In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-4047, 98-4056, 98-4127, 98-4291

Lisetta Molnar,

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

v.

Lloyd Booth and East Chicago

Community School Corp.,

Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:96 CV 259 JM--James T. Moody, Judge.

Argued September 24, 1999--Decided October 2, 2000

 Before Bauer, Ripple, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit

Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. This appeal comes

to us from a jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff

Lisetta Molnar on her sexual harassment claims

against the East Chicago Community School

Corporation (East Chicago) and Lloyd Booth, the

principal of the junior high school where she

taught. She based these claims on both Title VII

and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. In addition to modest

awards of $500 each on the two theories, the jury

awarded $25,000 in punitive damages against Booth

and the court added $65,760 in attorneys’ fees

against both defendants. The defendants’ appeals

are based principally on the district court’s

denial of their motions for judgment as a matter

of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, though they also

complain about other aspects of the trial, the

fees, and (in Booth’s case) the punitive damages.

Molnar cross-appealed from the court’s decision

to grant judgment as a matter of law on part of

her sexual harassment claim. Finding no

reversible error in any of the court’s decisions,

even taking into account the changed landscape

for sexual harassment claims after the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc.

v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), we

affirm.
I

 The account of the facts that follows presents

them in the light most favorable to Molnar, for

two reasons. To the extent we are considering the

Rule 50 motions filed by Booth and East Chicago,

we are obliged to view the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party--that is,

Molnar. See Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero

Products, Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir.

1995). To the extent we are reviewing the jury’s

verdict, we must view the facts in the light that

supports its verdict. McCalpine v. Foertsch, 870

F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1989); LaMontagne v.

American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405,

1410 (7th Cir. 1984). With respect to the jury

instructions, evidentiary rulings, and

disposition of attorneys’ fees, our review of the

district court’s actions is essentially for abuse

of discretion (though the specific standard for

jury instructions cautions us to make sure that

the law was fairly stated to the jury).

 Molnar began working at Westside Junior High

School, which was part of East Chicago, on August

22, 1994. She had been engaged to teach art

classes as an intern, and she hoped to become

qualified to be a full-fledged teacher at the end

of her internship there. Booth was the principal

of Westside.

 On her first day of work, Booth ogled her and

made appreciative noises. He took her into his

office, closed the door, and put on music. He

then suggested that he and Molnar had much in

common and asked for her telephone number. During

the same conversation, he told her that he could

secure various benefits for her like a permanent

art room--a "perk" that she, like other junior

teachers, did not have--and supplies. She

perceived all of this as a sexual advance, which

made her uncomfortable.

 For a time, Booth’s unwelcome behavior

continued. Over the next three to four weeks he

called Molnar down to his office on a regular

basis during the class period set aside for

planning. He discussed "personal things." She

thought she saw him staring at her from outside

her classroom on several occasions. He showed her

a music room and a wrestling room as potential

art rooms. He invited her onto his boat. He

talked about how difficult it was to meet people

and have relationships and discussed the threat

of AIDS with her. Once he pulled his pants

tightly over his crotch, making Molnar think he

was calling attention to that part of his body.

Molnar felt intimidated by Booth, but she

rejected all of his advances.
 Her spurning of him had rather immediate

repercussions. Booth took back the art supplies

he had given her, and all talk of giving her an

art room evaporated. At one point Molnar asked

the Director of Secondary Education for East

Chicago, Charles Carter, for help in getting a

room. When Booth learned of the inquiry, he

became angry and told Molnar not to go over his

head again. 

 Matters became worse at the end of the school

year. In May 1995, Booth gave the Indiana

Professional Standards Board an evaluation of

Molnar’s internship that could have been

understood as failing her. He specifically failed

her in two categories, but, in a contradictory

move, he also signed the back of the form.

Standing alone, the signature on the back of the

form would have meant that she could get her

license. On the other hand, the negative

evaluation on the face of the form meant that she

could not. The effect of the inconsistent

feedback from Booth meant, according to Molnar,

that she was not in a position to receive the

license. 

 The rest of the evidence supports her view that

the failing evaluation was a serious matter.

Molnar learned of it in October 1995 when union

officials told her about it. She asked them to

file a grievance on her behalf complaining both

about Booth’s sexually harassing conduct and his

retaliation when she rejected him by failing her.

Around the same time, Booth learned that she was

protesting the evaluation, and he warned her,

"you don’t know what you’re getting yourself

into." 

