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THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG TRADE ON BORDER

SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 29, 2004

Serial No. 108–250

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform
(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

NICHOLAS COLEMAN, Professional Staff Member and Counsel

MALIA HOLST, Clerk
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 29, 2004 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Barker, Luis E., Chief Patrol Agent, El Paso Sector Border Patrol, U.S.

Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security;

Kenneth Cates, Associate Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, TX, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security;

Errol J. Chavez, Director, New Mexico High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Area; Luis Garcia, Director of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Field Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice; and Steve Swingle,

Acting Aviation Group Supervisor, Albuquerque Air Branch Office of

Air and Marine Operations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

Department of Homeland Security .............................................................. 14

Williams, Captain Richard, commander, District 4 (Las Cruces), New

Mexico State Police; and Sheriff Juan Hernandez, Dona Ana County

Sheriff’s Office ............................................................................................... 77

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Barker, Luis E., Chief Patrol Agent, El Paso Sector Border Patrol, U.S.

Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 17

Cates, Kenneth, Associate Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, TX, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 24

Chavez, Errol J., Director, New Mexico High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Area, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 32

Garcia, Luis, Director of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border

Protection, Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of ... 41

Gonzalez, Sandalio, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Field Division,

Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 48

Pearce, Hon. Stevan, a Representative in Congress from the State of

New Mexico, prepared statement of ............................................................ 9

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 4

Swingle, Steve, Acting Aviation Group Supervisor, Albuquerque Air

Branch Office of Air and Marine Operations, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 55

Williams, Captain Richard, commander, District 4 (Las Cruces), New

Mexico State Police, prepared statement of ................................................ 80

(1)

THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG TRADE ON

BORDER SECURITY

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Las Cruces, NM.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m., at the

Las Cruces City Council Chambers, 200 North Church Street, Las

Cruces, New Mexico, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representative Souder.

Also present: Representative Pearce.

Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member;

David Thomasson, congressional fellow; and Malia Holst, clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. Subcommittee will now come to order.

Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. I’d first like to

thank Congressman Steve Pearce for inviting us to come back to

this region to continue studying the problem of drug smuggling

along the Texas and New Mexico border. I’ve appreciated Congressman Pearce’s leadership and support on drug issues at the House

of Representatives, and I look forward to meeting with him in the

months ahead.

Since the summer of 2001, this subcommittee has been making

a comprehensive study of law enforcement at our Nation’s borders,

including a field hearing last April in El Paso. There have been

some major developments since that hearing in how our Federal

Government approaches the drug trafficking threat, most notably

the reorganization of the former Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the new Department of

Homeland Security.

The Southwest Border remains the primary conduit of illegal

drugs into our country, with up to three-quarters of narcotics coming across it. The Las Cruces-El Paso area in particular has been

the site of some of the worst drug smuggling activity in the country

for decades, and the problem is not going away. Drug seizures here

have risen significantly during this decade, even as they fell in

other parts of the country. It seems that almost every week, law

enforcement agents discover huge quantities of drugs in this area,

especially at the El Paso port of entry. Drug smuggling and the related crime have taken a toll on the environment and the quality

of life for local residents, besides presenting a threat to the entire

Nation.
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Because of the very real threat posed by drug smuggling here

and everywhere else in the Nation, Congress made stopping that

smuggling one of the primary missions of the new Department of

Homeland Security. Taken together, the Border Patrol agents, the

former INS and Customs inspectors, the Customs special agents,

and the former Customs pilots represented America’s front line

against drug traffickers. Without them, we will have little or no defense against smugglers. Thus, it is vitally important that these

agencies remained focused on the narcotics threat.

Today’s hearing is intended to focus on how the various Federal

agencies with counternarcotics responsibility—including the Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement divisions of the Department of Homeland Security, and

the Drug Enforcement Administration—are meeting the problem of

illegal drug smuggling. In particular, we need to closely examine

how well these agencies are coordinating their efforts with each

other, and with their State and local law enforcement partners. It

is my hope that at this hearing we will learn what steps DHS,

DEA and other agencies are taking to improve coordination and cooperation in counternarcotics efforts. I also hope to hear about

what new initiatives our Federal agencies have put in place to stay

ahead of the traffickers. President Bush has made reducing drug

trafficking and abuse of our country a top priority for his administration, and DHS and its partners are vital to achieving that goal

over the long term.

These issues are all very important and extremely urgent, and

we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about ways

to address them. I again thank Congressman Pearce for joining us

today, and for the assistance that he and his staff have provided

to us in setting up this hearing. We also welcome six representatives of the Federal agencies primarily responsible for dealing with

drug smuggling in this region. We welcome Mr. Luis Barker, Chief

Patrol Agent of the US Border Patrol’s El Paso’s Sector; Mr. Kenneth Cates, Associate Special Agent in Charge of ICE’s El Paso Division; Mr. Errol Chavez, Regional Director of the New Mexico Regional Partnership of the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area, a program with the Office of the National Drug

Control Policy, i.e. the drug czar, intended to foster cooperation between Federal, State and local law enforcement; Mr. Luis Garcia,

Director of Field Operations at CBP’s El Paso Field Office; Mr.

Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Division Office; and Mr. Steve Swingle, Acting Aviation Group Supervisor of the Albuquerque Air

Branch of the ICE Office of Air and Marine Operations.

When examining border policies we must of course also seek the

input of representatives of the State and local agencies who also

have to deal with the border drug threat. We welcome the Honorable Louise Peterson, Hidalgo County Commissioner; Captain Richard Williams, Commander of District 4 of the New Mexico State

Police; Sheriff Robert E. Hall of Hidalgo County; and Sheriff Juan
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Hernandez of Dona Ana County. We thank everyone for taking the

time this afternoon to join us for this important hearing.

With that, I’d like to yield to my friend and colleague, Congressman Pearce.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. PEARCE. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder. I appreciate the

subcommittee’s interest in holding a public hearing in southern

New Mexico about its border security problems here in Las Cruces,

New Mexico, the Second Congressional District, which I represent.

Your willingness to travel the long distance to the southern New

Mexico border and assess its critical security situation demonstrates your understanding of the pressing challenges this area

faces, as well as your leadership in seeking solutions to these problems. I’m also pleased the committee will hear from some of our

Nation’s finest, hardest working Federal, State, and local border

law enforcement officials and community leaders.

Mr. Chairman, America’s borders must provide a strong defense

against all illegal activity including the trade of illegal drugs, the

flow of illegal immigration, diseases and other forms of contraband.

This country’s current and future prosperity and security depend

on a border that operates securely and effectively.

But at the same time that we establish security we must maintain a friendly border, one which allows commerce to travel freely

with its legitimate commerce, one which recognizes that families

have family members on both sides of the border and have desires

and needs to be on both sides of the border frequently.

Much of that prosperity is shaped and built in large measure by

international commerce, tourism and immigration. Immigration

originates right here in the southern part of our district. Commerce

and tourism add to our economy’s vitality. Total annual trade with

Mexico more than doubled through the 1990’s to reach more than

$248 million. In fact, Mexico has now surpassed Japan as a U.S.

trading partner. This commerce is critical to business in Southern

New Mexico. Moreover, immigration continues to keep our country

demographically young and enriches our culture. That is why it’s

crucial trying to balance making our borders impermeable to activity that subverts our laws with accessibility for legal activity that

positively contributes to the American economy and society.

President Bush’s leadership in consolidating our border law enforcement agencies into the Department of Homeland Security was

the first step in reaching this very important balance. Since the

Border Patrol functions of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service have been absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, our Nation’s

borders now have a 40,000-person bureau focusing exclusively on

security at and in between ports of entry, a standardized inspection

process, and a unified chain of command between existing operations.

Also, the incorporation of the investigative and intelligence resources of the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration & Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective Service into the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau unifies more than 20,000 employees who focus on the

enforcement of immigration and customs laws within the United

States.

The U.S. Congress has also risen to this challenge by ensuring

that the new Department has the tools it needs to operate secure

and efficient borders. The Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which funds the Customs and Border Protection,
7

provides $9.6 billion for border protection and related activities, an

increase of $630 million over fiscal year 2004 enacted levels. $74

million has been allocated for border security technology, including

surveillance and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Notwithstanding these efforts, there remains a significant need

for greater attention and additional resources to the Mexico-New

Mexico border.

As Customs and Border Protection augments its efforts through

additional money, agents and technology to the more high-profile

southern Border States such as California, Arizona and Texas, New

Mexico’s border law enforcement agencies are left understaffed and

under-prepared for the increased drug trafficking and human

smuggling resulting from the crackdown in other States.

In 1994, INS announced a new Southern Border Strategy to combat activity by placing thousands of new Border Patrol agents in

key high-migration centers. The problem was that the focus was

placed on major population centers, so activity shifted away from

the large cities to the rural, remote areas like what we see here

in Southern New Mexico.

Today, after $19 billion spent for border security and technology

in the last 2 years, DHS has increased its emphasis on Arizona

border security through its Arizona Border Control Initiative. This

Initiative invests $10 million in the Tucson Customs and Border

Protection region to hire more border agents, improve technology

and provide unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs. As a result, more

than 2,000 Border Patrol agents will be assigned to that region.

This makes an average of six agents for each mile of border in Arizona.

However, with only 425 agents in New Mexico, there are fewer

than 2 agents per mile of border. Yet, increasing pressure against

illegal activity on the Arizona border will result in increasing drug

and human trafficking spilling over into New Mexico. In fiscal year

2004, that is just since October, agents in Lordsburg, New Mexico

have made 141 percent more apprehensions than all of last year.

Agents in Deming report a 15 percent increase. Border Patrol

agents in the El Paso sector, which includes all of Southern New

Mexico, have already confiscated 130,000 pounds of marijuana

since October of last year.

The influx of illegal activity spurred by the stratified allocation

of border security resources is not only creating a strain on Federal

law enforcement agencies in New Mexico, but on local communities

and the Federal judiciary system here in New Mexico as well. Our

local governments’ budgets are consistently strained by the disproportionate costs related to the incarceration of illegal immigrants held for drug and human smuggling. While 17 New Mexico

counties have recently been awarded $679,000 from the Department of Justice’s State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, the

funds do not cover the entire cost of incarcerating these individuals.

Furthermore, illegal immigration and narcotics cases are almost

exclusively driving the increase in caseload for the Federal court

here in Las Cruces, which already has the fourth highest criminal

caseload per judge in the Nation. In fact, illegal immigration prosecutions currently account for 85 percent of all criminal cases in
8

the Las Cruces District. Accordingly, I believe a proper examination of the impact of illegal activity on border security in Southern

New Mexico should include the urgency for additional Federal judicial resources as well.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I’m hopeful that the unique, pressing challenges to New Mexico’s southern border security presented

to the subcommittee today will encourage much more focused attention and a greater commitment of Federal resources to this region so that New Mexico’s southern border is an equal partner in

contributing to America’s security and prosperity.

In short, we must succeed in creating a border that interdicts

people engaged in illegal activity, while the same border must be

friendly to the people who have legitimate reasons for coming and

crossing to either side of the border—to visit family, to conduct

commerce, or just engage in tourist activities.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for bringing this valuable subcommittee into New Mexico to look at this increasingly important

problem for us.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearce follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

For those of you who may not be familiar with this particular

subcommittee and our mission, we’re part of the Committee on

Government Reform, which is historically called the Government

Oversight Committee. I chair on the Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources and it has multiple

missions, but historically spends somewhere between 50 and 65

percent of its time particularly on the drug problem, because 23

different committees in Congress have overlapping jurisdiction.

And this was an attempt to consolidate in one committee the overall question of how you tackle the drug issue.

Therefore, increasingly, in addition to oversight, we’ve been given

legislative jurisdiction and authorization jurisdiction. The biggest

example is the drug czar’s office at the Office of National Drug

Control Policy, which would be the highest jurisdiction. Also, a national ad campaign and increasingly smaller bills where, rather

than multiple jurisdiction, committees are putting it into one committee.

So we’re unusual in the sense we’re authorizing in the oversight,

and that we’ve done a variety of different types of hearings, many

very high-profile hearings, during the last administration, and even

in this administration, which you’ll be seeing more of in the next

few weeks on Iraq, but also on Waco and everything from the Travel Office and Whitewater investigations.

Therefore, it’s the tradition, and always has been of this committee, to swear in all witnesses. The truth is, we have had prosecutions in this committee for perjury because this is the way we track

what the government is doing, so that’s the reason you’ll see a little

bit different process in how the committee works.

So first let me take care of two procedural matters. I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit

written statements and questions and answers to questions provided also be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

And second, I ask unanimous consent that all Members present be

permitted to participate in the hearing. Without objection it is so

ordered.

The first panel is composed of six representatives of the Federal

Government. And it’s the tradition of this committee, since it’s a

Federal oversight committee, to always have the Federal witnesses

in the first panel: Mr. Barker of the Border Patrol; Mr. Cates of

ICE; Mr. Chavez of HIDTA; Mr. Garcia of CBP; Mr. Gonzalez of

DEA; and Mr. Swingle of AMO.

It’s our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify under oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

We thank you all and your agencies for your work, and we would

like, when you start, if you could state your name and spell it for

the public record, the court reporter. And we’ll start with Mr. Barker.
14

STATEMENTS OF LUIS E. BARKER, CHIEF PATROL AGENT, EL

PASO SECTOR BORDER PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;

KENNETH CATES, ASSOCIATE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,

EL PASO, TX, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ERROL J. CHAVEZ,

DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA; LUIS GARCIA, DIRECTOR OF FIELD OPERATIONS,

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; SANDALIO GONZALEZ, SPECIAL

AGENT IN CHARGE, EL PASO FIELD DIVISION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND STEVE SWINGLE, ACTING AVIATION GROUP SUPERVISOR, ALBUQUERQUE AIR BRANCH OFFICE OF AIR AND

MARINE OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. BARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Luis E.

Barker, B-A-R-K-E-R, first name L-U-I-S, Luis.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, I am pleased

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the El

Paso Border Patrol Sector’s law enforcement initiatives to secure

the U.S. border in New Mexico and West Texas, with regards to

the extent and the impact of narcotics trafficking, interdiction and

our interaction with all the Federal, State and local agencies to address this concern. Again, my name is Luis Barker, I’m the Chief

Patrol Agent for the El Paso Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol, a

branch of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security.

