Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, May 10, 2005 OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not 

Fully Implemented Key 

Measures to Protect U.S. 

Officials from Terrorist 

Attacks Outside of 

Embassies 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-05-688T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-688T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-688T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

May 10, 2005

OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not Fully 

Implemented Key Measures to Protect 

U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks 

Outside of Embassies 

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, 

protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, 

State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies 

safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. 

State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and 

implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently 

initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, 

State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal 

and financial issues. 

Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials 

outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on 

training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that 

State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement 

accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security 

procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress 

that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State’s 

hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have 

not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained 

to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures. 

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its 

scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 

Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security 

vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The 

multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. 

officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee 

association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to 

posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could 

qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. 

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences 

is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security 

program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State 

officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited 

deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences 

of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of 

U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater 

protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance 

detection teams in residential areas. 

 

U.S. government officials working 

overseas are at risk from terrorist 

threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy 

officials have been attacked—23 

fatally—by terrorists outside the 

embassy. As the State Department 

continues to improve security at 

U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are 

likely to focus on “soft” targets—

such as homes, schools, and places 

of worship. 

GAO was asked to determine 

whether State has a strategy for 

soft target protection; assess 

State’s efforts to protect U.S. 

officials and their families while 

traveling to and from work; assess 

State’s efforts overseas to improve 

security at schools attended by the 

children of U.S. officials; and 

describe issues related to 

protection at their residences. 

What GAO Recommends

We are recommending that the 

Secretary of State develop a soft 

targets strategy; develop 

counterterrorism training for 

officials; and fully implement its 

personal security accountability 

system for embassy officials. State 

generally agreed with our 

recommendations. 
Page 1 GAO-05-688T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are releasing today on 

State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from 

terrorist attacks outside of embassies.1

U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas 

are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have 

been attacked—23 fatally—by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State 

Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, concerns are 

growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on “soft” targets—such as 

homes, schools, and places of worship. Recent terrorist attacks against 

housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and places of 

worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated security 

assessments have further documented this growing concern and 

recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials 

and their families in soft target areas.2

Our report addresses four issues: (1) whether State has a strategy for soft 

target protection, (2) an assessment of State’s efforts to protect U.S. 

officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and 

from work, (3) State’s efforts to improve security at schools overseas 

attended by the children of U.S. officials, and (4) issues related to 

protection of U.S. officials and their families at residences. I will also 

discuss our recommendations to State and State’s response. 

For our work on this subject, we reviewed State documents and 

interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and at five posts in four 

countries. We also attended security trainings and briefings available to 

State officials. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

 1

GAO, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to 

Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies, GAO-05-642

(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005). 

2

These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on 

Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2) Accountability Review Board reports that 

followed assassinations of U.S. officials in 1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 

1999 Report by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission). 
Page 2 GAO-05-688T 

State has a number of programs and activities to protect U.S. officials and 

their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection 

at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has 

not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and 

security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and 

their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State 

officials raised a number of legal, management, and resources challenges 

related to developing and implementing such a strategy, but agreed a 

strategy was needed. The department is now in the process of developing 

a soft target strategy. 

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards 

against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work—

counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into terrorist 

attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found officials lacked 

the necessary training that could have saved their lives, including 

surveillance detection and avoidance and defensive and evasive driving 

techniques. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on 

counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to 

ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, we found 

that State has not fully implemented these recommendations. For 

example, State’s hands-on counterterrorism training course is still not 

required, and ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security 

officers are not trained to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures. 

In addition, the accountability procedures, monitoring, and checklists 

developed in 2003 designed to promote personal security were not being 

followed at any of the five posts we visited. 