 The union officials followed through by

informing the school administrators of Booth’s

harassing and retaliatory conduct. One School

Board member testified that he had asked someone

to look into the matter, but no one ever talked

directly to Molnar, and in the meantime Booth

continued to haunt her. At the Board meeting of

November 27, 1995, union members formally

presented her grievance. Nothing happened except

Booth’s reappearance in her classroom a week

later, ostensibly to perform another evaluation.

This prompted the union to institute a formal

grievance proceeding. The Board scheduled a

hearing for three weeks after the union’s

presentation, but no hearing ever took place.

Instead, on December 27, the Board overturned the

conclusion that she had failed her internship. It

never made a decision on the sexual harassment

charges, nor did it take any disciplinary action

against Booth, who continued to serve as Molnar’s

principal for the remainder of that school year.
II

 Molnar filed her complaint against Booth and

East Chicago on August 15, 1996. She argued that

East Chicago had violated both Title VII and sec.

1983, and that Booth had violated sec. 1983,

through the sexual harassment she had suffered.

The case went to trial, where both defendants

moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 for judgment as a

matter of law. The district court granted the

motions insofar as they sought to eliminate

Molnar’s claim based on "hostile environment"

sexual harassment (a commonly recognized category

before the Ellerth and Faragher decisions), but

it denied them otherwise. 

 At the trial, over the defendants’ objection,

Molnar presented the testimony of Christine

Kolavo, another woman who had served her

internship under Booth’s supervision. Kolavo

testified that Booth had asked permission to call

and date her, and that when she refused, he had

discontinued his supervision of her and had asked

Vice-Principal Donna Vega to take over. The

defendants’ objection was based on relevancy and

potential prejudice; Molnar defended its

admissibility on three grounds: that it was

admissible to establish retaliatory intent, that

it was proper to impeach Booth’s testimony that

he had never asked out any female employee and

would never do so, and that it tended to show

that East Chicago was on notice of Booth’s

behavior. The district court agreed that it was

relevant to Booth’s intent and not unduly

prejudicial and on that basis admitted it.

 The defendants also object to the court’s

instructions to the jury, which were obviously

drafted before Ellerth and Faragher. The three

instructions at issue, numbers 4-6, all relate

expressly to Title VII liability and thus are

relevant only to the claims against East Chicago.

(Booth makes the erroneous statement in his brief

that because he cannot be liable under Title VII,

he should also be exempt from liability under

sec. 1983. That is not true. See Wudtke v. Davel,

128 F.3d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997) (and cases

cited there). Those three instructions as a whole

clearly showed that the court was restricting the

Title VII theory to East Chicago, as was proper.

The remaining instructions make it clear that it

was asking the jury to evaluate Booth’s conduct

only under sec. 1983.) East Chicago argues that

the three instructions misstated both pre- and

post-Ellerth and Faragher law and that this error

independently requires us to reverse and remand

for a new trial.

 The jury found for Molnar on both her Title VII

and her Equal Protection claims, awarding her
$500 in actual damages against East Chicago on

the Title VII count and $500 against Booth and

East Chicago on the sec. 1983 count. It also

awarded her $25,000 in punitive damages against

Booth on the sec. 1983 count. The district court

entered judgment on the verdict on March 16,

1998. In response to Molnar’s motion for costs

and attorneys’ fees, the court entered a final

order on October 29, 1998, awarding attorneys’

fees in the amount of $65,760 jointly and

severally against Booth and East Chicago. Booth

and East Chicago have appealed from the verdict

and fee orders against them, and Molnar has taken

a cross-appeal from the district court’s Rule 50

order dismissing her hostile environment claims.

III

 A. Appeal of Booth and East Chicago

 Our review of the district court’s denial of

the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter

of law under Rule 50 is de novo. See Deimer v.

Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, supra, 58 F.3d at

343-44. In addition, it is particularly important

here to acknowledge that we apply the law as it

now is, including the Supreme Court’s intervening

decisions in Ellerth and Faragher. See Harper v.

Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97

(1993).

 1. Title VII

 Although Booth’s brief contains some references

to Title VII, we reiterate for the sake of

completeness the fact that the district court’s

instructions clearly indicated that it was not

permitting Molnar to pursue a Title VII claim

against Booth. This was correct, because an

individual supervisor does not fall within the

definition of the term "employer" for Title VII

purposes. See, e.g., Bryson v. Chicago State

Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 1996); Williams

v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).

