RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2794-22 

D.W.A., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

A.L.H., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted March 11, 2024 – Decided March 20, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla and Chase. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FV-12-0426-04.

A.L.H., appellant pro se. 

Respondent has not filed a brief. 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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 Defendant A.L.H.1 appeals from September 1, 2022 and April 3, 2023 

orders, which enforced his obligation to pay child support arrears to plaintiff 

D.W.A. We affirm. 

 Defendant is the father of two children he had with plaintiff, both of whom 

are now adults and emancipated. This child support dispute arises from a final 

restraining order (FRO), entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant in 2004. 

Pursuant to the FRO, defendant was obligated to pay child support, but instead 

amassed an arrearage exceeding $166,000 by the time the court heard the matter 

in September 2022. 

 The September hearing pertained to plaintiff's appeal from a child support 

hearing officer (CSHO) determination regarding defendant's obligation to pay 

the arrears. Both parties testified and the court obtained the following salient 

facts from defendant. He testified he had completed one year of college and

worked in information technology (IT) for thirty years. Defendant told the court 

he worked two IT jobs at a combined rate of eighty-five dollars per hour, which 

totaled $110,000 in yearly earnings. He had been out of work for two months, 

because there was a workforce reduction in one job and the other was a 

temporary position. He testified he had been conducting a job search by "go[ing] 

1

 We use initials to protect plaintiff's confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). 
3 A-2794-22

online a lot," attending a job fair three months prior, and "putting . . . [his] name 

out there, . . . [and] calling up former colleagues." 

Although defendant's arrearage was substantial, he admitted he had not 

made any payments, except by way of an involuntary levy in 2021. He conceded 

he owed the money and had not been meeting his obligation. However, he 

managed to pay his rent for seven years and sold a car to meet his expenses, but 

not the arrearage obligation. Defendant testified he was fifty-nine years old and 

not disabled. He claimed he had filed a motion to modify the arrears. 

The court entered the September 1, 2022 order requiring defendant to: pay 

$1,000 by September 15, 2022 and $1,000 by October 13, 2022; pay $476 per 

week and stay current thereafter; and provide probation with proof of ten job 

searches per week. A bench warrant would issue if defendant failed to comply 

with the order. Defendant did not appeal from the September order. 

In March 2023, probation moved to enforce litigant's rights because 

defendant failed to comply with the September order. The CSHO found 

defendant was willfully noncompliant with the September order and sought 

defendant's incarceration. The parties appeared and testified before a different 

judge. Defendant's arrears totaled more than $164,000. 
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The judge noted that rather than pay the $476 per week, defendant was 

"paying, at his prerogative, between [thirty] and [fifty] dollars per week." 

Further, defendant's probation officer had asked him to participate in a judiciarysponsored employment program geared to job placement in the IT field, but 

defendant did not comply. Defendant claimed he could not travel from his home 

in Hudson County to Middlesex County to attend job fairs. 

Defendant reiterated he had once been making "something like $95,000 a 

year," but was "not earning anything now." When the judge asked defendant 

how he was surviving, he advised he "had some money [set] aside." Defendant 

said his last full-time job was in 2018 and his last employment of any type was 

in 2019. Probation advised the judge defendant's job searches were vague. 

Plaintiff noted the coercive measures the court took in its September order had 

worked to an extent, because defendant made both $1,000 lump sum arrears 

payments. Defendant claimed he filed a motion to modify the arrearage amount 

in December 2022. However, the court had no record of the motion. 

Based on the facts presented, the judge found defendant had the ability to 

pay $2,500 within two weeks and make another $2,500 payment two weeks 

thereafter. The judge ordered defendant to continue providing proof of ten job 

searches per week and furnish proof of more detailed job searches. Defendant 
5 A-2794-22

was ordered to comply with the probation officer's instructions "regarding job 

fairs and other employment assistance." The judge did not incarcerate 

defendant. 

I.

 On appeal, defendant claims the court intimidated him at the September 

2022 hearing and never determined the issue of indigency or his ability to pay. 

He alleges the court never considered his tax returns, pay stubs, or W2s. 

Defendant argues the court misinterpreted his earnings based on his testimony 

and imputed an income to him that he did not earn. He reiterates he filed a 

motion to modify his obligations in December 2022 that was never heard. 

Defendant claims the court repeated the same errors when it entered the 

April 2023 order. Moreover, he was prejudiced by the CSHO's finding he was 

willfully not complying with the September 2022 order. Defendant claims he 

was unable to comply with the September 2022 order because of the COVID-19 

pandemic and lock-down restrictions. Furthermore, the court ignored his job 

search efforts. 

 Defendant blames plaintiff for orchestrating the proceedings. He claims 

she sat on her rights for twenty years, the children are emancipated, and she now 

wants a windfall. He alleges the court misapplied the law because it was 
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required to weigh the statutory child support factors, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), 

before enforcing the arrears, and failed to make those findings as required by 

Rule 1:7-4. Defendant claims the bench warrant requirement was "an egregious 

abuse of discretion as it is too excessive, when there are other remedies 

available, including termination of the child support arrearages due to 

[p]laintiff's bad faith abuse" of the legal process. 

II. 

The general rule is that "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal 

when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 

222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). Therefore, we review a child support determination 

for an abuse of discretion. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. 

Div. 2012). "If consistent with the law, [the decision] will not be disturbed 

unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or 

to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Ibid. (quoting Foust v. 

Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001)). However, "all legal 

issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. 

Div. 2017). 
7 A-2794-22

III. 

 At the outset, we decline to consider defendant's arguments pertaining to 

the September 2022 order because he did not file a timely appeal from that order. 

R. 2:4-1(a). The September order, along with the court's finding regarding 

defendant's arrears, earnings, and ability to pay, is final. 

IV. 

"The obligation to provide child support 'is engrained into our common 

law, statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 

405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39

(App. Div. 2004)). For that reason, "enforcing the parental duty to support 

children is 'an inherent part of the "best interests of the child" rubric which 

underlies our family courts.'" Ibid. (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Div. of Soc. 

Servs. for D.M. v. G.D.M., 308 N.J. Super. 83, 88 (Ch. Div. 1997)). 

It is well-established "the enforcement, collection, [and] modification . . . 

of unpaid arrearages in . . . child support payments are matters addressed to the 

sound discretion of the court." In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. 317, 327 (App. 

Div. 2007) (quoting Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super. 130, 141 (App. 

Div. 1981)). Likewise, the "[i]mputation of income is a discretionary matter not 

capable of precise or exact determination[,] but rather require[s] a trial judge to 
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realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 

N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 158 (App. Div. 2013), rev'd on other 

grounds, 222 N.J. 414 (2015)). 

Having considered the record pursuant to these principles, we reject 

defendant's arguments the April 2023 order was the product of either an abuse 

of discretion or a misapplication of the law. Initially, defendant's assertion the 

court was required to apply the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factors in deciding the 

arrearage issue is misplaced. That statute governs the calculation of child 

support, not the setting of an arrearage payback amount. 

We also reject the claim the court erred when it enforced his obligation to 

pay the arrears. The record reveals defendant made no meaningful effort to pay 

child support, let alone the arrears, and only made limited payments because of 

the coercive effect of the enforcement orders entered by the court. Defendant 

claims the court failed to consider his income documentation, yet the record does 

not show he offered it to the court and no such documentation is contained in 

the appellate record. The record is also devoid of the job searches he claims the 

CSHO misrepresented to the court. Rather, the record shows the court discerned 

defendant's income and ability to pay, based on his sworn testimony and 
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representations he had earned between $95,000 and $110,000. Therefore, the 

substantial, credible evidence in the record showed defendant was not indigent, 

had the ability to pay, and willfully refused to do so. 

Defendant's claim he filed a motion to modify the arrears is unavailing. 

He never told the court why he was entitled to a modification and how it would 

impact the arrears that had accumulated. Defendant's appellate appendix 

contains only the first page of the modification application bearing the court's 

received and filed stamp dated December 28, 2022. However, beyond 

completing the caption and heading, the document is blank and provides no 

explanation of defendant's reasons for modifying the arrears. 

We categorically reject defendant's argument that plaintiff was not 

entitled to the arrears because she sat on her rights. A review of the record 

shows she was anything but complacent and expressed frustration because 

defendant had refused to pay support while she was raising the children. It is 

inconsequential that the children are now emancipated. 

"Laches is an equitable doctrine which penalizes knowing inaction by a 

party with a legal right from enforcing that right after passage of such a period 

of time that prejudice has resulted to the other [party] so that it would be 
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inequitable to enforce the right." L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 39 (App. Div. 

2002). Notably, 

[t]he length of delay, reasons for delay, and changing 

conditions of either or both parties during the delay are 

the most important factors that a court considers and 

weighs . . . . It is because the central issue is whether 

it is inequitable to permit the claim to be enforced that 

generally the change in condition or relations of the 

parties coupled with the passage of time becomes the 

primary determinant . . . . Inequity more often than not, 

will turn on whether a party has been misled to [their] 

harm by the delay. 

[Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of Hackensack, 90 

N.J. 145, 152-53 (1982)).] 

"The application of laches to matters of parent-child relationships have been 

carefully circumscribed." Id. at 41. 

Laches clearly does not apply here because there is no evidence plaintiff 

acquiesced in the enforcement of the child support arrears or that defendant was 

"misled to his harm by the delay." Id. at 39. As we noted, it was plaintiff who 

appealed from the CSHO's arrearage payback determination in September 2022. 

When the court asked her why she was appealing, she said: "I've been at this 

for numerous years with . . . defendant. He was ordered to do job searches 

before and didn't comply . . . . I just don't have any faith that he's going to do 

what is recommended." 
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We also decline to apply laches here because it is fundamental that child 

support belongs to the child and cannot be waived by a parent. Martinetti v. 

Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993). Therefore, even if 

plaintiff were negligent in enforcing defendant's arrearage obligation, "there is 

no basis to impute to a child the custodial parent's negligence, purposeful 

delay[,] or obstinacy so as to vitiate the child's independent right of support from 

a natural parent." L.V., 347 N.J. Super. at 40. 

Finally, it is a bedrock principle of our law that both parents bear the 

obligation for support of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 593 

(1995). Another basic principle is that one who seeks equity must do equity and 

come to court with clean hands. Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 345 (2009). 

The doctrine of unclean hands embraces the principle 

that a court should not grant equitable relief to a party 

who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter 

of the suit. It calls for the exercise of careful and just 

discretion in denying remedies where a suitor is guilty 

of bad faith, fraud[,] or unconscionable acts in the 

underlying transaction. 

[Pellitteri v. Pellitteri, 266 N.J. Super. 56, 65 (App. 

Div. 1993) (citation omitted).]

Defendant's refusal to pay child support, except by means of coercive 

enforcement, convinces us he acted in bad faith and had unclean hands. As a 

result of his conduct, his children entered adulthood without the benefit of his 
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support. Although defendant's appearances at the September 2022 and April 

2023 hearings were not pursuant to an arrest warrant, neither the legal nor the 

equitable arguments defendant raises on appeal favor relieving him from the 

obligation to comply with the April 3, 2023 order. 

To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on the appeal, it 

is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.