http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

<DOC>

[109th Congress House Hearings]

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]

[DOCID: f:20420.wais]

 CHINA'S NEW REGULATIONS ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: A PARADIGM SHIFT?

=======================================================================

 ROUNDTABLE

 before the

 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

 ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

 FIRST SESSION

 __________

 MARCH 14, 2005

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

 ______

 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

20-420 PDF WASHINGTON : 2005

____________________________________________________________________________

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-

1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (1 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

 LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate House

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Chairman MEMBERS TO BE APPOINTED

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

JIM DeMINT, South Carolina

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

 

 EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

 STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor

 PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State

 GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce

 David Dorman, Staff Director (Chairman)

 John Foarde, Staff Director (Co-Chairman)

 (ii)

 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Page

 STATEMENTS

Spiegel, Mickey, senior researcher, Human Rights Watch, New York, 

 NY............................................................. 2

Bays, Daniel H., professor of history, head of the Asian studies 

 program, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI...................... 6

Hamrin, Carol Lee, consultant and research professor, George 

 Mason University, Fairfax, VA.................................. 9

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (2 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 APPENDIX

 Prepared Statements

Spiegel, Mickey.................................................. 26

Bays, Daniel H................................................... 28

Hamrin, Carol Lee................................................ 29

 Additional Submission

Statement submitted by Human Rights in China entitled, ``China's 

 New Regulations on Religious Affairs: A Paradigm Shift? '' 

 dated March 14, 2005........................................... 33

 CHINA'S NEW REGULATIONS ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: A PARADIGM SHIFT?

 ---------- 

 MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2005

 Congressional-Executive

 Commission on China,

 Washington, DC.

 The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., 

in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde (staff 

director) presiding.

 Also present: Susan Weld, general counsel; Carl Minzner, 

senior counsel; Keith Hand, senior counsel; Steve Marshall, 

senior advisor; Kate Kaup, special advisor; Mark Milosch, 

special advisor; Rana Siu, U.S. Department of State; and Laura 

Mitchell, research associate.

 Mr. Foarde. Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to this 

issues roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China.

 Since we gathered on Thursday last for our issues 

roundtable on public intellectuals in China, the Majority 

Leader of the Senate has chosen our Chairman for the 109th 

Congress and the Senate members of the Commission. The chairman 

is Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, who was our co-chairman in 

the last Congress. So we are delighted to welcome our three 

panelists on behalf of Senator Hagel and the members of the 

CECC so far appointed, and to welcome all in the audience today 

to this issues roundtable, in which we are going to examine 

China's new regulation on religious affairs.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (3 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 This new regulation is important to the Commission because 

I think it is fair to say that every Member who has been 

appointed so far to the CECC has had among his or her 

priorities for membership on this Commission the monitoring of 

religious freedom in China and advocacy on these issues. So 

over three and a half years, we have done quite a number of not 

only full hearings of the Commission, but also roundtables on 

various aspects of China's legal and political regime to 

control religious belief and practice.

 This new regulation on religion, which became effective on 

March 1, has been hailed by Chinese officials and Chinese 

experts as something of a paradigm shift in the way that the 

government treats religion. One official was quoted in 

materials that we have seen in the Chinese language that the 

``new regulation sets clear limits on official exercise of 

power over religion, safeguards religious freedom, and moves 

from direct administrative control to a system of permitting 

self-government by religious groups.''

 But religious believers and practitioners and human rights 

organizations dispute these claims, arguing that the more 

detailed new regulation will in fact further limit the ability 

of religious believers to worship freely in China. Some critics 

charge that the government's goal really was a more efficient 

``rule by law'' rather than a protection of the right to 

religious belief and practice of the ``rule of law'' approach. 

They have also suggested that the details of the new regulation 

are less significant than some of the very unhelpful 

simultaneous acts of the government, such as the arrest of 

dozens of house church leaders right after the new rules were 

announced, and a generally harsher Communist Party policy, 

particularly in ethnic regions.

 To help us examine this new regulation and what it might 

mean, we have three distinguished panelists--two of them have 

been our guests in the past--to share their expertise with us, 

and one of them is new to testifying here at one of our staff 

panels. We are delighted to have all three of you, both the old 

friends and the new friend.

 I will introduce each, briefly, before they speak. Just as 

we have done over the last three and a half years at these 

issues roundtables, each panelist will have 10 minutes to make 

an opening presentation. I will let you know when you have 

about two minutes left. That is your signal to wrap things up. 

Inevitably, you will not get to all the points that you wish to 

make, but we hope that there will be time during the subsequent 

question and answer session for you to catch up any points that 

you did not get to discuss.

 Our first panelist this afternoon is Mickey Spiegel, a 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (4 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

senior researcher at Human Rights Watch in New York, and an old 

friend and frequent contact of ours. Mickey has been working on 

China for Human Rights Watch since 1990. Trained as an 

anthropologist, she holds a Masters of Philosophy degree in 

anthropology from Columbia University. Among her recent 

writings are a chapter entitled, ``Control and Containment in 

the Reform Era'' in God and Caesar in China: Policy 

Implications of Church-State Tensions, 2004, edited by Jason 

Kindopp and Carol Hamrin. Mickey co-edited the March-April 2000 

Documents on Religion in China, 1980-1997: Central Government 

Policy (1), which is part of the Chinese Law & Government 

Series. Mickey has researched and written an enormous number of 

reports for Human Rights Watch on topics relating to religion 

in China, including, most recently, ``Trials of a Tibetan Monk: 

The Case of Tenzin Deleg'' as well as ``Dangerous Meditation,'' 

a report on repression of the Falun Gong. Her nine reports on 

religious regulation include the major work, ``China: State 

Control of Religion,'' published by Human Rights Watch in 1997.

 Mickey Spiegel, welcome. Over to you for 10 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF MICKEY SPIEGEL, SENIOR RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS 

 WATCH, NEW YORK, NY

 Ms. Spiegel. As a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, 

a private, independent human rights monitoring organization, I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear today before the 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China to present our 

perspective on the evolution of religious policy in China 

following the end of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1997.

 From the time the Chinese Government rescinded the Maoimposed ban on all religious belief, it has steadily reinforced 

the structure of laws and regulations directing religious 

practice. The regulations that went into effect on March 1, 

2005 do not appear to be a break with tradition, but an attempt 

to tighten the state's control, codify Party policies, and 

strengthen the bureaucracy established to enforce them. The aim 

is twofold: stricter control and less arbitrariness.

 In 1982, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 

Party promulgated Document 19, ``The Basic Viewpoint and Policy 

on the Religious Question during Our Country's Socialist 

Period.'' Its principles continue to underlie religious policy 

in the People's Republic of China even today as we meet to 

consider the implications of the new State Council Decree, 

``Regulations on Religious Affairs,'' effective since March 1, 

2005.

 Document 19's original formulation was sparse: ``respect 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (5 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

for and promotion of the freedom of religious belief,'' but it 

signaled a sea change. Promotion of freedom to choose to 

believe signaled an end to policies of repression which 

alienated believers and interfered with the state's ability to 

turn its full attention to, and to direct the attention of 

believers to, the mutual goal of rapid modernization. Respect 

for a variety of beliefs spoke to the state's determination to 

curb cadres who had been able, with impunity, to intimidate, 

harass, arrest, and torture believers.

 However, with the promulgation of the 1982 Chinese 

Constitution which followed hard on the heels of Document 19, 

the potential for limiting the full flowering of religious 

belief and practice became immediately obvious. Document 19 

limited freedom to believe to five major religions: Buddhism, 

Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and post-denominational 

Protestantism. Article 36 of the Constitution limited state 

protection only to ``normal'' religious activities.

 The ambiguity of the term ``normal'' permitted a plethora 

of limits on religious freedom. What developing regulations 

implicitly allowed was considered normal; any other activity 

could be deemed abnormal, even by a local bureaucrat. As a 

Chinese official said some months ago, what was illegal was 

abnormal; what was abnormal was illegal. It did not get us very 

far. But such a formulation continued to make possible 

arbitrary rule by local fiat, something the central government 

was determined to disallow, even as it strengthened control 

over religious practice. At the same time, prohibition on the 

use of religion to disrupt public order signaled a concern, one 

that continues to this day, that hostile forces would use 

religion as a cover for fomenting subversion.

 Guidelines, such as those making ``patriotic'' 

organizations responsible for monitoring compliance with state 

policy, establishing a ``three-fix'' policy that limited 

evangelical practices and the use of lay religious leaders, and 

instituting a ``three-self'' policy that barred organizational 

ties to world religious bodies, gave way to emphasis on a 

``rule of law.'' That new emphasis culminated in 1991 in a 

policy directive that carried Document 19 a step further and is 

still the centerpiece of religious control. Document 6, 

``Circular on Some Problems Concerning the Further Improvement 

of Work on Religion'' mandated that every congregation, temple, 

monastery, mosque, and church had to register with the 

authorities. An unregistered group was, by definition, illegal, 

and its members subject to arrest. A group deemed ``legal'' 

opened itself to control of its personnel, religious materials, 

activities, membership, and finances.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (6 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 Jiang Zemin extended the impetus toward regulation of 

religious activity through law when, in 1993, he stated that 

religion must adapt itself to a socialist society. The 

imperative has been interpreted to mean that everything from 

the organization of rights and rituals, to underlying theology, 

to day-to-day management of personnel, materials, and 

activities, must meet the changing needs of society, as 

interpreted by its rulers.

 By 1994, regulations codified by the State Council 

specified the steps required to properly register and the right 

of rejection reserved to those bodies charged with monitoring 

compliance. Local regulations made still more explicit what 

legally registered organizations could or could not do. There 

was, however, still room for small groups operating discreetly 

in the shadows to continue to meet and worship. That small 

space, though still in existence in 1994, narrowed again in 

1999 when the Chinese Government, in response to the emergence 

of Falun Gong, further reserved for itself the right to 

determine, in the religions it recognized, what constituted 

orthodox belief and what was heterodox, and thus, illegal, and 

to further determine what belief structures could be classified 

as cults and thus, ipso facto, illegal.

 The regulations that went into effect on March 1, 2005, 

further codify the rules restraining religious practice in 

China and the bureaucratic mechanism used to reinforce those 

rules. That bureaucracy consists, in part, of the nationallevel State Administration of Religious Affairs; a hierarchy of 

religious affairs bureaus in all administrative units such as 

provinces, townships, and counties; the Ministry of Public 

Security; and local police units.