Thus, the jury was never invited to impose

liability on Booth under Title VII, it never did

so, and Booth has no grounds for complaining

about any ruling of the district court on a Rule

50 motion that addressed his liability under that

theory. 

 East Chicago, in contrast, was Molnar’s employer

and it was therefore potentially liable to her

for a violation of that statute. The district

court also denied East Chicago’s Rule 50 motion

seeking to keep from the jury Molnar’s claim of

sexual harassment. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Molnar, and keeping in

mind the Supreme Court’s guidance in Ellerth and

Faragher for these claims, we find no error in
the court’s decision.

 In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court

established the standards that govern the

liability of an employer for sexually harassing

behavior of a supervisor toward a subordinate

employee. The Court abandoned the prior

distinction, for vicarious liability purposes,

between so-called quid pro quo harassment and

hostile environment harassment, in favor of a

test that distinguished between cases in which

the supervisor takes a tangible employment action

against the subordinate and those in which he

does not. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-65; Faragher,

524 U.S. at 807. The employer’s liability in all

kinds of cases is determined under agency

principles, as the Supreme Court has developed

them.

 In general, employers bear vicarious liability

for the harassment committed by a supervisor, in

accordance with the following rules as summarized

in Faragher:

An employer is subject to vicarious liability to

a victimized employee for an actionable hostile

environment created by a supervisor with

immediate (or successively higher) authority over

the employee. When no tangible employment action

is taken, a defending employer may raise an

affirmative defense to liability or damages,

subject to proof by a preponderance of the

evidence. . . . No affirmative defense is

available, however, when the supervisor’s

harassment culminates in a tangible employment

action, such as discharge, demotion, or

undesirable reassignment.

524 U.S. at 807-08. Regardless of the vocabulary

then in use, Molnar therefore had to have

evidence in the record that, if believed by the

jury, would have shown that she was suffering

from sexual harassment. In addition, the question

whether the harassment led to a tangible

employment action was critical. If so, East

Chicago was liable without more; if not, East

Chicago was entitled in principle to the

opportunity to show (1) that it exercised

reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly

any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that

Molnar unreasonably failed to take advantage of

any preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by her employer or to avoid harm

otherwise. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,

524 U.S. at 807.

 Though we consider it a close call, we conclude

that Molnar did show a "tangible employment

action," as the Court signaled that term should

be understood in Ellerth. Citing with approval
the concept of "tangible employment action" used

in this court’s decision in Crady v. Liberty Nat.

Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th

Cir. 1993), the Court highlighted indicia such as

"termination of employment, a demotion evidenced

by a decrease in wage or salary, a less

distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,

significantly diminished material

responsibilities, or other indices that might be

unique to a particular situation." Ellerth, 524

U.S. at 761. We reaffirmed the Crady test in our

post-Ellerth/Faragher decision in Ribando v.

United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th

Cir. 1999). To similar effect, in Savino v. C.P.

Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1999), we said

that "[a] tangible employment action has to cause

a substantial detriment to the plaintiff’s

employment relationship." Id. at 932 n.8.

 The clearest tangible employment action shown in

Molnar’s evidence was Booth’s confiscation of the

art supplies he had given her--supplies the jury

could have believed were necessary for her to be

able to perform her assigned job. (Indeed, as we

discuss below, the jury was specifically told in

Instruction 6 that it had to find that Molnar’s

reaction to Booth’s advances "affected tangible

aspects of her employment." Its verdict for

Molnar indicates that it did so find.) This

deprivation was not something the School Board

ever fixed. At least as a temporary matter, the

negative evaluation Booth gave Molnar was also a

tangible employment action; the jury could have

believed that it spelled the end of a career for

an intern. The mere fact that the evaluation was

reversed more than six months later and Molnar’s

career put back on track does not diminish its

importance during the time it lasted. To hold

otherwise would mean that harassing supervisors

could demote employees who rejected their

advances with impunity, as long as they later

reversed the demotion and restored the employees

to their former positions. The short duration is

naturally relevant to the degree of damage Molnar

suffered from the evaluation, but the jury’s

verdict of $500 on this claim indicates strongly

that the jury was aware of that fact too.