Let me begin by thanking you and your colleagues, on behalf of

all CBP, for your continued support, as we pursue our primary mission of preventing the entry of terrorists and their weapons of terror; and enforce laws that protect America’s homeland by the detection, interdiction and apprehension of those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle persons or contraband across our Nation’s

sovereign borders. The challenges for securing our borders and protecting our homeland are many and ever changing. CBP’s goal is

to increase our operational effectiveness to the point where the

likelihood of apprehension is high enough to be an effective deterrent. We continue to improve our capabilities by adding or shifting

resources as required. Although the strategy of deterrence was developed with immigration issues in mind, it has equal effect on

narcotics smuggling.

The El Paso Sector is responsible for securing the 289 miles of

border between the ports of entry in Texas and New Mexico. To accomplish this, we have established four Border Patrol stations in

the two westernmost counties in Texas, and eight stations in the

State of New Mexico. This sector’s vast area of operations is divided into three main corridors: The Deming Corridor, the El Paso

Corridor, and the Fabens Corridor. Narcotics smuggling is active in

all of these corridors.

The border area we secure is unique in that we must control both

land borders across New Mexico, and a water border defined by the

Rio Grande River. In many areas only a barbed wire fence, if anything, marks the border. As a deterrent, we continue to place light-
15

ing, fencing, and vehicle barriers in many areas such as Sunland

Park, New Mexico and Deming. This has proven to be effective in

controlling illegal entries, especially of vehicles carrying contraband, to include narcotics.

Although physical barriers and lighting assist in border control,

additional technology has proven to be a great deterrent and a

‘‘force multiplier’’ for our Agents. Remote Video Surveillance Systems, sensors, radiation pagers, night vision equipment, density

meters, and other tools are a great asset. In addition, better data

on criminals, or wanted subjects assists us in locating subjects and

in determining their true identity.

Large population centers on both sides of the border helps make

the El Paso area ideal as a major hub for smuggling of people, narcotics and other contraband. Highways, hotels and other infrastructure attract both legitimate trade and travel, and unfortunately

those adept in illicit activities. To maintain control of the border,

we use both forward deployment—that is patrolling immediate border—and secondary operations such as traffic checkpoints and task

force initiatives with other agencies. We have agents that liaison

with the DEA; the FBI; Joint Terrorism Task Force; the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA office; U.S. Marshal’s Task

Force; U.S. Attorney’s Office; and State and local law enforcement,

including the Sheriff’s Office.

Furthermore, we work daily with officials from the Mexican Government through our Mexican liaison Unit to address our concerns

of the border. We have been very successful in identifying, apprehending and prosecuting law violators through these efforts.

We continue to employ every available means at our disposal to

combat illegal activity which occurs in this area. Besides coverage

on the border, we maintain six permanent traffic checkpoints, five

of which are in the State of New Mexico. Checkpoint operations are

an essential component of our enforcement strategy, and from fiscal

year 2002 to the present they have accounted for 18 percent of our

narcotics seizures, and virtually all seizures involving cocaine and

heroin.

The purpose of these checkpoints is to detect and interdict, terrorists, undocumented immigrants, contraband and weapons of

mass effect. As a result of these checkpoint operations, we frequently encounter violators of law and persons wanted for crimes

such as narcotics smuggling, murder, and assault. Improvements in

information access and the expansion of the Integrated Automated

Fingerprint Identification System, or AAFES have assisted us

greatly in this regard. With these resources, we have identified

2,613 criminal aliens in fiscal year 2004, some 300 of which were

wanted for various crimes ranging from assault to weapons violations.

Over the past three fiscal years, 2002, 2003 and 2004, we have

interdicted large quantities of narcotics. Historically, this has been

the norm and we anticipate that this will continue, as efforts to

dismantle cartels such as the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel continue. The

principal narcotic seized has been marijuana. Since October 2003,

agents have seized approximately 156,777 pounds of marijuana,

511,000 pounds since fiscal year 2002. We have also seized approximately 1,521 pounds of cocaine, 3,505 pounds since fiscal year
16

2002. And 22.5 pounds of heroin, 22.5 pounds since fiscal year

2002. Cocaine and heroin seizures have been on the rise and have

more than doubled since fiscal year 2002.

As I’ve stated, cocaine and heroin are mainly interdicted at our

checkpoint operation. Most narcotic cases are prosecuted federally,

and those that fall below the Federal threshold are prosecuted by

State and local authorities. This is possible because of the close

working relationship developed in our counternarcotic efforts.

A key component of our counternarcotics effort is our canines.

We have 57 canine teams assigned to the stations and checkpoints.

They are on call 24 hours a day to assist agents in the field and

other agencies as requested. These teams have been highly effective in both detecting people and narcotics. With regards to narcotics, during the same time periods previously mentioned, fiscal

years 2002, 2003 and 2004, our canine teams have assisted in the

seizures of approximately 299,000 pounds of marijuana, 3,348

pounds of cocaine, and 23 pounds of heroin. In May 2004 alone, one

canine handler assisted three local and one Federal law enforcement agency in separate callouts. This resulted in the seizure of

1,285 pounds of marijuana, 89 pounds of cocaine, and $5,678 in

currency.

Interdiction efforts often cause smugglers to resort to extraordinary measures to avoid apprehension. They are more likely to

flee from agents and use violence, by using their vehicles as weapons, or use of firearms to protect their cargo. On October 12, 2002,

a female agent assigned to the Fort Hancock Station was shot in

the leg while attempting to interdict a narcotics load. She survived

and has returned to full duty. Despite the desperation of the smugglers, our agents continue to be vigilant in protecting our borders.

I would like to add that the men and women of the El Paso Sector are committed to the safety and security of the Nation’s borders, no matter the threat—whether from terrorists, undocumented

immigrants or narcotics smugglers. I’m extremely proud of the

commitment and professionalism of these men and women and the

important role they play in our national security. And I also assure

you that this degree of dedication and vigilance will continue, despite operational challenges.

I am confident also of your continued support, and I thank the

subcommittee for this opportunity to be present to provide my testimony today. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that

you might have at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barker follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Our second witness is Mr. Cates, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso ICE division of Customs Enforcement.

Mr. CATES. My name is Kenneth Cates, C-A-T-E-S. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you to discuss the ‘‘Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security.’’ My name, as I said

before, is Kenneth Cates. I’m the Deputy SAC of the El Paso District, and I represent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

which is the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security. ICE is charged with the mission of preventing terrorist and criminal activity by targeting the people, money, and

materials that support terrorist and criminal organizations. One of

our key goals within that larger mission is to detect and address

vulnerabilities in our border security. These vulnerabilities include

the threats posed by criminal organizations engaged in the smuggling of illegal narcotics and other contraband across our Nation’s

borders.

ICE’s combined capabilities, bringing together the expertise and

the authorities of the former U.S. Customs Service and the former

Immigration and Naturalization Service, make it a powerful weapon in the fight against smuggling and narco-trafficking organizations. This expertise is further augmented by the assets and the

abilities of the ICE Air and Marine Operations. With these newly

combined investigative authorities and expertise, ICE is uniquely

positioned to address the threats posed by criminal smuggling organizations.

Consider, for example, ICE’s creation of a unified smuggling division. Prior to our reorganization into DHS, enforcement authorities

for drug and contraband smuggling and enforcement authorities for

human smuggling were the exclusive province of separate agencies.

Unfortunately, criminal smuggling organizations do not observe the

same careful divisions of labor. Motivated by profit, they may

smuggle narcotics 1 day and human ‘‘cargo’’ the next, shifting their

tactics in response to demand, profit margins, and enforcement patterns. By combining these authorities and investigative expertise,

we can now target these organizations much more effectively,

whether they are trafficking in drugs, weapons, illegal aliens, or

even terrorists.

Moreover, with its financial investigations capabilities, ICE is

able to follow the money trails that support these criminal smuggling organizations. Under Operation Cornerstone, our comprehensive economic security initiative, ICE has the ability to follow the

money trails that support smuggling, criminal, and terrorist organizations. With Cornerstone, ICE brings to bear one of the most sophisticated financial investigations Divisions in law enforcement to

detect these financial schemes, disrupt the flow of money, and dismantle these criminal organizations.

In coordination with our counterparts from U.S. Customs and

Border Protection and the DEA, we are utilizing these newly combined law enforcement capabilities as a part of a focused and integrated strategy to combat the flow of illegal narcotics and contraband across our Nation’s borders—particularly here along the

Southwest Border.
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For many years, the Southwest Border region has been a preferred point of entry for many drug smuggling organizations, and

a result of this has been a major focus for drug interdiction. The

ease with which narcotics can be smuggled into the United States

underscores the seriousness of this vulnerability. The U.S. Southwest Border stretches across 3300 kilometers and boasts an extensive network of Ports of Entry and border crossings, as well as a

number of documented areas where unofficial crossings occur. Established routes, organizations, and methods used to smuggle one

commodity, such as narcotics, could easily be exploited to smuggle

others, such as people, bulk cash, small arms, contraband, or even

weapons of mass destruction.

I would emphasize that these smuggling and narco-trafficking organizations are flexible and adaptive. When we increase seizures at

one point, they frequently shift their operations elsewhere, where

there is less perceived resistance from law enforcement. I will emphasize also these criminal smuggling organizations are often highly sophisticated. Along with their criminal experience, they have

developed an acute knowledge and awareness of U.S. border security and enforcement operations, so that they can change their tactics in response to new enforcement patterns.

One particular area of concern is the increase of methamphetamine usage and investigations along the Southwest Border. It is

believed that due to the increased seizures and enforcement operations along the Northern Border, as well as pressure being placed

by Canadian law enforcement on importation of pre-cursor chemicals, we may be seeing more methamphetamine smuggling investigations along the Southwest United States. ICE investigators,

working in cooperation with Federal, State, and local law enforcement, will continue to track trends and developments in the methamphetamine trade.

Despite the decrease in reported seizure numbers from fiscal

year 2003 to currently in 2004, we must not be complacent in believing that drug smuggling organizations will not continue to

probe our Nation’s borders for easier methods and routes to smuggle narcotics into the United States. I can assure you that we will

continue to carry on our mission of securing our Nation’s borders

and protecting our homeland from threats posed by criminal and

terrorist organizations.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the

members of the subcommittee for the privilege to testify before you

today. It’s my pleasure to answer any questions that the committee

may have at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cates follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. I thank you for your testimony.

Next is Mr. Chavez, regional director of the New Mexico partnership of the HIDTA.

Mr. CHAVEZ. It’s Errol Chavez, E-R-R-O-L, C-H-A-V-E-Z. Chairman Souder, Congressman Pearce and distinguished members of

the subcommittee and honored guests, it is indeed my distinct

pleasure to appear before you today. Again, my name is Errol Chavez, the Director of New Mexico High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Area, HIDTA. On behalf of the members of the New Mexico

HIDTA, I would like to thank this subcommittee for your continued

support of the HIDTA and its mission.

There is a notable increase in the amount of narcotics entering

into the United States through New Mexico. Recent narcotic seizures are directly linked to the impact that the Mexican and the

U.S. Governments are having on the heads of the Mexican cartels.

The results of our enforcement efforts have lowered the level of

control of at least two Mexican cartels, while increasing the level

of control of two Mexican cartel leaders, Ismael ‘‘Mayo’’ Zambada

Garcia and Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, thus increasing the amount

of narcotics entering the United States through New Mexico.

While the amount of marijuana entering into the United States

remains constant, other narcotics trafficking is on the rise. This is

evidence that a growing amount of cocaine is being funneled

through New Mexico for distribution throughout the United States.

Methamphetamine production in Mexico is also increasing and is

entering through New Mexico for the U.S. market. Heroin continues to be readily available. In New Mexico, the impact of narcotics

trafficking has become increasingly significant.

The entire State of New Mexico is affected by these Mexican cartels and each of the drugs they traffic through the State. Marijuana

seizures continue to be made around the State. The marijuana

market is dominated primarily by Mexican traffickers, but there is

also evidence that marijuana is being grown in New Mexico. Marijuana is also being grown in California and Arizona and does cross

New Mexico’s borders, but is usually destined for the northeastern

coast of the U.S. multi-ton marijuana seizures occur annually along

the Southern New Mexican Border and the three interstate arteries, I–40, I–25 and I–10.

Marijuana is smuggled into New Mexico at the ports of entry and

between the ports of entry. The exact location of the smuggling varies depending on the enforcement efforts of the Border Patrol

Agents and the Customs and Border Protection Inspectors. In comparison to the other Southwestern Border States, New Mexico has

fewer Border Patrol agents assigned to patrol the border between

New Mexico and Mexico and fewer CBP inspectors to man the

ports of entry, thus allowing smugglers more opportunities to

smuggle narcotics into New Mexico, and therefore increasing the

threat to New Mexico.

Cocaine seizures are on the rise in New Mexico. The noticeable

increase in cocaine-related activity is directly related to increases

in law enforcement efforts in California and Arizona.

Methamphetamine is of major concern to New Mexico as it is

still the most favored drug for abuse. In general, methamphetamine is produced in Mexico in its purest form and then smuggled
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into the United States in bulk quantities, where it passes through

New Mexico for distribution into other parts of the United States.

Methamphetamine also comes into New Mexico for personal use

from mid-level distributors from Arizona and California.

Additionally, methamphetamine is produced in small quantities

in New Mexico by users, but in such small amounts it only reaches

the personal use level. The number of methamphetamine laboratories has more than doubled from 1998 through 2002. Most of

these laboratories were small operations designed to produce two

ounces or less at a time, making methamphetamine more available.

Nevertheless, the growing threat of small clandestine laboratories

cannot be overlooked, especially given the environmental and

health-related issues associated with methamphetamine lab byproducts, the high costs and manpower requirements involved in

each cleanup, and the increasing number of residential fires associated with methamphetamine laboratories.

While a significant amount of narcotics simply passes through

the State for distribution elsewhere, a reasonable amount remains

in New Mexico for local distribution and consumption. Two counties in Northern New Mexico, Rio Arriba County and Santa Fe

County rank one and two in the Nation for heroin overdoses per

capita. Heroin abuse has been a persistent problem for generations,

but the addict population continues to grow steadily as a result of

the location of the main supplier. The primary source of supply for

heroin is located in Nayarit, Mexico.

The magnitude of the heroin problem was best described in 1999

at the culmination of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Operation Tar Pit. Over 200 heroin distributors were arrested in 17

States, all of which were linked to the Nayarit source of supply.

Since the arrests, statistics clearly show that the overdose rate in

New Mexico dropped for a short period of time, but is now approaching peak levels despite valiant efforts to address the heroin

problem. In order to adequately combat the heroin dilemma in New

Mexico, added personnel and funding resources are desperately

needed.

