BLD-199 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 19-3438

___________ MICHAEL ROBINSON, Appellant

v. GEISINGER HOSPITAL; DONA LD ZYCOSKI; DAWN FAUST; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY; N ORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH; GEISING ER MEDICAL CENTER; ANTHONY MATULEWICZ; DEGG STARK; MAUREEN TROUTMAN; DAVID FEINBERG; SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPT; ROBE RT SHLABY; SHAMOKIN CITY; NORTHUMBERLAND COURT SYSTEM; NORTHUMBERLAND TAX OFFICE; NORTHUMBERLAND BOARD OF E LECTIONS; NORTHUMBERLAND CHILDREN AND YOUTH ; NORTHUMBERLAND SPECIAL CONFLICTS; NORTHUMBERLAND DA OFFICE; NOR THUMBERLAND MENTAL HEALTH; NORTHUMBERLAND PUBLIC DEF ENDERS; NORTHUMBERLAND DOMESTICS; SARA RODOMSKI; STACEY RODOMSKI; BRITTANY RODOMSKI; LAURA TROUTMAN; AQUA; MAYOR J OHN BROWN; JOHN BROWN, JR.; COUNCILMAN RHODES; MARC LIEB ERMAN; SAGE, COAL TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICER; WILLIE OLLIE MA RTIN, SR.; DAN MCGRAW; GENEE SHAFER; JOSEPH LESCHINSKI; VINCE NT ROVITO; RICHARD BOZZA; NICOL E BOZZA; RICHARD SLABY; BRUCE ROG ERS; FRANK KONOPKA; OFFICER PRIMERANO; SCOTT WEA VER, SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF TOBIAS; SHAMOKIN CITY CO UNCIL; AMANDA MILLER, NORTHUMBERLAND CHILDREN AND YOUT H; VINNY CLAUSI, EX COUNTY COMM.; SCOTT ROUGHTON; MALOURI, SHAMOKIN P OLICE DEPARTMENT; SIKO, SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMEN T; JUDGE ROSINI; JUDGE DIEHL; JUDGE JONES; JUDGE CO LE; JUDGE WILLIAMS, JR.

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 4-18-cv-00989)2 District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1915(e )(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Thir d Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10 .6 May 14, 2020 Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR . and BIBAS, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 22, 2020)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Michael Robinson appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his complaint for failure to stat e a claim. We will affirm.
I. Robinson is a former candidate f or mayor of Sham okin, Pennsylv ania. In this case, which is one of several relate d actions that he has filed, 1 Robinson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law agai nst an entity he identified as Geisinger Hospital. Robinson alleged that a Geisi nger employee improperly accessed his phone while he was involuntarily committed for psych iatric treatment. Following v arious orders and additional filings, a Magistrate Judge ultimately allowed Robin son to file a Third

* This disposition is not an opin ion of the full Court and pursu ant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute bindi ng precedent.

1 See M.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 4-17-cv-1 321, 4-17-cv-1322 & 4-17-cv-14 16. The District3 Amended Complaint. In that complaint, Robinson name d over 60 defendants and alleg ed a wide-ranging conspiracy to harm him in retaliation for his mayoral candidacy , during which he claims to have uncovered evidence of c riminal activity. Robinson alle ged that defendants, inter alia, obtained his involuntary co mmitment, prosecuted him (succ essfully) for harassing his own lawyer and his mayoral o pponent, refused to investigate his complaint that his opponent accused him of pedophi lia, caused him to lose custody of his children, wrongfully ticketed his car for p arking violations, and planned to murder him. Among the forms of relief he requested w ere the referral of criminal charges to state and federal Attorneys General and an order appointing Robinson as a “specia l RICO investigator/ attorney” to investigate defenda nts’ alleged pension fraud and other matters. The Magistrate Judge screened Rob inson’s complaint under 28 U.S .C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and recommended that the District Court dismiss R obinson’s federal claims for failure to state a clai m and decline to exercise sup plemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. The Magi strate Judge also recommended th at the District Court dismiss Robinson’s federal clai ms with prejudice and without fu rther leave to amend on the ground that further amendme nt would be fu tile. In addition , the Magistrate Judge recommended denying some 30 motio ns that Robinson had filed see king restraining orders, the institution of crimina l charges, and other forms of relief.

Court dismissed those actions , but Robinson did not appeal.4 Robinson filed objections but did not raise any specific challe nge to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Over those objections, the District Court ad opted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, dismisse d Robinson’s complaint, and den ied his pending motions. Robinson appeals. 2
II. We will affirm largely for the r easons explained by the Magist rate Judge. In brief, Robinson raised no specific alle gations regarding most of the d efendants and his largely conclusory allegations against oth ers fail to state a federal c laim. Robinson’s only specific allegati on that might conceivably have supported such a claim is his allegation that a Mun icipal Court clerk “forged” ajudge’s signature on a November 2018 warrant for non-pay ment of fines and that, as a r esult, the judge

2 We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We typically rev iew de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failu re to state a claim. See Fan tone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2015); Allah v. S eiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We do so in this case even though Robinson did not file meaningful objectio ns to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation because t he Magistrate Judge’s report di d not warn Robinson that his failure to object could subject him to plain-error rev iew. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99- 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing, inter alia, Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2007)). To state a claim, the co mplaint must contain “sufficient factual matter; accep ted as true; to state a claim to relief that is plausible on [its] face.” Fantone, 780 F.3d at 193 (quotation marks omitted ). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s dismissal without leave to amen d, see Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2019), and its decision n ot to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, see K ach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). In addition to filing his notice o f appeal, Robinson filed with th e District Court motions that could be construed as ones for r econsideration, which the Distr ict Court has denied. Those rulings are not before us because Robinson has not challe nged them by filing a new or amended notice of appeal . See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(B)(i i).5 “vacated” the warrant. (ECF No. 59 at 7, 11.) As the Magistra te Judge explained, however, that allegation does not state a Fourth Amendment clai m because Robinson does not allege that he was arrest ed or otherwise seized pursua nt to that warrant. See Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017). Nor did Robinson allege sufficient detail regarding this incident , or any other, to state a plausi ble federal claim. We also see no basis to disturb t he District Court’s conclusion that any further amendment of Rob inson’s complaint woul d have been futile. Robi nson’s numerous filings on appeal do not suggest otherwise and, to the contrary , tend to confirm that conclusion. Finally, because the D istrict Court properly dismi ssed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the District Court acted within i ts discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdictio n over Robinson’s state-law cl aims. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 650 (citing, inter alia, 28 U. S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). In that r egard, we construe the District Court’s dismissal of those clai ms as one without prejudice. Se e id.
III. For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. The motion of appellees Geisinger Hospita l, et al., for leave to file a re ply is granted in part and denied in part. 3 All other pending motions are denied.

3 These appellees seek leave to f ile a surreply in opposition to Robinson’s document titled “brief-motion-order,” in which he requests an order directing d efendants not to contact him. Appellees do so i n order to advise us that Robinson has s ent them documents that could be deemed threatening, and they further request an order directing Robinson to “cease and desist such communi cations.” The parties’ filings d o not reveal the need for6 such relief at this time, and appe llees’ motion is denied to th at extent. Appellees’ motion is granted, however, to the exte nt that they seek leave to file their surreply.