12. APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

12-100 Introduction 

401-2500 et seq. 

420-0150 

440-1720 

Section 9(a) of the Act implements the general provisions contained in Section 7 of the Act, 

which grant employees the right to self-organization and to representation through agents of their 

own choosing. Section 9(a) goes further by providing that representatives selected for the

purposes of collective bargaining shall be the “exclusive” representatives. 

There are specific requirements in the statutory provision. The representative must be chosen

by a majority of the employees. These employees must be in a unit appropriate for collectivebargaining purposes. Under Section 9(b) the Board is empowered to “decide in each case

whether, in order to assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by 

this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, 

craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.’’ “The selection of an appropriate bargaining unit lies 

largely within the discretion of the Board whose decision, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed.”

So. Prairie Construction v. Operating Engineers Local 627, 425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). 

The distinction between issues involving the scope of the unit and those involving its

composition should be kept in mind. The scope of the unit pertains to such questions as to 

whether it should be limited to one plant rather than employerwide or to one employer as 

distinguished from multiemployer. (Chs. 12–14.) Composition of a unit relates to such questions 

as the inclusion or exclusion of disputed employee categories or unit placement in general. (Chs. 

16–20.) In the Boeing Co., 337 NLRB 152, 153 (2001), the Board described its policy with 

respect to determining appropriate units:

The Board’s procedure for determining an appropriate unit under Section 9(b) is to 

examine first the petitioned-for unit. If that unit is appropriate, then the inquiry into the

appropriate unit ends. If the petitioned-for unit is not appropriate, the Board may examine 

the alternative units suggested by the parties, but it also has the discretion to select an 

appropriate unit that is different from the alternative proposals of the parties. See, e.g.,

Overnite Transportation Co., 331 NLRB 662, 663 (2000); NLRB v. Lake County Assn. for 

the Retarded, 128 F.3d 1181, 1185 fn. 2 (7th Cir. 1997). 

It will be observed that there is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for 

bargaining be the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit; the Act

requires only that the unit be “appropriate,’’ that is, appropriate to insure to employees in each

case “the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act.” Bartlett Collins Co., 

334 NLRB 484 (2001); Overnite Transportation Co., 322 NLRB 723 (1996); Morand Bros. 

Beverage Co., 91 NLRB 409 (1950), enfd. 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951); Federal Electric Corp., 

157 NLRB 1130 (1966); Parsons Investment Co., 152 NLRB 192 fn. 1 (1965); Capital Bakers, 

168 NLRB 904, 905 (1968); National Cash Register Co., 166 NLRB 173 (1967); NLRB v.

Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1986); Dezcon, Inc., 295 NLRB 109 (1989). A union is, 

therefore, not required to seek representation in the most comprehensive grouping of employees

unless “an appropriate unit compatible with that requested does not exist.’’ P. Ballantine & Sons, 

141 NLRB 1103 (1963); Bamberger’s Paramus, 151 NLRB 748, 751 (1965); Purity Food Stores, 

160 NLRB 651 (1966). Indeed, “the Board generally attempts to select a unit that is the smallest 

appropriate unit encompassing the petitioned-for employees.” Bartlett Collins Co., supra. 

Moreover, it is well settled that there is more than one way in which employees of a given 

employer may appropriately be grouped for purposes of collective bargaining. See, for example, 

General Instrument Corp. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 420, 422–423 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S.

123
124 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

966 (1964); Mountain Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1962). The Board 

will pass only on the appropriateness of units that have been argued for. Acme Markets, Inc., 328 

NLRB 1208 (1999). 

The presumption is that a single location unit is appropriate. Hegins Corp., 255 NLRB 1236

(1981); Penn Color, Inc., 249 NLRB 1117, 1119 (1980). Marks Oxygen Co., 147 NLRB 228, 230

(1964); See also Huckleberry Youth Programs, 326 NLRB 1272 (1998). 

A petitioner’s desire as to unit is always a relevant consideration but cannot be dispositive. 

Marks Oxygen Co., supra; Airco, Inc., 273 NLRB 348 (1984). Obviously, a proposed bargaining

unit based on an arbitrary, heterogeneous, or artificial grouping of employees is inappropriate.

Moore Business Forms, Inc., 204 NLRB 552 (1973); Glosser Bros., Inc., 93 NLRB 1343 (1951).

Thus, when all maintenance and technical employees have similar working conditions, are under 

common supervision, and interchange jobs frequently, a unit including only part of them is 

inappropriate. U.S. Steel Corp., 192 NLRB 58 (1971). 

The discretion granted to the Board in Section 9(b) to determine the appropriate bargaining 

unit is reasonably broad, although it does require that there be record evidence on which a finding 

of appropriateness can be granted. Allen Health Care Services, 332 NLRB 1308 (2000). The only 

statutory limitations are those pertaining to professional employees (Sec. 9(b)(1)); craft

representation (Sec. 9(b)(2)); plant guards (Sec. 9(b)(3)); and extent of organization (Sec.

9(c)(5)). These provisions are treated in summary manner here and at greater length under more 

specific headings in later chapters. By way of an introductory note to these statutory limitations, 

we summarize them here. 

12-110 Professional Employees 

355-2260 

401-2575-1400 

440-1760-4300 

Section 9(b)(1) prohibits the Board from deciding that a unit including both professional and 

nonprofessional employees is appropriate, unless a majority of the professional employees vote 

for inclusion in such a mixed unit. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Vickers, Inc., 124

NLRB 1051 (1959); Pay Less Drug Stores, 127 NLRB 160 (1960); Westinghouse Electric Corp.

v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 853 (1971); A. O. Smith Corp., 166

NLRB 845 (1967); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 NLRB 1140 (1973). In Russelton Medical 

Group, 302 NLRB 718 (1991), an unfair labor practice case, the Board declined to order

bargaining in a combined unit where there had never been a vote under Section 9(b)(1). See also

Utah Power & Light Co., 258 NLRB 1059 (1981), and section 18-100, infra. 

12-120 Craft Units 

440-1760-9100 

Section 9(b)(2) prohibits the Board from deciding that a proposed craft unit is inappropriate

because of the prior establishment by the Board of a broader unit unless a majority of the 

employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation. For a full discussion of 

this provision and its interpretation, see chapter 16 on Craft and Traditional Departmental Units 

in general and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 NLRB 387 (1967), in particular. 

12-130 Plant Guards 

339-7575-7500 et seq. 

401-2575-2800 

Section 9(b)(3) prohibits the Board from establishing units including both plant guards and 

other employees and from certifying a labor organization as representative of a guard unit, if the 

labor organization admits to membership, or is affiliated, directly or indirectly, with an
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 125

organization which admits nonguard employees. American Building Maintenance Co., 126 

NLRB 185 (1960); Bonded Armored Carrier, 195 NLRB 346 (1972); Wackenhut Corp., 196 

NLRB 278 (1972). See also Elite Protective & Security Services, 300 NLRB 832 (1990). 

The Board has also held that the 9(b)(3) restriction precludes it from finding unlawful the 

withdrawal of recognition for a mixed guard union that had been voluntarily recognized for a 

guard unit. Temple Security, Inc., 328 NLRB 663 (1999), and Wells Fargo Corp., 270 NLRB 787

(1984) 

See also section 18-200, infra. 