As a result of the implementation of North American Free Trade

Agreement, known drug traffickers are exploiting commercial trade

to facilitate their drug smuggling activities. Drug traffickers are

now directly involved with well-known legitimate trucking firms

that are less likely to be targets of law enforcement scrutiny. They

are using trade consultants to determine what merchandise moves

most quickly across the border under NAFTA regulations. They are

also owners or controlling parties in commercial trade-related businesses within the Mexican transportation infrastructure.

Once an international drug smuggler succeeds in importing contraband into the United States, the Southwest Border becomes a

gateway for narcotics destined for major metropolitan areas. Drug

traffickers obtain warehouses in Texas and Southern New Mexico

to ‘‘stash’’ the drugs and then recruit drivers from these areas to

transport the drugs to various destinations throughout the United

States.

The response from my Federal law enforcement agencies——

Mr. SOUDER. Wait, Mr. Chavez, we’re going to need to have you

summarize this last section.
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Mr. CHAVEZ. Yes. I was going to skip a page, as a matter of fact.

My emphasis, if I may, is to discuss the lack of staffing by Federal

agencies on the Southwest Border. The Drug Enforcement Administration does maintain a presence along the border, but because of

the number of newly identified investigations, the work that is

being done by the Border Patrol and the increased flow of narcotics

has resulted in the Drug Enforcement Administration being understaffed and not capable, and experiencing difficulty in responding

to all of the requests. Therefore, the HIDTA’s trying to create these

task forces so we can have a multiple effect in force—in developing

these investigations.

If I may, as a matter of conclusion, New Mexico is expecting a

shift in the smuggling patterns of the Mexican cartels operating

along the U.S. Southwestern Border with Mexico. More drugs are

expected to pass through New Mexico for distribution throughout

the United States. This does not mean that more drugs will be

smuggled into the United States, but it does mean that more drugs

than ever will be funneled through New Mexico.

To address the increase in drug smuggling and the rise in criminal activity in New Mexico, the Federal Government should continue to emphasize the importance of enforcing the narcotics laws

and provide the necessary staffing and resources desperately needed along the entire Southwest Border. Federal, State and local police agencies in New Mexico are performing and coordinating their

duties well, but are all severely understaffed and lack resources to

adequately contribute in the Nation’s effort to stop the narcotics

from entering the United States.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chavez follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. And all of your full statements will be

in the record. And we’ll probably have some more questions about

the Santa Teresa area, and a few other areas.

Next witness is Mr. Luis Garcia, Director of Field Operations, El

Paso Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS.

Mr. GARCIA. Good afternoon. My name is Luis Garcia, spelling LU-I-S, G-A-R-C-I-A, and I am the Director of Field Operations for

Customs and Border Protection in El Paso, TX.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank

you for this opportunity to appear today to discuss the efforts of the

Customs and Border Protection Officers under the El Paso Field

Office in interdicting narcotics arriving in the United States

through the various ports of entry in Western Texas and New Mexico.

The CBP’s El Paso Field Office is responsible for the management of five ports of entry, encompassing 10 border crossings,

spread along more than 550 miles of border with Mexico. These five

ports of entry are staffed by nearly 1,000 inspection officers, including 86 canine enforcement officers. During fiscal year 2003, these

officers seized more than 223,000 pounds of marijuana, 3,100

pounds of cocaine, and 200 pounds of heroin. These figures represent 24 percent of all the marijuana, 4 percent of all the cocaine,

and 5 percent of the entire heroin seized at all the ports of entry

nationwide last fiscal year.

This fiscal year, approximately 40 percent of the marijuana

seized at the ports of entry under the El Paso Field Office has been

found in commercial trucks. This method of smuggling has been a

growing threat for several years now and we have introduced several forms of non-intrusive inspection technology to address the

threat.

Every port in western Texas and New Mexico through which

commercial trucks enter the United States has at least one largescale unit capable of inspecting complete trucks at a minimum rate

of six trucks per hour. Obviously, this does not permit us to examine all trucks with this technology, but additional units are being

added. At this time, approximately one of every five trucks arriving

through the port of El Paso is processed through this non-intrusive

inspection technology. Inspection rates at the smaller ports are

much higher.

We have entered into partnerships with shippers, importers and

transporters in an effort to more effectively address both the terrorist threat and the smuggling of narcotics through our ports of

entry. One of the latest forms of these partnerships is called Free

and Secure Trade, or FAST. Under the FAST program, the shipper,

importer, transporter and driver are all vetted before program participation is allowed. We know with whom we are working and they

know what is expected of them. And as a further means of ensuring compliance, non-intrusive inspection units are dedicated to the

FAST program so the arriving FAST trucks can be inspected at a

much higher rate than non-FAST carriers.

Currently in El Paso, 60 percent of all arriving FAST shipments

are x-rayed upon arrival. We want to be very sure this program is

not compromised. With dedicated equipment, we are able to inspect

at a much higher rate and still process and release the shipments
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much faster than we do those shipments that are not part of the

program.

The port of El Paso also receives commercial shipments by rail

across two bridges from Ciudad Juarez. We now have non-intrusive

inspection technology installed at each of these bridges and are inspecting all arriving trains as they cross the bridges.

If we find 40 percent of the marijuana in the commercial trucks,

where do we find the balance of the marijuana, along with the cocaine and heroin? Nearly all of it has been found in private vehicles. The five ports of entry under my Field Office process—on average—more than 45,000 private vehicles every day. From this, we

average 4.5 narcotic seizures per day, or one seizure for every

10,000 private vehicles that we process.

Since our non-intrusive inspection technology is aimed toward

the large loads in commercial trucks where the average seizure is

2,400 pounds, nearly all loads in the private vehicle environment

are found due to the hard work of individual inspectors and canine

officers working with our highly trained narcotic detector dogs.

I don’t want to give you the impression that we work alone, ignoring the valuable contributions of other agencies with whom we

work in our counter-drug activities. Our ICAT dedicated intelligence unit has elements from both Immigration and Customs Enforcement and, from within the CBP, the Border Patrol, working

alongside our inspectional personnel.

We know that technology alone will not stop drug smuggling. It

never has. It never will. The hardworking, dedicated men and

women that I am proud to lead are our best means for interdicting

drugs and for deterring the smuggling organizations. Were it not

for the efforts of these motivated public servants, an additional 113

tons of marijuana, cocaine and heroin would have been on the

streets of the United States last year. The men and women of Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Field Operations, assigned

to the ports of entry in western Texas and New Mexico, working

in cooperation with CBP’s Border Patrol between the ports of entry,

as well as with ICE agents, have made a difference. And they will

continue to do so. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Mr. Sandy Gonzalez, Special Agent in

Charge for DEA El Paso Field Division. It’s good to have you in

front of our subcommittee.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it

is my pleasure to again appear before you. My name is Sandalio

Gonzalez. That’s S-A-N-D-A-L-I-O, G-O-N-Z-A-L-E-Z, and I am the

Special Agent in Charge of the El Paso Field Division of the Drug

Enforcement Administration. On behalf of DEA Administrator

Tandy and the men and women of the DEA, I thank the subcommittee for your continuous support of the DEA mission.

Throughout our 30-year history, the DEA has taken a leadership

role in fostering cooperation among law enforcement agencies combating this scourge of drug trafficking. The drug trafficking threat

facing Southern New Mexico far exceeds the capabilities of the

DEA or any other single law enforcement agency. Effectively targeting drug trafficking organizations and successfully disrupting

their organizations requires partnerships among government agencies at all levels. DEA promotes these partnerships in order to establish effective mechanisms to bring about this cooperation.

Our Las Cruces resident office is a HIDTA-designated task force,

and it is responsible for the 12 southernmost counties in New Mexico. One of its primary missions is response to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection checkpoint seizures and arrests, as

well as significant seizures made at the two New Mexico Department of Motor Vehicles ports of entry is Southern New Mexico.

This mission alone consumes about 60 percent of our agents’ time.

The DEA also focuses significant resources toward identifying, targeting and dismantling priority drug trafficking organizations at

the local, regional and international level.

In order to accomplish this mission, we depend upon significant

contributions from our local, State and Federal counterparts in

terms of intelligence, manpower, and resources.

DEA continues to foster cooperative investigative endeavors

throughout Southern New Mexico, and has been especially successful in conducting long-term investigations with HIDTA task forces

in Southern New Mexico. We all want to cooperate and share intelligence. The challenge is how best to promote cooperation and intelligence sharing in our unique environment in an efficient and costeffective manner.

All Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies in Southern New Mexico are faced with the same challenges. Geography,

limited law enforcement presence, a support system that is currently overwhelmed as a result of the substantial increase in immigration and drug trafficking prosecutions, and a multi-faceted nature of the drug trafficking threat in the region. Our Las Cruces

office operates both under the auspices of the HIDTA program, as

well as on an agency-to-agency basis.

Las Cruces is comprised of a cross-section of local, State and Federal task force officers. The multi-agency staffing lays a solid foundation for enhanced cooperation. Were it not for the enhanced resources and manpower provided by all local, State and Federal

agencies, the DEA would be hard pressed to effectively conduct
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both this border referral and major conspiracy investigative mission.

An example of cooperation between the DEA Las Cruces Office

and its law enforcement counterparts in Southern New Mexico is

the investigation and severe disruption of a local cocaine trafficking

and distribution organization operating in Las Cruces and Dona

Ana County.

In the fall of 2002, the DEA, FBI, New Mexico State Police and

the Las Cruces-Dona Ana Metro Narcotics Unit, identified a significant cocaine trafficking organization based in Michoacan, Mexico.

We realized that we were targeting the same organization, and

HIDTA, through enhanced liaison and intelligence sharing, pooled

our intelligence and investigative resources to target this organization. Utilizing HIDTA, OCDETF, and Special Operations Division

resources, we were able to obtain 37 Federal and 71 State level indictments against this organization. The impact of this operation

remains evident to this day, as the current purity level of cocaine

being sold in Las Cruces and Dona Ana County is now nearly half

of what it was prior to the onset of this operation. None of the participating agencies could have achieved this success on their own.

The Las Cruces office also leverages border referral investigations by conducting controlled deliveries of seized narcotic loads to

their destination cities. These controlled deliveries are time-sensitive and require extensive coordination, both within DEA as well

as other law enforcement agencies.

An example of such coordination was a controlled delivery of cocaine conducted by the Las Cruces Office to Colorado Springs, Colorado. An integral part of this controlled delivery was the effective

coordination and use of ICE Airwing assets to transport our agents

and the cooperating defendant to Colorado. This operation resulted

in the arrest of two additional subjects and the seizure of over

$300,000 in cash.

The long-term effects of this controlled delivery continue to pay

dividends for our DEA counterparts in Colorado, and none of this

would have been possible without effective coordination and the

participation of the ICE Airwing. DEA fully supports the mission

goals and objectives of the New Mexico HIDTA program to enhance

and coordinate New Mexico’s drug control.

We are an active participant in the New Mexico HIDTA and its

Intelligence Center. We support the New Mexico HIDTA Intelligence Center’s mission of fully integrating New Mexico’s counterdrug law enforcement information architecture and the sharing of

intelligence, not only in New Mexico, but throughout other jurisdictions in the United States.

While law enforcement in Southern New Mexico has improved

over the past years, we can do better. We fully support the ongoing

efforts of the New Mexico HIDTA to increase cooperation and intelligence sharing in its comprehensive strategy for increasing intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities. Our citizens deserve nothing less than our ongoing efforts to combat drug traffick-
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ing.

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today, and I’ll be able to answer your questions. Thank

you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzalez follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Our last witness on the first panel is Mr. Steven Swingle, Acting

Aviation Group Supervisor of the Albuquerque Air Branch Office of

Air and Marine Operations, ICE Division of the DHS.

Mr. SWINGLE. Thank you. My name is Steve Swingle, S-W-I-NG-L-E, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Air

and Marine Operations.

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pearce, distinguished subcommittee members. It’s a pleasure to appear before you today and

to share an operational view of the U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Office of Air and Marine Operations on ‘‘The Impact

of the Drug Trade on Border Security.’’ Let me begin by expressing

my appreciation for your interest in this critical national security

matter and for your continued support of the men and women of

the Department of Homeland Security who put their lives on the

line daily to secure our borders against smuggling organizations

and potential terrorists.

ICE’s Office of Air and Marine Operations protects our Nation’s

people and critical infrastructure by using an integrated and coordinated air and marine force to deter, interdict, and prevent potential acts of terrorism arising from the unlawful movement of

people and goods across the borders of the United States.

AMO’s three core competencies—air and marine interdiction, air

and marine law enforcement, and airspace security—provide critical, rapid, and flexible support to the Department of Homeland Security’s counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and counter-smuggling

operations at sea, on our borders, over our cities, and across our

Nation’s interior.

As an air and marine law enforcement agency, AMO employs 133

aircraft and 72 marine assets to meet many of the Nation’s critical

homeland security needs. The majority of AMO’s 1,000 personnel

are operationally deployed—primarily along the southern border.

Major AMO facilities are located in Texas, Florida, New Mexico,

Arizona, Louisiana, California and Puerto Rico. In addition, the

first two of five planned Northern Border Branches are being

launched in Bellingham, Washington, and Plattsburgh, New York

this year. Currently, AMO branches across the country provide personnel and assets on temporary duty to enforce airspace security

over Washington, DC, and for other sensitive locations and events

throughout the Nation as designated.

Also, in support of Presidential Decision Directive–14, AMO routinely deploys internationally to conduct counter-drug missions in

source and transit zones.

The focus of today’s hearing is drug trafficking on the southern

border. I would like to highlight how AMO contributes to the fight

against narcotics trafficking. In fact, AMO’s legacy mission was

born in the fight against illegal movement of drugs and people by

air and sea—mainly across our Southwest Border.

While AMO has been tasked with new missions in the post-September 11, 2001 strategic environment, the agency remains dedicated to our legacy missions because those threats remain as urgent as ever.

In particular, existing smuggling routes and networks represent

a new threat. As the United States continues to harden legal points
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of entry against potential terrorists, there are very serious risks

that traditional smuggling routes and networks are vulnerable to

exploitation by terrorists who seek to covertly move operatives and

weapons into this country.

Smuggling networks are in the business of moving people and

goods. These are multi-million-dollar criminal enterprises dedicated

to the illegal movement of tens of thousands of illegal immigrants

and tons of illicit cargo into our country without detection.

It takes little imagination to understand how easily such mature

delivery systems could facilitate the movement of terrorists and

their weapons into this country.