 If, in the alternative, one were to dismiss the

confiscation of supplies as insufficiently grave

to amount to a tangible employment action, and

one were to recharacterize the evaluation as a

threat of a tangible action instead of a present

detriment, we would turn to the other half of the

Ellerth/Faragher test. Ordinarily, that would

require a remand so that East Chicago could have

the chance to prove its affirmative defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. Remand is not

necessary in all cases, however, as Faragher

itself illustrates. In Faragher, after outlining

its new affirmative defense, the Court concluded
that "[w]hile the City would have an opportunity

to raise an affirmative defense if there were any

serious prospect of its presenting one, it

appears from the record that any such avenue is

closed." 524 U.S. at 808. That was so because the

district court had found that the City had

entirely failed to disseminate its policy against

sexual harassment to its beach employees, its

officials made no effort to monitor the conduct

of its supervisors, and the policy had no

provision for bypassing the problematic

supervisors when someone wanted to register a

complaint. Id. The Court thus held as a matter of

law that the City could not establish the

affirmative defense.

 On the alternate hypothesis that Molnar did not

show a tangible employment action, we find the

same to be true in the present record. East

Chicago does not dispute Molnar’s assertion that

it had no policy specifically aimed at sexual

harassment. The only relevant policy East Chicago

puts forward as a potential basis for an

affirmative defense is the general policy it had

barring discrimination on the basis of race,

color, or sex. That policy was not a sexual

harassment policy: it did not provide any

guidance as to what employees should do in the

face of sexual harassment--it did not even

mention or define sexual harassment. (It is not

surprising, then, that Booth, various other East

Chicago employees, and union officials offered

uncontroverted testimony that they had no idea

(or were extremely confused about) what sexual

harassment was, and what they should do about

it.) Like the City in Faragher, East Chicago thus

could never show that it had exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any

harassing behavior. It could not show that Molnar

unreasonably failed to take advantage of

corrective opportunities it provided, because it

provided none. It did not investigate Molnar’s

grievance; it set a hearing for three weeks

later, which was over twice the normal time

limit, and then it did not conduct one. There was

therefore enough evidence for Molnar to prevail

on this view of the facts as well.

 There is a certain amount of forcing a square

peg into a round hole when we evaluate evidence

and jury instructions that were organized and

drafted under an earlier view of the law

according to a later Supreme Court decision.

Nonetheless, this is the task the Court has given

us in Harper. In addition, since Rule 50 motions

are reviewed de novo in any event, we are free to

see if any rational jury could find in the nonmoving party’s favor. Here we have no trouble

saying that the answer is yes, under the nowgoverning legal standards, and thus we find no
error in the district court’s decision to submit

the case to the jury.

 Our review of the jury instructions on the

Title VII claim, Instructions 4 and 5, is

similarly influenced by later changes. Once

again, the standard of review is a liberal one:

we look at jury instructions only to determine if

taken as a whole they were sufficient correctly

to inform the jury of the applicable law. Maltby

v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 560 (7th Cir. 1994).

Even if the instruction contains errors or

misguides the jury, the error is reversible only

if a litigant is prejudiced. 

 Taken together with Instruction 6, we think

that the jury instructions were adequate. After

reciting the pertinent part of Title VII,

Instruction 4 told the jury that "[a] plaintiff

may establish a violation of Title VII by proving

that she was threatened with or suffered adverse

employment decisions for refusing unwelcome

sexual advances. This type of claim under Title

VII is called a claim of quid pro quo sexual

harassment or sexual discrimination." So far, so

good: Ellerth and Faragher permit both threats

and actual adverse actions to be actionable

(distinguishing between them only for purposes of

the affirmative defense), and it has been clear

since Meritor Sav. Bank F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57 (1986), and Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), that sexual harassment

is encompassed within Title VII’s prohibition

against sex discrimination. Instruction 5 told

the jury that it had to find for the plaintiff on

each of four listed elements:

(1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected

class.

(2) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual

advances, requests for sexual favors or other

verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.

(3) the harassment complained of was based on sex.

(4) that she suffered or was threatened with a

materially adverse change in the terms or

conditions of her employment as the result of her

refusal to comply with the sexual requests and

advances.

Again, even though these would in all likelihood

not be the instructions that would be drafted

today, given Ellerth and Faragher, they

communicate the most important points to the

jury.

 It is the final paragraph of Instruction 6,

however, that led us earlier to resolve our
doubts in favor of concluding that the jury found

an actual tangible employment action. That

instruction was a classic "quid pro quo"

instruction, which told them that the employer

(i.e. East Chicago) was strictly liable for quid

pro quo harassment, which occurs when a

supervisor uses his supervisory authority either

by making submission to requests for sexual

favors a term or condition of the individual’s

employment, or by making submission or rejection

the basis for decisions affecting the individual.