12-140 Extent of Organization 

401-2562 

Section 9(c)(5) prohibits the Board from establishing a bargaining unit solely on the basis of 

extent of organization. NLRB v. Morganton Hosiery Co., 241 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1957); 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 438 (1965); Motts Shop Rite of Springfield, 

182 NLRB 172 (1970). See also Overnite Transportation Corp., 322 NLRB 723 (1996), and 325 

NLRB 612 (1998), where the Board held that a finding of different units in the same factual 

setting does not mean that the decision is based on extent organization. 

For a fuller discussion of this statutory limitation, see sections 12-300 and 13-1000. 

12-200 General Principles 

The Board has given full recognition to the significance of its discretionary determination of 

an appropriate bargaining unit. In Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 NLRB 134, 137 (1962), it

stated: 

Because the scope or the unit is basic to and permeates the whole of the collectivebargaining relationship, each determination, in order to further effective expression of the 

statutory purposes, must have a direct relevancy to the circumstances within which 

collective bargaining is to take place. For, if the unit determination fails to relate to the

factual situation with which the parties must deal, efficient and stable collective bargaining 

is undermined rather than fostered. Accord: Gustave Fischer, Inc., 256 NLRB 1069 (1981). 

To obtain a better understanding of the factors which go into a unit finding, we shall first 

consider those which are relatively simple and therefore require little elaboration, and then, in 

more detail, those which need further explication. 

12-210 Community of Interest 

401-7500 

420-2900 

420-4000 et seq. 

A major determinant in an appropriate unit finding is the community of duties and interests of 

the employees involved. When the interests of one group of employees are dissimilar from those

of another group, a single unit is inappropriate. Swift & Co., 129 NLRB 1391 (1961). See also U. 

S. Steel Corp, supra. But the fact that two or more groups of employees engage in different

processes does not by itself render a combined unit inappropriate if there is a sufficient 

community of interest among all these employees. Berea Publishing Co., 140 NLRB 516, 518 

(1963). 

Many considerations enter into a finding of community of interest. See, e.g., NLRB v. Paper 

Mfrs. Co., 786 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1986). The factors affecting the ultimate unit determination may

be found in the following sampling: 

a. Degree of functional integration. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 109 

(2004); United Rentals, Inc., 341 NLRB No. 72 (2004); United Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 
126 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

123 (2002); Seaboard Marine Ltd., 327 NLRB 556 (1999); Atlanta Hilton & Towers, 273

NLRB 87 (1984); NCR Corp., 236 NLRB 215 (1978); Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.,

194 NLRB 469 (1972); Threads-Inc., 191 NLRB 667 (1971); H. P. Hood & Sons, 187 NLRB 

404 (1971); Monsanto Research Corp., 185 NLRB 137 (1970); and Transerv Systems, 311 

NLRB 766 (1993). 

b. Common supervision. United Rentals, Inc., 341 NLRB No. 72 (2004); Bradley Steel,

Inc., 342 NLRB No. 22 (2004); United Operations, Inc., supra; Associated Milk Producers, 

250 NLRB 1407 (1970); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 191 NLRB 398 (1971) ; Donald Carroll 

Metals, 185 NLRB 409 (1970); Dean Witter & Co., 189 NLRB 785 (1971); Harron 

Communications, 308 NLRB 62 (1992); and Transerv Systems, supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

319 NLRB 607 (1995). 

c. The nature of employee skills and functions. United Operations, Inc., supra; Overnite 

Transportation Co., 331 NLRB 662 (2000) (all unskilled employees at particular location);

Seaboard Marine Ltd., supra; J. C. Penney Co., 328 NLRB 766 (1999); Harron 

Communications, supra; Hamilton Test Systems, 265 NLRB 595 (1982); R-N Market, 190

NLRB 292 (1971); Downingtown Paper Co., 192 NLRB 310 (1971); Phoenician, 308 NLRB 

826 (1992). 

d. Interchangeability and contact among employees. United Rentals, supra; J. C. Penney, 

supra; Associated Milk Producers, supra; Purity Supreme, Inc., 197 NLRB 915 (1972); Gray 

Drug Stores, 197 NLRB 924 (1972); Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 192 NLRB 1212 (1971). 

e. Work situs. R-N Market, supra; Bank of America, 196 NLRB 591 (1972); Kendall Co.,

184 NLRB 847 (1970). 

f. General working conditions. United Rentals, supra; Allied Gear & Machine Co., 250

NLRB 679 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra; Yale University, 184 NLRB 860 (1970). See 

also K.G. Knitting Mills, 320 NLRB 374 (1995), where the Board held that the fact that

employees receive a salary, do not punch timeclocks, receive different health insurance

benefits from other unit employees, and are able to adjust their own hours was not an

adequate basis for exclusion from the unit. 

g. Fringe benefits. Allied Gear & Machine Co., supra; Donald Carroll Metals, supra; 

Cheney Bigelow Wire Works, 197 NLRB 1279 (1972). In Publix Super Markets, supra; 

Bradley Steel, Inc., supra; and Los Angeles Water & Power Employees’ Assn., 340 NLRB 

No. 146 (2003), the Board found community of interest where the only factor militating 

against inclusion was the higher rate of pay enjoyed by the contested employee. 

“[T]he manner in which a particular employer has organized his plant and utilizes the skills of 

his labor force has a direct bearing on the community of interest among various groups of

employees in the plant and is thus an important consideration in any unit determination.”

International Paper Co., 96 NLRB 295, 298 fn. 7 (1951). Accord: Gustave Fischer, Inc., supra at

fn. 5. 

This enumeration of factors relevant to a community-of-interest finding is intended to alert 

the reader to the ingredients to look for in arriving at a determination. It should be noted, 

however, that, in the normal situation, the unit question is resolved by weighing all the relevant

factors against the major determinant of community of interest. See, e.g., Publix Super Markets,

supra; Bradley Steel, Inc., supra; Trumbull Memorial Hospital, 338 NLRB 917 (2003); United 

Operations, Inc., supra; and Hotel Services Group, 328 NLRB 116 (1999). 

A difference in the situs of employment does not in itself require establishment of separate

bargaining units, especially when there is evidence of a community of interest in their 

employment joining both groups. NLRB v. Carson Cable TV, supra. McCann Steel Co., 179 

NLRB 635, 636 (1969); Peerless Products Co., 114 NLRB 1586 (1956). Conversely, employees 

stationed away from the plant are excluded from a production and maintenance unit where they

do not have sufficient interests in common with the in-plant employees. Sealite, Inc., 125 NLRB 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 127

619 (1959); Sheffield Corp., 123 NLRB 1454 (1959). As a consequence, homeworkers are 

generally excluded from a unit of in-plant employees. Valley Forge Flag Co., 152 NLRB 1550

(1965); Terri Lee, Inc., 103 NLRB 995 (1953). However, employees who spend most of their

time away from the plant may be included in a plantwide unit if the petitioner is willing to 

represent such a unit and no other union seeks to represent them separately. Marks Oxygen Co., 

supra. Difference in supervision is not a per se basis for excluding employees from an appropriate

unit. Texas Empire Pipe Line Co., 88 NLRB 631 (1950). The important consideration is still the 

overall community of interest among the several employees. 

For a typical analysis of the operative factors leading to or away from a community-ofinterest finding, see U. S. Steel Corp., supra, and Brand Precision Services, 313 NLRB 657

(1994). See also Aerospace Corp., 331 NLRB 561 (2000) (community-of-interest test used in

research and development industry). 

