UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JOHN P. ELMENSDORP, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARNIVAL CORPORATION, CARNIVAL 

PLC, ARNOLD W. DONALD, DAVID 

BERNSTEIN, and MICKY ARISON,

Defendants.

Case No. ___________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR 

VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL 

SECURITIES LAWS

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff John P. Elmensdorp (“Plaintiff”), by and through his counsel, alleges the 

following upon information and belief, except as to those allegations concerning Plaintiff, which 

are alleged upon personal knowledge. Plaintiff’s information and belief are based upon, inter alia, 

counsel’s investigation, which included review and analysis of: (1) regulatory filings made by 

Carnival Corporation and Carnival plc (together, “Carnival” or the “Company”) with the United 

States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); (2) press releases, presentations, and media 

reports issued by and disseminated by the Company; (3) analyst and media reports concerning 

Carnival; and (4) other public information regarding the Company. Plaintiff believes that 

substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a 

reasonable opportunity for discovery.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a federal class action on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who 

purchased or otherwise acquired Carnival’s common stock (NYSE: CCL) and/or Carnival’s 

American Depository Shares (“ADSs”) (NYSE: CUK) between September 26, 2019, and April 

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30, 2020, inclusive (the “Class Period”). Plaintiff brings this class action to recover damages 

proximately caused to himself (and the Class) resulting from violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) 

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 

thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), as a result of false and misleading statements made by or on 

behalf of: (1) Defendant Carnival; (2) Defendant Arnold W. Donald (“Donald”), the Company’s 

President and Chief Executive Officer, and a Company director; (3) Defendant David Bernstein 

(“Bernstein”), the Company’s Chief Financial Officer; and (4) Defendant Micky Arison 

(“Arison”), the Company’s Chairman of the Boards of Directors.

2. Carnival, headquartered in Miami, Florida, operates the world’s largest cruise 

company, carrying nearly forty-five percent of global cruise passengers through nine different 

business segments, including Carnival Cruise Line, Princess Cruises, Holland America Line, 

Seabourn, P&O Cruises (Australia), Costa Cruises, AIDA Cruises, P&O Cruises (UK), and 

Cunard. The Company boasts that it is “the leading provider of vacations to all major cruise 

destinations throughout the world.”

3. Carnival has repeatedly assured investors and passengers that it follows the highest 

safety standards to ensure passengers’ health, safety, and comfort while aboard its ships. The 

Company has also linked health, safety, and comfort to its profitability, admitting that 

“[Carnival’s] commitment to the safety and comfort of our guests and crew is paramount to the 

success of our business. . . .”

4. Notwithstanding these assurances, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(“CDC”) identified multiple instances of norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships owned or operated 

by Carnival in 2019, including: three outbreaks on AIDA Cruises (AIDAdiva and AIDAluna), one 

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outbreak on Carnival Cruise Line (Conquest), and one outbreak on Princess Cruises (Island 

Princess).

1

5. Three out of the five outbreaks on Carnival ships occurred before the start of the 

Class Period, and the CDC investigation and reported data clearly put Carnival on notice of the 

threat of infectious diseases on its ships.

6. According to data on the CDC’s website under the heading “Investigation Update,”

the 2019 outbreaks occurred on: (1) Carnival Cruise Line (Conquest), voyage occurred September 

7–14, 2019; (2) Princess Cruises (Island Princess), voyage occurred February 8–18, 2019; and (3) 

the Royal Caribbean (Oasis of the Seas), voyage occurred January 6–13, 2019.

7. Despite these investigations and reports, and as described below, Carnival reemphasized is commitments to the health, safety, and comfort of its passengers and crew members, 

but made no mention of its actual inability to contain the threat of infectious illnesses on its ships

and its need to downplay outbreaks to maintain bookings and reservations.

8. The recent outbreak of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, has exposed Carnival’s

omissions as well as its assurances to safeguarding passengers and crew and, thereby its 

profitability, as false and/or misleading.

9. The Class Period begins on September 26, 2019, when Carnival filed its Form 10-

Q for the quarterly period ended August 31, 2019, and a Form 8-K, in which the Company 

purported to describe all the primary risks that potentially could impact the Company and its 

shareholders (in identical lists), yet the 10-Q and 8-K entirely omitted any reference to the potential 

 1 See “CDC Cruise Ship Outbreak Summary,” Shipdetective.com, available at

http://www.shipdetective.com/ships/cdc/outbreak_summay_cruise_ships.htm.

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harm to shareholders that would be caused by the Company’s inadequate facilities and preparation 

for a viral infection and/or other outbreaks of diseases on one or more of its ships.

10. These omissions were consistent with a host of pre-Class Period statements wherein 

the Company stated that the welfare of its passengers was paramount, but omitted any reference 

to the Company’s inability to adequately address the spread of infectious disease among 

passengers and crew members on its ships. For example, the Company’s 2018 Form 10-K filed 

with the SEC on January 28, 2019, consistent with Defendants’ past statements, made numerous 

representations about the Company’s commitment to the health and safety of its guests and crew 

members, but made no references to the threat of infectious disease or the susceptibility of its own 

ships to infectious disease and/or its inability to control such outbreaks (the “2018 10-K”). The 

2018 10-K also failed to disclose that the Company lacked effective means to control an outbreak 

of an infectious disease on its ships, and that an outbreak on any of its ships due to an infectious 

disease could harm its passengers and crew and lead to death. The Company’s 2019 Form 10-K, 

filed with the SEC on January 28, 2020, during the Class Period, repeated the same statements and 

omissions (the “2019 10-K”).

11. In fact, on January 27, 2020, as COVID-19 spread beyond China, the Company 

claimed that the risks of COVID-19 posed to the Company’s guests, crew, and global business 

were “very low.” 

12. The Company also launched several cruise ships in early 2020, putting tens of 

thousands of passengers and crew at serious risk and turned Carnival’s ships into vessels for 

seeding the virus across the globe. See Austin Carr and Chris Palmeri, “Carnival Executives Knew 

They Had a Virus Problem, But Kept the Party Going,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 16, 2020, 

accessed here: https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-carnival-cruise-coronavirus/.

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13. Investors began to learn the relevant truth about the Company’s disregard for health 

and safety when operating its cruise ships and selling and retaining reservations, including the 

Company’s disregard for the true risks of COVID-19, through a series of disclosures beginning on 

February 3, 2020, when the Company admitted that a passenger who had recently been onboard 

the Company’s Diamond Princess cruise ship, then docked in Yokohama, Japan, had tested 

positive for COVID-19 after disembarking. The revelation forced Carnival to sequester passengers 

and crew while Japanese authorities examined other guests and crew members for the virus. 

Ultimately, more than 700 cases of COVID-19 (nearly 20% of people aboard the ship)—and at 

least fourteen deaths—were connected to the Diamond Princess outbreak.

14. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $0.78 per share, or 

approximately 2%, from a close of $43.53 per share on January 31, 2020, to close at $42.75 per 

share on February 3, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $0.45 per share, or 

1.1%, from a close of $41.10 per ADS on January 31, 2020, to close at $40.65 per ADS on February 

3, 2020.

15. Notwithstanding the investigation by Japanese authorities, the quarantine of one of 

Carnival’s ships in or near Yokohama, Japan, and international media reports of an ever-increasing 

global pandemic, Carnival continued to operate many of its ships during subsequent weeks, which

experienced additional outbreaks of COVID-19 and deaths.

16. Notably, on March 4, 2020, the Company announced that the CDC was 

investigating a cluster of COVID-19 cases in connection with passengers who had recently 

traveled on the Company’s Grand Princess ship, then docked in or near the Port of San Francisco, 

California—and, further, that dozens of passengers and crew members on the Grand Princess’s 

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current voyage were also experiencing symptoms. More than 100 COVID-19 cases, and multiple 

deaths, were eventually connected to the Grand Princess.

17. In response to these disclosures, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined 

$4.59 per share, or 14.1%, from a close of $32.46 per share on March 4, 2020, to close at $27.87 

per share on March 5, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $3.96 per ADS, or 

12.9%, from a close of $30.58 per ADS on March 4, 2020, to close at $26.62 per ADS on March 

5, 2020.

18. Evidence revealing how Carnival’s conduct allowed outbreaks on its shipsto spread 

also surfaced. For example, on March 8, 2020, The New York Times reported that the Diamond 

Princess quarantine failed, at least in part, due to Carnival’s mishandling of the outbreak—in light 

of known risks—despite Carnival’s false assurances that risks on its cruises were “very low.”

19. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $5.41 per share, or 

19.9%, from a close of $27.15 per share on March 6, 2020, to close at $21.74 per share on March 

9, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $2.46 per ADS, or 19.7%, from a close 

of $12.48 per ADS on March 6, 2020, to close at $10.02 per ADS on March 9, 2020.

20. COVID-19 outbreaks on Carnival ships continued and, on March 27, 2020, the 

Company revealed that four passengers on its MS Zaandam ship had died, with additional 

confirmed cases of COVID-19 onboard, and many more people exhibiting symptoms.

21. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $3.41 per share, or 

19.1%, from a close of $17.82 per share on March 26, 2020, to close at $14.41 per share on March 

27, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $2.58 per ADS, or 17.3%, from a close 

of $14.88 per ADS on March 26, 2020, to close at $12.30 per ADS on March 27, 2020.

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22. Additional information emerged on April 16, 2020, when Bloomberg Businessweek

detailed the Company’s many failures in handling COVID-19 outbreaks. Among other things, this 

article also exposed Defendants’ efforts to downplay the seriousness of the virus and the effects of 

outbreaks on Carnival ships.

23. In response to the revelations in the Bloomberg article, the price of Carnival’s 

common stock declined $0.53 per share, or 4.3%, from a close of $12.38 per share on April 15, 

2020, to close at $11.85 per share on April 16, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs 

declined $0.41 per ADS, or 3.6%, from a close of $11.33 per ADS on April 15, 2020, to close at 

$10.92 per ADS on April 16, 2020.

24. On May 1, 2020, and as a result of the many outbreaks on Carnival ships, as well 

as reporting that exposed the effects of Carnival’s actions and inactions, the United States House 

of Representatives opened an investigation into Carnival’s handling of COVID-19, initiated by a

letter addressed to Carnival’s chief executive officer requesting records regarding the Company’s

COVID-19 response (the “Congressional Letter”). The Congressional Letter, which cited prior 

outbreaks, stated that the request for records was based on concerns that Carnival was “ignoring 

the public health threat posed by coronavirus to potential future passengers and crew,” and that 

“officials at Carnival were aware of the threats to some of its ships and did not take appropriate 

actions, which may have led to greater infections and the spread of the disease.”

25. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $1.97 per share, or 

12.4%, from a close of $15.90 per share on April 30, 2020, to close at $13.93 per share on May 1, 

2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $1.49 per ADS, or 10.7%, from a close of 

$13.92 per ADS on April 30, 2020, to close at $12.43 per ADS on May 1, 2020.

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26. In total, at least nineteen Carnival ships have been connected to nearly 2000 

reported cases of COVID-19 and at least fifty-eight deaths, and investors have suffered substantial 

losses in response to the Company’s assurances about its commitments to the health and safety of 

its passengers and crew and subsequent statements in the midst of the COVID-19 epidemic by

downplaying the threat of COVID-19 on its ships.

27. In addition to the Congressional investigation, the Company is also the subject of 

civil lawsuits by passengers on COVID-19 infected ships and at least one criminal investigation 

by officials in Australia, looking into why Carnival permitted nearly 2,700 passengers to 

disembark a cruise ship in Sydney on or about March 19, 2020, creating a coronavirus hotbed in 

Australia.

28. As a result of the revelation of the truth about Carnival’s inability and unwillingness 

to deal with the spread of infectious diseases on its ships, investors who purchased shares on U.S. 

exchanges lost billions of dollars when the Company’s shares declined following the corrective 

revelations.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

29. Plaintiff’s claims arise under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, including SEC 

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

30. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 

1331 and Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

31. Venue is proper in this District under Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 

78aa, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because Carnival Corporation is headquartered in this District, 

Defendants conduct business in this District, and many of the acts and conduct that constitute the 

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violations of law complained of herein, including the preparation and dissemination to the public 

of materially false and misleading information, occurred in this District.

32. In connection with the acts, conduct, and other wrongs alleged in this Complaint, 

Defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 

including the United States mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the 

national securities markets.

II. PARTIES

33. Plaintiff John P. Elmensdorp is a citizen of the state of California. As indicated on 

the certification submitted herewith, Plaintiff purchased Carnival common stock at artificially 

inflated prices during the Class Period and suffered damages as a result of the violations of the 

federal securities laws alleged herein.

34. Defendant Carnival Corporation is incorporated in the Republic of Panama, and 

headquartered in Miami, Florida.

35. Defendant Carnival plc is incorporated in England and Wales, and headquartered

in Southampton, England.

36. Defendants Carnival Corporation and Carnival plc operate a dual-listed company 

called “Carnival Corporation & plc,” which operates as “a single economic enterprise with a single 

senior executive management team and identical Boards of Directors.”2

 Defendants Carnival 

Corporation and Carnival plc are collectively referred to hereafter as “Carnival” or the 

“Company.”

37. Defendant Arnold W. Donald is the Company’s President and Chief Executive 

Officer, and a Company director.

 2 See Carnival Corporation & plc, Form 10-K filed Jan. 28, 2020.

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38. Defendant David Bernstein is the Company’s Chief Financial Officer.

39. Defendant Micky Arison is the Company’s Chairman of the Boards of Directors.

40. Defendants Donald, Bernstein, and Arison are collectively referred to hereafter as 

the “Individual Defendants.”

41. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions with Carnival, possessed the 

power and authority to control the contents of the Company’s reports to the SEC, press releases, 

and presentations to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, and institutional investors. 

Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with copies of the Company’s reports, 

presentations, and press releases alleged herein to be misleading prior to, or shortly after, their 

issuance and had the ability and opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected. 

Because of their positions and access to material non-public information available to them, each 

of the Individual Defendants knew that the adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed 

to, and were being concealed from, the public, and that the positive representations which were 

being made were then materially false and/or misleading.

42. Carnival and the Individual Defendants are collectively referred to hereafter as the 

“Defendants.”

SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

43. Carnival’s common stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 

under the ticker symbol “CCL,” while Carnival’s ADSstrade on the NYSE under the ticker symbol 

“CUK.”

44. Norovirus and other communicable diseases are not new public health threats to the 

cruise line industry. In 2010, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) identified norovirus and 

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influenza outbreaks as “the major public health challenges for the cruise industry.”3

 This 

assessment was made a decade before COVID-19 emerged.

45. In SEC filings going back to at least 2014, the Company has long touted its

commitment to the health, safety, and comfort of its passengers and crew.

46. More recently, in Carnival’s 2018 10-K, filed with the SEC on January 28, 2019, 

the Company made numerous representations that the Company remained committed to the health, 

safety, and comfort of its guests and crew, including:

• “Our commitment to the safety and comfort of our guests and crew is paramount 

to the success of our business. We are committed to operating a safe and reliable 

fleet and protecting the health, safety and security of our guests, employees and 

all others working on our behalf. We continue to focus on further enhancing the 

safety measures onboard all of our ships. We are dedicated to fully complying 

with, or exceeding, all legal and statutory requirements related to health, 

environment, safety, security and sustainability throughout our business.”

• “Health, Safety and Security Goals: Continue to build on our commitment to 

protect the health, safety and security of guests, employees and all others 

working on our behalf.”

• “To ensure that we are compliant with legal and regulatory requirements and 

that these areas of our business operate in an efficient manner we: [1] Provide 

regular health, environmental, safety and security support, training, guidance 

and information to guests, employees and others working on our behalf. [2] 

Develop and implement effective and verifiable management systems to fulfill 

our health, environmental, safety, security and sustainability commitments. [3] 

Perform regular shoreside and shipboard audits and take appropriate action 

when deficiencies are identified. [4] Report and investigate all health, 

environmental, safety and security incidents and take appropriate action to

prevent recurrence. [5] Identify those employees responsible for managing 

health, safety, environment, security and sustainability programs and ensure 

that there are clear lines of accountability.”

• “We have implemented and continue to enhance policies and procedures that 

demonstrate our commitment to the safety of our guests and crew. These 

policies and procedures include the following: [. . .] Identifying and 

standardizing best-practice policies and procedures in health, environment, 

 3 Ross Dowling and Clare Weeden, “Cruise Ship Tourism,” (2nd Edition), 2017, available at

https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ePMsDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA220&dq=cr

uise+ship+health+s.

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safety and security disciplines across the entire organization including on all 

our ships.”

• “We are committed to providing a healthy environment for all of our guests and 

crew. We collaborate with public health inspection programs throughout the 

world, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the U.S. 

(‘CDC’) and the SHIPSAN Project in the EU to ensure that development of 

these programs leads to enhanced health and hygiene onboard our ships.”

47. The Company also advised investors that Carnival’s commitment to ensuring the 

health and safety of its passengers and crew is “[p]aramount to the success of our business.”

48. Despite these assurances made at the start of 2019, Carnival-owned ships 

experienced more reported outbreaks of infectious diseases during 2019 than any other cruise line. 

49. The CDC identified ten instances of norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships in 2019. 

Five of the ten 2019 norovirus outbreaks occurred on three Carnival owned cruise lines, including 

three outbreaks on AIDA Cruises (AIDAdiva and AIDAluna), one outbreak on Carnival Cruise 

Lines (Conquest), and one outbreak on Princess Cruises (Island Princess). On its website, the 

CDC provides investigative reports for each outbreak, titled “Outbreak Updates” and subtitled 

“Investigation Updates,” which contain data, among other things, identifying the name of the ship 

and the date of the trip, the number of passengers and crew affected, predominant symptoms, cause 

(norovirus), and the actions taken by the crew during the cruise. As noted, three out of the five 

Carnival-owned ships and voyages identified by the CDC for 2019 occurred before the start of the 

Class Period. See supra Complaint ¶¶ 4–6 (summarizing CDC data regarding Carnival cruise 

ships and voyage dates). 

50. Notwithstanding that half of the incidents at sea investigated and reported by the 

CDC in 2019 concerned Carnival cruise ships, Carnival never addressed the issues or updated its 

statements regarding the Company’s purported commitments to the health, safety, and comfort of 

its passengers and crew.

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51. At the beginning of the Class Period on September 26, 2019, and consistent with 

its historical failure to disclose life-threatening issues related to its unwillingness and inability to 

address infectious disease concerns on its ships, Carnival filed a Form 10-Q and a Form 8-K with 

the SEC that purported to describe all of the “risks” facing the Company, yet both Forms contained 

a verbatim list of risks that wholly omitted any reference to the susceptibility of its ships to the 

transmission of infectious diseases among passengers and crew and to the Company’s manifest 

inability to address the spread of infectious diseases on its ships.

52. In December 2019, a novel strain of coronavirus, which causes an illness now 

known as COVID-19, was first reported in Wuhan, Hubei province, China.4

 On January 11, 2020, 

China reported its first death. On January 20, 2020, the WHO and media outlets reported that 

confirmed cases of COVID-19 were discovered outside of mainland China—in Japan, South 

Korea, and Thailand. On January 21, 2020, the first United States citizen, in Washington State, 

was diagnosed with the illness.

53. COVID-19 quickly spread to numerous countries and has since been designated a 

global pandemic by the WHO.5

54. On January 27, 2020, as reported by Jonathan Levin, reporter for Bloomberg,

Carnival stated: “Although the risks to our guests, crew and business around the world is very 

low, we are closely monitoring the situation” (emphasis added).6

 4

 Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 19, 

2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html. 

5

 Id.

6

 Jonathan Levin, Carnival’s Costa Cruises Suspends Nine Departures from China, BLOOMBERG

(Jan. 27, 2020); see also Matthew Arrojas, Cruise Stocks Fall As Carnival, Royal Caribbean, 

Norwegian Cancel Trips Due To Coronavirus Outbreak, SOUTH FLORIDA BUSINESS JOURNAL

(Jan. 28, 2020).

