elements? 

The relationship among the UN, ISAF, U.S. Embassy, CJCMOTF and the U.S. combat 

force commander should be examined in the context of a peace building operation like 

Afghanistan. CJCMOTF can assume signifi cant responsibilities. Initially, the commander 

CJCMOTF was also the Deputy OMC for the U.S. Embassy. As the USCENTCOM 

representative in Kabul, he signed the Technical Agreement drawn up between ISAF and 

the ATA. He was in a position of great infl uence, acting for the commander USCENTCOM, 

but reporting to CFLCC. CFLCC did not appreciate CMO and was not a forward planning 

organization for CMO. Therefore, CENTCOM established direct liaison with CJCMOTF 

to facilitate future planning118. 

There are some organizational problems with forming the CJCMOTF that must be 

considered. For example, how does the existing civil affairs structure fi t into the concept 

of the CJCMOTF? In OEF, what was the role of the Civil Affairs Command, Brigades, and 

Battalions? Parts of all of these organizations formed the command element and staff of 

CJCMOTF. There were feelings among the commanders that the inclusion of all of these 

organizations in the process led to redundancy where Battalion and Brigade headquarter 

were amalgamated doing the same job. The Civil Affairs community should examine 

how the logistics community transforms from a peacetime administrative structure into 

a wartime task organized structure. For the concept of CJCMOTF to be an unqualifi ed 

success, its organization and command relationships need to be streamlined. 

The use of military capability in support of CMO was different in practice than 

in theory as described in JP 3-57. In JP 3-57, logistical and engineer capability are 

directed to support transporting time sensitive items and relief supplies, and restoring and 

maintaining relief lines of communications (LOC) “while civilian capacity is catching 

up.”119 In OEF, the decision was made not to provide any excess capacity to support 

CMO, even in the face of civilian need and lack of emergency capacity. It was not the 

responsibility of OEF to support civilian need in theater. All logistical and engineer assets 

were focused on supporting the combat forces. This had not been the case in previous 

contingencies such as the Balkans. This “change of concept” confused and upset NGOs 

that had read the doctrine and participated in these operations. 120 Practice and doctrine 

ought to align. 

U.S. Army 

Like joint doctrine, U.S. Army doctrine describes the type of operational 

environment that exists in Afghanistan, but does not provide an adequate set of 

principles to guide commanders. The Army’s Civil Affairs Manual, FM 41-10, uses the 

principles of war, which were designed for combat operations, as the basis for Civil Affairs 

operations that deal in an entirely different dimension. The manual does the same thing for 

SOF “imperatives” that also do not correlate well with CMO. Army doctrine developers 
42

should consider incorporating UK and NATO CIMIC principles. For example, one highly 

useful CIMIC principle absent from Army doctrine is Transparency, the development 

of mutual trust and confi dence. Lack of transparency repeatedly increased the friction 

between OEF forces and NGOs. 

Civil Affairs doctrine in FM 41-10 does not describe the type of operations 

conducted by the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Doctrine calls for using CA assets 

indirectly “supplementing or complementing Host Nation (HN) or Humanitarian Relief 

(HR) agencies.” However, CA teams (CHLCS) became service providers rather than 

coordinators. They used DOD, DOD, and OGA monies to provide quick impact projects. 

The quick impact missions took priority over traditional assessment and coordination 

missions. ODACHA monies were used for the fi rst time in supporting military operations 

instead of a natural disaster. This meant that the projects had to involve military forces vice 

NGOs or contractors.121 The doctrine needs to clearly describe this new approach. 

The doctrine does not describe how the Civil Affairs teams conducted operations 

at the tactical level. The doctrine does not describe the village team concept of CA, 

PSYOP, and INTEL that was used, even though this technique is taught at the civil affairs 

school. The mission of the CHLCs was primarily to win the heart of minds of the people 

through quick impact projects. This concept is also not covered in the doctrine. The 

doctrine assumes that the main objective is humanitarian relief. 

The doctrine also states that the “Military forces provide a secure environment,” 

but it was not the mission of OEF to provide such an environment for the relief 

community. The doctrine must be expanded to cover the situation created in Afghanistan 

in which OEF was not intended to provide a safe and secure environment for relief efforts, 

and did not bring any excess capacity to assist in humanitarian assistance. The result was 

that NGOs did not stretch out in any great numbers into the country. 

Terminology in the doctrine is confusing and does not lead to full understanding 

of C2 and coordination relationships. There was a proliferation of ad hoc arrangements 

(e.g. CHLCs, CMOC North and South, NCMCC, CM Coord Center, JRT) that are not 

described in doctrine. CJTF 180 has renamed and readjusted most of these organizations 

so that they now refl ect current doctrine but non-doctrinal terms such as the PRT( provincial 

reconstruction team) and the CM Coord (Civil Military Coordination Meeting) still exist. 

Doctrine does not describe the concept of contingency aid that the CHLCs 

employed. The objective of CMO in Afghanistan was to “win the hearts and minds” of 

the Afghans and increase force protection of U.S. forces. This was a PSYOP objective 

rather than CA because it focused on modifying behavior. CMO doctrine does not discuss 

PSYOP or force protection objectives. 

Doctrine for planning, commanding, and controlling operations contains no 

guidance on combined and interagency integration. FM 5-0, Planning and Orders and 

FM 6-0 Mission Command, have little to say about synchronizing operations with nonmilitary organizations and coalition partners. Doctrine says nothing about concurrent and 

collaborative planning with non-military entities. CJTF 180 created the PRTs without 

collaborative planning, leading to diffi culty in getting this concept accepted by the NGOs. 

122
43

U.S. Air Force

RAMCC should become part of Air Force Doctrine. The RAMCC provides 

a centralized facility to coordinate arrival and departure times to help de-confl ict both 

military and civilian air traffi c at designated airfi elds in a particular area of responsibility. 

The RAMCC helps the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), normally the C/JFACC, 

fulfi ll its duties. The goal of the RAMCC is to provide a safe and effi cient operating 

environment for all aircraft transiting the airspace control area, including military combat, 

combat support and humanitarian airlift missions and civil humanitarian and commercial 

air operations. A RAMCC has been used at least twice to date, fi rst in the Balkans and, 

more recently, beginning in January 2002, for OEF. In both situations, the air traffi c control 

structure was inadequate to deal with the complex interaction of military and civil aircraft 

attempting to access the regions. A RAMCC is indispensable when signifi cant military 

forces operate in an area lacking a robust air traffi c control infrastructure. CFACC stated 

on 27 January 2002, “I couldn’t do my job without you...the RAMCC should be a part of 

every AOC from the beginning.” The RAMCC stood up late because it was not a part of Air 

Force or joint doctrine. This concept should be included in that doctrine. 123

New Concepts

The following are new concepts used in Afghanistan that should be addressed in 

doctrine.

• Stand Alone Civil Affairs Teams at the Operational Level. The CA teams 

operated as small stand alone elements under the operational control of a 

CJCMOTF. They conducted operational level tasks in support of the force 

commander and his nationwide concept and not under the control of the various 

Army unit commanders in whose areas they operated. They formed interagency 

and intergovernmental teams including DOS and local government offi cials that 

combined CMOC as well as direct action project functions. Doctrine developers 

need to carefully consider this new in light of CA force structure and attendant 

support requirements.

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The study ended before this concept 

could be fully evaluated but it needs to be examined. These teams integrated the 

CHLC function of doing projects with the CMOC function that had been lacking 

befor,e and created what the UK calls linked-up government with DOS, USAID, 

UNAMA, and ITGA representatives. 

• Contingent Assistance. The UK CIMIC concept differentiates between 

humanitarian assistance that is to be dispensed without conditions and 

developmental assistance which should be contingent. The 96th CA Battalion 

deployed with the purpose of assisting those who supported the US. SOF and 

infl uencing those who were not supporting. If the objective is to increase the 

consent for the Bonn process or any peace process than contingent assistance 

is used to reward the supporters. The UNSCR that established ISAF states that 

contingent assistance will be used to support the Bonn process. The doctrine must 

address this issue by clearing up the distinction in doctrine between these two 

categories.
44

• Force Protection aspects of Civil Military Operations. Local community 

engagement through CHLCs and village teams proved effective in obtaining 

information that directly assisted force protection by providing indications and 

warnings. This concept should be added to the doctrine. 

• Psychological Aspects of Civil Military Operations. The CHLCs, CJCMOTF, 

the 101st Airborne Division, CJTF 180, and the ISAF CIMIC all stated that the Airborne Division, CJTF 180, and the ISAF CIMIC all stated that the st

purpose of their engagement with the Afghans was to win their hearts and minds, 

a psychological objective. Afghanistan presents a clear example of the use of 

CMO primarily to infl uence behavior. Doctrine should address this purpose of 

CMO.

• Role of the Non-Civil Affairs Forces in CMO. Although doctrine clearly 

states that any formation can conduct CMO, several of the military forces acted 

as if CMO was the special preserve of Civil Affairs and defaulted to them. The 

doctrine should be more specifi c and provide examples of non-civil affairs units 

conducting CMO.
45

Chapter 6: NGO/IGO Issues

This chapter describes the relationship among the military, NonGovernmental Organizations, the International Governmental 

Organizations

From Operation Provide Comfort, the operation assisting the Kurds in Northern 

Iraq, through the operations in the Balkans, working relationships among the NGO and 

IGO community and the U.S. military gradually improved. Seminars were held, NGOs 

participated in major exercises, and Army units such as the XVIII Airborne Corps pursued 

their own initiatives with the NGO community. Doctrine was written about dealing with 

NGO. ASD (SOLIC)‘s Offi ce of Stabilization conducted outreach programs. But during 

OEF, the NGO/IGO relationships with U.S. Military were strained more that any time since 

Operation Provide Comfort.

General 

Relations between the military and NGOs/IGOs mirrored the complexity of the situation 

in Afghanistan. Relations varied based upon different stages of the operation and different 

methods of aid distribution, and also varied at different levels as well. 

Pre-Confl ict Planning and Coordination

A long-term relationship and clear operational parameters among all players was never 

established before the confl ict. The lack of an interagency plan and management process 

contributed to this failure. Tight security restrictions also resulted in poor information 

fl ow and mutual suspicion. NGOs/IGOs knew that a major operation was about to happen 

with an attendant humanitarian crisis, but could not get any information. Most of the U.S 

Army’s CA offi cers are reservists who lacked Top Secret clearances and were therefore 

also restricted.

UNOCHA and USAID, realizing that coordination was essential, sought approval to 

establish an LNO with USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM’s concept was to provide wholesale 

support to NGOs/IGOs and avoid conducting direct humanitarian assistance. The LNO 

team at Tampa did provide assistance and some coordination but it never participated in 

any operational planning. USCENTCOM used them as an information source, but offered 

little in return. The LNO team provided a critical resource to educate the command on the 

civilian aspects of humanitarian assistance and recommendations to the command group. 

USCENTCOM and the NGOs considered its existence a success.124 

Because of the close hold nature of the operation and the question of neutrality, there 

was no rehearsal or training building up among the NGO community and the military as 

there had been for Haiti and the Balkans. The NGO community had to rely on previous 

exercises, operations and U.S. doctrine for a guide. But U.S. operated differently in 

Afghanistan.

ISAF and NGO Coordination

The Joint Doctrine Development Center in the UK was conducting a CIMIC conference 

with key NGOs when the announcement was made that the UK would lead ISAF. The 
46

conference then became the venue where information and experiences were shared and 

working arrangements developed for ISAF. Here “soft” networks were established that 

enabled planning and sharing of information. The ISAF planning was modifi ed based 

on these personal contacts. So unlike the U.S. planning effort that was characterized by 

exclusion, the UK and NGO relationships gathered strength and understanding through 

informal networks.125

Wholesale Support Method

While the international aid community focused on wholesale support, the military 

coordinated with NGOs and the UN to facilitate aid delivery. The military had not 

expected to be on the ground for an extended period with the NGOs in Afghanistan. 

Overall, deconfl iction of combat operations with humanitarian relief was a success story. 

The working relationships with NGOs in Islamabad were close, but there were sensitivities 

over the neutrality issue. It was clear that a rift existed between OEF’s operational focus 

and NGO needs. NGO requests for security and airlift were turned away as not the policy 

of OEF to provide either countrywide security or to divert military assets from combat 

operations to assist NGOs. 

Deconfl icting Humanitarian Relief

NGOs/IGOs were primarily concerned with delivering relief and protecting their people. 

Two organizations were established to ensure this--the UN/NGO cell at USCENTCOM and 

the CHLC at Islamabad. The UN/NGO cell worked with the USCENTCOM J2 and J5 to 

pass critical, time sensitive information to the NGOs. The procedure adopted to accomplish 

this task was to pass information to USCENTCOM’s LNO in Islamabad and share with 

the NGOs at the HAWG in Tampa. Additionally, UNJLC provided what information it 

could on the movements of aid and personnel. There was no injury or loss of life reported 

because of lack of coordination. An accidental air strike on an ICRC warehouse on 25 

October 2001 was partly the result of the reluctance of the ICRC to participate with the 

military in any of these deconfl iction meetings and to share information with the military.

The following is one example of a successful operation. The Disaster Assistance Relief 

Team (DART) of USAID in Islamabad contacted the CHLC to inform them that there was 

a humanitarian relief convoy between two towns that was currently under aerial attack by 

OEF CHLC informed the USCENTCOM LNO team and within three minutes AWACS had 

been notifi ed and ensured that the convoy was not hit by the bombing.126

The NGOs/IGOs also requested the use of military air and desired that the military 

provide security for their convoys. The CHLC in Islamabad replied that OEF had no assets 

to assist the NGO community. Eventually the NGOs stopped asking. 

Humanitarian Air Drops

On 7 October 2001, concurrent with the combat air operations, the U.S. started air 

dropping Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) into Afghanistan. The HDR was developed 

in 1993 as a less expensive alternative to the military’s Meal Ready to Eat (MRE). The 

ration was designed to be more appropriate to the needs of refugees and other vulnerable 

populations. Designed to be acceptable under the widest range of cultural and religious 

dietary restriction the HDRs contain no animal products and are readily digestible by 
47

moderately malnourished people. HDRs can be airdropped via the triad system, by which 

individual packets fl utter to the ground.127

DoDs viewed these drops as the only way to get food into areas where NGOs were not 

present and as a way to demonstrate the U.S. government’s good will to the Afghans, and 

the rest of the world. However, the international relief community opposed the program. 

NGOs viewed this as a U.S. psychological military operation rather than as a humanitarian 

effort. NGOs raised the following specifi c concerns: 

• Drops were directed toward drop areas that the military could support, rather than 

the most desperate populations. 

• Intelligence was not accurate enough to ensure effective targeting of the drops.

• Because of the threat, the rations were dropped from altitudes above 30,000 feet, 

which created concerns about drop accuracy and damage to the packages. In fact, 

some packages were damaged and the contents contaminated, allowing Islamic 

extremists to claim that the U.S. was conducting biological warfare against the 

Muslim people of Afghanistan.

• HDR were dropped individually at an exorbitant cost that out weighted their 

benefi t. The fi rst UNJLC convoy provided more food that the entire airdrop did 

from October through December 2001. 

• Distribution of the supplies could not be controlled. Reports from the ground 

indicated that the hungry populations were not getting the rations directly. Instead, 

the HDR were going to combatants or to enterprising individuals who would sell 

them to the highest bidder. 

• The color and shape of the ration was similar to that of the cluster bomb submunitions. There was fear that civilian could be hurt of killed by a cluster bomb 

mistaken for food packet. 

• Drops brought people into risky areas and endangered them in recovering 

supplies.

• HDR provided a little amount when compared to the effort. A better solution from 

the NGO perspective was to establish a safe and secure environment so that the 

food convoys could get through to secure distribution locations. 128

The validity of NGOs’ concerns is unknown; what is certain is that HDR became a key 

friction point between the U.S. military and the NGOs

Retail Support Method

As the international community turned to retail distribution of aid,with the NGOs 

and the CHLCs working inside Afghanistan, the relationship among OEF, the UN, and 

NGOs was chilly at the operational and managerial levels, but accommodations occurred 

at the tactical level. CJCMOTF, with its focus on executing projects, did not establish as 

successful an outreach to NGOs and the Afghan Ministries as did ISAF. The NGOs had 

certain expectation of the U.S. military based on U.S. doctrine and previous practice that 

were not met. 
48

NGO Expectations of U.S. Military Capabilities and Support

Based on their experience in the Balkans, NGOs expected the U.S. military to deploy 

with suffi cient capacity engineer, transportation, logistic, and civil affairs specialty assets, 

which would stabilize the situation while the NGOs built their own capability. NGOs 

expected to fi nd a CMOC where they could coordinate for this support. But there were 

neither these capabilities nor a CMOC function. 129

Safe and Secure Environment

The NGOs/IGOs expected the U.S. military to establish a general safe and secure 

environment in which to work. But the U.S. policy guidance was to do no such thing. 

ISAF was expected to establish such an environment in and around Kabul. The U.S. did not 

favor an expansion of ISAF and did not intend to expand its own forces into a countrywide 

peace enforcement mission. 

NGO/IGOs felt unsafe returning to the countryside. The NGOs who had been in 

Afghanistan prior to OEF carried baggage had previously arranged with the Taliban for 

security and were unsure about their future relationships with the warlords. OEF military 

assets did not provide security either on an area basis or for specifi c events such as WFP 

food shipments. The lack of communication among all parties aggravated the situation. 

One result was that NGOs were not represented in most of the countryside and that the 

CHLCs assumed the role that NGOs would have performed.130.

“Market Share”

CFLCC desired that CA make an impact to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans and 

not just coordinate the actions of others like CA did in the Balkans. There, CA established 

CMOCs to coordinate and enable NGO work over which they had no direction or infl uence. 

In Afghanistan, CA contracted projects with ODAHCA monies. It should be noted that 

NGO complaints that OHDACA monies represented funds somehow diverted from them 

were invalid. Under the program’s governing rules, OHDACA set-aside money would 

never have gone to NGO in the fi rst place.131

CA operated in areas that had been the domain of NGOs for over ten years. Nevertheless, 

CA operations did not steal NGOs’ “market share.” Initially, many NGOs, for a number of 

reasons, not the least of which was uncertainty about their relationship to the new political 

reality, did not extend their operations beyond the major population centers. As they did 

expand outward, in many instances, CA teams shared projects or gave them to NGOs to 

execute. In only rare circumstances did an NGO and the U.S. Military directly compete 

over a project.132

Much more common were episodes such as the renovation of the Women’s Hospital 

in Kabul, OHDACA monies focused on renovating parts of the building, and the NGO 

provided the medical supplies. In this way, CHLC and NGO were complementary. Afghan 

benefi ted.133

Perceptions of Neutrality and the Civilian Clothes Issue

Neutrality and independence are two of the fundamentals that guide most NGO and UN 

agencies dealing with relief. The relief community seeks to create “humanitarian space” 

to reach at risk populations. For many years under the Taliban, NGOs and the UN made 
49

deals to create humanitarian space, at times playing off one Taliban faction against another. 

