SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST 

AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE:

LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

Max G. Manwaring

November 2004

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iii

FOREWORD

 This monograph comes at a time when U.S. and other world 

political and military leaders are struggling with the “new” politicalpsychological aspects of unconventional conflict. Unfortunately, the 

strategic theory of unconventional political war has played little part 

in the discourse. Yet political-insurgency war is the most likely type 

of conflict to challenge the maintenance and enhancement of global 

and regional security over the near-to-long term. Contemporary 

political-insurgency war is a threat we can ill afford to ignore.

 Through the analysis of the cases of Argentina (1969-79), Peru 

(1962-present) and Italy (1968-82), the author identifies the politicalstrategic challenges of modern unconventional conflict. He stresses 

the political complexity of insurgency and the broader implications 

for the promises of democracy, free market economies, and prosperity 

implicit in the mandates to civil-military forces that confront global 

and regional instability. These cases are significant because they 

address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. As a 

consequence, this examination is a logical point from which to begin 

to understand how governments and international organizations 

might ultimately control--or succumb to--the strategic challenges of 

political-insurgency war. 

 The author’s recommendations impose no easy set of tasks. 

Nevertheless, if the U.S. and other global leadership ignore the highly 

political aspects of modern unconventional conflict, the resultant 

instability and possible state failure will adversely shape the security 

environment in which all nations must struggle to survive. The 

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this cogent monograph 

as a part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING, a retired U.S. Army colonel, joined the 

Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000. He has served in various 

civilian and military positions, including a previous appointment at 

the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the 

Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with politicalmilitary affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at War; 

Gray Area Phenomena; Confronting the New World Disorder; Managing 

Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and 

Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; and 

Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in 

economics, a B.S. in political science, an M.A. in political science, and 

a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Illinois. He is also 

a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
v

SUMMARY

 This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary 

insurgency. It argues that in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any 

other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions 

mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to 

gain political control of a state. These organizations are engaged in 

a highly complex political act--political war. Given that this type of 

conflict is likely to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over 

the next several years, it is important to understand that the final 

results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determined 

by arms alone. Rather, the results depend on winning the political 

support of the people.

 In these terms, it is helpful to examine some key harbinger 

case studies from which the first contemporary lessons of modern 

insurgency were learned. They stress: (1) insurgencies may be 

populist-nationalist as well as Marxist-Maoist oriented, (2) they 

may be urban as well as rural-based, and (3) they may be highly 

political-psychological as well as military conflicts. Additionally, this 

monograph emphasizes some broader lessons learned. Among other 

things, the Argentine case provides a basis from which to understand 

better the problem of current and future radical populism and urban 

insurgency. All three cases--but especially the Peruvian case--invoke 

the fundamental strategic political issue of state failure. The Italian 

case emphasizes the issue of military vs. political victory, and its 

implications for the future of the state. 

 This monograph concludes with the idea that the complex realities 

of contemporary political-insurgency wars must be understood as 

holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies 

and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve 

mutually agreed political-strategic ends. In this connection, at a 

minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to 

deal effectively with unconventional conflict situations. They are: 

(1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable 

security and stability, (2) fundamental education and understanding 

requirements, and (3) the strategic application of U.S. military 
vi

power. The associated recommendations take us beyond doing 

“something” for something’s sake to the cooperative, holistic, and 

long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways, 

and means that directly support the achievement of a political endgame.
1

SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE:

LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

The lessons of the Persian Gulf War, the recent Iraqi War, and 

the hundreds of other conflicts that have taken place since the end 

of World War II are not being lost on state and nonstate powers 

emerging into the contemporary multipolar global security arena. 

Ironically, strategies being developed to protect or further the 

interests of a number of traditional and nontraditional political actors 

are inspired by the dual idea of evading and frustrating a superior 

conventional military or police force. The better a government has 

become at conventional maneuver warfare or law enforcement, 

the more likely potential opponents will turn to unconventional 

insurgency war that is often called asymmetric, insurgent, guerrilla, 

terrorist, or “knowledge-based” war. 

 Even though prudent governments must prepare for high-risk 

low-probability conventional state vs. state wars, the President 

and Congress of the United States and the Security Council of the 

United Nations (UN) will likely require high operations tempo 

(OPTEMPO) military-civil participation in small, unconventional, 

and intrastate conflicts well into the future. These unconventional 

low intensity conflicts, complex emergencies, ethnic wars, and 

small-scale contingencies threaten the security and stability of the 

global community, and are gravely complicated by various militant 

nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious fundamentalists, 

ideologues, demagogues, civil and military bureaucrats, organized 

criminals, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and rogue and criminal 

states working to achieve their own objectives. In this security 

environment, governments and their defense establishments have 

little choice but to rethink contemporary unconventional wars as 

they apply to global and national security and stability.

 In an attempt to provide a better understanding of the current 

and future strategic security environment, we first examine 

unconventional asymmetric insurgency war as a very political form 

of warfare for the weak against the strong. As a corollary, we also 

seek to highlight insurgency and counterinsurgency as the most 

likely form of global, regional, and sub-national political-coercive 
2

interaction for now and the future. The outcomes and second- and 

third-order effects of these wars will shape the security environment 

in which all nations and socio-political groups must struggle and 

survive.

POLITICAL WAR AND INSURGENCY: ILLUMINATING 

SOME SHADOWS FROM THE PAST 

The contemporary use of political-psychological efforts as the 

primary means—rather than just military means―to achieve the 

control or overthrow an existing government has been termed 

“political war.”1 It may be combined with military violence, economic 

pressure, subversion, and diplomacy―but its chief aspect is the use 

of words, images, and ideas. It is also a natural means of expression 

and self-assertion for extremist political actors, terrorists, and 

insurgents. The more messianic the vision, the more likely the actor 

is to remain committed to the use of violent political-psychological 

measures to achieve his objectives.2 But, let us begin this discussion 

at the beginning. 

 Rebellion has always existed. It is a simple, violent effort to force 

an incumbent government to redress grievances. For a rebellion to 

become an insurgency, a much stronger political component must be 

added to the equation. That is, the “authoritative allocation of values 

in a society;” or, essentially, “who gets what”―to include resources, 

rights, and privileges.3 Thus, an insurgency is a political war in 

support of a goal in which the power to allocate is at stake. Even 

those revolutionary movements that are not explicitly political―

such as radical Islam―ultimately must seize political power in order 

to implement the changes they demand. The insurgent political 

intent, then, would be to force a radical socio-economic-political 

restructuring of a nation state―and its governance.4

 The difference, then, between rebellion and insurgency is that 

rebellion requires only redress of grievances, and insurgency requires 

the achievement of the control or overthrow of the incumbent 

government to bring about fundamental (revolutionary) change.5

 In 

this connection, the stakes in insurgency war are not limited. They 

are, in fact, total from the standpoint of both the eventual winners 

and losers. Ultimately, it is a question of survival. Failure in political 

war is not an option. 
3

 Thus, we come back to where we began―in studying terror 

war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, 

we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed 

organizations attempting to gain political control of the state. Such 

organizations involved in that kind of effort are engaged in a highly 

complex political act―political war. To emphasize this fact, in this 

monograph we use “insurgency” and “political war” as synonymous 

or hyphenated terms. 

 U.S. and other world political and military leaders have been 

struggling with this “new” political aspect of unconventional war 

since the end of World War II—and especially since the ending of 

the Cold War. Yet, the nature of the unconventional war dilemma 

still is not understood. Unfortunately, the strategic theory of political 

war has played little part in the debate. Yet the type of conflict that 

is likely to challenge U.S. and global leadership over the near-tolong term must be informed by an understanding of insurgency as 

political war. 

 Understanding the nature of a given conflict, according to Carl 

von Clausewitz, is “the first of all strategic questions and the most 

comprehensive.”6 And, in that context, ample evidence indicates that 

the highly respected Brazilian theorist of insurgency war, Abraham 

Guillen, was right when he explained that “revolutionary war is 

never decided by arms, but rather by winning the political support 

of the people.”7

 One can take an important step toward understanding the 

insurgencies in our midst by examining a few case studies. That may 

be done in abstract theoretical terms, or it may be accomplished by 

remembering some of the hard-learned―and sometimes unpopular―

lessons of the past. Thus, this monograph examines three premier 

cases―Argentina, 1969-1979; Peru, 1962-date; and Italy, 1968-82. 

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASES

 What makes these political wars significant beyond their own 

domestic political context is that they are the cases from which the 

first contemporary lessons of urban and populist insurgency were 

learned. In these terms, these cases are harbingers of much of the 

political chaos emerging from the Cold War’s end. They stress: 
4

(1) insurgencies may be populist-nationalist as well as MarxistMaoist oriented, (2) they may be urban as well as rural-based, and 

(3) they may be highly political-psychological as well as military 

conflicts. These cases also are significant because they address 

counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. Thus, examining 

these cases is also a logical point from which to begin to understand 

how governments might ultimately control―or succumb to―the 

strategic challenges of political war. 

Argentina, 1969-79.

Argentina, with well over half the national population 

concentrated in the Buenos Aires area, was a good place to experiment 

with urban insurgency in a contemporary populist and nationalist 

context. And today, the world is urbanizing at a faster and faster 

rate. Latin America, and, of course, Europe, are already two of the 

most highly urbanized regions of the world. But, as fast as cities are 

growing, their slums and shantytowns are growing even faster. As a 

consequence, urban space is now “where the people are.” Moreover, 

rural migrants to the urban areas find conditions that surpass the 

isolation, squalor, and hopelessness they fled. They move into 

places known variously as callampas (“mushrooms” because of the 

way they suddenly appear), favelas (squatter towns) in Brazil, villas 

miserias (miserable villages) in Argentina, and pueblos jovenes (young 

towns) or invasions (invasions) in Peru. Security forces normally are 

unable to enter these so-called “lawless” areas―much less control 

them. As a consequence, this kind of urban space is theoretically as 

impregnable as rural forests, jungles, or mountains.8

 The Argentine case is a prime example of a “new jungle” within 

which insurgents can find similar conditions as in rural space, and 

take the fight directly to the enemy. It also is a good example of a 

demagogic-populist insurgency that was designed to take down a 

regime and replace it with another envisioned by Juan Domingo 

Peron. At the same time, the Peronist Montonero insurgency and 

the Argentine governmental response to it are prime examples 

of how not to conduct an insurgency and how not to conduct a 

counterinsurgency. 
5

 In that connection, the Montonero insurgent leadership made 

a conscious decision to “militarize” the struggle and attack―

directly―the Argentine armed forces. The political objectives that 

originally motivated the confrontation were sacrificed to military 

considerations. The groups that were supposed to bring national 

and social liberation to the country developed into mirror images of 

the Argentine armed forces, and legitimizing political-psychological 

efforts were considered unproductive niceties. The new Peronist 

Motherland, literally, would be created only out of the destruction 

of the traditional Argentine military establishment.9

 The Argentine government counterinsurgency response came in 

the form of unprincipled societal repression and the “Dirty War.” 

Today, the country still does not exhibit the harmony and prosperity 

that might have been expected to come with peace. Rather, virtually 

all Argentines―regardless of which side they were on―personally 

bear the open wounds and festering scars of the insurgency period. 

There are recriminations 25-30 years after the fact, with “witchhunts” and cynicism regarding the personal motives of the “political 

class.” Furthermore, the general Argentine society, economy, and 

polity still struggle with urban overcrowding, intense poverty, and 

rampant corruption. The Argentine example clearly demonstrates 

the importance and necessity of a legitimate political-psychologicalmilitary balance in insurgency―and in countering it. 

Peru, 1962-date.