 Several immediate problems assert themselves. The usual 

twin problems of undefined terminology and vaguely worded 

regulatory articles make it difficult to understand precisely 

what compliance requires and leave considerable leeway for 

national and local interpretation. For example, the problem 

remains of what is ``normal'' and what is not; nowhere is there 

an explanation of ``the lawful rights and interests of 

religious bodies, sites for religious activities and religious 

citizens;'' and the requirement that those same actors 

``safeguard unification of the country, unity of all 

nationalities, and stability of society'' (Article 3) leaves 

the state free to re-interpret the provision as the need arises 

and leaves religious practitioners no redress should they be 

charged with a violation. In addition, other than the specific 

requirement in Article 48 of the new regulations that the 

``Regulations on Administration of Sites for Religious 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (7 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

Activities'' be repealed, laws and regulations remain in place 

that do not specifically target religious activities, but 

nevertheless have serious implications for religious 

expression. The 2005 regulations make no comments on these preexisting laws and regulations, nor do they suggest how their 

implementation will affect provincial 

regulations. The usual practice had been for provinces and 

other administrative areas to follow national templates in 

crafting regulations specific to their jurisdiction.

 The most problematic addition to prior regulatory regimes, 

and one that I believe clearly signals an increase in state 

control, is the requirement that a religious body--nowhere 

defined--``shall be registered in accordance with the 

provisions of the Regulations on Registration Administration of 

Associations.'' The change signals the need for the religious 

body to satisfy two bureaucracies, the Civil Affairs Ministry 

and the State Administration of Religious Affairs. The 

requirement not only adds to bureaucratic oversight, but in 

theory it requires inter alia a religious organization to have 

a government agency ``as a professional leading unit,'' 50 

members, full-time personnel, and if local, have ``activity 

funds totaling in excess of 30,000 yuan.'' Most important, the 

regulations state in Article 13(2), that an application may be 

rejected because one with a ``similar operational scope exists 

in the same administrative area.'' In other words, the state is 

given the power to decide how many mosques are enough.

 Several other provisions speak directly to an increase in 

state control: the requirement that the religious affairs 

department of the State Council approve educational institutes, 

which may reject an application on the grounds that sufficient 

institutes exist in a given locale; involvement of a national 

religious body in the selection of students who may go abroad 

for religious study; the obligatory involvement of three 

administrative levels before an application to prepare to 

establish a site for religious activities can be approved and 

the additional requirement that no application for registration 

can be made until construction is complete; apparent 

elimination of any gray area through which small local groups 

without a structure could use someone's home or shop as a 

meeting place where like-minded believers could quietly 

congregate; acceptance of ``guidance, supervision and 

inspection'' by ``relevant departments of the local people's 

government''; and restrictions on large-scale religious 

activities.

 An added worry grows out of the requirement in Article 27 

that religious personnel be ``determined qualified as such by a 

religious body.'' The stipulation brings to mind the ongoing 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (8 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

``patriotic'' campaigns in Tibet and Xinjiang, during which 

clergy are compelled to examine themselves and their colleagues 

for inappropriate behavior or thought.

 One omission may--but only may--signal a positive policy 

change. Nowhere in the regulations is there reference to what 

belief systems qualify as religions. The omission may signal 

that additional belief systems will be added to the short list 

as apparently has been the case for some aspects of popular 

religion. Conversely, it may signal only that the government 

will continue to be the sole arbiter of what is a religion and 

what is not.

 I am reluctant to consider regularizing religious belief, 

practice, or organization as a positive development. The 

premise seems to be that communities of believers have the 

potential to challenge Beijing's rule throughout China, though 

more so in Tibet and Xinjiang, where religion serves as an 

identity marker and supports independence sentiment.

 I believe the hope is that the new regulations will lay the 

groundwork for religious organizations to perform necessary 

social welfare functions that the state itself cannot support--

hospitals, clinics, old-age homes, senior centers. But I 

suspect that China's leadership has crafted the regulations in 

a way intended to further isolate religious belief and practice 

from life's day-to-day minutiae. That emphatically is not 

freedom of religious belief, even as defined in the dry 

language of international human rights doctrines.

 No, the March 1, 2005 regulations are, at best, a cosmetic 

cover-up.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Spiegel appears in the 

appendix.]

 Mr. Foarde. You were remarkably disciplined, and I 

appreciate it very much. We will have a chance to reach some of 

the material that you did not cover during the Q&A.

 Next, I would like to go on and recognize this afternoon a 

new friend, Professor Daniel Bays, Professor of History and the 

head of the Asian Studies Program at Calvin College. Professor 

Bays is the former chair of the History Department at the 

University of Kansas at Lawrence. He has directed major 

research projects, funded by the Henry Luce Foundation and the 

Pew Charitable Trusts, on the history of Christianity in China 

and American missionary movements. He is the editor of 

``Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the 

Present,'' a 1996 volume published by Stanford University 

Press; with Grant Wacker, he also was the editor of the book, 

``The Foreign Missionary Enterprise at Home: Explorations in 

North American Cultural History,'' a 2003 volume published by 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (9 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

the University of Alabama Press; and is also the author of 

``Chinese Protestant Christianity Today,'' an article in The 

China Quarterly, No. 174, 2003.

 Professor Bays, thanks very much for being with us.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL H. BAYS, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HEAD OF THE 

 ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAM, CALVIN COLLEGE, GRAND RAPIDS, MI

 Mr. Bays. Thank you very much. I am honored to be here to 

participate.

 As I look at them and read them over, these regulations do 

not constitute a ``paradigm shift,'' especially when, at the 

same time, as you point out in your introduction, there are 

major cases of persecution continuing.

 In late February in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, there 

was a raid by several different types of security personnel, 

and Chinese officials ultimately kicked several foreigners out 

of the country and temporarily detained 150 or so Chinese 

pastors and church workers.

 Carol Hamrin mentions near the end of her paper some things 

that have been going on since last fall as well, or last 

summer: a purge from the Party of people who are discovered to 

be religious believers; a tightening of campus Christian 

activities at colleges and universities; and a freeze on the 

creation of what up until recently was the rapidly expanding 

number of university-level study centers that looked at 

Christianity or other religions. That is going on at the same 

time that these new regulations are going into effect.

 Like Mickey Spiegel, I believe that the purpose is not to 

enhance believers' rights or their security to practice their 

religion. There might be a side effect, some side effect which 

is not all bad, for believers to know what the state is going 

to do if it regularizes its supervisory behavior. But I think 

that the regularization of control is to enhance state and 

Party control. So, the purpose is to reduce arbitrariness, but 

for the purpose of better total control.

 Like Mickey, I noted, as in the past with such laws, great 

problems of vagueness of terms, no definition of them. For 

example what is ``normal religious behavior,'' or ``religious 

extremism? '' Still, I found some interesting features, 

interesting to me as an historian. For example, Article 38 

talks about how state functionaries can be disciplined for 

abuse of power, but it does not indicate whether that could 

include Party members. Does ``state functionaries'' include 

Party members? We are not told.

 Article 33 makes it clear that believers are entitled to 

fair compensation for confiscated property when their old 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (10 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

church has to be demolished. In the past, there have been some 

cases of real exploitation and unfairness of the compensation. 

This Article 33 makes it clear that that should not be done.

 There is a reference in the regulations that relates to 

religious groups carrying out social service activities. And 

foreign donations can be used for social service as well. That 

may indicate that the state is not doing very well in these 

responsibilities, which we know is the case. The state is not 

doing well in social service activities for its own population.

 I notice that there runs through the document a consistent 

thread of concern about religious groups coming under the sway 

of foreign forces. That could be, of course, Muslims, Tibetans, 

Catholics, and even Protestants. It applies to anybody.

 Overall, my conclusion, in general, is that this is not a 

``paradigm shift.'' This is sort of a clean-up by bureaucrats. 

I always think of a comment from someone that Chan Kim-Kwong 

and Allan Hunter interviewed. I think it was Chan who 

interviewed a fairly high-ranking bureaucrat before their book 

came out in 1993 on Protestantism in contemporary China. He 

said, ``These people who are always at us for more rights--

reporters, political organizers, and religious believers--they 

have all kinds of claims, but we just see them as an 

administrative problem.''

 As a historian, this document reminds me a lot of the 

behavior and assumptions of pre-Communist Chinese political 

regimes, e.g., the compulsion on registration of venues and 

licensing of clerics, a deep fear of heterodoxy which then, as 

now, is xiejiao. It was translated as ``heterodoxy'' in the old 

days; now it is ``evil cult.'' Absolute paranoia about 

religious forces becoming politically subversive, as in Falun 

Gong.

 Actually, there are some Protestant-related groups, sort of 

offshoots of Protestantism, who are pretty off-the-wall and are 

potential candidates for anti-state rebellious behavior. That 

is one of the weaknesses of the Protestant scene, I think, in 

China today.

 I have a few other related observations, some along the 

lines of religious believers dealing with state control. 

Thinking of laws that affect religion and religious believers, 

at some point one would think that people will start to realize 

that the laws should, and can, protect citizens as well as 

being instruments of the state. There were a few cases in the 

last years starting to show this.

 John Pomfret, who was for a few years the correspondent for 

the Washington Post in Beijing, had an interesting article a 

couple of years ago on how some of the local lawyers who are 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (11 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

believers--I think it was in Fuzhou--sued the state for not 

letting their churches have Sunday schools for kids, and making 

the legal argument that the regulations against that were not 

laws, but simply guidelines. In Ian Buruma's book, ``Bad 

Elements,'' there are a couple of cases of very brave Chinese 

lawyers trying to push the envelope on protecting citizens, 

including some religious believers.

 Other aspects which come to mind from recent reading are 

all the Web sites being shut down by the state, and the state 

itself says some of those are religious. We are not sure how 

many of them, but there must be quite a few if some are being 

shut down.

 Protestant groups in particular, about which I know the 

most, continue to refuse to register with authorities and 

continue to create their own non-state-sanctioned training 

schools and programs for their leaders, and print material that 

they are not supposed to, and often have extensive, 

unauthorized contacts with Christian groups outside of China.