In order to continue providing AMO personnel with the best

tools, training, safety and equipment, AMO has approved a new

modernization plan. It is a comprehensive capability-based systems

acquisition strategy designed to improve AMO operational effectiveness and to reduce overall life cycle cost in the most effective

manner and in the minimum amount of time.

It is a strategic plan that provides an overview of the current

state of AMO infrastructure and outlines the necessary acquisition

of platforms, sensors and logistic support to meet new and legacy

missions and responsibilities of AMO.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for

the opportunity to highlight the Office of Air and Marine Operations within Immigration and Customs Enforcement. AMO remains a critical tool in the national effort to secure our borders

against smuggling networks and potential terrorists. It would be

my pleasure at this time to answer any questions that you may

have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swingle follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Before I start the questioning, I should

have noted at the beginning that this subcommittee held hearings

in San Diego, multiple times actually; Arizona, Nogales and over

in El Paso. We’ve been down from Laredo to McAllen. And this is

our first time into New Mexico, which is partly because it is closely

related to El Paso, but, as you clearly stated, has its own problems.

In the kind of open zone, when you squeeze one part you move

problems around. And we felt it was important to get that.

But this is also part of an ongoing investigation that we continue

to look at in the Southwest Border, because there’s no question the

Southwest Border is our primary transit zone for narcotics, overwhelmingly our primary transit zone for narcotics, and we’re trying

to integrate that.

I also serve on the Committee on Homeland Security and on the

subcommittee on Border there. And we’ve been having some very

tense questioning about integration questions and how narcotics is

fitting into the mission, including just 2 weeks ago at a subcommittee hearing there.

So I have a series of questions that I want to try to sort through

today that won’t be as New Mexico-focused here, but first on some

general policies and how you’re approaching it in this section of the

border.

A number of these are directed first to DHS divisions. And I’ll

start with Mr. Barker. For your division and your agents, where

does drug trafficking stand in the priorities? Is it a high priority?

Do you view your primary mission as to stop terrorists, to stop illegal immigration, to stop drugs? How do you handle that?

Mr. BARKER. The primary mission is preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. But as we see it in the

Border Patrol, our missions, really, and how we perform these

functions have not really changed much in terms of our deployment

since September 11. We look at all our enforcement strategies as

one that’s capable to stop all of them.

Our secondary mission before the creation of the Department of

Homeland Security, was drugs. That’s still a very high priority. We

feel that our deployment, as we say, will take care of anything that

comes across the border, whether it’s a terrorist, weapons smuggler, narcotics smuggler, and the like.

It is a very high priority, and you can see by the statistics it’s

being doggedly pursued. Considering the fact that we have seen the

shift, especially in the Fabens Corridor and the Deming Corridor,

we see that as a very high priority. That cannot be separated from

that priority that we put to the terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Garcia, when you’re checking a vehicle, if you

put a bomb-sniffing dog on the drug, can you also put a drug-sniffing dog on the same one, or does it tend to be mutually exclusive?

Mr. GARCIA. Our canines are trained for different types of processes. We have chemical detection dogs as well as bomb detection

dogs and narcotics detection dogs.

Additionally, all our officers that are on the front lines carry a

personal radiation detector device on their person.

Mr. SOUDER. So when dealing with the psychology of how your

individual agents are working with this, when they’re seeing a
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truck and they have a radiation device, and then if—do you have

bomb-sniffing dogs at your border crossings?

Mr. GARCIA. We have them assigned to El Paso. At the moment

the two positions are vacant, but we do have two.

Mr. SOUDER. Wouldn’t you see a subtle change occurring in what

your agents view as their priority if each one is carrying radiation

devices and you have the bomb-sniffing dogs, as opposed to what

was historically a much more drug-oriented mission.

Mr. GARCIA. Our priority, top priority, is terrorists and their

weapons coming across our borders, realizing that terrorists are

people, of course. Immigration and the narcotic detection enforcement efforts kick in secondary to our primary mission.

Mr. SOUDER. The ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr.

Cummings, points out that we have 20,000 deaths annually—since

September 11 we’ve had over 45,000 deaths in the United States

because of narcotics and zero because of terrorism. And we have to

make sure that in this mission we don’t wind up switching over

hunting for weapons of mass destruction, which may or may not

ever occur at the Southwest Border, not to mention other types of

things.

I don’t think there’s any one of us who wants to see any atomic

materials come across or borders that could wipe out 2 million people, but somewhere we’ve got to make sure that we don’t play what

all of you who have been in this service know, and that is, when

the Federal Government says, ‘‘X is a priority,’’ everybody goes running toward that priority. And for 2 to 5 or 6 years, we reorient

toward missing children, we reorient toward this, whatever the

thrust is, and then go back and say, ‘‘Whoops, we missed this big

problem over here.’’

And we need to know at the Federal level what kind of pressure

we’re actually putting on when we say, ‘‘Oh, everybody’s going to

be checking for this.’’ What was dropped as well? Because if we

don’t see these, often in political terms it is a mutually exclusive

choice.

Now, yes, the machines you have are going to pick up both, and

you’re going to be able to see that. But there are some choices, and

we need to understand what, A, is happening at the grassroots

level with those choices; and secondarily, psychologically, what it

does with the individuals if they think that the pressure is on one

item and that there’s not as much focus on the other.

You look like you wanted to respond.

Mr. GARCIA. At our ports of entry, it’s a natural funnel for people

coming directly into the ports of entry. We don’t see a conflict between our terrorist priorities with the narcotics, with our trade, everything that funnels into one particular mode into the other. We

look for terrorism, we look for narcotics, we look for legitimate

trade coming across, make sure that people are documented to be

entering the United States. So we don’t see a conflict at all at our

ports of entry.

Mr. SOUDER. OK. Let me ask either Mr. Barker or Mr. Cates or

Mr. Garcia or Mr. Swingle, have any of you had any interaction

with Roger Mackin.

Mr. SWINGLE. No, sir.

Mr. BARKER. No, sir.
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Mr. CATES. No, sir.

Mr. GARCIA. No, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you seen any memos in your organization

from Mr. Mackin?

Mr. GARCIA. I don’t recall seeing a memo with his name, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you know who he is.

Mr. CATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARKER. No, sir.

Mr. GARCIA. No, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. His policy was created in the Department of Homeland Security coordinating narcotics efforts inside the Department

of Homeland Security. And we’re trying to sort out why that isn’t

getting through in the Department of Homeland Security. And how

that’s handled. So you answered my question.

Next, I wanted to ask one more question before yielding to Mr.

Pearce. One of the concerns is how you’re coordinating the operations inside the Department of Homeland Security as it relates to

narcotics.

So let me ask the first question of both ICE and CBP. And

maybe you can start with this, Mr. Cates. Do you still report drug

seizures differently in the different divisions of Homeland Security?

Mr. CATES. No, sir. The way we report drug seizures has not

changed. We still have a unified statistical collection system that

both ICE and CBP utilize.

Mr. SOUDER. So if the Border Patrol seizes it, or whether ICE

seizes it, or whether Air and Marine seizes it, there wouldn’t be

any kind of way, if I wanted to find out who was doing what to

find it?

Mr. CATES. I’m not sure I understand your question.

Mr. SOUDER. One of our concerns is whether there is—we know

for a fact there’s a competition between your different agencies.

The question is that you need to justify your budgets and your purposes. At the same time, particularly after you see the 9–11 commission report that is coming out and other things, there is going

to be an outcry about our lack of integration inside the department.

And in the area, to what degree is your reporting system? Do you

still have the ability for your superiors or for Congress to figure out

who is making the seizures inside the Department of Homeland Security, or is it seamless inside your own organization? I know you

have a joint report as Department of Homeland Security, but, in

fact, if I were to boost one of the agencies over another, can I figure

out who’s making the seizure, which indirectly gives you an incentive to keep it separated?

Mr. CATES. I would tell you that I believe that the reporting,

since the mergers actually are far more accurate—we still utilize

in ICE, as do our counterparts in CBP, the former Treasury Communications Enforcement Network, which is the initial documentation of all seizure actions and all follow-on actions.

And now, with the advent of the Border Patrol joining in DHS,

they also have adopted that system and are now also engaged in

their reporting through that one unified system.

So the system itself is very, very reliable and very accurate in

showing the origin of every individual seizure, and then every fol-
65

low-on action, you know, that might add to it or enhance it in some

way.

So the merger of these agencies and the transition to that one

unified reporting system, I think, actually significantly enhances

the accuracy of reporting and prevents, in most instances, any sort

of duplicitous reporting and claiming of seizures.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Swingle, is that right.

Mr. SWINGLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. When the Border Patrol Agency or the ICE agency

or your agency initiates a drug process, do the other subparts get

immediately notified so you-all know you’re working a case?

Mr. SWINGLE. On a local level, we do. We do share intelligence.

We have an intelligence officer that is responsible for working with

the other agencies, CBP, OI, our own investigation arm, and we do

attempt to coordinate that information.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barker, is it mandatory if any of your agents

come into a drug case that it’s immediately notified inside the

other agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, so you can

see whether it’s part off an ongoing case?

Mr. BARKER. Our immediate notification is to turn it over. Depending on the memorandum of agreement we either turn it over

to the counterparts within DHS or through DEA. It all depends on

where the seizure occurred.

But it’s not for any follow-on investigation, because we do not

have the investigative authority. It has to be turned over for that

follow-on. And we rely on the agency to who it’s turned over to determine whether the case ends there, whether there’s going to be

controlled delivery, or whatever follow-on investigation comes. But

our notification is strictly to turn it over.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Gonzalez, if anybody in DHS initiates a drug

bust, does DEA get notified so you know whether it’s part of an ongoing case?

Mr. GONZALEZ. We are notified if the seizure occurs at a checkpoint, and we respond. Depending on whether it meets the Federal

guidelines for Federal prosecution, we take the seizure and try to

develop the case, or we turn it over to the local authorities.

Mr. SOUDER. But not if it’s an ICE or Marine.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Correct. We only respond to the Border Patrol

checkpoint.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you tell ICE and Air and Marine if you’re working on a drug case? In other words, there are lots of concerns about

whether things are going to be compromised? But you’re all Federal

agencies, and as we have more and more agents—terrorism questions, for example, most of the FBI, it means we have fewer people

working narcotics. Mr. Cates, did you——

Mr. CATES. Mr. Chairman, there are mechanisms involved. Both

DEA and ICE have interfaces between our national computer systems so that, for instance, were a CBP inspector to make a narcotic

seizure on one of the bridges, an ICE agent would respond and initiate that investigation.

Through our mandatory protocols for computer and intelligence

query, if that particular suspect was somehow on record with DEA,

we would be notified principally through the offices of the El Paso

Intelligence Center, that DEA has some interest or some history.
66

And, conversely, the DEA agents in any active investigation get a

notification that there has been activity on that subject. Now, it’s

not always exactly realtime, but it does take place.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chavez, I know that’s one of the purposes in

the HIDTAs, that you’re trying to do an Intelligence Center. And

let me broaden that. In addition, in New Mexico and working with

El Paso, one of our frustrations has been that the Southwest Border HIDTA has also, let’s say, had a few conflicts between the

States, and approximately between Douglas and Deming and El

Paso. We can’t afford to have those kind of things. So do you want

to add to how you see the seamless——

Mr. CHAVEZ. Yes. The Investigative Support Center in Las

Cruces is designed to do exactly what you’re asking. If there is an

agency working on a particular investigation, we do have a

deconfliction purpose in which all participating agencies of the

HIDTA and nonparticipating agencies can call to the Investigative

Support Center to deconflict.

Mr. SOUDER. Can call, or is it mandatory?

Mr. CHAVEZ. It’s mandatory for members. And for non-members,

they can call. We are encouraging all members of the law enforcement community, and nonmembers, to use the Investigative Support Center to deconflict their investigation and allow us to conduct

a pointer system that will point them to other agencies working on

investigations that they are inquiring about from an intelligence

perspective.

We are also linked to the other HIDTAs along the Southwest

Border, and we’re establishing programs that will allow us to query

their data directly from New Mexico, whether it’s in Arizona or

California or in Texas, that would allow us to deconflict with their

investigations so that there would be a complete coordination.

We’re in the process now of getting new programs in place that

will allow us to do that, a new system in place for a Watch Center,

new equipment. And we’re at a stage, the first step, in linking the

entire Southwest Border for investigative purposes and interdiction.

Another point to be made is that the agencies are given credit

not only for seizures, but referrals. If they have an investigation

and they are not working to develop that investigation, they can

refer that information to another agency. And HIDTA does keep

count of—because of our interest to have an impact on our investigation, so we are more attuned to looking at outcomes and not

productivity.

Mr. SOUDER. Your statement that you just made is eminently

logical. I’ve been in Congress for 10 years and on this subcommittee for 10 years and I remember Barry McCaffery saying years ago

that this was his goal in front of our committee 8 years ago, that

this is what we’ve been spending tens of millions of dollars on the

Southwest Border with Federal agents and State and local. And

you’re saying we’re trying to integrate through the HIDTAs on the

Southwest Border.

You’ve been in this business for a long time as well. Would you

like to editorialize a little bit on what you think the problems have

been and how we can make it actually happen?
67

Mr. CHAVEZ. With my 31 years with drug enforcement, having

been assigned to offices in Mexico City for 3 years and the Agent

in Charge in San Diego, the Special Agent in Charge in Phoenix

for a year and a half, as well as working within the State of New

Mexico, and particularly now with the HIDTA, I see a desperate

need to open up the doors so that we can be linked to other agencies throughout the Southwest Border. And by opening up the

doors, I mean to have direct access to the intelligence that is available.

For too long there have been agencies who have been trying to

hold on to that information because they were going to be given

credit for their efforts, but now with this new design of how we’re

going to give credit—we will feel its impact, because we want to be

focused in our efforts to target the most significant violators that

will bring in the drugs into the United States.

It’s clearly a question of whether we are going to work together

as a task force or work independently. And we are pushing to work

as a task force jointly, openly, and have the confidence in our fellow law enforcement agents.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Pearce.

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I’d like to

request unanimous consent that Mr. Hall and Ms. Peterson’s testimony would be added. They were not able to make it in to testify

on the second panel.

Mr. SOUDER. No objection. So ordered.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Barker, last year I wrote to Mr. Hutchison requesting additional resources on the Southern New Mexico border.

He wrote back saying 570 new patrol agents would be deployed

this year. How many of those have actually been deployed, and how

many actually came to New Mexico.