The Peruvian case demonstrates how a small number (about 180) 

of well-trained and organized militants can work together, organize 

internal support, terrorize, and take a nation of over 20 million 

people to a point of near collapse within 10 years. It also illustrates 

that the fortuitous capture of key insurgent leadership in 1992 did 

not end the insurgency. Successive Peruvian governments failed 

to address the political aspects of the problem adequately, and the 

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgency is now in resurgence.10

 The ongoing insurgency is an example of the blending of mass 

mobilization techniques of both rural and urban insurgencies. The 

strategic intent is to develop adequate support bases in rural areas 

and in urban pueblos jovenes (i.e., slums) from which to break the 
6

power of the foreign-dominated, non-Indian, and undemocratic 

governing oligarchy, and to form a new Peruvian, Indian, and 

democratic political entity. In this context, all past and present 

regimes are judged to be the equivalent of “occupying powers,” 

and the Sendero Luminoso insurgents are considered to be a kind of 

“resistance movement.”11

 The operational intent of the movement not only includes a 

marriage of rural and urban bases from which to attack the enemy, 

but also the blending of both military and political-psychological 

elements to conduct a true “People’s War” to replace the illegitimate 

internal enemy. The tactics of “People’s War” would begin the 

mobilization the masses, create an alternative society, and carve 

out “liberated” rural and urban areas from which to launch a 

“final offensive.” Lastly, the “People’s War” and “final offensive” 

would inflict decisive punishment on the “occupying regime” and 

theoretically force it to leave Peru.12

 The contemporary notion that Sendero’s regeneration and 

continued “People’s War” will eventually force the incumbent 

“occupying regime” to leave Peru has been generally dismissed 

as the disappointed rhetoric of its jailed leader, Abmael Guzman. 

That dismissive rhetoric may have some truth to it, but it should 

be remembered that the legitimizing socio-political basis of the 

insurgency did not die with the figurative “decapitation” of the 

insurgent political leadership. It must also be remembered that, over 

the past 42 years, Sendero has proved to be a patient and resilient 

organization. In the meantime, it is important to remember that 

terror is all that is left to the fanatical remnants of the leadership.

 One observer poignantly warns us that the perceptions of 

repression, injustice, and inequity of a self-appointed insurgent 

elite―its raison de etre―cannot be disrupted or ended “for something 

as mundane as peace.”13 Thus, in Peru since 1992, we see the logical 

aftermath of an unfinished insurgency―prolonged terror and 

destruction, and a slow but sure process that can lead to state failure.14

How else to let the masses know that you are still there for them?

Italy, 1968-82.

Somewhat like the Argentine and Peruvian cases, the Italian 

case illustrates a strategy aimed at the destruction of the state, and 
7

replacing it with something else. Yet, Italian terrorism, through the 

1970s, was not taken very seriously, and was allowed to fester and 

grow.15 It was not until after the highly publicized 1978 kidnapping, 

“people’s trial,” and “execution” of five-time Prime Minister Aldo 

Moro, that the Italian government directly addressed the insurgency 

and its associated “terrorist” threat. That “terrorist incident” 

marked the first time in over 10 years of kidnappings, murders, 

maimings, and bombings that the Italian government decided 

that terrorism was, in fact, more than a complex law enforcement 

problem. The various insurgent organizations―through the use of 

“terrorism”―were challenging the integrity of the country’s political 

institutions and creating an unacceptable level of internal instability. 

Decisionmakers began to understand that insurgent violence was 

“an ideological substitute for conventional war.”16 And, it began to 

be understood that the political objective of that unconventional war 

was to “destroy the political equilibrium of Italy and give impetus to 

the conquest of political power and the installation of the dictatorship 

of the proletariat.”17 As a consequence, Italian terrorism was finally 

defined as a national security problem. 

 Interestingly and importantly, the planning and coordination 

of the response to insurgent “terrorism” essentially fell to the 

paramilitary Carabinieri. The mandate for those political, economic, 

informational, and security instruments of the state that would 

implement the counterinsurgency effort was two-fold. First, there 

would be no “Dirty War” in Italy. Second, there would be no strategic 

ambiguity―that is, the various political-security instruments of the 

Italian state would integrate all their actions under the direction of a 

Carabinieri General. Together, these unifying and legitimizing efforts 

would reestablish the kind of stability that was derived from popular 

Italian perceptions that the authority of the state was genuine and 

effective and that it used morally correct means for reasonable and 

fair purposes.18

 Thus, the Italian case is an excellent point from which to examine 

the ways and means by which governments can combine military 

with political victory, and legitimately control or neutralize the 

strategic challenge of insurgent terrorism. In that context, the Italian 

experience demonstrates the effective political-military means 

through which to reverse the impetus toward failing or failed state 

status. 
8

Conclusions.

This brief examination of the Argentine, Peruvian, and Italian 

revolutionary urban insurgency cases provides instructive lessons 

regarding current and future unconventional war. The primary 

issues to be discussed in each case are the following:

 • The General Situation,

 • The Stated Objectives and Visions of the Insurgents,

 • The Insurgent Organization,

 • The Program for Gaining Power,

 • The General Response to the Insurgent Program, and

 • Key Points and Lessons.

ARGENTINE URBAN INSURGENCY, 1969-79: SOME 

STRATEGIC LESSONS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEARNED

 Despite what was at one time a popular cultural myth that an 

Argentine coup d’etat is no more violent than a Mexican wedding party, 

that country’s political history has, in fact, been marked by considerable 

violence. Violent conflict between those advocating a unitary 

state and those demanding a federal government prevailed in the 

early decades of Argentine nationhood. Military interventions and 

popular rebellions further contributed to considerable political 

instability in the early 20th century. Argentina experienced extreme 

political polarization and the rise of Peronism before, during, and after 

World War II. In the context of polarization, Peronism encouraged 

its followers to pursue a confrontational populist and nationalistic 

agenda in which the sovereign nation and socio-political justice were 

identified with the Argentine “people,” and economic dependency 

and political imperialism with the “oligarchy.”19

 What followed the military coup that deposed Juan Peron in 1955 

was political deadlock. Peronist resistance to the new government 

made sure that rule would be impossible without Peron. Peron’s 

opponents in government and society did all they could to outlaw 

Peron and Peronism and prevent his return to power. Thus, the 

only way for either side to attempt any kind of political action was 

through either popular or state violence. In that connection, Argentina 
9

experienced three failed attempts at rural guerrilla warfare between 

1959 and 1969. At that point, the insurgents decided in favor of 

urban warfare. It seemed obvious that they would be safer and more 

relevant in crowded urban space than in isolated rural areas.

 Nevertheless, one final attempt was made at generating a 

conventional rural-based insurgency. In 1974, Marxist admirers of 

Che Guevarra (the People’s Revolutionary Army [ERP]) took control 

of the remote province of Tucuman and actually governed that part 

of the national territory. However, eventually, the Army was ordered 

to Tucuman to eradicate the insurgents and restore the province to 

the Argentine state. The Army did just that―swiftly and ruthlessly. 

And 1975 marked the end of any serious rural insurgency effort in 

Argentina.20

 Over the period of time between the ouster of Peron in 1955 

and his return from exile in 1973, a number of urban insurgent 

organizations emerged. Six major groups―two Marxist-MaoistGuevarrist-oriented, and four populist-nationalist Peronistoriented―eventually dispersed or joined either the ERP or the 

Peronist Montoneros. The Montoneros became the largest and most 

active of the two revolutionary movements, but maintained close 

ties with the ERP.21

 The Montoneros illustrate some important points regarding 

contemporary insurgency. First, they demonstrate the efficiency of 

mobilizing a mass support base within urban space. Second, they 

show that insurgents―either urban or rural based―need not be 

Marxists or Maoists, or even religious fundamentalists. Populists 

and nationalists may also become major players on the insurgency 

stage. Third, the Montonero experience illustrates that once an 

insurgent movement achieves a certain momentum, its leadership is 

not likely to accept “peace” as a viable alternative to armed struggle. 

As a result, we concentrate on the Montoneros. 

Montonero Objectives and Vision.

 In Argentina, Juan Domingo Peron is credited with beginning 

the country’s national liberation. After taking power in 1946, he and 

his first wife, Eva, initiated the nationalization of the major means 

of production and distribution in the country, and gave political 
10

voice and dignity to organized labor. This socialist transformation 

continued until a military coup restored the traditional Argentine 

oligarchy to power in 1955. During the subsequent 18 years of 

exile, Peron used the Montonero insurgents as a primary means 

of breaking the resultant political impasse. He also used them as a 

political bridge to a worker-based mass movement and as a bridge 

to rebellious youth movements. This strategy proved successful. 

The military was nudged out of government, and fair elections were 

allowed that put a Peronist, Hector Campora, into the presidency 

and paved the way for Peron to return to Argentina.22

 During the period of exile―and shortly after Peron’s return to 

power―Montonero strategy focused on a political-psychological war 

to liberate Argentina from foreign economic domination and political 

dependency, and from the oligarchy who were acting in behalf of 

foreign interests. The focus began to change sometime during the 

period between Peron’s return to Argentina and his death. At that 

time, the insurgents began to argue that they were also liberating 

Argentina from the military and police who were acting in behalf of 

the oligarchy. In these terms, the Montonero vision of the “Peronist 

Motherland” could only be achieved by building an army capable 

of defeating the Argentine Army.23 The final logic of the argument 

was straightforward―“Unarmed, the people inevitably suffer 

repression.” This was the lesson that was learned by generations 

of Argentines from independence through the advent, exile, and 

subsequent return of Juan Peron.24

Organization.

The Peronist Montonero insurgent organization, as well as 

its militant allies, tended to follow a standard Leninist-Maoist 

organizational model. In that regard, cadres were built; political and 

logistical infrastructure was created; a military arm was recruited, 

trained and deployed; and, finally, political-military operations were 

conducted. The offensive strategic intent, clearly, was to “capture 

the controlling and governing institutions of the Argentine state.” 

Likewise, the various clandestine units in the military part of the 

organization tended to adopt a centralized and compartmentalized 
11

cellular structure in which the individual only knew the members of 

his or her own cell, and one member of another cell who acted as a 

“connecter.”25

 A recruit would generally pass through a mass-front political 

youth group to become a miliciano, an aspirante, and, finally, an 

official Montonero. Once one became a Montonero, military rank 

was awarded, and he or she could progress through the ranks to 

sergeant, lieutenant, captain, commandant, etc. Thus, the general 

Montonero organization was described as a “double pyramid.” 

One of the pyramids included a number of political-logistical massfront youth or labor organizations. The other pyramid included the 

official Montonero fighting units―commandos, detachments, and 

columns that eventually gave way to squadrons (squads), platoons, 

companies, and battalions. The “national leadership” set broad 

policy goals, and the relevant political-logistical support groups 

and individual fighting units implemented that guidance as they 

could.26

 After 1973-74, the subordination of political work to military 

activity became more pronounced. For example, youth organizations 

would organize mass demonstrations and popular rallies. Milicianos

would provide the oratory for a demonstration, and aspirantes would 

throw molotov cocktails at nearby cars or property to divert the 

attention of security forces. Then, with security forces engaged in 

crowd control, minor violence, and looking for organizers, fighting 

units would strike at designated “military targets.” Additionally, 

elite Montonero troops (Special Combat Groups [GEC]), distinct 

from the regular fighting units, could be called upon to operate 

anywhere and against any target in the country. By 1975, the 

Montoneros had over 5,000 combat troops operating throughout 

Argentina―primarily in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. At the 

same time, the organization had over 8,000 political activists capable 

of mobilizing hundreds or thousands of demonstrators for any given 

mass event.27

 Toward the end of the revolutionary period in 1979, two 

organizational factors came together to contribute to the state’s 

ability to destroy the Montoneros and their allies. First, the “National 

Leadership” began to expand itself from a simple and effective 

four-person directorate into five relatively large and bureaucratic 
12

“National Secretaryships.” These hierarchies were involved in specific 

personnel, financial, technical, and communications functions. They 

slowed and diluted decisionmaking and support processes, and 

generally lowered the effectiveness of the organization. Moreover, 

as some bureaucracies have been known to do, they lost effective 

contact with the rest of the organization and isolated themselves in a 

self-serving and unrealistic world.28

 Second, Montonero leadership tended to ignore the sociopolitical side of the conflict and primarily used the mass front 

groups overtly in support of military activities. As a consequence, 

these “noncombatant” political activists acquired considerable 

visibility and became easy prey for the Argentine security forces. 

