Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, April 14, 2005 NATIONAL AIRSPACE 

SYSTEM 

Progress and Ongoing 

Challenges for the Air 

Traffic Organization 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, 

Director, Civil Aviation Issues 

GAO-05-485T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-485T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham, (202) 512-2834, 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-485T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

April 14, 2005

NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

Progress and Ongoing Challenges for the 

Air Traffic Organization 

The ATO is taking a number of positive steps to address the legacy cost, 

schedule, and performance problems that have affected the ATC modernization 

program for the past two decades. For example, the ATO is beginning to involve 

stakeholders early and throughout a system’s development; has demonstrated a 

willingness to cut major acquisitions that are not meeting their goals, even after 

investing significant resources; and has improved its management of information 

technology. However, the ATO does not use a knowledge-based approach to 

acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial and federal practices, which 

would help avoid cost, schedule, and performance problems. Additionally, the 

ATO has used a process improvement model in several software-intensive 

acquisitions. However, because the ATO has not mandated use of the model in 

all such acquisitions, it risks taking a major step backwards in its capabilities for 

ATC systems and software. Finally, the ATO is taking steps to change the 

culture of its component organizations by, for example, replacing a personalitydriven culture with one that is more sustainable and stable. Continued 

management attention in this area will be important to the organization’s 

success. 

The ATO faces the challenges of (1) modernizing and expanding NAS capacity to 

accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in the volume of air traffic over 

the next 10 years, (2) hiring thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those 

expected to retire over the next decade, (3) working with the new JPDO to 

coordinate the research efforts of diverse federal agencies to transform the NAS 

to meet potential air travel needs of 2025, and (4) addressing aging 

infrastructure. To fund its major system acquisitions through fiscal year 2009 

while remaining within projected budget targets, the ATO has substantially 

reduced funding for other areas. However, the ATO does not provide 

administration and congressional decisionmakers with information about the 

impact of the reduced funding on NAS modernization. To deal with these 

challenges, some aviation experts suggested options that the ATO could 

consider, including contracting out more services and incurring debt to obtain 

multiyear funding for capital investments (an option requiring legislative 

change). Our work and some experts also suggest clarifying budget submissions 

to show decisionmakers how constrained budgets affect NAS modernization and 

how the ATO is working to live within its means. 

Air Traffic Control Tower 

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Congress’s formation of the Air 

Traffic Organization (ATO) and the 

Joint Planning and Development 

Office (JPDO), both within the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), represent the latest efforts 

to address the monumental 

challenges of modernizing the 

national airspace system (NAS) 

during the first quarter of the 

twenty-first century. For more 

than two decades, FAA has been 

working to modernize the air traffic 

control (ATC) system, but projects 

have repeatedly missed cost, 

schedule, and performance targets. 

Consequently, ATC modernization 

has been on GAO’s list of high-risk 

federal programs since 1995. 

 

The ATO’s focus is on a rolling 10-

year outlook to operate and 

modernize the NAS. By contrast, 

the JPDO’s vision is longer term, 

focused on coordinating the 

research efforts of diverse federal 

agencies to achieve a common goal 

of meeting potential air traffic 

demands in 2025. 

This statement discusses (1) GAO’s 

assessment of the ATO’s efforts to 

date in addressing some of the key 

challenges for the ATC 

modernization program and (2) 

challenges that lie ahead for the 

ATO and options that it could 

consider in addressing the needs of 

the NAS over the next decade, as 

well as longer-term needs defined 

by the JPDO. 
Page 1 GAO-05-485T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss 

the implementation of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air 

Traffic Organization (ATO) and the new Joint Planning and Development 

Office (JPDO). Both organizations represent the latest efforts of Congress 

and FAA to address the monumental challenges of transforming the 

national airspace system (NAS) during the first quarter of the twenty-first 

century. As key organizations for determining how to safely accommodate 

projected increases in air traffic demand, the ATO and JPDO are distinct 

yet complementary. The ATO’s focus is on a rolling 10-year outlook to 

operate and modernize the NAS. By contrast, the JPDO’s focus is longer 

term—determining how the NAS will meet possible air traffic demands in 

2025. 

As brief background: in 1981, over two decades ago, FAA began what it 

initially proposed as a 10-year program to replace and upgrade the NAS’s 

facilities and equipment. However, systemic management problems 

associated with ATC system acquisitions and organizational culture 

resulted in cost growth, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls, 

leading us to classify FAA’s ATC modernization program as high risk in 

1995.1

 In 2000, the administration issued an executive order that called for 

a performance-based air traffic organization to, among other things, 

improve the provision of air traffic services and accelerate modernization 

efforts, and Congress passed legislation that established an oversight body 

and a chief operating officer. FAA hired a chief operating officer in 2003 

and in February 2004, formed the ATO, merging its former acquisitions2

and air traffic operations offices, to manage FAA’s air traffic control 

investments and operations. Congress also directed the Secretary of 

Transportation to establish the JPDO to develop a “next generation” 

transportation plan to meet air traffic demands by 2025. Located within 

FAA and reporting to the FAA Administrator, the JPDO has responsibility 

for coordinating the research efforts of several diverse federal agencies to 

support the goals of the next-generation plan. 