With OEF, the entire situation changed.

The U.S. was considered a belligerent. Early in the confl ict, the UNOCHA in Islamabad 

maintained liaison with both the U.S., and the Taliban, and only met with them on a caseby-case basis. The confl ict’s outcome was uncertain, and the UN felt it had to keep the 

doors open to create humanitarian space. Additionally, they were concerned for the safety 

of local staff that was inside Afghanistan. Some of their staff did come under pressure 

because of the impression that their organization was associating with the U.S. military.134 

NGOs shared this concern and it crystallized around the subject of some U.S. military 

CA personnel wearing civilian dress. The episode provides an interesting case study of 

misunderstanding and miscommunication. 

When the CHLC arrived in Islamabad, the U.S. Ambassador, concerned that the 

increasing numbers of the U.S. military in Pakistan would place them and the operation 

at risk, requested that military personnel wear civilian clothe. In Afghanistan, Northern 

Alliance leaders required U.S. to wear native clothes to reduce the appearance that outsiders 

were infl uencing them. When the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed, it assumed the same 

garb. After the fi ghting subsided, Ismael Khan, Abdul Dostum, and other local governors 

continued to request that CHLCs wear civilian clothes for their own protection and for the 

general stability of the region. Also, these governors wanted it to appear that they were in 

charge of their area and not beholden to OEF forces or the central authority in Kabul. The 

UN and some NGOs also initially insisted that OEF soldiers wear civilian clothes to meet 

with them.135

Other NGOs, however, became upset because the military was wearing civilian clothes 

while, carrying weapons. They were concerned that the locals would not be able to 

differentiate between U.S. military and NGOs, and that their security and freedom of action 

could be compromised. Medecins sans Frontieres expressed this view quite vehemently:

Time and again the Medecines Sans Frontieres team in Kandahar has 

observed military personnel from the international coalition force in 

civilian cloths with or without concealed guns, driving civilian cars...

People suspect us of carrying hidden guns. We were repeatedly warned 

by Afghans not to go to specifi c places outside town since people might 

not be able to distinguish us from western soldiers....With the underlying 

tension between some Afghan military factions and the coalition forces, 

humanitarian aid workers are placed a signifi cant risk because of this 

confusion...If armies engaged in fi ghting are involved in delivering 

humanitarian assistance, it can be regarded by their opponents as an act 

of war. If humanitarian action is seen as partisan, aid and aid workers 

can be targeted. Humanitarian aid promotes a concern for humanity and 

dignity in times of violence. This relies on a respect for the impartiality 

of aid agencies, and their independence from the pursuit of military 

causes.... Coalition forces who wear civilian clothes misrepresent their 

role. This practice jeopardizes the safety of humanitarian workers and 

endangers the humanitarian work...136

On 19 March 2002, USCENTCOM completed a review of the issue and directed all CA 

personnel in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to return to full uniform. Guidance and authority 
50

were provided to ground force commanders to establish uniform policies based upon local 

threat conditions and force protection requirements.137

Because of the NGO complaints, the issue of military wear of civilian clothing was 

further reviewed within the DoD. Following DOD-JCS coordination, guidance was 

forwarded to USCENTCOM in May 2002 that was consistent with CJCMOTF guidance 

issued 7 April 2002. Because of USCENTCOM/CJCMOTF guidance, the number of 

CA personnel in civilian clothing had already diminished signifi cantly before DOD-JCS 

action.

As the CHLCs switched to uniforms, there was an initial period where the local people 

would not talking to them. But, because the CHLCs had already achieved rapport, the 

people responded positively after a few days. The CHLCs appeared to be able to continue 

their mission successfully in uniform.138

Relationships with Warlords 

CHLCs initially owed their access, security and support for projects to the regional 

leaders or warlords. It was essentially the only way the teams could survive and function. 

However, this left them open to the impression that they were the lackeys of the warlords, 

doing the bidding of individuals who had questionable human rights pasts.139 NGOs 

complained that the CHLCs were only considering short-term objectives by strengthening 

the hand of the warlords at the expense of the Afghan central government. NGOs such as 

CARE and IGOs such as ICRC felt that they were supporting the overall Bonn vision of 

creating a stable country based on legitimate central authority, but that CJCMOTF was only 

focused on increasing warlord support to OEF combat objectives that could undermine the 

central authority. CJCMOTF understood this problem but there was no concept or transition 

plan that laid out how to proceed in strengthening the central government’s control in these 

regions. Without such a concept or plan, CHLCs continued to support the local authorities 

during this phase of the operation.140

Conditionality of Aid 

The relief community was concerned because humanitarian assistance provided by the 

military, both OEF and ISAF, was conditional. Among NGOs/IGOs the accepted defi nition 

of humanitarian assistance is that it is to be unconditional and focused on populations in 

need and at risk.

Part of the problem lies in the defi nition of humanitarian assistance. The CHLCs, 

for the most part, were dealing more in reconstruction than pure humanitarian aid. But 

because of the restriction placed on nation building, everything the CHLC did was called 

humanitarian aid. Rebuilding schools, digging water projects, and refurbishing medical 

facilities fi t more into the developmental defi nition than the humanitarian aid defi nition. 

For instance, the intent of the OHDACA program to “enhance force protection and 

facilitate coalition presence” created friction with the UN and NGO relief community. The 

instructions from commander CFLCC were clear that this was not a purely humanitarian 

program, but a psychological operation aimed at winning the hears and minds of the local 

population to enhance force protection and to maximize civilian support for military 

operations.141

On the other hand, CHLCs, in providing conditional developmental aid, were doing no 

more than what had been done in the past. Conditional aid was the basis for the Offi ce of the 
51

High Representative operations in Bosnia, UNMIK in Kosovo, and is part of the mandate 

for UNAMA. The Security Council Resolution establishing UNAMA in Afghanistan 

specifi cally instructed that reconstruction aid be conditional. The Afghanistan Research 

and Evaluation Unit called this “aid-induced pacifi cation.”142 Those who support the 

peace process are rewarded with developmental assistance; those who do not support it 

receive none. This was the basis for the CHLC and ISAF projects.143

By all reports, the CJCMOTF and ISAF CIMIC did succeed in “winning the hearts and 

minds” of the peoples that their programs touched. The projects enhanced force protection, 

built consent for the Bonn process, and supported U.S. and UK national objectives in 

coordination with USAID and DFID. 

Communication and Coordination Mechanisms

USCENTCOM had the HAWG in Tampa but did not establish any in theater CMOC to 

inform and coordinate NGO/IGO actions. CMOC North and CMOC South were command 

and control headquarters for the CHLCS and did not perform any of the traditional CMOC 

functions. CMOC North did conduct briefi ngs for UNJLC in Tashkent. CHLCs in the fi eld 

were focused on projects and not on outreach to NGOs.144

Even though the NGOs/IGOs had worked with the CHLC in Islamabad, the UN 

decided that it would have no formal relationship with the U.S. military since the U.S. was 

a belligerent. There were workarounds, however. For example, the UN would not allow 

U.S. participation in its daily coordination meetings with the NGOs. But the day after 

these meetings, the CHLC visited the UN and each of the NGOs separately to coordinate. 

The UN in Tashkent was open to coordination based upon a different threat and the fact the 

US teams did not openly appear as US Military.145 

Overall. the absence of any institutional means of sharing information and expectations 

among NGOs, IGOs, and the U.S. military increased misperceptions about intent and 

capabilities on all sides. By contrast, from the beginning, the ISAF CIMIC Center did 

provide that information for those NGOs associated with ISAF. The result was that ISAF 

was able to develop a much more harmonious relationship with NGOs than OEF, even 

though they were conducting similar civil military operations. 

Again, there were several incidents of quiet cooperation. CJCMOTF and UNICEF 

cooperated on putting together boxes of school supplies to hand out to the local villages. 

UNICEF provided the expertise to determine what should go in the boxes, CJCMOTF 

provided the materials; UNICEF boxed the materials out of its warehouses, and CJCMOTF 

taped them closed. Even though CJCMOTF could not use UNICEF tape because the 

UNICEF symbol was on the tape, both sides were satisfi ed. 146 

Generally, NGO--even Medecins sans Frontieres--and CHLCs worked with each 

other at the tactical level in remote locations; however, the relationship was diffi cult at the 

operational and higher levels. 

NGO relationships with Afghan Government and internal coordination 

Relationships between NGOs and the Afghan Governmental structures have been 

strained. T For instance, the Afghan Government wanted to exercise control over NGO 

activities but the NGOs, accustomed to a decade of operating in a vacuum, bypassed 

the new central government and chafed at the suggestion of control. Often, the Afghan 
52

Government would complain to ISAF and OEF, which further soured the relationship 

between those military entities and NGOs..

The NGOs have had diffi culty coming together in any useful forum. By doctrine, 

the CJCMOTF looked for the semblance of a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), 

but except for the UNOCHA sectors, there was nothing. With diffi culty, the Agency 

Coordination Body for Afghans Relief has been trying to reestablish itself in Kabul and 

regain status as a lead agency for NGO. In April 2002, the Kabul based “NGO Forum” was 

placed under ACBAR’s umbrella. 

Stability Operations

As the coalition began stability operations in earnest, the U.S. military and UNAMA 

and OEF established mechanisms to foster cooperation between OEF forces and NGOs. 

Some NGOs recognized that the CHLCs were not competitors, but would assist them 

in getting projects. CJCMOTF shifted to enabling Afghan institutions and NGOs, and 

created coordination mechanisms such as PRTs and the Civil-Military Coordination Center 

in Kabul. The ITGA also demonstrated initiative by establishing Consultative Groups to 

coordinate reconstruction.

Coordination Mechanisms

With the deployment of CJTF 180 and the 360th CA Brigade standing up as CJCMOTF, 

the situation began to change. Mechanisms such as PRTs and the Civil-Military 

Coordination Center led to improved relationships with Afghanis and NGOs. ACABAR 

supported the PRT initiative and the ITGA was embedded in the project. PRTs, working 

in the countryside, coordinated the military support with the ITGA and NGOs, and provide 

the interface needed to begin the process of transition envisioned in Phase IV of OEF.

With the PRTs, UNAMA, and the ITGA hosted development planning workshops. 

These included key players such as: IOM, UNHCR, UN Habitat, Solidarities, Aga Khan 

Development Foundation, and representatives from ITGA ministries and local government. 

The UNAMA area coordinator met with the PRT commander of the PRT in Bamyan and 

agreed to act as moderator between the coalition and aid organizations--a signifi cant step 

forward. According to the USAID regional representative, “The PRT has been invited 

to attend the UN Heads of Agencies monthly meetings, as well as the bi-weekly NGO 

forum facilitated by UNAMA, and to meet weekly with UNAMA.” Again, this step is a 

signifi cant advance toward harmonization.147 

On 2-3 November 2002, 500 representatives of the Afghan government, NGOs, 

UN, and donor counties met in Kabul at the urging of the Afghan Ministry of Planning 

assisted by ACSF, ACBAR and ANCB. Simply having the conference indicated a notable 

improvement of the climate between the new Afghan Government and NGOs. The Afghan 

government stated that it depended on NGO support: 

Especially in expanding capacity, involving representatives of civil 

society, setting standards, and advising on policy. The Afghan 

Government expects help from the NGOs, especially in the sectors of 

women’s and human rights148.
53

The conference ended with the founding of a working group of Government and NGOs. 

Additionally, in December 2002, The Afghan Government established Consultative Groups 

(CGs) to focus on the attainment of specifi c benchmarks in the 12 development programs 

as defi ned in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the 

international donors.149

Key Successes

• USAID, USCENTCOM, and operators in the fi eld forged a closer and more 

productive relationship than at any time in the past. USAID assisted CHLCs 

with program selection, funding, and oversight. This close coordination should 

serve as a model and be repeated in the future.150

• The relationship between CHLC and OGAs was closer than at any time in 

the past. CHLCs depended on OGAs for assistance and funding. OGAs were 

fl exible and able to provide quick impact money. 

• The military was able to deconfl ict combat operations with Humanitarian 

Relief. USCENTCOM was able to sanitizing intelligence and pass it to NGOs 

in timely fashion.

• CJCMOTF and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul worked closely from the beginning 

of the operation. Commander CJCMOTF was a member of the country team. 

This access led to synchronization of political, economic, informational, and 

military activities.

• UNOCHA, UNJLC, and INTERACTION established a successful cell at 

USCENTCOM in Tampa. This contributed to successful CMO.

• UNJLC concept worked exceedingly well in providing an emergency response 

to coordinate the relief efforts. CJCMOTF worked closely with the UNJLC. 

• CHLCs at the tactical level established working relationships with several 

NGO that proved to be productive and harmonious. 

• CJTF 180 has a vision that recognizes the need to coordinate with NGOs and 

is developing plans accordingly

55

Chapter 7: Providing Appropriate Forces

This chapter examines the structure, identifi cation, mobilization, 

equipping, and assignment of forces

If CA forces are to be employed again as they were in Afghanistan, then changes must 

be made to basic organizations, equipment, and mobilization procedures and preparation.

Tables of Organization and Equipment Do Not Support the CA Employment 

Profi le in Afghanistan. 

The current RC CA brigade and battalion TO&Es are based on an employment concept 

in which these units operate in support of a conventional force that provides security and 

support. But in Afghanistan, CA units were required to conduct small unit, independent 

operations in an austere and non-permissive environment. Because the units were not 

properly organized and equipped for this, CA commanders task organized their forces 

to accomplish the mission.151 For future “come as you are” contingencies, recommend 

consideration be given to upgrading RC CA units’ priority for equipment and personnel to 

ensure readiness matches contingency requirements. 

The RC CA TO&Es are defi cient in the following areas:

• Communications: The current TO&E authorizes communications capability 

compatible with conventional units with which the CA element is designed 

to work, but it does not support stand alone, small team operations in remote 

locations. CA units need the communications capability to conduct split team 

(CAT-A,) two to three person teams operations, with the same type of redundant 

communications that the SOF possess. For the majority of the deployment, some 

of the AC 96th CA Battalion did not have secure data communications capability. 

There was a difference between COMOC North assets and CMOC South. CMOC 

North had INMARSAT, Iridium, PSC5, MBITAR, and an international cell phone 

(primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communications). However, 

CMOC South did not deploy with all the communications needed. For almost 

two months the CAT-A and CAT-B teams in Kabul could not even talk to their 

headquarters located only one mile away. Radios such as the PSC-5, Inmersat, 

and iridium handheld satellite phone, to communicate with civilian as well as 

military were required, but were not authorized across the Civil Affairs active and 

reserve forces. In Afghanistan, SOF assisted CHLCS with communications so 

that they could perform their tasks. 152 

• ADP Support. The independent nature of the operations requires more lap top 

computers than the TO&E allows. 

• Transportation. Adequate transportation for a four-person team to operate 

independently is not provided for in the current TO&E. As a result, CHLCs 

had to contract automobiles that were of poor quality and provided inadequate 

force protection. In several places in Afghanistan, and other areas of the 

world, HMMWVs are too large to move and require a signifi cant logistical tail. 

Consideration should be given to authorize CA units to purchase civilian vehicles 

that meet specifi cations such as other SOF did in Afghanistan. 
56

• Weapons. The teams require the fi repower and fl exibility that includes the type of 

weapons that the Special Forces teams are authorized. The standard M16 cannot 

be maneuvered inside a vehicle. The M4 is a better weapon, but although on the 

TO&E of CA units, it has not been fi elded to them. 

• Night Vision. The units need to be authorized the current night vision systems.

• Body Armor. Current state of art, concealable body armor should be 

authorized. 

• Proper Military Occupational Specialties. To operate as small, detached units, 

the MOS structure should be reviewed to ensure that proper rank structure and 

skills are resident to meet the operational concept. The CA teams perhaps should 

look more like small Special Forces teams with medical, engineer, and intelligence 

specialists. 

• Tentage. More required to support stand alone operations. If possible, teams 

will look for existing structures for security and access to key players. 

• CA Support to Conventional Brigades.

The ODP for 39C (Civil Affairs) does not exist to support a CA offi cer on conventional 

maneuver brigade staffs.

The 352d CA Command’s AAR, (26 July 2002), provides more detail on the above CA Command’s AAR, (26 July 2002), provides more detail on the above d

issues to include equipment specifi c nomenclature.153 New equipment that was issued was 

fi elded improperly with no training provided. For instance, both the 450th CA Battalion 

and the 360th CA Brigade received AN/PRC-150 Improved High Frequency Radios before 

deploying. But they were issued without the proper components that included antennas, 

power supplies and amplifi ers.154

“Light Footprint” and No “Nation Building” Limitations Affected Deployment

Because the U.S. explicitly eschewed nation building in Afghanistan and sought to 

minimize its military “footprint” there, both the size and composition of CA units were 

restricted. In reality, the situation on the ground required a robust CA capability. Most 

of the equipment required by the CA units was available at the mobilization site, but was 

reserved for combat forces despite the fact that units like the 489th CA Battalion were 

deploying small, unsupported units into remote and hostile territory, places that combat 

units were not going. This employment profi le was neither understood nor appreciated by 

those preparing and authorizing the CA units for deployment.155

Mobilization Did Not Support the Mission.

Mobilization was not timely

The National Guard elements that formed the fi rst CJCMOTF mobilized in a matter 

of weeks; the RC CA units, however, took months. The 377th TSC took only two weeks 

to start arriving at ARCENT. A three member planning team from the 352d Civil Affairs Civil Affairs 

Command did arrive in two weeks at USCENTCOM, but the rest of the unit’s mobilization 

took 43 days.156 Thus, there was little CA expertise available in the key early phases of 

the operation.
57

Part of the explanation for the difference between National Guard and RC CA 

mobilization time lies in the added procedures for SOF mobilization. Unlike the non-SOF 

National Guard, the SOF RC requests went fi rst from USCENTCOM to USSOCOM and 

then to ARSOC at Ft Bragg, back to USCENTCOM and then to USA FORSCOM. The nonSOF National Guard deals directly with FORSCOM. In the case of OEF, the procedures 

were not well understood and the initial request for CA when fi rst sent to FORSCOM, was 

rejected and sent back without action for resubmission through the appropriate channels. 

This initial confusion caused delays.157

There was also a great deal of confusion over mobilization orders and formats when 

dealing with SOF Army Reserve and National Guard. The Army Regulations were not 

helpful, and the staff offi cers were not educated in the procedures. The result was delay 

and complication. Many soldiers did not receive orders in a timely manner. In fact, some 

received orders the day they were to report and then waited 60 days at a mobilization site, 

which created unacceptable problems for families and employers.

Later mobilized units fared no better. 414th CA Battalion took over 60 days to mobilize. 

This unit went through multiple reorganizations before it left Ft Bragg due to a lack of clear 

mission guidance. Other units were given shifting mission statements before, during, and 

after the mobilization process, thus affecting their preparation. The 414th CA Battalion 

received at least three different missions while in the mobilization station, thus limiting 

their ability to prepare.158

 The Center for Army Lessons Learned summarized as follows:

• The time between the request for forces (RFF) and the approved deployment order 

was too bureaucratic and time consuming.