 A few comments just to conclude this part of it, just 

laying out some ideas. Laws aside, overall, where are we headed 

in terms of religious groups, especially, say, Protestants, in 

terms of the future? I have a hunch that the growth of an urban 

and better-educated, better-off class of religious believers, 

urban Protestants, may result in more security for the church. 

It is harder to beat up on better-off urban residents than it 

is on rural people. Will that result in elements of a Chinese 

civil society, with believers showing a sense of civic duty and 

responsibility and a desire to participate in local 

decisionmaking? That is possible, I think. I think that 

intellectuals can play a role in this, too.

 It is possible that, in the future, there will be these 

people who are referred to as ``culture Christians,'' some of 

them religious believers, others simply appreciative of what 

they think Christianity might do by way of public social values 

to address the problems of corruption and ineffectiveness of 

government, and that sort of thing. They might play a role in 

establishing an urban Christianity.

 Looking far ahead and making a wild guess about the future, 

there may be in effect now a long-term pattern of the state's 

gradually and selectively declining control over society, 

because it just cannot control everything, and some elements of 

society gradually growing more assertive and claiming their 

rights if they can conceive of law as giving them rights, as 

well as the law giving the state a tool. It might be easier for 

religious believers to do that, to be more assertive and to try 

to claim their rights with this new religion law or that may be 

wishful thinking, because it is possible that the 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (12 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

interpretation and implementation of this law, or these 

regulations, rather, might keep us right where we are in terms 

of practical freedom of religious belief.

 So, with that I will conclude and wait for our discussion 

later.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Bays appears in the 

appendix.]

 Mr. Foarde. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Bays.

 Our third panelist today is also an old friend, Dr. Carol 

Lee Hamrin, currently a consultant and Research Professor at 

George Mason University here in the area. Carol's long career 

in public service includes 25 years in the U.S. State 

Department, where I had the privilege of being her colleague 

and benefited very much from her work as Senior China Research 

Specialist. Dr. Hamrin currently is a Chinese affairs 

consultant and, as I said, a Research Professor at George Mason 

University in Fairfax, VA. She is also a senior associate with 

the Global China Center in Charlottesville, VA, and advises 

other nonprofit organizations supporting social services in 

China. Her current research interests include research and 

training projects for the development of the nonprofit sector 

in China, and cultural change, human rights, and religious 

policy. Recent publications include ``Advancing Freedom of 

Religion and Belief in a Global China: A New Framework,'' which 

is a report that she put together for the China Task Force of 

the Council on Faith & International Affairs in 2004. We are 

looking forward to reading ``God and Caesar in China: Policy 

Implications of Church-State Tensions,'' which she co-edited 

with Jason Kindopp from Brookings.

 Carol, over to you.

 STATEMENT OF CAROL LEE HAMRIN, CONSULTANT AND 

 RESEARCH PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, FAIRFAX, VA

 Ms. Hamrin. Thank you, John. I am always happy if I can be 

of help to the Commission. I think your work is very important. 

I think you have done a remarkable job of giving Washington a 

deeper, more complex understanding of the change going on in 

China, so keep it up.

 I view trends in religious affairs as part of a broader 

trajectory in state-society relations that might be called 

``outgrowing socialism.'' Following a pattern set by the 

economic reforms, the state still protects and gives special 

support to select social institutions that are granted a 

monopoly for certain functions--what we might call stateorganized institutions [SOIs], to reflect similarities to the 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (13 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

state-owned enterprises [SOEs]--while also allowing smallscale, private, civic institutions to spring up in order to 

meet demand. These smaller and weaker organizations, 

nonetheless, just like private businesses in China, have 

greater vitality and flexibility, and gradually put competitive 

pressure on the state agencies. I think that kind of 

competition is good.

 Thus, the unregistered religious organizations, through 

steady, positive resistance, have greatly outpaced, in growth 

and popularity, those belonging to the five official 

monopolies, the so-called ``patriotic'' religious associations; 

this, despite the state's unwillingness to grant them 

legitimacy and its periodic efforts to force them to register 

through the monopoly associations. Similarly, more than half of 

the three million nonprofit organizations of other types in 

China do not register or find loopholes for registering in some 

other way to gain maximum autonomy.

 The lack of legitimacy for the old state-run social system 

and this widespread passive resistance to it is evidence to me 

of a more equal relationship developing between the state and 

society in general as the state is forced to down-size and a 

pluralistic society 

develops.

 So the state can no longer easily suppress or control 

social organizations, and even finds them quite useful to 

lighten its burden at various levels in providing social 

services; thus, they have to begin to address their concerns in 

order to get compliance with the regulations.

 I am just setting that forth as a comparative context for 

analyzing these new state regulations on religious affairs. I 

should 

emphasize, all of us feel like we are just taking a first cut 

at understanding these and their implications. This is not the 

final word, by any means.

 Compared with previous regulations that focused on the 

registration and operation of religious sites, these new 

regulations are an improvement in the sense that they are both 

comprehensive and transparent. One reason I think this is 

important, is that the central government can no longer say, 

``Well, those abuses are due to those local officials who do 

not know what they are doing.'' I mean, these are now State 

Council level, not just Religious Affairs Bureau level, 

regulations, so the central government is accountable for 

enforcing them.

 The new rules are detailed, with 48 articles, and 

systematic in addressing religious affairs. I would say that 

they do go a ways toward defining what is ``normal'' by listing 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (14 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

all the things that are legal and approved. They do not define 

clearly the demarcation point, of course, between ``normal'' 

and ``abnormal,'' other than registered or not registered.

 I think there is a discernible trend in the regulations for 

the state to step back from micro-management of religious 

affairs to a more general oversight position, giving somewhat 

greater autonomy and authority to authorized religious 

associations. This is true of other regulations for other 

social organizations. But I would say that this ``paradigm 

shift,'' if we want to call it that, took place in the 1990s, 

not with these regulations. There was a round of regulations in 

the early and late 1990s, and now there is another round of 

regulations for social organizations, including religious 

organizations, that is sort of an update. They are more 

detailed, more 

systematic, and they are an update, basically, on the rules. 

These regulations now have the highest level, State Council, 

legitimation for certain kinds of practices that have actually 

been won through the perseverance of religious adherents who 

started doing things, and that became a de facto part of the 

rules. Now they are endorsed at the highest level. For example, 

inter-provincial meetings. I mean, I did not even know there 

were such things allowed, but they have taken place, so now 

they are just slipped in here as things that are now listed as 

normal. So, there are a few things like that that are 

improvements.

 However, most of these practices could already have been 

found scattered in pre-existing provincial regulations or the 

implementing guidelines, as Mickey and Dan have pointed out. 

So, in a sense, these regulations are more of a snapshot of de 

facto practices in this area than any step toward more 

democratic practices that would meet international standards. 

They fall far short of the type of legislation required to 

protect constitutional rights, or even improve constitutional 

rights, that would be expected of China after signing the U.N. 

Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. I think everybody can 

be disappointed they did not go much further toward where they 

need to be.

 Note, the full meaning and import of these regulations will 

not be clear until the implementing guidelines are available. 

Usually that takes months, but since there is a lot of training 

already under way of religious affairs officials, perhaps they 

already do have those guidelines, and we just have not read 

them. Mickey has heard about the handbook that was prepared for 

religious affairs officials, so maybe when we see a copy of 

that we will know more.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (15 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 However, I do think that legal status still will only be 

granted to religious groups, not local bodies of believers, 

through membership in official religious associations. These 

regulations all talk about religious organizations, and by that 

they mean social organizations, membership organizations, not 

the local, independent congregations. So, I think that is 

something we need to really watch closely.

 The most important unknown, perhaps, is whether the state 

will allow new religious associations to develop and be 

registered and operate or whether they are going to stick with 

their current five, or maybe add a couple more. That will be 

important to watch for.

 The cautious nature of these regulations is similar to 

others recently implemented, and regulations being reviewed for 

updates in the social sector. There are a lot more regulations 

that now apply, tax and auditing rules, the donation law, and 

so forth, so it is a much more complex situation.

 But I would say we then have the good news. There is an 

intent to treat religious organizations equally with other 

social organizations as a normal part of Chinese society and 

culture instead of a special kind of ideological, political 

threat that needs to be eliminated. So, we are on the right 

track that way.

 The bad news is that all social organizations are still 

highly restricted under the dual management system, which this 

regulation echoes. I will not go into all of those onerous 

requirements for registration, the quotas that Mickey has 

mentioned, and so forth. But I would say that, even though 

there is suspicion of foreign involvement with all social 

organizations, there still is even more such suspicion for 

religious organizations. So, there is still no level playing 

field there. Religious affairs are required to be independent 

and self-governing, prohibiting any foreign domination, 

``domination'' being undefined; and it seems to me that these 

kinds of barricades are anachronistic at a time when foreigninvested and foreign-run companies are generating more than 

half the value of all Chinese exports.

 But in any case, I would say, too, that we need to see 

whether the current patriotic organizations revise their 

constitutions and rules to comply with the somewhat more 

moderate language in these regulations, because there are a lot 

of internal requirements for members of these associations that 

are even less close to international norms.

 So I would say the most welcome part of these regulations--

which is their intent, apparently--is to reduce arbitrariness 

and abuses by local implementing officials. If this nationwide 

training includes the police as well as religious officials and 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (16 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

legal officials, I think that something good can come of that. 

Hopefully the content is positive and provides more constraints 

on their arbitrariness.

 The most important bottom-line concluding thought that I 

would offer is that I think these regulations, along with those 

for other social organizations, show that the state is under 

both internal and external pressure to regularize or normalize 

its relations with religious believers. Now, of course, they 

would prefer to achieve that via a relationship of control and 

top-down edict, but they know it is not going to happen. They 

had to take into account wide consultations, at least of the 

official religious groups. There are no longer just purely 

bureaucratic interest groups drafting and giving ideas and 

doing research in this area. There are academic groups and the 

grassroots religious organizations and international players 

who make their views known as we are today, and all of that is 

starting to get into the hopper, putting pressure on the 

government to keep moving in the direction of recognizing the 

rights of believers.

 So I think maybe this is the beginning rather than the end. 

There is hard bargaining ahead, perhaps eventually leading to 

more equal negotiating to protect the rights of the people at 

the grassroots.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Hamrin appears in the 

appendix.]