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55. Despite various reports of an ever-increasing global outbreak, Carnival restated all 

the assurances it made in its 2018 10-K verbatim in the Company’s 2019 10-K, filed with the SEC 

on January 28, 2020,7 with the addition of a single phrase in italics below:

• “Our commitments to the safety and comfort of our guests and crew and protecting 

the environment are paramount to the success of our business. We are committed to 

operating a safe and reliable fleet and protecting the health, safety and security of 

our guests, employees and all others working on our behalf. We continue to focus 

on further enhancing the safety measures onboard all of our ships. We are dedicated 

to fully complying with, or exceeding, all legal and statutory requirements related 

to health, environment, safety, security and sustainability throughout our business.”

• “Health, Safety and Security Goals: Continue to build on our commitment to protect 

the health, safety and security of guests, employees and all others working on our 

behalf.”

• “To ensure that we are compliant with legal and regulatory requirements and that 

these areas of our business operate in an efficient manner we: [1] Provide regular 

health, environmental, safety and security support, training, guidance and 

information to guests, employees and others working on our behalf. [2] Develop 

and implement effective and verifiable management systems to fulfill our health, 

environmental, safety, security and sustainability commitments. [3] Perform 

regular shoreside and shipboard audits and take appropriate action when 

deficiencies are identified. [4] Report and investigate all health, environmental, 

safety and security incidents and take appropriate action to prevent recurrence. [5] 

Identify those employees responsible for managing health, safety, environment, 

security and sustainability programs and ensure that there are clear lines of 

accountability.”

• “We have implemented and continue to enhance policies and procedures that 

demonstrate our commitment to the safety of our guests and crew. These policies 

and procedures include the following: [. . .] Identifying and standardizing bestpractice policies and procedures in health, environment, safety and security 

disciplines across the entire organization including on all our ships.”

“We are committed to providing a healthy environment for all of our guests and 

crew. We collaborate with public health inspection programs throughout the world, 

such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the U.S. (‘CDC’) and the 

SHIPSAN Project in the EU to ensure that development of these programs leads to 

enhanced health and hygiene onboard our ships.”

 7

 The Individual Defendants, among others, signed the 2019 10-K.

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56. On January 31, 2020, China’s envoy to the United Nations attested that there had

been more than 9,800 confirmed cases of the virus in China, with 213 deaths. News reports that 

day indicated that the virus had spread to at least eighteen other countries.

57. Carnival continued to double-down on its statements of “low risk” throughout the 

next two months by permitting cruises to continue (except those traveling to and from China or 

where quarantined by authorities) in the face of mounting cruise passenger illnesses and deaths on 

its ships due to COVID-19, or soon after disembarking its ships.

58. On February 3, 2020, just a few days after the Company reiterated that COVID-19 

was “very low” risk to the Company’s guests, crew, and business, the Company admitted that a 

passenger who had been onboard the Company’s Diamond Princess ship, from January 20, 2020,

through January 25, 2020, had tested positive for COVID-19.

59. This diagnosis caused Japanese authorities to conduct a review of all guests and 

crew as the ship was docked in Yokohama, Japan, causing a delay in the next leg of the ship’s 

journey.8

60. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $0.78 per share, or 

approximately 2%, from a close of $43.53 per share on January 31, 2020, to close at $42.75 per 

share on February 3, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $0.45 per share, or 

1.1%, from a close of $41.10 per ADS on January 31, 2020, to close at $40.65 per ADS on February 

3, 2020.

 8

 Jonathan Levin, Coronavirus Sickened Cruise Customer on Carnival’s Princess Line, 

BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2020), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-

03/coronavirus-sickened-cruise-customer-on-carnival-s-princess-line.

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61. During the investigation of the Diamond Princess, Japanese authorities discovered 

that at least nine guests and one crew member had tested positive for COVID-19.9

 Accordingly, 

the ship was quarantined in the port for two weeks in mid-February 2020, and the remainder of the 

trip canceled.

10

62. Despite the purported quarantine, at least 712 Diamond Princess passengers and 

crew members ultimately contracted COVID-19, resulting in at least fourteen deaths.11

63. On February 12, 2020, the Company issued a press release titled “Carnival 

Corporation & plc Update On Financial Impact Of Coronavirus,” which stated in relevant part:

Carnival Corporation & plc is closely monitoring the evolving 

situation with respect to Coronavirus. The safety of guests and 

employees, compliance and protecting the environment are top 

priorities for the company. The company’s medical experts are 

coordinating closely with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention and the World Health Organization to implement 

enhanced screening, prevention and control measures for its guests, 

crew and ships. The company’s global team is working tirelessly to 

support guests impacted by voyage disruptions during this 

unprecedented time.

64. On March 4, 2020, the Company announced that the CDC was investigating a 

cluster of COVID-19 cases connected with the Company’s Grand Princess ship, located

temporarily within or near the Port of San Francisco, California.

12 Specifically, a passenger on 

the Grand Princess’s prior voyage—which sailed from February 11, 2020, through February 21, 

 9

 Confirmed Cases of Coronavirus on Diamond Princess (Feb. 4, 2020), available at

https://www.princess.com/news/notices_and_advisories/notices/diamond-princess-update.html.

10 Id.

11 About the Present Situation of New Coronavirus Infectious Disease (April 25, 2nd Edition), 

JAPANESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR, AND WELFARE (Apr. 25, 2020), available at

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_11043.html.

12 See Grand Princess Health Advisory (Mar. 4, 2020), available at https://www.princess.com/

news/notices_and_advisories/notices/grand-princess-updates.html.

Case 1:20-cv-22319-MGC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2020 Page 16 of 36
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2020—had died from COVID-19 on March 4, 2020, and the CDC was investigating additional 

coronavirus patients in Northern California who had been passengers on the same ship.13

65. Later that day, during a press conference after market hours, California Governor 

Gavin Newsom further revealed that twenty-one passengers and crew members on the Grand 

Princess’s current voyage were also showing COVID-19 symptoms, and that the ship would be 

held off the coast of San Francisco while public health officials prepared to screen everyone aboard 

the ship.14

66. The Company also announced that the CDC had identified certain current guests 

and crew members who would be tested for COVID-19, and that the U.S. Coast Guard would 

deliver testing kits to the ship via helicopter.

67. Further, the Company cancelled the Grand Princess’s next voyage, set to depart on 

March 7, 2020.15

68. In response to these disclosures, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined 

$4.59 per share, or 14.1%, from a close of $32.46 per share on March 4, 2020, to close at $27.87 

per share on March 5, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $3.96 per ADS, or 

12.9%, from a close of $30.58 per ADS on March 4, 2020, to close at $26.62 per ADS on March 

5, 2020.

 13 See John Bacon & Jorge L. Ortiz, Coronavirus Live Updates: US Death Toll Hits 11, 

Including First in California, Which Declares State of Emergency, USA TODAY (Mar. 4, 2020), 

available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/04/coronavirus-live-updateswashington-outbreak-amazon-schools-vaccine-facebook/4940378002/.

14 See Sarah Mervosh & Mitch Smith, California Reports First Coronavirus Death as Symptoms 

Swirl on Cruise Ship, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), available at

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/

03/04/us/coronavirus-california.html. 