In Winsett-Simmonds Engineers, Inc., 164 NLRB 611 (1967), the Board found sufficient 

community of interest to include work release prisoners in a bargaining unit in the circumstances

there. Compare Speedrack Products Group, 321 NLRB No. 143 (1996) (not reported in Board 

volumes), enf. denied 114 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997). On remand the Board included the work

release prisoners. Speedrack Products Group, 325 NLRB 609 (1998). 

12-220 History of Collective Bargaining 

420-1200 et seq. 

In determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, prior bargaining history is given

substantial weight. As a general rule, the Board is reluctant to disturb a unit established by 

collective bargaining which is not repugnant to Board policy or so constituted as to hamper 

employees in fully exercising rights guaranteed by the Act. Canal Carting, Inc., 339 NLRB 969 

(2003); Ready Mix USA, Inc., 340 NLRB No. 107 (2003); Red Coats, Inc., 328 NLRB 205 

(1999); Washington Post Co., 254 NLRB 168 (1981). Fraser & Johnston Co., 189 NLRB 142, 

151 fn. 50 (1971); Lone Star Gas Co., 194 NLRB 761 (1972); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 

120 NLRB 1281, 1284 (1958); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 153 NLRB 1549 (1965). The 

rationale for this policy is based on the statutory objective of stability in industrial relations. See 

also Hi-Way Billboards, 191 NLRB 244 (1971). 

Bargaining history under Section 8(f) agreements is relevant to a unit determination under 

Section 9 but not conclusive. Barron Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 58 

(2004). 

A party challenging a historical unit as no longer inappropriate has a heavy evidentiary 

burden. Trident Seafoods, Inc., 318 NLRB 738 (1995); Canal Carting, supra; and Ready Mix 

USA, supra. 

As in many areas of substantive law, exceptions are made to the general rule. These are: 

12-221 Consent-Election Stipulation 

393-6054-6750 

401-5000 

420-7312 

The Board does not consider itself bound by a collective-bargaining history resulting from a

consent election conducted pursuant to a unit stipulated by the parties rather than one determined 

by the Board. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, 341 NLRB No. 140 (2004); Mid-West

Abrasive Co., 145 NLRB 1665 (1964); Macy’s San Francisco, 120 NLRB 69, 71 (1958). 

Likewise, the Board does not consider itself bound by a history of bargaining resulting from a 

Board certification or stipulation of the parties at the hearing. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 

Baltimore, 156 NLRB 450, 452 (1966); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 118 NLRB 1043 (1957). 

This policy is not applicable to instances in which the Board is making unit placement
128 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

determinations in a stipulated unit. In such cases, the intent of the parties is paramount. Tribune 

Co., 190 NLRB 398 (1971); Lear Siegler, Inc., 287 NLRB 372 (1987). Where that intent is 

unclear, a community-of-interest test is applied. Space Mark, Inc., 325 NLRB 1140 fn. 1 (1998). 

For additional discussion of stipulations in representation cases, see sections 23-500, 23-520,

and 23-530 and Pacific Lincoln-Mercury, 312 NLRB 901 (1993). 

12-222 Bargaining History Contrary to Board Policy 

420-1787 

Bargaining history, conducted on a basis contrary to established Board representation policy,

carries little or no weight in a determination of appropriate unit. Mfg. Woodworkers Assn., 194 

NLRB 1122 (1972) (bargaining history on a “members only’’ basis); Land Title Guarantee & 

Trust Co., 194 NLRB 148 (1972) (bargaining history based solely on the sex of the employees); 

Crown Zellerbach Corp., 246 NLRB 202 (1980), and A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, 192 NLRB 

1118, 1120 (1971) (inclusion of employees by agreement despite lack of community of interest);

Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 91 NLRB 1145, 1146 fn. 3 (1950) (bargaining history on a 

“members only” basis); New Deal Cab Co., 159 NLRB 1838, 1841 (1966) (bargaining history

based solely on race). But simply because the historical unit would not be appropriate under

Board standards if being organized for the first time, does not make it inappropriate. Ready Mix 

USA, Inc., 340 NLRB No. 107 (2003).

12-223 Ineffective Bargaining History 

420-1708 

420-1775 

A brief or ineffective history of collective bargaining is not accorded determinative weight. 

Generally, a bargaining history of less than a year in duration is regarded as too brief to be 

deemed a significant factor. See Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 206 NLRB 928 (1973); Duke Power

Co., 191 NLRB 308 (1971); Heublein, Inc., 119 NLRB 1337, 1339 (1958); Chrysler Corp., 119 

NLRB 1312, 1314 (1958).

12-224 Oral Contract 

420-1725 

A bargaining history which is based on an oral contract is not controlling. Inyo Lumber Co.,

92 NLRB 1267 fn. 3 (1951). 

12-225 Bargaining History of Other Employees 

420-1254 

420-1263 

420-1281 

The bargaining history of a group of organized employees in a plant does not control the unit

determination for every other group of unorganized employees in that plant. North American 

Rockwell Corp., 193 NLRB 985 (1971); Piggly Wiggly California Co., 144 NLRB 708 (1963); 

Arcata Plywood Corp., 120 NLRB 1648, 1651 (1958); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 101

NLRB 101 (1953). Compare Transcontinental Bus System, 178 NLRB 712 (1969). 

For similar reasons, the bargaining pattern at other plants of the same employer or in the 

particular industry will not be considered controlling in relation to the bargaining unit of a 

particular plant, Big Y Foods, 238 NLRB 855 (1978); Miller & Miller Motor Freight Lines, 101 

NLRB 581 (1953), although it may be a factor in unit determination, Spartan Department Stores, 

140 NLRB 608 (1963). 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 129

12-226 Significant Changes 

420-2300 

Notwithstanding a long history of bargaining on a multiplant basis, where significant changes 

occur after the prior certification, the bargaining history on the former basis no longer has a 

controlling effect. Plymouth Shoe Co., 185 NLRB 732 (1970); General Electric Co., 185 NLRB 

13 (1970); General Electric Co., 100 NLRB 1489 (1951). Thus, the bargaining history lost its 

impact where, as a result of a reorganization, integrated plants became decentralized. See also

General Electric Co., 123 NLRB 1193 (1959); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 144 NLRB 455 

(1963). Compare Crown Zellerbach Corp., supra, where the Board found the changes 

insubstantial but nonetheless directed an election in a single-plant unit which had historically

been part of a multiplant unit. In Rinker Materials Corp., 294 NLRB 738 (1989), the Board found

that the changes were not sufficient “to destroy the historical separation of two groups of

employees.’’ See also Ready Mix USA, Inc., 340 NLRB No. 107 (2003), changes made by

successor found insubstantial.

12-227 Checkered Bargaining History 

420-1209 

Where there is a varied bargaining history, sometimes described as a “checkered bargaining 

history” (Western Electric Co., 98 NLRB 1018, 1036 (1951)), the most recent bargaining history

normally controls. Weston Paper & Mfg. Co., 100 NLRB 276 (1951). A “checkered bargaining

history’’ is one in which no fixed pattern of bargaining has been established either among all 

employees or among groupings of employees in a plant. See Western Electric Co., supra, for an 

illustration of such a bargaining history.