The instruction concluded as follows: "Defendant

School Corporation, the employer, is thus

responsible or liable for the action of

plaintiff’s supervisor in plaintiff’s claim of

quid pro quo sexual harassment if plaintiff

Molnar proves, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that her reaction to Booth’s advance

affected tangible aspects of her employment."

 In our view, these instructions did not so

signficantly misstate the law as to require

vacation of this verdict and remand for a new

trial. In fact, in emphasizing that the action

had to be "based on sex," the district court

anticipated the Supreme Court’s later decision in

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 

 2. Section 1983

 East Chicago purports to challenge the jury

instructions on both Title VII and sec. 1983, but

its brief makes it clear that the only

instructions it is attacking are 4, 5, and 6,

which pertained only to Title VII and which we

have already discussed. It also challenges the

district court’s denial of its Rule 50 motion on

the sec. 1983 claim, arguing that the evidence

did not show the kind of intentional

discrimination that is necessary for a claim

under the equal protection clause. Based on the

evidence, however, we believe this was properly

a question for the jury. For example, the lack of

any policy addressed to sexual harassment was

East Chicago’s responsibility, not Booth’s.

Furthermore, East Chicago offers little in the

way of argument in support of its claim other

than analogies to Title VII. Thus, even if there

were points unique to sec. 1983 that it might

have developed, it did not do so, and we will not

undertake that task.

 As far as Booth is concerned, we have already

noted his error in assuming that because he is

not a proper defendant for Title VII, he cannot

be held individually liable under sec. 1983. That

mistaken premise forms the basis for most of the

rest of his arguments, which point out various
alleged errors in the Title VII jury

instructions. Once again, there was evidence in

the record on which the jury was entitled to

rely, and we see no reversible error in the

district court’s decision to submit the case to

them.

 3. Admission of Kolavo Testimony

 As we noted earlier, Christine Kolavo testified

at trial on Molnar’s behalf. Kolavo was a former

employee whom Booth had supervised. She recounted

an incident in which Booth had followed her out

to her car and asked for her telephone number.

Kolavo refused to give it to him and then

reported the "come on" to Assistant Principal

Vega. Vega then offered to supervise Kolavo

directly. Kolavo did not make any report to the

general school administration.

 The defendants argued that Kolavo’s testimony

was irrelevant and prejudicial; Molnar responded

that it tended to show either Booth’s retaliatory

intent or his discriminatory motive, that it

impeached Booth’s testimony that he had never

asked out a person under his supervision and

would not do so, and that it gave East Chicago

notice of Booth’s conduct. The district court,

whose decision here we review only for abuse of

discretion, admitted it, and did not give an

instruction telling the jury it could be

considered only for impeachment.

 We are not impressed with the argument that

this evidence gave East Chicago notice about

Booth’s behavior, especially because Kolavo

herself did not alert the administration to the

incident. Nor does it show anything about

retaliatory intent, either with respect to Kolavo

herself or with respect to Molnar. Discriminatory

motive, or more accurately modus operandi, comes

closer to the mark. Rule 404(b) allows the

admission of evidence of other acts if it tends

to prove facts like intent, preparation, and

absence of mistake. Booth’s effort to establish

a sexual relationship with Kolavo (which was the

way she saw it) suggests that he intended to do

the same with Molnar and that he was not

accidentally engaged in behavior that could be

misconstrued. This was not the entirety of what

Molnar needed to prove, but the request for

sexual favors was a piece of the evidentiary

puzzle, and as such, evidence tending to make the

existence of that fact more probable was

admissible. See also Fed. R. Evid. 401. In

addition, and perhaps even more clearly, the

evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes.

The fact that no limiting instruction to that

effect was given was the defendants’ own fault,
as they never requested one.

 Finally, even if the Kolavo evidence would have

been better left out (that is, even if the

district court’s decision to allow it was an

abuse of discretion), we find that the error was

harmless. See Fed. R. Evid. 103; 28 U.S.C. sec.

2111. Both defendants took advantage of ample

opportunities at trial to argue that Booth’s

actions toward Kolavo were not discriminatory and

that East Chicago did not derive any notice from

them. Furthermore, the evidence did not report

shocking behavior; it was about a simple social

request that the listener found inappropriate and

that was rebuffed. The jury was thus able to

place this one piece of evidence in its proper

perspective.