15 See Grand Princess Update (Mar. 4, 2020), available at https://www.princess.com/news/

notices_and_advisories/notices/grand-princess-updates.html.

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69. Ultimately, more than 100 Grand Princess passengers were confirmed to have 

contracted COVID-19, resulting in multiple deaths.16

70. Additional details concerning Carnival’s role in causing, exacerbating, and failing 

to protect passengers in its care from outbreaks emerged on March 8, 2020, when The New York 

Times reported that the Diamond Princess quarantine failed, at least in part, because the Company 

had, among other things: (1) ignored an email from a port representative notifying the Company 

that one of its Diamond Princess passengers had tested positive for COVID-19; (2) incorrectly 

assumed that the risk was minimal; (3) initiated only the lowest-level cleaning protocols for 

outbreaks; (4) failed to provide sufficient protective gear for its crew members; and (5) delayed 

announcing the infection and placing restrictions on passengers, giving the virus time to spread 

while passengers moved freely and continued to attend parties and performances.17 

71. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $5.41 per share, or 

19.9%, from a close of $27.15 per share on March 6, 2020, to close at $21.74 per share on March 

9, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $2.46 per ADS, or 19.7%, from a close 

of $12.48 per ADS on March 6, 2020, to close at $10.02 per ADS on March 9, 2020.

72. On March 13, 2020, the Company announced a pause in operations of the Carnival 

Cruise Line, stating in an official press release:

[W]e have implemented higher and higher levels of screening, monitoring and 

sanitation protocols to protect the health and safety of our guests, crew and the 

communities we serve. While Carnival has not had a diagnosed case linked to 

our operation we realize this situation is bigger than the cruise industry and we will 

 16 See Morgan Hines, U.S. Congress Announces Investigation into Carnival Corp. Response to 

COVID-19 Outbreak, USA TODAY (May 1, 2020), available at https://www.usatoday.com/

story/travel/cruises/2020/05/01/coronavirus-congress-investigate-carnival-corp-s-virusresponse/3066565001/.

17 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Failures on the Diamond Princess Shadow Another Cruise Ship 

Outbreak, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 8, 2020), available at

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/world/asia/coronavirus-cruise-ship.html.

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continue to do our part to support public officials to manage and contain this

unprecedented public health challenge. [emphasis added]18

73. On March 27, 2020, the Company revealed the extent of a COVID-19 outbreak on 

yet another Carnival-owned cruise ship—the MS Zaandam—with four passengers dead, two 

confirmed cases of COVID-19 onboard, and more than 100 people reporting flu-like symptoms.19

74. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $3.41 per share, or 

19.1%, from a close of $17.82 per share on March 26, 2020, to close at $14.41 per share on March 

27, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $2.58 per ADS, or 17.3%, from a close 

of $14.88 per ADS on March 26, 2020, to close at $12.30 per ADS on March 27, 2020.

75. Additional evidence detailing Carnival’s failures surfaced on April 16, 2020, when 

Bloomberg Businessweek published a feature article extensively detailing the Company’s many 

failures in handling the COVID-19 crisis, as well as its efforts to downplay the scope of its 

outbreaks and the effects of the Company’s actions, or lack thereof.20 

 18 See Carnival Cruise Line Announces Pause In Service, Carnival News Release (March 13, 

2015) available at https://www.carnivalplc.com/news-releases/news-release-details/carnivalcruise-line-announces-pause-service; see also Carnival Cruise Line Announces Pause in Service, 

prnewswire.com (March 13, 2015) available at https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/carnival-cruise-line-announces-pause-in-service-301023389.html; Richard Danielson, 

Carnival Suspends Cruises Because of Coronavirus, Halting All Cruises Out Of Port Tampa 

Bay, tampabay.com (March 15, 2020) available at

https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2020/03/15/carnival-suspend-cruises-because-ofcoronavirus/.

19 See Hannah Sampson, Four Passengers Have Died, Two Test Positive for COVID-19 on 

Cruise Ship Stranded off the Coast of Panama, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2020), 

available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2020/03/27/four-passengers-have-diedzaandam-cruise-ship-where-two-people-tested-positive-covid-19/.

20 See Austin Carr & Chris Palmeri, Socially Distance This: Carnival Executives Knew They 

Had a Virus Problem, But Kept the Party Going, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 16, 2020), 

available at https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-carnival-cruise-coronavirus/.

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76. In addition to confirming prior reporting about the Company failing to act on the 

alert that a Diamond Princess passenger had tested positive, the Bloomberg Businessweek article 

revealed, for example, that the Company had also delayed in taking action on the Grand Princess, 

leaving passengers free to gather in groups of hundreds for events even after the ship had begun 

isolating people suspected of carrying the virus.21 

77. Moreover, the Bloomberg Businessweek article disclosed that Company executives 

failed to act promptly to halt the spread of the virus, including by cancelling cruises to Asian 

destinations other than mainland China, even though—according to John Padgett, the Company’s 

Chief Experience and Innovation Officer—the Company had “insight into the global situation 

much earlier than most,” due to Padgett’s communication with a manufacturer in Wuhan on 

January 25, 2020.22 

78. Indeed, Padgett specifically noted that the Company’s leadership, “including 

Arnold Donald, all knew about the scale of the coronavirus outbreak,” as Padgett immediately 

relayed to them what he learned from the Wuhan manufacturer.23 

79. As such, the author observed that “several of the plagued Carnival ships didn’t even 

begin their voyages until well after the company knew it was risky to do so,” countering 

Defendants’ arguments that Carnival could not have improved on its actions.24 

80. For this reason, CDC epidemiologist Cindy Friedman explained that she “ha[s] a 

hard time believing they’re just a victim of happenstance.”25 Friedman, who leads the CDC’s 

 21 See id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

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cruise ship task force, further stated that Carnival’s actions had a “huge strain” on the United 

States.26

81. Friedman also disputed Defendant Donald’s claim that cruise ships do not spread 

disease more easily than other public spaces, stating that coronavirus infection rates have 

approached 20% on at least two Carnival ships—far higher than infection rates in supermarkets or 

subways.27 

82. Additionally, further contradicting Defendant Donald’s prior representations about 

the Company’s commitment to health and safety, the Bloomberg Businessweek article revealed 

that Donald was not even aware that the Company had failed 3% of the CDC’s ship health 

inspections since 2016—a failure rate three times worse than competitor Royal Caribbean 

Cruises.28

83. In short, the article revealed a longstanding corporate culture dedicated to 

“ke[eping] the party going” at the expense of issues Defendants had claimed were the Company’s 

top priorities, including health and safety.29

84. For example, though Defendants had long represented that the Company was 

deeply committed to sustainability and the environment, the article recounted that in 2017, the 

United States Department of Justice had “fined Carnival’s Princess line a record $40 million for 

dumping oil-contaminated waste at sea and falsifying official discharge records to cover it up.”30

 26 Id.

27 See id.

28 See id.

29 See id.

30 Id.

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85. Still, the Company continued dumping oil even after the ruling, resulting in a June 

2019 guilty plea Defendant Donald entered on behalf of the Company and demonstrating 

Carnival’s “tendency to cut corners on safety”—which were further demonstrated by the 

Company’s failures in responding to the COVID-19 crisis.31

86. In response to the revelations in the Bloomberg Businessweek article, the price of 

Carnival’s common stock declined $0.53 per share, or 4.3%, from a close of $12.38 per share on 

April 15, 2020, to close at $11.85 per share on April 16, 2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s 

ADSs declined $0.41 per ADS, or 3.6%, from a close of $11.33 per ADS on April 15, 2020, to 

close at $10.92 per ADS on April 16, 2020.