Mr. BARKER. We have not gotten the resources this year. We

have not heard of the deployment for fiscal year 2004.

Mr. PEARCE. How many of the 570 that he promised have actually been deployed anywhere.

Mr. BARKER. I know of no deployment.

Mr. PEARCE. Could you find out and let me know? We shouldn’t

have had to ask for it twice, but we will.

Mr. Cates, and I don’t know if you’re the right one to answer,

just if any of you know the answer, the functions that you-all represent, how much of those function’s dollars actually are spent

along the border of New Mexico, and what percent does the border

comprise of the entire border? I’m just wanting to compare our border mileage compared to the dollars spent. Does anyone know that

relationship?

Mr. CATES. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. GARCIA. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. PEARCE. Can we find that out? Mr. Cates, on page 46 of your

testimony, you describe an acute knowledge and awareness of the

processes by the drug cartels. Just makes it harder, makes them

more effective. What processes do you have to actually change that

so that they don’t understand exactly how you operate and when

you’re going to do things that you’re going to do.
68

Mr. CATES. Well, both us and the Customs and Border Protection

officers are constantly working to vary our routines, to apply

changing investigative techniques or inspectional techniques.

We are often limited by the fact that our operations are fixed.

You know, our ports of entry do not move. They are susceptible to

visual observation, how many lanes are open, that sort of thing.

There have been significant investment in screening and deterrent

activities such as that.

Mr. PEARCE. How much would it take to put motion detectors,

Mr. Cates, all along the border—I mean, we are hearing tremendous testimony about motion detectors and high-resolution cameras. And how much would it cost to equip the border to where we

could see the border all at one time.

Mr. CATES. We in ICE don’t perform that function. That is probably addressed by the Chief.

Mr. PEARCE. Chomping at the bit.

Mr. BARKER. Yes, sir, that is technology that would impact, you

know, drug smuggling severely. In fact, if you look at New Mexico,

and especially in the Deming area, we have camera sites. And unfortunately, the cost of the cameras, it’s pretty high.

Mr. PEARCE. How high is the cost, just roughly.

Mr. BARKER. I think it’s somewhere in the range of 200,000.

Mr. PEARCE. Per camera.

Mr. BARKER. Half a million per pole.

Mr. PEARCE. Half a million.

Mr. BARKER. Yes, sir. And the reason it’s that expensive, you

have two cameras per pole, 2 days, 2 nights looking in each direction. But I think if you get an opportunity to go to the Deming station, or even El Paso, you’ll see the effectiveness of these cameras.

And, in fact, what it does, it channels the traffic in locations where

they think the camera cannot see.

We are in the process of getting further deployment. I think

there are 16 additional sites that were scheduled for 2004 and we

understand that they’re going to come early 2005.

Mr. PEARCE. How many of those would it take to cover the entire

border, from Texas to—just roughly.

Mr. BARKER. Geez. I think we have sites in New Mexico—I think

in this sector, I think we have——

Mr. PEARCE. How far can they see? Just basically, how far can

a camera see.

Mr. BARKER. Somewhere between mile and a half, 2 miles.

Mr. PEARCE. OK. So every 4 miles, you’d have to have one, at the

extreme.

Mr. BARKER. Yes.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Swingle, what’s your operating budget for 133

aircraft.

Mr. SWINGLE. Actually, I’m not certain. That’s a national level

thing. I’m not exactly sure what our budget is. I can get the answer

for you, though.

Mr. PEARCE. What kind of aircraft do you fly.

Mr. SWINGLE. We operate civilian type jets, corporate jets, citation jets, UH–60 Black Hawk.

Mr. PEARCE. If you’ve got 133 of them, each a couple thousand

dollars, how many hours do you fly a month in your fleet.
69

Mr. SWINGLE. In our area of responsibility here, approximately

300 hours.

Mr. PEARCE. How many.

Mr. SWINGLE. 300 hours.

Mr. PEARCE. Per aircraft.

Mr. SWINGLE. Not per aircraft.

Mr. PEARCE. How many aircraft do you have assigned to you.

Mr. SWINGLE. In Albuquerque we have five aircraft. And in El

Paso we have five as well.

Mr. PEARCE. You get about 10 aircraft, you get about 30 hours

per month per aircraft? Runs about $5 million, that Citation that

you’re flying.

Mr. SWINGLE. When we equip them, probably a little more than

that.

Mr. PEARCE. Sure. So you’re looking at the operational cost of a

couple of thousand dollars per hour for 300 hours. 133 aircraft flying up and down, we should be able to have somebody over the border all the time over every inch of the border. Why do we still have

the problems that we do.

Mr. SWINGLE. Well, we do a significant amount of patrol. One of

the problems that we have now is our commitment to Washington,

DC, for airspace security. That’s kind of tapped the resources, both

in the Albuquerque and El Paso office, which are sister offices of

each other.

Mr. PEARCE. How many aircraft do you have flying in Washington.

Mr. SWINGLE. Well, more important than the aircraft are the

crews. We have at any one time two UH–60 Black Hawks and two

Citations that are stationed in Washington, DC. The problem is the

personnel that we take from this area to man those aircraft. When

we send them up there, we send them for an 8 or 9-day rotation,

but with days off at the beginning, days off at the end of that.

Mr. PEARCE. Is one philosophy to use your people rather than

military people to fly combat air patrol over the capitol? Seems like

the function would be more military when you’re trying to defend

the perimeter. And if we’re cutting down, if we’re taking away resources and parking aircraft on the ground because crews are

somewhere else, it just——

Mr. SWINGLE. Right. Well, we do carry one unique thing with us

that the military doesn’t have, and that’s the law enforcement authority. And when these aircraft are kind of escorted out of that secure airspace, then there needs to be some sort of action taken on

the ground when they land. And the military does not have that

capability.

Mr. PEARCE. It would be interesting if you could get me that 133

aircraft and what it costs to fly them per year, both in operational

cost and then in purchase cost.

Mr. SWINGLE. Yes.

Mr. PEARCE. Because myself, I’m not sure if you’d be as effective

as these motion detectors set up and down the corridor.

Mr. SWINGLE. We do a completely different mission. I mean,

we’re a multi-role unit, the Air and Marine Program. I mean, we

don’t just detect and interdict people that are walking across the
70

border, or driving across. We still have our Air and Marine interdiction mission, which is one of our core——

Mr. PEARCE. The testimony here today, Cates, is that the increase of drug trafficking and the increase of illegal activities is

going up. And at some point we have to ask if our primary mission

is actually—I’m not directing this at you, it’s far different from

your role—but somewhere we need to start asking if what we’re

doing is effective and if we should change what we’re doing. And

then what we would change.

My last question, Mr. Chairman, would be, if any one of you can

tell me about where the total combined operational costs were 10

years ago versus today in the total amount of narcotics that—I

don’t guess you can measure what gets through, but just narcotics

and illegal activity that’s interdicted. How much more resources

are we spending 10 years later versus what we were 10 years ago,

and how much more effective is it? Can you give me a read on that,

any one of you?

Mr. CHAVEZ. If I may, I can attempt to answer that question.

Mr. PEARCE. OK.

Mr. CHAVEZ. For the amount of money that’s given to law enforcement, it has not kept up with the amount of drugs that have

been coming into the United States, particularly for New Mexico.

We know that the cartel leaders are funneling their narcotics

through New Mexico. It creates a bigger problem for us in the

State.

But if you compare that to the budget that the traffickers have,

we’re far, far behind, since they are dealing with billions of dollars

and we in law enforcement try to do our work in the millions of

dollars.

So to get an accurate count, it would be practically impossible.

To get a true reading of what’s happening in different States

throughout the Southwest Border would be impossible. We have to

look at it from the bigger picture, look at who the cartel leaders

are, how big is their organization, and how much control they have

in smuggling their narcotics into the United States.

A general statement would be that law enforcement is far behind

when dealing with cartel leaders that control Mexico, control the

narcotics.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more question. If

we’re going to adopt a policy that would succeed, do any of you

have a recommendation? Because I think we can definitely say that

the policies that we have right now are falling further and further

behind. And if we’re going to take some strategic step that would

really ratchet up our effectiveness, what would it be.

You seem to be chomping at the bit again.

Mr. BARKER. Because I also wanted to say something about the

question that you asked previously about sensors, and then I’ll

come back to the last one.

The motion detectors, you can say we have some of that right

now, because we’ve got sensors arrayed on the border. I think we

have, like, 900 sensors, which is nowhere close to what we should

have right now. The only problem with a motion detector is it tells

you that there has been an event. It doesn’t tell you exactly what
71

you have. So an animal can go across it and it would prompt a response. And that’s one of the issues that we have with sensors.

In fact, I was looking at the figures. We have monthly an average of somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 tickets, events, that

these agents have to respond to because of sensor activity. What

we are looking for as an agency is integrating sensors and cameras,

which is the ISIS system that started that. If we’re going to have

motion detectors, they’re going to have to be integrated with something else to tell us it is a legitimate hit or something we should

not worry about.

So we do have that technology in the sense, right now, with our

sensors. And if we do that, we need to make sure that—or else

we’re going to have agents responding to things that don’t deserve

a response.

Mr. PEARCE. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. My understanding from staff is that Air Division is

$257 million? Let me do a brief comment on Mr. Pearce’s last question, and then that sets up—I want to do a couple more followup

on how we collect the data.

Part of the problem, which you all know, is drug funding. Like

I mentioned with missing children or other things, we go through

fads. In Congress, in 1992, 1995, 70 percent of the interdiction

budget was cut by the last president. And to get back to where we

were in 1992, we’d have to take a 50 percent reduction in drug use.

So it isn’t like there’s a straight line to track. It went down like

that. Drug use soared, then we worked the last 2 years—3 years.

We have had 3 years of 5 percent reduction. In the last 2 years

of President Clinton, when they reorganized, we had some reduction. We wiped out about half of what went up under Clinton. But

it’s going like this, is our problem, because when it reaches crisis

stage, Congress runs toward it. But, unless we have a stable approach—and one of our problems on the Southwest Border, much

like any other—which we’re having in Iraq, too, by the way—is

that when you secure one zone, you put all that money into one

zone, then you’ve got to maintain that and move to the next zone.

And what’s happening is in places like Sells, Arizona, where

they’re running through the Barry Goldwater in the cactus, and

east of Douglas and in New Mexico. And in parks like Big Bend

National Park, where the testimony is, it’s overrun. Padre Island,

where we haven’t had traditional protection to the same rate. It

funnels into those gaps.

At Sells, Arizona, while we were holding one of these hearings,

they had 1500 pounds of marijuana the previous year, they had

1500 in the first 3 months of 2003, and during our hearing they

picked up about 1700 pounds. It’s just kept trying to run. Even

though we had the whole law enforcement agency one load of 500,

one of 300, one at 400, one at 500 right there. And it just became

a question of how many people are you going to stop? Because it

was just pouring through. Now, we have those same fears in this

part of the border.

Now, Mr. Swingle, I just want to make sure, you testified about

TARS. We know we’ve given you a difficult task, because in addition to trying to stop an almost unmanageable flow of illegal immigrants, because we don’t have a work permit system that reflects
72

the demand for work force in the United States, therefore, you

have all these people pouring through, mostly for jobs, who have

jobs already in the United States to some degree, and therefore it’s

an unmanageable flow coming across the border that’s

unseparated.

So you have that immigration question, which is sensors, our

flow and everything. And then the TARS, which are the aerostats,

are supposed to be able to catch the planes, low-flying planes that

are coming in. Because if we are successful, which we are, but if

we are successful in sealing more parts of the border, then they’re

going to find gaps around it, particularly if you’re a drug dealer

smuggling Arab terrorists apart and unless we have some systems

that can also catch low-flying aircraft underneath it. Are there any

aerostats in New Mexico right now?

Mr. SWINGLE. Yes, sir, in Deming. Actually, we have the southern land border pretty much covered, from Yuma, Arizona, to Laredo.

Mr. SOUDER. And, yeah, the place that we were just at, in New

Orleans, they said basically from Corpus Christi to New Orleans

are basically——

Mr. SWINGLE. I think Congress intended to pursue that and give

us that radar net back in 1988 or so. But for some reason, that got

kind of sidetracked.

Mr. SOUDER. But they are working and functioning in this section of the border.

Mr. SWINGLE. Yes, sir, they are. And Mr. Chairman, if I could,

you hit a very pointed point, in that it seems like a lot of times

that we do intend to kind of like chase rabbits. If they get up over

here, this is where we go, and then kind of let our guard down with

what we just stopped. And I, like Mr. Chavez, have been in narcotics enforcement for almost 30 years, and in New Mexico, and I’ve

seen—it’s very cyclic. And I’ve seen it come full circle many times.

I think the approach is to keep the pressure on all facets of it.

If we were to let the TAR program, for example, go tomorrow, the

cartels and smuggling organizations are savvy enough and structured enough that they would just exploit that in a matter of seconds. I mean, it would take them 2 weeks to start exploiting that.

So we have to keep our guard up at every area.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Pearce.

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You commented that

Congress gets active as the problem reaches crisis stage, and I

would say that, from Mr. Chavez’s testimony, we’ve reached crisis

stage. We’ve got two counties in New Mexico out of our 33 No. 1

and two in the Nation per capita in overdose on heroin use. And

for us, I think it’s epidemic, and it’s time for us to get some attention.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. I want to ask a question. Are any of you

familiar with this proposal that we heard at EPIC this morning,

Border Interdiction Support Center? Have you seen this proposal

circulating? That would be under DHS.

Mr. BARKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. It’s to be supported at EPIC.

Mr. BARKER. I’ve heard of it.

Mr. CATES. We’ve heard of it.
73

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barker, have you seen this.

Mr. PEARCE. No, sir.

Mr. BARKER. Mr. Cates.

Mr. CATES. I haven’t seen that document. I’m aware of the document.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you inputted into the program proposal your

agency.

Mr. CATES. No.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chavez.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Likewise, I’m aware of the program, but I did not

have any input into the design of the program.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Garcia.

Mr. GARCIA. Ditto.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I haven’t seen that, but I am aware.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Swingle.

Mr. SWINGLE. I have not seen it.

Mr. SOUDER. This is a proposed fusion center for the Southwest

Border that would be under DHS, and it would pull together working groups to try to coordinate Southwest Border information.

Now, my first question would be is, Mr. Chavez, if you’ve seen

this, how does this differ from what the HIDTAs are trying to do

and what the national drug czar is trying to do?