My statement today will focus on two key questions: First, what is GAO’s 

assessment of the ATO’s efforts to date in addressing some of the key 

 1

ATC modernization has remained on our high-risk list since 1995. See GAO High Risk 

Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

2

These included FAA’s Office of Research and Acquisitions and Free Flight Program Office. 
Page 2 GAO-05-485T 

challenges for the ATC modernization program? Second, what challenges 

lie ahead for the ATO, and what options could it consider in addressing the 

needs of the NAS over the next decade, as well as the longer-term needs 

defined by the JPDO? My statement is based on recently completed and 

ongoing studies for this committee and for the House Committee on 

Government Reform. We obtained information from FAA officials, an 

international panel of aviation experts, and relevant stakeholders on the 

ATO’s prospects for addressing the systemic management problems on 

which we and others have reported. (See the list of related products at the 

end of this statement). Later this year, we expect to issue a detailed report 

that will address these and other related issues. We also obtained 

information and perspectives from the JPDO and other knowledgeable 

sources on its mission and plans for achieving that mission. We performed 

our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

In summary: 

• The ATO is taking a number of positive steps to address legacy challenges 

in system acquisitions and organizational culture that have affected the 

ATC modernization program for the past two decades. Our work indicates 

that four interrelated factors have contributed to the legacy challenges in 

meeting system acquisitions’ cost, schedule, and performance targets: (1) 

funding acquisitions at lower levels than called for in agency planning 

documents, (2) adding requirements and/or unplanned work, (3) 

underestimating the complexity of software development, and (4) not 

sufficiently involving stakeholders throughout system development. 

Among the positive steps it is taking, the ATO is beginning to include 

stakeholders in all phases of system development, so that they can provide 

input in response to technical or financial developments. The ATO has 

also demonstrated a willingness to cut some major acquisitions that are 

not meeting their goals, even after investment of significant resources. And 

it has improved its management of information technology investments 

and software-intensive acquisitions. However, the ATO does not use a 

knowledge-based approach to system acquisitions, characteristic of best 

commercial practices for managing commercial and Department of 

Defense (DOD) product developments, which would help avoid cost, 

schedule, and performance problems. Additionally, because the ATO has 

not mandated use of a process improvement model for all softwareintensive acquisitions, it risks taking a major step backwards in its 

capabilities for ATC systems and software. Finally, the ATO has 

recognized the fundamental importance of changing its organizational 

culture; it has been working on altering its leadership model and replacing 

a personality-driven culture—one that changes as leadership changes—
Page 3 GAO-05-485T 

with one that is sustainable and stable. Continued improvement and 

management attention will be crucial if the organization’s efforts are to 

succeed. 

• The ATO’s key challenges include modernizing and increasing NAS 

capacity to accommodate a 25-percent increase in air traffic operations by 

2015, hiring thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those expected 

to retire in the next decade, working with the new JPDO to ensure that 

research programs led by diverse agencies support national goals, and 

repairing or replacing facilities believed to be beyond their useful lives. 

The ATO will be further challenged to accomplish these tasks while 

remaining within the administration’s future budget targets, which are 

lower than those of recent years. To fund its major system acquisitions 

while remaining within the budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned 

funding to start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding 

for other areas. However, when forwarding its budget submission for 

administration and congressional review, the ATO provides no detail on 

the impact of the planned funding reductions on ATC or NAS 

modernization. Aviation experts and our work have identified options for 

the ATO to increase its chances of success. First, some aviation experts 

proposed that the ATO evaluate its experience in contracting out flight 

service stations and, if positive, consider contracting out other services. 

Second, some experts suggested that the ATO be allowed to incur debt so 

that it could obtain multiyear funding for capital investments, an option 

that would require a legislative change. While we have consistently 

maintained that Congress should control new funding sources through the 

budget and appropriations processes, these experts believed that giving 

the ATO access to multiyear funds for capital investments would increase 

its flexibility, thereby allowing it to modernize systems more efficiently. 

Third, our preliminary work shows, and some experts agreed, that the 

ATO should provide the administration and Congress with detailed 

information in its budget submissions about the impact of reduced 

budgets on both ATC and NAS modernization. To do so, the ATO should 

explicitly identify the trade-offs it is making to reach administration 

budget targets, highlighting those programs slated for increased funding 

and those slated for reduced funding. 
Page 4 GAO-05-485T 

The ATO inherited a decades-long legacy of cost, schedule, and 

performance problems in the ATC modernization program. We found that 

four interrelated factors contributed to these problems. The ATO has 

taken a number of positive steps to address these issues through 

improvements in its management of information technology investments 

and software-intensive acquisitions, but there is room for further progress. 

Additionally, the ATO recognizes that changing its organizational culture is 

a key challenge underlying its transition to a highly effective, performancebased organization. Options are available to help the ATO address these 

challenges. 

Our research shows that four common factors emerged that contributed to 

12 of FAA’s 16 major systems missing their original cost, schedule, or 

performance targets. (See table 1.) Appendix I provides the full name and 

a description of each of the 16 systems. Appendix II shows changes in cost 

and schedule for these systems. 

Table 1: Four Key Factors Contributing to Cost Growth, Schedule Extensions, and Performance Shortfalls for 12 ATC System 

Acquisitions 

Name of system 

The funding level 

received was less than 

the agency-approved 

funding levela

The system acquisition 

experienced 

requirements growth 

and/or unplanned work

The complexity of 

software development 

was underestimated 

Stakeholders were not 

sufficiently involved 

ASDE-X X 

ASR-11 X X 

ATCBI-6 X 

CPDLC X 

FFP2 X 

ITWS X X X 

LAAS X X X

NEXCOM X X 

NIMS-2 X X 

OASIS X X X X

STARS X X

WAAS X X X

Source: GAO Analysis of FAA Data 

The ATO Has Made 

Progress in 

Addressing Key 

Challenges and Needs 

to Continue 

Four Interrelated Factors 

Contributed to 

Acquisitions Missing Cost, 

Schedule, and 

Performance Targets 
Page 5 GAO-05-485T 

a

Agency approved funding level refers to the annual funding required to deliver a system as 

planned—that is, as documented in an acquisition program baseline, the document approved by the 

agency at the beginning of an acquisition. In December 2004, the ATO began using the Office of 

Management and Budget’s Capital Asset Plan and Business Case (exhibit 300) in place of the 

acquisition program baseline, as the primary decisionmaking document for acquisitions. 