• The force cap placed on the theater resulted in a departure from the standard 

approach to resourcing the theater.159

Mobilization site did not prepare units for the specifi c region and mission 

Most of the CA units reported a poor experience at the Fort Bragg Mobilization Unit 

In-Processing Center (MUIC). Pre-mobilization Training Support Requirements (PTSR) 

are designed to facilitate preparation. If done properly, PTSR allow the commander and 

the mobilization site to tailor a training program that takes into account the commander’s 

estimate of his unit’s strengths and weaknesses. This did not happen. The MUIC used the 

cookie cutter approach for all the units.

The authors of this study attended an abridged version of the full MUIC training 

cycle that included mine awareness, counter-terrorism, force protection, ROE, and six 

hour mandatory video. The team concluded that operations at the MUIC were extremely 

disjointed, unfocused, and failed to prepare mobilized CA units for the combat environment 

of Afghanistan.160

The AARs compiled by the 352 d CA Command, 489 CA Command, 489 d th CA Battalion, 401st CA

Battalion, 418th CA Battalion, 377th TSC. As well as interviews of all ranks conducted by 

the 126 th Military History Detachment were nearly universal in their complaints about the 

mobilization process. The key issues were:
58

• Training was not tailored to the support the specifi c mission area of the target 

country. There were few or no briefi ngs on Afghanistan customs, government, or 

religion. 

• No country specifi c ROE briefi ng was presented.

• Training and awareness were not updated by information from the operational 

area. There was no current intelligence reports from the AOR provided to the CA 

units in the MUIC. The 96th CA Battalion had just returned from Afghanistan in 

March 2002, but was not tasked by USASOC or USACAPOC to provide subject 

matter experts to mentor, train or prepare subsequent deploying CA units. Soldiers 

returning from the 10th Mountain Division or 101st Airborne Division could have Airborne Division could have st

been used as well. Initially there was no mine awareness training for the 352d CA

Command. Unqualifi ed instructors using inaccurate data about actual conditions 

in Afghanistan presented the mine awareness training to this research team one 

year later. 

• Poor coordination delayed processing and training by weeks. At Ft. Bragg, there 

were many units engaged (USACAPOC, Dragon Brigade, Training Support 

Brigade, 78th Division (TR), liaison teams, and the mobilizing unit), none of 

whom understood the relationship among all of these entities or how to coordinate 

with them to gain maximum benefi t.

• Many soldiers in the CA community needed “over-40” physicals and medical 

support. The MUIC was not prepared to handle the volume of such individuals 

and this created delays and lost training opportunities.

• There were no uniform standards on time utilization for the validation process. 

Units reported that soldiers were idle days at a time and then would spend hour 

upon hour on work that was focused neither on the mission nor the Area of 

Operations. Some units provided four day passes to fi ll in the time.

• Units were held from forward deploying pending the certifi cation of one or two 

individuals. 

• At Ft. Bragg, planned classes on OPFUNDs classes never occurred for still 

undetermined reasons. Therefore, key individuals deployed without a clear 

knowledge of accounting procedures, purchasing restrictions, and authorization 

authority.161

The Army established a system that supports deployment to the Balkans, but has 

not transferred those lessons to OEF. The 26 November 2002 report of the U.S.A. John 

F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School provides more detail on the problems 

associated with preparing civil affairs units for deployment into Afghanistan. 162

Composite Units 

Derivative Unit Identity Codes (UICs) were used to integrate parts of units into other units. 

This created support problems because the parts of units came with no equipment sets. The 

mixing of derivative UICs and a TO&E unit broke down the integrity of both elements 

and created confusion and a lack of teamwork. Earlier deploying units took elements 
59

and equipment from latter deploying units to fi ll their needs. This caused problems in 

subsequent rotations. The mixing of units and the harvesting of equipment from other units 

was necessary because the standing CA units were not fully mission capable. They were 

not fully staffed and needed special skills and equipment that had not been fi lled.163

WARTRACE alignments were ignored

For OEF, the WARTRACE concept was violated, leaving units without CA support. 

Neither the 101st Airborne nor the 10th Mountain Divisions had support from their habitual 

CA slices. CHLCs supported operations indirectly, but the task force commanders, did 

not have a means of directly infl uencing CA in their own AOs. The Commander of TF 

82 (82d Airborne Division) listed the lack of his WARTRACE CA slice as one of the Airborne Division) listed the lack of his WARTRACE CA slice as one of the d

major shortcomings of OEF. As with the conventional units, SOF also suffered from the 

breaking of habitual relationships. The 404th CA Battalion (Special Operations) has been 

established in the force structure to support employed Special Forces units in the conduct 

of unconventional warfare. However, the 404th was never mobilized, and its mission was 

assumed, fi rst by the 96th CA Battalion and later by the 489 th CA Battalion, a unit with a 

WARTRACE to the 101st Airborne Division. Airborne Division.164

Conventional Units Were Not Resourced to Conduct CMO

Deprived of their CA slices, units needed additional resources to conducted required 

CMO. Nevertheless, these units had no access to funds to conduct any quick impact 

projects to support their operations. Any of the materials that they obtained came from 

OGAs, CJMOTF or JSOTF. They did receive materials through the mail from concerned 

U.S. citizens but this was sporadic. Without access to the programs of CJCMOTF, these 

commanders had little fl exibility to shape their operational areas.165

CA Force Structure Inadequate to Support World Wide Requirements

The CA force structure is inadequate to provide immediately deployable assets to 

conduct initial on-the-ground CA/CMO assessments, despite commitments to all of the 

Combatant Commanders that include Homeland Security and three major theater war 

contingencies. 

Doctrinally, the AC Civil Affairs component provides the initial (M Day) “generalist” 

capability, while the RC provides the “functional” CA expertise at M+30 to 60 days. 

However, the situation in Afghanistan demanded early RC expertise. Partial mobilizations 

had to be done to obtain key capabilities to support the mission. The AC/RC mix must be 

reassessed.166

Force Cap Adversely Affected CMO Capability

The CJCMOTF objective plan for Afghanistan was a task force of 3,000 individuals 

that included all of the disciplines and support needed to deal with the instability of the 

country. However, the force cap that was imposed on the number of military that could be 

in Afghanistan meant that CJCMOTF never approached this capability. 

61

Chapter 8: Education and Training

This chapter examines the military’s preparation to face civil military 

challenges such as Afghanistan

The consistent response from the NGO, IGO, CA and SOF communities was that most 

U.S. commanders, staffs, and soldiers at all levels lacked an understanding of complex 

stability operations. The chapter addresses this issue by examining at the three pillars of 

Army education and training: institutional, unit, and self development. 

Institutional Training.

In 1999, United States Institute for Peace conducted a conference with senior 

commanders after their deployment in the Balkans to determine how prepared they were to 

face a stability operation. Generals William Nash and Eric Shinseki stated that for thirty 

years, the Army trained them to “read a battlefi eld” and that they had to learn to read a 

“peace fi eld.” General William Crouch noted that although the Battle Command Training 

Program (BCTP) helped him prepare for Bosnia, it did not provide any guidance on how to 

link the civil with the military effort. General Montgomery Meigs stated that he was given 

no preparation other than what he did personally.167

The Army needs must increase awareness and understanding of CMO and stability 

operations at all levels of its institutional training.

Unit Training.

For Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. Army realized that extensive preparation was necessary 

and established a training program for all units would accomplish before deploying. Once 

a unit is identifi ed for participation in a Balkan peace operation, it alters its training focus 

toward peace operations 90 days before deployment.

Over this three month period, training sensitizes the unit to many of the situations that 

it might face. It includes using ethnic role players in simulated joint military commission 

meetings, dealing with the media, harmonizing civil and military operations, working with 

IGOs, NGOs and civilian contractors, dealing with civil unrest, use of force and ROE. 

The situations are vignette-driven and the unit takes home these vignettes on CDs and 

videotapes.

After a year and two rotations of units into Afghanistan, the Army had not developed 

a similar training program. This was initially understandable given the need to quickly 

deploy units. However, the situation has changed and the challenges in Afghanistan are as 

great as in the Balkans. The Army should consider institutionizing a train-up program.

Current mobilization training and preparation of reserve units for Afghanistan was 

inadequate, especially in the areas of CMO and stability operations. 

Self Development.

Respondents stated that their personnel experience in previous engagements in the 

Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, or East Timor formed the base of their preparation. CA 

units that had served in the Balkans were able to adapt to the environment. 
62

Self development cannot fi ll all the educational gaps. Commanders should consult 

experts to become knowledgeable about legal and fi scal issues. Dealing with other agencies’ 

funding arrangements, operational funds, donated humanitarian goods, local contractors, 

and other countries’ monies, placed commanders and staffs on unfamiliar ground. When 

CHLCs initially deployed, they were unprepared to write contract proposals, arrange 

bidder’s conferences, and deal closely with OGAs and regional warlords upon whom they 

would depend upon for security and access.168 

The Army emphasizes self development but does not provide helpful tools in the area 

of stability operations. The Chief of Staff of the Army has published a professional reading 

list that does not include one work on stability operations. Instead, all of the books are 

focused on combat. For instance, the list might profi tably include the U.S. Army Center 

for Military History’s book The US Army Counter Insurgency and Contingency Operations 

Doctrine 1860-1941, which provides insights into these types of operations. 169

Lessons Not Learned and Exercise Design

Lessons learned is the feedback that shapes training and education systems. Before 

OEF, USCENTCOM conducted a number of exercises that all identifi ed CMO short falls 

such as the need for a CMO cell in the headquarters. These recommendations were not 

acted upon; for example, no CMO cell was established full time at USCENTCOM.170

Additionally, most exercises stop short of post confl ict, peace-building activities. 

Exercises

focus on combat, with CMO as supporting task. In environments such as Afghanistan, 

CMO has the major weight with combat in support. Exercise design should take this new 

operational environment into account. 

RC Civil Affairs Education and Training.

Although many non-CA soldiers may not understand CMO, many times the CA forces 

do not understand how the rest of the military works. Some CA staff offi cers have been 

assessed as weak in understanding and applying the Military Decision Making Process 

(MDMP). This lack of training leads to diffi culties integrating within planning groups at 

tactical and operational headquarters. This was one of several factors driving the decision 

not to have a CA unit form the initial CJCMOTF.171

The Joint Special Operations University has started a Civil Affairs Campaign Planners 

workshop. CA should seek more slots in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Ft. 

Leavenworth and the Basic and Advanced Strategic Arts Programs at the U.S. Army War 

College.172

Personnel Turnover 

Rapid personnel turnover hindered operations also. The NGO/IGO representatives at 

Tampa became frustrated when offi cers they had educated in were constantly reassigned. 

The LNO cell at Tampa stated that in a one-week period at the beginning of the OEF, the 

offi cers with whom they worked changed three times.173
63

Chapter 9: Resources

This chapter examines the resources that were made available to 

support CMO and the limitations on those resources 

The “light footprint” concept, coupled with the self-imposed stricture against “nation 

building,” as well as other global requirements, affected the resources available to support 

OEF. Afghanistan of course had limited indigenous capacity. The NGO community had 

left the country before the confl ict, and was limited in generating capability. During the 

initial emergency phase of OEF, the U.S. military was the only organization that could 

gain access and provide support for much of the country. However, CMO was under 

resourced. 

Transportation

Diffi cult terrain, primitive or nonexistent infrastructure, and extreme distances placed 

a premium on reliable transportation, but the military force was structured and resourced 

only to support the combat operations. OEF did not include transportation assets required 

to support the CMO demands present in a stability operation. 

Availability of air support was a major constraint. In Herat, the CHLC went without 

resupply for up to six weeks, because no airlift could be found. Projects that had been 

approved were often delayed because contract offi cers could not be transported to required 

locations. Project Execution Teams (PETs) had diffi culty assessing contract compliance 

because they could not obtain timely transportation.

The purpose of the CMO effort was to demonstrate that the U.S. cared about the 

population and prompt action on projects was key. In order to overcome some of the 

problems, CJCMOTF used opportune UN air and borrowed SOF airlift from JSOTF. 

To get around the constraints imposed by lack of air assets, in April 2002, CJCMOTF 

deployed the PETs to mass at one location to begin simultaneous projects.174 Commander 

CJCMOTF also formally proposed to establish a standard fi xed-scheduled “milk run” to 

each of the CHLC locations with a fi xed wing aircraft. This proposal was never acted upon, 

and CJCMOTF, as January 2003, was still scrounging aircraft support.175 

Ground Transportation was another shortfall. Some CA units were directed at 

the mobilization station not to deploy with their organic transportation. This led them to 

lease (they were not allowed to purchase) automobiles, pick-ups and SUVs to accomplish 

their in country mission. The cost was between $900 and $3,000 per month per vehicle in 

November 2002. The Pakistani contractor provided older, unreliable Japanese vehicles that 

lacked on board equipment such as jacks and spare tires and offered no force protection 

measurers. Although a maintenance contract did exist, it could not respond to vehicles at 

remote sites. The CJCMOTF did the best it could under these circumstances.

In these remote situations, a combination of milititay and civilian vehicles is required. 

The current fl eet of military vehicles is too wide to travel on all roads, and fi t into narrow 

streets and compounds. Additionally, there are political constraints on military vehicles. 

For instance, some borders such as the one with Uzbekistan would not allow military 

vehicles to transit. Further, meetings with some NGOs/IGOs could not be accomplished in 

military vehicles. Consideration should be given purchasing a fl eet of CMO vehicles with 
64

a maintenance package and proper force protection before deploying. The Special Forces 

did this by purchasing vehicles and outfi tted them to specs at Ft Bragg. 176 

Inadequate security for ground transported logistics support. CJCMOTF 

contracted local trucks to supply CHLCs and PRTs. Frequently, between 30 to 50 percent 

of the supplies on these trucks were pilfered. CJTF 180 did not have the assets to secure 

these convoys nor did the Afghan authorities. This situation had no solution other than 

CJCMOTF hiring private contractors to secure its ground lines of communication.177

Funds

The UK and the U.S developed different approaches to funding CMO.

UK and ISAF:

The UK, as the lead nation for ISAF, used the Department of International Development 

(DFID) monies for quick impact projects. The concept came from Bosnia, where DFID did 

not have the ability to disburse funds over a wide area and asked UK military offi cers to 

assume that responsibility, while DFID ran the programs. The UK agreed, with the proviso 

that DFID allow a certain percentage of projects to be determined by the military as long 

as they met general DFID guidelines. Thus, the UK military gained a tool to win hearts 

and minds and used it in Afghanistan, though perhaps not as effectively as in the Balkans 

as indicated below. 

DFID provision of funds to military units has always been a contentious 

issue amongst some in the humanitarian community. The involvement 

of UK troops in offensive military actions at the same time as UK 

troops being in a leading position in ISAF was a further complicating 

factor. Nonetheless, the DFID strategy remained constant and ISAF 

projects received funds on satisfactory compliance with DFID criteria 

established for QIPs. Adherence to these criteria and staffi ng of project 

proposals to the standard expected within the timescale required did not 

prove easy for either DFID Kabul or ISAF and the relationship suffered 

as a result.178 

DFID initially provided the money for immediate impact projects. Later a considerable 

donor base developed for ISAF with the UK, Turkey, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, 

and the European Union being some of the major contributors. CIMIC’s 2002 budget of 

4.422 Million Euros provided a deal of fl exibility to coordinate projects. 

Additionally, the UK commander can use his Operational Money to fund civil military 

projects that support his mission. The UK has authorized its operational commanders 

to spend O&M monies on building a bridge or fi xing a school if that supports the 

accomplishment of the mission. 

US and CJCMOTF:

There are two aspects to funding: operational funds that support CA teams survival in 

their environment and those that support quick impact projects.
65

Operational Funds 

CJCMOTF and the CHLCs needed money to operate. They had to contract for security 

with the local warlords, provide for quarters and rations, and obtain transportation and 

other sundries in areas remote from the support structures of the main military force. The 

Special Forces teams were allocated operational funds to meet these needs. CA teams are 

not normally provided those funds, because their doctrinal mission does not envision such 

independent employment. In Afghanistan, the CA teams were given operational funds for 

the fi rst time and they were indispensable. If this is to be a model for future CA missions, 

then operational funds should be provided, along with the education required to properly 

manage them. The utility of operational funds must be balanced against contracting for 

services. Contracts are better for long-term, recurring expenses. The PRTs are using 

both.179 

Project Funds

In Afghanistan, CA teams contracted directly for projects and getting the appropriate 

funding was essential. Initially, they used funds from U.S. Special Forces, OGAs, and the 

UK DFID, before an independent U.S. funding source was provided. They needed two 

types of funds, one for quick impact, and another for longer-term, large projects. They 

eventually obtained money for the latter contracting projects--Overseas Humanitarian 

Disaster and Civil Aid funds--but never got money for the quick impact projects that they 

had local authority to expend. CA teams should be provided a variety of fi nancial tools 

and authority to use them.

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Disaster and Civil Aid (OHDACA)

In December 2001, USCENTCOM requested that funds be authorized to support CMO 

operations in Afghanistan. In January 2002, DOD authorized OHDACA funds to be used 

for quick impact projects. The initial OHDACA concept came from the Humanitarian 

Assistance Survey Teams from Bamiyan and Konduz. These teams identifi ed projects that 

were submitted to USCENTCOM who arranged the funding concepts. 

OHDACA is a program to support Combatant Commanders’ security cooperation 

strategies to build capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies, friends, and 

potential partners through an unobtrusive and low cost means. The Offi ce of the Secretary 

of Defense, ASD (SOLIC), manages the funds in coordination with the DOS and USAID. 

Although these funds are the result of a deliberate planning process aimed at shaping the 

international environment, OSD has increased the emphasis on crisis response in recent 

years. The program has expanded to include the use of contractors under DOD oversight. 

OHDACA allows greater fl exibility than projects under the Humanitarian Civic Action 

(HCA) program that requires training benefi ts to the U.S. and host nation forces be 

paramount. OHDACA can focus on humanitarian benefi ts without such constraints.180

No category of project was restricted provided it met the general guidelines of the policy. 

Annex F to this study includes a complete list of the guidelines.181 

OHDACA funds were a useful tool that allowed commanders the fl exibility to support 

projects, though the following issues arose:
66

• The intent of the OHDACA program to “enhance force protection and 

facilitate coalition presence” created friction with the UN and NGO relief 

community. The instructions from commander USCENTCOM and CFLCC were 

clear that this was not to be a purely humanitarian program nor not nation building, 

but rather a psychological operation aimed at winning the hears and minds of the 

local population, to help the force protection of OEF, and to maximize civilian 

support for military operations.182

• CA soldiers felt that the funds should have been available upon deployment.

The CJCMOTF should have requested these funds immediately, but did not. 

Initially, the CHLCs could do little to infl uence the situation until the funds 

became available. Although OHDACA was approved in January 2002, the 489th

CA Battalion did not see the money until April 2002. 183

• OHDACA is a contracting tool and is not designed to provide immediate 

impact funds. What the teams needed was a funding tool that would provide 

immediate monies for low dollar projects such as putting up traffi c signs. 