 Mr. Foarde. Carol, thank you very much. Thanks to all three 

of our panelists for presentations rich in themes and material 

for us to take up in the next few minutes in our question and 

answer session.

 Before we begin that, I would just say to those of you in 

our audience this afternoon who have not signed up for our 

information list on our Web site, to please visit our Web site 

at www.cecc.gov and sign yourself up for the periodic e-mail 

announcements about our hearings and roundtables, press 

releases, and other materials related to the Commission's 

mandate.

 I would like to go on now to the question and answer 

session. We have been conducting these roundtables over the 

last three and a half years pretty much in the same way. Each 

member of our staff panel will get about five minutes to ask a 

question and hear the answer. Normally, we ask our staff panel 

to address the question either to a specific panelist, or to 

the group in general. Then if any of the other panelists have a 

comment to make on it, we are glad to hear their views. We will 

keep going until we run out of steam, or until 3:30, whichever 

comes first.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (17 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 So let me exercise the prerogative of the chair and begin 

the questioning by addressing a question really to all three of 

you.

 It strikes me from what you have said, that given the huge 

growth that we have seen in religious belief and practice, both 

in registered churches and in unregistered groups of both 

Protestants, Catholics, and others over the last, say, 10 

years, 15 years, or longer, why would the government and the 

Party bother with a new religious regulation, given that the 

dynamism, it seems to me, is very much in the unregistered 

groups? Why try to control them at all? What is the motive for 

doing that?

 Ms. Hamrin. I have been thinking about this recently and 

was struck by a clause in something I read, the term ``the zone 

of indifference.'' I think maybe in the 1980s the state was 

retreating from its total involvement in every aspect of the 

economy and society because it cannot possibly run everything, 

manage everything, administer everything. With the 

decentralization to lower levels of government, a lot of 

responsibilities and authority were just hived off and sent 

down, and so the central government did not have to worry about 

it.

 The problem is, however, that local governments have 

started to pursue their own interests, not complying with 

national interests. I think that we are seeing, since the 

1990s, a recentralization of central authority in many sectors, 

including the economy. But the government is trying to use new 

mechanisms, such as fiscal and monetary policy rather than the 

state planning agency in the economy, and for social 

organizations, an effort to use these regulations rather than 

just policies sent down to cadres to apply as they wish. So 

with the concern about corruption in the last few years and the 

new, younger leadership clearly making an effort to get a 

handle on it, or at least to slow down the growth of it, we 

have got anti-corruption efforts of a number of different 

types.

 I would say that perhaps these regulations, and the others 

for foundations and social organizations, are part of that 

effort--to try to get better implementation of policy at lower 

levels to reduce the levels of corruption and abuse that are 

arousing widespread social outbursts. I mean, there has been 

massive social unrest in certain cities over small incidents, 

really, but it shows the pent-up anger in the populace.

 Mr. Foarde. Useful. Thank you. Somebody else? Mickey.

 Ms. Spiegel. I think another piece of it has to do partly 

with what Carol said, but partly with the need of the central 

government to insist that there is a rule of law in China.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (18 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 In almost every realm, in terms of publications, in terms 

of religion, in terms of social organization, there is a need 

to craft something that will appear to be a rule of law that 

will partly will solve some of the central leadership's 

internal problems, but will also be crafted in a way that 

international organizations will buy. I think that is a big 

piece of what is happening here.

 I also think that in other fields there is tension between 

people within the ranks, not necessarily of the central 

leadership, but within the ranks of people involved in crafting 

policy and in creating policy in China. The tension has been 

between those who are trying to push the envelope and those who 

are basically hard-liners. I think one of the things that the 

government is trying to do here, is to integrate these two, or 

to monitor the tension. The leadership needs to pay attention 

to both wings or both extremes. I think, that accounts in part 

for why the regulations are, in many respects, as vague as they 

are. How do you satisfy both constituencies? So, I think that 

is another piece of what is happening here. But there is, 

clearly--and I agree with Carol--a felt need on the part of the 

central government to solidify its hold over the whole issue.

 If you look at some of the local regulations--and I admit, 

I have looked at them over the years but I have not gone back 

and looked at them in the last couple of weeks--there is a 

major difference. There is a template, and that template is 

adhered to in many respects. But there is a major difference in 

the regulations promulgated for certain areas.

 The obvious ones, of course, are Tibet and Xinjiang, where 

the regulations are much stricter and where there has been a 

concerted effort to re-educate cadres, re-educate believers, 

and re-educate religious leaders.

 So, I think, but I cannot be certain, that some of what has 

been tried out in those areas is going to find its way, maybe, 

into these new regulations when they are eventually put into 

practice. Maybe the terms will be a little bit softer, but I 

think the practices will be there.

 Mr. Foarde. Good. Thank you. Let me now recognize Susan 

Roosevelt Weld, the general counsel of the Commission staff, to 

pick up the questioning. Susan.

 Ms. Weld. Thanks a lot, John.

 When I think about the actual impact of the new religious 

legislation that is coming out of China, I wonder whether the 

legislation might say one thing while Party policy might say 

something entirely different.

 Do these regulations add significant predictability to 

believers' lives so they will now know what will happen if they 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (19 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

worship in certain places and in certain ways? Do they add 

significant predictability as to how the religious affairs 

officials and local police will treat them? This is an 

important part of what ``rule of law'' means, in one sense?

 Mr. Bays. I think it might. I think it is Article 38 that 

says state functionaries can be punished or disciplined if they 

abuse or mistreat religious believers. If that actually 

happened a few times, it might help some local religious 

believers' confidence. Of course, they might then step out and 

do something that they think they have the right to do and get 

clobbered in their local area. But if that provision, that 

Article 38 were to be extensively implemented and publicized by 

the higher levels of government and a few cadres actually 

punished for beating up on believers or arresting them, fining 

them, extorting money from them, that might make believers' 

lives a little more predictable and a little more pleasant.

 Ms. Hamrin. That is a really good question. It just made me 

think that we should remember, from a Chinese perspective, 

these are rules for a certain sector. These are rules for 

religious believers and religious officials. They are not rules 

for everybody. This is not a law to protect religious belief 

for everybody in China. Therefore, you will have other things 

going on in other sectors of society that contradict the 

moderate tone, at least, of these rules. So for example, if you 

have a Propaganda Department campaign to foster atheism and 

materialism in the media and the school system, well, that is 

for everybody else, but it is discriminatory against religious 

belief. It privileges atheism over religious belief. If you 

have an Organization Department campaign to winnow out 

religious believers from Communist Party membership roles, 

these rules are not for them. If you have the Education 

Department instructions to put a freeze on the development of 

the religious study centers and the more careful attention and 

reporting on materials that you are translating, publishing, or 

people that you are interacting with, well, most of these 

people are Party members. So, again, these are religious 

researchers, they are not religious believers, so these rules 

are not for them. I think we have to keep that 

compartmentalization in mind in Chinese culture.

 Mr. Foarde. Let me now pass the questioning on to our 

colleague, Kate Kaup, who joins us this year as a special 

advisor during her sabbatical year from her associate 

professorship at Furman University in Greenville, SC.

 Ms. Kaup. Thanks, John. Thank you very much to all the 

panelists for being here.

 As you all have noted, these regulations, in many ways, are 

not brand new and represent a systemization of existing 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (20 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

regulations, or as Carol called them, a ``snapshot of existing 

regulations.'' Since these newest regulations have not really 

been tested yet over the last two weeks, I was wondering if you 

could very briefly--I know it is a big question--talk about how 

well religious freedoms that have already been provided for in 

earlier regulations have been observed by the authorities. 

Particularly, maybe you could mention how well freedom of 

religious belief has been protected in Xinjiang and Tibet. I 

said it was a big question.

 Ms. Spiegel. It is difficult in Xinjiang and Tibet. There 

has definitely been a hardening of attitudes in both areas. In 

many ways, I think the Chinese Government, the Communist Party, 

have succeeded in winning some of those battles. The problem 

is, of course, that you have religious belief and religious 

identity intertwined with movements toward more autonomy or 

independence.

 Now in Xinjiang government officials use the term 

``religious extremism,'' which is simply a way of saying, ``if 

you are a devout Muslim you are probably a terrorist,'' so we 

had better be careful. Really, it has gone that far. The 

Chinese Government just made another statement about the 

issues.

 What has happened in both areas--and, again, slightly 

differently in each because you have a monastic situation in 

one and mosques in the other--is total secular control of 

religion: the organization, the finances, the personnel, the 

materials, educational systems, can children receive religious 

instruction. There are very specific regulations. It is not 

simply left to reading between the lines.

 In Tibet and in Xinjiang, there are very specific 

regulations about what might happen to a child who somehow 

advertises that he or she is a religious believer. As I have 

said already, I think a part of what has been tried in Tibet 

and Xinjiang may find its way into other provinces. While you 

do not have the same situation, this push for autonomy or 

independence, maybe there was a testing out of ways to control 

religion. I see some of that reflected in the new regulations, 

certainly in training of personnel.

 For example, in Xinjiang, there was a two-year campaign, 

imams--I cannot remember the numbers off-hand--were subject to 

very intense patriotic education campaigns. They were 

reminiscent of the old criticism, self-criticism method where 

you had to think about your own thoughts and your own 

activities and criticize what somebody else did. You had to 

write a critique of yourself and a critique of the process. It 

was a very intense process. I would not be surprised to see 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (21 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

more of that happening in other areas.

 The way I read the new regulations, that is implied. It is 

certainly not set out, but it is implied. That is, I think, one 

of the problems with these regulations. A lot is implied and we 

do not know how it is going to play out.

 We are still seeing, from recent testimony of people from 

Tibetan areas, not simply in the TAR, the same kinds of intense 

pressure on believers. People are leaving because, as they say, 

what is left is not religion. Monks say, ``we are told what to 

believe, we are told what to say, we are told how to say it, 

and if we do not do it in that way, we are out--expelled from 

the monastery--and we cannot go anyplace else to practice our 

religion the way we want.''

 Mr. Foarde. Would either of the other panelists like to 

address that? Yes. Please, Carol, go ahead.

 Ms. Hamrin. I would say, among the Han Chinese, that the 

further down in the system you go, the further away from the 

emperor you are, the more there has been a remarkable amount of 

freedom for the registered groups. They have been growing by 

leaps and bounds. They have been building new churches and 

having larger scale meetings, and having foreigners coming in, 

preaching and teaching, sending people overseas for study, and 

more and more materials being published, not just scriptures, 

but other materials. They have also been opening bookstores. 