12-228 Deviation From Prior Unit Determination 

420-1766 

420-9000 

Bargaining on a basis which deviates substantially from a prior unit determination is not

controlling in a subsequent proceeding in which a redetermination of the unit is sought. Thus, for 

example, where all the parties have abandoned joint bargaining, as where a multiemployer 

association released its members and the members in turn resigned, revoked the association’s 

authority, and entered into separate agreements with the former common employee 

representatives, the former bargaining history has no controlling effect on current unit

determination. Pennsylvania Garment Mfrs. Assn., 125 NLRB 185 (1960). 

12-229 Other Exceptions 

339-7550 

420-1227 

420-1758 

420-1787 

An employer’s dealings with a shop committee established by it, which did not conduct any 

bargaining with the employer or handle any grievance, is not regarded as evidence of a bargaining 

history. Mid-West Abrasive Co., 145 NLRB 1665 (1964). Although in the determination of the 

scope of the appropriate unit weight is given to bargaining history and to the prior agreement of 

the parties, such factors are not determinative of the status of disputed employee categories whose

exclusion may be required because of the statute or for policy reasons. Firemen & Oilers, 145 

NLRB 1521, 1525 fn. 10 (1964). Where a multiplant bargaining history began prior to the 

expiration of a single-plant contract, and resulted in the execution of a multiplant contract found 

to be a premature extension of the single-plant contract, the bargaining history was not given
130 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

controlling weight in determining the appropriate unit. Continental Can Co., 145 NLRB 1427,

1429 (1964)). See also Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co., 171 NLRB 1121 (1968), wherein the 

employees involved were found to be accretions to an existing unit.

12-230 Specific Unit Rules 

A number of rules have been formulated affecting a variety of unit contentions urging the 

determination of an appropriate unit on one or more of the grounds listed here. These include 

considerations such as size of unit, mode of payment, age, sex, race, union membership, territorial 

or work jurisdiction, and the desires of the employees involved. 

12-231 Size of Unit 

347-8040 

As noted above 12-100, the Board generally selects the smallest appropriate unit that includes 

the petitioned-for employees. Bartlett Collins Co., 334 NLRB 484 (2001). 

It is, however, contrary to Board policy to certify a representative for bargaining purposes in 

a unit consisting of only one employee. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum, 229 NLRB 251 (1977);

Sonoma-Marin Publishing Co., 172 NLRB 625 (1968); Griffin Wheel Co., 80 NLRB 1471

(1949); cf. discussion in Louis Rosenberg, Inc., 122 NLRB 1450, 1453 (1959); also Foreign Car

Center, 129 NLRB 319 (1961)); Teamsters Local 115 (Vila-Barr Co.), 157 NLRB 588 (1966). In 

the latter case, the Board held that, because it is not empowered to require bargaining or to certify 

a bargaining representative in a unit comprising only one employee, it does not direct elections in 

such units either under Section 9(c) or under Section 8(b)(7)(c). Consequently, a union claiming

recognition is disabled through no fault of its own from invoking the Board’s election processes 

for purposes of resolving the question concerning representation raised by picketing, and it would

be inequitable and not within the congressional intent to condition the lawfulness of the

recognitional picketing in the one-man unit on the union’s filing of a petition. See also Operating 

Engineers Local 181 (Steel Fab), 292 NLRB 354 (1989); Laborers Local 133 (Whitaker & Sons), 

283 NLRB 918 (1987). 

It should be noted that the appropriateness of a unit is not affected by the speculative 

possibility that the employee complement may be reduced to one employee. National Licorice 

Co., 85 NLRB 140 (1949). It is the permanent size of the unit, not the number of actual 

incumbents employed at any given time that is controlling. Copier Care Plus, 324 NLRB 785 fn.

3 (1997). 

12-232 Mode and/or Rate of Payment 

420-2903 et seq. 

The mode of payment itself is not determinative of the scope of an appropriate bargaining

unit. Palmer Mfg. Corp., 105 NLRB 812 (1953). Nor does a distinction in the rate of pay affect 

the unit determination. Four Winds Services, 325 NLRB 632 (1998) (some paid under DavisBacon and some not), and Donald Carroll Metals, 185 NLRB 409, 410 (1970). A mere difference 

in the method of payment does not warrant exclusion from an appropriate unit. Armour & Co.,

119 NLRB 122 (1958); Century Electric Co., 146 NLRB 232 (1964). Where a different method 

of payment arises out of historical or administrative reasons, rather than a functional distinction, 

no valid basis exists for distinguishing, for representation purposes, hourly paid workers from 

those paid by the week. Swift & Co., 101 NLRB 33 (1951). It is to the general interests, duties, 

nature of work, and working conditions of the employees that significance is given in the 

resolution of unit questions. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 75 NLRB 609 (1948). Mode of 

payment, if viable at all as a factor, is generally only one of a number of factors, all of which 

when considered together determine the unit finding. Hotel Services Group, 328 NLRB 116

(1999); Liquid Transporters, 250 NLRB 1421, 1424 (1980); Firestone Tire Co., 156 NLRB 454, 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 131

456 (1966); “M” System, 115 NLRB 1316 (1956); Curcie Bros., Inc., 146 NLRB 380 (1964);

Carter Camera Shops, 130 NLRB 276 (1961). 

12-233 Age 

420-3460 

Age is not a valid consideration for exclusion from a unit. Thus, a contention for exclusion

from a unit on the ground that the employees were elderly was rejected. Metal Textile Corp., 88

NLRB 1326, 1329 (1950). Similarly, social security annuitants who limit their earnings so as not 

to decrease their annuity but who otherwise share community of interests with unit employees are 

included. Holiday Inns of America, 176 NLRB 939 (1969). 

12-234 Sex 

420-3440 

In the absence of evidence of a substantial difference in skills between male and female

employees, a petition for a unit based on sex is inappropriate. Cuneo Eastern Press, 106 NLRB 

343 (1953); Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 194 NLRB 148 (1972). For related reasons, 

severance of all female employees, although they performed similar duties and had interests in 

common with the other employees, was denied. No justification for severance had been advanced,

leaving only the differentiation in sex, and that, Board policy makes clear, is by itself no basis for 

a separate unit. Rexall Drug Co., 89 NLRB 683 (1950). Where the evidence established, and the 

parties admitted, that the sole basis for separate units and separate contracts was that one included 

all female production employees and the other included all male production employees, the Board 

directed an election in a unit of all production employees, rejecting a proposed unit based solely 

on sex. U.S. Baking Co., 165 NLRB 951 (1967). 

In the latter case, the Board admonished the parties that if the labor organization which had 

represented the separate units of male employees and female employees wins the election, and it

should later be shown, in an appropriate proceeding, that equal representation had been denied to 

any employee in the unit, the Board would consider revoking its certification. See U.S. Baking 

Co., supra at fn. 6. See also Glass Bottle Blowers Local 106 (Owens-Illinois), 210 NLRB 943

(1974), separate locals and units based on sex held violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). 

12-235 Race 

420-3420 

The race of employees is not a valid determinant of the appropriateness of a unit. Norfolk

Southern Bus Corp., 76 NLRB 488 fn. 8 (1948); New Deal Cab Co., 159 NLRB 1838 (1966). 

See also Andrews Industries, 105 NLRB 946 (1953); Pioneer Bus Co., 140 NLRB 54 (1963);

Lindsay Newspapers, 192 NLRB 478 (1971). 