Operational funds are not authorized for such a use. In another example, the 

commander of CJTF 180 wanted CJCMOTF to put together packages of school 

supplies for distribution when they visited a village. Under the rules established 

for OHDACA, this material had to be tracked, which was next to impossible. 

How do you track crayons? The CJMOTF, however, designed a plan that was 

acceptable. All items were packaged together in one kit and the chief village 

elder was required to sign for the kit, thus ensuring the fi ction of “accountability,” 

because U.S. soldiers could not hand kits out directly to the people. To avoid 

this type of situation, a separate operational fund source without the contractual 

restrictions of OHDACA is required.184

• Confl icting guidance on the monetary cap per project caused the CA teams 

to search for other methods of funding. OSD’s intent was that any project 

over $300,000 should be referred to it for approval. However, the guidance that 

USCENTCOM provided to CFLCC commander stated that $300,000 was the limit 

and no projects that exceeded that limit would be accepted. The initial guidance 

provided to the CHLCs was also confusing. The guidance fi rst stated that no 

projects over $100,000 would be considered. Then it was changed to $250,000 

then to $300,000. By November 2002, the J-9 CJCMOTF understood that all 

projects in excess of $300,000 would be sent to the HAWG at CENTCOM to be 

considered vetted. Although this procedure did exist for vetting projects in excess 

of $300,000, it was rarely used.185

• There were complaints that the bureaucratic system for project approval was 

not responsive. This research team and CALL identifi ed bureaucratic problems 

with a program that was designed to be streamlined and fl exible. 

o Each headquarters from USCENTCOM to CFLCC to CJMOTF added 

constraints to the approval and execution process. The legal advisors for 

CJCMOTF did not identify any legal reason for such an extensive review 

process. The research team has identifi ed other examples of micromanagement 
67

that stemmed from a concern that commanders and staffs believed that their 

subordinates needed advice and close supervision.186

o When the CHLCs would identify a project, it would be screened by CMOC 

North or South and then forwarded to CJMOTF, where they would be 

deconfl icted with USAID and other agencies, and subjected to a board 

review. Next, the project would be submitted to CFLCC in Kuwait, where it 

was subjected to another board review. CJMOTF and the CHLCs would then 

have to respond to the concerns of the CLFCC staff in Kuwait. In June 2002, 

CJTF 180 in Bagram replaced the CFLCC in the process. CLFCC would 

then send a report to USCENTCOM listing the projects. After approval there 

followed the process of getting the contract let. This entire process could 

take up to two months before work began. 

o CHLCs felt they needed a 96 hour response on approval and contracting. 

Initially, the CHLC supporting the JSOTF had to wait six to eight weeks for 

approval of a small scale project. The immediate impact value was usually 

lost. 

o CFLCC, as the initial approval authority for all HA projects, made the key 

decisions in Kuwait far away from the area of operations. CFLCC’s focus 

was not CMO, but to ensure that these projects met all regulatory criteria 

and to provide an implementation plan with the approved projects to 

USCENTCOM. Unfortunately, there was no holistic plan for the stabilization 

of Afghanistan that the CFLCC could work with to place all of these projects 

into perspective. All they had was a list of criteria and the recommendations 

from the fi eld.187 

o At fi rst, most of the CHLCs did not know how to write a contract, arrange a 

bidder’s conference and follow up on the work. So part of the “bureaucratic 

burden” stemmed from the lack of preparation and inexperience of the teams. 

As of November 2002, neither CJCMOTF nor any other entity had established 

standard cost estimate guidelines. Each CHLC made its estimates differently 

based upon what it felt was appropriate. This led to a disparity among the 

various locations. The CHLCs grew into the jobs and became more profi cient 

at the process, but there was room for improvement.

o Eventually CJTF 180 reduced the approval process down to two weeks 

and then had to wait for the availability of funds. But the second-guessing 

did not stop. The two weeks was much faster than the average NGO could 

respond.188 

• Funding was not immediately available and that affected operations: 

o The standard peacetime funding cycle did not facilitate operations. It took 

three to four months to get the funding into theater. In March 2002, the funds 

began to fl ow. But as the end of the fi scal year neared, the funding dried up 

until just prior to the year’s end when the teams got a pot of money and had 

to commit it all in a short period of time. This type of funding profi le places a 

burden on the teams in the fi eld trying to cope with a volatile situation. 189
68

An example of an information operations opportunity lost because of 

the nonavailabilibty of funds was the clean up of the Kandahar Hospital 

following its seizure by Al-Qaeda patients. After Special Operations 

Forces had retaken the Kandahar Hospital from the Al-Qaeda, the intent 

was to conduct a quick assessment, get materials and supplies, and go 

in to clean up and repair the damage in an effort to capitalize on HA 

capabilities while the media covered it. It would have also shown Afghans 

that while the U.S. can kill Al Qaeda terrorists; it could also provide 

compassionate, humanitarian assistance. The lack of an established 

quick disbursement system help up the funding. It took several months 

to get a contractor to do the clean up190.

• Meeting the basic criteria for project selection, supporting the AIA, and 

meeting the basic needs of Afghan people were diffi cult because there was 

no overall plan and no overall coordination mechanism. As discussed earlier, 

there was no overall theater plan upon which to base project selection. The initial 

teams had no guidance on what projects they should consider. Some teams, like 

the CHLC in Konduz, tried to second-guess what they thought the U.S. authorities 

would approve as “popular projects.” They guessed schools correctly and they 

realized that any public property that had sustained war damage from U.S. 

actions would get priority. The CHLC in Herat recognized that the NGOs in 

their area were willing and capable of building schools, and found a high impact 

infrastructure project. They guessed incorrectly; CJCMOTF directed them 

toward school projects. With the shift of emphasis in CJCMOTF upon the arrival 

of 360th CA Brigade toward a holistic CMO, the establishment of the CMOC 

in Kabul December 2002, and the publishing of the latest Afghan Development 

Budget and Development Framework, the project selection process improved.191

Quick Impact Funds.

Most CA commanders propose that CA teams be authorized a quick impact fund that is 

similar to operational funds. CA teams would be authorized an amount they could spend 

to quick start local, low cost projects that do not lend themselves to contracting. Had this 

existed in Afghanistan, great benefi ts could have been reaped.192

OHDACA, although an excellent program, does not lend itself to solving immediate 

problems. For example, CJCMOTF supported Muslim pilgrims making the Hajj in March 

2002. Transportation problems left thousands of people stranded for several days at the 

Kabul airport. It was cold and three people died from exposure. CJCMOTF discovered 

the problem, and convinced a local contractor to purchase 15 stoves and construct warming 

areas in the buildings at the airport. This rapid action saved lives. However, CJCMOTF 

had no fund source to authorize the immediate purchase of the stoves. The contactor 

went acted in hope of reimbursement. Ultimately, CJCMOTF resolved the problem by 

contracting for stoves in Bagram and reimbursing the contractor with them. Had this failed, 

the CJCMOTF commander and staff were prepared to pay for the stoves out of their own 

pockets. Had a quick impact fund been authorized, then such funding would have been 

readily available.193
69

Interagency Mixing of Money

USAID money and OHDACA money cannot legally mix. The CHLCs and implementing 

partners of USAID had to ensure there was separation of funded projects. This restriction 

constrains the harmonization of an interagency approach to stability. As noted earlier, the 

UK has no such constraints between military and DFID.194.

Combat Commanders use of O&M Funds:

Commanders are constrained in the use of O&M monies in support of full spectrum 

military operations. Although commanders have always had the authority to defi ne what 

support of operations means, their approach is generally conservative when it comes to 

CMO, since their actions are typically subjected to extensive legal review. The Operational 

Law Handbook provides the following guidance:

Examples of O&M expenses include force protection measures, 

sustainment costs, and repair (vice construction) of main supply routes. 

Likewise, expenses that are “necessary and incident” to an assigned 

military mission (e.g., costs of maintaining public order and emergency 

health and safety requirements of the populace in Haiti during the 

NCA-directed mission of establishing a secure and stable environment). 

Beware of “mission creep,” however. Where the military mission departs 

from security, combat, or combat-related activity, and begins to intersect 

other agencies’ authority/appropriations, the expenditure merits close 

scrutiny by the judge advocate. For example, commanders must have 

special authorization before engaging in “nation-building” activities 

or recurring refugee assistance. These activities normally fall within 

the category of foreign assistance functions administered by the State 

Department or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).195

In complex contingencies like Afghanistan, the military operates in an environment 

where victory is largely defi ned in non-military terms. During the initial phases of such 

operations, before NGO/IGO and interagency processes can be established, the military 

should have the fl exibility to expend O&M monies without fearing extensive bureaucratic 

review. U.S. military commanders should be provided with fl exibility akin to that afforded 

UK commanders.

Payment of Claims for Collateral Damage. 

Additionally, the restriction on playing claims for collateral damage tied the hands of 

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. Although the non-payment policy may make sense at 

the macro level, it has signifi cant drawbacks at the micro level. Afghan society believes in 

compensation for death or destruction of property. The CHLCs were forced on occasion 

to request assistance from other agencies to provide compensation when the U.S. military 

would not pay. For instance, during an operation in the village of Kwost, U.S. forces 

accidentally fi red upon the village truck. The village depended on the truck for its well 

being. It was essential to make amends to turn villagers away from the Taliban and to gain 

intelligence. The local CHLC turned to an OGA for resources to repair the truck.196

 
70

Provisions should be made for the military to pay. Precedent exists. The Operational 

Law Handbook states:

At the conclusion of combat in Grenada, it quickly became apparent that 

the U.S. could not refuse to pay for combat-related damage if it wanted 

to maintain the support of the Grenadian citizens. With the claims 

statutes providing no means to make such payments, the Department 

of State entered a Participating Agency Servicing Agreement between 

the U.S. Agency for Internal Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army 

Claims Service (USARCS) that allowed for payment of combat claims. 

This agreement established a nonstatutory, gratuitous payment program 

outside of the combat activities exclusion using USAID funds. USARCS 

provided personnel to staff FCCs to process requests, investigate, and 

recommend payment or denial of claims. This was done in Panama to 

support the Endara government and help to establish its legitimacy. Our 

mission was to support the legitimate government, not to act in place 

of it. The U.S. and Panama agreed to a Letter of Instruction (LOI) that 

established the procedures to be followed, listed categories of claims 

deemed not compensable, and set monetary limits for claims under the 

Foreign Claims Act that were not barred by the combat claims exclusion. 

These commissions proceeded to adjudicate and recommend payment on 

the combat-related claims, essentially using the same procedures already 

established for the payment of claims under the Foreign Claims Act and 

incorporating the special requirement of the LOI. $1,800,000 of USAID 

money was made available: $200,000 to support the claims offi ce and 

personnel and the remainder to pay claims.197

Humanitarian Supplies

Because of the “light footprint” and other priorities, obtaining humanitarian supplies 

was a challenge. TF Mountain (10th Mountain Division) distributed approximately 500,000 

pounds of humanitarian assistance goods, most all of which were provided by CJCMOTF, 

JSOTF, and OGAs. When the 82d Airborne Division assumed the mission, SOF provided Airborne Division assumed the mission, SOF provided d

them with an 8,000 pound stock of humanitarian material for distribution.198 Many civilian 

groups, some associated with the deployed forces, donated goods to be distributed to the 

people of Afghanistan. These goods enhanced good will, and provided some essential 

items to make life easier in the communities. Two programs are set up to get these goods 

to deployed forces: Funded Transportation under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 2551 and the 

Denton Transportation Authority (Space Available) under Title 10 U.S.C., section 402.

The Funded Transportation program is supported by OHDACA appropriated funds that 

are pre-positioned at the beginning of the fi scal year at USTRANSCOM. The NGO or IGO 

must request transportation through DOS, which certifi es that it is in the foreign policy 

interest of the U.S. and meets a minimum cargo requirement. If approved, the goods are 

transported by the most economical means available. 

The Denton program allows greater fl exibility and responsiveness for transporting 

humanitarian supplies. DOD will provide transportation on military aircraft of privately 

donated humanitarian cargo on a space-available basis.199
71

In OEF there was little space available airlift for humanitarian cargo. Units in theater 

often relied upon the postal service to transport donated goods. For example, one CHLC 

got on the Internet and generated support from friends, churches, medical facilities, and 

local organizations across America. These supportive American citizens used their own 

funds to mail large quantities of good to Bagram, where the CHLC picked them up and 

distributed them to the population. The medical supplies for the rebuilding of the National 

Medical School in Kabul were obtained in the same manner. The CJCMOTF Surgeon 

contacted medical colleagues in the U.S. and had them mail books and supplies to Bagram 

to form the basis for the reconstitution of the medical facility. Other CHLC as well as 

elements of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82 Airborne Division, the 82 st nd Airborne Division, and the Canadian Airborne Division, and the Canadian nd

Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry all generated humanitarian goods through the post.200

73

Chapter 10: Planning

This chapter examines the CMO planning process 

National Guidance

U.S. national level guidance for Afghanistan was succinct and implied the need to 

develop a stability plan to address full spectrum operations. That guidance was:

Support the creation of an international political environment hostile to 

terrorism201.

However, without an interagency plan to interpret this guidance, establish responsibilities 

and develop end states, each department interpreted the guidance independently.

USCENTCOM’s Operational Plan Was Focused on Combat, not CMO

USCENTCOM developed a plan that focused on defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban 

while supporting NGOs/IGOs that provided humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, this plan did 

not address CMO. The plan consisted of four phases:

• Phase I—Set conditions and build forces to provide the National Command 

Authority credible military options.

• Phase II—Conduct initial combat operations and continue to set conditions for 

follow-on operations.

• Phase III—Conduct decisive combat operations in Afghanistan, continue to build 

coalition, and conduct operations AOR wide

• Phase IV—Establish capacity in coordination with coalition partners to prevent the 

re-emergence of terrorism and provide support to humanitarian relief efforts.202

The concept called for defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and then in Phase IV 

supporting humanitarian relief and transition to civil control. The small CMO cells at 

USCENTCOM and ARCENT knew that humanitarian assistance had to be ongoing in 

each of the phases and worked that concept into the plan’s CMO annex. Humanitarian 

assistance support to the NGOs/IGO would commence in Phase II and continue throughout 

until transition in phase IV. 

The plan was envisioned as a phased sequential plan, but the phases as defi ned did not 

enhance the commander’s ability to address the full spectrum operation that in fact occurred 

in Afghanistan. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, supporting a new Afghanistan 

government, training a new Afghan defense force, controlling civil disturbances, and 

fi ghting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their sanctuaries all occurred simultaneously

Initially, Phase IV was not considered a stability operation or military operation 

other than war (MOOTW). Planning focused on delivering humanitarian aid and not on 

establishing stability inside Afghanistan. The thought was that fi rst the Taliban would be 

defeated and then stability operations would start and the U.S., having defeated the Taliban 

and assisting the NGO and IGO community to establish itself, could depart. In fact, the 

CFLCC developed a plan for the downsizing of the CJCMOTF and its forces by the spring 

of 2002 and then shifting its functions to the OMC in the U.S. Embassy. 
74

Planners never have a crystal ball. The initial plan was written in October 2001, before 

the Taliban were defeated, before the Bonn Agreement was developed, and before ISAF 

and UNAMA were even conceived. Planning did not envision full spectrum operations 

that included a stability role for the OEF. This lack of planning was due in part to DOD 

strictures against peacekeeping and nation building. Security concerns provided another 

constraint to effective planning. Due to compartmentalization, planning for various 

aspects of the operation, to include CMO, was done in a vacuum. Sporadic linkage to the 

interagency, and lack of coordination with coalition partners and NGO/IGO also hindered 

planning. All of this, plus a lack of understanding by the commands at all levels about 

CMO, set the stage for disjointed planning.203 

Measures of Effectiveness/Criteria for Success 

USCENTCOM developed initial measurers of effectiveness (MOE), but none of 

them were CMO-specifi c. The CMO cell did develop an Endstate for the humanitarian 

assistance operation that focused on providing wholesale support to NGOs/IGOs.204 MOE 

were renamed “criteria for success” and eventually passed to CJCMOTF: 

Endstate:

IO/NGO are capable of providing vital HA to the vulnerable population 

in AFG within own resources

Criteria for Success

• Mortality rate less than Sep 01 level as measured by UN

• Nutrition level greater than Sep 01 level as measured by UN

• Regional hubs have suffi cient stores to feed the vulnerable people in 

AFG

• Flow rates of vital HA to the vulnerable population are suffi cient to 

ensure survival205

These criteria supported the wholesale part of CMO, but events in Afghanistan quickly 

made these criteria obsolete. The tactical operation shifted to retail and to stability 

operations, and the criteria based on the original plan no longer applied. The 96th CA 

Battalion never felt that it understood how to determine a successful transition to civil 

organizations. For instance, in areas where NGOs were delivering food at fi ve times the 

rate of September 2001, CHLCs were nevertheless still operating. The mission had shifted 

from what was originally envisioned of just providing support to humanitarian assistance 

to one of stability operations, but the USCENTCOM plan never adjusted to the changed 

reality. Until the CJTF 180 arrived in June 2002 and issued its plan, the criteria for success 

remained unchanged.206 

CJTF 180/Effects Based CMO Planning

The fi rst plan that CJTF 180 drafted contained just three lines on CMO; the only guidance 

that the plan provided was “conduct CMO.” Eventually, the concept was revised to include 

a signifi cant section on CMO. Planners determined that the existing criteria for success 

were inadequate and that effects based operations (EBO) would better address the dynamic 
75

situation in Afghanistan. EBO is a process for obtaining a desired outcome or effect on 

the enemy or situation through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application 

of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels.207

An offi cer on loan from the UK to CJTF 180, used effects based targeting concepts and 

assisted in development of a plan that addressed full spectrum operations. He and his team 

looked at six areas of CMO: Populace and Resource Control, Humanitarian Assistance, 

Foreign Nation Support, Emergency Services, Military Civic Action, and Support to 

Civil Administration, and linked them to EBO concepts.208 The planners identifi ed the 

operational objective as ensuring that Afghanistan would be stable enough not to export 

terrorism. This objective nested with the DOS-led Interagency Plan objective of ensuring 

“that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven for terrorists.” 209

 Planners identifi ed two centers of gravity: one for Al Qaeda/ Taliban and another for 

stability of Afghanistan institutions. Four lines of operation were determined based upon 

effects required to leverage the centers of gravity and achieve the operational objective. 

One focused on removing the causes of instability, the second on assisting Afghanistan 

institutions, a third on defeating terrorism, and the last on protecting the coalition’s own 

friendly center of gravity. The lines proceeded concurrently. By following these lines 

of operations, the commander could allocate resources across the spectrum of operations 

to best achieve his operational objective. Each line of operations was subdivided into 

operational tasks, operational supporting tasks, and tactical tasks. For these tasks, the 

command developed MOE. These were rated red, green, and amber with a trend arrow.210

Transition Planning

By May 2002, USCENTCOM’s CMO cell began developing revised criteria for 

success in Phase IV and a transition plan. Doctrinally, the considerations for developing a 

transition plan are well conceived but presuppose that a political-military plan exists. As 

noted previously, this was not the case in OEF. 