Someone recently sent me the catalogue of a couple of Christian 

bookstores in small-sized cities, which of course are still 

large to us, like Hangzhou or elsewhere, where these were 

bookstores not connected to a church, but just had a lot of 

material available.

 So, I think that regulations at the top and personnel 

appointed at the top by the government is one thing, and we 

should always look at the bottom up perspective as well. I do 

think that the recentralization, though, this effort to try to 

get a handle on what had been a larger and larger zone of 

indifference, has rolled back earlier progress in certain 

areas.

 Personnel is one of the big problem areas, and theology and 

doctrine, is another. I think in the past, the government was 

paying the most attention to organizational structure, 

registration of worship sites. But more and more, the 

government has been promoting certain kinds of theological 

changes and campaigns, even in the Protestant circle, that are 

clearly intended to try to get rid of ``supernatural'' 

elements, ``superstitious'' beliefs, and focus on ethics and 

social service, to do something useful to society and forget 

the rest of it. I do think that is not a good trend.

 Ms. Spiegel. I think one other thing that has been 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (22 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

mentioned in passing, but that is very important, is concern 

about large meetings and meetings that go across discrete 

administrative boundaries.

 That, interestingly enough, was a piece of what Tenzin 

Deleg was charged with--not necessarily charged with, because 

we do not know what the charges were; nobody has ever seen the 

indictment or the verdict--but that was something that he had 

done that he had been warned about.

 We are seeing that in other places, too, this need to get 

permission to come together, to have a religious rally. That is 

something that I never saw before--in any of the regulations, 

that you had to get permission to go beyond a discrete small 

administrative area. Maybe you did, Carol.

 I think that is an area to watch because I think it speaks 

to the fear of religion. It speaks to the fear that I think the 

Chinese Government and the Communist Party have, that another 

organization somehow is going to co-opt--and I think that would 

be their words--the hearts and minds of the Chinese population. 

I personally do not see it that way. I think you can be a vey 

good Chinese citizen and still be a fervent religious believer.

 Mr. Foarde. Certainly we have heard that from some of the 

Chinese pastors that have come to visit us over the last year 

or longer, so I agree.

 Let me go on and continue our questioning this afternoon 

with our colleague from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, at the U.S. Department of State, Rana Siu. Rana, 

please.

 Ms. Siu. Thanks, John. Thanks to the panelists for your 

presentations.

 Compared to the last question, my question is much more 

specific. I would like you to talk about there being a shift 

from focusing on sites to groups? Do the new regulations give 

legal protections to activities of officially recognized 

religious groups to hold religious services in places other 

than at an officially-recognized church? When I mention this, I 

am wondering, could an official church sponsor ``house church'' 

services?

 Ms. Spiegel. That is a very good question. I personally do 

not have any answer. I think that is one of the most confusing 

aspects of these regulations, what is a group or an 

organization.

 At one point, reading it--we were discussing this before 

the roundtable, and I do not think anybody agrees with me--it 

seems that an organization has to have a physical structure, 

that it actually has to have a building, has to have a church, 

or a mosque, or a temple, a structure.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (23 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 It was not clear how venues or sites relate to 

organizations. It was not clear if they have to have a 

structure. It was not clear if there is room for the house 

church. If somebody knows the answer to that or has other 

thoughts on it, I would be very interested to hear them because 

I think that is the most confusing part of the regulations.

 Mr. Foarde. Let us give Dan Bays a try.

 Mr. Bays. My conclusion is that what freedoms are 

guaranteed are still for the venue. A floating house church 

would not be acceptable as coming under this regulation. If the 

house church were to formally affiliate with a registered 

church, then of course it would become a meeting point of that 

registered church and that would probably be all right. I think 

it would have to self-register and become a meeting point of a 

registered church, I think. But we were talking about this at 

lunch as well, and it is difficult to figure out.

 Ms. Hamrin. In looking through these regulations and 

comparing the social organization regulations with these 

religious organization regulations, I became more aware that 

when they talk about religious organizations, they mean 

membership associations.

 So only the associations, not the local individual group or 

congregation, can be a legal personage and can do any of these 

things. The sites that are registered as part of an association 

can do certain things, but there is no independent way to 

become a legal personage to do these things on your own. That 

is my understanding, that we can all test out.

 I do think that the shift of focus to talk about these 

religious organizations does suggest that, once they are 

registered, once they are legal, that they could then apply for 

special kinds of meetings, large-scale meetings that cannot fit 

into a specific churchground. This would be possible if you are 

registered, you are legal, and you go to the police and you can 

apply.

 But this is the biggest challenge that the urban house 

church people face. They cannot just go meet in a field. They 

really have trouble finding places to meet, certainly in large 

numbers. I think there may be a shrinking zone of indifference 

here. I was told by friends about a couple thousand people who 

had rented a hall in an auditorium, for a Christmas Eve 

service. That has been going on for a number of years.

 This time, though, the security people cutoff all the 

electricity and there was no heat and no light, and they were 

sitting there in the dark and people were nervous that it was 

going to have a bad ending if there was disruption of social 

order, and so forth.

 But actually, they stayed and continued with flashlights, 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (24 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

and left peacefully and kind of made a statement, saying in 

effect ``We will not be intimidated.'' But I do think that is a 

critical concern.

 Mr. Foarde. Thank you.

 Let me recognize Steve Marshall, who is our colleague who 

handles Tibet issues and works on political prisoner issues for 

us. Steve.

 Mr. Marshall. I would like to thank each of you for 

insightful observations on a very complex subject. I would like 

to return to the Tibetan Buddhism question. I will direct this, 

first, to Mickey, but I would appreciate anything that I can 

hear from the other panelists.

 Tibetan Buddhism is based very much on the monastic 

community, and that community is essentially about association, 

assembly, and education. The lay community looks to the 

monastic community for guidance, and the contact between them 

is, again, all about association, assembly, and education.

 These new regulations appear to be more finely drawn with 

respect to association, assembly, and education. Mickey, what 

impact do you think that might have on the already delicate 

situation between the lay and monastic community with respect 

to Tibetan Buddhism? Thanks.

 Ms. Spiegel. First of all, I think, Steve, you probably 

have a better answer to that question than I have, but I will 

try to answer it. It is hard for me to envision the regulations 

pertaining to religion in Tibet, to Buddhism in Tibet, to the 

organization of a monastery or a nunnery becoming any worse 

than they are now. But I have said the same about other issues, 

and time and time again I have had to say, ``Well, why didn't I 

think about that? '' It probably can get worse.

 From what we are hearing, the monastic community, whether 

it is 200 people in a monastery or 20 people in a monastery, 

the 

attempt really is to cordon it off. The monastery is here and 

lay people are elsewhere.

 There is certainly no interaction between children and the 

monastic community. If anything, there is probably a tightening 

of 

restrictions on visiting a monastery. Monasteries, more and 

more, as you know, have become tourist sites. For many people, 

there is no recognition of it as a sacred place.

 One of the changes that has happened in the monastic 

community is that education even for those who are members of a 

monastery has become watered down. This is one of the 

complaints you hear over and over again, that, yes, I am a monk 

and I am associated with this particular monastery, but there 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (25 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

is nobody to teach me. There has been such a crack-down on the 

teachers, therefore, there is a real need to try to go 

someplace else to get a religious education. So if you have 

that kind of situation, how does the religion spread to the lay 

community? Then, there are very specific rules for the lay 

community.

 It is a unclear whether it is simple cadres who obviously 

cannot have pictures of the Dalai Lama and cannot have a place 

of worship in their houses. How far that restriction extends to 

the lay population, is unclear. The rules appear fuzzy and 

nobody is exactly clear what they are.

 I would refer back to the Tenzin Deleg case. From the 

research that we did, one of the major problems at the 

authorities faced in relation to him, was the extent of his 

influence in the community. I believe, that kind of influence 

is something the Chinese Government and Communist Party does 

not want. They want lay control. More than lay control, lay 

rather than monastic influence within a community. That came up 

fairly recently in an odd way.

 I believe it was in Golog Prefecture in Qinghai that a monk 

was killed. There was a lot of confusion about who, what, when, 

and where, but nevertheless, somebody was killed and there was 

unrest within the community. Despite the government's attempt 

to resolve the situation, officials finally called in a lama to 

calm things down.

 In other words, they were admitting that there was monastic 

influence within the community. But my guess is they are going 

to continue to try to narrow the areas of monastic influence.

 Mr. Foarde. Let me now pass the questioning on to our 

colleague, Mark Milosch, a senior advisor who has been working 

these last couple of years on Catholic issues and Protestant 

issues. Mark.

 Mr. Milosch. Thank you very much.

 This question is for anyone who might be able to help 

answer it. I am interested in Article 8 of the new regulations, 

the article on schools. Could you give us an idea how far 

Article 8 represents a change from previous regulations and 

practice and what you think the authorities may have in mind, 

and what might be the effect of this article. Will there be a 

sudden movement by the faiths to create schools? What do the 

authorities expect? What do you expect? How do you think the 

authorities might react to various likely developments? I 

should say, I am talking about religious schools here.

 Ms. Spiegel. As I understand it, there has always been a 

two-tier system. You have those seminaries that are recognized 

by the Religious Affairs Bureau, and then you have underground 

seminaries. I think the new regulations simply make explicit 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (26 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

that officials are going to see to it that does not happen any 

more.

 It also is very clear that you cannot have a school on 

every corner any more than you can have a mosque on every 

corner. Officials are very definitely going to limit the 

number.

 Obviously, they have tried to control the curriculum, 

control which students are admitted, that they are patriotic 

students, and so on.

 I believe this is a codification of what they have been 

trying to do for years, and just further tightens control. I do 

not see any particular difference, but maybe someone else does.

 Ms. Hamrin. This tends to look like recentralization for 

authorization at the national level for any religious 

institute, whereas, my understanding is, up until now, 

provincial-level religious associations were able to set up, 

not necessarily seminaries, which do seem to have sort of a 

quota, one for the northeast, one for the southwest, but rather 

Bible schools. By this I mean a school that would be less than 

a full seminary, but something that could be more local, 

smaller scale, maybe two years instead of four years. Or 

perhaps some just lay training institutes of all sorts, some 

for six months, some for six weeks. I mean, there has been a 

lot more going on. So this could be an effort to recentralize 

approval over all such activities. We do not know what is a 

religious institute, all of the above or just the few that are 

regional or national in scope. We do not know.

