UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO.: 20-cv-22471-DPG

NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE &

TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., GOLDWIND

INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (HK) LTD.,

DSV AIR & SEA INC., BBC CHARTERING

USA, LLC and BBC CHARTERING

SINGAPORE PTE LTD.,

Defendants.

/

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY AND PROCEEDINGS

PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd., DSV Air & Sea Inc., BBC 

Chartering USA, LLC, and BBC Chartering Singapore PTE Ltd. (collectively, “Defendants”),1 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and this Court’s Notice of Court Practice (ECF 

No. 4), move the Court to enter an Order staying all discovery and deadlines in this action 

pending resolution of Defendants’ case-dispositive, joint motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF

No. 54). In that motion, Defendants argue that, as a threshold matter, this Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over this action altogether, and that Plaintiff’s claims fail to state a claim for 

relief. Because these circumstances provide good cause for the requested stay, which is 

reasonable and could save substantial judicial and party resources, the Court should grant this 

Motion. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If the 

1 As of the date of this filing, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. has not 

been served.

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district court dismisses a non-meritorious claim before discovery has begun, unnecessary costs to 

the litigants and to the court system can be avoided.”).

BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff North American Sugar Industries Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed the 

Complaint in this action, alleging various claims under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 

Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85) (the “Act”) (ECF No. 

1).2 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “trafficked” in a port in Cuba that the 

Cuban government confiscated from Plaintiff by Defendants “coordinat[ing] at least two separate 

voyages that delivered and unloaded equipment [from China] at [the port], by way of Florida, for 

use in the Herradura Wind Farm Project.” Id. ¶ 103; see also id. ¶¶ 198–203, 216–17, 230–33. 

On August 31, 2020, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim (“Joint MTD,” ECF No. 54). In the Joint MTD, 

Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) Plaintiff lacks 

constitutional standing to sue because the alleged injury is not fairly traceable to any one 

Defendant’s conduct and (2) Plaintiff cannot bring this action, and the Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over it, because Plaintiff recently filed for bankruptcy but did not disclose to its 

creditors and the Court the causes of action it pursues here. Defendants also argue in the Joint 

MTD that the Act precludes Plaintiff from bringing causes of action both under the Act and 

under common law (here, Plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy) for the same incidents of alleged 

trafficking, and that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it does not allege facts plausibly 

showing that Defendants knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the confiscated property (as 

defined in the Complaint).

2 The Complaint also asserts a claim for civil conspiracy, which is impermissible under the 

express terms of the Act. See ECF No. 54, at pp. 32-34.

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Also on August 31, 2020, Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 48, 52, and 53. After seeking and securing an unopposed 

enlargement of time to respond to the various Rule 12 motions, the deadline for Plaintiff’s 

responses was set October 14, 2020. ECF Nos. 56, 58. On September 29, 2020, Plaintiff moved 

both for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery and to stay the deadline to respond to 

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) motions, leaving the deadline to respond to the Joint MTD as October 

14, 2020. All activity, including but not limited to any jurisdictional discovery and the briefing 

on the Rule 12(b)(2) motions, should be stayed pending resolution of the Joint MTD.

ARGUMENT

A district court has ample power to control its docket and enjoys broad discretion to stay 

proceedings and discovery pending resolution of a case-dispositive motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1), (2)(A)-(C); Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (“At 

the outset, we stress the broad discretion district courts have in managing their cases.”); Johnson 

v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (observing that “a district 

court is entitled to establish proper pre-trial procedures and set an appropriate pre-trial schedule . 

. . .”). As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, “[i]f the district court dismisses a non-meritorious 

claim before discovery has begun, unnecessary costs to the litigants and to the court system can 

be avoided.” Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1368 (holding that district court should have ruled on 

motion to dismiss before compelling discovery).