As the “national leadership” increased the intensity of its unrealistic 

“war of attrition” against the much larger Argentine military forces, 

the security forces were killing and imprisoning suspected Peronist 

activists―literally―by the truckload. Over the last year of the 

insurgency, the Montonero leadership found that there was “no one 

and nothing” to lead.29

The Montonero Program for Gaining Total Power.

 Universal revolutionary hero Che Guavara taught idealistic and 

frustrated youth not to wait for a “revolutionary consciousness” 

to develop within the masses. He argued that small groups of 

revolutionaries could speed that development by initiating an armed 

struggle. And he taught that popular forces could defeat a professional 

army.30 Harsh experience taught pragmatic Montoneros that these 

conditions would not come about spontaneously. They understood 

that a serious military force had to be organized, equipped, and 

trained for the task of confronting a regular army. Such a task would 

require significant human and financial resources.31

 The human resources were readily available. Argentina’s youth 

had turned against their parents’ generation and blamed them and 

the oligarchy―and the military―for all that was wrong with the 

government, the society, and the economy. These radicalized young 

people happily and enthusiastically joined whatever insurgent 

organization their friends had joined. Financial resources were 

another matter. Although there is evidence that Cuba and the Soviet 
13

Union provided limited asylum, training, equipment, and money, 

no evidence suggests that help was ever significant. The Argentine 

insurgents generated the necessary revenue for their “revolution” 

through two primary sources―“revolutionary taxes” on foreign 

and domestically owned businesses, and kidnapping. The ransoms 

received for kidnapped individuals kidnapped were lucrative 

beyond expectations, and provided more than enough cash to buy the 

uniforms, medical supplies, equipment, and weapons required.32

 Thus, at the beginning of the revolutionary period, the insurgent 

program consisted of three general parts. First, all the various 

insurgent organizations were heavily engaged in kidnapping and tax 

collection. Second, other actions were predominantly acts of “armed 

propaganda”―hijacking food delivery vans to distribute food in 

shanty towns, bombing supposedly empty buildings and monuments 

to mark Peronist and Guevarist anniversaries, bombing elite country 

clubs and the residences of directors of foreign corporations, and 

brief commando style occupations of small towns outside Buenos 

Aires. Third, Montonero actions also included assassinations of 

“traitors”―primarily deserters and informers from their own ranks, 

and from labor union leadership.33

 These components of the revolutionary program, by their 

nature, required careful and deliberate planning. Moreover, 

armed propaganda and kidnapping tended to be only as violent as 

absolutely necessary. The Argentine insurgents, at least at the outset, 

understood two things. First, they understood that propaganda is 

intended to inform, impress, co-opt, and coerce―not necessarily 

to kill. Objectives are primarily political and psychological―not 

military. Second, a live kidnapping victim was worth a good deal 

more than a dead body. Dead bodies tended to have a negative effect 

on popular “good will.” As a result, from 1969 through 1973, survey 

data indicated that nearly half the Argentine population considered 

the “armed struggle” to be justified.34

 Thus the insurgents enjoyed strong popular support and a certain 

legitimacy. That, in turn, created an associated level of popular 

dissatisfaction with the military regime that stimulated a voluntary 

retreat to the barracks, and “The sight of the military retreating 

contributed to the perception that insurgent action was effective, even 

though the real causes of the regime’s crisis were more complex.”35
14

Under these circumstances, the political parties were forced to deal 

with the problem of popular unrest. The solution was to call for the 

elections in March 1973 that brought Peronist Hector Campora to 

the presidency, and, subsequently, Juan Peron from exile and back 

to power.

 Peron had argued from his exile in Spain that insurgent violence 

in Argentina would disappear once the Peronist electoral victory 

had been secured. On his return to Argentina and to political power, 

a general political amnesty was proclaimed. Additionally, Peronist 

Montoneros were given important posts in the government and 

in the national universities. As a consequence, there was a major 

political opportunity to abandon the armed struggle and cooperate 

in a stable new government. Some Peronists claimed victory and took 

advantage of the situation. Others, however, never abandoned their 

vision of taking total control of the state. They conducted several 

covert operations and openly renewed hostilities in September 1974. 

The armed struggle did not end.36

 The insurgents’ “Robin Hood” image began to tarnish as they 

continued to take from the rich and began to give to “poor” arms 

merchants. The image was tarnished further as insurgent armed 

violence increased steadily and dramatically after Argentina’s 

return to constitutional rule. As an example, it was estimated that 

revolutionary guerrilla groups staged 205 operations prior to the 1974 

elections, and 807 and 723 in 1974 and 1975, respectively.37 This move 

away from armed propaganda toward more direct conflict against 

the state was in response to at least two factors. First, the insurgent 

leadership was never convinced that the Argentine Army would 

not execute another coup against a Peronist government―and, thus, 

the Army still had to be defeated. Second, Peron argued that the 

insurgents had served their purpose and no longer had a legitimate 

basis on which to continue their violent activities. He thus authorized 

the creation of the clandestine Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance 

(Triple A) “death squads”―whose mission was to eliminate regime 

opponents.38

 Thereafter, a new phase of violence was marked by a greater 

proportion of assassinations of “traitors” and informants. In time, 

kidnappings and bombings became less discriminate, larger-scale, 
15

and more likely to involve ordinary citizens. Vengeance killings 

in response to Triple A death squad activities became a major 

component of the insurgent program. At the same time, more daring, 

sophisticated, and spectacular operations were being conducted 

directly against the Argentine armed forces. The political objectives 

assigned to operations were gradually forgotten, as operations 

increasingly were designed only to show military strength.

 Instead of remaining an asymmetrical political-psychological 

war, the changed strategy began to define a futile war of attrition in 

which the 5,000 Montonero combatants realistically could not hope 

to defeat the 60,000-member Argentine military establishment. Three 

demonstrations of Montonero military acumen during 1975 would 

include: (1) Montonero frogmen attacked and damaged the Navy’s 

first modern missile-carrying frigate; (2) regular forces destroyed an 

Air Force transport aircraft carrying 45 anti-guerrilla personnel; and 

(3) elite forces hijacked an aircraft, took over a provincial airport, 

attacked a major army garrison, seized its cache of arms, and escaped 

in the hijacked aircraft.39

 By 1976, the public mood had changed. The insurgents were no 

longer “the proletariat in arms.” They were providing inconsequential 

conventional military responses to political situations, and they 

were bent on emulating the regular armed forces. The people who 

were supposed to bring national and social liberation to Argentina 

developed into an ideology-bound, bureaucratized, isolated, 

cynical, mirror image of the their “enemy.” In a moment of belated 

revolutionary self-criticism, a former insurgent leader reflected that, 

“When you become like the enemy, you end up being the enemy . . . . 

The enemy has defeated you because he has managed to transform 

you into him.”40 As a consequence, in December 1976, the Peronist 

Montonero leadership quietly followed its erstwhile allies into 

exile but continued to direct operations in Argentina until the final 

“Popular Counter-Offensive” of 1979.41

The State Response: The Dirty War.

 After the death of Juan Peron in 1974 and the subsequent military 

coup in 1975 that deposed the government of his third wife, Isabel, 

state action against the Peronist and Marxist insurgents intensified 
16

dramatically. The same people who deposed Peron in 1955, outlawed 

Peronism, excluded one-third to one-half of the Argentine population 

from the political process, and fought to keep Peron from returning 

from exile were now back in power. And those Rightists attacked 

insurgents, their supporters, and the society that had created them―

with a vengeance. General Jorge Rafael Videla made it clear when he 

explained that, “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, 

but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western 

and Christian civilization.”42

 One by one, the Marxist ERP, the Peronist Montoneros, and their 

allies had been outlawed. A penal code reform introduced by Peron 

in 1974 provided severe punishments for insurgent and subversive 

activities. Other measures were taken to deprive insurgents of 

their organizational publications, and to impose censorship on all 

publications. Additional legislation was promulgated that imposed 

prison sentences on leaders of strikes that were declared illegal. And 

provincial police forces were placed under military control.43

 These legalities, however, were irrelevant. Captured insurgents 

and known or suspected “subversive delinquents”―or people who 

just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time―were 

murdered or imprisoned without trial. Those captured and not 

killed in combat operations, and those detained as a result of various 

counterinsurgency operations, were interrogated and tortured 

without legal constraints or time limits. The victims either were 

placed in one of an estimated 340 secret detention camps, buried 

in mass graves, or “were disappeared.” The final societal insult in 

this cynical and unprincipled dirty war was a gray economy based 

on war booty. That booty was derived from stripping an apartment 

bare after “disappearing” its occupants and selling the furnishings 

and other property in specified shops. Additionally, babies born in 

the detention camps were sold to more “deserving parents.”44

 Importantly, this kind of repression against insurgents, relatives, 

friends, acquaintances, and suspected supporters continued at 

a high level for at least a year after the insurgents had lost their 

operational capacity. This point reveals two conclusions regarding 

the state response to the insurgency. First, the Dirty War claimed 

roughly six times the number of noncombatants vs. combatants 

(5,000 combatants killed vs. 30,000 noncombatants killed). More to 
17

the point, the military governments in power from 1975 to 1983 were 

not only at war with the insurgents, they were also at war with a 

large part of the Argentine society.

 Second, given the various regimes’ full and direct involvement in 

the Dirty War, it is accurate to say that the Argentine governmental 

response to insurgency was―simply―state terrorism.

Key Points and Lessons.

 • The urban insurgency conducted in Argentina between 1969 

and 1979 was a combined populist (Peronist) and nationalist 

effort dedicated to the violent overthrow of the authoritarian, 

foreign-dominated capitalist system. It relied on internal 

urban strategies from which to develop a mass support base, 

and to develop the capability to defeat the regular army.

 • The primary urban insurgent group, the Peronist Montoneros, 

organized a vigorous military-oriented campaign to implement 

its vision of how to depose the military-supported oligarchy, 

and establish a “Peronist Motherland.”

 • The political objectives that originally rationalized the insurgent 

struggle against the regime and its security institutions were 

sacrificed to military considerations and were subsumed in 

the fight against the Argentine armed forces.

 • The state response to the insurgency went far beyond 

neutralizing and eliminating the Montoneros and their 

revolutionary allies. The state also attacked the part of 

Argentine society that had nurtured and supported the 

populist-nationalist vision of the future.

 • The state response to the insurgency was, thus, total. The 

“Dirty War” was also completely unprincipled and could 

accurately be described as state terrorism.

Probably the most serious consequence of any given insurgency is 

to provide a rationale for a government to take repressive measures 

and delay the broadening of a social and political base that alone 

can ultimately ensure socio-political stability and progress. The 

Argentine experience reminds us that there is a far superior and 
18

opposite alternative to state terrorism. The wisdom of Sun Tzu 

makes the point that, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their 

own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. 

