1Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 96-40554

Summary Calendar

_______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES DOUGLAS IMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

Sherman Division

(4:95-CR-52)

_________________________________________________________________

September 17, 1997

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

James Douglas Impson was convicted pursuant to a twocount indictment alleging that 1) he, acting alone and aided and

abetted by others, maliciously damaged and destroyed, by means of

a fire, a building and personal property used by Mark Dunston’s

Steakhouse, Inc., in interstate commerce and in an activity

affecting interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2

844(i), and 2) he “used a firearm, to wit: a destructive device”

during and in relation to the crime of arson, in violation of 18

U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Impson was sentenced to consecutive terms of

imprisonment of 100 months on count one and 360 months on count

two, concurrent three-year terms of supervised release,

restitution in the amount of $672,492.12, and a special

assessment of $100.

Impson contends that a conviction for destroying a

building under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) precludes an enhanced

punishment under § 924(c)(1) for the use of the incendiary

explosive that caused the destruction of the building. He

asserts that sentencing on both counts constitutes double

punishment for the same crime. Impson also contends that the

conviction and sentence for a violation of § 924(c)(1) violates

the Double Jeopardy Clause, since the same facts were necessarily

used as proof of both offenses. In the recent decision in United

States v. Nguyen, 117 F.3d 796, 797 (5th Cir. 1997), a panel of

our court rejected these same arguments, concluding that

indictment under § 844(i) and under § 924(c)(1) was not

multiplicitous and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

See also United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1428-29 (5th

Cir. 1994). The Nguyen decision forecloses Impson’s arguments.
3

Impson also argues, for the first time on appeal, that

the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution

without considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), which

include a defendant’s financial resources, needs and earning

ability. Impson has failed to show any error, plain or

otherwise. Sentencing judges are accorded broad discretion in

ordering restitution and are not required to make specific

findings on each factor listed in § 3664. See United States v.

Ryan, 874 F.2d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Plewniak, 947 F.2d 1284, 1289 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 1120 (1992). The defendant has the burden of proving that

he cannot pay restitution by objecting and requesting specific

findings on his ability to pay. See United States v. Reese, 998

F.2d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d). Impson did

not carry this burden.

AFFIRMED.