The primary considerations are whether the party seeking the stay can demonstrate good 

cause and that the stay is reasonable. United States v. Med-Care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc., 

No. 10-81634-CIV, 2014 WL 12284078, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2014) (granting motion to stay 

discovery until resolution of motion to dismiss). Determining good cause and reasonableness 

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requires “the Court to take a ‘preliminary peek’ at the merits of the motion to dismiss to see if it 

appears to be clearly meritorious and truly case dispositive.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Here, the Joint MTD establishes that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction 

over this action and that Plaintiff’s Complaint otherwise fails to state a claim. In circumstances 

like this, courts stay all proceedings until resolution of a motion like the Joint MTD. E.g.,

Lawrence v. Governor of Ga., 721 F. App’x 862, 864–65 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to stay discovery and 

pre-trial deadlines pending a decision on a motion to dismiss). In Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit 

lauded the district court for “identif[ying] [its] warnings in Chudasama, and heed[ing] them” as 

the complaint “support[ed] the district court’s reluctance to allow the relevant pretrial 

procedures to begin, as . . . [m]any . . . issues were apparent from the face of the complaint, such 

as the district court’s likely lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added); see also

Bufkin v. Scottrade, Inc., 812 F. App’x 838, 842 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming stay of discovery 

pending resolution of defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss); Kleiman 

v. Wright, No. 18-CV-80176-BB, 2018 WL 8620096, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2018) (granting 

motion to stay proceedings and discovery pending a decision on a motion to dismiss); 

Chevaldina v. Katz, No. 17-22225-CIV, 2017 WL 6372620, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2017) 

(same). Like the underlying motions in Lawrence and Bufkin, a “preliminary peek” at the Joint 

MTD reveals meritorious grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and this case 

should be completely disposed of at the outset. 

There are two grounds upon which the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 

case. First, Plaintiff’s alleged injury altogether is not fairly traceable to any Defendants’ conduct 

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as required by U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 because it occurred between 1959 and 1960, and Plaintiff 

has no possessory interest in the confiscated property – Plaintiff is in the exact same position 

today as it was before the two voyages at issue occurred. See Joint MTD, at 10-16. Second, the 

Court is deprived of jurisdiction and Plaintiff is judicially estopped from pursuing the claims 

related to the confiscated property because Plaintiff failed to disclose these interests to the Court 

and its creditors as required during its 2019 bankruptcy proceedings, and therefore has no 

interest in the claims. Id. at 16-29. 

There are other grounds, in addition to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, why this action 

fails at the outset. First, the Act’s “Election of Remedies” provision precludes plaintiff from 

bringing claims under both the Act and Florida common law. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(f). Plaintiff 

impermissibly sued Defendants under the Act and for civil conspiracy, and section 6082 of the 

Act bars the Plaintiff from bringing both claims. See Joint MTD at 32-34. Importantly, when 

specific jurisdiction over the Defendants is challenged, as here, this Court should first determine 

whether the Complaint states claims for relief. Taylor v. Moskow, 717 F. App’x 836, 839–40 

(11th Cir. 2017) (“In Florida, before a court addresses the question of whether specific 

jurisdiction exists under the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether the allegations of 

the complaint state a cause of action.”) (citing PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., 

N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 808 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges that the Court has specific 

jurisdiction over Defendants because they engaged in business related to its cause of action and 

committed a tort in Florida. See §§ 48.193(1)(a)(1) and (2). But if Plaintiff elects to pursue its

remedies under the Act, and not for civil conspiracy, then the civil conspiracy claim cannot form 

the basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over any Defendant. Second, the Complaint 

alleges no plausible factual allegations that Defendants “trafficked” in all of the confiscated 

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property for which Plaintiff claims $97.37 million in damages. Instead, the Complaint only 

alleges that Defendants trafficked in the confiscated port within the confiscated property, which 

was valued at $2.228 million. The remaining allegations in the Complaint consist of conclusory 

recitations of the elements of a cause of action under the Act. See Joint MTD at 29-32. 

Therefore, entering a stay to consider the Joint MTD would also allow the Court to first 

determine whether a conspiracy cause of action is stated and is a proper basis for specific 

personal jurisdiction.

Here, a stay of all proceedings pending resolution of the Joint MTD would also comport 

with well-established Eleventh Circuit precedent and prevent wasting judicial and party 

resources on non-meritorious claims. And the possibility of such unnecessary expense and 

efforts is not hypothetical; Plaintiff has already demonstrated its intent to proceed with seeking 

jurisdictional discovery while the Joint MTD is pending. See generally ECF No. 59. In addition, 

the Court extended the date by which Plaintiff is to respond to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) 

motions until after the date in which it is to respond to the Joint MTD. ECF 61. It would be 

wasteful to take discovery and otherwise litigate the case when the Joint MTD will in all 

likelihood be fully briefed before any jurisdictional discovery is complete or the Rule 12(b)(2) 

motions are ripe for decision.