 Mr. Foarde. Professor Bays.

 Mr. Bays. I think the highlighting of the role of the State 

Council here--it is mentioned specifically twice in that one 

paragraph--may well indicate a recentralization, an intent to 

have closer monitoring and permission from Beijing.

 Mr. Milosch. It sounds like none of you see any doors 

opening here.

 Mr. Bays. If anything, maybe the opposite, because of the 

role of the State Council, both in the initial stage and having 

the final say-so. Although the regulation does ask the lower 

level administrative unit to indicate whether it intends to 

accept the application or not before officials send it up to 

the State Council.

 Mr. Foarde. Good. Thank you.

 Let us hand the questioning now to our colleague, Carl 

Minzner, another senior counsel on the Commission staff. Carl.

 Mr. Minzner. Thank you very much, John.

 This question is directed to Professor Hamrin, but I will 

invite the other participants to answer the question as well.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (27 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 I was interested in the comparison that you made in the 

beginning of your statement about the resemblance of Chinese 

religious policy to economic policy, particularly with the idea 

that there were state-sponsored institutions that the 

government had been long involved in supporting, and they were 

gradually opening up the realm for some more civic associations 

to challenge the power of the long-established state religious 

organizations. One aspect of this economic context is that, 

while the Chinese Government may open up an area for more 

private associations, it frequently pursues a strategy of cooption with respect to those associations that demonstrate 

particular strength or popular appeal. In the economic context, 

you could cite the example of the ``Three Represents'' strategy 

in bringing private entrepreneurs into the Party.

 So my question is: in the religious context, is there any 

evidence of this co-option strategy as well? Is the government 

making an effort to bring in those particular Protestant or 

Catholic leaders who are part of these newly-emerging, nonstate organizations that might be in opposition to the statesponsored church or the state-sponsored Catholic groups? Is the 

government making active efforts to bring those people into the 

patriotic church associations?

 Ms. Hamrin. I would just say that I think the government's 

intention in the civic sector is not necessarily to promote the 

competition. I think they did see that was valuable in the 

economic sector.

 But co-option is intrinsic to the whole ``united front'' 

strategy, and so all along I do think the government and 

Party's intention has been to resurrect these monopoly 

religious associations and allow them to develop and set up 

local churches, even in some areas that never had churches 

before. At the beginning, the associations did not intend to do 

that, but the government wants to allow them gradually to do 

enough that they can attract people into the fold, and then 

that would take care of the problem: everybody would register, 

everybody would be part of this one group, and then you can 

just put the squeeze on the people at the top of the group to 

be responsible for the behavior of all others.

 But it just has not worked out that way. So I view these 

regulations as yet one more effort to make the system function, 

and again we will have to wait and see whether it is going to 

work any better than previous efforts.

 These efforts at co-option always have a carrot and a 

stick, so we are seeing both here. I mean, we are seeing the 

stick--they are going after unregistered groups rather than 

ignoring and winking at their activities--in an effort to put 

the pressure on them to either come above ground or just 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (28 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

disappear.

 So, I am sorry--did I answer the question? I wanted to say 

at some point, and maybe I could just say it here, I was 

talking to someone from the Religious Affairs sector and 

learned, to my surprise, that considering religious 

organizations as social organizations and registering them with 

Civil Affairs is not new. Now, I did not know that any 

religious associations were registered with Civil Affairs, but 

they are. I asked, ``Why does nobody know about this? '' He 

said, ``Well, it is just all very automatic.''

 If you were already one of these mass organizations, once 

the regulations were put out in 1994, which were government 

regulations, not Party policies, then these Party mass 

organizations were just automatically registered, and all the 

members, all the churches that were part of these associations, 

were just considered registered. So it was ``we are going to 

shift this whole system from party control to government 

control through regulations, and so register everybody.'' That 

was news to me, and maybe needs to be tested out and further 

investigated.

 That is the standard system. All social organizations have 

to register with Civil Affairs and be supervised by, or 

administered by, the functional agency in the government that 

controls that sector.

 Mr. Foarde. So, for example, the Health Ministry or 

something like that.

 Ms. Hamrin. There was huge debate about this in recent 

years. Reformers in the State Council Legislative Office and 

the Ministry of Civil Affairs, plus the organizations 

themselves, were saying that this is just really onerous. In 

fact, one of the reasons so many social organizations do not 

register, or register instead as businesses, is because they 

cannot find a government agency that will sponsor them, 

probably because the government agency cannot make money off of 

them and they are just a pain.

 So in the debates going into the drafting of the foundation 

regulations, they debated, ``Should we just do away with this? 

'' One earlier draft did, but then when you came down to the 

bargaining at the end, to a consensus that everybody can 

accept, you put that off for the next round, knowing there will 

be a next round. This is continually in negotiation, like any 

good Chinese contract.

 Ms. Spiegel. There was a meeting in December 2003, to 

discuss NGOs. There were Chinese participants; the EU was the 

other partner. The Chinese participants said at that time that 

the need to have government sponsorship of an organization was 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (29 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

on its way out.

 For awhile, it looked like that was going to happen, but it 

seems not to be happening now. However, I still see a 

difference between the fact that there is some kind of 

oversight by a sponsoring organization and the fact that you 

have at the whole bureaucracy set-up to oversee religious 

organizations. I may be dead wrong.

 Mr. Foarde. Dan, do you have a comment?

 Ms. Hamrin. One important difference is that Religious 

Affairs Bureaus have a vested interest in keeping this system, 

because they do not do anything else.

 Ms. Spiegel. Agreed.

 Ms. Hamrin. Whereas, most other government agencies do have 

other business.

 Mr. Foarde. Or at least have another function. Right. A 

comment, Dan?

 Mr. Bays. I just wanted to point out that in 2002, 

something happened which has implications for the future and 

relates to what Carl was mentioning. Frank Ching, who was 

writing then for the Far Eastern Economic Review, had a column 

in the first half of 2002 where he stated very confidently 

that, at the upcoming 16th Party Congress later that year, not 

only businessmen, but also religious believers, would be 

allowed to join the Party.

 Nothing came of that, but I think that this perhaps 

indicates very well how trial balloons can get shot down maybe 

by conservative people in the Party. It also indicates that a 

substantial part of the Party at that time was willing to 

contemplate having religious believers as Party members instead 

of going through and purging all the Party members who were 

discovered to have 

theistic beliefs. So that indicates some flexibility for the 

future, perhaps. What it would mean for a believer to become a 

Party member, it is a little anomalous, but who knows?

 Mr. Foarde. Interesting. Thank you.

 Let me recognize Laura Mitchell, our research associate on 

the Commission staff, who is also a member of our Religion 

Working Group. Laura.

 Ms. Mitchell. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.

 I would like to know more about how the new regulations 

will affect membership of religious groups. I read that the 

regulations stipulate that legal action can be taken against 

anyone who attempts to compel others to believe in certain 

religions. How will this affect the ability of religious groups 

to meet with potential new members or discuss their religion 

and encourage new membership?

 Ms. Spiegel. When I read that clause, I think in terms of 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (30 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

religious officials not being allowed to force people to 

disbelieve or 

believe in atheism. I would have to go back and look again to 

understand the implication for ordinary recruitment. I never 

thought of the clause from that perspective. There may well be 

some intent to find an additional way to counter proselytizing. 

I did not see that, but I will have to look again.

 Mr. Foarde. Dan.

 Mr. Bays. Eastern Lightning, of course, would fall under 

this provision. It is already a xiejiao, already an evil cult.

 Mr. Foarde. Both organizations and individuals, according 

to the thing. How interesting. Laura, do you have another 

question? You have a couple of minutes left.

 Ms. Mitchell. How do you think the regulations might impact 

local traditional religious practices? Do you think that local 

officials will now be more likely to stop traditional folk 

religious practices?

 Ms. Spiegel. Carol and I were at a meeting--Carol was one 

of the speakers--and one of the other people who spoke talked 

particularly about that issue. What it seems to be is that 

local traditional religion is going to be incorporated into the 

system. Originally there were only five recognized religions. I 

would guess that, unless there is real pressure on them, local 

officials would tend to let it remain as it was. I think 

traditional religion is so much a part of the culture in 

certain provinces. From what I understand, in some areas many 

local officials, if not the leaders, play a big part in 

traditional religion I do not imagine there is going to be a 

lot of change, but I do not know enough about it to do anything 

more than make a guess at this point.

 Mr. Foarde. Go ahead, Carol.

 Ms. Hamrin. You saved all the good questions for me.

 Mr. Foarde. That is right. That is right. We want to keep 

you awake. [Laughter.]

 Ms. Hamrin. I just think this is an issue to watch very 

closely, and it is related to what Dan Bays was talking about 

earlier about Party membership. At the local level in areas 

where folk religion--or folk faith, which is less organized but 

more cultural--is really prominent, and it is not just the 

southeast, but around Beijing, and it is growing all over, you 

have got Party members and Party officials who are involved in 

these local practices, if not some organized religion.

 So, just like earlier, when you have so many Party members 

leaving the Party and government and going into business, but 

still they were Party members, what do you do with them? It is 

not a matter of recruiting businessmen. It is, what do you do 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (31 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

with these businessmen who are already in the Party?

 It is the same thing here. What about all these Party 

people who have joined, or are practicing, religion, or whose 

families are? Do you just say, ``all right, that is fine? '' Do 

you try to purge them, to somehow roll that back? That is what 

they have decided to do, for now, at least. Maybe the next 

round will be a different decision.

 Ms. Spiegel. They did roll it back in Tibet and Xinjiang. 

Whether that reflects the difference in the way religion in 

those two provinces is viewed and the way other religions are 

viewed, is hard to know. Whether they will be a model is hard 

to know.

 Mr. Foarde. Thank you. Let us give the last set of 

questions for this afternoon to Keith Hand, our senior counsel. 

Keith.

 Mr. Hand. Those of us who are lawyers like to say there is 

no right without a remedy. Professor Bays, you mentioned that 

one of the goals of the new regulation is to control 

arbitrariness, and also to discipline officials if they do not 

follow the rules. Do the rules give the religious believers 

themselves any legal cause of action through which to enforce 

them?

 The second question is should we make anything of the fact 

that this was passed as a State Council regulation as opposed 

to a national law?

 Mr. Bays. For the first, there is nothing in the 

regulations that indicates who can bring suit. It sort of 

implies that the official's supervisor would know about this 

and take action, which is probably not very realistic. But the 

legal profession in China is expanding and there are lawyers 

doing all kinds of daring things. I can imagine an 

adventuresome local religious leader being a lawyer and 

bringing suit against a cadre. Of course, he might get beat up 

for it by thugs. Anyway, that is probably the area of remedy.

 The other question. It probably is significant that it is a 

State Council regulation, because maybe that is easier to 

change in the future. This is, perhaps, somewhat experimental.

 Ms. Hamrin. I was a little surprised when I read that, 

explicitly, religious believers are told that they can take 

these laws on administrative wrongful action and use those if 

they feel local officials have abused their authority, because 

I thought, they are citizens of the PRC, of course they can do 

that for any kind of administrative wrongful action. But in the 

Chinese culture, unless it is spelled out, it will not happen. 

It is not like here in the United States, where we 

assume,''Well, of course they can, even if they did not say 

so.''

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (32 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 I think it is important that they spelled out that people 

can take officials to court if there is a problem, or they can 

get a second opinion, so to speak, if they disagree with the 

administrative opinion. It is important both because they are 

more likely to do so in fact, and because officials then know 

that and may think twice when they make decisions.

 Mr. Foarde. I appreciate that answer, and all the profound 

answers we have gotten to the questions this afternoon, as well 

the statements from our panelists.

 For the first time in several weeks of doing these 

roundtables this year, we actually have sunshine streaming in 

the windows from outside, and I see now that the shadows are 

growing long. So, on behalf of Chairman Chuck Hagel and the 

Members of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, let 

me thank our three panelists, Carol Hamrin, Mickey Spiegel, Dan 

Bays, and all of you who came this afternoon to hear them share 

their expertise with us.

 Please watch our Web site and your e-mail for announcements 

about the series of roundtables and hearings that we will have 

throughout the spring. Announcements will be coming up soon.

 Thank you all, and we will adjourn this roundtable. Thank 

you.

 A P P E N D I X

=======================================================================

 Prepared Statements

 ---------- 

 Prepared Statement fo Mickey Spiegel

 March 14, 2005

 As a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, a private, 

independent human rights monitoring organization, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear today before the Congressional Executive 

Commission on China to present my/our perspective on the evolution of 

religious policy in China following the end of the Cultural Revolution 

(1966-1997).

 From the time the Chinese government rescinded the Maoist imposed 

ban on all religious belief, it has steadily reinforced the structure 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (33 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

of laws and regulations directing religious practice. The regulations 

that went into effect on March 1, 2005 do not appear to be a break with 

tradition, but an attempt to tighten the state's control, codify Party 

policies, and strengthen the bureaucracy established to enforce them. 

The aim is two-fold: stricter control, less arbitrariness.

 In 1982, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 

promulgated Document 19, ``The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the 

Religious Question during Our County's Socialist Period.'' Its 

principles continue to underlie religious policy in the People's 

Republic of China even as we meet to consider the implications of the 

new State Council Decree, ``Regulations on Religious Affairs,'' in 

effect since March 1, 2005.

 Document 19's original formulation was sparse: ``respect for and 

promotion of the freedom of religious belief,'' \1\ but it signaled a 

sea change. Promotion of freedom to choose to believe signaled an end 

to policies of repression which alienated believers and interfered with 

the State's ability to turn its full attention to and to direct the 

attention of believers to a mutual goal of rapid modernization. Respect 

for a variety of beliefs spoke to the State's determination to curb 

cadres who had been able with impunity to intimidate, harass, arrest, 

and torture believers.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 \1\ Chinese Law and Government, vol. 33 (March-April 2000) p. 22.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 However, with the promulgation of the 1982 Chinese constitution 

which followed hard on the heels of Document 19,\2\ the potential for 

limiting the full flowering of religious belief and practice became 

immediately obvious. Document 19 limited freedom to believe to five 

major religions, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and postdenominational Protestantism; article 36 of the constitution limited 

state protection only to ``normal'' religious activities.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 \2\ Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 

Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated 

for implementation by the proclamation of the National People's 

Congress on December 4, 1982.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 The ambiguity of the term ``normal'' permitted a plethora of limits 

on religious expression. What developing regulations explicitly allowed 

was considered normal; any other activity could be deemed abnormal even 

by a local bureaucrat. As a Chinese official said some months ago, what 

was illegal was abnormal; what was abnormal was illegal. But such a 

formulation continued to make possible arbitrary rule by local fiat, 

something the central leadership was determined to disallow even as it 

strengthened control over religious practice. At the same time, 

prohibition on the use of religion to disrupt public order signaled a 

concern, one that continues to this day, that ``hostile forces'' would 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (34 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

use religion as a cover for fomenting subversion.

 Guidelines, such as those making ``patriotic'' organizations 

responsible for monitoring compliance with state policy, establishing a 

``three-fix'' policy that limited evangelism and the use of lay 

religious leaders, and instituting a ``three-self'' policy that barred 

organizational ties to world religious bodies, gave way to emphasis on 

a ``rule of law.'' That new emphasis culminated in 1991 in a policy 

directive that carried Document 19 a step further and is still the 

centerpiece of religious control. Document 6, ``Circular on Some 

Problems Concerning the Further Improvement of Work on Religion,'' \3\ 

mandated that every congregation, temple, monastery, mosque, and church 

had to register with the authorities. An unregistered group was by 

definition illegal and its members subject to arrest; a group deemed 

legal opened itself to control of its personnel, religious materials, 

activities, membership, and finances.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 \3\ Chinese Law and Government, vol. 33 (March-April 2000) pp. 56-

63.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Jiang Zemin extended the impetus toward regulation of religious 

activity through law when, in 1993, he stated that religion must adapt 

itself to a socialist society. The imperative has been interpreted to 

mean that everything from organization of rites and rituals to 

underlying theology to the day to day management of personnel, 

materials, and activities must meet the changing needs of society as 

interpreted by its rulers.

 By 1994, regulations codified by the State Council specified the 

steps required to properly register and the right of rejection reserved 

to those bodies charged with monitoring compliance. Local regulations 

made still more explicit what legally registered organizations could or 

could not do. There was, however, still room for small groups, 

operating discreetly in the shadows, to continue to meet and worship.

 That small space, though still in existence in 1994, narrowed again 

in 1999, when the Chinese government, in response to the emergence of 

Falun Gong, further 

reserved for itself the right to determine what in the religions it 

recognized constituted orthodox belief and what was heterodox and thus 

illegal, and to further determine what belief structures could be 

classified as cults and thus ipso facto illegal.

 The regulations that went into effect on March 1, 2005 further 

codify the rules restraining religious practice in China and the 

bureaucratic mechanism used to 

enforce those rules. That bureaucracy consists in part of the national 

State Administration of Religious Affairs; a hierarchy of religious 

affairs bureaus in all administrative units such as provinces, 

townships, and counties; the Ministry of Public 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (35 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

Security; and local police units.

 Several immediate problems assert themselves. The usual twin 

problems of undefined terminology and vaguely worded regulatory 

articles make it difficult to understand precisely what compliance 

requires and leave considerable leeway for national and local 

interpretation. For example, the problem of what is ``normal'' and what 

is not remains; nowhere is there an explanation of ``the lawful rights 

and interests of religious bodies, sites for religious activities and 

religious citizens;'' and the requirement that those same actors 

``safeguard unification of the country, unity of all nationalities and 

stability of society'' (article 3) leaves the state free to reinterpret the provision as the need arises and leaves religious 

practitioners no redress should they be charged with a violation.

 In addition, other than the specific requirement in Article 48 of 

the new regulations that the ``Regulations on Administration of Sites 

for Religious Activities,'' be repealed, laws and regulations remain in 

place that do not specifically target religious activities, but 

nevertheless have serious implications for religious expression. The 

2005 regulations make no comment on these pre-existing laws and 

regulations, nor do they suggest how their implementation will affect 

provincial regulations. The usual practice has been for provinces and 

other administrative areas to follow national templates in crafting 

regulations specific to their jurisdiction.

 The most problematic addition to prior regulatory regimes, and one 

that I believe clearly signals an increase in State control, is the 

requirement that a religious body (nowhere defined) ``shall be 

registered in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations on 

Registration Administration of Associations.'' The change signals the 

need for a religious body to satisfy two bureaucracies, the Civil 

Affairs Ministry and the State Administration of Religious Affairs. The 

requirement not only adds to bureaucratic oversight but in theory it 

requires, inter alia, a religious organization to have a government 

agency ``as a professional leading unit,'' 50 members, full time 

personnel, and if local, have ``activity funds totaling in excess of 

30,000 yuan.'' Most importantly, the regulations state, in article 

13(2), that an application may be rejected because one with a ``similar 

operational scope exists in the same administrative area.'' In other 

words, the state is given the power to decide how many mosques are 

enough.

 Several other provisions speak directly to an increase in state 

control:

 <bullet> the requirement that the religious affairs department of the 

 State Council approve educational institutes, which may reject an 

 application on the grounds that sufficient institutes exist in a 

 given locale;

 <bullet> involvement of a national religious body in the selection of 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (36 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 students who may go abroad for religious study;

 <bullet> the obligatory involvement of three administrative levels 

 before an application to prepare to establish a site for religious 

 activities can be approved and the additional requirement that no 

 application for registration can be made until construction is 

 complete;

 <bullet> apparent elimination of any gray area through which small 

 local groups without a structure could use someone's home or shop 

 as a meeting place where like-minded believers could quietly 

 congregate;

 <bullet> acceptance of ``guidance, supervision and inspection'' by 

 ``relevant departments of the local people's government;''

 <bullet> restrictions on large-scale religious activities.

 An added worry grows out of the requirement (article 27) that 

religious personnel be ``determined qualified as such by a religious 

body.'' The stipulation brings to mind the on-going ``patriotic'' 

campaigns in Tibet and Xinjiang during which clergy are compelled to 

examine themselves and their colleagues for inappropriate behavior or 

thought.

 One omission may--but only may--signal a positive policy change. 

Nowhere in the regulations is reference made to what belief systems 

qualify as religions. The omission may signal that additional belief 

systems will be added to the short list as apparently has been the case 

for some aspects of popular religion. Conversely, it may signify only 

that the government will continue to be the sole arbiter of what is a 

religion and what is not.

 I am reluctant to consider regularizing religious belief, practice, 

or organization a positive development. The premise seems to be that 

communities of believers have the potential to challenge Beijing's rule 

throughout China, though more so in Tibet and Xinjiang where religion 

serves as an identity marker and supports independence sentiment.

 I believe, the hope is that the new regulations will lay the 

groundwork for religious organizations to perform necessary social 

welfare functions that the state itself cannot support--think 

hospitals, clinics, old-age homes, senior centers. But I suspect that 

China's leadership has crafted the regulations in a way intended to 

further isolate religious belief and practice from life's day to day 

minutiae. That emphatically is not freedom of religious belief, even as 

defined in the dry language of international human rights doctrines.

 No, the March 1, 2005 regulations are at best, a cosmetic cover up.

 ______

 

 Prepared Statement of Daniel H. Bays

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (37 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 March 14, 2005

Summary of main points:

 1. These regulations do not seem to constitute a ``paradigm 

shift.'' Especially when at the same time on the broader stage major 

cases of persecution continue.

 2. Purpose is not (except perhaps as a side effect) to enhance 

believers' rights or security to practice their religion. It is rather 

to regularize, and thus enhance, state and party control. I.e., the 

purpose is to reduce arbitrariness in managing religious affairs (which 

would be positive for believers), but in pursuit of better total 

control.

 3. Notorious problems of vagueness of terms and no definition, e.g. 

``normal activity,'' ``religious extremism,'' even ``religion'' itself, 

continue from past documents.

 4. Nevertheless some interesting features, e.g. art. 38 where 

``state functionaries'' (but does this mean party members as well?) can 

be disciplined for abuse of power, or art. 33 which makes clear that 

believers are entitled to fair compensation for confiscated property.

 5. Several mentions of aspects relating to religious groups 

carrying out social service activities, including use of foreign 

donations to do so. Seems almost a tacit admission that the state isn't 

doing very well in meeting these responsibilities.

 6. There runs through the document a consistent thread of concern 

that religious groups might ``come under the sway of foreign forces.'' 

Not entirely clear who is main target here, Muslims, Tibetans, or 

Catholics; or even Protestants.

 7. Overall, again not a paradigm shift, just a cleanup by 

bureaucrats?

 8. This document reminds me a lot of the behavior and assumptions 

of pre-Communist Chinese political regimes going back a couple of 

millennia: insistence on registration and licensing, deep fear of 

heterodoxy, paranoia about religious forces 

becoming politically subversive, etc. Note that some groups are in fact 

candidates for rebellion.

Some other related observations, some of them along lines of religious 

believers ``resisting'' state control:

 1. At some point people will start to realize that laws should 

protect citizens as well as being instruments of the state. A few cases 

starting to show this.

 2. Technology and religion's resistance to or evasion of the state. 

Web sites being constantly shut down by the state, including many 

religious ones, indicating a lot of them are in existence.

 3. Continued pattern of, e.g., Protestant groups refusing to 

register with authorities, and many of them creating their own nonhttp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (38 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

state sanctioned training schools and programs for leaders.

 4. Will more growth of an urban, better educated, wealthier class 

of believers (thinking of Protestants here) result in more security for 

the church? Will it result in elements of a Chinese civil society, with 

believers manifesting a sense of civic duty and responsibility and 

desire to participate in local decisionmaking?

 5. Possible role for intellectuals here? E.g. ``culture 

Christians.''

 6. It seems we may be in a long-term pattern of the state's 

declining control over society and elements of society gradually 

growing more assertive in claiming their ``rights;'' perhaps it will be 

easier to do so with this new religion law. (Or that may be wishful 

thinking).

 ______

 

 Prepared Statement of Carol Lee Hamrin\1\

 march 14, 2005

 New State Regulations on Religion: The Bargaining Begins

 Trends in religious affairs are part of a broader trajectory in 

state-society relations that might be called ``outgrowing socialism.'' 

Following a pattern set by the economic reforms, the state still 

protects and gives special support to its monopoly institutions--what 

we might call state-organized institutions (``SOIs'') to echo stateowned enterprises (``SOEs'')--while allowing non-state civic 

institutions to spring up in order to meet demand. These smaller and 

weaker organizations nonetheless have greater vitality and flexibility 

and gradually put competitive pressure on the state agencies.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 \1\ From commentary presented at ``Religion and Cultural Change in 

China,'' a seminar at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 

February 1, 2005.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Thus, the unregistered religious organizations have greatly 

outpaced in growth and popularity the five official monopolies--the socalled ``patriotic'' religious associations. This, despite the state's 

unwillingness to grant them legitimacy--and periodic efforts to force 

them to register through the monopoly agencies. This adds to evidence 

of a more equal relationship developing between the state and society 

in general, as the state downsizes and a pluralistic society develops. 

The state can no longer easily suppress or control social 

organizations, and also finds them useful to lighten the state's burden 

in providing social services in ever greater demand.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (39 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

 This is the comparative context for analyzing the new State Council 

regulations on religious affairs that went into effect on March 1, 

2005, in the place of the national regulations of 1994. (Note that the 

1994 rules for foreign nationals still apply). Compared with the 

previous regulations, which focused on the registration and operation 

of religious sites, there is some improvement in both comprehensiveness 

and transparency. The new rules are detailed--48 articles--and 

systematic in addressing the establishment and registration of 

religious associations, religious activities, personnel, property and 

liability. The content of the regulations, however, contains little 

that could not be found scattered in existing provincial regulations or 

implementing guidelines. It is more of a ``snapshot'' of current 

practice than a step toward more democratic practices, including 

legislation to protect constitutional rights, that would be expected of 

China at this stage of development. Nonetheless, the regulations now 

provide the highest level (State Council) legitimation for existing 

practices such as large-scale or inter-provincial meetings, publication 

of religious materials circulated ``within religious circles,'' 

acceptance of donations from overseas, and provision of social services 

to the community. Note that the full meaning and import of these 

regulations cannot be known until the implementing guidelines are 

hammered out among contending parties.

 The cautious and conservative nature of these regulations is 

reflected in other regulations and implementing guidelines under review 

for the social sector--such as the June 2004 set of rules for public 

and private foundations and the rules for social (membership) 

organizations and non-commercial institutions. There are also changes 

underway in the donation law and tax and audit rules that will affect 

all these various types of social organizations. The application of new 

rules on property ownership will be critical to all of them, and 

perhaps the most important will be a law on association reportedly 

being drafted.

 So the good news is that there is a stated intent to treat 

religious organizations equally with other social organizations rather 

than as some special kind of threat to the polity. For example, in the 

model constitution drafted by the China Christian Council to be used as 

a template for the constitutions of all registered Protestant churches, 

the Council specifically states that churches in China have a dual 

nature--that of a spiritual organization and that of a social 

organization. As social organizations, churches should ``abide by 

China's constitution, laws, regulations, and policies and should foster 

social progress, national construction, and the cause of world peace.'' 

\2\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 \2\ Church Order for Chinese Protestant Christian Churches, 

December 28, 1996, translation 2001 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the 

Chinese text, ``Zhongguo jidujiao jiaohui guizhang,'' Tianfeng 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (40 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

(Heavenly Wind), No. 2 (1997).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 However, the bad news is that all social organizations are still 

tightly restricted by intrusive state supervision, including strict 

quotas for those with national or provincial scope and restrictions 

about foreign ties. For example, the new foundation regulations require 

that foundations ``must not endanger national security, national unity 

or the unity of nationalities,'' reflecting suspicion about foreign 

involvement. The new regulations on religious affairs are less subtle, 

requiring ``independence and self-governance'' and prohibiting any 

``foreign domination.'' Such warnings seem anachronistic, at a time 

when foreign-invested companies in China are generating more than half 

of the value of all Chinese exports.

 The intent of the current regulatory approach seems to be reducing 

the arbitrariness and abuses of local implementing officials while 

retaining the final authority for defining and applying the rules in 

the hands of government. Thus, the state alone will define case by case 

such key terms that were left quite vague in the 

regulations such as ``religious belief'' or ``normal'' religious 

activities that deserve government protection, on the one hand, or the 

``state or public interests'' or ``foreign domination'' that would 

require government intervention on the other hand.

 Moreover, there is no requirement to harmonize the new regulations 

with previous laws, regulations or policy directives that may 

contradict them, to guarantee constitutional rights. So existing 

restrictions, including rules set by the monopoly religious 

associations such as not converting or baptizing minors, very likely 

will continue. The importance of this lack of coherence can be 

illustrated by mentioning just a few current policies that impact 

negatively on free religious practice--ongoing security campaigns 

against ``religious extremism'' (the new term for cults, terrorism, and 

separatism) and ``foreign infiltration'' (undefined); a propaganda 

department campaign to foster ``atheism and materialism'' in the media 

and education systems (maintaining the privilege of atheism over 

theistic belief); an organization department campaign to winnow out 

religious believers from Chinese Communist Party membership rolls; and 

education department instructions to stop religious activities on 

university campuses and put a freeze on the development of religious 

study centers. Thus, the actual environment for religious affairs is 

highly complex, confusing and intimidating, while implementation is 

heavily dependent on the locality in question.

 The adoption of these regulations on religious affairs may be most 

important as evidence that the state is under internal and external 

pressure to regularize or normalize its relations with religious 

believers. As with other regulations, we are dealing with a moving 

target; the drafters and implementers are well aware that they will be 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (41 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais

engaged in ongoing negotiations and hard bargaining with the various 

interest groups affected. And no longer are these purely the 

bureaucratic interest groups, but include the grass-roots religious 

organizations and international players as well.

 It seems that religious believers have won some grudging acceptance 

by the authorities that they are here to stay and have legitimate 

interests that must be taken into account. A lot of hard bargaining 

lies ahead, but having established the necessity of negotiating is a 

step toward the eventual free exercise of the right of association. In 

sum, the new regulations offer no guarantees or even probabilities of 

progress but signal some important possibilities.

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:20420.wais (42 of 42)7/26/2005 11:20:43 AM