In New Deal, supra, the Board found that New Deal Cab Co., and Safety Cabs, Inc.,

constituted a single employer but had engaged in a bargaining pattern predicated on racial factors 

“which cannot be accepted as appropriate.” The separation of bargaining units was rooted 

originally in representation by separate segregated locals, a situation fostered by the local

government’s issuance of separate permits to the separate enterprises based essentially on lines of 

racial segregation. That racial pattern continued to exist as of the time of the Board decision. 

“Throughout its entire history,’’ said the Board, it “has refused to recognize race as a valid factor

in determining the appropriateness of any unit for collective bargaining.” See, for example,

American Tobacco Co., 9 NLRB 579 (1938); Union Envelope Co., 10 NLRB 1147 (1939); Aetna 

Iron & Steel Co., 35 NLRB 136 (1941); U.S. Bedding Co., 52 NLRB 382 (1943); Norfolk 

Southern Bus Corp., supra; Andrews Industries, supra; Pioneer Bus Co., supra. 

For a discussion of Board policy with respect to contention that a union should not be 

certified because it discriminates on racial grounds see Handy Andy, Inc., 228 NLRB 447 (1977), 

discussed of section 6-130. See also Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 259 NLRB 401 (1981). 
132 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

12-236 Union Membership 

420-7336 et seq. 

The fact that a union does not admit certain employee categories to membership is not a valid 

ground for excluding such employees from a bargaining unit. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 89 NLRB 1434,

1436 fn. 8 (1950). Thus, the jurisdictional inability of a union to represent certain employees or 

job classifications in no way restricts the Board in the determination of the appropriate unit. Davis 

Cafeteria, 160 NLRB 1141 (1966); Associated Grocers, 142 NLRB 576 (1963); Central Coat, 

Apron & Linen Service, 126 NLRB 958 (1960). Nor are the union’s jurisdictional limitations, 

standing alone, a proper determinant of bargaining unit. Pennsylvania Garment Mfrs. Assn., 

supra. Moreover, a jurisdictional agreement between two or more unions does not relieve the 

Board of its statutory duty to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. J. A. Jones Construction 

Co., 84 NLRB 88 (1949). This is true even where there has been a prior bargaining history along

the lines of the jurisdictional agreement. Utility Appliance Corp., 106 NLRB 398 (1953). 

When, however, exclusion from membership is based on invidious or discriminatory reasons, 

see Handy Andy, Inc., supra. 

12-237 Territorial Jurisdiction 

420-7342 

420-8473 

The union’s territorial jurisdiction and limitations do not generally affect the determination of 

an appropriate unit. Groendyke Transport, 171 NLRB 997, 998 (1968). See also Building

Construction Employers Assn., 147 NLRB 222 (1964); John Sundwall & Co., 149 NLRB 1022 

(1964); Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 NLRB 316 (1959). But see Dundee’s Seafood, Inc.,

221 NLRB 1183 (1976), in which the Board considers the union’s jurisdictional limitations as 

one factor in its unit determination. In doing so, the Board noted that its limitation was a factor in 

past bargaining. See also P. J. Dick Contracting, 290 NLRB 150 fn. 8 (1988). 

12-238 Work Jurisdiction 

420-7342 

420-8400 

560-7580-4000 

Early in its history the Board stated that its function in a representation proceeding “is to

ascertain and certify to the parties the name of the bargaining representative, if any, that has been

designated by the employees in the appropriate unit; it is not our function to direct, instruct, or 

limit that representative as to the manner in which it is to exercise its bargaining agency.’’ Wilson 

Packing & Rubber Co., 51 NLRB 910, 913 (1943). Thus, in describing a unit the Board does not

make an award to employees in the unit found appropriate to perform exclusively all the duties 

required by their job classifications. General Aniline Corp., 89 NLRB 467 (1950). See also 

Plumbing Contractors Assn., 93 NLRB 1081, 1087 fn. 21 (1951); Gas Service Co., 140 NLRB 

445 (1963). As the Board has explained, certifications are not granted to unions on the basis of 

specific work tasks or types of machines operated, on union jurisdictional claim but in terms of 

employee classifications performing related work functions, under a community of interest

analysis. Ross-Meehan Foundries, 147 NLRB 207 (1964). Scrantonian Publishing Co., 215 

NLRB 296, 298 fn. 9 (1974). 

12-239 Employees’ Desires 

420-7306 

“While the desires of employees with respect to their inclusion in a bargaining unit [are] not 

controlling, it is a factor which the Board should take into consideration in reaching its ultimate 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 133

decision. . . . Indeed, it may be the single factor that would ‘tip the scales.”’ NLRB v. Ideal 

Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712, 717 (10th Cir. 1964).

While in Ideal Laundry, the Board accepted the court’s theory with respect to the employees’

unit desires as the law of the case, it disagreed with the court’s opinion to the extent that the court 

indicated that subjective testimony by employees as to their desires for inclusion in or exclusion 

from an appropriate unit is generally relevant in Board unit determinations. Ideal Laundry & Dry 

Cleaning Co., 152 NLRB 1130, 1131 fn. 6 (1955). See also Marriott In-Flite Services v. NLRB, 

652 F.2d 202 (1981). 

See also Extent of Organization, section 12-300, infra.

12-300 Extent of Organization 

401-2562 

420-8400 

We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in referring to statutory limitations, that one of

these is the provision in Section 9(c)(5) against making “extent of organization’’ a controlling 

factor in bargaining unit determination. Amplification of this provision appears to be appropriate 

at this point. Although this requirement is essentially one of statutory origin, its application is 

nonetheless couched in terms of Board policy and therefore does not seem out of place in a 

synopsis of general unit principles. 

The Board has effectuated the 9(c)(5) provision denying unit requests where the only

apparent basis was the extent of the petitioner’s organization of the employees. However, it has 

held that extent of organization may be taken into consideration as one of the factors in unit

determination, together with other factors, provided, of course, that it is not the governing factor.

NLRB v. Quaker City Life Insurance Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963); Metropolitan Life 

Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 438 (1965). 

In conformity with this statutory limitation, it has been held that a unit based solely or 

essentially on extent of organization is inappropriate. New England Power Co., 120 NLRB 666

(1958); John Sundwall & Co., supra. However, the fact that under Section 9(c)(5) the extent that

employees have been organized may not be the controlling determinant of the appropriateness of 

a proposed bargaining unit does not, as we have said, preclude reliance on that factor in

conjunction with other factors. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 156 NLRB 1408 (1966); Central 

Power & Light Co., 195 NLRB 743 (1972); Mosler Safe Co., 188 NLRB 650, 651 fn. 6 (1971);

Overnite Transportation Co., 141 NLRB 384 fn. 2 (1963). 

In Central Power & Light Co., supra at 746, which involved the public utility industry, it was 

pointed out that “Before bargaining can occur on the basis of a systemwide unit, there must be 

systemwide organization of employees”; there is nothing in the Act or in Board policy which

requires a petitioner to seek the optimum unit; and it “need only seek to represent an appropriate 

unit of employees.’’ Consequently, the decision aimed at in that case comported with the

statutory direction and did not preclude the eventual establishment of bargaining in the 

systemwide unit. 