By these means, they make their governments invincible.”45

THE SENDERO LUMINOSO INSURGENCY IN PERU, 

1962-PRESENT: WHERE THE SHINING PATH LEADS

 Peru is faced with two ongoing insurgencies. The first is that of the 

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) that has stirred the imagination of 

most observers of revolutionary conflict. The second, the Tupac Amaru

Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), despite some spectacular actions, 

has generated much less concern. Sendero, generally, is the more 

successful and violent of the two organizations, and is considered the 

most serious security problem facing the Peruvian government. In 

that connection, ample evidence indicates the resurgence of Sendero 

Luminoso.

46 Thus, we will focus on that organization.

 Dr. Abimael Guzman was the main leader of Sendero until his 

arrest in September 1992. With or without Guzman’s continued 

leadership, that insurgency movement continues to represent 

a militant, revolutionary commitment to a long-term and very 

disciplined approach to clean government, a sense of social 

purpose, and national (i.e., Indian) tradition. Sendero thus provides 

violent reformers, disillusioned revolutionaries, and submerged 

nomenklaturas all over the world with a relatively orthodox and 

very sophisticated Leninist-Maoist model for the organization and 

implementation of a successful “people’s war.” It also provides an 

illustration of the consequences of not pursuing a counterinsurgency 

to its neutralization―prolonged terrorist war and possible state 

failure. 

Sendero Objectives and Vision.

 Abimael Guzman, also known as Comrade Gonzolo and as Dr. 

Puka Inti (Red Sun), identified the origins of the Sendero Luminoso

insurgency in Peru, and defined the central strategic problem 

as the lack of legitimacy of all Peruvian governments since the 

Spanish conquest.47 He further identified the primary objective of 
19

the insurgency as power. Power is generated by an intelligent, wellmotivated, and highly-disciplined organization with a vision and 

long-term program for gaining control of a state or a society. In that 

connection, the Sendero Luminoso resistance organization, through its 

governance function, would theoretically maintain the state as its 

military forces replace the illegal regime.48 The objective is to destroy 

the old foreign-dominated political system in Peru, take power, and 

create a “nationalistic,” “Indian,” and “popular” democracy.49

 This revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a 

conventional armed rebellion. The revolutionary challenge is rooted 

in the concept that the Peruvian governmental system is not doing 

what is right for the people and that Sendero Luminoso’s political 

philosophy and leadership will. Thus, regime legitimacy is key to 

the conflict. A government counterinsurgency campaign that fails 

to understand this fact, and responds only to top Sendero leadership 

cadres and military forces, is programmed to fail.50

Organization.

 Guzman’s first and continuing concern centers on organization. 

The preparatory activities to achieve his vision―or the resurgence of 

the movement―are to establish: (1) a dedicated cadre and the first 

rudiments of a revolutionary party, (2) an insurgent military force, 

and (3) a support mechanism for the entire organization. This longterm effort would lay the foundations for the group’s subsequent 

struggle and ultimate victory. Organization, not operations, is the 

key to success.51

 Generally, Sendero appears to be structured much like other 

Leninist-Maoist movements along rigid, close-knit, and secretive 

lines. At the top level is the cupula, which includes Guzman (in jail) 

and other (out of jail) leaders. The cupula also includes the Politburo 

and the Central Committee, along with the Permanent Committee, or 

Secretariat. These individuals oversee the entire party operation. The 

key, however, to organizational success is quality of individuals―not 

the number of members. Thus, the cupula and lower level leadership 

(cuadros) come from the political and intellectual elite of the rural 

areas and from the urban universities. Guzman’s main concern was 
20

and is to place men and women in leadership positions who have 

an understanding of the why and how of subversion, insurgency, 

and governance. Thus, this “vanguard of the proletariat” performs 

the traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing 

leadership, controlling mechanisms, and providing the means for 

replacing the old regime and taking power.52

The Program for Gaining Power.

 The Sendero program centers on a rigid five-stage long-term 

effort: (1) an organizational phase that lays the foundations for the 

subsequent struggle; (2) an offensive phase that begins by attacking 

symbols of the bourgeois state; (3) an expansion of violence and terror 

throughout the country to convince the masses that the government 

cannot and will not perform its basic security and other rudimentary 

governance functions―and to create vacuums in rural and urban 

space that will allow Sendero to become the de facto authority in areas 

uncontrolled or abandoned by the state; (4) the consolidation and 

expansion of political and logistical support bases throughout the 

country; and (5) the programmatic isolation of the “center” and 

bringing about the total collapse of the state. That is not scheduled 

until (a) the necessary rural and urban support bases are consolidated, 

(b) the major population centers are subverted psychologically to the 

point where a relatively small, but direct, military assault could bring 

about the desired result, and, importantly, (c) the leadership nucleus 

of the movement is sufficiently large and well-enough prepared to 

govern the state.53

 By September 1992 and the time of Guzman’s arrest, the Peruvian 

government and the country itself appeared to be on the brink of 

collapse. An estimated 25,000 people had been killed in “terrorist” 

actions. Over 500 political figures had been “assassinated”; over 

35 percent of all mayorships were vacant; and over 85 percent of 

voters did not vote in elections. At the same time, inflation had 

reached the staggering rate of 7,600 percent per year, and terrorism 

had destroyed an estimated equivalent of one-third to one-half of 

the gross national product (GNP). Businesses were preparing to 

close, and affluent people were leaving the country and taking their 

money. One observer commented that, “If Sendero had maintained 
21

the pressure, the government would have been at their mercy.”54 The 

pressure eased, however, with the capture of Guzman and several 

high-ranking aides. And, as a result, a prolongation of the fifth 

stage or the addition of a sixth stage of the revolution―“preparation

for (rather than bringing about) the total collapse of the state”―was 

proclaimed from Guzman’s prison cell.55

 This addition to the revolutionary program has generally been 

dismissed as the rhetoric of a disappointed old man. Nevertheless, 

it should be remembered that, while the government was able to 

capture Sendero’s key leader in 1992 and inhibit progress toward his 

final political objective, succeeding governments have not managed 

to neutralize Sendero Luminoso. It must also be remembered that 

Sendero has proven to be a patient and resilient organization. Thus, 

at the strategic level, Sendero appears to be increasing sabotage and 

terrorism, taking a relatively low military profile, and preparing for 

the time when the interior bases of support and the organizational 

leadership are well enough prepared to make feasible the final 

attack on the center. It will jab and probe, destroy infrastructure, 

and enforce its will against carefully selected targets, but its primary 

efforts will continue to focus on the basis of power―the lack of the 

moral right—an elitist, foreign-dominated, and non-Indian minority 

regime. 

 At the operational level, Sendero continues to develop cadres to 

man the resurgent political, military, and support components of 

the movement; and to consolidate its position in Peru’s rural space 

and in poor districts of urban areas. Tactically, Sendero operates in 

small units with political, psychological, and military objectives―in 

that order. The intent of these operational and tactical objectives is to 

demonstrate to the country that Sendero Luminoso is still working to 

provide the freedom of revolutionary movement in rural and urban 

areas that is necessary to take power.56

Response.

 Generally, Peru, the United States, and other countries that 

ultimately might be affected by the destabilizing “spillover” 

consequences of Sendero Luminoso’s attacks against Peru’s 

governmental legitimacy have tended to deal ad hoc with the 
22

insurgency problem in a piecemeal fashion, or to ignore it. The 

fundamental causes of the conflict act as continuing stimulants to the 

revolutionary movement, and the Sendero organization remains intact 

and functioning. Thus, the causes and consequences of insurgency 

continue to threaten the stability, development, and peace of Peru―

and, perhaps, that of the entire Andean region.

 More specifically, from 1980 through 1993, the various Peruvian 

governments dealt with the insurgency ad hoc―without a plan, 

without adequate intelligence, and in an environment of enmity 

between the civil government and the armed forces and within 

the armed forces. Then, after nearly 15 years of suffering, billions 

of dollars worth of destruction, and thousands of deaths, President 

Alberto Fujimori announced a new, more comprehensive politicalmilitary strategy. This strategy was never implemented completely. 

Moreover, there is still no intelligence below the national level, little 

trust or unity of effort between civil administrators and the armed 

forces, and not a lot of trust or unity of effort within the armed 

forces. It appears that the principal Peruvian leaders understand 

the insurgency problem in the rhetorical sense, but the fortuitous 

capture of Guzman significantly reduced Sendero’s activity―and 

the urgency of the situation. That rhetorical understanding has not 

been translated into a viable program to address the core problem of 

regime legitimacy.57

 Over the years, the United States has tended to ignore the 

Peruvian insurgency problem and concentrate limited effort on the 

war on drugs. From a security perspective, the punitive supply-side 

counterdrug eradication and interdiction measures emphasized by 

the United States are perceived by most citizens to be largely cosmetic 

and directed more often at “little people” than at real power centers 

of the illegal drug trade. Making criminals of minor employees 

and farmers in the relatively inaccessible areas of Peru encourages 

territorial disintegration, provides a ready source of recruits for any 

organization violently threatening the Peruvian government, and 

causes further estrangement between people and government. As a 

consequence, even though the United States has not been involved to 

any extent in Peru’s counterinsurgency effort, the second- and thirdlevel effects of U.S. counterdrug activities in that country appear to 

have worked to Sendero Luminoso’s advantage.58
23

Key Points and Lessons.

 • Sendero Luminoso is an insurgent organization dedicated 

to resisting and replacing a reputed Peruvian neo-colonial 

regime. It blends both rural and urban strategies in an effort 

to develop an adequate support base.

 • Sendero advocates a long-term, disciplined, and rigorous set 

of stages through which to organize and implement people’s 

war. It believes that political success will not be achieved as a 

result of conventional armed rebellion only.

 • Rather, success will come as a result of the careful application 

of political, psychological, and military efforts―in that order 

of priority. This indirect attack on the occupying regime 

centers on undermining the moral legitimacy of the incumbent 

government. 

 • By September 1992, the Peruvian government had been 

brought to the brink of collapse, but the fortuitous capture of 

Sendero leader Dr. Abimael Guzman significantly reduced the 

insurgency’s activities and effectiveness.

 • The Peruvian government, however, failed to address the 

insurgency’s political legitimacy, and Sendero is now in a 

process of resurgence. Terror (that is, armed propaganda) is its 

principal political-psychological-military tactic and strategy.

The Peruvian insurgency has been ongoing from 1962 to date. In that 

time, violence and destruction have varied from acute to tolerable. 

However, just because a situation improves to the point of being 

tolerable does not mean that the problem has gone away, or should 

be ignored. Sun Tzu reminds us that, “For there has never been a 

protracted war from which a country has benefited.”59

THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL-INSURGENCY 

WAR IN ITALY, 1968-1982: POLITICAL VS. MILITARY VICTORY

 From 1968-82, Italy was subjected to a number of insurgencies 

with unique bases of power, separate ideologies, and differing levels 

of effectiveness. In that context, literally 297 “leftist” groups along 
24

with several militant rightist, separatist, and pacifist organizations 

were supported by outside forces and dedicated to the overthrow 

of the Italian state. Moreover, the Red Brigades proved to be the 

most practical, calculating, and cynical of all the Italian insurgent 

organizations at conducting political war. As a result, we focus on 

the Red Brigades as the most important political phenomenon in 

Italy during the 1970s and 1980s.60

 The basic problem in the Italian case was that, although similar 

political violence emerged in other Western democracies in the 

same period (including the United States), only in Italy did it reach 

such intensity and persistence as to be considered a serious threat 

to the state. The assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro 

in 1978 at the hands of the Red Brigades, however, was the catalyst 

that finally forced the Italian government into a direct confrontation 

with political-insurgency war and its associated terrorism. In that 

connection, the Red Brigades considered the large-scale killing and 

maiming of high-level officials as well as ordinary citizens to be “a 

social duty imposed by the laws of class warfare.”61 These highly 

ideological insurgents, along with most of the others―both left 

and right―thus provide an example of extremist ideology as the 

justification for the use of terrorism as strategy and tactics.

