************************************************

The “officially released” date that appears near the 

beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be 

published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it 

is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the 

beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event 

of discrepancies between the advance release version of 

an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest 

version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying 

an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or 

Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may 

not be reproduced or distributed without the express 

written permission of the Commission on Official Legal 

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

************************************************
Page 2A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

2 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

CITY OF WATERBURY v. JANET

BRENNAN ET AL.

(AC 46178)

Elgo, Moll and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, in her individual capacity and as the executrix of the estate

of the decedent, the former fire chief of the plaintiff city, appealed from the

judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant

claimed that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and improperly denied her motion for summary judgment. Held:

The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the decedent,

under the terms of his employment contract, was entitled to receive pension

benefits under the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff

and the plaintiff’s municipal administrators association, rather than the

collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the firefighters

union.

In light of the record and the plain and unambiguous language in the decedent’s employment contract, this court concluded that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as no genuine

issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff’s retirement board

possessed authority under the city charter to unilaterally confer a pension

benefit on the decedent pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement

with the firefighters union.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion

for reargument and reconsideration on the ground that the defendant did

not properly preserve her claim that the plaintiff was not permitted to utilize

the decedent’s pension benefits to offset heart and hypertension benefits

due to him, and the defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court

committed plain error.

Argued February 5—officially released September 24, 2024

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that

no further workers’ compensation payments are due

to the defendants, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

where the court, Roraback, J., denied the defendants’
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 3

Waterbury v. Brennan

motion for summary judgment, granted the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, and rendered judgment

thereon, from which the defendants appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was

Andrew S. Marcucci, for the appellants (defendants).

Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ELGO, J. In this action for declaratory relief, the

defendant Janet Brennan1 appeals from the judgment

of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the

city of Waterbury (city). On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court improperly denied her motion for

summary judgment and, relatedly, that it improperly

granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the

city. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The backdrop to this appeal is detailed in Brennan

v. Waterbury, 331 Conn. 672, 207 A.3d 1 (2019) (Brennan I). The city hired the decedent, Thomas Brennan,

as its fire chief on November 8, 1991. Id., 675. Following

a heart attack in 1993, the decedent filed a claim for

heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to General

Statutes § 7-433c. Id., 676. In December, 1993, the workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner)2

1 The city brought this action against Janet Brennan in both her individual

capacity and as executrix of the estate of her late husband, Thomas Brennan. 2 General Statutes § 31-275d (a) (1), effective October 1, 2021, provides

in relevant part that, ‘‘[w]henever the words ‘workers’ compensation commissioner,’ ‘compensation commissioner,’ or ‘commissioner,’ denote a workers’ compensation commissioner in [several enumerated] sections of the

general statutes, [including sections contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.] the words ‘administrative law

judge’ shall be substituted in lieu thereof . . . .’’

Because many of the events underlying this appeal occurred prior to

October 1, 2021, in this opinion we use the terms workers’ compensation

commissioner or commissioner.
Page 4A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

4 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

issued a finding and award, concluding that the decedent had sustained a compensable injury and ordering

the city to pay all benefits to which he ‘‘ ‘is or may

become entitled.’ ’’ Id. The city and the decedent thereafter attempted to no avail to reach an agreement on

the payment of benefits. Id. While those negotiations

were ongoing, the decedent elected to take disability

retirement in December, 1995; id.; and the city’s retirement board (board) authorized a 75 percent disability

pension.3 Id., 677 n.4. Although the city made payments

to the decedent pursuant to § 7-433c in July, 1997, and

June, 1999,4 the decedent and the city never entered into

a full and final settlement of the heart and hypertension

claim. Id., 677.

The decedent died on April 20, 2006. Id., 678. As the

court noted in Brennan I, ‘‘[i]t was not until 2013 that

the decedent’s attorney sought to finalize the decedent’s

permanent partial disability claim under § 7-433c.’’ Id.

The decedent’s attorney subsequently moved to substitute the defendant as party claimant. The commissioner

granted that motion and, in a decision dated December

7, 2015, ordered permanent partial disability benefits

of 80 percent payable to her, less any advance payments

made to date. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

The city commenced the present action by service

of process on December 24, 2015. The gist of its complaint was that, due to a pension offset provision in the

1967 Waterbury city charter (city charter), no further

3 In its response to the defendant’s requests for admission, the city admitted that ‘‘the annual pay of [the decedent] at the time of his retirement was

$86,690.78’’ and that ‘‘[t]he disability pension granted to [the decedent] was

in the amount of $65,018.04.’’ It is undisputed that the decedent received

monthly pension payments in the amount of $5418.17 from the time of his

retirement on December 30, 1995, until his death on April 20, 2006. 4 The record before us indicates that the city made lump sum payments

toward the decedent’s § 7-433c claim in the amounts of $59,200.20 in 1997

and $17,982.12 in 1999.
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 5

Waterbury v. Brennan

heart and hypertension payments were due to the defendant.5 The city thus sought a declaratory judgment that