Note: Blank spaces in the chart denote that the specific factor was not a key contributor to a 

program’s inability to meet cost, schedule, or performance targets. The remaining four major systems 

we reviewed are FTI, ERAM, ECG, and ATOP. FTI’s revised baseline reflected increased costs to 

cover requirements which, while included in the original baseline, were unknown at the time the 

original baseline was prepared. ERAM, ECG, and ATOP are generally meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance targets. 

According to FAA officials, funding gaps contributed to problems in one or 

more of three areas—cost, schedule, and performance—for 8 of the 12 

system acquisitions. Most major acquisition programs establish a baseline 

that describes the programs’ estimated annual costs, planned schedules, 

and performance expectations, which is approved by FAA’s Joint 

Resources Council—the agency’s executive body responsible for 

approving and overseeing major system acquisitions.3

 The estimated cost 

for a given year assumes that the program received all funding for prior 

fiscal years as described in the baseline. In practice, however, this is not 

always the case. For example, when FAA’s budget level does not allow all 

system acquisitions to be fully funded at the levels approved in their 

baselines, FAA may elect to fully fund higher-priority acquisitions and 

provide less funding for lower-priority acquisitions than called for in their 

baselines. The ASR-11 acquisition, a digital radar system, illustrates how 

reduced funding has resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. FAA 

officials stated that because of funding reductions and reprogramming, the 

program received $46.45 million less than requested for fiscal years 2004 

and 2005. According to FAA officials, total costs may escalate and 

schedules may slip under such circumstances. 

The stories behind cost and schedule increases for WAAS—a satellite 

navigation system—and STARS—new controller and maintenance 

workstations—demonstrate how the remaining three contributing factors 

can interact. For WAAS, FAA underestimated the complexity of the 

software that would be needed to support this system when it reduced, by 

3 years, its plans to develop, test, and commission the system. FAA then 

 3

The Joint Resources Council is an executive body consisting of associate and assistant 

administrators, acquisition executives, the chief financial officer, the chief information 

officer, and legal counsel. The council determines, among other things, whether an 

acquisition meets a mission need and should proceed. The council also approves changes 

to a program’s baseline, budget submissions, and the NAS architecture baseline. 
Page 6 GAO-05-485T 

tried to accomplish these tasks in 28 months, even though the software 

development alone was originally expected to take from 24 to 28 months. 

In retrospect, FAA acknowledged that the agency’s in-house technical 

expertise was not sufficient to address WAAS’s technical challenges, 

particularly the need to warn pilots in a timely manner when a system may 

be giving them potentially misleading and therefore hazardous 

information. FAA’s efforts to resolve this issue resulted in unplanned 

work, which contributed to a $1.5 billion increase over the 1994 baseline 

costs and to a 6-year delay in commissioning the system. According to 

FAA, adding the cost of satellite leases, formerly listed as an operating 

cost, to the capital cost and adding 6 years to the program’s life cycle also 

contributed to increased costs. 

For STARS, a joint FAA/DOD acquisition, not adequately including 

stakeholders in development led to unplanned work, cost growth, 

schedule delays, and reduced deployment. Because the program’s 

aggressive development schedule allowed for only limited evaluation by 

controllers and maintenance technicians, FAA and the contractor failed to 

recognize human-factors concerns that these stakeholders later identified. 4

 Restructuring the contract to make up for these oversights contributed to 

$500 million in cost growth, a 7-year schedule delay, and a reduction in 

deployment from 172 to 47 facilities. 

Three of the major ATC system acquisitions are currently operating within 

their original cost, schedule, and performance targets, but have exhibited 

symptoms of past problems, such as requirements growth or 

underestimating the complexity of software requirements. These 

acquisitions include a system for processing flight data for oceanic flights 

(ATOP), a communications system (gateway) for controlling high-altitude 

traffic at 20 en route facilities (ECG), and a replacement for the primary 

computer system used for controlling air traffic (ERAM). Despite 

successes to date, these acquisition programs will require sustained 

management attention to help ensure that they remain within their cost, 

schedule, and performance targets. 

 4

A human-factors evaluation examines how humans interact with machines and identifies 

ways to enhance operators’ performance and minimize errors. 
Page 7 GAO-05-485T 

The ATO has already taken some steps to control the legacy problems 

identified with the ATC modernization program.5

 For example, it has 

begun to include stakeholders throughout system development, so that 

they can provide input in response to technical or financial developments. 

Reviews of a precision-landing system augmented by satellites (LAAS), a 

digital e-mail-type communication system between controllers and pilots 

(CPDLC), and the next generation air/ground communication system 

(NEXCOM)—each of which had cost, schedule, and performance 

problems to varying degrees—contributed to the ATO’s reducing or 

eliminating funding for these systems in FAA’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2005. Additionally, the ATO has established collaborative teams of 

technical experts and ATC system users, reorganized air traffic services 

and the research and acquisition organization along functional lines of 

business to bring stakeholders together and integrate goals, rewarded 

cooperation by linking investments to operations, started preparing 

agency planning documents in a format consistent with that prescribed by 

the Office of Management and Budget, begun implementing portions of a 

cost accounting system, and reduced layers of management from 11 to 7 to 

help address the hierarchical nature of the organization. 

These are positive steps. We believe the ATO should continue the phased 

approach to acquiring new systems, and involving stakeholders 

throughout a system’s development should help avoid the types of 

problems that led to cost growth and delays for STARS. Additionally, we 

view the decision to cut major systems as an indication that the ATO is 

willing to make difficult decisions to suspend major ATC system 

acquisitions that are not achieving their intended goals—even after a 

substantial investment of agency resources. 