Objectives and Vision of the Red Brigades.

 Generally, insurgent terrorism and its associated asymmetry 

emerge when fragments of a marginalized, self-appointed elite are 

frustrated to the point of violence by what they perceive as injustice, 

repression, and/or inequity. It must be remembered that it is 

individual men and women―so-called terrorists―who react violently 

when a government or another symbol of power is perceived to be 

unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a given injustice. And, 

as the means of causing mass destruction become less expensive 

and more available, the angry, the frustrated, and the weak rely on 

inventive forms of mass destruction to impose their vision of justice 

on peoples, countries, and the global community.62

 More specifically, Italian insurgency emerged from the prolonged 

protest cycle of the late 1960s. During those years, demands for 

political, economic, and social reforms were widespread and 
25

included elements of the entire society. Extreme left-wing fringe 

elements, ranging from white-collar workers to industrial workers 

to university students organized and became a political force when 

workers’ and students’ grievances expressed themselves in mass 

demonstrations that often were confronted violently by police. 

Thus, the Red Brigades evolved from demonstrators favoring socioeconomic reforms into militants defending themselves against state 

repression. As time moved on, the violence of the Red Brigades 

changed from self-protection to aggressive actions. And those actions 

increasingly shifted from demonstrations, sit-ins, and propaganda to 

direct violence against individuals. All these efforts were considered 

to be war against the state because “the State, its juristic ideology, 

and its law are nothing other than instruments through which the 

bourgeoisie exercises its dictatorship over the proletariat.”63

 For the Red Brigadists, these political crimes quickly became acts 

of justice. At first, they were acts of retribution and vengeance against 

perceived attackers. For example, Aldo Moro had to be eliminated 

because he embodied “all that was the most intelligent and the 

most dangerous in the [governing] regime.”64 Then, progressively, 

more ordinary individuals were singled out―depending on the 

“bureaucratic need.” As another example: “You make a political 

analysis, but then you need a victim. When you have singled out your 

victim . . . he is the one to be blamed for everything. In that moment, 

there is already the logic of a trial in which you have already decided 

that he is guilty; you only have to decide about his punishment . . . 

you punish him not only for what he has done but also for all the 

rest.”65 From that point, together with adventure, action became a 

reward in itself. In that context, “revolutionary violence [becomes] 

the highest possible good in overthrowing a moribund capitalist 

order.”66 The logical conclusion to this type of political war was 

articulated by Red Brigades leader Alberto Franceschini: “All of us 

in the BR (Brigate Rosse) were drug addicts of a particular type―of 

ideology. A murderous drug, worse than heroine.”67

Basic Organization of the Red Brigades.

 The Red Brigades were founded in Milan by members of a militant 

leftist group called the Metropolitan Political Collective (CPM). Some 
26

of the organizers came from Marxist-Leninist backgrounds and 

others from the more traditional Italian left. The CPM quickly spread 

to Turin, where workers of that industrial city increasingly became 

more violently involved with police. Subsequent organizational 

splintering, reorganization, ideology, and actions were adapted to 

the needs of the organizers’ militant orientation.

 Only people who were able to pass a rigorous vetting process 

were accepted into the ranks of the Red Brigades. That process 

carefully evaluated an individual’s military courage and group 

loyalty. Successful recruits were divided into regular and irregular 

forces. Regulars were the only individuals who were allowed into the 

vertical command structure and were required to go “underground” 

and work for the organization full-time. Irregulars kept their jobs 

and lived with their families. Their primary tasks were to recruit 

sympathizers and to help generate support for the revolutionary 

movement. And irregulars were never allowed into the clandestine 

vertical hierarchy. At the same time, Marxist-Leninist-type rules 

on centralization and vertical hierarchy were enforced strictly, and 

disagreements with authoritative decisions were not tolerated.68

 The organizational structure of the so-called Red Brigades 

included a strategic directorate, an executive committee, several 

“columns,” and a number of “fronts.” The column was the basic selfsustaining unit of the movement. It was composed of regulars and 

was given a specific geographic area of responsibility, such as Genoa, 

or certain neighborhoods of Milan, Turin, or Rome. The columns 

controlled subordinate brigades, which were termed logistical or 

mass, depending on the mission. The logistical brigades provided 

support, and the mass brigades were responsible for intelligence 

and operations. Thus, the primary orientation of all recruits was 

military or support for the military actions of the group. Because 

of that political culture, the Red Brigades attracted those individual 

men and women who understood discipline and were also prone to 

violence.69

The Program to Overthrow the “Moribund Italian Capitalist Order.”

 At the height of Italian insurgency in the late 1970s when people 

were asked about the program of the Red Brigades, most citizens 
27

probably would have described Red Brigade terrorism as ad hoc and 

arbitrary. Arbitrary perhaps, but ad hoc it was not. Political war in that 

instance was not a simple revolutionary need but, rather, the “exalted 

instrument” of liberation. As a result, Red Brigades’ leadership saw 

itself as the vanguard of the proletariat, stressed Leninist military 

discipline, and opposed spontaneity. Thus, actions of the Red 

Brigades were carefully planned, organized, and implemented.70

 The insurgent terrorist strategy, however, could not have been 

implemented without the support provided by a sufficiently large 

and politically active internal support base. That support was 

provided by the logistical brigades responsible for procurement, 

falsification, communications, codes, medical assistance, billeting, 

and other internal support functions. Likewise, the mass brigades 

could not have carried out the actions that they did without 

significant international support. For example, the Soviet Union 

provided political-diplomatic and logistical-financial support; 

Bulgaria provided weapons, training, and money; and Palestinians 

provided “Energia bombs.”71

 Typical human targets for the mass brigades included 

representatives of the capitalist system of production, political 

figures, and members of the judiciary and security agencies. 

Typical material targets included property in any way related to the 

classes of individuals noted above. Attacks on property either were 

complementary to attacks on persons or served as training and testing 

of recruits. Targeting tactics involved close, long-term observation of 

targets and the use of explosives, individual weapons, and ambush, 

raid, or abduction―depending on the difficulty of attacking a specific 

target and his prescribed punishment.72

 Major attacks included: (1) the wounding of Gavino Manca in 

Milan, an executive at Pirelli, and the murder of Pietro Coggiola 

in Turin, an executive with Lancia; (2) the abduction and murder 

of President of the Christian Democratic Party and former Prime 

Minister Aldo Moro in Rome; (3) the murder of Supreme Court 

Judge Ricardo Palma in Rome; and (4) the murder of Assistant 

Deputy Police Commissioner Antonio Esposito in Genoa. For some 

clarification, it should be noted that the murder of the five escorts 

accompanying Aldo Moro at the time of his abduction was not 

considered a major incident. The ratio of woundings to murders 
28

generally was consistent over the late 1970s and early 1980s at about 

2:1. And the ratio of abductions/kidnappings to murders over the 

same period was about 3-4:1.73

 In sum, the program of the Red Brigades was straightforward, 

transparent, and unchanged from the organizations’ beginnings 

in 1969 through the early 1980s. In general terms, this urban 

insurgency―stressing terrorist strategy and tactics―would challenge 

the integrity of Italy’s political and socio-economic institutions and 

create an unacceptable level of instability. In turn, the resultant 

instability would erode the basic public trust that must underlie the 

legitimate functioning of the state. In more specific terms: 

The city must become a treacherous terrain for the enemy, for the men who 

exercise today an ever-increasing hostile power extraneous to the interest 

of the masses. All their gestures must be observed, all abuses must be 

denounced, all collusion between the economic and political power must 

be uncovered . . . The long revolutionary march in the metropolis . . . 

must begin here today.74

And from another source:

The only language that the servants of imperialism have demonstrated 

to understand is the language of arms . . . No objective, no matter how 

militarily protected, is unattackable by a guerrilla force . . . Proletarian 

power must be affirmed even through the concretization of its own justice, 

through the capability of trying, passing judgment on, [and] convicting 

enemies of the proletariat.75

It must be remembered that the organization of the Red Brigades 

was derived out of violence, and that its primary objective was to 

destroy the political equilibrium of Italy and enable the dictatorship 

of the proletariat. 

Response to the Revolutionary Program.

 Over the 10-year period from 1968 to 1978, the Italian government 

considered revolutionary violence to be only a little more serious than 

normal violent criminal behavior. Thus, revolutionary insurgency 

was not a national security issue. Nevertheless, after the murder 

of Aldo Moro―and 2,497 other terrorist incidents in 1978―it was 
29

generally agreed that Italy indeed was involved in an unconventional 

political-insurgency war for survival. The revolutionary assault 

on the Italian state was dividing, corrupting, destablilizing, and 

destroying Italian society―and the government was finding it more 

and more difficult to conduct the business of governance and to 

perform its legitimizing functions. As a consequence, the concept of 

national security was expanded to allow the Italian government to 

confront the nontraditional threat of insurgency to national stability 

and security―and meaningful sovereignty.76

This challenge required rethinking the problem of revolutionary 

insurgency, terrorist tactics, and unconventional war. In these terms, 

it was generally agreed that the unconventional threat comes in many 

forms, both direct and indirect. The most visible form of the direct 

threat to the state came in the form of public violence (terrorism) 

against leading officials who were considered symbols of something 

the insurgent leadership defined as “bad” or some form of “threat” 

to their movement. 

 The indirect threat came in the form of the progressive 

discrediting of public institutions that eroded their ability to 

perform their functions for society―and eroded the basic public 

trust that government could and would provide individual and 

collective security, along with other legitimizing duties prescribed 

in the social contract. But, because of the continuing absence of a 

homogeneous and solid parliamentary majority, accompanied by 

endemic governmental instability, the Italian government could not 

micro-manage the problem and was limited to the promulgation of 

foundational measures that would facilitate an adequate response to 

the political war at the legislative, police, and intelligence levels.77

 First, at the legislative level, it was agreed that the moral legitimacy 

of the republic that emerged out of World War II was strong enough 

to allow the planning, public dissemination, and implementation 

of a coordinated and legitimized counterinsurgent/terrorist policy. 

State legitimacy also was strong enough to allow the promulgation 

of a modern criminal code and “hard law” legislation directed 

specifically against the insurgents. This legislation brought the preWorld War II Criminal Code of 1930 up to date, and specifically 

addressed conspiracy and actions taken for the purposes of terrorism 

and subversion of the democratic order.78
30

 Second, at the national security level, it was generally understood 

that political-insurgency war is, in fact, a series of “wars” within a 

general war against the state. These wars represent the major strategic 

dimensions that determine the outcome of the general war and take 

into account the so-called “forgotten” political-psychological-socioeconomic-moral dimensions of conflict that make the difference 

between winning the battles―or winning the war itself. Both Carl 

von Clausewitz and Niccolo Michiavelli covered these dimensions 

in their treatises on conducting war, and both philosophers taught 

that war was not a strictly military effort.79 Michiavelli, for example, 

argues that good laws and good arms allow the leader with virtu

to master fortuna to take―or maintain―effective control of a state. 

Superior virtu consists of six related elements: (1) a well-disciplined 

and trained security force; (2) careful planning for the application of 

that force before and after power is achieved; (3) the skillful use of spies 

(intelligence); (4) isolation of the enemy from his sources of support; 

(5) unison (unity) of political-military effort; and (6) perceived moral 

rectitude (self-restraint and justice).80 Italian strategic leaders also 

understood that this particular conflict was an internal affair. It was 

Italian vs. Italian. As a result, there was no way this confrontation 

could be allowed to degenerate into a simple military or “Dirty War.” 