(1) ‘‘[p]ursuant to Russo [v. Waterbury, 304 Conn. 710,

41 A.3d 1033 (2012)], the city charter and [the decedent’s] employment contract, any benefits allegedly due

to [the decedent] under § 7-433[c] and the Workers’

Compensation Act would have resulted in an offset of

the defendant[’s] or [the decedent’s] pension’’; (2) ‘‘[t]he

offset applies to all amounts in contention, the ‘net’

amount in contention is zero and the city does not have

to pay the defendant any additional benefits as a matter

of law’’; and (3) ‘‘[t]he judgment for benefits issued by

the [commissioner] would result in a double recovery

explicitly forbidden by the [city charter] and Russo,

therefore the city does not have to pay the defendant

any monies as a matter of law . . . .’’6

The defendant subsequently filed a request to revise

the city’s complaint in multiple respects. The city filed

an objection to that request, which the court sustained.

The defendant also served two sets of requests for

5 Section 2761 of the city charter contains an offset provision, which

provides: ‘‘No payments of retirement, disability or death benefits shall be

allowed or paid under the provisions of this act so long or for such period

as payments are being made by [the city] under the provisions of the General

Statutes relating to workers’ compensation except when such payments

would exceed the payments made under the provisions of the Workers’

Compensation Act. In such cases the pensioner shall receive, in addition to

his payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act the difference between

that amount and the amount which he would have received under the

provisions of this act.’’

As our Supreme Court observed in Russo v. Waterbury, 304 Conn. 710,

714, 41 A.3d 1033 (2012), § 2761 of the city charter ‘‘allows the city to offset

the . . . pension benefits [of municipal employees] based on their heart

and hypertension benefits’’ under § 7-433c.

All references to the city charter herein are to the 1967 city charter unless

otherwise indicated. 6 The city also sought injunctive relief ‘‘prohibiting the payment of any

benefits to the defendant following the ruling of the [commissioner] until

[its request for] declaratory relief has been decided’’ by the trial court. That

injunctive relief is not at issue in this appeal.
Page 6A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

6 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

admission on the city in 2019 and 2021; copies of the

city’s responses thereto were filed with the court. At

no time did the defendant answer the city’s complaint.

On April 21, 2021, the city filed a motion for summary

judgment, which was accompanied by a memorandum

of law and several exhibits, including copies of the

decedent’s employment contract with the city (employment contract), the affidavit of Cynthia Van Deursen,

a benefits analyst with the city, the affidavit of Daniel

J. Foster, an attorney with the city, and collective bargaining agreements between the city and both the

Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association7 and

the Waterbury Firefighters Association, Local 1339

(union). On September 29, 2021, the defendant filed an

objection to that motion, as well as her own motion

for summary judgment.

The primary disagreement between the parties, as

detailed in their respective motions for summary judgment, concerned precisely which collective bargaining

agreement governed the decedent’s pension with the

city. After hearing argument from the parties, the court

rendered summary judgment in favor of the city. In so

doing, the court concluded that no genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether the decedent, under

the terms of his employment contract, was entitled to

receive pension benefits under the collective bargaining

agreement between the city and the Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association (administrator agreement),8 rather than the collective bargaining agreement

7 In her affidavit, Van Deursen stated that the ‘‘Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association’’ was a labor union and was ‘‘also known as the ‘Management Union.’ ’’ 8 The record contains copies of two collective bargaining agreements

between the city and the Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association,

which covered the time periods of 1989–1993 and 1994–1998, respectively.

Because there is no material difference in those agreements relevant to this

appeal, for convenience we refer to them as the administrative agreement.
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 7

Waterbury v. Brennan

between the city and the union (firefighter agreement).9

In addition, the court rejected the defendant’s claim

that certain actions on the part of the board created

an issue of fact as to whether the decedent was entitled

to the benefits set forth in the firefighter agreement.

With respect to the city’s obligation to pay workers’

compensation benefits pursuant to § 7-433c, the court

noted, in light of the undisputed evidence of pension

payments made to the decedent; see footnote 3 of this

opinion; that, if the city ‘‘is permitted to offset pension

payments . . . against any as of yet unpaid workers’

compensation benefits to which [the decedent] might

lawfully be entitled, the offsets would exceed the

amounts due so as to relieve the city of any liability

for payments on account of workers’ compensation

awards.’’ The court then concluded that the defendant

could not ‘‘escape [the] offset rules reducing amounts

payable under workers’ compensation awards by

amounts that are received by way of pension payments’’

pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s employment

contract. The court thus granted the city’s motion for

summary judgment and denied the defendant’s motion.

On July 11, 2022, the defendant filed a motion seeking

reargument and reconsideration, to which the city filed

an objection. The court heard argument from the parties

and thereafter denied that motion, and this appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we note the well established

standard that governs our review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice

Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be

9 The record contains copies of three collective bargaining agreements

between the city and the union, which covered the time periods of 1989–1992,

1992–1995, and 1995–1999, respectively. Because there is no material difference in those agreements relevant to this appeal, for convenience we refer

to them as the firefighter agreement.
Page 8A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

8 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any

other proof submitted show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding

a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. . . . [T]he moving party . . . has

the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue

as to all the material facts . . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment

fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material

fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit

documents establishing the existence of such an issue.

. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that

demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual

issue. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to

grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn. 764, 772–73,

176 A.3d 1 (2018).

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material

fact existed as to whether the decedent was entitled to

receive pension benefits under the administrator agreement, rather than the firefighter agreement. We disagree.

A

As the court noted in its decision, it is undisputed

that, when the decedent was hired as the city’s fire

chief in 1991, he had not previously been employed by

the city and had never been a member of the union.10

10 The record indicates that the decedent previously had been employed as

a firefighter in New York City before serving as an editor at Fire Department

Magazine for approximately nine years.
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 9

Waterbury v. Brennan

At the time of his hire, the decedent entered into the

employment contract with the city.11 That employment

contract provides in relevant part that the decedent

‘‘shall be paid an annual salary commencing November

4, 1991 at $65,000’’; that he ‘‘shall be entitled to twenty

days vacation’’; that he ‘‘shall be entitled to sick leave

as Management personnel are entitled to’’; and that he

‘‘shall be entitled to all insurance . . . benefits and all

other fringe benefits,including pension if eligible, currently available to members of the Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The employment contract further provides that ‘‘[t]his

Contract embodies the whole agreement between [the

city] and [the decedent] and there are no inducements,

promises, terms, conditions or obligations made or

entered into by either party other than those contained

herein. . . . This Contract may not be changed except

by a written Agreement signed by the Mayor of [the

city] and [the decedent].’’12

‘‘Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a

question of fact . . . [w]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties

intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law. . . . [T]he interpretation and construction

of a written contract present only questions of law,

within the province of the court . . . so long as the

contract is unambiguous and the intent of the parties

can be determined from the agreement’s face. . . .

Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite

and precise meaning about which there is no reasonable

basis for a difference of opinion. . . . A court will not

11 A copy of the employment contract was appended to the city’s memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment. 12 The record also contains an addendum to the employment contract

dated January 6, 1995, which extended its term for an additional three years

and increased the decedent’s annual salary. Both the decedent and the city’s

mayor signed that addendum.
Page 10A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

10 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary

meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do

not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings. . . . When only

one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court

need not look outside the four corners of the contract

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin, 72 Conn. App. 14, 20,

804 A.2d 865 (2002).

The employment contract plainly and unambiguously

provides that the decedent may be eligible for the pension ‘‘currently available to members of the Waterbury

Municipal Administrators Association.’’ The employment contract also states that it embodied ‘‘the whole

agreement’’ between the city and the decedent and may

only be changed by written agreement of those parties.

That contract contains no reference whatsoever to

either the union or the firefighter agreement. Moreover,

the decedent and the city’s mayor never entered into

a written agreement to change the fringe benefits provision of the employment contract, which expressly provides a pension benefit to the decedent pursuant to

the administrator agreement.13 In light of the plain and

unambiguous language contained in the employment

contract, we agree with the court’s conclusion that the

decedent’s employment with the city entitled him to a

pension pursuant to the administrator agreement.

B

The defendant nevertheless argues that (1) the decedent qualified for a pension under the firefighter agreement and (2) the board awarded him such a pension.

Neither contention has merit.

13 We reiterate that the administrator agreement is the collective bargaining

agreement between the Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association

and the city. See footnote 8 of this opinion.
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 11

Waterbury v. Brennan

1

As the court observed in its decision, the decedent

was never a member of the Waterbury Fire Department

or the union prior to being hired as fire chief by the

city. Despite that undisputed fact, the defendant maintains that the decedent qualified for a pension under

the firefighter agreement.

‘‘It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement

is a contract.’’ D’Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95

Conn. App. 834, 838, 898 A.2d 228, cert. denied, 280

Conn. 905, 907 A.2d 88 (2006). For that reason, ‘‘[p]rinciples of contract law guide our interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.’’ Honulik v. Greenwich, 293

Conn. 698, 710, 980 A.2d 880 (2009); see also Christian

v. Gouldin, supra, 72 Conn. App. 20.

Article I, § 1, of the firefighter agreement recognizes

the union ‘‘as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent

for all full-time permanent uniformed and investigatory

employees of the Waterbury Fire Department . . . .’’

It then specifies exactly who qualifies as an ‘‘employee,’’

as that term is used in the firefighter agreement, stating:

‘‘The term ‘employees or employee’ as used in this

Agreement shall refer only to those personnel who

occupy positions whose job specifications required that

the work be performed by uniformed and/or investigatory members of the Waterbury Fire Department and

who are covered by the bargaining unit referred to

herein; which bargaining unit, the parties agree, does

not include the following positions and/or classifications: Fire Chief . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) That language plainly and unambiguously provides that the fire

chief is neither an employee nor a member of the union

for purposes of the firefighter agreement between that

bargaining unit and the city.