FAA has made progress in addressing long-standing problems with 

managing the risks associated with acquiring major ATC systems, many of 

which are software-intensive, but further improvement is possible. For 

example, FAA has established some discipline for acquiring these systems 

through the Acquisition Management System that it began implementing 

after Congress exempted the agency from federal acquisition regulations 

in 1995. Also, FAA has begun basing funding decisions for system 

acquisitions, in part, on their contribution to reducing the agency’s 

operating costs while maintaining safety. Currently, FTI, a new 

 5

The improvements spanned the period when FAA created the ATO. In the future, the ATO 

will have the primary responsibility for making further improvements in these areas. 

ATO Is Taking Some 

Positive Steps to Address 

Legacy Acquisition 

Problems 
Page 8 GAO-05-485T 

telecommunications system, is the only acquisition that will reduce FAA’s 

operating costs. Most of FAA’s major system acquisitions are aimed at 

increasing NAS capacity and delivering benefits to users. 

However, as we reported last fall, the Acquisition Management System still 

does not ensure that FAA uses a knowledge-based approach to acquisition 

that is characteristic of the best procurement practices used in 

commercial entities or by DOD. Capturing specific knowledge and using it 

to determine whether a product has reached a level of development 

(product maturity) sufficient to demonstrate its readiness to move forward 

in the acquisition process helps to avoid cost overruns, schedule slips, and 

performance shortfalls that can occur if decision-makers commit to a 

system design before acquiring critical technology, design, or 

manufacturing knowledge. 

FAA has reported that it met its annual acquisition performance goal for 

fiscal year 2004—to meet 80 percent of designated milestones and 

maintain 80 percent of critical program costs within 10 percent of the 

budget, as published in its Capital Investment Plan. In our opinion, having 

and meeting such performance goals is commendable, but it is important 

to note that these goals are updated program milestones and cost targets, 

not those set at the program’s inception.6

 Consequently, they do not 

provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time. 

Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in 

isolation to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule goals over the 

life of an acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in acquiring 

major ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to tell whether 

meeting these annual performance goals will ultimately improve the 

agency’s ability to deliver system acquisitions as promised. 

 6

Our statements about cost, schedule, and performance in this testimony and in our past 

reports are based on original targets that FAA established and approved at the start of its 

acquisition programs. 
Page 9 GAO-05-485T 

FAA has made considerable progress in managing its information 

technology investments.7

 FAA recently informed us that it has taken a 

number of steps aimed at achieving a higher maturity level, including 

establishing service-level mission need statements and service-level 

reviews, which address operational systems to ensure they are achieving 

the expected level of performance. While these steps could resolve some 

of the deficiencies that we previously reported, we have not yet performed 

our own evaluation of these steps. FAA could realize considerable savings 

if these reviews result in the discontinuation of some investments, since 

operating systems beyond their second year of service accounted for 37 

percent of FAA’s total investment in information technology in fiscal year 

2004. 

Finally, FAA has made progress in improving its process for acquiring 

software-intensive systems. The quality of these systems and software, 

which are essential to FAA’s ATC modernization program, depends on the 

value and maturity of the process used to acquire, develop, manage, and 

maintain them. In response to our previous recommendations, FAA 

developed an FAA-integrated capability maturity model (iCMM).8

 Since 

FAA implemented the model, a growing number of system acquisitions 

have adopted the model, and its use has paid off in enhanced productivity, 

higher quality, greater ability to predict schedules and resources, better 

morale, and improved communication and teamwork. However, while 

FAA has encouraged process improvement through iCMM, use of the 

model has remained voluntary, and the agency’s future commitment to this 

 7

GAO, Information Technology: FAA has Many Investment Management Capabilities in 

Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems Is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). This report evaluates how FAA’s information technology investment 

management for NAS systems and other systems compares to our Information Technology 

Investment Management Framework. Information technology systems used in air traffic 

control are the principal technology component of the NAS. The framework is a maturity 

model composed of five progressive stages, based on our research and the practices of 

leading private- and public-sector organizations. For more information on the Information 

Technology Investment Management Framework, see GAO, Information Technology 

Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, 

GAO-04-394G (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004). 

8

GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More Can be 

Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

iCMM is similar to the Capability Maturity Model® (CMM) Integration (CMMISM) developed 

by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, but crafted to include 

international standards. CMM®, Capability Maturity Model, and Capability Maturity 

Modeling are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. CMMISM is a service mark 

of Carnegie Mellon University. For a detailed description of these models, see GAO-04-901. 
Page 10 GAO-05-485T 

initiative is not certain. Unless FAA demonstrates a strong commitment to 

process improvement and establishes a consistent, institutional approach 

to implementing and evaluating this process improvement, the agency 

risks taking a major step backwards in its capabilities for ATC systems and 

software. 

FAA has also continued to develop an enterprise architecture—a blueprint 

of the agency’s current and target operations and infrastructure. However, 

this architecture is still not complete and compliance is not yet enforced. 

We have ongoing work evaluating what the agency needs to do to develop 

and enforce its enterprise architecture. 

Recognizing that cultural factors can play a critical role in an 

organization’s success, the ATO has initiated organizational changes that 

are designed to create a foundation for cultural change in the acquisitions 

and operations workforces, which FAA combined to form the new 

organization. For example, the ATO is giving high priority to changing its 

leadership model by linking top management more closely to operations in 

the field and by replacing “command and control” with communication 

across organizational levels. In the past, according to the chief operating 

officer, FAA’s management culture was “intensely hierarchical, risk 

averse,” and “reactionary.” But now, he said, FAA is attempting to foster 

“results-focused, proactive and innovative behavior.” Changing the 

agency’s leadership model is also designed, he said, to replace a 

“personality-driven culture” with a viable, stable, and sustainable 

organization that can make rational decisions that transcend changes in 

leadership. 