This war would have to be fought with prudenza (prudence) so as to 

avoid, as much as possible, any damage to the future state of peace, 

prosperity, stability, and security of the country.81

 Thus, third, the conduct of the diverse wars within the general war 

could not be left to the discordant elements of the state bureaucracy 

working separately and with their own agendas. There would also 

have to be (1) a strong attempt to achieve a certain level of “unity of 

effort” (unison, in Michaevelli’s terms) that would be made effective 

by (2) a unified intelligence capability. As a consequence, the Italian 

government created a temporary Counter-Terrorism Task Force. That 

organization was given the primary responsibility for intelligence 

collection and counterterrorist operations, and placed under the 

control of late Carabinieri general Carlo Alberto della Chiesa.82 The 

para-military Carabinieri understand how to plan and coordinate 

action, and have the full police power throughout the entire Italian 

national territory. Thus, intelligence, operational planning, and 

multiorganizational coordination, to the extent that it was achieved, 
31

essentially fell to that organization. As a result, the regular Italian 

armed forces generally took over routine, inconspicuous, and 

unobtrusive police functions to allow the State Police, other police 

forces, and the national Carabinieri freedom to concentrate on the 

counterinsurgency mission. Under Carabinieri leadership, long-term 

and short-term mutually supportive objectives were determined and 

pursued, and the war was discreetly brought under control as early 

as 1981-82.83

 Additionally, two other extremely important factors were at work 

in the process of response to the revolutionary program. The first 

had to do with the intelligence component of the conflict. The second 

factor that influenced heavily the outcome of the counterinsurgency 

effort and the type of internal peace that was ultimately achieved 

was the use of power.

 Intelligence. The legitimacy of the various disunited insurgent 

organizations was questioned from the outset. Even though 259 of 

the 297 leftist groups claiming responsibility for diverse terrorist acts 

were classified as communist, the legal parliamentary Communist 

Party of Italy (PCI) denied responsibility for taking a violent 

approach to achieving control of the state. Throughout 1968-82, the 

PCI “wrapped itself in the flag of the Italian republic,” insisted on 

its commitment to a pluralist society, and withheld its support from 

the combatant communists.84 In that context, it was probably the 

role of the PCI that was decisive in bringing the insurgency under 

control within a relatively short period. That is to say, the PCI role 

in providing intelligence to the state security apparatus was key. 

The PCI’s capillary structure―strengthened by a large number of 

efficient ancillary organizations―was able to identify and locate 

specific terrorist organizations, leaders, and members. The PCI 

furnished a great deal of this human intelligence to the CounterTerrorist Task Force and made it appear to be much more efficient 

and effective than it would have otherwise been. In any case, timely 

and accurate human intelligence provided by the PCI considerably 

enhanced Italian government efforts to find, discredit, and neutralize 

revolutionary insurgent organizations and leadership.85

Power. In an urban insurgency situation, there are normally no 

identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy and no 

specific geographical territory to take and hold. Moreover, the enemy 
32

is living and mingling together with ordinary citizens, and there is 

no obvious way to determine which Italian is or is not a member 

of a revolutionary movement. Under these conditions, the enemy 

must be very carefully discerned and isolated from the rest of the 

population. This is crucial because, in the words of General John R. 

Galvin, U.S. Army, (Retired), “The resulting burden on the military 

institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed adversary 

while attempting to provide security to the civilian population, it 

also must avoid inadvertently furthering the insurgents’ cause. If, 

for example, the military’s actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause 200 

previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent cause, the use 

of force will have been counterproductive.”86

 Thus power must be considered as multilayered and combining 

“hard” and “soft” elements―political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal, military, police, and civil bureaucratic 

activities―that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes 

as well as the perpetrators of violence.87 In Michaevelli’s terms, 

exceptional prudence (prudenza) is required in applying power in 

any internal―and external―situation, depending on the desired 

outcome.88 The blunt hard power exercised by conventional military 

organizations supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft in urban 

space is likely to be counterproductive―or irrelevant, at best. In a 

large number of cases, the more subtle use of soft power supported 

by relevant information warfare, careful intelligence work, and 

surgical precision in removing specific individual men and women 

insurgents from the general populace has proven effective―and 

imperative.89

 For example, the Italian Carabinieri replaced the smart bomb 

aimed at an apartment in downtown Milan with a discrete knock 

on the apartment door. In doing that, they were able to destroy an 

enemy cell and not destroy an apartment building and displace 

the residents in the process. The Carabinieri gained the approval 

and admiration of the community―and contributed directly to the 

enhancement of the popular perception that governmental authority 

was genuine and effective, and used for reasonable and fair (that is, 

legitimate) purposes.90

 Response to the revolutionary program on the part of external 

powers, such as the United States and other Western countries, 
33

proved to be relatively ineffective. If credit is given where it is 

due, the Italian state deserves most―but not all―of the credit for 

effectively bringing the insurgency under control. It is important to 

remember that governmental success was at least partially based on 

a certain level of failure and isolation on the part of the insurgent 

organizations.91

Key Points and Lessons.

 • The Italian urban insurgency included a large group of 

diverse organizations motivated to the violent replacement 

of a “moribund” capitalist system. It relied on internal urban 

strategies from which to develop a support base and to act as 

an ideological substitute for conventional war.

 • The primary insurgent organization, the Red Brigades, utilized 

a vigorous, wide-spread, and violent set of terrorist tactics to 

implement its objective of bringing down the Italian state. 

 • The Red Brigades were organized into logistical and 

mass brigades. The logistical brigades operated overtly to 

provide support to the mass brigades. The mass brigades 

operated covertly, and were responsible for intelligence and 

operations. 

 • The Red Brigades were derived out of political-social 

violence, and their primary objective was to destroy the 

political equilibrium of Italy to enable the dictatorship of the 

proletariat.

 • The Italian government―once it made the political decision to 

treat the 10-year-old insurgency as a national security problem 

rather than an increasingly irritating law enforcement issue―

planned, organized, and implemented a soft multilayered 

political-paramilitary response. Not unexpectedly, that 

strategy generated political stability and the viable possibility 

of a sustainable peace within a relatively short time.

 • As a corollary, it was recognized that the unwillingness or 

inability of a government to develop a long-term, multidimensional, and morally acceptable strategy to confront an 
34

insurgency and its associated terrorism is a threat to the 

stability and sovereignty of the state itself. In these terms, the 

state has the clear responsibility to take legitimizing measures 

to confront insurgency and avoid possible state failure.

These hard-won lessons, learned from the Italian experience with 

urban insurgency, and its associated terrorism, are all too relevant 

to the “new” political wars of the 21st century. Sun Tzu argues that 

“those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They 

capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state 

without protracted operations.”92

OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF THE PAST: 

IMAGES OF THE FUTURE 

 Victory in any kind of war―including insurgency war―is 

not simply the sum of the battles won or lost over the course of a 

conflict. Rather, it is the product of connecting and weighting the 

various political, economic, informational, and security elements of 

national power in support of a unifying political goal. Lessons from 

over a half-century of bitter experience suffered by governments 

involved in dealing with destabilizing internal conflicts show that 

a given response to a given threat often ends―or continues―short 

of achieving the desired peace. Too often, this is because too much 

time, treasure, and blood are dedicated to tactical and operational 

concerns as opposed to defining and implementing the strategic 

political end-game.

 Moreover, it would be a terrible mistake to assume that there is 

nothing to be learned from past insurgency wars. On the contrary, 

in the “savage wars of peace” of the current and future eras, the 

lessons learned from earlier experience are all too relevant. Thus, this 

monograph emphasizes some strategic-level lessons learned over 

the past several years. The most salient points and lessons are seen―

to one degree or another―in the Argentine, Peruvian, and Italian 

insurgency/terrorism cases outlined above. Among other things, the 

Argentine case provides a basis from which to examine the problem 

of current and future populism and urban insurgency. All three 

cases―but especially the Peruvian case―invoke the fundamental 
35

strategic political issue of state failure, and why it matters. The Italian 

case illustrates good governmental decisionmaking regarding the 

question of military vs. political victory in internal conflict and has 

its implications for the future of the state.

Populism and Urban Insurgency.

 A map of the 21st century security situation shows 79 low-intensity 

conflicts, 32 complex emergencies, and 18 ethnic wars, overlapping 

with 175 small-scale contingencies ongoing throughout the world.93

Nationalist and separatist discontent, often accompanied by populist 

militancy, appears to provide fuel for most of these conflicts. In 

this connection, weak, corrupt, incompetent, misguided, and/or 

insensitive governments cannot or will not satisfy the legitimate 

expectations of their peoples―and add more fuel to the conflict 

syndrome. As a consequence, armed nonstate insurgent groups all 

over the world are challenging democratic as well as undemocratic 

governments’ physical and moral right to govern.94

 Latin America is only one example of this political turmoil. Since 

1945, internal conflict in the region has been a series of confrontations 

between populist reform movements―sometimes radical, sometimes 

moderate, and occasionally (as in Peronist Argentina) quasi-fascist. 

But, the main line of internal conflict in Latin America, and elsewhere 

in the world, has been between the various populist forces and those 

of the existing oligarchic social and economic structures. The basic 

problem is that the transition to democracy is not satisfying the socioeconomic expectations of the populace. Likewise, the transition to 

free market economies is not satisfying expectations.95

 Ambitious populist leaders such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo 

Chavez in Venezuela, and others exploit these popular grievances 

to catapult themselves into political power―and stay there. Their 

success stems from solemn promises―made directly to the urban 

masses―to solve national and individual problems without regard 

to slow, obstructive, and corrupted democratic processes. Thus, 

through mass mobilization and supporting demonstrations, 

demagogic populist leaders are in a position to claim a mandate to 

place themselves above elections, political parties, legislatures, and 

courts―and govern as they see fit.96
36

 In testimony before the U.S. Congress on March 24, 2004, General 

James T. Hill, U.S. Army, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, 

stated that, “Traditional threats [in Latin America] are now complicated 

by an emerging threat best described as radical populism . . . .

That threat emerges when populism becomes radicalized by a 

leader who increasingly uses his position . . . to infringe gradually 

upon the rights of all citizens.”97 The threat becomes serious when 

a populist leader relies on the increasing use of repressive violence 

as an effective deterrent against any and all opponents. Under these 

conditions, can an insurgency be far behind? 

In considering urban insurgency as a likely contemporary 

strategic approach to political war, this monograph goes against 

the conventional wisdom and the Leninist-Maoist tradition of ruralbased insurgency. Ironically, we emphasize the urban approach for 

the same fundamental reasons Lenin reluctantly took his party cadre 

into rural Russia, and Mao happily concentrated his organizational 

efforts in the rural space of China. Simply put, that is where the 

people are. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that, as important 

as populism, its associated instability, and probable insurgency 

might be in a given threat environment, it is only a symptom―not 

necessarily a threat in itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is state 

failure.

The Issue of State Failure.

 State failure is an evolutionary process, not an outcome. This state 

of affairs is often brought on by poor, irresponsible, and insensitive 

governance, and leads to at least one other very fundamental 

reason why states fail. That is, state failure can be a process that 

is exacerbated by nonstate (insurgent) groups that, for whatever 

reason, want to take down or exercise illicit control over a given 

government. In Latin America, Colombia is, Peru has been, and both 

continue to be good examples of this. The narco-insurgent/terrorist 

nexus in those countries represents an unconventional, asymmetric 

threat to the authority of the central governments. Through murder, 

kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, destruction of infrastructure, 

and other means of coercion and persuasion, these violent, internal, 

nonstate actors compromise the exercise of state authority. The 
37

government and its institutions become progressively less and less 

capable of performing the tasks of governance, including exercising 

their fundamental personal security functions to protect citizens. 