The defendant nonetheless argues that, read together,

article I, § 4, and article XXXIII, § 3 (1), of the firefighter
Page 12A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

12 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

agreement, compel the conclusion that the fire chief is

considered an employee who is eligible for a pension

under that agreement. We do not agree. Article XXXIII

is the pension portion of the firefighter agreement. Section 3 (1) thereof provides: ‘‘The term ‘employee’ shall

be defined per Article I, [§] 1, including Article I, [§] 4

of this Agreement . . . .’’ We already have concluded

that the fire chief is categorically not an employee under

article I, § 1. The remaining question is whether the

decedent, in his capacity as fire chief, qualifies as an

employee under article I, § 4.

Article I, § 4, of the firefighter agreement provides in

relevant part that ‘‘[t]he parties . . . agree that for the

purposes of [Article XXXIII], any member promoted to

the rank-classification of Fire Chief . . . may, if he so

elects, receive the pension benefits prescribed by, and

his pension contribution will be governed by Article

XXXIII hereof.’’ For multiple reasons, we conclude that

the decedent does not meet the qualifications of that

section. First, the phrase ‘‘member promoted,’’ as used

therein, plainly refers to someone who previously was

a member of the Waterbury Fire Department. See Firefighter Agreement, art. I, § 1 (explaining that firefighter

agreement pertains to ‘‘personnel who occupy positions

whose job specifications required that the work be performed by uniformed and/or investigatory members of

the Waterbury Fire Department’’). It is undisputed that

the decedent never was a member of the Waterbury Fire

Department prior to his hiring as fire chief.14 Second,

the decedent was not a member who was promoted to

the rank of fire chief; the record unequivocally indicates

that he was a magazine editor for nine years prior to

his hiring by the city. See footnote 10 of this opinion.

14 In his affidavit submitted in support of the city’s motion for summary

judgment, Foster averred that ‘‘[a] review of all documents that could be

located with reasonable effort relating to [the decedent] found no documents

indicating that he held any position of employment with [the city] or its fire

department other than fire chief.’’ The defendant does not argue otherwise.
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 13

Waterbury v. Brennan

Third, article I, § 4, provides that any member promoted to the position of fire chief ‘‘may, if he so selects,

receive the pension benefits prescribed by, and his pension contribution will be governed by Article XXXIII

hereof.’’ That provision plainly and unambiguously

requires members promoted to the position of fire chief

to (1) make a selection to receive a pension under

the firefighter agreement and then (2) make pension

contributions in accordance with the requirements of

article XXXIII. In moving for summary judgment and

opposing the city’s motion, the defendant furnished no

evidence indicating that the decedent, following his hiring as fire chief by the city, made a selection to receive

a pension under the firefighter agreement at any time

prior to filing for retirement in 1995.

There likewise is no evidence in the record before

us that the decedent made pension contributions in

accordance with the requirements of article XXXIII, as

expressly required by article I, § 4, of the firefighter

agreement. To the contrary, the evidence in the record

demonstrates that the decedent, in his four years of

employment as fire chief, made pension contributions

at rates of 5 percent and 6 percent, consistent with the

requirements of the administrative agreement.15 Article

XXXIII of the firefighter agreement, by contrast,

required pension contributions at a rate of 6 percent

from the time of the decedent’s hire until June 29, 1992,

at a rate of 7 percent from July 1, 1992 until June 30,

1995, and at a rate of 9.5 percent from July 1, 1995 until

the decedent retired on December 30, 1995.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that no genuine

issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant

qualified for a pension under the firefighter agreement.

15 In her affidavit, Van Deursen averred in relevant part that, ‘‘[u]pon being

hired in 1991, [the decedent] made pension contributions at the rate of

5%’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n July of 1993, [the decedent’s] pension contribution rate

increased to 6%, where it stayed until his retirement.’’
Page 14A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

14 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

The pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence submitted

demonstrate that the decedent (1) never was a member

of the Waterbury Fire Department or the union prior

to his hiring as fire chief, (2) was not an ‘‘employee,’’

as that term is defined in article I, § 1, of the firefighter

agreement, (3) was not a ‘‘member promoted,’’ as that

phrase is used in article I, § 4, of the firefighter agreement, (4) did not make a selection to receive a pension

under the firefighter agreement upon being hired as fire

chief, as required by article I, § 4, of the firefighter

agreement, and (5) did not make pension contributions

while employed as fire chief at the rates specified in

article XXXIII, as required by article I, § 4, of the firefighter agreement. The court, therefore, properly determined that the decedent did not qualify for a pension

under the firefighter agreement.

2

The defendant further claims that, irrespective of the

decedent’s entitlement to a pension under the terms of

the firefighter agreement, the board in this case

awarded him a disability pension under that agreement.

For two distinct reasons, we disagree.

a

First, the record belies the defendant’s claim. It is

undisputed that, in applying for a disability pension,

the decedent and his attorney requested a disability

pension pursuant to the terms of the firefighter agreement. Appended to the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment are two letters sent to the board from the

decedent and Attorney Angelo Maragos. Those letters,

dated November 28, 1995 and November 30, 1995,

respectively, both state in relevant part that the decedent was exercising his option, pursuant to article I,

§ 4, of the firefighter agreement, to receive a pension
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 15

Waterbury v. Brennan

pursuant thereto.16 In part I B 1 of this opinion, we have

explained why that request was untenable, as (1) the

decedent was not a ‘‘member promoted’’ to the position

of fire chief, as that terminology is used in the firefighter

agreement, (2) there is no evidence that the decedent

ever made a selection to receive a pension thereunder

upon being hired as fire chief, and (3) there is no evidence that the decedent, while employed as fire chief,

made the requisite pension contributions as mandated

by article I, § 4, and article XXXIII of the firefighter

agreement.