Even if a petitioning union’s proposal is, in part, based on the extent of its organizational

efforts, it does not follow that such a unit is necessarily defective or that in designating that unit 

as appropriate the Board is thereby giving any, much less controlling, weight to the union’s extent

of organization. Dundee’s Seafood, Inc., supra; Consolidated Papers, 220 NLRB 1281 (1975);

Bell Industries, 139 NLRB 629, 631 fn. 7 (1962). Similarly, the fact that the petitioner’s motive 

in seeking separate units is guided by the extent to which the union had organized is immaterial

so long as the Board, in its choice of appropriate unit, does not give controlling weight to that 

fact. Stern’s Paramus, 150 NLRB 799, 807 (1965). 

See earlier reference to this subject at sections 12-140 and 12-239, supra. See also section 13-

1000, infra. 
134 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

12-400 Residual Units 

420-8400 

440-1780-6000 

Groups of employees omitted from established bargaining units constitute appropriate 

“residual” units, provided they include all the unrepresented employees of the type covered by the 

petition. G.L. Milliken Plastering, 340 NLRB No. 138 (2003); Carl Buddig & Co., 328 NLRB 

929 (1999); Fleming Foods, 313 NLRB 948 (1994). See also Premier Plastering, Inc., 342

NLRB No. 111 (2004). 

For example, where a group of laboratory employees had been excluded from the production 

and maintenance unit and were therefore unrepresented, representation in a separate unit on a

residual basis was held appropriate. S. D. Warren Co., 114 NLRB 410, 411 (1956). When, 

however, a petitioner sought a unit of employees in the employer’s shipping and warehouse 

office, and it appeared that the employer had many unrepresented clerical employees other than

those petitioned for, the unit sought was found to be comprised of only a segment of all the 

unrepresented employees, and therefore did not meet the test of “residual unit,’’ and was 

inappropriate as a bargaining unit. American Radiator Corp., 114 NLRB 1151, 1154–1155 

(1956). Where, however, the union is willing to proceed to an election in a larger unit, an election 

will be directed. Carl Buddig, supra, and Folger Coffee Co., 250 NLRB 1 (1980). 

In fashioning overall or larger units, the Board is reluctant to leave a residual unit where the

employees could be included in the larger group. Huckleberry Youth Programs, 326 NLRB 1272

(1998) . See also United Rentals, Inc., 341 NLRB No. 72 fn. 11 (2004) (only unrepresented 

employees at facility included in unit despite sparse record of community of interest) and sec. 19-

440, infra. 

Where the record was insufficient to establish whether the requested residual unit includes all

unrepresented employees, the Board has remanded the matter to the Regional Director. G.L. 

Milliken, supra. 

For other illustrations of groups found appropriate as “residual,” see Cities Service Oil Co., 

200 NLRB 470 (1972) (in a multiplant situation); Walter Kidde & Co., 191 NLRB 10 (1971) 

(plant clerical employees); Water Tower Inn, 139 NLRB 842, 848 (1962) (food service and

kitchen employees); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 143 NLRB 578 (1963)) (food preparation employees and

related categories); and Rostone Corp., 196 NLRB 467 (1972) (so-called hot mold employees). 

For illustrations of groups found inappropriate for a bargaining unit on a residual basis, see

Republican Co., 169 NLRB 1146, 1147 (1968) (part-time employees in mailing room alone); 

Budd Co., 154 NLRB 421, 428 (1965) (separate residual units of engineers and accountants

inappropriate in view of established units of technical and office clerical employees represented 

by the petitioner); Armstrong Rubber Co., 144 NLRB 1115, 1119 fn. 11 (1963) (unit sought as 

“residual’’ did not contain all of the unrepresented employees); Richmond Dry Goods Co., 93

NLRB 663, 666–667 (1951) (inappropriate because the larger unit as to which it was allegedly

“residual” was inappropriate). 

When the employer’s only employees not presently represented by a labor organization are

those classified in the category sought by the petitioning union, the petition is treated as a request 

for a residual unit of all unrepresented employees and an election is directed in that unit. Building 

Construction Employers Assn., 147 NLRB 222 (1964) supra; Eastern Container Corp., 275

NLRB 1537 (1985). 

The issue of appropriateness of a residual unit sometimes arises in a more complex context. 

For example, when, in the face of an existing multiemployer unit, separate residual units of all

unrepresented employees of two hotels were sought, these units were found inappropriate for the 

reason that the employees sought comprised miscellaneous groupings lacking internal 

homogeneity or cohesiveness and could not alone constitute an appropriate unit. To be

“residual,’’ the group must be coextensive in scope with the existing multiemployer unit, and not
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 135

merely coextensive with the particular employer’s operations and thus only a segment of the 

residual group. Los Angeles Statler Hilton Hotel, 129 NLRB 1349 (1961). But where employees 

could have expressed their choice in a smaller clerical unit if included in a prior election (held on 

the basis of a stipulation which failed to include them), they were accorded the opportunity to 

vote on a residual basis “under the same condition afforded represented clericals.” Chrysler

Corp., 173 NLRB 1046, 1047 (1969). 

12-410 Residual Units in the Health Care Industry 

When it fashioned its rules for bargaining units in acute care hospitals, the Board specifically

deferred resolving whether or not it would process a petition for a residual unit filed by a

nonincumbent union in cases involving nonconforming units. See Health Care Rules, 284 NLRB 

1580-1597; Rules 103.30. Later in St. John’s Hospital, 307 NLRB 767 (1992), the Board held

that it would process a petition for an incumbent union but that the unit would have to include all

skilled maintenance employees residual to the existing unit and that the employees must be added 

to the existing unit by means of a self-determination election. 

In St. Mary’s Duluth Clinic Health System, 332 NLRB 1419 (2000), the Board held that a 

nonincumbent union may represent a separate residual unit of employees in an acute care hospital 

that is residual to an existing nonconforming unit. In doing so, the Board overruled its pre-Rule 

decision in Levine Hospital of Hayward, 219 NLRB 327 (1975). Thereafter in Kaiser Foundation 

Health Plan of Colorado, 333 NLRB 557 (2001), the Board applied its new St. Mary’s policy to a 

nonacute care health facility. See also 15-170. 

For a more extensive discussion of the type of elections accorded residual groups, see chapter

21, infra. 

12-500 Accretions to Existing Units 

316-3301-5000 

347-4050-1733 

385-7533-4080 

440-6701 

In outlining general unit principles, and before turning to the broad specific areas each of 

which is treated in the separate chapters that follow, we turn our attention to “accretion.’’ For 

additional discussion of “accretion” see chapter 21 and section 11-220. “The Board has defined 

an accretion as ‘the addition of a relatively small group of employees to an existing unit where 

these additional employees share a community of interest with the unit employees and have no 

separate identity.’” Safety Carrier, 306 NLRB 960, 969 (1992). See also Progressive Service Die

Co., 323 NLRB 1182 (1997). 

In Safeway Stores, Inc., 256 NLRB 918 (1981), the Board described its test as requiring that

the group to be accreted have “little or no separate group identity” and “have an overwhelming

community of interest with the unit.” Recently, the Fourth Circuit agreed with this rule but 

disagreed with how the Board applied it. Baltimore Sun Co. v. NLRB, 257 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 

2001). Accord: E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, Inc., 341 NLRB No. 82 (2004). 