As a result, the narco-insurgents become increasingly wealthy and 

powerful, and affected countries deteriorate further and further 

toward failed state status.98

 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities 

that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. 

Drug cartels operating in that country and throughout the Andean 

Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business 

incentives. Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to 

further their specific objectives, Sendero’s and other violent nonstate 

actors’ armed propaganda and business incentives are aimed at 

lessening a regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability 

and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and 

society. This debilitating and destabilizing activity generates the 

most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global 

community today.99

 More specifically, failing or failed states in Latin America, Africa, 

the Middle-East, and Asia are breeding grounds for instability, 

insurgency, and terrorism. A breakdown in institutional governance 

can breed or exacerbate humanitarian disasters and major refugee 

flows. Such states can host networks of all kinds, including criminal 

business enterprises and/or some form of ideological, religious, or 

populist crusade. They also spawn a variety of pernicious and lethal 

activities and outcomes, including torture and murder; poverty, 

starvation, and disease; the recruitment and use of child soldiers; 

trafficking in women and human organs for transplants; trafficking 

and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons 

of mass destruction; genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism; and 

criminal anarchy and insurgency. At the same time, these networks 

and activities normally are unconfined and spill over into regional 

syndromes of destabilization and conflict.100

Additionally, failing and failed states simply do not go away. 

Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states become 

dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new 

people’s democracies. Moreover, failing and failed states tend not to 
38

(1) buy U.S. and other exporting nations’ products, (2) be interested 

in developing democratic and free market institutions and human 

rights, or (3) cooperate on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illicit 

arms flows, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous 

environmental problems. In short, the longer they persist, the more 

they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, 

and prosperity.101

Military vs. Political Victory.

 The global security arena may be characterized as a game of chess. 

In it, protagonists move pieces silently and subtly all over the game 

board. Under the players’ studied direction, each piece represents 

a different type of devastating power, and may simultaneously 

conduct its lethal attacks from differing directions. Similarly, each 

piece shows no mercy against its foe, and is prepared to sacrifice itself 

to allow another piece the opportunity to destroy a more important 

adversary―or checkmate the king. Likewise, every player in the 

global security arena from proverbial pawns to bishops to the queen 

must attack the adversary and simultaneously cope defensively with 

several potentially grave types of threats.

 In the real game of global politics, and at a lower level on the 

likelihood ladder of warfare as a whole, conventional military attack 

retains certain credibility. Nevertheless, this challenge is frequently 

complicated by threats and menaces at a higher level of likelihood 

emanating from rogue states, nonstate and transnational terrorists, 

insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, 

militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 1,000 other “snakes” 

with a cause―and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare to 

achieve their own political objectives.102 Logic would, thus, dictate 

that military organization, training, and equipment must adopt two 

parallel tracks: the first aimed at direct conventional interstate war, 

and the second aimed at unconventional nonstate and intrastate 

political war. But, as in the game of chess, General Sir Frank Kitson, 

United Kingdom, (Retired), argues that these tracks should not be 

considered as independent forms of contemporary conflict. They are 

parts within the concept of total war.103
39

 In connection with the idea of total war, or warfare as a whole, the 

military role goes beyond traditional warfighting to unconventional 

conflict and to consolidating success by providing security and 

support to partners, other government and international agencies, 

and nongovernmental organizations in the aftermath. Under 

these conditions, security forces provide the capabilities needed 

to consolidate battlefield success and turn it into strategic political 

victory. Thus, as shown in the Italian case, strategic victory requires 

not only the defeat of an enemy military or insurgent force, but also 

the protection of the state’s socio-political foundations to ensure a 

durable and prosperous peace. 

In the contemporary global security environment, international 

organizations and willing national powers are increasingly called 

on to respond to conflicts generated by all kinds of instabilities and 

destabilizers. Furthermore, the international community increasingly 

is expected to provide the leverage to ensure that legitimate governance 

is given to responsible, incorrupt, and competent leadership that 

can and will address the political, economic, and social root causes 

that underlie a given traditional or unconventional conflict. This 

legitimate governance concept has serious implications in terms of 

failing and failed states. As demonstrated in the Italian, Peruvian, 

and Argentine cases, the conscious positive or negative choices 

that a government makes about how to conduct national security 

and stability efforts will define the future of the state―through the 

processes of national reform, regeneration, and protection of citizens’ 

well-being and by extension, global security. Thus, the capability to 

attain strategic political victory―rather than just military victory―is 

much more important now and for the future than it has been in the 

past.104

Summary.

 In sum, instability, violence, and the use of terrorist tactics and 

strategies in political wars are pervasive in the world today. It is 

important, then, for the United States and the West―as primary 

recipients of most of the benefits of global stability and economic 

integration―to do their utmost to protect and enhance the global order. 

And that must be done before even more territory, infrastructure, 
40

and stability are quietly and slowly destroyed, and more thousands 

of innocents die.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

 The study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been 

the cornerstone for understanding conventional war.105 It is no less 

relevant to nontraditional conflict. In the past, some wars tended to 

be unrealistically viewed as generally amenable to military attrition 

solutions―the Vietnam War and the two relatively recent Iraq Wars 

being good examples. In the 21st century, the complex realities of 

contemporary wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely 

on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working 

together in an integrated fashion, to achieve common, workable, and 

reasonable political-strategic ends.

 Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequately for present 

and future political-insurgency war contingencies is unconscionable. 

Experience clearly demonstrates that the tradition of simply training 

and equipping troops has proven to be an inadequate tacticaloperational reaction to the types of problems that pertain to modern 

political war. At a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are 

needed to begin to deal effectively with contemporary global conflict 

situations: (1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue 

regarding viable security and stability; (2) fundamental education 

and understanding requirements; and the (3) strategic application of 

U.S. military power. 

Dialogue on Security and Stability.

 At the highest levels, a beginning point from which to work 

toward viable security and stability would be to:

 • Help advance a nation’s or region’s understanding of the 

conventional and unconventional security concerns and 

threats facing it,

 • Develop permanent civil-military mechanisms for addressing 

these concerns and threats,

 • Obtain consensus on common principles and concepts of 

security and stability to address real threats stemming from 

general concerns, and 
41

 • Foster expanded political-military dialogue and cooperation 

in an atmosphere of mutual respect for sovereignty and 

understanding diverse points of view.

Education and Understanding.

 At base, however, education and understanding are key to 

success in dealing with political war. Thus, the political issue in 

conflict dominates threat and response at two related levels: (1) 

leader development and (2) development of strategic clarity. 

Leader Development. The ambiguous multidimensional politicalpsychological nature of contemporary political conflict situations 

forces the redefinition of long-used terms. In this connection, civilian 

and military leaders at all levels must learn that:

 • The enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or 

an industrial capability to make traditional war. The enemy is 

also the individual political actor that plans and implements 

illegal violence, and exploits the causes of violence for his 

own self-determined purposes. In these terms, another very 

real enemy is recognized now to exist in the form of poverty, 

disease, and other nonhuman destabilizers that must be dealt 

with early and aggressively.

 • Power is no longer confined to combat firepower directed at 

a uniformed enemy military formation or industrial complex. 

Power is multilevel, consisting of coordinated political, 

psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, 

and police activity that can be brought to bear discretely on 

the causes as well as the perpetrators of illegal violence.

 • Victory or success is not an unconditional surrender marked 

by a formally signed document terminating a conflict. In the 

absence of an easily identifiable human foe to attack and 

destroy, there is no specific territory to take and hold, no single 

credible government or political actor with which to deal, no 

guarantee that any agreement between or among contending 

authorities will be honored, and no specific rules to guide 

leadership in a given civil-military engagement process. 
42

Victory, perhaps with an international impetus, is now 

more and more defined as the achievement of a sustainable 

peace. Those who would declare victory and go home before 

achieving the foundations for a sustainable peace must be 

prepared to return and deal with the problem again―and 

again.

 • Conflict is not a military-to-military war of attrition. 

Conflict now involves entire populations. It involves a large 

number of national civilian and military agencies, external 

national civilian organizations, international organizations, 

nongovernmental organizational and subnational indigenous 

actors, all dealing one way or another with myriad threats 

to global, regional, and national security, peace, and wellbeing. Thus, conflict is not only multidimensional, but also 

multiorganizational.

 • Finally, at this level, contemporary conflict situations are not 

limited―they are total. Conflict is not a kind of appendage―a 

lesser or limited thing―to the development or disruption of 

collective or individual well-being. As long as nonhuman 

destabilizers such as poverty and disease exist that can 

lead to the destruction of a people, a society, and/or a 

government―there is conflict. These are the root causes that 

human destabilizers exploit to implement their programs to 

take down violently a government, destroy a society, or cause 

great harm to a society.

 Educational Solutions for Strategic Clarity. At a minimum, there 

are seven educational and cultural imperatives to modify traditional 

war and ethno-centric mindsets, and to develop the leader 

judgment needed to deal more effectively with complex, politically 

dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, 

and multicultural contingencies:

 • Strategic civilian and military leaders at all levels must 

learn the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency, 

with particular reference to the way in which military and 

nonmilitary and lethal and nonlethal force can be employed 
43

to achieve political ends; and the way in which political 

considerations affect the use of force. Additionally, leaders 

need to understand the strategic and political-psychological 

implications of operational and tactical actions.

 • Strategic leaders must understand that the number of 

battlefield victories or the number of enemies arrested or 

killed has meaning only to extent that such actions contribute 

directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state.

 • Civilian and military personnel must be able to operate 

effectively and collegially in coalitions or multinational 

contingents. They must also acquire the ability to deal 

collegially with civilian populations and local and global 

media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance interagency as 

well as international cultural awareness―such as civilian and 

military exchange programs, language training programs, 

and combined (multinational) exercises―must be revitalized 

and expanded.

 • Strategic leaders must learn how to cooperatively and 

collegially plan and implement an operation employing a 

full complex of diverse organizations―internal agencies, 

international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

and coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.

 • Strategic leaders must learn that an intelligence capability 

several steps beyond the usual is required for small politicalinsurgency wars. This capability involves active utilization of 

intelligence operations as a dominant element of both strategy 

and tactics. Thus, commanders and leaders at all levels must 

be responsible for collecting and exploiting timely intelligence. 

The lowest military echelon where adequate intelligence assets 

generally have been concentrated is at the division or brigade 

level. Yet, military operations in most contemporary conflicts 

are normally conducted by battalion and smaller units.

 • Strategic civilian and military leaders must understand that 

nonstate political actors in any kind of intrastate conflict 

are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of 

conventional and unconventional weaponry. Political wars 
44

have and will continue to place military forces and civilian 

support contingents into harm’s way. Thus, leadership must 

be prepared to deal effectively and decisively with that kind 

of threat.

 • Finally, leadership at all levels must understand that 

generating a more complete unity of effort and concomitant 

strategic clarity is imperative in contemporary political war. 

Strategic leaders must establish the appropriate politicalorganizational mechanisms to achieve effective national 

and coalitional unity of effort. They must ensure that the 

application of the various national and international civilian 

and military instruments of power contributes directly to the 

achievement of a mutually agreed―or mandated―end-state.

The Strategic Application of U.S. Military Power. At the outset, it 

should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for stability and 

security lies with governments directly involved in political war. 