Although the decedent requested a pension pursuant

to the firefighter agreement, the record indicates that

the board did not grant that specific request. In its

January 11, 1996 written notice of its decision, the board

informed the decedent that it had approved his application for a disability retirement and had awarded him

an annual pension of $86,690.78 pursuant to the terms

of the administrative agreement.17 The board’s January

11, 1996 letter also advised the decedent in relevant

part: ‘‘If you have any questions regarding your pension

or benefits, please do not hesitate to contact our office.’’

The decedent nevertheless did not raise any issue or

16 In his letter to the board, the decedent stated in relevant part: ‘‘[I] do

hereby make my election of Option one with regard to computing my pension

entitlement under [article I, § 4, of the firefighter agreement] . . . .’’ Attorney Maragos similarly stated, in his letter to the board, that the decedent

‘‘makes election, pursuant to [article I, § 4, of the firefighter agreement] to

retire, as is his right.’’ 17 Appended to the city’s motion for summary judgment were copies of

both the board’s January 11, 1996 written notice of its decision to the

decedent and the April 21, 2021 affidavit of Van Deursen, which indicate that

the board granted the decedent a disability pension based on the ‘‘Waterbury

Municipal Administrators Asso[ciation] (non union).’’ In addition, the decedent’s pension worksheet similarly states that it was calculated in accordance with the ‘‘(Management) Waterbury Municipal Administration Association.’’ The administrative agreement sets forth pension benefits for the

Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association. See footnote 13 of this

opinion.
Page 16A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

16 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

request clarification with respect to the board’s determination that his pension was governed by the administrative agreement. To the contrary, the record before us

indicates that the decedent, after receiving written

notice of the board’s decision in January, 1996, proceeded to collect his pension for more than ten years

without question. The defendant’s claim, therefore, fails

as a factual matter.

b

In addition, we note that the board’s decision to grant

the decedent a pension in accordance with the terms

of the administrative agreement is entirely consistent

with the plain and unambiguous terms of his employment contract with the city. As noted in part I A of

this opinion, that contract provides that the decedent’s

benefits may include a pension pursuant to the administrative agreement with the Waterbury Municipal Administrators Association and that the terms of the employment contract ‘‘may not be changed except by a written

Agreement signed by the Mayor of [the city] and [the

decedent].’’ In granting the decedent a pension pursuant

to the administrative agreement, the board’s decision

comports with the principle that municipal agencies

cannot bind the municipality by contract, in the absence

of express authorization in the municipal charter or the

General Statutes. See Fennell v. Hartford, 238 Conn.

809, 813, 681 A.2d 934 (1996).

Fennell is instructive in this regard. In that case, a

group of supervisory police officers brought an action

against the defendant municipality and its pension commission, claiming that a statement in a pension manual

prepared by the pension commission created an implied

contract between the municipality and those officers.

Id., 811–13. In rejecting that claim, our Supreme Court

observed that ‘‘a city’s charter is the fountainhead of

municipal powers . . . . The charter serves as an
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 17

Waterbury v. Brennan

enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the

form in which it must be exercised. . . . Agents of a

city, including [its boards], have no source of authority

beyond the charter. . . . In construing a city charter,

the rules of statutory construction generally apply. . . .

The officer, body or board duly authorized must act [on]

behalf of the municipality, otherwise a valid contract

cannot be created. Generally the power to make contracts on behalf of the municipality rests in the council

or governing body . . . . Generally, no officer or

board, other than the common council, has power to

bind the municipal corporation by contract, unless duly

empowered by statute, the charter, or authority conferred by the common council, where the latter may so

delegate its powers . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 813. ‘‘It follows that

agents of a city, including its [boards], have no source

of authority beyond the charter. [T]heir powers are

measured and limited by the express language in which

authority is given or by the implication necessary to

enable them to perform some duty cast upon them by

express language.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 814.

The court then concluded, ‘‘as a matter of law, that

the pension manual created and distributed by the commission could not confer any additional benefits not

provided for by the city’s charter.’’ Id., 816. As it

explained: ‘‘In order for additional retirement or pension benefits to be conferred on the plaintiffs and other

city employees, the city council must adopt ordinances

in compliance with the statutory and charter mandates.

. . . The plaintiffs concede that this was not done. If

additional benefits were allowed to be conferred in any

other manner, the actions of the commission would

impinge on the city council’s legislative prerogative to

oversee the maintenance of the city’s municipal employees’ retirement fund. . . . In sum, the commission was
Page 18A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

18 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

without authority to confer additional benefits through

the pension manual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 817–18. The court further stated: ‘‘The plaintiffs

argue that in order to carry out its obligation to administer the municipal employees’ retirement fund, the commission must, by necessity, interpret the charter and

confer pension benefits upon eligible recipients. We

disagree. The fact that the commission has authority to

administer the city’s municipal employees’ retirement

fund does not give it authority to amend the pension

plan and circumvent the city council’s authority to

amend the municipal employees’ retirement fund.’’ Id.,

818 n.7.