 4. Punitive Damages Against Booth

 Booth claims that the jury’s award of $25,000

against him was excessive, because there was

insufficient evidence for it to find that he had

the requisite scienter to support punitive

damages. Unfortunately, he has done little to

preserve this point properly. He never moved for

judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages,

nor did he move for a new trial after the jury

returned its verdict and the trial court entered

its order. Never having asked the district judge

to fix this problem, it is too late in the day to

ask us to do so.

 At least in this procedural posture, we find

nothing reversible here. Under Kolstad v.

American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), a

defendant must behave with malice or reckless

indifference in order for a court to impose

punitive damages on him. Id. at 535. The terms

"malice" and "reckless indifference" "pertain to

the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in

violation of federal law, not its awareness that

it is engaging in discrimination." Id. The Court

specifically rejected an additional "egregious

misconduct" requirement that the court of appeals

had engrafted onto the statute.

 The events here took place in 1994, long after

the law of sexual harassment had become well

established by the Supreme Court. The jury could

have found that Booth (the relevant actor here,

since we are considering only the sec. 1983

theory) acted with malice or reckless

indifference toward Molnar, particularly after

she rejected his advances. Booth also attacks the

amount of the award, $25,000, as grossly

excessive. We realize that this is a significant

amount of money for an individual, but as a

matter of law $25,000 is not so far out of line
that it must be reduced. We upheld a similar

punitive damages award in Merriweather v. Family

Dollar Stores of Indiana, 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th

Cir. 1996), another sexual harassment case.

Assuming as we must that the jury believed

Molnar’s account and not Booth’s, this award is

not "monstrously excessive."

 B. Molnar’s Cross-Appeal

 Molnar’s cross-appeal focuses on the district

court’s dismissal of her "hostile environment"

theory of sexual harassment. But, just as we had

to evaluate the verdict in her favor under

current Supreme Court law, we must evaluate this

part of the case under the current law as well.

Many of the facts Molnar put forth fit more

comfortably under the old "hostile environment"

rubric than they did under the "quid pro quo"

classification: facts like Booth’s habit of

standing outside her classroom and ogling her,

calling her to his office continuously, and

persistently asking for her telephone number to

the point where she started avoiding the

lunchroom and common areas lest she find him

there. But Molnar was able to introduce this

evidence at the trial, and jury instructions 4

and 5 allowed the jury to consider threats as

well as actions. Even though instruction 6 called

for the jury to find an effect on "tangible"

aspects of her employment, the fact is that the

jury did so. Molnar would have a stronger case

for reversal if the jury had rejected her case

under this arguably more demanding standard. The

loss of the chance here to present more squarely

to the jury the question whether the harassment

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to

a hostile environment was unimportant given the

way things worked out.

 It would be pointless in our view to send this

case back for a retrial on a theory that the

Supreme Court has since rejected. Our review of

this record satisfies us that Molnar was able to

put before the jury all relevant evidence, and

the jury was able as a practical matter to

consider the very points it would look at under

a proper Ellerth/ Faragher set of instructions.

We therefore find no reversible error in the

district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of

law on this part of her case.

 C. Attorneys’ Fees

 The district court awarded $65,760 in attorneys’

fees jointly and severally against both

defendants. They assert that it abused its

discretion in doing so (which is the proper
standard of review). We do not find the award to

be so far out of line that it must be

reconsidered. Molnar in the end walked away with

$35,000 in total damages: $1,000 actual damages

on the two counts, and $25,000 punitive damages.

The fees are a little less than double that. In

addition to winning her monetary award, she was

also instrumental in causing East Chicago to

institute a sexual harassment policy in the wake

of her case.

 East Chicago also argues that the fees should

have been apportioned between the defendants,

rather than being imposed jointly and severally,

because the monetary award against it was so much

smaller than the award against Booth. Again, even

though this might have been reasonable, we do not

find the district court’s refusal to do so an

abuse of discretion. When two or more defendants

actively participate in a constitutional

violation, they can be held jointly and severally

responsible for indivisible attorneys’ fees. See

Herbst v. Ryan, 90 F.3d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.

1996). A number of factors govern the decision

whether to apportion or to use joint and several

liability: the relative active or passive role

each defendant played, fairness, and the goal of

reimbursing private attorneys general. Id.

Molnar’s attorneys’ fees were indivisible,

because so many of the issues against the two

defendants were the same or similar. As in

Herbst, Booth could have been seen as an

important moving force behind East Chicago’s

policies (or lack thereof at the pertinent time).

This is enough, in our view, to keep the district

court’s decision within the bounds of its

discretion.

IV

 The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.