Initial guidance stated that the military would pass off the humanitarian assistance 

mission to the NGOs when they were capable. The plan did not envision the need to 

establish stable governance in Afghanistan. Yet, had an unconstrained CMO estimate of 

the situation been conducted in accordance with the Post Confl ict Matrix in the introduction 

section of JP 3-57, the stability issue could have been framed and the command poised to 

seize the initiative. The US Army Peacekeeping Institute recommended this approach to 

ARCENT in September 2001, but it was rejected based on OSD guidance that the military 

should avoid involvement in nation building in Afghanistan.211 The staff used the ITAP 

2002 as the basis for developing transition criteria, although this plan was essentially a 

UN vehicle for donors and not a true blueprint for Afghan reconstruction.212 Transition 

planning was still in fl ux by the end of this study.

77

Chapter 11: Keys to Success in Afghanistan

This chapter presents observations based upon what the study team 

believes are three keys to success in Afghanistan

General

The study team believes that there are three keys to success in Afghanistan.

Establish a Safe and Secure Environment.

A safe and secure environment is absolutely essential. The security gap must be fi lled 

to insure the survival of a national government and the establishment of an atmosphere that 

will encourage investment and development. Security will create political and economic 

space for development. The components are:

• Extend the ISAF “effect” countrywide.

o ISAF and OEF should merge as one stabilization force for the country.

o This new force must extend its infl uence countrywide.

• Establish Rule of Law.

o UNAMA should establish a holistic, systemic approach that integrates the 

police, judicial, and penal aspects of the rule of law.

o The Afghan Constitutional Process must determine what law is to be 

followed.

o The police and judicial system should be integrated with the Defense and 

Border systems.

o Providing for a rule of law will assist in establishing a viable counter-drug 

program.

• Reform the Ministry of Defense 

o The ANA should be trained to become a more capable force than the local 

militias.

o The Ministry of Defense must develop a national security strategy.

• Establish a functioning DDR program

o A program for the reintegration of local militia into their societies is 

essential.

o Central control should be established over use of military power.

• Establish a functioning Human Rights program.

o Address justice for criminal acts and war crimes.

o A Human Rights commission must identify and legally deal with accused war 

criminals.
78

Share Power Successfully Between Central Government and Local Power Centers

This issue must be settled if Afghanistan is to survive as a country and preclude the 

reemergence of the Taliban and the return of Al Qaeda. 

• Establish Afghan governmental political power in the provinces.

o Enhance governance to give all people a stake in the central government.

o Extend the political mandate to the provinces.

o Capitalize on the Loya Jirga and extend to future elections.

• Strengthen central government institutions, fi nance and trade.

o Ensure money fl ows into the government rather than out to the provinces or 

to other countries.

o Establish arrangements so that the majority of tax revenues return to the 

central government.

o Control illicit sources of money such as drugs and smuggling. 

Extend and Resource Reconstruction Countrywide.

Physical reconstruction must be tied to extending the political mandate, because one 

cannot exist without the other. The Afghanistan central government must have a hand in 

providing “bread and work.” NGO and IGO programs cannot work at cross-purposes by 

supporting warlords at the expense of the central government.

• Extend government ministries’ presence into the country

• Extend NGO presence into the countryside to previously nonsecure areas in 

support of government ministries.

• Provide adequate resources for countrywide reconstruction

• Decrease dependence on UN, NGO, OEF and ISAF through comprehensive and 

well-integrated transition plans.
79

Chapter 12: Recommendations

This chapter provides recommended approaches to address complex 

Civil Military Operations

Develop Clear Political-Military Guidance for Stability Operations

• Promulgate a directive to ensure interagency planning. Approve NSPD XX to 

replace PDD 56. 

• Establish a standing emergency management organization at the national level. 

One proposal worth examining suggests the formation of a Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA)-type organization to employ the same concepts 

applied to domestic crises international crises. 

Establish Interagency Mechanisms at the Operational Theater Level to Coordinate 

Theater Wide Military and Civilian Efforts 

• Add a civil stability advisor co-equal to the political advisor (POLAD) to the 

special staff of the Combatant Command. This advisor could come from USAID 

or an umbrella NGO such as InterAction.

• Establish an NGO/IGO coordination cell at combatant commands to provide input 

for impending operations. This cell must be supported with communications and 

access to the planning process. 

• Publish and promulgate a political military plan to establish holistic management 

oversight. Commanders should establish close working relationships with other 

USG operations in theater. An executive committee of all agency leads should be 

established to provide a forum to synchronize planning.

o Regional Action Groups should be established to execute the directions of 

the executive committee. The PRT concept in Afghanistan is an example of 

a regional action group.

• Establish reliable communications among all Host Nations and international 

players. The Department of Defense may have to provide the communications 

equipment.

• Conduct collaborative transition planning. The other U.S. agencies, Host Nation 

offi cials, and UN and NGO representatives should be included at the onset of 

planning. The objective is to gain consensus and early buy-in to a transition 

plan

• Establish a full time, active component, civil affairs planning cell at each 

Combatant Command and Army component command. This cell would work 

future operations and OPLANS during peacetime, and coordinate with the regional 

CACOM and handoff the planning to them when operations are pending. 

Revise Joint and Army Doctrine to Refl ect CMO/CA lessons learned in Afghanistan

• Revise Joint doctrine to include CMO principles and describe the concept of 

operations for multidimensional operations involving both combat and stability. 
80

NATO doctrine for CIMIC should be used as a model. 

• Revise Army doctrine to refl ect the emerging concept of CA operations as practiced 

in Afghanistan. 

• Emphasize the commander’s role in CMO.

• Add the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team Model to the CA Operational 

Doctrine. 

Organize, Train, and Equip forces in Accordance with Revised Doctrine

• Develop TO&E that supports the new tasks preformed by CA in Afghanistan. 

Correct force design to organize and equip CA forces, to include organic 

transportation and communications.

• Provide the appropriate priority to CA as afforded to combat units in future 

complex contingencies that include a stability component.

• Review and Active and Reserve Component mix; more CA forces required in 

AC.

• Mobilize appropriate RC personnel in a timely manner.

• Support the interagency task force concept.

Provide Appropriate CMO/CA Expertise at Senior Commands

• Establish a peacetime CA planning cell at each Combatant Command.

• Develop habitual planning relationships between Combatant Commands and 

supporting CACOMs through peacetime exercises.

• Enhance the planning abilities of CA offi cers through education and training in 

order to make them valued and credible to supported commands.

Provide Commanders Financial and Resource Flexibility to Address Stability 

Operations

• Provide fi scal and resource fl exibility to all commanders. Provide fi scal tools so 

that the commander can support stability operations. 

• Review existing laws to provide commanders the confi dence to take appropriate 

actions in expending monies or providing resources, to include support in 

providing humanitarian aid. 

Establish Clear Lines of Communication and Coordination Between Military and 

NGOs/IGOs

• Facilitate collaborative planning while protecting essential information.

• Develop working relationships, during peacetime, that establish informal networks 

and frames of reference to serve as the basis for coordination during crisis. This 

can be done through exercises and joint training events. 

• Second military offi cers to NGOs and IGOs. 
81

Ensure Intelligence Supports CMO and Stability Operations 

• Provide appropriate intelligence support to stability operations and CMO. Lower 

echelon units should have their intelligence staffs augmented with personnel wellversed in stability operations. These operations require a breadth and depth of 

intelligence support that is normally not resident even at the division level.

• Consider using the procedures developed in Bosnia for integration of coalition 

HUMINT into operations. [AMIB, Factional LNO, JCO, and national NIC]

Ensure Information Support CMO and Stability Operations

• Establish theater integrating and coordinating mechanisms that link tactical level 

information operations with interagency operational guidance. 

• Integrate IO with the CA effort. Integrate IO among all of the interagency as well 

as with the host nation.

o Communications may have to be provided to Host Nations to assist in the 

overall IO effort.

• Tailor IO to address cultural realities. For instance, for Afghans, legitimacy is 

built on actions rather than words.

Ensure Planning that Encompasses Full Spectrum Operations

• Insure that planners develop concepts that address full spectrum operations 

including confl ict termination, post-confl ict actions, and transition planning. 

• Develop measurers of success that guide policy makers, interagency and coalition 

partners, and members of the command that relate to full spectrum operations.

Educate and Train Military and Civilian Leaders

• Make CMO and stability operations a part of the curriculum in all PME.

• Conduct unit-level mission rehearsals that incorporate stability operations

• Conduct regular exercises centered on stability operations involving military, 

interagency, and NGO/IGO participation. 

83

ANNEX A: CMO STUDY QUESTIONS 

 Attribution: Will the following be for attribution or non-attribution?

1. General Description

a. Describe your position and function?

b. How long have you been working these issues?

c. How do you fi t into the structure?

2. Preparation

a. Describe your preparation prior to deployment.

b. Did you attend any orientation seminars on Afghanistan or CMO?

3. Training

a. How did your organization approach training and preparation for this activity?

b. What sort of training was provided for people before deployment? In the fi eld? 

Has this changed as the mission evolved? 

c. How well do you think you were prepared to work in this environment? 

d. Did the prospect of working alongside disparate organizations factor into your 

training?

e. Did you train with NGOs, International Organizations, or Interagency 

personnel?

4. Deployment

a. Describe the deployment. 

b. Were you mobilized?

c. Describe the mobilization. 

5. Guidance

a. What is your mission?

b. What written guidance have you received? .

c. What verbal guidance have you received?

d. What guidance have you promulgated?

e. Is the guidance adequate to the situation?

f. What addition guidance is required?

6. Concept of Operation

a. To what extent do you believe that humanitarian assistance can assist in the 

military mission in Afghanistan? In what ways? 

b. In what ways, if any, do you believe the two missions support one another or 

compete with one another? 
84

c. What do you think are the views on these questions of others in your organization 

and in other organizations and other countries? 

d. How do these issues affect relationships between the military International 

Organizations, NGOs, and other groups?

7. Coordination

a. With whom do you talk, hourly, daily, monthly?

b. To whom would you turn to “get things done?”

c. Who should you be coordinating with that you are not?

d. Describe the coordinating bodies that can assist you?

e. Do you run a coordinating body? Describe its composition, purpose, and 

procedures. 

f. To and from what organizations do you have liaisons? To and from what other 

organizations would you want to have liaisons?

g. What mechanisms were established to share information?

i. Was there an information management strategy?

ii. Are you familiar with the Afghan Information Management System (AIMS)? 

Did you use this or know of others that did? Evaluate its effectiveness. 

iii. What worked and what did not and why?

8. Relationships.

a. Given the politically fragmented nature of Afghanistan, are the civil affairs 

teams and the humanitarian organizations able to operate effectively across the 

country?

b. Are certain regional commanders more cooperative with civil affairs and NGOs 

than others?

c. Describe your relationship with local political authorities. 

d. Describe your relationship with local religious authorities.

e. How has this changed over time? 

f. What have been key challenges of working with local authorities? Key 

successes? 

g. What would you characterize as some of the important lessons from this experience 

in this issue area?

h. Describe your relationships with other, international and otherwise, donors and 

aid providers. How have these changed over time? 

i. What have been key challenges of working with other groups? Key successes? 

j. What would you characterize as some of the important lessons from this experience 

in this issue area?
85

9. Agendas 

a. Do you think different organizations approached the issues involved in this 

mission differently? In what ways? Did they have different goals? What were 

they? How did this affect interaction?

b. Do you think individual personalities played an important role in how organizations 

interacted? Did certain personality types that you can identify, certain sorts of 

people, seem to be more or less effective in this environment?

10. Communication 

a. What communication means do you use?

b. To whom are you connected? 

c. To whom are you not connected but would like to be? To whom would like to be 

connected by another, different communication means?

11. Requirements

a. In practice, was there coordination between agencies in assessing what 

humanitarian needs were and how they would be met? 

b. Did these assessments change as the mission evolved? Were any proven false? 

c. What role was played by various organizations (NGOs, IOs, military, host nation, 

etc.)? 

d. What different assumptions about humanitarian needs and mechanisms of 

provision did you and your organization have initially? Were there discrepancies 

with what other individuals and organizations believed? How were disagreements 

resolved? 

e. What were the mechanisms by which humanitarian requirements were validated 

among the groups involved in providing assistance? Were there regular meetings? 

How frequent? Who attended? How useful were these meetings? 

f. How did each organization’s own bureaucratic procedure affect coordination?

g. Did issues often have to be cleared through headquarters and capitals? What level 

of consensus was there among organizations and groups about requirements and 

needs? Did disagreements follow similar lines each time? Were there patterns of 

agreement and disagreement? How were disagreements resolved?

h. What was the role of capitals and headquarters in establishing and assessing and 

validating requirements? How and how often were they briefed on issues? What 

sorts of issues required their involvement? How different was this for different 

organizations? Did the need for some organizations to coordinate with capitals 

and headquarters present problems? 

i. How did the requirements process change over time?

j. How do you think the requirements and assessment process can be improved?
86

12. Capabilities

a. How were capabilities prioritized and assigned within and among various 

organizations and groups?

b. What were the major capabilities that different organizations and groups brought 

to the table? 

c. How much overlap was there? How much complementary?

d. Who were the most important players (organizations and individuals) in prioritizing 

operations?

e. What mechanisms were used to generate consensus on how capabilities and 

activities would be allocated?

f. How did the prioritization process change over time?

g. How can this process be improved, in your opinion?

13. CMO Projects

a. Describe the CMO project(s) you have completed.

b. Describe the current and future projects.

c. How do you determine what projects to undertake?

d. Describe the funding an approval process for your projects. 

e. How did the streamlined procedures for using OHDACA funds in Afghanistan 

impact on mission success? 

f. What would be the impact now if the normal approval process through Washington, 

D.C. was re-instituted? 

g. Whom do you contract with to accomplish those projects?

h. What standards do you use?

14. Interagency 

a. Describe you interaction with the U.S. Interagency?

b. Do you deal with OFDA/ AID?

c. Do you deal with the US Embassy or Military Mission?

d. Do you work with any other U.S. interagency entity? What are the long-term, 

strategic objectives for Afghanistan, as you understand them? What is your 

source for this understanding?

e. How does the work of your organization support the attainment of these strategic 

objectives?

f. Do you feel that your organization’s goals are in consonance with USG objectives, 

or working at cross-purposes? In what ways?

15. UNAMA/ ISAF

a. Describe your relationship with UNAMA/ ISAF.
87

b. Do you work with the ITAP or the AIA National Development Framework Plan?

c. Describe your relationship with ISAF.

d. Do you coordinate with the ISAF CIMIC? What is their relationship to you?

e. You are involved in the DDR program?

f. Describe you relationship with other UN agencies.

i. UNHCR

ii. UNOCHA

iii. WFP JLC

16. Afghan Transitional Authority

a. How effective would you say the Afghan Transitional Authority has been? 

b. What, if any, is your role in support of providing a secure environment for the 

Afghan Transitional Authority? For the international relief effort? What is the 

impact of this role on your other missions and vice versa?

17. Afghan National Army

a. Have you had any interaction with the Afghan National Army (ANA)? 

b. What is your impression of the concept of developing the ANA into a regional 

security force using U.S. SOF training support? Has it been effective? Mixed? 

Unclear? Please provide examples.

18. Security Situation

a. How does the difference between the security situation in Kabul (ISAF control of 

the capital) vice that in the countryside (where the US ENDURING FREEDOM 

forces patrol) impact on humanitarian activities?

b. What is your role?

c. What is UNAMA role in developing defense structure for Afghanistan?

d. Do you have a role in developing a security structure for Afghanistan? If yes:

i. What is UNAMA role in developing defense structure for Afghanistan?

ii. Where does the US Training of the ANA fi t?

iii. What role will the Germans, UK and others play? 

e. What role is played by the ATA?

19. Effects of Military Operations on Civil and NGO 

a. How did military support to humanitarian activities affect the local populace?

b. How did they affect coalition military operations? The efforts of NGOs? Of IOs? 

Please provide examples.

c. How well integrated would you say the military and civilian efforts were? What 

about the efforts of various states? Please provide examples.

d. Describe the challenges you have encountered in dealing with the military?
88

e. Is there a difference between ISAF and ENDURING FREEDOM forces?

f. Does the military facilitate you operations?

g. Where could the military assist your operations?

h. Does the military get in the way of your operations?

i. Is the military aware of NGO and what they do?

j. What coordinating body exists to assist you? 

k. What is the role of CHLC/ CMOC?

20. Combat Operations.

a. How do combat operations against Al Qaeda impact on your and your colleagues’ 

relations with the local populace? With the NGO/IO community?

b. How do they affect CMO activities? 

c. Do you have any dealings with the combat Special Forces elements? How do the 

Special Forces operations affect yours?

21. Local Contractors

a. What are the political affi liations of the contractors you deal with?

b. What is the state of the local infrastructure?

c. Describe you dealings with local business or fi nanciers. 

22. Demining.

a. Were or are you involved in the Demining effort?

b. Explain your involvement and your observations?

23. Human Rights

a. Were you involved in the Human Rights Issues?

b. Explain your involvement.

c. What are your observations?

24. NGO/ IO

a. Who are the NGO/IOs that you deal with all the time?

b. Describe your relationship with the NGO/IO community. 

c. Describe the attitudes of the locals to the NGO/IOs and yourselves.

d. How do the NGO/IOs coordinate their activities?

e. Are you aware of the issue of U.S. Military wearing civilian cloths conducting 

civil action programs?

i. What is the issue if any from your perspective?

ii. How was it perceived by the IO, NGO or Military? 

iii. Has this been resolved? How?
89

iv. Evaluate how it was handled.

v. Have similar situations occurred in the past?

25. Language

a. Are you profi cient in any of the local languages?

b. Did you receive any orientation languages before deployment?

c. Do you use an interpreter?

i. What is the political affi liation of the interpreter?

ii. How was the interpreter selected?

iii. What do you use as a guide for dealing with interpreters?

26. Information Operations

a. Describe how you support the information operation?

b. What themes/ talking points are you required to put out concerning the stability 

mission?

c. What methods do you use to support the information operation?

27. Media 

a. Describe your relationship with the media.

b. What effects has media been on your operations?

c. Have you talked with a media representative?

d. What guidance were you given about talking with the media? 

28. End State/ Transition

a. What do you use as measurers of effectiveness (MOE) or criteria for success?

b. How do you measure success?

c. What are the major barriers that prevent mission accomplishment?

d. Does your organization have a transition plan?