In the present case, the defendant has identified no

provision in the city charter that authorized the board

to unilaterally grant the decedent a pension that is (1)

contrary to the express terms of his employment contract and (2) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement under which the decedent did not qualify for a

pension. In this regard, we note that the defendant, in

moving for summary judgment, did not furnish a copy

of the entire city charter to the court, but rather

appended only select portions to her memorandum of

law. On appeal, the defendant relies on § 2767 of the

city charter.18 That reliance is unavailing, as that section

merely provides in broad terms that official actions of

the board are binding on the city. As applied to the

facts of this case, § 2767 mandates that the board’s

decision to grant a pension to the decedent in accordance with the administrative agreement, as communicated to the decedent by written notice on January 11,

1996, is binding on the city.

18 Section 2767 of the city charter provides in relevant part: ‘‘All acts,

actions, payments, failures to pay, pensions, contributions from employees

and proceedings of the [board] . . . are validated, confirmed, approved,

ratified and made binding on the [city] and the participants in the retirement system.’’
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 19

Waterbury v. Brennan

The defendant also overlooks the fact that the city

charter contains a distinct section titled ‘‘Adjustment

of pensions paid under retirement system.’’ It provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the

[city charter] or any special act or any requirements in

Section 2-14 of the General Statutes . . . the [board]

with the approval of the board of aldermen may by

appropriate action, including approval by a majority

vote . . . of said [board] and a majority vote of the

board of aldermen, with respect to monthly payments

of [disability pensions] . . . to retired employees . . .

including retired teachers, firemen, policemen, officer

participants and regular participants as such classifications of retired employees are established by the [city

charter], provide for adjustments in the amount of

such monthly payments as deemed necessary by said

[board] and the board of aldermen . . . . Any actions

taken by the [board] and the board of aldermen . . .

in accordance with this act are hereby validated and

. . . binding upon the [c]ity.’’19 (Emphasis added.)

Waterbury City Charter, Div. 2, § 2711 (1989 Supp.).

Section 2711 thus demonstrates that, when the city

charter intends to confer authority on the board to

modify the pension benefits of a particular person, it

does so explicitly. See Stafford v. Roadway, 312 Conn.

184, 194, 93 A.3d 1058 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a well settled

principle of statutory construction that the legislature

knows how to convey its intent expressly . . . or to

use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so’’

(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the decedent’s employment contract with the city provided for

a pension benefit pursuant to the administrative agreement. To the extent that the defendant argues that the

board intended to deviate from the plain terms of that

19 A copy of that section of the city charter was submitted in support of

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Page 20A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

20 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

employment contract and grant the decedent all of the

benefits contained in the firefighter agreement,20 § 2711

of the 1989 Supplement to the city charter provides little

recourse, as that section only authorizes adjustments

to the amount of monthly pension payments.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that § 2711 of the 1989

Supplement to the city charter could be broadly construed to encompass pension benefits generally, the

plain language of that section obligated the board to

secure the approval of a majority of the board of aldermen in order to make such an adjustment to the decedent’s pension benefits. There is no suggestion by the

defendant, nor evidence in the record before us, that

such approval was sought or granted by the board of

aldermen. On the record before us, we therefore conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as

to whether the board possessed authority under the

city charter to unilaterally confer a pension benefit on

the decedent pursuant to the firefighter agreement.21

20 The defendant claims that the board granted the decedent all of the

benefits contained in the firefighter agreement, including the provision pertaining to the offset of § 7-433c benefits. That provision is contained in

article XXXIII, § 11, of the firefighter agreement and provides in relevant

part: ‘‘The parties hereto agree that . . . an employee who applies for, and

receives, a disability pension [pursuant to § 7-433c] shall be entitled to, and

shall receive, a maximum disability pension of [76 percent] of BASE PAY.

. . . The parties agree that the provisions of this Section shall not apply

to, and shall not require a reduction of, any specific injury award [pursuant

to § 7-433c].’’ 21 The defendant also claims that the board’s handling of her spousal

pension demonstrates that it ‘‘treated [the decedent’s] disability pension

as a pension under the firefighter contract,’’ as reflected on a ‘‘pension

worksheet.’’ That pension worksheet plainly states that it is a pension worksheet for ‘‘(Management) Waterbury Municipal Administration Association’’

and—like the written notice sent by the board to the decedent on January

11, 1996—indicates that the pension benefit was calculated pursuant to

the administrative agreement. The defendant nevertheless claims that the

undisputed fact that she was granted a spousal pension in excess of that

to which she was entitled under the administrative agreement demonstrates

an intention on the part of the board to grant the decedent a pension pursuant

to the firefighter agreement. In light of our conclusion that nothing in the

city charter authorized the board to grant a pension to the decedent pursuant
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 21

Waterbury v. Brennan

See Fennell v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. 818 n.7 (‘‘[t]he

fact that the [pension commission] has authority to

administer the city’s municipal employees’ retirement

fund does not give it authority to amend the pension

plan and circumvent the city council’s authority to

amend the municipal employees’ retirement fund’’).