In response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in 2003 

designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their families at 

schools and some off-compound employee associations from terrorist 

threats. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware, such 

as shatter-resistant window film, alarms, and radios, and additional 

protective measures based on threat levels and vulnerabilities. The first 

two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have 

previously received grant funding from the State Department. The third 

and fourth phases, which are similar to the first and second phases, focus 

on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with American students.3

 During 

 3

Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from State’s Office of 

Overseas Schools. There are over 185 department-sponsored schools worldwide. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-688T 

our visits to five posts, Regional Security Officers were unclear about 

which schools qualified for security assistance under phase three of the 

program. Some Regional Security Officers raised questions about whether 

to fund schools in which just a few American children were enrolled. 

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences is 

largely designed to deter crime. The Residential Security program includes 

basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, 

limited access control measures, and local guards. To reduce the terrorist 

threat, some posts limit the number of U.S. officials living in specific 

apartment buildings. Moreover, at most of the posts we visited, 

surveillance detection teams were used to help protect schools and 

residential areas. Several Regional Security Officers told us that use of 

surveillance detection teams could provide greater deterrence to potential 

terrorist attacks. 

We are recommending that State, as it develops its soft targets strategy, 

determine the full scope of its responsibilities and the legal and financial 

ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their families outside the 

embassy; develop corresponding protection programs and activities; and 

integrate elements of the soft targets strategy into embassy emergency 

action plans. We are also recommending that State bolster its training and 

compliance procedures, including by making counterterrorism training 

mandatory and delivered on a prioritized basis, and by fully implementing 

the personal security accountability system that State agreed to implement 

in response to the 2003 Accountability Review Board for all embassy 

officials. 

State said it was in general agreement with most of our recommendations 

and said that it would examine the others. 

Although State has not yet formally defined what constitutes a soft target, 

State Department travel warnings and security officers generally consider 

soft targets to be places where Americans and other westerners live, 

congregate, shop, or visit, such as hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping 

centers, housing compounds, places of worship, schools, or public 

recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government employees are also 

considered soft targets, based on their history of terrorist attacks. 

The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000 

government employees, and their family members, who work in embassies 

and consulates abroad in 180 countries. Although the host nation is 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-05-688T 

responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions 

under the 1961 Vienna Convention, State has a variety of programs and 

activities to further protect U.S. officials and family members both inside 

and outside of the embassy. 

Following a terrorist attack that involves serious injury or loss of life or 

significant destruction of a U.S. government mission, State is required to 

convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs investigate the 

attack and issue a report with recommendations to improve security 

programs and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions 

it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there 

have been 11 ARBs convened since the board’s establishment in 1986. 

Concerned that State was not providing adequate security for U.S. officials 

and their families outside the embassy, the American Foreign Service 

Association testified on a number of occasions before the Senate 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the 

Judiciary on the need for State to expand its security measures. The 

subcommittee, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate 

a strategy for addressing threats to locales abroad that are frequented by 

U.S. officials and their families. It focused its concern about soft targets on 

schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering places. 

In fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, Congress earmarked a total of $15 

million for soft target protection each year, particularly to address security 

vulnerabilities at overseas schools.4

 Moreover, in 2005, the Senate 

appropriations report directed State to develop a comprehensive strategy 

for addressing the threats posed to soft targets no later than June 1, 2005. 

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. 

officials and their families outside the embassy, including security 

briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. 

However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly 

identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to 

protect U.S. official and their families. 

 4

For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked “up to” $15 million in the Overseas Buildings 

Operations appropriations to address security vulnerabilities of soft targets. State set aside 

$5 million to undertake a review of the security of all overseas schools attended by children 

of nonmilitary U.S. government employees. Of the fiscal year 2005 earmark, $10 million is 

for security at overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S. government employees. 

State Lacks a Strategy 

to Cover Soft Target 

Areas; Key Issues 

Need to Be Resolved 
Page 5 GAO-05-688T 

State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting soft 

targets. As the terrorist threat grows, State is being asked to provide ever 

greater levels of protection to more people in more dangerous locations, 

and they questioned how far State’s protection of soft targets should 

extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect U.S. 

officials and their families at private sector locations or places of worship 

was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial 

challenges—including sovereignty and separation of church and state—

that have not been resolved by the department. State officials also 

indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets—

including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas 

where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be 

necessary to complete a strategy. 

Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy, 

some State officials told us that several existing programs could help 

protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are 

not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they 

should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be 

more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether 

new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps. 

A senior official with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) told us 

that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to develop a 

comprehensive soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of 

protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences, and 

other areas outside the embassy. According to State, the strategy should 

be completed by June 1, 2005. 

To identify vulnerabilities in State’s soft target protection, and determine if 

State had corrected these vulnerabilities, we reviewed the ARB reports 

conducted after U.S. officials were assassinated outside the embassy. Of 

the 11 ARBs conducted since 1986, the majority (5) have focused on soft 

target attacks, compared with attacks against embassies (2) or other U.S. 

facilities (4). We found that, 17 years after the first soft target ARB, State 

has still not addressed the vulnerabilities and recommendations identified 

in that and more recent reports: specifically, the need for hands-on 

counterterrorism training and accountability mechanisms to promote 

compliance with personal security procedures. Despite State’s assurances 

to Congress that it would implement recommendations aimed at reducing 

these vulnerabilities, we found that State’s hands-on training course is still 

not mandatory, and procedures to monitor compliance with security 

State Has Not Fully 

Implemented ARB 

Training and 

Accountability 

Recommendations to 

Improve Security for 

Embassy Personnel 
Page 6 GAO-05-688T 

requirements have not been fully implemented. We also found that 

ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers were 

not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect 

U.S. officials outside the embassies. 

Since 1988, State has reported to Congress that it agreed with ARB 

recommendations to provide counterterrorism training. For example, in 

1995, State reported that it “re-established the Diplomatic Security 

Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to 

teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive 

driving techniques.” In 2003, State reported it agreed with the 

recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive 

security briefings and indicated that it would review the adequacy of its 

training and other personal security measures. 

Although State implemented the board’s recommendation to require 

security briefings for all staff, hands-on counterterrorism training is still 

not mandatory, and few officials or family members have taken DSAC. 

Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings are no longer 

adequate to protect against current terrorist threats. In June 2004, DS 

developed a proposal to make DSAC training mandatory. DS officials said 

that DSAC training should be required for all officials, but that issues such 

as costs and adequacy of training facilities were constraining factors. As of 

April 18, 2005, the proposal had not been approved. 

Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability 

system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 

1988, there is still no such system in place. Beginning in 2003, State has 

tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance. 

However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are 

following few, if any, of these new procedures. 

In response to a 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve 

compliance with State’s personal security procedures for officials outside 

the embassy. In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria to 

take personal security into account when preparing performance 

appraisals, and in December 2003, State revised its Foreign Affairs Manual 

to mandate and improve implementation of personal security practices. In 

May 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal Security 

Self-Assessment Checklist to improve security outside the embassy. 

However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these and other 

key policy changes. For example, none of the officials we met with, 

Despite State’s Agreement 

That Counterterrorism 

Training Is Needed, It Is 

Still Not Required 
Page 7 GAO-05-688T 

including ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, regional security 

officers, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings process now includes 

an assessment of whether staff are following the personal security 

measures or that managers are now responsible for the reasonable 

oversight of subordinates’ personal security activities. Furthermore, none 

of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we found no one was 

using the checklists to improve their personal security practices. 

In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal security 

regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work 

and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs 

Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be 

implemented globally. 

Furthermore, State’s original plan, to use the checklist as an accountability 

mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its June 2003 

report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB recommendations, 

State stipulated that staff would be required to use the checklist 

periodically and that managers would review the checklists to ensure 

compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability 

mechanism out of concern it would consume too much staff time. 

We also found that key officials receive no training on how to promote 

personal security outside the embassy. According to a number of State 

officials, improvements in this area must start with the ambassador and 

the deputy chief of mission. Yet no ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, 

or regional security officers receive any training in how to maximize soft 

target protection at embassies. DS officials agreed that this critical 

component should be added to their training curriculum. 