Accretions to an established bargaining unit are regarded as additions to the unit and 

therefore as part of it. United Parcel Service, 325 NLRB 37 (1997). An accretion issue may arise 

in three different contexts: contract bar, a petition for certification, or a petition for unit

clarification. “The Board has followed a restrictive policy in finding accretion because it

foreclosed the employee’s basic right to select their bargaining representative.” Towne Ford 

Sales, 270 NLRB 311 (1984); Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 NLRB 107 (1970). See also Giant Eagle

Markets, 308 NLRB 206 (1992). Thus, the accretion doctrine is not applicable to situations in 

which the group sought to be accreted would constitute a separate appropriate bargaining unit.

Passavant Health Center, 313 NLRB 1216 (1994), and Beverly Manor-San Francisco, 322 
136 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

NLRB 968, 972 (1997). The issue may also arise in an unfair labor practice case where the 

General Counsel alleges that an employer unlawfully added employees to a unit where there is no 

accretion and the union did not represent a majority of those added. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 

Inc., 329 NLRB 1493 (1999). 

Where employees are found to be an accretion to an existing unit, a current contract covering

that unit bars the petition. Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co., 171 NLRB 1121 (1968); Public Service

Co., 190 NLRB 350 (1971). 

Employees accreted to an existing unit are not accorded a self-determination election. BorgWarner Corp., 113 NLRB 152, 154 (1955); Goodyear Tire Co., 147 NLRB 1233 fn. 6. (1964).

Compare Massachusetts Electric Co., 248 NLRB 155 (1980), where a self-determination election

was directed where the meter readers could have been in either of two units. See also CarrGottstein Foods Co., 307 NLRB 1318 (1992), and Photype, Inc., 145 NLRB 1268 (1964), for 

discussion of self-determination elections. For a complete discussion of self-determination 

elections see chapter 21. 

Finally, a new classification that is performing the same work the unit classification had 

historically performed is viewed as part of the unit, not as an accretion. Premcor, Inc., 333

NLRB 1365 (2001); Developmental Disabilities Institute, 334 NLRB 1166 (2001). 

A petition for certification of a group found to be an accretion is, of course, dismissed. 

Granite City Steel Co., 137 NLRB 209 (1962); Radio Corp. of America, 141 NLRB 1134 (1963).

However, a petition for clarification is granted if the disputed employees are an accretion to the 

unit. Printing Industry of Seattle, 202 NLRB 558 (1973). 

Accretion issue resolution can depend on a number of factors and as in the case of most areas

depending on a resolution of factors, it is a combination of factors rather than one single factor 

which affects the determination whether the employees in question constitute an accretion to an

existing bargaining unit. For example, the production and maintenance electrical workers and

steamfitters at employer’s newly established can manufacturing plant were held not an accretion 

to the employer’s brewery plant in view of the absence of employee interchange, separate

management and administrative control, and differences in working conditions. Jos. Schlitz 

Brewing Co., 192 NLRB 553 (1971). Similarly, shared factors such as geographic proximity,

working conditions and wages were outweighed by other factors. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, Inc.,

341 NLRB No. 82 (200)4 By way of contrast, accretion was found where the employer’s second 

plant provided the same service as the original unit; the employer was the sole owner of both

companies; and the companies had interlocking officers and directors and similar operating 

functions, job classifications, and working conditions. Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 170 NLRB 

1183 (1968). See also Earthgrains Co., 334 NLRB 1131 (2001). 

The factors commonly used to determine whether the group of employees in question 

constitutes an accretion include the following: 

12-510 Interchange 

Absence or infrequency of interchange among the new employees and those in the existing 

unit. Dennison Mfg. Co., 296 NLRB 1034 (1989); Plumbing Distributors, 248 NLRB 413 (1980); 

Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 129 NLRB 361 (1961); Combustion Engineering, 195 NLRB 909, 912

(1972). 

As pointed out by the administrative law judge in the last case, “The absence, or infrequency,

of interchange of employees is probably the one factor most commonly relied upon by the Board 

in finding no accretion.” It has not deemed it material that interchange was feasible. Thus, in 

finding no accretion, the Board noted that, although the jobs at the two operations involved were 

virtually interchangeable, there was in fact no interchange. Essex Wire Corp., 130 NLRB 450 

(1961). See also Towne Ford Sales, 270 NLRB 311 (1984); Super Value Stores, 283 NLRB 134

(1987); and Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 333 NLRB 175 (2001). 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 137

12-520 Supervision and Conditions of Employment 

420-2900 

Common supervision and similar terms and conditions of employment. Western Cartridge 

Co., 134 NLRB 67 (1962); Western Wirebound Box Co., 191 NLRB 748 (1971). 

In Western Cartridge Co., supra, the Board issued a decision in which it clarified an existing 

certification, including in the description of the appropriate unit a grouping of employees. It relied

in part on the fact that these employees had “the same supervisors, duties, and conditions of 

employment.’’ Compare Town Ford Sales, supra; Plumbing Distributors, supra. See also Safety 

Carrier, Inc., 306 NLRB 960, 969 (1992), and Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 333 NLRB 175 (2001). 

12-530 Job Classification 

385-7533-2000 

Substantially similar job classifications. Gillette Motor Transport, 137 NLRB 471 (1962); 

Printing Industry of Seattle, supra; Plough, Inc., 203 NLRB 818 (1973). 

In Printing Industry of Seattle, supra, a certification was clarified to include personnel as an 

accretion because of the identical work being performed by them. But where a new classification 

is performing the same basic functions as a unit classification historically had performed, the new

classification is properly viewed as “remaining in the unit rather than being added to the unit by

accretion.” Premcor, Inc., 333 NLRB 1365 (2001). See also Developmental Disabilities Institute,

334 NLRB 1166, 1168 (2001). 

12-540 Integration of Units 

420-4600 

The physical, functional, and administrative integration of units. Granite City Steel Co., 

supra; Combustion Engineering, supra. 

“Although both groups may occasionally utilize similar work measurement techniques, this

fact alone is insufficient to warrant the accretion of the new group to the existing unit, where, as 

here, the functions performed by the two groups are in no way integrated or related and there is 

no common supervision.” General Electric Co., 204 NLRB 576 (1973). 

The Board will find an accretion of a separate unit of employees into an existing unit where 

the reasons for the exclusion have been eliminated. U.S. West Communications, 310 NLRB 854

(1993). 

An employer cannot have employees clarified out of a unit merely by transferring them to a

new location, when they are doing the same work under the same supervision. Montgomery Ward 

& Co., 195 NLRB 1031 (1972). Similarly, in the case of an intracorporation reorganization, 

employees who continue to perform the same type of functions under the same supervision

should remain in the unit. Swedish Medical Center, 325 NLRB 683 (1998); McDonnell Douglas 

Astronautics Co., 194 NLRB 689 (1972); S. D. Warren Co., 164 NLRB 489 (1967). However, 

when a merger eliminates the “rational basis” for a separate unit, such unit will be found 

inappropriate and its members will be clarified into the larger, more comprehensive unit. Joseph 

Cory Warehouse, 184 NLRB 627 (1970). And when a change in the method of operation

eliminates the historical justification for including certain employees in a unit, they may be

clarified out of the unit. Cal-Central Press, 179 NLRB 162 (1969); Libby, McNeill & Libby, 159

NLRB 677, 681 (1966). 