II

The defendant alternatively contends that § 2761 of

the city charter does not permit the city to utilize the

decedent’s pension benefits to offset heart and hypertension benefits due to him. In response, the city submits that this claim is unpreserved. We agree with

the city.

A

Our rules of practice require a party, as a prerequisite

to appellate review, to distinctly raise its claim before

the trial court. See Practice Book § 5-2 (‘‘[a]ny party

intending to raise any question of law which may be

the subject of an appeal must . . . state the question

distinctly to the judicial authority’’); Practice Book § 60-

5 (‘‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim

to the firefighter agreement, that claim is unavailing. Any miscalculation of

the defendant’s spousal pension benefits by the board cannot create additional pension benefits for the decedent. See Fennell v. Hartford, supra,

238 Conn. 817–18.

We note that the city has not sought a reduction of the defendant’s spousal

pension as part of this declaratory judgment action, which she has received

without interruption for almost two decades. The city merely sought a

declaration that, due to the offset provision of the city charter, it is not

obligated to make further payments on the decedent’s heart and hypertension claim. As the city averred in its objection to the defendant’s motion

for reargument and reconsideration: ‘‘[The defendant] . . . assert[s] that

the city cannot offset pension payments made to Janet Brennan in her

capacity as surviving spouse. . . . But the city never has sought to do so.

The city asserts that no additional payments are owed to the estate [of the

decedent] because the pension payments made to [the decedent] during his

lifetime would have been subject to an offset covering 100 percent of any

[permanent partial disability] payments allegedly owed to him.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis omitted.)
Page 22A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

22 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial’’). For that reason, we repeatedly have

held that ‘‘we will not decide an issue that was not

presented to the trial court. To review claims . . . not

raised before the trial court would be nothing more

than a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martin, 110 Conn.

App. 171, 180, 954 A.2d 256 (2008), appeal dismissed,

295 Conn. 192, 989 A.2d 1072 (2010); see also State v.

Jorge P., 308 Conn. 740, 753, 66 A.3d 869 (2013) (‘‘the

sina qua non of preservation is fair notice to the trial

court’’); State v. Favoccia, 119 Conn. App. 1, 14, 986 A.2d

1081 (2010) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that issues not properly

raised before the trial court ordinarily will not be considered on appeal’’), aff’d, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d

1002 (2012).

The record reveals, and the defendant does not dispute, that she did not raise her claim regarding the

proper application of the offset provision of § 2761 of

the city charter at any time prior to the court’s June

27, 2022 decision on the parties’ respective motions for

summary judgment.22 Although the defendant thereafter

filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration, she

22 The defendant’s assertion that this claim arose subsequent to the court’s

ruling on the motions for summary judgment is unavailing. The entire basis

for the city’s declaratory action was its assertion that the offset provision

in question operates to bar any further payments of heart and hypertension

benefits to the decedent’s estate. In its complaint, the city sought a declaratory judgment that ‘‘[t]he offset applies to all amounts in contention, the

‘net’ amount in contention is zero and the city does not have to pay the

defendant any additional [heart and hypertension] benefits as a matter of

law’’ and that ‘‘[t]he judgment for benefits issued by the [commissioner]

would result in a double recovery explicitly forbidden by the [city charter]

and Russo, therefore the city does not have to pay the defendant any monies

as a matter of law . . . .’’ The city similarly argued, in its memorandum of

law in support of its motion for summary judgment, that ‘‘any [heart and

hypertension] benefits to which [the decedent] may have been entitled would

have been offset, in their entirety, from the [pension] sums already being

paid to him by the city.’’
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 23

Waterbury v. Brennan

likewise did not advance such a claim in that written

motion. Rather, the record indicates that the defendant

raised this claim for the first time during argument

before the court on September 26, 2022.23

It is well established that, generally speaking, ‘‘[r]aising an issue for the first time in a motion to reargue

will not preserve that issue for appellate review.’’ White

v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 634,

99 A.3d 1079 (2014). For that reason, the court correctly

concluded that the defendant’s offset provision claim

was not properly preserved. Mindful that our review of

a court’s denial of a motion to reargue is pursuant to

the abuse of discretion standard; see Klass v. Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co., 341 Conn. 735, 740–41, 267 A.3d 847

(2022); and that motions for reargument and reconsideration are not to be used as an opportunity for a second

bite of the apple; see Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel,

303 Conn. 614, 624, 35 A.3d 260 (2012); we further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the defendant’s motion on that basis.

B

The defendant also seeks to prevail on her unpreserved claim pursuant to the plain error doctrine. As

our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[t]he plain error

doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is

a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this

court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that,

although either not properly preserved or never raised

23 The defendant also raised the issue of the tax implications of offsetting

§ 7-433c benefits due to pension payments for the first time at oral argument

on her motion for reargument and reconsideration. On appeal, we do not

address that unpreserved claim, as the defendant has not distinctly briefed

that issue in accordance with our rules of practice. See Practice Book §§ 67-

4 (b) and (e); see also Weber v. Pascarella Mason Street, LLC, 103 Conn.