Mr. CHAVEZ. I believe that program is structured for an interdiction program, similar to Operation Cobija. And, as I understand,

all intelligence and operations of law enforcement along the border

would be coordinated through that center to fuse the intelligence

that is obtained from interdiction programs.

The HIDTAs are involved also in investigations; so, therefore,

interdiction is just a part of HIDTA, but in investigations where we

focus on the major traffickers, the cartel leaders, and further hold

people accountable for what they’re doing so that we have an impact along the border. It takes it a step further than what this program is designed to do, as I understand it.

Mr. SOUDER. How do you see that as being different from what

EPIC does now?

Mr. CHAVEZ. Well, within the State of New Mexico, the HIDTA

Investigative Support Center takes into account all of the investigative activities from the task forces and is clearly focused on

New Mexico, but does share its intelligence outside of the State so

that it can expand on the investigations.

I hate to take it a step further, but I think there needs to be better coordination with EPIC with everybody along the Southwest

Border.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, what gets confusing to us, and what’s scary

is, I spend more time with this, and I’m confused, and my staff is

a little confused. I mean, we’re not completely confused as what we

see is the Riverside Center tracking the track. And they have certain functions. We see EPIC there, you said in your testimony,

which I agree with.

Director Waldridge is trying to figure out how to get everything

connected. There’s a proposal here for another subagency. You have

drug intelligence centers in Johnstown, PA, which interprets the

data. We have the Laughlin, the local agency, to tap into. And you
74

start to get the feeling that we’re probably spending about, I don’t

know, sometimes 25 percent of our time calling up to the different

agencies and swapping information, when, theoretically, we ought

to be integrated enough that you can tap in and get the information without having to go five different places, or input into five different places.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That’s correct. And from the HIDTA, that is exactly

what we’re trying to do, through the Investigative Support Center,

is bring all of the Federal agencies into the center with their data,

their base, and so, therefore, we can access all of that data and

focus on our problem, or our program.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I just want to make an observation. Of all the

centers that you mentioned, EPIC was the first one. All the others

came afterward.

Mr. SOUDER. Yeah. In trying to sort this through, one of the advantages at this particular moment in time, and why we’re trying

to plunge into this very aggressively, is that when narcotics are the

No. 1 focus, then everybody goes after narcotics money. But right

now, Homeland Security is the No. 1 focus, so every agency, even

in EPIC—what they said this morning is, 40 percent of their inquiries were terrorist inquiries from the Coast Guard at EPIC,

which is supposed to be the Drug Intelligence Center.

And those of us who work with narcotics want to make sure that

there’s some kind of firewall that’s here, where we’re going to focus

on drugs, and additionally is going to focus on Homeland Security

and terrorism. There are certain overlaps, because the terrorist

groups are funded by narcotic moneys. And that’s going to increase.

And the groups are getting more and more integrated as we look

around. And every agent in the country needs to understand that.

But, as FBI moves more toward other roles than narcotics and

DEA emerges with that, clearly we have merged a whole bunch of

agencies inside the Department of Homeland Security.

In narcotics, there are basically two major players on the table

right now, and has fused a lot more players than we had before.

So when we look at these different agencies, in my opinion, there

shouldn’t be a proliferation of new things. What we ought to be

able to do is to figure out how to hammer the existing ones we have

together, or the rule that when a new one’s added, two go out. We

don’t have a bunch of money, extra money, to throw at this, when

we’re having all sorts of holes on the border, questions on how your

agencies are going to be able to obtain and bring new people in.

And payroll questions are nearly overwhelming the system.

Do any of you want to add anything, comments?

Mr. GONZALEZ. If I may, I think it speaks to the effectiveness of

EPIC as to how it’s being used after September 11. That should

send a signal that, rather than bring on new centers, that maybe

what needs to be done is maybe expand EPIC, or something along

those lines.

Mr. SOUDER. Terrorism separated out. Mr. Swingle, could you

tell me a little bit what Air and Marine is looking at doing on the

New Mexico border from your Albuquerque center?
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Mr. SWINGLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We continue to conduct our

patrols with UH–60’s along the border, and our C–550 interceptor

tracker jets.

But I believe, if I’m not mistaken, you’re going to be briefed this

afternoon after this hearing on one of the new initiatives that we

have that we’ve discovered a way to exploit some of this smuggling

to identify and exploit some smuggling rings. As I understand, it’s

at least a sensitive, if not a classified issue. But I believe you’re

being briefed on it after this hearing.

Mr. SOUDER. Are you proposing to move your headquarters to the

border? What is the reason for that?

Mr. SWINGLE. Of course, that is a national issue, and I believe

that there is a move afoot to do that, to bring it back to the border.

It was here at one time.

Mr. SOUDER. Why would you propose to do that?

Mr. SWINGLE. I suppose to get our reactionary time to the border

back down. But one would have to understand the purpose of its

move in the first place to see that. I did see that cycle.

Mr. SOUDER. And what——

Mr. SWINGLE. Well, before the aerostats, quite frankly we relied

on the FAA radar in this area to detect targets. And, as you know,

before the aerostats there was a true air threat that was real. And

as a State police narcotics agent, air smuggling investigator, we

made at least one or two cases a week. That’s how rampant it was.

The radar environment was such, though, that we could not detect these targets as they crossed the border until they were many,

many miles north of the border. So the El Paso Air Branch at that

time was always playing a catch-up game, if you will. They were

always having to chase the target, as opposed to being able to come

down from the north and intercept it.

There was a decision made to move the office up there, which at

the time was a very viable option and a good idea. They did essentially the same thing in San Angelo and San Antonio, moved the

branch further north. But then shortly thereafter, the aerostats

came, and that changed the entire complexion.

Mr. SOUDER. So now the planes are flying down from Albuquerque to the border.

Mr. SWINGLE. We have a Citation stationed here, but, because of

our lack of staffing, we can’t man them 7–by–24. So, between the

two offices, we crew our aircraft.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me yield to Mr. Pearce. Let me ask one other

question on the record, on the unmanned aerial vehicles. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee of Homeland Security has recommended that money be appropriated to the Border Patrol and

Customs to develop unmanned aerial vehicles.

So that would be Mr. Cates. Is that who would have that? Mr.

Barker. It’s my understanding that, even though you’re both in the

Department of Homeland Security, your vehicles aren’t the same.

Is there a reason for that?

Mr. BARKER. We talking about aircraft.

Mr. SOUDER. Unmanned, UAVs.

Mr. BARKER. They are new to us, and right now they’re deployed

in Tucson. And it is something that Director Ridge has made a
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commitment to. And we think it’s a pretty good addition to our air

operations to have the UAVs.

Mr. SOUDER. Why are we paying for development of two systems?

Do we know of any reason?

Mr. BARKER. I’m not aware.

Mr. SWINGLE. And I’m not certain at all. We do have some of my

colleagues from Tucson, Arizona that are going to brief you on the

UAV program, since it’s operated out of Arizona. To be honest

about it, I’m not up to speed on it.

Mr. SOUDER. The Coast Guard is developing one as well, so we’ll

followup. We’re having a Washington hearing in about 2 weeks.

We’ll followup on that question. But, just so you know, at our level

we’re getting increasingly concerned in what we want to know. And

we’ll come back to you at some point and say, ‘‘Look, is there an

operational reason for this? Is your function different than their

function? It’s different than the Coast Guard, but can’t you have

one basic model that might have some alterations? Do we really

need to fund,’’ quite frankly, maybe at the congressional level.

I’m not saying it’s not. Three centers have companies in their districts that are developing these different things. But we don’t have

time for this stuff anymore in this country, or the money to do it

when we’re short in grassroots things, and then we’re winding up

in the same department. Put Coast Guard, Air and Marine on

board, probably, then, all in the same department, all developing

similar type programs. We saw this also on the FAST pass systems, which is getting much better organized now that DHS is in

one agency.

Mr. Pearce.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I would ask anyone on the panel, as

we’re looking at alternatives, again to look and watch the border

all the time, how much would it cost to use low-altitude radar capabilities? In other words, that would be far more effective, and I

think you could cover a broader scope, you wouldn’t have to have

as many sites for low-altitude radar. It wouldn’t measure the driving traffic. But in some of the remote areas, it might pick up some

of those targets. But any comments about that.

Mr. BARKER. A comment from the Border Patrol perspective. Our

mission is on the ground. How that would affect our mission is unknown to me, because we would have to be able to see things that

are on the ground. Cameras, those are some of the things that

would be of interest and benefit to us, because, you know, most of

the things that we’re going to be dealing with are on the ground.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I would just recommend that we ask

that question, too. Rather than airborne aircraft to pick up the

tracks of other aircraft, I think if you look at the $257 million it

takes annually to run 133 aircraft, that you can put in a lot of

radar, low-altitude radar for that, and at least find your targets as

they’re crossing the border, and probably can pick up the targets

back into Mexico as you’re crossing that. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. With that, the first panel is dismissed.

And thank you all for your work. And if you’ll thank all the people

working in your agencies and daily take risks for the rest of us, we

appreciate it.
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Two of our witnesses on the next panel have submitted their testimony because things have come up. So we have Captain Richard

Williams, Commander of District 4, Las Cruces, New Mexico State

Police; and Sheriff Juan Hernandez of the Dona Ana County Sheriff’s Office. Earlier I butchered that county name, but I think most

people here knew where I was talking about. Just remain standing

I’ll swear you in.

Subcommittee stands in recess for 5 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. SOUDER. We’ll reconvene the subcommittee. Subcommittee’s

reconvened. Back to order, whatever the correct terminology is.

Captain Williams and Sheriff Hernandez, if you’ll raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Let the record show both responded in

the affirmative. I don’t think we’ve ever held a hearing where we

looked at the Federal issues without trying to talk to our State and

local people, figure out how this integrates.

After we’ve heard your testimony we’ll have some questions for

you, so Captain Williams, if you’ll start.

STATEMENTS OF CAPTAIN RICHARD WILLIAMS, COMMANDER,

DISTRICT 4 (LAS CRUCES), NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE; AND

SHERIFF JUAN HERNANDEZ, DONA ANA COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE

Captain WILLIAMS. My name is Richard Williams, W-I-L-L-I-AM-S, I’m the district commander for the New Mexico State Police

here in Las Cruces. I would like to thank you for the opportunity

of testifying before you today, Mr. Chairman and this committee.

On behalf of New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, Department

of Public Safety Secretary John Denko, and New Mexico State Police Chief Carlos Maldonado, I would like to convey our appreciation for the Federal support and leadership provided by New Mexico Congressman Pearce regarding this issue.

Allow me first to discuss the nature of the problem. The Southwest Border continues to be a focal point for narcotics smuggling

operations. Albuquerque, Las Cruces, El Paso, TX, and many other

communities in New Mexico, have seen an increase in drug smuggling operations as this region of the country is a primary shipment point for drug trafficking organizations.

Contributing to the security problems are the inadequate barrier

or fencing systems which physically keep offenders and vehicles

from entering our country. Of the 180 miles of international border

of New Mexico, approximately 160 are not properly fenced or protected. Additionally, there is a lack of surveillance, monitoring

technology, deployed along the border. Even if the technology was

in place, there is a lack of sufficient law enforcement personnel and

resources to respond to incursionsites rapidly.

In 2000, New Mexico ranked 36th in population, yet third in the

crime index. A contributing factor to this disparity is the abuse and

trafficking of narcotics, along with the associated crimes most commonly linked to illegal narcotics.

It is well documented that drug trafficking organizations utilize

the three ports of entry in New Mexico and the vast geographical
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land area to bring vehicles and people across into the United States

carrying illegal drugs or undocumented aliens.

The alarming reality is that other criminal organizations can utilize the same tactics as the drug smugglers to bring across terrorists who are willing and waiting to attack our country. The entire

Southwest region is at risk due to unsecure nature and enormous

geographical area to be protected. The task of securing our international border is monumental, and cannot be undertaken by one

agency alone.

There are thousands of miles of highways in the State near the

Mexican border. New Mexico has three major interstate highways

traveling through the State that lead to numerous destinations

throughout the entire country.

The impact of drug-related and/or violent crime in New Mexico

has many aspects. Like the criminal drug trafficking groups from

South America that preceded them, organized crime syndicates in

New Mexico are extremely violent and routinely employ intimidation and violence while conducting drug transactions in New Mexico. There have been numerous incidents that illustrate the ruthlessness of these organizations. Much of the drug-related brutality

that has become commonplace in Mexico has spilled over to communities within our State.

Allow me to quickly discuss some of the methods of operations

used by drug smugglers. Backpacking is a common method utilized

by drug trafficking organizations along the international border. A

significant concern is that these offenders are walking through

rough terrain, quite often in extreme heat with limited supplies of

food and water.

A very recent concern is drugs like ephedra, which was recently

banned in the United States, are given to these backpackers to enhance their performance as they journey across the border into the

United States. Backpacking smuggling operations are just one

method of transportation, and law enforcement throughout the entire Southwest Border is still interdicting narcotics shipments and

commercial vehicles, private vehicles, buses, airplanes, trains, and

through the postal and shipping industries.

Let me discuss some of the law enforcement’s response to drug

trafficking problems in New Mexico. The State of New Mexico has

developed a statewide coordinated strategy utilizing seven regional

task forces to combat violations of the Federal and State Controlled

Substance Act.

Each one of the regional task forces experience drug-related and

social problems unique to their area of responsibility. The New

Mexico State Police Narcotics Section is an active member in each

of the regional task forces and assists the regions with resources

and personnel on a statewide level.

The New Mexico State Police Uniform Bureau and the New Mexico Motor Transportation Division diligently work interdiction operations on a statewide level, and participate in Operation Cobija. In

Spanish, the word ‘‘cobija’’ translates to blanket, and this operational name symbolizes the extensive amount of resources deployed during operational periods.
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On the local level, communication and coordination between the

Federal, State and local law enforcement is exceptional, primarily

due to the coordination of the regional task force concept.

The New Mexico State Police Narcotics Section conducts undercover operations that generally start at the local and State level,

and pursues the investigation to the regional and international

level. Many of the undercover cases are eventually developed into

Federal cases, as they are adopted by our Federal partners and

prosecuted in Federal court.

Coordination is the key to successful management of case operations, and the New Mexico Investigative Support Center is crucial

to all law enforcement operations throughout the entire Southwest

Border. The services provided by the Investigative Support Center

are immeasurable and provide law enforcement officers with critical information that facilitates furthering the investigation to the

source of supply level.