In response to several congressional committee reports, State began 

developing a “Soft Targets” program in 2003 to help protect overseas 

schools against terrorism. The program has four proposed phases. The 

first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have 

previously received grant funding from the State Department, and the third 

and fourth phases focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with 

American students. 

In phase one, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for 

basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way 

radios for communication between the school and the embassy, and public 

address systems. As of November 19, 2004, 189 department-sponsored 

State Develops Soft 

Targets Program for 

Schools, but Scope Is 

Not Yet Fully Defined 
Page 8 GAO-05-688T 

schools had received $10.5 million in funding for security equipment in 

phase one of the program. The second phase provided additional security 

enhancements, such as perimeter fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard 

booths. As of November 2004, State has obligated over $15 million for 

phase two security upgrades. For phases three and four, State plans to 

provide similar types of security upgrades to eligible nondepartmentsponsored schools. 

The program also funds security enhancements for off-compound embassy 

employee association facilities, such as recreation centers. Security 

upgrades include funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window 

film. In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated for these 

enhancements. 

Regional Security Officers (RSO) said that identifying and funding for 

security enhancements at department-sponsored schools were 

straightforward because of the department’s pre-existing relationship with 

these schools. However, they said it has been difficult to identify eligible 

nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three because of the vast 

number of schools that might qualify, the lack of any pre-existing 

relationship, and limited guidance on eligibility criteria. For example, 

some RSOs questioned how many American students should attend a 

school for it to be eligible for security upgrades. Some RSOs were 

considering funding schools with just a few American students. Moreover, 

one RSO was considering providing security upgrades to informal 

educational facilities, such as those attended by children of U.S. 

missionaries. 

State is trying to determine the appropriate scope of the program, and sent 

cables to posts in the summer of 2004 asking RSOs to gather data on 

nondepartment-sponsored schools attended by American students, 

particularly U.S. government dependents. State officials acknowledged 

that the process of gathering data has been difficult since there are 

hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an Overseas Buildings 

Operations (OBO) official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the 

more than 250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools. 

OBO plans to use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be 

eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the 

program. 

In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, RSOs 

have been asked to identify other facilities and areas that Americans 

Full Scope of School 

Program Not Yet 

Determined 
Page 9 GAO-05-688T 

frequent, beyond schools and off-compound employee association 

facilities, that may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. State Department 

officials were concerned about the large number of sites RSOs could 

identify as potential soft target sites, and the department’s ability to 

protect them. 

State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for 

U.S. officials and their families overseas. However, we found that State’s 

primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families at 

residences, the Residential Security program, is principally designed to 

deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security hardware 

and guard service; and as the crime threat increases, the hardware and 

guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State 

officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by 

the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it 

could provide limited or no deterrence to minimize the risk and 

consequences of a residential terrorist attack. State officials told us that 

the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety of housing 

options, including apartments and single-family homes, to reduce the 

potential for a catastrophic attack. 

To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we 

visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The 

program is intended to enhance the embassies’ ability to detect 

preoperational terrorist surveillance and stop the attack. According to 

State’s guidance, surveillance detection units are primarily designed to 

protect embassies, and their use in residential areas is discouraged.5

However, we found RSOs at some of the posts we visited were routinely 

utilizing surveillance detection units to cover areas outside the embassies, 

such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools attended by 

U.S. embassy dependents. RSOs told us that the Surveillance Detection 

program is instrumental in providing deterrence against potential terrorist 

attacks, and argued that the current program guidelines are too 

restrictive.6

 Senior State officials agreed that the use of the surveillance 

detection in soft target areas could be beneficial, but noted that the 

 5

Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and Operations Field Guide 

Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530. 

6

The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe other areas besides the 

embassy and key residences, but only if there are specific threats present at these 

locations. 

Issues Related to the 

Protection of U.S. 

Officials and Their 

Families at 

Residences against 

Terrorist Threats 
Page 10 GAO-05-688T 

program is labor intensive and expensive, and any expansion of the 

program could require significant funding. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Diana Glod at 

(202) 512-8945. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

included Edward George and Andrea Miller. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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