alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   infomration  extracted  from
     MACAW CAPITAL, INC. June 30, 1996 financial statements and is qualified
     in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>                         0000894542
<NAME>                        MACAW CAPITAL, INC.

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996

<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1996

<CASH>                                                   0
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         0
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                          (1,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             0
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                          0
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                             0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                            0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        


</TABLE>
### §7344. Extended application of penalties relating to officers of the Treasury Department

All provisions of law imposing fines, penalties, or other punishment for offenses committed by an internal revenue officer or other officer of the Department of the Treasury, or under any agency or office thereof, shall apply to all persons whomsoever, employed, appointed, or acting under the authority of any internal revenue law, or any revenue provision of any law of the United States, when such persons are designated or acting as officers or employees in connection with such law, or are persons having the custody or disposition of any public money.

(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 872.)
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsMoCog1: A computer simulation of recognition-primed human decision makingThis report describes the successful results of the first stage of a research effort to develop a 'sophisticated' computer model of human cognitive behavior. Most human decision-making is of the experience-based, relatively straight-forward, largely automatic, type of response to internal goals and drives, utilizing cues and opportunities perceived from the current environment. This report describes the development of the architecture and computer program associated with such 'recognition-primed' decision-making. The resultant computer program was successfully utilized as a vehicle to simulate findings that relate how an individual's implicit theories orient them toward particular goals, with resultant cognitions, affects, and behavior in response to their environment. The present work is an expanded version and is based on research reported while the author was an employee of NASA ARC.Document ID19920017645Acquisition SourceLegacy CDMSDocument TypeTechnical Memorandum (TM)AuthorsGevarter, William B.*(NASA Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA, United States)*Date AcquiredSeptember 6, 2013Publication DateAugust 1, 1991Subject CategoryCyberneticsReport/Patent NumberFIA-91-23NAS 1.15:107872NASA-TM-107872Accession Number92N26888Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightWork of the US Gov. Public Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType19920017645.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
 No Fear Act | Freedom of Information Act | Office of the Inspector General | Agency Financial ReportsNASA Web Privacy Policy and Important Notices | NASA Guidelines for Quality of InformationDisclaimers, Copyright, Terms of Use | Accessibility | NASA OCIO | USA.gov | NASA.govContact Us | Site MapSTI LogoNASA Official: JoAnne R. Calhoun Site Curator: STI Compliance and Distribution Services Last Modified: September 12, 2024
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roberto ROMERO-MONTIEL, also known as Roberto Romero, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-40463.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Feb. 23, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Timothy William Crooks, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

*274Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Roberto Romero-Montiel appeals his conviction and sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for attempting to illegally re-enter the United States after having been deported. Romero-Montiel argues that the district court erred in ordering, as a condition of supervised release, that he cooperate with the probation officer in the collection of DNA. His claim is not ripe for judicial review in light of our holding in *United States v. Riascos-Cuenu,*428 F.3d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir.2005), *petition for cert, filed*(Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 05-8662). Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Romero-Montiel also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional. His challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Romero-Montiel contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert, denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Romero-Montiel properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
### §2042. Proceeds of life insurance

The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property—

#### (1) Receivable by the executor

To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.

#### (2) Receivable by other beneficiaries

To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary. In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate.

(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 387; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, §1906(b)(13) (A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1976—Pub. L. 94–455 struck out "or his delegate" after "Secretary".
1 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
2 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 01-2479

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Michael S. Shirley, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 12, 2001 Filed: January 14, 2002

___________ Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and BATTEY, 1 District Judge.

___________ PER CURIAM. Michael S. Shirley appeals from the district court’s 2refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion for downward departure. We affirm.-2- On March 1, 2001, Shirley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and to criminal forfeiture. On May 11, 2001, Shirley filed a motion for downward departure on the basis of his physical condition, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (2001), and on the basis of an over-representation of the seriousness of his criminal history as reflected in the criminal history category, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2001). The motion included a request for an evidentiary hearing and was accompanied by a brief in support of the motion. On May 14, 2001, the district court issued an order denying the motion for an evidentiary hearing and for downward departure. On May 31, 2001, the district court sentenced Shirley to 188 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Conceding that the district court was aware of its authority to depart downward and that its decision not to do so is thus unreviewable, Shirley contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for downward departure. The United States Sentencing Guidelines require that the district court afford the parties “adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding” disputed sentencing factors. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (2001). The court must resolve the disputed factors in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1). U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(b) (2001). Rule 32(c)(1) requires that the district court “afford counsel . . . the opportunity to comment on the probation officer’s determinations . . . and must rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence report. The court may, in its discretion, permit the parties to introduce testimony or other evidence on the objections.” See also , United States v. Granados , 202 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wise , 976 F.2d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Shirley’s brief in support of the motion for downward departure contained pertinent facts and argument that informed the district court of the bases for the-3- motion. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for an evidentiary hearing. The sentence is affirmed. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
---

Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Lawrence J. Finn, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Terax
  Energy, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain
  any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
  to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
  statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
  annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
  financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all
  material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
  of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I am responsible
  establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
  in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 (e) and 15d-15 (e) for the registrant and we have:

a)
  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
  controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
  material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
  subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
  during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b)
  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures
  and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness
  of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
  by this annual report based on such evaluation; and

c)
  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
  financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
  quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
  that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,
  the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
  based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
  to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board
  of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)
  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
  of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
  adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
  report financial information; and

b)
  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
  who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
  reporting.

Date: October 13, 2006

/s/ Lawrence J. FinnLawrence J. Finn 
  Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) 
  and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)

---
#### Branch *v.*Bishop.

.Atkinson, J.

1. The grounds of the motion for new trial, based on rulings of the court as to the admissibility of evidence, so far as they were approved by the judge, and the ground's relative to the charge to the jury, so far as approved by the judge, do not disclose any such errólas to require the grant of a new trial.

*111September 21, 1910.

Action for damages. Before Judge Brand. Oconee superior court. July 19, 1909.

*B. E. Thrasher, F. O. Foster, Brown*<£ *Randolph,*and *R. S. Parker,*for plaintiff in error.

*Gobb & Erwin, George G. Thomas,*and *W. M. Smith,*contra.

2. The action was for damages for malicious prosecution. In Iris answer the defendant did not specially plead that although there might not have been probable cause for causing the arrest, yet upon information he believed there was such cause and acted in good faith and not in a spirit of malice, and rely on allegations of that character either as a defense to the action or as mitigation of damages. But there was evidence tending to establish the facts above enumerated; and it was complained in one of the grounds of the motion for new trial that the court, although not requested in writing, omitted to charge such theory of defense. It appears from other portions of the charge that the judge instructed the jury in effect that there could be no recovery unless the defendant in causing the warrant to issue was “moved by malice.” The matters alleged to have been erroneously omitted from the charge were merely elaborative of the instructions actually given to the jury, in so far as they bore on the non-liability of the defendant, and were collateral in so far as they related to mitigation of damages. In either ease, in the absence of appropriate and timely written requests, the omission to charge was not sufficient cause for the grant of a new trial. *Savannah Electric Co.*v. *Jackson,*132 *Ga.*559 (64 S. E. 680) ; *Savannah El. Co.*v. *Bennett,*130 *Ga.*597 (61 S. E. 529) ; and cases cited; *Savannah El. Co.*v. *Crawford,*130 *Ga.*421 (60 S. E. 1056), and eases cited.

3. The verdict was supported by the evidence, and there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Jxistices concur.*
§ 3833.32 How do I transfer a mining claim or site? ( a ) State law governs transferring mining claims or sites. A transfer is effective in the manner and on the date provided by state law, not the date you file it with BLM.
( b ) You must file in the BLM State Office a notice of the transfer that includes: ( 1 ) The name and, if available, the serial number BLM assigned to the claim or site when the notice or certificate of location was originally recorded (the person who transferred you ownership or legal interest should have this number);
( 2 ) Your name and current mailing address; and
( 3 ) A copy of the legal instrument or document that you used to transfer the interest in the claim or site under state law.
( c ) For each mining claim or site transferred, each transferee must pay the full processing fee specified in the table of service charges and fees in § 3830.21 of this chapter.
( d ) BLM will notify the claimant of record with BLM of any action it takes regarding a mining claim or site. If BLM is required by law to give a claimant notice of any new legal requirements, BLM has properly given notice by sending the notice to the claimant of record with BLM.
[68 FR 61071, Oct. 24, 2003, as amended at 70 FR 58879, Oct. 7, 2005]
__... 

. . . _. 

. . . . . . ..- 

OFFICE OF THE AITORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 


. 

.
(No. 1130

Claimant awarded $1,711.40.)

#### Charles A. Elliott, Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed April*29, 1927.

Respondeat *superior*— when *State not liable.*The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.

Social justice and *equity*— award *may be made.*An award may be made to an injured employee of the State, who is injured in the discharge of his duty, and compensation fixed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Chiperfield & Chiperfield, for claimant.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Charles A. Elliott, of Canton, Illinois, in his *345declaration alleges that on May 12, 1926, while in the employ of the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, Bureau of Maintenance, he was injured by reason of an accident which occurred while he was working on said day filling cracks with tar and sand in the hard road upon Route 9, one-fourth of a mile west of the corporate limits of the city of Canton, Pulton county, Illinois, when he was struck with great violence by an automobile traveling upon said public highway and coming from the west, and as a result of such striking and collision the claimant received a broken left leg; the muscles and ligaments of his . back and hip were strained and injured and he received a great nervous shock, and thereby became lame, sick, sore and disordered; that his earnings during the preceding year were $1,500.00; that no compensation has been received from the employer on account of medical care and attendance.

To the declaration, the State of Illinois, by the Attorney General, filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

While there is no legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois on account of the injury in question, on the grounds of equity and social justice, we award claimant the sum which he would be entitled to receive under the provisions of the • Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois, or the sum of $1,711.40.