It is apparent that the U.S./Mexico border is an area of concern

for all law enforcement agencies in New Mexico and Texas. The

lack of resources, communication technology, surveillance technology and barrier systems all contribute to the problem. As California and Arizona take monumental steps to secure their portion

of the border, New Mexico and Texas cannot be overlooked.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my testimony to this

committee by quoting a retired New Mexico State Police sergeant

on his assessment of the struggle regarding narcotics trafficking.

He said, The problems associated with narcotics trafficking and the

response of law enforcement is like rushing the gates of hell with

a few fire extinguishers and a water hose. We just don’t have

enough personnel and resources to impact this enormous problem.

I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

[The prepared statement of Captain Williams follows:]
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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you for your testimony.

Sheriff Hernandez.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Chairman, thank you, and Congressman

Pearce, thank you for being here, and also for inviting us to here

to speak to you-all today. Like Captain Williams and everybody

else has been telling you today, I mean, definitely, there’s a shortage of manpower here along the border for us and stuff.

Another problem we encounter is, like with my agency along the

border here, our radio communication systems, there are areas

along the border down there where our radios won’t even work at

all. We definitely need to get some more equipment that will help

us along the border.

My agency, we do have an excellent working relationship with

State Police. Also with Customs, Border Patrol, and DEA and the

FBI. You know, I do have personnel assigned to DEA. I’m getting

ready to give the FBI Task Force two more, and I also have two

assigned to the U.S. Customs Task Force, also, which, you know,

they do work issues with drugs and related issues, and stuff like

that.

Just this year alone, I do have four canine units, and—well, actually, five, because I still work with mine. I still get out there and

work every once in a while with mine. We do have canine units out

there doing drug interdiction. So far this year we have taken down

over 4,000 pounds of dope here in Dona Ana County itself, and a

lot of that is turned over either to DEA or Customs so that, you

know, they can develop some information from them. And a lot of

them will do controlled deliveries. Some have been going up to New

York and Chicago, you know.

But, actually, the Federal agencies, we also need a lot more

equipment here, like to do the wire taps and stuff like that, also

to help out. The Intelligence Center here in Las Cruces, actually,

is more supportive of the local law enforcement projects than what

we get from EPIC there in El Paso, really. We get more information from them here than we do from EPIC over in El Paso.

And Customs, for instance, you know, with their aircrafts, I

mean, they’ve always been very cooperative with me. I’ve even had

their home phone numbers and stuff, to where we need a helicopter

in the air to work something along the border, or even do a surveillance and take aerial photographs of some homes that are doing

meth labs and all that, and all I call them, and 15 minutes later

they’ll call me back, ‘‘OK, we’re taking off. We’ll meet you at the

airport here in Las Cruces.’’ They’ll pick us up and we’ll show them

where we need the photographs, or they’ll track some subjects for

us.

And I would like for them to get more support from the Federal

Government so they can buy a few more of the A-Star helicopters,

because those are the ones that have really been the most helpful

here to us, because, you know, they fly at a certain height where

you can’t even hear them on the ground. And then with a flare

camera and everything else, I mean, it’s really helped us out a lot

on getting us information, you know, that we need to get when

we’re going to be doing some operations and stuff, going after some

dope dealers or going into some homes that are being utilized making meth, and stuff like that.
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We also, you know, have an excellent working relationship with

Border Patrol, you know. We have done a lot of operations with

them along the border, and then also along the east mesa over

here. I do have some of my deputies, also, in ATVs and stuff. And

along with Border Patrol’s ATVers, too, we’ve done some operations

along the border so we can start taking care of some of the issues.

It’s just going to get worse now, like everybody’s saying, with the

operations going on in Arizona, to where, you know, definitely the

use of more personnel is going to be needed down here. And that’s

it.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you for your testimony. Can I ask you a couple of questions, Sheriff, about Dona Ana County? Does that county

cover the whole New Mexico/Mexico border?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. No, sir, Luna County and Hidalgo County

cover the western part over there, also.

Mr. SOUDER. So is Santa Teresa in your country?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir, Santa Teresa is in my county. And

we have been helping Customs out there also, at the Santa Teresa

port of entry. I have been assigning my personnel to help them out,

also, on inspecting vehicles and, you know, coming across.

Mr. SOUDER. How many people live in your county?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Pardon me.

Mr. SOUDER. How many people live in your county?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. We have well over 180,000.

Mr. SOUDER. So is Las Cruces in the county, also? So it goes from

where to where?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. It goes all the way from Las Cruces north.

Mr. SOUDER. Even farther north, then.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir. It’s 50 miles north of here, still.

Mr. SOUDER. And the counties to your west, they’re the ones that

border Arizona, then.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Well, Hidalgo County borders Arizona, and

Luna County is between Dona Ana and Hidalgo County.

Mr. SOUDER. In those counties, I assume there’s a lot less population, and they don’t have as many local sheriff resources to tackle

it. Do you help them? What is your relationship with them?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir, I was going to bring that up. See,

they’re pretty short on personnel. Also, those counties are, well,

pretty poor also, so they don’t have enough personnel. So what I

have done is, I got with the sheriffs from not only Hidalgo County

and Luna County, but also Otero County, which is a county over

here to the east of us, and we signed that Memorandum of Understanding to where we have cross-deputized all of our people.

So that if my guys are along the border over there and, say, Border Patrol runs into some problems there at Luna County and

they’re requesting assistance, Luna County doesn’t have the personnel to send them, then my guys can just go ahead and respond

without us having to go through all of the procedure of them having to contact the sheriff in Luna County, then him having to contact me, and then giving them the authorization for them to go.

So with the Memorandum of Understanding that we have now

on cross-deputizing everybody, it’s like, you know, Border Patrol or

Customs or whoever, State Police might call us, you know, also,
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and my guys can just go ahead and go into the next county and

assist them with whatever is going on.

Mr. SOUDER. You said you had two of your officers currently in

the FBI Task Force. Is that a particular case type thing, or is it

a category like certain types of crimes, or is it tracking a certain

group?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. The FBI is looking at, you know, certain

things and everything else. DEA, they handle the narcotics stuff.

And Customs, they do a lot of the narcotics, also. The ones that I

have assigned to those task forces.

Mr. SOUDER. So you have two with the Customs Task Force. Is

that correct?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. And two with FBI?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. And you’ve got some with DEA, too?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. I have three with DEA. I’ve got two regular

deputies, and then also one canine officer assigned to them over

there, also.

Mr. SOUDER. And the two with Customs, are they doing narcotics

as well?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. With the State Police, with Captain Williams, how

far does your zone go north?

Captain WILLIAMS. My area is District 4, and it encompasses all

of Dona Ana County, a very small portion of Otero County, which

is in the Chaparral County, which is a small little community. And

then also we take parts of Sierra County, about 5 miles into Sierra

County. And that’s primarily our area. It’s about 4,500 miles.

Mr. SOUDER. So the State Police are split at the border as well?

You have a different district that takes you west?

Captain WILLIAMS. Yes, there’s another district to the west of us,

and that’s Captain King’s district, and he’s seated right here.

Mr. SOUDER. And are the two of you integrated.

Captain WILLIAMS. Yes. It’s kind of interesting. If you’ll give me

a few minutes, let me tell you. What we have is, we have a uniformed bureau, narcotics section and criminal section. Each one of

the uniformed bureau is broken down into 12 districts throughout

the entire State. We work with District 12, which is the Deming

area. And then, of course, there’s a Las Cruces area, we’re District

4. And then on the other side of us is the Alamogordo area, which

is another district in and of itself. So we have the uniform responsibilities, so we have the responsibility of investigating car crashes,

handling domestic violence. And we also help out with some of the

border operations and some of the interdiction operations throughout the State.

We also have units that are specialized, though, and that’s the

Criminal Investigations Unit that handles major felony type homicides and major felony cases.

We have a Narcotics Bureau here as well, and the narcotics section is based—there’s a portion here out of Las Cruces. And we

have agents assigned to a DEA Task Force. We also have agents

assigned to the local Regional Task Force. And then we also have
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agents that work regular primary New Mexico State Police cases

as well.

Mr. SOUDER. I’m going to yield to Congressman Pearce for some

questions, and I’ll come back.

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you.

Captain Williams, on the Cobijas, that’s where you pretty well

would interdict a lot more things than you would on a regular routine day-to-day basis. Is that correct?

Captain WILLIAMS. We really try to enhance our enforcement operations during the operational periods, and really try and saturate

the area with saturation patrols.

Mr. PEARCE. So you would interdict more things than normal?

Captain WILLIAMS. That’s the attempt, yes, sir.

Mr. PEARCE. Do you do any forecast out of that, of how much is

actually getting through on your best estimates using the maximum that you interdict in a Cobija?

Captain WILLIAMS. What we’ve utilized to help us forecast this

is the Investigative Support Center, and they’ve told us what some

of the prime days are. Focus-based on that intelligence. As far as

tracking, the statistical data that we gather from them, we do

enter all that information with the Investigative Support Center.

What we’ll do is, our narcotics agents aren’t even allowed to draw

a case number unless they’ve already contacted the Investigative

Support Center and notified them as to what they’re doing.

Mr. PEARCE. So, based on the interdictions during these high-intensity periods, how many narcotics get through every day that we

don’t interdict, and low periods of low activity?

Captain WILLIAMS. I think that would be very difficult to measure, because there are some times where we’re very successful at

interdicting narcotics, and there’s days where we’re out there and

we’re stopping a lot of vehicles and we’re writing a lot of tickets,

but we don’t get anything. So I think that would be very difficult

to measure, as to what gets through and what we don’t get.

Mr. PEARCE. What’s the extreme difference between a regular intensity day and a Cobija?

Captain WILLIAMS. What we’ll generally do, as far as manpower.

Mr. PEARCE. No, as far as the interdiction. I’m just trying to get

some feel to what gets through that we don’t interdict on a daily

basis.

Captain WILLIAMS. You know, I don’t have the exact numbers.

Mr. PEARCE. Just approximately.

Captain WILLIAMS. What comes through? I would imagine that

we may interdict 5 percent of what comes through.

Mr. PEARCE. OK. That gives me closer than any number I could

get. I appreciate that, and I understand that it’s really a rough

guess.

Sheriff Hernandez, you know, we met with law enforcement officials way back last year, and I got a letter shortly after that from

one of the sheriffs, I think, in Hidalgo County, and he was saying

that the people were becoming more brazen. They pull them over

and threaten them, ‘‘If you keep trying to do your job, we’re just

going to rub you out.’’
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If there were one thing we could do from this committee to

change the threats and the risk that you face out of here on the

local level, what would that thing be?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Well, you know, probably if you could

change the laws, as far as us being able to enforce immigration

laws. That would probably help us out, you know. Because right

now, basically, you know, we run across illegal immigrants or

something, we have to bother the Border Patrol for them to come

and take care of them and stuff, you know.

Mr. PEARCE. OK.

Mr. SOUDER. Has that ever been looked at.

Mr. PEARCE. I’m not sure. We’ve had the question about using

law enforcement officers anywhere or picking up or detaining illegal immigrants, and that’s been, I think, routinely rejected. But I’m

not sure what the status is.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Just the other night, Congressman, I had

two of my canine guys on State Road 9 along the border, and they

spotted a vehicle coming across, you know, through the desert out

there. When they tried to pull it over, they got into a pursuit, but

they did put out the stop stick, flattened the tires. It turned out

it was a vehicle full of illegal aliens that were being smuggled

across the border. It’s another thing that we are encountering down

there on that highway quite a bit.

Mr. PEARCE. And for either one of you, when Federal border law

enforcement officials, any of the ones on the panel previously, get

information from you-all about local illegal activity, how long does

it take them to respond? In other words, you call them for help, for

their assistance, how long does it take them to actually get involved?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. The Border Patrol?

Mr. PEARCE. Any one of them, Customs, Border Patrol, any of

them.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. It doesn’t really take them really long, because one thing we have done, Congressman Pearce, they have our

radio frequencies, and not only in their units, but also in the aircraft, to where we can just go ahead and directly follow them. And

they also monitor us. And one thing I like about Customs and Border Patrol, they see my guys on a traffic stop and whatever, they’ll

hover right over the top of them with the helicopter, you know.

They’ll shine the lights on them and stuff to make sure everything

is OK.

Mr. PEARCE. Do either of you have any requests or suggestions

as far as the coordination between State, local and Federal border

enforcement officials? Is there something that we could do that

would enhance that, or assist you in any way.

Captain WILLIAMS. Can I answer that? I would imagine that the

Investigative Support Center is a very good tool. I would like to see

that, personally, enhanced. Our officers have been able to use that

for deconfliction purposes. And in addition to that, we also see information intelligence sharing bulletins that they give to us quite

frequently, and that helps us enhance our enforcement operations.

And we know it gives us recent trends and gives us knowledge on

what’s going on in the current drug organization. So it’s been very

helpful.
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Mr. PEARCE. That’s all my questions, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the opportunity.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. I concur with Captain Williams there, Congressman. Like I said, from our local Intelligence Center here, it’s

like I was telling you earlier, we get more cooperation from them

than we do from EPIC over in El Paso. A day doesn’t go by that

I do not get, you know, information from our center here as far as,

you know, certain things to be on the lookout for and stuff and officer safety issues and stuff like that, you know.

And we also get information from them here as to what sort of

consignment methods these drug smugglers are using nowadays

and everything else. So it has really been very beneficial to us out

here.

Mr. SOUDER. Captain Williams, did you say that the other superintendent, or the other person from the State is here as well?

Captain WILLIAMS. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. Can you come forward? I need to swear you in. Will

you state and spell your name for the record?

Mr. KEENE. Richard Keene, R-I-C-H-A-R-D, K-E-E-N-E.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Again, you represent the whole section, right?

Captain WILLIAMS. Yes, the whole section of the border.

Mr. SOUDER. And you are the one——

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. I’m in the middle.

Mr. SOUDER. I asked a question at the Department of Homeland

Security, and DHS responded that it was true and gave a little bit

more detail. I wonder whether any of you are familiar with this

and how it’s coordinated and what we can do to address this question? There are packages that are sold to immigrant groups that

range from $4,000 to $15,000, currently more like $8,000 to

$15,000. In 7 days you’re guaranteed entry into the United States

or you get all your money back. There is a section in New Mexico

that it is $40,000 for an Arab to get in. And that’s testified under

oath by the Department of Homeland Security. Are you familiar

with that?

Captain WILLIAMS. I’m not familiar with that, no, sir.

Mr. KEENE. No, sir.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. I’m not, either.

Mr. KEENE. I haven’t heard about that.

