3We conclude that Sylvestri is estopped from challenging the 

conditions of her probation that require her to pay $20,000 in restitution 

on the date of sentencing and stipulate to and authorize the entry of a civil 

judgment against her. See Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 769, 121 P.3d 

592, 599 (2005) ("A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped 

from raising any objection on appeal."). And Sylvestri's remaining 

continued on next page... 

2 

NINZIE1,;(aftE 

- 

agree. Ordering Sylvestri to pay $750 a month while at the same time 

ordering that she spend twenty-four of those months in jail is irrational. 1 

See Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) ("An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or 

capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." (internal 

quotations omitted)). This condition of probation must be reversed. 

Sylvestri also contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by requiring that she complete 40 hours of community service 

per month as a condition of probation. We agree that this condition 

violates NRS 176.087(4)(a) because it fails to fix the total period of 

community service. 2We also agree that the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing this condition without making an exception for the 

period of time Sylvestri was ordered to be incarcerated. This condition of 

probation must also be reversed. 3 

1We note that during the sentencing hearing, the district court 

agreed with the victim's attorney that no restitution payments would be 

made during the term of incarceration. It therefore appears that the 

district court may have intended, but inadvertently omitted, to include 

language in this condition of probation relieving Sylvestri of her obligation 

to pay restitution while incarcerated. 

2Because the district court failed to fix the total period of community 

service imposed, we need not reach Sylvestri's contention that the district 

court erred by imposing a period exceeding the statutory maximum. See 

NRS 176.087(4)(a)(3). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A a • 

1111 
Saitta 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

iaMtEMME 

Having considered Sylvestri's contentions and concluded that 

she is only entitled to the relief stated herein, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED IN PART 

AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district 

court for proceedings consistent with this order. 

Gibbons 

.1D.CD'U-61 ' J 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge 

Paul E. Quade 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Mineral County District Attorney 

Mineral County Clerk 

...continued 

challenges to the conditions of her probation lack merit. SeeNRS 

176A.400(1) (allowing the district court to "fix the terms and conditions" of 

probation, including those identified in the statute, "without limitation"); 

NRS 176A.400(1)(c)(4) (allowing the district court to impose conditions of 

probation "[p]rohibiting the probationer from engaging in specific conduct 

that may be harmful to the probationer's own health, safety or welfare"); 

NRS 176A.500(2)-(3) (district court may issue an arrest warrant or 

probation officer may arrest a probationer who has violated the conditions 

of probation); NRS 209.432 (defining an "offender" as used in NRS 

209.4465); Haney v. State,124 Nev. 408, 414 n.21, 185 P.3d 350, 354 n.21 

(2008); Creps v. State,94 Nev. 351, 360, 581 P.2d 842, 848 (1978) 

(legislative intent is the primary focus of an inquiry into the propriety of a 

condition of probation).