Given these circumstances, ample authority confirms that Defendants should not be 

forced to endure this undue burden and expense until the Joint MTD is resolved. Chudasma, 123 

F.3d at 1368 (“[D]elaying ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . a [non-meritorious] claim until after 

the parties complete discovery encourages abusive discovery and, if the court ultimately 

dismisses the claim, imposes unnecessary costs.”); Kleiman, 2018 WL 8620096, at *2 

(recognizing that staying the proceedings and discovery “under the particular circumstances 

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present here . . . [and] the high burden on engaging in discovery, much of which will involve 

locating evidence and witnesses [outside of the U.S.], during the pendency of Defendant’s 

[m]otion to [d]ismiss that seeks dismissal on various grounds – including standing . . . –

outweighs the potential harm to Plaintiffs”) (emphasis added); Chevaldina, 2017 WL 6372620, 

at *3 (“Defendants should not be required to suffer monetary burdens or expenses when it 

appears that Plaintiff’s claims may fail for several reasons as a matter of law.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an Order granting this Motion and 

staying all proceedings until resolution of the Joint MTD. 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(a)(3)

Prior to filing this Motion, Defendants’ counsel conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel and is 

authorized to represent to the Court that Plaintiff opposes the relief requested herein.

Dated: October 12, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Pedro A. Freyre 

Florida Bar No.: 192140

Email: pedro.freyre@akerman.com

Naim S. Surgeon

Florida Bar No.: 101682

Email: naim.surgeon@akerman.com

AKERMAN LLP

Three Brickell City Centre

98 Southeast Seventh Street, Suite 1100

Miami, Florida 33131

Telephone: (305) 374-5600

Facsimile: (305) 349-4654

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

600 Brickell Avenue

Suite 2700

Miami, Florida 33131

Telephone: (305) 459-6500

Facsimile: (305) 459-6550

By: /s/ Allen P. Pegg

Allen P. Pegg

Fla. Bar No. 597821

allen.pegg@hoganlovells.com

Richard C. Lorenzo

Fla. Bar No. 071412

richard.lorenzo@hoganlovells.com

 Reginald Cuyler Jr.

 Fla. Bar No. 114062

 reginald.cuyler@hoganlovells.com

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/12/2020 Page 7 of 9
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Martin Domb

(admitted pro hac vice)

Email: martin.domb@akerman.com

AKERMAN LLP

520 Madison Ave.

20th Floor

New York, New York 10022

Telephone: (212) 880-3880

Facsimile: (212) 880-8965

By: /s/ Pedro A. Freyre

Attorneys for Defendants

BBC Chartering USA, LLC and

BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.

Counsel for Goldwind International 

 Holdings (HK) Ltd.

Robert M. Brochin

Florida Bar No. 0319661

bobby.brochin@morganlewis.com

Matthew Papkin

Florida Bar No. 106565

matthew.papkin@morganlewis.com

Sarah J. Cohen

Florida Bar No. 1010683

sarah.cohen@morganlewis.com

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

200 South Biscayne Boulevard

Suite 5300

Miami, Florida 33131-2339

Telephone: 305.415.3000

Facsimile: 305.415.3001

By:/s/ Robert M. Brochin 

John M. Vassos (admitted pro hac vice)

john.vassos@morganlewis.com

101 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10178

Telephone: 212.309.6000

Facsimile: 212.309.6002

Carl A. Valenstein (admitted pro hac vice)

carl.valenstein@morganlewis.com

One Federal Street

Boston, MA 02110

Telephone: 617.341.7700

Case 1:20-cv-22471-DPG Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/12/2020 Page 8 of 9
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Facsimile: 617.341.7701

Counsel for Defendant 

DSV AIR & SEA, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 12, 2020, the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of Court 

using CM/ECF, which will serve a Notice of Electronic Filing on all counsel of record.

By: /s/ Allen P. Pegg

Allen P. Pegg 

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