To further support cultural change, the ATO is emphasizing accountability 

and other core values. For example, it is holding managers accountable for 

managing their budgets and in fiscal year 2006, it plans to include financial 

management among the pay-for-performance criteria for its managers. 

Additionally, the ATO is using the results of the most recent Employee 

Attitude Survey9

 to set a baseline for cultural improvement in five core 

areas—(1) integrity and honesty, (2) accountability and responsibility, (3) 

commitment to excellence, (4) commitment to people, and (5) fiscal 

responsibility. FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute analyzed the survey 

 9

The most recent survey was administered in September 2003, before the ATO was formed. 

FAA organized the responses by suborganization to be consistent with the new ATO. 

ATO Recognizes the 

Importance of 

Organizational Culture for 

Facilitating Transition 
Page 11 GAO-05-485T 

results by grouping three to seven survey items under each of these areas. 

For example, FAA placed the survey item “We are encouraged to express 

our concerns openly” with four other items under the Integrity and 

Honesty core value. For many items, across all core values, fewer than 40 

percent of ATO employees indicated agreement or strong agreement. We 

are comparing the results of FAA’s Employee Attitude Survey with our 

1996 findings identifying culture as a problem in the acquisition workforce, 

which is now within the ATO.10 We plan to report our findings later this 

year. 

It is incumbent upon the ATO, as it moves forward, to follow through with 

its commitment to transform the culture of its component organizations. 

Our studies suggest that transformations need focused, full-time attention 

from a dedicated team. The team must have vested authority and 

resources from top management to set priorities, make timely decisions, 

and move quickly to implement decisions. Such a team provides a visible 

signal that the transition is being undertaken with the utmost seriousness 

and commitment. Having a dedicated transition team is just one of several 

practices that we have identified, such as setting implementation goals and 

a timeline and establishing a communication strategy, that are key to 

successful mergers and organizational transformations. (See app. III for a 

complete list.) 

The ATO faces multiple challenges: (1) expanding and modernizing the 

NAS to accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in the volume of air 

traffic over the next 10 years; (2) hiring thousands of air traffic controllers 

to replace those expected to retire over the next decade; (3) working with 

the new JPDO to coordinate the research efforts of diverse federal 

agencies to transform the NAS to meet potential air travel needs of 2025; 

and (4) addressing aging infrastructure. The ATO faces the additional 

challenge of accomplishing these tasks with less funding than it has 

received in the past. A number of options are available for the ATO to 

consider in addressing these challenges. 

The ATO plans to continue modernizing and expanding the capacity of the 

NAS to accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in air traffic volume 

over the next 10 years. Even after cuts to the LAAS, CPDLC, and NEXCOM 

 10GAO, Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change 

at FAA, GAO/RCED-96-159 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996). 

To Address the 

Challenges of 

Modernizing and 

Expanding the NAS 

While Living within Its 

Means, the ATO Has a 

Number of Options 
Page 12 GAO-05-485T 

budgets, the remaining major ATC systems would consume $4.4 billion, or 

45 percent of FAA’s total planned funding (excluding personnel and travel) 

for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. The funding situation is further 

exacerbated by the ATO’s need to hire and train thousands of air traffic 

controllers to replace those reaching retirement eligibility over the next 

decade. (See fig. 1.) 

Figure 1: Projected Controller Retirements, Fiscal Years 2005-2014 

Additionally, as the ATO works with the JPDO to address the NAS’s 

potential needs 20 years into the future, it will need to ensure linkage to 

and continuity with its own 10-year plans. The JPDO is responsible for 

developing a national vision and plan that will prepare the NAS to meet an 

assumed tripling of air traffic demand by 2025. In its first report, in 

December 2004, the JPDO concluded that meeting this demand would 

require a complete transformation of the NAS. It also predicted that fossil 

fuels would become less available and more costly, and global travel and 

commerce would become more interdependent. As one senior JPDO 

official suggested, if we fail to consider these issues now, future 

passengers may not be able to fly to their destinations in a single day and 

overnight package delivery may become a thing of the past. While the 

JPDO’s plan did not discuss costs, the Vision 100—Century of Aviation 

Source: FAA.

Number of retirees

Fiscal years

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500
Page 13 GAO-05-485T 

Reauthorization Act authorized $50 million annually for fiscal years 2004 

through 2010 for the JPDO. 

The ATO will be challenged to harness the efforts of the diverse agencies 

that participate in the JDPO, including DOD, the Department of Homeland 

Security and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and to 

align these efforts with the goals of the national plan. Although a relatively 

new organization, the JPDO has defined eight interdependent strategies to 

guide its work towards transforming the NAS and has established 

integrated product teams, each led by a participating federal agency, to 

address each of these strategies. These agencies have historically “gone 

their own way,” with little thought given to coordinating with other 

agencies and moving toward a common goal. Aviation experts told us that 

within FAA, there is resistance to having outside organizations, rather than 

FAA, develop new procedures and systems for FAA to approve and 

institute. This will have to change under the JPDO paradigm. 

Additionally, the ATO has cited the need to renew its aging infrastructure. 

The ATO estimates that such renewal will require an annual investment of 

$2.5 billion, assuming a $30-billion value of its assets and 7- to 12-year 

useful lives. According to the ATO, much of its physical infrastructure, 

including the buildings and towers that house costly ATC systems, is over 

30 years old on average.11 (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Age of NAS Facilities 

Facility Average age 

En route traffic control facilities 40 years 

Air traffic control towers 30 years 

Terminal approach control centers 34 years 

Source: FAA. 

Because Office of Management and Budget funding targets for fiscal years 

2005 through 2009 are lower than those for recent fiscal years, the chief 

operating officer predicts a cumulative $5-billion gap in operations funding 

and a $3.2-billion gap in capital funding. He said that, in effect, remaining 

within these lower targets would require a 21-percent reduction in costs 

and a 9-percent increase in productivity. The chief operating officer also 

 11We have not verified the ATO’s reported refurbishment and replacement needs. 