87. Incredibly, as of April 23, 2020, none of the front facing web pages from any of 

Carnival’s nine affiliated cruise lines contained a single word about COVID-19, coronavirus, or 

the precautions Carnival intended to take once the CDC lifts its “No Sail Order” for cruise lines. 

Instead, these sites, at the time, displayed various images of couples dining and dancing, musicians 

entertaining, and lines of children holding hands and playing.32

88. Thereafter, and as a result of the many COVID-19 outbreaks on Carnival ships and 

the subsequent reporting on Carnival’s actions, the United States House of Representatives

commenced an investigation into the Company’s handling of COVID-19. On May 1, 2020, 

Representative Peter A. DeFazio, who chairs the House Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, and Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, Chair of the Subcommittee on Coast 

Guard and Maritime Transportation, sent the Congressional Letter to Defendant Donald requesting 

specific records regarding Carnival’s COVID-19 response.

 31 Id.

32 Congressional Letter at 3 (citing Carnival’s webpages).

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89. Citing extensive public reporting—particularly the April 16, 2020 Bloomberg 

Businessweek article, which the letter called “quite disturbing”—the Congressional Letter stated 

that “it seems as though Carnival Corporation . . . is still trying to sell this cruise line fantasy and 

ignoring the public health threat posed by coronavirus to potential future passengers and crew.”33

90. Specifically, the Congressional Letter cited reports suggesting “that officials at 

Carnival were aware of the threats to some of its ships and did not take appropriate actions, which 

may have led to greater infections and the spread of the disease.”34 

91. Accordingly, the Congressional Letter requested the records “[i]n order to gain a 

better understanding of how Carnival intends to protect passengers and crew once vessels resume 

sailing.”35

92. The Congressional Letter also made clear that the results of the COVID-19 

pandemic were simply the newest manifestations of longstanding risks concealed by Carnival, 

observing that “[l]ong before the COVID-19 pandemic began to race around the world, affecting 

local communities, churches, cities, homes, hospitals, and cruise ships sailing at sea, the cruise

industry had a problem managing, containing, and responding to public health outbreaks.”36 

93. For example, the Congressional Letter stated, in 2019 alone, there were ten 

norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships—half of which were on ships owned by Carnival.37 Indeed, 

 33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 See id.

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the Congressional Letter explained, “[c]ruise ships are a fertile breeding ground for infectious 

diseases due to their environmental conditions and physical structure.”38

94. Despite these obvious risks and the Company’s admitted connection between 

passenger safety and profitability, Carnival had failed to “undertake a proactive approach in crisis 

management,” and did not heed advice to “pay[] more attention to emerging health issues as well 

as preparing itself with comprehensive and exhaustive crisis management plans”—and had instead 

opted to focus on entertainment.39

95. On this news, the price of Carnival’s common stock declined $1.97 per share, or 

12.4%, from a close of $15.90 per share on April 30, 2020, to close at $13.93 per share on May 1, 

2020. Similarly, the price of Carnival’s ADSs declined $1.49 per ADS, or 10.7%, from a close of 

$13.92 per ADS on April 30, 2020, to close at $12.43 per ADS on May 1, 2020.

96. In total, at least nineteen Carnival ships have been connected to nearly 2000 

reported cases of COVID-19 and at least fifty-eight deaths.

97. In addition to the Congressional investigation, the Company is also the subject of 

several civil lawsuits asserting, among other things, claims for wrongful death and that Carnival 

knew that the virus was spreading, people were already sick on the ship, and Carnival did not take 

proper safety precautions in the face of known dangers. Carnival is also the focus of at least one 

criminal investigation by officials in Australia, looking into why Carnival permitted approximately 

2,700 passengers to disembark a cruise ship in Sydney on or about March 19, 2020, creating or 

increasing the severity of an outbreak in Australia.

 38 Id.

39 Id.

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98. As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline 

in the market value of the Company’s common stock and ADSs, Plaintiff and other putative class 

members have suffered significant losses and damages.

DEFENDANTS’ MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND 

OMISSIONS

99. Defendants made materially false and misleading statements and omissions to 

investors during the Class Period in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act 

and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

100. At the beginning of the Class Period on September 26, 2019, Carnival filed a 

quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-Q that was signed by Defendants Donald and 

Bernstein. On the same day, Carnival also filed with the SEC a Form 8-K announcing “RECORD 

THIRD QUARTER EARNINGS.” Consistent with its historical failure to disclose lifethreatening issues related to its unwillingness and inability to address infectious disease concerns 

on its ships, Carnival’s September 26, 2019 Form 10-Q and 8-K purported to describe all of the 

“risks” facing the Company and the value of its shares in verbatim lists, yet the Company wholly 

omitted any reference to its manifest inability to address the spread of infectious disease on its 

ships and the susceptibility of its ships to the transmission of such diseases among passengers. 

Defendants’ failed to disclose material information that: (1) its ships were susceptible to 

contagious diseases due to the ships’ environmental condition, physical structure, and reports by 

the CDC in 2019, prior to the Class Period, that three Carnival ships on separate voyages had 

already experienced an outbreak of norovirus; (2) the Company lacked effective means to control 

an outbreak of an infectious disease on its ships; and (3) an outbreak on any of its ships due to an 

infectious disease could harm its passengers and crew and lead to death.

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101. On January 28, 2020, Carnival filed its 2019 10-K with the SEC, which was signed 

by the Individual Defendants, among others. The 2019 10-K stated that: “We are committed to 

operating a safe and reliable fleet and protecting the health, safety and security of our guests, 

employees and all others working on our behalf.” Defendants’ statements about the health and 

safety of its guests and crew were materially false and/or misleading when made because 

Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that: (1) its ships were susceptible to 

contagious diseases due to the ships’ environmental condition, physical structure, and reports by 

the CDC in 2019, prior to the Class Period, that three Carnival ships on separate voyages had 

already experienced an outbreak of norovirus; (2) the Company lacked effective means to control 

an outbreak of an infectious disease on its ships; and (3) an outbreak on any of its ships due to an 

infectious disease could harm its passengers and crew and lead to death. 