12-550 Geographic Proximity

420-6700 

Rollins-Purle, Inc., 194 NLRB 709, 711 (1972), in which the administrative law judge quoted 

from Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 NLRB 107 (1970), supra: “We will not . . . under the guise of 

accretion, compel a group of employees, who may constitute a separate appropriate unit, to be 
138 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

included in an overall unit without allowing those employees the opportunity of expressing their 

preference in a secret election or by some other evidence that they wish to authorize the Union to 

represent them.’’ Geographic remoteness was among the factors militating against an accretion

finding in Rollins-Purle, Inc., supra. See also Granite City Steel Co., supra. See also Super Value 

Stores, supra. In that case the Board found a 10–12 mile distance as not weighing in favor of 

accretion. See Bryant Infant Wear, 235 NLRB 1305 (1978), and Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 333 NLRB 

175 (2001) (70 miles), supra. Compare Arizona Public Service, 256 NLRB 400 (1981); White 

Front Stores, 192 NLRB 240 (1971). 

The Board does not automatically accrete employees at a new facility solely because the unit 

description covers all facilities in a geographical area. Superior Protection Inc., 341 NLRB No. 

35 (2004). 

12-560 Role of New Employees 

The role of the new employees in the operations of the existing unit is a factor in accretion

analysis. Granite City Steel Co., supra. In that case, the Board commented, inter alia, on the “vital 

role in the operation” of new employees held to be an accretion. Compare Premcor, Inc., supra; 

Developmental Disabilities Institute, supra, section 12-530. 

12-570 Community of Interest 

401-7550 

As we have seen in other substantive areas, the element of community of interest is 

consistently a vital element in determining accretion. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra. In Firestone 

Synthetic Fibers Co., supra at 1123, accretion was found where maintenance employees, recently

acquired, shared a community of interest with the employer’s other maintenance employees and

with the production and maintenance employees generally. Earthgrains Co., 334 NLRB 1131

(2001). See also U. S. Steel Corp., 187 NLRB 522 (1971); CF&I Steel Corp., 196 NLRB 470

(1972). Compare Giant Eagle Markets, 308 NLRB 206 (1992). 

A UC petition was dismissed where petitioner did not seek to include other employees who 

performed similar functions and had a close community of interest with the employees sought. 

Armstrong Rubber Co., 180 NLRB 410 (1970). Compare KMBZ/KMBR Radio, 290 NLRB 459

(1988). 

12-580 Bargaining History 

420-1200 

A long history of exclusion from the unit was relied on by the Board in rejecting an accretion 

contention. Aerojet-General Corp., 185 NLRB 794, 798 (1970). See also Manitowoc 

Shipbuilding, 191 NLRB 786 (1971), noting a long history of inclusion of related employees in

the unit which warranted finding of accretion. Compare Safeway Stores, 256 NLRB 918 (1981),

where jurisdictional clause in a contract with another union precluded accretion. In Massachusetts

Electric Co. , supra, the Board declined to accrete transferred employees who had been separately 

represented by another union. See also United Parcel Service, 303 NLRB 326 (1991); Staten 

Island University Hospital, 308 NLRB 58 (1992); ATS Acquisition Corp., 321 NLRB 712 (1996). 

As a general rule, the Board will not clarify a bargaining unit to interfere with or change a 

long-term collective-bargaining history. However, in Rock-Tenn Co., 274 NLRB 772 (1985), the 

Board clarified a two-plant unit into separate units in which the two plants had been sold to 

separately incorporated operating divisions of Rock-Tenn. The Board found that the sale had 

resulted in significant organizational changes which offset what community of interest had

existed among the employees of the two plants. The Board’s Rock-Tenn decision emphasized the 

particular facts of the case finding that they constituted “compelling circumstances” for 

disregarding the two-plant bargaining history. Later, in Batesville Casket Co., 283 NLRB 795

(1987), the Board declined to clarify an existing two-company single unit into separate units 
APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 139

where the single unit had been in existence without substantial changes for many years. In 

distinguishing Rock-Tenn, the Board emphasized that the changes there which had prompted 

clarification were “recent substantial changes.” As there were not “recent substantial changes” in

Batesville, the UC petition was dismissed. See also Ameron, Inc., 288 NLRB 747 (1988), where 

the Board clarified a single unit into two units under Rock-Tenn principles and Delta Mills, 287 

NLRB 366 (1987), where the Board in an RD proceeding rejected a contention that changed 

circumstances warranted splitting an existing unit into two units. Accord: Lennox Industries, 308 

NLRB 1237 (1992), in which the Board clarified a single unit into two units rejecting the

employer’s request for six units. In Mayfield Holiday Inn, 335 NLRB 38 (2001), the Board 

allowed a historically single unit covering two locations to be divided into two separate units 

when the two facilities were sold to different employers. 

As a “members only” contract does not afford the kind of representation nor establish the

type of bargaining unit which the Act contemplates, the Board will not make its procedures 

available to clarify a unit covered by an agreement which has been applied, in effect, on a

“members only” basis. Ron Wiscombe Painting Co., 194 NLRB 907 (1972). 

In United Parcel Service, 325 NLRB 37 (1997), the Board declined to clarify a nationwide 

bargaining unit to include a group of employees in one geographic area while continuing to 

exclude employees performing similar duties in the rest of the unit. 

For an analysis of the effect of hiatus on accretion, compare F & A Food Sales, 325 NLRB 

513 (1998) (position included in unit after 3-year hiatus), with Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of

Wisconsin, 310 NLRB 844 (1993) (no accretion due to 12-year hiatus). 

12-590 Skills and Education 

420-2963 

Despite an apparent similarity of function, employees found to be basically “computer 

programmers,’’ who had to meet special educational requirements, were held, for this reason 

among others, not to have accreted to the unit. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra; Aerojet-General Corp., 

supra at 797. Accord: E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, Inc., 341 NLRB No. 82 (2004). 

12-600 Relocations, Spinoffs, and Accretions 

530-8018-2500 

530-8090-4000 et seq. 

The Board has been confronted with the problem presented by the transfers of bargaining unit 

work members. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Buffalo, 299 NLRB 989 (1990), the Board termed a 

transfer of what has been traditionally unit work to a new facility using unit members as a

“spinoff.” In Gitano Distribution Center, 308 NLRB 1172 (1992), the Board overruled CocaCola and announced a new test for determining the bargaining obligation in such situations. 

Under this test, the Board will presume that the new operation is a separate appropriate unit. If 

this presumption is not rebutted, the Board then applies “a simple fact-based majority test’’ to 

determine the bargaining obligation. See also U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 331 NLRB 327 (2000); Mercy

Health Services North, 311 NLRB 367 (1993, and ATS Acquisition Corp., supra. The Board 

remanded Coca Cola for further consideration in light of Gitano and later found that the 

presumption of a separate unit had been rebutted. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Buffalo, 325 NLRB 

312 (1998). See also Rocks Bottom Stores, Inc., 312 NLRB 400 (1993), an unfair labor practice 

case involving when it is appropriate to require application of an existing contract at the new 

facility. 

In Armco Steel Co., 312 NLRB 257 (1993), the Board held that UC proceedings could be 

utilized to resolve the full panoply of issues presented in a Gitano analysis. Thus, the Board 

found the UC proceeding is a more expeditious method of resolving the unit scope and the 

majority status issues that are part of a Gitano consideration. 
140 APPROPRIATE UNIT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES