United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

William Christie, Plaintiff,

v.

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. and 

others, Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 20-22439-Civ-Scola

Order On Motions to Dismiss

Now before the Court are Defendants Jefferson Insurance Company and 

AGA Service Company’s (the “Insurance Defendants”) motion to dismiss the 

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 17) as well as Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises 

Ltd.’s motion to dismiss count VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 22). For 

reasons stated below, the Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX and X of the complaint (ECF No. 17) and grants 

Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the complaint (ECF No. 22).

The Plaintiff is directed to file his amended complaint in a manner consistent 

with this order by November 3, 2020. 

I. Background1

The Plaintiff William Christie was a passenger on Royal Caribbean’s 

Symphony of the Seas. (ECF No. 1 at ¶8.) In connection with his trip on Royal 

Caribbean’s vessel, Mr. Christie purchased travel insurance from Defendant 

Jefferson Insurance Company, a travel insurance policy underwriter. (ECF No. 1 

at ¶3.) That policy was serviced by Defendant AGA Service Company. (ECF No. 

1 at ¶3.) In connection with this policy, Mr. Christie alleges the Insurance 

Defendants were obligated to provide for “the coordination and supervision of 

emergency medical care for the Plaintiff during the subject cruise.” (ECF No. 1 

at ¶3.) 

While aboard Royal Caribbean’s vessel, on July 1, 2019, Mr. Christie

began experiencing severe back pain and visited the ship’s medical facility, where 

he was treated by Pranjal Pathak, one of the ship’s doctors. (ECF No. 1 at ¶16.) 

Mr. Christie claims his back pain was so severe he was unable to lay on the 

examination table and was “unable to walk.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶16.) As a result of 

1 The Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true for the purposes of 

evaluating the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).

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this, Mr. Pathak gave Mr. Christie certain treatments and suggested he followup with his personal doctor when he was back home in Florida after the cruise. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶18.) 

The next day, July 2, 2019, Mr. Christie’s condition had not improved. Still 

unable to walk, and now unable to have a bowel movement, Mr. Christie returned 

to the ship’s medical facility where a Nurse, Iuliana Bratu, gave Mr. Christie a 

glycerin suppository for his wife to administer to him. (ECF No. 1 at ¶20.) Mr. 

Christie alleges that no medical record was created for this event and he received 

no follow-up from the ship’s medical staff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶20.)

On July 3, 2019, Mr. Christie was still unable to walk and had to return 

to the ship’s medical facility by wheelchair. Mr. Christie alleges that up through 

this point the ship’s doctors, including Dr. Randall Ortel, assumed Mr. Christie 

was suffering from sciatica and after realizing this was not the case, referred Mr. 

Christie to a hospital in Puerto Rico for a lumbar spine MRI and treatment. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶21.) The hospital where Mr. Christie was referred by Royal Caribbean 

did not have an available MRI scanner. (ECF No. 1 at ¶21.) Mr. Christie alleges 

that at this point, he contacted AGA and Jefferson to assist in coordinating his 

emergency medical care. (ECF No. 1 at ¶21.) After attempting to get an MRI at 

the hospital he was referred to, Mr. Christie was told there were no scanners 

available that day and that they would need to come back tomorrow. (ECF No. 1 

at ¶25.) While waiting for his MRI scan, Mr. Christie and his wife attempted to 

arrange through AGA to have Mr. Christie airlifted to a medical facility in Florida, 

however, AGA would not agree to do so until Mr. Christie received an MRI. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶23-25.)

Eventually, the Christie’s chartered their own air ambulance for 

$10,000.00 and had Mr. Christie airlifted from Puerto Rico to a hospital in 

Tampa, Florida. (ECF No. 1 at ¶27.) After being admitted, Mr. Christie was 

diagnosed with cauda equina syndrome and underwent an emergency spinal 

decompression surgery. (ECF No. 1 at ¶28.) Mr. Christie alleges that the delay in 

his obtaining surgery resulted in permanent injury, including paralysis. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶28-32.)

The Insurance Defendants have moved to dismiss counts VII, VIII, IX and 

X of the Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 17) and Royal Caribbean has moved to 

dismiss Count VI of the Complaint on the grounds that it is a facially deficient 

pleading. 

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all the 

complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to 

the Plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Under 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading need only contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). The Plaintiff must nevertheless articulate “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action” will not survive dismissal. Id. In applying the Supreme Court’s directives 

in Twombly and Iqbal, the Eleventh Circuit has provided the following guidance 

to the district courts:

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should 1) eliminate any 

allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 

2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief. Further, courts may infer from the factual 

allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanation[s], 

which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the 

plaintiff would ask the court to infer.

Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App’x 136, 138 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

III. Legal Standards

A. Shotgun Pleadings

“Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.” 

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018). They 

violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), “waste scarce judicial 

resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate 

court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Id. (quotations 

and alterations omitted). When presented with a shotgun pleading, a district 

court “should strike the pleading and instruct counsel to replead the case—if 

counsel could in good faith make the representations required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b).” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) 

(“This is so even when the other party does not move to strike the pleading”). One 

type of shotgun pleading is where a complaint fails to “separate[] into a different 

count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. 

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23, n.13 (11th Cir. 2015). 

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B. Scope of Tort Claim in a Contract Case

The economic loss rule is “a judicially created doctrine that sets forth the 

circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages 

suffered are economic losses.” Koski v. Carrier Corp., 347 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 97 

(S.D. Fla. 2017) (Scola, J.) (quoting Tiara Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan 

Cos., Inc., 110 So. 3d 399, 401 (Fla. 2013)). The rule is the “fundamental 

boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy 

interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care 

and thereby encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others.” Id. 

The rule prohibits parties in contractual privity from suing in tort for purely 

economic losses. Id.; see also Tiara Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 

Inc., 714 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2013). 

In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that “the application of the 

economic loss rule [wa]s limited to products liability cases” but in a concurrence 

to that opinion, Justice Pariente wrote “the majority’s conclusion . . . does not 

undermine Florida’s contract law or provide for an expansion in viable tort claims 

. . . [f]or example, in order to bring a valid tort claim, a party still must 

demonstrate that all of the required elements for the cause of action are satisfied, 

including that the tort is independent of any breach of contract claim.” USI 

Insurance Services LLC v. Simokonis, No. 15-cv-24337-Moreno/O’Sullivan, 2016 

WL 11547701, at *6 (S.D. Fla. April 15, 2016) (internal citations omitted). The 

rule detailed in Justice Pariente’s concurrence is known as the “independent tort 

rule.” That rule prevents a party from seeking recovery in tort for what is actually 

a breach of contract claim. Ca. Inst. of Arts and Tech. v. Campus Mgmt. Corp., 

No. 18-24701-Civ-Smith, 2020 WL 1692079, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2020) 

(Smith, J.). Since the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling, district courts in the 

Eleventh Circuit have split on whether the “independent tort rule remains intact 

following the Tiara decision.” Id. at *6-8 (collecting cases). While some courts 

have held the independent tort rule is still applicable despite the majority’s 

opinion in Tiara, others have found Justice Pariente’s concurrence to be mere 

dicta. 

This Court has recently held in two opinions that the independent tort rule

survived the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Tiara. Accordingly, a Plaintiff 

must plead an independent tort, separate and apart from their contract-based 

claims, in order to have a viable tort claim relating to activities governed by a 

contract. For instance, in Capten Trading Ltd. v. Banco Santander International, 

the Court dismissed negligence claims, among other reasons, because the 

Plaintiff “failed to establish a recognized duty existing outside the parties’ 

contractual relationship” and noted that “fundamental contract principles . . . 

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bar a tort claim where a defendant has not committed a breach of duty 

independent of his breach of contract.” Capten Trading Ltd. v. Banco Santander 

Int’l, No. 17-20264-Civ-Scola, 2018 WL 1558272, at *5 (S.D. Fla. March 29, 

2018) (Scola, J.). Similarly, in Perez v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., the Court again applied 

the independent tort rule, noting the rule had recently been reaffirmed by 

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals. Perez v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 19-

22761-Civ-Scola, 2019 WL 5457746, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2019). Consistent 

with the prior practice of the Court, for a plaintiff to state a viable tort claim 

where that claim is derived from a contractual relationship, the Plaintiff must 

allege all required elements for its cause of action and state a “recognized duty 

existing outside of” that contractual relationship. Capten, 2018 WL 1558272, at 

*5. 

C. Undertaker’s Doctrine

Florida courts have articulated a doctrine, known as the undertaker’s 

doctrine, which states generally that “whenever one undertakes to provide a 

service to others, whether one does so gratuitously or by contract, the individual 

who undertakes to provide the service thereby assumes a duty to act carefully 

and to not put others at undue risk of harm.” Weinberg v. Advanced Data 

Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (Bloom, J.)

(emphasis added) (citing Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 

(Fla. 2003)). Indeed, this doctrine is recognized as an “entrenched aspect of 

Florida tort law.” Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1051 (Fla. 2009). 

Section 342A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the 

appropriate standard for assessing liability where a Plaintiff alleges a cause of 

action pursuant to the undertaker’s doctrine. The Restatement provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 

to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a 

third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for 

physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 

protect his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, 

or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third 

person, or

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(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person 

upon the undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342A. The undertaker’s doctrine has been 

applied by Courts where duties under a contract were allegedly negligently 

performed. See Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 348 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (M.D. 

Fla. 1972) (recognizing applicability of undertaker’s doctrine where store 

contracted with insurer for insurer to make periodic inspections of its premises 

to detect any hazardous conditions). The undertaker’s doctrine creates a duty 

over and above a party’s duty under a contract and therefore can provide the 

basis for an independent tort sufficient to satisfy the independent tort rule. 

IV. Analysis

A. Counts VII and VIII, Breach of contract against the Insurance 

Defendants

The Insurance Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss Counts VII 

and VIII of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that they impermissibly seek 

damages for items “not contemplated under the travel insurance policy.” (ECF 

No. 17 at 7.) Specifically, the Insurance Defendants claim that the travel 

insurance policy at issue provided “specific amounts and types of coverage” 

including “emergency transportation coverage and emergency medical and 

dental coverage” with a “maximum benefit of $500,000 and $25,000, 

respectively. (ECF No. 17 at 7.) The Insurance Defendants assert that the policy 

does “not contemplate coverage for lost income and earning capacity, pain, 

suffering, disability, physical impairment, mental anguish, and all the other tort 

compensatory damages that Plaintiff seeks.” (ECF No. 17 at 7.) In response, the 

Plaintiff argues that he may plead damages related to personal injury resulting 

from negligent performance of a contract. (ECF No. 18 at 10.)

In Florida, the injured party in a breach of contract action may recover 

damages that will put the party in the same position they would have been in 

had the other party not breached the contract. Capital Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Earth 

Tech, Inc., 25 So. 3d 593, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Recoverable damages are 

inclusive of “all damages that are causally related to the breach so long as the 

damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the 

contract.” Id. Damages are “foreseeable if they are the ‘proximate and usual 

consequence’ of the breaching party’s act.” Id. Accordingly, it is not necessary 

that the parties “contemplated the exact injury which occurred as long as the 

actual consequences could have been reasonably expected to flow from the 

breach.” Id. 

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Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Parties’ contract required the Insurance 

Defendants to assist in “coordinating and supervising emergency medical care, 

if needed, during the [Plaintiff’s] cruise vacation.” (ECF No. 18 at 2.) The Plaintiff 

claims that the Insurance Defendants breached their contractual duties by 

failing to coordinate emergency medical services after the Plaintiff began 

experiencing severe back pain which ultimately caused him to suffer permanent 

disabilities, including paralysis. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) While the Insurance 

Defendants claim that the tort-style damages sought by the Plaintiff were not 

contemplated by the Parties it is not necessary that the parties contemplated 

such damages when entering into their contract. Rather, under Florida law, the 

Plaintiff need only plead that his injury was a foreseeable consequence of the 

Insurance Defendants’ breach. Making all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the 

Court finds that the Plaintiff has adequately plead that his injuries were a 

foreseeable consequence of the Insurance Defendants’ alleged failure to perform 

under the contract. Specifically, the Court finds that it is foreseeable that failure 

to adequately coordinate emergency medical services could result in significant 

personal injury which would result in the tort-style damages the Plaintiff seeks. 

Indeed, the Insurance Defendants fail to advance any argument contesting the 

foreseeability of the Plaintiff’s damages. 

In light of the above, the Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ request 

that the Court dismiss Counts VII and VIII of the Plaintiff’s complaint. 

B. Counts IX and X, Negligent failure of the Insurance Defendants 

to coordinate medical care

Next, the Insurance Defendants request the Court dismiss Count IX and 

X of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the Plaintiff fails to allege an 

independent tort beyond the breach of the insurance contract at issue. (ECF No. 

17 at 4.) In response, the Plaintiff argues that his tort claims are proper on three

grounds: 1) a plaintiff may pursue a tort claim based on negligent performance 

of a contract where such negligence results in personal injury; and 2) the 

Insurance Defendants breached their duty to the Plaintiff under the undertaker’s 

doctrine; and 3) the Insurance Defendants’ actions created a foreseeable zone of 

risk giving rise to a duty owed by the Insurance Defendants to the Plaintiff. (ECF 

No. 18 at 3-5.) As stated above, this Court adheres to the independent tort rule

and accordingly, for the Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Insurance Defendants

to survive the Insurance Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff must have 

plead a tort claim independent of the alleged breach of contract. 

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has met its burden. The Plaintiff has 

adequately plead that the Insurance Defendants owed a duty to the Plaintiff 

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under the undertaker’s doctrine and there for has plead an independent tort in 

satisfaction of the independent tort rule. The undertaker’s doctrine requires that 

when the Insurance Defendants agreed to undertake the coordination of 

emergency medical care on Plaintiff’s behalf, by way of contract between the 

parties, the Insurance Defendants had a duty to do so in a manner that did not 

put the Plaintiff at undue risk of harm. See Weinberg, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1365. 

By allegedly negligently performing its duties to coordinate emergency medical 

services under the contract, the Insurance Defendants breached their duty to 

the Plaintiff and that breach arguably caused the Plaintiff’s permanent injuries. 

See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (“It is 

axiomatic that to establish negligence, the passenger must allege 1) duty; 2) 

breach of that duty; 3) causation; and 4) harm.”). The Court therefore finds that 

the Plaintiff has adequately plead a tort independent of the breach of contract 

has been alleged by the Plaintiff. While the Insurance Defendants argue that the 

Counts VII, VIII, IX and X are impermissibly duplicative, the Court notes that 

negligent performance of a contract can give rise to a claim sounding in tort as 

well as one for breach of contract. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Indus. Plants 

Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1977). 

The Court therefore denies the Insurance Defendant’s request that the 

Court dismiss counts IX and X of the complaint. As the Court has found an 

independent tort was plead under the undertaker’s doctrine, the Court need not 

reach the additional grounds raised by the Plaintiff in support of his tort claims 

against the Insurance Defendants. 

C. Count VI, Negligent hiring, selection, retention, monitoring, 

and training of the onboard medical staff and medical facility

by the Defendant Royal Caribbean

In its motion to dismiss, Royal Caribbean asks the Court to dismiss Count 

VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that it is a facially defective 

pleading. (ECF No. 22 at 2-3.) In response, the Plaintiff argues that it has alleged 

sufficient facts in support of Count VI, which seeks relief for “negligent hiring, 

selection, retention, monitoring, and training of the onboard medical staff and 

medical facility.” (ECF No. 1 at 36.) Specifically, the Plaintiff notes they alleged

that: Royal Caribbean “knew or should have known that the medical education 

of the staff . . . did not meet any reasonable standards” (ECF No. 1 at ¶101); a 

reasonable investigation of the ship doctors’ prior training and experience would 

have revealed the doctors were unfit to work on the vessel (ECF No. 1 at ¶102); 

doctors Ortel and Pathak were “not capable, due to their insufficient education, 

training, and experience, to request, advocate for, and arrange a prompt 

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emergency medical evacuation from the vessel for Plaintiff” (ECF No. 23 at 4; see 

also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶103-04); Royal Caribbean failed to “sufficiently verify, 

investigate, background check, and screen the shipboard physicians prior to 

hiring them” (ECF No. 23 at 4; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶106-07) (emphasis in 

original); Royal Caribbean failed to provide adequate training to its medical staff 

regarding “situations where passengers should be transported off of its ships” 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶108); and Royal Caribbean had a duty to monitor the activities 

and abilities of its shipboard medical staff after they were hired and trained and 

therefore fit to be retained. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶108-12.)

The Court agrees with the Defendant Royal Caribbean that the Plaintiff’s 

pleading is deficient. To support its various claims under Count VI the Plaintiff 

must adequately plead facts supporting each of those claims. Gharfeh v. Carnival 

Corp., 309 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1332-33 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (Goodman, Mag. J.). 

Where the Plaintiff’s pleadings, as here, are “fact-free, wholly conclusory, 

boilerplate allegations” that the cruise line knew or should have known about 

alleged deficiencies in the training and performance of its onboard medical staff, 

the Plaintiff has not done enough to plead facts making its claims plausible 

rather than merely possible. Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 16-cv-23733-UU, 

2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (Ungaro, J.); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8. As the Plaintiff’s pleading could be interchangeably alleged against any 

cruise line defendant and its medical staff, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has 

failed to adequately allege viable causes of action under Count VI.

Moreover, the Court finds that Count VI is an impermissible shotgun 

pleading. Count VI attempts to cram multiple, distinct theories of liability into 

one claim. To the extent each theory is a separate cause of action, each must be

asserted independently and with supporting factual allegations. See Garcia v. 

Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1337, n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.) 

(dismissing maritime negligence claim that “epitomizes a form of ‘shotgun’ 

pleading,” where the plaintiff alleged that Defendant owed a duty of “reasonable 

care under the circumstances,” and then “proceed[ed] to allege at least twentyone ways in which Defendant breached this duty”); Brown v. Carnival Corp., 202 

F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Ungaro, J.) (“Simply alleging that 

Carnival owed Plaintiff a duty of ‘reasonable care’ in a conclusory fashion, while 

also pleading [“forty-one”] alleged breaches that purport to impose a heightened 

duty upon Carnival, is not sufficient to state a valid negligence claim under 

maritime law,” and holding that “the burden will remain on Plaintiff to review 

her Complaint and ensure that each factual allegation is supported by law and 

plausible facts, and is alleged in good faith.”); Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 

No. 11-23359-Civ, 2012 WL 2049431, at *5-*6, n.2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012) 

(Scola, J.) (ordering plaintiff to amend complaint to “separately allege an 

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independent count” for various theories of liability that were lumped into a single 

maritime negligence claim); Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 15-

22295, 2015 WL 8227674, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (Lenard, J.) (same); 

Doe, 2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (holding that Plaintiff’s “boilerplate allegations” of 

breach of duty failed to state a claim for negligent hiring and retention, training 

and supervision under maritime law, and ordering Plaintiff to “allege each of 

these three claims in separate Counts” in an amended complaint (emphasis in 

original)); Ciethami v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1349-50 

(S.D. Fla. 2016) (Williams, J.) (holding that maritime negligence claim failed Rule 

8(a), where the Plaintiff’s “shotgun-style recitation[]” of “34 breaches of duty,”

“without any factual context,” makes “any meaningful assessment of her claims 

difficult”); Gharfeh v. Carnival Corp., No. 17-20499, 2018 WL 501270, at *3, *6-

*7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2018) (Goodman, Mag. J.) (dismissing maritime negligence 

count that “improperly commingles claims” as an “impermissible shotgun 

pleading”); Gharfeh, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 1333, n.7 (dismissing negligence claim 

where Plaintiff “has done little more than assert fact-free, wholly conclusory, 

boilerplate allegations” and requiring in any amended pleading that the plaintiff 

“allege facts, not merely labels and boilerplate conclusions”); Ward v. Carnival 

Cruises, No. 17-24628, 2019 WL 342027, at *2-*3, n.1, n.2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 

2019) (Scola, J.) (collecting cases). Further, the Plaintiff must eliminate any 

redundant allegations. 

Given that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts sufficiently 

supporting its claims in Count VI and in further consideration of the fact that 

Count VI is an impermissible shotgun pleading, the Court grants Royal 

Caribbean’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint. 

V. Conclusion

The Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its 

entirety. (ECF No. 17.) The Court grants Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 22) and orders the Plaintiff to replead Count VI of the complaint by 

November 3, 2020. Alternatively, if the Plaintiff wishes to abandon its claims in 

Count VI, the Plaintiff should advise the Court that it wishes to proceed under 

the current complaint, with Count VI dismissed. 

The Court also notes that the Plaintiff requested “the opportunity to 

conduct discovery before amending his complaint so that he may plead his 

claims for negligent hiring, selection, retention, monitoring and training with the 

benefit of [Royal Caribbean’s] employment files for the medical staff at issue.” 

(ECF No. 23 at 6.) The Court denies this request. The Plaintiff is “seeking to 

change the logical sequence of litigation” and “seeks discovery to learn whether 

it may be able to assert a valid claim.” Sovereign Bonds Exch. v. Fed. Republic of 

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Ger., No. 10-219440-Civ., 2011 WL 13100214, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2011) 

(Altonaga, J.) (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly 

instructed that facial challenges to a claim, such as a motion to dismiss, must 

be resolved before discovery begins. Id. (discussing Chudasama v. Mazda Motor 

Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)). Parties may not file insufficient 

complaints with the hopes of receiving discovery to make them sufficient. Id. at 

*2. 

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on October 20, 2020.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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