102. Carnival also stated in the 2019 10-K that: “We have implemented and continue 

to enhance policies and procedures that demonstrate our commitment to the safety of our guests 

and crew. These policies and procedures include the following: [. . .] Identifying and 

standardizing best-practice policies and procedures in health, environment, safety and security 

disciplines across the entire organization including on all our ships.” Defendants’ statements

about the health and safety of its guests and crew were materially false and/or misleading when 

made because Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that: (1) its ships were 

susceptible to contagious diseases due to the ships’ environmental condition, physical structure, 

and reports by the CDC in 2019, prior to the Class Period, that three Carnival ships on separate 

voyages had already experienced an outbreak of norovirus; (2) the Company lacked effective 

means to control an outbreak of an infectious disease on its ships; and (3) an outbreak on any of 

its ships due to an infectious disease could harm its passengers and crew and lead to death.

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103. On January 27, 2020, Carnival stated to a reporter from Bloomberg covering the 

growing outbreak: “Although the risks [of COVID-19] to our guests, crew and business around 

the world is very low, we are closely monitoring the situation” (emphasis added).40 This 

statement was repeated the following day by at least one other media outlet and attributed to a 

spokesperson from Carnival. Defendants’ statement about the risks of COVID-19 to the health 

and safety of Carnival’s guests and crew was materially false and/or misleading when made 

because Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that: (1) its ships were susceptible 

to contagious diseases, including COVID-19, due to the ships’ environmental condition, physical 

structure, and reports by the CDC in 2019, prior to the Class Period, that three Carnival ships on 

separate voyages had already experienced an outbreak of norovirus; (2) the Company lacked 

effective means to control an outbreak of an infectious disease, including COVID-19, on its ships; 

(3) an outbreak of COVID-19 on any of its ships could harm its passengers and crew and lead to 

death; (4) prior to this statement being issued, Defendants were already made aware of the 

existence of COVID-19, that it had killed people in China, and that the virus was spreading from 

China to other countries; and (5) Defendants had already suspended at least nine cruises 

scheduled to depart from China through February 4, 2020.

104. On January 31, 2020, in a statement released to the press and thereafter reported

in articles on travelmarketreport.com and wusa9.com, Carnival again stated that: “Although the 

risk to our guests and crew is low, we are closely monitoring the evolving situation with respect 

to Coronavirus” (emphasis added).41 Defendants’ statement about the risk of COVID-19 to the 

 40 Jonathan Levin, Carnival’s Costa Cruises Suspends Nine Departures from China, 

BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2020); see also Matthew Arrojas, Cruise Stocks Fall As Carnival, Royal 

Caribbean, Norwegian Cancel Trips Due To Coronavirus Outbreak, SOUTH FLORIDA BUSINESS 

JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2020).

41 Jessica Montevago, Cruise Lines and Hotels Make Changes Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, 

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health and safety of Carnival’s guests and crew was materially false and/or misleading when 

made because Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that: (1) its ships were 

susceptible to contagious diseases, including COVID-19, due to the ships’ environmental 

condition, physical structure, and reports by the CDC in 2019, prior to the Class Period, that three 

Carnival ships on separate voyages had already experienced an outbreak of norovirus; (2) the 

Company lacked effective means to control an outbreak of an infectious disease, including 

COVID-19, on its ships; (3) an outbreak of COVID-19 on any of its ships could harm its 

passengers and crew and lead to death; (4) prior to January 31, 2020, Defendants were already 

made aware of the existence of COVID-19, that it had killed hundreds of people in China, and 

that the virus was spreading from China to at least eighteen other countries; (5) Defendants had 

already suspended at least nine cruises scheduled to depart from China through February 4, 2020; 

and (6) the WHO had designated COVID-19 a global health emergency.

105. On March 13, 2020, Carnival stated in an official Press Release: “While Carnival 

has not had a diagnosed case linked to our operation we realize this situation is bigger than the 

cruise industry and we will continue to do our part to support public officials to manage and 

contain this unprecedented public health challenge” (emphasis added).42 Defendants’ statement 

 

TRAVEL MARKET REPORT (Jan. 31, 2020), available at

https://www.travelmarketreport.com/articles/Cruise-Lines-and-Hotels-Make-Changes-AmidCoronavirus-Outbreak; see also https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/nation-world/carnivalroyal-caribbean-restrictions-china-coronavirus/507-7b77496b-1651-4f06-ac95-57c10a3f53e3

42 See Carnival Cruise Line Announces Pause In Service, Carnival News Release (March 13, 

2015) available at https://www.carnivalplc.com/news-releases/news-release-details/carnivalcruise-line-announces-pause-service; see also Carnival Cruise Line Announces Pause in Service, 

prnewswire.com (March 13, 2015) available at https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/carnival-cruise-line-announces-pause-in-service-301023389.html; see also Richard 

Danielson, Carnival Suspends Cruises Because of Coronavirus, Halting All Cruises Out Of Port 

Tampa Bay, tampabay.com (March 15, 2020) available at

https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2020/03/15/carnival-suspend-cruises-because-ofcoronavirus/.

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that, as of March 13, 2020, Carnival had not had a single case linked to its operation was 

materially false and/or misleading when made because Defendants misrepresented and/or failed 

to disclose that: (1) Carnival had admitted on February 3, 2020, that a passenger who had been

onboard the Company’s Diamond Princess ship, from January 20, 2020 through January 25, 

2020, had tested positive for COVID-19; (2) Japanese authorities, beginning in early February 

2020,started an investigation into the Diamond Princess cruise, then docked in Yokohama, Japan, 

discovering that at least nine guests and one crew member had tested positive for COVID-19, 

leading to a two-week quarantine of the ship, in mid-February, 2020, and further investigation 

revealed that at least 712 Diamond Princess passengers and crew members had ultimately 

contracted COVID-19, resulting in at least fourteen deaths; and (3) on March 4, 2020, the 

Company announced that the CDC was investigating a cluster of COVID-19 cases connected 

with the Company’s Grand Princess ship, located temporarily within or near the Port of San 

Francisco, California, at least in part because a passenger on the Grand Princess’s prior voyage—

which sailed from February 11, 2020 through February 21, 2020—had died from COVID-19 on 

March 4, 2020.

VI. LOSS CAUSATION / ECONOMIC LOSS

106. During the Class Period, and as detailed herein, Defendants made materially false 

and misleading statements and omissions. This artificially inflated the price of Carnival’s common 

stock and ADSs operated as a fraud or deceit on the Class (as defined below). Later, when the 

relevant truth of Defendants’ prior false and misleading statements were disclosed to the market 

(on February 3, 2020, March 4, 2020, March 8, 2020, March 27, 2020, April 16, 2020, and May 

1, 2020 as specifically set forth above), the price of Carnival’s common stock and ADSs fell 

precipitously as the prior artificial inflation came out of the price over time. As a result of their 

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purchases of Carnival’s common stock and ADSs during the Class Period, Plaintiff and other 

members of the Class suffered economic loss, i.e., damages, under the federal securities laws.

VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

107. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly 

traded common stock and ADSs of Carnival during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from 

the Class are Defendants and their families, directors, and officers of Carnival and their families 

and affiliates.

108. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to 

the parties and the Court. As of March 25, 2020, Carnival had 527 million shares of common 

stock (NYSE: CCL) outstanding, and over 182 million ordinary shares outstanding, with one ADS 

(NYSE: CUK) representing one ordinary share, owned by hundreds or thousands of investors.

109. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact 

involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which 

predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members include:

(a) Whether Defendants violated the Exchange Act;

(b) Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts;

(c) Whether Defendants’ statements omitted material facts necessary in order to 

make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 

made, not misleading;

(d) Whether the Individual Defendants are personally liable for the alleged 

misrepresentations and omissions described herein;

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(e) Whether Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements and/or 

omissions were false and misleading;

(f) Whether Defendants’ conduct impacted the price of Carnival’s common stock

and ADSs; 

(g) Whether Defendants’ conduct caused the members of the Class to sustain 

damages; and

(h) The extent of damage sustained by Class members and the appropriate measure 

of damages.

110. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class 

sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct.

111. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel 

experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those 

of the Class.

112. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all Class members is impracticable.

VIII. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR

113. Defendants’ “Safe Harbor” warnings accompanying any forward-looking 

statements issued during the Class Period were ineffective to shield those statements from liability. 

Defendants are liable for any false and/or misleading forward-looking statements pleaded because, 

at the time each forward-looking statement was made, the speaker knew the forward-looking 

statement was false or misleading and the forward-looking statement was authorized and/or 

approved by an executive officer of Carnival who knew that the forward-looking statement was 

false. None of the historic or present-tense statements made by Defendants were assumptions 

underlying or relating to any plan, projection, or statement of future economic performance, as 

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they were not stated to be such assumptions underlying or relating to any projection or statement 

of future economic performance when made, nor were any of the projections or forecasts made by 

Defendants expressly related to or stated to be dependent on those historic or present-tense 

statements when made.

IX. PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE – FRAUD ON THE MARKET DOCTRINE

114. At all relevant times, Plaintiff will rely upon the presumption of reliance established

by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that, among other things: 

(a) Defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts 

during the Class Period;

(b) The omissions and misrepresentations were material;

(c) The Company’s common stock and ADSs traded in an efficient market;

(d) The misrepresentations alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to 

misjudge the value of the Company’s common stock and ADSs; and

(e) Plaintiff and the Class purchased Carnival’s common stock and ADSs between 

the time Carnival and the Individual Defendants misrepresented or failed to 

disclose material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without 

knowledge of the misrepresented or omitted facts.

115. At all relevant times, the market for Carnival’s common stock and ADSs were

efficient because: (1) as a regulated issuer, Carnival filed periodic public reports with the SEC; 

and (2) Carnival regularly communicated with public investors using established market 

communication mechanisms, including through regular disseminations of press releases on the 

Case 1:20-cv-22319-MGC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2020 Page 32 of 36
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major news wire services and through other wide-ranging public disclosures, such as 

communications with the financial press, securities analysts, and other similar reporting services.

X. SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS

116. During the Class Period, Defendants had both the motive and opportunity to 

commit fraud. They also had actual knowledge of the misleading nature of the statements they 

made or acted in reckless disregard of the true information known to them at the time. In so doing, 

Defendants participated in a scheme to defraud and committed acts, practices, and participated in 

a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Carnival’s common stock 

and ADSs during the Class Period.

XI. CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

COUNT I:

For Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

117. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully 

set forth herein.

118. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme, and course of 

conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (1) deceive the investing 

public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (2) cause Plaintiff and 

other members of the Class to purchase Carnival’s common stock and ADSs at artificially inflated 

prices.

119. Defendants: (1) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (2) made 

untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the 

statements not misleading; and (3) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which 

operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s common stock and ADSs in 

Case 1:20-cv-22319-MGC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2020 Page 33 of 36
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an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Carnival’s common stock and ADSs in 

violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder.

120. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means 

or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a 

continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the Company’s 

financial well-being, operations, and prospects.

121. During the Class Period, Defendants made the false statements specified above, 

which they knew or recklessly disregarded to be false and misleading in that they contained 

misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements 

made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

122. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of 

material fact set forth herein, or recklessly disregarded the true facts that were available to them. 

Defendants engaged in this misconduct to conceal Carnival’s true condition from the investing 

public and to support the artificially inflated prices of the Company’s common stock and ADSs. 

123. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of 

the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Carnival’s common stock and ADSs. Plaintiff 

and the Class would not have purchased the Company’s common stock and ADSs at the prices 

they paid, or at all, had they been aware that the market prices for Carnival’s common stock and 

ADSs had been artificially inflated by Defendants’ fraudulent course of conduct.

124. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the 

other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases of the 

Company’s common stock and ADSs during the Class Period.

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125. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 

and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder.

COUNT II:

For Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

126. Plaintiff repeats, incorporates, and realleges each and every allegation set forth 

above as if fully set forth herein.

127. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Carnival within the 

meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. By virtue of their high-level positions, 

participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations, direct involvement in the day-today operations of the Company, and/or intimate knowledge of the Company’s actual performance, 

and their power to control public statements about Carnival, the Individual Defendants had the 

power and ability to control the actions of Carnival and its employees. By reason of such conduct, 

the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:

(a) Determining that this action is a proper class action under Rule 23 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

(b) Awarding compensatory damages in favor of Plaintiff and other Class 

members against all Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages sustained as a result of 

Defendants’ wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;

(c) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses 

incurred in this action, including attorneys’ fees and expert fees; and

(d) Awarding such equitable/injunctive or other further relief as the Court may 

deem just and proper.

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XIII. JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

DATED: June 3, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Zachary S. Bower 

ZACHARY S. BOWER

Florida Bar No. 17506

zbower@carellabyrne.com

CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN,

BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

Security Building

117 NE 1st Avenue

Miami, Florida 33132-2125

Tel: (973) 994-1700

Fax: (973) 994-1744 

 and 

James E. Cecchi

5 Becker Farm Road

Roseland, NJ 07068-1739

jcecchi@carellabyrne.com

Tel: (973) 994-1700

Fax: (973) 994-1744

KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER 

 & CHECK, LLP

Naumon A. Amjed

Ryan T. Degnan

Geoffrey C. Jarvis

Mark C. Franek

280 King of Prussia Road 

Radnor, PA 19087

namjed@ktmc.com

gjarvis@ktmc.com

rdegnan@ktmc.com

mfranek@ktmc.com

Tel: (610) 667-7706

Fax: (610) 667-7056

Counsel for Plaintiff John P. Elmensdorp

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