App. 710, 713–14 n.2, 930 A.2d 779 (2007). Rather, she mentions that claim

in a mere sentence of the supervisory authority section of her principal

appellate brief.
Page 24A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

24 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal

of the trial court’s judgment . . . for reasons of policy.

. . . [P]lain error review is reserved for only the most

egregious errors. When an error of such a magnitude

exists, it necessitates reversal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McClain, 324

Conn. 802, 813–14, 155 A.3d 209 (2017). The defendant’s

burden under the first prong of that doctrine is to demonstrate the existence of an error that is ‘‘obvious in

the sense of not debatable. . . . [T]his inquiry entails

a relatively high standard, under which it is not enough

for the defendant simply to demonstrate that [her] position is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error

review must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety

was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the

extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Coccomo, 302 Conn. 664, 685,

31 A.3d 1012 (2011).

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s decision to render summary judgment in favor of the city

was predicated on ‘‘an obvious misinterpretation of

[§ 2761 of the city charter] as permitting the [city] to

offset [§ 7-433c] benefits against pension benefits.’’ In

her view, § 2761 of the city charter permits a reduction

in pension payments as a result of offsetting § 7-433c

payments, but not the converse.

Section 2761 of the city charter provides: ‘‘No payments of retirement, disability or death benefits shall

be allowed or paid under the provisions of this act so

long or for such period as payments are being made

by [the city] under the provisions of the General Statutes

relating to workers’ compensation except when such

payments would exceed the payments made under the

provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In such

cases the pensioner shall receive, in addition to his

payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act the

difference between that amount and the amount which
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25A

228 Conn. App. 206 SEPTEMBER, 2024 25

Waterbury v. Brennan

he would have received under the provisions of this

act.’’ In Russo v. Waterbury, supra, 304 Conn. 714, our

Supreme Court concluded that § 2761 of the city charter

‘‘allows the city to offset the . . . pension benefits [of

municipal employees] based on their heart and hypertension benefits’’ under § 7-433c.24

Although the defendant now claims that the court

committed an ‘‘obvious misinterpretation’’ of § 2761 of

the city charter to permit the offset of § 7-433c benefits

due to pension payments made by the city, that error

apparently was not obvious to the defendant’s counsel,

who did not raise that claim at any time between the

commencement of this action in December, 2015, and

the court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment more than six and one-half years

later. That error also was not obvious to the defendant

at the time that she filed her motion for reargument

and reconsideration in July, 2022. While the defendant

raised four distinct grounds in that motion, she did not

claim that the court had misinterpreted § 2761 of the

city charter.

Moreover, in Russo, our Supreme Court, in considering the applicability of § 2761 of the city charter, emphasized that ‘‘[t]he purpose of . . . § 7-433c is to protect

against a wage loss, not to give some firemen and policemen a double recovery for the same wage loss.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., 730. If the defendant’s

construction of § 2761 of the city charter is correct—

and § 7-433c benefits cannot be offset by pension payments made by the city—the result would be a double

recovery by the decedent for the same wage loss. In

our view, whether the city charter intended to permit

that double recovery is, at the very least, debatable.25

24 In Brennan I, the Supreme Court noted that ‘‘§ 7-433c benefits are

subject to pension offsets and caps.’’ Brennan v. Waterbury, supra, 331

Conn. 692. 25 We reiterate that, in moving for summary judgment on her claim regarding the proper application of § 2761 of the city charter, the defendant did
Page 26A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL September 24, 2024

26 SEPTEMBER, 2024 228 Conn. App. 206

Waterbury v. Brennan

As our Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘[p]lain error is a

doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamison, 320 Conn.

589, 596, 134 A.3d 560 (2016). The defendant’s burden

under the first prong of that doctrine is to demonstrate

proof of ‘‘an error so obvious on its face that it is

undebatable.’’ State v. McClain, supra, 324 Conn. 820

n.13. On the record before us, we conclude that the

defendant has not met that burden.26

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

not furnish the court with a complete copy of the city charter. The inadequacy

of the record in that respect impairs our ability to conclude that the court’s

interpretation of the charter in the present case was obviously and indisputably incorrect. See State v. Coccomo, supra, 302 Conn. 685 (party seeking

review under plain error doctrine must demonstrate ‘‘obvious and indisputable’’ error (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putala v. DePaolo, 225

Conn. 378, 386, 623 A.2d 989 (1993) (court required to construe section of

municipal charter ‘‘in the context of the charter as a whole with a view

toward reconciling its parts in order to obtain a sensible and rational overall

interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kusterer v. Sheehy, 2

Conn. App. 712, 714–15, 483 A.2d 1105 (1984) (‘‘[t]o construe a specific

provision in the charter it is necessary to look at the charter as a whole’’). 26 The defendant also asks us to exercise our supervisory authority to

review her unpreserved claim. See State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 686–87,

224 A.3d 129 (2020). We decline that invitation.