This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 32,098 4 GREGORY KETELSON, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 7 William G. Shoobridge, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Albuquerque, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender 12 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15
MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 KENNEDY, Judge. 172 Gregory Ketelson (Defendant) appeals his conviction for felon in possession 1 of a firearm. We issued a calendar no tice proposing to affirm. Defendant has 2 responded with a memorandum in opposition. We affirm. 3 Defendant continues to argue the distri ct court erred in denying his motion to 4 suppress. [MIO 8; RP 83] “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, 5 we observe the distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a 6 substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts[,] which is 7 subject to de novo review.” State v. Nieto , 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 8 P.3d 442 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted). “We 9 view the facts in the manner most favorableto the prevailing party and defer to the 10 district court’s findings of fact if substantial evidence exists to support those 11 findings.” State v. Urioste , 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. 12 The district court relied on the findings of fact made in the ruling on the first 13 motion to suppress. [RP 181] In its opinion on the appeal from the first motion to 14 suppress, the Supreme Court set forth these facts as follows: 15 On the evening of November 13, 2008, Officer Shane Blevins of the 16 Hobbs Police Department stopped a GMC Jimmy with expired 17 temporary tags. Officer Blevins approached the driver side of the 18 vehicle and informed the driver, KerriAllen, of the reason for the stop. 19 Meanwhile, Officer Miroslava Belye u (née Jurado) approached the 20 passenger side of the vehicle, where Gregory Ketelson (Defendant) was 21 seated. Officer Belyeu saw a black nine millimeter handgun lying on the 22 back seat floorboard. Officer Belyeu asked Defendant to step out of the 23 vehicle, and Officer Blevins retrie ved the firearm fro m the back seat 243 floorboard. Neither Defe ndant nor Ms. Allen was in the vehicle when 1 Officer Blevins retrieved the firearm. After Officer Blevins retrieved the 2 firearm, Defendant signed a card cons enting to the search and admitted 3 that the firearm belonged to him. 4 Officer Blevins requested dispatch to run a background check on 5 Defendant. The background check rev ealed that Defendant had a prior 6 felony conviction in Texas for burgl ary in 1999. Defendant was placed 7 under arrest as a felon in possession of a firearm. 8 State v. Ketelson , 2011-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 2-3, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957. 9 Ketelsonconcluded that it was constitutionallyreasonable to remove the firearm 10 from the vehicle. Id . ¶ 27. Here, Defendant is argui ng that the scope of the stop was 11 invalid under the state constitution. [MIO 8] We note that an officer may run an 12 NCIC check on a firearm that is le gally in the officer’s possession. State v. Gutierrez , 13 2004-NMCA-081, ¶ 19, 136 N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18. The ability to run an NCIC check 14 on a weapon that is lawfully in the possessi on of law enforcement is not limited by the 15 identity of the actual owner of the firearm whether it be the driver or another 16 individual. While the NCIC check was bei ng run, Defendant informed the officer that 17 the weapon was his. [RP 164] In light of this, we believe that it was reasonable for 18 the officer to run the identity check to make sure that Defendant would be in lawful 19 possession of the firearm once th e officer returned it to him. In short, we conclude 20 that the minimal intrusion here was reasonable and, th erefore, constitutional under 214 both the federal and state constitutions. See Ketelson , 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 27 (noting 1 that reasonableness is the focus of our inquiry). 2 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

_______________________________ 5 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 6
WE CONCUR: 7

___________________________ 8 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 9

___________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11