29. Lessons and Experience

a. Based on your past experience/knowledge, how similar or different was 

Afghanistan from previous CMO/Humanitarian operations? 

b. Do you think certain things worked better in Afghanistan than they did in Bosnia, 

Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere? Did other things work better in other 

operations?

c. To your knowledge, was experience specifi cally drawn from previous operations 

applied in Afghanistan? Please provide examples. How applicable did this 

experience prove? 

d. Do you think there are areas where past lessons could have been applied, but 

were not? Do you think there are unique aspects to this operation that make past 

experience less relevant? What are some of these?
90

30. Issues:

a. What are the major problems as you see them?

b. Although combat operations and CMO are often in tension, combat operations 

clearly have priority when they are underway. How often and in what specifi c 

instances or issue areas has the tension actually become a problem in Afghanistan? 

(Possible examples might include airlift, resources, etc.)

31. Opportunities

a. What missed opportunities did you observe?

32. Recommendations

a. What are your recommendations to improve the situation?

b. What are the positive lessons learned?

33. Further Investigation

a. Who else should we talk with?

b. What documentation should we consult?
91

ANNEX B: CHRONOLOGY

DATE EVENT

1 June 01 DART deploys to Afghanistan in response to Food Crisis

11 Sep 01- 19 

Sep 01 NGO and DART start to leave Afghanistan for Islamabad

 Sep 01 BRIGHT STAR exercise in Egypt. 377th TSC deployed and start 

planning. 

21 Sep 01 US SOF Deploys 

22 Sep 01 Taliban cuts the UN communication in Afghanistan

24 Sep 01 96th CA LNO attached to 5th SFG for planning

25 Sep 01 UNJLC Established

Oct 01 CFLCC in Cairo West planned for Iraq

ARCENT team arrives in Tampa to stand up CJCMOTF. 

4 Oct 01 President Bush announces $320 mil assistance program

7 Oct 01 OEF starts with Air Operations

First Humanitarian Air Drops

8 Oct 01 96th CA LNO team attached to 5th SFG deploys to Stronghold Freedom, 

Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan

9 Oct 01 UNJLC has delays in food delivery that will persist until 9 Dec 01

10 Oct 01

LNO at CENTCOM established consisting of UNOCHA, UNJLC, 

UNHCR and later on 24 Oct, InterAction, ICRC declines the invitation. 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds fi rst of Committee meetings 

on Humanitarian Assistance, Hearing voiced concerns about the utility 

of Air Drops of HA.

11 Oct 01

Major Dejarnette, 96th Civil Affairs Bn. arrives in Islamabad and forms 

the CHLC. It consists of one US Major, four UK CIMIC offi cers and 

DFID representatives. 

16 Oct 01 Cat-A32 from 96th CA deployed to Uzbekistan.

19 Oct 01 A Team Deploys into Afghanistan

20 Oct

22 Oct 01

ARCENT deploys 2 Man Cell to Tashkent.

 First meeting of the CA cell of 8 at ARCENT

25 Oct 01 US Air Strike against ICRC warehouse

1 Nov 01

USMC at Kandahar Air Port

First Elements of 122nd ROC arrive to Augment CJCMOTF later ROC arrive to Augment CJCMOTF later 

followed by 377th TSC and a planning section from 352 CA Command. 

2 Nov 01 CHLC reinforced in Islamabad of 2 US from 96th CA 

9 Nov 01 Mazar-e Sharif falls to Dostum

12 Nov 01 10th Mountain deploys to Uzbekistan K2 Stand up CFLCC( Forward) 

13 Nov 01 Kabul Falls

15 Nov 01

ARCENT Orders CAT-A of 96th to establish HA Hub at Mazar-e-Sharif, 

Afghanistan. ADVON of ARCENT arrive at Camp Dohar. USMC and 

SOF arrive at Bagram. CJCMOTF formed in Kuwait with 80 personnel 

from 377th, 122nd , and CA planning team of 352 , and CA planning team of 352nd ?? ( exact dates 

uncertain)
92

20 Nov 01 US Japanese Reconstruction Talks

Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group formed. ARSG.

22 Nov 01 C company of 96th CA (CAT- B and 3 CAT A’s) arrive at K2. ( exact 

dates uncertain)

23 Nov 01 CHLC (CAT A32 and CAT B30) 96th CA deploy to Bagram in support 

of Special Forces

25 Nov 01 Camp Rhino Established

27 Nov 01 CHLC (CAT-A33) 96th CA deployed to Mazar-e-Sharif. 

30 Nov 01 ARCENT Forward CFLCC established at Camp Dohar

26 Nov 01 Kunduz falls

1 Dec 01 Tora Bora

5 Dec 01 Bonn

5-9 Dec 01 CJCMOTF deploys to Kabul,D company of 96th CAT –B and 5 CAT 

7 Dec 01 Kandahar Surrenders

9 Dec 01 HAST (Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team) of 96th CA deploys to 

Bamiyan 

8-9 Dec 01 Friendship Bridge Open and Large Food convoy of WFP fl ows from 

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 

12 Dec 01 Karzi Arrives in Kabul

10th MTN Div (-) Uzbekistan establish CFLCC (FWD) 

13 Dec 01 Humanitarian Air Drops using the fl utter method stops

17 Dec 01 US Embassy in Kabul Opened.

19 Dec 01 ISAF arrives in Kabul

20-21 Dec 01 ARSG meets in Brussels under EU

22 Dec 01 ATA formed in Kabul

24 Dec 01

End of daily C-17 HA Air drops. 

Elements of CJCMOTF and ACT A 34 and A 36 deployed to K2 to link 

up with C company and D company of 96th CA 

31 Dec 01 CAT A 36 Deployed to Dushanbe, Tajikistan to establish a CHLC

Jan 02 352 CA fi nally completed mobilization. 

1 Jan, CHLC CAT A 34 set up in H erat, 14 Jan, 

4 Jan 02 3rd BDE 101st Deploys to Kandahar along with Canadian Bn.

14 Jan 02 CAT A-32 deployed to Konduz to form CHLC.

21 Jan 02 Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan 

People 2002 issued by UN. 

21-22 Jan 02

Tokyo Conference

ASD Collins (Offi ce of Stability), AMB Dobbins, BG Kern (CG, 352nd

CACOM), BG Kratzer Commander CJCMOTF went to the Tokyo 

conference. 

22 Jan 02 OSD Message outlining the rules for OHDACA monies.

29 Jan 02 President Bush press statement “lasting partnership” with Afghanistan 

to provide security and ensure stability
93

Feb 02 OHDACA funds received. ( exact dates uncertain)

1 Feb 02 RAMCC Operational in Qatar. 

16 Feb 02 10th Mountain Deploys to Bagram as CFLCC forward

18 Feb 02

489 CA BN arrives to begin the replacement of 96th CA. and 

assume their projects. Kandahar CHLC established. ( exact dates 

uncertain)

March 02

10th Mountain assumes command of CTF Mountain and moves from K2 

to Bagram. 

Bamyan CHLC sets up. (exact dates uncertain)

2 – 18 March 02 ANACONDA

12 March 02 World Bank Transitional Support Strategy for Afghanistan issued

26 March 02 Earthquake support

28 March 02 UNAMA established.

April 02 96th CA redeploys. ( exact dates uncertain)

April 02 National Development Framework Drafted

April 02 Department of State issues “ Political Military Plan”

3 April 02 COMCFLCC approved to draw down the CJCMOTF. 

7 April 02 CENTCOM develops plan and concept for XVIII Airborne Corps to 

assume responsibility for Afghanistan.

15 April 02 Loya Jirga Process

17 April 02 President Bush calls for “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan. 

7 May 02 First meeting between CJCMOTF and AACA inside the wire. XVIII 

Corps begins to deploy to Bagram as CJTF 180.

14 May 02 US start training Afghan Army. UK had training one BN earlier that 

was used to support the Loya Jirga. 

21 May 02 Loya Jirga phase 2

22 May 02 House of Reps voted a $1.4 mil aid package. 

23 May 02 Donors Conference in Delhi.

31 May 02 CJTF 180 Assumes command in Bagram, reverses the draw down of 

CJCMOTF and increases their presence in non-permissive areas.

June 02 CJTF 180 Established in Afghanistan and CFLCC is no longer in 

charge. CJTF 180 shifts to stability operations.

10 June 02 Loya Jirga Phase 3

22 June 02 IATG formed with Karzai

I July 02

Bombing of Afghan Ceremony Uruzgan province. 

LNO offi ce UNOCHA, UNJLC, and InterAction at CENTCOM is shut 

down.

23 July 02 US Bn ANA graduated.

2 Oct 02 ALAMO SWEEP

Nov 02 360th CA BDE Arrives to assume command CJCMOTF.

2-3 Nov 2002 NGO government conference in Kabul at the request of Afghan 

Ministry of Planning; ACSF, ACBAR, and ANCB

31 Dec 02 PRT initial test in Gardez 

Feb 03 PRT offi cially opened.
94

ANNEX C: NATO AND EU CIMIC PRINCIPLES

A. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING MILITARY DIRECTION

2. Mission Primacy. NATO conducts CIMIC activities in support of a military 

mission. In turn, however, the latter will have been derived from a political strategic 

objective and should therefore not confl ict with the objectives of most of the civilian 

organisations working in an area of operations. Nonetheless, only the commander can 

decide how far military resources will be committed to CIMIC tasks. Indeed, additional 

humanitarian tasks should not be assumed without an assessment of the resources 

and the prioritisation of military tasks. Nor should any local CIMIC tasks that might 

compromise the theatre level CIMIC effort or the overall mission be undertaken by 

subordinate commanders.

3. Command Direction. The direction of CIMIC operations and activities is the 

responsibility of commanders at all levels. Only through unity of authority and 

integration of effort at all levels can peace be achieved and transition to normalcy be 

realised. Commanders should be aware of the impact of military operations on the 

civil environment and the impact of the civil environment on their operations. They 

must be able to prioritise and direct CIMIC operations and activities in such a way that 

military effectiveness is maintained without adding unnecessarily to civil hardship.

4. Economy. Commanders must seek to minimise the use of military assets and maximise 

the use of civil resources. Care must be taken not to deplete the latter beyond that 

needed to sustain the civil population. Low level CIMIC activities are often carried 

out in circumstances where the civil population faces an inadequate infrastructure and 

widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Military resources are fi nite 

and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the minimum required 

to achieve the military aim should be used in support of the civilian population or 

civilian organisations.. Commanders must guard against creating long term civilian 

dependence on military resources by either the local population, government, or IOs/

NGOs. Once provided, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be diffi cult as it 

may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, and may cause 

lasting damage to public confi dence in the military force.

5. Concentration. Assets available for CIMIC will be limited, therefore they should 

be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission success. 

Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the military 

force and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest. Dissipation of 

assets, on the other hand, will result in minimal impact on the population and the 

mission, and runs the risk of unnecessarily prolonging the achievement of the desired 

end state.

6. Humanitarian Obligations. Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply 

with international legal statutes concerned with armed confl ict and the law of war. 

In addition to fulfi lling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, 

within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on, and 

where possible facilitate maximum support for, non-combatants. This is fundamental 

to building mission legitimacy. The use of military force, with few exceptions, entails 
95

human suffering which should be relieved whenever possible and wherever it is 

found. The dignity and human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and 

protected in compliance with international law and the Rules of Engagement.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

7. Cultural Awareness. A sustained sensitivity towards civil customs and ways of life is 

of fundamental importance to all missions. In a politically sensitive environment a 

thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news 

event and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success. The military must 

acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. CIMIC plays a vital 

role in ensuring cultural awareness of the forces through education. 

8. Common Goals. Once a relationship has been established, it will usually need to be 

maintained, and whenever possible strengthened in order to survive disagreement, 

setback, compromise and even threats from third parties. Therefore common goals 

shared by NATO forces and civilian organisations must be established and recognised. 

Both CDOs and CROs take place in rapidly changing environments where decisionmaking processes must be streamlined and responsive. Each participating organisation 

must understand the political and resource commitments required. This understanding 

forms the basis of civil-military co-operation and commitments are made in anticipation 

of achieving objectives and not timelines.

9. Shared Responsibility. The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil 

organizations and agencies with which NATO military forces must co-operate is 

extremely diverse. The analysis of common goals must lead to an agreed sharing of 

responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually benefi cial 

relationship. CIMIC must establish co-ordination measures with the civilian 

organizations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and defi ne their 

respective roles and responsibilities.

10. Consent. Because a military organization does not ultimately require consent to 

function, its crucial importance in CIMIC matters can be overlooked. Every effort 

must be made to secure the willing consent of civilian organizations with which the 

allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves poor 

results and will not endure. Loss of consent can occur suddenly, for reasons that seem 

trivial and commanders must be prepared to expend time and energy in its pursuit and 

retention. 

11. Transparency. Successful CIMIC operations and activities require the mutual 

trust and confi dence of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC work should be 

transparent, demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the 

trust and confi dence of all elements of the civil environment. The tension between 

political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship 

will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times. These tensions 

will be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion and poor 

communications. Transparency is vital in preventing and defusing such potentially 

volatile situations because it instills trust, increases confi dence and encourages mutual 
96

understanding. CIMIC personnel will be a valuable source of local information and 

will be advocates of the military cause, but they will rapidly become ineffective if used 

for intelligence gathering or as a means of communicating inaccurate information. It 

must be recognised that information obtained by military means cannot always be 

shared with civilian organisations and authorities. CIMIC staff must work closely 

with intelligence assets to obtain the most accurate information that may be passed 

to the civilian organizations in time to be effective. Much of this information, such 

as refugee movements, given to the civilian organizations may assist the commander 

greatly by allowing the appropriate civilian agency to react in a timely manner while 

minimally diverting military resources. Such information allows the civilian agencies 

to tailor themselves to the developing situation and prevents the military from 

unnecessarily expending its resources. Specifi c rules and arrangements to declassify 

military information should be made in advance. 

12. Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, 

organizations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation. The 

differences between military and civilian organizations require an investment in time 

and understanding to overcome. Most civilian organizations with which the military 

will deal will, to a large extent, pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the 

view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The 

key to minimizing these diffi culties is to maintain open and constant communication. 

Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels 

through CIMIC sources and possibly CIMIC centres should be developed to avoid 

potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to 

arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established 

system. 
97

ANNEX D: UNITED NATIONS S/RES/1383 (2001)

Security Council

01-68109 (E)

*0168109*

Resolution 1383 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4434th meeting on

6 December 2001

The Security Council,

Reaffi rming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1378 

(2001) of 14 November 2001,

Reaffi rming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial 

integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Stressing the inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine 

their own political future,

Determined to help the people of Afghanistan to bring to an end the tragic confl icts 

in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for 

human rights, as well as to cooperate with the international community to put an end to the 

use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism,

Welcoming the letter of 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General informing the 

Council of the signature in Bonn on 5 December 2001 of the Agreement on provisional 

arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government 

institutions (S/2001/1154),

Noting that the provisional arrangements are intended as a fi rst step towards the 

establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative 

government,

1. Endorses the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions as reported in the SecretaryGeneral’s letter of 5 December 2001;

2. Calls on all Afghan groups to implement this Agreement in full, in particular through 

full cooperation with the Interim Authority which is due to take offi ce on 22 December 

2001;

3. Reaffi rms its full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary General and 

endorses the missions entrusted to him in annex 2 of the abovementioned Agreement;

4. Declares its willingness to take further action, on the basis of a report by the SecretaryGeneral, to support the Interim institutions established by the abovementioned 

Agreement and, in due course, to support the implementation of the Agreement and 

its annexes;
98

5. Calls on all Afghan groups to support full and unimpeded access by humanitarian 

organizations to people in need and to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian 

workers;

6. Calls on all bilateral and multilateral donors, in coordination with the Special 

Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Agencies and all Afghan 

groups, to reaffi rm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the 

rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the 

Interim Authority and as long as the Afghan groups fulfi ll their commitments;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
99

ANNEX E: UNITED NATIONS S/RES/1401 (2002)

Security Council Distr.: General

28 March 2002

02-30914 (E)

*0230914*

Resolution 1401 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4501st meeting, on 28 March 2002

The Security Council,

Reaffi rming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1378 

(2001) of 14 November 2001, 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001, and 1386 (2001) of 20 

December 2001,

Recalling all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 56/220 

(2001) of 21 December 2001,

Stressing the inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine 

their own political future,

Reaffi rming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial 

integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in 

Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in 

Bonn on 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154) (the Bonn Agreement), in particular its annex 2 

regarding the role of the United Nations during the interim period,

Welcoming the establishment on 22 December 2001 of the Afghan interim authority 

and looking forward to the evolution of the process set out in the Bonn Agreement,

Stressing the vital importance of combating the cultivation and traffi cking of illicit 

drugs and of eliminating the threat of landmines, as well as of curbing the illicit fl ow of 

small arms,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2002

(S/2002/278),

Encouraging donor countries that pledged fi nancial aid at the Tokyo Conference on 

reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to fulfi ll their commitments as soon as possible,

Commending the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) for 

the determination shown in the implementation of its mandate in particularly diffi cult 

circumstances,

1. Endorses the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months from the date of adoption 

of this resolution, of a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 

with the mandate and structure laid out in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 

March 2002 (S/2002/278);
100

2. Reaffi rms its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

and endorses his full authority, in accordance with its relevant resolutions, over the 

planning and conduct of all United Nations activities in Afghanistan;

3. Stresses that the provision of focused recovery and reconstruction assistance can greatly 

assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and, to this end, urges bilateral 

and multilateral donors, in particular through the Afghanistan Support Group and the 

Implementation Group, to coordinate very closely with the Special Representative of 

the Secretary-General, the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors;

4. Stresses also, in the context of paragraph 3 above, that while humanitarian assistance 

should be provided wherever there is a need, recovery or reconstruction assistance 

ought to be provided, through the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors, 

and implemented effectively, where local authorities contribute to the maintenance of 

a secure environment and demonstrate respect for human rights;

5. Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its 

mandate and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff throughout 

the country;

6. Requests the International Security Assistance Force, in implementing its mandate in 

accordance with resolution 1386 (2001), to continue to work in close consultation with 

the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on the 

implementation of this resolution;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
101

ANNEX F: OHDACA CHECKLIST

GENERAL PROJECT GUIDANCE

1. Projects must advance DOD security goals.

2. Improve access and infl uence to regions and people.

3. Reinforce security and stability.

4. Generate good will for DOD.

5. Economic assistance is NOT humanitarian assistance.

6. “Nation building” and foreign assistance type projects that go beyond mere 

humanitarian assistance are NOT authorized. Distinguishing between Nation 

Building and the fi rst four bullets above can sometimes be diffi cult.

7. Projects should be sustainable w/o continued long term oversight by DoD 

personnel.

8. Projects that improve the capacity of the HN to address problems are preferred to 

projects that simply provide services.

9. Projects should address the basic humanitarian needs of local, humanitarian 

populations.

10. Goods and services may only be received by the host nation. The benefi ciaries 

should be the civilian population.

SPECIFIC PROJECT GUIDANCE

1. Single projects cannot exceed $300,000. Single end-items cannot exceed 

$100,000.

2. Although permissible, projects that merely purchase a piece of equipment should 

be limited. I would expect increased scrutiny for purchases of pieces of equipment, 

especially if high dollar and numerous.