Continued Reductions in 

Funding Levels Will 

Challenge the ATO’s Ability 

to Live within Its Means 
Page 14 GAO-05-485T 

predicts that currently planned cost-saving measures would produce only 

half of the needed savings. One aviation expert predicted that the gaps 

would more likely have a gradual effect, rather than an immediately 

catastrophic effect, manifested by a slow but sure increase in air traffic 

delays. 

To provide the $4.4 billion needed for its major system acquisitions while 

remaining within its budget targets through fiscal year 2009, the ATO has 

made significant cuts elsewhere in its capital funding plans. For example, 

the ATO eliminated all of the $1.4 billion that it had set aside for what it 

calls the “architecture segment.” (See fig. 2.) These funds would have been 

used to perform about 2 years’ worth of early research on new programs 

before they are mature enough to receive formal Joint Resources Council 

approval. The ATO also made significant reductions in planned 

investments for facilities—an action that runs counter to its reported need 

to refurbish or replace its physical infrastructure. 
Page 15 GAO-05-485T 

Figure 2: Capital Investment Plan Reductions, by Category, January 2005 

Compared with January 2003 

Such reductions reflect the end result of difficult decisions about which 

programs to fund and which to cut in order to remain within the 

administration’s budget targets. However, when forwarding its budget 

submission for administration and congressional review, the ATO does not 

highlight the programs slated for increased or reduced funding and does 

not identify the impact of these decisions on ATC and NAS modernization. 

Such information would make clear how constrained budgets will affect 

NAS modernization and how the ATO is working to live within its means. 

Percentage

Category

Personnel

Navigation

Weather

Mission support

Surveillance

Communications

Facilities

Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

Automation

Architecture
Page 16 GAO-05-485T 

Contracting out more services and proposing legislation to provide 

borrowing authority are two options proposed by aviation experts12 to 

improve the ATO’s chances of success. A third option, providing more 

clarity in budget submissions, is supported by our work and some experts. 

First, some members of our expert panel suggested that the analysis 

performed on contracting out flight service stations could be extended to 

other functions, such as oceanic or en route air traffic control, or 

nighttime operations. Under this option, experts said that ongoing 

government oversight could ensure the safety of contracted operations, 

and such a “staged outsourcing” of the NAS’s functions might build 

confidence in the private sector’s ability to provide air traffic services 

safely and efficiently. We view the agency’s decision to study the 

contracting out of flight services as a significant step towards cost 

reduction and one that could be selectively expanded to other services if 

the current experience proves positive. 

Second, some experts suggested that the ATO finance its capital 

investments by incurring debt through private capital markets, rather than 

relying on annual appropriations. While we have consistently maintained 

that Congress should control new funding sources through the budget and 

appropriations processes, these experts believed that debt financing 

would increase the ATO’s flexibility by providing a dedicated, multiyear 

source of funds that it could manage as program needs dictate, thereby 

allowing it to modernize more efficiently. A legislative change would be 

required to give the ATO borrowing authority. 

Our preliminary work shows, and some aviation experts maintain, that the 

ATO needs to prioritize its capital investments, as well as its investments 

in operating systems, with affordability in mind. These experts believe that 

the ATO needs to review all of its spending plans for modernization, 

determine which programs can realistically be funded, and select 

programs to cut. They also indicated that the ATO should have a 

mechanism to explain to Congress the implications that cutting the 

funding for one system has on other systems. Indeed, the ATO appears to 

 12As part of our research, we sought the perspective of an international group of experts. 

One of the issues that we asked these experts to address was how the ATO can improve its 

chances of achieving its mission. The options presented were identified by one or more 

members of our expert panel and do not necessarily reflect the views of GAO or of the 

panel as a whole. We expect to present additional options in our forthcoming report on the 

status of NAS modernization. 

The ATO Has Options to 

Increase Its Prospects for 

Success 
Page 17 GAO-05-485T 

be prioritizing its investments, as indicated by the varying percentage 

reductions in various planned capital investments. We believe that the 

ATO could clarify how these trade-offs affect progress in modernizing the 

ATC system and related components of the NAS in the near, mid-, and 

longer term. Such transparency would provide senior agency officials and 

Congress with a clear view of how the ATO is working to live within its 

means. 

In summary, we believe that the ATO has taken a number of positive steps. 

With continued management attention and focus to carry the momentum 

forward, the ATO has an opportunity to address its heretofore intractable 

problems with ATC modernization. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 

Dillingham, at (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Tamera 

Dorland, Seth Dykes, Bess Eisenstadt, Maren McAvoy, Edmond Menoche, 

and Beverly Norwood. 

Contact and 

Acknowledgements 
Page 18 GAO-05-485T 

Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Interrogator – Replacement 

(ATCBI-6) 

ATCBI-6 is a replacement radar capable of determining both range and 

direction to and from the aircraft. It can also forward this information to 

the appropriate air route traffic control centers. It will replace radars that 

have exceeded their life expectancy and have proved extremely vulnerable 

to outages and critical-parts shortages. 

Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) 

ATOP is an integrated system of new controller workstations, dataprocessing equipment, and software that will enhance the control and flow 

of oceanic air traffic to and from the United States. ATOP is planned for 

the three sites that control oceanic air traffic: Anchorage, Alaska; New 

York, New York; and Oakland, California. 

Airport Surface Detection System – Model X (ASDE-X) 

ASDE-X is an airport surveillance system that enables air traffic 

controllers to track the surface movement of aircraft and vehicles. The 

detection system automatically predicts potential conflicts and seamlessly 

covers airport runways, taxiways, and other areas. 

Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR-11) 

ASR-11 is a digital radar that replaces aging analog radars, such as ASR-7 

and ASR-8, with a single, integrated digital radar system. ASR-11 reduces 

operational costs, improves safety, and can accommodate future capacity 

increases. 

Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) 

CPDLC is a communication system that will allow pilots and controllers to 

transmit digital data messages directly between FAA automated ground 

computers and aircraft. 

En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) 

ERAM will replace software and hardware in the host computers at FAA’s 

20 en route air traffic control centers, which provide separation, routing, 

and advisory information. It provides a flexible and expandable base to 

facilitate further national airspace system (NAS) modernization initiatives. 

Appendix I: Major ATC System Acquisitions 
Page 19 GAO-05-485T 

En route Communications Gateway (ECG) 

ECG provides a communications interface between radar sites and en 

route centers, and is a precursor to ERAM. The system has an open and 

expandable platform that allows for new connectivity and functionality as 

the NAS evolves. It replaces the interim Peripheral Adapter Module 

Replacement Item that has been operating for 10 years and has exceeded 

its life expectancy. 

FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) 

FTI is FAA’s new telecommunications system. It will replace costly 

networks of separately managed systems and services—both leased and 

owned—by integrating advanced telecommunications services within 

FAA’s NAS and non-NAS infrastructures. 

Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2) 

FFP2 is a suite of air traffic control tools and subsystems that allows air 

traffic controllers to move gradually from a highly structured system, 

based on elaborate rules and procedures, to a more flexible system 

wherein pilots, within limits, can change their route, speed, and altitude 

while keeping air traffic controllers informed of such changes. It includes 

the Traffic Management Advisor, Collaborative Decisionmaking, User 

Request Evaluation Tool, and the Surface Management Advisor. 

Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) 

ITWS is a weather information system that furnishes air traffic controllers 

and supervisors with full-color graphic displays of weather conditions that 

need no meteorological interpretation. It provides a comprehensive 

representation of the current weather situation and precise 20 minute 

forecasts (to be increased to 60 minutes in 2006) of convective weather 

conditions. 

Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) 

LAAS is a landing guidance system that would use global positioning 

satellites and would be installed at airports to allow aircraft to execute 

precision instrument approaches and landings in all weather conditions. 

LAAS would eliminate the need for multiple instrument landing systems at 

airports where it is installed. 
Page 20 GAO-05-485T 

NAS Infrastructure Management System—Phase 2 (NIMS-2) 

NIMS is a centralized system to help manage and schedule maintenance on 

the NAS infrastructure, including its facilities, systems, and equipment. 

NIMS will decrease the number of en route delays by reducing the time 

required to restore systems to full operation following maintenance. NIMS 

Phase 1, already complete, provides initial Operational Control Center 

capability, along with remote monitoring and control functionality, to 

3,700 NAS facilities and 5,800 deployed maintenance data terminals.1

Phase 2 will fully implement resource management and enterprise 

management software and focus on increasing workers’ productivity in 

receiving orders and managing resources. 

Next Generation Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM) 

NEXCOM is a digital communications system, consisting of multimodal 

digital radios, avionics, and ground stations, which will improve air traffic 

control communications by replacing old analog communication systems. 

Segment 1A will replace 30- to 40-year-old radios, deploying 6,000 new 

radio sets that use analog and digital communications with aircraft. 

Segment 1B will create ground stations to communicate with aircraft 

equipped with digital capability. 

Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS) 

OASIS a system used at flight service stations to assist general aviation 

pilots with flight planning. The system provides up-to-the-minute weather 

graphics by integrating real-time weather and flight planning data with 

overlays of flight routes. It replaces the Flight Services Automation system 

for which spare parts and hardware support have been difficult for FAA to 

obtain. 

 1

Operational Control Center capability, established in 2001, was a standard set of tools and 

procedures needed to open the control centers. The tools provide the initial enterprise 

management and resource management technical capabilities needed at Operational 

Control Centers. 
Page 21 GAO-05-485T 

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) 

STARS is workstation to allow civilian and military air traffic controllers 

to direct aircraft near major U.S. airports and will replace aging 

workstations at certain facilities. It has an open and expandable terminal 

automation platform that can accommodate air traffic growth, as well as 

new hardware and software that is designed to promote safety, maximize 

operational efficiency, and improve controllers’ productivity. 

Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) 

WAAS is a navigation and landing guidance system that uses global 

positioning satellites to provide precise navigation and landing guidance at 

all airports, including thousands that have no ground-based instrument 

landing capability. 
Page 22 GAO-05-485T 

Dollars in millions 

ATC system Cost targets Last site implementation targets 

Original 

date Original cost 

Current 

cost (as of 

March 

2005) Change 

Original 

date 

Current 

date

Change (in 

years)

Airport Surface Detection Equipment 

– Model X (ASDE-X) 

September 

2001 

$424.3 $510.2 $85.9a2007 2009b2 

Airport Surveillance Radar Model – 

11 (ASR-11) 

November 

1997 

$743 $916 $173 2005 2013 8 

Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon 

Interrogator – Replacement (ATCBI6) 

August 

1997 

$281.8 $282.9 $1.10 2004 2008 4 

Advanced Technologies and Oceanic 

Procedures (ATOP) 

June 2001 $548.2 $548.2 None 2006 2006 None

Controller-Pilot Data Link 

Communications (CPDLC) 

1999 $166.7 To be 

determined

Not 

applicable

June 

2005 

To be 

determined

Not applicable

En Route Communications Gateway 

(ECG) 

March 

2002 

$245.2 $245.2 None 2005 2005 None

En Route Automation Modernization 

(ERAM) 

June 2003 $2,150 $2,150 None December 

2010 

December 

2010

None

Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2) June 2002 $546.2 $546.2 None 2006 2007 1