Mr. SOUDER. Never heard of that at all.

Mr. KEENE. No.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you been involved in any cases or seen where

Middle Eastern immigrants have come across your border in New

Mexico?

Captain WILLIAMS. We have not interdicted any cases where

there’s Middle Eastern immigrants coming across, no, sir. We have

interdicted cases, though, where there’s undocumented aliens from

Mexico coming across, but nothing from the Arab countries.

Mr. SOUDER. It’s not your primary responsibility, it’s the Border

Patrol’s primary responsibility, but we have a hole in our system

if for $40,000 anybody from the Middle East can get in or get their

money back. And you’re partly the hole. And the fact that it’s on

the record, it’s something that’s been known for some time, but I’m
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not sure precisely where it is. We wouldn’t want to announce exactly, although if we announce it, we can moderate it.

Mr. PEARCE. Just following up with that, I guess Captain Keene,

we’ve had information in discussion with the officials that run the

hospital in Luna County at Deming, and they tell us that, routinely, there will be—Federal law requires that if we have an immigrant come to the border, present themselves with a medical

condition of any kind, the local hospital or local county has to pick

them up at the border and transport them to the nearest facility

that does what they need. If they need heart surgery, they go to

Denver or Albuquerque or whatever.

And we’re understanding that more and more people are asking

for that medical assistance and getting in the planes, being transported somewhere, and they’re getting out and running the last

two or three blocks; they’ve got somebody waiting to pick them up.

So they’re using our own system against us. Have you encountered

cases like that and feel it is as persistent as the Deming hospital

tells us it is?

Mr. KEENE. Congressman, I’ve been in Deming since 1995, and

I have seen and heard of that going on.

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. When you pick up somebody on a narcotics charge,

either State Police or local, does that go on—and let me just say

up front, I’m basically more moderate on immigration questions. I

favor legal work. I actually favor amnesty to a certain degree,

which is very controversial. I get flak in my district. Nevertheless,

we have to have control of our border or we’re not safe, and we

need to figure out how to have immigration laws that are workable.

But then we have to enforce the laws that we have. And one of the

ways you abuse your rights, whether you’re an illegal or a legal,

is if you bring in narcotics.

When you make an arrest for somebody on narcotics, does that

get into our system so that it shows up when they get picked up

again? Basically we have testimony—we also have jurisdiction over

the Justice Department—that last year, that—and we had it again

in Washington from Mr. Aguilar, and from east, that I think they

said in El Paso—trying to remember—do you remember what the

number was? I think it was 14 times somebody has to be picked

up before they’re held in El Paso, if it’s 14 times. But if they have

a drug charge, you assume that it would be different than if you

would just be picked up and released. But part of the question is,

when you pick somebody up on a drug charge, does that get into

the system?

Captain WILLIAMS. Generally what we do with interdiction cases,

it depends on the size of the case and whether it meets the threshold or not. If it’s a smaller amount, we will typically handle that

at the State level with State Police narcotics agents. That information is turned over to the Investigative Support Center. And my

understanding is that they are the ones who share that information

with the Federal agencies.

If it is a larger amount of narcotics, generally we try and turn

that over to the Federal agencies, DEA or someone like that, to

adopt the case and prosecute it federally. And that information is

as well turned over to the Investigative Support Center.
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So we put a lot of faith in the Investigative Support Center to

disseminate intelligence for us, and all seizure data and arrest data

is handed over to the ISC.

Mr. SOUDER. We had testimony, again this morning, that illegals

are—we do a good job of checking when we pick them up whether

they have a criminal record, although apparently breaking immigration laws isn’t considered a criminal record. But the question is,

what level are the drug laws? What if it’s a misdemeanor, felony,

dealing? And how does that get into the record as far as detaining?

Captain WILLIAMS. I don’t believe you’re going to see very much

of a record for misdemeanor type offense. Now, the majority of the

backpacking type operations, to just use those, those are the majority of the felony weights, anyway. So those are large enough to be

dealt with.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have a ballpark guideline? Because we had

testimony in El Paso that it takes a major load, their prison’s full,

they don’t prosecute. How are your prisons? Are they full and is

that impacting who you pick up?

Captain WILLIAMS. That’s not impacting on who we pick up. I

mean, if we come across a load, we’re going to pick it up regardless

of what’s going on in the prisons system.

Mr. SOUDER. Even knowing that they wouldn’t prosecute?

Captain WILLIAMS. We’ll push—every load we get, we try and get

that prosecuted. Generally our District Attorney’s office, our local

District Attorney’s office, works very well with us on prosecuting

these cases. Now, that doesn’t mean, though, that they won’t try

and plea bargain it or come up with a different solution afterwards.

But we do send everybody in for prosecution.

There would be one exception, and that would be if we were trying to further the investigation or to take the investigation to the

next level, we may hold prosecution at that point. But for the majority of the cases they are prosecuted, yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Sheriff Hernandez, how full is your jail?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. We have quite a few inmates there, yes. But

one thing I was going to tell you, Mr. Chairman, is that, like last

year, I did bring in the U.S. Consulate down here to—and we gave

our deputies a training as far as what the immigration laws are

and what we were required to do as far as, say we did pick up

somebody, you know, doing something illegal here in the United

States. And, you know, we’ve been following those guidelines and

stuff, the laws that are set, you know the U.S. Consulate told us

we had to follow and stuff as far as, you know, having to notify.

Like if, you know, we arrest them, we have to actually give them

the opportunity to—ask them, ‘‘Do you want us to notify your Mexican Consulate or not?’’ You know, if they tell us no, then we don’t.

But if they say yes, of course we have to notify the Mexican Consulate that we have picked them up.

Mr. SOUDER. It’s one of our measures to try and figure out, when

we squeeze one area, where is it moving? And I don’t mean when

I was asking questions—are your jails full is one way you tell

whether it’s moved, whether an area has been flooded, and whether

or not they have nowhere to put people and whether the prosecutors will prosecute them.
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And it’s suggested the focus is still, it’s so easy to get across at

El Paso they haven’t quite hit the desert as hard as going across

El Paso, because their jail’s full. And they testified twice that they

don’t basically go after anybody under 200 pounds. 200 pounds is

a big load, so that means it’s easy enough to run through there,

that they aren’t putting as much pressure. But, the reason I ask

the question about the Middle Eastern immigration, is suggesting

the more isolated areas we may have, in effect, bigger loads moving

through or terrorist groups moving through, because it’s much

harder to find them.

Now, you mentioned, of course, Sheriff Hernandez, that you had

two ATV vehicles.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. No, I’ve got more than that.

Mr. SOUDER. OK. Two that are dedicated for——

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. No, we deal with some ATV operations with

Border Patrol along the border.

Mr. SOUDER. OK. And did you get those through a Federal grant?

Do we assist in the border with that kind of equipment? Because

we have all kinds of equipment.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. No, sir, actually, we might call it Federal

funds, because it was actually moneys that I gathered from seized

assets from these dope dealers that we were busting and everything else, and then selling, you know, their vehicles that were

given to us by the Federal Government.

Mr. SOUDER. I see.

Captain WILLIAMS. If I can, Mr. Chairman, my understanding is,

the New Mexico State Police Narcotics Section has just purchased,

I believe it’s three or four ATVs, and they were purchased through

Federal funds. I believe it was through HIDTA. And those are

going to be used for interdiction operations along the border as

well.

Mr. SOUDER. I just want to make sure it’s flexible enough for different areas to accommodate that.

Do you have any additional questions?

Mr. PEARCE. No questions, but I would like to make some closing

comments when you arrive at that point.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, thank you all for your work. Clearly, we’re

watching very closely, because when we push one area—and clearly, as we push Arizona more, we’re watching New Mexico very

closely, in addition to huge gaps in the Texas area. Because focus

has been more California and Arizona for the last few years. And

continue to work through Congressman Pearce and others, your

senators, to gain attention to make sure it’s there. I know they’ve

been active in the Senate side as well, and we thank you for your

efforts in your local law enforcement and taking the risks that you

described in your testimony.

Sheriff Hernandez.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Well, one thing I was going to say, Mr.

Chairman, is that if you-all would really support our Intelligence

Center here, we would really appreciate it, because, like I said, we

do get a lot of information from them, and it’s really been helpful

to us.

Mr. SOUDER. That’s the HIDTA Intelligence Center.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Yes, sir, uh-huh.
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Mr. SOUDER. And you don’t have a RISS program here where you

put—are you part of a RISS—you know, R-I-S-S network? Are you

part of that?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. I believe the Intel Center is.

Mr. SOUDER. So that feeds into the HIDTA center.

Captain WILLIAMS. Right.

Mr. SOUDER. One of the major functions, and why we funded the

HIDTAs, is to have them coordinate. And most are increasingly

putting in an Intelligence Center that then interacts with EPIC. As

you can hear from the first panel, we’re having a little bit of discussion as we get this proliferation of these agencies on how many we

need, does each agency need their own, which ones work. HIDTA

was supposed to be an interaction between Federal, State and

local, and that’s its purpose. Now, it may interact with EPIC and

RISS as opposed to you then directly interacting with EPIC and

RISS. But we need to make sure garbage in, garbage out. Getting

information in and out.

Southwest Border HIDTA, in particular, is—we have tried to

make even further adjustments in the latest DCP, Drug Czar’s Office, because the Southwest Border, as you mentioned, has 60 percent, which may be low, as far as the drugs went.

Let me ask one other question. Any of you know anything about

the heroin up in Santa Fe? Is that Colombian heroin or Mexican

heroin?

Captain WILLIAMS. My understanding, that was Mexican heroin.

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Mexican heroin.

Mr. SOUDER. And how many deaths are we talking there, do you

know?

Captain WILLIAMS. One year when I worked narcotics up there,

they had 26, I believe, in Rio Arriba County, and that was in a

year span. That’s been a few years back, so I don’t have recent statistics, but that’s quite a significant amount, because that county

itself is not populated.

Mr. SOUDER. Seattle has more, but, I mean, Seattle’s a lot bigger,

and it’s not that many more.

Captain WILLIAMS. I tell you what, Rio Arriba County has had

some significant problems with their heroin problems, and they’ve

taken steps in local law enforcement and at Federal and State law

enforcement to attack that problem through undercover operations.

And it just continually seems to stay there and fester in that area.

Mr. SOUDER. One other question. We just did a meth hearing

over in Arkansas, and while you’re having the growth, Arkansas is

having an absolute explosion, as we are. I think we’re up in the

1400 labs, versus 29 just a few years ago.

And we had written testimony from the HIDTA director that

showed clearly that the most potent stuff is Mexican, and California superlab stuff coming in. But at the local police level, Sheriff

Hernandez, have you had any local lab cleanups that you’ve had

to deal with?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. When we have meth lab stuff like that, we

turn it over to the State Police, because they have a meth lab unit

and stuff. So they go ahead and take care of that for us.

Mr. SOUDER. Because you have a meth lab—is it——

Captain WILLIAMS. Statewide unit.
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Mr. SOUDER. How long did it take? How long are your officers at

the scene?

Sheriff HERNANDEZ. Usually when we go after a meth lab, see,

we already know that it’s there, so we already have the warrant

and everything else to go hit that residence and stuff. And the

State Police is notified already before that. So they are already responding there with us.

Mr. SOUDER. At this point you have roughly the number of lab

cleanups you need to be able to handle the flow so that you don’t

have—in Arkansas we were hearing 8 hours until the lab could get

there.

Captain WILLIAMS. What it’s also doing, going out in a proactive

manner. So they may already be there when they’re getting ready

to start the cleanup. And they may have been the ones who interdicted, along with the local police and the local sheriffs.

One of the things that we have, though, is we have had, and

maybe it’s not an explosion, but we have had a significant increase

in our meth lab operations here in New Mexico as an entire State.

Mr. SOUDER. Crippled your local police department is what happened, because it takes so many people. The cost of cleaning up if

it’s a small methamphetamine lab, total, are only 8 percent of our

national problem, and even in the big States where it’s exploding,

it’s not the majority of the drug problem. But the problem is it’s

like 90 to 100 percent of the local law enforcement problem and the

State Police, because it takes so long to clean them up and prosecution.

And we heard from prosecuting attorneys how it takes, even just

to try, the prosecuting attorneys take twice as long to prosecute the

cases, that labs trying to identify the stuff have to have more

chemicals to try to prove what it is. It is a much harder process,

although it’s not the major drug problem, it is an exploding problem. If we ever do control the border, we’re going to wind up producing more meth.

Captain WILLIAMS. Sure. One of the things that’s most alarming

about methamphetamine is what it does to the individual, the person who’s hooked on it, because they can go four, 5 days without

sleeping. They can be high anxiety. They can become extremely

nervous and paranoid to that point. And, actually, I brought it up

in my written statement. We’ve even had law enforcement officers

killed by people who were what we call tweaking, where they’ve

been up for several hours and they were highly anxious and they’re

panicking.

So that’s the most scary part to us as local law enforcement,

along with all the other concerns, including the environment and

the property values and what it does to a neighborhood and things

like that.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you seen it in Albuquerque and the bigger cities?

Captain WILLIAMS. We’re seeing it just about everywhere in the

State.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, thank you all for your testimony. I yield to

Mr. Pearce.
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Mr. PEARCE. In closing, I, of course, would like to thank the city

of Las Cruces and Mayor Bill Mattiace for having us in the facility

here.

And as far as some of the things that have come up, Mr. Chairman, if we’re going to look at the border expansion of Santa Teresa

and expanding the capabilities, maybe moving part of the El Paso

Field Office functions out there, like has been discussed, I would

be very supportive of that. I feel like that border could be used to

handle much more traffic and stop some of the congestion that

we’re finding right there in the middle of El Paso. Possibly give us

a better chance to look at more of the packages coming across.

As far as the UAVs, we’ve got some of the research occurring

here in Las Cruces. Of course, we would like to accommodate anything that we can do there.

My office has secured funding for airport expansion at Santa Teresa. We feel like, if the branch of Air and Marine activities decided to relocate there, that some of the expansions that we’re

causing to occur would give it even greater capability and it would

be a more suitable spot, and certainly provide more access and

quicker access to the border.

So, after listening to the testimony today, I would encourage any

of those things that you can oversee or cause to happen, that we

would move that to the next step and see if it’s actually plausible

and feasible.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for coming to the district

and having a discussion that I think is extremely critical to all of

New Mexicans, as well as all of America. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, thank you for your leadership. I look forward

to working with you on those projects, because we’re certainly

going to be focusing increasingly on that section of the border that

you have in your district.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]
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