3. Approved project categories under OHDACA:

a. Public Health Survey and Assessments – Does not include authority to include authority to 

actually conduct medical treatment. Treatment and funding authority must 

be conducted under 401.

b. Water supply / Sanitation 

c. Well Drilling

d. Medical Support & Supplies – There is a preference for using existing stocks 

of DOD med supplies under the DOD excess property program. Before 

purchasing medical equipment it should be determined beforehand that it can 

be properly maintained and operated. Does not provide legal and funding 

authority to conduct direct medical treatment. Treatment and funding 

authority for direct treatment are under 401.
102

e. Construction & Repair of rudimentary surface transportation systems and 

public facilities – A very broad category that has allowed for us to do many 

of the school and hospital projects.

f. Repair Electrical Grids – May enhance electrical service, but may NOT 

provide a level of service greater than pre-war Afghanistan.

g. Humanitarian Demining Mine Awareness Training – Mine awareness is 

currently the only authorized HD activity.

h. Mine display boards – Could be implemented as part of a mine awareness 

campaign.

i. Essential repairs/rebuilding for orphanages, schools, relief warehouses 

j. Animal husbandry / VETCAP

k. Victim Assistance training for mine victims 
103

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS.

AACA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority

ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. Founded in 1988 to 

coordinate aid for Afghanistan from Pakistan.

ACSF Afghan Civil Society Forum

AIA Afghan Interim Authority

AIMS Afghanistan Information Management Service. Computer Data Base

AMF Afghan Militia Force

ANA Afghan National Army

ANCB Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau/ Body

ARCENT U.S. Army Forces Central Command

ARIC Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Resource & 

Information Center

ARSG Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group

ASG Afghanistan Support Group

ATA Afghanistan Transitional Authority/Administration

BAAG British Agencies Afghanistan Group

CA Civil Affairs

CAG US Marine Corps Civil Affairs Group

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAT Civil Affairs Team

CENTRIXS Coalition Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System

CG Consultative Group 

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CHLC Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation. The concept for NATO, the UK and ISAF

CJCMOTF Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CMCC Civil-Military Coordination Center

CMOC Civil Military Operations Center 

DDR United Nations Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

DFID Department for International Development. The UK counterpart to 

USAID.

DPKO Department for Peacekeeping Operations of the UN
104

DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs

FY Fiscal Year

HAWG Humanitarian Assistance Working Group

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IG United Nations Implementation Group

IGO International Government Organization

IO Intergovernmental Organization 

IOM International Organization for Migration

ISAF International Security Assistance Force of NATO

ITAP Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 

2002 of the UN

ITGA Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

MOB Mobilization

MOE Measure of Effectiveness

MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated

MRE Mission Readiness/Rehearsal Exercise

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OEF Operations Enduring Freedom

OGA Other Governmental Agencies. Refers to the Central Intelligence Agency 

along with other classifi ed agencies of the US and other governments.

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid

OMC-A Offi ce of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan

OSD Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PKI Peace Keeping Institute of the US Army

PKSOI Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute of the US Army

POLMIL Political-Military

PRT Provisional Reconstruction Team

RAMCC Regional Air Movement Control Center of the US Air Force

ROC Regional Operations Center
105

SETAF U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne)

SF Special Forces

SOR Statement of Requirements

SRSG Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General 

TSC Theater Support Command

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Centre

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNOC Offi ce of the UN Coordinator

UNOCHA United Nations Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNPD United Nations Procurement Division

UNSMA United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan

USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USIP United States Institute for Peace

USJFKSWC United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
106

Bibliography

After Action Reports

Belote, COL Tom, “After Action Report--Worldwide Psychological Operations 

Conference,” US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1 December 2002.

Ehrlich, SFC Rob, Operations Enduring Freedom, Lessons Learned and Observations, Ft 

Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Lessons Learned, 19 May to 12 June 2002.

Langley, COL K.G., Operation Enduring Freedom, 352 CA CMD After Action Review, 

Riverdale Park, Md: 352nd CACOM, 26 July 2002.

Leide, John AAR Enduring Freedom/ Sep 2001-Apr2002/ C Co, 96th Civil Affairs BN (A). 

Ft Bragg: 96th CA Battalion, 15 April 2002

Skrzecz, SFC Dave, “Trip Report U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) CMO Study 

of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Afghanistan,” Ft Bragg, NC, 29 

November 2002. 

Briefi ngs:

CJCMOTF, “Situational Brief,” briefi ng slides, Kabul, Afghanistan. 3 September 2002.

CJCMOTF, “Coalition/Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force,” briefi ng slides, Tampa, 

FL 29 May 2002. 

CJCMOTF, “Civil-Military Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom,” briefi ng slides, 

CENTCOM, Tampa, FL, 20 March 2002.

CJCMOTF, “Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations (CJCMOTF) Brief,” briefi ng slides, 

CENTCOM, Tampa Fl, 29 January 2002.

CJCMOTF, “Civil Military Operations Civil Sector Assessment Strategy,” briefi ng slides, 

CJCMOTF Kabul, undated.

Coggin, MAJ Jeff “ CHLC Operational Brief,” briefi ng presented by CHLC 13/ Gardez, 

Afghanistan, September, 2002.

Durch, William, “Security and Peace Support in Afghanistan: Analysis and Short- to 

Medium-term Options,” briefi ng slides, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. 14 

June 2002.

Goldsmith, MAJ Stu, “Command Battle Update Brief 070600R Sep 02,” Briefi ng slides, 

8th PSYOP Bn, Raleigh, N.C. 22 November 2002.

Grunwald, Col Scott “RAMCC, Regional Air Movement Control Center,” briefi ng slides 

CENTAF, AFFSA/CC, 26 December 2002.

Newman, COL Tom “USAREUR’s OEF/ONE Initial Impressions,” briefi ng slides, US 

Army Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, 27 August 2002.

Princes Patricia’s Light Infantry Battalion, “CIMIC Operations Lessons Learned,” briefi ng 

slides with notes, Edmonton, Canada, 23 October, 2002.

Princes Patricia’s Light Infantry Battalion, “Information Operations Lessons Learned,” 

briefi ng slides with notes, Edmonton, Canada, 23 October, 2002.
107

Political Military Bureau of the Department of State, “Pol-Mil Plan for Post-Hostilities 

Afghanistan,” briefi ng Slides, Washington, D.C. May 2002.

Stout, LTC Michael, “Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept,” briefi ng slides, Kabul, 

CJCMOTF 20 February 2003.

Stout, LTC Michael, “Civil-Military Coordination Center,” briefi ng slides, Kabul, 27 

March 2003. 

Stout, LTC Michael, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” briefi ng slides, Kabul, 24 April 

2003. 

USCENTCOM, “OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 

Strategic Concept,” briefi ng slides, CENTCOM, Tampa Fl, 12 November 2001. 

Congressional Hearings:

U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Subcommittee, Joint Hearing on the Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan, 10 October, 

2001 (20385 words). Database on –line. Available from Lexis-Nexis. Accessed 23 January 

2003. 

U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Subcommittee, Joint Hearing on U.S. Efforts to Deliver Aid to Afghanistan, 15 November, 

2001 (13108 words). Database on –line. Available from Lexis-Nexis. Accessed 23 January 

2003.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, Hearing on the Political Future of 

Afghanistan, 6 December, 2001 (14427 words). Database on –line. Available from LexisNexis. Accessed 23 January 2003.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, Hearing on Operation Enduring 

Freedom, 7 February 2002 (20458 words). Database on –line. Available from Lexis-Nexis. 

Accessed 23 January 2003.

U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Defense Authorization 

Budget Request, 27 February 2002 (13985 words). Database on –line. Available from 

Lexis-Nexis. Accessed 23 January 2003.

U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Emerging Threats Subcommittee, Hearing on the 

Special Operations Budget, 12 March 2002 (17150 words). Database on –line. Available 

from Lexis-Nexis. Accessed 23 January 2003.

U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Operation Enduring 

Freedom, 31 July 2002 (21911 words). Database on –line. Available from Lexis-Nexis. 

Accessed 23 January 2003.

Interviews: All of the interviews were conducted under Chatham House rules. None of 

the comments can be attributed. PKI has developed the following notation system for the 

footnotes. The note will identify the organization and the date but not the person. For 

example, CJCMOTF 01, 4 Nov 02 and NGO 02, 5 Nov 02 identify two separate individuals 

interviewed on two separate occasions. The key to the notation and the original, attributed 

interview are maintain by PKI and can be review with authorization by the Director of PKI. 

The footnote annotations are listed beside each of the sources below to assist the readers. 
108

• US Military

• US Central Command, (CENTCOM number, date).

• ARCENT, Army Component Command for Central Command, 

(ARCENT number, date).

• Combined Joint Task Force 180, Afghanistan, (CJTF 180, number, 

date).

• Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force, Afghanistan, 

(CJCMOTF, number, date).

• 10th Mountain Division, (10th Mountain Div, number, date).

• 101st Air Assault Division, ( Air Assault Division, (101ST, number, date).

• 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date). 

• 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).

• 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Civil Affairs Command, (352nd , CACOM, number, date)

• 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, (CJCMOTF number, date).

• Subordinate CHLC, (CHLC number, date)

• 122nd ROC, (122nd ROC, number, date)

• 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, (96th CA, number, date)

• United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 

Command. (USACAPOC, number, date)

• 377th Theater Support Command, (377th TSC, number, date)

• US Army War College, (USAWC, number, date)

• 126th Military History Unit. This unit interviewed all of the Civil 

Affairs soldiers that participated for the fi rst year in OEF. There are 

18 CD located at the Library at the USJFKSWC. (USJFKSWC Oral 

History Report number, OEF, date)

• US John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Archives. 

(USJFKSWC, number, date)

• US Government

• Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, (OSD, number, date)

• Offi ce of the Secretary of State, (DOS, number, date)

• US Agency for International Development, (US EMBASSY, number, 

date)

• US Embassy, Kabul, (US EMBASSY, number, date)

• Allied Military

• 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, (CANADA, 

number, date).

• Joint Doctrine Development Center, United Kingdom, (UK, number, 

date)
109

• ISAF, Afghanistan, ( ISAF, number, date).

• UK Department for International Development, DFID, ( UK, number, 

date)

• Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE (SHAPE, 

number, date)

• United Nations

• UNAMA, Afghanistan, (UNAMA, number, date)

• UN Offi ce of Chief for Humanitarian Assistance, UNOCHA (UN, 

number, date).

• World Food Program,( IGO number, date).

• UN Joint Logistical Center, (UN, number, date).

• UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, (UN, number, date).

• NGO All identifi ed in footnotes as (NGO, number, date)

• .InterAction

• CARE

• Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency

• International Committee for the Red Cross

• Doctors Without Boarders

• Mercy Corps

• International Organization for Migration

• European Commission- Humanitarian Aid Offi ce (ECHO)

• RAND. Identifi ed as RAND

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118

ENDNOTES

1 Joint Staff, J-7 Directorate, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 

1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, 14 August 2002.

2 NATO, Civil Military Operations, Allied Joint Publication 9-0 (Brussels, BE) Paragraph 0212; 

European Union Military Committee, CIMIC Concept, (Brussels, BE) DOC 06/02. 

3 Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 

of the Army, 14 June 2001, 1-47.

4 Dr. Frederick Machmer, “Refl ections of Afghanistan,” The Liaison. 3, no.1, ( Bi-Annual 2003) 

18.

5 UN-05, 23 APRIL 03; UN-06, 23 April 03.

6 UNAMA 01, 9 NOV 02

7 USIP-RAND Oct. 7-2002, Conference Notes by Flavin. NGO 05, 17 NOV 02; NGO 06, 17 

NOV 02;

8 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-015, OEF, 31 May, 2002

9 USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin

10 UN News Center, “Afghanistan & the Untied Nations,” available from http://www.un.org/

News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml Internet; accessed 19 February 2003. The following 

are the UN Security Council Resolution since 1989: Resolution 647 (1990) of 11 January - 

extends UNGOMAP for a fi nal two months. Resolution 1076 (1996) of 22 October - calls for an 

end to hostilities, outside interference and supply of arms to the parties to the confl ict; denounces 

discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan. Resolution 1193 (1998) of 28 August - 

demands an end to hostilities and an investigation into the killing of two UN staff members and the 

military adviser to the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan. Resolution 1214 (1998) of 8 December 

- repeats demands of resolution 1193 and reaffi rms support for the United Nations Special Mission 

to Afghanistan. Resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October - demands the Taliban turn over Usama bin 

Laden, forbids aircraft to take-of or land in Taliban-controlled territory without approval and freezes 

assets of the Taliban. Resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December - repeats demand that the Taliban 

turn over bin Laden and imposes further measures on their territory pending concurrence with the 

demand. 

Resolution 1363 (2001) of 30 July - establishes a monitoring mechanism for the measures 

imposed under the previous two resolutions.

11 UN Security Council, Resolution 1383, (New York: 4434th Meeting of 6 December 2001).

12 United Nations, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, (Bonn: 5 December 2001) 1,5,6.

13 Chris Johnson, William Maley, Alexander Their and Ali Wardak, Afghanistan’s Political and 

Constitutional Development, (London: Overseas Development Institute, January 2003), 3. Naomi 

Weinberger, “Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan,” Journal 

of International Affaires 55 (Spring 2002): 257. 14 Lakhdar Brahimi in “Brahimi lays out plan for 

political transition in Afghanistan.” 13 November 2001, available from <www.un.org/apps/news/

storyAr.asp?NewsID=2134&Cr=afghan&Crl=> Internet; accessed 19 February 2003. Department 

of State, Department of State International Information Program 9 September, 2002, (Washington 

D.C.: Department of State, 9 September, 2002). Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, “The 

Establishment of Consultative Groups for Furtherance of the National Development Programme,” 

memorandum for donors, Kabul, 12 December 2002.
119

15 UN 04, 29 MAY 02; UN 03, 24 JUNE 02; UN 02, 5 SEP 02 UN 03, 24 JUNE 02; UK 02, 

18-20 SEP 02; 

16 UN Security Council, Resolution 1401, (New York: 4501st Meeting of 28 March 2002).

17 UN-06, 23 April 03; UN-05, 23 APRIL 03; The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance. 

(Islamabad: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002),77-79.

18 UN Security Council, Resolution 1401, (New York: 4501st Meeting of 28 March 2002).

19 UN Security Council, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International 

Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: General Assembly, 56th Session, 

Agenda Item 43, 18 March 2002).

20 UN-06, 23 April 03 

21 USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin; US EMBASSY 02, 9 

NOV 02

22 COL Michael Stout, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” briefi ng slides, Kabul, 24 April 

2003. 

23 NGO 06, 17 NOV 02; NGO 05, 17 NOV 02; Strategic Coordination, 20-24.

24 Strategic Coordination, 25.

25 Strategic Coordination, 2.

26 CJCMOTF 03, 4-12 NOV 02; UN-06, 23 April 03; UN 02, 5 SEP 02 

27 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, The Establishment of Consultative Groups for 

Furtherance of National Development Programme, (AACA Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 December 2002) 

2.

28. US EMBASSY 03, 7 NOV 02

29USIP, RAND, OSD Conference

30 ISAF 02, 6 DEC 02; CENTCOM 01, 29 MAY 02; DOS 01, 12 JULY 02; CJTF 180 02, 11 

NOV 02; 

31 CENTCOM 01, 29 MAY 02; UN 04, 29 MAY 02; CENTCOM 04, 30 MAY 02; IGO 01, 

30 May 02; NGO 02, 30 May 02.

32 Henry L Stimson Center, “Views on Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and Statements 

by U.S. and International Leaders,” available from http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP2002053036

Internet; accessed 9 July 2002.

33 Secretary- Generals Report 18 March 2002,9.

34 UN Security Council, The Situation In Afghanistan And Its Implications For International 

Peace And Security Report Of The Secretary-General. (New York: General Assembly 57th Session, 

Agenda Item 37, 18 March 2003) 13.

35 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, “The Establishment of Consultative Groups 

for Furtherance of the National Development Programme,” memorandum for donors, Kabul, 12 

December 2002 describes the establishment of 5 working groups for rule of law: ANA, Demobilization 

and Reintegration, National Police Justice and Anti-narcotics. There is no penal. Donors are asked to 

assume the focal point for each of these working groups. There is no overall direction. CJCMOTF 

03, 4-12 NOV 02; UK 01, 20 SEP 02; 

36 US EMBASSY 02, 9 NOV 02; Report of the Secretary-General, 18 March 2003, 8-10.

37 Author was told by UNAMA contractor in Nov 2002 that something like $300,000 
120

for a one-way fl ight was not uncommon. CJCMOTF 05, 5 NOV 02; 

38 AACA, op cite. 

39 Strategic Coordination, 29.

40 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, The Establishment of Consultative Groups for 

Furtherance of National Development Programme, (AACA Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 December 2002) 2.

41 Barry Bearak, “Unreconstructed,” New York Times Magazine (1 June 2003): 43. Ron Moreau, 

“Walking a Fine Line,” Newsweek (9 June 2003), 37 states that CARE reports that Kosovo receives 

$250 per capita while Afghanistan get $42 yet the needs and the security problems are much greater 

for Afghanistan. 

42 Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, “The Afghan Job Is Bigger Than Expected,” International 

Herald Tribune January 14, 2003 available from < http://www.iht.com> Internet, accessed 14 January, 

2003.

43 United States Central Command, “OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Humanitarian 

Assistance (HA) Strategic Concept,” briefi ng slides 12 November 2001 presented to author 

USCENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida, 23 May 2002.

44 Ibid.

45 377th TSC, 5-6 Oct 02

46 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

47 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-010, OEF, 15 May, 2002

48 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

49 Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force, “ Coalition Joint Civil-Military 

Operations (CJCMOTF) Brief January 2002,” briefi ng slides presented to author at USCENTCOM 

MacDill AFV, Florida, 23 May 2002.

50 96th CA 02, 25 OCT 02; 96th CA 01, 25 OCT 02

51 Interview with Major James Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, PKSOI Carlisle PA.

52 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-003, OEF, 10 May, 2002

53 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002

54 BG David E Kratzer, “ CJCMOTF Spending Implementation Plan in Support of the CivilMilitary Engagement Strategy in Afghanistan Midterm Assessment and Azimuth Adjustment,” 

Memorandum for Commander CFLCC, Kabul Afghanistan, 26 April 2002; USJFKSWC Oral 

History Report 1-139, OEF, 11 December 2002

55 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002

56 CJCMOTF, “Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations,” briefi ng slides, CJCMOTF, Tampa 

Florida, 29 January 2002.

57 CJCMOTF, “Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force,” briefi ng slides, CJCMOTF, 

Tampa Florida, 29 May 2002. 

58 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-039, OEF, 9 October, 2002; USJFKSWC Oral 

History; USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-061, OEF, 23 October 2002 Report 1-139, OEF, 

11 December 2002; John Leide, AAR Enduring Freedom/ Sep 2001-Apr2002/ C Co, 96th Civil 

Affairs BN (A). (Ft Bragg: 96th CA Battalion, 15 April 2002).

59 ARCENT 02, 5 AUG 02
121

60 Ibid. USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-010, OEF, 15 May, 2002

61 UN-08, 23 April 03

62 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

63 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-006, OEF, 12 November 2002

64 Ibid. COL Mike Stout, Interview by author at AWC, 15 July 2003.

65 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, The Establishment of Consultative Groups for 

Furtherance of National Development Programme, (AACA Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 December 2002) 

2.

66 Deborah Alexander, “Bamyan Field Report,” USAID/Kabul, 21-27 January, 2003.

67 CJCMOTF PRT, 01, 9 FEB 03

68 8th PSYOP Battalion, “Commander’s Battle Update Briefi ng, 070600R SEP 02,” briefi ng 

slides with notes, World Wild Psychological Conference, 22 November 2002. 

69 CANADA 06, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 02, 23 OCT 02; 101ST 01, 12 SEP 02; 101ST 04, 12 

SEP 02

70 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-132, OEF, 22 Nov, 2002

71 COL Mike Stout, “Draft PRT IPR.” Memorandum for CJTF 180, CJCMOTF Afghanistan, 

March 2003. COL Mike Stout, interviewed by author, 15 July, 2003.

72 CJCMOTF 02, 5 NOV 02

73 SFC Rob Ehrlich, Operation Enduring Freedom, Lessons Learned and Observations, (Ft 

Leavenworth: U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, 19 May to 12 June 2002), Topic 5.

74 Princes Patricia Light Infantry, “InformationOperations Lessons Learned,” briefi ng slides 

with scripted commentary, Princes Patricia Light Infantry, Edmonton, Canada 23 October, 2002.

75 Ibid.

76 CJTF 180 02, 11 NOV 02

77 Interview with Major James Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, PKSOI Carlisle PA.

78 British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Afghanistan Briefi ng Pack: An Introduction to Working 

in Afghanistan and/or with Afghans. (London: BAAG, January 2003) 16/38

79 Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, “NGO Coordination and Some other Relevant Issues in 

the Context of Afghanistan from an NGO Perspective,” (The International Council of Voluntary 

Agencies, 9 April 2002) 12.. 

80 10th Mountain Div 01, 17 SEP 02

81 CJCMOTF 02, 5 NOV 02; ARCENT 02, 5 AUG 02; 96th CA 02, 25 OCT 02

82 USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin

83 CJCMOTF 07, 6 NOV 02; 10th Mountain Div 02, 15 SEP 02; 101ST 06, 12 SEP 02; CJTF 

180 01, 12 NOV 02

84 377th TSC, 5-6 Oct 02; 352nd CACOM , 23 Sep 02

85 CENTCOM 01, 29 MAY 02; CENTCOM 04, 30 MAY 02; Interview with Major James 

Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, PKSOI Carlisle PA. Major Mike Warmack, Major Fritz Little, and 

Major Jose Salcedo were the 39Cs assigned to ARCENT staff. 

86 352nd CACOM , 23 Sep 02
122

87 CENTCOM 04, 30 MAY 02

88 Douglas Mercado, Report to InterAction on Activities, Observations and Recommendations 

of the NGO Liaison to US Central Command (Tampa: US Central Command, July 2002) 1-6.

89 IGO 01, 30 May 02; UN 04, 29 MAY 02; UN 04, 29 MAY 02

90 UN 04, 29 MAY 02

91 IGO 01, 30 May 02

92 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-003, OEF, 10 May, 2002

93 ISAF 04, 12 NOV 02

94 Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, “NGO Coordination and Some other Relevant Issues in 

the Context of Afghanistan from an NGO Perspective,” (The International Council of Voluntary 

Agencies, 9 April 2002) 13. 

95 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

96 CJCMOTF, “Civil-Military Coordination Center (CM Coord Center),” Briefi ng slides, 

CJCMOTF, Kabul Afghanistan 25 March 2003. . CMCC was located in Kabul with the purpose 

to: Share information among all interested parties, Assess progress of reconstruction efforts, and 

facilitate the development of projects to meet identifi ed program shortfalls.

97 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, The Establishment of Consultative Groups for 

Furtherance of National Development Programme, (AACA Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 December 2002) 

2.

98 CJCMOTF, “Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept,” briefi ng slides, CJCMOTF, 

Kabul, Afghanistan, 3 January 2003. The detail mission of PRTs is: Assist in marginalizing causes 

of instability by: Forming and facilitating information sharing bodies that support the ITGA thus 

stimulating and enhancing local, regional, and national reconstruction efforts. Create a more safe 

and secure environment by monitoring/assessing/reporting on military, political, civil reform efforts. 

Facilitate negotiations to defuse local and inter-regional tensions. Assist, as required, with regional 

development of Afghan National Army and local Afghan law enforcement/security sector authorities. 

Facilitate information sharing between National/international/local organizations and agencies 

Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) Security sector and military (Afghan and 

coalition) Facilitate/strengthen/extend ITGA infl uence through interaction with political, military, 

and community leaders. Provide expert advice, as needed, to local leaders/offi cials in the province. 

Monitor local and regional situation via conducting frequent patrols in both civil and security sectors. 

Monitor, assist, and report on UNAMA DDR process. Report information on: Government operations 

Infrastructure improvements Intra-regional commerce Health care/basic human needs Security 

operations Economic improvement Afghan acceptance of the rule of law/ arbitration of disputes in a 

non-violent and peaceful manner. Report on local/provincial leader’s acceptance of the ITGA

99 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-001, OEF, 11 May 2002

100 CENTCOM 08, 14 JAN 03; US EMBASSY 05, 7 NOV 02

101 Her Majesty’s Government, “Defeating International Terrorism: Campaign Objectives,” 

16 October 2001: available from http://ww.globalsecurity.org/militaty/library/news/2001/10/uk011016-terror-objectives; accessed 5 March 2003.

102 ISAF 01, 27 SEP 02; ISAF 02, 6 DEC 02; ISAF 03, 7 NOV 02; ISAF 04, 12 NOV 02; see 

also “Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (IASF) and 

the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 31 December 2001. 

103 CHLC 01, 16 NOV 02

104 96th CA 02, 25 OCT 02; CJCMOTF 02, 5 NOV 02
123

105 10th Mountain Div 01, 17 SEP 02; 101ST 05, 12 SEP 02; 101ST 05, 12 SEP 02.

106 CANADA 01, 23 OCT 02

107 CANADA 01, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 02, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 05, 23 OCT 02; 

Princes Patricia Light Infantry, “CIMIC Operations Lessons Learned,” briefi ng slides with scripted 

commentary, Princes Patricia’s Light Infantry, Edmonton, Canada 23 October, 2002.

108 CANADA 03, 23 OCT 02

109 “ CIMIC Operations Lessons Learned” Briefi ng 

110 CANADA 06, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 02, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 04, 23 OCT 02; 10th 

Mountain Div 02, 15 SEP 02; 101ST 03, 12 SEP 02; 101ST 04, 12 SEP 02; 101ST 02, 12 SEP 

02.

111 ISAF 02, 6 DEC 02; ISAF 03, 7 NOV 02; John Bratton, “MPAT Workgroup Module Series 

Peace Operations,” briefi ng slides with commentary, USPACOM, Hawaii, 7 June 2002.

112 CANADA 01, 23 OCT 02; CANADA 06, 23 OCT 02; 101ST 04, 12 SEP 02; 101ST 06, 

12 SEP 02

113 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), I-4.

114 Ibid, I-4.

115 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, 8 February 2001), I-3, 1-4.

116 Ibid, I-10; USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin; Mark 

Burgess, “Navigating the Three-Block War and the Urban Triad,” 4 April 2003, available from http://

www.cdi.org/iraq/urban-pr.cfm Internet. Accessed 12 April 2003.

117 JP 3-57, II-7.

118 CENTCOM 06, 30 MAY 02

119 Ibid, IV-8.

120 USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin;

121 USCINCENT MSG, 222230Z Jan 02

122 Department of the Army, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Field 

Manual 6-0 Final Draft (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2002), 4-25; 

Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, Field Manual 5-0 Final Draft 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 July 2002).

123 COL Scott Grunwald, “RAMCC, Regional Air Movement Control Center,” briefi ng slides 

CENTAF, AFFSA/CC, 26 December 2002. 

124 UN 04, 29 MAY 02; CENTCOM 01, 29 MAY 02; IGO 01, 30 May 02; NGO 02, 29 MAY 

02

125 UK 02, 18-20 SEP 02

126 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-010, OEF, 15 May, 2002

127 J.G Zavales, Guide for Planning and Implementation of Department of Defense Humanitarian 

Assistance Programs, 24 April 2000 available from http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECJ4/ECJ4-

ID/hap/OSD%20GUIDE%20HA.doc Internet: accessed 22 May 2003.

128 IGO 01, 30 May 02; IGO-02, 23 April 03; 
124

129 CJCMOTF, “Request for Assistance Matrix,” HAWG, Tampa, 30 May 2002, items 111-113; 

NGO 01, 30 May 02. UNJLC, UNOCHA, UNHCR, and IOM identifi ed three bridges that were 

critical to facilitate the fl ow of relief supplies and refugees that by any international understanding 

fi t the defi nition of Humanitarian Assistance better than reconstructing schools. The NGO did not 

have the capability nor did the Afghans to repair these bridges. These bridges, Takhta Pull between 

Spin Boldak and Kandahar; Bala Murghab between Hirat and Qala-e-Naw; and Koksha on the 

Taloquan/Khajawa Ghar/Rustag road, were submitted at the beginning of March 2002 to the HAWG 

at CENTCOM for military assistance where they have remain an open item for at least fi ve months 

if not longer.

130 NGO 01, 30 May 02; USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin; 

IGO 01, 30 May 02; UN 03, 24 JUNE 02 

131 USCINCENT MSG, 222230Z Jan 02

132 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-006, OEF, 12 November 2002; USJFKSWC Oral 

History Report 1-007, OEF, 15 May 2002; USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-001, OEF, 11 

May 2002

133 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-130, OEF, Nov, 2002

134 UN 04, 29 MAY 02

135 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-118, OEF, 14 Nov, 2002

136 Michelle Kelly and Morten Rostrup, “Identify Yourselves,” The Guardian, 1 February, 

2002; available from http://society.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,7784,642970,00.html Internet; 

accessed 20 June 2003.

137 Douglas Mercado, Report to InterAction on Activities, Observations and Recommendations 

of the NGO Liaison to US Central Command (Tampa: US Central Command, July 2002) 1-6.

138 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-066, OEF, 20 October 2002

139 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002

140 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-051, OEF, 15 Oct, 2002

141 BG David E Kratzer, “ CJCMOTF Spending Implementation Plan in Support of the CivilMilitary Engagement Strategy in Afghanistan Midterm Assessment and Azimuth Adjustment,” 

Memorandum for Commander CFLCC, Kabul Afghanistan, 26 April 2002.

142 Nicholas Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, Issues Paper Series of the 

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. (Islamabad: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 

August 2002), 25.

143 UK 03, 21 April 03; ISAF 02, 6 DEC 02; Colonel Kurt Mueller, J-9 SHAPE 1996-97, 

interviewed by author, 27 May 2003, US Army War College, PA.

144 Interview with Major James Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, PKSOI Carlisle PA.

145 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-015, OEF, 31 May, 2002; Interview with Major 

James Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, PKSOI Carlisle PA.

146 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

147 Deborah Alexander, “Bamyan Field Report,” USAID/Kabul, 21-27 January, 2003.

148 AFCSF, Newsletter, November 2002. (Berne, Switzerland: ACSF swisspeace, November 

2002) 1.2.

149 Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, The Establishment of Consultative Groups for 

Furtherance of National Development Programme, (AACA Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 December 2002) 
125

2.

150 USIP, RAND, OSD Conference 7-8 October 2002 Notes by Flavin

151 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-039, OEF, 9 October, 2002

152 ARCENT 02, 5 AUG 02; Interview with Major James Brown, 96th CA, 9/10/2004, 

PKSOI Carlisle PA.

153 COL K.G. Langley, Operations Enduring Freedom- 352 CA CMD After Action Review 

(AAR) v1, (Riverdale Park, MD: 26 July 2002). 

154 COL Mike Stout, “Draft PRT IPR.” Memorandum for CJTF 180, CJCMOTF Afghanistan, 

March 2003.

155 Ibid, 377th TSC, 5-6 Oct 02; 377th TSC, 5-6 Oct 02; CJCMOTF 07, 6 NOV 02

156 352nd CACOM , 23 Sep 02

157 COL Mike Stout, Interviewed by author, USAWC 15 July, 2003,

158 CJCMOTF 07, 6 NOV 02; 414th CA BN, 26 Oct 02

159 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Emerging Lessons, Insights & Observations Operation 

Enduring Freedom,” briefi ng slides, US Army Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, 27 

August 2002. 

160 David E Skrzec, “Trip Report U.S. Army peacekeeping Institute (PKI) CMO Study of 

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM9OEF0 Afghanistan,” (Ft Bragg: US Army John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center and School, 29 November 2002), 2.

161 COL Mike Stout, “Draft PRT IPR.” Memorandum for CJTF 180, CJCMOTF Afghanistan, 

March 2003.

162 Ibid, COL K.G. Langley, Operations Enduring Freedom- 352 CA CMD After Action Review 

(AAR) v1, (Riverdale Park, MD: 26 July 2002); CJCMOTF 07, 6 NOV 02; 414th CA BN, 26 Oct 

02

163 COL Mike Stout, Interview with author, AWC, 15 July 2003.

164 101ST 06, 12 SEP 02

165 10th Mountain Div 01, 17 SEP 02

166 352nd CACOM , 23 Sep 02

167 Howard Olson and John Davis, Training U.S. Army Offi cers for Peace Operations; Lessons 

from Bosnia, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 29 October 1999) 4-6.

168 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002

169 Chief of Staff, Army, Offi cer Professional Reading List, available from http://hqda.army.

mil/library.csa.html ; Internet; accessed 21 May 2003.

170 CENTCOM 01, 29 MAY 02

171 ARCENT 02, 5 AUG 02

172 COL Mike Stout, Interview with author, 15 July 2003.

173 UN 04, 29 MAY 02; UN-08, 23 April 03

174 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03
126

175 CJCMOTF-02, 5 NOV 02; BG David E Kratzer, “ CJCMOTF Spending Implementation 

Plan in Support of the Civil-Military Engagement Strategy in Afghanistan Midterm Assessment and 

Azimuth Adjustment,” Memorandum for Commander CFLCC, Kabul Afghanistan, 26 April 2002. 

Lt Col Mike Stout, “Draft PRT IPR.” Memorandum for CJTF 180, CJCMOTF Afghanistan, March 

2003. CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

176 COL Mike Stout, “Draft PRT IPR.” Memorandum for CJTF 180, CJCMOTF Afghanistan, 

March 2003.

177 Ibid.

178 Confl ict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID, Terms Of Reference: Lessons 

Learned From DFID/MOD Relationship During The Afghanistan Crisis, (London: Joint Doctrine 

and Concept Centre, MOD Overseas Secretariat, MOD, 5 September 2002)

179 Ibid.

180 J.G Zavales, Guide for Planning and Implementation of Department of Defense Humanitarian 

Assistance Programs, 24 April 2000 available from http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECJ4/ECJ4-

ID/hap/OSD%20GUIDE%20HA.doc Internet: accessed 22 May 2003.

181 USCINCENT MSG, 222230Z Jan 02 

182 BG David E Kratzer, “ CJCMOTF Spending Implementation Plan in Support of the CivilMilitary Engagement Strategy in Afghanistan Midterm Assessment and Azimuth Adjustment,” 

Memorandum for Commander CFLCC, Kabul Afghanistan, 26 April 2002.

183 352nd CACOM , 23 Sep 02; CJCMOTF-02, 5 NOV 02; Major Norman Emery, “Civil 

Affairs Support to Unconventional Warfare Missions,” CALL Training Quarterly April 2002; 

available from http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq4-02/emery.htm ;Internet. Accessed 21 

November 2002.

184 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

185 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-193, OEF, November 2002

186 CENTCOM 08, 14 JAN 03

187 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

188 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002 USJFKSWC Oral History 

Report 1-123, OEF, 16 Nov, 2002; USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-051, OEF, 15 Oct, 2002

189 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-193, OEF, November 2002

190 CJCMOTF-02, 5 NOV 02; Major Norman Emery, “Civil Affairs Support to Unconventional 

Warfare Missions,” CALL Training Quarterly April 2002; available from http://call.army.mil/

products/trngqtr/tq4-02/emery.htm ;Internet. Accessed 21 November 2002.

191 CENTCOM 02, 30 MAY 02

192 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-118, OEF, 14 Nov, 2002; USJFKSWC 2 June 03

193 CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

194 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-121, OEF, 15 Nov, 2002

195 COL Tia Johnson et.al. Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville: The Judge Advocates 

School, 2003), 224.

196 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-046, OEF, 12 Oct, 2002

197 COL Tia Johnson et.al. Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville: The Judge Advocates 

School, 2003), 150.
127

198 Walter Pjetraj, CTF82-C9, “Response to CTF180 RFI concerning Awards Program and 

Humanitarian Assistance,”30 August 2002.

199 J.G Zavales, Guide for Planning and Implementation of Department of Defense Humanitarian 

Assistance Programs, 24 April 2000 available from http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECJ4/ECJ4-

ID/hap/OSD%20GUIDE%20HA.doc Internet: accessed 22 May 2003.

200 USJFKSWC Oral History Report 1-051, OEF, 15 Oct, 2002; CJCMOTF 08, 24 Jun 03

201 CJCS MSG, 252116Z Oct 01, “Planning Order.”

202 “ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Strategic Concept,” 

briefi ng slides, United States Central Command, Tampa, 12 November 2001.

203 CENTCOM 08, 14 JAN 03; IGO 01, 30 May 02; Colonel Tom Newman, “USAREUR’s 

OEF/ONE Initial Impressions,” briefi ng slides, US Army Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle 

Barracks, 27 August 2002.

204 “ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Strategic Concept,” 

briefi ng slides, United States Central Command, Tampa, 12 November 2001.

205 Ibid.

206 John Leide, AAR Enduring Freedom/ Sep 2001-Apr2002/ C Co, 96th Civil Affairs BN (A). 

( Ft Bragg: 96th CA Battalion, 15 April 2002) 

207 USJFCOM, Glossary; available from http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm Internet; 

accessed 20 June 2003.

208 CJTF 180 02, 11 NOV 02

209 DOS 01, 12 JULY 02

210 CJTF 180 02, 11 NOV 02

211 Mr Mark Walsh, Mr William Flavin, COL Mike Dooley conversations with Major Kim Fields 

ARCENT, COL George Oliver conversations with G5 ARCENT September and October 2001. PKI 

offered to attach an advisory team to ARCENT to assist in developing a plan for the eventual stability 

operations. ARCENT decided to turn to the Center of Excellence in PACOM because the mission 

looked like Humanitarian Assistance with no following on stability operation. Additionally, there 

were personality issues involved.

212 CENTCOM 02, 30 MAY 02