FAA Telecommunications 

Infrastructure (FTI) 

July 1999 $205.7 $310.2 $104.5c2008 2008 None

Integrated Terminal Weather System 

(ITWS) 

June 1997 $276.1 $286.1 $10 July 2003 2009+ 6+

Local Area Augmentation System 

(LAAS) 

January 

1998 

$530.1 $696.1 $166 2006 To be 

determined

Not applicable

Next Generation Air/Ground 

Communications (NEXCOM) 

September 

1998 

$405.7

(First segment 

only)

$986.4

(First 

segment 

only)

$580.7 2008 To be 

determined 

Not applicable

NAS Infrastructure Management 

System – Phase 2 (NIMS – 2) 

May 2000 $172.9 $172.9 None 2005 2010d5

Operational and Supportability 

Implementation System (OASIS) 

April 1997 $174.7 $155.50 ($19.2) 2001 2004 3

Standard Terminal Automation 

Replacement System (STARS) 

February 

1996 

$940 $1,460

(Phase 1 

only)

$520 2005 2008 3

Wide Area Augmentation System 

(WAAS) 

1994 $509 $2,036 $1,527eDecember 

2000 

2013 13

Source: GAO presentation of FAA data. 

Appendix II: Changes in Cost and Schedule 

Targets for 16 Major ATC System Acquisitions
Page 23 GAO-05-485T 

a

FAA plans to extend ASDE-X’s current deployment target from 2007 to 2009 because the project’s 

budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 

b

According to FAA officials, the change in cost target for ASDE-X was due to an increase in the scope 

of the project. 

c

The increased costs were for requirements which, while included in the original baseline, were 

unknown at the time the original baseline was prepared. 

d

In light of reduced funding, FAA is revising NIMS-2’s targets; a Joint Resources Council decision is 

planned for May 2005. 

e

According to FAA, adding the cost of satellite leases, formerly listed as an operating cost, to the 

capital cost and adding 6 years to the program’s life cycle contributed to increased costs. 
Page 24 GAO-05-485T 

Practice Implementation steps 

Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. Define and articulate a succinct and compelling reason for change. 

Balance continued delivery of services with merger and 

transformation activities. 

Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to 

guide the transformation. 

Adopt leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning and 

reporting. 

Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of 

the transformation. 

Embed core values in every aspect of the organization to reinforce 

the new culture. 

Set implementation goals and a time line to build momentum 

and show progress from day one. 

Make public implementation goals and time line. 

Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate followup actions. 

Identify cultural features of merging organizations to increase 

understanding of former work environments. 

Attract and retain key talent. 

Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to 

allow knowledge exchange among merging organizations. 

Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation 

process. 

Establish networks to support the implementation team. 

Select high-performing team members. 

Use the performance management system to define 

responsibility and ensure accountability for change. 

Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance 

management systems with adequate safeguards. 

Establish a communication strategy to create shared 

expectations and report related progress. 

Communicate early and often to build trust. 

Ensure consistency of message. 

Encourage two-way communication. 

Provide information to meet specific needs of employees. 

Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership for 

the transformation. 

Use employee teams. 

Involve employees in planning and sharing performance 

information. 

Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures. 

Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels. 

Build a world-class organization. Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization. 

Source: GAO. 

Appendix III: Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps for Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations 
Page 25 GAO-05-485T 

High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 

2005. 

Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination When 

Approving Air Traffic Control Systems. GAO-05-11. Washington, D.C.: 

November 17, 2004. 

Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Acquisition Management Has Improved, but 

Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results. GAO05-23. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2004. 

Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management 

Capabilities in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems Is 

Needed. GAO-04-822. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004. 

Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but 

More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements. GAO-04-901. 

Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004. 

FAA Budget Policies and Practices, GAO-04-841R. Washington, D.C.: July 

2, 2004. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges for Transforming into a 

High-Performing Organization. GAO-04-770T. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 

2004. 

Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Efforts—Past, Present, and 

Future. GAO-04-227T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2003. 

Aviation Safety: Information on FAA’s Data on Operational Errors at 

Air Traffic Control Towers. GAO-03-1175R. Washington, D.C.: September 

23, 2003. 

National Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to 

Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System. GAO-03-542. 

Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003 

National Airspace System: Reauthorizing FAA Provides Opportunities 

and Options to Address Challenges. GAO-03-473T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 12, 2003. 

Related GAO Products 
Page 26 GAO-05-485T 

National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could Improve FAA’s 

Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement 

System. GAO-03-343. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2003. 

Air Traffic Control: Impact of Revised Personnel Relocation Policies Is 

Uncertain. GAO-03-141. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002. 

National Airspace System: Status of FAA’s Standard Terminal 

Automation Replacement System. GAO-02-1071. Washington, D.C.: 

September 17, 2002. 

Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better Prepare for Impending Wave of 

Controller Attrition. GAO-02-591. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002. 

National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed 

Despite Recent Reduction in Flight Delays. GAO-02-185. Washington, 

D.C.: December 14, 2001. 

National Airspace System: Free Flight Tools Show Promise, but 

Implementation Challenges Remain. GAO-01-932. Washington, D.C.: 

August 31, 2001. 

Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA’s Modernization Program in Reducing 

Delays and Congestion. GAO-01-725T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001. 

National Airspace System: Problems Plaguing the Wide Area 

Augmentation System and FAA’s Actions to Address Them. 

GAO/T-RCED-00-229. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2000. 

National Airspace System: Persistent Problems in FAA’s New 

Navigation System Highlight Need for Periodic Reevaluation.

GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2000. 

Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA’s Implementation of the Display 

System Replacement Project. GAO/T-RCED-00-19. Washington, D.C.: 

October 11, 1999. 

Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Investment Management 

Approach Could Be Strengthened. GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88. Washington, 

D.C.: April 30, 1999. 

(540097) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER