[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12018

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WAYMON BRYANT, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00019-LMM-WEJ-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12018

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Waymon Bryant appeals his 84-month sentence imposed after Bryant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). No reversible error has 

been shown; we affirm.

Before Bryant’s sentencing, a probation officer prepared a 

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). According to the PSI, 

Bryant had two prior felony convictions that constituted “crimes of 

violence” within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines: a 2003 

Georgia conviction for armed robbery and a 2018 Georgia conviction for aggravated assault. Based on these convictions, the PSI --

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) -- assigned a base-offense level of 

24. Bryant’s resulting advisory guideline range was calculated as 

100 to 120 months’ imprisonment. 

In his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, Bryant argued that his 2018 Georgia aggravated-assault conviction -- a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) -- did not qualify as a 

“crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines.1 Relying on 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 

1817 (2021), Bryant argued chiefly that his conviction for Georgia 

1 That Bryant’s 2003 armed-robbery conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” is undisputed.

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22-12018 Opinion of the Court 3

aggravated assault was no crime of violence because that offense 

could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. 

The district court overruled Bryant’s objection. The district 

court concluded -- in the light of our decision in United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) -- that Bryant’s 2018 aggravated-assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The 

district court then imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84 

months. 

On appeal, Bryant reasserts his argument challenging the 

designation of his 2018 Georgia aggravated-assault conviction as a 

crime of violence. “We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior 

conviction qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing 

Guidelines.” United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1326 

(11th Cir. 2010).

Under the Guidelines, a defendant who commits an offense 

involving the unlawful possession of a firearm is assigned a baseoffense level of 24 if he committed the offense after sustaining at 

least two felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(a)(2). For purposes of section 2K2.1, the term “crime of 

violence” means a federal or state offense punishable by more than 

one year that satisfies one of the clauses in section 4B1.2(a). See id. 

comment. (n.1) (adopting the definition of “crime of violence” set 

forth in section 4B1.2(a)); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The “elements 

clause” defines “crime of violence” as an offense that “has as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The 

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“enumerated-offenses clause” contains a list of offenses that qualify 

as crimes of violence, including “aggravated assault.” Id. § 

4B1.2(a)(2). For purposes of this appeal, we need only consider the 

enumerated-offenses clause.

Bryant’s argument on appeal is foreclosed by our decision in 

Morales-Alonso. In Morales-Alonso, we concluded that Georgia aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) constitutes a 

“crime of violence” under the enumerated-offenses clause of 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2: a clause that lists “aggravated assault” among the 

offenses defined as a crime of violence. See Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 

at 1317, 1320 (examining language in the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines). In reaching that conclusion, we explained “that the elements 

of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) are 

substantially the same as the elements of generic aggravated assault . . ..” Id. at 1320. 

Although Morales-Alonso dealt with a different guidelines 

provision than the provision involved in this case, both section 

2L1.2 and section 4B1.2 define the term “crime of violence” to include “aggravated assault” in its list of enumerated offenses. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 comment. (n.2), with id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). No material difference exists between these two definitions: our decision 

in Morales-Alonso steers the outcome of this appeal. 

Bryant acknowledges that his argument on appeal is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent. Nevertheless, Bryant contends 

that recent decisions in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), 

United States v. Carter, 7 F.4th 1039 (2021), and United States v. Moss, 

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920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), mandate a conclusion in this case that 

Georgia aggravated assault constitutes no “crime of violence” because it can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. We disagree. 

Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by a 

prior panel’s decision “unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this 

court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 

(11th Cir. 2008). “While an intervening decision of the Supreme 

Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the 

Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” Id. 

Nothing in Borden or in our decisions in Moss and Carter indicates that our decision in Morales-Alonso has been overruled or 

undermined to the point of abrogation. Those dissimilar decisions 

dealt only with whether an offense constitutes a “violent felony” 

under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”) -- not whether an offense constitutes a “crime of violence” under the enumerated-offenses clause of section 4B1.2. See 

Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1834 (concluding that a criminal offense with a 

mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under 

the ACCA’s elements clause); Carter, 7 F.4th at 1041, 1045 (concluding -- in the light of Borden and Moss -- that a conviction under 

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) did not qualify as a “violent felony” under 

the ACCA’s elements clause); Moss, 920 F.3d at 754, 758, opinion reinstated, 4 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (concluding that a 

Georgia conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-

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21(a)(2) does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause because the offense can be committed with a mens 

rea of recklessness). And -- unlike section 4B1.2’s enumerated-offenses clause -- the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause does not list 

“aggravated assault” among the offenses that constitute a violent 

felony. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

That the opinion in Morales-Alonso never addressed expressly the 

mens rea argument now asserted by Bryant is immaterial: the Morales-Alonso decision remains binding law. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 

789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a prior panel precedent cannot be circumvented or ignored on the basis of arguments not 

made to or considered by the prior panel”). 

The district court committed no error in concluding -- based 

on our decision in Morales-Alonso -- that Bryant’s 2018 Georgia aggravated-assault conviction constituted a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2’s enumerated-offenses clause. Because Bryant 

had two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence, the district 

court applied properly a base-offense level of 24, under section 

2K1.2(a)(2).

AFFIRMED.

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