Yet, the United States and other Western countries as interested 

outside actors, have indispensable experience, resources, and 

political influence that can adapt military efficacy to a given strategic 

threat. This task, with those outlined above, extends to professional 

multilateral civil-military education and leader development:

 Primary Recommendations. At the least, a carefully designed 

and relatively modest assistance program could increase vastly 

the speed at which civil-military institutions professionalize and 

modernize themselves. A short list of the most important areas for 

improvement would include: 

 • Development of strategy, 

 • Development of end-state planning capabilities,

 • Training and doctrine for joint and combined operations,

 • Improvement in the collection, fusion, evaluation, and 

dissemination of usable and timely intelligence, 

 • Development of quick-reaction capabilities, and

 • Improvement in transport capability and lift.
45

 Some More Advanced Recommendations. A short list of 

additional areas for improvement would include:

 • Help define and implement nontraditional national 

interests centering on national “well-being” and effective 

sovereignty (control of territory and the body politic),

 • Help implement the application of all the instruments 

of national and international power―including the full 

integration of legitimate civilian partners―as a part of a 

synergistic security/stability process,

 • Help teach and apply the notion of indirect engagement 

versus direct involvement,

 • Help teach and apply the notion of multiple centers of 

gravity, and how to defend one’s own centers of gravity 

as well as attack those of an opponent,

 • Help teach and apply the power of information and public 

diplomacy and an understanding of the penalties that 

are paid when these instruments of power are not used, 

channeled, or harnessed, 

 • Help indigenous leadership understand that governmental 

inaction can be as much of a threat to stability and security 

as any other destabilizer, and

 • Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to a given 

government makes a specific contribution to its strategic 

objectives of promoting democracy, human rights, 

economic development, social justice, personal and 

collective security, and creating an environment for 

sustainable peace.

A Cautionary Concluding Note.

 The above outline of fundamental strategic recommendations 

takes us back to where we began. This list of recommendations 

provides the basis for the understanding and judgment that civilian 

and military leaders must have to be clear on what the situation 

is and what it is not. The hard evidence over time underscores the 
46

wisdom of Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the most 

far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander 

have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they 

are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 

something that is alien to its nature.”106

 These recommendations take us beyond doing “something” for 

something’s sake. They take us beyond developing budgets, force 

structure, and equipment packages for a given crisis situation. 

They take us beyond asking, “What are we going to do?” “Who is 

going to command and control the effort?” “How is it to be done?” 

These imperatives take us to the development of a mutually agreedupon strategic vision (that is, the political end-game). In turn, these 

imperatives take us to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term 

planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways and means 

that directly support the achievement of the political end-game.107

 There is very little glamour, only a few sound bites, and not 

many career enhancement possibilities inherent in much of the work 

outlined above, but it does have great potential for directing progress 

toward democracy, stability, and sustainable peace.

ENDNOTES

 1. Paul E. Smith, On Political War, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1989, p. 3. This encompasses what B. H. Liddell Hart, drawing 

from Sun Tzu, calls the indirect approach to war. “The perfection of strategy would 

be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting. . . . Thus, those 

skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities 

without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.” 

B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d revised edition, New York: Signet, 1967, p. 324; and 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B., Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University 

Press, 1971, p. 79. 

 2. See Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences 

of Political Violence, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983; and 

Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, New York: 

Continuum, 2003.

 3. This concept was formulated and elaborated in David Easton, A Framework 

for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

 4. For a good discussion of this set of points, see Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology 

of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Spring 2004, pp. 107-109.
47

 5. Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.

 6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and 

eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88.

 7. See Donald C. Hodges, ed., Philosphy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary 

Writings of Abraham Guillen, New York: William Morrow, 1973, p. 250.

 8. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, The Urbanization of Insurgency: 

The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations, Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center/

RAND, 1994, p. ix.

 9. From 1955 through 1958, the author was in a position from which to 

observe personally the political-military situation in Argentina. Over the period 

1955 through 2004, the author has continuously interviewed civilian and military 

officials regarding political-military affairs and insurgency in that country and 

others―including, specifically, Italy and Peru. Thus, this and subsequent assertions 

made in this monograph are consensus statements based on observation and 

interviews. The intent is to allow anonymity for those who object to their names 

being made public. In subsequent notes, these statements are cited as Author 

Interviews.

 10. See, for example, Juan Chamorro, “Sendero prepara nueva estrategia de 

resurgimiento,” La Republica, November 16, 2002.

 11. Abimael Guzman, “El Discurso del Dr. Guzman,” in Los partidos politicos 

en el Peru, Rogger U. Mercado, ed., Lima: Ediciones Latinamericanos, 1985, pp. 

85-90; Comite Central del Partido Comunista del Peru, Desarrollar la Guerra popular 

sirviendo a la revolucion mundial, Lima: Comite Central de Partido Communista del 

Peru, 1986, pp. 82-88. 

 12. Ibid.

 13. Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam, London: Frank Cass 

Publishers, 1996, p. 54. 

 14. Ibid., p. 282.

 15. Author Interviews.

 16. Testimony of Red Brigadist Antonio Savasta quoted in Richard Drake, The 

Aldo Moro Murder Case, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 50.

 17. Declaration of Red Brigades sent to L’Expresso and published as “Le due 

anime delle Br,” March 1, 1987. 

 18. Author interviews.

 19. Richard Gillespie, “Political Violence in Argentina: Guerrillas, Terrorists, 

and Carapintadas,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context, University Park, 

PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 215. Also see Maria Jose Moyano, 

Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979, New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 1995.
48

 20. Ibid.; and Author Interviews.

 21. Ibid.

 22. Ibid.; and Gillespie, pp. 218-223.

 23. Author Interviews.

 24. Ibid.

 25. Ibid.; and Gillespie and Moyano.

 26. Ibid.

 27. Ibid.

 28. Ibid.

 29. Ibid.

 30. The original formulation of the “foco theory” can be found in Ernest 

Guevara, Obras Completas, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cepe, 1973, Vol. III.

 31. Author Interviews.

 32. Ibid.; and Montoyo, p. 59.

 33. Ibid.; and Gillespie, p. 224-225.

 34. Ibid.; and Moyano, p. 172.

 35. Ibid.; and Gillespie, pp. 222-223.

 36. Ibid.

 37. Ibid.; and Moyano, p. 36.

 38. Ibid., and pp. 38-41, 82-83.

 39. Ibid., pp. 56-57; and Gillespie, p. 236.

 40. Ibid., and p. 238.

 41. Ibid.; and Moyano, p. 155.

 42. Reported in The Times, London, January 4, 1978.

 43. Gillespie, pp. 239-240.

 44. Ibid., p. 244; Moyano, p. 164; and Author Interviews.

 45. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

 46. Chamorro.

 47. Guzman.

 48. Comite Central del Partido Comunista del Peru, Bases de discussion, Lima: 

Comite Central del Partido Comunista del Peru, 1987; and “El documento official 

de Sendero,” in Mercado.

 49. Ibid. Also see Communist Party of Peru Central Committee, Interview with 

Chairman Gonzolo, San Francisco: Red Banner Editorial House, 1988.
49

 50. Guzman.

 51. Author Interviews. 

 52. Ibid.

 53. Ibid.

 54. Ibid.

 55. Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, New York: 

Random House, 1992, pp. 225-231.

 56. Author interviews.

 57. Ibid.

 58. Ibid.

 59. Sun Tzu, p. 73. 

 60. Author Interviews. Also see Donatella della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism 

in Italy,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context, University Park, PA: 

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 105.

 61. Testimony of Red Brigadist Robert Buzzatti, quoted in Richard Drake, p. 

143.

 62. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, July 

1981, pp. 379-399.

 63. This passage was extracted from Red Brigades documents quoted in 

Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary 

Italy, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p. 39.

 64. Testimony of Red Brigadist Antonio Savasta, quoted in Richard Drake, p. 

51.

 65. Testimony of Antonio Savasta, 45, quoted in Donatella dela Porta, p. 150.

 66. Antonio Savasta in Richard Drake, p. 50.

 67. Alberto Franceschini, Mara, Renato, e io: storia dei fondatori delle BR, Milan: 

Mondadori, 1988, p. 204.

 68. Author Interviews.

 69. Ibid.

 70. Ibid.

 71. An energia bomb is a more powerful bomb than one made with TNT. Ibid.; 

and Pisano, pp. 119-143. 

 72. Ibid.; and these data may also be found in della Porta, p. 130. 

 73. Ibid.; and these data may also be found in Pisano, pp. 157-167.

 74. Romano Cantore, Carlo Rossella, and Chiara Valentini, Dall’Interno della 

Guerriglia, Minan: Mondadori, 1978, p. 24.
50

 75. Quote taken from Pisano, p. 40, that was taken from a document entitled 

“Red Brigades,” No. 6, March 1979, Spring Campaign: Seizure, Trial, Execution of 

Christian Democratic President Aldo Moro.

 76. Author Interviews.

 77. Ibid.

 78. Ibid. Also see Pisano, pp. 144-151; and della Porta, pp. 118-119.

 79. Ibid. Also see Clausewitz, pp. 88-89; 93-93; and Niccolo Machiavelli, The 

Art of War, New York: DaCapo Press, 1965, pp. liv-lvi, 7-8, 34, 46, 77-78, 171, 179, 

202-204.

 80. Ibid.

 81. Author Interviews.

 82. Ibid.

 83. Ibid.

 84. Ibid.; and Drake, pp. 193-194.

 85. Author Interviews.

 86. General John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” 

Parameters, December 1986, pp. 2-8.

 87. Ibid.

 88. Machiavelli.

 89. This assertion is derived from statistical tests based on interviews with 

several hundred civilian and military officials and scholars with direct experience 

in 69 post-World War II insurgency wars. The first public publication of the 

results of this research may be found in Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, 

“Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Small 

Wars & Insurgencies, Winter, 1992, pp. 272-305.

 90. Author Interviews.

 91. Ibid.

 92. Sun Tzu, p. 77.

 93. See the “World Conflict and Human Rights Map,” prepared by Berto 

Jongman with the support of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, 2002; 

The State of the World Atlas, 1997; and website for Genocide Watch.com, Dr. Greg 

Stanton, among other sources.

 94. Gelb; Walter Laquer, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, SeptemberOctober 1996, pp. 24-36; Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, JanuaryFebruary 1997, pp. 50-66; and Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign 

Affairs, September-October 2003, pp. 32-44.

 95. This point is well-documented in Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Nuevo 

contexto de seguridad internacional: nuevos desafios,nuevas oportunidades?” in 

La seguridad en America Latina pos 11 de Septiembre, Flaxo-Chile, 2003, pp. 23-43. 
51

 96. Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark, Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition 

Latin America, Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998, pp. 103-104, 109, 216.

 97. Reported by Rudi Williams in American Forces Information Service, News 

Articles, March 31, 2004.

 98. Author Interviews. Also see David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money 

and Democracies, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999; and Eduardo 

Pizarro and Ana Maria Bejarano, “Colombia: A Filing State?” ReVista: Harvard 

Review of Latin America, Spring 2003, pp. 1-6. 

 99. Ibid. Also see Crocker.

 100. Ibid.; and Daniel C. Esty, et al., “The State Failure Projects: Early Warning 

Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in Preventive Measures: Building Risk 

Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, 

eds., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 27-39; and Thomas F. HomerDixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1999, pp. 133-168.

 101. Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Security,” 

in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, The Search for Security: 

A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 

127-140.

 102. General Michael P. C. Carns, “Reopening the Deterrence Debate: 

Thinking about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow,” in Max G. Manwaring, 

ed., Deterrence in the 21st Century, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 8.

 103. Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

 104. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Future War/Future Battlespace: The 

Strategic Role of American Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2003, pp. ix-x, 15-17, 22-23.

 105. Kitson.

 106. Clausewitz.

 107. Author interviews with General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, Retired, 

Boston, MA, August 6, 1997; Lieutenant General William G. Carter, III, U.S. 

Army, Retired, Washington, DC, November 30, 1998 and March 2, 1999; General 

Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander-in Chief, U.S. Central Command, 

Washington, DC, June 2, 1999, and October 6, 2000; and General Charles E. 

Wilhelm, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Washington, DC, February 9, 2001, and June 

22, 2001.